EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9444. October 29, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOFRONIO DE LA CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

Sofronio de la Cruz was charged with having threatened Dolores Coronel in a letter with death or the burning of her house unless she gave him
P500, which she must deposit in the place indicated to her in the letter. This letter was found by Rafaela Goronel, who was living with Dolores, in
the fence around her house, and as she was then on her way to church she turned it over to her neighbor Agustin, Coronel, who read its contents
to Dolores Coronel, an old woman of 70 years, who became nervous and uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito Coronel reported the
matter to the municipal president of Guagua, Pampanga, who went to Dolores’ house and adopted some precautionary measures. Upon returning
to the town hall he found a man held under arrest by the Constabulary. He had him searched to see whether he was carrying any prohibited thing
and there was found upon him an envelope inside a pocketbook, and upon the envelope was written the name of Dolores Coronel. The man under
arrest was Sofronio de la Cruz.

The letter with its envelope, found in the fence around the house, forms Exhibit A. The envelope found in the pocket- book, Exhibit B.

On this envelope (Exhibit B) the name written is "Dolores Cronel" and the letter and envelope (Exhibit A) also set forth the same name, "Dolores
Cronel." It is sufficient to compare the nature of the handwriting of the name "Dolores Cronel" on the envelope (Exhibit B) with that of the same
writing used in the letter (Exhibit A) in order to appreciate at a glance their complete similarity.

Sofronio de la Cruz had been arrested by the Constabulary and taken to the town hall for a similar letter, addressed, apparently, to one Andres
Valenzuela of the same neighborhood of Guagua, which has been brought into this case as Exhibit C. A glance at it corroborates the idea that both
letters were written by the same hand.

Sofronio de la Cruz says that Tito Coronel wrote the name "Dolores Cronel" that appears on the envelope found on him; but Tito Coronel was made
to write a name in court for comparing his handwriting, and it is evident that this is not at all like that of any of the letters that figure as exhibits in
the case.

In connection with this phase of the defense the defendant presented the witness Florentino Nacu to demonstrate that the old woman Dolores
Coronel had been in his house, accompanied by Tito Coronel, for the purpose of talking about plowpoints with the defendant, and that the latter
made a note of her name in order to know her address, and Tito Coronel wrote the name "Dolores Cronel" on the envelope (Exhibit B); that the
defendant remained in Florentino Nacu’s house until Good Friday (on which day the letter addressed to Dolores Coronel was found); that he was in
said house to collect from Nacu what the latter owed him; that on the Wednesday previous he had urged Nacu to get some money because he
needed it badly. Florentino Nacu testified in agreement, but to all this said that while the old woman Dolores and the defendant were talking about
plowpoints he was in the kitchen cooking the food for his family and gave his attention to that, although he was moving in and out where Dolores
and Tito Coronel were talking with the defendant, but still he did not affirm that he had seen Tito Coronel write on the envelope that he handed
the defendant. Tito Coronel totally denies all the assertions of the defendant and his witness Nacu.

The Court of First Instance of Pampanga sentenced the defendant, as guilty of threats, under article 494 of the Penal Code, to four years two
months and one day of prision correccional, the accessories of the law, with credit for half the time of detention suffered, and to payment of the
costs.

The first ground of error assigned to us is the denial of the motion for dismissal presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution
had been closed and before that for the defense had been begun, the motion being based upon lack of evidence.

The Attorney-General in this instance alleges that the question has already been determined by this Supreme Court in a negative sense in the case
of the United States v. Abaroa (3 Phil. Rep., 116), wherein the following principle was laid down: "After the prosecution rests, the court should not
dismiss the case on motion for insufficiency of proof but should require the defendant to present evidence on his own behalf."cralaw virtua1aw
library

This is true. But this decision was rendered on December 29, 1903, when, in conformity with General Order No. 58, it was possible to appeal from
dismissals and final judgments. It was then held that the practice of dismissing the case immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had
been closed ought not to be followed, for when the order of dismissal was appealed from and this higher court sustained the conviction of the
accused on that evidence of the prosecution he would have been convicted without having been heard in his own defense, which would work an in
justice; and when to avoid this difficulty the order of dismissal was overruled and the case returned for rehearing, another difficulty would be
encountered, which is that of subjecting the accused a second time to another trial without action on his part and without need, since all the
evidence could and should have been taken at the trial already held, and with the additional risk of all the inconveniences of delay. In this state of
affairs the Supreme Court of the United States rendered the decision in the case of Kepner v. U. S. (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669), and since
then the situation assumed and disposed of in United States v. Abaroa cannot be considered, for the Government cannot now appeal from an
order sustaining the motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution has been closed, on the ground of
insufficiency thereof.

Even now, after the Kepner case, it is no ground for error that the Court of First Instance denied the motion for dismissal presented immediately
after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed because the defense believed it to be insufficient; for the reason that, as in this case, the
court did not hold it to be insufficient — it was under no obligation so to hold it — and it could continue the trial and take the evidence for the
defense in order to reach the conclusion induced in its opinion by the allegations and the evidence, or as it did conclude in this case by sentencing
the defendant on the evidence for the prosecution, which it held to be sufficient.

And it is quite sufficient, as the trial court has held, even taking into consideration only the exhibits.

One of the methods of proving the authenticity of a writing is collation, the comparison the court can make with other writings proven to its
satisfaction to be authentic. The trial court held to be proven to its satisfaction as authentic the writing by the defendant (Exhibit B) that was found
inside the pocketbook. The defendant tried to ascribe the writing to another — to Tito Coronel — and his counsel tested Tito Coronel by having him
write in the court room what he dictated to him. He directed him to write the name of a person and of a place as the address of a letter, and it
plainly appears that neither the free handwriting of the letter nor the firmness of the strokes of the writing is at all like the somewhat rough and
uncertain form, as of a beginner, of the writing and strokes in Exhibit B and the anonymous Exhibits A and C. These are signed in the same way with
a "Pulano Tal" so similar that it seems to be one signature traced over the other. Moreover, Tito Coronel, said to be an intimate of the old woman
Dolores Coronel, if he had really written her name in order thus to give the defendant a definite post-office address when he knew so well how to
write, as he demonstrated, would not have written Dolores Cronel, as it appears in Exhibits A and B. Furthermore, the initial "D" of the name
Dolores and the same unusual way of writing the "D" in the Exhibits A and C is not the "D" written by Tito Coronel in the word "Dumaguete," which
he was made to write. The attempt to ascribe to Tito Coronel the writing of the name that appears in Exhibit B was frustrated. "I wish to prove,"
said the witness Pedro Bacani, municipal president, "that the witness Tito Coronel is an influential man, and not, as the defense is trying, to prove
indirectly that it was Tito Coronel who wrote the letter." The defense: "From the moment we presented him as a witness, we ceased to suspect
him. We admit that Tito Coronel is an influential man." (p. 50.)

The trial court having held that the anonymous threat (Exhibit A) was written by the defendant, and there being no ground for the contrary, the
legitimate conclusion from the facts is to sustain such finding, which is certainly corroborated by the other data furnished by the witness Florentino
Nacu regarding the presence in Guagua of the defendant, who was a resident of Angat, Bulacan.

The conclusion in law therefore is for the guilt of the defendant, who is guilty of the crime penalized in paragraph one of article 494 of the Penal
Code; and there must be imposed upon him the penalty lower by two degrees than that fixed by the law for the crime he threatened to commit.
For having made the threat and demanding a sum of money, even though he did not obtain it, the penalty should be in the maximum degree,
however, as he made the threat in writing. The penalty fixed by the law for the crime he threatened to commit, which is homicide, is reclusion
temporal (art. 404), so the lower by two degrees, according to scale No. 2, is prision correccional, which in its maximum degree is four years two
months and one day to six years. The penalty of four years two months and one day of prision correccional in the judgment appealed from being in
this degree and the imposition of the accessories of the law and the allowance of half of the time of detention suffered and the payment of the
costs all being proper, said judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5348. November 16, 1909. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEJO PAGUIRIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ELLIOTT, J. :

The defendant Paguirigan, charged with having threatened to kill Sotero Pascua, Vicente Marquez, and Maximo Lopez, was convicted and
sentenced under the second part of article 494 of the Penal Code to one month and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, and
in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of 12 1/2 pesetas a day, said subsidiary imprisonment no to exceed ten days,
and to pay the costs of this prosecution. The court found no extenuating or aggravating circumstances, and gave the defendant the benefit of
article 11 of the Penal Code, for the purpose of reducing the penalty from the medium to the minimum degree.

The offense was not a serious one, and there is nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant ever really contemplated carrying his threat
into effect. The men were engaged in transplanting rice upon land which was claimed by the defendant. While they were at work the defendant
appeared, and flourishing a cane in an excited manner, ordered them to stop their work and leave, at the time threatening to kill them unless they
obeyed. They obeyed the order, and the incident was closed. Upon these facts the defendant should have been convicted under the third
subdivision of article 589, instead of article 494 of the Penal Code. The threats referred to in article 494 consist in formally threatening a private
person with some injury to himself or his family which would amount to a crime. A threat made in jest or in the heat of anger is a misdemeanor
only under article 589. Subdivision 3 of article 589 provides that "Those who shall threaten another, by words and in the heat of anger, with an
injury that would constitute a crime, and who by their subsequent actions show that they persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in
their threat; provided that, in view of the circumstances of the deed, it should not be included in Book II of this code." shall be punished with the
penalty of from one to five days of arrest, or a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger, and that the
subsequent actions of the party show that he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into execution, reduce the offense from a crime to a
misdemeanor. It is true that the code uses the words "and who by their subsequent actions showed that they persisted in the intention which they
gave utterance to in their threat," but a literal adherence to this language would produce the absurd result of making persistence in an illegal
purpose operate in mitigation of the offense. The power of a court to supply or omit words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result
which the legislature will not be supposed to have intended, is well established. (State v. Bates, 96 Minn., 110.) It is evident that words of negation
should be inserted between the words "they’ and "persisted," thus making the provision read "and who by their subsequent actions showed that
they had not persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat." In commenting upon this section, Viada, volume 3, page 310,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The article says . . .’that did persist.’ This is undoubtedly a mistake, because it is precisely the persistence in a threat that gives it the aggravating
character so as to amount to a crime. However, this mistake is not found among the many that were corrected by the decree of January 1, 1870.
But the strict moral and juridical sense should supply this omission."cralaw virtua1aw library

That this is understood to be the true meaning of the provision of the code appears from the language used in United States v. Estrada (10 Phil.
Rep., 583). The defendant had taken offense at some words used by one Delgado, and threatened to kill him. While Estrada was searching for a
revolver, Delgado concealed himself. On the following day Estrada called at Delgado’s house and stated that the threat had been uttered without
premeditation, and that it was not seriously made. The court commented upon the fact that it appeared that the defendant had not persisted in
carrying out the threat, and held that the offense had only the characteristics of a misdemeanor, and was punishable under article 589, instead of
article 494, of the Penal Code. These articles have been construed by this court in several other cases. In United States v. Sevilla (1 Phil Rep., 143) it
appeared that the defendant while beating certain parties said that he would kill them if they did not return his jewels. It was held that the threats
dealt with under article 494 are those made with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat
will be carried into effect, and that under the circumstances of the case the defendant was punishable under article 589, instead of article 494. So
in United States v. Simeon (3 Phil. Rep., 388), a person who raised a bolo as if to strike or stab a night watchman, who thereupon ran away; was
held guilty under article 589 of threatening another with weapons.

In United States v. Castañares (8 Phil. Rep., 730), the defendant having taken offense at some remark, drew a revolver and threatened to kill one
Yap Gea, who thereupon fled. The trial court held the defendant guilty of amenaza under article 494, but this court was of the opinion that the
defendant was guilty only of the offense declared by section 2 of article 589 of the Penal Code. In United States v. Algurra (9 Phil. Rep., 644), it was
held that threats made against another, and in the heat of anger, constituted a misdemeanor only under section 3 of article 589 of the Penal Code.
The court there remarked that "it has not been shown . . . that he threatened them in earnest with the apparent intent to carry the threat into
effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the authority of these decisions the defendant should have been convicted and punished for a misdemeanor. The sentence is therefor
reversed, and the defendant is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of 125 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in the
provincial jail of La Union, at the rate of 15 pesetas or P3 a day, said subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed ten days, and to pay the costs of this
prosecution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City,
convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594),
to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the
second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were
terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the
main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla
boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine
Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon
went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval
station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy
Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted
to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about
his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the
station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told
Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted,
"Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After
Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and
posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina
mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant,
in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned
complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as
follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution
moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel
objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would
affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the
information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave
threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could
legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner
of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting
petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.

On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and
at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of
Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence,
petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the
crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to
require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the
Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides
for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the
deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was
merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the
amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in
convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats
were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2
Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he
stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of
anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was
correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to
the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In
other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the
letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court
believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from
the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of
the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 171511 : March 4, 2009]
RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and its Resolution2 dated
February 15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision3 dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint Decision4 dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty
of slight physical injuries and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations5 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag
and Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling
him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, moved by personal resentment which he entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime, by then and there poking his
gun at her forehead and uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit:

"Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?"

thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as
follows:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o'clock8 in the afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were
mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people
including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to
pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife
to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.9

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked
her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"10
Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities.11

For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to
them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 o'clock in the evening, Caluag was on his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor,
drunk and unruly, blocked his way and asked him, "Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?" He answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning
and would not allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, "Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!" Nestor then boxed him on his face which
caused him to fall down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified them, he
was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them.
Nestor then shouted, "Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!" Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed
with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a
gun at Julia.12

In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The MeTC relied on Nestor's testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that
he got annoyed by Nestor's attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor's unruly behavior.
On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay. While she had intended to
report the mauling of her husband, as he instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such straightforward and
seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of Nestor and Julia.

The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of P200.00 each. The
two (2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with people.

The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of P200.00.

Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.

SO ORDERED.13

Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the MeTC gave credence to
the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the natural course of things. Likewise, petitioner's negative assertions cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court disregarded the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor
and Julia since these refer to collateral matters and not to the essential details of the incident.

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals:

I.

'MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;

II.

'ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;

III.

'ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.14

Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats?cralawred

Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and
debunked those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner offered mere denials, Barrameda's testimony is
actually a positive statement that should have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts acknowledged that
Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to believe his testimony rather than petitioner's. Petitioner adds that
there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestor's unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just
because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it actually happened. Petitioner
also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code.15

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and
Julia. The MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course
of events, constituted the more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident
to the barangay authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly
behavior of Nestor.

We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioner's conviction.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.16

The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
under which this petition is filed. It is not the Court's function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative
value of the evidence presented.17

Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court
to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be
reviewed on appeal.18

A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply
the exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC and the
RTC. This Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal
particularly where, as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.19

Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the appellate court's
ruling.

As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course of
things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor's
unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead
of reporting the mauling of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive
declarations of Nestor and Julia that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The fact that Barrameda
testified in petitioner's behalf cannot be given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find
they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P200. We find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of
the MeTC and RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article
285). These provisions state:

Art. 282. Grave threats. - Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family
of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat
demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender
shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Art. 283. Light threats. - Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next
preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Art. 285. Other light threats. - The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such
weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.

2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show
that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of
Article 282 of this Code.

3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to
a crime and there is no condition.

The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband
which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her
forehead, while at the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia's
husband, petitioner's act of pointing a gun at Julia's forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person.
Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to
inflict serious injury evinced by petitioner's accompanying act.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone
amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in
a quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or
not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed
down by the then Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No. 4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Coercion as penalized
under Art. 286 in the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS
OF IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay the offended party in the amount of
P5,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby
ordered ACQUITTED.

The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte,
accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to
fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of
Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for
closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances
per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.

Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court
of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under
lawful authority.

We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and
695 of the Civil Code, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
foregoing definition.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal
Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance
per-se. Thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a
stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public
passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place.
Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters
for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for in addition,
this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights — the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere
[Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in 11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan Lingkod ng
Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487].

xxx xxx xxx

... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded
defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ...
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article
699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. têñ.£îhqwâ£

ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or

[2] A civil action; or

[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having
then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.

Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not
prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any
person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
[2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and
control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other
words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2

The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4812. October 30, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMUALDO MENA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The accused was convicted of the crime of coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined and penalized in article 497 of the Penal Code, and sentenced
to one month and one day of arresto mayor; to the payment of a fine of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment as provided by law; and to the
payment of the costs of the trial; the penalty prescribed being imposed in its minimum degree, the trial court having taken into consideration the
extenuating circumstance of race, as prescribed in article 11 of the Penal Code.

On or about the 21st day of December, 1907, three carabaos, the property of the defendant, trespassed upon the rice paddies of the complaining
witness, Ceferino Flora, doing considerable damage thereto. Flora took possession of the animals and refused to return them to the defendant
without compensation for the damage done The defendant did not deny Flora’s right to compensation, but said that he was unable to make
payment in kind, because at the time he did not own any rice; and there would appear to have been some question also as to the amount of
damage done by the animals. Between 10 and 11 o’clock on the following morning, Flora and his son set out to take the carabaos to the justice of
the peace, for the purpose of depositing them in his care until the question of damages could be settled in his court. On the road to the justice of
the peace, they met the defendant in company with some other persons. In answer to a question of some of the party who were with the
defendant, Flora said that he was bringing the animals to the justice of the peace, and refused to surrender them to the defendant or his friends.
Thereupon, the defendant drew his bolo, rushed at Flora’s son (who was in advance of Flora himself, mounted on one of the carabaos, and leading
another with a mecate), cut the mecate by which the son was leading the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury, compelled him to turn the
other loose; and then with further threats of bodily injury, compelled Flora himself to turn loose the carabao which he was riding.

While there is some dispute as to the details of the incidents, we think the testimony of the witnesses clearly establishes the facts as above set out,
Counsel for the defendant insist that the complaining witness had no right to take possession of the carabaos of the defendant, even though they
were trespassing upon his lands; that he had no right to take the animals to the justice of the wace; and that the defendant was guilty of no offense
in forcibly taking possession of his own carabaos at the time when the incident above related occured.

Without enterring upon a discussion of the respective rights of the parties, we are of opinion that, granting it were true that the complaining
witness had no lawful right to the possession of the carabaos or to take the carabaos to the justice of the peace, and granting further that the
accused had a right to have the carabaos turned over to him, when he demanded them of the complaining witness, nevertheless, the crime of
coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined and penalized in article 497 of the Penal Code, was committed by him, when with violence he compelled
the complaining witness to turn over the carabaos against his will, it being clearly understood by the defendant and his friends that the complaining
witness was not seeking to appropriate the animals or to carry them off as his property, and that he merely asserted a right to the possession of
the carabaos for the purpose of taking them to the justice of the peace in order that the question of the damages might be adjusted.

Article 497 of the Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of coaccion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"He who, without being lawfully authorized so to do, prevents another, with violence, from doing something which is not prohibited by law or
compels him to do some thing which he does not wish to do, whether such thing be just or unjust will be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of coaccion. With violence he compelled the
complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to do — that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos — and it matters not
whether it was "just or unjust" that they should thus have been turned over to the defendant; whether it was or was not the duty of the
complaining witness to turn them over on demand, the defendant was guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce
his demand when the complaining witness refused compliance therewith.

The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and it is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized to take the law
into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined cases, where one acts in the necessary defense of
one’s life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and manifestly the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was taken in
defense of life, liberty, or property. The carabaos were in the possession of the complaining witness who claimed the right thereto for the purpose
of turning them over to the justice of the peace; the defendant denied the right of the complaining witness to this possession and claimed the
absolute right to possession in himself; but in forcibly depriving the complaining witness of possession of the carabaos the defendant was not
acting in defense of his right to the possession of the property from unlawful aggression, but rather asserting his right to take the possession from
another, and thus he himself became the aggressor.

A dispute having arisen as to the right of possession, and the carabaos being actually in the possession of the complaining witness, it was the duty
of the defendant if he desired to enforce his claim, to seek the aid of the proper judicial authority; and had he thus asserted his claim in the orderly
manner provided by law, he would have secured not only the possession of the animals, but damages for their detention, upon proof of the justice
of his claim.

A similar question was decided in the case of U. S. v. Tremoya (10 Phil. Rep., 89), wherein it was held that where one was actually in possession of a
parcel of land and claimed the right to possession under color of title the lawful owner of the land with the true title to the possession was guilty of
coaccion when with violence he compelled the person in possession to vacate.

The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., concurs in the result.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 2550. August 23, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. GABINO VENTOSA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

On the evening of the 30th of March, 1902, in the house of Teodoro Husain, in the pueblo of Cabatuan, in the Province of Iloilo, the people of the
town were entertained by the owner of the house for the purpose of celebrating Easter. There were present a great many young people, and more
women than men. Supper had been prepared and was being served when the defendant, a corporal in the Constabulary, accompanied by four of
his soldiers, appeared in the house. He asked the owner of the house if had a license for entertainment. The owner was not able to produce any
written license and, as the defendant himself said, he started to suspend the meeting because in the first place no license had been given for it, and
secondly because the people made a noise and disturbed the public peace. He remained in the house an hour, compelled some of the people to
sign a document and leave the house, stopping the entertainment.

The evidence we think shows that upon protest being made by some of the young men present, he drew his revolver and pointed it at them. He is
prosecuted in this case for the crime of coaccion, defined in article 497 of the Penal Code. There was no proof in the case of the existence of many
ordinance of the pueblo of Cabatuan requiring a license for the holding of such an entertainment, and there is moreover, proof that the owner of
the house had secured from the municipal president verbal permission therefor. The evidence is conclusive that the meeting was in no sense
illegal, but was a mere social gathering, and it is also conclusive that there was no breach of the peace or any disorder being committed there at
the time the defendant interfered. Act No. 175, section 9, gives the Constabulary the right to suppress unlawful assemblies and also provides that
"they and each of them are empowered to make arrest upon reasonable suspicion without warrant for breaches of the peace or other violations of
the law." In this case there was not only no breach of the peace and no violation of the law, but the defendant could not have any reasonable
suspicion of the existence of such violation. His act was illegal and he is responsible therefor. Even if there had been an ordinance of the
municipality prohibiting such meetings without obtaining a license therefor, it would seem that, by reason of the provisions of section 6 Act No.
610, the defendant had no authority to make arrests for the violation of such an ordinance.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. At the expiration of ten days from the date of
final judgment the case will be remanded to the court below for proper procedure. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1568. February 10, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AQUILINO CALVO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

A complaint, filed October 8, 1903, by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, charged Aquilino Calvo, a physician, with the
crime of coercion with threats and attempt of illegal detention. It alleged that the accused did, on the evening of the 29th of August last, in the
pueblo of Iba, order one Mariano Atienza out of the house of Feliciano Farrales, who was ill and whom the former wished to visit, and did put him
out of said house, and did threaten to kill him with a revolver, and did order a policeman to take him to jail. This order, however, was not complied
with by the said policeman.

The evidence in this case shows that on the evening of August 29, 1903, Mariano Atienza came to the house of Feliciano Farrales, who had a
serious attack of cholera, to visit him; that when Atienza was warned by the attending physician, Aquilino Calvo, president of the board of health of
Zambales, to go away, the former insisted on remaining there, alleging that the patient was his friend; whereupon the physician put him out of the
house and threatened to kill him if he did not go, and immediately ordered a policeman who was in the neighborhood to take the intruder to jail,
with which order, however, the said policeman did not comply.

Aside from the question whether or not there was any material error in the trial below, this decision shall be confined to the evidence adduced in
the case, drawing the necessary conclusions therefrom.

In the judgment rendered October 13, 1903, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor, to pay a
fine of 250 pesetas, and the costs. The defendant as well as the provincial fiscal appealed from the said judgment. The Solicitor-General withdrew
the appeal in this instance. It appears from the record that Atienza was suffering from mental derangement, and that he persisted, with a club in
his hand, in the attempt to enter the room, where there was a man with a serious attack of cholera whom he desired to see. The fact that the
attending physician, who was also president of the board of health, at the request of the wife of the patient, had compelled him to leave the house
and had even threatened to shoot him with a revolver, besides ordering a policeman who was passing in front of the house to arrest him, does not
constitute coercion, threats, or attempt of illegal detention.

Agatona Medina, the wife of the patient, was opposed to the admittance of Mariano Atienza into her house because the latter was known in the
town to be suffering from insanity; but as he persisted in entering the room to see the patient, with a club in his hand, she then requested the
physician to expel the intruder from her house. Atienza was not an acquaintance of the family, and had come there for the first time to see
Feliciano Farrales, who was not in a condition to receive anybody. The action of the said physician in compelling the intruder to leave the house
was in compliance with the request of the wife of the patient, as well as with his duty to protect the owner of the house, who also denied
admittance to the intruder.

The physician, being the president of the board of health, acted within the scope of his authority when he prevented Atienza from entering the
room occupied by the patient, for the reason that it was contrary to sanitary regulations. His action was no less justified when he ordered a
policeman to arrest Atienza on account of his persistence to remain in the house. The owner of the house was excited by fear of the mental
condition and attitude of the intruder, and was compelled to urge his expulsion from her house.

In view of the foregoing reasons there is no way in law to consider the existence of any of the crimes charged in the complaint; though threats are
said to have been made, there is no evidence sufficiently conclusive to corroborate this assertion, considering the mental condition and the ill
behavior of Atienza. Therefore the acts performed by the president of the board of health, who was the attending physician of a man suffering
from a contagious disease, do not constitute the crime for which he is prosecuted.

It is the judgment of this court that the defendant be acquitted, with costs de oficio. Let this case be remanded to the Court of First Instance with a
certified copy of this decision and of the judgment which shall be rendered in accordance herewith. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
C.A. No. 762 February 6, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SILVERIO NEBREJA ET AL., defendants.
SILVERIO NEBREJA, appellant.

FERIA, J.:

The appellant Silverio Nebreja was charged with several others and found guilty of the crime of grave coercion by the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P100 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-seventh of the costs. The other accused pleaded guilty of light coercion and were
sentenced to serve the corresponding penalty and did not appeal.

The following facts are established in this case. The appellant was an encargado of Mateo Maningat, an hacendero of Balayan, Batangas, who
bought the Lian Estate, situated in Lian, Batangas, from the corporation El Colegio de San Jose, but the buyer could not tare possession of a portion
of the land due to opposition of the occupants, among them the offended party Nicomedes Jonson. In the morning of October 5, 1942, while
Nicomedes Jonson, assisted by Felipe Balbal, Marcelo Jonson and Alfonso Jonson, was plowing a parcel of the said land claimed by him and in his
possession, the seven defendants led by the appellant, all armed with bolos except the appellant and Mariano Magno, ordered Nicomedes Jonson
to stop plowing the land because the defendants would plow it. Nicomedes Jonson answered that he had a right to continue plowing the land as it
was still in his possession, and that while it was involved in a litigation there was as yet no decision and order of the court to deliver possession
thereof to somebody else. The appellant retorted that if they (Nicomedes Jonson and his companions) did not stop plowing they would get hurt,
and grabbed the rope of the carabao of Nicomedes Jonson, while his co-accused, with their hand on the handles of their bolos, surrounded
Nicomedes Jonson and his companions. Cowed by this hostile attitude of the defendants, Nicomedes Jonson and his companions had to stop
plowing, thus enabling the defendants to take possession of and plow the land. Nicomedes Jonson immediately reported the matter to the local
authorities, and returned with Sergeant of Police Amado Caraig and five policemen. Upon arriving at the place, they found Silverio Nebreja standing
on the land while three of the defendants were plowing and the rest were standing guard. Sergeant Caraig approached and asked the appellant if it
was true that he had stopped Nicomedes Jonson from plowing the land, to which the latter answered in the affirmative, stating that it was he who
should plow the land. The Sergeant then warned the appellant that if the he had and his men did not stop the plowing they would be taken to the
municipal building; and as the defendant refused to stop and the appellant said that he was ready for any eventuality, they were arrested and
taken to the municipal jail.

Appellant's defense is an alibi, that is, that in the morning of October 5, 1942, when the alleged crime was committed, he was at the Central
Azucarera Don Pedro in Nasugbu, Batangas, talking with a certain Captain Mauchi, and that when he returned to the Lian, Batangas, in the
afternoon of the same day, he was arrested and thrown in jail.

