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INTEREST

REPRESENTATION
IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION

STIN GREENWOOD
The major
Published
institutions and actors Forthcoming
Siegtinde Gstöht and Dirk de Bievre The Trade Policy
the European Union
christìan Kaunert and sarah Leonard Justice and Home
of
lnterest
Representation in the
Renaud Dehousse The European Court of Justice

Justin Creenwood lnterest RePresentation in the Affairs in the EuroPean Union


European Union (4rd edn) PauI stephenson, Esther Verstuis and Mendeltje van
Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace The council Keulen lmplementing and Evaluating Poticy ¡n the
of Ministers (2nd edn)
simon Hìx and Christopher Lord Pol¡tical Parties ln the
European Union
European Union
Also planned
Political Union
European Union
David Judge and David Earnshaw The European
Partiament (2nd edn)
Neitl Nugent and Mark Rhinard The
commission (2nd edn)
European
The member states and the Union 4th edition
Published
sâbine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan The Court of
Just¡ce ofthe European Union and the Politics of Law Carlos closa and PauL Heywood Spain and the
Anne Stevens with HandLey Stevens Brussels European Union
Bureaucrats? The Admlnistration of the European Andrew Geddes Britain and the European Union
Union Alain cuyomarch, Howard Machin and ELta Ritchie
WotfgangWessels The EuroPean council France in the European Uníon Justin Greenwood
Brigid Lâffan and Jane O'Mahoney ¡reland and the
Forthcoming
European Union
Ariadna Ripotl Servent The EuroPean Parliament

Forthcoming
The main areas of policy Simon Butmer and wìttÌam E. Paterson Germany and
Published the European Union

Karen Anderson Social Policy in the EuroPean Union /ssues


Michêel Baun and Dan Marek Cohesion Policy in the
Published
European Union
senem Aydrn-Düzgit and Nathatie Tocci Turkey and
MicheLleCini and Lee McCowãm competition Poticy in
the European Union
the European Union (2nd edn)
Derek Beach The Dynamics of European lntegration:
Wyn crant The common AgrlculturaI Policy
Why and When EU lnstitutions Matter
Martin HotLand and lvlathew Doidge DeveloPment
Christina Boswetl and Andrew Geddes Migration and
Policy of the European Union
Mobitity ln the European Union
Jotyon Howorth Securlty and Defence Poticy in the
Thomas Christiansen and Christine Reh
European Union (2nd edn)
Const¡tutionalizing the European Union
Johanna Kântola Gender and the European Union Desmond Dìnan, Neilt Nugent and WiLllêm E. Paterson
Stephan Keuketeire and Tom Delreux The Foreign (eds) The European Union in Crisis
Poticy of the European Union (2nd edn)
Tuomas Forsberg and Hìskì Haukkala The European
Brigid Laffan The Finances of the EuroPean Union
Union and Russia
MatcoLm Levitt and Christopher Lord The Potiticat
Robert Ladrech Europeanization and Nat¡onal Polit¡cs
Collège d'Europe
Economy of Monetary Union
CéciteLeconte UnderstandlngEuroscepticism
Jânne Haaland Mattéry Energy Poticy ln the EuroPean Steven McGuire and l"lichaeI Smith The European
Union
John Mccormick Env¡roniîental Policy inthe
Union and the United States '/ t ,AN. 2018
Wyn Rees The US-EU Security Retationship: The
European Union
Tensions between a European and a Global Agenda
John Peterson and Margaret Sharp Technology Policy l"lagnus Rynerand Atan Cafruny The European Union
in the European Union and clobal Capltalism
Handley Stevens Transport Poticy in the European Union Eibliothèque
Forthcoming
Hans Bruyninckx and Tom Detreux Environmental
Policy and Politics in the European Un¡on Thomas Christiansen, EmiI Kirchner and Uwe
macmilian
Maren Kreutler, Johannes PoLtak and SamueI
Schubert Enerry Policy in the European Union
Wissenbach The European Union and China
Doug Webber European Disintegration?
â education
ñðëürõvry
O Justin Creenwood 2003, 2OO7, 2O1 1' 2017 Contents
Att r¡ghts reserved. No reProduction, coPy or transmission of this
pubtiiation may be made without written permission.

ce
fron
List of Features vll
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this Publication Preføce to the Fourth Edition viii
miy be tiabte to criminaI Prosecution and civiI claims for damages'
to be identified as the author of this
Thè author has asserted his right
List of Abbreuiatìons ix
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988'
Firsr edition 2003
Second edition 2007
1 Introduc.tion: Representation,Participation andDeliberation 1,

Third edition 201 1 The variety of interests in Europe 1,1,

Fourth edition pubtished ?O17 bY Groups 1,4


PALGRAVE Non-group actors 1B
Palgrave in the UK is an imPrint of Macmillan Publishers Lim¡ted, registered Conclusions 22
in ingtand, comPany number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW'
Palgraveo and Macmitlano are registered trademarks in the United States, 2 EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 24
thtUnited Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
'Routes' of influence 26
ISBN 978-1-1 37- 49132-9 hardback EU interest representation through the'national route' 28
ISBN 978-1-1 37-49131-2 paperback
EU interest representation through the'Brussels route' 32
Conclusions 53

3 The Regulation of Lobbying and the European


A catalogue record for this book is avaitabte from the British Library. Transparency Register 55
A catatog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress' Regulating conduct of those working in EU institutions 56
The regulation of lobbyists 58

4 Business Interests and the Professions 67


Business interest associations 71,
Cross-sectoral associations 76
Sector associations and firms 8B
Large firms as EU public affairs actors 92
Professional interests 94
Peak associations claiming representation of
professionals 97
EU sectoral professional interests 100
Conclusions 107

v
vi Contents

5 Labour Interests 109


113
List of Features
Labour and the economic agenda
Social Europe through a participative labour
market model 1,1,7

The European organization of labour interests 1,21.

Conclusions 125
Tables
6 Citizen Interests 127 1,.1, Transparency Register registrations as at 31 August 2016 13
The landscape of citizen interest groups 129 4.1 EU business associarions employing 15 or more staff 75
The European Citizens' Initiative 1,33
6.1. Members of the EU Civil Society Conract Group L29
The funding of NGOs 134
6.2' Cross-sectoral EU citizen interest associations not in
Historic landmarks in the development of EU membership of the Civil Society Conrac Group
139 130
cítízen interest representatio n
1.42
6.3 EU funding of principal EU NGOs L36
Environmental interests
Consumer interests 155 6.4 Greenl0 Transparency Register declarations 148
Social interests 161, 7.1, Degrees of devolved authority in the EU member srates 176
Social movements 1.67 7.2 Territorial representation offices in Brussels: EU-28 181
Conclusions 171, 7.3 Principal sectoral EU trans-regional associations and
networks 188
7 Territoriallnterests t73
Regional governance in llestern Europe 17s
Figure
The organization of territorial public interests at
the European level 1.79 6.1, NGO clusters around the European Parliament
The Brussels offices of the regions 180 in the Brussels property hotspot 1,39
Territorially based EU collective action organizations 185
Conclusions 190

8 Organized Civil Society and European Integration 793


Organized civil society and the democratic
legitimacy of the EU 1.94
Organized civil society and the development of
EU competencies 21.8
Conclusions: organized civil society and the EU 222

Bibliography 227

Index 257

vll
Preface to the Fourth Edition List of Abbreviations

ACE Architects' Council of Europe


ACEA Association of European Automobile
constructors
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
AEBR Association of European Border Regions
AEMH European Association of Senior Hospital
Physicians
AER Assembly of European Regions
AFCO Constitutional Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament
AFME Association for Financial Markets in Europe
ALTER-EU Alliance on Lobbying Transparency and
cease being a member Ethics Reyiew
treated throughout the AMCHAM-EU EU Committee of the American Chamber of
g 28 member states, as Commerce
per the time this book entered production. ANEC European Association for the Coordination of
Consumer Representation in Standardisation
ATTAC Association for the Taxation of Financial
Transactions in aid of the Citizen
BAR Brussels Automobile Representatives
BEREC Body of European Regulators for Electronic
Communication
BEUC The European Consumer Organisation
(Bureau Européen des Unions de
Consommateurs)
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CCBE Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Union
CCRLA Consultative Council of Regional and Local
Authorities
CEC Confédération Européenne des Cadres
CEDAG European Council for Voluntary Organisations

vlll 1X
X List of AbbreuiaTions List of Abbreuiations X1

CEE Central and Eastern EuropQ EEA European Environmental Agency


CEEP European Centre of Emplgyers and Enter- EEB European Environmental Bureau
prises, providing public services and services EEC European Economic Community
of general interest EES European Employment Strategy
CEFIC European Chemical Industry Council EESC European Economic and Social Committee
CEMR Council of European Municipalities and EFBW^X/ European Federation of Building and \Øood
Regions \Working
CEN Comité Européen de la Normalisation E,FM European Federation of Metalworkers
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical EFPIA European Federation of Pharmaceutical Indus-
Standardization try Associations
CEo(s) Chief Executive Officer(s) EFSA European Food Safety Authority
CEPLIS European Council of the Liberal Professions EFTA European Free Trade Association
CESI European Confederation of Independent EIB European Investment Bank
Trade Unions EIFs European Industry Federations
CGT Confédération Général du Travail ELISAN European Local Inclusion and Social Action
CLRAE Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Network
Europe ELU European Lawyers' Union
COFACE Confederation of Family Organisations in the EMF European Metalworkers Federation
European Union EMU Economic and Monerary Union
CONCA\øE The Oil Companies European Organization ENSA European Network of Social Authorities
for Environmental and Health Protection EP European Parliament
CONECCS Consultation, the European Commission and EPACA European Public Affairs Consultancy Associa-
Civil Society tron
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives EPE European Partners for the Environment
CoR Committee of the Regions EPHA European Public Health Alliance
CPME Standing Committee of European Doctors EPO European policy office
CPMR Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions ERFS European Roundtable on Financial Services
CSO Civil society organization ERRIN European Regions Research Innovation Net-
DG Directorate General work
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Bundesvorstand ERRT European Retail Round Table
DG EMPL Directorate General Employment, Social ERT European Round Table of Industrialists
Affairs and Inclusion ESAN European Social Action Network
DG SANTE Directorate General for Health and Food ETI European Transparency Initiative
Safety ETR European Transparency Register
EAPN European Anti-Poverty Network ETSI European Telecommunications Standards
ECAS European Citizen Action Service Institute
ECCE European Council of Civil Engineers ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
ECI European Citizens' Initiative EU European Union
ECJ European Court of Justice EUMF European Union Migrants' Forum
EDRi European Digital Rights initiative EUPHF European Union Public Health Forum
xll List of Abbreuiations List of Abbreuiations xllt

European Association of (Regional) Develop- MEP Member of the European Parliament


EURADA
ment Agencies METREX Network of European Metropolitan Regions
European Regional and Local Health and Areas
EUREGHA
Authorities NGO Non-governmental organization
Union of the electricity industry in Europe NORMAPMF, The official represenrarive of craftltrades and
EURELECTRIC
Council of European Professional and Managerial SMEs in the European standardization bodies
EUROCADRES
Staff
NUTS Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
Association of European Chambers of OMC Open Method of Coordination
EUROCHAMBRES
Commerce and IndustrY ORGALIME European Engineering Association
European Federation of Retailing and PAP Public Affairs Practitioners
EUROCOMMERCE
Distribution PERMREP Permanent Representation to the European
European Community of Consumer Cooperatives Union
EUROCOOP
E\øC European'Works Council QMV Qualified majority voring
European Women's LobbY REGLEG Conference of Regions with Legislative Powers
ENíL
Federation Européenne d'Associations Nationales ROIR Register of Interest Representatives
FEANI
d'Ingénieurs RSB Regulatory Scrutiny Board
European Federation of National Organisations SEAP Society of European Affairs Pracririoners
FEANTSA
'Working SGSD Second General Systems Directive
with the Homeless
Federation of EuroPean EmPloYers SINAPSE Scientific Information for Policy Support in
FedEE
First General SYstems Directive Europe
FGSD
European Construction Industry Federation SLG Starting Line Group
FIEC
Forum of Financial Services Users SME small and medium-sized enterprise
FIN-USE
Friends of the Earth TABD Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue
FoE
Friends of the Earth EuroPe TACD Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue
FoEE
Financial Services Consumer Group TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European
FSCG
Financial Times Union
FT
Greenl0 - the'group of ten' environmental TEU Treaty on European Union
G10
NGOs TI Transparency International
General Agreement on Tariffs and Services TR Transparency Register
GAIS
Inter-institutional agreement TUC Trades Union Congress
IIA
UAE Union des Avocats Européens
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
UDH Unternehmerverband Deutsches Handwerk
INTERREG Cross-border and Inter-regional Cooperation
UEAPME European Association of Craft, Small and
IPRA International Public Relations Association
Innovating Regions in EuroPe Medium-Sized Enterprises
IRE UEMO
Interregional Trade Union Council European Union of General Practitioners
IRTUC \øHO
International Standard Classification of World Health Organization
ISCO \øPG
Occupations White Paper on Governance
'llorld Conservation Union wwF 'Síorld lù(/ide
IUCN Fund for Nature
zdH Zentr alverband des Deutschen Handwerks
JTI Joint technology initiatives
Chapter I

lntroduction : Representation,
Participation and Deliberation

lùlhat role d.oes interest representarion play in the European


Union (EU)
political system? \x/hat should we make of populist narratives about
public decision-making prone ro caprure by 'special inreresrs'? Or the
counter-narrative, that EU political institutions skilfully use a diverse
range oÍ advocacy organizations to lobby member states and each other
to achieve their legislative goals? How much do resources matter in
lobbying activities and outcomes? If advocacy organizations politicize
issues sufficiently to a level of high public salienc¡ will decisive supporr
from the European Parliament follow? Do lobbies work within param-
eters set by EU institutions, or themselyes act as agenda setters? Are
there different patterns of lobbying for different caregories of policies?
Does the size of lobbying coalitions marter? Is there a European ,style,
of lobbying distinctive from elsewhere, or do characreristics of EU lob-
bying simply reflect the different rules of political decision-making? Are
systems in place which achieve participation from a diverse range of
interests in EU policymaking which strengrhen political decision-making
and its connections to civil societ¡ and how well do procedures intended
to achieve these work in practice? These questions have been subject to
a substantial legacy of research in recent years which offer increasingly
sophisticated and highly nuanced approaches.
'Lobbying' is a highly charged term which is perceived in very differ-
ent ways throughout EU member states and beyond. For international

vote in European Parliament elections, and


little as I3o/" inthe lowest
as
turnout country. Much of rhe conrent of EU legislation
involves highly

1
Intr o du ction: Repr es entatio n, Particip ation and eration
2 Interest Reþresentation in the Euroþean Union D elib 3

technical regulation seemingly difficult -to-


beyond highly specialized groups of stakehol
p,Ú instit.rtion, ut. advocacy groups as the
ãtherwis. absent civil society' How does th
"*rlî.î-'nttåiitütio., states, a view prevails that representative polit-
method of governing, while accountable (Kröger 2016). once issues reach open public spheres of
ical institutions provid. the oily legiti-mate
deliberation, their salience increases, placing reason ãnd pofular will
in others parallel Par in positions taken by political insriturions, rather than secludèd venues
have long co-existed
of private interest represenrarion (Dür and Mateo 2014). Article 11 of
Democrøcy TheorY (P
the Treaty on F,uropean union (TEU) mandates rhe EU institutions 'to
sentatiYe democratic s
maintain an open, transparent and regular di
view that'expanding the opportuni
associations and civil society', following Artic
deficits in democratic representatio
macy of representative democracy in the EU
has experienced something of- a.recent.
that the common will can only be achi
cal institutions. This presents something
organizations which are reliant lpon a
the best available proxy or civil
par",
"rã âv lncr
soc institutions, they carry the prospect
to resources and organization to seek
change or to preserYe some percei ed advantage in the status quo' and
,.r"y ãu.n l.ad to'regulatory capture'' For Stie:

ut too much emPhasis on public deliberation in the EU's multi-level governance decision-making
society organisations onlY scheme to create an effective system of checks and balances which con-
rticipants themselves can- tributes to, rather than detracts from, democratic representation. An
those who are going to be entrepreneurial example involves Members of the European parliament
(MEPs) providing pump-priming for the establishment of the NGO
bound by them. (Stie 2010:130) 'watch
Finance in 2011 to help pluralize expert information sources in
technical financial regulation after the global financial crisis, drawing
Non-governmentalorganizations(NGos)presentparticularisticinter-
'interest' upon those with previous industry experience and beyond to provide
.ri, ;îrtin.a in ,r.tiu.?r"l 'public terms' and the absence of
mechanisms for them is problematic (Kröger_ 201,6)'
"...ir",áUiffty
R"..n, public contÀversies over the rolã of Greenpeace in 'Golden
Rice' involves adding a genetically
Rice, illustrates the point. 'Golden
food staple to address vitamin A
modified (GM) suppiemenr to a daily
to child death in poor countries'
deficiency, a majoi ãnnual contributor
opposition to GM
but implementation À", b.tt delayed by Greenpeace's
solutions (Connor 2014)'
Intr o du ction : Repr es entation, Particip ation and D elib eration s
4 Interest Representation in the European Union

and evolving plu- of their funding (Greenwood and Dreger 2013). some European policy
(AFME). The example is a metaphor for an emerging offices (EPos) of inrernarional NGos (such as the ìØorldwiàe pund for
NGOs can
i^l¡r^t¡onof participation in expert I U policymaking'.where Nature - NøIøF EPO, and Friends of the Earth Europe - FoEE) do draw
co-exist in the same eco-system as producer organizations on EU funds to supplement their own network of resources, helping
a European Com-
\X/ith 28 member states, eight pólitical parties' and to maintain substantial staff levels in their Brussels offices. Accorãing
*irrion with multi-d.p"ti-ät"i pt"p"ttiutt' the basic constitutional to the European Commission's Financial Transparency System, FoEE
to be present
ä.rtg"- f.t pluralizatioi of decisioi--ukittg would seem received over €6 million from EU institutions in2014,yet any cursory
by any type of
in EU decisior,--"Ling.'Capture' of EU decision-making examination of the campaign messages on its website shows that it
spectre' A core ques-
outside interest ,..-Jtht"Jore to be an unlikely does not find this to be a constraint on its criticisms of EU political
¡á" i, whether there is sufficient proceduralization, and a broad degree institutions or EU public policy. Similarl¡ Transparency Inrernational's
of pluralization, of interest repre prominent website headline that'EU institutions perform poorly' arose
.oon,.r-argument to Public from their 2015 report on'Lobbying in Europe' co-funded by an EU
"rrå
deliberation maY be in formation funding streaml (Transparency International 2015b). NGO; under-
stand their role is to be an 'unofficial opposition' in an EU political
system based on consensual decision-making which lacks the mecha-
nisms its member states have to bring'politics to the people,. Informed
lity to citizens: critique by organizations such as Transparency International (TI),
working from a staff complement of ten in its Brussels EU liaison office
primarily on supplemented by the resources of the network in other European cities
Legitimate representation in postmodernity depen-ds and beyond, acts as a'critical friend' to help align EU decision-making
constituents and representatives,
the continuous interaction between with core democratic standards. These critiques, informed by tools
the exchange of arguments and the
justification of decisions.
ú;rJ ." such as the construction of specialist transparency'watchdog' websites
(Wolff 201'3:45) ro monitor activities of EU institutions and their dialogue with CSOs
th EU institutions (Chapter 3), provide ready fodder for specialist press outlets surround-
A permanent ecosystem of ing EU politics. A notable recenr arrival on the Brussels scene, politico,
the 'usual mecha-
fr.îp, ,o bring accountabil has brought a new cutting edge to EU journalism from'Washington DC
at national level'
nisms' connecting citizens and, together with information feeds from NGOs, helps to establish
such as a common language medium and recogniza-bi:,fl:lt:î31"Tï; compelling forms of accountability on EU institutions.
has seeminglY now Heavy reliance upon, and institutio nalizationof, interest organizations
substantial funding in any political system brings to the fore a whole range of issues. There
are questions about the ability of cSos to perform surrogate democratic
s to ensure Pluralis-
are accompanied functions when there is the possibility of being instrumentalized by their
lic' sphere. These
engâgement with political institutions (Chapter 6). Another key issue
by measures of pr aimed at meeting basic democratic
is the extent to which interest organizatíons can really connect wider
in increasingly
pre-conditions suc rt public' deliberates
civil society with political institutions, and the types of stakeholders who
funds to rein-
íiJur. p"uric sphe NCOs draw on these
win and lose from these relationships. Thus, long-standing questions
force tiheir uduo. ical contributions' Although some
and Greenpeace) ons in political systems come into
international NGOs (such as Amnesty International d to the EU because of a systemic
do not draw on EU funds on the basis that it might create the-percep-
For those EU NGOs tion. Yet most liberal democracies
tion of constraints, these tend to be exceptions' el as secondary to a representative
of 43%
;ññ g;; ; grant from EU institutions, it provides an average
Introdwction: Representation, Participation and Deliberation 7
6 Interest Representation in the European Union

of ParticiPatorY channels There were also aspirations that groups might somehow bridge
model remote EU institutions with wider civil societ¡ although these expeca-
which tes has alwaYs been a fea-
d bY' inter alia' Kant' and tions have receded somewhat and supplemented with means of reaching
ture o out to citizens directly (Chapters 2,8). The European Commission has
in the review in ChaPter 8)' the
a reliance upon elite therefore been very active in interest groups of
ËU ,il"r., with other international organizations 'rwhile
there are estab- all types constituted at EU lev se of these facrors,
interest groups as proxies for wider,civil society'.
and the potential for a dialo s to moderate rhe
lisheddebatesaStowhattheterm.civilsociety,shouldmean,andin demands upon them, some commentators see the EU institutions more
particular its extent of
as a'master oÍ Íate'than a 'victim of pressure' in its exchanges with inter-
Lrato 1'992), in EU P est groups (Grande 1,996;see also Chapter 8). That is, EU institurions set
to mean every tYPe of agendas which others follow, although again approaches ro this question
'otganized civil societY' denot
are nuanced. In the 1980s, the EU institutions worked with business
producers (business, union, e
organizations to help them secure a common endeayour of achieving a
'dialogue with civil society' at
European single market (Green-Cowles 1995, 1996). Bur once this goal
as is reviewed later' the links
was achieved, the European Commission's focus turned to a more reg-
ments have helped to stimulate part
ulatory agenda which was often more aligned with the goals of NGOs
public. Mechanisms such as the (Boräng and Naurin 2015; Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall20I5; Klüver,
helped to broaden Public Partici
Braun and Beyers 2015).
(Chapter 6).
' The EU's extent of systemic dependence upon organized civil society
The potential satisfaction of their
makes the study of EU interest representation a compelling analytical
tions from their exchanges with intere
focus for scholars of European integration and federalism, of compar-
the need for policymaking expertise, ative public polic¡ and of interest groups rhemselves. This degree of
EU institutions also work with dependence is systemic to the EU political system, in much the same way
¡ that is common to other transnational systems. There are structural fea-
e latter has the abilitY to convey
ng the latter has been the Poten- tures characterizing exchanges between political institutions and organ-
ent member states towards seek- ized civil society which arise in any democratic setting (such as resource
dependencies), and factors intensively at work in the international
ing common solutions by ceding -sov governance setting (such as deficits among political institutions of capac-
19"58; see also the examPles in ChaP
ity and legitimacy) to make these work out in very specific ways. Thus,
EU political institutions which are particular properties and characteristics of political decision-making
meni with organized interests make systems become drivers of common outcomes, and of differences. Hence,
them, consistãntly resisting formalized accr interest representation in consensual decision-making systems (such as
grounds that it might limit the supply of n the EU) is quite different from that in 'majoritarian' systems of g<_rv-
ãUiti,y of groups to convey political messag ernment, because the latter has a party of government able to exert its
tions iobby interest groups almost as vigoro will. In majoritarian systems government relations are oriented towards
using groups to exert pressure upon the p a.'winner takes all', whereas in consensual systems there are rarely out-
,rpon member states, other EU institutions right winners and losers, requiring broadly based alliances to bé con-
tåns, and as agents in the international system (Chapter 8)' A
policy
the structed between civil society interests. And the extent of democratic
shift from -"ik.t making to market regulating meant that EU
connections between political institutions
advocates to achieve their regulatory and civil society (in particular,
irrrtitrrtiorN needed civil sãciety accountability mechanisms) significantly structures
the ways in which
goals (Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall 2015)'
Union Intr o du cti on : Repr es entation, Parti cipation and D elib eration 9
8 Interest Representation in the Euroþean

2008); at EU level'.the lack of is because interest groups have the potential to caïry the political mes-
interest organizations behave (Mahoney sages of the EU institutions to member states and to (and from) wider
these connections may,"s
paraioxically' help to insulate the sys-
'ã"*it*
i.t" fto- special interest pressures (Chapter 8)'EU intensifies consensual
civil society. This possibility was developed in the earliesr works on Euro-
pean integration theor¡ most notably the'neo functionalist' account of
A complex ,""1,i-l;;í;;'it- titft "',tht European integration of Ernst Haas (1958), but also appeared among
outcomes, and the i; "iii""ttt' in the search for solutions ofis pre-
any
the aspirations of the most prominent architects of the initial European
"";d solutions' If anything
kind and information "Lo't tht potential.for towards Community project, including Jean Monnet. This accounr highlighted
dictable about the EU;;;;-;ii i' tntt w!ic1 outcomes will tend
oveiwhelming maiorilv,1f, l¡9r;lative the potential consequences for interest groups to develop the range of
a consensual nature, ;;;;h;' the EU powers by acting as forces of pressures upon member states to cede
pr.ptt"it tS0% -Voll 201'2) from the European Commtsston encl up as
policymaking in the EU and USA' competencies to the EU (via rrearies), and the porenrial for socializing
law. This is a kev diff;;;t f;tween of the participants of EU interest groups (and thereafter the national audiences
p'opos"ls op as law because
;h;r;';;ly 1t;Á
"trãeiti"tl"t a
"ttd Thus' lobbying in Europe
guillotine' which they relate to) into seeing European solutions and the consequenr
."rã-"f ¿"í"yi,',g l.gi'i;tion "tttil lobbying i" !!:. USA is identification with Europe. The last of these endeavours has increasingly
is aimed rowards .o"t""t"r buildiig, whereas seemed far-fetched, in that EU interest groups are narrowly focused
attem >roposals (\foll 2012)'
oriented towards upon policy advocacy with EU institurions and tend to be staffed by a
rf 'brash' or'softly spo-
These instilutionalfactc professionalized cadre who'know the Brussels scene' (Chapter 8). The
reen EU and US lobby-
ken' lobbying styles' exr first endeavour, however - actions by groups resulting in the develop-
his stor¡ providing the
ing (\loll 201,2).EU int
hances of success of a ment of EU competencies - can be illustrated by a number of examples
Commission with infor
Marshall 201'5)'and helping it (Chapters 6 and 8), although it should not be regarded as a universal
;;i;ü*-;ropor"l (õti', g""'h'ugen and of the consensual nature of the mechanism, and there are cases where the role of interest groups has
to protect it, ."pot"tlo"" ¡'"¿ thã
extent
more been as supporting agents for action which would have happened
for an EU'government rela-
;ï;;;;;;t;."ï, thut it is not uncommon more time in dialogue with rather than causal agents (see Chapters 4 and 8).
tions' manager of a multinational to spend ^îyway
The contribution that interest groups make to European integra-
with environmental NGOs'
NGOs than with n'U i"'tit"tions' Alliances public interest tion depends upon their general alignment with the outlook of the EU
in nerticular. are infl,,et'tial because of the strength of
institutions. Groups which are generally opposed to the logic of lib-
::"ï,iäi'ä;;;;, i'il .;"ironment in Europe, anã. positioning vourself eral integration of markets may find themselves frozen out and have to
,"tht' than'part-of ihe problem'ìs a.recognized
as'part of the solution'
Specific procedures of political insti- re-interpret their core values. Eising recounts how the main EU electricity
;;"il;';;uti.
tutions
"rr"i"' -"t"g""'
also become drivers oJ i"t""'t repiesentation practice' such as association was forsaken by the Commission in favour of a small region-
initiation ùes' whether there are default ally based organization with more aligned values (Eising 2009). Woll
where responsibility iclt ptjity
mechanisms to Uto.L.-ihã ì"tt"gt of
legislation' the presence of rules tells the story of how the European textiles organization, EURATEX,
infrastructures had to completely about-turn its demands for a protectionist regime in
restricting access to justiËe, ""1 tt""tp"rency-related
(Chapters 2,3,6 and 8)'
'-tWriit" ,o-. f.",rrr"s of the EU system of interest representatlon orlg-
of particular interest
in"i. in factors to bt fo""d tl"*h""' the feature upon inter-
the extent of dependence
about the EU syst.m to t'igntign' is
g""rt'-and the corrèsponding action by
est groups ,o est
".rri.u""it;"itti
potiü"t'inrtitutions to maintain such groups' For
the EU system as a ise. Thus,
the
'*ïof., the particularly noteworthy consequences of this lie'in the toY,t¡; insi
ecâme ân

;iã;;;i";å"nt of Erl'opean integration' both impatt


in terms of the expanston
upon civil society' This
ate ï.i:J"';
of EU comp.,.rr.i.,"l"ä'nt po"""ti"l for
Intro duction: Repr e sentation, Particip ation and D el ib eration
e EuroþeanUnion 1,1,

The key question is whether the system of pluralist experr deliberation


:ing the struggle to establish it, and the
surrounding EU institutions can re-creare the effects *h.r" saliency is
,rs"against the initiative (Chapter 3)'
brought by wider public debate. As social movemenr scholars have rec-
betr,íeen EU institutions and civil soci-
ognized, when issues become publicly salient the European parliament
blic. The European Citizens' Initiative
is keen to take opportunities to showcase its role as the people's tribune
¡ stimulate pobli. campaigning on EU
(Imig and Tarrow 2001, in Parks 2015:181). This was rhe case involv-
involve a wider range of campaigners
rle'. 'When EU CSOs take issues to a ing the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), when mobilized
cnses to a public consultation can swell
public opinion turned the European Parliament sharply against the
rternet neutrality)' and whenever issues European Commission's proposal to sign up to the measure (Dür and
: deliberation it changes the politics in Mateo 2014), drawing on frames such as the possibility of criminalizing
raising their saliency. Issues involving friends who had shared music files. The ACTA case notably involveã
mobiize organizations with advanced a mixture of activists, going well beyond professionalized advocacy
rore usually the consultation responses groups in Brussels and drawing upon social movements active in the
roert oroducer associafions and NGOs' protection of internet rights. Similarl¡ in August 201,6 campaigners her-
...,-Ë irro., involve intra-industry and alded a major triumph when a European regulator made strict rules for
cs aimed at passing the costs of regula- internet neutrality, effectively banning internet service providers against
rr consumers, and some involve battles their wishes from blocking services or offering them at differential speeds
rn and Parliament work in tandem with to suppliers. The European Digital Rights initiative (EDRi) proclaimed
n order to achieve common regulatory that'Europe is now a global standard-setter in the defence of the open,
competitive and neutral internet', while the online campaign Saue the
sitions of 1042 non-state actors on L12 Internet proclaimed 'a triumph for the European digital rights move-
rent legislative proposals introduced by ment', and the Pirate Party in the European Parliament trumpeted ,a
,.en 2õ08 and i010, Dür et al' find that victory for civil society' (Toor 2016). Any case involving internet rights
ss successful than citizen groups in the can become highly politicized by skilled online campaigners, drawing
ì protect their interests if interest group upon a diverse set of supporters.
lrii"r.,.rr, role is restricted (Dür, Bernha-
authors chart a shift in the activities of The variety of ¡nterests in EuroPe
n an earlier era of market making in the
The variety of interests with a stake in regulation formulated at
¿ulatins in the 1990s and beyond, requir-
EU level has a global embrace. Among functional interests, almost
å.,orc io secure regulatory goals which
every conceivable interest is organized in some way through formal
echoes the findings of Boräng and Nau-
collective entities. As well as the 'usual suspects', there are interest

organizations, and over 1,Oo/o of the active population of interest


on is low, and a few business actors get to organizations are those headquartered in non-member
e media, the odds get to even out between states (ìØonka
et al.2010).
:äng and Naurin 2015:514)
Union Intr o du ction: Repr e s entation, Particip ation an d D elib eration 3
Interest Re7resentdtion in the Ewropean
1
12
numbers and different types TABLE 1.1 Transparency Register registrations as at
There is, as yet, no definitive list of the
This is significant' 31 August 2016
rf ;hy;'".tlve in EU interest representâtion'
of groups is the basis for a
because a teeming'p;p;ñ"; "tolägy'
,gutr""t,o"' to Perform democratic Cøtegory Number %
Consultancies 669 6.9
Law firms r1.2 1.1
Self-employed consultants 334 3.4
not a reliable means of counting Companies 1827 18.7
concerned the limited structure of Trade and business associations 2197 22.5
eme.'slhile these have develoPed Tiade union and professional associations 668 6.8
eme in 201'1', and a 2'0 version in
Other producer interests 287 2.9
which limit its use for headcount
openj to anY entitY which wishes NGOs 2474 25.4
or.d temPorary free PublicitY Think tanks, research and academic institutions 691. 7.1.
"t
dication of these, at a time when Churches and religious communities 44 0.5
ood at around half of the Present Organizations representing 1ocal, regional and 449 4.6
include'EuroPean' as among the municipal authorities, other public or mixed
eenwood and Dreger 2013)' Some entltles
ring routine checks, but there Total 97 52
submitted to indicate that the
the register' On the other hand'
though highlY incentivized bY There are dangers in drawing conclusions from the population of
in oráer to meet with a cabinet categories, because apparently high numbers can reflect a landscape
of competition between specialist groups, particularly among business
interest organizations (Chapter 4). Nonetheless, the best available data
oean Parliament buildings' No
sta seemingly provides a plausible picture, with one-quarter (almosr 2500)
irrtior,, from the member of organizations making a registration in the NGO category.
never make an entry in the regis There is much greater uncertainty about the number of individuals
a surge of 4000 new regi involved in 'EU lobbying'. This endeavour raises definitional issues
requiiement to be on the ('what is a lobbyist?') and methodological issues ('how can a head-
tháir staff (Politico 2016)' count of which type of staff be undertaken?') of such magnitude that
dencies for the register to it is difficult to provide a figure of much value at all. As the issue of
under-state (occasional visitors), EU lobbying has become increasingly politicized, so the figures cited
ance each other. Organizations tend to suit the purpose. A figure in recent vogue has been 30,000
miscatego tizatíon of a number
wish to be included;iã;t, resulting in lobbyists, although the popularity of this seems to relate more to
choose to register in any
of orsanizations, and orgánizationi can also the frequency with which it is cited rhan ro an aurhoritative head-
3)' Nonetheless' the reg-
Ï;;: tfi";;;lfrri^¡í^"g"'g" of(chapter count. Another figure, again not without difficult¡ is the number of
ister is the best å"rî. data for advocacy organizations
annual passes to its buildings issued by the European Parliament to
(see Table 1.1).
"u"it"ut"
Union Introduction: Representation, Participation and Deliberation 15
1,4 Interest Representdtion in the European

