Constitutional Law II

1. What is the essence of privacy?

2. What are the requisites of a valid search warrant and warrant of arrest?
3. What are general warrants?
4. What is the purpose of particularity of description?
5. When is particularity of description complied with? (for WOAs and Search Warrants)
6. What are the properties subject to seizure?
7. What is probable cause?
8. How is probable cause determined personally by the judge? (for WOAs and Search Warrants)
9. What constitutes personal knowledge?
10. What constitutes searching questions?
11. What are the instances of a valid warrantless arrest? Expound.
12. Can there be a waiver of the right to question an invalid arrest?
13. Are there any other instances where a peace officer can validly conduct a warrantless arrest,
assigned from those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the ROC?
14. Can the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant be amplified or modified by the officers’
personal knowledge of the premises or evidence they adduce in support of their application for
the warrant?
15. Which court has the primary jurisdiction in issuing search warrants?
16. Does the Constitution limit to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrests?
17. What is the nature of a search warrant proceeding?
18. What are the instances of a valid warrantless search?
19. What is the Plain View Doctrine?
20. What is a “stop‐and‐frisk” search?
21. Are searches conducted in checkpoints lawful?
22. When may motorists and their vehicles passing though checkpoints be stopped and extensively
searched?
23. Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping. He
was pulled out of the room. The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the
locked cabinet where they found a firearm and ammunition. Is the warrantless search and seizure
of the firearm and ammunition justified as an incident to a lawful arrest?
24. When is there an administrative arrest?
25. When can a person be arrested in a deportation proceedings?
26. Is a law requiring mandatory drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
unconstitutional?
27. Is a law requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private offices
unconstitutional?
28. Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming
back and forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier
of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag
on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then
proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for
inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Cutie Pie
Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007. She saw the impression
of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Upon seeing the suspected
firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage
inspector then. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered
Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag. "Port Police Officer
Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in
Pier 1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot." Igot told Officer Abregana that there were
firearms in a bag owned by a certain person. Igot then pointed to the person. That person was

ATTYPDCBCPA
 later identified as Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag was then
inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s
book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked
whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela
Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also
informed of his constitutional rights. In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz
was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms.
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation of
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment. After trial, Branch 12
of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU 80085. Dela Cruz was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office and the right
to suffrage. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Judgment. Dela Cruz filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
August 23, 2013.

a. Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
b. Assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.

29. Police Senior Inspector Bayan "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"
that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "would be transporting marijuana". PSI
Bayan thereafter organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered
SPO1 Taracatac to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers. A passenger jeepney
arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac
approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. "SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and
Dayao and brought them to the police station. Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Laya
II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. According to
Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao. Upon arrival at
their destination, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for
Cogaed’s help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." Cogaed agreed
because they were both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them,
and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did
not know. Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the
police station. At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit him on the head." The
bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. It was only later when Cogaed
learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.

a. Whether or not the search and seizure of marijuana as against the accused are valid.

30. Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information, filed before the RTC.

ATTYPDCBCPA
 That, the Sanchez, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug. When arraigned, Sanchez
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1) the request
for laboratory examination; 2) certification issued by the National Bureau of Investigation; 3)
Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4) transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent plastic
sachet of white crystalline substance. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution’s version states that around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the
information that Jacinta Marciano, aka “Intang,” was selling drugs to tricycle drivers, SPO1
Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel
Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation. While at
the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a
few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group
chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that
they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the
contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small
transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group
brought the two to the police station. Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI,
submitted a Certification that the specimen/s gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

In the present petition, Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a
different version of the events that transpired in the afternoon of March 19, 2003. He testified
that on the date and time in question, he, together with a certain Darwin Reyes, was on their way
home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a passenger, when their way was
blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men
frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked what offense they committed. The arresting
officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely
transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the
Imus Police Station where he was further investigated. The police officer, however, let Darwin
Reyes go.

The RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto , in
actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe
that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when
the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The CA found no cogent reason
to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld
the conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The CA then
went on to write that non-compliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and photograph
of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecution’s cause since its integrity and evidentiary value
had been duly preserved. Hence, this petition.

a. Whether or not the Court of Appeals, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it held that accused was caught in flagrante
delicto, hence, a search warrant was no longer necessary.

31. At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the
officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro,

ATTYPDCBCPA
 received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza,
that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island. Immediately
thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2)
boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat.
They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who
were transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing
boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strongwaves, the police officers were prevented from chasing
the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine
trouble.On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que
and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags containing a white,
crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.” They requested the appellants to show their
identification papers but appellants failed to do so. Thus, the police officers directed appellants to
transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to the shore behind the
Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified that
appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money” which they ignored.

Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags
containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and
Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were
forty-five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each. Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper
documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in
the Philippine territory. However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s questions.
Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors. The PNP Regional
Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following day.

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived. They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the
arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further investigation. There, the appellants and the suspected
prohibited drugs were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and
Investigation Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the
appellants using “broken” English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only
kept saying the phrase “call China, big money,” giving him a certain cellular phone number.

With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and explained to the
appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to
counsel, as well as the right to be informed of the charges against them, and the consequences
thereof. Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted
to avail of said constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase “big
money, call China.”
According to Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able to confirm that the appellants are
Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign
nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in
Cavite, and Quezon Province.

Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic

Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office,
Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of the white, crystalline substance in the
forty-five (45) bags seized from the appellants. After performing three (3) tests thereon, she
positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.”

ATTYPDCBCPA
 On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed
an Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for
violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as
amended by RA No. 7659, or the Importation of Regulated Drugs. Appellants pleaded not guilty
to the charges against them.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and Fernando
Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime
Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal
Council, essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the
apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not
actually from the speed boat the appellants were on. The trial court found appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its
Decision dated January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’ Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision, amendment, or
reversal of its assailed Decision.

a. Whether the arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their
constitutionally protected rights.

32. The general rule is that the right to privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable.
What are the exceptions?
33. Is the tape recording of a telephone conversation containing a person’s admission admissible in
evidence? Why?
34. Is the use of telephone extension a violation of R.A. 4200 (Anti‐Wire Tapping Law)?
35. Are letters of a husband’s paramour kept inside the husband’s drawer, presented by the wife in
the proceeding for legal separation, admissible in evidence?
36. What does the exclusionary rule state?
37. What is the writ of habeas data?
38. What are the reliefs that may be obtained in the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data?
39. What is the concept and scope of protected freedom of expression under the Constitution?
40. What are considered protected speech?
41. What is the concept behind the provision?
42. What are the limitations of freedom of expression?
43. What are the four aspects of freedom of speech and press?
44. What is the first prohibition of the free speech and press clause?
45. Is the prohibition of prior restraint absolute?If not what are the exceptions?
46. What is the second basic prohibition of the free speech and press clause?
47. Is freedom from subsequent punishment absolute?
48. Discuss the Doctrine of Fair Comment.
49. A national daily newspaper carried an exclusive report stating that Senator XX received a house
and lot located at YY Street, Makati, in consideration for his vote cutting cigarette taxes by 50%.
The Senator sued the newspaper, its reporter, editor and publisher for libel, claiming the report
was completely false and malicious. According to the Senator, there is no YY Street in Makati,
and the tax cut was only 20%. He claimed one million pesos in damages. The defendants denied
"actual malice," claiming privileged communication and absolute freedom of the press to report
on public officials and matters of public concern. If there was any error, the newspaper said it
would publish the correction promptly. Is there "actual malice" in the newspaper’s reportage?
How is "actual malice" defined? Are the defendants liable for damages?

ATTYPDCBCPA
 50. Is the Borjal doctrineapplicable in a case where the allegations against a public official were false
and that the journalist did not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles?
(Read Tulfo Case G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008)
51. Distinguish content‐neutral regulation from content‐based restraint or censorship.
52. The NTC issued a warning that that the continuous airing or broadcast by radio and television
stations of the an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President allegedly fixing votes
in the 2004 national elections is a continuing violation of the Anti‐Wiretapping Law and shall be
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued to the said companies. Were the rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern violated?
53. What do you mean by Facial Challenges?
54. How is "facial" challenge different from "as‐applied" challenge?
55. Are facial challenges allowed in penal statutes?
56. What is the Overbreadth Doctrine?
57. What are the tests for valid governmental interference to freedom of expression?
58. Can an offensive and obscene language uttered in a prime‐time television broadcast which was
easily accessible to the children be reasonably curtailed and validly restrained?
59. Is broadcast media entitled to the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the
Constitution as the print media?
60. Can a trial in the Sandiganbayan or any other court be broadcasted in TV or radio?
61. What is the meaning of commercial speech?
62. In order for government to curtail commercial speech what must be shown?
63. Differentiate Government Speech From Private Speech.
64. What is a Heckler’s Veto?
65. A resolution dated 26 Nov. 2013 was issued directing Cagas to explain why he should not be cited
in contempt of court for the letter he sent to the Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez. In the
letter, he expressed his dismay on the decision in the case of Cagas vs. COMELEC- in his words:
I was offended of the “level of deceitfulness of the ponente” and that “the decision can poison the
minds of law students.”