This alibi set up by the appellant has no probative value, because it is not supported by evidence, for neither Captain Mauchi nor any one from the
sugar central was presented to support it. The negative testimony of the negative co-defendants, who pleaded guilty and were convicted, to the
effect that the appellant was not in the land when they were arrested are not strictly in support of the alibi that the appellant was in said sugar
central, and is contradicted by Arsenio Nebreja, one of his co-accused who was presented as a witness of the defense, who categorically testified
that the appellant was among the arrested in the place where the offense was committed in the morning of October 5, 1942, and by the positive
testimony to that effect of the offended party, Felipe Balbal and Sergeant Caraig. Besides, considering the short distance between the municipality
of Lian and Nasugbu and the available means of transportation, it was not impossible to the appellant, according to the lower court which took
judicial notice of that fact, to have been in the sugar central at Nasugbu in the morning of October 5, 1942, and to have returned to Lian in the
same morning in time to commit the offense charged.

The contention of attorney for the appellant that the latter, being an "encargado" of the owner of the land, had the right to eject forcibly the
offended party from the land and prevent him from plowing it, does not deserve serious consideration, for no person may take the law into his
own hands.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt of the crime charge and of which he was
convicted, and that the penalty imposed is in confirmity with the law, and, therefore, the sentence appealed from its hereby affirmed with costs to
the appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Briones, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 8722 September 10, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, Defendant-Appellant.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sentencing the defendant, Buenaventura Balcorta, to three years six
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas, together with the accessory penalties provided by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is alleged that the court does not sustain the guilt of the appellant. The record, however, clearly shows that the accused entered a private house,
uninvited, where services of the Methodist Episcopal Church were being conducted by between ten and twenty persons, and threatened the
assemblage with a club, thereby interrupting of disturbing the divine service. The punishment meted out to the defendant by the lower court is
that provided for in article 223 of the Penal Code which reads as follows:

The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of not less than 625 and not more than 6,250 pesetas shall be
imposed upon any person who, by means of threats violence, or other equivalent compulsion, shall force some other person to perform an act of
worship or prevent him from performing such act.

This conclusion of law is assigned as error, it being insisted that the offense falls under paragraph 1 of article 571, which reads:chanrobles virtual
law library

The penalties of arresto from one to ten days and a fine of from fifteen to one hundred and twenty-five pesetas shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who shall disturb or interrupt any ceremony of a religious character in any manner not failing within the provisions of section 3,
chapter 2, title 2 of book 2 of this code.

The twenty-first article of the Spanish constitution of 1869 provided for a state religion, but also guaranteed the privilege of freely practicing, both
in public and private, the forms and ceremonies of other sects, subject only to the restrictions imposed by general law and morality. Under this
constitution of Penal Code of Spain, now in effect, was promulgated in 1870. As a consequence of the removal of all restrictions upon the exercise
of religious beliefs, the Penal Code of Spain, enacted in 1870, in its chapter on crimes against religion, is wholly impersonal. In none of its articles
(Nos. 236 to 241) is any particular religion mentioned, but offense against religion, as such, are defined and penalized. The heading of the chapter is
"Crimes relative to the free exercise of religion ( los cultos)."chanrobles virtual law library

The constitution of 1876, in Spain, which is still in force, after providing for a state religion, guaranteed that no one in Spanish territory would be
molested for his religious opinions, nor for observing the forms of his faith, provided due respect were shown for Christian morals. By this same
article, however, only the followers of the state religion could engage in public ceremonies or other manifestations. It will be noted that this article
materially modified article 21 of the former constitution. While everyone could still worship God in his own manner, it was no longer permissible
for cults other than the state religion to demonstrate their religious beliefs in public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was under this constitution that the Penal Code for the Philippine Islands was promulgated in 1884. As a consequence its provisions are
considerably different from those of the Spanish Penal Code. Of the eight articles defining and penalizing "Crimes against religion and worship"
(which is the title of the chapter), six refer specially and solely to crimes against the state religion. The only crime specifically defined against
religious other than that of the state is for disturbing, by means of violence, threats, etc., their ceremonies when conducted in cemeteries or other
places were such ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art. 225.)chanrobles virtual law library

The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill caused the complete separation of
church and state, and the abolition of all special privileges and all restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect.
All became equal in the eyes of the law, and those articles of the Penal Code defining special crimes against that denomination which, under the
former sovereign, was the state religion, as well as article 225, defining a crime against all others than that religion, necessarily became inoperative.
Only those articles of the Penal Code which refer to all religious equally and without distinction can now be considered as in effect. They appear to
be two in number, viz, article 223 and 571.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Let us first examine article 223, from which, neither by the specific language used nor by implication, can it be inferred that nay particular religious
doctrine was in the minds of the code makers. What was the object and purpose of this section? It will be remembered that at the time this article
became law, all faiths not opposed to Christian morals were, under the constitution of Spain, tolerated. According to the terms of the constitution,
everyone had the right to worship his Maker in his own manner; and as a corollary no one could be compelled to indorse a particular creed. Were it
lawful to prevent the one or exact the other, the terms of the constitution would have become a dead letter. As is usual with constitutions, no
penalty was attached to this article. It remained for the legislature in the course of its ordinary legislation to provide for its enforcement. In order to
instil respect for this constitutional provision, it was necessary to provide a punishment for anyone who sought to interfere with the religious
beliefs of his fellow citizens. A glance at the other articles of the Penal Code in the chapter we are discussing shows that none of the crimes defined
and punished therein would respond to a state of facts where both the will and conscience of a human being were being tampered with upon the
subject of religion. The provisions of article 223 were relied upon to prevent such practices. The article says that "the penalty . . . shall be imposed
upon any person who . . . shall force some other person to perform an act of worship . . ." In other words, any attempt, by coercive methods, to
induce a person to worship God in a manner different from or to an extent greater than that person desired, constituted an abridgment of his
constitutional right to believe or disbelieve, to regard or disregard the outer forms of a sect, even though he were a member of that sect. Whatever
may have been the inducement for the passage of this article of the code, certainly it is in the closest harmony with the principles of government of
the present sovereign, one of which is the greatest freedom of thought and speech consistent with public order upon religious
matters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The concluding portion of the article is, "or prevent him from performing such act." History has perhaps demonstrated that it is a more common
form of interference with freedom of religious thought to prevent a person from worshiping the Supreme Being according to the dictates of his
own conscience than it is to force him to go through the forms of a religious ceremony in which he does not believe; but whether the one method
or the other is adopted, it remains interference with religious freedom, which is incompatible with tolerance of all creeds as provided for in the
Spanish constitution. To prevent a person from performing acts of devotion which he desires to perform for the sole reason that this creed does
not meet with the approval of him who prevents them is as much as blow aimed at that constitutional right to religious as is the first method of
requiring a person to perform acts of devotion against his will or conscience. Thus far the clause extends. But does it also extend to acts which,
while preventing a person from performing an act of devotion, are not prompted by religious intolerance but from some other motive? It must be
remembered that the great underlying purpose of this article is to prevent and punish religious intolerance. There is no reason for presuming that
the code makers had in view mere disturbances of religious worship, since these offenses are provided for in other articles of the same chapter.
Even less is it to be presumed that they had in mind offenses which, while perhaps seriously disturbing or preventing (for the time) religious
services, were committed with some other object in view. We are of the opinion that an essential element of the crime defined and penalized
under this article is the intent of the guilty person to coercively the religious beliefs of another person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The offense defined and punished by article 571, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code falls under the classification of "Misdemeanors against the public
order." Due to the fact that all the articles in section 3, chapter 2, of book 2 of the code, with the exception of article 223 have become inoperative,
all offenses against religious cults which do not amount to an attempt to control the conscience of persons must now fall within the provisions of
this article. While the punishment therein provided may be, in some instances, not sufficient, we are of the opinion that, it together with those
provided for "Threats and coercion," will serve as a sufficient deterrent, and instil a wholesome respect for the decorum and dignity of an
assemblage gathered for religious devotion. We find it much easier to arrive at this conclusion after comparing this penalty with those provided in
the jurisdiction of that country from whence came the clause of the Philippine Bill which insures to all religious orders in this country equal
protection. Mere disturbances of religious worship in the United States are generally classified as misdemeanors only. The increased severity of the
punishments affixed to such penalties under the Penal Code is doubtless due to the long religious training of the nation which enacted the law and
its recognition of a particular faith as a state religion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, the offense of the defendant falls within the provisions of article 223 or of article 571. The record fails to disclose the purpose of the
defendant in committing the acts complained of. It is true that it is shown that the defendant was of the Aglipayan faith, while the members of the
congregation were of a different sect, but none of the witnesses for the prosecution state that the defendant made any comment whatever upon
religion. He simply treatened to assault them with a sick he was carrying if they did not stop the services. Under the circumstances, and considering
that it is not proven that religious hatred prompted the defendant to act as he did, his offense appears to be simply that of disturbing or
interrupting the religious services. An essential element of the crime provided for in article 223 was not proved and the court erred in finding him
guilty of the crime therein defined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by the defendant were not holding religious services, as they were simply reading some verses
out of the Bible. We have been unable to find any provision of law which requires religious services to be conducted in approved orthodox style in
order to merit its protection against interference and disturbances. As stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153):

It makes no difference that the method of worship of those assembled was singular or uncommon. The protection of the statute is extended to all,
irrespective of creed, opinion, or mode of worship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so without being
molested or disturbed.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant is sentenced to ten days imprisonment [ arresto menor],
and a fine of P20, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the
costs of the cause. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5168 February 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NICOMEDES MORALES and CRISPINA MORCO, defendants.
NICOMEDES MORALES, Appellant.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendants were accused of the crime of estafa under article 535, subdivision 5, of the Penal Code. Nicomedes Morales was convicted in the
court below and condemned to four months and one day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the party injured in the sum of P666.05, to the accessories
mentioned in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs of the action. Crispina Morco was acquitted, Nicomedes Morales
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears that the defendants received from Hatin Cafure to sell on commission certain jewels and jewelry of the value of something more than
P1,000. They sold all of said jewels and jewelry, and upon a settlement of their accounts with said Hatin Cafure it was found that there was due to
him from the defendants the sum of P666.05. They defendants did not pay him that sum in cash, nor did they return to him the jewels and jewelry
which that sum represented.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In receiving the said articles from Hatin Cafure the defendants gave to him a receipt in substantially the following form:

Received of Mr. Atim Kapuri goods taken on commission which amount to P1,384.10 on account of him who subscribes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Legaspi, 14th of March, 1905.

(Signed) NICOMEDES MORALES.

This receipt constitutes the only written evidence of the terms of the agreement upon which the property was taken by the
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants upon the trial and in their defense introduced in evidence promissory notes amounting to the said sum of P666.05, given to the
defendants by persons to whom had been sold the jewels and jewelry amounting to that sum. These notes the defendants had several times
tendered to the owner as the proceeds of the jewelry sold. The defendants offered, if the owner would give them time, to collect these notes and
pay him the proceeds. It appears undisputed that the sales of the jewelry were made in good faith by the defendants and that the promissory notes
taken from the purchasers of said jewelry by the defendants were bona fide in every respect. It does not appear whether the notes were good,
bad, or indifferent, collectible or uncollectible. Neither does it appear what they were actually worth. The only evidence produced by the
prosecution and, therefor, the only evidence upon which the defendants were convicted, was, as before stated, that they had taken the property in
question upon the terms and conditions mentioned in the receipt above quoted and that they had failed to return either jewelry or the value
thereof, but, instead, had also said jewelry on credit and taken promissory notes from the purchasers for the purchase
price.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While the question in this precise from has never heretofore been presented to this court, we are of the opinion that the principles laid down,
either expressly or impliedly, in many similar cases, are applicable to this. This court has uniformly required, either expressly or impliedly, that to
convict there must be some evidence of conversion of the property to the benefit of the accused or of some other person - that there must be an
intention to convert. A number of cases decided by this court have been cited by the fiscal to sustain the conviction in this case. It may not be amiss
to examine them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United State vs. Pascual (10 Phil. Rep., 621), this court passed upon the question only of whether or not to constitute estafa
within the terms of article 535, subdivision 5, it was necessary that the property be secured from the possession of the owner by deceit or fraud;
and it was there held that "deceit with intent to defraud, in obtaining the money or other personal property afterwards misappropriated, is not
always an essential requisites."chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Leaño (6 Phil. Rep., 368), it appeared that a certain ring of the value of P750 was delivered to the defendants on
condition that they return the same within a week or pay the value thereof if sold. It was further understood that if the defendants could not sell
the ring for more than a certain sum fixed by the contract it should not be sold. The week having elapsed and the defendants having failed to
comply with their agreement, the owner sought to obtain possession of it and found that it had been pledged by the defendants with a
pawnbroker for the sum of P180. The court held (p. 371) that under the facts of the case: chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants appropriated, misapplied, and converted the said ring to their own use by pledging the same with a pawnbroker, though they had
secured the same under the pretext of selling it to person desiring to buy it." chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Alabanza (11 Phil. Rep., 475), it appeared that Mercedes Alabanza received from one named Aquino a gold
rosary, valued at P100, for sale on commission, with the obligation to sell the rosary and to account for the value of the same; that,
notwithstanding the fact that the time within which the agreement was to be performed had elapsed and in spite of repeated demands made for
the return of the rosary or the payment of its value, the accused did nothing; that the accused claimed in explanation of her refusal to comply with
the agreement that she delivered the rosary to another person for sale on commission and that the latter took it to Cagayan to be sold there and
that it had not been returned. It was clearly proved on the trial that the person to whom the accused claimed she had given the rosary for sale on
commission had died of cholera in Vigan four years prior to the date of the alleged delivery. In that case the court said (p. 479):

It should be observed, on the other hand, that the Penal Code punished not only the appropriation but also the conversion of property received
under the obligation to return it, as in the present case.

The evidence here was very clear that the accused intended to convert the rosary to her own use and that she actually did do so. The court further
said in that case (p. 478):

That in the behavior of the accused the elements which constitute the crime of estafa are present, i. e., the deceit by which it was intended to
defraud, . . . .
In the case of the United states vs. Zamora (2 Phil. Rep., 582), it appeared that on the 10th day of July, 1901, the defendant received from the
complaining witness for sale on commission the jewelry mentioned in the complaint, and, although repeatedly requested by the owner to return
the same, failed to do so. In discussing the question the court said (p. 583):

It is contended for the defense that no time was fixed within which the defendant was to make sale of or return the property. It was proven that it
is the custom, when jewelry is taken out for sale, that if taken in the morning it is to be returned in the evening, or at least within two or three
days. Independent of any such custom, and in the absence of any time fixed for its return, it was the duty of the party so receiving it to return it
upon the demand of the owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The complaining witness testified that upon several occasions she demanded of the defendant the return of the jewelry; that the defendant failed
to comply, on each occasion asking for two or three days longer, and up to the date of the trial, which was over one year from the date of the
delivery of the property, he had failed to make a return of the jewelry or to give any account thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

We think the evidence in this entirely sufficient to show the conversion of the property by the defendant to his own use.

