Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
REPRESENTATION
IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
STIN GREENWOOD
The major
Published
institutions and actors Forthcoming
Siegtinde Gstöht and Dirk de Bievre The Trade Policy
the European Union
christìan Kaunert and sarah Leonard Justice and Home
of
lnterest
Representation in the
Renaud Dehousse The European Court of Justice
Forthcoming
The main areas of policy Simon Butmer and wìttÌam E. Paterson Germany and
Published the European Union
ce
fron
List of Features vll
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this Publication Preføce to the Fourth Edition viii
miy be tiabte to criminaI Prosecution and civiI claims for damages'
to be identified as the author of this
Thè author has asserted his right
List of Abbreuiatìons ix
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988'
Firsr edition 2003
Second edition 2007
1 Introduc.tion: Representation,Participation andDeliberation 1,
v
vi Contents
Conclusions 125
Tables
6 Citizen Interests 127 1,.1, Transparency Register registrations as at 31 August 2016 13
The landscape of citizen interest groups 129 4.1 EU business associarions employing 15 or more staff 75
The European Citizens' Initiative 1,33
6.1. Members of the EU Civil Society Conract Group L29
The funding of NGOs 134
6.2' Cross-sectoral EU citizen interest associations not in
Historic landmarks in the development of EU membership of the Civil Society Conrac Group
139 130
cítízen interest representatio n
1.42
6.3 EU funding of principal EU NGOs L36
Environmental interests
Consumer interests 155 6.4 Greenl0 Transparency Register declarations 148
Social interests 161, 7.1, Degrees of devolved authority in the EU member srates 176
Social movements 1.67 7.2 Territorial representation offices in Brussels: EU-28 181
Conclusions 171, 7.3 Principal sectoral EU trans-regional associations and
networks 188
7 Territoriallnterests t73
Regional governance in llestern Europe 17s
Figure
The organization of territorial public interests at
the European level 1.79 6.1, NGO clusters around the European Parliament
The Brussels offices of the regions 180 in the Brussels property hotspot 1,39
Territorially based EU collective action organizations 185
Conclusions 190
Bibliography 227
Index 257
vll
Preface to the Fourth Edition List of Abbreviations
vlll 1X
X List of AbbreuiaTions List of Abbreuiations X1
lntroduction : Representation,
Participation and Deliberation
1
Intr o du ction: Repr es entatio n, Particip ation and eration
2 Interest Reþresentation in the Euroþean Union D elib 3
ut too much emPhasis on public deliberation in the EU's multi-level governance decision-making
society organisations onlY scheme to create an effective system of checks and balances which con-
rticipants themselves can- tributes to, rather than detracts from, democratic representation. An
those who are going to be entrepreneurial example involves Members of the European parliament
(MEPs) providing pump-priming for the establishment of the NGO
bound by them. (Stie 2010:130) 'watch
Finance in 2011 to help pluralize expert information sources in
technical financial regulation after the global financial crisis, drawing
Non-governmentalorganizations(NGos)presentparticularisticinter-
'interest' upon those with previous industry experience and beyond to provide
.ri, ;îrtin.a in ,r.tiu.?r"l 'public terms' and the absence of
mechanisms for them is problematic (Kröger_ 201,6)'
"...ir",áUiffty
R"..n, public contÀversies over the rolã of Greenpeace in 'Golden
Rice' involves adding a genetically
Rice, illustrates the point. 'Golden
food staple to address vitamin A
modified (GM) suppiemenr to a daily
to child death in poor countries'
deficiency, a majoi ãnnual contributor
opposition to GM
but implementation À", b.tt delayed by Greenpeace's
solutions (Connor 2014)'
Intr o du ction : Repr es entation, Particip ation and D elib eration s
4 Interest Representation in the European Union
and evolving plu- of their funding (Greenwood and Dreger 2013). some European policy
(AFME). The example is a metaphor for an emerging offices (EPos) of inrernarional NGos (such as the ìØorldwiàe pund for
NGOs can
i^l¡r^t¡onof participation in expert I U policymaking'.where Nature - NøIøF EPO, and Friends of the Earth Europe - FoEE) do draw
co-exist in the same eco-system as producer organizations on EU funds to supplement their own network of resources, helping
a European Com-
\X/ith 28 member states, eight pólitical parties' and to maintain substantial staff levels in their Brussels offices. Accorãing
*irrion with multi-d.p"ti-ät"i pt"p"ttiutt' the basic constitutional to the European Commission's Financial Transparency System, FoEE
to be present
ä.rtg"- f.t pluralizatioi of decisioi--ukittg would seem received over €6 million from EU institutions in2014,yet any cursory
by any type of
in EU decisior,--"Ling.'Capture' of EU decision-making examination of the campaign messages on its website shows that it
spectre' A core ques-
outside interest ,..-Jtht"Jore to be an unlikely does not find this to be a constraint on its criticisms of EU political
¡á" i, whether there is sufficient proceduralization, and a broad degree institutions or EU public policy. Similarl¡ Transparency Inrernational's
of pluralization, of interest repre prominent website headline that'EU institutions perform poorly' arose
.oon,.r-argument to Public from their 2015 report on'Lobbying in Europe' co-funded by an EU
"rrå
deliberation maY be in formation funding streaml (Transparency International 2015b). NGO; under-
stand their role is to be an 'unofficial opposition' in an EU political
system based on consensual decision-making which lacks the mecha-
nisms its member states have to bring'politics to the people,. Informed
lity to citizens: critique by organizations such as Transparency International (TI),
working from a staff complement of ten in its Brussels EU liaison office
primarily on supplemented by the resources of the network in other European cities
Legitimate representation in postmodernity depen-ds and beyond, acts as a'critical friend' to help align EU decision-making
constituents and representatives,
the continuous interaction between with core democratic standards. These critiques, informed by tools
the exchange of arguments and the
justification of decisions.
ú;rJ ." such as the construction of specialist transparency'watchdog' websites
(Wolff 201'3:45) ro monitor activities of EU institutions and their dialogue with CSOs
th EU institutions (Chapter 3), provide ready fodder for specialist press outlets surround-
A permanent ecosystem of ing EU politics. A notable recenr arrival on the Brussels scene, politico,
the 'usual mecha-
fr.îp, ,o bring accountabil has brought a new cutting edge to EU journalism from'Washington DC
at national level'
nisms' connecting citizens and, together with information feeds from NGOs, helps to establish
such as a common language medium and recogniza-bi:,fl:lt:î31"Tï; compelling forms of accountability on EU institutions.
has seeminglY now Heavy reliance upon, and institutio nalizationof, interest organizations
substantial funding in any political system brings to the fore a whole range of issues. There
are questions about the ability of cSos to perform surrogate democratic
s to ensure Pluralis-
are accompanied functions when there is the possibility of being instrumentalized by their
lic' sphere. These
engâgement with political institutions (Chapter 6). Another key issue
by measures of pr aimed at meeting basic democratic
is the extent to which interest organizatíons can really connect wider
in increasingly
pre-conditions suc rt public' deliberates
civil society with political institutions, and the types of stakeholders who
funds to rein-
íiJur. p"uric sphe NCOs draw on these
win and lose from these relationships. Thus, long-standing questions
force tiheir uduo. ical contributions' Although some
and Greenpeace) ons in political systems come into
international NGOs (such as Amnesty International d to the EU because of a systemic
do not draw on EU funds on the basis that it might create the-percep-
For those EU NGOs tion. Yet most liberal democracies
tion of constraints, these tend to be exceptions' el as secondary to a representative
of 43%
;ññ g;; ; grant from EU institutions, it provides an average
Introdwction: Representation, Participation and Deliberation 7
6 Interest Representation in the European Union
of ParticiPatorY channels There were also aspirations that groups might somehow bridge
model remote EU institutions with wider civil societ¡ although these expeca-
which tes has alwaYs been a fea-
d bY' inter alia' Kant' and tions have receded somewhat and supplemented with means of reaching
ture o out to citizens directly (Chapters 2,8). The European Commission has
in the review in ChaPter 8)' the
a reliance upon elite therefore been very active in interest groups of
ËU ,il"r., with other international organizations 'rwhile
there are estab- all types constituted at EU lev se of these facrors,
interest groups as proxies for wider,civil society'.
and the potential for a dialo s to moderate rhe
lisheddebatesaStowhattheterm.civilsociety,shouldmean,andin demands upon them, some commentators see the EU institutions more
particular its extent of
as a'master oÍ Íate'than a 'victim of pressure' in its exchanges with inter-
Lrato 1'992), in EU P est groups (Grande 1,996;see also Chapter 8). That is, EU institurions set
to mean every tYPe of agendas which others follow, although again approaches ro this question
'otganized civil societY' denot
are nuanced. In the 1980s, the EU institutions worked with business
producers (business, union, e
organizations to help them secure a common endeayour of achieving a
'dialogue with civil society' at
European single market (Green-Cowles 1995, 1996). Bur once this goal
as is reviewed later' the links
was achieved, the European Commission's focus turned to a more reg-
ments have helped to stimulate part
ulatory agenda which was often more aligned with the goals of NGOs
public. Mechanisms such as the (Boräng and Naurin 2015; Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall20I5; Klüver,
helped to broaden Public Partici
Braun and Beyers 2015).
(Chapter 6).
' The EU's extent of systemic dependence upon organized civil society
The potential satisfaction of their
makes the study of EU interest representation a compelling analytical
tions from their exchanges with intere
focus for scholars of European integration and federalism, of compar-
the need for policymaking expertise, ative public polic¡ and of interest groups rhemselves. This degree of
EU institutions also work with dependence is systemic to the EU political system, in much the same way
¡ that is common to other transnational systems. There are structural fea-
e latter has the abilitY to convey
ng the latter has been the Poten- tures characterizing exchanges between political institutions and organ-
ent member states towards seek- ized civil society which arise in any democratic setting (such as resource
dependencies), and factors intensively at work in the international
ing common solutions by ceding -sov governance setting (such as deficits among political institutions of capac-
19"58; see also the examPles in ChaP
ity and legitimacy) to make these work out in very specific ways. Thus,
EU political institutions which are particular properties and characteristics of political decision-making
meni with organized interests make systems become drivers of common outcomes, and of differences. Hence,
them, consistãntly resisting formalized accr interest representation in consensual decision-making systems (such as
grounds that it might limit the supply of n the EU) is quite different from that in 'majoritarian' systems of g<_rv-
ãUiti,y of groups to convey political messag ernment, because the latter has a party of government able to exert its
tions iobby interest groups almost as vigoro will. In majoritarian systems government relations are oriented towards
using groups to exert pressure upon the p a.'winner takes all', whereas in consensual systems there are rarely out-
,rpon member states, other EU institutions right winners and losers, requiring broadly based alliances to bé con-
tåns, and as agents in the international system (Chapter 8)' A
policy
the structed between civil society interests. And the extent of democratic
shift from -"ik.t making to market regulating meant that EU
connections between political institutions
advocates to achieve their regulatory and civil society (in particular,
irrrtitrrtiorN needed civil sãciety accountability mechanisms) significantly structures
the ways in which
goals (Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall 2015)'
Union Intr o du cti on : Repr es entation, Parti cipation and D elib eration 9
8 Interest Representation in the Euroþean
2008); at EU level'.the lack of is because interest groups have the potential to caïry the political mes-
interest organizations behave (Mahoney sages of the EU institutions to member states and to (and from) wider
these connections may,"s
paraioxically' help to insulate the sys-
'ã"*it*
i.t" fto- special interest pressures (Chapter 8)'EU intensifies consensual
civil society. This possibility was developed in the earliesr works on Euro-
pean integration theor¡ most notably the'neo functionalist' account of
A complex ,""1,i-l;;í;;'it- titft "',tht European integration of Ernst Haas (1958), but also appeared among
outcomes, and the i; "iii""ttt' in the search for solutions ofis pre-
any
the aspirations of the most prominent architects of the initial European
"";d solutions' If anything
kind and information "Lo't tht potential.for towards Community project, including Jean Monnet. This accounr highlighted
dictable about the EU;;;;-;ii i' tntt w!ic1 outcomes will tend
oveiwhelming maiorilv,1f, l¡9r;lative the potential consequences for interest groups to develop the range of
a consensual nature, ;;;;h;' the EU powers by acting as forces of pressures upon member states to cede
pr.ptt"it tS0% -Voll 201'2) from the European Commtsston encl up as
policymaking in the EU and USA' competencies to the EU (via rrearies), and the porenrial for socializing
law. This is a kev diff;;;t f;tween of the participants of EU interest groups (and thereafter the national audiences
p'opos"ls op as law because
;h;r;';;ly 1t;Á
"trãeiti"tl"t a
"ttd Thus' lobbying in Europe
guillotine' which they relate to) into seeing European solutions and the consequenr
."rã-"f ¿"í"yi,',g l.gi'i;tion "tttil lobbying i" !!:. USA is identification with Europe. The last of these endeavours has increasingly
is aimed rowards .o"t""t"r buildiig, whereas seemed far-fetched, in that EU interest groups are narrowly focused
attem >roposals (\foll 2012)'
oriented towards upon policy advocacy with EU institurions and tend to be staffed by a
rf 'brash' or'softly spo-
These instilutionalfactc professionalized cadre who'know the Brussels scene' (Chapter 8). The
reen EU and US lobby-
ken' lobbying styles' exr first endeavour, however - actions by groups resulting in the develop-
his stor¡ providing the
ing (\loll 201,2).EU int
hances of success of a ment of EU competencies - can be illustrated by a number of examples
Commission with infor
Marshall 201'5)'and helping it (Chapters 6 and 8), although it should not be regarded as a universal
;;i;ü*-;ropor"l (õti', g""'h'ugen and of the consensual nature of the mechanism, and there are cases where the role of interest groups has
to protect it, ."pot"tlo"" ¡'"¿ thã
extent
more been as supporting agents for action which would have happened
for an EU'government rela-
;ï;;;;;;t;."ï, thut it is not uncommon more time in dialogue with rather than causal agents (see Chapters 4 and 8).
tions' manager of a multinational to spend ^îyway
The contribution that interest groups make to European integra-
with environmental NGOs'
NGOs than with n'U i"'tit"tions' Alliances public interest tion depends upon their general alignment with the outlook of the EU
in nerticular. are infl,,et'tial because of the strength of
institutions. Groups which are generally opposed to the logic of lib-
::"ï,iäi'ä;;;;, i'il .;"ironment in Europe, anã. positioning vourself eral integration of markets may find themselves frozen out and have to
,"tht' than'part-of ihe problem'ìs a.recognized
as'part of the solution'
Specific procedures of political insti- re-interpret their core values. Eising recounts how the main EU electricity
;;"il;';;uti.
tutions
"rr"i"' -"t"g""'
also become drivers oJ i"t""'t repiesentation practice' such as association was forsaken by the Commission in favour of a small region-
initiation ùes' whether there are default ally based organization with more aligned values (Eising 2009). Woll
where responsibility iclt ptjity
mechanisms to Uto.L.-ihã ì"tt"gt of
legislation' the presence of rules tells the story of how the European textiles organization, EURATEX,
infrastructures had to completely about-turn its demands for a protectionist regime in
restricting access to justiËe, ""1 tt""tp"rency-related
(Chapters 2,3,6 and 8)'
'-tWriit" ,o-. f.",rrr"s of the EU system of interest representatlon orlg-
of particular interest
in"i. in factors to bt fo""d tl"*h""' the feature upon inter-
the extent of dependence
about the EU syst.m to t'igntign' is
g""rt'-and the corrèsponding action by
est groups ,o est
".rri.u""it;"itti
potiü"t'inrtitutions to maintain such groups' For
the EU system as a ise. Thus,
the
'*ïof., the particularly noteworthy consequences of this lie'in the toY,t¡; insi
ecâme ân
in the ìØonka et al. (2010) identify almosr 500 firms who have appeared in
as will public affairs directory sources. The multiple-level architecture of the EU
cti ízed affords access to such players, and the need to participate in and beyond
n because their interests are often trade associations also contributes to the rationale for establishing such
don imPoses costs and benefits on offices. An analysis of the geographical origin (by national headquarters)
-For
chain. instance, the makers of of those listed in the European Public Affairs Directory in 2003 indi-
to higher regulatory stanclards for cates that around one-quarter were Americ an,1.7o/o British, 11 % French
,.r, ("b,,Y"ttf because theY have the and 1.1.o/" German (Coen 2009). Anglo- and American-based firms in
ter bear the costs' parficular, familiar with operating in pluralist environments, are used
which such funding comPromises to working outside of groups and with commercial public affairs con=
nizations. or creates quasi-agencies sultancies, whereas those used to the corporatist traditions of Germanic
authors see funding as a fatal form countries tend to place a greater emphasis upon collective associations.
, recipient organizations
rarely seem However, the growth of consultancies has followed multinational firms
U institutions (see Chapter 6)' inter- to a variety of locations. One piece of research suggests that the Anglo/
Germanic division also works in preferences for the type of commercial
sources used, with Anglo/American firms using traditional public affairs
consultancies and Germanic firms using law firms (Lahusen 2002). An
oft-posed question in the literature is whether national traditions of cor-
poratism or pluralism might influence the ability of organized interests
to engage the EU level, and in particular whether the generally pluralist
narure of the EU policymaking environment might be disabling for inter-
ests with corporatist traditions. However, studies seeking to investigate
(Chapter 6). explanations couched in the'fit' between national and EU policymaking
environments have found contradictory results (for a review see Eising
Non-grouP actors 2009). Klüver finds that national embeddedness does matter, with fewer
civil society active at EU level incentives to go to Brussels for firms in highly embedded environments
There are five categories of players from (Klüver 2010; Klüver et al. 2015). However, of the top 20 lobbying
which are spending business associations in the TR, one-quarter are German. There
(Chapter is no evidence that interests from countries with corporatist traditions
cial terms experience difficulties in engaging with the EU level; rather, the issue is
a website the under-development of organized civil society in the south of Europe,
linking the varietY of actors from and central/eastern Europe, where firms are more likely to rely on their
Anln-house Public affairs caP established relationships with national governments (Greer, da Fonseca
and Adolph 2008; Kohler-Koch and
Quittkat2016).
There is very little literature on the organizarion of organized civil
society interests from non-EU member states.'!Øonka et al. found that
EU level h
o/"), and a
any EU as
lic affairs, or onlY do so after bein are based
initiative.
