POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
ARTICLE III: THE BILL OF RIGHTS The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among
SECTION 1
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With
the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.”
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.
Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility
for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued
by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant
did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The
raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the
subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
COMPANY
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and
the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect
the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not
safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is
a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that
the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration
of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the
human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike.
There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by
the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors
to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in
the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then
would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay
for competent legal services.
TUPAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive
law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of
the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant
although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and we repeat it
now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and
prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the
Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO v. PALANCA
In dealing with questions involving the application of the constitutional provisions relating to due
process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from attempting to define with
precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is applicable
under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt at precise definition hazardous and
unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be
a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction
must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of
the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service, such notification does not constitute
a service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to
take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguished master
of constitutional law has used the following language:
"* * * if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather
from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not
be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that form." (Cooley on Taxation [2d.
ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to
be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it
would seem highly unreasonable to hold that the failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in
applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the
provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial
power in these proceedings.
STATE PROSECUTORS v. MURO
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges
should show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote
confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. A
judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is
a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a
system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and
disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of the law. These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the
task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present
case.
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
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uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
In taking judicial notice, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known.
PEOPLE v. TEEHANKEE, JR.
The SC did not sustain the accused’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It’s true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity,
just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, “a responsible press has always been regarded as
the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts
and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of
touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-
court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR
There are primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings:
1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief
Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, "the right
to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration."
3. "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy). This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation
upon power.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v.
national labor Relations Board) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board,
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board) The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Commerce Commission v. Baird; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co;
United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board)"
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of
any of its powers. (Section 10)
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved
with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG v. OLALIA
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
ADMU v. CAPULONG
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1)
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to
study.
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students
have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a
social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.
LAO GI alias FILOMENA CHIA, SR., et al. v. CA and COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. Although a deportation
proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
GLOBE TELECOM, INC. v. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
With the advent of rapid technological changes affecting the telecommunications industry, there
has been a marked reevaluation of the traditional paradigm governing state regulation over
telecommunications. In the Philippines, similar to the US, there has been a trend of deregulation with the
passage of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 ("PTA"). As noted by one of the law's principal
authors, Sen. John Osmeña, under prior laws, the government regulated the entry of pricing and
operation of all public telecommunications entities. The new law proposed to dismantle gradually the
barriers to entry, replace government control on price and income with market instruments, and shift the
focus of government's intervention towards ensuring service standards and protection of
customers. Towards this goal, Article II, Section 8 of the PTA sets forth the regulatory logic, mandating
that "a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which telecommunications carriers are
free to make business decisions and to interact with one another in providing telecommunications
services, with the end in view of encouraging their financial viability while maintaining affordable rates."
The statute itself defines the role of the government to "promote a fair, efficient and responsive market to
stimulate growth and development of the telecommunications facilities and services."
By no means should this Decision be interpreted as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction
and review by the NTC. The issue before the Court is only the prior approval requirement as imposed on
Globe and Smart. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe
and Smart's SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be
had.
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
CORONA v. UHPAP
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure
is “the granting of license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses
(as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards.” A license is a right or
permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such
license, would be illegal.
In order to fall within the aegis of the due process clause, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”
PEOPLE v. NAZARIO
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a
saving clause or by construction.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the
validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality.
A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and
more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
which petitioner is alleged to have committed.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then
have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and
hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership.
This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to
prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect
the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public.
In sum, appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to be prevented;
hence, We rule that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance with the
Constitution in the exercise of police power of the state. Consequently, the absence of notice and
hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under receivership.
The absence of prior notice and hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith. Thus, an
MB resolution placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may only be
annulled after a determination has been made by the trial court that its issuance was tainted with
arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination is made, the status quo shall be maintained, i.e., the
bank shall continue to be under receivership.
ABAKADA GURU PARTY LIST, ET AL v. ERMITA
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes
the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the
due process clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons
have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were
created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of
such rights.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. CAMACHO
To our mind, the classification freeze provision was in the main the result of Congress's earnest
efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of the tax administration over sin products while trying to
balance the same with other state interests. In particular, the questioned provision addressed
Congress's administrative concerns regarding delegating too much authority to the DOF and BIR as this
will open the tax system to potential areas for abuse and corruption. Congress may have reasonably
conceived that a tax system which would give the least amount of discretion to the tax implementers
would address the problems of tax avoidance and tax evasion.
Congress sought to, among others, simplify the whole tax system for sin products to remove these
potential areas of abuse and corruption from both the side of the taxpayer and the government. Without
doubt, the classification freeze provision was an integral part of this overall plan. This is in line with one
of the avowed objectives of the assailed law "to simplify the tax administration and compliance with the
tax laws that are about to unfold in order to minimize losses arising from inefficiencies and tax avoidance
scheme, if not outright tax evasion."
Aside from the major concern regarding the elimination of potential areas for abuse and corruption
from the tax administration of sin products, the legislative deliberations also show that the classification
freeze provision was intended to generate buoyant and stable revenues for government. With the frozen
tax classifications, the revenue inflow would remain stable and the government would be able to predict
with a greater degree of certainty the amount of taxes that a cigarette manufacturer would pay given the
trend in its sales volume over time. The reason for this is that the previously classified cigarette brands
would be prevented from moving either upward or downward their tax brackets despite the changes in
their net retail prices in the future and, as a result, the amount of taxes due from them would remain
predictable. The classification freeze provision would, thus, aid in the revenue planning of the
government.
All in all, the classification freeze provision addressed Congress's administrative concerns in the
simplification of tax administration of sin products, elimination of potential areas for abuse and corruption
in tax collection, buoyant and stable revenue generation, and ease of projection of revenues.
Consequently, there can be no denial of the equal protection of the laws since the rational-basis test is
amply satisfied.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
U.S. v. TORIBIO
The general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect
right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles,
ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but
is subject to the supervision of the court.
The State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
CHURCHILL AND TAIT v. RAFFERTY
If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, it
is within the 'scope of the police power of the State. Within such bounds the wisdom, expediency, or
necessity of the law does not concern the courts.
An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the
police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be
invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health,
safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views
for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.
While the state may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests; yet, its determination in
these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
From whatever direction the social, economic, or general welfare of the people is menaced, there
is legal justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use of private property may be regulated
or restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate these declared essentials to the
well being of the public.
It has long been recognized that uses of private property which are offensive to the senses of
smell or hearing may be so regulated or segregated as to disturb as little as possible the pursuits of
other persons.
It is not the adoption of a new principle but simply the extension of a well established principle to
hold that the police power may also regulate and restrict uses of private property when devoted to
advertising which is offensive to the sight.
The indiscriminate use of outdoor advertising tends to mar not only natural outdoor landscapes but
whatever of civic beauty has been attained by the expenditure of public moneys for parks, boulevards,
and buildings. The widespread agitation in many European countries, as well as in the United States,
against the so- called billboards the most common form of this kind of advertising shows that they are a
source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper enjoyment of outdoor life by
the general public. This justifies their suppression or regulation to the extent that they interfere with the
right of the public.
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV
RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government
instead of a private employer."
Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others –
such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public – may have frequent
access to an individual’s office. The "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable
intrusions in its capacity as employer," x xx but some government offices may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. Given the great variety of work
environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the
employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control,
and the efficient operation of the workplace.
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the
work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they
entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it
is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context,
much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the
concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for
the purpose of securing state property. xxx To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related,
noninvestigatory reasons.
In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would
impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct
caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x xx for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold,
therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable:
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. xxxThe search will be permissible in its scope when "the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of …the nature of the [misconduct]."
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
PEOPLE v. CAYAT
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES v. BSP
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of
its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally
valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances.
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether
that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
35
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition….. In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation…. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. …. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
PAGCOR v. BIR
Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been effectively
omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. Petitioner argues that such omission is
unconstitutional, as it is violative of its right to equal protection of the laws under Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[17]
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., this Court expounded the meaning and scope of equal protection, thus:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The
equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal
protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
A perusal of the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting of the Committee on
Ways on Means dated October 27, 1997 would show that the exemption of PAGCOR from the
payment of corporate income tax was due to the acquiescence of the Committee on Ways on
Means to the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from such tax.
GANCAYCO v. QUEZON CITY
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the
ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice
Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as
there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with
regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is
not the proper person to do so.
MENDOZA v. PEOPLE
True, the petitioner’s case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed. Unfortunately for
him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment period, the
petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903. This is how the law
is written: it condones employers — and only those employers — with unpaid SSS contributions or with
pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period following the law’s date of effectivity. Dura lex,
sed lex.
The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit
the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an amendment of RA No.
9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) v. FINANCE SEC. TEVES
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a
similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions -
taxation. Such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence,
the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
SECTION 2
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge.
PEOPLE v. VELOSO
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, “for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect.” The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify under it.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough
of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched
judicial interference.
NARCISO ALVAREZ v. CFI OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that “A search warrant shall not
issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.” It will be noted that both provisions require that
there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant
must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may
produce.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused.
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to
take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more
than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of
the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch
as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not
personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses
for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal
and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the
applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the fact is necessary.
Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58
provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether
probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and
must be strictly complied with; but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.
The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them
as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is
unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself.
HARRY S. STONEHILL v. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO
The Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, ad particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST
MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN ORGANIZATION, INC.
We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal
Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the
Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question,
and that, accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and
seizure complained of have not been proven to be unreasonable.
BACHE & CO. v. RUIZ
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant
and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of
the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated,
the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account
of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the
record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did
not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its
training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on
the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.