over-estimation. Nonetheless, while the geographical distribution of


EU-level groups is concenrrated in Belgium, this only seems ro account
for around 60% of EU groups (Greenwood 2003).
In terms of the characteristics of groups established at the EU level, the
federated (associations of national associations) format predominates
throughout virtually all interest categories. Significant numbers of direct
membership organizations only exist in the business domain where some
associations admit companies. In its early days, the Commission oper-
ated a policy of dialogue only with European level groups as an incenrive
to national groups to form them, as well as the age-old bureaucratic
preference for consultation with collective bodies. In practice this proved
unworkablç, because the presence of such groups was patchy and, where
they existed, some were little more than symbolic presences, with endur-
ing collective action problems evident in some as a result of their sheer
diversity of membership. \X/here these proved intracable, the Commis-
sion has engaged in dialogue with national groups (Caporaso 1974) or
lobbyists. with large firms and other entities. Bouwen found that large individual
firms had a higher degree of access to the Commission than do EU-level
'lflhile
Groups associations (Bouwen 2002). the Commission is open ro dialogue
also with any organization that wishes to engage it, there remains a policy
Estimates of the number of groups constituted at EU level have
statement still in force, from the department of the Commission that
been subject to signifi leads relations with civil society (Secretariat General), which records
figure, partlY because that 'the Commission tends to favour European (con)federations over
which their count has representatives of individual or nation al organizatrons' (European Com-
does include groups mission 1,992:5).
'Vlhile
there is variation between and within different
only groups formall Commission services (European Commissjon 2002b), some segments of
i." í."- ,. have b simple category counts in directory
in assigning the Commission reinforce their preference to dialogue with groups when
iit;l"gt All such sources have part al cóvtragt' quirkiness
snap an approach is made by an individual group member.
made
u-p"rîi.,rt", entry to " .uttgo'y type, and have iudgements
Formal groups range in scope from those organi zing'horizontal' inter-
ab'out eligibility. Conseq"tãtty, ii L o"ly possible to take impressions
ests across a particular constituency (such as confederations of producer
itr-;À.* ro.h ", the eitent'of growth over time' which refer to more interests or citizens), to sectoral-type interests, to specialist issue organiza-
than L00 in existence bY 1959 (Ei tions. The large groups representing'horizontal', or cross-sectoral, inter-
ests include: Business Europe, a confederation of national business-wide
associations; ERT (the European Round Table of Industrialists) and the
EU Committee (of the American Chamber of Commerce), both based
around large firms; UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises), the confederation of national associa-
the TR had an address in Belgiu tions represenring sma (SMEs); EURO-
rent population of the TR' would ac CHAMBRES (thã Asso f Commerce and
TR are from
;;J'Dr'"g., 2013). A, -ást of the recent entries ro the likelv to be an
Industry), representing rs of Commerce;
;;;;;il"; u"r.a i' the member states' this figure is
Union Intro du ction: Repr e s entation, Particip ation and D elib eration 1,7
16 Interest Representation in the European
providing public interlocutors as happens in corporatist settings. Consequentl¡ many
CEEP (European Centre of Employers and-Enterprises' EU business associations are marked by continual internal debate as
(European Trade Union
services and services of gener"f intere st); ETUC to whether to go for the eâse of collective agreement through nârrow
ðorrf"d.r"tion), the prin"cipal organization representing worker
interests;
Liberal Professions)' Sub-national embrace, at the price of competition, or to contain the scope for com-
and CEpLIS (tsuropean Cåuncillf the
CEMR (Council of petitive lobbying by organizing through breadth, at rhe price of produc-
interests are represented horizontally through the ing'lowest common denominator' positions. Níhen combined with the
European M lns) and the Assembly of European
natural heterogeneity of business, rival business factions are frequently
Regions (AE lined up on different sides of the fence over regularory proposals which
their organiz threaten to create narrow groups of 'winners' and losers', with encom-
collection of passing business associations paralysed by disagreement. And there are
marked by a bifurcation between'
only a very small number (around ten) of EU business associations with
whose membershiP PrimarilY com
NGos) and organizations more than 25 staff (Chapter 4).
i;;;h ; ,h" pl"tfãrm of European Socjal than sector representation' such EU funding ensures that resource asymmerries between different
ini.n are based more around uåuot"ty
Action Service (ECÄ'S)' types of interests are less extreme than might otherwise be the case.
as the European Citizen
,sectorali organization of interests at EU level follows the tendency The'Green10' EU Environmental NGOs together declare €6.6 million
of funding from EU institutions in their latest annual TR declarations,
for federative structures - i.e. most EU interest groups are
associations
comprising over one-quarter of their budgets, and enabling them to fund
of other associations' The primary unit of membership of almost
every
very-few have a category of full 130 EU staff between them (Chapter 6). These exceed the collective staff
;;; gt;"p is other orgånizations;
indiviCuals. For ffade unions' the same is headcount of the five EU business-wide organizations (90) (Chapter
-.-U"ånip which embrà-ces despite a sizeable presence of asso- 4). Best resourced among EU environmental NGOs is Friends of the
true. And for business organizations,
Earth Europe with a 2014 budget of €4,830,196 (over half of which
.1",i.", which hav. largJfirms as members (mainly in concentrated sec- is funded by EU institutions) and 15 staff. The European Consumer
i..rl, -"r, still remainlased around national associations of business' Organisation, BEUC, has an annual budget approaching €5 million.
The most important consequence is concentration of activities
upon
the International NGO brands, such as W!íR Greenpeace, Friends of the
påfi,."f repråsentatio.r, ,.l"iiu. to national associations, because
do Earth and Amnesty International, can supplement the resources of their
(large firms and national associations)
members of EU associations
European policy offices by drawing on resources from offices in other
membership services (such as discounted business services'
"ri,.q"ir. geographic locations, as well as a substantial base of volunteer help.
;;. ;Ë;;",ancy and .-ploy*t"t law advice) in the same way as SME Among European-specific organizations, the European Youth Forum
Consequentl¡ EU associations are
-î-b"rs of naiional asiociations.
compared to their national counterparts' lists 29 staff on its entry in the European Transparency Register and
,.i"tlu.ly small organizations reveals that 87"/' of its total budget oÍ €3,028,122 was derived from
A feat,rre of EÚ business organiration is high specialization which the EU institutions in 2015. The Platform of European Social NGOs
a landscape of com-
makes collective agreement e"sitr, but which creates ('Social Platform'), a leading organization in the citizen field, likewise
hus, the glass industry has separate
received 84% of its budget from EU institutions in2014,and the Euro-
the interests of flat glass, container
pean rü/omen's Lobby 78o/o. Purpose-renovated 'NGO eco-houses'
s, crYstal glass, domestic glass and
(Mundo-B; Mundo-J) from which ro network, share back office facilities
), aswell as a'peak' cross-sub-sector
and co-ordinate resourc
et finding common agreement across
the Brussels property ,h
ore complicated by virtue of their separate tng (Chapter 6). The ap
is particularly common at EU level because
lousrness)' image might
." J,ro.r.rr. of the EU makes it impossible for as a means of gaining access to the policy process, but may be overstated.
atively designate organizations as monopoly
Union Intro ductio n: Repr esentation, Particip ation and D el ib eration 1,9
18 Interest Representation in the European

in the ìØonka et al. (2010) identify almosr 500 firms who have appeared in
as will public affairs directory sources. The multiple-level architecture of the EU
cti ízed affords access to such players, and the need to participate in and beyond
n because their interests are often trade associations also contributes to the rationale for establishing such
don imPoses costs and benefits on offices. An analysis of the geographical origin (by national headquarters)
-For
chain. instance, the makers of of those listed in the European Public Affairs Directory in 2003 indi-
to higher regulatory stanclards for cates that around one-quarter were Americ an,1.7o/o British, 11 % French
,.r, ("b,,Y"ttf because theY have the and 1.1.o/" German (Coen 2009). Anglo- and American-based firms in
ter bear the costs' parficular, familiar with operating in pluralist environments, are used
which such funding comPromises to working outside of groups and with commercial public affairs con=
nizations. or creates quasi-agencies sultancies, whereas those used to the corporatist traditions of Germanic
authors see funding as a fatal form countries tend to place a greater emphasis upon collective associations.
, recipient organizations
rarely seem However, the growth of consultancies has followed multinational firms
U institutions (see Chapter 6)' inter- to a variety of locations. One piece of research suggests that the Anglo/
Germanic division also works in preferences for the type of commercial
sources used, with Anglo/American firms using traditional public affairs
consultancies and Germanic firms using law firms (Lahusen 2002). An
oft-posed question in the literature is whether national traditions of cor-
poratism or pluralism might influence the ability of organized interests
to engage the EU level, and in particular whether the generally pluralist
narure of the EU policymaking environment might be disabling for inter-
ests with corporatist traditions. However, studies seeking to investigate
(Chapter 6). explanations couched in the'fit' between national and EU policymaking
environments have found contradictory results (for a review see Eising
Non-grouP actors 2009). Klüver finds that national embeddedness does matter, with fewer
civil society active at EU level incentives to go to Brussels for firms in highly embedded environments
There are five categories of players from (Klüver 2010; Klüver et al. 2015). However, of the top 20 lobbying
which are spending business associations in the TR, one-quarter are German. There
(Chapter is no evidence that interests from countries with corporatist traditions
cial terms experience difficulties in engaging with the EU level; rather, the issue is
a website the under-development of organized civil society in the south of Europe,
linking the varietY of actors from and central/eastern Europe, where firms are more likely to rely on their
Anln-house Public affairs caP established relationships with national governments (Greer, da Fonseca
and Adolph 2008; Kohler-Koch and
Quittkat2016).
There is very little literature on the organizarion of organized civil
society interests from non-EU member states.'!Øonka et al. found that
EU level h
o/"), and a
any EU as
lic affairs, or onlY do so after bein are based
initiative.
Intr o du ction : Repr e sentation, Particip ation and D elib eration 21
20 Interest Representdtion in the European Union

issue about the admission of


This is likely to attract clients who are relucranr to see their public
are not member states. Beyond this is an affairs activities disclosed through the registrations which dedìcated
.r-f""i.t from non-EU member states in direct membership business public affairs consuhancies are asked ro make on rhe TR (chapter 3).
with a -L" ¿ f i.,o' "
",,oiiu,io,',, ;,låJ:îïî:ö::ff#:'ff :'ïJîåT The clientele of commercial consultancies are of a much broadËr spec-
trum than those of law firms, and, while based on business fromthe
t to distinguish between'European'
h many of the latter holding substan-
corporate sector, are much more diverse. They include citizen interest
here is non-admission, multinational
firms will inevitably have a presence' and there are cases of national
firms with a multination"l pr.r.n.. with a Brussels office (e'g' Huawai
frorn ònin", with seven ,'"?f *ith a pall to the European Parliament)'
public affairs capacities in Brussels are
ó.r tn. *há1", large firm EU min- valuable to policymaking officials rhan ro their clients.
táll, Ë"r.d "'oo"ã 'Think tanks' place information, assessments and ideas in the public
"r,.":ì"it.
istrative assistant. are m
A few rma-
The arcna, and seek to improve the quality of public policies, and democratic
ceutical nufacture
t'h' debate, accordingly. EU think tanks came under the spotlight during the
compan ill almost
r 1
a vaúety of product
tt,-:-:^-^---,
divisions within a 2011 revision of the Transparency Register, with the change of name
need to
..][r",', divisions had
An example is provided by IBM, wñere product
of the proposal for a Directive
øåt in Uoth ."-þ, drri"g the course
"å" Ci-p*.r Impleïented ínventions, which pitted softwareprotection
of derivative
i.ri.r.*r'"g"inst ihos. whose products were based on users
have little capacity for
software (Gehlen 2006)' Sometimes. companies
acti;ities' and any attempt to do
centralized -"rr"g"-"i of political
div reserve their butions to €30,000, while Bruegel has a rule that no one member con-
rt ìt resiied by proåuct
".*.fy clatlons' etc' tributes more than 5"/, of their budget (Brussels Influence 2016). Some
autonomy tt participate in technical organizations use think tanks as part of a wider business model in which
prevent dif-
The consequence is that a large firm there is an associated public affairs business, such as'The Centre', which
on the same
f*;"; p;oi"ct divisions taking up c positioned itself as Brussels first'think-do' tank, but is now incorporated
there is no central cor-
issue in different trade associ"lio.rr. Sometimes, within the Edelman public affairs consultancy. But the core of Brussels
pïr"," r.""*l.dge oi the number of trade association affiliations they think tanks are largely independent organizations, funded by a mixture
ment of commercial consultan-
of diverse short-term project work for a wide range of organizations
in civil societ¡ together with a pluralism of medium-term stakeholder
affairs offering (Lahusen 2003;
partners.
rovide public affairs services' Inevi-
offering competition policy-related . At the fringes of EU interest organizations are a range of orhers,
including lone entrepreneurs operating a business model -servicing the
of theirilientele' And their pitch for
tnterest representation communit¡ and website-based activists related
es sense as a wider business model'
er law-based dePart-
heY have develoPed
ancies is their reluc-
ounds that they are governed by pro-
h client confidentiality is sacrosanct'
Union Introduction: Representation, participation and Deliberation 23
22 Interest Re7resentation in the European

actio
simil
in to
kind
Another notable feature concerns
of some of these interests as policy
chime with those of a segment of t their contribution. certainl¡ most EU interest groups are associations
where the balance of thti activities
turns more towards dialogue with
than seeking to undermine of associations, operated by professionalized staff, with a focus more
Ëü i*;i;;ti"", "nd toì.l"tionship build-ing ges rather than on ,communicating
rh.-.ourse of establishment of
,ñ ö;;hroogh ;;;ii. ;;rråg"r. been dependent upon elites, and the
the rR demonstrate';;;' of thesã
?îîïi îî3ll;ti:t:ï'ìi:tJïl: wide range of advocacy from every
indicated by tendencies to develop Some commentators see in the EU
a reasunabie level of resources and system no more than a structured system of exchanges between interest
matelY come to terms with the label groups and political institutions which amounts to, at best, no more than

'lobbyist' (ChaPter 6)'

Conclusions
interest representation which
There are common drivers of systems of
the EU possesses, such as the waYs
prod,rcãs pluralistic outcomes' Dis
äf th. d.pìndencY of EU institutio
Organized civil society interests Note
meitt in which EU Political insti L.'Prevention of and Fight against crime Programme of rhe European union,
tiãn towards systemic input and output legitima
the EU system is based around regulation'
so

;i""tfi.J, actors' because of the ways in which


t'"ibutt' costs and benefits "ot"' ""1,3rttiiîi0.,
interest distributions
itics involving forces such as public
olitical institutions rather than sec-
ers. Hence, claims that some of the

scepticism'
pluralist in charac-
The EU interest group system is essentially.
dominate the EU
ter. No one type oi i"t""'t can ever routinely
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 25

decision-making arenas, powers and procedures according to the issue


Chapter 2 at stake and the treaty specificarions adds to its complexìt¡ and with
greater complexity and venue shifting comes the relaiive insulation of
EU Decision-Makin g and Channe ls the system from over-domination by any one particular type of interest.
Following the Lisbon Treaty, qualified majority voting in the council
of lnfluence and co-decision-making between the parliament and the council became
the 'ordinary legislative procedure'. This has the effect of diluting the
power of any one institution, and increasing unpredictability as
are made to find resolution berween legislative institutions. This"tt.-pm
seaich
for compromise tends to involve settlement by political institutions, pro-
gressively excluding outside interests in the process.
The ways in which inrerests are arriculated in institutional politics
at the European level can be categorized as a complex series of irr.r.,
surrounding: aggregations of interests, through collective and independ-
ent action formats; the routes through which influence is exerteå and
voiced, discussed below; and the institutional channel and point of entry
tlined in Chapter 1, the highly frag- within the institutional decision-making process. chapter 1 reviewed
the breadth of interdependencies that EU insrirutions, and particularly
the commission, have with outside interests. The commission's role in
&afting and monitoring legislation, and its representative function for
the EU in international affairs, together with seeking to drive forward
civil society players but dilute the European integration (chapter 1), make it the foremost venue for inter-
centralized structures create esr representation at the European level. The early stages of the policy
impact of any given constituency' wherea.s process involve the critical ways in which issues are defined and fiamed
the near monopolistic'insider'
difficulties of access ú;;;;;t'tained by reference to wider criteria, and subsequently shaped. The definition
(Risse-Kappenl'995.)'
;;t:;; result in high policv impact
ih. .o-pl.* inìtrplay between sub- and framing of issues are ideological processes in which civil society
For EU inrtitotio,ï"i'poiiii.t,
' players contribute a viewpoint, whereas the technical basis of developing
tiers of authority creates
"national policy initiatives into detailed proposals requires of policy participants
access. Broadly speaking' intergov-
a corresponding ability to provide technical input. organized intãrests
re indirect forces involving outside
which are equipped, and willing, to play this latter role become geared
ranational ones more direct forces'
to playing the game of institutionalized politics.
involves the socialization of mem-
Second in importance to the European commission as an institutional
venue is the Parliament, arising again from its role as the represent-
ative outlet of civil societ¡ and fror its ability ro amend and, where
treaty provisions stipulate, to co-decide upon proposed legislation.
An
exception to this is legislation arisin
lined later in this .h"pì"r, where poli
6). oypass the Parliamenr.
ncY towards EU decision-making On the whole,
Parliament and its openness
of EU interest rep- as an ar
rules has considerably influenced the character cttlzen interests to engage. Third comes the Council of Ministers, with
level. The shifting of EU
resentation by focusing it at the ,op,",'"tio,'al
24
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 27
26 Interest Re7resentøtion in the European

representation occurs through the'national route' or the,Brussels strat-


the end of the policymaking þrocess'
its full decision-making powers at egy'. A very early parrern proposed by Lindberg was that rhose inter-
n"ì btt" reluctant to accept that
although the Council ñtãú 'o-.t*hat ests in search of European integration would take the'Brussels strategy',
choosing to exclude itself
it is a venue for EU interest representation' whereas those with defensive postures would take the national roure
n a common EuroPean TransPar-
(Lindberg 1'963). Some empirical verificarion can be found for this
ch activities were directed at other

gences invoìves, through necessit¡ the use of the national route.


institutions become involved in an Unsurprisingly the balance of views
toward forces pean Act tended to emphasize the 'n
Afte for its Averyt 1.977), v¿ith the development
arises. pre- cies and of EU decision-making rules
i-oiã-"","rion' ''r
and some have use .a
implementati th the ter resourced, organized and networked types of civil society inrerests
i:;i.ffi;'ä"îr3" structures for partici- towards the'Brussels route'. A large scale survey of 100 uK trade associ-
monitoring of implementãtion, create opportunity ations, in which 70"/" of the sample comprised small and medium-sized
pation by organized civil society' associations, found that EU legislation had exceeded uK legislation as
the principal source of their representation work, with some B0% oÍ
'Routes'of influence the sample citing an ability to achieve access to senior commission staff
(Trade Association Forum 2006). Lehmkuhl compared the impact of the
policy proces.s means that
The multi-level character of the European Common Transport Policy upon associations in the Netherlands and
p"blit affairs therefore have
actors seeking to participate in Europe"tt Germany. Liber alization and subsequent national deregulatory policies
At its most simple
a number of ,o-.ulltã-lio"tt'' of tommt"'ication' national structures led to a much stronger struggle for legitimacy among associations in
of other
;;îlh;'";tional rãutt' refers to the usethe 'Brussels route' involves German¡ because deregulation rendered the political raison d,être of
to engage gU decisi-oî-making' whereas themselves, whether alone transport associations in Germany unnecessary. These had worked to
,ãnril".ri'ãr1"" . ,n. Ë"-rrp."[ institutions preserve the existing regulatory framework so as to guarantee protec-
oi through collective channels o tion from domestic and foreign competition, and afrer deregulation the
using a national organization to en membership incentive had gone, resulting in a dramatic loss of resources
wh.i.", a direct aPProach to EU
route'. These two routes' the
come under their umbrella, an
provide the organizing device
decision-maki"g g";;;;;J úy tht treaties'
for the rest of the chapter' The extent toïhith
sub-national domains
route of' European-level inter-
are both p".ti.ip""ì'i", u' well as a.
"
represent",io", åjì' f- chapter on the territorial domain
est " '"f"'""
(Chapter 7). debate
are not mutually exclusive' a long-standin-g
\íhile the routes
the balance of EU interest
in the literature has U.." ifr. extent io which
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 29
28 Interest Representation in the European

i'e' they are participants as well as Council Presidencies. Together with the Social platform, they have also
subjects of interest representation'
appea;;;iltg;tácant vaii"tions in the permutation of been included in the informal preliminaries of the Employment and social
channels. There Affairs Council of the Council of the European Union. Environmenral
upon a
.^fr""".ft of influence used, depending th non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are privy to a similar type of
i".f"¿i"g the nature of the issue concerned' arrangement preceding Environment Council meetings (Hayes-Renshaw
;;;h;;'."ailing context, in;lud119
:1:
n:i:"* 2009). Hayes-Renshaw sounds a note of caution that the importance of
tions. Tñese are reviewed in the sectlons below'
such access arrangements should not be exaggerated, in that they occur
at an advanced stage in the Council decision-making cycle (ibid.).
the'national route'
EU interest rePresentation through The priority (and back-burner) European Council agenda rhemes
chosen by each member state are often the subject of advance input by
Theuseofthe.nationalroute'forinterestrepresentationattheEuropean civil society interests, while during the six-month period of office meet-
siates in EU decision-making,
level is conditioned Uy',fr.ã.ãf -.-b.,
taken' and by the extent to which it ings it is now relatively common for the Presidency to meer with interests
the nature of the positiã"' U"i"g within the priority theme arenas. Both Business Europe and ETUC have
familiar point of âccess for interests'
;;iã;;".o'u.,tit"rund u'"ãt their strongest during treaty nego- made a point of contacting the Presidency with their carefully agreed
Intergovernmentat infl "' internal agendas around 24 months in advance of its office while it is
and strattgy direction through the
tiations between the ä ""'"" politics' venues involving inter-state still preparing its programme, in co-ordination with the national federa-
E 'high
civil õciety interests are not in the forefront' rion concerned. Meetings with the Presidency during their term of office
n inter- tend to be more geared towards publicity than operational public aÍfairs.
;"ith" ""iio"al level become nationalprocess
" of the The rapid turnover of the office bearer, together with the contrasting
itics' But tht p'og'""ive democratization
of some variations in culture and agendas of each Presidenc¡ mean that the pos-
tflo"g-h"o'i'uttt'io"t has led to the design
"tit't';;;;:ä ti"tr t"tittv'.The presjdents of the principal sibilities introduced by these relationships fluctuate considerably. Post
f"' Lisbon, both organizations maintain their engagement with the Euro-
(" -tth;;-" describei later in this chapter) organiza-
ETUC were allocated observer status pean Council and the rotating presidencies of the Council of Ministers.
tions, Busines n"'opt, C¡EP a1d Interest representation in the Council of Ministers machinery is only
treatv establishing a Constitu-
at the 2003¡+ Conut"tã" át"fti"g the beginning to emerge. One interpretation is that the Council is not lob-
tht opportunitv. to draft a treatv
tion for Europe, t"kì;;;;";;;gËof now bied as such; just its members (Nicoll and Salmon 1.990):
clause aimed institîtionalization of social dialogue,
-"rì,ï"ãJ
in ",
tr" ltîåîr""tv' At the convention';åï*Ïl
.rì"uiiJ.¿ ,iîiffi The Council portrays itself as an institution where no lobbying takes
proPosals for draft place; the secretariat keeps no listing of lobbyists and takes the posi-
on members' A keY tion that'all contact with lobbyists and NGOs is handled with the
to EU PolicYmaking European Commission'. (Friends of the Earth Europe 2006)
in this wav (Kaufmann' Lamassoure
found its way into the draft treaty
b"t" tt included in the Lisbon The Council has been ambivalent about participating in inter-institutional
and Meyer 2004),;;il;h-;ü-"t"tv discussions on the Transparency Register (TR), and for some time
ttïil;,Social refused to do so on rhe grounds that'lobbying' was something which
partners, are the civil society players which have achieved
happened to the other institutions (Commission, Parliamenr). Fãr these
decision
most access to intergovernmental.EU that ind uncil -
iDants in the'macroeconomic dialogue'
become lobby-
éouncil, as well as the Commission'
a

in social summits held on the ociated ncil as


fñ.y p"t,i.ipate 8), and s little
Social Summit for Growt
""ã',il.'Trþartite
EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 31
30 Interest Representation in the European Union

officials in their own The dossier of decision-making over the End of Life vehicle Directive
direct evidence of overt lobbying of Secretariat (1997-2000), for instance, involved an intervenrion from German chan-
rãceived, this is'in listening mode onlv'
ö;;; ùùi;,'J3¡, "r'd,;i;"'; cellor Gerhard schröder, inspired by the chief Executive of volkswagen,
(ibid.:84): Ferdinand Piëch. Piëch used Schröder's position as a former board mem-
ber of the compan¡ and as head of the country then holding the EU
on principle to circulate position papers
[the] Secretariat tend to refuse Presidenc¡ to his advantage, to buy time on the dossier when schröder
mailing lists of working
from interes, grorrpr, o' to provide them with instructed his Environment Minister ro postpone the item from an Envi-
p"try .t .o-Ãitr.ã membe?s' (Hayes-Renshaw 2009:84) ronment council agenda, and subsequently to acquire sufficient votes
for a temporary blocking minority. Subsequently, some aspects of the
Bouwen'sdatathatnational-levttttt:tï:rtil,1xT:r:t"äïJ;.,:î:"(::r: original proposal were watered down, although the end result was not
entirely to the liking of the automobile constructors (Tenbücken 2002).
nized civil societY (Bouwen 2002)
Like many other dossiers, the ELV case involved'horse trading, between
;:äï îlï' :'î'ì"::i' :Ï,Î ï",';' ;: member states) and, while increasing transparency is likely to ieduce the
scope for this, decision-making in the council continues in practice to be
alizatíonthrough procedures which
Commission' There is some the least transparent element of EU decision-making. The consequence
has recently emerged from the European is that it is an unpredictable venue for civil society inrerests focused
working groups'
un".dotul åvidence of interaction through Council (Hayes-Renshaw upon the detail of a legislative proposal. The reality of council decision-
."rr.r *ìin orgunlr.d irrt.rests constitot.d ut EU level interests and the making in an EU of 28 member states is intergovernmental negotiation
between
and'!Øallace 2006),anãtt; through contact and consensus. The search for common ground among so many elements
th" working groups (Pointer 2002) '
national civil servant, *ho "tut ott
in finalizing legislation will continue to make the Council a secondary
contacts with national minisrry mem-
iJ;;, lobbying arises through venue for EU interest representation.
\Øhile the limited number of dossiers prescribed by unanim-
ity decision have reduced the attraction of the 'national route', it
has historically represented the 'tried and tesred' ground for many
interests, where established policy networks and dependency rela-
tionships operate which can equally well be used for the purposes of
the conduct of electronic commerc EU representation as they can for the governance of domestic affairs.
issue through subsequent Council The resources available to small firms has always meant that any
better than damage limitation (Poi single firm needing to engage with EU decision-making is likely to
intriguing issues are always likely t use domestic contacts first, with federated representation available
Committee of Permanent RePrese through national association membership of EU business associa-
Council of Ministers' decision-ma tions. civil society interests in southern and central/eastern Euro-
is limited. Saurugger usefully dist pean countries have few direct channels of representation in Brussels,
co-ordination mechanisms for EU and consequently have been notable individual users of the national
ministries are lead bodies, such as route when EU representation is required (Kohler-Koch and
euittkat
which aPProach Permanent _2016). These tendencies also exist in countries with corporuiirt t."-
national ministries; whereas t ditions (Klüver 201.0), although the general decay of corporarisr
co-ordination mechanism' can be more accommo- arrangements in western Europe has weakened the practice;
"îá..'n"tizontal German
dating (Saurugger 201'0a)' trade for instance, occupy orr"-qurr,", of the top 20
-- scope for inter- .associations,
nf",n" timJãn issue has reached ministerial level, the lobbying spending associations. By contrast,
civil society inteiests
inrerventions do arise.
u.*ío' is diminisheJ, brr, ,rorr.rheless dramatic
Union EU Decision-MøÞing and Channels of Influence 33
32 Interest Representation in the European

ralized traditions which exclude The broad thrust has been to create a pluralistic design of 'checks and
aking.have more incentives to balances', where any one interest is challenged by another, and where
nstititions (Klüver' Braun and interests are empowered through procedures to do so and to keep EU
institutions accountable. The foundation stones of these are regimes of
transparency, and participative measures, including the funding of citizen
interest groups (Chapter 6), and detailed rules for consultation. Some of
these have been applied on an inrer-institutional basis, while some are
nce upon national intermediarY specific to individual institutions and the contexr in which they operate.
more direct mechanisms' These are described in further detail for the purpose of their evaluarion
in Chapters 3 and 8.

the'Brussels route'
EU interest rePresentation through lnter-institut¡onal mechan¡sms for engagement with organized
rules o ety
The development of pt9::q"t11 gtt c¡vil soc¡ety
actors to engage wlt'h EU institutions'
ñ/ers nal In overview, the most important inter-institutional procedural mecha-
as sh
ver nisms structuring exchanges between EU institutions and civil society
ed question is whether relYing on involve transparency-related measures. One is the 2001 Regulation
om a base in the member states on Access to Documents (104912001), which provides for rights of
access to most documents, supported by open access internet search-
able document registers, and by facilitation mechanisms and vigor-
ous enforcement procedures.'While there are safeguards in place for
restrictions of access on various grounds, it has been implemented
zealously as a result of retroactive application, an activist Ombuds-
of formalitY, ranging from access man who has championed rights granted by the measure through
worst excesses of these assertive interventions, and rulings by the Court of First Instance
to information through to interaction' The which have favoured release by favouring public interest transparency
asymmetric over personal privacy (Chapter 8). The measure has become increas-
macy, givin ingly used, with around three-quarters of requests granted in full, and
to the use the remainder comprising the single most numerous category of cases
ence. The i taken up by the Ombudsman (European Ombudsman 2010). This
measure has changed the landscape of EU interest intermediation,
empowering civil society organizations vis-à-vis the EU institutions
and each other. The Access to Documents Regulation has also altered
the modus operandi of the ways in which civil society organizations
resignation of the EuroPean
'llhite Pa communicate with EU institutions, resulting from the stipulation that
-"rk *"t the 200L access also applies to documents received by the Commission which
intention to originate with third parries. This changes behaviour through the rec-
ognition among staff of civil society organizations that the communi-
listening to one side of the argu-
reduce the risk of policy-makers iust cations they send to EU institutions can
be observed, either by their
ment or of particular groups gettlng privileged access' (European members (Naurin 2007),or by other interested
stakeholders.
Commission 2001'17)
Interest Representltion in the European Union EU Decision-MaÞìng and Channels of Influence
34 35

EU-le.vel inrerest groups in the generar absence of civil society


TheEuropeancomm¡ssionandinterestrepresentation
mobilization ( chapter 1 ".!.tg
). Frequent ry,- organizations issue rheir own
lmpact assessments. In this process) evidence is subject to challenge
and counter challenge, and the key concepts used for the
detail of
legislative proposals become crystallized;
' a Green Paper is a'thinking aloud' consultation instrument about
the need to legislate. Once completed, a \X/hite p"p., .onr,rir,
ou.,
the detail of the policy oprions;
' minimum standards of consultation appl¡ embracing the informa-
tion in consultation documents, and measures to ensure that rele-
vant parties have an opportunity ro express their opinion;
. rhe standard pracice is for consultatiãn to be plaied oí th. op.r,
web portal 'Your voice in Europe' inviting responses from anyone
inclined ro do so, and individu"l r.spon.ãs
are often published;
-åd. to consulrations
. more focused consultations with stakeholders may be conducted
as an additional, or alternative, route, through the expert groups,
workshops and forums described above, including .-ftro-" rt.o.-
tures. Insrrumenrs of the latter include the slxÃpsE e-network
(Scientific Information for policy support in Europe) through
which
scientific opinion for policy purposes is elicited from inãividuals
(currently over 30,000 are regisrered) and scientific and stakeholder
The stages are: organizations (over 1500 registered organizations). These insrru-
ments are covered by transparency provisions, although more infor-
the announcement of all legislative initiatives in advance in an ¡
mal and irregular strucrures will always be less visiblJ;
annual 'Commission Legislative Work Programme', following. a the final legislative proposal from the commission contains a
,State of the Union' addiess by the Commission President to the sratement identifying the consultation procedures undertaken,
together with a presentation of what the responses advised. It is
European Parliament as the start of a debate with the European
also supposed to include the commission's own response to these,
Parliament and Council;
identifying why a particular course of recommended action
a each measure is accompanied by the publication of a comprehensive was
taken or rejected, although rhere are significant deficiencies
consultation plan, speiifying the goals and means of consultation' in the
implementation of this (euittkat 2011; see also chapter g).
At the choice of the Commission services, the latter can be an open There
is, however, some degree of oversight, with a
public consultation, or focused through expert advisory- g.toyPt' well-plaåd member of
the.European Parliament secretariat commenting
i"ot[tnopt and forums, represe ting a wide range of stakeholder th"t the Er-f.u'
Parliament'often requests the commission to present
organizaiions, providing for pluralism of th more detailed
,nã.."t"f,"tio.t plu.t foi-, pä,t of a wider i which info¡mation on who is consulted when and
a how such consultations
legìslative pråpo,"l', which nt the have been carried out' (Lehma
nn 2009:4g).
"l.o-p""i.s
basis oif evidencã used to ãrrive at the proposal, This is a key
stage,

in that the evidence becomes the subiect of public debate involv- Article 11 provides the legal basis for consultation, the pro-
Yl,]:T::"rt
scuutâl tormars
ing detailed scrutiny ty i.t,...rr.d participani', who are primarily adopted are not enforceable in law, instead forÁlrrg p".t
Union EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 37
36 Interest Representation in tbe European

this initial stage. The responsible official will normally consult widely
lation'' Similar schemes' with the
K and in Ireland, embracing Pro- with interest groups of all types. (Cini 1996:147)
n and consultation' ranging from
iding a baseline of wider legiti- The internal commission deliberation process has been further illumi-
.o-á' are reached' At EU level' nated by Gillies. During the drafting srage, other departmenrs of the
organized civil societ¡ such meas- Commission affected by the proposals will be given the broad outlines
th because of the need to broaden and asked for comments, and one person allocated in each of these to
follow the proposal's progress. Discussions are also held at this stage
with the member states' permanent representations, Council officials
and technical advisors, and extensive informal consultations before a
proposal is drawn up. Once a full first draft of the proposed legisla-
tion is drawn up it is circulated to all Commissioners and their Cabinets
Assessments', while other Directorat (described below), interested departmenrs, and the Commission Legal
Service. Changes may be suggested at this stage by any one of these
actors. The drafting process can take a substantial amount of time, and
a number of drafts produced before a proposal is agreed and adopted as
a Commission formal proposal. Once the Directorare Generals (DGs) of
the Commission services have nearly agreed on the text for a proposal, it
then goes to Cabinets and to the College of Commissioners for approval.
Once approved, it is published in the OfficialJournal (Gillies 1998).
Once drafts are passed upwards through the Commission and on
to cabinets of Commissioners, they progress to their private office
of around six advisory staff (1,2 in the case of the President), usually
hand-picked individuals whom the Commissioner concerned has cho-
rade unions formed out of a concern sen to work with. Commissioners are often dependent upon the assis-
rd for deregulation' tance provided to them by their'Cabinet'. Some are functional experts,
Commission in the PreParation while others might have a more wide-ranging political role in keeping
a Commissioner briefed on wider developments inside and outside the
ed interaction with interested parties
Commission. Eventuall¡ a draft reaches the level of 'Chef [head] de
s a middle-ranking official within a
Cabinet'. The heads of each of the different Cabinets meer once a week
and prepare the agenda for the weekly meeting of Commissioners on
sibility for PreParing t \íednesdays. Relatively uncontenrious proposals are agreed at Chef de
eters of EU PolicY and Cabinet level and passed on up to the College of Commissioners for rub-
measure alreadY set' A ber-stamping. Proposals which are more contenrious are left for debate
is regarded as a maior career oPP at the College, where the perspectives of differing Commission depart-
sible individual. Cini comments:

re wavs in which these prior consid-


t"k.,, i"to account, whilst avoiding
as
oles and unintended consequences
at
interests is vital for the rapporteur
Union EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence
38 Interest Representation in the European 39

staff within responded with an announcement that he had referred the appointment
through other legislative stages falls b,ack to the permanent
to the commission's ad hoc Ethics committee for scrutiny, effectively
a diviiion of the Directorate (Cini 1996)'
extending the period of regulation, and demonstrating the incremental
Collins has suggested:
process through which rules respond to the turn of over time.
The consultation procedures cover the process of "u*t,
a king, can be a lonelY f using expert advice,
off from domestic Politics, including a code of practice for those who provide and usð it, which, inter
a real Power base. Their alia, seek to make the evidence basis transparent (European commission
to alarge degree from the force of 2002b). Expert groups provide non-binding advice to the commission
authority stems
(Collins 1'993 53) throughout the policy process, although much of the significant input
arises during the policy development phase. These groups are (primar-
These factors make them particularly dependent upon
their cabinet, and ily) constituted by _the Commission, with members nominated ty ,.p-
resentatives.of public authorities in the member states and civil societ¡
to their own domestic links, often inter-related through cabinet mem-
to achieve his or The definitive study on the use of expert groups made by the European
bers. Members of a cabinet will help the commissioner
h;;;;;lr;À-ugh alliances with civil society organizations_who share the Commission is provided by Gornitzka and Syerdrup (2015), who found
,a-î poli.y thr"usts, whether business or NGO oriented. In the Juncker that around 40% (500) of the Commission's advisory groups featured
societal actors, with the remainder comprising national ministries and
òo-,,'irrior, (20I4-I9) rhese meetings are recorded on the website of
with agencies. Of these, business actors were present in 29o/" of groups and
the commissioner. Kautto tells the story of how Nokia worked
the Cabinet of the Finnish Commissioner to good effect (Kautto 2009)' NGOs in28% of groups, leading them to conclude that
ðï";;Jt of this volume tells the story of how the Deputy Head of Cabi-
relationship with the overall pattern of inclusion/exclusion of societal acrors are partly
net fãr a Commissioner developed a productive working
,outsider' NG-o, based on broadly shared political consistent with a norm of participatory diversity and representation
u k"y fig.rr. from an
to build impetus and support behind. a new policy of heterogeneous interests and perspectives ... business interests are
leanings, as a means
opposition to it in public fora. Otherwise, there more often than not matched and mixed with other non-governmental
;;;;;;"i and to tackle quir ading from actors. (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2015:161)
ir r"pp.tt in the literatrrr.io. the
ð.äi"t, *irtt the former head of the Eu W\ülF (and
L.y p"t,.ipant in the'Green1O' G1 ntal NGOs Nonetheless, the European Ombudsman has exercised vigilant over-
"orrttí.rid in ihapter 1)recountint mis- sight in response to concerns represented to her by the cEo and related
NGOs, to which the European Commission has been responsive. The
rio""t had the irabit of participati for-
Ombudsman welcomed a decision by the European Commission to
Lörinczi
mal invitation' (Long and
plng
make transparent the basis for selection, to develop a new conflict of
and
an animal welfare ÑGO draft a P interest policy for members, and to make membership of the TR manda-
Rawlings 1992). Public focus on tory for those from civil society (European Ombudsman Z01S).
and civil society interests is mainl
More formalized are the (around 250; European commission201,1a)
of taking up positions with outsid committees appointed by the legislator (council; parliament)
the potential for conflicts of interes ro issue
opinions on Commission proposals for implementing measures, and
Cori.r,t rules involve a ban from taking up such a position within
18