Intr o du ction : Repr e sentation, Particip ation and D elib eration 21
20 Interest Representdtion in the European Union
actio
simil
in to
kind
Another notable feature concerns
of some of these interests as policy
chime with those of a segment of t their contribution. certainl¡ most EU interest groups are associations
where the balance of thti activities
turns more towards dialogue with
than seeking to undermine of associations, operated by professionalized staff, with a focus more
Ëü i*;i;;ti"", "nd toì.l"tionship build-ing ges rather than on ,communicating
rh.-.ourse of establishment of
,ñ ö;;hroogh ;;;ii. ;;rråg"r. been dependent upon elites, and the
the rR demonstrate';;;' of thesã
?îîïi îî3ll;ti:t:ï'ìi:tJïl: wide range of advocacy from every
indicated by tendencies to develop Some commentators see in the EU
a reasunabie level of resources and system no more than a structured system of exchanges between interest
matelY come to terms with the label groups and political institutions which amounts to, at best, no more than
Conclusions
interest representation which
There are common drivers of systems of
the EU possesses, such as the waYs
prod,rcãs pluralistic outcomes' Dis
äf th. d.pìndencY of EU institutio
Organized civil society interests Note
meitt in which EU Political insti L.'Prevention of and Fight against crime Programme of rhe European union,
tiãn towards systemic input and output legitima
the EU system is based around regulation'
so
scepticism'
pluralist in charac-
The EU interest group system is essentially.
dominate the EU
ter. No one type oi i"t""'t can ever routinely
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 25
i'e' they are participants as well as Council Presidencies. Together with the Social platform, they have also
subjects of interest representation'
appea;;;iltg;tácant vaii"tions in the permutation of been included in the informal preliminaries of the Employment and social
channels. There Affairs Council of the Council of the European Union. Environmenral
upon a
.^fr""".ft of influence used, depending th non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are privy to a similar type of
i".f"¿i"g the nature of the issue concerned' arrangement preceding Environment Council meetings (Hayes-Renshaw
;;;h;;'."ailing context, in;lud119
:1:
n:i:"* 2009). Hayes-Renshaw sounds a note of caution that the importance of
tions. Tñese are reviewed in the sectlons below'
such access arrangements should not be exaggerated, in that they occur
at an advanced stage in the Council decision-making cycle (ibid.).
the'national route'
EU interest rePresentation through The priority (and back-burner) European Council agenda rhemes
chosen by each member state are often the subject of advance input by
Theuseofthe.nationalroute'forinterestrepresentationattheEuropean civil society interests, while during the six-month period of office meet-
siates in EU decision-making,
level is conditioned Uy',fr.ã.ãf -.-b.,
taken' and by the extent to which it ings it is now relatively common for the Presidency to meer with interests
the nature of the positiã"' U"i"g within the priority theme arenas. Both Business Europe and ETUC have
familiar point of âccess for interests'
;;iã;;".o'u.,tit"rund u'"ãt their strongest during treaty nego- made a point of contacting the Presidency with their carefully agreed
Intergovernmentat infl "' internal agendas around 24 months in advance of its office while it is
and strattgy direction through the
tiations between the ä ""'"" politics' venues involving inter-state still preparing its programme, in co-ordination with the national federa-
E 'high
civil õciety interests are not in the forefront' rion concerned. Meetings with the Presidency during their term of office
n inter- tend to be more geared towards publicity than operational public aÍfairs.
;"ith" ""iio"al level become nationalprocess
" of the The rapid turnover of the office bearer, together with the contrasting
itics' But tht p'og'""ive democratization
of some variations in culture and agendas of each Presidenc¡ mean that the pos-
tflo"g-h"o'i'uttt'io"t has led to the design
"tit't';;;;:ä ti"tr t"tittv'.The presjdents of the principal sibilities introduced by these relationships fluctuate considerably. Post
f"' Lisbon, both organizations maintain their engagement with the Euro-
(" -tth;;-" describei later in this chapter) organiza-
ETUC were allocated observer status pean Council and the rotating presidencies of the Council of Ministers.
tions, Busines n"'opt, C¡EP a1d Interest representation in the Council of Ministers machinery is only
treatv establishing a Constitu-
at the 2003¡+ Conut"tã" át"fti"g the beginning to emerge. One interpretation is that the Council is not lob-
tht opportunitv. to draft a treatv
tion for Europe, t"kì;;;;";;;gËof now bied as such; just its members (Nicoll and Salmon 1.990):
clause aimed institîtionalization of social dialogue,
-"rì,ï"ãJ
in ",
tr" ltîåîr""tv' At the convention';åï*Ïl
.rì"uiiJ.¿ ,iîiffi The Council portrays itself as an institution where no lobbying takes
proPosals for draft place; the secretariat keeps no listing of lobbyists and takes the posi-
on members' A keY tion that'all contact with lobbyists and NGOs is handled with the
to EU PolicYmaking European Commission'. (Friends of the Earth Europe 2006)
in this wav (Kaufmann' Lamassoure
found its way into the draft treaty
b"t" tt included in the Lisbon The Council has been ambivalent about participating in inter-institutional
and Meyer 2004),;;il;h-;ü-"t"tv discussions on the Transparency Register (TR), and for some time
ttïil;,Social refused to do so on rhe grounds that'lobbying' was something which
partners, are the civil society players which have achieved
happened to the other institutions (Commission, Parliamenr). Fãr these
decision
most access to intergovernmental.EU that ind uncil -
iDants in the'macroeconomic dialogue'
become lobby-
éouncil, as well as the Commission'
a
officials in their own The dossier of decision-making over the End of Life vehicle Directive
direct evidence of overt lobbying of Secretariat (1997-2000), for instance, involved an intervenrion from German chan-
rãceived, this is'in listening mode onlv'
ö;;; ùùi;,'J3¡, "r'd,;i;"'; cellor Gerhard schröder, inspired by the chief Executive of volkswagen,
(ibid.:84): Ferdinand Piëch. Piëch used Schröder's position as a former board mem-
ber of the compan¡ and as head of the country then holding the EU
on principle to circulate position papers
[the] Secretariat tend to refuse Presidenc¡ to his advantage, to buy time on the dossier when schröder
mailing lists of working
from interes, grorrpr, o' to provide them with instructed his Environment Minister ro postpone the item from an Envi-
p"try .t .o-Ãitr.ã membe?s' (Hayes-Renshaw 2009:84) ronment council agenda, and subsequently to acquire sufficient votes
for a temporary blocking minority. Subsequently, some aspects of the
Bouwen'sdatathatnational-levttttt:tï:rtil,1xT:r:t"äïJ;.,:î:"(::r: original proposal were watered down, although the end result was not
entirely to the liking of the automobile constructors (Tenbücken 2002).
nized civil societY (Bouwen 2002)
Like many other dossiers, the ELV case involved'horse trading, between
;:äï îlï' :'î'ì"::i' :Ï,Î ï",';' ;: member states) and, while increasing transparency is likely to ieduce the
scope for this, decision-making in the council continues in practice to be
alizatíonthrough procedures which
Commission' There is some the least transparent element of EU decision-making. The consequence
has recently emerged from the European is that it is an unpredictable venue for civil society inrerests focused
working groups'
un".dotul åvidence of interaction through Council (Hayes-Renshaw upon the detail of a legislative proposal. The reality of council decision-
."rr.r *ìin orgunlr.d irrt.rests constitot.d ut EU level interests and the making in an EU of 28 member states is intergovernmental negotiation
between
and'!Øallace 2006),anãtt; through contact and consensus. The search for common ground among so many elements
th" working groups (Pointer 2002) '
national civil servant, *ho "tut ott
in finalizing legislation will continue to make the Council a secondary
contacts with national minisrry mem-
iJ;;, lobbying arises through venue for EU interest representation.
\Øhile the limited number of dossiers prescribed by unanim-
ity decision have reduced the attraction of the 'national route', it
has historically represented the 'tried and tesred' ground for many
interests, where established policy networks and dependency rela-
tionships operate which can equally well be used for the purposes of
the conduct of electronic commerc EU representation as they can for the governance of domestic affairs.
issue through subsequent Council The resources available to small firms has always meant that any
better than damage limitation (Poi single firm needing to engage with EU decision-making is likely to
intriguing issues are always likely t use domestic contacts first, with federated representation available
Committee of Permanent RePrese through national association membership of EU business associa-
Council of Ministers' decision-ma tions. civil society interests in southern and central/eastern Euro-
is limited. Saurugger usefully dist pean countries have few direct channels of representation in Brussels,
co-ordination mechanisms for EU and consequently have been notable individual users of the national
ministries are lead bodies, such as route when EU representation is required (Kohler-Koch and
euittkat
which aPProach Permanent _2016). These tendencies also exist in countries with corporuiirt t."-
national ministries; whereas t ditions (Klüver 201.0), although the general decay of corporarisr
co-ordination mechanism' can be more accommo- arrangements in western Europe has weakened the practice;
"îá..'n"tizontal German
dating (Saurugger 201'0a)' trade for instance, occupy orr"-qurr,", of the top 20
-- scope for inter- .associations,
nf",n" timJãn issue has reached ministerial level, the lobbying spending associations. By contrast,
civil society inteiests
inrerventions do arise.
u.*ío' is diminisheJ, brr, ,rorr.rheless dramatic
Union EU Decision-MøÞing and Channels of Influence 33
32 Interest Representation in the European
ralized traditions which exclude The broad thrust has been to create a pluralistic design of 'checks and
aking.have more incentives to balances', where any one interest is challenged by another, and where
nstititions (Klüver' Braun and interests are empowered through procedures to do so and to keep EU
institutions accountable. The foundation stones of these are regimes of
transparency, and participative measures, including the funding of citizen
interest groups (Chapter 6), and detailed rules for consultation. Some of
these have been applied on an inrer-institutional basis, while some are
nce upon national intermediarY specific to individual institutions and the contexr in which they operate.
more direct mechanisms' These are described in further detail for the purpose of their evaluarion
in Chapters 3 and 8.
the'Brussels route'
EU interest rePresentation through lnter-institut¡onal mechan¡sms for engagement with organized
rules o ety
The development of pt9::q"t11 gtt c¡vil soc¡ety
actors to engage wlt'h EU institutions'
ñ/ers nal In overview, the most important inter-institutional procedural mecha-
as sh
ver nisms structuring exchanges between EU institutions and civil society
ed question is whether relYing on involve transparency-related measures. One is the 2001 Regulation
om a base in the member states on Access to Documents (104912001), which provides for rights of
access to most documents, supported by open access internet search-
able document registers, and by facilitation mechanisms and vigor-
ous enforcement procedures.'While there are safeguards in place for
restrictions of access on various grounds, it has been implemented
zealously as a result of retroactive application, an activist Ombuds-
of formalitY, ranging from access man who has championed rights granted by the measure through
worst excesses of these assertive interventions, and rulings by the Court of First Instance
to information through to interaction' The which have favoured release by favouring public interest transparency
asymmetric over personal privacy (Chapter 8). The measure has become increas-
macy, givin ingly used, with around three-quarters of requests granted in full, and
to the use the remainder comprising the single most numerous category of cases
ence. The i taken up by the Ombudsman (European Ombudsman 2010). This
measure has changed the landscape of EU interest intermediation,
empowering civil society organizations vis-à-vis the EU institutions
and each other. The Access to Documents Regulation has also altered
the modus operandi of the ways in which civil society organizations
resignation of the EuroPean
'llhite Pa communicate with EU institutions, resulting from the stipulation that
-"rk *"t the 200L access also applies to documents received by the Commission which
intention to originate with third parries. This changes behaviour through the rec-
ognition among staff of civil society organizations that the communi-
listening to one side of the argu-
reduce the risk of policy-makers iust cations they send to EU institutions can
be observed, either by their
ment or of particular groups gettlng privileged access' (European members (Naurin 2007),or by other interested
stakeholders.
Commission 2001'17)
Interest Representltion in the European Union EU Decision-MaÞìng and Channels of Influence
34 35
in that the evidence becomes the subiect of public debate involv- Article 11 provides the legal basis for consultation, the pro-
Yl,]:T::"rt
scuutâl tormars
ing detailed scrutiny ty i.t,...rr.d participani', who are primarily adopted are not enforceable in law, instead forÁlrrg p".t
Union EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 37
36 Interest Representation in tbe European
this initial stage. The responsible official will normally consult widely
lation'' Similar schemes' with the
K and in Ireland, embracing Pro- with interest groups of all types. (Cini 1996:147)
n and consultation' ranging from
iding a baseline of wider legiti- The internal commission deliberation process has been further illumi-
.o-á' are reached' At EU level' nated by Gillies. During the drafting srage, other departmenrs of the
organized civil societ¡ such meas- Commission affected by the proposals will be given the broad outlines
th because of the need to broaden and asked for comments, and one person allocated in each of these to
follow the proposal's progress. Discussions are also held at this stage
with the member states' permanent representations, Council officials
and technical advisors, and extensive informal consultations before a
proposal is drawn up. Once a full first draft of the proposed legisla-
tion is drawn up it is circulated to all Commissioners and their Cabinets
Assessments', while other Directorat (described below), interested departmenrs, and the Commission Legal
Service. Changes may be suggested at this stage by any one of these
actors. The drafting process can take a substantial amount of time, and
a number of drafts produced before a proposal is agreed and adopted as
a Commission formal proposal. Once the Directorare Generals (DGs) of
the Commission services have nearly agreed on the text for a proposal, it
then goes to Cabinets and to the College of Commissioners for approval.
Once approved, it is published in the OfficialJournal (Gillies 1998).
Once drafts are passed upwards through the Commission and on
to cabinets of Commissioners, they progress to their private office
of around six advisory staff (1,2 in the case of the President), usually
hand-picked individuals whom the Commissioner concerned has cho-
rade unions formed out of a concern sen to work with. Commissioners are often dependent upon the assis-
rd for deregulation' tance provided to them by their'Cabinet'. Some are functional experts,
Commission in the PreParation while others might have a more wide-ranging political role in keeping
a Commissioner briefed on wider developments inside and outside the
ed interaction with interested parties
Commission. Eventuall¡ a draft reaches the level of 'Chef [head] de
s a middle-ranking official within a
Cabinet'. The heads of each of the different Cabinets meer once a week
and prepare the agenda for the weekly meeting of Commissioners on
sibility for PreParing t \íednesdays. Relatively uncontenrious proposals are agreed at Chef de
eters of EU PolicY and Cabinet level and passed on up to the College of Commissioners for rub-
measure alreadY set' A ber-stamping. Proposals which are more contenrious are left for debate
is regarded as a maior career oPP at the College, where the perspectives of differing Commission depart-
sible individual. Cini comments:
staff within responded with an announcement that he had referred the appointment
through other legislative stages falls b,ack to the permanent
to the commission's ad hoc Ethics committee for scrutiny, effectively
a diviiion of the Directorate (Cini 1996)'
extending the period of regulation, and demonstrating the incremental
Collins has suggested:
process through which rules respond to the turn of over time.
The consultation procedures cover the process of "u*t,
a king, can be a lonelY f using expert advice,
off from domestic Politics, including a code of practice for those who provide and usð it, which, inter
a real Power base. Their alia, seek to make the evidence basis transparent (European commission
to alarge degree from the force of 2002b). Expert groups provide non-binding advice to the commission
authority stems
(Collins 1'993 53) throughout the policy process, although much of the significant input
arises during the policy development phase. These groups are (primar-
These factors make them particularly dependent upon
their cabinet, and ily) constituted by _the Commission, with members nominated ty ,.p-
resentatives.of public authorities in the member states and civil societ¡
to their own domestic links, often inter-related through cabinet mem-
to achieve his or The definitive study on the use of expert groups made by the European
bers. Members of a cabinet will help the commissioner
h;;;;;lr;À-ugh alliances with civil society organizations_who share the Commission is provided by Gornitzka and Syerdrup (2015), who found
,a-î poli.y thr"usts, whether business or NGO oriented. In the Juncker that around 40% (500) of the Commission's advisory groups featured
societal actors, with the remainder comprising national ministries and
òo-,,'irrior, (20I4-I9) rhese meetings are recorded on the website of
with agencies. Of these, business actors were present in 29o/" of groups and
the commissioner. Kautto tells the story of how Nokia worked
the Cabinet of the Finnish Commissioner to good effect (Kautto 2009)' NGOs in28% of groups, leading them to conclude that
ðï";;Jt of this volume tells the story of how the Deputy Head of Cabi-
relationship with the overall pattern of inclusion/exclusion of societal acrors are partly
net fãr a Commissioner developed a productive working
,outsider' NG-o, based on broadly shared political consistent with a norm of participatory diversity and representation
u k"y fig.rr. from an
to build impetus and support behind. a new policy of heterogeneous interests and perspectives ... business interests are
leanings, as a means
opposition to it in public fora. Otherwise, there more often than not matched and mixed with other non-governmental
;;;;;;"i and to tackle quir ading from actors. (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2015:161)
ir r"pp.tt in the literatrrr.io. the
ð.äi"t, *irtt the former head of the Eu W\ülF (and
L.y p"t,.ipant in the'Green1O' G1 ntal NGOs Nonetheless, the European Ombudsman has exercised vigilant over-
"orrttí.rid in ihapter 1)recountint mis- sight in response to concerns represented to her by the cEo and related
NGOs, to which the European Commission has been responsive. The
rio""t had the irabit of participati for-
Ombudsman welcomed a decision by the European Commission to
Lörinczi
mal invitation' (Long and
plng
make transparent the basis for selection, to develop a new conflict of
and
an animal welfare ÑGO draft a P interest policy for members, and to make membership of the TR manda-
Rawlings 1992). Public focus on tory for those from civil society (European Ombudsman Z01S).
and civil society interests is mainl
More formalized are the (around 250; European commission201,1a)
of taking up positions with outsid committees appointed by the legislator (council; parliament)
the potential for conflicts of interes ro issue
opinions on Commission proposals for implementing measures, and
Cori.r,t rules involve a ban from taking up such a position within
18
months of demitting office. when former (2004-14) President of the ember states (Treaty on the Func-
commission B"rroro took up a position with Goldman Sachs
in 201'6 90 k. 291, formerly 'Comitology
,ho.tly after the expiry of ihe cooling-off period,_ an online petition se in oversight of implementation
resulted and the frrrãpé"r Ombudsmai m"di call to review the rules st representation than committees
" (2014_19) lation, some authors have seen in
further (European o*b,,d,-",, 201'6a)' President Juncker
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence
40 Interest Representation in the European 41
members, with around 400 advi- adopt a different position from that proposed by the lead committee. All
rhese factors result in substantial lobbying. Lehmann gives the example
, from 201'6, of €22'879 Per
generous' (Pegan 201'6:3) in of the roaming telecoms charges file, with the chair of the Industry
This allows MEPs to emPloY Committee reported receiving around 50 requests for appointments
ed to Postgraduate masters level' each day from stakeholder organizarions (Lehmann 2009). Almost all
ved in a Particular file, assistants cases with notable outcomes generate complaints of excessive intensity
iety of stakeholder organizations of lobbying, involving mobilization by a range of interests with highly
of information means that mem- polarized positions. Some recent research suggests that both'friends and
n needs, rather than make them foes' are lobbied, although there is a disproportionare focus upon the
such as the European Commis- larger partíes (Marshall 2010). Most lobbying activity is directed at the
dependent upon a single outside source Parliament until the first reading has been taken, because intervention
sion (MarshaIl201'2)' becomes pr.ogressively more difficult as inter-institutional discussions
a lead committee' which
In the first stage, a proposal is passed to intensify in a search to find common ground, and because most legisla-
then appoin,, ,"pp-'i"ifrom amo"g its members to prepare.a draft
" rapporteur' this individual tive files are agreed at first reading with the Council through informal
reoort on the propo,"t' iike the Commission 'trilogue' negotiations. During trilogues, the rapporteur and shadow
other committees
;"ä;r'; ;;;;i-i;.", for interest *ill work independently
represenrarion.