PLACER v. VILLANUEVA
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing , a warrant or
order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by
respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice
had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate
bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners
had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the
cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require further
proceedings.
BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is
the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched."
CORRO v. LISING
An application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials
published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel
Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, "mere
generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to
be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be committed, — that abuses may not be committed.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR v. HON. TOMAS ACHACOSO
Under the New Constitution, “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.”
It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it was declared that
mayors may not exercise this power (Ponsica v. Ignalaga) neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting
body (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA).
Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al. v.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA
Coming now to the contention that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence
based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases, the
8
ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Court finds the same devoid of merit. Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise
known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
“Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of
the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.”
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration
Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants
of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the
case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.
Furthermore, petitioners’ position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent’s arrest came
twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration
Act states that deportation “shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises.”
In the case at bar, petitioners’ alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent
arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only
on August 15, 1990—28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners’ cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent
William Gatchalian.
LIM, et al. v. HON. FELIX and HON. ALFANE
In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses
that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the
Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of
applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more
important judicial functions.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. There was no basis for the respondent Judge
to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However,
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. The SC cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
(Placer v. Villanueva, 1973 Constitution)
A judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant of arrest.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112
of the ROC, to wit: “Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must
issue a warrant or order for his arrest.”
If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.
(Soliven v. Makasiar, after the 1987 Constitution took effect)
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized
by law", does not mean that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. What
the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedures, the judge shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation
of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al.)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone
makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is
the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the
Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
(People v. Delgado, et al., 1990)
The judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it
may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest.
The court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy
itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Reliance on the
COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the
COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or
resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not
on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
(Castillo v. Villaluz, 1989)
RTC Judges no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority was
removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not a judicial function but part of the prosecution's job,
a function of the executive. Whenever there are enough prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job, which is essentially executive to them.
SILVA v. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF NEGROS ORIENTAL
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Section 2, (Bill of Rights) guarantees the right to personal liberty and security of homes against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative
or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
The judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable
cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers.
"Probable cause" - "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause
upon which a warrant may issue.
This Court declared the search warrant issued as invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine
the witness in the form of searching questions and answers.
ALLADO v. DIOKNO
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof.
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of
political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of
the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the
former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is
necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.
HUBERT WEBB v. JUDGE DE LEON
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
. . ." An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy
of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an
opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants
in Soliven vs. Makasiar, thus:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the
existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before
issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance
of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer as well as the
counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties'
evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determinepersonally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting
minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the
probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
ROBERTS v. COURT OF APPEALS
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by
way 'of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court." More specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should, be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to
refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.
IMPORTANT ISSUE: It appears that the Judge when it issued the warrant DID NOT personally
determine if there exists probable cause and that it is enough for her to issue a warrant
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs)
except those in the National Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive original jurisdiction; in cases covered by the rule
on summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when required; and in cases filed with them
which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the
National Capital Region (MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate
preliminary investigations conducted by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs
and MCTCs.
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but
[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof; issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge, following established doctrine and procedure, may either:
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
(a) Rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause whether or not the case is
cognizable only by the Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant We
emphasize the important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
. . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution).
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone
makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.
It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor's certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the
filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had
before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.
In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a
judicial prerogative. In People vs. Inting, this Court aptly stated:
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is
made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.
....
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The
second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is
judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. . . .
TH
20 CENTURY FOX FILM v. CA
As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by
the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for
the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes
owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master
tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature
and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes.
In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business
not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence,
including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in
violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation
of all items found in any video store.
PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in Veloso. At
first glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient. However,
from the application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the police officer serving
the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended precisely because it
was wrongly described as No. 122, although it may have been located on the same street as No. 120.
Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house located at No. 122 M.
Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the
exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the
actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge of the place. The
controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the place
identified by the police.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application
for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to
officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from
them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.”
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL v. COURT OF APPEALS
There was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we find that the search conducted at Apartment
No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing
so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at
Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against
petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant above-quoted appears to us beyond cavil. The items
seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of
the items ordered to be seized did not require, in our view, a technical description. Moreover, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in
the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
UY v. BIR
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description
of “the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized.” The rule is that a description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Asking of leading questions
to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. Search
warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.
Labaria’s knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own
perception but was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on
hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search warrants.
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labaria’s deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners’ alleged illegal practices was apparently
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by
Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents
supposedly evidencing these schemes were located.
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be
seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a
general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description
in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the terms “multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,”
“production record books/inventory lists, stock cards,” “sales records, job order,” “corporate financial
records,” and “bank statements/cancelled checks” is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms “unregistered delivery receipts” and “unregistered purchase & sales
invoices,” however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of
these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it
is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate
and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered
documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require
the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional
provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.
VALLEJO v. CA
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of
the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Any description of the
place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to
locate such place or thing is sufficient.
The requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant. Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude
any possibility of seizing any other property.
A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. In fact, a
careful perusal of the application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act
performed by the petitioner constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses.
MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty
but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following
circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint
for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
The SC ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from
public officer or private individual under Article 32 and Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
Persons indirectly responsible are also liable. [T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the
language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
PEOPLE v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
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Under the law, the authority of persons duly commissioned to enforce tariff and customs laws is
quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of goods suspected to have
been introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws.
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon probable cause, that is, upon a
belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
There is distinctive feature of a warrantless search of a ship motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
10
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. In such a situation, what
appears to the measure of legality of the seizure was formulated in this sense: "that the seizing officer
shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes
has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. " Therein the guarantee of the 4th
Amendment was fulfilled. Where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts
11
unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
14
usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness
and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
15
correspondence.
Thus, in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence
of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured.
JOSEFINO S. ROAN v. HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 71410
November 25, 1986
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge
or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No
less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.
Probable cause was described as referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." The probable cause must
refer to only one specific offense.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had
no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule
were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the
guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for
the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made
incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise
be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent
smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels
and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and
their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched
or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken
without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
NOLASCO v. PANO
§3, Art IV of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.
No Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts
and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.
PAPA v. MAGO
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control,
even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
(Exception) However, in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It
is the Court’s considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
PEOPLE v. LO HO WING
A Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at
least 3 well-recognized exceptions thereto. These are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of
a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan).
The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
The act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an
offense under a special law.
PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant
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to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.
“SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.––A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there
was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
POSADAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; of when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this
Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints
and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable
cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.
CONGRESSMAN ANIAG v. COMELEC & DOJ SPECIAL TASK FORCE
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well
as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and
stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime
in the vehicle to be searched.
The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of
each case. Thus, the validity of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee has been upheld.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The SC also recognized the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the
basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters,
e.g., where a confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the
route where the search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting
drugs at the time of their arrest; where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country; where the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was
strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his
passport and other identification papers; where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the
description given in the confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; where the
accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about
its contents; or where the identity of the drug courier was already established by police authorities who
received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the vessels
arriving in Dumaguete City.
On Acquiescence
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of Aniag’s right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
In the face of 14 armed policemen, Arellano could not have marshaled the strength and the
courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied
acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to
the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
SAMMY MALACAT v. CA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILS.
Warrantless arrest; Search incidental to a lawful arrest
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.
As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court:
Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped.
A warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Valid warrantless searches are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to
a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
In this case, the RTC confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for
a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
Stop-and-frisk
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
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protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate the same. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC v. CA
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented
warrantless search.
Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed.
ASUNCION v. CA
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial
authority.
The rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search
of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate
that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case
undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle —
petitioner's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the
police authorities were justified in searching the petitioner's automobile without a warrant since the
situation demanded immediate action.
PEOPLE v. CANTON
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for
weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine. The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a
case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures.
As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the
"Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said
provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are
also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
FAJARDO v. PEOPLE
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied
in Section 3(2) of the same article.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing
rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of
the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course
of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS v. NATIVIDAD
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure
that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But
in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of books and documents in question is
tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge
place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated,
because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of
the books and documents in question in virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an express
exception in favor of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court
of justice.
OKLAHOMA PRESS v. WALLING
When a subpoena is issued a against a corporation, the Fifth Amendment affords no protection by
virtue of the self-incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its officers.
The Fourth Amendment, if applicable, guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be "particularly described," if the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant, the gist of the
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protection being the requirement that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. (In essence, the
Fourth Amendment protects the people from general warrants and unbridled searches).
The requirement of "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," literally applicable in the
case of a warrant, is satisfied, in the case of an order for production, by the court's determination that the
investigation is authorized by Congress and is for a purpose Congress can order, and that the
documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.
Beyond this, the requirement of reasonableness, including particularity in "describing the place to
be searched, and the persons to be seized," also literally applicable to warrants, comes down to
specification of the documents to be produced, adequate but not excessive, for the purposes of the
relevant inquiry.
CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when authorized
and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in
other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a
weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs
under consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The
Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of these inspection programs by refusing to
require search warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the question whether some
other accommodation between public need and individual rights is essential.
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a
valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably
restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to
criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives
full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills
the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of
privacy.
HARVEY v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must
be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also
provide that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1)
when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it(Rule 113, Section 5) The Commissioner of
Immigration has the power to institute deportation charges and effect arrests in accordance with Section
37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien;
PEOPLE v. AMINNUDIN
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to
Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the
trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the
Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
PEOPLE v. BURGOS
At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall
within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided
by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok’s verbal report. Masamlok
led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can
make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok
who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the
process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of
the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure
which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
UMIL v. RAMOS (DECISION)
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught
in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed
and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
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However, there is a different rules for some crimes. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof
or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge
of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
ON HABEAS CORPUS:
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
ULIM v. RAMOS (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law.