months of demitting office. when former (2004-14) President of the ember states (Treaty on the Func-
commission B"rroro took up a position with Goldman Sachs
in 201'6 90 k. 291, formerly 'Comitology
,ho.tly after the expiry of ihe cooling-off period,_ an online petition se in oversight of implementation
resulted and the frrrãpé"r Ombudsmai m"di call to review the rules st representation than committees
" (2014_19) lation, some authors have seen in
further (European o*b,,d,-",, 201'6a)' President Juncker
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence
40 Interest Representation in the European 41

m c iv i I so ci ety i nte r est p o I it i c s' )iöîl:


t he
",t'iå'lr;i' i.';:'ri:',:Î ff ;.
sion studY which noted how it was
interests, including NGOs, to
.201'4)' More startlingl¡ some
in comitologY committees with
democratic potential (Joerges and Neyer
7997)' although this is some-
disputed (Rhinard 2002)'
"'îil;;;;.duìes
what
describ.d have sought to provide some baseline
"tou" engages with outside
standards for the ways in which the comrnission
interests,
ples such
baseline,
sion serv
Commission services have highlY
arr¡! ent (th
Rural Development, D_G Environment,
iåäi, | 2016), DG Markt (Directorate Gen-
DG The European Parl¡ament and interest representation
eral rvices) (Coffey International Develop-
mãnt zor+l and DG Sante (Directorare General for Health and Food
Safety), forming extensive an
tion. These are described in
the number and diversitY of organi
ing here. Inevitabl¡ there are diff
thãse dialogues from civil society
2007.;.Coffey defence of diffuse (i.e. citizen) interesrs (pollack 1997; young 2010).
i-n.-.u"to"iøn of one as'a voice, not a vote' (ECORYS on the There is an ongoing debate as to whether committees endowed *itrr r.rtt
also Iusman and Boswell
i.ri"rnu,iorr"l o.u.lop-.nt2u'4;see
Forury on tbe Rights of the Child)'
nC ¡orti."-"dministåed Ewropeøn
in. i"rrir*ion"lired ãialogt"' of t G Trade and Santefromwere designed by
a Director in
;il;. individual durini the passage of his career
of DG Sante' Both dialogues are note-
DG Trade to the Director-ôe"e'"1

solving which Participants are


contributions from the food i
these dialogues are more inform
ized, exchange fota, such as tho
icrárrro' ,t"îwork áf .nuiro,,-ental interest groups (Chapter 1)'
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 43
42 Interest Representdtion in tbe European

members, with around 400 advi- adopt a different position from that proposed by the lead committee. All
rhese factors result in substantial lobbying. Lehmann gives the example
, from 201'6, of €22'879 Per
generous' (Pegan 201'6:3) in of the roaming telecoms charges file, with the chair of the Industry
This allows MEPs to emPloY Committee reported receiving around 50 requests for appointments
ed to Postgraduate masters level' each day from stakeholder organizarions (Lehmann 2009). Almost all
ved in a Particular file, assistants cases with notable outcomes generate complaints of excessive intensity
iety of stakeholder organizations of lobbying, involving mobilization by a range of interests with highly
of information means that mem- polarized positions. Some recent research suggests that both'friends and
n needs, rather than make them foes' are lobbied, although there is a disproportionare focus upon the
such as the European Commis- larger partíes (Marshall 2010). Most lobbying activity is directed at the
dependent upon a single outside source Parliament until the first reading has been taken, because intervention
sion (MarshaIl201'2)' becomes pr.ogressively more difficult as inter-institutional discussions
a lead committee' which
In the first stage, a proposal is passed to intensify in a search to find common ground, and because most legisla-
then appoin,, ,"pp-'i"ifrom amo"g its members to prepare.a draft
" rapporteur' this individual tive files are agreed at first reading with the Council through informal
reoort on the propo,"t' iike the Commission 'trilogue' negotiations. During trilogues, the rapporteur and shadow
other committees
;"ä;r'; ;;;;i-i;.", for interest *ill work independently
represenrarion.
(Gillies rapporteurs are mandated to follow a committee position, resulting in
mav also be asked f"tä" tpi"ú" u"d
i' bv each political cohesion to protect the EP position regarding the Council. During these
ffiti; Trfr"ì""n"ã.* ìuipo"'"' yh.9 appointed
negotiations, MEPs therefore tend to act as a team, involving the prior-
"' th" on behalf of the interests of that partv'
f'o'""
;;;;;';;;;il"t ttization of negotiating positions which are often oriented towards the
Gillies comments: public saliency of issues.
on amendments; they Intergroups of the European Parliament are cross-party, cross-
The Rapporteur exerts an lmportant influence
committee groupings of individual MEPs clustered around subjects on
haveanãssistant;;;';;'i'J"ï'Ïo"J:îå;liJ:'i:ïìåÍå:Ï which members have particular interests, with open public meetings act-
the views of other committees' The ing as an informal forum for discussion as well as a means to link politi-
ft report, which is discussed by each cians with various civil society stakeholders. They have no formal role in
ve advice from shadow raPporteurs the policy process and are explicitly required to act in a way which does
to advise them' During the committee not create confusion with'official' activities of the Parliament. At the srart
to it - thus this is a good of each term of the EP Members vote on the establishment of intergroups,
stage, âny member can propose amendments which enables such groups to use the facilities of the EP and logistical
(Gillies L998:L8L)
time to contact Vtlps and iheir assistants' support of the parties, and requires compliance with rules of disclosure of
with sonrces of external support. ln 2014 the establishment of some 28 inter-
ence whether interest groups make contact
a
groups were agreed for the eighth term of the EP. A number correspond
oarty of the rapporteur, whether a pafty
is- getting
positions of parties closely to NGOs who provide secretariat facilities, such as intergroups on
itr-poritiont, anã whtther the
íi,h -or" contact where there is disa-
"t"ãitg".¿,
(De BruYcker 2016)'
greement
Different committees have dif
different tYPes of civil societY
2015). Once a committee has
more difficult because the re
-f-offt..rury. can
th. p,ott" can be unpredictable' such that the plenary
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence
44 Interest Representation in the European Union 4S

tcr use EP facilities was to The European court of Justice and interest representation
rules requiring regulation for those wishing
et al.Z0O7). Corbett ãt "1. huu. suggested that the
-".i "if-_ri,. 1"CorË.tt effect on the working
scale of intergroup activity has had a considerable
in Stras-
methods of the et and in particular during the plenary sessions
held:
borrrg, where intergroup meetings are normally

[intergroups] permit members


to focus on a particular set of issues
They enable
of specific national, constituency or personal concern'
groups on a
itr"- ,o tp.cialise, make contacts with outside interestmake political
*Àr" i"foi-al basis than in committee meetings, and
I groups' Intergroups thus not only
contacts outsi
helptoformnsonspecificissues'.buttoforge
wiåer politic 4 can be useful in other circumstances,
andcanhelpconsensuswhichisessentialinthe
European Pårliament' (Corbett et al' 2005:1'77)

This view on the importance of intergroups is in


part shared by Cullen'
one of the main avenues for citizen
-iã ft"t t"æ"rt.d tË"t they represent
i;;.;;Jg.;ps lacking "...r, to other jnstitutional strucrures (cullen
1,999).However, ro-.*MEPt seem to take a view
that their importance
has been exaggerated, the concept has gone stale' and that those who
attend are few ir, ,r.ráb". t*d towãrds the converted. One earlier
".rd purposes to
account has suggested that MEPs use them for symbolic
ã.-onr*",. to-tieir constituents an interest, arranging for their name

i" ü. tig".¿ in the attendance register even when they were unable to
attend (Harlow 1'992)'
Citizen interest grouPs have
among Parliaments because of
producer interests the oPenness
iar and unpredictable territor¡
tions and the engagement of P
dedicated parliamentary liaison st

veto points
heteroclite and multipolar institution ... with multiple
andopportunltiesforhorsetradinganditisaninstitutionatthe
centre of the rise of European party politics and media
attention'
therefore requires
Effective inrerest representltion in the Parliament
approaches'
wider coalitiorrr, IËtt., networking, and non-technical
combined with an acute sense for regional or even locåi
political
priorities. (2009:40)
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 47
46 Interest Representation in the European Union

oes en interests
qi which con-
"of
SMEs, the
The some of the
test cases.Iùlhile this is expensive,
mainstream citizen interests, such as those concerned with the environ-
ment, consumer affairs and disabilities. In order to address these issues,
the EESC developed a'Liaison Group' comprised of a selection of EU cit-

being'parked' at the EESC, and do not participate in the Liaison Group


(including, notabl¡ the'Green10' network and the,Human Rights anã
Democracy Network' - see also Chapter 6). Nonetheless, the Liaison
Group has been the source of some interesting thinking and debate, par-
ticularly on the concept of'representativeness' criteria for civil ,o.ì.ty
organizations, which includes the need to have members in at least haif
of the member states. The concept of group 'representativeness' is con-

the way' (McGown 2009:100)

lnterest representation regarding other inst¡tutions


EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 49
Europeøn Union
48 Interest Representation in the

(EIB) has increasingry found itself


a 'participation', wilh the emphasis upon avoiding suspicion of third party
The European rnvesrment Bank capture' and public confidence in the outcome of decisions (wifiams
represe
tarset ofinterest iïî'.:,tå:îîlitff:l: 2005; Borrás and Krapohl 2007).
A case study
',ïr"îJt,dj|:?J]ffi* I interest groups have
stakeholders
actions with private
rocedures, reiulting
been active in Presstne in autonomY . Ossege notes how
(,Ef no,)' to
ffi ;struJ,ørr' u"d D"evelopment
lnvolvlng industry uses agency procedures to delay or re-open cases where it has
.nuitonmental criteria for work
,iri.t
"F;t."Jt received a negative ruling, requiring the agencies to respond on a point-by-
of the Earth .separat point basis to external input. One of his interviewees points to the politi-
tn central and east European
#Ë *;h;, ..Ápri national financial institutions cization of their work:
countries, to monitor have
EU-related political institutions
in the region' A number of other throigh'h'Ï-': o-f :,':::d""' Suddenly. all agencies get problems of recruiting experrs. you will not
becom "ä;;;'*:iil:"of Auditors' anã a number of the EU's find a professor of distinction in pharmaceuticals, who has not in
topur d" ê;;;; some way, via third party funding, collaborated with industry. \J7hy
used in this way' should he, in the first place? Not everyone, who has collaborated with
"g.rr.i the need for
industry is a criminal ... Everyone who exchanges views with industry
,.r.''f¡ :iiI Pendent from
seems to be a Trojan horse for the detriment of people or public health
political d".isio"-ma ... \X/ith the result that we have difficulties ro recruir experts. (Ossege
commission to grve
carion ,.r,:,'"ililUl;
totu' ge"ãtitaliy modi- 2015:1.09)
ated bY BASF) for comt
-' "to make a deciston
able ;^";;;;á
fied potato. Because '^^-':;i:
åi-Ut' states had not been Agencies with regulatory powers often operate in highly politicized
p'oii''î;Ë;;;t referred back to the Commission'
for or agains, tn" upon a preceding iudgment domains. The BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic
heavily
The commission,s #ñì;r.- (EFsÂ) which considered Communication) recently (2016) issued a key regulatory decision based
reached by the E"';:i;i;;ft;f;ü;"tÉo'iiv on the principle of internet neutralit¡ restricting the circumstances under
an investigation into concerns
it to be safe, and i"'p"ïti*f"t follówingma gttt"t' There is a debate which internet service providers can discriminate between suppliers of
resistant
about the presence of'antiblotic ' services. This was heralded by one internet-based platform as'a triumph
abouttheã*t.,,t,.;h''iïÀ,:,,1U:ru",;'.',î.îtå:",:Jå'.î,t;t"îÏ: for the European digital rights movemenr', with the NGO European
Digital Rights Initiative trumpering rhat'Europe is now a global stand-
of demoiratic architecture for partlclpatlve ard-setter in the defense of the open, competitive and neutral internet'
monltorlng
blished at an early stage perform (Toor 2016).
regulatory roles which raisesignificant
roles. more recent agenci"' ;;î;;
pr...¿,rr., árd outcomes' particularlv as
;ï,,,'#;;rb"ä";r"*""'ur"i paid by users seeking reg-
the work of these is fund' id gou"tttuttce procedures
lnterest representation in other EU-related structures
ulatory clearance.,suc
'he avoidance of capture'
based on essentlally d transParenc¡ although
a

agencies (Euro-
for improvements ln a sample of
2015). The EP has increa
assisted bY watchdog NGOs
to steer a middle course be
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 51
50 Interest Representation in the Ewropean
barriers to integratlon Other policymaking procedures: social dialogue
used for EU objectives of removing non-tariff
Members of technical
through harmonizati;; ;i;;it;it"i 't""du'ds' awn from industr¡
social dialogue between EU employer and trade union organizations
committees incrude around 25,000 together with local
arose in the mid-1980s as part of a drive by commission presiáent Delors
to build a social aspect to the European single market. The macroeco-
details involved in nomic dialogue with public aurhorities, described earlier in this chapter,
selves (Egan 2001)' Some comPa- is one part of the social dialogue; anorher is the dialogue between the
and invest considerable resources social partners themselves. In return for the promise to ,t.- the tide of
benefits at stake (Egan 2001)' A social legislation, Delors asked employer and trade union organizations
national level devote a to engage in labour market dialogue as ,social partners', Ãd .ro-_
members with the tech- "
ber of agreements between them have arisen frorntheir'social dialogue,'
nstance' a studY of L35 including a small number with legislative effect.
1% had live contact with a Euro- At cross-sectoral level, there are six participating organizations, three
1997). Some of the extreme for employers and three trade unions, although the key organizations are
associations can PartlY be BusinessEurope and UEAPME (for business), cEEp (for public sector
standards committees' The employers) and ETUC (for labour) (chapter 1). Employeriparticipated
íalized associations in the European because they anticipated that 1992 would bring a uK Labãur goì.r.r-
esults from Comité EuroPéen de la ment, and with it remove the last obstacle to a veto on qualified major-
ity voting_in the social policy arena. BusinessEurope reâsoned that they
mittee is not constitutionally deter- would be better placed if they were in a position ro influence legislation,
compla some commit- and acceded to long-standing commission requests that they enter inro
mined by a general
tees are
"totto",é"tt,t"f"
ou.r-do-i""ä-ïy that they have an arrangement, together with GEEP and ETUC, for formalized social
t..,, ",.¿,o "du",,,i!;lll*h ïi:rî',:iï:-:l partnership with a legal basis in the EU treaties. These powers give the
social partners the opportunity to write EU employment measures by
mutual agreement either bypassing the Parliament, going directly to
the council for legislative endorsemenr) or through binding agreemenr
between themselves for implementation in the member states.
The first of these mechanisms, through council legislation, is driven
by a'negotiate or we'll legislate' dynamic from the commission, in that
where employers fail to do so the commission has the option of initiat-
ing a standard Directive, depending upon an assessment ãf its chances in
the other EU political institutions (Branch and Greenwood 2001; smis-
mans 2008). These factors introduce substantial politics into the equa-
s under this route stalledor broke
s-sectoral agreements of no more
Standardisation, which also attracts
funding from. the European
the last of which was in January
for (such as those con-
õ;ñ;i;;. This has resulted in some committees s either broke down or employers
cerned *ith *""'for considerable contention' but those agreements that have been
"otomäilË;ñ;tttg
,rä';l;r";î? g.".tl"uìirv ái tn' EU (Eichener and
ection for workers in a number of
the net resutt is
Voelzkow, in Eising 2009)' superior domestic legislation. The
Union EU Decision-Mahing and Channels of Influence 53
52 Interest Representation in the European

there were independent detailed studies commissioned of candidate


is estimated (by former ETUC Deputy
1996 agreement on parental leave organizations. This resulted in'tiers' of participation status, the conten-
General Secretary Jt";"|;;tte)
to have benefited workers (relative to
riousness of which ultimately resulted in a significant legal challenge to
o*r,
conditions in their stut.r¡ from five of the (then) 12 mem-
-ä-b.,
art-tlme work to bring benefit to the Court of First Instance by UEAPME seeking annulment of one of
the agreements concluded, and which was resolved by BusinessEurope
incorporating UEAPME into the employer delegation. At sectoral level,
employer and union organizations need to file a joint application to the
Commission, and to demonstrate that they are organized at EU sectoral
level with adequate structures for effective participation. They must also
demonstrate that they

consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and


recognised part of Member States' social partner structures, and have
the capacity to negotiate agreemenrs, and which are representative of
several Member States. (European Commission 2011b)

binding agreement between th This focus upon geographic representativeness (Pérez-Solórzano Bor-
nation;l level, became the de ragán and Smismans 2012) has spilled over from producer organizations
have been four such binding agre to NGOs (Chapter 6), with consequences for democratic legitimacy
through the potential to exclude 'what' groups whose existence is not
based around representing members but advocating for a cause for
whom representativeness is irrelevant, such as animal welfare and the
environment. This is considered further in Chapters 6 and 8.

Conclusions
The starting point for this chapter was rhat characteristics of political
systems and their structures of power and decision-making greatly influ-
civil aviation and maritime sectors ence the nature of interest representation. ìØhereas maj'oritarian regimes
concentrate power, fragmented and multi-level decision-making struc-
tures disperse it, resulting in the dilution of impact for any one rype
of interest constituency. Multiple-level opportunity structures thus have
a pluralistic effect, limiting the
ing venues for competitive lobby
sienificant, both as legislative institutions and their insulation
.rido*.d with elevated status ing others by opening up venue
should not be overstated' The si
movement is considered in Chapter
5'- ..
A noteworthy f;;';;" tiEtj social dialogue has been.the attempts
of organizations as a pre-
to estabrish .rit"riu îå, Àe represenrativeness
p"rü.ip"ii.n. Ar cross-r..tor"l level at the
outset
condition for their
54 Interest Representation in the European Union
Chapter 3

The Regulation of Lobbying and


the Europe an Transpare ncy Register

'Lobbying' raises similar types of issues for most democratic political


systemswhich leads to some degree of regulation. The core issue involves
public assur"":: ."r to the probity of exchanges berween lobby organi-
zarions and political institutions, but this can exrend into wiáer issues
involving equality of access. This is particularly important in the EU
political system because of the high degree of relianie upon organized
civil society to undertake core democraric mechanisms (Chapterl).
'Lobby Regulation' can embrace a variety of goals, on ì spectrum
nnging from limited aims of avoiding corrupr practice th.o.rglito con-
tributing to more complex regulation of access to political institutions,
and exchanges between them and outside organizations aimed at ensur-
outcomes. The EU's systemic reliance upon
ns that it has all of these fearures. Chapter g
edures wt ich regulate exchanges with organ-
ocratic outcomes, while this chapter
U's lobby regulation schemes, although
of these schemes to, and implications

The focus of lobby regulation schemes can be bifurcated between


the
behaviours of public office holders and 'lobbyists'. The former is
the
easier to achieve' because_ the constituency is easier
to identify and regu-
late, while the latter involves definitional complexities.
For instan.e, the
2014 Inter-Institutional Agreemenr establishi.g
the Transpar.n.y någir-
ter (TR) offers a definition of lobbying
as

all activities ... carried out with the


objective of influencing the policy
formulation or ìmplementation of páti.y
and the decisårr-m"kirrg
processes of the EU
institutions. (European Commission 2015a:5)

.5.t
Union The Regulation of Lobbying 57
56 Interest Representation in the European

This raises. problematic issues of embrace'


in that it would seem to permission; the unauthoriz
representation'. from or behaviour which might
i*'1"õ ;;;r1.,. ,n..h""i'-s of participation andwriting or attending a 1.2).They also impose a d
;ï,1;;;;ities such u' pttitioÅ
- signing' letter
tivities of member states in the EU is suspected, including fra
her clarifY this in the Green PaPer of their cabinet and director-generals are required to publish meerings
ing a'lobbyist' only serves to illus- held with lobbyists on their websites, and to refrain from meering wiih
any lobbyist not on the TR. There are also provisions aimed at ávoid-
ing conflicts of interest when commissioners and officials leave office,
activitiest
Dersons carrying out such
organi- the so-called'revolving doors' provisions. For commissioners there is
í;t-J*.hit'i"urit"rfairs consuít think-
' trade
r
an 18-month 'cooling-off' period involving an outright ban on taking
a lobbying-related position after leaving office, and for senior officials
;;;k;;.-tor"å roÙuv units ('in-h
^^
(European Commission 2006a:5) there is a prohibition on lobbying their former deparrmenrs for three
"rro.i"tionr. years, as well as the need to seek permission on taking up a position for
as' examples' later refined tv/o years after leaving office. Following an intervention by the Euro-
Thus, the'definition' involves providing'such
In essence, the'definition' pean Ombudsman, the Commission now publishes on ân annual basis
f"rrÀä, *irn the exclusion of pnbli. authorities.
around a loose concept of those to whom permission has been granted. A recent referral to the
i;;;il ;"biective g.;"'"ti'åd notions basedis a somewhat problematic Commission's Ad-hoc Ethics Commitree, citing TFEU Article 245, of the
;fo,, kno* tire typeãf player we mean''.This
system seeking enforceable standards' and immediate past President of the Commission taking up a position with
foundation fo.
"..gotãio'y allv commenced with the easier task of Goldman Sachs after the 18-month period demonsrrares the upward tra-
nduct for the behaviour of officials jectory of stricter regulation. Similarl¡ the President of the European
political institutions, with sanctions Commission has recently (November 2016) imposed increasing the
Le enforced' Over time, these have 'cooling-off' period for Commissioners to two years, and the President
ment to'lobbyists' to develop self- to three, while the European Parliament has proposed increasing the
period for all Commissioners to three years.
The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (European par-
liament 201,4) have a chapter specifically directed at elected members, in
which Rule 11 specifies principles concerning members' financial inter-
ests, standards of conduct and access to Parliament, supplemented by a
representatives' hosted code of conduct in Annex 1. This requires electronic public disclosure
more formalized regulatory schemes for'interest
by political institutions'

Regulating conduct of those work¡ng in EU institutions


als of the EuroP
ietY of general Pri
this chaPter' Thus
nstructions from a
; the accePtance of anY honour'
deco-
:ting in circumstances which give rtse

toaconflictofpersonalinterest;engagit'ginoutsideactivitywithout
Union The Regulation of Lobbying 59
58 Interest Re\resentdtion in the European

laration of their professional activ- criticism concerns the absence of real sanctions and of structural inde-
ctions or activities' Chairs of any pendence from the industry, leading to an inability to satisfy regulatory
required to disclose donations of demands. Another version of regulation involves a scheme hosted by
creiarial assistance) to those enti- political institutions to which varying degrees of ease are atached to
cular effect upon the regulation of incentives for'lobbyists' who engage with the scheme, including access
have often undertaken to political institutions. Another version again would involve a formal
intergroups, where civil society organizations accreditation scheme for access linked to explicit organizational crite-
takes up a posi-
secretariatroles (Chapui zl'Á"y io'-tt MEP who
ria, such as those operated by the United Nations and the Council of
tion with a lobby organization lose Europe. The EU has the first two of these schemes, but has rejected de
members, such as access to the buil jure accreditation schemes, although there are arguments that its incen=
u
tive. schemes bear elements of de facto accreditation schemes (Green-
" ,o,ts on taking uP Positions wood and Halpin 2007).
office. Nonetheless, the gen- The first self-regulatory scheme in the EU was operated by commercial
upwa the EP recently introducing public affairs practitioners from 1994, and has its origins in gentle pres-
eral regulatory traiectory is
anizations which legislators sure applied by the Secretariat-General of the European Commission,
a'legislative footprint' it'ittt titt then anxious to protect its access to the resources which outside interests
interacted with in the preparation
bring by anticipating emerging pressures for regulation (Mclaughlin and
In essence, these rules are centre Greenwood 1995). This organization of 'Public Affairs practirioners'
by prohibition of excess, as well as (PAP) evolved into the present European Public Affairs Consulrancy
adversely...'). There are
Association (EPACA), with a code whose progressive development
parency of business (Ch ^ 1 of
^r Good
¡-^^Å Administrative
Code ^l-i-io reflects the strength of demand for regulation, but which has failed to
uments). The Europàan forestall regulation by political institutions. \ùØatchdog organizations
Behaviour .-br".. lawfulness, but extends beyond
"lro rimination and equal treatment' have tested out EPAClt's code and adjudication mechanisms by filing a
spect small number of allegations of conrravention. Another organization has
. The a wider embrace of membership, extending to business associations and
h the to'in-house' company public affairs managers, the Society of European
Affairs Practitioners (SEAP), which also operates a self-regulatory code
public (such as times for dating from the second part of the 1990s. The International public Rela-
'-ïh.J. provisions have ill; tions Association (IPRA) has a code of conduct dating from 2011. These
in EU institutions when al
.med
at organizations have developed slightly different policy positions about
i-p*t "p"" 'lobbying scenarios" Beyond this are measures the detail of the TR, operational from 2008. \x¡hile rhe self-regulatory
'lobbyists'. schemes remain in place, the principal regulatory instruments ãr. ,ro*
operated by EU institutions.
The regulat¡on of lobbYists
have oriented schemes
Definitional complexities leading to loopholes
such actors t0
,.golating lobbyists towards incentives upon
"i-.ã "t
participate rsion of this is to encourag€
xplicit disapproval
self-regulat f": i::-
participantofaccesstopoliticalinstltu- of
tions. As w ry ,.h.*t', the main Point
60 Interest Representation in the European Union
The Regulation of Lobbying 61

(wi sted) in a public for NGOs and thi funding. Entries must
and entry.as an individual
sch o the European be updated at least months of a change to
tågrti.r,în. Parliament's
cheme in 2011' the register arising ment (IIA). Enrries are
ðåÁ-irrio.t scheme in 2008 join the register' published directly with the Commission
-."rpã.",i"g the EP's access schemtjoin the register appears to.have been making random checks on entries and on unusual
However, the greatest incentive to
;ñ';;ü;.i; introduced tn20í4 in order to have a meeting with a zations publishing an entry are therefore answerab
new organ- 2016 proposal for a new IIA, the Commission has
êãrn-ìrtio"er or their Cabinet, and a director-general'.4000
joined the register since inffoduction of 'systematic' checks. The IIA seeks
;;;i;;, (around 40% ofrhe current population) the register carries cover officials of the council and the Presidenc¡ introducing a common
ihi, l".rdrnurk (European Commission 2016a)'Joining
principle that in order to have a meeting with anyone in the EU institu-
the obligation to abide bY th
mentally since the PAP code,
tions an organization cludes an open sanction

in this chapter) its terms and system to rqmedy an the present reputation-
al-based sanction of m the register. The IIA
is a Pre-requirement for lobbY also invites member states on a voluntary basis to include their permanent
ition at a Public hearing, and representations in its scope, an initiative aheady implemented by Ireland.
aPPear at a committee hearing Separatel¡ the Bureau of the European Parliament has introduced a vol-
ly. For the Commission it is a Pre- untary'legislative footprint', whereby a footnote will list all those con-
rt advisory groups' Commission may sulted during consideration of a measure in the EP. The Commission IIA
ered organizations (or otherwise must proposal excludes from its scope representative organizations of territo-
its 2016 proposal rial public authorities on the basis of their public narure, although some
invite registration at the start of any meeting)' and
to meet with of these were explicitly included in preceding versions of the scheme. In
for an inter-institutional agreement makes it a requirement
sum, the EP introduced its scheme in 1996; the Commission introduced
;;;;ili"l. À.ro* the Cãmmission, webpages related_to consultation its scheme, a 'Register of Interest Representatives' (ROIR) in 2008; the
áir"., org"nizations to making an entry in ihe tR' The Commission
lists
schemes were merged 1n 2011 into a common TR; and the 2016 IIA pro-
separately in its consultation
poses extension to the Council. The use of the term'Transparency Regis-
*hi.h are, and are not' on the ter'was meant to make it easier for organizations which had objected to
are warned that the contents of t
the term 'interest representative', making public transparency the focus.
weight than that of a Private indi
The development of the ROIR demonsrrares how the commission works
becárrs. of the difficulties of Polic
together with organizations which share its policy goals.
consultation alerts for nominated i
lobbying organizations' and beyond this A final change proposed to the 2016 scheme is worthy of note. The
de fac
2011 Transparency Register included a definition of lobbying as
it has get for ãrganizations to advertise them-
selves itg EU institutional platform' despite
"t
linkage to EU public policymaking. allactivities directly or indirectly
- having no more than tenuoús
some
registration to a'Transpar- influencingt ¡ of policy and thê
in. basiã of the present scheme involves
p,rblt web dat zaíons decision_mak irrespìctiv! of where
"";'i;;i*r;
1åã..tnän p,rbii. authorities) ^
tttk,:: they are unde
used,
- of commrrnication
ìnflo.rr." p,-tbli. policy. The key
dtsclo-
inter'
sure element, ,.rrroo.rdi,, gt organi"
s;
and the key wi{e;ringing definition is a mark of distinction for the TR, notably
est categorizurion; *t o iJ"på'""ttd;-missiorlinterest
areas' lfr¡
tts breadth in including indirect activities. This takes in its scope public
representation; and,
recent legislative fiI., *oìk"å o.r; ,p.rrãi.rg on interesr
The Regulation of Lobbying
62 lnterest Representation in the European Union 63

aimed at EU institutions' How-


relations and specialist communications
ever, the 2016 proposal for an IIA
proposes to change this' in defining
lobbying as

certain interests by interacting with any of


activities
the three utions, their members or officials' with the
objective he formulation or implementation of policy
orlegislaion-makingprocesswithintheseinstitutions.
Ifoassed.thiswouldloseadistinctivefeatureoftheTRincompari-
::iÏ'.ffi;'';i;h*. in the world. Activist sroups involved in the A trail of emails between these parties confirm this interpretation.
of ,.gi,*r from the outset have lamented this
change
Theie appeared in the public domain-from 2008 until th.y *"rË archived
"ri"ùiiJÀ.", "
(ALTER-EU 201.6). ot Europa sometime in the spring of 2010, via a link from Kallas's

Register of
The emergence of the European Commission
Interest RePresentatives
The first announcement of a Commission
lobby regulation scheme in
documentation. This latter action seems to have marked the end of the
close working r seems to have been perceived as
hostile by Cabi responded by making the doc-
umentation thu ilable through the ETI website.
organization, the CorPorate The differences between these two parties on the operational issues sur-
of business lobbYing, and a new rounding the registration scheme became apparent thereafter. Nonethe-
gendas earlY in his term of office' less, their close working relationship, the list
oPe Observator¡ Erik'SØesselius' of co the most frequent outside correìpondent
. new Commission in the autumn with elius himself. In sum, the items of .o.r.-
ierYatorY
)cating a
e USA. T
responsible Commission service was not
General of the) Commission saw no need
to change the existing arraîBe'
ments. He re-sent a similar advoca
nomination to the corporate Europe observatory's'worst
lobby' award.

The operation of the Transparency Register


t records that
its existence has been the quality
concerns and alarrnist' arions. This has its origins in the
the speech ... basically used the " ' demands'
n the quality of registrations in
not to say u.h.-""t, ttne of the campaigt""' 1Ch"b"net2006:33)
64 Interest Representdtion in tbe European Union The Regulation of Lobbying 6S

a key issue became


its formative years. Once the scheme was launched'
the number of registrations it would atÛact'
In announcing the scheme
i"zoos, Kallas erl in oarticular thar'around 2600 interest
5)'
groupshaveaP er-
ã"d th. achievi on
formance indicator of the scheme by
to it' of which around
was siven to the rype J o':g^ni'utiâns signing up
ffi fhä';; ;;,'ffi;ã. ,i" EU level *itni" their territorial scope of
earlv davs of the register
;;:;;;l&.t*ood and Dreger 201'3)' The and small service enterprises
i;;-i;dt"idrr"lr, would-be foliticians decision centres all taking the
in suburban lo.utio.r, iu. from political
organizations from third
oDoortunitv of free advertising'f"t", as well as
representation' His- position on both geographic and
;å;;",|lirfr nignfy tenuou! links to EU interest
because they believed has been further softened bv the
;;;;iÇ;rh... h"î" úeen orqanizations registering and enrries of list only the number of -.-b.rr,
;h;;;håi, chances of grant"funding would be increased, spend of €250
lobbying members are. The more subdued
,rorr-."irt.nt organir"Iions claiming an annual
(Phillips 2009).In 2015, focus in the ETR is upon using transparency as an exposure device as
Àiiiir", attribuied to the work of a,prankster'
list comprising around a means to address the issues. NGos are asked to list their members, a
Transparency lnternational sent in a complaints
implausible or miss- requirement which is not made of other categories of enúants such as
h;îi-;iìil .r,tri., of the register which it deemed NGO' and specialist business associations who are apparently assumed to have the desired
i"g f."y data (Transp",t"t/Itt"'national 2015a)'
iegister, supplements that by EU institutions' quality of representativeness.
-ã¿i", monitoring ãf the Jç ¿"t".ntii.t on the register has improved one clause contained in the code of conduct linked to regisrrarion
;"i ;; a resu* thã quality is set apart in terms of significance from the otherwise anodyne content.
over time for the mainstream organizations'
The quirkin.r, of entries blelles. the limited resources originally Clause d of the code states that

ïil:lï'i ;i: :î,ffi J;Jîl iiT:lii;


e Inter-Institutional Agreement with
itsextensiontotheCouncilpledgestoincreasetheresourcestothesec.
,.r".i"i,""¿ therefore the capaciiy to upgrade its checks from'random'
to'systematic' uPon new entries'

Links to Democratic Mechanisms


regulation IS one. The
The ETI contalns three strands, of which lo b by
common theme IS the protectlon and advancement
of p ublic legitimacY
\íith lob by regula tlon, the rhetoric from the
through transParency.
(Kallas 200 5 was that a sys-
announcement of the nitiati ve onwards
pu blic legitimac¡
tem of transparency was needed 1n order to safeguard
extent of dependence by the EU system upon its
particularlY gr ven the
has al wa ys been
exchanges with organized cl vil soclety. TransparencY
7

Union
66 Interest Representation in the European

Chapter 4
assessment' of proposed legislative
Commission (ChaPter 8), in that st
Business lnterests and the
Professions
wider signifrcance to have emerged
which an anti-globalization activ-
tus with Cabinet Kallas during the
This demonstrates a keY Point
f this volume; that the imPact of
e extent to which its goals coincide
itical junctures' rather than the type
of interest rePresented'

professions are diversely constituted, even where most members of a


particular profession perform their activities in the public sector, there is
a mixed model of private and public sector contracting, and as private
operatlYes.

exchange. The mechanics of achieving this liberal vision has meant thar
ration
f eco_
'made
he EU

67
7_
Business Interests and the Professions 73
the EuroPean Union
72 Inlerest RePresentd ilon in

Key features
-üíhile the reasons for specialization were provided in Chapter 1, some of
the consequences have been reserved for description in this chapter. Apart
fiom chimney sweeps there are, for instance, specialist associations ded-
icated to the producers of heat pumps, autoclaved aerated concrete, and
six different types of glass products (each with their own associations).
Xlhile many specialisms can be explained around divisions in the product
chain, others reflect'issues' rather than sectoral clusters. Some of these
did not stâft life as representative associations at all, but as'issue niche'
organizations created by an entrepreneur'selling' a 'winnable' issue in
order to cÍeate a flourishing member organization (Browne 1990), or as
technology clusters in EU research framework programmes.
Around three-fifths of all EU associations are pure federations
(i.e. those which have only national associations as members), a quar-
ter embrace both national associations and firms, and around one-sixth
have only companies as members (Greenwood 2002b). These latter
orgaîizatíons are almost exclusively large firm clubs. The mixed types
of member group are usually associations drawn from sectors with a
significant large firm population. These typically started life as federa-
tions, and sought to embrace the best of both worlds by attracting the
resources, status and expertise that large firms bring, while retaining their
claim to comprehensive representation. They also respond to the realities
of being'bypassed' by multinationals in their domain that are active in
Brussels. Of greatest significance is, however, that the membership base
of national associations and large firms results in a very low degree of
Olsonian-type'collective action problems'. Olson challenged the basis
of interest group analysis by questioning whether like-minded interests
would automatically associate. Using behavioural principles derived
from economics, Olson used the concept of rational pursuit of interests
on the part of the potential member to show how membership would not
arise if benefit could be derived without bearing the cost of membership.
That is, if the benefit of interest group activity could be obtained without
lolnlng SO the most logical be haviour would be to 'free n de' the benefit.
Free ridi ng would partl cular
v arlse ln the political representa tl on work
of rnterest gro UPS, tn that any benefits negotiâted with stâte a uthorities
would apply unl versally such AS ind ì.rstry regula tlon of deregula tlon
rather than be restr icted to nterest gfoup
mem bers only In consequence,
0lson argued, nterest groups would nee d to develop pecial
rncentr VCS
were only accessible through membership (Olson 1965)
7-