(Gillies rapporteurs are mandated to follow a committee position, resulting in
mav also be asked f"tä" tpi"ú" u"d
i' bv each political cohesion to protect the EP position regarding the Council. During these
ffiti; Trfr"ì""n"ã.* ìuipo"'"' yh.9 appointed
negotiations, MEPs therefore tend to act as a team, involving the prior-
"' th" on behalf of the interests of that partv'
f'o'""
;;;;;';;;;il"t ttization of negotiating positions which are often oriented towards the
Gillies comments: public saliency of issues.
on amendments; they Intergroups of the European Parliament are cross-party, cross-
The Rapporteur exerts an lmportant influence
committee groupings of individual MEPs clustered around subjects on
haveanãssistant;;;';;'i'J"ï'Ïo"J:îå;liJ:'i:ïìåÍå:Ï which members have particular interests, with open public meetings act-
the views of other committees' The ing as an informal forum for discussion as well as a means to link politi-
ft report, which is discussed by each cians with various civil society stakeholders. They have no formal role in
ve advice from shadow raPporteurs the policy process and are explicitly required to act in a way which does
to advise them' During the committee not create confusion with'official' activities of the Parliament. At the srart
to it - thus this is a good of each term of the EP Members vote on the establishment of intergroups,
stage, âny member can propose amendments which enables such groups to use the facilities of the EP and logistical
(Gillies L998:L8L)
time to contact Vtlps and iheir assistants' support of the parties, and requires compliance with rules of disclosure of
with sonrces of external support. ln 2014 the establishment of some 28 inter-
ence whether interest groups make contact
a
groups were agreed for the eighth term of the EP. A number correspond
oarty of the rapporteur, whether a pafty
is- getting
positions of parties closely to NGOs who provide secretariat facilities, such as intergroups on
itr-poritiont, anã whtther the
íi,h -or" contact where there is disa-
"t"ãitg".¿,
(De BruYcker 2016)'
greement
Different committees have dif
different tYPes of civil societY
2015). Once a committee has
more difficult because the re
-f-offt..rury. can
th. p,ott" can be unpredictable' such that the plenary
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence
44 Interest Representation in the European Union 4S
tcr use EP facilities was to The European court of Justice and interest representation
rules requiring regulation for those wishing
et al.Z0O7). Corbett ãt "1. huu. suggested that the
-".i "if-_ri,. 1"CorË.tt effect on the working
scale of intergroup activity has had a considerable
in Stras-
methods of the et and in particular during the plenary sessions
held:
borrrg, where intergroup meetings are normally
i" ü. tig".¿ in the attendance register even when they were unable to
attend (Harlow 1'992)'
Citizen interest grouPs have
among Parliaments because of
producer interests the oPenness
iar and unpredictable territor¡
tions and the engagement of P
dedicated parliamentary liaison st
veto points
heteroclite and multipolar institution ... with multiple
andopportunltiesforhorsetradinganditisaninstitutionatthe
centre of the rise of European party politics and media
attention'
therefore requires
Effective inrerest representltion in the Parliament
approaches'
wider coalitiorrr, IËtt., networking, and non-technical
combined with an acute sense for regional or even locåi
political
priorities. (2009:40)
EU Decision-Making and Channels of Influence 47
46 Interest Representation in the European Union
oes en interests
qi which con-
"of
SMEs, the
The some of the
test cases.Iùlhile this is expensive,
mainstream citizen interests, such as those concerned with the environ-
ment, consumer affairs and disabilities. In order to address these issues,
the EESC developed a'Liaison Group' comprised of a selection of EU cit-
agencies (Euro-
for improvements ln a sample of
2015). The EP has increa
assisted bY watchdog NGOs
to steer a middle course be
Union EU Decision-MaÞing and Channels of Influence 51
50 Interest Representation in the Ewropean
barriers to integratlon Other policymaking procedures: social dialogue
used for EU objectives of removing non-tariff
Members of technical
through harmonizati;; ;i;;it;it"i 't""du'ds' awn from industr¡
social dialogue between EU employer and trade union organizations
committees incrude around 25,000 together with local
arose in the mid-1980s as part of a drive by commission presiáent Delors
to build a social aspect to the European single market. The macroeco-
details involved in nomic dialogue with public aurhorities, described earlier in this chapter,
selves (Egan 2001)' Some comPa- is one part of the social dialogue; anorher is the dialogue between the
and invest considerable resources social partners themselves. In return for the promise to ,t.- the tide of
benefits at stake (Egan 2001)' A social legislation, Delors asked employer and trade union organizations
national level devote a to engage in labour market dialogue as ,social partners', Ãd .ro-_
members with the tech- "
ber of agreements between them have arisen frorntheir'social dialogue,'
nstance' a studY of L35 including a small number with legislative effect.
1% had live contact with a Euro- At cross-sectoral level, there are six participating organizations, three
1997). Some of the extreme for employers and three trade unions, although the key organizations are
associations can PartlY be BusinessEurope and UEAPME (for business), cEEp (for public sector
standards committees' The employers) and ETUC (for labour) (chapter 1). Employeriparticipated
íalized associations in the European because they anticipated that 1992 would bring a uK Labãur goì.r.r-
esults from Comité EuroPéen de la ment, and with it remove the last obstacle to a veto on qualified major-
ity voting_in the social policy arena. BusinessEurope reâsoned that they
mittee is not constitutionally deter- would be better placed if they were in a position ro influence legislation,
compla some commit- and acceded to long-standing commission requests that they enter inro
mined by a general
tees are
"totto",é"tt,t"f"
ou.r-do-i""ä-ïy that they have an arrangement, together with GEEP and ETUC, for formalized social
t..,, ",.¿,o "du",,,i!;lll*h ïi:rî',:iï:-:l partnership with a legal basis in the EU treaties. These powers give the
social partners the opportunity to write EU employment measures by
mutual agreement either bypassing the Parliament, going directly to
the council for legislative endorsemenr) or through binding agreemenr
between themselves for implementation in the member states.
The first of these mechanisms, through council legislation, is driven
by a'negotiate or we'll legislate' dynamic from the commission, in that
where employers fail to do so the commission has the option of initiat-
ing a standard Directive, depending upon an assessment ãf its chances in
the other EU political institutions (Branch and Greenwood 2001; smis-
mans 2008). These factors introduce substantial politics into the equa-
s under this route stalledor broke
s-sectoral agreements of no more
Standardisation, which also attracts
funding from. the European
the last of which was in January
for (such as those con-
õ;ñ;i;;. This has resulted in some committees s either broke down or employers
cerned *ith *""'for considerable contention' but those agreements that have been
"otomäilË;ñ;tttg
,rä';l;r";î? g.".tl"uìirv ái tn' EU (Eichener and
ection for workers in a number of
the net resutt is
Voelzkow, in Eising 2009)' superior domestic legislation. The
Union EU Decision-Mahing and Channels of Influence 53
52 Interest Representation in the European
binding agreement between th This focus upon geographic representativeness (Pérez-Solórzano Bor-
nation;l level, became the de ragán and Smismans 2012) has spilled over from producer organizations
have been four such binding agre to NGOs (Chapter 6), with consequences for democratic legitimacy
through the potential to exclude 'what' groups whose existence is not
based around representing members but advocating for a cause for
whom representativeness is irrelevant, such as animal welfare and the
environment. This is considered further in Chapters 6 and 8.
Conclusions
The starting point for this chapter was rhat characteristics of political
systems and their structures of power and decision-making greatly influ-
civil aviation and maritime sectors ence the nature of interest representation. ìØhereas maj'oritarian regimes
concentrate power, fragmented and multi-level decision-making struc-
tures disperse it, resulting in the dilution of impact for any one rype
of interest constituency. Multiple-level opportunity structures thus have
a pluralistic effect, limiting the
ing venues for competitive lobby
sienificant, both as legislative institutions and their insulation
.rido*.d with elevated status ing others by opening up venue
should not be overstated' The si
movement is considered in Chapter
5'- ..
A noteworthy f;;';;" tiEtj social dialogue has been.the attempts
of organizations as a pre-
to estabrish .rit"riu îå, Àe represenrativeness
p"rü.ip"ii.n. Ar cross-r..tor"l level at the
outset
condition for their
54 Interest Representation in the European Union
Chapter 3
.5.t
Union The Regulation of Lobbying 57
56 Interest Representation in the European
toaconflictofpersonalinterest;engagit'ginoutsideactivitywithout
Union The Regulation of Lobbying 59
58 Interest Re\resentdtion in the European
laration of their professional activ- criticism concerns the absence of real sanctions and of structural inde-
ctions or activities' Chairs of any pendence from the industry, leading to an inability to satisfy regulatory
required to disclose donations of demands. Another version of regulation involves a scheme hosted by
creiarial assistance) to those enti- political institutions to which varying degrees of ease are atached to
cular effect upon the regulation of incentives for'lobbyists' who engage with the scheme, including access
have often undertaken to political institutions. Another version again would involve a formal
intergroups, where civil society organizations accreditation scheme for access linked to explicit organizational crite-
takes up a posi-
secretariatroles (Chapui zl'Á"y io'-tt MEP who
ria, such as those operated by the United Nations and the Council of
tion with a lobby organization lose Europe. The EU has the first two of these schemes, but has rejected de
members, such as access to the buil jure accreditation schemes, although there are arguments that its incen=
u
tive. schemes bear elements of de facto accreditation schemes (Green-
" ,o,ts on taking uP Positions wood and Halpin 2007).
office. Nonetheless, the gen- The first self-regulatory scheme in the EU was operated by commercial
upwa the EP recently introducing public affairs practitioners from 1994, and has its origins in gentle pres-
eral regulatory traiectory is
anizations which legislators sure applied by the Secretariat-General of the European Commission,
a'legislative footprint' it'ittt titt then anxious to protect its access to the resources which outside interests
interacted with in the preparation
bring by anticipating emerging pressures for regulation (Mclaughlin and
In essence, these rules are centre Greenwood 1995). This organization of 'Public Affairs practirioners'
by prohibition of excess, as well as (PAP) evolved into the present European Public Affairs Consulrancy
adversely...'). There are
Association (EPACA), with a code whose progressive development
parency of business (Ch ^ 1 of
^r Good
¡-^^Å Administrative
Code ^l-i-io reflects the strength of demand for regulation, but which has failed to
uments). The Europàan forestall regulation by political institutions. \ùØatchdog organizations
Behaviour .-br".. lawfulness, but extends beyond
"lro rimination and equal treatment' have tested out EPAClt's code and adjudication mechanisms by filing a
spect small number of allegations of conrravention. Another organization has
. The a wider embrace of membership, extending to business associations and
h the to'in-house' company public affairs managers, the Society of European
Affairs Practitioners (SEAP), which also operates a self-regulatory code
public (such as times for dating from the second part of the 1990s. The International public Rela-
'-ïh.J. provisions have ill; tions Association (IPRA) has a code of conduct dating from 2011. These
in EU institutions when al
.med
at organizations have developed slightly different policy positions about
i-p*t "p"" 'lobbying scenarios" Beyond this are measures the detail of the TR, operational from 2008. \x¡hile rhe self-regulatory
'lobbyists'. schemes remain in place, the principal regulatory instruments ãr. ,ro*
operated by EU institutions.
The regulat¡on of lobbYists
have oriented schemes
Definitional complexities leading to loopholes
such actors t0
,.golating lobbyists towards incentives upon
"i-.ã "t
participate rsion of this is to encourag€
xplicit disapproval
self-regulat f": i::-
participantofaccesstopoliticalinstltu- of
tions. As w ry ,.h.*t', the main Point
60 Interest Representation in the European Union
The Regulation of Lobbying 61
(wi sted) in a public for NGOs and thi funding. Entries must
and entry.as an individual
sch o the European be updated at least months of a change to
tågrti.r,în. Parliament's
cheme in 2011' the register arising ment (IIA). Enrries are
ðåÁ-irrio.t scheme in 2008 join the register' published directly with the Commission
-."rpã.",i"g the EP's access schemtjoin the register appears to.have been making random checks on entries and on unusual
However, the greatest incentive to
;ñ';;ü;.i; introduced tn20í4 in order to have a meeting with a zations publishing an entry are therefore answerab
new organ- 2016 proposal for a new IIA, the Commission has
êãrn-ìrtio"er or their Cabinet, and a director-general'.4000
joined the register since inffoduction of 'systematic' checks. The IIA seeks
;;;i;;, (around 40% ofrhe current population) the register carries cover officials of the council and the Presidenc¡ introducing a common
ihi, l".rdrnurk (European Commission 2016a)'Joining
principle that in order to have a meeting with anyone in the EU institu-
the obligation to abide bY th
mentally since the PAP code,
tions an organization cludes an open sanction
in this chapter) its terms and system to rqmedy an the present reputation-
al-based sanction of m the register. The IIA
is a Pre-requirement for lobbY also invites member states on a voluntary basis to include their permanent
ition at a Public hearing, and representations in its scope, an initiative aheady implemented by Ireland.
aPPear at a committee hearing Separatel¡ the Bureau of the European Parliament has introduced a vol-
ly. For the Commission it is a Pre- untary'legislative footprint', whereby a footnote will list all those con-
rt advisory groups' Commission may sulted during consideration of a measure in the EP. The Commission IIA
ered organizations (or otherwise must proposal excludes from its scope representative organizations of territo-
its 2016 proposal rial public authorities on the basis of their public narure, although some
invite registration at the start of any meeting)' and
to meet with of these were explicitly included in preceding versions of the scheme. In
for an inter-institutional agreement makes it a requirement
sum, the EP introduced its scheme in 1996; the Commission introduced
;;;;ili"l. À.ro* the Cãmmission, webpages related_to consultation its scheme, a 'Register of Interest Representatives' (ROIR) in 2008; the
áir"., org"nizations to making an entry in ihe tR' The Commission
lists
schemes were merged 1n 2011 into a common TR; and the 2016 IIA pro-
separately in its consultation
poses extension to the Council. The use of the term'Transparency Regis-
*hi.h are, and are not' on the ter'was meant to make it easier for organizations which had objected to
are warned that the contents of t
the term 'interest representative', making public transparency the focus.
weight than that of a Private indi
The development of the ROIR demonsrrares how the commission works
becárrs. of the difficulties of Polic
together with organizations which share its policy goals.
consultation alerts for nominated i
lobbying organizations' and beyond this A final change proposed to the 2016 scheme is worthy of note. The
de fac
2011 Transparency Register included a definition of lobbying as
it has get for ãrganizations to advertise them-
selves itg EU institutional platform' despite
"t
linkage to EU public policymaking. allactivities directly or indirectly
- having no more than tenuoús
some
registration to a'Transpar- influencingt ¡ of policy and thê
in. basiã of the present scheme involves
p,rblt web dat zaíons decision_mak irrespìctiv! of where
"";'i;;i*r;
1åã..tnän p,rbii. authorities) ^
tttk,:: they are unde
used,
- of commrrnication
ìnflo.rr." p,-tbli. policy. The key
dtsclo-
inter'
sure element, ,.rrroo.rdi,, gt organi"
s;
and the key wi{e;ringing definition is a mark of distinction for the TR, notably
est categorizurion; *t o iJ"på'""ttd;-missiorlinterest
areas' lfr¡
tts breadth in including indirect activities. This takes in its scope public
representation; and,
recent legislative fiI., *oìk"å o.r; ,p.rrãi.rg on interesr
The Regulation of Lobbying
62 lnterest Representation in the European Union 63
Register of
The emergence of the European Commission
Interest RePresentatives
The first announcement of a Commission
lobby regulation scheme in
documentation. This latter action seems to have marked the end of the
close working r seems to have been perceived as
hostile by Cabi responded by making the doc-
umentation thu ilable through the ETI website.
organization, the CorPorate The differences between these two parties on the operational issues sur-
of business lobbYing, and a new rounding the registration scheme became apparent thereafter. Nonethe-
gendas earlY in his term of office' less, their close working relationship, the list
oPe Observator¡ Erik'SØesselius' of co the most frequent outside correìpondent
. new Commission in the autumn with elius himself. In sum, the items of .o.r.-
ierYatorY
)cating a
e USA. T
responsible Commission service was not
General of the) Commission saw no need
to change the existing arraîBe'
ments. He re-sent a similar advoca
nomination to the corporate Europe observatory's'worst
lobby' award.
Union
66 Interest Representation in the European
Chapter 4
assessment' of proposed legislative
Commission (ChaPter 8), in that st
Business lnterests and the
Professions
wider signifrcance to have emerged
which an anti-globalization activ-
tus with Cabinet Kallas during the
This demonstrates a keY Point
f this volume; that the imPact of
e extent to which its goals coincide
itical junctures' rather than the type
of interest rePresented'
exchange. The mechanics of achieving this liberal vision has meant thar
ration
f eco_
'made
he EU
67
7_
Business Interests and the Professions 73
the EuroPean Union
72 Inlerest RePresentd ilon in
Key features
-üíhile the reasons for specialization were provided in Chapter 1, some of
the consequences have been reserved for description in this chapter. Apart
fiom chimney sweeps there are, for instance, specialist associations ded-
icated to the producers of heat pumps, autoclaved aerated concrete, and
six different types of glass products (each with their own associations).
Xlhile many specialisms can be explained around divisions in the product
chain, others reflect'issues' rather than sectoral clusters. Some of these
did not stâft life as representative associations at all, but as'issue niche'
organizations created by an entrepreneur'selling' a 'winnable' issue in
order to cÍeate a flourishing member organization (Browne 1990), or as
technology clusters in EU research framework programmes.
Around three-fifths of all EU associations are pure federations
(i.e. those which have only national associations as members), a quar-
ter embrace both national associations and firms, and around one-sixth
have only companies as members (Greenwood 2002b). These latter
orgaîizatíons are almost exclusively large firm clubs. The mixed types
of member group are usually associations drawn from sectors with a
significant large firm population. These typically started life as federa-
tions, and sought to embrace the best of both worlds by attracting the
resources, status and expertise that large firms bring, while retaining their
claim to comprehensive representation. They also respond to the realities
of being'bypassed' by multinationals in their domain that are active in
Brussels. Of greatest significance is, however, that the membership base
of national associations and large firms results in a very low degree of
Olsonian-type'collective action problems'. Olson challenged the basis
of interest group analysis by questioning whether like-minded interests
would automatically associate. Using behavioural principles derived
from economics, Olson used the concept of rational pursuit of interests
on the part of the potential member to show how membership would not
arise if benefit could be derived without bearing the cost of membership.
That is, if the benefit of interest group activity could be obtained without
lolnlng SO the most logical be haviour would be to 'free n de' the benefit.
Free ridi ng would partl cular
v arlse ln the political representa tl on work
of rnterest gro UPS, tn that any benefits negotiâted with stâte a uthorities
would apply unl versally such AS ind ì.rstry regula tlon of deregula tlon
rather than be restr icted to nterest gfoup
mem bers only In consequence,
0lson argued, nterest groups would nee d to develop pecial
rncentr VCS
were only accessible through membership (Olson 1965)
7-
also acknowledges the presence of calcula tlon and a membership decision. European Automobile ACEA 20
But some may not even undertake this For some large firms membershiP Manufacturers Association
once con-
became 'habit' and, even if the original membership decision European Association of Craft, Small UEApME
20
sdtuted a calcula ted decision, their continued affiliation
may not ha YC and Medium-Sized Enrerprises
degree of
req uiied any thought or actlon. In sectofs where there IS a high EuroCommerce
18
IS never
similarity ln the lssues facing members assoclatlon membership European Cemenr Industry CEMBUREAU '1.7
seriously q uestioned In industries where the case for collecti
ve actlon ls Association
a higher consideration
less apparent, the cost of non-membershi p ma v be EURELE CTRI C
Union of rh e EURELECTRIC
p. can include the loss of abilirY Electricity Indu stry I6
than the benefits of membershi These COSTS
The ERT
x sent bv the ERT to the'lune description. Several things combined to get things moving. Most mem-
Mattl whicú member state leaders ber state governments had been elected on largely liberal market plat-
1985 . at forms by the early 1980s, replacing the more left-oriented governmenrs
rolect:
were of the 1.970s. In October 1984 the European summir settled the UK
budget rebate and Greek entry problems, which had stalled EU politics
for so long, while the European economy was finally growing again aÍter
the oil crisis, unemployment was coming down and optimism was in the
air. By January 1985, Commissioner Cockfield was working remarkably
well with Delors, and had galvanized everyone with his White Paper on
completion of the single market by the end of 1992.The 1985 Milan
Eur.opean Summit endorsed the White Paper and agreed that it could be
implemented only if the treaty were changed to allow QMV on single
cop market issues. Even member state leaders who were committed Euros-
leo ceprics, such as Margaret Thatcher, were committed to seeing this goal
sto through.
This scenario casts the ERT as a supporting,rather than causal, agent
position. (Mattli 1999 280)
for a process which would have happened anyway (Young and lØallace
2000). Undoubtedl¡ ERT sat alongside Delors at his press conferences
and gave legitimacy to the single market project. The popularity of
accounts suggesting its influence was more causal is a flag of conven-
ience for those who wish to portray it so. The ERT participates in the
rarefied atmosphere of 'high politics', in which its voice is just one of a
number seeking influence upon public policies, alongside forces such as
national governments and the international environment. Undoubtedl¡
it contributes to the climate of debate, and to the influences upon some
of these decision-making forces. But, as with all interest group-based
explanations of the policy process, the simple and uncritical connection
should not be made between demands and public policy outcomes.
The reputed strength of the ERT derives from its membership profile
and format. Its policy positions are built directly by its members, with
one asked to take the lead on a particular issue through a working party.