The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted. In ascertaining
whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the
crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can
validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to
conduct an arrest without warrant.
What is important is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas
corpus proceeding. The Court will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to
do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule
113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be
ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the
least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground
for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
GO v. CA
The conditions in Sec. 5 Rule 113 must be strictly followed. In this case, the petitioner was
arrested six days after the shooting and only on the basis of the statements of people in the area. It
cannot be said that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto nor can it be said that the arresting
officers have personal knowledge that Go committed the crime.
ON WAIVING THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION:
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundamental, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety,
aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful
to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section
3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by
Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding
the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
MANALILI v. COURT OF APPEALS
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as
a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant.
In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
SECTION 3
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a ictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
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Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions
of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS
The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers
to the immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in
which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies
of his life.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant’s
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
KMU v. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, NEDA
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are treated as “strictly confidential” under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data
are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
grants the “right of the people to information on matters of public concern.” Personal matters are exempt
or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The data
treated as “strictly confidential” under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern,
these data cannot be released to the public or the press.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more
efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the President’s constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive
department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
PEOPLE v. DAMASO
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence.
But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they
now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot
be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf.
SPS. VEROY v. LAYAGUE
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a
moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view.
Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every
opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal searches, were
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow
that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary.
SECTION 4
NEAR v. MINNESOTA
It is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The liberty
deemed to be established was described by Blackstone: 'The liberty of the press is essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if
he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own
temerity.' Madison meanwhile, said, “This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be
exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint
also.' The main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends
as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the
false.
The criticism upon Blackstone's statement has been 'that the liberty of the press might be rendered
a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a by-word, if, while every man was at liberty to publish
what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications.' But it is
recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the
protection of the public, and that the rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense,
as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our Constitutions. The
law of criminal libel rests upon that secure foundation. There is also the conceded authority of courts to
punish for contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions.
In the present case, the statute in question provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for
violation of the court's order, but for suppression and injunction-that is, for restraint upon publication.
The protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has
been recognized only in exceptional cases. 'When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fignt and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' On similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the
community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of
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orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.
FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
A noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids
constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the
dangers of a censorship system.
1. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.
"Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process requires that the State bear the
burden of persuasion to show that the appellants are engaged in criminal speech."
2. While the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to bar all showings of
unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect
of finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.
3. Only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose
a valid final restraint.
a. The exhibitor must be assured, that the censor will, within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
b. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination must be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial
resolution.
c. The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the
deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
Without these safeguards, it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's
determination.
NEW YORK TIMES v. US
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity." The Government "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of such a restraint."
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power
of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that
would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or
even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the
happening of an event of that nature. Only governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of
a State’s citizen’s can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere
conclusions be sufficient: if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must
inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. Unless and until the
Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may
issue.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING CORP AND CBS BROADCASTING v. MAYOR DY
And there is the fact that the mode of expression restrained in these cases—broadcast—is not one
which petitioners are physically able to accomplish without interacting with the regulatory arm of the
government. Expression in media such as print or the Internet is not burdened by such requirements as
congressional franchises or administrative licenses which bear upon broadcast media. Broadcast is
hampered by its utilization of the finite resources of the electromagnetic spectrum, which long ago
necessitated government intervention and administration to allow for the orderly allocation of bandwidth,
with broadcasters agreeing in turn to be subjected to regulation.
That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression
of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing
tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at
expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other
forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC, 357 SCRA 496 (2001): “Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, ‘any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity…. The Government ‘thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal of
the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.”
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny
from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on
free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate implication of the application
of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove
that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be
done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such
compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
The provisions of the Treason and Sedition Law must not be interpreted so as to abridge the
freedom of speech and the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range
of liberty of speech. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties
of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed
to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the
existence of the State.
DENNIS, et al. v. UNITED STATES
The First Amendment requires that one be permitted to believe what he will. It requires that one be
permitted to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and present danger that a substantial public
evil will result therefrom.
The basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will
answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies. It is for this
reason that this Court has recognized the inherent value of free discourse. However, this is not an
unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to
other values and considerations.
Justice Holmes stated that the "question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Where an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction relying
upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication
created a "clear and present danger" of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.
Where a statute transgressed the First Amendment, judgments of conviction made on the basis of
such statute must be invalidated.
The phrase "clear and present danger" of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of
Congress to punish cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is
about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a
group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course
whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is
required. The argument that there is no need for Government to concern itself, for Government is strong,
it possesses ample powers to put down a rebellion, it may defeat the revolution with ease is rejected. An
attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of
inadequate numbers of power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The
contention that success or probability of success is the criterion, is likewise rejected.
Chief Judge Learned Hand, interpreted the phrase as follows: "In each case, courts must ask
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger."
When facts are found that establish the violation of a statute, the protection against conviction
afforded by the First Amendment is a matter of law. The doctrine that there must be a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent is a judicial rule to be applied as a
matter of law by the courts. The guilt is established by proof of facts. Whether the First Amendment
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protects the activity which constitutes the violation of the statute must depend upon a judicial
determination of the scope of the First Amendment applied to the circumstances of the case.
GONZALES and CABIGAO v. COMELEC
A governmental purpose constitutionally subject to control or prevent activities state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
Even though the governmental purposes be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Free speech and free press
Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment.
There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether
in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a
clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of assuring participation by the people
in social including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and
change.
The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope
and assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty.
It may best serve its purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Freedom of speech and of the press thus means
something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
support to official measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. The right belongs as well to those who question, who do not conform, who differ.
Freedom of expression is not absolute. There are other societal values that press for recognition.
Tests for permissible restriction
There are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction: 1) the 'clear
and present danger' rule; and 2) the 'dangerous tendency' rule.
The ‘clear and present danger’ rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be
punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented." It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be public established."
The clear and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should there be an
occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but also that they be limited in scope.
Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is explained by
Justice Branders thus: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.” For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." Justice Black requires that the
substantive evil be "extremely serious."
It received its original formulation from Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words
used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree."
This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection
with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be
probable but very likely inevitable.
Under the ‘dangerous tendency’ rule, "If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
Freedom of assembly
This right is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of
free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs.
This right is not to be limited, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
Freedom to form associations for purposes not contrary to law
Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association for purposes not contrary to
law. With or without a constitutional provision, it may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a
member of any group or society exists. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution.
If such a right were non-existent then the likelihood of a one-party government is more than a
possibility. Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to exist;
minority groups may be outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well
become a thing of the past. Political parties which assume the role alternately of being in the majority or
in the minority as the will of the electorate dictates, will lose their constitutional protection.
Douglas: "Justice Frankfurter thought that political and academic affiliations have a preferred
position under the due process version of the First Amendment. But the associational rights protected by
the First Amendment are in my view much broader and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as
well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion…”
Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an
abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when their purposes are "contrary to law".
How should the limitation "for purposes not contrary to law" be interpreted? It is submitted that it is
another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could
be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to
form association societies.
The views a citizen entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology he
embraces, and the people he associates with are no concern to government — until and unless he
moves into action.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) v. HON. DANS, ET AL.
All forms of communication, as well as all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause.
However, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media for the following reasons: First, broadcast media has
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making
certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television,
where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media has also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose
reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the
vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has
lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule
– that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
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The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to
violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start
of widespread uprising.
At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little
reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on
public issues, they also deserve special protection.
The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
AYER v. JUDGE CAPULONG
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute
right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute of a public character. The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy
is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not mean that no subsequent liability
may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The
right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD v. COMELEC
Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the
reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section
11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would
be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of
absence. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates.
In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction
on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to
justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
No presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result
in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the
operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation.
The applicable rule is the general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional
and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly
proving that assertion.
The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it
requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a reasonable
nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.
First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined
in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind
of restriction involved in this case.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth
or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
OSMENA v. COMELEC
The term political “ad ban,” when used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even
as §11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates
the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.
The law’s concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media equality
between candidates with “deep pockets,” as Justice Feliciano called them in his opinion of the Court
[10]
in NPC, and those with less resources. The law is part of a package of electoral reforms adopted in
1987.
Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content
of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich
candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental
interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the
Constitution, which provides:
The commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or
donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space
and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election
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period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio
and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates.
These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period
as well as campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the
mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-government. What is bad is if the
law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the ad. Content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.
Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions
[34]
In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs
on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L
Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S
[35]
Ct 2118[1984])
[36]
This test was actually formulated in United States v. O’Brien. It is an appropriate test for
restrictions on speech which, like §11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are
not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are
tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v.
[37]
COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or
against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster
under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and
vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like
§11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial
[38]
governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking
randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a
'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. x
x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of
thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least,
free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth,
of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that
debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. It means more than the right to
approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to
take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And paraphrasing the
eminent justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate,
no less than the thought we agree with.
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. In setting the
standard or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice
Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency"
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the
danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be
so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.
Justification for a Restriction
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is
treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the
[35]
presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any
act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly, stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research
data which may be used to study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute
prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll
data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.
SWS v. COMELEC
For reasons hereunder given, we hold that §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
To be sure, §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election.
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, “any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The
Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such
restraint.’” There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4? The United
States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O’Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral
regulations and is said to have “become canonical in the review of such laws.” It is noteworthy that
the O’Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should
be invalidated if such governmental interest is “not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to
achieve the governmental purpose in question.
Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to §5.4.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O’Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the suppression
of free expression.” By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility
that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole
class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In
effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion
to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that “the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words ¾ those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no
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essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which §5.4 lays on protected speech. In Near v.