In this case the defendant made no effort to explain what he had done with the property or to give any account thereof or of the proceeds thereof.
The evidence of conversion to his own use was clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Ongtengco (4 Phil. Rep., 144) it appeared that the defendant received from the complaint jewelry of the value of
P1,510; that it was delivered on the condition that the defendant sell it on commission and if not sold to return the same or, if sold, the value
thereof on the 31st day of July of the same year; that the defendant willfully and feloniously misapplied, embezzled, and appropriated to himself
the said jewelry and the value thereof without the consent and to the prejudice of the complainant. In that case the court held (p. 146):

Instead of doing this he appropriated to himself the said jewelry by false pretenses and in bad faith, thus deceiving the owner of the jewelry, to her
prejudice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The guilt of the accused is evident, since up to the time the complaint was filed he had neither returned the jewelry nor given any account of the
same or of the price thereof . The fact that he pleaded not guilty; that he gave the owner of the jewelry part of what he embezzled, 300 pesos; that
he delivered some jewelry (which was afterwards returned to him) as a guaranty for his obligation; and, finally, the fact that he made a third person
offer to reimburse the amount embezzled, do not exempt him from liability, since neither the jewelry was returned nor the price thereof was paid
to the owner of the same, and whatever acts the defendant did, they all prove that he embezzled the jewelry or the value thereof .

Here again the conversion of the property to the use of the accused was clearly proved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Ramirez (9 Phil. Rep., 67) it appeared that the defendant received from George W. Walker the sum of P65 for
the purpose of investing the same in the business of buying and selling fish in this city, with the obligation to account for and deliver the said sum
of P65 or the proceeds thereof, either in money or property of the said business, to the said Walker; that notwithstanding the lapse of seven
months and twenty- seven days, the accused did not account for the money received nor produce the fish which he ought to have bought with the
P65; that the defendant made no explanation whatever of what became of the P65 or, if used, what be came of the fish bought therewith. The
court held that under the circumstances of the case there was sufficient evidence to hold that the defendant had converted the said money to her
own use and that she was therefor guilty of estafa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Anacleto (3 Phil. Rep., 172), it appeared that the defendant asked one Modesto for some jewelry to sell, giving
as a person for that request that she knew of some prospective purchasers. The woman Modesto thereupon delivered them to the accused on the
10th of June. She never recovered either the jewels or their value. She attempted to do so continuously for more than four months. The defendant
refused and failed to give any account whatever of the jewels or what had become of them other than to say that she had sold them, neglecting to
state to whom she had sold them, for what price she had sold them, or whether or not she had received the pay for them. The court in that case
said (p.174):

The crime was committed by fraud and deceit, on the pretext that the defendants had some prospective purchasers for the jewelry. Relying upon
this statement the owner delivered the jewels.

Here the evidence of conversion to the use of the accused was entirely clear. It should be noted also that the defendant denied having received the
jewelry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Singuimuto (3 Phil. Rep., 176) it appeared that the defendant received 300 sacks of rice for sale on commission
and was to deliver their value to Lieut. William H. Bell, and that he denied ever having received the said 300 sacks of rice. He was convicted because
of his denial as well as for having sold the same and converted the proceeds to his own use.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

In the case of the United States vs. Guzman (1 Phil. Rep., 138) it appeared that on October 16, 1900, the defendant went to the house of another
woman in the district of Santa Cruz and, on the pretext that she had a purchaser who wished to see the jewels, took from the latter several pieces
of gold jewelry, set with diamonds, of the total value of P730. These the defendant promised to return or in case they were sold to pay over their
value on the afternoon of the same day. As she did not do so, the son of the owner of the jewelry went next day in search of the defendant. He was
unable to find her until after some days had passed. Then the defendant pleaded with the owner of the jewels that she be given an extension of
time for their return. She failed, however, upon various pretexts to return the jewels. In explanation of what became of the jewels the defendant
asserted that she had delivered them to a broker, who stated that she either lost them or that they were stolen from her. The court held upon this
evidence that the defendant was guilty of estafa. The evidence of misappropriation or conversion to the use of defendant or of some other person
was clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Ner (4 Phil. Rep., 131) it appeared that the defendant received from another certain jewelry belonging to the
latter, consisting of four rings, three pairs of earrings, and two breastpins, all set with diamonds, of the total value of P869; that this jewelry had
been given to the defendant to be sold by him on commission; that instead of doing so the defendant, with the intention of profiting thereby,
misapplied and embezzled the value of said jewelry to the prejudice of the owner thereof. The court found the defendant guilty, predicating that
decision upon the foregoing facts and upon the further fact that the defendant " did not given any account as to the whereabouts of the jewelry or
the value thereof ." chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of the United States vs. Jockers (7 Phil. Rep., 464) it appeared, as stated by the court, that "the accused was employed by Weingarten
Brothers to peddle on commission in the city of Manila cheap jewelry, collars, cuffs, underwear, and other articles of like nature. On the 16th of
February, 1906, he informed his employers that he had a special opportunity to make a sale to two Turks who were to meet him that evening at
the Waldorf Hotel. Upon this representation he was intrusted with goods valued at P267.18 Philippine currency, for which it was understood he
would render an account the following day, the terms of his commission obligating him to return the goods intrusted or the money received
therefor, less his commission."chanrobles virtual law library

The court said (p.465):

It does not appear whether this representation was or was not made in good faith, but the accused failed to return on the following morning as
agreed, and he left the city of Manila, taking the goods intrusted to him to some of the outlying barrios and municipalities, where he remained until
the 24th of February, when he was arrested at the instance of his employers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During his absence he sold various articles from his stock amounting to P37.77 Philippine currency, for which he failed to make an accounting, the
rest of the goods being found in his possession and being returned to his employers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The information charges the accused with estafa of all the goods intrusted to him, but we are of opinion that, as to the goods unsold and which
were returned to the owners, the charge of estafa can not be maintained. The evidence of record strongly tends to establish the fact that in taking
the goods intrusted to him outside of the city of Manila he was merely seeking a better field for his peddling operations and that it was not his
intention to appropriate these goods to his own use or to make away with the proceeds after selling them. The fact that he did not return at the
time stipulated, and the fact that he went beyond the limits of the city of Manila without the permission of his employers, taken by themselves and
without any other evidence as to his motive, might and probably would be sufficient to raise the presumption that it was the accused's intention to
make away with all the goods intrusted to him, but his conduct during his absence appears to have been wholly inconsistent with such as intention,
and we think in view of all the circumstances that it affirmatively appears that he at no time entertained such a plan.

In this case the defendant was declared not guilty of the conversion of the goods unsold because of the lack of intention to convert to his own use,
but he was held to be guilty of converting the proceeds resulting from the sale of the remaining merchandise, amounting to
P37.77.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is apparent that the cases above set forth do not sustain the contention of the prosecution that the defendants in the case at bar guilty of the
crime of estafa. In all those cases there was present evidence of the conversion of the goods by the defendant to his own use or to the use of some
other person.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code is as follows:

ART. 535. The following shall incur the penalties of the preceding articles:

xxxxxxxxx

5. Those who, to the prejudice of another, shall appropriate or misapply any money, goods, or any kind of personal property which they may have
received as a deposit on commission for administration or in any other character producing the obligation to deliver or return the same, or who
shall deny having received it.

Commenting upon that subdivision, Groizard, volume 5, page 16, says;

Other classes of estafa:chanrobles virtual law library

A new type now presents itself for study. In the four numbers which we have just commented upon the acts therein punished have deceit, artifice,
machination, or cunning employed by the agent to obtain the defeat the confidence of the passive subject of the crime as a common factor and
prevailing circumstance. With regard to the persons accused in the present case such fraudulent activity as is employed by the guilty in order to
obtain possession of a thing, or to effect a fraud, does not exist, or exists in but few cases and in limited proportions. Impudence, barefacedness,
covetousness, and disloyalty employed in taking advantage of an opportunity take here the place formerly occupied by deceit. It has been rightly
stated by the Supreme Court "that if the crime of estafa generally contains the element of deceit, the one specially defined in paragraph 5 of article
548 of the Penal Code (equivalent to No. 5 of article 535 of that for the Philippines) implies on the part of the person committing it a more or less
serious abuse of confidence, it being the purpose of the criminal to obtain and benefit, to the prejudice or fraud of third persons, availing himself of
any of the means specified in the code." (Decision of November 26, 1884.)

Viada, discussing this same subdivision, says in his Commentaries on the Penal Code (vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 514): 1

In the matter of estafa, this is unquestionably the article which is most frequently applied in practice, it being also the one that presents the most
difficulties. It is therefore advisable to take carefully into consideration the essential elements of the same. The fact of having received a thing
constitutes the first element, and in this the said crime differs from that of theft, the first element of which is the taking of the thing. It is important
to bear in mind such an essential circumstance so as not to mistake the one crime for the other. In Question 11 of the commentary on article 533,
we have already seen that, by reason of having overlooked such an important distinction, the appeal in casacion interposed by the public
prosecutor in the case therein dealt with was rejected. The second requisite consists in that the thing received be money, goods, or any other
personal property, in a word, anything which, owing to its value, may be an article of trade, among which we think are deeds and documents the
appropriation or misappropriation of which might cause a material prejudice - as, for example, a deed of sale, a promissory note, a receipt for
money, etc. The third element of this crime consists in that the above-stated things may have been received by virtue of deposit, on commission, or
for administration, or under any other title producing the obligation to deliver or return them; that is, to deliver or return the same thing that was
received (not an equivalent thereto in kind or quality), as happens with the deposit, commission, and administration specially dealth with in said
article, and also, for example, in the contract of commodatum by which the bailee is required to return the same thing that he received for a stated
use. Finally, the fourth and last requisite essential to the crime defined in this number consists in the appropriation or misappropriation of the thing
by whoever received it under such a title and which obligences him to make restitution thereof, or denying the fact that he received it.

The proposition that an accused may not be convicted of estafa without proof of the misappropriation or improper diversion of the property
intrusted to his care to his own use or to the use of another, sanctioned as we have seen by the supreme court of Spain and by the great
commentators on the Penal Code, and by the decisions of this court, is supported by the American authorities also. (Pullan vs. State, 78 Ala., 31, 56
Am. Rep., 21; Ex Parte Hedley, 31 Cal., 109; Lycan vs. People, 107 Ill., 423; State vs. Snell, 9 R. I., 112; Webb vs. State, 8 Tex. App., 310; Griffin vs.
State, 4 Tex. App., 390; State vs. Hill, 47 Neb., 456; Chaplin vs. Lee, 18 Neb., 440; State vs. Adams, 108 Mo., 208; State vs. O'Kean, 35 La. Ann., 901;
Ker vs. People, 110 Ill., 627; U. S. vs. Sander, 6 McLean (U. S.) 598; Commonwealth vs. Smith, 129 Mass., 104; State vs. Baumhager, 28 Minn., 226;
Calkins vs. State, 18 Ohio State, 366; People vs. Gray, 66 Cal., 271; People vs. Treadwell, 69 Cal., 226; Spalding vs. People, 172 Ill., 40; State vs.
Smith, 47 La. Ann., 432; Commonwealth vs. Tuckerman, 10 Gray (Mass.) 173; People vs. Hurst, 62 Mich., 276; People vs. Galland, 55 Mich., 628;
People vs. Wadsworth, 63 Mich., 500; State vs. Fritchler, 54 Mo., 424; State vs. Noland, 111 Mo., 473; People vs. Wyman, 102 Cal., 552; U. S. vs.
Fish, 24 Fed. Rep., 585; Ross vs. Innis, 35 Ill., 487; People vs. Lapique, 120 Cal., 25.) chanrobles virtual law library

This court has held that the mere failure to return the goods is not sufficient proof of conversion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

In the case of the United States vs. Dominguez (2 Phil. Rep., 580) the court says (p. 581):

We find it necessary to pass upon only one of the questions presented by the record. The appellant makes the following statement in his brief in
this court:

"There is no doubt that the defendant has the character of a receiver, consequently it is his duty to return what he has received in trust. This being
the case, the punishable act involved in a refusal to so return implies a damage to the depositor or his assignee, inasmuch as the latter is illegally
deprived of something which belongs to him; and this refusal and damage is covered by the fifth clause of article 535 of the Penal Code."

This is not the law. The paragraph cited from the Penal Code says that the depository shall be guilty of estafa, not if he refuses to return the thing
deposited but if he denies that he ever received it. In this case the defendant has never denied that he received the rice as a deposit; on the
contrary, when the demand was made upon him by the private prosecutor on December 7, 1901, he said that he had delivered it to Alejandro
Cornejo a few days before the death of Borras, the bailor, by the written order of the letter. The defendant never having denied that he received
the deposit, he can not be convicted unless it is proved that he has appropriated or diverted it. The mere refusal to return the article is not itself
sufficient to prove this. In addition to this refusal, there must be evidence in the case from which the court can see that the depository has
appropriated it to his own use or to that of another. There is no such evidence. On the contrary, it is entirely probable that, after the departure of
the defendant from Libmanan on September 20, 1898, two days after the uprising of the civil guard in Nueva Caceres, the rice was seized by the
revolutionists and appropriated to their own uses.