Business Interests and the professions 7S


74 Interest Representation in the European Union

TABLE4.1 EU business associations employing 15 or more staff


o lsonian- type collective actlon pro blems' tend to be less significant
to the constltuency of EU business lnterest assocta tlons when
compared
unlike national âss ocla tl ons, Name Acronym
to national âSSOCI attons. This IS because, Secretariat
primarily from those who ate
they draw their mem bership constt tuency stze
to express this
aheady poli ticall v actr V€r and who ha ve sought a venues European Chemicals Industry CEFIC 72
political âctlvrtv ln Brussels Hence, lt makes little SCNSC not to oln, and
Association 'family'
assoclattons are
even less to leave. The members of European business Association for Financial Markets in AFME 69
neither of which req urre an
national assoclatlons and large companres, Europe
of the type commonly to
elaborate structure of mem bership lncentlves Committee of Agricultural COpA/
assoclatlons where a wide 50
be found among nâ tional business rnterest Organizattons in the EU/ COGECA
varlety of companles ate members, such AS low cost financial
servlces,
General Committee of Agricultural
employment la w and taxatlon ad YlCe and trarnlng. Large companles
Cooperation in the EU
and national assocl atlons instead look to EU assoclatlons
for political
BusinessEurope 49
assoclatlons are focused
repres entatron, and consequently EU business Insurance Europe
narro\¡r' special- 43
on this task Their resource base reflects this relati v vel
European Federation of EFpIA
been a mo dest 34
tzatlon, often with fewer staff than five While there has
Pharmaceutical Industry
over the past
incremental uplift tn the secretarlat SIZCS of E U assoclatlons Associations
em ploye d 5 or more
deca d., ln 20 1 6 only 1, 9 E U business assoclatlons
1
indica ted EuropeanEngineeringlndustries ORGALIME
staff (Table 4 1 A recent survey of 1 0 1 UK tr ade assoclatlons
31
Association
a median subscri ptlon to an EU assocl atron of around
€20 000 each year,
o/ of a verage total lncome (Trade Association EuropeanAssociation of Chambers EUROCHAMBRES 31
representlng less than 1 /o of Commerce and Industry
F orum 20 06) F or companles who hold mem bership of
EU and national
likewise compar- European Banking Federation EBF
assocra tlons, the affrliatron fees for E U assoclatlons
are 30
€1 DigitalEurope
atrvely sma An annual subscription to AM CHAM EU COSTS
7 ,00 0 28
ln 2 0 1 6 ), a small S um for an American multina tional to pay. European Confederation of Iron and EUROFER 26
other members Steel Industries
Some larger members afe willing to pay higher fees than
1n an ASSOCIA tron AS a way of achieving a higher degree of influence over Food Drink Europe
25
1 9 90s to create
lts work The tendency 1n some large firm sectors ln the American Chambers of Commerce AMCHAM-EU 21
direct company membership AS a route to more exclusive collecti ve actlon to the European Union

also acknowledges the presence of calcula tlon and a membership decision. European Automobile ACEA 20
But some may not even undertake this For some large firms membershiP Manufacturers Association
once con-
became 'habit' and, even if the original membership decision European Association of Craft, Small UEApME
20
sdtuted a calcula ted decision, their continued affiliation
may not ha YC and Medium-Sized Enrerprises
degree of
req uiied any thought or actlon. In sectofs where there IS a high EuroCommerce
18
IS never
similarity ln the lssues facing members assoclatlon membership European Cemenr Industry CEMBUREAU '1.7
seriously q uestioned In industries where the case for collecti
ve actlon ls Association
a higher consideration
less apparent, the cost of non-membershi p ma v be EURELE CTRI C
Union of rh e EURELECTRIC
p. can include the loss of abilirY Electricity Indu stry I6
than the benefits of membershi These COSTS

to influence the posltlons of an assoclatlon, the loss of access to


institutions, and the perceived potentlal for 15
channel with EU political
Transparency Register
entries; Association websites, September 2016
r-
76 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union Business Interests and the professions 77

although even rhese have substantially distinct niches which differentiate


them from each other. of the constituency of business-wide associations
as a whole, it is striking rhar rwo, BusinessEurope and the European
Round Table of Industrialists, have mirror-imag. st.e.rgths and weak-
nesses' and propertieswhich are both a sffengrh and *J"kn.rs to each.
Thus, as will be evident from the
weakness of BusinessEurope lies
whereas the strength and weakness
constituency. Their different niches
functions, in that BusinessEurope does ,everyday lobbying', while ERT
does.'srrategic issues'. It is therefore not difficult for theseãiganizations
to work toge,ther where necessary.
This feature of 'mutual accommodation', where organizations are
deliberately designed to differentiate themselves and to li-it competi-
tion between them, allows organizations to co-exisr. \x/hile the group of
business-wide associations are far from being a common set ãf actors
and have differences in policy positions on individual files, it also means
that where the issue is one in common they do participate in alliances
together, and combinations of them sometimes issue ;oi.rt ,t"t"-.r,tr.
BusinessEurope, as the lead cross-sectoral association, brokers a num-
ber of alliances with cross-sectoral, and sectoral, associations. Thus, the
Alliance for a competitive European Industr¡ creared in2004,provides
a common platform where required, bringing together 11 of ihe major
sectoral EU business associations. The Alliance periodically issues a
interests are. 'manifesto', where strategic priorities for global competitiveness of the
major European industries are identified, contributing to agenda setting
public policy needs. BusinessEurope also participates in ihe European
Cross-sectoral associations Services Forum, bringing rogerher the major European stakeholder
Ëom-
that their
The distinguishing feature of business- wide orgaîva
trons IS panies and associations for services-related issues.
maln breadth of their The five principal EU cross-sectoral business associations have
interventions are geared to those tha t affect the a total
on sectoral rSSUC they staff complem ent of 134,and a declared annual
constl tuency and where they take a posltlon expenditure o" råuuyi"g
of inter-sectoral comPet¡' Eu institutions in excess of €15 milli rn. The organizarions
have to do SO with care AS there ma v be SSUES are described
their own niche' eacb in detail below.
tlon. The ma ln busines s-wide assoclatlons all ha ve
ln that new
wt th verY different structures. This 1S not accidental,
1 96 9 Browne 19
emerge to opera te ln unfilled niches Salisbury BusinessEurope
'Where they fish 1n different pools for members there IS no need to
there 1S no ln
pete and there 1S a good degree of colla boration where
1 9 .5 8 B usinessEurope (former
v UNICE, the Union of
of overlap for and Employers Confederations of E urope
la pprng representa tl0n constltuency, The maln degree has 40 ful
medi thes e being natlona assocla tlons
assocla tl ons only arlses ln the representatlon of
smal and of bus INCSS from J 4 coun
ha ftva spanning all 28 EU
Enterprises SMEs ), where num ber of assocratlons member sta tes (known AS E u-2 B accesslon and
YC
r
Union Business Interests and the professions
80 Interest Representdtion in the European g1

82) builds on a legacy of similar summation


Á íoog it received an industry award for 'trade
(AMCHAM-EU 200eb).

the way in which manY firms ofAmeric


i,,u.,,á.,,* a.,d op erátio ns n
i

T:'.1t": Íffi, i::i';,ffi '"","f"i:ffi


is suPPorted bY the emPloYment of
These factors have contributed to
organization with EU institutions,
ithin services of the European Com-
mission, where some see it as a supportive-
ally in it: gY:t! lg-.1"utlop
-E;t.pea" has led
integration' This Europran profile of AMCHAM-EU
;r;;;; of itin US domestic poiiti.r that it has somewhat gone native In support of this account of the role of the ERT in the single
(Calingaert 1'993). marker project, the FT article cites Jacques Delors in recalling that
The Execurive council of AMCHAM-EU (until 2006 the
of chief
'The ERT was the right vehicle. unice could not have done it. Dlscus-
err-p."rr-emerican Industrial Council) comprises
a group sions with the ERT were simple and straightforward' (Betts 2001:16).
officers responsible for the F'uropean operations
of US The clout of the ERT, with its involvemenr ar chief executive level
"*".otiu.
multinationals (supporied by public affairs heads)'
-U"ti*tt
providing a.forum for
leaders oi EU Co--ittee members to engage
EU politicians at
Council
,f* niglt"t, level. An example of the work which the Executive
has undertaken is a stody oï the impact of
globalization in Europe at the
U.tr.t, of President Barroso (AMCHAM-EU 2008)'

The ERT

necessary political support, first by


.the
le in 1985 in which'STisse Dekker, head
become Chairman of the ER! said if
EuroPean Union
Business Interests and the Professions 83
82 Interest RePres entdtion in the

x sent bv the ERT to the'lune description. Several things combined to get things moving. Most mem-
Mattl whicú member state leaders ber state governments had been elected on largely liberal market plat-
1985 . at forms by the early 1980s, replacing the more left-oriented governmenrs
rolect:
were of the 1.970s. In October 1984 the European summir settled the UK
budget rebate and Greek entry problems, which had stalled EU politics
for so long, while the European economy was finally growing again aÍter
the oil crisis, unemployment was coming down and optimism was in the
air. By January 1985, Commissioner Cockfield was working remarkably
well with Delors, and had galvanized everyone with his White Paper on
completion of the single market by the end of 1992.The 1985 Milan
Eur.opean Summit endorsed the White Paper and agreed that it could be
implemented only if the treaty were changed to allow QMV on single
cop market issues. Even member state leaders who were committed Euros-
leo ceprics, such as Margaret Thatcher, were committed to seeing this goal
sto through.
This scenario casts the ERT as a supporting,rather than causal, agent
position. (Mattli 1999 280)
for a process which would have happened anyway (Young and lØallace
2000). Undoubtedl¡ ERT sat alongside Delors at his press conferences
and gave legitimacy to the single market project. The popularity of
accounts suggesting its influence was more causal is a flag of conven-
ience for those who wish to portray it so. The ERT participates in the
rarefied atmosphere of 'high politics', in which its voice is just one of a
number seeking influence upon public policies, alongside forces such as
national governments and the international environment. Undoubtedl¡
it contributes to the climate of debate, and to the influences upon some
of these decision-making forces. But, as with all interest group-based
explanations of the policy process, the simple and uncritical connection
should not be made between demands and public policy outcomes.
The reputed strength of the ERT derives from its membership profile
and format. Its policy positions are built directly by its members, with
one asked to take the lead on a particular issue through a working party.
The member's company will then use its informal networks with others
in order
to build a position before returning to the formal structures of
the ERT, followed by presentation in one of the twice-yearly plenary
meetings. In addition to written communiqués and publications in which
posltlons are presented, memb ers are use d to take the message to the
level through face-to-face communlcatlon wl th Euro pe's leading
and policymakers (van Apeldoorn 2001). This rather flat and
membership-driven strucrure, together with its cohesiveness and
to come to rich common positions, finds its supporters elsewhere
I
Union Business Interests and the Professions 85
84 lnterest Representation in the Europeøn

Its membership constituency fishing in the same pool for members. The emergence of the ERT reflects
in the business representation community' general accounts of how a group comes forwaìd through the work of
in both the size and struc-
äüry ;.Ëliiu"ir,¿ ,"lutiutly homogenous executives with broadly similar 'entrepreneurs' (Davignon/Gyllenhammer) spotting and filling a niche
ture of firms, and i" d;"*;g óon chiãf
represent or to discipline' does gap in the representarion population (Salisbury 1969;Brown llOO¡.
worldviews. It has no ;;b'tt; to either
2000)' and chief exec-
;;i;;;';""ernabilitv frobl"-''- 1u"" Apelãoorn their company to ERT
utives are in a unique pãri,io., to lànd thå name of EUROCHAMBRES
EUROCHAMBRES has 45 national chambers of commerce (from Iceland
to Israel) as member organizations, which in turn encompass regional
ardlocal chambers. In the old member states, chambers of commerce are
differentiated from national business and employer organizations as a
distinct brand whose strength lies in regional and local organization, with
a mass of SME members and a strong service provision orientation to
its members. In the EU-28 and beyond, national chambers of commerce
have often played a role as the principal business organizarion. At the EU
level, where political representation is the principal requiremenr of busi-
ness associations because service functions are required less by national
business member organizations, the identity of EUROCHAMBRES is
squeezed.It lies somewhere between the predominance of BusinessEurope
and the greater recognition of UEAPME as an SME representarive
orgarLtzation. These realities mean that EUROCHAMBRES has had
to find its own distinct niche away from centre stage. One has been to
develop strong institutional ties with the Committee of the Regions.
A second has been to be an EU learning forum for horizontal business
interest organizations from central and eastern European countries, and
an outlet for their political representarion. A third distinct role has been
an unusual one for EU business associations, a service-related role in
acting as a point of contact for export advice, business partner searchers
through its network, and advice in chamber development. A fourth role
has been to act as a partner with the European commission for the deliv-

prrncipa strengths
AS an assocratlon.
The strong emphasis on servtce
work relatl VC to political representa-
partly r eflects the d lvers tty of the mem
bershi p of EURO CHAMBRES
r
Union Business Interests and the professions g7
86 Interest Representdtion in the Europeøn

in Brussels, leaving the UEAPME secretariat and its members relatively


free to define the positions of the organization.
The organization has incorporated the resources of its membership
to good effect. Its larger members operate from the corridor of the same
building in which UEAPME is based, supplementing irs resources con-
siderabl¡ creating a strong collective, almosr famil¡ identit¡ whereby
members acrively contribute to the work of UEApME.fne 2&lruOT
has contributed a relatively large number of staff, while some of the
individuals from national offices are self-employed entrepreneurs sell-
UEAPME ing their part-time services to UEAPME. UEAPME has proved adept
settlng IS the appear- at entrepreneurial activit¡ such as the crearion of xonMApMp and
A characteristic of SME assoclatrons ln any rerritorial the Academie Avignon. NORMAPME is the official represenrative of
of organizations more or less geared
ance disappearance and merger craftltrades and sMEs in the European srandardization bodies, and has
often with particular niches and terrlto-
towards political representatlont spawned a structure in itself, comprising a Technical Advisory committee
organlzattonst although
rial partiality. This pfocess contlnues \¡ñ th EU level and a number of working groups. Egan is one observer who has been
tlon to emerge 1S the European
the clear leader representatlve ofSanva
Enterprises UEAPME). Its impressed at the results of its efforts to push sMEs towards compliance
Associa tlon of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized (Egan 2001). The Academie Avignon is an institutional framewãrk for
with some nota ble mem ber-
full members ate national SME assoclatlonst of European co-operation in the field of research and transfer of knowl-
world, reflected ln the composltlon
ship strengths from the Germanic edge in favour of SMEs.
of rancophile orientatlon. The glaring
lts secretarta t following ^ period F

membershiP gap IS from the UK, where the


principal representatl ve organ' . There is a highly receptive environment for sME representation in
the commission, to the extent that some sector âssociatiòns
tlon of Small Businesses, dominates ensure that
lzatlons of SMEs ln the UK, the Federa an sME entrepreneur is included within their delegation
(ESBA) while the second larg' when going
the rl val European Small Business Alliance t0 meet with commission officials. one major
EU business associãtion
est UK small business assocla tlon, the
Forum of Pri vate Bus lness, resigned recently elected as president an SME entrepieneur
to these organlZatlOns, EURG as a means to tackle
rts UEAPME membershiP. In addition perception ln the Commi SSION that the
BusinessEuroPe each ha ve substantial deri va tl ve assoctatlon was pfl ma rily an
CHAMBRES and for multinational ln the sectof. In ad di tton to dialogue
between UEAPME and with al
constttuency, with some membershiP overlap of SME repre sentatlon, the Commission has ad vlsofy groups
nessEurope, either directly or by affilia
t10ns.
from SME entreprene urs, a S à separa te lnrtla t1 ve to meet-
ârlses from three sources One
ts
The internal cohesion of UEAPME
SME repres entatr VC organlzâtlons.
Germanic countfles where the principal language IS German)
r
Business Interests and the Professions 89
European Union
88 Interest Representation in the

to be able to reach common posrttons'


of uK trade associations found that less than half of their sample of
\While it is usual for UEAPME uK national associations saw their EU association as effective (compass
to a view that it is unable to reach
it is also not unusual for it to come Partnership 1'997), the equivalent exercise repeated in 2005 found that
a common position
Ii also often uses a system of majority
""î"-it*t' it is not possible for the 88% dld so (Trade Association Forum 2006). Bouwen found that EU
opi'io's,îä;';*Xïî,Tere
"J -ï".riiy associations had a higher degree of access to the European commission
and European Parliament than did other types of acrors (Bouwen 2006).
g sor an
n SME some EU associations have been identified in'islands' of corporatist rela-
ation and knowledge' its secretariat' tionships with EU political institutions (Greenwood and Ronit 1994;
initial draft of the position papers) Grant 1997). In a case study of information and communication tech-
ty. nologies in standardizatron, Knill also found significant self-regulatory
functions, and concluded that EU associations have greater
"rru-.J
importance.than they have been credited for (Knill 2001). Clusters of
Sector assoc¡ations and firms cogîafe associations working on common agendas can be found work-
and significance of business asso- ing from the same premises in key sectors, such as chemicals (under
s, can be found in the literature' the CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) umbrella) and engi-
ses in the decision-making caPac- neering (under the ORGALIME (European Engineering Association)
rchner and Schwaiger 1981; Butt umbrella). In the latter case, something of a Brussels'engineering house'
1'992)' Bennett rePorts the views has emerged in the Diamant building, in which national and European
erPrise and lndustrY)' that associations work together on industry-critical issues such as the dãvel-
opment of the research framework programmes (Chapter 2).
n trade association is rePresent- Thus, there is a mixed picture among associations at EU level.'VØhich
rests and theY do not invariablY factors predict the ability of an industrial segment to undertake collec-
tive action? My own research interviews among 50 EU business associa-
single view' Some oPinions that we
tions and 150 of their members examined the causal factors of variation
lowest common denominator Prin-
in the ability of these associations to unify their members' interests and
to secure compliance with associational goals (Greenwood ZOO2\),
known âS 'governa bility' One a ssocla tlon General Secretary has calcu-
lated tha t afo und .50 o/
/o of the tlme of assoclatrons ls spent 1n reaching
picture and helPs us to understa internal cohesion (Ager 2 0 02 Beyond internal factors the maln causes
of vanatlon between assoclatlons ln their governa bility are structural
EU assoclatrons lies ln pointing
In this accountt the maln value of hctors concerned with the extent to which there are share d rnteres ts
lie. He also drew ttentlon
w her e the maln differences of oplnlon 'we between a rela tively homogenous and clearly defined lnterest constr
tu-
a conference audience how
their lack of speed, recountlng to argued âssessment Thus, ASSO clatrons re presentlng a imited number of firms of a, stm-
set out thoroughlY
received the most bea utifully sizein commodity product industries (such as merals, oil, chlorine)
proposa w hich had been adopted srx months
a Commission relatively undifferentiated in their interests, whereas associations
(\íhi te t 99 74
ps are not lnterests across the pfo duct chain such AS wholesalers, dis-
These criticisms of the CA
paclttes of Euro grou
and retailers ln diversel constituted industries aÍe bound to
their relati vely sl 1m resource v
ou t historic foundation, based on more difficulty ln reaching common
posltlons. Beyond the nature
and somewhat broad brushed'
described earlier ln this chapter, product sector a nd structural propertles
of the industry lie more
post box association through
reality IS Yarlatlont ranglng from '!lhile factors which are predictors of cohesion. Th US, ind ustrles
1n Ta b1e 4 1 a 1 9 97 large sanrPle
SO me of the examples
r
Union Business Interests and the professions g1
90 Interest Representution in the European

nstruments help manage


facing pro blems of overca paclty seek policy restruc-
to support industrial
the pro blem, such AS financial instruments
pflce war which ha ve
turlng, rather tha n market solutions such
AS a
industry segments can
uncontrolled regional conseq uences Similarl¡ \lithout
common enemv
find cohesion from their contestatlon by collective
the presence of such factors there IS
little basis for sustained
actlon Greenwoo d 20 02 b
now accommodate
Most industry sectors wrth a large firm component
or risk being undermined by the
large firms through direct membershiP
with EU institutions, particularly erations, and the concentration of control within direct firm member-
contacts such players inevitably make
haVC their own dedicated representa
because the largest firms almost all
Banking Federation faces ust this
t1 VC offices 1n Brussels The European
of national assoclatlons of banks
scenarlo b ecause rt 1S solely comprised
of large firms ha ve tended to
Sectors that aÍe almost wholl v comprised
dir ect membership organlzatlons,
develop assoclatlons w hich aÍe solel v
assoclatlons ha VC no direct membership. In turn, In addition to formal trade associations, a variety of informal net-
and ln w hich national
assoclattons ale excl uded from works have emerged in Brussels to link the public affairs staff of co¡-
this brings lts o\Mn TSSUES w here national
because they can also find their own
E U sector association membershi P,
bile manufacturing sector ls
contacts wl th E U instrtu tlons; the automo
1n such sectofs 1S to admit both
one exam ple of this. The usual solution
into membership, on the
national associations, and companrest directly N ollert and Field er 2000; Cha banet 2006) These Sâ tl sfy a need
tn reaching common posltrons events
grounds that w hatever the difficulties ate
membership base they ate over- ridden by the among partlcr pants for discussion, rnterpretatlon, network lng and infor-
AS a result of the wider
bers will feel towards the col- matton, and to tune ln to the la test thinking. tøhil e shared beliefs and
lncreaslng SCNSC of o bliga tron which mem
An interesttng alternati YC has mutual socialization are the ba SIS for S uccessful collecti YC actlon, and all
lective policy posltlons of an assoclatlon'
system of national assocta tloil¡ the US ua benefits can be expected from foutlne networ king actlYrtles,
been the developmen t of Europe- wide
association hub and national assù the lmportance of irregul ar 8a therings should not be exaggerated.
1n the p astrcs sector, with a European
like futuristic model Some informal structures afe caucuses of firms seeking to provl de
clatlon spokes F or ^ short trme this looked direction to the actl vltres of a p articular lnterest group Typicall¡
a
EU ffade assoclatlons, but the model has
not been repl lCa ted, with these
âre olganl ze d at the sectoral level, such as the
assocla tlons identifying reverse p ressures for ubsidiarity and 'Brus sels A utomo bile
Representatives' BAR) structufe linking all the publi
of the importance of assocratlons to com
panles IS c affairs managers
tzàtloî. A SCNSC
of the Brussels offices of vehicle man ufacturers,
study of Nokia, w hose members hip of one
EU where all but one of the
vided 1n a case ts members of the European Automo
informed by tha t assoclatl0n bile Constructors Associa tlon (ACEA)
with direct mem bers was partly ue based S ome Íora of arge companles
ha VC also emerge d ln response
of another confedera tlon (Ka utto 2 o0e)
ship initiatives from the Commi SSION
The most noted of these from the
sid e was the Trans- Atlantic B USINESS Dialogue (TABD
and networks who SE
Direct company membership associations conference ln 1 99 5
emerged rnto a, company- led 'informal process
ASS octa tlons
European and American compânles
develop jolnt poli cy fecom-
As discussed ln the commentarY on business-wide to di SCUSS wt th the EC and US dminis tratlons
and federations of associations Coen and
direct firm memb ership structures 200 1 :3 9 In addition
Some of these differences to this, the partles concluded agreements
have differen t strengths and weaknesses
Business Interests and the Professions 93

costs (Mattli 1999; \Øeber and Hallerberg 2001). Keith Richardson, a


former General Secretary of the ERI has claimed that multinational
firms were kept out of the initial stages of European integration, and
shunned in favour of trade associations, despite the fact that they were
the earliest to think in pan-European rerms (Richardson 1997).
^rnorrg
l4any corporate EU public affairs capacities are small units of rwo ro
three people. While some are staffed by senior personnel with support
staff and a degree of autonomy, at the other extreme are those in a rel-
atively junior position within their compan¡ working alone in Brussels
with part-time secretarial assistance. These latter personnel may have
little scope for action without reference to sometimes disinterested line
rnanagement in a public affairs headquarters in the member states. The
difficulty of large firms in acting corporately was reviewed earlier in this
chapter.
Companies provide a complementar¡ and sometimes competitive,
smaller segment to EU business interest representation than trade asso-
ciations. There is a legacy of research investigating whether there are
patrerns evident in the use of particular channels by different actors,
including companies (for a review of these, see ìØoll 2006). Amongst
the earliest propositions is Sidjanski's suggestion that collective channels
would be used for general purposes and to support proposals, with indi-
vidualchannels used to combat details (Sidjanski 1967). More typicalof
recent research is work by Mahoney in focusing on the institutional and
policy context in which players are seeking to act. She argues that'advo-
cacy is a process composed of numerous stages ... lobbying decisions
at each of those stages are determined by a confluence of contextual
factors including institutional, issue and interest group characteristics'
(Mahoney 2008:iii). Her comparative research drawing upon samples of
ectors and ìssues in Brussels and llashington reveals plausible conclu-
cions in suggesting that strategies to block or amend are related to the
ease of achieving change in a given political sysrem, and to the degree of
democratic architecture in place, with a developed infrastructure lËading
!o a Sreater use of a ppea a nd alliance stra tegres
Large firms may behave differen tlv w hen actlng alone or when under-
collecti ve actlc)n. A report by the Policy Studies Instiiute showed
some multinational companles with strong S ustarna bility policies
at the same tlme mem bers of trade assocl atrons which were lobby
EU climate policy (Policy Studies Institute 20 1 5 Large firms
thus use trade assoclatrons AS
a collective cloak for posltlons they
difficult to pursue indi vid
uallv
Union Business Interests and the professions g s
94 Interest Representation in the European

preferences of multina- and constitution of professions, which in turn helps explain their collec_
Levy and Prakash's analysis of the changing tive action problems at the EU level. There
in internatio"ãl gou"ttt"nce leads them to
,iorr"i'.orforations trvnÑòtl
diff.r..rt national tradi-
"t. the
dons of organizing, with certain interesrs from prof.rriorr,
conclude that to wider units of organization or operaring indepenàentty. r"ìrr", "rnii"r.¿
,rr"..
gentle giants pursui.ng the differences are reproduced at the European leveì, and create diffiáulties
MNCs are neither omnipotent ogres nor and other for some EU associations in defining the parameters of their own mem-
äil ;;"r.r,; ,"rt.tihev barlain-witñ st"tes' NGOs' agreements and bership constituency. one branch of the profession from a particular
;;;;; ;t.t the form "íd "i"ttot" of internationalsuggests that while counrry may well be represented by a different European assoiiation to
;t-"r ... th. ,.srrlt"ntl,td"tttrni""cy of outcomessucceed in imposing its counterpart in another country. Thus, Italian civil engineers educate
il;iä;;;;;ã*ìtr"r actors' thev doendPointnot alwavs
when corPorations rule and license architects, who are organized separately.ls.w"h.r. in Europe;
s anã states are also building their dentistry in Italy is subsumed within g..r..àl medicine; and rhere are no
ities and act effectively in interna- counrerparts.to British solicitois and barristers (orzack 1991). French
003:147-8) pharmacis.ts have.prescribing powers but their premises and establish-
ment âre llcensed by government, whereas uK pharmacists have no pre_
scribing rights but their premises and practice righrs are controilej by
their professional association. Architecture in France has primarily been
Professional ¡nterests rcgarded as one of the liberal arts, whereas in other .o.r.r,rì., it is treated
surrounding interest rep- as a technical Practice.
of all types of civil society interests, ISSUCS

least prominent in the literature.


resentatlon by the professions are the
most weaklY organized category
This may ârlse from their status AS the
Most are based outside Brus-
of cl vil socletY interest a t the EU level
tn the constltutlon and practts-
sels. The extreme nâ trona differences
lng en vlronmen ts of professions, together
with the defensi ve posture of
towards European lntegra tlon,
many of the member state professions
There IS a general p attern of
helps explain this rela tlve disorganization.
ha ve positive outlooks towards
small E U assocla tlons whose secretarlats
interests IN developing lt are frustrated
E uropean integratlo n, but whose
and powerful na tional members.
by their much more sceptical
that European integration rS on
professions afe corfect ln percelvlng
ance more of a threat, SO their nascent strength ma v ironicall v be
ln tha t they deny to the
organizational weakness a t the EU level,
olicymaking or competency-
institutions an alliance partner for p
Union Business Interests and the professions 97
96 Interest Reptesentation in the Ewropean

Alliance (EPHA)' while associa-


campaigning European Public Health
are often exercised by single
il;;;îËnting architects and lawyers to provide com-
marker freedom irr.r.r-"boot the righti
of-establishment
the detail
;;;.ì;i t;;";."r. Fo, l"'ç f'uttiteJof architects
rules
and
are
engineers'
also matters of con-
ä"î åp"r"lfr" of EU piUti. procurement

such as teachers, nurses and midwives being organized in some mem-


ber states by associations that are midway between trade unions and
professional associations. These factors are reflected among the land-
scape of 'horizontal' organizations claiming a remit across the interests
of the professions. As will be apparenr,
each of the 'peak' organizations has a
professional interests tt is representing.
Í.aced by the professions as organized
from the disputed and irresolvable definition of 'what is a profession?'

Peak associat¡ons claiming representation of professionals


At the peak level, there are three European-level pan-sectoral groups
ttat claim representation of general professional intèrests.

CEPLIS, the European council of the Liberal professions, represent-


ing independent liberal professions.
EUROCADRES, the Council of European professional and
Managerial staff, operates within ETUC, and represents r"r"ri.¿,
unionized professional and managerial staff in both trr. priu"t.
public sectors. "rrã
CEC E uropean Managers, re presentlng independent organlzatlons
salaried managerial staff primarily
ln industry and commerce
IS not affil iated
to E TUC.

ts clear functional di vlslon


b etween the three peak assoclatlons,
re presentlng the independent liberal
profes SI ons, CEC
Interest Representation in the Europeøn
Union Business Interests and tbe professions
98 99

reoresenting salaried private sector managers


and EUROCAD'RES rep- evaluation of it (1999) instigated by
,;,u,t"g"" in b th the.public and private. sectors' des Sciences du Travail 1999) with
;;;;;ü ;ii,cnired
However,allrepresentsimilarconcernsattheEuro- sentativeness remained to be estab
p"r.t f.uáf' a abãur market issues' Each has distinct ¡egotiated an agreement with EUR
membershipcleardemarcationlinesbetweenthem, fepresent CEPLIS positions ar rhe ra
and no mem
EUROCADRES
CEPLIS !íith roots in the trade.union movement, EUROCADRES is a quite dif-
CEPLlsregardsmembershipofthe.liberalprofessions,asexcluding fercnttype of organization to cEpLIS. Formed in1993,EunõðÃönns
;;;ói;fees. This results istent application seeks to group together (estimated at almost six million¡ prof".sor,"l
and managerial salaried staff in Europe who are org"-;J i; ;r"a.
"äõ;:;e,nbershiP,witha "ull1ll',-".'o"
common lnterest unions. Its direct members are national private and pub"lic ,..ro, ,rrrior*
natiorial contexts' as well as
fields. has no more than L1 inte
It members' and 11 across Europe (who in rurn are required to b. -Ë-b.., oi o.g;ir"-
sectoral members' Its foundatio n h 1'974 reflects the account of interest tions which are affrliated to ETUC), and EU-level sectoral ,rg""ii"ii.",
trepreneur' spotting a'niche' gap in (ETUC-affiliated) unionized professionar and managerial staif. Its secre_
earlier in this chapter; until 1989 it tariat (oÍ two executives and an administrative assisánt) is located in the
ion in the domain. Nonetheless, the Brussels premises of ETUC, operating under the ETUó s..r"i"ri"i
r the organization to develop beyond Executive Committee. "r¿
at struggled over the Years to make The maln niche of EURO CAI) RES ls rh US lts trade unt on
constl t-
uency, which has afforde d lt excellent access to D G Employment
an d
Social Affairs and to social partners hip negotla ttons, and to
D G Educa-
tron and C ulture Its pnnclpa niche strength ls the partlcl patlo
n rights
ln social dialogue Chapter 2 which lt enJ oys from lts em
be ddedness
within ETUC, and 1t IS ln lts own right a partner ln EU macroeconomic
sociaf dialogue, with mem bership also of the Standing
Committee on
Employment However, lt IS actrve on core ISSUCS of
concern to the pro-
fessions, involv lng the mutual recognltlon
oÍ q ualifications, obstacles to
circula tl otrt incl uding those presented by
sup plementafy penslon
parenta lea YC and e qual opportunities.

European Managers
ln 1 989 from the International
Confe dera tl on of Professions, the
IS an independent organ'zaÎlon with French orlgtns and oflenta
representing SA laried
managers ln industr¡ the pub lic sector, trade
commerce through
national CTOSS -sectoral assocl atlons of manag-
E uro pean level
ectoral assocratrons. It has a dedicated office
with post holders from ln
national memb er organna trons sharing
It comprises 1 6 na tl onal cross-sectofa
assoclatlons from
Interest Representation in tbe European Union
Business Interests and the professions 101
100

to reflecr the composition of that profession in some countries.


There are also a number of other spãcialized associarions for engi-
neering operating at EU level.

EU sectoral professional interests .ations covering specialisms such as orthodontics.

a Professions with single unified âssoclatlon ln a member state may . At the other end of the spectrum are organizatio
^ of organizations represent- narrow specialisms a little adrift of the mainstr
need to malntaln affiliations to a number
Association, for lnstance, places far from the cenrre of EU decision-mak
lng mlcro specialisms The British Medical
medical assoclatrons coveflng artached to scientific institutes. Examples of
malntalns affiliations to a range of EU
specialisms such AS senlor hospital
physicians, junlor doctors and European Association of Handwriting Analysts and the European
general practltlonerst AS well AS the more
generlc Standing Committee Association of Fish Pathologists. The European Showmen's uiion
of E uropean Doctors and the European U nlon
of Medical Specialists, and the European Association of Plastic surgery are other examples
ves embrace other of the vast range of highly specialized inreresrs which have formed
In turn, some of these organrza tlons themsel
While there EU associations.
assoclatlons representlng medical specialisms
between the principal organizations, there
inevitab ly anse ISSUCS a The constituency of associations representing the professions
definitional includes more than its fair share of those which have beãn invenred
co-or dination between them. Reflecting the
discussed earlier, some of the medical
assoclatlons differ by by an entrepreneur in search of a livelihood. some of these are oper-
practltloners' An examination ated by a segment of Association Management companies, usuãlly
sentlng salaried and independent,
reveals that operating from a base in Brussels, or in the Netherlanãs where these
the membershiP lists of each of these organlzatlons
the European arfangements are common. Some of these tend to be less
have significant membershiP ga PS, such AS towards political representatlon than afe most
oriented
Physicians (AEMH) which has no mem ber EU AS soclatlons
of Senior Hospital because their prlncl pal pur pose ls ncome generatlon for the creator,
the British Isles. and profes sional offer prospects AS
a Some professions have differen t âssocla
tl ons for the same attractlve high -lncome eafners
that and a good profile. At this qulr
informed by differen t na tional traditions within found the very few exampl
ky end of the S pectrum ate to be
the principal assoclatlon FEANI CS of assoclatlons with membership a vail
englneerlng, for lnstance, to pflv ate indiv iduals. There are also
d 'Ingénieurs has those w hich afe dri ven by
Européenne d Associations Nationales entrepreneurs with we bsite funded
C ivil
assoclatlont ECCE European Council of
), from advertisi ng reYenue.
example IS the F ederati on
contend with, which leans more towar ds the architecture of E uropean now International
102 Interest Reþresentation in tbe European Union Business Interests and the professions 103

vented itself from an orgariization respective practices. In some of these fields, the role of EU associations is
ding) seeking to represent labour restricted to that ator. The balance of..rporrri_
companies to one positioning itself bilities in the impl tion is vested more in.r"tion"l
as a network of human resource professionals' associations than s, both for sectoral and generalized
directives affecting the professions (Evetts 2000).
once implementation activities are undertaken by others, so associa-
tions have to strive to find a role if they seek to b.coÅ.
-o.. ih"r, simply
organizations based around the dissemination of information and the
inrerpretation of EU legislation for their members. For most EU associa-
tions, this can be found through early detection and shaping of
and in leading their members' analyses of what their l.rtä.srr""r. "g.nd"r,
o'
ransnational issues. Few of the EU associations of the professions are
endowed with sufficient capacities to undertake these latter activities,
and were one of the major reasons why the establishment of sectoral
directives aimed at mutual recognition of qualifications either failed or
took up to 25 y,earc to complete. Even in the relatively better organized
EU professional associations, such as the ccBE, conracrs with thã Euro-
pean commission are insufficiently strong, and consequently the com-
mission still needs to turn to the national associations.
Given the differences in composition within the professions, rhe
difficulties of their EU associations in achieving ih".,
lowest common denominator positions between their "nyt-hing ^or"
mem"bers is inevi-
table (Klüver et al. 2015), and it is little surprise that past aurhors have
reached this conclusion (see, for instance, Arnison, in ñeale 1994). rn a
survey of British professional groups, Neale found a marked pr.f"r..r..
for developing their own channels of interest representation io Eurcrpe,
rather than using Euro groups (Neale r9g4). Nãtionaland sectoral
dif-
ferences remain so strong that collective interest representation
is often
dealt with on an issue-by-issue basis using differentllliances
of national
associations' Thus, there. was something of a 'free-for-aLl'
among
national and sub-national bar associations in making
representations
during the course of the 1998 Directive
on the right"of e'stablishment
tfre tesa t professi on. such intra-coun rry
[11
differeîces u..o-.- -"gni
ued to extremes when attempts are made to reach
the EU level.
collective vi.w! at
L04 Interest Re7resentation in the European Union

those locate d apartfrom the EU association, are there primarily. because


the activ-
.ö;.;i;;á1i'i.,.t,'r"lweaknes
il.";;y ""dertake contributes bypassing

ii. r" ,nL main, however' these


affairs of
ack to the
typically one to t*o p.opl" in early to.
association from where most of
iü.rrr.ilon"l departmeni of a national
-'^ EU affairs ãre managed and
their co-ordinated'
fft. *orkloud of the"EU professional associations;ä;"il:,,ft::
for instance, have
associations, such
funding (including
education), as articulated con-
the funding of higher
Some organi-
..."t rfr"r."¿ by piofessional interests in small enterprises'
institutes
and technical
zations with names resembling those of scientific
while others which are
h;;; ;..; established by business organizations,
upon business
ãrg".riru,øns of scientists may have become dependent
organizations.