Minnesota, it was held:
[The] protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has
been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . . No one would question but that a government might
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against
incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by §5.4 cannot be
justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for
a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a
period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before
a local election.
This sufficiently distinguishes §5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, §11(b), which this Court found to be valid
in National Press Club v. COMELEC and Osmeña v.COMELEC. For the ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646,
§11(b) is not only authorized by a specific constitutional provision, but it also provided an alternative so
that, as this Court pointed out in Osmeña, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media
advertisements by the COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression
of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to
meet criterion [4] of the O’Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to
further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure
on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, “junking” of weak or “losing” candidates, and resort to the
form of election cheating called “dagdag-bawas.” Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be,
they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be
more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that
such speech creates the danger of such evils. Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
COMELEC is given the power:
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or
false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in §5.4. Pursuant to this
power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates
can have their own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of
equality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. As for the purpose of
the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this natural-
enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with the “winners.” Some are
susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of
survey results which are a form of expression? It has been held that “[mere] legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.”
To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
RUBIN v. COORS BREWING
Central Hudson identified several factors that courts should consider in determining whether a
regulation of commercial speech survives First Amendment scrutiny:
"For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest." 447 U. S., at 566.
CINCINNATI v. DISCOVERY
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordinary newspapers is commercial
speech and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents' promotional publications is not what
we have described as "core" commercial speech.
The regulation is not content neutral. Although the respondent’s publication is not banned based
on the contents of the publication, the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between
ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. True, there is no evidence that the city has acted with
animus toward the ideas contained within respondents' publications, but just last Term we expressly
rejected the argument that "discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only
when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S., at 117. Regardless of the mens rea of the city, it has enacted a
sweeping ban on the use of newsracks that distribute "commercial handbills," but not "newspapers."
Under the city's newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by
the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of
the term, the ban in this case is "content based."
The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified “without reference to
the content of the regulated speech."
CITY OF LADUE v. GILLEO
Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint
discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a
common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.
Even regulations that do not foreclose an entire medium of expression, but merely shift the time,
place, or manner of its use, must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication." In this
case, we are not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech that
Ladue has closed off.
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the
same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely because of
their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the "speaker." As an early and
eminent student of rhetoric observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many
attempts to persuade. A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf" in the front lawn of a retired general or
decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-yearold child's
bedroom window or the same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of
social- ism may carry different implications when displayed 57*57 on the grounds of a stately mansion
than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.
While signs are a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they pose distinctive
problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers. Unlike oral speech, signs take up space and
may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that
legitimately call for regulation. It is common ground that governments may regulate the physical
characteristics of signs—just as they can, within reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose,
regulate audible expression in its capacity as noise.
POLICARPIO v. MANILA TIMES
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining
the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached
thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal.
Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are
not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such
proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy
immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it
must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks.
Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing the news items in question had not
been established by the plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and
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2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
other functions.
LOPEZ v. CA
No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the well-nigh all
embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what
items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence
on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers
and other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly
made, however, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-
delict.
According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's
photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture
is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." In support of the above
statement, he made reference to several cases. Other decisions to the same effect have been
promulgated since the fourth edition of Newell published in 1924. Why libel law has both a criminal and a
civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results
in depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather to be chosen
than great riches , an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money
damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory
statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of
peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a
crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment."
NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. Like insurrection, contempt,
advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the
various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this court, libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.
"Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect the
obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors. . . . The interest of the public here
outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual. The protection of the public requires not
merely discussion, but information. Political conduct and views which some respectable people approve,
and others condemn, are constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors of fact, particularly in regard to a
man's mental states and processes, are inevitable. . . . Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken
from the field of free debate."
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth. A defense for erroneous
statements honestly made is no less essential here than was the requirement of proof of guilty
knowledge which, in Smith v. California, we held indispensable to a valid conviction of a bookseller for
possessing obscene writings for sale.
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions -
and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount - leads to a comparable "self-
censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not
mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate
safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its
factual particulars.
ROSENBLOOM v. METROMEDIA
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily"
choose to become involved.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
The present case illustrates the point. The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its
criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number of highly important values are
potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in seeing that the criminal law is adequately
enforced and in assuring that the law is not used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression.
Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a "private" businessman
running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the
issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First
Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous.
GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC
The court first addresses the idea of strict liability for defamation and concludes that compelling a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of their factual assertions may lead to intolerable
self-censorship. Public figures have a remedy available to them of self-help because they have access
to opportunities to refute the lies or correct the errors. Private individuals however do not have access
and therefore are more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly
greater. The court therefore concludes that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to
enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.
HUSTLER MAGAZINE v. FALWELL
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce
speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are "intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large."
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in
the form of damages. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, we have consistently ruled that a public
figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory
falsehood, but only if the statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an
individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.
While such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of
the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public
figures. Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would
be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely de- famed its subject.
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness
about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps
on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageous- ness" standard thus runs afoul of
our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience.
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i. e.,
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
BORJAL v. COURT OF APPEALS
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. ‘Public policy, the
welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public
opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege.’
Privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely adheres
to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the
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strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self- expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling
Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and
political culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on
the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true report without
comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged
communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy effloresence of public debate and
opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the
manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued
with public interest. An organization such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the
transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large
cannot dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close
scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of
the qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily
choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the
conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's
prior anonymity or notoriety.
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events
and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to
court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects
and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous
statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of
error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine
requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the
absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.
MILLER v. CALIFORNIA
Obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. We acknowledge, however, the inherent
dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation
to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the
applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts; that concept has never
commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time. If a state law that regulates
obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate
courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of
public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection.
The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of
the ideas these works represent. "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people." But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing
commercial gain, is a different matter.
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th century American censorship of
public distribution and display of material relating to sex, in any way limited or affected expression of
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any question that the
era following Thomas Jefferson to Theodore Roosevelt was an "extraordinarily vigorous period," not just
in economics and politics, but in belles letters and in "the outlying fields of social and political
philosophies." We do not see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas—good or bad, sound or unsound—
and "repression" of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of commercial exploitation of human
interest in sex.
GONZALES v. KALAW-KATIGBAK
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger
must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to
the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such
danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate,
wherefore, as noted earlier, is that where the movies, theatrical productions radio scripts, television
programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom of
expression — censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that "every writer,
actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty
and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without
any deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not
enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not
lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the amended
petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that
some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a
theater-club and a good portion of the film shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked,
or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing
and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence
attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the
young audience will misunderstand these scenes." Further: "Respondents further stated in its answer
that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would
agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film." Petitioners, however,
refused the "For Adults Only" classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for
certiorari.
It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown.
BAYAN v. ERMITA
The Constitution provides for the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances. It is a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not
absolute. It is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
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of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police
power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression,
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
SECTION 5
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
It is important to determine the purpose of the act of the government in order to rule on its
constitutionality. In this case, the sale of stamps was for the benefit of the government and not the
Catholic Church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people."
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON v. SCHEMPP
The First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made applicable to all the States by the 14
th
Amendment. This Court has held that "neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can it pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." It
did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an
establishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a `broad interpretation... in the light
of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress. "Although these two clauses may in
certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is
not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve
coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
The Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. The Amendment "requires the state to be a
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary.”
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ALLEN
The Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits of state laws to all
citizens without regard for their religious affiliation.
The line between state neutrality to religion and state support of religion is not easy to locate. "The
constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem, like many problems in
constitutional law, is one of degree." Several cases fashioned a test subscribed to by several Justices for
distinguishing between forbidden involvements of the State with religion and those contacts which the
Establishment Clause permits." The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
structures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
LEMON v. KURTZMAN
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by
the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
TILTON V. RICHARDSON
The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the nonideological character
of the aid that the Government provides. Our cases from Everson to Allen have permitted church-related
schools to receive government aid in the form of secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities,
or materials that are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they attend. In
Lemon and DiCenso, however, the state programs subsidized teachers, either directly or indirectly.
Since teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral, greater governmental surveillance would be
required to guarantee that state salary aid would not in fact subsidize religious instruction. There we
found the resulting entanglement excessive. Here, on the other hand, the Government provides facilities
that are themselves religiously neutral. The risks of Government aid to religion and the corresponding
need for surveillance are therefore reduced.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY v. GREATER PITTSBURGH ACLU
In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion, a concern that has long had a place in
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion
"preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred".
The government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing
religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its context.
ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT
We have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad
class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.
State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash or in kind, where the effect of the aid is
`that of a direct subsidy to the religious school' from the State.
CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOAD et al. v. PINETTE et al.
It is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion.
What distinguishes Allegheny and the dictum in Lynch from Widmar and Lamb's Chapel is the
difference between government speech and private speech. "[T]here is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."
By its terms that Clause applies only to the words and acts of government. It was never meant,
and has never been read by this Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech
connected to the State only through it soccurrence in a public forum.
It has radical implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid whenever
hypothetical observers may—even reasonably —confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state
endorsement.
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If Ohio is concerned about misperceptions, nothing prevents it from requiring all private displays in
the square to be identified as such. That would be a content-neutral "manner" restriction that is
assuredly constitutional. But the State may not, on the claim of misperception of official endorsement,
ban all private religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it by requiring religious
speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship.
Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2)
occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.
ISLAMIC D’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines
Bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure
that the Office of Muslim Affairs does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society
with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
Freedom of religion takes precedence over the right against the impairment of contracts. In case
of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has
also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of
religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not
unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of
values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.