The member's company will then use its informal networks with others
in order
to build a position before returning to the formal structures of
the ERT, followed by presentation in one of the twice-yearly plenary
meetings. In addition to written communiqués and publications in which
posltlons are presented, memb ers are use d to take the message to the
level through face-to-face communlcatlon wl th Euro pe's leading
and policymakers (van Apeldoorn 2001). This rather flat and
membership-driven strucrure, together with its cohesiveness and
to come to rich common positions, finds its supporters elsewhere
I
Union Business Interests and the Professions 85
84 lnterest Representation in the Europeøn
Its membership constituency fishing in the same pool for members. The emergence of the ERT reflects
in the business representation community' general accounts of how a group comes forwaìd through the work of
in both the size and struc-
äüry ;.Ëliiu"ir,¿ ,"lutiutly homogenous executives with broadly similar 'entrepreneurs' (Davignon/Gyllenhammer) spotting and filling a niche
ture of firms, and i" d;"*;g óon chiãf
represent or to discipline' does gap in the representarion population (Salisbury 1969;Brown llOO¡.
worldviews. It has no ;;b'tt; to either
2000)' and chief exec-
;;i;;;';""ernabilitv frobl"-''- 1u"" Apelãoorn their company to ERT
utives are in a unique pãri,io., to lànd thå name of EUROCHAMBRES
EUROCHAMBRES has 45 national chambers of commerce (from Iceland
to Israel) as member organizations, which in turn encompass regional
ardlocal chambers. In the old member states, chambers of commerce are
differentiated from national business and employer organizations as a
distinct brand whose strength lies in regional and local organization, with
a mass of SME members and a strong service provision orientation to
its members. In the EU-28 and beyond, national chambers of commerce
have often played a role as the principal business organizarion. At the EU
level, where political representation is the principal requiremenr of busi-
ness associations because service functions are required less by national
business member organizations, the identity of EUROCHAMBRES is
squeezed.It lies somewhere between the predominance of BusinessEurope
and the greater recognition of UEAPME as an SME representarive
orgarLtzation. These realities mean that EUROCHAMBRES has had
to find its own distinct niche away from centre stage. One has been to
develop strong institutional ties with the Committee of the Regions.
A second has been to be an EU learning forum for horizontal business
interest organizations from central and eastern European countries, and
an outlet for their political representarion. A third distinct role has been
an unusual one for EU business associations, a service-related role in
acting as a point of contact for export advice, business partner searchers
through its network, and advice in chamber development. A fourth role
has been to act as a partner with the European commission for the deliv-
prrncipa strengths
AS an assocratlon.
The strong emphasis on servtce
work relatl VC to political representa-
partly r eflects the d lvers tty of the mem
bershi p of EURO CHAMBRES
r
Union Business Interests and the professions g7
86 Interest Representdtion in the Europeøn
preferences of multina- and constitution of professions, which in turn helps explain their collec_
Levy and Prakash's analysis of the changing tive action problems at the EU level. There
in internatio"ãl gou"ttt"nce leads them to
,iorr"i'.orforations trvnÑòtl
diff.r..rt national tradi-
"t. the
dons of organizing, with certain interesrs from prof.rriorr,
conclude that to wider units of organization or operaring indepenàentty. r"ìrr", "rnii"r.¿
,rr"..
gentle giants pursui.ng the differences are reproduced at the European leveì, and create diffiáulties
MNCs are neither omnipotent ogres nor and other for some EU associations in defining the parameters of their own mem-
äil ;;"r.r,; ,"rt.tihev barlain-witñ st"tes' NGOs' agreements and bership constituency. one branch of the profession from a particular
;;;;; ;t.t the form "íd "i"ttot" of internationalsuggests that while counrry may well be represented by a different European assoiiation to
;t-"r ... th. ,.srrlt"ntl,td"tttrni""cy of outcomessucceed in imposing its counterpart in another country. Thus, Italian civil engineers educate
il;iä;;;;;ã*ìtr"r actors' thev doendPointnot alwavs
when corPorations rule and license architects, who are organized separately.ls.w"h.r. in Europe;
s anã states are also building their dentistry in Italy is subsumed within g..r..àl medicine; and rhere are no
ities and act effectively in interna- counrerparts.to British solicitois and barristers (orzack 1991). French
003:147-8) pharmacis.ts have.prescribing powers but their premises and establish-
ment âre llcensed by government, whereas uK pharmacists have no pre_
scribing rights but their premises and practice righrs are controilej by
their professional association. Architecture in France has primarily been
Professional ¡nterests rcgarded as one of the liberal arts, whereas in other .o.r.r,rì., it is treated
surrounding interest rep- as a technical Practice.
of all types of civil society interests, ISSUCS
European Managers
ln 1 989 from the International
Confe dera tl on of Professions, the
IS an independent organ'zaÎlon with French orlgtns and oflenta
representing SA laried
managers ln industr¡ the pub lic sector, trade
commerce through
national CTOSS -sectoral assocl atlons of manag-
E uro pean level
ectoral assocratrons. It has a dedicated office
with post holders from ln
national memb er organna trons sharing
It comprises 1 6 na tl onal cross-sectofa
assoclatlons from
Interest Representation in tbe European Union
Business Interests and the professions 101
100
a Professions with single unified âssoclatlon ln a member state may . At the other end of the spectrum are organizatio
^ of organizations represent- narrow specialisms a little adrift of the mainstr
need to malntaln affiliations to a number
Association, for lnstance, places far from the cenrre of EU decision-mak
lng mlcro specialisms The British Medical
medical assoclatrons coveflng artached to scientific institutes. Examples of
malntalns affiliations to a range of EU
specialisms such AS senlor hospital
physicians, junlor doctors and European Association of Handwriting Analysts and the European
general practltlonerst AS well AS the more
generlc Standing Committee Association of Fish Pathologists. The European Showmen's uiion
of E uropean Doctors and the European U nlon
of Medical Specialists, and the European Association of Plastic surgery are other examples
ves embrace other of the vast range of highly specialized inreresrs which have formed
In turn, some of these organrza tlons themsel
While there EU associations.
assoclatlons representlng medical specialisms
between the principal organizations, there
inevitab ly anse ISSUCS a The constituency of associations representing the professions
definitional includes more than its fair share of those which have beãn invenred
co-or dination between them. Reflecting the
discussed earlier, some of the medical
assoclatlons differ by by an entrepreneur in search of a livelihood. some of these are oper-
practltloners' An examination ated by a segment of Association Management companies, usuãlly
sentlng salaried and independent,
reveals that operating from a base in Brussels, or in the Netherlanãs where these
the membershiP lists of each of these organlzatlons
the European arfangements are common. Some of these tend to be less
have significant membershiP ga PS, such AS towards political representatlon than afe most
oriented
Physicians (AEMH) which has no mem ber EU AS soclatlons
of Senior Hospital because their prlncl pal pur pose ls ncome generatlon for the creator,
the British Isles. and profes sional offer prospects AS
a Some professions have differen t âssocla
tl ons for the same attractlve high -lncome eafners
that and a good profile. At this qulr
informed by differen t na tional traditions within found the very few exampl
ky end of the S pectrum ate to be
the principal assoclatlon FEANI CS of assoclatlons with membership a vail
englneerlng, for lnstance, to pflv ate indiv iduals. There are also
d 'Ingénieurs has those w hich afe dri ven by
Européenne d Associations Nationales entrepreneurs with we bsite funded
C ivil
assoclatlont ECCE European Council of
), from advertisi ng reYenue.
example IS the F ederati on
contend with, which leans more towar ds the architecture of E uropean now International
102 Interest Reþresentation in tbe European Union Business Interests and the professions 103
vented itself from an orgariization respective practices. In some of these fields, the role of EU associations is
ding) seeking to represent labour restricted to that ator. The balance of..rporrri_
companies to one positioning itself bilities in the impl tion is vested more in.r"tion"l
as a network of human resource professionals' associations than s, both for sectoral and generalized
directives affecting the professions (Evetts 2000).
once implementation activities are undertaken by others, so associa-
tions have to strive to find a role if they seek to b.coÅ.
-o.. ih"r, simply
organizations based around the dissemination of information and the
inrerpretation of EU legislation for their members. For most EU associa-
tions, this can be found through early detection and shaping of
and in leading their members' analyses of what their l.rtä.srr""r. "g.nd"r,
o'
ransnational issues. Few of the EU associations of the professions are
endowed with sufficient capacities to undertake these latter activities,
and were one of the major reasons why the establishment of sectoral
directives aimed at mutual recognition of qualifications either failed or
took up to 25 y,earc to complete. Even in the relatively better organized
EU professional associations, such as the ccBE, conracrs with thã Euro-
pean commission are insufficiently strong, and consequently the com-
mission still needs to turn to the national associations.
Given the differences in composition within the professions, rhe
difficulties of their EU associations in achieving ih".,
lowest common denominator positions between their "nyt-hing ^or"
mem"bers is inevi-
table (Klüver et al. 2015), and it is little surprise that past aurhors have
reached this conclusion (see, for instance, Arnison, in ñeale 1994). rn a
survey of British professional groups, Neale found a marked pr.f"r..r..
for developing their own channels of interest representation io Eurcrpe,
rather than using Euro groups (Neale r9g4). Nãtionaland sectoral
dif-
ferences remain so strong that collective interest representation
is often
dealt with on an issue-by-issue basis using differentllliances
of national
associations' Thus, there. was something of a 'free-for-aLl'
among
national and sub-national bar associations in making
representations
during the course of the 1998 Directive
on the right"of e'stablishment
tfre tesa t professi on. such intra-coun rry
[11
differeîces u..o-.- -"gni
ued to extremes when attempts are made to reach
the EU level.
collective vi.w! at
L04 Interest Re7resentation in the European Union
their voluntary schemes to assist the small numbers of their members who
at the domestic level and vis-à-vis
in rurn strengthened their role wish to engage in cross-border practice. Beyond the sectoral level, the
inrer-sectoral associations have struggled to find any significant role,
and some have statutes that prevent them from ever doing so. Where
¡þe sectoral ones can find a niche in supporting their national members
and finding common mutual interests, such as the opening up of global
lil/TO liberalization, they have been able to make a
and the narkets through
marked conffibution'
degree I
Evetts 2
Conclusions
Business interests demonstrate a high tendency towards fragmentation,
observed as the norm in collective associations and within large multi-
national enterprises. The choice is between specialist collective organi-
zadon, with low capacity to co-ordinate common interests across linked
soecialisms, or large umbrella organizations where co-ordination is pos-
,ibl. bu, a high degree of collective action is difficult because of the
oroblems of reaching common positions between divergent interests.
ivluch membership of business associations is informed by the need to
influence association positions (and particularly for damage limitation),
¡ather than an expectation of a high capacity for collective action. Many
úade association executives have limited autonomy to deviate from
membership instructions, not least because the impact of losing a mem-
ber is significant in associations where the number of members (national
tions and multinational firms) is relatively low when compared to
counterparts, and because EU associations depend upon mem-
subscriptions because of their concentration upon political rep-
Some multinationals also have little central co-ordinating
to reconcile the different positions of their product divisions. In
business solidarity is less than that of environmental, or labour,
because of the absence of a common outlook. Sectoral and
market characteristics mostly predict the governability of asso-
such as the presence of a commodity product, and firms of a
size. But the most common picture is that market power is a poor
of political power. The EU is primarily a regulatory regime, and
typically divides the interests of capital, producing compering
hile busine SS prefere nces can be difficult to construct because
of calcula tlng COSTS and benefits. The p u blic affalrs man
companies spend a substantial amount of time trying to make
Union
L08 Interest Representdtion in the European
with each other, with the ln 2 007- 8 established how had become used AS a vehicle to bri
them if.they would engaSe 1n a formal dialogue be
would halt the flood of draft wor ker repfesentatr ves ln to 'sel ng' red uced worki ng tl me to lts work-
incenti ve for employers that participation
that 'if you want force (Timesonline 201. 1 Another colourful exampl e was w hen an Air
directives 1n the social field Delors told
the emPloYers
you must o btain the support of France VØor ks Council degenerated lnto d efrocking the huma resources
the single market to be completed, then
can you lmaglne me trylng to create the single market director (Reuters 2 0 15 Nonetheles S, a failure to consult over signifi-
the ftade unlons
Tyszkiewicz 1.998 A cafi t company p lans, such âS a merger or red undancies has led to tem
agalnst the wishes of the trade unlons
1.
provides ETU C with an elev ated potaty lnJ unctlons ln S ome countrles preventl ng the propo e d actron.
Participation ln the social dialogue ln the
well as for ETU C members F,rne recounts the role of the EW C ln the merger/ d ownslzlng cas e of
status 1n EU pub lic policymaking, AS
recrult and retain ABB. Alstom ln co-ordi natlng actlons ln the fa ce of competltlo n Íor local
hational contextt which helps these organizations
hard alongside BusinessEurgÞe pfo duction capacltles among company subsidiaries, and ln mo bilizing
members Conseq uentlY, ETU C fought
and theii respective roles in it in the Lisbon at EU evel which led to Euro pean Commission endorsement of a rescue
to maintain the mechanism (Er¡e 20 0 8
from social partnership
Treaty Nonetheless the actual achievements the EW C Directive has not prevented the use of 'social
needed to make significant
aÍe modera te Chapter 2 ), and ETUC
has dump-
ln an a ttempt to malntaln the mechanisms to move pro duction to chea per STTCS across borders,
concessrons to individual agreements
irtg' lt
agreements on part-trme work has made lt mofe difficul to do SO wl thout involving the workforce ln
wider significance of the mechanism The
Branch and Greenwood 2 001 and telework Pochet conjunctton with other rela te d meas ures. These nclude 2 002 Direc-
F alkner t998
and sacrificial terms. tlve 200211 4tEC) esta blishing a general framework for informing and
20 0 3 have been interpreted 1U. these symbolic îg employees where a much ower threshold appli CS with fur-
la bour market agendas are consulti
Beyond social partnershiP particiPatorY
European \for ks Council E\vC) ther inÍormatlon and consulta tl on safeguards involv lng company Stra
develop rng at a aúable rate. The
workers with à right to informa tron teglc decisi on likely to affect their employment lnterests; and a 1 99 8
Directive (94t4slEC) provides'!lor
ks Councils, applicable ln Directi VC with minimal proY lslons for information and consulta tron on
consulta t10n companles vla
at least 1 5 0 1n two ællecti ve re dundancies 9 8t s9/EC) Such measures are hardly worker
em ploying 1 000 workerst w hich includes tlon, but they do provide for a basic level of legall enforcea ble
states. ETUC estrmates tha t around
60% of the workforce could v
20 1 1 b but the to informati on and consultation.
tially be covered by such Councils ETU C Some of the large national confederations from high
proportlon around
Foundation estlmates that a much smaller labour maf-
conditions, and with stfong relationships ln domestic politics,
900 ln num ber
million workers actually aÍe) compr 1S lng over difficulty ln seer ng significa nt galNS through EU measufes aimed
ha ve
lished to date(uNI Euro pa 2016 This IS beca use the Directive at
from at least 7 0 0 minimal cross-bor der S tandards. N onetheless, the EU do CS
upon managemen t lnl tlatl ve or request an oppoftunlty to seek to export' higher protectlo
(Euro pean F ounda tron
across member sta tes to establish one n conditions
standard memb er states ln a stra tegy aimed a t countering
'!lhere they have been esta blished, identified prob lems incl ude the social
and 'consulta tlon ln the The strong and well-resource d German trade
1n which the definition of 'information
untons have his-
practlce, and the viewed the EU through this lens, AS an addi tional
trve eads to varrable interpreta tlon ln adequatel v dealt with through the national
âfena w hich
In some the resul t IS 1i ttle more than envlronment, and ã ble
meet once a yeaÍ only. CASCS
their needs adequately at the domes tlc level
tatlon, but there aÍe
bolic practlce based on minimalist implemen other countrles, particularly those
Roethig 1 994 In
pro actl VC CASCS European F oundation 2 00 8 :4 with more ln the south and east of Europe,
level represents significan t new o pportunities
meettngs and SU b-committeestructures with comprehensive to develop
consul tatlo n over For some national confedera tlons, membershi
tlon provlslon, though rarely extending rnto their role vls a -vls lts national members,
p of E TUC
cepts. 'Proactive cas CS ate more likely
to be found ln companles beca use rt pro-
maln route for them to a ddress
U ntil recentlyt the Volkswagen the European level A British
there aÍe centralize d structur ES
lea der d urlng the Tha
was held up as a model of good practlce, until court CASCS ln tcher er encouraged colleagues to see
120 Interest Representation in the European Union
Løbour Interests 12I
'Brussels as the only card game in town' (Trades Union Congress 19B8),
although commentators have suggested that EU trade union organiza-
tion is no substitute for domestic weakness (Roethig 1,995).
There is no uniform trend of union embeddedness in political systems
across the member states, or of changes over time, and the picture ig
complicated as governments change and the belief systems of parties,
labour organizations and governments evolve. However, the wider exter-
nal forces to which member states have been subjected have made it dif-
ficult for unions ingrained in quasi-corporatist systems to maintain thg
full strength of the positions they once held in domestic politics. ì7here
the labour movement has not been marginalized in domestic settings, it
is difficult to see how its position could be significantly advanced by the
context of EU politics in which it operates. Nonetheless, the stakes ¿¡s
too high for disengagement, and all have invested in EU-level organi-
zation. And trade union links with sympathetic national governrnents
ensure that the movement has a spread of avenues of influence within EU
policymaking to match those it enjoys within the EU instirutions. Here,
union organizations to impac
the trade union movement has institutionalized access to policymaking,
members (Offe 1981). These
particularly in DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, wirh qne
consider during analyses of la
member of the Delors cabinet once famously describíng that Commission
service as a'union lobbying organisation, old style' (Ross 1994:507).
The natural links between trade unionists and the S&D Party in The European organization of labour
interests
European Parliament (EP) provide it with important access, and
EP has been a strong supporter of a'European Social Model'. The
liament's work includes a strong and effective trade unions
with which ETUC meets monthl¡ and close connections between
SScD party and European trade union leaders. ETUC has been
to table amendments in the Parliament through this route. I
the relationship between these two actors has been so strong that
former UNICE Secretary General, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, once
plained that'ETUC has a privileged relationship with the
Parliament which shares its objectives and consistently passes
tions by a large majorit¡ advocating social policies that business
unacceptable' (Stern 1994:1,41,). A source of tension does,
remain in the way in which the social dialogue procedure
the EP.