Single market freedoms


Business Interests and the Professions 107
the European Union
106 Interest Representation in

their voluntary schemes to assist the small numbers of their members who
at the domestic level and vis-à-vis
in rurn strengthened their role wish to engage in cross-border practice. Beyond the sectoral level, the
inrer-sectoral associations have struggled to find any significant role,
and some have statutes that prevent them from ever doing so. Where
¡þe sectoral ones can find a niche in supporting their national members
and finding common mutual interests, such as the opening up of global
lil/TO liberalization, they have been able to make a
and the narkets through
marked conffibution'
degree I
Evetts 2
Conclusions
Business interests demonstrate a high tendency towards fragmentation,
observed as the norm in collective associations and within large multi-
national enterprises. The choice is between specialist collective organi-
zadon, with low capacity to co-ordinate common interests across linked
soecialisms, or large umbrella organizations where co-ordination is pos-
,ibl. bu, a high degree of collective action is difficult because of the
oroblems of reaching common positions between divergent interests.
ivluch membership of business associations is informed by the need to
influence association positions (and particularly for damage limitation),
¡ather than an expectation of a high capacity for collective action. Many
úade association executives have limited autonomy to deviate from
membership instructions, not least because the impact of losing a mem-
ber is significant in associations where the number of members (national
tions and multinational firms) is relatively low when compared to
counterparts, and because EU associations depend upon mem-
subscriptions because of their concentration upon political rep-
Some multinationals also have little central co-ordinating
to reconcile the different positions of their product divisions. In
business solidarity is less than that of environmental, or labour,
because of the absence of a common outlook. Sectoral and
market characteristics mostly predict the governability of asso-
such as the presence of a commodity product, and firms of a
size. But the most common picture is that market power is a poor
of political power. The EU is primarily a regulatory regime, and
typically divides the interests of capital, producing compering
hile busine SS prefere nces can be difficult to construct because
of calcula tlng COSTS and benefits. The p u blic affalrs man
companies spend a substantial amount of time trying to make
Union
L08 Interest Representdtion in the European

rticular, because of the


and Positioning them-
f the problem involves
fessions demonstrate an even greater
o different outlooks about European
nt comPosition of Professiorrs in
highlY qualifY the imPact ot Pro-
.
110 Interest Representation in the European Union Labour Interests 1I1

The narrow scope of EU competencies in industrial relations is lim-


ited to the working environment, health and safet¡ and equal rights.
unanimity voting rules prevail (and are likely to do so for the ioreseeable
future) for the sensitive areas classified as taxation, employee rights and
social security, with qualified majority voting (eMVi only foi health
a'.d safety and equal rights measures. lØage bargaining i, .*.lrrd.d f.o*
g,[J competencies, while legislation which would ..gol"t. the freedom
ro associate and the right to strike is specifically exciuded by the treaty
(Erne 2008). The^viÞìng.case (c-438105) and Laual case (c-341loi)
In the European courr of Justice qualify the principle enshrined in the
charter of Fundamental Rights of freedom to strikeLy placing the qual-
ification upon it that it does nor override the single -"ik., frreedoms of
establishment and to provide services. The Rùffert case (c-346106) also
seenis to elevate the right of freedom to provide services above those of
collectively agreed wage rates.
Historic weaknesses amongst organized business and labour interesrs
until the 1980s contributed to rhe lack of a social agenda to develop,
and until then this was the paradoxical strength of business. As long as
orgailzed labour was weak, so business did not need a highly developed
each other below.
The recessron which followe d the oil shock of the
1, 9 70s contributed employer organization In any event, this might result in the counter
ofganlze d labo uf oryanization of labour, and the development of demands for a social
to the renewed ability of CA pital to assert itself agalnst
unlons have agenda. only Directorate General (DG) Employmenr and social Affairs
weakened by InASS unemp loyment, and ln conseq
uence
of politics and markets than of the European Commission, in some cases in partnership with the
enl oyed less of a central role 1n the operatlon
of Keynesianism Other contrl butory factors ha ve been Germanic countries seeking to 'export' their high production costs,
ln the heyday
and agrr to take the agenda forward, Among the more hopeful his-
there
structural la bour market changes from InASS manufacturing
ìJvere
Í employment with toric moments for trade unions during this period were the Òollective
cultural employment to more dispersed servlce secto
for collecti ve actlon. The Redundancies l) trectrve of 1 9 77 providing for workplace nformation
less secure working pa tterns a nd reduced scope
through and consulta tIon, and the Transfer of Undertakings Directi YC of 1 979
emphasis has thus been on employment crea tlon
deregulation,
la bour market which protected esta blished working conditi ons when servlce co ntracts
and ena bling capital to exert more control over
members hi p of change and thus pfeventlng social dumping AS a mechanism of cost cut-
based on mar ket principles Against this context,
has been ln ting during competltl ve bidding for contfacts. Around the
unlon organtzatl0ns throughout western Europe same tlme the
tade unron movement contrl buted to the draftíng of the ambitious
Aggregate
decline, with the strongest decline 1n the pnvate sector. and
-yeat period v unsuccessful 'Vredeling' directive with lts 'extra -ter festna
mem bership fell by one-sixth across the EU ln the
ten
countr tes for \M hich information to empower wor kers n multina tlo nal com panles with infor-
1 993 to 2003, with all but one of 20
unlon density (total unl0n and consultatio n rights
Green Cowles 1 996 And the notable
vaila ble experlenclng a decline ln
^ the same case Chapter 2 from the L 9 70s was a Iandmark
ship AS a proportlon of the number of employees over n equality
E uropean F oundation 2005 The decline lft dens rty
has been
There has for
central and east E uro pean countnes European Founda
tlon 20 0el some tlme been considerab e sceptlclsm of the
tha the labo uf movement
co llecti ve acíoî
basis for trade union membershiP has shifted from has extracte d from corporatlst,
or patron arrangements involving itself, business and
individualized'insurance policies''
Labour Interests 113

social goals by the leadership of any political system always tends to be


contextual upon overall economic performance, as well as the orienta-
tion of its leadership. But as long as social goals remain, so it will attÍact
stakeholders who seek to hold political sysrems accounrable for them
1no'cheap talk' - Lange 1992), and civil society actors will always be
able ro find common cause somewhere in each of the EU institutions. In
the Commission there are various services, and parts of services, where
ffade union interests are seen as partners, most notably DG Employ-
6ent, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, and within DG Education
and Culture, although these have ro contend with more market-oriented
services. In the European Council and Council of Ministers there is a
constantly evolving turnover of political colours. And the European Par-
liament has a large left-of-centre party. The established links with the
laffer, together with the shift of strategy by ETUC from reliance upon
institutionalization within the European Commission to mass mobiliza-
tion, mean that the trade union movements' best institutional channels
now lie with the European Parliament, rather than within the European
Commission. The dramatic outcome of the yote in the European Parlia-
rnent in the defeat of the proposed (company) Takeover Directive has
been attributed by some scholars partly to the lobbying work of ETUC
in the European Parliament (ìøatson and Shackleton 2008).
The trade union movement has thus been able to combine mass mobi-
lization strategies with those of institutionalized working. This is a niche
which environmental organizations, such as Friends of the Earth and
Greenpeace, have also been able to follow, linking social movements to
institutionalized EU politics (Ruzza 2011). But the institutionalized role
of the trade union movement includes a place at the social dialogue table.

w and the economic agenda


reconstruction of rules of market exchange has led to high-standard
states seeking to'export' their high-cost labour market regula-
to ensure a level playi ng fiel d ln pro duction. The general tendency
been upwards n employment standards ra ther than to tngger a com
'race to the bottom' b etween member sta tes.
QMV IS well estab-
ln fields such âS Heal rh and Safety at 'Slork, wor king conditions
and consultation of workers, gender eq uality àt work and
of persons excl uded from the la bour market. IØhere nec-
the Commission has resorted
to p laying the Treaty game by clas-
measures under sectro NS
of the treatv to w hich a MV pplies The
Union
11.4 Interest Representdtion in the European
1,1.6 Interest Representation in the Europeøn Union

Equal Treatment Directive now introduces a number of measures on


sexual harassment, one of the measures where agreement for legisla-
tion stalled within the social dialogue.'Corporate social responsibility'
is a further vehicle through which a variety of agendas are presented
re- pr esented from which la bour rnterests have drawn benefit. An
ple IS the sugar industr¡ where the social partners first signed an
ment ln 2 003 n mlnlmum standards for corporate social
A pes slmlstrc vlew of these lnltratl ves highlights those which aÍe
ts
torical devices remrnlscent of Edelman concept of policymaking
thea tre with words that reassure and po licies with dub lous records
tangible achievement Edelman 1 971, In this vlew' they àfe
actlons tha t are long on analysis and short on real actlon,
little but reams of statistics, propaganda and reports. A more
tlc vlew of them IS that they talk up prospects create momentum
enhance the scope for actron. In this line of thinking, the value ls the
chea p talk' dimension of actron to which mem ber states will
bound by tn terest constrtuencres. Those servrces of the Commission
lnterests ln particular measures, together with the
interest groups Cha pter 6 ha VC enforced support
lssues rnto the open de bating arenas of the E U and
scenes to implement measures designed to advance them. The
ts
NCSS of the women movement within D G Employment, Social
Union
118 Interest Representation in the European Labour Interests 119

with each other, with the ln 2 007- 8 established how had become used AS a vehicle to bri
them if.they would engaSe 1n a formal dialogue be
would halt the flood of draft wor ker repfesentatr ves ln to 'sel ng' red uced worki ng tl me to lts work-
incenti ve for employers that participation
that 'if you want force (Timesonline 201. 1 Another colourful exampl e was w hen an Air
directives 1n the social field Delors told
the emPloYers
you must o btain the support of France VØor ks Council degenerated lnto d efrocking the huma resources
the single market to be completed, then
can you lmaglne me trylng to create the single market director (Reuters 2 0 15 Nonetheles S, a failure to consult over signifi-
the ftade unlons
Tyszkiewicz 1.998 A cafi t company p lans, such âS a merger or red undancies has led to tem
agalnst the wishes of the trade unlons
1.

provides ETU C with an elev ated potaty lnJ unctlons ln S ome countrles preventl ng the propo e d actron.
Participation ln the social dialogue ln the
well as for ETU C members F,rne recounts the role of the EW C ln the merger/ d ownslzlng cas e of
status 1n EU pub lic policymaking, AS
recrult and retain ABB. Alstom ln co-ordi natlng actlons ln the fa ce of competltlo n Íor local
hational contextt which helps these organizations
hard alongside BusinessEurgÞe pfo duction capacltles among company subsidiaries, and ln mo bilizing
members Conseq uentlY, ETU C fought
and theii respective roles in it in the Lisbon at EU evel which led to Euro pean Commission endorsement of a rescue
to maintain the mechanism (Er¡e 20 0 8
from social partnership
Treaty Nonetheless the actual achievements the EW C Directive has not prevented the use of 'social
needed to make significant
aÍe modera te Chapter 2 ), and ETUC
has dump-
ln an a ttempt to malntaln the mechanisms to move pro duction to chea per STTCS across borders,
concessrons to individual agreements
irtg' lt
agreements on part-trme work has made lt mofe difficul to do SO wl thout involving the workforce ln
wider significance of the mechanism The
Branch and Greenwood 2 001 and telework Pochet conjunctton with other rela te d meas ures. These nclude 2 002 Direc-
F alkner t998
and sacrificial terms. tlve 200211 4tEC) esta blishing a general framework for informing and
20 0 3 have been interpreted 1U. these symbolic îg employees where a much ower threshold appli CS with fur-
la bour market agendas are consulti
Beyond social partnershiP particiPatorY
European \for ks Council E\vC) ther inÍormatlon and consulta tl on safeguards involv lng company Stra
develop rng at a aúable rate. The
workers with à right to informa tron teglc decisi on likely to affect their employment lnterests; and a 1 99 8
Directive (94t4slEC) provides'!lor
ks Councils, applicable ln Directi VC with minimal proY lslons for information and consulta tron on
consulta t10n companles vla
at least 1 5 0 1n two ællecti ve re dundancies 9 8t s9/EC) Such measures are hardly worker
em ploying 1 000 workerst w hich includes tlon, but they do provide for a basic level of legall enforcea ble
states. ETUC estrmates tha t around
60% of the workforce could v
20 1 1 b but the to informati on and consultation.
tially be covered by such Councils ETU C Some of the large national confederations from high
proportlon around
Foundation estlmates that a much smaller labour maf-
conditions, and with stfong relationships ln domestic politics,
900 ln num ber
million workers actually aÍe) compr 1S lng over difficulty ln seer ng significa nt galNS through EU measufes aimed
ha ve
lished to date(uNI Euro pa 2016 This IS beca use the Directive at
from at least 7 0 0 minimal cross-bor der S tandards. N onetheless, the EU do CS
upon managemen t lnl tlatl ve or request an oppoftunlty to seek to export' higher protectlo
(Euro pean F ounda tron
across member sta tes to establish one n conditions
standard memb er states ln a stra tegy aimed a t countering
'!lhere they have been esta blished, identified prob lems incl ude the social
and 'consulta tlon ln the The strong and well-resource d German trade
1n which the definition of 'information
untons have his-
practlce, and the viewed the EU through this lens, AS an addi tional
trve eads to varrable interpreta tlon ln adequatel v dealt with through the national
âfena w hich
In some the resul t IS 1i ttle more than envlronment, and ã ble
meet once a yeaÍ only. CASCS
their needs adequately at the domes tlc level
tatlon, but there aÍe
bolic practlce based on minimalist implemen other countrles, particularly those
Roethig 1 994 In
pro actl VC CASCS European F oundation 2 00 8 :4 with more ln the south and east of Europe,
level represents significan t new o pportunities
meettngs and SU b-committeestructures with comprehensive to develop
consul tatlo n over For some national confedera tlons, membershi
tlon provlslon, though rarely extending rnto their role vls a -vls lts national members,
p of E TUC
cepts. 'Proactive cas CS ate more likely
to be found ln companles beca use rt pro-
maln route for them to a ddress
U ntil recentlyt the Volkswagen the European level A British
there aÍe centralize d structur ES
lea der d urlng the Tha
was held up as a model of good practlce, until court CASCS ln tcher er encouraged colleagues to see
120 Interest Representation in the European Union
Løbour Interests 12I
'Brussels as the only card game in town' (Trades Union Congress 19B8),
although commentators have suggested that EU trade union organiza-
tion is no substitute for domestic weakness (Roethig 1,995).
There is no uniform trend of union embeddedness in political systems
across the member states, or of changes over time, and the picture ig
complicated as governments change and the belief systems of parties,
labour organizations and governments evolve. However, the wider exter-
nal forces to which member states have been subjected have made it dif-
ficult for unions ingrained in quasi-corporatist systems to maintain thg
full strength of the positions they once held in domestic politics. ì7here
the labour movement has not been marginalized in domestic settings, it
is difficult to see how its position could be significantly advanced by the
context of EU politics in which it operates. Nonetheless, the stakes ¿¡s
too high for disengagement, and all have invested in EU-level organi-
zation. And trade union links with sympathetic national governrnents
ensure that the movement has a spread of avenues of influence within EU
policymaking to match those it enjoys within the EU instirutions. Here,
union organizations to impac
the trade union movement has institutionalized access to policymaking,
members (Offe 1981). These
particularly in DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, wirh qne
consider during analyses of la
member of the Delors cabinet once famously describíng that Commission
service as a'union lobbying organisation, old style' (Ross 1994:507).
The natural links between trade unionists and the S&D Party in The European organization of labour
interests
European Parliament (EP) provide it with important access, and
EP has been a strong supporter of a'European Social Model'. The
liament's work includes a strong and effective trade unions
with which ETUC meets monthl¡ and close connections between
SScD party and European trade union leaders. ETUC has been
to table amendments in the Parliament through this route. I
the relationship between these two actors has been so strong that
former UNICE Secretary General, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, once
plained that'ETUC has a privileged relationship with the
Parliament which shares its objectives and consistently passes
tions by a large majorit¡ advocating social policies that business
unacceptable' (Stern 1994:1,41,). A source of tension does,
remain in the way in which the social dialogue procedure
the EP.
Labour interests comprise one of the three categories of interest
the Economic and Social Committee, as Group II (workers). There
obvious limitations to the rmpact of this adv lsory body
but the effort ln vested by employers to ensure the orSantza tlon ls
1,22 Interest Representdtion in the European Union Løbour Interests 123

Labour sectoral actors in Brussels as the EFBIX/]X/


in co_ordinating action and
'posted workers'threat (Erneioóé1.
Sectoral union organizations are mostly ETUC-affiliated EIFs. These i.r"
differ vastly in their membership size, structure, strategy and potential. tory of change by ETUC, considereJ'i.lo*.
Most have developed from structures of international sectoral unions
(such as UNI-Europa), and/or located within these premises. Most have The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
engaged in social dialogue with their sectoral industry counterpart and
arã involv.d in formalized 'secroral dialogue committees' (Chapter 2).
EIFs have been particularly active in E\ùícs, where they are ideally placed
to co-ordinate the role of their members across countries to serve s¡
them; according to its entry on the UNI-Europa
provides co-ordination for over one ncils. In r¡es¡
sectors, these have the right to make ership, and in
some cases have the sole capacity to do so. Most EIFs have a low level of

to be self-sufficient labour representatives at the European level, but sup


plementary structures to ETUC for sectoral organlzatlons and lnterests,
As the earlier example of IG Metall demonstra tes EIFs have pla yed
significan t role ln the establishment and oversight of cross-na tional
bargaining co-ordination mechanisms ta IRTUCs. These are
by ETU C, elect a Chair to represent them t E TUC Executi YC
mlttee meetlngs, and elect representatl VCS ETU C working
Although autonomous, EIFs are also incorporated within the
of ETUC. To be eligible for membership, each has to be open to
tion to unions who subscribe to ETUC's national union co
and to subscribe to ETUC's aims. They have a seat, and voting rights,
all of ETUC's decision-making committees (except on financial
beca use they neither contribute to ETU C nor take funds from it)
'dual mem bership structure of ETUC has occasionall v caused
Historicall¡ tensrons have revolved aro und the dilution of power Íot
national confederations 'w here E TUC has wa nted to take the lead
sectoral issues, and when members are represented by different
within their national confederations and the industry federations
theless, the successful lncorpora tlo n of them has prevented them
develop lng rnto a parallel, and partly competltl V€, structure, and
now perform a complementary role 1n return for (a steadily
influence ln ETUC internal structures. The SUCCCSS of the EMF,
ts
124 Interest Representation in the European Union

ETUC's collective action problems as insurmountable (Timmersfield, in


Turner 1,995).4 further limitation it shares with BusinessEurope is that
it lacks a wide-ranging collective bargaining mandate from its members.
The ETUC Secretariat (currently) comprises an elected General
Secretar¡ a Deputy General Secretary (with provision for a second), and
three Confederal Secretaries (with provision for a fourth), each with
responsi I areas. In total, it has 65 staff,
ETUC's has historically been the German
Deutsch vorstand (DGB), although it has
recently significantly reduced its funding level and has now been usurped
by the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) as its single largest member.
This reflects both differing views about what ETUC should be and the

the corridors of power in British politics. In the early years of its forma-
tion ETUC was only just more than a co-ordination centre for national
trade union confederations to engage the European level (Roethig 1994;
Dølvik and Visser 2001). Early analysis emphasized overall weakness,
with fragmentation and diversity the unwieldy na ture of tS federal
structure, the indi vidualized actl vttres of tS mem bers, tendency to
est common denominator positions, and an over-dependence upon
Commission to achieve its goals (Visser and Ebbinghaus 1992;
1 9 94; Roethig 1 9 94'' Armingeon 1 9 94; Ross 1 9 94; Roethig
Hoskyns 19 96 Marks and McAdam 1 99 6 Síallace and Young 1 9e7),
These earlier analyses pre-date the full development of social
at EU level which brough t to ETU C members SCNSC of the need Íor
organlzatlon to develop beyond a co-ordination centre, alongside a
rng realization of the impact of monetary unlon. Looking back at
development of ETUC toda Y' lts greatest strengths have been lts
rty alongside the marntenance of rts breadth, and rts bility to respond
the co-ordination challenges presente d by monetarv unl0n and to
from reliance on an'insider' strategy to one which includes mass
lization. This is significant, because large-scale demonstrations are
un usual ln EU politics because of the lnstltutlo nal tza tlon of interest
resenta tlon, the logi stical difficulties of assembling cross-border
and the difficulties of engagrng mass constrtuencres ln EU- related
t has d eveloped some \ /ay from the càÍtcature of Martin and Ross
1,26 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union

A single market in services and labour cfeates substantial issues for labour
interests. Trade unions have accepted the concept as an inevitabilit¡ miti-
gâring its effects as well as progressing its interests through adaptation to
make what it can of the changes it brings, and to focus upon the agendas
presented by a'European Social Model' and a'Europe of the citizens'. For
ifree markets' read're-regulation'. Ilhile this does not bring a European
system of industrial relations, with limited outcomes from the social dia-
logue and'\ü[orks Councils, the former has provided trade union organiza-
tions with an elevated status in EU and national policymaking and acted
as a recruiting sergeant for EU and national unions, as well as engaging A str iking deve lopment IS the comlng o Í age
o f ct ttze n lnter es
narional trade union leaders in EU policymaking at domestic and EU otgaîna tron mo bil att and represen ta tron a t EU eve There S a
levels. And the labour movement has established a European benchmark, dense landsca p of non gover nmental organt atrons NGO S
orga n
and significant cross-border co-operation structures, to respond to the ized a nd a dvoca tlng a t EU evel for virtually every lmagtna b e L
a use,
potential for deflationary effects caused by monetary union. from the unem pl oyed to M US lm wome to grou ps coun terlng the
Dølvik and Visser drew attention to the ways in which European trade long- held monopoly of producer gf o p S ln echnica domains
S uch
union structures have been weakest at the sectoral level where national as frnancia efvrces A n um ber of EU N GO S aÍe a
SO rela tl vely we ll
unions are strongest, and strongest at the peak level where national resourced One segme n a lone envlronmen tal NGO S, has
ver 1, 3 0
unions are weakest (Dølvik and Visser 2001; Martin and Ross 2001). EU -onente d staff and self -declare a n a nnual spend on
lo b bvi ng
'While these assessments remaln valid, unlon solidarity remalns relati vely the EU nstr tutlon of oYer € 1 3 milli on The lø'ùøF European
Policy
strong ln comparlson wl th business. And there ha ve also been consider- 0ffice, Tr anspo rt and the Environment, nd the European
Co NS um
ble changes and mltlgatlng factors. \øhi 1e sectoral unlon ers Organizatron e ach h as a staffing complemen t
com pata ble to the
has developed little ln breadth, rt has developed SU bsta ntially n group of best- res o urced busines S organt tlons, b ar
one (Ta b 4 1
most notably with the extent of orSanna tlon of the EMF, the N G o h ve recently ocate d a yarrcty o Í we al rh
Pu blic Services U nron and UNI Europa. These organizations and ^ v independent
tl ons from w hich to draw fi nancla SU pport In d vid ual
have demonstrated the capacity to lead and co-ordinate in critical NGO S
highl v networ ked by fo rmal organna tlon S
and inform al struc-
cumstances, developing new infrastructure to proactively engage wl thin a nd âcro SS SC gments sometrme S
wor king al o ngsl de
and opportunltles, to organlze new segments of labour and to another ln purpose fenova ted buildings,
often wor king on olnt
lob bylng at EU level with significant InASS mobiliza tlon ETU C has Manifestos with a coheren t o ut o o k for people
and the
nota blv pursued a dual strategy of institutionalized E U lob bying (EEB 20 1 0 ate published together
by co alition pa rtn ers with
lnASS mo bilization. This has contribute d to the withdra wal of o f scope to ma tch those of p o li tl
cal partles standing for
modification of Iegislati ve proposals such AS port servlces, company An d, significantl Y, ocl al movement
structures which li
OVCTS and general servlces, and the introduction of legisla trve the 'usual SUS pects' of lnstltu
'Workers tlo nalized Brussels N G Os ha VC
such AS the Posted Directi ve. ETUC has notably shifted the EU uslng yarl u S c hannels linked
to p li cymaking
to add mass mobilization its institutional lobbying, with a host
to oÍganlza trons such a S F rl e nd S of the
Earth a, nd Gre en p eace
successful demonstrations to its name in an environment 20 1 5
difficult to mobilize within. Furthermore, its institutionalized the Europ ea n
Communi ty w à S dri ven b the single mârket
has shifted away from reliance upon DG Employment, Social ln the decade fo v
lowing the c orresponding tÍeatY' so glanc
and Inclusion to relations with the Parliament where mass of the core co n temporary e
de ba tes S lnce the Trea ty on Euro-
makes an impact. Attempts to create a'Europe of the citizens' te vea S tha has come to be gripped by disco ur e
about
at the least, measures of 'output legitimacy' for workers.

127
128 Interest Representation in the European Union Citizen Interests 129

its legitimacY. Much of the his The landscape of c¡t¡zen interest groups
inp,rit"gitl-acy (ParticiPati gh
rathlrìhan outp bY
"rãã"í"1
mod.l of :participatory democracy
tic
oi-otgu"i;"d citten groups as a means .to I th
í), explains why organizations articulating
"n¿
,trã" ãf thre citizen have-arrived at the centre of
Si."ft ttg""izations have successfully used the d
their
.i",i. t.iitimacy for this purpose,'framing'linkage 6.7 Members of the EU Ciuil Society Contact Group
TABLE
key terms (Börang and Naurin 2015)' The
of policy-agendag
to'p o p,rl d i sc o rir s e is caPture drit,o,t.\m:il
"r' *Ir:Tl ri'Jilî:; Social Platform t Groups organized
oric, symbols and PolicY analYsis' licy field, spanning
zey 2000:339). The all-imPortant acy. Initiated by EU
nd'framed' create policy priorities ization in sector
process. These factors have helped with elevated status in institutions. Seven staff.
European NGO Confederation for Relief and
to propel citizen issues to the fore of EU policy agendas' CONCORD
i öor.,-.r.rication from the Er ropean Commission in 2000, 'The Development, comprising 20 international networks
and28 national associations across Europe. Lead
commission and NGos: Building a Stronger Partnership" issued in
six main reasons partner of DG Development. 13 staff.
,h. ,t"-., of its president and vice-president' lists for

co-operation with organized civil society: Human Rights Network organization of 50 outlets of international
and DemocracY peace and human rights, organizations, active at EU
Network level.
fostering participatory democracy
as information relaYs Greenl0 'Family'network of ten environmental NGOs active
representlng the vrews of specific groups of cltrzens
to the EU at EU level, which purposefully co-ordinates resources
co ntributing to policymaking between parriciparing organizations. 130 staff.
contributing to prol ect management and policy/programme European Confederation of 31 national organizations and 19
mentatlon Vomen's Lobby trânsnational organizations. Secretariât of ten staff,
a contributing to European integration (European (ETüL) plus interns.
2o0ob). Culture Action Family of 90 transnational and narional member
Europe organizations working on EU culture issues, Seven staff.
These roles âre mrxture of 'in put' and 'output legitimac¡ and Public 47 transnational organizations and 41. national
fore hel p to explain the actlvrsm of EU political
lnstltu tlons 1n the Alliance organizations working in public health field. Ten
As well AS respo nding
ma tlon and malntenance of lnterest groups. staff, plus interns.
lncentl VCS provided by EU political institutions Chapter ),
1
Civil Umbrella of 40 European networks active in
w hich identified and
ha VC als o emerged to fill 'niches are Plarform education and training. Six staff.
the
entrePreneurs To the above list can also be added Lifelong
by keeping office hol ders to âccount'
functions exercised by NGOs,
accountabil lty limited, themsel YCS not
flip side IS that their own 1S LLL)
ChaPrcr
accounta ble to those upon whom their ad vocacy impacts Organizarion
websites
130 Interest Representdtion in tbe European Union Citizen Interests 131

A variety of organizations fulfil horizontal niches within the citizen -)


domain alongside the CSCG (see Table 6'2)'

not in
Nøme Year Social Role
TABLE 6.2 cross-sectoral EU citizen interest associations (AcrortYm) Estab. Platform
membership of the Ciuil Society Contact Group Member?

agencies. Active on direct democrac¡


Name Year Social Role
free movement of citizens, and
(Acronym) Estab Platform
European governance. Seven staff.
Member?
EuroPean 1991 Yes Horizontal mandate with
European 1.990 Yes 29 national (and regional and Social Action
Anti-Poverty local) and 18 European members Network
Network concerned with disadvantage. (ESAN)
(EAPN) Has developed into a horizontal-
type' umbrella organizatron
remit of sociai inclusion. Heavily member.
institutionalized in DG EMPL (Bauer
Permanent 199 5 No Federalist outlook. Active on
2002),and has assumed a formal
Forum of iss ues of citizen_shi p, partici patory
monitoring role in the European
European oemocracy, and fundamental rights.
Employment Strategy. Seven staff,
Civil Society Limited membership base.
European 1'989 No French dominated'third sector'
Organization websites
Council for organization, with members from
Voluntary eight countries which are nationâl
and regional councils for voluntary Social PI atform wa S lnl tiall cre ate d AS
Organisations v a otn t lnrtl a tl VC of
(CEDAG) organizations as members. One Directora te General Employ ment, Social Affairs
an d Incl uslon
permanent employee, suPPlemented EMPL and the Chair of the Employment
an d Social Affairs
by member resources. Led the of the E uropean Parl ament ln 1 9 9 5 to purs
ue a 'ci vil dia
unsuccessful pursuit of a European for lnp ut Iegi tlmacy with cl vil socle ty, drawing
a parul el with
Association Statute with DG XXIil 'social dialogue' Íor prod ucer ofganna tlons
Its ear ly work was
of the European Commission in the at a wide-scal e mobi lizatton of
ttzen lnteres ts a EU Ievel
1990s (Kendall and Fraisse 2005)' end, b ut progressl vely developed
AS an otganva tlon rnto
nterlocuto r for E U political rnstr tutt an
European 1990 No Direct membershiP organi zation, o NS Geyer 2 00 1
drawn diversely from over 100 EU, 2 00 3 C ullen 200 5 T hese
Citizen ha ve inclu ded bi -ann ual clvl
national and regional NGOs with summlts with D G EMPL,
Action organlzlng N G o ln p ut rnto the
interests in citizen issuesAJGOs' o n the Fu ture of Europe
Service Cullen 2 0 0 5 a nd n meetl ngs
(ECAS) Members from fields of citizens informal Council o f
Social Affairs an d E-p oyment (Alha
h has prevl ously S ught d eff
advice, civil liberties, culture, a system of a ccre dita tron fo f
development, health and social on the basis of repres EU nter-
enta tl veness ln the knowle dg" tha
welfarå, local government, general system wo ul
d lea ve lt a the top of the
t
level of fina tree, argul ng for the
civil society develoPment ncial sup p oft o be res erved
to distinguish for t Cul en 200 5
Its elf fro m other organ tzatt
ons the Social
1,34 Interest Representation in the Union

enJoy campaigning' mostlY fres from student politics at university


with experience of studying in member state, and who are
mostly distinct from the esta hed world of Brussels NGOs. Some
of the
of these have used their networ ks to take campaigns into some
new member states ( Greenwood and Tuokko 201'6), introducing sorns

national collaborators to EU politics for the first time.