The ”establishment clause” (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise
clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with
a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for
withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act.
Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from
The coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to
do a positive act· to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure
without need of any positive act on his part.
CANTWEL ET AL. v. CONNECTICUT
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or from worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
No one would contest the proposition that a State may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to
preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and absolute restraint would violate
the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a State may by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
meetings thereon, and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order, and comfort of the
community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellants are right in their insistence that the Act in question is not such a regulation, If a certificate
is procured solicitation is permitted without restraint but, in the absence of a certificate, solicitation is
altogether prohibited.
The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious
test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a
prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise.
Such a censor ship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty
protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the
Fourteenth.
A statute authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial
decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative
action.
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of
public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation
of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination
by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty
protected by the Constitution.
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or
other immediate threat to public peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is
obvious. Equally obvious is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views,
religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields
the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point
of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been,
or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.
US v. BALLARD
The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only "forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship," but also "safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion." "Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts -- freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to
followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious
experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.
"With man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner
in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be
permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the
morals of its people, are not interfered with."
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the
freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator." It has reference to one's views of his relations
to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and
obedience to His Will. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of
such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is
a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent".
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The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedom is indeed as potent as the
power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as
a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose
enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to
suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat
license tax."
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason we believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second
is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the
schools is not justified.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their
religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if
they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do
not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.
EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
As to the contention that the exemption accorded by our decision benefits a privileged few, it is
enough to re-emphasize that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it
did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity." The essence of the free
exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma. Moreover, the suggestion implicit in the State's pleadings to the effect that
the flag ceremony requirement would be equally and evenly applied to all citizens regardless of sect or
religion and does not thereby discriminate against any particular sect or denomination escapes the fact
that "[a] regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
PAMIL v. TELERON
The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now
under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights." The principle of the paramount character of the fundamental law thus comes into
play. There are previous rulings to that effect. The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot
survive. So the writer of this opinion would hold.
It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the
provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be
heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.
MCDANIEL v. PATY
The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach,
proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister of the type
McDaniel was found to be. Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek
and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention. Yet under the clergy-
disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has
conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. Or, in James Madison's words, the State is
"punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right."
Tennessee asserts that its interest in preventing the establishment of a state religion is consistent
with the Establishment Clause and thus of the highest order. The constitutional history of the several
States reveals that generally the interest in preventing establishment prompted the adoption of clergy
disqualification provisions, see Stokes 622; Tennessee does not appear to be an exception to this
pattern. Cf. post, at 636 n. 9. There is no occasion to inquire whether promoting such an interest is a
permissible legislative goal, however, see post, at 636-642, for Tennessee has failed to demonstrate
that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity
they may once have enjoyed. The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on
ministers is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence to
promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others,
contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality. However widely that view may
have been held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day, the American
experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful
of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained
counterparts.
GOLDMAN v. WEINBERGER
In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular
restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. Not
only are courts " `ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have,' but the military authorities have been charged by the Executive and
Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy. "[J]udicial deference . . . is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged."
The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the traditional outfitting of personnel
in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of
the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate
outward individual distinctions except for those of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during
peacetime as during war because its personnel must be ready to provide an effective defense on a
moment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in advance of trouble.
The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that
which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged here reasonably and
evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity. The First
Amendment therefore does not prohibit them from being applied to petitioner even though their effect is
to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs.
GERMAN v. BARANGANAN
Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still
respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative of the
freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the
Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the
streets approaching it have been restricted, While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not
been absolutely prohibited, passers- by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks.
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The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the
same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang. The need to secure the
safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their
lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world. Vivid illustrations of this grave and
serious problem are the gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism
that have been perpetrated against heads of state and other public officers of foreign nations.
Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the Malacañang
grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications
facilities that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction
imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government,
which petitioners’ mass action would certainly disrupt.
CENTENO v. VILLAON-PORNILLOS
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is,
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to
regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the
protected freedom.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order
that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit
funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
LEE v. WEISMAN
No. The practice of inviting members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at middle
school and high school graduations is unconstitutional. It violates the non-establishment clause.
State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation
ceremonies for secondary schools. Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are, in a fair and real sense,
obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the
diploma.
The controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary and
secondary public schools compel the holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an
unconstitutional one.
The Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so." The State's involvement in the school prayers challenged today violates these central
principles.
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are
too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State. The design of the Constitution is that
preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed
to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.
CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE v. CITY OF HIALEAH
The First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion
in general. At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is to
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression
of religion or religious conduct. To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the
minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if
it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context.
Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial neutrality because they use the
words "sacrifice" and "ritual," words with strong religious connotations. We agree that these words are
consistent with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive.
Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause,
extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause "forbids subtle departures from neutrality," and "covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs.” Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the
most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance "`interests of the highest order,'" and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those
interests.
A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental
interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases. It
follows from what we have already said that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.
First, even were the governmental interests compelling, the ordinances are not drawn in narrow
terms to accomplish those interests. All four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial
respects. The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct, and
those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.
LAMB'S CHAPEL v. CENTER MORICHES SCH. DIST.
The total ban on using District property for religious purposes could survive First Amendment
challenge only if excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. The court's
conclusion in this case was that Rule 7 met this test. We cannot agree with this holding, for Rule 7 was
unconstitutionally applied in this case.
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not
encompassed within the purpose of the forum . . . or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for
whose special benefit the forum was created . . ., the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject."
The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible under Rule 10,
and its exhibition was denied solely because the film series dealt with the subject from a religious
standpoint. The principle that has emerged from our cases "is that the First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."
IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. COURT OF APPEALS
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.
FREEDOM TO BELIEVE: The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning
the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals
to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious conviction
as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove
his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men
may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to
account because he cannot prove what he believes.
FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONE’S BELIEF: But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
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omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As
great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can
be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation
of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of
evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or
fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial
function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors."
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR
The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a
different reading of the “wall of separation.” The strict separtionist view holds that Jefferson meant
the “wall of separation” to protect the state from the church. Jefferson was a man of the Enlightenment
Era of the eighteenth century, characterized by the rationalism and anticlericalism of that philosophic
bent. A tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view is
largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular
society.
The separationist approach, whether strict or tame, is caught in a dilemma because while the
Jeffersonian wall of separation “captures the spirit of the American ideal of church-state separation”, in
real life church and state are not and cannot be totally separate.
Benevolent neutrality is congruent with the sociological proposition that religion serves a function
essential to the survival of society itself, thus there is no human society without one or more ways of
performing the essential function of religion. Although for some individuals there may be no felt need for
religion and thus it is optional or even dispensable, for society it is not, which is why there is no human
society without one or more ways of performing the essential function of religion. Even in ostensibly
atheistic societies, there are vigorous underground religion(s) and surrogate religion(s) in their ideology.
Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose
Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We Trust” on American
currency, the recognition of America as “one nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the
flag, the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation “God save
the United States and this honorable Court,” and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of
paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination to lead representatives in prayer.
Accommodation is distinguished from strict neutrality in that the latter holds that
government should base public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the
religious consequences of its actions. The debate between accommodation and strict neutrality is at
base a question of means: “Is the freedom of religion best achieved when the government is conscious
of the effects of its action on the various religious practices of its people, and seeks to minimize
interferences with those practices? Or is it best advanced through a policy of ‘religious blindness’ -
keeping government aloof from religious practices and issues?” An accommodationist holds that it is
good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict neutrality
adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the government to
avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise.
Benevolent neutrality gives room for different kinds of accommodation: those which are
constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; and those which are discretionary
or legislative, i.e., and those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the
Establishment Clause.
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice
of one’s religion. The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism, although the
Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of religious
groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state.
In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The realm of
belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one’s imagination and thought. So is
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. (Gerona v. Sec. of
Education)
Religious speech comes within the pale of the Free Exercise Clause as illustrated in the
American Bible Society case. In that case, plaintiff American Bible Society was a foreign, non-stock,
non-profit, religious missionary corporation which sold bibles and gospel portions of the bible in the
course of its ministry. The defendant City of Manila required plaintiff to secure a mayor’s permit and a
municipal license as ordinarily required of those engaged in the business of general merchandise under
the city’s ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to “religious censorship and restrained the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other
religious literature to the people of the Philippines.”
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Thus, the religious freedom doctrines one can derive from Gerona are: (1) it is incumbent upon the
Court to determine whether a certain ritual is religious or not; (2) religious freedom will not be upheld
if it clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law such that when a law of
general applicability (in this case the Department Order) incidentally burdens the exercise of
one’s religion, one’s right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption from compliance with
the law.
Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty and has a
preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of
religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary. (Victoriano v. Elizalde)
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply
felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Free Exercise Clause vis-à-vis Establishment Clause
In both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is a tension between the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in their application. There is a natural
antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice; this
tension between the religion clauses often leaves the courts with a choice between competing values in
religion cases.
Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent
neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act
indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them
when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply
dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law
or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the
Constitution, i.e., that in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law of general
applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it.
RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE:
OFFICE HOURS)
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise
clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise
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clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or
reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence;
recognize or deny the immortality of his soul – in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he
alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the
majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He
may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. “Men may believe
what they cannot prove.” Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account
because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious
freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for
the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.
SECTION 6
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., v. JUSTO LUKBAN
One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor
of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and
these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile
from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public
officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.
Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen
are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila
and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the
"right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may
be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or
morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would
therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
SECTION 7
LEGASPI v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents,
papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New
Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised
by the public.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of mandamus in a proper case.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may
be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September
23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both
terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO
The right to information is a constitutional right in and of itself and does not derive its significance
only in relation to the exercise of another right, such as the right to free speech or a free press if that is
the kind of “function” of an individual that can be equated with the functions of government agencies in
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
the above cases cited by the ponencia. To reiterate, Valmonte teaches that the right to information is not
merely an adjunct of the right to free speech and a free press. Stated another way, the right to
information is an end in itself, even as it may be exercised in furtherance of other rights or purposes of
an individual. To say that one exercises the right to information simply to be informed, and not because
of a particular need, is not a meaningless tautology. Thus, instead of using “showing of need” as a
passport to access purportedly privileged information, as in the case of government entities needing
information to perform a constitutionally mandated duty, the yardstick with respect to individuals
exercising a constitutionally granted right to information should be the importance of the right and the
public interest in upholding it.
The right to information lies at the heart of a government that is not only republican but also
democratic. For this reason, Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, calls for “an informed citizenry
with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and
the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution.” Thus, employing the “balancing of interests” test, the public interest
in upholding this constitutional right of the public to information must be carefully balanced with the
public interest in nondisclosure of information in relation to treaty negotiations. This test is in line with the
approach adopted in the right to access statute of the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential—since there should be
“ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved”—the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic
confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines
to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that
Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first
impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears
noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro
quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance
in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. x x x
(Emphasis and italics supplied) It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the
government may not be disclosed if they fall under “recognized exceptions.” The privilege for diplomatic
negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted
ruling cites PMPF v. Manglapus itself as an authority.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GRP PANEL
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a
significant part of the country’s territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs.
The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill
of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading
to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for
feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public
rights.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
SECTION 8
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION v. LAGUIO
There was no violation of the petitioners’ right to due process. The teachers admitted that they
were engaging in a strike. All the striking teachers were served with suspension orders and charge
sheets notifying them of their charges. They were given 5 days to answer. An investigation committee
was formed.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a right to strike, which
it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there was in fact such a
strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about this.
SECTION 9
IRON STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) v. COURT OF APPEALS
Under Rule 3, §1 of the RoC, the parties to a civil action are natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law. Thus, it will be seen that those who can be parties to a civil action may be broadly
categorized into two (2) groups: (a) those who are recognized as persons under the law whether natural,
i.e., biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical person such as corporations, on the other hand; and
(b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.
(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as
the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein. xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Administrative Code of 1987)
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of
the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof
such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the
charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
“Sec. 3. Representative Parties. — A trustee of an expressed trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by statute may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order
such beneficiary to be made a party. . . . .” (Rules of Court)
REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
domain:
First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
"Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration"; "lasting a very short time;
transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment". The word "momentary" when
applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" —
not indefinite or permanent.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1)
that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and
(2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use,
Under § 4 of Rule 67 of the RoC, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
U.S. v. CAUSBY
Common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe, but that doctrine has
no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, and to recognize private claims to airspace
would clog these, seriously interfere with the control and development in the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
But that general principle does not control the present case. If the flights over the property
rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. It is
the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken.
Though it would be only an easement of flight, that easement, if permanent and not merely
temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete
dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface
would be irrelevant. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land- his beneficial ownership -would
be destroyed.
If the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could
not be planted, and fences could not be run. The landowner owns at least as much of the space
above the ground as the can occupy or use in connection with the land. The flight of airplanes,
which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more
conventional entry upon it. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. It is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that
determines the question whether it is a taking.'
PEOPLE v. JUAN F. FAJARDO
While property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight the State may NOT, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the community.
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose, must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference
between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of
payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. A regulation which
substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is a deprivation
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment.
Zoning which limits property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it cannot be said to set
aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. If it
be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, should bear the
cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation
of private property for public use.
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. v. NEW YORK CITY
The Fifth Amendment injunction provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Its guarantee is designed to bar the Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely upon the particular circumstances in that case. The
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are relevant considerations. So, too, is the
character of the governmental action.
A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
The Government hardly could go on if to some extent, values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.
Government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values.
Exercises of the taxing power are one obvious example. A second are the decisions in which this Court
has dismissed "taking" challenges on the ground that, while the challenged government action caused
economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable
expectations of the claimant to constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes.
More importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded
that "the health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real
property interests have been upheld. Zoning laws are the classic example -- which have been viewed as
permissible governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.
Zoning laws generally do not affect existing uses of real property, but "taking" challenges have
also been held to be without merit in a wide variety of situations when the challenged governmental
actions prohibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had previously been devoted and thus
caused substantial individualized harm.
(Miller v. Schoene) The State might properly make "a choice between the preservation of one
class of property and that of the other" -- and since the apple industry was important in the State
involved, the State had not exceeded "its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one
class of property, without compensation, in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, is of greater value to the public."
(Goldblatt v. Hempstead) Because the restriction served a substantial public purpose, no taking
had occurred. It is, of course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may constitute a
"taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, or perhaps if it
has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that
substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations
as to amount to a "taking."
Government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate
uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute "takings."
The submission that appellants may establish a "taking" by showing that they have been denied
the ability to exploit a property interest that they believed was available for development is rejected.
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, the Court focuses on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
The NYC law is not rendered invalid by its failure to provide "just compensation" whenever a landmark
owner is restricted in the exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to a greater extent than
provided for under applicable zoning laws.
SUMULONG v. GUERRERO & NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA)
The taking to be valid must be for public use. The "public use" requirement is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. This is not
true anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. The constitution in at least two cases determines what is public use. One is the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government.
At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. It now
covers the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a
public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific
provisions in the Constitution.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by
those who satisfy prescribed qualifications.
Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The propriety of exercising the power of eminent
domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis.
There has since evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the 'number of people to be benefited
test.'
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be
expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, the Court will give
due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The
property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property
would have been more suitable for the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private
property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. Under the stewardship
concept, private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in
general, who are its real owners.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual
differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Buildings are described in terms of only 2 or 3 classes
of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can
serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
Before a writ of possession is issued in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be
met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A
provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be
made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The
deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION v. PANIS
Under the Constitution, there must be a law expressly authorizing local governments to
undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over
its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain. Section 100 of said Revised Charter
authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform.
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or
occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to
vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be
expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only.
The public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by
changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. TUDTUD
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator x x x. If expropriated
for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property
shall return to its former owner, then, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is
granted upon conditions that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city
abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory
provision to the contrary.
CITY OF MANILA v. ESTRADA
The market value of the property means its actual value, independent of the location of plaintiff’s
road thereon, that is, the fair value of the property as between one who wants to purchase and one who
wants to sell it; not what could be obtained for it in peculiar circumstances when greater than its fair price
could be obtained; not its speculative value; not the value obtained through the necessities of another.
Nor, on the other hand, is it to be limited to that price which the property would bring when forced off at
auction under the hammer. The question is, if the defendant wanted to sell its property, what could be
obtained for it upon the market from the parties who wanted to buy and would give its full value.
“Compensation” means an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken. Anything beyond
that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render something
which is equal to that taken or received. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation;” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be
real, substantial, full, ample. “Just compensation,” therefore, as used in section 246 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.”
MADDUMBA v. GSIS
It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its
assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to
preference. What respondent GSIS is resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at
their face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD
251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land
Bank bonds shall be accepted 'in the amount of their face value'; and (b) to accept the said bonds at
their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay
death, retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million
members, the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers."
These bonds are deemed contracts and the obligations resulting therefrom fall within the purview
of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, and any impairment thereof may take any
encroachment in any respect upon the obligation and cannot be permitted. Thus, the value of these
bonds cannot be diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said bonds are fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines. They are issued not in the open market nor for the
primary purpose of raising funds or pooling financial resources but in the captive market of landowners
and to facilitate the speedy transfer of lands to the tenant-farmers in support of the land reform program
of the Government. They are not ordinary commercial paper in that sense subject to
9
discounting (Emphasis supplied).
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) v. URGELLO
Contrary to petitioners DPWH’s and ATO’s undertakings in the January 17, 1990 Compromise
Agreement, they failed to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent despite her return of the purchase
price therefor. Such failure amounts to expropriation without just compensation.
DE KNECHT v. REPUBLIC
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Although RP has the right to expropriate, it may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
property should be taken. When the government acts arbitrarily, the right of the landowner to due
process is violated.
REPUBLIC v. DE KNECHT
While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case
between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public
use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
SECTION 10
HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSN v. BLAISELL
The Constitutional prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like
a mathematical formula. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing
and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The interdiction of statutes
impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are
vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public,
though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power,
which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of
the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is
paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
RUTTER v. ESTEBAN
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the determination of
the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable,
otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
It must be noted that the application of the reserved power of the State to protect the integrity of
the government and the security of the people should be limited to its proper bounds and must be
addressed to a legitimate purpose. If these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of
the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. We can
cite instances by which these bounds may be transgressed. One of them is that the impairment should
only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the
obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile. Another limitation refers to the propriety of
the remedy. The rule requires that the alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into
an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy
hardly pursuing. In other words, the Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the
police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against
impairment of contracts.
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by
giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized buy their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have
gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war
and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in
force (section 1).
But we should not lost sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still
inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least 12
years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. while the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest
during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
ABELLA v. NLRC
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition
is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not
to read with literal exactness for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. For not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order.
All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power
must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power.
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract of obligations, no
unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each
statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon
its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is
enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the
constitutional limitation of that power.
PRESLEY v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these
contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title
can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.