Labour interests comprise one of the three categories of interest
the Economic and Social Committee, as Group II (workers). There
obvious limitations to the rmpact of this adv lsory body
but the effort ln vested by employers to ensure the orSantza tlon ls
1,22 Interest Representdtion in the European Union Løbour Interests 123
the corridors of power in British politics. In the early years of its forma-
tion ETUC was only just more than a co-ordination centre for national
trade union confederations to engage the European level (Roethig 1994;
Dølvik and Visser 2001). Early analysis emphasized overall weakness,
with fragmentation and diversity the unwieldy na ture of tS federal
structure, the indi vidualized actl vttres of tS mem bers, tendency to
est common denominator positions, and an over-dependence upon
Commission to achieve its goals (Visser and Ebbinghaus 1992;
1 9 94; Roethig 1 9 94'' Armingeon 1 9 94; Ross 1 9 94; Roethig
Hoskyns 19 96 Marks and McAdam 1 99 6 Síallace and Young 1 9e7),
These earlier analyses pre-date the full development of social
at EU level which brough t to ETU C members SCNSC of the need Íor
organlzatlon to develop beyond a co-ordination centre, alongside a
rng realization of the impact of monetary unlon. Looking back at
development of ETUC toda Y' lts greatest strengths have been lts
rty alongside the marntenance of rts breadth, and rts bility to respond
the co-ordination challenges presente d by monetarv unl0n and to
from reliance on an'insider' strategy to one which includes mass
lization. This is significant, because large-scale demonstrations are
un usual ln EU politics because of the lnstltutlo nal tza tlon of interest
resenta tlon, the logi stical difficulties of assembling cross-border
and the difficulties of engagrng mass constrtuencres ln EU- related
t has d eveloped some \ /ay from the càÍtcature of Martin and Ross
1,26 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
A single market in services and labour cfeates substantial issues for labour
interests. Trade unions have accepted the concept as an inevitabilit¡ miti-
gâring its effects as well as progressing its interests through adaptation to
make what it can of the changes it brings, and to focus upon the agendas
presented by a'European Social Model' and a'Europe of the citizens'. For
ifree markets' read're-regulation'. Ilhile this does not bring a European
system of industrial relations, with limited outcomes from the social dia-
logue and'\ü[orks Councils, the former has provided trade union organiza-
tions with an elevated status in EU and national policymaking and acted
as a recruiting sergeant for EU and national unions, as well as engaging A str iking deve lopment IS the comlng o Í age
o f ct ttze n lnter es
narional trade union leaders in EU policymaking at domestic and EU otgaîna tron mo bil att and represen ta tron a t EU eve There S a
levels. And the labour movement has established a European benchmark, dense landsca p of non gover nmental organt atrons NGO S
orga n
and significant cross-border co-operation structures, to respond to the ized a nd a dvoca tlng a t EU evel for virtually every lmagtna b e L
a use,
potential for deflationary effects caused by monetary union. from the unem pl oyed to M US lm wome to grou ps coun terlng the
Dølvik and Visser drew attention to the ways in which European trade long- held monopoly of producer gf o p S ln echnica domains
S uch
union structures have been weakest at the sectoral level where national as frnancia efvrces A n um ber of EU N GO S aÍe a
SO rela tl vely we ll
unions are strongest, and strongest at the peak level where national resourced One segme n a lone envlronmen tal NGO S, has
ver 1, 3 0
unions are weakest (Dølvik and Visser 2001; Martin and Ross 2001). EU -onente d staff and self -declare a n a nnual spend on
lo b bvi ng
'While these assessments remaln valid, unlon solidarity remalns relati vely the EU nstr tutlon of oYer € 1 3 milli on The lø'ùøF European
Policy
strong ln comparlson wl th business. And there ha ve also been consider- 0ffice, Tr anspo rt and the Environment, nd the European
Co NS um
ble changes and mltlgatlng factors. \øhi 1e sectoral unlon ers Organizatron e ach h as a staffing complemen t
com pata ble to the
has developed little ln breadth, rt has developed SU bsta ntially n group of best- res o urced busines S organt tlons, b ar
one (Ta b 4 1
most notably with the extent of orSanna tlon of the EMF, the N G o h ve recently ocate d a yarrcty o Í we al rh
Pu blic Services U nron and UNI Europa. These organizations and ^ v independent
tl ons from w hich to draw fi nancla SU pport In d vid ual
have demonstrated the capacity to lead and co-ordinate in critical NGO S
highl v networ ked by fo rmal organna tlon S
and inform al struc-
cumstances, developing new infrastructure to proactively engage wl thin a nd âcro SS SC gments sometrme S
wor king al o ngsl de
and opportunltles, to organlze new segments of labour and to another ln purpose fenova ted buildings,
often wor king on olnt
lob bylng at EU level with significant InASS mobiliza tlon ETU C has Manifestos with a coheren t o ut o o k for people
and the
nota blv pursued a dual strategy of institutionalized E U lob bying (EEB 20 1 0 ate published together
by co alition pa rtn ers with
lnASS mo bilization. This has contribute d to the withdra wal of o f scope to ma tch those of p o li tl
cal partles standing for
modification of Iegislati ve proposals such AS port servlces, company An d, significantl Y, ocl al movement
structures which li
OVCTS and general servlces, and the introduction of legisla trve the 'usual SUS pects' of lnstltu
'Workers tlo nalized Brussels N G Os ha VC
such AS the Posted Directi ve. ETUC has notably shifted the EU uslng yarl u S c hannels linked
to p li cymaking
to add mass mobilization its institutional lobbying, with a host
to oÍganlza trons such a S F rl e nd S of the
Earth a, nd Gre en p eace
successful demonstrations to its name in an environment 20 1 5
difficult to mobilize within. Furthermore, its institutionalized the Europ ea n
Communi ty w à S dri ven b the single mârket
has shifted away from reliance upon DG Employment, Social ln the decade fo v
lowing the c orresponding tÍeatY' so glanc
and Inclusion to relations with the Parliament where mass of the core co n temporary e
de ba tes S lnce the Trea ty on Euro-
makes an impact. Attempts to create a'Europe of the citizens' te vea S tha has come to be gripped by disco ur e
about
at the least, measures of 'output legitimacy' for workers.
127
128 Interest Representation in the European Union Citizen Interests 129
its legitimacY. Much of the his The landscape of c¡t¡zen interest groups
inp,rit"gitl-acy (ParticiPati gh
rathlrìhan outp bY
"rãã"í"1
mod.l of :participatory democracy
tic
oi-otgu"i;"d citten groups as a means .to I th
í), explains why organizations articulating
"n¿
,trã" ãf thre citizen have-arrived at the centre of
Si."ft ttg""izations have successfully used the d
their
.i",i. t.iitimacy for this purpose,'framing'linkage 6.7 Members of the EU Ciuil Society Contact Group
TABLE
key terms (Börang and Naurin 2015)' The
of policy-agendag
to'p o p,rl d i sc o rir s e is caPture drit,o,t.\m:il
"r' *Ir:Tl ri'Jilî:; Social Platform t Groups organized
oric, symbols and PolicY analYsis' licy field, spanning
zey 2000:339). The all-imPortant acy. Initiated by EU
nd'framed' create policy priorities ization in sector
process. These factors have helped with elevated status in institutions. Seven staff.
European NGO Confederation for Relief and
to propel citizen issues to the fore of EU policy agendas' CONCORD
i öor.,-.r.rication from the Er ropean Commission in 2000, 'The Development, comprising 20 international networks
and28 national associations across Europe. Lead
commission and NGos: Building a Stronger Partnership" issued in
six main reasons partner of DG Development. 13 staff.
,h. ,t"-., of its president and vice-president' lists for
co-operation with organized civil society: Human Rights Network organization of 50 outlets of international
and DemocracY peace and human rights, organizations, active at EU
Network level.
fostering participatory democracy
as information relaYs Greenl0 'Family'network of ten environmental NGOs active
representlng the vrews of specific groups of cltrzens
to the EU at EU level, which purposefully co-ordinates resources
co ntributing to policymaking between parriciparing organizations. 130 staff.
contributing to prol ect management and policy/programme European Confederation of 31 national organizations and 19
mentatlon Vomen's Lobby trânsnational organizations. Secretariât of ten staff,
a contributing to European integration (European (ETüL) plus interns.
2o0ob). Culture Action Family of 90 transnational and narional member
Europe organizations working on EU culture issues, Seven staff.
These roles âre mrxture of 'in put' and 'output legitimac¡ and Public 47 transnational organizations and 41. national
fore hel p to explain the actlvrsm of EU political
lnstltu tlons 1n the Alliance organizations working in public health field. Ten
As well AS respo nding
ma tlon and malntenance of lnterest groups. staff, plus interns.
lncentl VCS provided by EU political institutions Chapter ),
1
Civil Umbrella of 40 European networks active in
w hich identified and
ha VC als o emerged to fill 'niches are Plarform education and training. Six staff.
the
entrePreneurs To the above list can also be added Lifelong
by keeping office hol ders to âccount'
functions exercised by NGOs,
accountabil lty limited, themsel YCS not
flip side IS that their own 1S LLL)
ChaPrcr
accounta ble to those upon whom their ad vocacy impacts Organizarion
websites
130 Interest Representdtion in tbe European Union Citizen Interests 131
not in
Nøme Year Social Role
TABLE 6.2 cross-sectoral EU citizen interest associations (AcrortYm) Estab. Platform
membership of the Ciuil Society Contact Group Member?
-
funding from EU institutions.
tt isirfficult to establish a precise figure for the total extent of funding
by EU rnstltutl0ns of N GO s, WI th estlma tes from Commission ources
1 bi lion. Thus, the Commission discussion paper
varyrng from € 1
of 2000 issued in the nâme of President Barroso and Vice-
Kinnock recorded that
EU NGOs
TABLE 6.3 EIJ fund.ing of PrinciPal
F inancial TrtnsQ 4r en cY
Funding
Orgønization year Datubase (Year if different
to column 2)
of incorne
€220,000155"/"
2014 €2,166,000
Culture Action EuroPe €2,246,953
€1,725,351184o/"
Network zjt4
European Anti-PovertY
(EAPN) €2,525,732199"/'
2014 €2,566,062
Service
EuroPean Citizen Action
(ECAS) €2,5 53 ,2891 52"/"
2014 €4,726,327
EuroPean Consumer
Organisation (BEUC) €0
2015 €5,000
F-uroÞean Council for
VoluntarY
õrg"iir"tions (CEDAG) €48,355
€1,313,579140"/"
Bureau 201,5
European Environmental
(EEB)
A formal dialogue structure dating from major commission \x/hite papers of the early to mid-1990s,
in dialogues with the European Commrssion'
dates from 1961.' and such as rhose on Grouth, competitiueneis and Emptoyment (1993) and
between consumer i,,....'t, and the Commission
reforms), to the present day' Since European social Policy (1994),or initiatives such as action programmes
h", .orrti.ro.cl (subject to a number of
with Development NGOs (later or mainstreaming (chapter 5), which resulted in landmark io.lrl a.tion
,fr" -i¿-f gZ0s, a Liaison Committee acting programmes for the remaining years of the 1990s. The social platform's
of organizations,
óðñèono) embraced an elaborare srrucrurewith the European Com- organization of two large 'social forums' in search of ,civil dialogue, dur-
inrtitotionalized channel for dialogue
"r-".t the scene in the mid-1980s' ing this period were also landmarks, helping to develop the soáal plat-
mission. Amnesty lnternational arrived on
of
e establishment
forl's leadership role for EU.civil sociery organizationì. A new budg.t
ion. Animal rights line for NGos to pursue civil dialogu e in 199i supported these activities.
an Environmental From the side of EU political institutions, DG EMPL was a clear leader
n umbrella bodY and institutional in_ these 'social policy' initiatives, whereas the leadership for
another set
ined of relaged, parallel initiatives running at the time in the social economy
interlocutor late field was provided by a unit within a now defunct service of the Euro-
the sole env eno,s pean commission, DG xxIII (now incorporared within DG Enterprise).
1980s. Thos
eacn Thus unit, together with cEDAG (European council for voluntary
of the Earth
as co-ordinating devices for wider movements to address EU organisations), proposed an ultimately unsuccessful mission for a Euro-
ãfn..t pean Association statute, seeking a legal status for EU organizations
oolitical decision-making' in
""T'ö;;';;;;; ; ñ'o'op'"'' Parliament (Fontaine-Report)' leading
r1'. the wider frame of democraric legitimacy (Kendall and Fra"isse 2005). In
social and civic 1997 the unit launched a commission communication on ,promoting
to ,rrbr.q,r"nt EP resolutioï, put the'third sector' of
"
rtæ"ir"ri""s on the EU policy agenda' recording that
the role of voluntary organizations and foundations in Europe' which
argued that
towards its des.tiny as a
Europe needs inspiration to take a further step
Community. Nonprofit organisations are an
opportunity to be taken voluntary organizations and foundations foster a sense of solidar-
this opportunity must be ity and citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our
in this respect. Inertia -"t-bt overcome and
democracy. In the light of the challenges now facing the É,ur,rp.a.,
boldly seized. (Kendall and Fraisse 2005:283)
communit¡ these functions have never been more vital. (European
uropean Commission 1997:5)
;:îi:1: This claim was followed up by the 2000 commission Discussion paper
cluded a 'The Commission and NGOs', which argued that ,NGOs can makè a
imporla.nce "' of coop- contribution to fostering a more participatory democracy both within the
landmark declaration, Declaration 23,stating'the
unity and charitable associations EU and beyond' (European commission 2000b:4). This thinking came
erâti downstream in the 'sØhite Paper on Governance, aimed at sffuãturing
and nsible for welfare establishments
and 2006a)' Despite this' many such a system of participatory democracy as a wider solution to democratic
treaty competencies'.clustering legitimac¡ and is the subject of exrensive analysis in chapter g. In acting
organizations operated at the fringes of
around the emerging social ptog'á--t' and initiatives coming out of as a catalyst for the creation of a procedural framework lor a systematic
Environmental ¡nterests
EU's environmental pol-
As successive Earth Summits have revealed, the
the reality that
i;;; ;;. the most advanced in the world. This reflects
concern throughout citizens' rights in environmental matters, guaranteeing rights of access
environmental issues are a central public interest
are highly politicized' to information, public participation in decision-making, ãnd access to
ip".ir."ì".iy, ,torth.rn¡ member siates, and
-f
and'$ØWF, involving the certification that fish had been drawn from
sustainable stocks. Initiatives sttch as these are geared towards show-
ing how good environmental practice can also be good business sense,
through meeting consumer demand, providing competitive advantage
and good positioning, and reducing overheads (Ruzza 2000). For busi-
ness organizations, an alliance with an environmental NGO is highly
prized, because of the general need for alliance making in a consen-
sus-oriented decision-making system, and because of the strength of
environmental protection sentiment in Europe. For these reasons' a
European public affairs manager of one leading US multinational con-
sumer brand reports spending more time talking to NGOs than to Now, after several decades of expansion, the (one
time) new market
EU institutions. Nonetheless, achieving an issue-specific business-green enrranr .is seen b, ,^.^T: as possibly part of à ,toUUyi"g
otigãpoty,
alliance in detail is not easy, and often, once achieved, is somewhat (Long and Lörinczi 2009:1.8,
unstable. There are more examples of participation by 'light green'
NGOs such as the EEB and'!lWF. The latter purposefully tries to lend
its name to projects involving business organizations which have tan-
gible benefits for the environment. EEB has entered into alliances with
Orgalime, the EU engineering association, and with the IT and con-
sumer electronics associations, about practical collection targets in the
framework of the European'Waste from Electronic Equipment (\X/EE)
Directives. The risk of entering into such alliances is an apparent
compromise to 'ideological purity'. The latter position may be more
Environmental c¡t¡zen interest groups
informed by the need to maintain membership levels and the funds
they bring, and therefore a niche for some of the'dark green' organiza-
tions is to undertake'stunts' with high media visual appeal as a means
of demonstrating to their members thal the organization concerned
is active about the things which concern them in a 'protest business'
(Jordan and Maloney 1997).In practice, however, even'dark green'
organizations enter into issue-specific alliances with business interests
on the Brussels scene.
As well as voluntary initiatives among producers, statutory frame-
work initiatives to which the environmental movement has contributed
have reinforced and contributed towards changes in consumer behav-
iour. And as well as specific interventions over policy measures, the key
contribution of environmental public interest groups, at EU and other
levels, are the influences they have contributed to the belief systems of
policymakers and of business and consumers.
Not long after establishing an office in Brussels, the Director of the
W-WF European Policy Office (WWF-EPO) reflected that 'in general
the environmental organizations are unable to exercise power' (Long
Ê
À
oo
Nenvork
European Envt. 2015 3,266,046 3.35-3'5m 1''1L3765 L7 16'8 11
Bureau
Friends ofthe 2014 4,830,1,96 830,736 2,610,891' 15 6.5 10
Earth Europe
Greenpeace 2015 1,625,727 952,627 0 11 7.2 11
European Unit J
À
\o
150 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
Citizen Interests 1S1
a number of regionally based environmental organizations. Commis- The Greenl0 claims that it
sion funding supports the work of 2B environmental NGOs (Kirchner
2006).There are thus around 150 staff working for environmental pub- successfully lo bbied the
nexistingTreaty
lic interest groups based in Brussels alone, supplemented by the potential commitments to sustai ental protection
resources of other European offices of organizations, and countless and the integrationr ur
of each EU policy
supporters willing to contribute expertise and voluntary assistance. area. (G1o 2o1o)
Greenpeace, for instance, claims to have access to over 1200 scientific This claim once again raises the problematic issue of rhe
environmental experts worldwide (Mazey and Richardson 2005:116), exrent to which
environmental NGOs create policy outcomes, or act
making for an interesting comparison with those of the collective chem- as contributory
voices to ourcomes that would have happen.á
ical industry (4000), described above. Participation at a level of detail, it TÀ;;; i;,"-"
seems, is possible for environmental NGOs throughout the policy pro-
confidence among leading G10 particip".rtr o,r tr*".ry*"y.
óoi"i, *iii, iå"g
of environmental
Lörinczi claiming that ""a
cess, rather than simply relying upon the strength sen-
timent to agenda-set issues. [al G10 letrer ro Pre.sident Ba¡roso in Jury 2005 was undoubtedly
Apart from some tensions surrounding the position of the EEB, influential in saving the seven thematic strategies on the
.nuirårr-.rr,
described below, and some frictions arising from significant differences being proposed by commissioner Dinas rtJ- air"pf.*irg
in style, relationships within the Greenl0 are generally collaborative îir ,n"
-o -'
Commission's agenda. (Long and Lörinczi 200917SiL
and well co-ordinated. They meet together every month for purposes of
information swapping and co-ordination, periodically with the Cabinet once again, the power of EU environmental NGos as agenda
setters is
of the Environment Commissioner and with the Director-General of DG stressed by this reflection.
Environment, and, on an annual basis, with the President of the Com-
mission. The Environment Commissioner has been known to turn up,
unannounced, at meetings of the G10 (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Most
G10 members have excellent links throughout DG Environment, meet
up in a variety of other fora, and get to share thinking. Co-ordination is
particularly good between a core 'Gang of Four', comprising the EEB,
Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), líXøF and Greenpeace, who com-
menced the network as'G4' in 1,990 (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Most of
the G10 have competencies in matters affecting the environment across
the range of their interests, with an informal and unwritten division of
labour to enable the organization with the natural specialism to take the
lead on it. This division is not intended to be exclusive, in that most of
the organizations undertake work on a core of related environmental
issues. Long and Lörinczi have reflected that
a
lþr '1,52 Interest Representation in the European Union
Citizen Interests 153
Apart from meetings with the Presidents of the Commission and the
Council, the EEB is a member of Commission delegations at Earth/Envi-
ronmental Summits.
These strengths apart, the EEB has also had some problems of style.
A past Chair of the EP Environment Committee once commented that
'instead of making it short and snappy they go in for awfully wearisome
and hectoring briefings. Effective lobbying is about being selective with
information' (Financiøl Times L994). Inevitabl¡ its influence has been
diluted since other environmental NGOs established Brussels offices,
and the EEB has not always welcomed the leadership the latter have
sometimes given on particular environmental issues.
W\(/R and the Birdlife International network, are similar in outlook
to EEB in working primarily through institutionalized channels at EU
level. Their strong resource bases also enable them to engage policy-
making at a highly technical scientific level, WSIF has something of an
establishment image as the world's largest and best-known field-based
nature conservation organization, and declares corporate sponsorship
amongst the financial contributors to its European policy office. Along-
side its 'cuddly panda' image and institutionalized links, its European
office has self-consciously sought to position itself as a policy- as well
as advocacy-oriented NGO (Long et aL.2002). Besides using its estab-
lished channels in the national delegation offices in Brussels, it has
resorted to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) system where neces-
sary to ensure action is taken against member states for environmental
violations of structural fund initiatives. It has also played an important
whistle-blowing role, such as providing the European Investment Bank
and the Court of Auditors with video evidence of environmental viola-
tions arising from use of the structural funds in Spain (Long 1995). In
addition, it also makes use of its mass membership base through letter
writing campaigns, co-ordinating with the Swiss-based Europe/Middle
East regional office of \X X/F International (Graziano 1,999). Birdlife
International also has a mass membership base, with one million mem-
bers in the UK alone (Graziano 1999),which it has used in EU politics.