The funding of NGOs

-
funding from EU institutions.
tt isirfficult to establish a precise figure for the total extent of funding
by EU rnstltutl0ns of N GO s, WI th estlma tes from Commission ources
1 bi lion. Thus, the Commission discussion paper
varyrng from € 1
of 2000 issued in the nâme of President Barroso and Vice-
Kinnock recorded that

At present It 1S estimated that over 1 ,00 0 ml llion a year 1S


to N GO prol ects directly by the Co mmlsslon, the ma or part ln
field of exter nal rela tlons for d evelopment co-op era tlon,
rights, democracy programmes, and ln particular, humanitarian
ln
on a verage € 40 0 million) o ther important alloca trons àre
social a pproximatelY €70 million educational approximately
million) and environment sectors w1 thin the EU Several
NGOs in EuroPe and world-wide àfe recelvlng funds from the

(European Commission 2000b)

The Co mmlssloner anno unclng the European TransparencY


tlve 1n 2005 recorded that a nnually the Commission cha nnels
ts
billio n euro to develop lng countnes through N GO Kalla 20 05
N
Most pol lcy areâs have budget lines for the sup port of GO s,
and
(,
lJ
o\

EU NGOs
TABLE 6.3 EIJ fund.ing of PrinciPal

F inancial TrtnsQ 4r en cY
Funding
Orgønization year Datubase (Year if different
to column 2)
of incorne
€220,000155"/"
2014 €2,166,000
Culture Action EuroPe €2,246,953
€1,725,351184o/"
Network zjt4
European Anti-PovertY
(EAPN) €2,525,732199"/'
2014 €2,566,062
Service
EuroPean Citizen Action
(ECAS) €2,5 53 ,2891 52"/"
2014 €4,726,327
EuroPean Consumer
Organisation (BEUC) €0
2015 €5,000
F-uroÞean Council for
VoluntarY
õrg"iir"tions (CEDAG) €48,355
€1,313,579140"/"
Bureau 201,5
European Environmental
(EEB)

European NGO Confederation 2015 €864,458 €700,000/55%


for Relief and Development
(coNCoRD)
European Public Health Alliance 2015 €2,1.75,973 €544,247t67"/"
(EPHA)
European Social Action 2014 nla €0
Nenvork (ESAN)
European'$Øomen,s Lobby
2014 nla
(EVL) €846,446t79%
European Youth Forum (EyF)
2015 €6,1 13,099 €2,725,522t96y"
Friends of the Earth Europe
2014 €813,721
(FOEE) €3,050,339/63y"
Platform of European Social 2014 €600,000 €598,795/84%
NGOs
Vorld Vide Fund for Nature 2014-1.5 nla €588,1.27/1.6y"
(WYiF) European policy
Programme
Average EU Funding
s6%
in the EuroPean Union Citizen Interests 139
138 lnterestRe?resentat'on

European Disability Forum


European Parliament
Finance Watch
Mundo-B
Mundo-J
Platform
& Environment

6.7 NGO clusters around the Ewropean parliament in the


Brussels property h otspot

landmarks in the development of EU citizen


representation
gfoups were the first crtrzen lnterest organlzatlons
at EU
the focus of the European Economic Communit¡
and
emerged ln the years immediately
following the Treaty of Rome.
\ryas followed by groups
representing world development and
concerns. Both SCtS of groups were heavi
ly institutional ized
Union Interests 14I
140 Interest Representation in the European Citizen

A formal dialogue structure dating from major commission \x/hite papers of the early to mid-1990s,
in dialogues with the European Commrssion'
dates from 1961.' and such as rhose on Grouth, competitiueneis and Emptoyment (1993) and
between consumer i,,....'t, and the Commission
reforms), to the present day' Since European social Policy (1994),or initiatives such as action programmes
h", .orrti.ro.cl (subject to a number of
with Development NGOs (later or mainstreaming (chapter 5), which resulted in landmark io.lrl a.tion
,fr" -i¿-f gZ0s, a Liaison Committee acting programmes for the remaining years of the 1990s. The social platform's
of organizations,
óðñèono) embraced an elaborare srrucrurewith the European Com- organization of two large 'social forums' in search of ,civil dialogue, dur-
inrtitotionalized channel for dialogue
"r-".t the scene in the mid-1980s' ing this period were also landmarks, helping to develop the soáal plat-
mission. Amnesty lnternational arrived on
of
e establishment
forl's leadership role for EU.civil sociery organizationì. A new budg.t
ion. Animal rights line for NGos to pursue civil dialogu e in 199i supported these activities.
an Environmental From the side of EU political institutions, DG EMPL was a clear leader
n umbrella bodY and institutional in_ these 'social policy' initiatives, whereas the leadership for
another set
ined of relaged, parallel initiatives running at the time in the social economy
interlocutor late field was provided by a unit within a now defunct service of the Euro-
the sole env eno,s pean commission, DG xxIII (now incorporared within DG Enterprise).
1980s. Thos
eacn Thus unit, together with cEDAG (European council for voluntary
of the Earth
as co-ordinating devices for wider movements to address EU organisations), proposed an ultimately unsuccessful mission for a Euro-
ãfn..t pean Association statute, seeking a legal status for EU organizations
oolitical decision-making' in
""T'ö;;';;;;; ; ñ'o'op'"'' Parliament (Fontaine-Report)' leading
r1'. the wider frame of democraric legitimacy (Kendall and Fra"isse 2005). In
social and civic 1997 the unit launched a commission communication on ,promoting
to ,rrbr.q,r"nt EP resolutioï, put the'third sector' of
"
rtæ"ir"ri""s on the EU policy agenda' recording that
the role of voluntary organizations and foundations in Europe' which
argued that
towards its des.tiny as a
Europe needs inspiration to take a further step
Community. Nonprofit organisations are an
opportunity to be taken voluntary organizations and foundations foster a sense of solidar-
this opportunity must be ity and citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our
in this respect. Inertia -"t-bt overcome and
democracy. In the light of the challenges now facing the É,ur,rp.a.,
boldly seized. (Kendall and Fraisse 2005:283)
communit¡ these functions have never been more vital. (European
uropean Commission 1997:5)

;:îi:1: This claim was followed up by the 2000 commission Discussion paper
cluded a 'The Commission and NGOs', which argued that ,NGOs can makè a
imporla.nce "' of coop- contribution to fostering a more participatory democracy both within the
landmark declaration, Declaration 23,stating'the
unity and charitable associations EU and beyond' (European commission 2000b:4). This thinking came
erâti downstream in the 'sØhite Paper on Governance, aimed at sffuãturing
and nsible for welfare establishments
and 2006a)' Despite this' many such a system of participatory democracy as a wider solution to democratic
treaty competencies'.clustering legitimac¡ and is the subject of exrensive analysis in chapter g. In acting
organizations operated at the fringes of
around the emerging social ptog'á--t' and initiatives coming out of as a catalyst for the creation of a procedural framework lor a systematic

OC V lrro* DG Èmp"loym.r,,, So.iul Affairs


& Inclusion), until the inser- engagement with civil societ¡ the white Paper followed up an agenda
opened the gate-s for the first set by the 1992 Sutherland Report (Sutherland 1992).
tion of an Article ¡n ri.' tggZ'nmsterdam Treaty
market measures' Many of 'Democratic legitimacy' was also a catalyst for the creation in the
development of ro.øi-pãlicy beyond labour
also haveiheir origins or spurts of significant
development late 1990s of a strucrured dialogue by DG Trade with civil society in
;h;;;;;p,
1,42 Interest Representation in the European Union Citizen Interests 143

Environmental ¡nterests
EU's environmental pol-
As successive Earth Summits have revealed, the
the reality that
i;;; ;;. the most advanced in the world. This reflects
concern throughout citizens' rights in environmental matters, guaranteeing rights of access
environmental issues are a central public interest
are highly politicized' to information, public participation in decision-making, ãnd access to
ip".ir."ì".iy, ,torth.rn¡ member siates, and
-f

146 Interest Representation in the European Union


Citizen Interests 147

and'$ØWF, involving the certification that fish had been drawn from
sustainable stocks. Initiatives sttch as these are geared towards show-
ing how good environmental practice can also be good business sense,
through meeting consumer demand, providing competitive advantage
and good positioning, and reducing overheads (Ruzza 2000). For busi-
ness organizations, an alliance with an environmental NGO is highly
prized, because of the general need for alliance making in a consen-
sus-oriented decision-making system, and because of the strength of
environmental protection sentiment in Europe. For these reasons' a
European public affairs manager of one leading US multinational con-
sumer brand reports spending more time talking to NGOs than to Now, after several decades of expansion, the (one
time) new market
EU institutions. Nonetheless, achieving an issue-specific business-green enrranr .is seen b, ,^.^T: as possibly part of à ,toUUyi"g
otigãpoty,
alliance in detail is not easy, and often, once achieved, is somewhat (Long and Lörinczi 2009:1.8,
unstable. There are more examples of participation by 'light green'
NGOs such as the EEB and'!lWF. The latter purposefully tries to lend
its name to projects involving business organizations which have tan-
gible benefits for the environment. EEB has entered into alliances with
Orgalime, the EU engineering association, and with the IT and con-
sumer electronics associations, about practical collection targets in the
framework of the European'Waste from Electronic Equipment (\X/EE)
Directives. The risk of entering into such alliances is an apparent
compromise to 'ideological purity'. The latter position may be more
Environmental c¡t¡zen interest groups
informed by the need to maintain membership levels and the funds
they bring, and therefore a niche for some of the'dark green' organiza-
tions is to undertake'stunts' with high media visual appeal as a means
of demonstrating to their members thal the organization concerned
is active about the things which concern them in a 'protest business'
(Jordan and Maloney 1997).In practice, however, even'dark green'
organizations enter into issue-specific alliances with business interests
on the Brussels scene.
As well as voluntary initiatives among producers, statutory frame-
work initiatives to which the environmental movement has contributed
have reinforced and contributed towards changes in consumer behav-
iour. And as well as specific interventions over policy measures, the key
contribution of environmental public interest groups, at EU and other
levels, are the influences they have contributed to the belief systems of
policymakers and of business and consumers.
Not long after establishing an office in Brussels, the Director of the
W-WF European Policy Office (WWF-EPO) reflected that 'in general
the environmental organizations are unable to exercise power' (Long
Ê
À
oo

TABLF 6.4 GreenlT Transpdrency Register declarations

Financial Total budget TR actiur.ty EIJ funding € N. staff FTE2 EP passes


Organization
€ spending €1 staff
Year

Birdlife Europe 2014 1.,222,760 'L-L.25m 316,230 18 18 5

CEE Bankwatch 2014 1,745,897 300-399k 1,L94,19 5 4 2.8 2

Climate Action 2015 1,240,655 800-899k 262,762 19 15.8 11

Nenvork
European Envt. 2015 3,266,046 3.35-3'5m 1''1L3765 L7 16'8 11

Bureau
Friends ofthe 2014 4,830,1,96 830,736 2,610,891' 15 6.5 10

Earth Europe
Greenpeace 2015 1,625,727 952,627 0 11 7.2 11

European Unit J

Health and 2014-15 779,086 100_199k 356,159 .5 2.5 6


J
Environment
Alliance
Naturefriends intl. 2014 82g,g7g Below 10k 19g,g0g 0.5 2 0
Transport and 20t5 3,721,577 3.5-3.75m 0 19.2 25 17
Envt.
'$(r!(/F
EU Policy 2014-15 3,642,316 2_2-.25m 588,127 21.8 33 l3
office
Total 22,903,329 6,64L,937 130 129.6 86

1 Reported in bands or as an absolute figure


2 Full-time equivalent

S our c e : T r anspa¡ency Register

À
\o
150 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
Citizen Interests 1S1

a number of regionally based environmental organizations. Commis- The Greenl0 claims that it
sion funding supports the work of 2B environmental NGOs (Kirchner
2006).There are thus around 150 staff working for environmental pub- successfully lo bbied the
nexistingTreaty
lic interest groups based in Brussels alone, supplemented by the potential commitments to sustai ental protection
resources of other European offices of organizations, and countless and the integrationr ur
of each EU policy
supporters willing to contribute expertise and voluntary assistance. area. (G1o 2o1o)
Greenpeace, for instance, claims to have access to over 1200 scientific This claim once again raises the problematic issue of rhe
environmental experts worldwide (Mazey and Richardson 2005:116), exrent to which
environmental NGOs create policy outcomes, or act
making for an interesting comparison with those of the collective chem- as contributory
voices to ourcomes that would have happen.á
ical industry (4000), described above. Participation at a level of detail, it TÀ;;; i;,"-"
seems, is possible for environmental NGOs throughout the policy pro-
confidence among leading G10 particip".rtr o,r tr*".ry*"y.
óoi"i, *iii, iå"g
of environmental
Lörinczi claiming that ""a
cess, rather than simply relying upon the strength sen-
timent to agenda-set issues. [al G10 letrer ro Pre.sident Ba¡roso in Jury 2005 was undoubtedly
Apart from some tensions surrounding the position of the EEB, influential in saving the seven thematic strategies on the
.nuirårr-.rr,
described below, and some frictions arising from significant differences being proposed by commissioner Dinas rtJ- air"pf.*irg
in style, relationships within the Greenl0 are generally collaborative îir ,n"
-o -'
Commission's agenda. (Long and Lörinczi 200917SiL
and well co-ordinated. They meet together every month for purposes of
information swapping and co-ordination, periodically with the Cabinet once again, the power of EU environmental NGos as agenda
setters is
of the Environment Commissioner and with the Director-General of DG stressed by this reflection.
Environment, and, on an annual basis, with the President of the Com-
mission. The Environment Commissioner has been known to turn up,
unannounced, at meetings of the G10 (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Most
G10 members have excellent links throughout DG Environment, meet
up in a variety of other fora, and get to share thinking. Co-ordination is
particularly good between a core 'Gang of Four', comprising the EEB,
Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), líXøF and Greenpeace, who com-
menced the network as'G4' in 1,990 (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Most of
the G10 have competencies in matters affecting the environment across
the range of their interests, with an informal and unwritten division of
labour to enable the organization with the natural specialism to take the
lead on it. This division is not intended to be exclusive, in that most of
the organizations undertake work on a core of related environmental
issues. Long and Lörinczi have reflected that

NGOs might have an advantage over business groups in that NGOs


find it easier to construct and maintain broad cross-national coalitions
than do business interests who are essentially in competition with each
other and who are differentially affected by EU regulation. (Long and
Lörinczi 2009:177)

a
lþr '1,52 Interest Representation in the European Union
Citizen Interests 153

one Commission official suggested to us that the task force which


preceded the formation of DG (Environment) was originally so weak
that it sought the support of the NGOs and mobilised and supported
them in order to defend itself. He believed that without NGO support
DG (Environment) might have died in its early years. (Mazey and
Richardson 2005:1.15)

Apart from meetings with the Presidents of the Commission and the
Council, the EEB is a member of Commission delegations at Earth/Envi-
ronmental Summits.
These strengths apart, the EEB has also had some problems of style.
A past Chair of the EP Environment Committee once commented that
'instead of making it short and snappy they go in for awfully wearisome
and hectoring briefings. Effective lobbying is about being selective with
information' (Financiøl Times L994). Inevitabl¡ its influence has been
diluted since other environmental NGOs established Brussels offices,
and the EEB has not always welcomed the leadership the latter have
sometimes given on particular environmental issues.
W\(/R and the Birdlife International network, are similar in outlook
to EEB in working primarily through institutionalized channels at EU
level. Their strong resource bases also enable them to engage policy-
making at a highly technical scientific level, WSIF has something of an
establishment image as the world's largest and best-known field-based
nature conservation organization, and declares corporate sponsorship
amongst the financial contributors to its European policy office. Along-
side its 'cuddly panda' image and institutionalized links, its European
office has self-consciously sought to position itself as a policy- as well
as advocacy-oriented NGO (Long et aL.2002). Besides using its estab-
lished channels in the national delegation offices in Brussels, it has
resorted to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) system where neces-
sary to ensure action is taken against member states for environmental
violations of structural fund initiatives. It has also played an important
whistle-blowing role, such as providing the European Investment Bank
and the Court of Auditors with video evidence of environmental viola-
tions arising from use of the structural funds in Spain (Long 1995). In
addition, it also makes use of its mass membership base through letter
writing campaigns, co-ordinating with the Swiss-based Europe/Middle
East regional office of \X X/F International (Graziano 1,999). Birdlife
International also has a mass membership base, with one million mem-
bers in the UK alone (Graziano 1999),which it has used in EU politics.
ì
1,54 Interest Representdtion in the Euroþean Union Citizen Interests 1Ss

Greenpeace Switzerland, for instance, have held responsibility for'work had been overtaken as 'effective lobbyists' in the estimation
of MEps
on infrastructural Trans-European Networks' where these issues have by business interests, and parricurarly in the energf à.-"ì"'is"rr""
high environmental impact and strong local mobilization, with specialists Marsreller 2009).This contrasts with an earry ..iåbr"t.d t,r...rr' of
in the Brussels office only for chemicals, climate, electricity and biotech- ".,d
the Bio-patenting Directive of 1.995,
nology. The Brussels office plays a co-ordinating role between these. tributed ro an atmosphere in which
'ùíhile the differences between the G10 organizations mean that ers for the first time, rejected com_
they cannot always work together, the overall pattern tends to work
well for environmental citízen interests. The G10 embrace ranges from geneticmodincations.rhus,",äö',i:;,*1;:äîi j[:,ï:îîi-Jj
the respectable and 'establishment-friendly' W-SøF and Birdlife to the as to the impact of environmental interest, ,o-.rn]hat problematic.
more assertive, direct-action-oriented Greenpeace and FoE. It encom- The analysis of practitioners of an increasing"r.ability ou", ,i'-.-à
írr,"r-
passes the mass membership power base of FoE and Greenpeace, and .vene in public policymaking beyond agendã s.tting is difficurt ro resr
'Sí-\ùøF
the institutionalízed EEB, and Birdlife. Styles vary too, such as empirically because of the difficulty of isolati.rg thelmpac of enyiron_
the interpersonal contact style of Birdlife, and the informal and loosely mental.interest groups from other issues, not leaãt of whlh is the general
co-ordinated, but effective, Climate Action Network (Rucht 1'993).The strength of the environ_ment in public senriment and its correspãnding
relationships between the Greenl0 are more harmonious than are many strength as an issue within the mechanisms of representatiy. d.Åu..".y.
business coalitions, and contain some close alliances, helped by the occu-
pation by five Greenl.0 members of the Mundo-B building in Brussels.
Consumer interests
Because most are operational outreach Brussels offices operating with a
high degree of autonomy, rather than membership offices, they do not The Consumer Programme 2014-20 records the objective of
have to be overly concerned with internal platform-building, enabling
them to respond quickly to issues. A single market where citizens are welr represented by professional
'$Øith
the exception of Greenpeace, all of these organizations have consumer organisations whose capacity is built ro meeri;g the
chal_
been commissioned by the European institutions for investigative work' lenge of today's economic environment.
They all have the technical and political ability to turn science into pol-
itics by influencing the ways in which issues are perceived and defined, This mini revolution in EU consumer affairs in recent years lies in
stark
to become part of the knowledge communities which drive policymak- contrast to Grant's assessment of a decade earlier that EU consumer
ing, and to engage public policy throughout the different stages of its policy was largely symbolic, and th
formulation, implementation and monitoring. And, cruciall¡ they have largely outsiders (Grant 1993). Whil
helped shape not only the thinking of other policy actors such as the all other commentators at the time, i
Commission and producer groups, but also member state preferences have nor been the catalyst for the
towards environmental protection policies. Former W-SøF-EPO Director catalyst has been the wider agendas
Tony Long is reported to have responded with delight to a Commission popular supporr for the_EU through the impact of its policies), and
the
Green Paper on Common Fisheries Policy Reform with the words'it high, crisis politics resulting from fc od safåty problems, ,u.h'^ thor.
could have. been written by \M!íF' (Scotland Europa 2002:96). over BSE (bovine spongiform encep This resulted
Environmental NGOs have a natural ally in the shape of the EP, in the establishment of the_Europe ity (EFSA) in
whose members are quick to take up concerns popular with their elec- 2002, and the investment of responsi Commission
torate. Surveys of 'lobbying effectiveness' among parliamentarians have for food safety along the entire food chain. other safety .rir"r, ,u.h
in the past indicated that environmental groups were rated by MEPs as.the discovery of phthalates in toys and infant equipm.rrt ani their
as the most effective of all citizen interest groups (Burson Marsteller subsequent ban for use in this context, have also åontributed to this
2001). However, a repeat survey conducted in 2009 found that NGOs development.
156 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union
Citizen Interests 157

The search for output legitimacy issues includes the high profile target-
ing of particular consumer price issues, such as differential cross-border
car prices, denied and late boarding of aircraft. and the abolition of
roaming charges for mobile phones usecl in a cross-border context.'High
politics' and a search for output legitimacy have done more to drive
consumer policy to centre stage of the EU agenda than 50 years of con-
tinual effort by EU consumer organizations could. They have developed
an agenda logic of their own, almost separate to that of wider consumer
polic¡ following the discourse of 'consumer protection'. Elsewhere, con-
sumer policy has largely been a story of incremental progression, and
even potentially major catalysts such as mainstreaming and the Trans-
atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have not lit the touchpaper. This
bears interesting comparison rvith more radical progression in the envi-
ronmental domain, because they share similar starting points of commu-
nity action programmes (circa 1972), and some common development
factors, including the embrace of the favourable'citizen's first' discourse:

a Mainstreamløg. Consurner policy wâs mainstreamed later (1997


Amsterdam Treaty; Article 153) than environmental policy (1992
TEU). Commission consumer policy papers continue to carry calls
for more effective integration, contrasting sharply with the achieve- a

ment of environmental policy (European Commission 2006b).


a Institutional Deuelopment and Supþorf. In contrast with a history
of significant and increasing funding for environmental polic¡ the
annual EU consumer policy budget has declined relative to 1990.
The environmental arena achieved DG status at a much earlier stage
and has its own cleclicated l)irectorate General, whereas consumer
affairs only achieved DG status ât a relatively late stage, and is
incorporated as a junior partner within Directorate Generals with
a wider remit (Justice and Consumers, DG JUST; Health and Food a

Safet¡ DG Sante). There is around four times the level of support


reserved for EU Environmental NGOs compared with consumer
NGOs, and there has been no growth in funding for consumer
NGOs in more than a decade. Consumer/Commission liaison fora
have not progressed beyond dialogue and advisory status in over
40 years of operation. Consumer policy is somewhat submerged in
a Council which also covers employment, social policy and health,
a re-organization decision taken without any prior consultation of
consumer representâtives (BEUC 2002). Nonetheless, DG JUST
has witnessed substantial development of instruments with which

.. *..,.:._Jì!!-;an
158 Interest Representation in the European Union
Citizen Interests lS9

All of these organizations have supplemented their central


resources
by drawing upon those of its meml .rr, BEUC has used rhis resource
for particular needs. ""à
!,uropean Transpáre'cy Register data indicates that
BEUC has an annual budget bs ,nilrion, with iã staff, as
-r-"liranrial
FIN-NET. i well as the ability to drañ "ppto"ìhing
,r,. resources of irs mem_
"på" o
ber organizations (the UK consumer
. Differing degrees of centrality to business'
core operations of businesses in markets,
ness has been more difficult for consumer
agendas have been grafted on to business agendas by more mixed
soufces. g it to work across the range
ly large legal department als=o
. Collectiue dction. While the GreenlO has grown, the number of pure equips it with the ability to handle
consumer policy-oriented organizations at EU level has shrunk to (Vallace and Young 1,997).There
one (BEUC), and one concerned with input to technical standards with DG Agriculture and Rural A
bodies. BEUC is a confederation, whereas most of the environmen- with business interests, and in pa
tal organizations are outreaches of wider moYements' able to act and automobile manufacturers. In
quickly. There has been considerable recent change in the landscape advantage of divisions among producer interests to form
strategic alli-
of EU consumer organizations in recent years. Three organizations ances against the car companies with spare parts manufacturäs
and
have disappeared entirely, while another two have lost funding from insurance companies (young and walrace)ooo other
automobii" .".rr-
I.
the Commission. The Consumer Policy Programme continues to paign activities have included press and publicity drives to publicize
price
seek to increase the participation of consumer organizations in EU differentials and trade barrierq whistle-Ëlowing monitori"g
irai_
policymaking, despite around 50 years of institutionalized dialogue. d"g"i"lt
McGowan,
ng and work_
While BEUC is the sole European-level organization dedicated to the 1,992). BEUC
representation of consumer affairs in public policymaking, two further commission
long-established organizations include consumer issues within their the car market.
domain. One is a producer association of the co-operative movement' . .BEUC has long been able ro make a contribution to rhe detail
of
EUROCOOP, while another (COFACE) focuses more on family issues in debate on particular issues. In a generalized sense, th. .o"riri.*/or ir,
-Ã"k.,
its slimmed-down format. A further organization at the technical level marker orientarion with those of core single market ou;..tiu.,
it
is the European Association for the Coordination of Consumer Rep- easy to operate alongside its core p"tttr"^ in the commission,
altÁough
resentation in Standardisation (ANEC), established in7995. ANEC was embracing members from high, lo*, protection countries Á."rrs
"trã th"t
eâsy rask (young 1999). BEUC
enjoys regular meetings at direc_
s way to welcome the Consumer
en involved in its delivery. A core
of strategy, and the community Action programme in ionsume.
.this
committees, deployed in a quite deliberate way to act âs a counterweight 2007-13, is capacity building for consumer organizations, and
to industry. These are concentrated in some of the most sensitive areas
lgli:l
BEUC has delivered courses on commission premises ãimed
at organi-
such as child and vehicle safet¡ as well as household appliances and zations from the new mem_ber srares on subjecis such as lobbying
irr. ¡u
general services such as post, tourism and road transport. institutions, paid by the EU institutions. The history of instiiutiãnalized
1.60 Interest Representdtion in the European Union Citizen Interests 1.61

Commission has not


coming, highly prone
nd them. In-fighting
has characterized the history of institutionalized consumer consulta-
tive structures between the Commission and consumer ,organizations.
The European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) comprises one
member representing national consumer organizations from each mem-
ber state, and one member from each European consumer organization
(ANEC, BEUC). The Commission is free to ignore its decisions, and
Social interests
rather little heed has been taken of them, or of those of its predecessors. interesrs ar rhe EU level hinged
Nonetheless, BEUC is represented in a range of advisory committees the arrival of the European Social
across the Commission. originate from Commission initi_
Unsurprisingly given its quest to represent civil societ¡ the EP has
been a kindred force for consumer interests throughout its existence. p ean i nre grati on.
rhe pa *ern :ä:i'ïî jn :i,1 :*:ï :1ffi LJ',,î
Its high-status Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee different outcomes. In the first"finsrance, the commission
has taken the
(IMCO) has taken on the mantle of its predecessor as a forceful pro- action of an initiative designed to create some momentum,
such as a
moter of consumer interests and a consistent critic of the Commission conference linked to a rheme of the partic,rl", E.rrop.";
for its failings in the consumer policy field. Consumer organizations
î*l ãii.riorr.
have been provided.for_, gró.rp by the c""i_irrià,lri_.ti_.,
fynds.
have been able to use this route as a means of inserting amendments into historically on a doubtful legal bãsis), sometimes with
rittle evaluation
Parliamentary business, and BEUC's resources are heavily drawn upon of the use to which funds have been put (Harvey 1.99s) other
th"r, th.
by individual MEPs. knowledge that a supporr strucrure wãurd u. i"
ir"." a .-rî i.-"r¿,
To a certain extent, the impact of the European institutions and for integration to member states. These have tended to be in safe fields
consumer organizations upon each other has been mutually reinforc- gendas difficult to openly resist
ing. Consumer organizations have played a paft in producing a general commencing a road leading to
climate whereby consumer interests are taken into account at the Euro- uality for women and for people
pean level, and European manufacturers have embraced consumer needs
and desires through higher product standards. For influences in the other
direction, the European institutions have played a part in improving "",0i1'ä,îliiHîåî:??'.':*:::
consumer representation, at both national and European levels. Industry cause direct to the doors of member
in Europe has become more oriented towards quality in the manufac- the Commission then proposes the
ture of products. The EU has been a contributory climate to this, with a followed by an amempt to insert the
General Product Safety Directive (1'992; revised 2001) placing on manu- action programmes. While the first, ,be
facturers a duty to monitor marketed products for safety. Under the pro- other, sometimes more difficurt causes, are grouped together
with the
visions of this directive, firms now have a duty to assess and investigate leading cause in a campaign for widel¡ embracing
to be enabled
consumer complaints, to identify product batches and to sample-test ".tioä
under ffeary provisions. The 1997 Amsterdam Trleaty
marketed products, while legislators can remove any product from the
provides .l"rri.
"
Following a sustained campaign
market for up to a year. These factors indicate how far consumer issues oups, told in further detail below,
have come on the EU agenda since their'symbolic' days.'tü(/here there is action' to combat discrimination
unavoidable conflict with business interests, so consumer organizations n, religion or belief, disabilit¡ age
have been able to exploit the natural divisions between business. rülhile
1,62 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union
Citizen Interests 1.63

Two further, linked, cases enable further exploration of the 1997 Ewopean year Against Raci
Commission/public interest axis in developing European integration, the Commission launch of a new
and provide classic examples of the role of DG Employment and Social covering aspects of discriminatio
Affairs in preparing the groundwork for, and building on, the Article 13 core parrner of a DG EMpl-funde
agreement in the Treaty of Amsterdam. They also demqnstrate the limits litigation'that trains NGOs to ide
to, and constraints of, Commission action in working with groups to seem likely to push forward the frontiers of EU policy comperencies
develop European integration. To support the campaign for Article 13 the field (Case and Givens 201,0).
in
in the Amsterdam Treaty, DG EMPL (then DG V) proposed that 1,997 A similar pâmern of Commissi
be designated the European Year Against Racism. It added a €7m fund- of homelessness, although the outc
ing package for projects in that year including support for NGOs, the of EU comperencies. In 1989 the
establishment of a European Monitoring Centre against Racism and pretation of a general clause in th
Xenophobia, and a major network event in Brussels bringing together of life) to fund a conference on h
130 anti-racism organizations to form the European Network Against This was a subject in which there
Racism. The following year,1998, with Article 13 safely in the treat¡ the conference was funded in the
saw the Commission Action Plan against Racism, with 176 projects finding a more permanent deman
funded, and an attempt by DG V to introduce new legislation on main- porri
streaming (Guiraudon 2001 ). the c
The Commission's work on anti-racism dates from 1986. In sup- pean ons ìØorking with the Homeless
port of this work, the Commission acted on an initiative of the Parlia- (FEA eful things fã, reÀñTSÀ ro do,
ment to establish the (now defunct) European Union Migrants' Forum such as designating it with official , rvarory,itatus to ,.rppiyìt _ith
(EUMF) inL99L, actively intervening to shape the group's parameters information on the srate of homelessness in Éurope. Th.
and operations during its turbulent history (Geddes 2000; Guiraudon
;;;;le is a
frighly typical one of each of rhe stages ,n. ,fã.in. -.^rrií ot."
2001). A later group was the Starting Line Group (SLG), a group of by the commission ro work with ñGos ""a
", "g.nt, ofof i.rt.g;iån.
yer
activist lawyers. SLG helped in the first instance by preparing a draft more than two decades later, beyond the generation
reams of infor-
directive outlawing racial discrimination, modelled on the 1,976 Equal marion, neither the commission nor FEAñTSA h"s
Treatment Directive (Geddes 2000; Case and Givens 201,0).
'While
this -u.h io Jo* uy
way of changes to EU competencies in the housing ã"i¿,
wâs never implemented, post Amsterdam SLG brought forward another generalized credir among a specialized community
*rr.ì ,n""
proposal for a Directive putting into effect the principle of equal treat- a social measure.
flr ,"ti"g?ál*"ra
ment (Geddes 2000). Geddes comments

It is possible todetect the influence of the SLG's proposals on policy


development within the Commission ... pro migrant lobbying at EU
level has centred on the building of alliances between lobby groups
and sympathetic EU institutions, particularly the Commission and the
EP. (Geddes 2000:644-5)
impact is rittre -o,. th*','råI'Jri::#Jt;ï:ïiäi ;låi#i:t i::
instance, had a budget of €5S million over a nu._y.".
pårì.ã,ìrpp""i"s
small-scale 'pilot projects', research, and netwo.t irrj
,r..a, oíirri.r.r,
Similarl¡ Case and Givens stress the impact of the SLG, but in par- of an estimated 50 million plus nU citizens being
ticular, the support of the Parliament in this, where there is a signifi- this view, actions such as ih.-. years' of ,Soli_
cant Intergroup on Anti-Racism and Diversity. The European Network tions,' 'Anti-Racism' 'Languages, and ,Sport' have
Against Racism (ENAR), established in 1998 as an outcome from the
1.64 Interest Representation in the European Union
Citizen Interests 1

'social Europe' has its origins as a series of measures adjunct ta the


single market. Until the Commission Green Paper on Social Policy in
1.993r'social Europe' in'Euro-speak' meant workers' rights. The sound-
est legal basis in the treaties for 'social policy', until Article 13 of the
'1.997 Amsterdam Treaty became the gatekeeppr for more traditional
social polic¡ arose from measures to ensure a level playing field in
production befween the member states in the single market. Thus, the
Treaty of Rome contained provisions for equal treatment of men and
women, social security for migrant workers, and health and safety of
workers, which came to be governed by QMV in later treaty changes
(Ilendon 1,997).In fields that could easily be related to employment,
such as equal opportunities, training, exclusion from the labour market,
disabilit¡ and protection and movement of workers, the Commission
has had little trouble in developing and funding programmes and ini-
tiatives. Interest groups in the fields of women's rights, young people,
disabilities and refugees became well established and resourced, and well
embedded into their patrons' corners of the Commission. A caveat is
that each óf these fields spawned multiple organizations working within
them, despite the presence of leader organizations. One of these exam-
ples concerns the representation of women, where a combination of cir-
cumstances makes it another'most likely scenario' case to consider the
impact of public interest groups on European integration.
The mixture of the EU labour market focus, an irresistible policy frame
of equalit¡ a committed patron, a strong network of grassroots organi-
zations and the ability to work in institutionalized politics combines to
create a favourable set of circumstances for EU women's organizations.
The Commission and the ECJ have become powerful institutional advo-
cates of EU equal opportunities policies (Mazey 2000), and the wom-
en's movement has long been embedded within DG Employment and
Social Affairs (Mazey and Richardson 1,999). The European-Women's
Committee was among the first advocacy organizations to emerge, in t least partly the result of a co-ordina ted lo b bying campalgn
1.984, created by a group of women working in the European Commis-
of
European women's movement spearhea ded by the
E ùøL.
sion, seeking to build upon dramatic successes achieved in the ECJ aris- and Kolb 2001:743
ing from the L976 Defrenne case. Once again, the Commission was the
first and main activist on the EU scene, and funded conferences the first and that the EWL was
vehicle for action. These factors gave rise to a series of densely organized
European women's advocacy and network organizations covering a vari- one of the few European public lnterest groups ln the S ocial po
lcy fi
ety of niches, with, by 201,0, around 55 women's organizations active at that was successful IN having lts demands taken by the
EU level. The lead organization, E\ù7L (European'Sflomen's Lobby), was representatives negotiating the new Treaty the acttve
itself formed in 1,990 from a coalition of traditional and radical feminist of the Erù(/L was crucial for the extent of the changes. (i bid. 7 44, 1. 4 7
1,66 Interest Representation in the Europeøn Union
Citizen Interests 167

According to these authors, ESøL's Spanish member convinced the EWL, with the dialogue invo
Spanish government to adopt E.WL positions as their own, and from sion, member states, Council
there got the position into treaty negotiations. The authors do specify
that'the final outcome would fall well short of the Lobby's expectation,
but it was nevertheless greeted as a success by the organization' (ibid.:
1,47). A further, stronger dose of caution should be added to the inter-
pretation reached by the authors, in that the story is told by a former
secretary general of the EIü(/L at the time of the'campaign', who claims works differently from organizatior
that the EWL went'one step further than the other groups working on characteristic of social movement organrzatlons.
the treaty revisions' (ibid.: 156). Just as the ERT *"t not the prime agent
responsible for the single market, neither was ElØL single-handedly
Social movements
responsible for the measure.in the treaty. The authors do acknowledge
that the'campaign' came ai the right time, when there was considerable
Union by ,social move_
concern within elite circles that there might be a repeat of the TEU sce-
peful way by a number
nario and a rejection of the Amsterdam Treaty. Other authors, too, have
007; Erne 2009; Crespy
lent a similar interpretation. Mazey has argued that women's organi-
zations have been important agents in the adoption of mainstreaming
strategies in EU and member states. Using similar arguments to those it is possible to already delin
presented by Helfferich and Kolb, Mazey has highlighted the importance European movement, in which
of mobilizing networks and'political opportunity structures', and draws are interwoven in extremely fle
upon her earlier work to outline the importance of a sympathetic'policy identities that are tolerani of
frame' in the relevant DG in determining the degree to which main- of such mobilizations rhat seem
streaming has had an impact (Mazey 2000). demands for sociar rights and a democrati
zationof European institu-
The European Commission has successively launched five-year strat- tions, not least through the creati rn of a supranational,
criticar pubric
egy programmes for equality between men and \ryomen. The CSCG sphere. (della porta 2007:205)
claims that the adoption of the 2006-10 programme arose from lobby-
ing by the ErüL, noting that Such movements appear to be drawn more
from grobally oriented activ-
ism rather rhan nationar origins (Tarrow
2006),iîo'i."liy ,t.
it covers approximately the same areas as the ErX/L Roadmap and theme. of 'anti-globarization\. R .o--o., f."rur. of .new -ãìiÇr.
sociar move-
contains some of the same vision and strategies for gender equalit¡ menrs' are their 'alrernative' perspecrives'. Leigh
although the official measures foreseen are not as strong, far reaching, Anheir, Kaldor and Glasis chàracierizethis
.ir., ìÀ" *"il; which
as
and precise as the ones suggested by the EWL text. (CSCG 2006:17)
an experiment in and demonstration of new
ways of living and new
Similarl¡ in 2010 the EWL issued a press release in which it'welcomed types of social relations - non-hierarchical
the launch of the EU's much anticipated new five year strategy for equal-
.o.,r.rriuJ"r"a.
(Leigh 2009:5) "nd
ity between men and women', noting in particular how'women's rights
groups are positive towards the envisaged annual top-level Gender A key issue concerns the point ar which and
Equality Dialogue amongst key stakeholders and stress the importance can be drawn between organizations which
- whether - a distinction
'rã.i"r -oî"-"rr,r'
of the presence of key women's organizations at such fora' (EWL 201,0). and those "r.
ryhigh arc part oÍ rhe 'usuar circuir' of Brussels-baJ-irrrti-
The latter is a further reference to the continued institutionalization of tutionalized NGos. A usuar caricarure is that
b"tw."r,
"áuo.".y
168 Interest Representcttion in the European Union
Citizen Interests 169

'insiders' and activist 'outsiders' (Tarrow 2006), r:anging fr:om itrsti- for policy a.dvocacy and funding (Leigh 2009
tutionalized charities headed by royal patrons through to rhe ATTAC are also .hybrid,cases
I]r*: (as"described by
(Association fol the Taxation of Transactions for the Aid of the Citi- The European Social Forum has been a venll
zen) network and beyond to'loosely affiliated anarchists' at the other of player.s ro meet, with participants balanced
extreme (Hadden 2009:13). There are normative overtones conveyed than'insider' organizations (delia porta 2007).The
by labels such as 'new' social movements, or idealized juxtapositions Forum has mer on a
more or less bi-annual basis since shortly after
between'professionalized and bureaucratized associational civil serv- the,rr",,Èãis.*Ie,, bur
rhere are prepararory
ants' on the one hand, and 'raclical' organizations populated b1''grass- -.:r]lq, four times yearly *itt up tã-+OO lctivists
present ar evenrs (Doer.r 2009).
roots activists' (Saurugger 2009) pursuing 'the politics of the street'. Ruzza shows how social movemenrs have found
This is to some extent also evident in Saurugger's definition of a social a niche which furfirs
a variety of functions they need ro meer ([.uzza
movement as 2011). ih;;-;..o-.
,'norm enrrepreneurs' ar EU lever, bringing ideas into tire Èõ.,-,urror._
collective challenges to existing alrangenìents of power and ciistri-
bution by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities. (ibid.:8)

A key point is the extent to which the activities of such actors contribute
to, or detract from, EU legitimacy. Is, for instance, the occupation of
business association offices (there were such incidents ât the European the political sysrem, Ru.zz1 moves beyond traditional
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and ERT by activists to be inter- caricatures of
once independently minded organizatiáns whose
preted as a positive sign of engagement and populating the public space a.rri"y-i, läï..o-.
progressively institutionalized and removecl from
with debate? Erne claims that their gr"r._roãr. ori_
gins. He identifies a set of intermediate organizational
forms that r.etain
movements but have also acquir.ed some
most political scientists corÌcur that social actors contribute to Euro-
including a degree of professiÀnalizarion,
democratization if they contribute to the making of a European er legal skills. Direct representation arises
public sphere, act collectively on a European ievel, and politicize the
are part of the social movement ,family,,
EU integration process in the transnational European public sphere.
but who can also play the ,institutional
(Erne 2009:4) p_olitics'- game, âpparently witho'r roo mnch
.o-p.o-ir. ãr-ìàrrrio,,
(Ruzza 2011). These 'broke r' organizations
are highiy ,kill.d ir,
Hadden takes a critical view of the message that'any engagement is a pos- building; rhey were key agents in the formation of the "i[",r..
itive contribution to legitimacy by creating a public space' on the basis of ALTER-EU aili-
ance in the creation of the European Transparency
Register (Chapter 3),
an assessment of the activities and perspectives of 37 organizations and and where required they builJ ailiances *rth p.odu?.r-"r:g;;i"rir",
a variety of activists. She casts the perspectives of'radical' organizations for common cause campaigns, a, g..r.ti."ìly -odifi.d'ã.g;lr_,
based around anti-globalization lenses as potentially de-legitimizing for (GMos) (Parks 2009a). The.ability _such -create
to ariin,rc.s -rtn-p?àa.,..,.
an EU seen by such activists as broadly pro-liberal. Hel analysis con- consriruencies is also a nored skill of W^X/R considered
firmed the presence of two distinctive segments of actors at EU level, split earlie'r in this
chapter.
between 'conventional' actors and those that use 'contentious actions', Protest and direct action have arways been the traditionar
with organizâtions such as Greenpeace acting in a brokering role as a tools of
'outsider' movements,,now facilitatecr, empowered and
bridge between these two worlds (Hadden 2015). Nonetheless, sorrre extended by thc
use of 'cyberactivism' (Thomas 2004).The key point
is that the inrernet
organizations are forced to play the institutionalized garne by the need allows activists to find and communicate with i".À
"ir..i r. .,Çg. i"