But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the
greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction
guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' but while it is
so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.'. Above all, it cannot
be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.,
An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of it’s
powers will conflict with vested rights arising from its contracts in which case the original terms and
provisions of the contract should govern.
The police power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of lands sold by
subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens Title.
It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people”. Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of Government,” the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
The claim to property rights based on the non-impairment clause has a lesser weight under the
present Constitution, vis a vis the police power
REPUBLIC v. CAGUIOA
The rights granted under the Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption of private respondents
are not absolute and unconditional as to constitute rights in esse – those clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
These certificates granting private respondents a “permit to operate” their respective businesses
are in the nature of licenses, which the bulk of jurisprudence considers as neither a property nor a
property right. The licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the grantor sees fit to impose,
including its revocation at pleasure. A license can thus be revoked at any time since it does not confer
an absolute right. While the tax exemption contained in the Certificates of Registration of private
respondents may have been part of the inducement for carrying on their businesses in the SBF, this
exemption, nevertheless, is far from being contractual in nature in the sense that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked.
LANDBANK v. REPUBLIC
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of
the thing mortgaged. Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is not the owner of the land, it does not have the
capacity to mortgage it to LBP.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, mortgagees of nondisposable lands, titles to which were
erroneously issued, acquire no protection under the Land Registration Law.
Even assuming that LBP was able to obtain its own TCT over the property by means of its
mortgage contract with Lourdes Farms, Inc., the title must also be cancelled as it was derived from OCT
No. P-2823 which was not validly issued to Bugayong. Forest lands cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish title or a Torrens title. It is well-settled that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral
land. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser
for value shall be cancelled.
Contrary to the argument of LBP, since the title is void, it could not have become
incontrovertible. Even prescription may not be used as a defense against the Republic.
The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts may not likewise be used by LBP
to validate its interest over the land as mortgagee. The State’s restraint upon the right to have an interest
or ownership over forest lands does not violate the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of
contracts. Said restraint is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
SECTION 12
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to over- bear the
will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel
present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the
system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.
If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the
dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is
reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a
lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and
that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial.
No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless
specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not
know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system
for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to
interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right
will suffice to stand in its stead: Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the
accused was aware of this right.
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure
that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.
PEOPLE v. SUNGA
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by
the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel
of his own choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the
right to be informed of these rights.
In People v. Bandula, this Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent counsel for the
accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
MAGTOTO v. MANGUERA
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And
the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed
and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in G, R. Nos. L-37201-
02, 3 7424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the
rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they
were not informed of “their right to remain silent and to counsel,” “and to be informed of such right,”
because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
GAMBOA v. JUDGE CRUZ
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel
to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited
provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several
cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the
right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was
not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
PEOPLE v. ESCORDIAL
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering
that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch
as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a
certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when
these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the
accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the
suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as “critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution” which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because
the results of these pre-trial proceedings “might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to
a mere formality.” We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible
as evidence against him.
GALMAN v. PAMARAN
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the
other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as
follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity"
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates."
The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents
should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be
given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The deletion of the phrase "in a
criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other
than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the
herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its
strictest sense, a criminal case
YAP v. CA
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial or whenever so
required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when
required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged is to permit the impression that the amount
paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because
bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await
the judgment of the appellate court.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail.
DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition,
the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a
guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and
declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment."
The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as
follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
COMENDADOR v. DE VILLA
The right to bail invoked has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
SECTION 14
OLAGUER v. MILITARY COMMISSION
Civilians placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process,
not by executive or military process.
Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive
power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.
Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on
the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that
have remained open and have been regularly functioning.
And in Toth v. Quarles, the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that the assertion of military
authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of
martial law.
The late Justice Black ... added that (A) Court-Martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which military
discipline is preserved," and that ex-servicemen should be given "the benefits of a civilian court trial
when they are actually civilians ... Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to
the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active
service.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-
Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
U.S. v. LULING
It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is
violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing
that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations,
has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute
prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or
acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.
DUMLAO v. COMELEC
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ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard.
MARQUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the
court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication,
it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are
to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable
opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is
warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a
rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures
were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable
opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of
the signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI.
PEOPLE v. HOLGADO
When a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1)
It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2) After giving
him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3) If he desires and is
unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4) If the accused
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that “no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”, and that all accused “shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel.” In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it
is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
PEOPLE v. RUDY REGALA and DELFIN FLORES
But the appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an
agent of a person in authority because the information filed against appellant did not allege the essential
elements of assault that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
an agent of a person in authority.
Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution
without any objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the
information so as to validly convict the accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. JUDGE
JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent
of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment
for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the
Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-
appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4)
for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies.
AURELIA CONDE v. PABLO RIVERA
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a
right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts
while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly
unjust to her and a detriment to the public.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
PEOPLE v. HON. GENARO GINES
"The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same
shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It
secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice."
It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays
and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where
it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a
medical check-up abroad.
For, speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution
can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial. While accused persons do have rights, many of them
choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.
MATEO v. VILLALUZ
38
ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
A judge should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.
Outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling
for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections
are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult
to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood.
His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an
impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that: the people's faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On
the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all important confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a
case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving
meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
The SC has the power to set aside the order denying the motion disqualification. While the
discretion in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our corrective
authority. Certainly, there can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to
refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's impartiality.
TAMPAR v. USMAN
The Court shares the concern of petitioners in the use of the yamin in this proceeding, and for that
matter, before Philippine Shari'a courts. Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional
right to due process. It denies a party his right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-
examine them.
CARREDO v. PEOPLE
What is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the accused "unqualifiedly admits in
open court after his arraingment the he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial," no more
no less.
It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the
accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means that he
thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others.
However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is
thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its
witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not
mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so
required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
SECTION 16
GUIANI v. SANDIGANBAYAN
In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the
rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. In the determination of
whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the
length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
The right to a speedy trial as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, except
when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. It must therefore be asserted. Thus, if
there was a delay in the trial of the case, petitioners are not entirely without blame. Furthermore, the
right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be
utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. While accused
persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights. It
secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. A party's individual
rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.
SECTION 17
US v. NAVARRO
It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express words or
acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him.
He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged.
US v. TAN TENG
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's
own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination
of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in the commission of a crime
US v. ONG SIU HONG
To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to
exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of
an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the
accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to
prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether
facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases
arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely
necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
FRANCISCO BELTRAN v. FELIX SAMSON
The scope of the right against self-incrimination, as to its scope, is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
39
ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation
so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally
to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward
their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed
not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means
than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention.
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
MARIA BERMUDEZ v. LEODEGARIO D. CASTILLO
The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. . . . But the privilege is an option of refusal,
not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on the stand, and self-criminating act
relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may be asked, and then it is for the
witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known beforehand what he
will do.
It further state that "the proper place in which to claim the privilege is in the trial court, when
the question is propounded, not here."
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and
prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person,
in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its
purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the
person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to
do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any
condition. This court is the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may
prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation
favorable to the person invoking it.
ROGER CHAVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
The right against self incrimination is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which
is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive
right; The constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and foresighted."
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern.
To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.
The constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of
policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of
humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and
17
degree of which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant."
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege
19
as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether
refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule
positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
"to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-
defendant in a joint trial.
MANUEL F. CABAL v. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA
The accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand.
Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence
of a default an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus
defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the
lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by
the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such a
offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to
the sovereign power.
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal, and,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against
themselves are applicable thereto.
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or
imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings
are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself
applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil
in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a
proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, .... (58 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 44, p. 49: emphasis ours.)
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a
question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a
prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by
counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to
incriminate the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. (C.J.S., p. 252; emphasis ours.)
A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any
question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or
forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.
In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-
incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness which
would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the
public justice the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal
ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal
court but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy.
PASCUAL v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
SC said in the Kapunan case: “We conclude… that the Self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to
other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and
the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.” We reiterate that such a principle is equally
applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. “The accused has a perfect right
to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.”
It is the right of a defendant “to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand – with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will.”
40
ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference
accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote
from Chief Justice Warren, “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government… must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”
According to Justice Douglas: “The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment.” So
also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of “a right to a private enclave where the
may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.”
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENATE
An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring
an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and
refuse to answer any and all questions.
Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its Committees,
to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits. It is plain that investigation of the
matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the
institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action.
The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law.
SECTION 19
PEOPLE v. ESTOISTA
It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense as to include “carries” and
“holds.” This has to be to is the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils, the same
perils to public security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatever. “Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the
ownership may tend to establish the guilt or intention of the accused.”
Intention to possess is an essential element of a violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to
imply title or right to the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention
to own but also intention to use. From the very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition control or
dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential
factor.
The terms “control” and “dominion” themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact
definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a
violation vary. It is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not
a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of
such possession is where “a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a
moment, or to shoot at some object.”
The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government,
directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify
imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive.
PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of
law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to
avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong
done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the later
generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law.
Today every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human rights recognized and
protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve
society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened
and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these
laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Under the RPC, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy
during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or
with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide,
and arson resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the
emergencies of the times.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same
was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of
the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral
self of a people.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose
the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that
Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by
death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. The
right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is
obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting
in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty,
greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche
of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
41
ALFONSO ARAGONES ATILANO BARTOLOME BAUTISTA CABRALES CASTRO DUEÑAS GUEVARA MACALINO TAGRA VALLO WILWAYCO YAN
The heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to
which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with the
fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with even more basic questions, for to
grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask
what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
SECTION 20
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of
a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain
acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the
law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se,
but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malumprohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.There are occasions when the police power of the
state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held
that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the
state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt
is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to
cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
SECTION 21
PEOPLE v. ELISEA YLAGAN
Under section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is in legal jeopardy when placed
on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint
or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the information. This
overrules the case of United States vs.Ballentine, which required the investigation of the charges by
the calling of a witness in order that a legal jeopardy may attach. The mere calling of a witness would not
add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the
process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and
stand trial.