ì
1,54 Interest Representdtion in the Euroþean Union Citizen Interests 1Ss
Greenpeace Switzerland, for instance, have held responsibility for'work had been overtaken as 'effective lobbyists' in the estimation
of MEps
on infrastructural Trans-European Networks' where these issues have by business interests, and parricurarly in the energf à.-"ì"'is"rr""
high environmental impact and strong local mobilization, with specialists Marsreller 2009).This contrasts with an earry ..iåbr"t.d t,r...rr' of
in the Brussels office only for chemicals, climate, electricity and biotech- ".,d
the Bio-patenting Directive of 1.995,
nology. The Brussels office plays a co-ordinating role between these. tributed ro an atmosphere in which
'ùíhile the differences between the G10 organizations mean that ers for the first time, rejected com_
they cannot always work together, the overall pattern tends to work
well for environmental citízen interests. The G10 embrace ranges from geneticmodincations.rhus,",äö',i:;,*1;:äîi j[:,ï:îîi-Jj
the respectable and 'establishment-friendly' W-SøF and Birdlife to the as to the impact of environmental interest, ,o-.rn]hat problematic.
more assertive, direct-action-oriented Greenpeace and FoE. It encom- The analysis of practitioners of an increasing"r.ability ou", ,i'-.-à
írr,"r-
passes the mass membership power base of FoE and Greenpeace, and .vene in public policymaking beyond agendã s.tting is difficurt ro resr
'Sí-\ùøF
the institutionalízed EEB, and Birdlife. Styles vary too, such as empirically because of the difficulty of isolati.rg thelmpac of enyiron_
the interpersonal contact style of Birdlife, and the informal and loosely mental.interest groups from other issues, not leaãt of whlh is the general
co-ordinated, but effective, Climate Action Network (Rucht 1'993).The strength of the environ_ment in public senriment and its correspãnding
relationships between the Greenl0 are more harmonious than are many strength as an issue within the mechanisms of representatiy. d.Åu..".y.
business coalitions, and contain some close alliances, helped by the occu-
pation by five Greenl.0 members of the Mundo-B building in Brussels.
Consumer interests
Because most are operational outreach Brussels offices operating with a
high degree of autonomy, rather than membership offices, they do not The Consumer Programme 2014-20 records the objective of
have to be overly concerned with internal platform-building, enabling
them to respond quickly to issues. A single market where citizens are welr represented by professional
'$Øith
the exception of Greenpeace, all of these organizations have consumer organisations whose capacity is built ro meeri;g the
chal_
been commissioned by the European institutions for investigative work' lenge of today's economic environment.
They all have the technical and political ability to turn science into pol-
itics by influencing the ways in which issues are perceived and defined, This mini revolution in EU consumer affairs in recent years lies in
stark
to become part of the knowledge communities which drive policymak- contrast to Grant's assessment of a decade earlier that EU consumer
ing, and to engage public policy throughout the different stages of its policy was largely symbolic, and th
formulation, implementation and monitoring. And, cruciall¡ they have largely outsiders (Grant 1993). Whil
helped shape not only the thinking of other policy actors such as the all other commentators at the time, i
Commission and producer groups, but also member state preferences have nor been the catalyst for the
towards environmental protection policies. Former W-SøF-EPO Director catalyst has been the wider agendas
Tony Long is reported to have responded with delight to a Commission popular supporr for the_EU through the impact of its policies), and
the
Green Paper on Common Fisheries Policy Reform with the words'it high, crisis politics resulting from fc od safåty problems, ,u.h'^ thor.
could have. been written by \M!íF' (Scotland Europa 2002:96). over BSE (bovine spongiform encep This resulted
Environmental NGOs have a natural ally in the shape of the EP, in the establishment of the_Europe ity (EFSA) in
whose members are quick to take up concerns popular with their elec- 2002, and the investment of responsi Commission
torate. Surveys of 'lobbying effectiveness' among parliamentarians have for food safety along the entire food chain. other safety .rir"r, ,u.h
in the past indicated that environmental groups were rated by MEPs as.the discovery of phthalates in toys and infant equipm.rrt ani their
as the most effective of all citizen interest groups (Burson Marsteller subsequent ban for use in this context, have also åontributed to this
2001). However, a repeat survey conducted in 2009 found that NGOs development.
156 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union
Citizen Interests 157
The search for output legitimacy issues includes the high profile target-
ing of particular consumer price issues, such as differential cross-border
car prices, denied and late boarding of aircraft. and the abolition of
roaming charges for mobile phones usecl in a cross-border context.'High
politics' and a search for output legitimacy have done more to drive
consumer policy to centre stage of the EU agenda than 50 years of con-
tinual effort by EU consumer organizations could. They have developed
an agenda logic of their own, almost separate to that of wider consumer
polic¡ following the discourse of 'consumer protection'. Elsewhere, con-
sumer policy has largely been a story of incremental progression, and
even potentially major catalysts such as mainstreaming and the Trans-
atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have not lit the touchpaper. This
bears interesting comparison rvith more radical progression in the envi-
ronmental domain, because they share similar starting points of commu-
nity action programmes (circa 1972), and some common development
factors, including the embrace of the favourable'citizen's first' discourse:
.. *..,.:._Jì!!-;an
158 Interest Representation in the European Union
Citizen Interests lS9
Two further, linked, cases enable further exploration of the 1997 Ewopean year Against Raci
Commission/public interest axis in developing European integration, the Commission launch of a new
and provide classic examples of the role of DG Employment and Social covering aspects of discriminatio
Affairs in preparing the groundwork for, and building on, the Article 13 core parrner of a DG EMpl-funde
agreement in the Treaty of Amsterdam. They also demqnstrate the limits litigation'that trains NGOs to ide
to, and constraints of, Commission action in working with groups to seem likely to push forward the frontiers of EU policy comperencies
develop European integration. To support the campaign for Article 13 the field (Case and Givens 201,0).
in
in the Amsterdam Treaty, DG EMPL (then DG V) proposed that 1,997 A similar pâmern of Commissi
be designated the European Year Against Racism. It added a €7m fund- of homelessness, although the outc
ing package for projects in that year including support for NGOs, the of EU comperencies. In 1989 the
establishment of a European Monitoring Centre against Racism and pretation of a general clause in th
Xenophobia, and a major network event in Brussels bringing together of life) to fund a conference on h
130 anti-racism organizations to form the European Network Against This was a subject in which there
Racism. The following year,1998, with Article 13 safely in the treat¡ the conference was funded in the
saw the Commission Action Plan against Racism, with 176 projects finding a more permanent deman
funded, and an attempt by DG V to introduce new legislation on main- porri
streaming (Guiraudon 2001 ). the c
The Commission's work on anti-racism dates from 1986. In sup- pean ons ìØorking with the Homeless
port of this work, the Commission acted on an initiative of the Parlia- (FEA eful things fã, reÀñTSÀ ro do,
ment to establish the (now defunct) European Union Migrants' Forum such as designating it with official , rvarory,itatus to ,.rppiyìt _ith
(EUMF) inL99L, actively intervening to shape the group's parameters information on the srate of homelessness in Éurope. Th.
and operations during its turbulent history (Geddes 2000; Guiraudon
;;;;le is a
frighly typical one of each of rhe stages ,n. ,fã.in. -.^rrií ot."
2001). A later group was the Starting Line Group (SLG), a group of by the commission ro work with ñGos ""a
", "g.nt, ofof i.rt.g;iån.
yer
activist lawyers. SLG helped in the first instance by preparing a draft more than two decades later, beyond the generation
reams of infor-
directive outlawing racial discrimination, modelled on the 1,976 Equal marion, neither the commission nor FEAñTSA h"s
Treatment Directive (Geddes 2000; Case and Givens 201,0).
'While
this -u.h io Jo* uy
way of changes to EU competencies in the housing ã"i¿,
wâs never implemented, post Amsterdam SLG brought forward another generalized credir among a specialized community
*rr.ì ,n""
proposal for a Directive putting into effect the principle of equal treat- a social measure.
flr ,"ti"g?ál*"ra
ment (Geddes 2000). Geddes comments
According to these authors, ESøL's Spanish member convinced the EWL, with the dialogue invo
Spanish government to adopt E.WL positions as their own, and from sion, member states, Council
there got the position into treaty negotiations. The authors do specify
that'the final outcome would fall well short of the Lobby's expectation,
but it was nevertheless greeted as a success by the organization' (ibid.:
1,47). A further, stronger dose of caution should be added to the inter-
pretation reached by the authors, in that the story is told by a former
secretary general of the EIü(/L at the time of the'campaign', who claims works differently from organizatior
that the EWL went'one step further than the other groups working on characteristic of social movement organrzatlons.
the treaty revisions' (ibid.: 156). Just as the ERT *"t not the prime agent
responsible for the single market, neither was ElØL single-handedly
Social movements
responsible for the measure.in the treaty. The authors do acknowledge
that the'campaign' came ai the right time, when there was considerable
Union by ,social move_
concern within elite circles that there might be a repeat of the TEU sce-
peful way by a number
nario and a rejection of the Amsterdam Treaty. Other authors, too, have
007; Erne 2009; Crespy
lent a similar interpretation. Mazey has argued that women's organi-
zations have been important agents in the adoption of mainstreaming
strategies in EU and member states. Using similar arguments to those it is possible to already delin
presented by Helfferich and Kolb, Mazey has highlighted the importance European movement, in which
of mobilizing networks and'political opportunity structures', and draws are interwoven in extremely fle
upon her earlier work to outline the importance of a sympathetic'policy identities that are tolerani of
frame' in the relevant DG in determining the degree to which main- of such mobilizations rhat seem
streaming has had an impact (Mazey 2000). demands for sociar rights and a democrati
zationof European institu-
The European Commission has successively launched five-year strat- tions, not least through the creati rn of a supranational,
criticar pubric
egy programmes for equality between men and \ryomen. The CSCG sphere. (della porta 2007:205)
claims that the adoption of the 2006-10 programme arose from lobby-
ing by the ErüL, noting that Such movements appear to be drawn more
from grobally oriented activ-
ism rather rhan nationar origins (Tarrow
2006),iîo'i."liy ,t.
it covers approximately the same areas as the ErX/L Roadmap and theme. of 'anti-globarization\. R .o--o., f."rur. of .new -ãìiÇr.
sociar move-
contains some of the same vision and strategies for gender equalit¡ menrs' are their 'alrernative' perspecrives'. Leigh
although the official measures foreseen are not as strong, far reaching, Anheir, Kaldor and Glasis chàracierizethis
.ir., ìÀ" *"il; which
as
and precise as the ones suggested by the EWL text. (CSCG 2006:17)
an experiment in and demonstration of new
ways of living and new
Similarl¡ in 2010 the EWL issued a press release in which it'welcomed types of social relations - non-hierarchical
the launch of the EU's much anticipated new five year strategy for equal-
.o.,r.rriuJ"r"a.
(Leigh 2009:5) "nd
ity between men and women', noting in particular how'women's rights
groups are positive towards the envisaged annual top-level Gender A key issue concerns the point ar which and
Equality Dialogue amongst key stakeholders and stress the importance can be drawn between organizations which
- whether - a distinction
'rã.i"r -oî"-"rr,r'
of the presence of key women's organizations at such fora' (EWL 201,0). and those "r.
ryhigh arc part oÍ rhe 'usuar circuir' of Brussels-baJ-irrrti-
The latter is a further reference to the continued institutionalization of tutionalized NGos. A usuar caricarure is that
b"tw."r,
"áuo.".y
168 Interest Representcttion in the European Union
Citizen Interests 169
'insiders' and activist 'outsiders' (Tarrow 2006), r:anging fr:om itrsti- for policy a.dvocacy and funding (Leigh 2009
tutionalized charities headed by royal patrons through to rhe ATTAC are also .hybrid,cases
I]r*: (as"described by
(Association fol the Taxation of Transactions for the Aid of the Citi- The European Social Forum has been a venll
zen) network and beyond to'loosely affiliated anarchists' at the other of player.s ro meet, with participants balanced
extreme (Hadden 2009:13). There are normative overtones conveyed than'insider' organizations (delia porta 2007).The
by labels such as 'new' social movements, or idealized juxtapositions Forum has mer on a
more or less bi-annual basis since shortly after
between'professionalized and bureaucratized associational civil serv- the,rr",,Èãis.*Ie,, bur
rhere are prepararory
ants' on the one hand, and 'raclical' organizations populated b1''grass- -.:r]lq, four times yearly *itt up tã-+OO lctivists
present ar evenrs (Doer.r 2009).
roots activists' (Saurugger 2009) pursuing 'the politics of the street'. Ruzza shows how social movemenrs have found
This is to some extent also evident in Saurugger's definition of a social a niche which furfirs
a variety of functions they need ro meer ([.uzza
movement as 2011). ih;;-;..o-.
,'norm enrrepreneurs' ar EU lever, bringing ideas into tire Èõ.,-,urror._
collective challenges to existing alrangenìents of power and ciistri-
bution by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities. (ibid.:8)
A key point is the extent to which the activities of such actors contribute
to, or detract from, EU legitimacy. Is, for instance, the occupation of
business association offices (there were such incidents ât the European the political sysrem, Ru.zz1 moves beyond traditional
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and ERT by activists to be inter- caricatures of
once independently minded organizatiáns whose
preted as a positive sign of engagement and populating the public space a.rri"y-i, läï..o-.
progressively institutionalized and removecl from
with debate? Erne claims that their gr"r._roãr. ori_
gins. He identifies a set of intermediate organizational
forms that r.etain
movements but have also acquir.ed some
most political scientists corÌcur that social actors contribute to Euro-
including a degree of professiÀnalizarion,
democratization if they contribute to the making of a European er legal skills. Direct representation arises
public sphere, act collectively on a European ievel, and politicize the
are part of the social movement ,family,,
EU integration process in the transnational European public sphere.
but who can also play the ,institutional
(Erne 2009:4) p_olitics'- game, âpparently witho'r roo mnch
.o-p.o-ir. ãr-ìàrrrio,,
(Ruzza 2011). These 'broke r' organizations
are highiy ,kill.d ir,
Hadden takes a critical view of the message that'any engagement is a pos- building; rhey were key agents in the formation of the "i[",r..
itive contribution to legitimacy by creating a public space' on the basis of ALTER-EU aili-
ance in the creation of the European Transparency
Register (Chapter 3),
an assessment of the activities and perspectives of 37 organizations and and where required they builJ ailiances *rth p.odu?.r-"r:g;;i"rir",
a variety of activists. She casts the perspectives of'radical' organizations for common cause campaigns, a, g..r.ti."ìly -odifi.d'ã.g;lr_,
based around anti-globalization lenses as potentially de-legitimizing for (GMos) (Parks 2009a). The.ability _such -create
to ariin,rc.s -rtn-p?àa.,..,.
an EU seen by such activists as broadly pro-liberal. Hel analysis con- consriruencies is also a nored skill of W^X/R considered
firmed the presence of two distinctive segments of actors at EU level, split earlie'r in this
chapter.
between 'conventional' actors and those that use 'contentious actions', Protest and direct action have arways been the traditionar
with organizâtions such as Greenpeace acting in a brokering role as a tools of
'outsider' movements,,now facilitatecr, empowered and
bridge between these two worlds (Hadden 2015). Nonetheless, sorrre extended by thc
use of 'cyberactivism' (Thomas 2004).The key point
is that the inrernet
organizations are forced to play the institutionalized garne by the need allows activists to find and communicate with i".À
"ir..i r. .,Çg. i"
Ë¡¡¿q,lå!-ll-
170 Interest Representation in the Euroþeøn Union
Citizen Interests 171
attacks on the IT domains of opponents ('hacktivism') and provides an Mobilization by inter.net activ
unprecederited platform for mobilization and broader public commu- arks 2015),
nication. The latter has been used in a way that is oriented towards of the Euro
public accountability of either political institutions or opponents, influ- r_counterfei
encing public policy through public messâge, ancl by confronting oppos- d towards
ing interests.'Websites are carefully constructed in a way to attract the when'WiþiLeaþs revealed drafts
casual browser, using satire as a weapon (Balme and Chabanet 2008), beyond counterfeiting, to include
aimed at striking chords with populist outlooks about the influence of troversial rights for internet service providers (ISps)
finance in politics.
to deny service to
miscreants in a'three strikes yotr;r. out, meas
At EU level, these activities have been used in a way to de-legitimize ing friends sharing music files"rrd
(parks 2015). The
the EU polity (Balme and Chabanet 2008), with opposition to the Euro- measurer conducted by a mixture of inter.net
acti
pean Services Directive proposed by Commissioner Bolkestein a par- decisive, resulting in an overwhelming rejection
by
ticular rallying point, and a means of connecting r'vith institutionalized ists have also been in the forefront ãf é"mp"ig,rs
for inrerner neurrar-
NGO actors in the EU system. Crespy notes how it¡which the European regurator recenrry upn.îa ,hrough-pirìing
stricr
condirions on rhe conditions under which inrerner
The Bolkestein Directive therefore constitutes a hybrid case where ,.ruiå p.ouøers can
eneral Data Protection Reg_
protest and institutionalised contention go hand in hand, with some
s can be frned 4%. of globál
actors among civil society pursuing dual strategies. (Crespy 2009:16)
ticization of inte¡net-related
Of significance is that mobilization on the Services Directive was particu- tive in 2005 provided a landmark
larly aimed at the European Parliament (Fazi and Smith 2006), making IT:related politics (Gehlen 2006).
the direct connection between citizens and their representative organi- âttuned to public sentiment, keen t
zation. This aspect also drew in traditionally'outsider' organizations to tribune whenever issues reach high
institutionalized EU public policymaking (Crespy 2009; Parks 2009a).
This included groups such as ATTAC, who also became drawn in cluring
the early days of dialogue with DG Trade and during the convention Conclusions
period drafting the constitutional treat¡ and through the ALTER-EU The b¡ead.th and depth of citizen inreresr mobirization
alliance (Chabanet 2006) (Chapter 3). Crespy and Parks take a more
ar EU lever is
substantial. New organizations are c
benign view of the role of contention, seeing it as a pre-requisite for causes and niches, now extending to
democratization through popular mobilization, and the presentation of organizations and networks of c
alternative choices in the public sphere (Crespy 2014; Parks 2015). In poseful co-ordination and a divi
this account, trade nnion organizations, notabl¡ link with social move- of issue alliances across segments de
ments to convey contention to and from civil society and EU institutions, lnterest community,.
in a political systerr otherwise noted for producing'policies without pol- of in this chapter,
itics' (Schmidt n.d., in Crespy 2014:85). The orientation of the EU sys- enviro related not only
tem to consensus ma¡ paradoxicall¡ make it more receptive to 'shock to the
the breadth and
tactics' of popular mobilization (Leiren and Parks 2014; Parks 2015). range the niches they fill, the strucrures
The trade union movement has proved adept at popular mobilization, y!.h link them rogether and the power of the envirorr_..,r"1ïìrÀu.r.
including confrontational demonstrations in front of the EP, apparently in F'urope' Their impact can be demonsrrated not oniy ir
fi"ld, oiug.rr,r^
to decisive effect (Leiren and Parks 2014). setting, but some way beyond. Niche organizations
ìn the sociar/cìtizen
a
1.72 Interest Representdtion in the European Union
1,73
174 Interest Representation in the Europeøn Union
Territorial Interests 77 S
struggles, rather than radically reforming centre/local relations struggles the hands of central government to their
(John 2000b; Schulrze 2003r Fleurke and \X/illemse 2006). ln some cjr- inteniied rargets, ancl whether
the. rules are being aãhered to. E,-
cumstances the'regional lobby' has been a nìeans for the Commission to
uirãn-ental organizations have also
assisted in this role (Chapter 6).
pursue its ends with member states (John 2000a), and the EU institutions In practice, distinctions betwee
expect regions to have an office in Brussels (Moore 2008). The history of ritorially based interests are diffic
regional interest lobbying is littered with examples of local government authorities work to attract,
organizations misunderstanding the basic ways in which the EU takes within their domain. public
decisions in fields which influence them (see, for instance, Greenwood, from the need to make an e
Levy and Stewart 1995; John and McAteer 1998). As is reviewed below, Brussels office is a separate
some regions established offices in Brussels without any clear purpose in ister, reflecting the embrace
mind at all, although some of those which have been left to find useful
things to do have developed significant agendas.