Ë¡¡¿q,lå!-ll-
170 Interest Representation in the Euroþeøn Union
Citizen Interests 171

attacks on the IT domains of opponents ('hacktivism') and provides an Mobilization by inter.net activ
unprecederited platform for mobilization and broader public commu- arks 2015),
nication. The latter has been used in a way that is oriented towards of the Euro
public accountability of either political institutions or opponents, influ- r_counterfei
encing public policy through public messâge, ancl by confronting oppos- d towards
ing interests.'Websites are carefully constructed in a way to attract the when'WiþiLeaþs revealed drafts
casual browser, using satire as a weapon (Balme and Chabanet 2008), beyond counterfeiting, to include
aimed at striking chords with populist outlooks about the influence of troversial rights for internet service providers (ISps)
finance in politics.
to deny service to
miscreants in a'three strikes yotr;r. out, meas
At EU level, these activities have been used in a way to de-legitimize ing friends sharing music files"rrd
(parks 2015). The
the EU polity (Balme and Chabanet 2008), with opposition to the Euro- measurer conducted by a mixture of inter.net
acti
pean Services Directive proposed by Commissioner Bolkestein a par- decisive, resulting in an overwhelming rejection
by
ticular rallying point, and a means of connecting r'vith institutionalized ists have also been in the forefront ãf é"mp"ig,rs
for inrerner neurrar-
NGO actors in the EU system. Crespy notes how it¡which the European regurator recenrry upn.îa ,hrough-pirìing
stricr
condirions on rhe conditions under which inrerner
The Bolkestein Directive therefore constitutes a hybrid case where ,.ruiå p.ouøers can
eneral Data Protection Reg_
protest and institutionalised contention go hand in hand, with some
s can be frned 4%. of globál
actors among civil society pursuing dual strategies. (Crespy 2009:16)
ticization of inte¡net-related
Of significance is that mobilization on the Services Directive was particu- tive in 2005 provided a landmark
larly aimed at the European Parliament (Fazi and Smith 2006), making IT:related politics (Gehlen 2006).
the direct connection between citizens and their representative organi- âttuned to public sentiment, keen t
zation. This aspect also drew in traditionally'outsider' organizations to tribune whenever issues reach high
institutionalized EU public policymaking (Crespy 2009; Parks 2009a).
This included groups such as ATTAC, who also became drawn in cluring
the early days of dialogue with DG Trade and during the convention Conclusions
period drafting the constitutional treat¡ and through the ALTER-EU The b¡ead.th and depth of citizen inreresr mobirization
alliance (Chabanet 2006) (Chapter 3). Crespy and Parks take a more
ar EU lever is
substantial. New organizations are c
benign view of the role of contention, seeing it as a pre-requisite for causes and niches, now extending to
democratization through popular mobilization, and the presentation of organizations and networks of c
alternative choices in the public sphere (Crespy 2014; Parks 2015). In poseful co-ordination and a divi
this account, trade nnion organizations, notabl¡ link with social move- of issue alliances across segments de
ments to convey contention to and from civil society and EU institutions, lnterest community,.
in a political systerr otherwise noted for producing'policies without pol- of in this chapter,
itics' (Schmidt n.d., in Crespy 2014:85). The orientation of the EU sys- enviro related not only
tem to consensus ma¡ paradoxicall¡ make it more receptive to 'shock to the
the breadth and
tactics' of popular mobilization (Leiren and Parks 2014; Parks 2015). range the niches they fill, the strucrures
The trade union movement has proved adept at popular mobilization, y!.h link them rogether and the power of the envirorr_..,r"1ïìrÀu.r.
including confrontational demonstrations in front of the EP, apparently in F'urope' Their impact can be demonsrrated not oniy ir
fi"ld, oiug.rr,r^
to decisive effect (Leiren and Parks 2014). setting, but some way beyond. Niche organizations
ìn the sociar/cìtizen

a
1.72 Interest Representdtion in the European Union

field are by now also highly established, as well as institutionalized. Chapter 7


'!Øhether
organizations which receive more than three-quarters of their
funding from the EU political institutions are well placed to help polit-
ical systems develop input legitimacy will always remain an open ques- Territo rial lnterests
tion. However, a new development since the last edition qf this book has
been the diversification of funding sources for NGOs. Consumer affairs
present a slightly different stor¡ although the main NGO in the field is
very well resourced. Here, significant policy landmarks have arisen not
from agenda setting by consumer groups but from crisis events involving
food or consumer product safet¡ and from the quest by EU institutions The focus of this chapter conce
fo¡ output legitimacy through the pursuit of populist measures, such as . interestrepresentation at the Eur
regulating cross-border mobile phone roaming charges. the perspectives of territorial pu
Together, a whole range of issues arise from this chapter for the dem- decades ago about regions beiåg
ocratic legitimacy of the EU, and particularly the extent to which the governance (to member states an
activities of interest organizations as well as engagement of the EU by
social movements can be a route to the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
These are considered in Chapter 8. some countries to be represented
by
ns in the Council of Ministers, anä
instruments, ,have ffansformed the
centric system of authority into a
ghe 2002:370_1). The slojan of
a

i,Jf :::i; JT:,,ff ;:i:"*:


ial interest representation con_
tinue to yield a succession of issues surrounding
,t. pr.r'*'ä å"f*,'hä.¡rur_
sels offices of the regions,. These are reviewed L, ,urn.
Since its establishment, the Com
pointed the principalmovers behi
beyond advisory status or to find
ising window in the 2001 SØhite
offered'radical decentralisation, as
into timidity (Metcalfe 2001). Th
a significant 'bypass, route for t
states (sutcliffe and Kovacev 2005) othe"r th-an
in *-. ."r", involving
party misalignmenr (callanan and Tätham 2011),
.rot"Ll.-i, trr"r,
in general, rhe grearesr recipienrs of srru*wal f,rrrá,"rrd
h"u. L".ïilr. r."r,
represenred among rhe 'Brussels offices of
the ."giorrJ. n, ir^ä.*.a
Iater, some of these offices have limited .ot.,
whiãh .orrriàrr"a uy
national and regional resrricrions. Brussers h"s "r" ;;;;-d;;r"".
b..o-.
for the respective players to act out domestic centre/regio.r"l
,.l"rior*

1,73
174 Interest Representation in the Europeøn Union
Territorial Interests 77 S

struggles, rather than radically reforming centre/local relations struggles the hands of central government to their
(John 2000b; Schulrze 2003r Fleurke and \X/illemse 2006). ln some cjr- inteniied rargets, ancl whether
the. rules are being aãhered to. E,-
cumstances the'regional lobby' has been a nìeans for the Commission to
uirãn-ental organizations have also
assisted in this role (Chapter 6).
pursue its ends with member states (John 2000a), and the EU institutions In practice, distinctions betwee
expect regions to have an office in Brussels (Moore 2008). The history of ritorially based interests are diffic
regional interest lobbying is littered with examples of local government authorities work to attract,
organizations misunderstanding the basic ways in which the EU takes within their domain. public
decisions in fields which influence them (see, for instance, Greenwood, from the need to make an e
Levy and Stewart 1995; John and McAteer 1998). As is reviewed below, Brussels office is a separate
some regions established offices in Brussels without any clear purpose in ister, reflecting the embrace
mind at all, although some of those which have been left to find useful
things to do have developed significant agendas.
But despite the absence of dramatic new developments, incremental
changes have strengthened the hand of regional goyernance players. An ests and a set of interests within i
EU-oriented network organization of regions with legislative authority region means differenr things in differenr
emerged from the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference, REGLEG, which -.-b., ,r"res. The committee
of the Regions (coR) is báth a de.irio,r-ro"king
claims to have influenced recognition of the concept of a region with and a source of interest represenrarion in
,tru.tur. rãi'r.gio,r,
its own right. coilective action
legislative powers in a European Council Declaration of that year. There issues applicable to other actors d
has been the progressive extension of decentralization in some member torial public authorities, because th
states, and where decentralization has arisen it has increased the capac- somerimes intertwined with nation
ity of regions to make the centre accountable in the implementation of w-ith a whole range of competenci
EU regional policy. Devolution has not, however, increased the number of the regions comprise the entire
of staff working on EIJ activities by local authorities (Sutcliffe and Kova- tion between them, and, to an ext
cev 2005). As is described later in this chapter, while some of the'peak' However, there are also a number
associations of regional and local government have not progressed torial authorities do work both ind
their role and influence, some of the sectoral regional associations have their interests in the EU, spanning b
done so. Thus, associations representing cities, and peripheral maritime
regions, have grown in resources and capacit¡ and in the ability to influ-
ence some of the smaller structural fund plogrammes. Most regional Regional governance in Western Europe
and local âuthorities of any size are involved in the implementation of various typologies of member state decentr arizationexisr,
cohesion policies. mosr of which
pre-date the accession of central a
The number of regions directly represented with an office in Brus- (Leonardi and Nanetti 1
sels has consolidated to a total of around 200 (Committee of the douh 2001; Schneider 20
Regions 2015). As is described later, some of the offices from the German and Schakel 2010). Thes
federal Länder, and the autonomous communities of Spain, are impres- elements ro them, and include EU,
sively large affairs. A highly dense collection of thematic networks of units for statistics) data. They also incorporate criteria
regions has emerged from the EU structural fund programmes, and par- which reflect the
position in cenrral and easrern Eu.op.aå
counr¡ies (Swianiewic z 2002)
ticularly the community initiatives. These have added to the ability of but in essence break down inro a variant of a ,high,
the Commission to monitor whether structural funds are getting pâst embracing political and adminisrrarive decentrariårr""
_;,r_;-Àï
"rl.
ri"Àlå ). r l.

a
176 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
Territorial Interests 177

-f ABLE 7.7 Degrees of deuolued authority in tbe EU member states of the interface with EU regional
had the power to agenda sãt ,ackl
the requirernent for matching
Predominant classification c(lte7ory Country
significant levels (McAleavy' 1
High: Austria, Belgium, Gern-ran¡ Spain Bache 1999).
Medium: Denmark, Finland, Iral¡ Concerns with uneven region
Netherlands, Sweden, UK
preamble to the Treaty of Rome.
and sreel community. Ar rhe conc
Mediun'r to low: France, Poland
regional or
Low to medium: Hungary. Czech Republic claims the c
Lcw: Other EU membel srates ,ing on its co
Bank (EIB), providing low_cost lo
Sources: LeonaL'di 1993; Loughlin, in Mamadouh 2001; MamadoLrh 2001; Keating and the European regions, was formed
Hooghe 2006 with particular difficulties were rh
not in the context of an oyerall re
pation that the common market
Most countries in the'low' category have been major recipients of dispar
EU structural funds, including those from central and eastern European policy
countries, as well as traditionally centralized countries such as Greece, confer
Portugal and Ireland. The latter created'administrative' 'paper' regions Social
for the purpose of conforming to structural fund rules (Hooghe and Fund (EAGGF) sures raken. <luring this start_up
Marks 7996). decade include .cnal
policy memorandum to
This differential degree of regional autonomy conditions the response the Council in 1 iir*iru, of a Directorare General
of territorial interests to the European level. \lhere there is high regionai for RegionalDe ß%).
autonomy, so the EU has strengthened it. For instance, the treaties enable Regional policy took a qua
member states to allow regional ministers to represent and vote for their -
of the UK, which, as pa.t of th
country in the Council (Hooghe 2002), and in Belgium, central govern- back'for its budget contributi
ment has stepped aside and allowed the regions to deal directly with European-level regional funding
Brussels (Hooghe, in Keating 1995).ln Austria too, federal state regions dependent upon traditio.,"l m"iu
have secured some form of own initiative access to EU decision-making marked regional disparities, had for some
time arso sought an active
(Jeffery 2000). At the other extreme, the position of member states as Europ-ean-level regionar policy. The resurt
was the creation of the Eur.o-
the gatekeeper of structural fund applications and the disburser of funds pean Regional Development Fund in 1975,tt
. _";o.
enhances its control in centre/local relations, and 'regions' in the most tural funds, and a co.nsrituency of interests seeking fiii; ;; iirã ,r.u._
centralized states, where they exist, are little more than paper entities. fund formed
;".;þ; irJ_ trri,
Beyond these factors lie other complexities. In some federal countries,
by membership aåcessio.r, i.ri^. 1970s and 19g0s. These
d portugal placed regional une_
such as German¡ and in a number of devolved centralized states, such
After a succession of reforms,
as Spain, Italy and the UK, there is also considerable control by central
en these funds were doubled in
government over EU regional policy issues (John 2000a). However, in
uctural expenditure came to com_
countries where regions have gainecl powers relative to the centre, there
has been a weakening of the centre's absolute ability to dominate aspecrs a tevel at which it has reacheo
" nt"r:ï;.0;irï'.:ïT:åî:?:î:rïr'Ji
1,78 Interest Representation in the European Union
Territorial Interests 179

note in European regional policy include the establishment in 1988 of


the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities (CCRLA),
annexed to the (then) DG XVI of the European Commissiou, compris-
ing representatives of regional and local authorities. In 1993, this was
replaced by the CoR.
The growth of the structural funds is largely related to the single
market project. Although there is no agreement on the regional eco-
nomic impact of the single market project, one interpretation was that
it would concentrate economic development. Metaphors to capture this
have included a 'golden triangle' between London, Paris and Milan; a originates in Brussels (Bavarian
'blue banana' (stretching through Frankfurt); and a'brown doughnut' be added issues concerned with
of peripheral regions largely excluded from the benefits of the single ment, encouragement to local inte
market (Benington 1,994; Armstrongl,995). The concept is a somewhat of information and advice, technol
contentious one, given the presence of prosperous city regions on the programmes, the supply of public
so-called peripher¡ such as Aberdeen, Barcelona, Bordeaux, Copenha- anti-poverty initiatives. All these c
gen, Helsinki and Stockholm. Nonetheless, the concept of the single mar- ritorial interesrs to set up camp
ket as a catalyst to geographically concentrate wealth is a plausible one, albeit, as is evident below, in a ia
with a common interpretation being of the structural (regional) funds as
a'side payment' to the poorer member states from wealthier countries
in return for agreement to the single market project (Moravcsik 1998,
2002). There is some evidence for aspects of the side payment argument.
Keating attributes Ireland's large positive vote for the Maastricht Treaty
to the ability of that country to gain from the structural funds (Keating
1995).4 new Objective 6 for Arctic regions was created almost certainly
with the intention of influencing the accession vote in the Nordic coun-
s rrucrurâl runds esta br ished the,,,,, #iTîïï;ff î f r.'#:|'iff ïl;
ating, enhancing and/or institutionalizing
tries, only to later disappear in future rounds. However, the 'side pay-
implementation of structural fund assis_
ment' explanation is weakened because the regional impact of the single
tnt
market remains disputed; indeed, it is possible that peripheral regions a dense series of rrans-regional T
will attract inward investment in Europe from firms shopping around funding under its successive IN
for the lowest production costs. Marks therefore argues that the growth designed to support cross-border regi
of the structural funds arose more because of the vulnerability of poten-
tial losers in the event that the single market does concentrate wealth in
the core of Europe at the expense of the periphery (Marks 1992).
The organization of territoriar pubric interests
at the
EU competencies, rather than structural funds or a national'bypass', European level
seem to explain the engagement of local authorities with the EU (Sut- sub-national territorialpubric authorities engage
the European revel directry
cliffe and Kovacev 2005). The liberal ethos of the single market seems to in a number of ways. There are murtiple aäess points.
The first ,channel'
provide much of the explanation for the extent of growth in the Europe- to consider is institutional
_sources.
some regionì play a.ol. ir, ,rliio.r"t
an-level regional dimension. Apart from the uneven development caused represenration through the council
by market forces, the single-market project involved a whole host of
of Ministers. wËil.it is
federal type states' it has occasionally involved -"i.iy ì"r"r*,
member states where a
new or revitalized initiatives and competencies deeply impacting upon region has an intense interest in a particular issue (Scotland
has represented
|n the European Union
Territorial Interests 1g1

r the Council of Ministers). Arlother forum civil society organizations. Table 7.2 identifres
rtside the framewòrk of the EU, is through the number of ,regional
offices' of EU member states.
ras a secretariat and forum for the regions,
cnal Authorities of Europe (CLRAE).
rn, the foremost regional¡ structure is the
al and Urban Polic¡ which has developed TABLE 7 '2 Territoriar representation offices in Brussers:
EU-28
ocal authority interests. As major employ-
nterests have also developed good links Sub -national territorial general entities
cial Affairs, while the peak public sector
Germany
, is a'first-level', or'macroeconomic' social 24
ment also contains a natural constituency Austria
8
rnd it was this institution which proposed Belgium
8
cessor organization to the CoR. The Par-
Bulgaria
nittee on Regional Development. Elected 3
authorities provide members for the CoR, Denmark
6
,y member state governments and do not Spain
1.9
s has been described, this forum has been Estonia
rflicts, mainly between regions (account- 1.

Finland
r federal countries) and local authorities 5
rtives in unitary member states). Its limited France
T9
has yet to be taken seriously in European Hungary 3
improved on its position asthe weakest of Ireland
annels available to territorial interests. Of 1_

; to EU decision-making, not surprisingl¡ kaly 21,


: of devolved autonomy have done most to Latvia 1,

ties. Netherlands 1.7


) create an overt sense of identity for com-
Poland 17
L, and interfacing with, the European insti-

ral and local authorities of any size have Romania 1


c manage the EU interface. Most territo- UK 1.4
ize have set up their own Brussels offices, Slovakia
5
and informal trans-regional networks in
Sweden 10
:gies are considered in detail below
Czech Republic 10
e regrons Croatia 4
ions embrace considerable diversit¡ from Total '1,97

ffed by civil servants through to economic


to membership associations of territorial Source: Cornmittee of the Regions (2015)
182 Interest Representation in the European Union
Territorial Iüerests 1g3

Around three-quarters of the Brussels offices listed in the CoR


directory are territorial generulized public authorities, ranging from
territorial administrations in federal states through to local government.
As such, they are likely to have some orientation towards perceiving and
articulating general (rather than particular) civil society-wide inreresrs, con
as well as those distinctive to public authorities. The remainder comprise the
a diverse mix of public-private partnerships and membership services 'flyi
offices, which may reflect national controversies in the establishment of The
a territorial 'representation' in Brussels (Badiello 1998). Also to be found a hed. so
among the population of territorial representâtions are collective units
of local and regional authorities from a single countr¡ such as the Dutch
'G4' large cities. There have also been a very small number of cross-
h
d
;:ï?il
appeared from the Brnssels scene,
border trans-regional offices, although these have waxed and waned The number of offices from the U
since first arriving on the scene in the early 1990s. and 2014 due to the abolition of E
The desire to be better positione
to support political claims for credit
The emergence and development of the Brussels territorial
offices
to be a morivation behind the estab
For many countries, however, the
Offices from the regions started to appear in Brussels in the mid-1980s, principal gatekeepers of EU regional
rising to 1.70 1n 2001 (Mamadouh 2001). In the Marks er al. survey regions to submit for various schemes ahead
(Greenwood et al. 799s;
of 2002, offices from German¡ Austria, Belgium and Spain spenr an chalmers 2013). An initial orienrarion it*"rd.
rhe structural funds
average of €447,000 each year, with single regional offices from these became supplemented by more focused agendas, whether in stiÁìlating
countries occupying up to 1000m2 space (Marks et aL.2002). The Brus- new cross-national networks, addressing poor
information flows from
sels offices of the German Länder together employ more staff than are f^r*I"l ministries (Knodt 2002), or päli.y orientarion (Marks
employed in the German permanent representation (Moore 2006); the " et al.
2002). Tatham argues rhar
office of Bavaria, operating from its notable'chateau', is the largest, with
over 30 staff. The lowest quartile of all offices in the Marks et al. survey ing the same game. V/hile most,sec_
were, unsurprisingl¡ from countries without powerful territorial author- nting for European projects, funds
ities, operating with budgets of less than €150,000 and floor space of seek to influence European public
less than 80m2, sometimes where a small group of localities in the same
region share the resource of part of the time of one person. The most
recent players on the scene are those from accession countries, where A parallel distinction is that between regional offices
whose acrivities are
regional devolved âuthority is typically low, of which all the administra- focused .À fo.u..ã ;;fil;;.'ä.r,.._
tive regions from Poland are the most represented, with staff capacities all¡ regi igh"..
degree of devolveJ fã*ì,
of up to three. Donas and Beyers found that only 39'/" of sub-national focused tc"l ã.rthorities have u'fo.o, "r.
on
authorities from central European countries have their own office in funding ). Among the
.first
t."g*Jr"glo,rr,
Brussels (Donas and Beyers 2012). Brussels had become a venue in ongoing power
struggles" in member
In part, the Brussels territorial representarions have followed predict- state politics berween rhe cenrre and the .ãgìorrr. This
cã-me to h."d l'
able EU milestones in the development of regional polic¡ including the cases surrounding the establishment of offices
not onry fro- th."G.r-"r,
CoR, treaty agreements on subsidiarit¡ the possibility of representation Länder but also from the Spanish communidad Autónoma,
".rJti"r"n
184 Interest Representdtion in the Etu'opean Union
Territc¡rial Intet.ests 1gs

regions r'vith special domestic status. In these countries, the presence of to recruir staff from the Brr_rssels p
regional offices in Brussels raised substantial national sensitivities about European orientation, are highly n
who had the right of external representation In e¿ch there were cases in working on issues whrch are rela
referred to the national constitutional coult seeking to establish whether rathel than tied ro a remir of a ,p
a regional'representation' in Blussels -¡¿as compatible with national law. ity. In this model, those who lead t
Offices from the German l-änder consequently chose low-key names in manoeuvre, and the space to devel
the early clays, such as 'liaison bureau', followed later by recogr-rition can pursue by themselves and/or. ,se
(Moore 2006). Fr:orn Spain (Case STC/1654194) ancl Italy (Law 52 of this cadre that actions related to
L996; Case 428 of 1997), territorial offices in Blussels initially had to legitimacy have arisen, and in parti
operate nnder a'camouflage' (..g. charnber of commerce or specialized of networks linking Brussels terriro
"
agency) (Badiello 1998). These cases clarified the nght of a region to 'citizen'-related issues, most notabl
establish an office, provided the office did not undertake activities which 2011). Ancl a 2009 survey with the <.lir.ectors
fell rvithin the sole jurisdiction of the state. Since this period, â pattern of 40
Olsson found that they saw their r.ole as communicar_
of 'settled accommodation' has emerged, with co-ordination between oals achieved in Brussels to the constituents at
home,
permanent representations and regional offices from federal member ro the elites at home, (Olssor.r 2009:26).
states. In this arrângement, regions get to participate in member stâte participation of 123 of the Brussels regional
EIJ decision-making in rcturn for an agreement not to work against the hosts an âverage of 635 visitor.s .".Ã u."r.
policies of centlal government, and to maintain confidentiality (Moore
2007,2008).
In some federal member states there has been the arrangement of
secondment of regional government employees to Brussels outlet offices,
Territorially based EU coilective action organ¡zations
working to highly prescribed agendas, with limitecl autonony to develop
other activities. For the German Ländel it has been a common arrange-
ment to send civil servants to their Brussels office for a period of two to
three years (Moore 2006), and have an authority staff member wolking
in Germar-ry to 'shadow' the work of a connterpaÍt in the Blussels office
working on the same dossier (Badiello 1998), measlrres which would
help prevent Brussels staff frorn'going native'. The regional offices from
Italy employ a mixed model of office staffing based on a core of 'civil
servants' sent by, and tied to, the regional authorit¡ but supplemented
by a number of more independent'consultants' recruited from the pool
of EU specialists in the Brussels job market.
Another model again is where a diverse set of stalceholders equips
Brussels terr.itorial representative offices to be able to take up and pursue
a wide range of initiatives. Scotland Europa, for instance, includes within
its membership traclc un jons. universjties. govel'nmental agencies. envi-
ronmental protection organizations and the loca1 autholity association.
The Dutch'G4' (large cities) office also offers a model whereby the
influence of any one stakeholder is diluted. \Vhere the territorial offices
have been less tied to specific regional authorities, so tlÌey have tended

I
I

186 Interest Representdtion in the European Union


Territorial Iüerests 187

between the regions of Europe, and to promote regionalism and fed- and URBAN (for,sustainable
eralism in Europe. It performed a semi-institutionalized role with the districts,) programmes have b
European Commission prior to the formation of the CoR, doing much
of the preparation work (Hooghe 1995). \X/hile Hooghe claims that both
it and CEMR framed the debate about the CoR (Hooghe 2002), ar leasr
one author doubts the impact which AER has (Jeffery 2000).
The CEMR is a federation of national representative associations of
the various local authority categories among Council of Europe coun-
tries, dating from 1951,.It has a Brussels office with a staff complemenr
of 20 (slimmed from 30 ín2002).It houses a variety of working groups
on functional issues, as well as hosting substantial twinning arrange-
ments. John (2000b) noted that the CEMR has not been effective in its EU
engagement.'Vühile the AER is more geared towards regional interests, the
CEMR primarily represents local and municipal interests. Both have mem- these organizations,
bers drawn from across western and eastern Europe. Like the Committee .Beyond
torial interests have periodically
of the Regions and its predecessor the CCRLA, they have been beset by
conflict, both within and, mainl¡ between these organizations, which are
largely divided along the lines of the regions (AER) and the municipalities
and local authorities (CEMR). A more distinct form of such conflict arises
between urban and regional needs. Both organizations perform similar
roles; typicall¡ this leads to a limited degree of collaboration as well as
competition, not least because the actors have had to work together on
a range of issues, including shared institutional involvement (including
the nomination of members) in the CCRLA. They are nonetheless the
most representative outlets of territorial authority for the Commission to
engage with.
Beyond these organizations lie European 'sectoral' organizations of
regions with particular themes, such as cities ('Eurocities'), maritime
regions (Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions) and border
regions (Association of European Border Regions). These are significant
organizations, described in further detail in Table 7 .3, along with a vari-
ety of networks linking territorial interests. A range of political, social
and economic networks of regions, or regions clustered around Euro-
pean programmes dedicated to bringing regions together for particular
purposes, emerged from the'Europe of the regions' agendas of the 1990s
and 2000. Some originated from the community initiatives, which had
the explicit purpose of trans-regional network formation, or in the regen-
eration schemes aimed at particular problems, andlor in the manage-
ment of structural fund programmes (Balme 1991; Marks 1993; Hooghe
2002). INTERREG (currently in its fifth phase as Interreg Europe)

a
a

oo
oo

TABLE 7.3 Principal sectoral EfJ trans-regional associations ønd nehuorþs

Name and acronym Role (if networÞ,'Netu''orÞ')

Associations
Association of European Founded 1971, focused on issues facing border and cross-border regions. Based
Border Regions (AEBR) in offices of EUREGIO (a Dutch/Gcrman geographical cross-border development'
enterprise and cultural partnership, established in 1958). Membership
compìsition (currently 95 members) is oriented towards northern/central
European border regions.
Confercnce of Peripheral Founded 1973. Focus is centre/periphery disparities. 150 regions from 28
Maritime Regions (CPMR) countries working in six Geographical Commissions, including:
Atlantic Arc, drawing in members from south of Spain to Scotland. Established
1989. Specialist sectoral networks. Claims to have undertaken studies which
guided strand B of INTERREG 3 programme-
Balþan and Black Sea, withmembers from Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, as well
as Albania, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine .

Baltic, drawtng in members from Baltic sea country regions. Activc throughout
regional policy and sectoral project domains.
Islands. Regional island authorities. Claims to have influenced content of both
the Amsterdam Trcaty and 2004 treary establishing a Constitution for Europe on
territorial-related issues. J

Intermediterranean- -!0 regions from ten countries,


including associated members J
such as Morocco and Tunisia.
North sea- 161 members from 2g counrries, with particurarly
active Norwegian
and uK profile. oriented rowards EU political lobtying
for ñorth s." tì".i., or,
variety of sectoral and regional issues. "
European Association of 70 regional development agencies from most
member states.
Regional Development
Agencies (EURADA)
Eurocities 130 city members in 35 countries. Brussels based.
46 staff. covers virtualy all EU
issues,'horizontal' and regional. Extensive networks
artached to ìt.
Networks
GMO-Free Network of regions, provìnces and rocal governments
decraring GMo-free
policies; over 60%o of region members frJm
Greece, France, poland and Albania.
METREX (The network Network of 50 metropolitan regions. uK based..provides
of European Metropolitan a platform for the
of knowledge., expertise and experience on metropolitan
Regions and Areas) :x¡hanse
joint action on issues of common inrerestl' (METREX affairs, and
webåte )
Conference of Regions Network, wjth 73 members from
with Legislative powers
eight ns with
legislative authoriry which.campaijns
(REGLEG) rights of
legislative regions in respect of subsidia

co
190 Interest Representdtion in the European Union Territorial Intetests 1.91,

The presence of such nerworks reflects the public remit of regional and and the nature of regional polici
terriiorial authorities, and these are widely linked through specialized explanations focusing on rhe acri
networks organized in citizen domaitrs, embracing fields such as the togerher wirh issues concerning r
environment, social action, health care and consumer protection. These between sub-national actors and
organizations are by nature networked with independent NGOs work- tors in explaining sub-national mo
ing in the related fields. In centralized states, some terr
Among the associations there are claims of influence for both treaty ence in Brussels because they se
insertions and policy-related issues. The Islands Commission of the government actors in the interest
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) also claims to level has contributed to the dev
have successfully lobbied to insert references and enabling policy instru- in some of these countries, and t
menrs into the Amsterdam Treaty. The Association of European Border tions around them. In federal state
Regions (AEBR) and the Atlantic Arc Commission of the CPMR claim partial strengthening of regional interests vis-à-vis
member states. Bur
to have influenced the design of the INTERREG programmes. AEBR the overall analysis is nothi'g like as simple as this. llesponsibility fo¡
has been extensively involved in the implementation of the INTER- regional policy has not been remrved from member sàtes. Member
REG programmes, and has an officially designated (by the Commission) states remain the decision-makers in key areas of European integration,
information 'observatory' status. Schultze has linked Eurocities as a and in matters concerning regions and localities, such ,t.u.toi"l forrá
leader of a lobbying campaign which resulted in pr:olonging the URBAN global financing and applications, and the developrnenr ^ of the coR.
srrucrural fund initiative, and mainstreaming of the urban dimension ve clearly been caught out bv rules which
in the structural funds, as well as acting as a co-author with the Com- , such as additionality. There i, ,-,o .I."r-.rrt
mission on a key policy paper on urban regional initiatives (Schultze _ there a clear pattern of the European-level
2003). Historicall¡ the RECHAR funding initiative for the adaptation strengthening, or weakening, of the position of member states vis-à-vis
of coalmining regions was proposed by the Coalfield Communities Cam- the regions and localities. The sub-national level is neither superseded
paign, a grouping linking coalfield communities in the UK, German¡ nor made subordinate, and nor is there a nascent'Europe of the regions'
Belgium, France, and Spain. Similarl¡ the steel region network CASTeT emerging, as a resuh of the European level. Nor are iegional interests
claimed ro have influenced the extension of the RESIDER funding initia- straightforwardly enhanced by the EU. Notable trani-regional net-
tive (community initiative for the economic conversion of steel areas) to works have arisen and developed, and a significant quantity ánd quality
1999 (van der Storm 2002). of partnerships of regional, local, national and European-level inter-
ests have been created. As John remarks, there is a complex interplay
of interests involving a triad of local aurhorities, nationai governments
Conclusions and EU institutions; sometimes all of these can be winners, and some-
The logic of the single market led to the development of a number of times different actors can be (lohn 1996). To this complexity might
compensatory initiatives in regional polic¡ of which some stimulâted be added the cleavages berween regional and local interesrs. collective
local and regional actors throughout and beyond member states' and action is also complicated by parterns of inter-regional competition and
these have formed demand structures for the development of regional collaboration.
policy ilitiatives. The Commission has not been an impartial actor in It is these complexities which have led a clutch of authors to search
this process, deliberately cultivating bridges directly between the terri- beyond state-centric accounts of European integration ( Chapter 8 ) to ade-
torial and supranational levels where it is able to, assisted by the Par- quately conceive of a'Europe with the regions' (Hooghe 1994;Hooghe
liament. Sub-regional mobilization cannot therefore be accounted fol and Marks 1,996). The question is nor so much what rhe rerrirorial level
by the growth of EU competencies alone, although the single mar- does to the position of member states ìn the EU, but what dynamics arise
ket has undoubtedly altered the structure of political opportunities, from the sub-national level itself, and throughour inreracrions with the
1,92 Interest Rel)resentdtion in the Ettroþean Union

European level. Hooghe (1994,1995) and Marks (1.993), in particular, Chapter g


th"r.?or. propose the label of 'multi-level governance' as

a System of continuous legotiation among nested governments at SeV- Organized Civil Society and
eral territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional, and local - as European lnte gration
the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisio¡al
reallocation that has pulled some previously centralised functions of
rfre state up to the supranational level and some down to the iocal/
regional level. (Marks 1'993:392)

Two decades on, these ideas have not come to fruition in any substan-
tial way. John and McAteer nore how'an emerging body of evidence Early'neo-functionalist' accounts
availabie on European lobbying by local authorities does not indicate stressed the transfer of civil socie
a high degree of influence' (1998:108), and-that'lobby success reflected European level. This raises de
rath"er thãn affected bureaucratic faction fighting within the Commis- 'civil society', as well as the cri
sion, (ibid.). In their analysis, the main value of the'regional lobby' has be assessed. There is an establishe
been as pawns to the Commission in their battles with member states) arly over t
and as ug.,-rtr of implementation (John and McAteer 1,998). This out- e Europea
look doein,t, howevìr, reflect the incremental growth and embedded- ion 2001)
nessof some core EU sectoral regional associations, their involvement means m
in both the design and the implementation of community initiatives, est group constituted at EU level a
and the historic density of grass-roots EU-oriented networks. There has
been a wider process of decentralization, and the devolution of power
has weakened the centrality of states in EU regional policymaking.
Nonetheless, there âre now welcome doses of realism in contrast to the
over-exuber.ance around the time of the creation of the CoR. It is not
the case that permissibility for: regions to represent member states in
the Council oi Minirt..r, and partnership in cohesion policy for sub-
lational authorities, 'have transformed the European Union from a
primarily state centric system of authority into a system of multi-level
gou.r,,,urr.., (Hooghe 2002:370_1). Perhaps of greater significance is the
î"y l. which regiãnal tiers of governance, as representatives of ge.eral
- dotnain, have the potential to be contribu-
p.rút
tory ic leg
offic evelo
the member states, so they have b
in deepening European integration
EU wñh territorial civil society (Greenwood 201'4)'

193

a.
Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration
Interest Reþresentation in the European
195
1.94

conflicting values or competing claims to scarce resources in a peace-


ful and consensual manner, and how the costs of arternativ" pãli.i.,
may be equitably distributed. (Kamm 1995)

ethus identified as those of fac


public cost. There are counter
although the difficulties of fin
between competing claims is

ro tn'e table of policymaking and legitimacy for them to be addressed


(Kohler-Koch 2010a). And everyday goods, such as experrise and infor-
mation, can deflate the public cosrs of policymaking.
The first complaint, of factionalism, is the counrer perspective to the
traditional pluralist view that public benefits can arise fiom sectional

carlcatures.

legitimacy of
Organizedcivil society and the democratic in the policy process. A variety of procedures empower groups to per-
thE EU form these and other roles, such as freedom of information measures
for ease of 'Access to Documents', and to keep EU political institutions