The phrase "without the consent of the accused" used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". The
sound rule is, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case
does not constitute a consent within the meaning of said section. The right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense is as important as the other constitutional rights of the accused in a
criminal case. Waiver can not, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
AGATON BULAONG v. PEOPLE
Under the Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where
he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent. It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information. In the case at bar the accused has not been convicted or acquitted
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
in another case filed against him. Neither has that case been dismissed or terminated without his
consent for it is still pending. Hence, the defense of double jeopardy is not available to him.
An accused charged with rebellion in the Laguna Court of First Instance and later with subversion
in the Manila Court of First Instance cannot plead double jeopardy in the rebellion case after he was
convicted of rebellion.
CONRADO MELO v. PEOPLE
One who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the Government cannot begin with the
highest, and then go down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included
therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result."
The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a
new and distinct offense," the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense.
PEOPLE v. BULING
The rule is: where after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense, and together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted
for the new offense.
However, in this case, a new fact has NOT come into existence. What happened was, a second
physician examined Balaba’s injuries, taking an x-ray picture of the arm wounded, and he made a
certification to the effect that the treatment will take 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. The SC agreed with
counsel for Buling’s contention that the injury and the condition thereof was the same when the first
examination was made.
Before filing informations for physical injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the
injuries should first be made to avoid instances where by reason of the Constitutional provision of double
jeopardy, the accused cannot be held to answer for the graver offense committed.
PEOPLE v. TIOZON
The rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law
while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the RPC.
The protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal
or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. In
other words, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under §1 of PD 1866 because of the
resulting crime of homicide or murder, the prosecution must allege in the information and prove by the
quantum of evidence required for conviction violation of said section and, more specifically, the use of an
unlicensed firearm and the commission of homicide or murder.
JUDGE MUPAS & ZAFRA v. PEOPLE
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional
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proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer
to evidence, its judgment is considered void.
(People v. Laguio) The appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
PEOPLE v. JUDGE RELOVA & OPULENCIA
The constitutional provision involved reads as follows: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” (Article IV (22), 1973
Constitution)
The first sentence sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged
in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under
an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
Our Bill of Rights deals with 2 kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even
if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity
of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution,
conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition,
different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense
having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other
— and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The second sentence was inserted precisely for the
purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not
otherwise be covered by the first sentence.
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to
have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in
the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the
accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been
moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously
under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
The rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must
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be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements
constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law
seeks to prevent harassment of an accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different
from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, an accused
should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise,
an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission,
by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. For example, the crime of rape may be converted
into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the
offended girl from remaining a virgin.
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused
by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented
and sliced to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or
statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
The extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO
Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. Estrada failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the
impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioner’s claim of double
jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment
court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a violation of his right to
speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute.
Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every invocation of an
accused’s right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court accords due importance to an accused’s
right to a speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be
invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time
are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
The doctrine is that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of the
accused, there is no double jeopardy.
PEOPLE v. HON. FERRER
Article III, §1 (11) "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted."
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. Bills of attainder were
employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it,
and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder.
VIRATA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
The PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the
equal protection clause and is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. The constitutionality of
laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shag not be declare invalid unless the
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conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt"The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality ....
A bill of attainder is legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be reasonably construed as a determination
or declaration of guilt. On contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 1 make it
perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt in the amassing acquisition of 'ill-gotten wealth' is to be
handed down by a judicial tribunal, in this case the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed an
prosecuted by the PCGG. In the second place, no punishment inflicted by the executive orders, as
the merest glance at their provisions will immediately make apparent. In no sense, therefore, may
the executive orders be regarded as a bill of attainder (sic).
LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one –
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person
to his disadvantage.
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It
is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
ARTICLE IV: CITIZENSHIP
VALLES vs. COMELEC
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held
by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in
the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated
her Australian citizenship.
ONG CHIA v. REPUBLIC
It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
22
favor of the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places
23
of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
GATCHALIAN v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra).
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian.
CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is
to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine
(9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
old.
YU v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship, by applying for a new Portuguese
passport, is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. The material facts are
not only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner.
Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed
when convenient.
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
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While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as
this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner’s claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF PROCLAMATION CONSISTENT WITH PURPOSE OF THE LAW
The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now,
an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the
law mandates his term of office to begin.
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
REGISTERED VOTER REQUIREMENT REFERS TO REGISTRATION NOT CITIZENSHIP
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It
should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of
this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
REPATRIATION RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF FILING OF HIS APPLICATION
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptionsto this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private
deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of
some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on
conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation.
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct
errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of
their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes
faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its
provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
ISSUE ON DUAL CITIZENSHIP/STATELESSNESS
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May
8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
Judicial declaration of disqualification not a continuing bar.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship
is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the
occasion demands.
LABO v. COMELEC
In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the
proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially
so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim
of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not
point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship
upon him. . . .
MERCADO v. MANZANO
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
Equally without merit is petitioner’s contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have
been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
TABASA v. CA
RA 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,” was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account
of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
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PETITIONER SHOULD BE A MINOR IN ORDER TO AVAIL RA 8171
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the
minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a
former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically
vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:[18] the children acquire
the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.
This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity
to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply
for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can
possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
The implementing rules require a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, “the
reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman,
or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her
Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified.”
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one’s native country is necessarily a political act, it
does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To
reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship
speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political
refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like
to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a
better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to
the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to
forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial
step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by
the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant
for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who
will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner
Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for
repatriation.
AASJS v. DATUMANONG
From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting
Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of
the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3
of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE
MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
In connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress shall
provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the
residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and
the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said Section appears to be repugnant
to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority
given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President
and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to
it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The ambit of
legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions,
one of which is the aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions. The
Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the
fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the
Government.”
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important
part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission
may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists,
and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
“except those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings.
In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of
R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.
NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC
Domicile” is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been
physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for
example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident
of the Philippines under this law. This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate
that we – that Congress – must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos. If we read the Constitution
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and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can
provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President. Senator Arroyo. Mr.
President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: “The Congress shall provide a
system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.” The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is “qualified.” In other
words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on
the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And
“residents” (sic) is a qualification. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately
after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section
2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember. The second reason, Mr.
President, is that under our jurisprudence … – “residency” has been interpreted as synonymous with
“domicile.” But the third more practical reason, … is, if
we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the
country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise – to
enfranchise them and empower them to vote.
ROMUALDEZ v. RTC
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
19
indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
20
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
21
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. It must be emphasized that
the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling
and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that the government can
truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed
ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle
as part of its national laws.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"
"to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to
strike down these stipulations.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
It is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the
Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to
redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative
and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the
determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with
the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal
with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to
the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes
beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program
as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will
guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it
is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just
distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can
now become the key at least to their deliverance.
LUZ FARMS v. DAR
It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the agrarian reform program of the government. The Committee adopted the
definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land. The
intention of the Committee was to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus, Section II of RA
6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine
raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State
PEOPLE v. LEACHON
The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and
conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or
eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.
What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane manner" is that the person to be
evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation
or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the
illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or
demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage
to properties.
The enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged "squatters" the opportunity to present
their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly
observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first
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requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to
show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the
consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking
advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners.
CARINO v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules
of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function,
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and
the entry of a judgment."
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own
judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in
the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining
order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law."
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the
CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not
being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also
be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in
an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
SIMON v. CHR
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations; such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the
tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."
CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
"The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it
that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or
protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
ARTICLE XIV: EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants
to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and advised. Of course, he may
not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the
same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a
course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that “every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical
schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
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MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. CA
Power to Discipline
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms
subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on
academic grounds: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who
may be admitted to study.
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom (how it
shall be taught). The establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary
for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Also, such rules and regulations are necessary for the protection of the students,
faculty, and property.
Further, by instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the
student likewise finds basis in the second freedom (what to teach).
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
Finally, the right to discipline is most evident in the fourth freedom (who may be admitted to study).
If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as
suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges. Admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study…
and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Such rules are "incident to the very
object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may
include those governing student discipline." Moreover, in Hohfeldian terms, students, by having the right
to education, have the concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational
institution: “The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions.” Such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover,
Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not
the deprivation of their rights.
Free Speech and Right to Peaceable Assembly v. Academic Freedom
Students have the rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They do not 'shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' While educational
institutions have authority over the conduct of students, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards.
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to
free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.
Thus, while the right of the students to free expression is recognized, the SC did not rule out disciplinary
action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Section 7 or RA 7079 provides: “A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status
as student in order to retain membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled or
suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of his
or her duties in the student publication.”
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is interpreted to mean that the school cannot suspend or
expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles
materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Power to Investigate
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel,
is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

GARCIA v. THE FACULTY

Being a particular educational institution (seminary), petitioner cannot compel the

mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to admit the
petitioner. Respondent Fr. Lambino and Loyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to
admit the petitioner or not. Factors that were considered are academic standards, personality
traits, character orientation and nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom?
- it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as
they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or
authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines."
The school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to
the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
gradging fashion

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. CA

It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules
and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom.
Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to
determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this
academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise.

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