But despite the absence of dramatic new developments, incremental
changes have strengthened the hand of regional goyernance players. An ests and a set of interests within i
EU-oriented network organization of regions with legislative authority region means differenr things in differenr
emerged from the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference, REGLEG, which -.-b., ,r"res. The committee
of the Regions (coR) is báth a de.irio,r-ro"king
claims to have influenced recognition of the concept of a region with and a source of interest represenrarion in
,tru.tur. rãi'r.gio,r,
its own right. coilective action
legislative powers in a European Council Declaration of that year. There issues applicable to other actors d
has been the progressive extension of decentralization in some member torial public authorities, because th
states, and where decentralization has arisen it has increased the capac- somerimes intertwined with nation
ity of regions to make the centre accountable in the implementation of w-ith a whole range of competenci
EU regional policy. Devolution has not, however, increased the number of the regions comprise the entire
of staff working on EIJ activities by local authorities (Sutcliffe and Kova- tion between them, and, to an ext
cev 2005). As is described later in this chapter, while some of the'peak' However, there are also a number
associations of regional and local government have not progressed torial authorities do work both ind
their role and influence, some of the sectoral regional associations have their interests in the EU, spanning b
done so. Thus, associations representing cities, and peripheral maritime
regions, have grown in resources and capacit¡ and in the ability to influ-
ence some of the smaller structural fund plogrammes. Most regional Regional governance in Western Europe
and local âuthorities of any size are involved in the implementation of various typologies of member state decentr arizationexisr,
cohesion policies. mosr of which
pre-date the accession of central a
The number of regions directly represented with an office in Brus- (Leonardi and Nanetti 1
sels has consolidated to a total of around 200 (Committee of the douh 2001; Schneider 20
Regions 2015). As is described later, some of the offices from the German and Schakel 2010). Thes
federal Länder, and the autonomous communities of Spain, are impres- elements ro them, and include EU,
sively large affairs. A highly dense collection of thematic networks of units for statistics) data. They also incorporate criteria
regions has emerged from the EU structural fund programmes, and par- which reflect the
position in cenrral and easrern Eu.op.aå
counr¡ies (Swianiewic z 2002)
ticularly the community initiatives. These have added to the ability of but in essence break down inro a variant of a ,high,
the Commission to monitor whether structural funds are getting pâst embracing political and adminisrrarive decentrariårr""
_;,r_;-Àï
"rl.
ri"Àlå ). r l.
a
176 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
Territorial Interests 177
-f ABLE 7.7 Degrees of deuolued authority in tbe EU member states of the interface with EU regional
had the power to agenda sãt ,ackl
the requirernent for matching
Predominant classification c(lte7ory Country
significant levels (McAleavy' 1
High: Austria, Belgium, Gern-ran¡ Spain Bache 1999).
Medium: Denmark, Finland, Iral¡ Concerns with uneven region
Netherlands, Sweden, UK
preamble to the Treaty of Rome.
and sreel community. Ar rhe conc
Mediun'r to low: France, Poland
regional or
Low to medium: Hungary. Czech Republic claims the c
Lcw: Other EU membel srates ,ing on its co
Bank (EIB), providing low_cost lo
Sources: LeonaL'di 1993; Loughlin, in Mamadouh 2001; MamadoLrh 2001; Keating and the European regions, was formed
Hooghe 2006 with particular difficulties were rh
not in the context of an oyerall re
pation that the common market
Most countries in the'low' category have been major recipients of dispar
EU structural funds, including those from central and eastern European policy
countries, as well as traditionally centralized countries such as Greece, confer
Portugal and Ireland. The latter created'administrative' 'paper' regions Social
for the purpose of conforming to structural fund rules (Hooghe and Fund (EAGGF) sures raken. <luring this start_up
Marks 7996). decade include .cnal
policy memorandum to
This differential degree of regional autonomy conditions the response the Council in 1 iir*iru, of a Directorare General
of territorial interests to the European level. \lhere there is high regionai for RegionalDe ß%).
autonomy, so the EU has strengthened it. For instance, the treaties enable Regional policy took a qua
member states to allow regional ministers to represent and vote for their -
of the UK, which, as pa.t of th
country in the Council (Hooghe 2002), and in Belgium, central govern- back'for its budget contributi
ment has stepped aside and allowed the regions to deal directly with European-level regional funding
Brussels (Hooghe, in Keating 1995).ln Austria too, federal state regions dependent upon traditio.,"l m"iu
have secured some form of own initiative access to EU decision-making marked regional disparities, had for some
time arso sought an active
(Jeffery 2000). At the other extreme, the position of member states as Europ-ean-level regionar policy. The resurt
was the creation of the Eur.o-
the gatekeeper of structural fund applications and the disburser of funds pean Regional Development Fund in 1975,tt
. _";o.
enhances its control in centre/local relations, and 'regions' in the most tural funds, and a co.nsrituency of interests seeking fiii; ;; iirã ,r.u._
centralized states, where they exist, are little more than paper entities. fund formed
;".;þ; irJ_ trri,
Beyond these factors lie other complexities. In some federal countries,
by membership aåcessio.r, i.ri^. 1970s and 19g0s. These
d portugal placed regional une_
such as German¡ and in a number of devolved centralized states, such
After a succession of reforms,
as Spain, Italy and the UK, there is also considerable control by central
en these funds were doubled in
government over EU regional policy issues (John 2000a). However, in
uctural expenditure came to com_
countries where regions have gainecl powers relative to the centre, there
has been a weakening of the centre's absolute ability to dominate aspecrs a tevel at which it has reacheo
" nt"r:ï;.0;irï'.:ïT:åî:?:î:rïr'Ji
1,78 Interest Representation in the European Union
Territorial Interests 179
r the Council of Ministers). Arlother forum civil society organizations. Table 7.2 identifres
rtside the framewòrk of the EU, is through the number of ,regional
offices' of EU member states.
ras a secretariat and forum for the regions,
cnal Authorities of Europe (CLRAE).
rn, the foremost regional¡ structure is the
al and Urban Polic¡ which has developed TABLE 7 '2 Territoriar representation offices in Brussers:
EU-28
ocal authority interests. As major employ-
nterests have also developed good links Sub -national territorial general entities
cial Affairs, while the peak public sector
Germany
, is a'first-level', or'macroeconomic' social 24
ment also contains a natural constituency Austria
8
rnd it was this institution which proposed Belgium
8
cessor organization to the CoR. The Par-
Bulgaria
nittee on Regional Development. Elected 3
authorities provide members for the CoR, Denmark
6
,y member state governments and do not Spain
1.9
s has been described, this forum has been Estonia
rflicts, mainly between regions (account- 1.
Finland
r federal countries) and local authorities 5
rtives in unitary member states). Its limited France
T9
has yet to be taken seriously in European Hungary 3
improved on its position asthe weakest of Ireland
annels available to territorial interests. Of 1_
regions r'vith special domestic status. In these countries, the presence of to recruir staff from the Brr_rssels p
regional offices in Brussels raised substantial national sensitivities about European orientation, are highly n
who had the right of external representation In e¿ch there were cases in working on issues whrch are rela
referred to the national constitutional coult seeking to establish whether rathel than tied ro a remir of a ,p
a regional'representation' in Blussels -¡¿as compatible with national law. ity. In this model, those who lead t
Offices from the German l-änder consequently chose low-key names in manoeuvre, and the space to devel
the early clays, such as 'liaison bureau', followed later by recogr-rition can pursue by themselves and/or. ,se
(Moore 2006). Fr:orn Spain (Case STC/1654194) ancl Italy (Law 52 of this cadre that actions related to
L996; Case 428 of 1997), territorial offices in Blussels initially had to legitimacy have arisen, and in parti
operate nnder a'camouflage' (..g. charnber of commerce or specialized of networks linking Brussels terriro
"
agency) (Badiello 1998). These cases clarified the nght of a region to 'citizen'-related issues, most notabl
establish an office, provided the office did not undertake activities which 2011). Ancl a 2009 survey with the <.lir.ectors
fell rvithin the sole jurisdiction of the state. Since this period, â pattern of 40
Olsson found that they saw their r.ole as communicar_
of 'settled accommodation' has emerged, with co-ordination between oals achieved in Brussels to the constituents at
home,
permanent representations and regional offices from federal member ro the elites at home, (Olssor.r 2009:26).
states. In this arrângement, regions get to participate in member stâte participation of 123 of the Brussels regional
EIJ decision-making in rcturn for an agreement not to work against the hosts an âverage of 635 visitor.s .".Ã u."r.
policies of centlal government, and to maintain confidentiality (Moore
2007,2008).
In some federal member states there has been the arrangement of
secondment of regional government employees to Brussels outlet offices,
Territorially based EU coilective action organ¡zations
working to highly prescribed agendas, with limitecl autonony to develop
other activities. For the German Ländel it has been a common arrange-
ment to send civil servants to their Brussels office for a period of two to
three years (Moore 2006), and have an authority staff member wolking
in Germar-ry to 'shadow' the work of a connterpaÍt in the Blussels office
working on the same dossier (Badiello 1998), measlrres which would
help prevent Brussels staff frorn'going native'. The regional offices from
Italy employ a mixed model of office staffing based on a core of 'civil
servants' sent by, and tied to, the regional authorit¡ but supplemented
by a number of more independent'consultants' recruited from the pool
of EU specialists in the Brussels job market.
Another model again is where a diverse set of stalceholders equips
Brussels terr.itorial representative offices to be able to take up and pursue
a wide range of initiatives. Scotland Europa, for instance, includes within
its membership traclc un jons. universjties. govel'nmental agencies. envi-
ronmental protection organizations and the loca1 autholity association.
The Dutch'G4' (large cities) office also offers a model whereby the
influence of any one stakeholder is diluted. \Vhere the territorial offices
have been less tied to specific regional authorities, so tlÌey have tended
I
I
between the regions of Europe, and to promote regionalism and fed- and URBAN (for,sustainable
eralism in Europe. It performed a semi-institutionalized role with the districts,) programmes have b
European Commission prior to the formation of the CoR, doing much
of the preparation work (Hooghe 1995). \X/hile Hooghe claims that both
it and CEMR framed the debate about the CoR (Hooghe 2002), ar leasr
one author doubts the impact which AER has (Jeffery 2000).
The CEMR is a federation of national representative associations of
the various local authority categories among Council of Europe coun-
tries, dating from 1951,.It has a Brussels office with a staff complemenr
of 20 (slimmed from 30 ín2002).It houses a variety of working groups
on functional issues, as well as hosting substantial twinning arrange-
ments. John (2000b) noted that the CEMR has not been effective in its EU
engagement.'Vühile the AER is more geared towards regional interests, the
CEMR primarily represents local and municipal interests. Both have mem- these organizations,
bers drawn from across western and eastern Europe. Like the Committee .Beyond
torial interests have periodically
of the Regions and its predecessor the CCRLA, they have been beset by
conflict, both within and, mainl¡ between these organizations, which are
largely divided along the lines of the regions (AER) and the municipalities
and local authorities (CEMR). A more distinct form of such conflict arises
between urban and regional needs. Both organizations perform similar
roles; typicall¡ this leads to a limited degree of collaboration as well as
competition, not least because the actors have had to work together on
a range of issues, including shared institutional involvement (including
the nomination of members) in the CCRLA. They are nonetheless the
most representative outlets of territorial authority for the Commission to
engage with.
Beyond these organizations lie European 'sectoral' organizations of
regions with particular themes, such as cities ('Eurocities'), maritime
regions (Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions) and border
regions (Association of European Border Regions). These are significant
organizations, described in further detail in Table 7 .3, along with a vari-
ety of networks linking territorial interests. A range of political, social
and economic networks of regions, or regions clustered around Euro-
pean programmes dedicated to bringing regions together for particular
purposes, emerged from the'Europe of the regions' agendas of the 1990s
and 2000. Some originated from the community initiatives, which had
the explicit purpose of trans-regional network formation, or in the regen-
eration schemes aimed at particular problems, andlor in the manage-
ment of structural fund programmes (Balme 1991; Marks 1993; Hooghe
2002). INTERREG (currently in its fifth phase as Interreg Europe)
a
a
oo
oo
Associations
Association of European Founded 1971, focused on issues facing border and cross-border regions. Based
Border Regions (AEBR) in offices of EUREGIO (a Dutch/Gcrman geographical cross-border development'
enterprise and cultural partnership, established in 1958). Membership
compìsition (currently 95 members) is oriented towards northern/central
European border regions.
Confercnce of Peripheral Founded 1973. Focus is centre/periphery disparities. 150 regions from 28
Maritime Regions (CPMR) countries working in six Geographical Commissions, including:
Atlantic Arc, drawing in members from south of Spain to Scotland. Established
1989. Specialist sectoral networks. Claims to have undertaken studies which
guided strand B of INTERREG 3 programme-
Balþan and Black Sea, withmembers from Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, as well
as Albania, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine .
Baltic, drawtng in members from Baltic sea country regions. Activc throughout
regional policy and sectoral project domains.
Islands. Regional island authorities. Claims to have influenced content of both
the Amsterdam Trcaty and 2004 treary establishing a Constitution for Europe on
territorial-related issues. J
co
190 Interest Representdtion in the European Union Territorial Intetests 1.91,
The presence of such nerworks reflects the public remit of regional and and the nature of regional polici
terriiorial authorities, and these are widely linked through specialized explanations focusing on rhe acri
networks organized in citizen domaitrs, embracing fields such as the togerher wirh issues concerning r
environment, social action, health care and consumer protection. These between sub-national actors and
organizations are by nature networked with independent NGOs work- tors in explaining sub-national mo
ing in the related fields. In centralized states, some terr
Among the associations there are claims of influence for both treaty ence in Brussels because they se
insertions and policy-related issues. The Islands Commission of the government actors in the interest
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) also claims to level has contributed to the dev
have successfully lobbied to insert references and enabling policy instru- in some of these countries, and t
menrs into the Amsterdam Treaty. The Association of European Border tions around them. In federal state
Regions (AEBR) and the Atlantic Arc Commission of the CPMR claim partial strengthening of regional interests vis-à-vis
member states. Bur
to have influenced the design of the INTERREG programmes. AEBR the overall analysis is nothi'g like as simple as this. llesponsibility fo¡
has been extensively involved in the implementation of the INTER- regional policy has not been remrved from member sàtes. Member
REG programmes, and has an officially designated (by the Commission) states remain the decision-makers in key areas of European integration,
information 'observatory' status. Schultze has linked Eurocities as a and in matters concerning regions and localities, such ,t.u.toi"l forrá
leader of a lobbying campaign which resulted in pr:olonging the URBAN global financing and applications, and the developrnenr ^ of the coR.
srrucrural fund initiative, and mainstreaming of the urban dimension ve clearly been caught out bv rules which
in the structural funds, as well as acting as a co-author with the Com- , such as additionality. There i, ,-,o .I."r-.rrt
mission on a key policy paper on urban regional initiatives (Schultze _ there a clear pattern of the European-level
2003). Historicall¡ the RECHAR funding initiative for the adaptation strengthening, or weakening, of the position of member states vis-à-vis
of coalmining regions was proposed by the Coalfield Communities Cam- the regions and localities. The sub-national level is neither superseded
paign, a grouping linking coalfield communities in the UK, German¡ nor made subordinate, and nor is there a nascent'Europe of the regions'
Belgium, France, and Spain. Similarl¡ the steel region network CASTeT emerging, as a resuh of the European level. Nor are iegional interests
claimed ro have influenced the extension of the RESIDER funding initia- straightforwardly enhanced by the EU. Notable trani-regional net-
tive (community initiative for the economic conversion of steel areas) to works have arisen and developed, and a significant quantity ánd quality
1999 (van der Storm 2002). of partnerships of regional, local, national and European-level inter-
ests have been created. As John remarks, there is a complex interplay
of interests involving a triad of local aurhorities, nationai governments
Conclusions and EU institutions; sometimes all of these can be winners, and some-
The logic of the single market led to the development of a number of times different actors can be (lohn 1996). To this complexity might
compensatory initiatives in regional polic¡ of which some stimulâted be added the cleavages berween regional and local interesrs. collective
local and regional actors throughout and beyond member states' and action is also complicated by parterns of inter-regional competition and
these have formed demand structures for the development of regional collaboration.
policy ilitiatives. The Commission has not been an impartial actor in It is these complexities which have led a clutch of authors to search
this process, deliberately cultivating bridges directly between the terri- beyond state-centric accounts of European integration ( Chapter 8 ) to ade-
torial and supranational levels where it is able to, assisted by the Par- quately conceive of a'Europe with the regions' (Hooghe 1994;Hooghe
liament. Sub-regional mobilization cannot therefore be accounted fol and Marks 1,996). The question is nor so much what rhe rerrirorial level
by the growth of EU competencies alone, although the single mar- does to the position of member states ìn the EU, but what dynamics arise
ket has undoubtedly altered the structure of political opportunities, from the sub-national level itself, and throughour inreracrions with the
1,92 Interest Rel)resentdtion in the Ettroþean Union
a System of continuous legotiation among nested governments at SeV- Organized Civil Society and
eral territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional, and local - as European lnte gration
the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisio¡al
reallocation that has pulled some previously centralised functions of
rfre state up to the supranational level and some down to the iocal/
regional level. (Marks 1'993:392)
Two decades on, these ideas have not come to fruition in any substan-
tial way. John and McAteer nore how'an emerging body of evidence Early'neo-functionalist' accounts
availabie on European lobbying by local authorities does not indicate stressed the transfer of civil socie
a high degree of influence' (1998:108), and-that'lobby success reflected European level. This raises de
rath"er thãn affected bureaucratic faction fighting within the Commis- 'civil society', as well as the cri
sion, (ibid.). In their analysis, the main value of the'regional lobby' has be assessed. There is an establishe
been as pawns to the Commission in their battles with member states) arly over t
and as ug.,-rtr of implementation (John and McAteer 1,998). This out- e Europea
look doein,t, howevìr, reflect the incremental growth and embedded- ion 2001)
nessof some core EU sectoral regional associations, their involvement means m
in both the design and the implementation of community initiatives, est group constituted at EU level a
and the historic density of grass-roots EU-oriented networks. There has
been a wider process of decentralization, and the devolution of power
has weakened the centrality of states in EU regional policymaking.
Nonetheless, there âre now welcome doses of realism in contrast to the
over-exuber.ance around the time of the creation of the CoR. It is not
the case that permissibility for: regions to represent member states in
the Council oi Minirt..r, and partnership in cohesion policy for sub-
lational authorities, 'have transformed the European Union from a
primarily state centric system of authority into a system of multi-level
gou.r,,,urr.., (Hooghe 2002:370_1). Perhaps of greater significance is the
î"y l. which regiãnal tiers of governance, as representatives of ge.eral
- dotnain, have the potential to be contribu-
p.rút
tory ic leg
offic evelo
the member states, so they have b
in deepening European integration
EU wñh territorial civil society (Greenwood 201'4)'
193
a.
Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration
Interest Reþresentation in the European
195
1.94
carlcatures.
legitimacy of
Organizedcivil society and the democratic in the policy process. A variety of procedures empower groups to per-
thE EU form these and other roles, such as freedom of information measures
for ease of 'Access to Documents', and to keep EU political institutions
a
Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration L97
I ;il;;;lt:"í¿
I
(Chapter 6).