The second complaint, of


stalting point. Kohler-Koch
democracy' (in essence, sys
principles of formal equality

a
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration L97

1972).\ríth and develop


r way they their expert
tutions and of organiza-
s can develo s which have

orgaîrzations on the Brussels scene in purpose-developed buildings in


Brussels (Chapter 6).
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 199

people nowadays take an interesr both in the effectiveness of the

The 'better la w making umbrella embraces the ad vance announcement


of legisla trve lntent through publica tlon of an annual work programme,
consultation plans consultation proce dures, and consultation
feports,
lmpact assessments and the collection and use of expertrse
Other signif-
icant procedural lnltratl ves aimed at enhancing procedural
democracy
include those concerned with trans parency,
and 2 00 1 Regulation on
Access to Documents. Taken together
with arrangements for funding
6 and institutionalization Cha pter T of lnterest groups,
constrtute a system of empowered pl uralism 1n which an
ACtlvrst
has sought ro create a level playing field between business
European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration
200 Interest Representation in the 201

reate mechanisms of accountability


empowering civil society interest
tion of interest groups in the EU
ique. GrouPs are used as agents of
on and inPut legitimacy Purposes'
:ough funding etc', the Commission
in citizen group formation in pursuit
i

has been highly active as an agent


i, a"tpivtttionsible for the landscape of such sroups
l

I ;il;;;lt:"í¿
I
(Chapter 6).
I

lr
society
rj A transparent dialogue with civil
ll eaty on EuroPean Union stated:
ll
I
Process strengthens
the demo-
I
p.tbli.'t confidence in the admin-
l.t 6a). The EuroPean Commission
statement that
l

as an important element of the


the Commission views this declaration
CommunitY's Pol
will be a means o
stimulating a mo
also be a
It will
CommunitY. (Harlow 2002:37 )

brought interpretation from the


A case in the European Court of Justice
Advocate General:
the administration 1S doing
The fact that cltlzens aÍe ware of what who
IS a guarantee tha t lt will
operate properly Supervision by those
encourages them to be
confer legitimacy on the public authorities their
effective ln adhering to their initial
will and can there by lnsplre
of public con tent S well as the
confidence, which 1S a guaran tee ^ of
system. At the highest level
proper functioning of the democratic the sufL
informa tlo n also
that system, providing the pub lic with public
the management of
est metho d of 1n volving them
1n

(Harlow 2002:41')

TransparencY IS therefore seen as


a pre-condition for the op eratlon
democratic mechanisms. A k.y means
to equiP such groups with
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 203
the EuroPean Union
2OZ Interest Re7resentltt on in

possible, the results of the consultation and the lessons that have been
to rhose with speciarist knowredg. iÏ:i: j::#Ë:ïlîå::'l, i-i learned. (European Commission 2002a)

rmation so as to be able to act


as
Protocol 7 annexed to the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) stipulated
that 'the (European) Commission should consult widely before pro-
posing legislation, and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation
documents' (European Commission 2006a). These requirements are
now translated into Article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty. The key point is
that the procedures are used in such a way so as to ensure that access
to political decision-making is possible for the widest possible range of
stakeholders, that the Commission listens to all sides of rhe argument,
and that no one type of interest routinely dominates.
All policy initiatives which are foreseen are first announced in
advance in the European Commission's forward programme of work,
a statement which is produced annually and posted on Europa.Thus,
Ombudsman comPlaints service as
all interests have an opportunity to know what is upcoming. Proposals
,, : I'lJ î,.?i|;i'iî: lÎlÍi'"Ti;
actions
for legislation are preceded by Green and'llhite Papers. Green Papers
set out a range of ideas presented for public discussion and debate, and
asserting the office' extending
Ifhite Papers contain an official set of proposals in specific policy areas
a means of. controlling the Commission'
to recruit the Parliament as of institutions aîd are used as vehicles for their development. And the publication of
once again, i""t ìT tit to""t to which the agendas legislative proposals is accompanied by'impact assessments', in which
'ftt
ooäid. interests coincide' the potential impact upon the various stakeholders is publicly outlined.
"r,d Accompanying an impact assessment must be a'consultation roadmap',
in which the European Commission identifies how it intends to con-
Consultation
duct consultations pursuant to the requirements set out inArticle 11 of
w-making action plan have involved'pro- the Lisbon Treaty. Responses to consultations are supposed to be public
,r" and 'systematizing
".td iarticipatiott"
of these reflected that
domain territor¡ and once the consultations have been completed the
Commission is supposed to respond to them by summarizing what the
responses said, and stating how it responds to them in summary form.
Each impact assessment produces a consultation 'roadmap' with
statements about the proposed conduct and duration of consultation,
including the: objectives of the consultation; elements upon which con-
sultation is being sought; policy options and a comparison of them; tar-
get groups for consultation; and consultation times and documents. A
'conception' impact âssessment is published at the time of consultation.
A new feature of the'Better Regulation' programme introduced in 2015-
16 involves the 'REFIT' (Regulatory Fitness), a rolling programme of
evaluation of the fitness of regulatory initiatives, including a stakeholder
platform where suggestions can be made for new, adapt.d, or the with-
0rawal of legislation. The three categories of consultations are: expert
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration
20s

non-organized interests and to strike a balance between


a wide range of
interests.
The two main categories of consultations which involve
avenues of
civil society interest represenrarion involve stakeholder ;"J;;bË
sultations. Among stakeholder consurtadons,
.."
euittkat tiotri"r, lirr.
"rrd

thinking of political instirutions a


venting opposing stakeholders fro
Places on them for civil society inter
associations. These factors help expl
fishing association, Europêche, continues to survive, despite apparently
irreconcilable differences berween its members. Bur consuirativË åommit_
tees are, as their name suggests, not decision-making bodies, anJ
their
importance should not be exaggerated. The Europ.i' co.rrú-er con-
sultative Group (ECCG) and its predecessors, ,eviewed in chapter 6,
provide an example of this.
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 207

Quittkat and Kotzian have undertaken a comprehensi YC analysis of


partrcrpa tlon ln the range of consultation lnstruments, and the Com-
ts
mlsslon response to them, taking 89 exerctses conducted by DG Sanco
now DG Sante and DG Employment between 2000 and 20 0 7 involving
252 8 partrclpants. They found that business lnterests comprised around
third of contributors, and NGOs over a quarter Quittkat and Kotzian
20 7 't There IS little scope for any one type of rnterest to routinely
dom-
inate consultation fora. Vhile consultations which ate not open to the
public ma v carry the potential to be over- focused upon one set of
lnter-
ests, the design of them IS carefully undertaken such that they
involve a
vaflety of k.y contributors and participants Hüller and
Quittkat found
from their analysis of the consultation exerclses from DG Employment
and DG Sanco that onl v around half of the responses to
consultations
were made publicly vailable, and tha t reports were only
available for
one-third of the consultation exerclses conducted Beyond
this, they
found very limited public reportlng from the Commission
AS to how
the consultation exerclses had informed the choices
lt had made ln pro-
poslng legislation (Hüller and
Quittkat 2 009 On the basis of detailed
case study insights, however, Tanasescu
concludes that tw hen consulta
tions ate conducted tn a timely and correct
manner, stakeholder lnp ut
does make a difference and IS reflected
ln the final Yerslon of the lmpact
âssessment report' (Tanasescu 2009
:223
Dra wlng on the work oÍ Hüller and
Quittkat AS well as her own empln
investigations Kohler- Koch sees a formal reglme
of open consultations
which partlctpatlon ls viewed as a pre-condition
for access to more
secondary system of elite invol vement. In this Ylew, participants
ZO8 Interest Representation in ilte European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 209

the collection and use of expertise (European Commission 2002b). This


was aimed at assisting with the evidence basis upon which policies are
developed, and that the process of collecting and using expertise should
be credible. The guiding principles are of independence of experts, plu-
ralism of viewpoints, and transparency in the ways issues are framed,
experts selected and the results used. To help put this into effect, public
web registers of experts, consultative and comitology committees have
us select a subset of been available since 2005 to provide further public information. Experts
[t]he Commission
with which it ns the Promise of are called upon to justify their advice when required, by explaining the
;;;;pr e useful informa- evidence and reasoning upon which it is based and making this accessi
ãnh"n..d access to i
ble to the public. Any persistent uncertainties, and diverging views, are
tion rather than their preferred and obviously tendentious arguments.
(Greer, da Fonseca and Adolph 2008:409)
made public. Any proposal submitted by departments for Commission
decision should be accompanied by a description of the expert advice
considered and how the proposal takes this into account.

The development of procedural initiatives


Curtin is one commentator who expects EU 'process democracy' to
address the potential for asymmetries of power between producer and
citizen interests (Curtin 2003). The various procedures described above
and in Chapter 3 are likely to be further developed in pursuit of a general
strengthening of participatory democracy surrounding the exchanges
between EU political institutions and organized civil society. These are
particularly important for the EU system, because it is heavily dependent
upon its exchanges with organized civil society for legitimacy-oriented
goals. A key principle surrounding a number of these involves trans-
parency.'sflhile policy measures in pursuit of transparency are easy to
champion, find a ready constituency of supporters, and are generally
irresistible in open public arenas, multi-level goYernance political sys-
tems do require bargaining to produce outcomes, which in turn is facili-
tated by some degree of opacity. Pursuing the point, Naurin shows how
the mechanisms of member monitoring in trade associations come into
play when transparency measures are introduced, in that they encourage
general secretaries to play to the gallery of their member audiences râther
than negotiating outcomes which may have wider distributional bene-
fits. His data arises from a content analysis of letters written by trade
associations before and after the 2001 Access to Documents regulation
Use of exPert¡se came into effect (Naurin 2005, 2007). A key point is retroactivity of the
The consultation Standards were issued on the same day as a com- legislation in that the authors of letters pre 2001 would not have known
mission Communication Paper providing guidelines and principles on that their correspondence would be in the public domain, whereas the
2L0 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 21'1'

knowledge of this after the measure was introduced p{oduced a marked such a role ... NGOs are no'magic bullet'which will automatically hit
increase T.r th. use of self-interested references in letters, in the knowl- the target of political socialisation. ('!Øarleigh 2001:635)
edge that trade association members (princ
to monitor their agents. In this sense, 'ful Further evidence for this perspective is provided by Sudbery. A respond-
self-interested, rather than deliberative, out ent from the European Environmental Bureau told her that
fully managed to produce public interest outcomes'
Íh. uurio.r, piocedures defining the'rules of engagement' between while ideally it would be good to get people involved, time pressures
EU institutions and civil society organizations have been defined primar- mean that the most effective use of my time is to get on with advocacy.
ily since the 2001 \white Paper on Governance. They are in the process of In the end my role is not to encourage the most participatory gov-
cåntinual extension, and regular revision. They have taken political will ernânce, but to ensure the best results for the environment. (Sudbery
2003:90)

This succinctly captures the orientation towards 'output'- rather than


'input'-oriented legítimac¡ giving rise to a debate about what can rea-
sonably be expected from NGOs. The 2001 Ilhite Paper on Govern-
ance (\WPG) had floated the idea of 'extended partnership arrangements'
in return for civil society organizations which could'tighten up their
ber of member states. internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativ-
it¡ and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the
Member States' (European Commission 2001':17). \X/hile this brought
lnterest group accred¡tat¡on and the debates about group rebuke from the European Parliament, some member states, and from
representativity and accountability some civil society organizations (Greenwood and Halpin2007), on the
Tbe 2002 Consultation Standards made a by now renowned reference grounds of elitism, it is to some extent reflected in continuing practice
to the need to avoid the impression that'Brussels is talking to Brussels' from the European Commission towards interest groups. The paradox
in the con- is that, despite statements from the European Commission which for-
number of mally reject de iure accreditation of groups, they have incorporated de
(somewhat facto accreditation practices. The formal position of the Commission on
Guiraudon accreditation was first made explicit in 1'992:
2001; Saurugger 2006,2009). on the basis of his research among citi-
zen inrerest gio"pt in Brussels,'slarleigh found little evidence of groups The Commission has a general policy not to grant privileges to special
engaging citizens in their work' and argued that interest groups, such as the issuing of entry passes and favoured access
to information. Nor does it give associations an official endorsement
NGOs will be unable ro act as agenrs of civil society Europeanisation by granting them consultatiye status. This is because the Commission
unless they are internally democratic and willing has always wanted to maintain a dialogue which is as open as possible
agents of political socialisation, with particular re with all interested parties. (European Commission 1.992:4)
si,on making and policy ... NGOs are as yet simpl
this role, and ... it cannot be assumed that their ca This position has been periodically re-stated since. In the course of
way will be improved ... their internal go to developing consultation standards ín2002, the Commission stated that
allow supporters a role in shaping policies it'does not intend to create new bureaucratic hurdles in order to restrict
Moreouã., most NGO supporters do not ke the number of those that can participate in consultation processes'
21,2 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 21,3

(European Commission 2002b:11). Yet paradoxicall¡ the same com-


munication identified that 'openness and accountabilitv are important
principles for the conduct of organizations when they are seeking to
contribute to EU policy development. It must be apparent which inter-
ests they represent, (and) how inclusive that representation is' (ibid.:17).
This preference for the representatiyity of interest groups was appar-
ent from the public web-based database of interest groups (CONECCS -
Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society) which
emerged from the \øPG. CONECCS was

a tool that can be used by the Commission itself to identify the appro-
priate mix of consultation partners who can offer the necessary geo- greater freedom to interpret the interests of the subject under consid-
graphical/sectoralltargetgroup coverage. (CONECCS 2006) eration rarher than just a set of stated wishes. Similarly, the perspective
that EU NGOs lack legitimacy because they are run by'professionàlized'
The CONECCS database restricted entry to those groups which staff suffers from the same misapprehension (Chapters 6 and 7). Rather,
could meet criteria of geographic representativeness, and in particu- a trustee with expert knowledge may be in a better position to be ablé
lar members in at least three member/candidate stâtes. The role of the to identify which course of action to pursue, and in doing so provides a
database to identify consultation partners for the different Commission better service to the cause, This perspective also emerged in Chapter 4; a
services meant that it had the potential for damage for less prominent former director-general of the largest UK business association once told
organizations by linking representativeness to access. This preference for this author,'if I represented my members' opinions in discussions with
representativeness was continued in the successor European Transpar- government I'd be laughed at'. The 'trustees' in charge of the Brussels
ency Register, albeit with a much softer emphasis, by using the device regional offices have developed activities with far greater potential for
of transparency to make it apparent which organizations do not have connecting with the citizens than have the mandated delegates from the
a geographic spread of members. This rule is particularly directed at Brussels offices of regional authorities, whose energies are taken up by
NGOs (Chapter 3). the pursuit of power struggles with domestic governments in another
The principal social partner organizations (Chapters 2, 3 and 5) do venue (Chapter 7).
have an elevated status based upon a formal evaluation of their repre- The linkage between 'representativeness' and accêss seems to have
sentativity. The Social Platform has an elevated status (Chapter 6, and been broken with the passing of the CONECCS database, although
above). The European Consumer Consultative Group (Chapter 6) has preference for it lives on through transparency application. The Trans-
access criteria based upon geographic representativeness and centrality of parency Register uses transparency to illuminate membership and
consumer mission. And unsurprisingl¡ the interest organizations stand- funding, and to some extent accountability. These principles had been
ing to benefit from this elevated status have sought accreditation-based stated clearly in the 2002 Commission Communication on consultation
schemes. The Social Platform has consistently argued the case for an standards, which stated that 'openness and accountability are impor-
accreditation scheme based on criteria of representativity, applying a tant principles for the conduct of organizations when they are seek-
rule that prospective applicants for membership of it should rhemselves ing to contribute to EU policy development' (European Commission
have members from at least half of EU member states (Chapter 6). 2002b:1,7). These came downstream in the Transparency Register, with
The dissenting voices in the Brussels NGO community about accred- clause d of the code of conduct for interest representatives notable for
itation unsurprisingly come from those organizations whose legitimacy assigning to them responsibility for information placed in the public
cannot be based upon their ability to represent a given'who' constituenc¡ domain. This concept also features in self-regulatory initiatives and in
but more advocate a'what' cause in EU public policymaking. Such groups the content of 'compact' agreements to which NGOs have signed up
214 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 21.s

(Chapter 3), as well as in early versions of a draft'European concordat' degrees of exclusion and isolation. The challenge is to develop these con-
which has attemçited to replicate'compact' 4greemenrs at EU level. The cepts of accountability for use as regulatory devices. One aspect of the
accountability agenda had also made an appearance in the European importance of clause d of the Transparency Register code of conduct lies
Association Statute, an instrument which had been in preparation for in its deliberative capacit¡ considered below, in that public reasoning
over a decade between a constituency of NGOs and a section of the depends upon the quality of information placed in the public domain.
Commission, proposing a series of participative rights to structure the
relationship between EU institutions and organized civil society (Ken-
dall, \X/ill and Brandsen 2009). While the Statute was abandoned in Organized civil society in the EU and deliberative democracy
2005 by the Barroso Commission under its'cutting red tape' initiative, Deliberative approaches, drawing on rhe work of Habermas in advo-
the compact seems to represent the next best thing for NGOs. ìØhile cating development through open exchanges based on the public use of
NGOs would like a legal basis for the consultation standards that reason, have been normatively applied to EU organized civil society by a
emerged in 2002, the European Commission - Iike most comparable number of authors (Joerges and Neyer 1997; loerges 1,999; Eriksen and
bureaucracies - has resisted tying its hands. A'compact' raises the ievel Fossum 2000; Curtin 2003; Magnette 2006; Smismans 2010). A sym-
of the agreement on consultation standards from that of a desirable pathetic hearing is also evident in the work of others (ìØarleigh 2003;
target to something more solemn (and in a small number of cases at Lord and Magnette 2004). 'ü/hile Eriksen sees rhe role of elites in EU
the national level, gives it a legal foundation). For these reasons, the policymaking as an obstacle to public deliberation, he also notes how
'European Network of National Associations', comprising 1.7 national the EU is more conducive to deliberation than other types of political
associations with experience of operating a compact, have been seeking systems because of the non-hierarchical nature of supranationality and
to develop a European Concordat to the level of acceptance in practice the involvement of a range of EU institutions (Eriksen 2000). Others
by EU institutions. share this perspective with an emphasis upon how the lack of major-
These norms that internal standards should accompany decision-mak- itarian mechanisms leads to negotiated policy outcomes (Christiansen,
ing roles now âppeâr prominently in the literature (Cohen and Rogers Føllesdal and Piattoni 2004).
1995; Slim 2002;Edwards and Zadek 2003). Clearl¡ groups which sim- \ühether interest groups can encompass deliberative standards
ply articulate viewpoints should not be subject to regulation, but those involving a willingness to change demands in response to evidence and
which place information in the public domain have a responsibilit¡ and argument is doubtful. Some of the exchanges between interest groups
therefore public accountabilit¡ for its accuracy (see Sikkink 2002).Bov- and EU political institutions involve bargaining, which involves trying
ens defines accountabilitv as to get as much as possible of an original goal set, rathêr than delibera-
tive participation. Christiansen, Føllesdal and Piattoni see'rhe network
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has of well-informed lobbies' at EU level as an anti-deliberariye element
an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conducr, the forum through their elite nature and capacity to monopolize policymaking
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face conse- inputs. Nonetheless, they also identify circumstances when they can be
quences. (Bovens 2007 :447) agents of deliberation where extensive consultations arise through net-
works, and where they are involved in comitology (Christiansen, Følles-
'Vlhile
this definition has recently attracted currency, a key question in dal and Piattoni 2004). Joerges and Neyer have likewise seen rhem as
operationalizing it is to meet the challenge of defining who the ,forum' potential agents of democratic legitimation via deliberative politics, find-
is. Inevitabl¡ the forum is diversely constiruted, and no less so where ing evidence from a study of food committees that the perspectives of dif-
organized civil society is a proxy for civil society. The ability to pose fering interests and a wide varíety of stakeholders are taken into account
questions and pass judgement on organizations in this context resides in a manner resembling deliberative processes (Joerges and Neyer 1997).
in political institutions, in other civil society organizations, and among Joerges cites the incredulity of Kohler-Koch: 'none other than comitol-
wider civil society. The same applies to sanctions, ranging from various ogy, that notorious system of inter-bureaucratic negotiation-diplomacy
I
21.6 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and Ewropean Integration 217

that even parliamentarians wish to abolish in the interest of democrac¡ different stakeholders over time results in changes to belief systems
is supposed to bring an element of democratically-legitimated politics (Sabatier 198S). Deliberative mechanisms can operate through policy
into the Community' (in Joerges 1,999:336).In such committees in the networks of varying degrees of integration. And they can arise in a nrrm-
foodstuffs domain, Joerges sees a high level of debate contributing to a ber of categories of stakeholder consultations, whether private or public
high level of European protective standards: gatherings of people, or through written consultations, and contribute
to the ideas which go into the formulation of public policy. The extent
by virtue of its feedback links to Member States, comitology can, in to which they do so is partly conditioned by the procedures through
principle, take all social concerns and interests into account while, at which ideas are channelled into policymaking, and whether these are
the same time, links with science (seen as a social body) can be shaped mechanistic or otherwise. But they also depend upon general processes
so as to allow for the plurality of scientific knowledge to be brought of the ways in which ideas are absorbed. This concept resonares with
to bear. (ibid.:334) those used in the wider literature on sociological institutionalism, where
belief systems arising from socialization effects of institutional partici-
Joerges draws attention to the way in which the Scientific Committee on pation help explain the behaviour of acrors. In this tradition, Goehring
Food publishes its opinions and exposes them to wider public debate, saw deliberative elements of DG Trade's institutionalized dialogue with
and uses the internet to disseminate its findings, reflecting that 'the organized civil society (Goehring 2002),although there is some cynicism
potential of this form of publication in terms of participatory democracy from civil society organizations that the forum is little more than a voice
cannot be overestimated' (ibid.:336). (ECORYS 2007). A number of authors have also assessed rhe presence
Aspects of the procedural regime which EU institutions have for and extent of deliberation by organized civil society interesrs in the con-
engaging with organized civil society do present deliberative possibilities. text of the Open Method of Coordination, where 'grass-roots' public
In the main, the regime can be characterized as that of 'liberal democ- deliberation among stakeholders was identified (Eberlein and Kerwer
racy' (Kohler-Koch 2010b), where, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 2002; Cohen and Sabel, in de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Smismans 2005).
issues surrounding the connections which organized civil society has to Nonetheless, these latter authors take a guarded assessment from the
civil society are raised. But where the aim is to achieve contributions to results obtained so far from OMC, finding some wider development but
public discourse it makes little sense to ask who is represented by the relatively little evidence of anything resembling deliberatiue ourcomes or
voice which speaks, and how the organization consulted its members so practice (de la Porte and Nanz 2004).
as to arrive at their position. Rather, it is the quality of the point raised, The European Commission system of engaging with outside interests,
the discourse, the contribution to public debate and a sufficient popula- while primarily a liberal democratic regime, does therefore have delibera-
tion of voices which matter. In this latter environment, the approach is to tive elements within it. The Commission system has more emphasis upon
'let a thousand flowers bloom', and it makes little sense to place restric- procedural participation than it does upon public reasoning, though its
tions on those voices or to create standards for connections with civil procedures are oriented towards delivery of public reasoning through
society. Only certain kinds of interest groups ('who') groups might be impact assessments, etc. 'S7hile the role of groups in traditions of liberal
equipped to do'internal democracy' (Halpin and Mclaverty 2010), but and deliberative democracy can be difficult to reconcile (Kohler-Koch
that may be an irrelevant standard to ask of 'what groups', particularly 2010b, citing Steffek and Ferretti 2010 - 'watchdogs don't deliberate'),
if the aim is to, ensure that a wide plurality of interests and viewpoints they can also be complementary. Developing norms of accountability
are represented. based upon standards of behaviour in public discourse is entirely con-
Even liberal democracy regimes have points within their proce- sistent with a system founded upon liberal democrac¡ but with deliber-
dures during which deliberative capacity is significant. rü/herever 'ideas ative elements. The requirement upon organized civil society contained
matter' to the formulation of public policies, so too do opportunities in clause d of the Transparency Register Code of Conduct, to ensure
for deliberation. The 'advocacy coalition framework' focuses upon that information is unbiased, up to date, complete and not misleading, is
the ways in which iterated exchanges of competing ideas between deliberative in effect, and accountability oriented.
218 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 2I9

If deliberation involves the use of processes of dialogue which


involve changing outlooks, then there may be a resonance with some
of the earliest ideas of neo-functionalist theory. The advocacy coalition
theor¡ however, segments belief systems into 'surface' and'deeper' out-
looks, suggesting that only the first type of these is affected by iterative
dialogue.
states may have h other aspects of the Single
European Act we r goal of achieving a sin-
Organized civil society and the development of EU
gle European mar ess organizations' las not
competenc¡es
a causal factor; member states knew that one home European market,
A number of chapters have reviewed claims that civil society interests where goods, services, people and capital could flow almost unhindered
have contributed to the acquisition of new EU competencies. These wanted, and the only long-term strategy
include the roles claimed for business interests in the expansion of the re Europe's competitiveness in the globe.
single market (Chapter 4), of social interests in the expansion of equality d a supporting role in communicating the
provisions, and more generally in seeking to expand competencies in
the social field (Chapter 6), and some territorial interests in treaty-based Iøhile business outlooks be taken inro considerarion
-"t"!;""r",1y
articles with specific applicability (Chapter 7).
The claimed role of the European Round Table of Industrialists
(ERT) in the achievement of the Single European Act (Chapter 4) has
been widely used to challenge state-centric accounts of European inte-
gration, reviving echoes of neo-functionalist accounts of the process of
European integration (Haas 1976). Separatel¡ the ERT case is also fre-
quently cited as a cause célèbre by activists seeking to illusrrate an out- of co-ordinating between different product divisions, and may even be
look which sees political decision-making as overwhelmingly driven by unaware that different parts of the business perceive different interests
the preferences of business. These perspectives appear to be supported
by some of the claims which the ERT has in the past made about its
impact. There is little doubt that the ERT did play a supporring role
in the achievement of the single market, and that its relationship with
the Commission and member states resembles some of the mechanisms 1995) or the differences so divide business thar collective agreement
of integration outlined by neo-functionalism. The ERT did, and does, through established interest groups is impossible, and business breaks
include some of the most significant European industrial interests. A up into factions. Solidarity is often greater among trade unions, and
Commissioner is said to have played a role in the formation of the certainly within environmental movements (Chapter 6; see, in particu-
ERI and in selecting and recruiting its members. Delors used the ERT lar, Long and Lörinczi 2009). Because the EU is a regulatory regime,
extensively for political support to carry the message to member states so competing politics between business interests is a feature of the EU
and has publicly acknowledged its role in doing so, and a number of system. And because EU decision-making is so fragmented between so
the messages conveyed by the organization have been well received by many different elements, it is impossible for any one type of inrerest ro
key decision-makers in domestic and EU politics. The ERT did imply routinely capture it.
that unless member states agreed to the Single European Act, its mem- Associations of business interests do not have the power to exercise
bers would consider the viability of keeping their operational base monopolistic influences over matters of 'high politics' which are open to
within the EU. public debate, such as a single European market or European
-o.r.t"ry
220 Interest Representation in the Europedn Union Organìzed Ciuil Society and Euroþean Integration 221

integration (Chapter 4). Consequentl¡ other factors may inform claims


that the ERI or cither large firms, were causal agents in decision-making
upon issues such as the course of monetary integration (van Apeldoorn
i:ffT:
to gather
2000). And business interests in non-Euro member states continue to national
have diverging views about the desirability of adopting the Euro, largely
depending upon where they do most of their business. 'l7hatever role the issue around the need r", *¿";ï1îHiì.H,[î;ïî-tlîï',ï¡
civil society interests did play can be easily accommodated by accounts zens, and using public opinion surveys to demonstrate that the
Eu was
which posit these as no more than contributory background factors to generally less popular among women, the campaign proved irresistible.
'sühile
the positions adopted by member states. Business associations have a some caution needs to be exercised in drawing wider conclusions
variety of reasons for propaganda which has the effect of exaggerating based upon a story of triumph told by a former genãral secrerary of
rhe
their influence, ranging from organizatíonal survival to reputational apparently successful organization, it has a ring of plausibility about
factors. it. Here, thg mixture of the EU labour marker focus, án irresistible pol-
Thus, there may therefore be reasons to doubt the'most likely' case icy frame of equalit¡ a_ committed patron, a strong network of grass-
cited in support of neo-functionalist accounts of the integration process. roots organizarions with a well-resourced hub, and the ability to work
Yet outside of producer fields something has emerged which bears very in institutionalized politics, all combined to create a favourable set of
close resemblance to neo-functionalist accounts of competencies arising circumstances for EU women's organizations. The commission and the
from the relationship between the European Commission and interest European court of Justice (ECJ) have become powerful institutional
groups, with the addition of a few elements (Chapter 6). DG Employ- advocates of EU equal opportuniries policies (Mazey 2000), and the
ment and Social Affairs has been the key Commission service creating women's movemenr became embedded within the Equal opportunities
and nurturing interest groups as agents of political demands to the mem- unit of DG Employmenr and Social Affairs (pollack 1997; Mazey and
ber states. It would first select a relatively uncontentious policy arena) Richardson 1,999).
such as actions against discrimination. It would fund a conference on the Such a process is by no means a linear pattern with an inevitable
subject designed to attract a wide range of stakeholders, perhaps linked consequence of further integration, and there are other cases in which
to the designation of a thematic European action year. Once together, the similar mechanisms have been at work, but with mixed impact. The for-
activists agree to form an interest group, and the group is sustained by EU mation of the social Platform was stimulated by EU institutions with
funding. The Commission then finds things for the transnational interest the aim of achieving a'civil dialogue'; participarory rules are certainly
group to do to help sustain it, such as designating'observatory' status in place, but some of the key demands of the social platform remain
to collect and supply it with information. Alternativel¡ the Commis- unfulfilled, such as a legal basis for consultation standards. other social
sion will act as broker to help organize the most effective transnational fields have no apparent outcomes in terms of new treaty competen-
interest group structure. The Commission and the newly formed interest cies (see, for insrance, rhe case of FEANTSA (European Federation of
group then engage in'activity noise', generating action programmes and National organisatíons working with the Homeless) and homeless-
activities in the interest arena, with relatively symbolic funding. Action ness in chapter 6). Most of the development of EU competencies in
programmes against poverty and racism have emerged in this way. In the consumer protection field seems to have emerged from crisis events
the latter case, the Commission took the lead in the absence of specific unrelated to the work of consumer groups, such as food safety issues
interest groups in the field, in the knowledge that the action programmes (Chapter 6). Nonetheless, groups are used by the Commission
and its funding would stimulate the formation of transnational interest ", "g.r,,,
of political demand to the member srates. The Erü/L ."r. ,ho*r-ho*
groups. These activities generate requests for EU competencies to which it needs the right relationship berween a corresponding interest group
member states find hard to openly resist. in the member states and a member state governmeni, together"with
The campaign run by the European lØomen's Lobby (E\øL) aimed at the other type of circumstances outlined, to reach the conclusion of an
the expansion of equality provision in the Treaty of Amsterdam seems expansion of EU competencies.
222 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society ønd European Integration 223

The common elements to the ERT and E\ùíL cases help to identify among civil society actors ro dilute expectations as well as interests. The
the circumstances in which groups do play the role cast for them in
institutionalist accounts of the integration process. Both involved groups
in which the Commission had played a critical role in group formation
and nurturing. Both pushed the right buttons at the right time so that
they were framed in the critical discourse - the ERT of wealth crea-
tion at a time when market-oriented governments had come to power
across the member states, and the E\ü/L at a time of critical concern.
This resulted in unopposed'campaign messages' in both cases, although
the ERT campaign would always be secondary given the enthusiasm
among member state governments for the cause, whereas the extension
of equality campaign seemed to require the EWL as an agent to make
something happen which would be politically impossible for member
states to resist. Member states do indulge in'cheap talk' at times, with
the result that they are required to deliver on it when called to do so,
such that'there is no such thing as cheap talk' (Lange 1992). Once mem- circumstances, business interests are factional, rather than homogenous,
ber states have set the parameters for EU policymaking through treaties, both across sectors and often within a single sector, because firms are
so the playing field seems to be left open for networks of interests and differentially affected by regulation. Because rhe reg-
supranational institutions to progress integration. The role of territorial ulatory regime, so it will be marked by such poli kash
interests in expanding the structural funds, and particularly community note how changing preferences across issues and with
initiatives such as URBAN and INTERREG, seems to provide such a the multiplicity of players in bargaining, resuh our-
case. Eurocities, and some of the 'Commissions' of the Conference of comes upon governance (Levy and Prakash 2003). And collective EU
Peripheral Maritime Regions, seem to have been particularly influential business associations are often paralysed through the inability of their
in this respect (Chapter 7). members to reach common positions, except in specific types of circum-
stances. Membership of such associations is often driven more by the
'costs of non-membership' than by any expectation that the association
Conclusions: organ¡zed civil society and the EU
will be able to reach common posirions (chapter 4). solidarity is grearer
The systemic features of organized civil society in any system arise pri- among NGOs and trade unions than among business interests. And
marily from its structural components. The EU system will, therefore, relatedl¡ 'the behavioural theory of the firm' (Cyert and March 1992)
have features which are to be found elsewhere, but which vary because of explains why companies are often poorly equipped to undertake polit-
the degree of intensity of those properties in the EU system. The strucrural ical action. Large organizations are by nature incoherent, and decen-
components underlying the EU system mainly produce pluralistic effects. tralized companies in particular have immense difficulties co-ordinating
First, the sheer multiplicity of elements means that the EU has ro have regulatory preferences across product divisions. The world of political
a consensually oriented decision-making system designed to accom- decision-making is uncharted territory for man¡ and they often act
modate the diversity of interests it contains, rather than a majoritarian clumsily (Chapter 4).
one in which a majority is empowered to routinely impose their will Third is the extent of accounrability levers (Mahoney 2008). The lack
(Lijphart 1999). Majoritarian systems create'winner takes all' politics, of direct connections between EU politics and its citizens means that it
whereas consensually oriented decision-making systems do not create is relatively insulated from pressures from civil society. The positive out-
outright'winners' and 'losers' over time, and even single legislative acts come is that the system cannot be captured by any one type of interest.
mostly tend towards compromise. This involves a corresponding need The negative side to a lack of connecting mechanisms to civil society
224 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European
Integration 22s

is a lack of popular legitimac¡ and particularly arising from a lack of ternal advice as a way
popular participàtion. Because of this, the EU political institutions have
to improve
, inrerest groups g., oppãrrrni,y
to construct participatory regimes, built upon organized civil "n
and promote thã lntereJt
".è¿.¿ áf ,h.i,
society - i.e. elite interest groups. The main task is to ensure a sufficient
population of interest groups in which a wide variety of interests are
represented, and which are sufficiently resourced so as to be able to act
as checks and balances upon each other, and upon EU political institu-
tions. A series of procedures ensures: funding for NGOs sufficient for
them to be able to undertake these tasks; formal equality of access (such
as consultation standards and regimes) for all; and that interest groups
are equipped with the tools to act as watchdogs, by dedicated transpar-
ency tools which produce all important symmetries of information flows
(Parks 2009b) (such as rights of access to information, and a transpar-
ency register). In effect, interest groups are used as surrogate democratic
mechanisms. The population of Brussels NGOs is notably well resourced
and professionalized, with mature features of interlocking coalitions well
capable of political action, and in some cases with outlooks so broad as
to resemble politicalparties (Chapter 6). This population has expanded
to include traditionally'outsider' organizations, both as established play-
ers in purpose-designed buildings in Brussels drawing upon a wide range
of wealthy donor foundations, and through such organizations acting as
'bridges' to social movement activist networks (Chapter 6). This raises
the issue as to whether any type of participation, no matter how appar-
ently hostile, can be regarded as positive for the EU system in that it is
open to interpretation as a contribution to the public sphere. Somehow,
even anti-globalization organizations manage to flourish in the Brussels
paradox of institutionalization within the embrace of a liberal regime.
For those which remain outside Brussels, the key issue is whether their
engagement with the EU has a de-legitimizing effect (Hadden 2009),or Coen 2009).
as'norm entrepreneurs' social movement actors contribute ideas, voices,
and otherwise pluralistic effects of checks and balances, as well as a
voice for the marginalized (Ruzza 2011').
An established way of accounting for the impact of interests in polit-
ical systems is to focus upon the resources exchanged between political
institutions and outside interests. At the EU level, this has been applied
in an exploration of the presence of corporatism at EU level (Green- missioner, and acted as a political agent for it in the establishment of the
wood, Grote and Ronit 1992), by Pappi and Henning to the Common concept of the European Transparency Register (chapter 3). Eising and
Agricultural Policy (Pappi and Henning 1999), in a much more devel- 'woll
separately demonsrrate how the EU political insiitutions or" ìnt"r-
oped form by Bouwen a decade later (Bouwen2002), and as stated by est groups for their own policy-related ends, and how civil society organ-
Persson: izations are willing to completely re-evaluate their entire outlook so as to
I
226 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union

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two-tiered 208 Protocol 7,203
See also Brussels
routes of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
engagement; interest representation, (ACTA) 1.'J.,1,71
main routes of influence; anti-globalization 167-g
Transparency Register (TR) architects, impact of European
accountability integration 9S-7
CSOs and democratic Architects Council of Europe (ACE)
legitimacy 4,213-1.s t02
International NGO Accountabilitv ArhusConvenrion 1,43-4
Charter (INGO) 65 Assembly of European Regions
lacking 795-6,1,98-200 (AER) 185_6
accreditation 59,270-13 Association of European Border
activism, internet-enabled 1.69-7I Regions (AEBR), 1gg, j.90
advocacy groups. See business groups; ATTAC T7O
civil society organizarions
(CSOs); citizen interesr groups; BEREC (Body of European
consumer lnterest groups; Regulators for Electronic
environmental interests; interest Communication) 49
groups; interest representation; BetterRegulation 35-6,
intergroups; labour interests; 11.7,203
lobbyists; non-governmental BEUC (European Consumer
organizarions (NGOs); Organisation)
professional interest groups; annual budget 1,7,159
trade unions; individual collective action 1i8
organizations funding 136
Air France !íorks Counc iI tl9 operations and
Alliance for a Competitive European contributions IS9-60
Industry 77 representation in other EU_related
alliances, creâting within social
structures 50
movements 169 Birdlife Europe 148

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