This court has held also that a sale of goods, taken to be sold on commission, for a less price than that agreed upon is not conversion,
misappropriation, or diversion of the property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Torres et al. (11 Phil. Rep., 606) it was held that when an agent who has been intrusted with goods to be sold at
a price fixed by the owner sells them at less than the price fixed and appropriates to his own use the money realized, the crime of estafa which he
thereby commits consists in the misappropriation and not in the wrongful sale. in that case Ramona R. Evangelista delivered certain jewels to
Juliana Torres under the obligation on the part of Juliana Torres to sell them at a fixed price for each jewels or in case she could not sell them at
that price to return them on a certain date. She sold a ring for P300 for which the selling price was fixed by her agreement at P600. She also sold a
pair of earrings for P100 for which the price fixed in the agreement was P200. The question before the court was, Did the act of the commission
agent in selling goods received for less than the price fixed by the contract of commission constitute the crime of estafa? In discussing this
question, the court said (p. 608):

If the act of selling the goods received on commission at a price lower than the one fixed constitutes the crime of estafa, then the owner of the
thing sold has not lost its legal possession, and it should be restored to him either by the guilty person or by the third person who, in an illegal
manner, obtained the possession of the thing illegally sold; and in that case the articles of the Penal Code above cited are applicable, and the thing
misappropriated should be returned either by the guilty person or by the third person who unlawfully restrains it in his possession as the object of
an estafa committed by the one who sold it to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But, if the act in question does not constitute estafa, since the act of transferring a thing sold to a third party in such a manner, as it were between
principal and agent is not punished by any statute, although illegal on the part of the latter, yet after all it was not illegal as between the seller and
the purchaser, and it is sufficient that it was not illegal (it not proceeding from a crime) in order that the acquisition be legal and the possession be
just and lawful. The unlawful conduct of the seller in exceeding the powers of his commission does not affect the purchaser in good faith, who was
not proven to have been aware of the illegality of such conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In deciding this question we hold:chanrobles virtual law library

That the fact of an agent selling the thing received on commission for a lower price than the one fixed does not constitute the crime of estafa, it not
being penalized as such in the Penal Code; but the act of the commission agent in misappropriating the price obtained by the sale, whatever it may
be, constitutes estafa, because it constitutes an appropriation for his private purposes of the money received on commission, or realized by the
commission which he undertook.

xxxxxxxxx

The crime did not consist in the sale of the thing, since the owner thereof delivered it to the seller for that purpose; but it consisted in the seller's
misappropriating the proceeds of the sale, . . . .

This latter case goes a long way toward being decisive of the case at bar upon the facts as well as the law. In that case the contract expressly
prohibited the sale of the jewelry for a price less than that fixed by the agreement between the parties. If the accused might sell a ring for P300,
the selling price of which was fixed by the agreement at not less than P600, and not be guilty of misappropriation or misapplication, at what price
would he need to sell before he would be guilty? At P200? At P100? Whether or not he would be guilty does not depend upon the amount for
which he sells, but upon the quality of his act. His sale at an unreasonable price may be unwise, unbusinesslike, and ruinous; but it is not criminal. It
may be gross neglect of duty, but it is not crime. His civil liability is apparent; but his criminal liability remains yet to be established. Such a sale
would be an extremely suspicious circumstance and but little additional evidence would be required to establish the crime; but the point is that
more evidence would be required. The important thing is the purpose with which it was done - the intent. It is that which qualifies the act as
criminal or not criminal. The amount for which the jewelry was sold does not, of itself, determine the quality of the act from the standpoint of the
criminal law. The real question is, Was it done for his own benefit or for the benefit of another? To be sure, such sale injured the other party to the
contract. But that is not sufficient. There must be the intent to benefit himself or another. This is the doctrine almost universally recognized, as
seen by the authorities above cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar there is wanting, under the authorities, almost every element of the crime charged. There was no conversion, misappropriation,
or diversion of the property for the benefit of the accused or of any other person. No intent to convert, misappropriate, or misapply has been
shown. He kept none of the proceeds of the sales. Those, such as they were, he turned over to the owner. The fact that he did not return the
jewelry is not sufficient. (U. S. vs. Dominguez, supra; State vs. O'Kean, 35 La. Ann., 910; People vs. Hurst, 62 Mich., 276.) The fact that he did not sell
in accordance with the terms of the contract (if that is that fact - the only writing between the parties, Exhibit, showing the contrary) is not
sufficient. (United States vs. Torres, supra.) To permit the accused to sell the property for a sum ridiculously and ruinously (to the owner) below
that fixed by the contract is fully as dangerous to the interests of the owner as to permit him to sell on credit. If he is exempt from criminal
responsibility in the one case there appears no reason why he should not be in the other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The proof failing utterly to show a conversion of the property to the use of defendant or of any other person, the defendant should be
acquitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his immediate discharge from custody ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Torres, J., dissents.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179243, September 17, 2011 ]
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, CARMINA A. ABBAS AND MA. ELENA GO FRANCISCO, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. JOSE A.
BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR, EDUARDO AGUILAR, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated May 23, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94229.

The facts of the case follow.

Petitioner Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Alejandro) is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery Center
Condominium in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase[3] with the lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI). On
October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas (Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and
Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be used as a law office.[4] However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend
payments until the problem is fixed by the management.[5] Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City,[6] against Alejandro for the latter's failure to pay rentals. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
9209. Alejandro, for his part, interposed the defense of justified suspension of payments.[7]

In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation (DCCC) was organized to administer the Discovery Center Condominium
independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando Amor (Amor) was appointed as the Property Manager of DCCC.

During the pendency of the ejectment case or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas),
ordered that the Unit be padlocked. In an Order[8] dated June 11, 2004 the MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit and discontinue
the inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro. However, on
August 11, 2004, at 8:00 in the evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. The padlocking was
allegedly executed by Amor, as Property Manager and respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with security
officers John Doe and Peter Doe. Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities on August 16, 2004.[9]

On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision[10] in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro and against OPI. The court found Alejandro's
suspension of payment justified. The decision was, however, reversed and set aside by the Regional Trial Court[11] whose decision was in turn
affirmed[12] by the CA.

On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint[13] for grave coercion against respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe
and John Doe with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig. The case was docketed as I.S. No. PSG 04-10-13650. In their Joint Affidavit-
Complaint,[14] petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious and unlawful which prevented them from entering the
premises.[15] Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave
coercion.[16]

In their Counter-Affidavit[17], Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the elements of grave coercion were not alleged and proven by petitioners. They
also claimed that nowhere in petitioners' complaint was it alleged that respondents employed violence which is an essential element of grave
coercion.

In addition to the above defenses, Amor and Aguilar maintained that petitioners did not allege that the former actually prevented the latter to
enter the Unit. They added that petitioners in fact gained access to the Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.[18]

On March 22, 2005, the OCP issued a Resolution,[19] the pertinent portion of which reads:

Wherefore, respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar are charged with unjust vexation and the attached information be filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail is not necessary unless required by the Court.

The charges against respondents Jose Bernas and Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[20]

The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence was employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased
premises and cutting off of facilities, respondents Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime of unjust vexation.[21]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the appeal was dismissed[22] for their failure to comply
with Section 12, paragraph (b) of Department Circular No. 70. The DOJ Secretary, acting through Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, explained that
petitioners failed to submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit of some of the respondents. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[23]
was likewise denied in a Resolution[24] dated April 3, 2006. He denied the motion after a careful re-evaluation of the record of the case vis-à-vis
the issues and arguments raised by petitioners.

Undaunted, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the assailed decision[25] on May 23, 2007. The appellate court recognized the
DOJ's authority to dismiss the petition on technicality pursuant to its rules of procedure. The CA explained that while the DOJ dismissed the petition
on mere technicality, it re-evaluated the merits of the case when petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration. On whether or not there was
probable cause for the crime of grave coercion, the CA answered in the negative. It held that the mere presence of the security guards was
insufficient to cause intimidation.[26] The CA likewise denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007.[27]

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING IN THE CASE OF SY VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (G.R. NO. 166315, DECEMBER 14, 2006), WHEREIN THE HIGHEST
COURT OF THE LAND DEVIATED FROM THE NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT BY HOLDING THAT
THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IF THE RECORDS CLEARLY SHOW PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED, IS APPLICABLE TO
INSTANT CASE,
given that there is more than ample evidence of the padlocking;
the padlocking has been admitted in no uncertain terms by Respondents;
the padlock was ordered removed by the court

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT [TO] LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE COURT OF
APPEALS DENIED THE PETITION DESPITE SHOWING OF PRIMA FACIE CASE OF GRAVE COERCION.

WHETHER OR NOT SUBJECT RESOLUTION OF THE DOJ IS ANOMALOUS BECAUSE THE GROUND OF DISMISSAL WAS FABRICATED WHICH
NECESSITATES A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SAID RESOLUTION.

WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH INTIMIDATION ALONE WITHOUT VIOLENCE.[28]

Petitioners claim that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities thereat.[29] They insist that
the allegations and evidence presented in the Joint Affidavit-Complaint are sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause for grave coercion
irrespective of any defense that may be put up by respondents.[30] Finally, petitioners maintain that although violence was not present during the
commission of the acts complained of, there was sufficient intimidation by the mere presence of the security guards.[31]

In their Comment,[32] respondents aver that petitioners raise issues of grave abuse of discretion which are improper in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. They also argue that the CA aptly held that petitioners failed to establish probable cause to hold them liable for grave
coercion. They do not agree with petitioners that the mere presence of security guards constituted intimidation amounting to grave coercion.
Finally, they insist that there is no legal impediment to cause the padlocking and repossession of the Unit as a valid exercise of proprietary right
under the contract of lease.

In their Reply,[33] petitioners assail the propriety of the dismissal of their appeal before the DOJ Secretary on technicality.

The petition must fail.

The propriety of the dismissal of petitioners' appeal before the DOJ Secretary has been thoroughly explained by the CA. We quote with approval
the CA ratiocination in this wise:

It was also incorrect for petitioners to claim that the dismissal was on mere technicality, and that the Department of Justice no longer studied the
appeal on the merits. The motion for reconsideration shows that the records were carefully re-evaluated. However, the same conclusion was
reached, which was the dismissal of the appeal. The first resolution was a dismissal on technicality but the motion for reconsideration delved on
the merits of the case, albeit no lengthy explanation of the DOJ's dismissal of the appeal was inked on the resolution. It was already a
demonstration of the DOJ's finding that no probable cause exists x x x[34]

Besides, petitioners' failure to attach the required documents in accordance with the DOJ rules renders the appeal insufficient in form and can thus
be dismissed outright.[35] Moreover, when the case was elevated to the CA, the latter ruled not only on the procedural aspect of the case but also
on the merit of the determination of probable cause.

The next question then is whether the CA correctly sustained the DOJ's conclusion that there was no probable cause to indict respondents of grave
coercion. We answer in the affirmative.

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and
entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors.[36] To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for
reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would
be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's findings in such investigations.[37] The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to the
determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.[38]

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[39] As held in Sy v. Secretary of Justice,[40] citing
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice:[41]

[Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based in opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[42]

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:

that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or
wrong;

that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and

that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority
of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.[43]

Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from
occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the time of the padlocking and
cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of the rights and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor,
pending before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor
and Aguilar had no right to do so.

The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners' Joint Affidavit-Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged the
fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities to prevent the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these acts is
sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners
belatedly alleged that they were intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.

There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person
or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. [44] Material violence is not
indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is
sufficient.[45]

In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the
CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind.[46] Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in
their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it
was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.

The case of Sy v. Secretary of Justice,[47] cited by petitioners is not applicable in the present case. In Sy, the respondents therein, together with
several men armed with hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools arrived at the complainants' residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from
peacefully occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition
while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court thus found that there was prima facie showing that
complainants were intimidated and that there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion.

On the contrary, the case of Barbasa v. Tuquero[48] applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several armed guards,
disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees because of the latter's failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held
that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon the lessees' employees when the cutting off of electricity
was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent
any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor's right under the contract. We reach the same conclusion in this case.

In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient.[49]

Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.[50] While probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in
prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.[51] It is, therefore, imperative upon the
prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused.[52]

A preliminary investigation is conducted for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.[53]

Notwithstanding the DOJ's conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing of information for unjust
vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security division. We find the same to be in order.

Petitioners' Joint Affidavit-Complaint adequately alleged the elements of unjust vexation. The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code which defines and provides for the penalty of unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive
of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.[54] Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove
petitioners' charges but such matters may only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime may be thoroughly passed upon.[55]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Resolution
dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94229, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona,* C.J., Leonardo-De Castro,** Abad, and Villarama, Jr.,*** JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163898 December 23, 2008
ROBERTO BARBASA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG, VICTOR
CALLUENG, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner assails the Decision1 dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610, which
dismissed his petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. The appellate court had found no reason to reverse the
Resolution3 of the Secretary of Justice ordering the City Prosecutor of Manila to move for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 against private
respondents.

Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19 and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned
by Tutuban Properties, Inc., (TPI). On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of
disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to
settle its outstanding obligations for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.

Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to
pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1, 1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and Victor Callueng, TPI
head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art
Brondial, and herein private respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.4 The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI
and its officers cut off the electricity in petitioner’s stalls "in a violent and intimidating manner"5 and by unnecessarily employing "several armed
guards to intimidate and frighten"6 petitioner and his employees and agents.

The respondents in the criminal complaint filed separate counter-affidavits7 which presented a common defense: that the July 1, 1999 cutting off
of electrical supply was done peacefully; that it was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties, and in accordance with
the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously executed between petitioner and TPI; that petitioner was not present when the
alleged acts were committed; and that petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid
interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-
Penalty Reports8 duly sent to him. Petitioner was likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times wherein it was stated that if
he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut.9 Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of
the third notice. Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the power cut-off, but only after sending a "Notice of Disconnection of
Utilities"10 to petitioner’s stalls informing him of the impending act.

Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has outstanding accountabilities with respect to "Priority
Premium Fees" in the amount of P5,907,013.10.11

They likewise stressed that their Agreement12 with petitioner contains the following stipulations:

CONTRACT OF LEASE
Prime Block Cluster Stall

xxxx

PRIORITY PREMIUM : P *2,367,750.00

xxxx

RENT PER MONTH : P *******378.00 per sq. m (Plus P*******37.80 10% VAT)

xxxx

OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE

TO THE LESSEE:

xxxx

B. COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA) CHARGES

Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover expenses stipulated in Section 6 hereof, subject to periodic review and adjustment to reflect actual
expenses.

C. INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service
(meter to be provided by the LESSOR, for the account of the LESSEE)
OTHER SERVICES : metered and/or reasonable
service charge
xxxx
7. PAYMENTS

xxxx

In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given month is not sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for said period, the order of
priority in the application of the payments made is as follows:

a. Penalties

b. Interests

c. Insurance

d. CUSA Charges

e. Rent

f. Priority Premium

xxxx

21. PENALTY CLAUSE

xxxx

It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility
charges corresponding to a total of three (3) months, even if not consecutively incurred, the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power
and other utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made, without prejudice to any other
remedies provided under this Contract, including the termination of this Contract.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit,13 claiming that Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not personally present at the
scene at the time, were to be held liable as the authors of the criminal design since they were the ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner’s
electricity. Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that he was unduly
prevented from using electricity to the detriment of his business and his person. He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the
amount and extent of his unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were paid; and that there was an ongoing negotiation with respect to
the matter of rentals and for reformation of the lease agreements.14

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares,
Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng. On
January 13, 2000, an Information15 for grave coercion was filed in court, but proceedings therein were deferred when the private respondents
filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.

On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave of court, for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.16

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit. The appellate court likewise denied his
motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether private respondents’ act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner’s stalls and the manner
by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion.

After carefully considering petitioner’s appeal, we are in agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit.

The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by
material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.17

Petitioner’s appeal gives us no sufficient reason to deviate from what has already been found by the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals.

The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioner’s employees when the
cutting off of petitioner’s electricity was effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent. We do
not subscribe to petitioner’s claim that the presence of armed guards were calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more
inclined to believe that the guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of TPI’s rights under the
lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioner’s electricity through less
desirable and conspicuous means.

It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to cut off power and
other utility services in petitioner’s stalls in case petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA
and utility charges corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made.18 The
stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in what is stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents’ act of
exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to which petitioner had agreed and
which he did execute and sign.

As held by this Court in a previous case which we find instructive:

Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and interpreted in a manner that reconciles and gives life to all of
them. The intent of the parties, as shown by the clear language used, prevails over post facto explanations that find no support from the words
employed by the parties or from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their understanding of such contracts.19

We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have made a finding of probable
cause to file a criminal case for grave coercion against private respondents, in light of the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that
there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the cutting off of electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide
faithfully with what has been covenanted. Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not so
readily expose the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI the total amount of more than P5 million, which
was undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under the lease agreements was justified. As held in Pryce Corporation v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation:

A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by
imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled."

Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could
be the liquidated damages resulting from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it
was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this connection, counsels must be reminded that equally important, as their duty to clients, is their duty as officers of the court to see to it that
the orderly administration of justice is not unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to advise a client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case. If counsel finds that his client’s cause lacks merit, then it is his
bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice may supersede his duty to his client’s cause; for such
fealty to ethical concerns is indispensable to the success of the rule of law.21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62610 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171579 : November 14, 2012
LILY SY, Petitioner, v. HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, BENITO FERNANDEZ GO, BERTHOLD LIM, JENNIFER SY,
GLENN BEN TIAK SY and MERRY SY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1filed on August 7, 2000, petitioner Lily Sy (petitioner) claimed that in the morning of December 16, 1999, respondents
Benito Fernandez Go (Benito) and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy (Glenn), together with "Elmo," a security guard of Hawk Security Agency, went to petitioner's
residence at the 1oth Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the door, destroyed and dismantled the door lock
then replaced it with a new one, without petitioner's consent.2ςrνll She, likewise, declared that as a diversionary ruse, respondent Jennifer Sy
(Jennifer) was at the lobby of the same building who informed petitioners helper Geralyn Juanites (Geralyn) that the elevator was not
working.3ςrνll Glenn and Benitos act of replacing the door lock appeared to be authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth Mansion
Corporations Board of Directors, namely, respondents Glenn, Jennifer, William Sy (William), Merlyn Sy (Merlyn), and Merry Sy (Merry).4ςrνll

In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from her
residence numerous boxes containing her personal belongings without her consent and, with intent to gain, load them inside a family-owned
van/truck named "Wheels in Motion."5ςrνll The same incident supposedly happened in January 2000 and the "stolen" boxes allegedly reached
34,6ςrνll the contents of which were valued at P10,244,196.00.7ςrνll

Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the accusations against them. They explained that petitioner made the baseless charges simply because
she hated their wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal differences on how to go about the estates of their deceased parents then
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51.8ςrνll They also manifested their doubts on petitioners capability to acquire
the personal belongings allegedly stolen by them.9ςrνll

Merry, Glenn, and Jennifer, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners accusations were brought about by the worsening state of their personal
relationship because of misunderstanding on how to divide the estate of their deceased father.10ςrνll They also pointed out that the whole
condominium building where the alleged residence of petitioner is located, is owned and registered in the name of the corporation.11ςrνll They
explained that the claimed residence was actually the former residence of their family (including petitioner).12ςrνll After their parents death, the
corporation allegedly tolerated petitioner to continuously occupy said unit while they, in turn, stayed in the other vacant units leaving some of their
properties and those of the corporation in their former residence.13ςrνll They further stated that petitioner transferred to the ground floor
because the 10th floors electric service was disconnected.14ςrνll They explained that they changed the units door lock to protect their personal
belongings and those of the corporation as petitioner had initially changed the original lock.15ςrνll They supported their authority to do so with a
board resolution duly issued by the directors. They questioned petitioners failure to report the alleged incident to the police, considering that they
supposedly witnessed the unlawful taking.16ςrνll They thus contended that petitioners accusations are based on illusions and wild imaginations,
aggravated by her ill motive, greed for money and indiscriminate prosecution.17ςrνll

In the Resolution18ςrνll dated September 28, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Jovencio T. Tating (ACP Tating) recommended that respondents
Benito, Berthold, Jennifer, Glenn and Merry be charged with Robbery In An Uninhabited Place; and that the charges against William Go19ςrνll (the
alleged new owner of the building), and "Elmo Hubio" be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.20ςrνll ACP Tating found that the subject
condominium unit is in fact petitioners residence and that respondents indeed took the formers personal belongings with intent to gain and
without petitioners consent. He further held that respondents defenses are not only contradictory but evidentiary in nature.21ςrνll The
corresponding Information22ςrνll was filed before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-199574 and was raffled to Branch 19. On
motion of Jennifer, Glenn and Merry, the RTC ordered a reinvestigation on the ground of newly-discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of
the witness.23ςrνll This notwithstanding, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) sustained in a Resolution24ςrνll dated September 23, 2002 its
earlier conclusion and recommended the denial of respondents motion for reconsideration.

When elevated before the Secretary of Justice, then Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong (the Secretary) reversed and set aside25ςrνll the ACPs
conclusions and the latter was directed to move for the withdrawal of the Information against respondents.26ςrνll The Secretary stressed that the
claimed residence of petitioner is not an uninhabited place under the penal laws, considering her allegation that it is her residence.27ςrνll Neither
can it be considered uninhabited under Article 300 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), since it is located in a populous place.28ςrνll The Secretary
opined that the elements of robbery were not present, since there was no violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, as the
replacement of the door lock was authorized by a board resolution.29ςrνll It is likewise his conclusion that the element of taking was not
adequately established as petitioner and her helper were not able to see the taking of anything of value. If at all there was taking, the Secretary
concluded that it was made under a claim of ownership.30ςrνll Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 17, 2004.31ςrνll

Aggrieved, petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On December
20, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision32ςrνll granting the petition and, consequently, setting aside the assailed Secretarys Resolutions and
reinstating the OCPs Resolution with the directive that the Information be amended to reflect the facts as alleged in the complaint that the robbery
was committed in an inhabited place and that it was committed through force upon things.33ςrνll

The CA held that petitioner had sufficiently shown that the Secretary gravely abused her discretion in reversing the OCPs decision.34ςrνll While
recognizing the mistake in the designation of the offense committed because it should have been robbery in an inhabited place, the CA held that
the mistake can be remedied by the amendment of the Information.35ςrνll Indeed, since the element of violence against or intimidation of
persons was not established, the same was immaterial as the crime was allegedly committed with force upon things.36ςrνll Thus, it held that
petitioner adequately showed that at the time of the commission of the offense, she was in possession of the subject residential unit and that
respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands if they indeed had claims over the personal properties inside the subject
unit.37ςrνll It also did not give credence to the newly-discovered evidence presented by respondents, because the affidavit was executed two
years after the filing of petitioners complaint.38ςrνll Lastly, the CA held that the element of taking was shown with circumstantial
evidence.39ςrνll

On motion of respondents, the CA rendered an Amended Decision40ςrνll dated May 9, 2005, setting aside its earlier decision and reinstating the
DOJ Secretaries Resolutions.41ςrνll It concluded that as part-owner of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the subject
residential unit, the very same properties involved in the pending estate proceedings, respondents cannot, as co-owners, steal what they claim to
own and thus cannot be charged with robbery.42ςrνll It continued and held that assuming that the door was forced open, the same cannot be
construed as an element of robbery as such was necessary due to petitioners unjustified refusal to allow the other co-owners to gain access to the
premises even for the lawful purpose of allowing prospective buyers to have a look at the building.43ςrνll

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution44ςrνll dated February 10, 2006.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT A CORPORATION MAY ARBITRARILY TAKE THE LAW
INTO THEIR OWN HANDS BY MEANS OF A MERE BOARD RESOLUTION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER IN POSSESSION
OF THE UNIT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER WAS IN POSSESSION OF ANOTHER UNIT.45ςrνll

We find no merit in the petition.

At the outset, a perusal of the records of Criminal Case No. 02-199574 in People of the Philippines v. Benito Fernandez Go, et al., pending before
the RTC where the Information for Robbery was filed, would show that on March 12, 2008, Presiding Judge Zenaida R. Daguna issued an
Order46ςrνll granting the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by ACP Armando C. Velasco. The withdrawal of the information was based on the
alleged failure of petitioner to take action on the Amended Decision issued by the CA which, in effect, reversed and set aside the finding of
probable cause, and in order for the case not to appear pending in the docket of the court. The propriety of the determination of probable cause is,
however, the subject of this present petition. Besides, in allowing the withdrawal of the information, the RTC in fact did not make a determination
of the existence of probable cause. Thus, the withdrawal of the information does not bar the Court from making a final determination of whether
or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of an Information for Robbery against respondents in order to write finis to the issue elevated
before us.47ςrνll

From the time the complaint was first lodged with the OCP, the latter, the Secretary of Justice and the CA had been in disagreement as to the
existence or absence of probable cause sufficient to indict respondents of the offense charged. After a thorough review of the records of the case,
we find no reason to depart from the CA conclusion that the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents
are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.48ςrνll There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to
consider the attendant conditions.49ςrνll

Respondents were charged with robbery in an uninhabited place, which was later amended to reflect the facts as alleged in the complaint that the
robbery was committed in an inhabited place and that it was committed through force upon things.50ςrνll

"Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything, is guilty of robbery."51ςrνll To constitute robbery, the following elements must be established:

(1) The subject is personal property belonging to another;

(2) There is unlawful taking of that property;

(3) The taking is with the intent to gain; and

(4) There is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.52ςrνll

Admittedly, the subject 10th floor unit is owned by the corporation and served as the family residence prior to the death of petitioner and
respondents parents. The 10th floor unit, including the personal properties inside, is the subject of estate proceedings pending in another court
and is, therefore, involved in the disputed claims among the siblings (petitioner and respondents). Respondents admitted that armed with a Board
Resolution authorizing them to break open the door lock system of said unit and to install a new door lock system, they went up to the subject unit
to implement said resolution. The said corporate action was arrived at because petitioner had allegedly prevented prospective buyers from
conducting ocular inspection.

Petitioner, however, claims that on December 16, 1999 and sometime in January 2000, respondents brought out from the unit 34 boxes containing
her personal belongings worth more than P10 million. We cannot, however, fathom why petitioner did not immediately report the first incident
and waited for yet another incident after more or less one month. If the value involved is what she claims to be, it is contrary to human nature to
just keep silent and not immediately protect her right. Her general statement that she was intimidated by Benito who was known to be capable of
inflicting bodily harm cannot excuse her inaction. Petitioner, therefore, failed to establish that there was unlawful taking.

Assuming that respondents indeed took said boxes containing personal belongings, said properties were taken under claim of ownership which
negates the element of intent to gain.

x x x Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. The unlawful taking of
anothers property gives rise to the presumption that the act was committed with intent to gain. This presumption holds unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator x x x.53ςrνll

Taking as an element of robbery means depriving the offended party of ownership of the thing taken with the character of permanency. The taking
should not be under a claim of ownership. Thus, one who takes the property openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in good faith is not
guilty of robbery even though the claim of ownership is untenable.54ςrνll The intent to gain cannot be established by direct evidence being an
internal act. It must, therefore, be deduced from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.55ςrνll

In this case, it was shown that respondents believed in good faith that they and the corporation own not only the subject unit but also the
properties found inside. If at all, they took them openly and avowedly under that claim of ownership.56ςrνll This is bolstered by the fact that at
the time of the alleged incident, petitioner had been staying in another unit because the electric service in the 10th floor was disconnected. We
quote with approval the CA conclusion in their Amended Decision, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, on second look, We note that what is involved here is a dispute between and among members of a family corporation, the Fortune Wealth
Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of said
corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner allegedly resided and where the crime of robbery was
allegedly committed. As part-owners of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said building the very same
properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents cannot, as co-owners, be therefore
charged with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which they claim to own.

Hence, even if we are to assume that private respondents took the said personal properties from the 10th floor of the Fortune Wealth Mansion,
they cannot be charged with robbery because again, the taking was made under a claim of ownership x x x57ςrνll

Respondents should not be held liable for the alleged unlawful act absent a felonious intent. "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. A crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is 58ςrνll innocent.

The Court adheres to the view that a preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State, but more importantly, it is a significant
part of freedom and fair play which every individual is entitled to. It is thus the duty of the prosecutor or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve
the accused of going through a trial once it is determined that there is no sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause to form a
sufficient belief that the accused has committed a crime. In this case, absent sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
respondents for the crime of robbery, the filing of information against respondents constitute grave abuse of discretion.59ςrνll

WHEREFORE,- premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93695 February 4, 1992
RAMON C. LEE and ANTONIO DM. LACDAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SACOBA MANUFACTURING CORP., PABLO GONZALES, JR. and THOMAS GONZALES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

What is the nature of the voting trust agreement executed between two parties in this case? Who owns the stocks of the corporation under the
terms of the voting trust agreement? How long can a voting trust agreement remain valid and effective? Did a director of the corporation cease to
be such upon the creation of the voting trust agreement? These are the questions the answers to which are necessary in resolving the principal
issue in this petition for certiorari — whether or not there was proper service of summons on Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA, for short) through
the petitioners as president and vice-president, allegedly, of the subject corporation after the execution of a voting trust agreement between ALFA
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for short).