I
lr
society
rj A transparent dialogue with civil
ll eaty on EuroPean Union stated:
ll
I
Process strengthens
the demo-
I
p.tbli.'t confidence in the admin-
l.t 6a). The EuroPean Commission
statement that
l
(Harlow 2002:41')
possible, the results of the consultation and the lessons that have been
to rhose with speciarist knowredg. iÏ:i: j::#Ë:ïlîå::'l, i-i learned. (European Commission 2002a)
knowledge of this after the measure was introduced p{oduced a marked such a role ... NGOs are no'magic bullet'which will automatically hit
increase T.r th. use of self-interested references in letters, in the knowl- the target of political socialisation. ('!Øarleigh 2001:635)
edge that trade association members (princ
to monitor their agents. In this sense, 'ful Further evidence for this perspective is provided by Sudbery. A respond-
self-interested, rather than deliberative, out ent from the European Environmental Bureau told her that
fully managed to produce public interest outcomes'
Íh. uurio.r, piocedures defining the'rules of engagement' between while ideally it would be good to get people involved, time pressures
EU institutions and civil society organizations have been defined primar- mean that the most effective use of my time is to get on with advocacy.
ily since the 2001 \white Paper on Governance. They are in the process of In the end my role is not to encourage the most participatory gov-
cåntinual extension, and regular revision. They have taken political will ernânce, but to ensure the best results for the environment. (Sudbery
2003:90)
a tool that can be used by the Commission itself to identify the appro-
priate mix of consultation partners who can offer the necessary geo- greater freedom to interpret the interests of the subject under consid-
graphical/sectoralltargetgroup coverage. (CONECCS 2006) eration rarher than just a set of stated wishes. Similarly, the perspective
that EU NGOs lack legitimacy because they are run by'professionàlized'
The CONECCS database restricted entry to those groups which staff suffers from the same misapprehension (Chapters 6 and 7). Rather,
could meet criteria of geographic representativeness, and in particu- a trustee with expert knowledge may be in a better position to be ablé
lar members in at least three member/candidate stâtes. The role of the to identify which course of action to pursue, and in doing so provides a
database to identify consultation partners for the different Commission better service to the cause, This perspective also emerged in Chapter 4; a
services meant that it had the potential for damage for less prominent former director-general of the largest UK business association once told
organizations by linking representativeness to access. This preference for this author,'if I represented my members' opinions in discussions with
representativeness was continued in the successor European Transpar- government I'd be laughed at'. The 'trustees' in charge of the Brussels
ency Register, albeit with a much softer emphasis, by using the device regional offices have developed activities with far greater potential for
of transparency to make it apparent which organizations do not have connecting with the citizens than have the mandated delegates from the
a geographic spread of members. This rule is particularly directed at Brussels offices of regional authorities, whose energies are taken up by
NGOs (Chapter 3). the pursuit of power struggles with domestic governments in another
The principal social partner organizations (Chapters 2, 3 and 5) do venue (Chapter 7).
have an elevated status based upon a formal evaluation of their repre- The linkage between 'representativeness' and accêss seems to have
sentativity. The Social Platform has an elevated status (Chapter 6, and been broken with the passing of the CONECCS database, although
above). The European Consumer Consultative Group (Chapter 6) has preference for it lives on through transparency application. The Trans-
access criteria based upon geographic representativeness and centrality of parency Register uses transparency to illuminate membership and
consumer mission. And unsurprisingl¡ the interest organizations stand- funding, and to some extent accountability. These principles had been
ing to benefit from this elevated status have sought accreditation-based stated clearly in the 2002 Commission Communication on consultation
schemes. The Social Platform has consistently argued the case for an standards, which stated that 'openness and accountability are impor-
accreditation scheme based on criteria of representativity, applying a tant principles for the conduct of organizations when they are seek-
rule that prospective applicants for membership of it should rhemselves ing to contribute to EU policy development' (European Commission
have members from at least half of EU member states (Chapter 6). 2002b:1,7). These came downstream in the Transparency Register, with
The dissenting voices in the Brussels NGO community about accred- clause d of the code of conduct for interest representatives notable for
itation unsurprisingly come from those organizations whose legitimacy assigning to them responsibility for information placed in the public
cannot be based upon their ability to represent a given'who' constituenc¡ domain. This concept also features in self-regulatory initiatives and in
but more advocate a'what' cause in EU public policymaking. Such groups the content of 'compact' agreements to which NGOs have signed up
214 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 21.s
(Chapter 3), as well as in early versions of a draft'European concordat' degrees of exclusion and isolation. The challenge is to develop these con-
which has attemçited to replicate'compact' 4greemenrs at EU level. The cepts of accountability for use as regulatory devices. One aspect of the
accountability agenda had also made an appearance in the European importance of clause d of the Transparency Register code of conduct lies
Association Statute, an instrument which had been in preparation for in its deliberative capacit¡ considered below, in that public reasoning
over a decade between a constituency of NGOs and a section of the depends upon the quality of information placed in the public domain.
Commission, proposing a series of participative rights to structure the
relationship between EU institutions and organized civil society (Ken-
dall, \X/ill and Brandsen 2009). While the Statute was abandoned in Organized civil society in the EU and deliberative democracy
2005 by the Barroso Commission under its'cutting red tape' initiative, Deliberative approaches, drawing on rhe work of Habermas in advo-
the compact seems to represent the next best thing for NGOs. ìØhile cating development through open exchanges based on the public use of
NGOs would like a legal basis for the consultation standards that reason, have been normatively applied to EU organized civil society by a
emerged in 2002, the European Commission - Iike most comparable number of authors (Joerges and Neyer 1997; loerges 1,999; Eriksen and
bureaucracies - has resisted tying its hands. A'compact' raises the ievel Fossum 2000; Curtin 2003; Magnette 2006; Smismans 2010). A sym-
of the agreement on consultation standards from that of a desirable pathetic hearing is also evident in the work of others (ìØarleigh 2003;
target to something more solemn (and in a small number of cases at Lord and Magnette 2004). 'ü/hile Eriksen sees rhe role of elites in EU
the national level, gives it a legal foundation). For these reasons, the policymaking as an obstacle to public deliberation, he also notes how
'European Network of National Associations', comprising 1.7 national the EU is more conducive to deliberation than other types of political
associations with experience of operating a compact, have been seeking systems because of the non-hierarchical nature of supranationality and
to develop a European Concordat to the level of acceptance in practice the involvement of a range of EU institutions (Eriksen 2000). Others
by EU institutions. share this perspective with an emphasis upon how the lack of major-
These norms that internal standards should accompany decision-mak- itarian mechanisms leads to negotiated policy outcomes (Christiansen,
ing roles now âppeâr prominently in the literature (Cohen and Rogers Føllesdal and Piattoni 2004).
1995; Slim 2002;Edwards and Zadek 2003). Clearl¡ groups which sim- \ühether interest groups can encompass deliberative standards
ply articulate viewpoints should not be subject to regulation, but those involving a willingness to change demands in response to evidence and
which place information in the public domain have a responsibilit¡ and argument is doubtful. Some of the exchanges between interest groups
therefore public accountabilit¡ for its accuracy (see Sikkink 2002).Bov- and EU political institutions involve bargaining, which involves trying
ens defines accountabilitv as to get as much as possible of an original goal set, rathêr than delibera-
tive participation. Christiansen, Føllesdal and Piattoni see'rhe network
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has of well-informed lobbies' at EU level as an anti-deliberariye element
an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conducr, the forum through their elite nature and capacity to monopolize policymaking
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face conse- inputs. Nonetheless, they also identify circumstances when they can be
quences. (Bovens 2007 :447) agents of deliberation where extensive consultations arise through net-
works, and where they are involved in comitology (Christiansen, Følles-
'Vlhile
this definition has recently attracted currency, a key question in dal and Piattoni 2004). Joerges and Neyer have likewise seen rhem as
operationalizing it is to meet the challenge of defining who the ,forum' potential agents of democratic legitimation via deliberative politics, find-
is. Inevitabl¡ the forum is diversely constiruted, and no less so where ing evidence from a study of food committees that the perspectives of dif-
organized civil society is a proxy for civil society. The ability to pose fering interests and a wide varíety of stakeholders are taken into account
questions and pass judgement on organizations in this context resides in a manner resembling deliberative processes (Joerges and Neyer 1997).
in political institutions, in other civil society organizations, and among Joerges cites the incredulity of Kohler-Koch: 'none other than comitol-
wider civil society. The same applies to sanctions, ranging from various ogy, that notorious system of inter-bureaucratic negotiation-diplomacy
I
21.6 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and Ewropean Integration 217
that even parliamentarians wish to abolish in the interest of democrac¡ different stakeholders over time results in changes to belief systems
is supposed to bring an element of democratically-legitimated politics (Sabatier 198S). Deliberative mechanisms can operate through policy
into the Community' (in Joerges 1,999:336).In such committees in the networks of varying degrees of integration. And they can arise in a nrrm-
foodstuffs domain, Joerges sees a high level of debate contributing to a ber of categories of stakeholder consultations, whether private or public
high level of European protective standards: gatherings of people, or through written consultations, and contribute
to the ideas which go into the formulation of public policy. The extent
by virtue of its feedback links to Member States, comitology can, in to which they do so is partly conditioned by the procedures through
principle, take all social concerns and interests into account while, at which ideas are channelled into policymaking, and whether these are
the same time, links with science (seen as a social body) can be shaped mechanistic or otherwise. But they also depend upon general processes
so as to allow for the plurality of scientific knowledge to be brought of the ways in which ideas are absorbed. This concept resonares with
to bear. (ibid.:334) those used in the wider literature on sociological institutionalism, where
belief systems arising from socialization effects of institutional partici-
Joerges draws attention to the way in which the Scientific Committee on pation help explain the behaviour of acrors. In this tradition, Goehring
Food publishes its opinions and exposes them to wider public debate, saw deliberative elements of DG Trade's institutionalized dialogue with
and uses the internet to disseminate its findings, reflecting that 'the organized civil society (Goehring 2002),although there is some cynicism
potential of this form of publication in terms of participatory democracy from civil society organizations that the forum is little more than a voice
cannot be overestimated' (ibid.:336). (ECORYS 2007). A number of authors have also assessed rhe presence
Aspects of the procedural regime which EU institutions have for and extent of deliberation by organized civil society interesrs in the con-
engaging with organized civil society do present deliberative possibilities. text of the Open Method of Coordination, where 'grass-roots' public
In the main, the regime can be characterized as that of 'liberal democ- deliberation among stakeholders was identified (Eberlein and Kerwer
racy' (Kohler-Koch 2010b), where, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 2002; Cohen and Sabel, in de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Smismans 2005).
issues surrounding the connections which organized civil society has to Nonetheless, these latter authors take a guarded assessment from the
civil society are raised. But where the aim is to achieve contributions to results obtained so far from OMC, finding some wider development but
public discourse it makes little sense to ask who is represented by the relatively little evidence of anything resembling deliberatiue ourcomes or
voice which speaks, and how the organization consulted its members so practice (de la Porte and Nanz 2004).
as to arrive at their position. Rather, it is the quality of the point raised, The European Commission system of engaging with outside interests,
the discourse, the contribution to public debate and a sufficient popula- while primarily a liberal democratic regime, does therefore have delibera-
tion of voices which matter. In this latter environment, the approach is to tive elements within it. The Commission system has more emphasis upon
'let a thousand flowers bloom', and it makes little sense to place restric- procedural participation than it does upon public reasoning, though its
tions on those voices or to create standards for connections with civil procedures are oriented towards delivery of public reasoning through
society. Only certain kinds of interest groups ('who') groups might be impact assessments, etc. 'S7hile the role of groups in traditions of liberal
equipped to do'internal democracy' (Halpin and Mclaverty 2010), but and deliberative democracy can be difficult to reconcile (Kohler-Koch
that may be an irrelevant standard to ask of 'what groups', particularly 2010b, citing Steffek and Ferretti 2010 - 'watchdogs don't deliberate'),
if the aim is to, ensure that a wide plurality of interests and viewpoints they can also be complementary. Developing norms of accountability
are represented. based upon standards of behaviour in public discourse is entirely con-
Even liberal democracy regimes have points within their proce- sistent with a system founded upon liberal democrac¡ but with deliber-
dures during which deliberative capacity is significant. rü/herever 'ideas ative elements. The requirement upon organized civil society contained
matter' to the formulation of public policies, so too do opportunities in clause d of the Transparency Register Code of Conduct, to ensure
for deliberation. The 'advocacy coalition framework' focuses upon that information is unbiased, up to date, complete and not misleading, is
the ways in which iterated exchanges of competing ideas between deliberative in effect, and accountability oriented.
218 Interest Representation in the Euroþean Union Organized Ciuil Society and European Integration 2I9
The common elements to the ERT and E\ùíL cases help to identify among civil society actors ro dilute expectations as well as interests. The
the circumstances in which groups do play the role cast for them in
institutionalist accounts of the integration process. Both involved groups
in which the Commission had played a critical role in group formation
and nurturing. Both pushed the right buttons at the right time so that
they were framed in the critical discourse - the ERT of wealth crea-
tion at a time when market-oriented governments had come to power
across the member states, and the E\ü/L at a time of critical concern.
This resulted in unopposed'campaign messages' in both cases, although
the ERT campaign would always be secondary given the enthusiasm
among member state governments for the cause, whereas the extension
of equality campaign seemed to require the EWL as an agent to make
something happen which would be politically impossible for member
states to resist. Member states do indulge in'cheap talk' at times, with
the result that they are required to deliver on it when called to do so,
such that'there is no such thing as cheap talk' (Lange 1992). Once mem- circumstances, business interests are factional, rather than homogenous,
ber states have set the parameters for EU policymaking through treaties, both across sectors and often within a single sector, because firms are
so the playing field seems to be left open for networks of interests and differentially affected by regulation. Because rhe reg-
supranational institutions to progress integration. The role of territorial ulatory regime, so it will be marked by such poli kash
interests in expanding the structural funds, and particularly community note how changing preferences across issues and with
initiatives such as URBAN and INTERREG, seems to provide such a the multiplicity of players in bargaining, resuh our-
case. Eurocities, and some of the 'Commissions' of the Conference of comes upon governance (Levy and Prakash 2003). And collective EU
Peripheral Maritime Regions, seem to have been particularly influential business associations are often paralysed through the inability of their
in this respect (Chapter 7). members to reach common positions, except in specific types of circum-
stances. Membership of such associations is often driven more by the
'costs of non-membership' than by any expectation that the association
Conclusions: organ¡zed civil society and the EU
will be able to reach common posirions (chapter 4). solidarity is grearer
The systemic features of organized civil society in any system arise pri- among NGOs and trade unions than among business interests. And
marily from its structural components. The EU system will, therefore, relatedl¡ 'the behavioural theory of the firm' (Cyert and March 1992)
have features which are to be found elsewhere, but which vary because of explains why companies are often poorly equipped to undertake polit-
the degree of intensity of those properties in the EU system. The strucrural ical action. Large organizations are by nature incoherent, and decen-
components underlying the EU system mainly produce pluralistic effects. tralized companies in particular have immense difficulties co-ordinating
First, the sheer multiplicity of elements means that the EU has ro have regulatory preferences across product divisions. The world of political
a consensually oriented decision-making system designed to accom- decision-making is uncharted territory for man¡ and they often act
modate the diversity of interests it contains, rather than a majoritarian clumsily (Chapter 4).
one in which a majority is empowered to routinely impose their will Third is the extent of accounrability levers (Mahoney 2008). The lack
(Lijphart 1999). Majoritarian systems create'winner takes all' politics, of direct connections between EU politics and its citizens means that it
whereas consensually oriented decision-making systems do not create is relatively insulated from pressures from civil society. The positive out-
outright'winners' and 'losers' over time, and even single legislative acts come is that the system cannot be captured by any one type of interest.
mostly tend towards compromise. This involves a corresponding need The negative side to a lack of connecting mechanisms to civil society
224 Interest Representation in the European Union Organized Ciuil Society and European
Integration 22s
is a lack of popular legitimac¡ and particularly arising from a lack of ternal advice as a way
popular participàtion. Because of this, the EU political institutions have
to improve
, inrerest groups g., oppãrrrni,y
to construct participatory regimes, built upon organized civil "n
and promote thã lntereJt
".è¿.¿ áf ,h.i,
society - i.e. elite interest groups. The main task is to ensure a sufficient
population of interest groups in which a wide variety of interests are
represented, and which are sufficiently resourced so as to be able to act
as checks and balances upon each other, and upon EU political institu-
tions. A series of procedures ensures: funding for NGOs sufficient for
them to be able to undertake these tasks; formal equality of access (such
as consultation standards and regimes) for all; and that interest groups
are equipped with the tools to act as watchdogs, by dedicated transpar-
ency tools which produce all important symmetries of information flows
(Parks 2009b) (such as rights of access to information, and a transpar-
ency register). In effect, interest groups are used as surrogate democratic
mechanisms. The population of Brussels NGOs is notably well resourced
and professionalized, with mature features of interlocking coalitions well
capable of political action, and in some cases with outlooks so broad as
to resemble politicalparties (Chapter 6). This population has expanded
to include traditionally'outsider' organizations, both as established play-
ers in purpose-designed buildings in Brussels drawing upon a wide range
of wealthy donor foundations, and through such organizations acting as
'bridges' to social movement activist networks (Chapter 6). This raises
the issue as to whether any type of participation, no matter how appar-
ently hostile, can be regarded as positive for the EU system in that it is
open to interpretation as a contribution to the public sphere. Somehow,
even anti-globalization organizations manage to flourish in the Brussels
paradox of institutionalization within the embrace of a liberal regime.
For those which remain outside Brussels, the key issue is whether their
engagement with the EU has a de-legitimizing effect (Hadden 2009),or Coen 2009).
as'norm entrepreneurs' social movement actors contribute ideas, voices,
and otherwise pluralistic effects of checks and balances, as well as a
voice for the marginalized (Ruzza 2011').
An established way of accounting for the impact of interests in polit-
ical systems is to focus upon the resources exchanged between political
institutions and outside interests. At the EU level, this has been applied
in an exploration of the presence of corporatism at EU level (Green- missioner, and acted as a political agent for it in the establishment of the
wood, Grote and Ronit 1992), by Pappi and Henning to the Common concept of the European Transparency Register (chapter 3). Eising and
Agricultural Policy (Pappi and Henning 1999), in a much more devel- 'woll
separately demonsrrate how the EU political insiitutions or" ìnt"r-
oped form by Bouwen a decade later (Bouwen2002), and as stated by est groups for their own policy-related ends, and how civil society organ-
Persson: izations are willing to completely re-evaluate their entire outlook so as to
I
226 Interest Reþresentation in the European Union
227
228 Bibliography
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Documents 33 equal employment 115-6
two-tiered 208 Protocol 7,203
See also Brussels
routes of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
engagement; interest representation, (ACTA) 1.'J.,1,71
main routes of influence; anti-globalization 167-g
Transparency Register (TR) architects, impact of European
accountability integration 9S-7
CSOs and democratic Architects Council of Europe (ACE)
legitimacy 4,213-1.s t02
International NGO Accountabilitv ArhusConvenrion 1,43-4
Charter (INGO) 65 Assembly of European Regions
lacking 795-6,1,98-200 (AER) 185_6
accreditation 59,270-13 Association of European Border
activism, internet-enabled 1.69-7I Regions (AEBR), 1gg, j.90
advocacy groups. See business groups; ATTAC T7O
civil society organizarions
(CSOs); citizen interesr groups; BEREC (Body of European
consumer lnterest groups; Regulators for Electronic
environmental interests; interest Communication) 49
groups; interest representation; BetterRegulation 35-6,
intergroups; labour interests; 11.7,203
lobbyists; non-governmental BEUC (European Consumer
organizarions (NGOs); Organisation)
professional interest groups; annual budget 1,7,159
trade unions; individual collective action 1i8
organizations funding 136
Air France !íorks Counc iI tl9 operations and
Alliance for a Competitive European contributions IS9-60
Industry 77 representation in other EU_related
alliances, creâting within social
structures 50
movements 169 Birdlife Europe 148
257