Cagas assisted by a law firm sent a Compliance Letter alleging that it was a personal
communication made by Cagas to a friend—thus the use of the words “pards” and “pare”—and
was not meant nor intended to be an official communication to Atty. Marquez in his capacity as
Court Administrator of the Honorable Court. Cagas added that he was merely carried away by
his emotions and he further stated that he still believes in the court and as a matter of fact he sent
DVDs so that the Court would know the truth.

a. Whether or not Cagas's act constitute disrespect for the Court hence should be cited for
contempt?

66. Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Bautista, in his capacity as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The petition seeks to nullify parts of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding online streaming and the imposition of a
maximum limit of two minutes of debate excerpts for news reporting, entered into between
COMELEC, Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas(KBP), and various media networks
regarding the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential debates, for being executed without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and for violating the fundamental rights of petitioner protected under the Constitution.
Petitioner is alleging that it is being discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions
on live audio broadcast via online streaming. Petitioner further argues that the MOA grants radio
stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates, even if the radio
stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA. Yet, this right to broadcast

ATTYPDCBCPA
 by live streaming online the audio of the debates is denied petitioner and other online media
entities, which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates. Petitioner insists
that it signed the MOA believing in good faith the issues it has raised will be resolved by the
COMELEC.

a. Whether or not pertinent parts of the MOA violated the rights/freedom of the Press of the
Petitioner

67. On February 21, 2013, petitioners The Diocese of Bacolod and the Most Rev. Bishop Navarra
posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size.

They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The second
tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners
as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”. These
tarpaulins were not paid for nor sponsored by any candidate, and they contain names of candidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013 respondent Atty. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, ordered Bishop Navarra to remove the tarpaulin within 3 days from receipt for
being oversized, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 which provided for a size
requirement for campaign materials. Petitioners requested for a definitive ruling from the
COMELEC Law Department. On February 27, 2013 the latter ordered the immediate removal of
the tarpaulin for violation of the abovementioned Resolution; otherwise COMELEC will file an
election offense case against the petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech,
petitioners initiated before the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials dated
February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013.

a. Did the COMELEC have legal basis to regulate the tarpaulin of the petitioners?
b. Are the tarpaulins are a form or expression (protected speech), or election propaganda/political
advertisement?
c. Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, did the COMELEC possesses
the authority to regulate the same?
d. May this form of expression may be regulated?
e. Was the doctrine of separation of church and state violated by the petitioners and the
respondents when the former posted its tarpaulin, and the latter ordered the tarpaulin taken
down?

68. The present case involves five petitions assailing the constitutionality of Sec 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes,
respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates

ATTYPDCBCPA
 freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions
implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean
that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per station." For the May 2013
elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15,
2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for
political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis.
Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN are owners/operators of radio and
television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing
operators of radio and television stations and said stations themselves. They sent their respective
letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the
COMELEC held public hearings.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, Senator Alan Peter S. Cayetano (Petitioner-Intervenor) filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit the Petition-in-Intervention, which was
granted by the Court per its Resolution dated March 19, 2013.
All of the Petitioners assail Sec. 9 (a) of the Resolution which provides for an "aggregate total"
airtime instead of the previous "per station" airtime for political campaigns or advertisements,
and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and
appearances. Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of the assailed Resolution provides for a very
restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a proper computation of "aggregate
total" airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and
purpose of R.A. No. 9006. Petitioners further contend that Section 9 (a), which imposes a notice
requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom of speech, of the
press and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern
Petitioners also allege that Section 9 (a) is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an
unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a candidate's
or political party's aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal liability.
Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or political party's "right to reply,"
is likewise assailed by Petitioners to be unconstitutional for being an improper exercise of the
COMELEC's regulatory powers; for constituting prior restraint and infringing petitioners'
freedom of expression, speech and the press; and for being violative of the equal protection
guarantee.
In addition to the foregoing, petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated
without public consultations, in violation of petitioners' right to due process.
Thereafter, on February 1, 2013 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of
Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and
oppressive, hence, the present petitions.

a. Whether or not the COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing
the interpretation and implementation of the airtime limits.
b. Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits goes against
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
c. Whether or not Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage.
d. Whether or not Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption.
e. Whether or not Resolution No. 9615 imposes an unreasonable burden on the broadcast
industry.

ATTYPDCBCPA
ATTYPDCBCPA