From the records of the instant case, the following antecedent facts appear:

On November 15, 1985, a complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International Corporate Bank, Inc. against the private respondents who, in
turn, filed a third party complaint against ALFA and the petitioners on March 17, 1986.

On September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58
denied in an Order dated June 27, 1988.

On July 18, 1988, the petitioners filed their answer to the third party complaint.

Meanwhile, on July 12, 1988, the trial court issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a
consequence of the petitioner's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the
management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP.

In a manifestation dated July 22, 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not
taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence.

On August 4, 1988, the trial court issued an order advising the private respondents to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA.

On August 16, 1988, the private respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial
court granted on August 17, 1988.

On September 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable since they were no longer officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of another mode of service under Rule
14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper service upon ALFA.

In their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1988, the private respondents argued that the voting trust agreement
dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of their positions as president and executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of summons
upon ALFA through the petitioners as corporate officers was proper.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners, thus, denying the latter's motion
for reconsideration and requiring ALFA to filed its answer through the petitioners as its corporate officers.

On January 19, 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust
agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf
of ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, the petitioners attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all
the stockholders of ALFA (the petitioners included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control of
ALFA became vested upon the DBP.

On April 25, 1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated January 2, 1989 and declared that service upon the
petitioners who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA.

On May 15, 1989, the private respondents moved for a reconsideration of the above Order which was affirmed by the court in its Order dated
August 14, 1989 denying the private respondent's motion for reconsideration.

On September 18, 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by the private respondent before the public respondent which,
nonetheless, resolved to give due course thereto on September 21, 1989.

On October 17, 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the pending petition for certiorari with public respondent issued an Order
declaring as final the Order dated April 25, 1989. The private respondents in the said Order were required to take positive steps in prosecuting the
third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on October 25,
1989 the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action.

On March 19, 1990, after the petitioners filed their answer to the private respondents' petition for certiorari, the public respondent rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the orders of respondent judge dated April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989 are hereby SET ASIDE and
respondent corporation is ordered to file its answer within the reglementary period. (CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 24)
On April 11, 1990, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the public respondent which resolved to deny the same on May
10, 1990. Hence, the petitioners filed this certiorari petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent in reversing the questioned Orders dated April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989 of the court a quo, thus, holding that there was
proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners.

In the meantime, the public respondent inadvertently made an entry of judgment on July 16, 1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period
during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated
January 3, 1991, the public respondent set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to
appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to us pursuant to our ruling in the case
of Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539 [1989]. (CA Rollo, pp. 249-250)

In their memorandum, the petitioners present the following arguments, to wit:

(1) that the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholders whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the
trustee deprives the stockholders of his position as director of the corporation; to rule otherwise, as the respondent Court of Appeals did, would be
violative of section 23 of the Corporation Code ( Rollo, pp. 270-3273); and

(2) that the petitioners were no longer acting or holding any of the positions provided under Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court authorized to
receive service of summons for and in behalf of the private domestic corporation so that the service of summons on ALFA effected through the
petitioners is not valid and ineffective; to maintain the respondent Court of Appeals' position that ALFA was properly served its summons through
the petitioners would be contrary to the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of its
officers' or agents' authority (Rollo, pp. 273-275)

In resolving the issue of the propriety of the service of summons in the instant case, we dwell first on the nature of a voting trust agreement and
the consequent effects upon its creation in the light of the provisions of the Corporation Code.

A voting trust is defined in Ballentine's Law Dictionary as follows:

(a) trust created by an agreement between a group of the stockholders of a corporation and the trustee or by a group of identical agreements
between individual stockholders and a common trustee, whereby it is provided that for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a certain
event, or until the agreement is terminated, control over the stock owned by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all purposes, is to
be lodged in the trustee, either with or without a reservation to the owners, or persons designated by them, of the power to direct how such
control shall be used. (98 ALR 2d. 379 sec. 1 [d]; 19 Am J 2d Corp. sec. 685).

Under Section 59 of the new Corporation Code which expressly recognizes voting trust agreements, a more definitive meaning may be gathered.
The said provision partly reads:

Sec. 59. Voting Trusts — One or more stockholders of a stock corporation may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or
trustees the right to vote and other rights pertaining to the share for a period rights pertaining to the shares for a period not exceeding five (5)
years at any one time: Provided, that in the case of a voting trust specifically required as a condition in a loan agreement, said voting trust may be
for a period exceeding (5) years but shall automatically expire upon full payment of the loan. A voting trust agreement must be in writing and
notarized, and shall specify the terms and conditions thereof. A certified copy of such agreement shall be filed with the corporation and with the
Securities and Exchange Commission; otherwise, said agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. The certificate or certificates of stock covered by
the voting trust agreement shall be cancelled and new ones shall be issued in the name of the trustee or trustees stating that they are issued
pursuant to said agreement. In the books of the corporation, it shall be noted that the transfer in the name of the trustee or trustees is made
pursuant to said voting trust agreement.

By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the voting rights of a stockholder from his other rights such as the right to
receive dividends, the right to inspect the books of the corporation, the right to sell certain interests in the assets of the corporation and other
rights to which a stockholder may be entitled until the liquidation of the corporation. However, in order to distinguish a voting trust agreement
from proxies and other voting pools and agreements, it must pass three criteria or tests, namely: (1) that the voting rights of the stock are
separated from the other attributes of ownership; (2) that the voting rights granted are intended to be irrevocable for a definite period of time;
and (3) that the principal purpose of the grant of voting rights is to acquire voting control of the corporation. (5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law on
Private Corporations, section 2075 [1976] p. 331 citing Tankersly v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538)

Under section 59 of the Corporation Code, supra, a voting trust agreement may confer upon a trustee not only the stockholder's voting rights but
also other rights pertaining to his shares as long as the voting trust agreement is not entered "for the purpose of circumventing the law against
monopolies and illegal combinations in restraint of trade or used for purposes of fraud." (section 59, 5th paragraph of the Corporation Code) Thus,
the traditional concept of a voting trust agreement primarily intended to single out a stockholder's right to vote from his other rights as such and
made irrevocable for a limited duration may in practice become a legal device whereby a transfer of the stockholder's shares is effected subject to
the specific provision of the voting trust agreement.

The execution of a voting trust agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the equitable or beneficial ownership of the corporate
shares of a stockholders, on the one hand, and the legal title thereto on the other hand.

The law simply provides that a voting trust agreement is an agreement in writing whereby one or more stockholders of a corporation consent to
transfer his or their shares to a trustee in order to vest in the latter voting or other rights pertaining to said shares for a period not exceeding five
years upon the fulfillment of statutory conditions and such other terms and conditions specified in the agreement. The five year-period may be
extended in cases where the voting trust is executed pursuant to a loan agreement whereby the period is made contingent upon full payment of
the loan.

In the instant case, the point of controversy arises from the effects of the creation of the voting trust agreement. The petitioners maintain that with
the execution of the voting trust agreement between them and the other stockholders of ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as the other party, the
former assigned and transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as trustee. They argue that by virtue to of the voting trust agreement the
petitioners can no longer be considered directors of ALFA. In support of their contention, the petitioners invoke section 23 of the Corporation Code
which provides, in part, that:
Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director which share shall stand in his name
on the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner of at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which
he is a director shall thereby cease to be director . . . (Rollo, p. 270)

The private respondents, on the contrary, insist that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP had all the more safeguarded the
petitioners' continuance as officers and directors of ALFA inasmuch as the general object of voting trust is to insure permanency of the tenure of
the directors of a corporation. They cited the commentaries by Prof. Aguedo Agbayani on the right and status of the transferring stockholders, to
wit:

The "transferring stockholder", also called the "depositing stockholder", is equitable owner for the stocks represented by the voting trust
certificates and the stock reversible on termination of the trust by surrender. It is said that the voting trust agreement does not destroy the status
of the transferring stockholders as such, and thus render them ineligible as directors. But a more accurate statement seems to be that for some
purposes the depositing stockholder holding voting trust certificates in lieu of his stock and being the beneficial owner thereof, remains and is
treated as a stockholder. It seems to be deducible from the case that he may sue as a stockholder if the suit is in equity or is of an equitable nature,
such as, a technical stockholders' suit in right of the corporation. [Commercial Laws of the Philippines by Agbayani, Vol. 3 pp. 492-493, citing 5
Fletcher 326, 327] (Rollo, p. 291)

We find the petitioners' position meritorious.

Both under the old and the new Corporation Codes there is no dispute as to the most immediate effect of a voting trust agreement on the status of
a stockholder who is a party to its execution — from legal titleholder or owner of the shares subject of the voting trust agreement, he becomes the
equitable or beneficial owner. (Salonga, Philippine Law on Private Corporations, 1958 ed., p. 268; Pineda and Carlos, The Law on Private
Corporations and Corporate Practice, 1969 ed., p. 175; Campos and Lopez-Campos, The Corporation Code; Comments, Notes & Selected Cases,
1981, ed., p. 386; Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. 3, 1988 ed., p. 536). The penultimate
question, therefore, is whether the change in his status deprives the stockholder of the right to qualify as a director under section 23 of the present
Corporation Code which deletes the phrase "in his own right." Section 30 of the old Code states that:

Every director must own in his own right at least one share of the capital stock of the stock corporation of which he is a director, which stock shall
stand in his name on the books of the corporation. A director who ceases to be the owner of at least one share of the capital stock of a stock
corporation of which is a director shall thereby cease to be a director . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a director, strictly speaking, cannot be adversely affected by the simple act of such director being
a party to a voting trust agreement inasmuch as he remains owner (although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of the voting trust
agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor of the trustee is required (section 36 of the old Corporation Code). No
disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right" provided under the old Corporation Code.

With the omission of the phrase "in his own right" the election of trustees and other persons who in fact are not beneficial owners of the shares
registered in their names on the books of the corporation becomes formally legalized (see Campos and Lopez-Campos, supra, p. 296) Hence, this is
a clear indication that in order to be eligible as a director, what is material is the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of, the stock as appearing
on the books of the corporation (2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, section 300, p. 92 [1969] citing People v. Lihme, 269 Ill.
351, 109 N.E. 1051).

The facts of this case show that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their shares through
assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on
the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of the
enterprise. The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the petitioners' shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective
positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholder of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust agreement
as evident from the following stipulations:

1. The TRUSTORS hereby assign and deliver to the TRUSTEE the certificate of the shares of the stocks owned by them respectively and shall do all
things necessary for the transfer of their respective shares to the TRUSTEE on the books of ALFA.

2. The TRUSTEE shall issue to each of the TRUSTORS a trust certificate for the number of shares transferred, which shall be transferrable in the
same manner and with the same effect as certificates of stock subject to the provisions of this agreement;

3. The TRUSTEE shall vote upon the shares of stock at all meetings of ALFA, annual or special, upon any resolution, matter or business that may be
submitted to any such meeting, and shall possess in that respect the same powers as owners of the equitable as well as the legal title to the stock;

4. The TRUSTEE may cause to be transferred to any person one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying such person as director of ALFA, and
cause a certificate of stock evidencing the share so transferred to be issued in the name of such person;

xxx xxx xxx

9. Any stockholder not entering into this agreement may transfer his shares to the same trustees without the need of revising this agreement, and
this agreement shall have the same force and effect upon that said stockholder. (CA Rollo, pp. 137-138; Emphasis supplied)

Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the
DBP as trustee, the latter became the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing that the DBP had
caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, the petitioners can no longer be
deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There
appears to be no dispute from the records that DBP has taken over full control and management of the firm.

Moreover, in the Certification dated January 24, 1989 issued by the DBP through one Elsa A. Guevarra, Vice-President of its Special Accounts
Department II, Remedial Management Group, the petitioners were no longer included in the list of officers of ALFA "as of April 1982." (CA Rollo, pp.
140-142)

Inasmuch as the private respondents in this case failed to substantiate their claim that the subject voting trust agreement did not deprive the
petitioners of their position as directors of ALFA, the public respondent committed a reversible error when it ruled that:
. . . while the individual respondents (petitioners Lee and Lacdao) may have ceased to be president and vice-president, respectively, of the
corporation at the time of service of summons on them on August 21, 1987, they were at least up to that time, still directors . . .

The aforequoted statement is quite inaccurate in the light of the express terms of Stipulation No. 4 of the subject voting trust agreement. Both
parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at the time of the execution of the agreement that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to the DBP, all
the directors of ALFA were stripped of their positions as such.

There can be no reliance on the inference that the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal
title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th
paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code which reads:

Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting
trust certificate as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of
stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors.

On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement
is contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. This is shown by the following portions of the agreement.

WHEREAS, the TRUSTEE is one of the creditors of ALFA, and its credit is secured by a first mortgage on the manufacturing plant of said company;

WHEREAS, ALFA is also indebted to other creditors for various financial accomodations and because of the burden of these obligations is
encountering very serious difficulties in continuing with its operations.

WHEREAS, in consideration of additional accommodations from the TRUSTEE, ALFA had offered and the TRUSTEE has accepted participation in the
management and control of the company and to assure the aforesaid participation by the TRUSTEE, the TRUSTORS have agreed to execute a voting
trust covering their shareholding in ALFA in favor of the TRUSTEE;

AND WHEREAS, DBP is willing to accept the trust for the purpose aforementioned.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

6. This Agreement shall last for a period of Five (5) years, and is renewable for as long as the obligations of ALFA with DBP, or any portion thereof,
remains outstanding; (CA Rollo, pp. 137-138)

Had the five-year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred all its rights, titles and interests in ALFA
"effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated January 24,
1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989,
had handled APT's account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT (CA Rollo, p. 142)
Hence, there is evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on August 21, 1987, the voting trust
agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.

In view of the foregoing, the ultimate issue of whether or not there was proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners is readily
answered in the negative.

Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines
or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.

It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the officers or members who compose it.
(See Sulo ng Bayan Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]; Osias Academy v. Department of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. Nos. 83257-58,
December 21, 1990). Thus, the above rule on service of processes of a corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly
receive court processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity
separate from those who compose it.

The rationale of the aforecited rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori
supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. (Far Corporation v. Francisco,
146 SCRA 197 [1986] citing Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corp. 81 SCRA 303 [1978]).

The petitioners in this case do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through the petitioners,
therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as correctly argued by the petitioners, will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be
bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority. (see Vicente v. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210 [1973]).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision dated March 19, 1990 and the Court of Appeals'
resolution of May 10, 1990 are SET ASIDE and the Orders dated April 25, 1989 and October 17, 1989 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 58 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 102070, July 23, 1992 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 15, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CAPIZ,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Which court has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code where the intimidation employed by the
accused consists of a threat to kill?

This is the issue in this case.

Upon a complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property filed against Ruperto Dimalata and Norberto Fuentes, and after the
appropriate preliminary investigation wherein Dimalata presented evidence showing that he is a successor-in-interest of the alleged original owner
of the land, and that the threat was established to have been directed against the complainants' tenant-encargado, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz handed down a Resolution, duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor,
finding prima facie evidence of guilt for the crime charged.[1] The complainants are co-owners of the parcel of land allegedly usurped.

On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding Information[2] for "Usurpation of Real Rights In Property defined
and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code" with the Regional Trial Court of Capiz. It was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3386 and was raffled to Branch 15 thereof. The Information reads as follows:

"The undersigned, with the prior authority and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, accuses RUPERTO DIMALATA and NORBERTO FUENTES of the
crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of November, 1990, at Brgy. Cabugao, Municipality of Panitan, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, possess and occupy a portion of Lot No. 3000,
Panitan Cadastre, belonging to and owned in common by Teresita Silva and the latter's brothers and sisters, after threatening to kill the tenant-
encargado if the latter would resist their taking of the portion of the land, and thereafter, plowed, cultivated and planted palay on said portion of
land to the exclusion of the above-named owners thereof who, therefore, were prevented from appropriating the property's produce or earning
profits therefrom from the time of the said usurpation by accused up to the present to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita Silva and her
co-owners.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below, dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction considering that "the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation
by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged," and
considering that "the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200.00 to P500.00" because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. The order of
dismissal[3] reads as follows:

"Upon personal examination and evaluation of the affidavit of the complainant, annexes and the resolution in support of the information, the
crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means
to commit it or a mere incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged.
Under above (sic) facts, an (sic) act of the accused was not a means to commit the other or by their single act, it resulted to (sic) two or more
offenses thereby making paragraph 1 of Article 282 the basis in imposing the penalty. In fine, the act of the accused as alleged could not be a
complex crime under Article 312 in relation to Article 282. One is a distinct crime from the other with separate elements to prove in case of
prosecution.
On the basis of the allegations of the information the value of the gain incurred for the act of violence or intimidation executed by the accused
cannot be ascertained, hence the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200 to P500 which is below the jurisdiction of this court.
For lack of jurisdiction over the case the herein information is dismissed."
Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order[4] alleging therein that it is true that the crime charged is not a complex
crime and if mention is made of Article 282, it is because "the penalty of the crime defined under Article 312 is dependent on Article 282. Article
312 'borrows' the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312 does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly
provides that the penalty for the violence shall likewise be imposed in addition to the fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of the
threat to kill the encargado, penalized under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; considering that the accused attained their purpose, the
penalty imposable thereunder is that which is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit --
-homicide. In his Order of 24 July 1991,[5] respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The order reads:

"This refers to the motion for reconsideration on (sic) the order of this court dated July 17, 1991, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
case as charged in the information.
The legal basis of the dismissal is founded on the fact that paragraph 1 of Article 282, and Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code, are separate and
distinct offenses. They could not be made a complex crime. Both are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated. Neither is
Article 312 a special complex crime. The mere circumstance that the two crimes may be so related does not make them a special complex crime or
be treated (sic) like one for the purpose of imposing the penalty.
Seemingly, the information charges two (2) separate and distinct crimes, one under paragraph 1, Article 282 and the other under Article 312, of the
Revised Penal Code. Close examination reveals that the violence or intimidation by the accused as alleged therein is a means to commit the crime
under Article 312 or a mere incident in its commission. Under the premises, the test of jurisdiction of the court over the case is the impossable (sic)
penalty under Article 312.
Above premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, this petition was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga for and in behalf of the People of the Philippines against respondent
Judge to whom is imputed the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for dismissing the criminal case. In support
thereof, it is argued that: (a) respondent Judge erred in not considering the penalty prescribed under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code as the
basis for the imposable penalty in the crime defined in Article 312 thereof, and (b) the crime charged in the information is not complexed with
Article 282 by the mere allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under said Article 312 in relation to Article 282.
Before acting on the petition, this Court required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor.[6]

In its Comment[7] filed on 13 November 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General, while observing that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal lacks the
authority to file the instant petition as only the Solicitor General is authorized by law to represent the People of the Philippines in cases of this
nature, declares, nevertheless, that the petition is impressed with merit and, consequently, it ratifies the same and prays that it be admitted, given
due course and the questioned orders of the respondent Judge be reversed. It, however, urges that the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor be advised
to be more circumspect in filing cases of this nature with this Court without the intervention of, or prior authorization from, the Solicitor General.

In sustaining the position of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that "in prosecution for Usurpation of
Real Property as provided for in Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the over-all penalty imposable on the accused is determined not only by the
penalty provided therein but also by the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him. x x x The accused in Crim. Case No. 3386
committed acts of violence on the complainant's tenant. The violent acts with which the accused were charged in attaining their wishes constituted
threats to kill Inocencio Borreros, if the latter prevented or prohibited both accused in (sic) taking possession of the lot in question. Hence,
accused's threats on the life of Borreros may be considered as the 'violence or intimidation of persons' mentioned in Art. 312, supra, as the means
by which accused took possession of the lot in question. And, under Art. 282, the imposable penalty for the threatening act of both accused -- to kill
Borreros -- is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime accused threatened to commit -- homicide; hence, the additional
penalty imposable on both accused is prision mayor minimum to prision mayor maximum, which is well within the jurisdiction of (sic) Regional Trial
Court."

Acting on the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, this Court admitted the petition and required respondent Judge to file his Comment
thereon, which he complied with on 9 December 1991.[8] Defending his challenged orders, respondent Judge argues that: (a) only the crime of
usurpation of real property is charged in the information; the violence against or intimidation of persons alleged therein is an element of the crime
charged; it cannot constitute a distinct crime of grave threats or give rise to the complex crime of usurpation of real property with gave threats as
basis for determining the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him" does
not refer to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; both Articles 312 and 282 are distinct offenses where only one juridical interest is violated; if
ever there are resultant offenses arising from the acts of violence of the accused in their occupation of the real property or usurpation of real rights
over the same, they shall be subject to other criminal prosecutions not necessarily under Article 282. He further claims that although not dwelt
upon in his order of dismissal, there is another ground for the dismissal of the case; this ground is the failure to allege intent to gain in the
information, an essential element of Article 312.

On 29 January 1992, this Court required the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file a Reply to the respondent's Comment. Considering the
appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General, she moved to be excused from complying with the same. The Office of the Solicitor General
subsequently filed the Reply.

This Court thereafter resolved to give due course to the petition.

Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ART. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. -- Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty
incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be imposed."
The Article is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" and the
clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty should be made the basis for determining which
court shall acquire jurisdiction over a case involving a violation of the said Article?

An inquiry into the nature of the crime may yield the desired answers.

The offense defined in this Article is one of the crimes against property found under Title Ten, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code, and is
committed in the same manner as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons defined and penalized in Article 294 of the
same Code. The main difference between these two (2) crimes is that the former involves real property or real rights in property, while the latter
involves personal property.[9] In short, Article 312 would have been denominated as robbery if the object taken is personal property.

Accordingly, the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" in Article 312 must be construed to refer to the same phrase
used in Article 294. There are five (5) classes of robbery under the latter, namely: (a) robbery with homicide (par. 1); (b) robbery with rape,
intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 (par. 2); (c) robbery with the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 2 of Article 263 (par. 3); (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence or with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
Article 263 (par. 4); and (e) robbery in other cases, or simple robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or intimidation of persons cannot be
subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs.[10]

Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons. The actual physical force inflicted results in death,
rape, mutilation or the physical injuries therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph five may cover physical injuries not included in
paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a
robbery, the accused may be prosecuted for and convicted of robbery under paragraph five.[11]

It seems obvious that intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four since no actual physical violence is inflicted; evidently then, it
can only fall under paragraph five.

But what is meant by the word intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law Dictionary[12] as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear". To
take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means "willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm". As shown in United States
vs. Osorio,[13] material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation; intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or
hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In an appropriate case, the offender may be liable for either (a) robbery under paragraph 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code if the subject matter is personal property and there is intent to gain or animus furandi, or (b) grave coercion under
Article 286 of said Code if such intent does not exist.[14]
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through force or such display of force that would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended
party is an essential ingredient.[15]

In the crime of Grave Threats punished under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, intimidation is also present. However, this intimidation, as
contra-distinguished from the intimidation in paragraph 5, Article 294 or Article 286 -- which is actual, immediate and personal -- is conditional and
not necessarily personal because it may be caused by an intermediary.[16]

Paragraphs one to five of Article 294 are single, special and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as defined under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.[17] The penalties imposed do not take into account the value of the personal property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of
the violence or intimidation.

Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible crime of occupation of real property or usurpation
of real rights in property by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. It is likewise not a complex crime as defined under Article 48.
However, while Article 294 provides a single penalty for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit two-tiered, penalty
consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain
obtained by the accused. This is clear from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him." For want of a
better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty.

What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But,
whenever appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained.
Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either
subdivisions 1 or 2 of Article 263 is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; or when, in the
course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by
subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; or when it is committed through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by
subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation and physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical injuries[18] or for the intimidation,
which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine
based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100 per centum of such gain, but in no case less than
seventy-five (P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00)
pesos.

Respondent Judge then was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.

This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means employed to occupy the land and is therefore absorbed in
the crime defined and penalized in Article 312. If that were the case, the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him" would be meaningless. As earlier explained, intimidation is a form of violence which may come in the guise of threats or coercion.
Besides, the peculiar theory of absorption would result in an absurdity whereby a grave or less grave felony defined in paragraph 1 of Article 282
and punished by an afflictive correctional penalty[19] consisting of the deprivation of liberty, would be absorbed by a crime (Article 312) penalized
only by a fine. Neither can this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article 312 refer to two (2) separate crimes, both of which
"are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated." As already stated, the crime of occupation of real right in property is a
single, special and indivisible crime upon which is imposed a two-tiered penalty. Also, such a proposition obfuscates the first proposition and
ignores the distinction between the two Articles. Article 286 is a crime against personal security while Article 312 is a crime against real property or
real rights thereon.

It does not, however, necessarily follow that just because the respondent Judge is wrong, the petitioner is correct. This Court finds the proposition
of petitioner similarly erroneous and untenable. As earlier stated, the complainants in the case are the co-owners of the lot and not the tenant-
encargado who was the person threatened. Thelatter was in actual physical possession of the property for, as found by the investigating
prosecutor:

"x x x This lot was tenanted by Inocencio Borreros after the latter was installed thereat by Teresita Silva herself. Lot No. 3000 is an agricultural land
devoted to palay."[20]
Accepting this to be a fact and without necessarily inquiring into the effects of P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 on such tenancy, the tenant has, at
the very least, a real right over the property -- that of possession -- which both accused were alleged to have usurped through the threat to kill.
Borreros is, therefore, the offended party who was directly threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this fact, Borreros is
not, most unfortunately, made the offended party. The information does not even suggest that the accused threatened complainants or their
families with the infliction upon their persons, honor or property of any wrong amounting to a crime so as to bring the former within the purview
of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. At most, the liability of the accused to the complainants would only be civil in nature. Hence, to the extent
that it limits the offended parties to just the co-owners of the property who were not even in possession thereof, the information in question does
not charge an offense.[21] It may, therefore, be dismissed in accordance with Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Considering, however,
that both accused have not yet been arraigned, the information may be accordingly amended to include the tenant as the offended party. This of
course is on the assumption that the accused usurped the tenant's real right with intent to gain or with animus furandi; for without such intent, he
could only be charged with coercion.[22] In so holding, this Court does not preclude the owner of a piece of property from being the offended
party in the crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of intimidation consisting of a threat, under
Article 282, provided, however, that all the elements thereof are present. In such a case, the penalty imposable upon the accused would be the
penalty prescribed therein plus a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. As stated earlier, intimidation as found in Article 312
could result in either the crime of grave threats under Article 282 or grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if
complainants were in fact the parties threatened and paragraph 1 of Article 282 is applicable,[23] the Regional Trial Court would have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the offense charged because the corresponding penalty for the crime would be prision mayor, which is the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened to be committed -- homicide -- which is reclusion temporal,[24]and a fine based on
the value of the gain obtained by the accused.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in Criminal Case No. 3386 are hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner may
amend the information as suggested above; otherwise, it should be dismissed not for the reason relied upon by the respondent Judge, but because
it does not charge an offense.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3699. March 18, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO CUSI, ET AL., Defendants, BENITO CUSI, Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

In the early morning of March 19, 1906, Benito Cusi, chief of the municipal police of Bauan, Batangas, accompanied by the other accused person,
Juan Corona, and four more members of the municipal police under his command, went to the house of Mariano Macaraig, situated in the barrio of
Natunuan, municipality of San Jose, of said province, because of a robbery that had been committed at Dagatan on the previous night, and in order
to arrest the said Macaraig, who from reports received, was one of the thieves. When the two accused persons went to the house of said Macaraig,
they found him sleeping in his room. Thereupon Benito Cusi woke him up and dragged him out of the room and commenced to hit him with the
butt end of his revolver, compelling him to confess his guilt as one of the robbers who had assaulted some individuals on the highway the night
before. After the arrested man, Macaraig, had passed out of the house, the defendant Cusi continued hitting him with a rifle, and because the
maltreated man fell into a ditch he slapped and kicked him, and when he got up the other defendant, Juan Corona, struck him with the side of a
bolo. Macaraig was then bound with a rope made of bamboo and conducted to the barrio of San Mariano, where he was again maltreated and
exposed to the sun until noon of the said day. All of this was done in order to compel him to confess his guilt.

Honorata Arellano, Macaraig’s wife, and a companion of the same, Domingo Atienza, witnessed part of the ill treatment, as did also Francisco
Mitra, a lieutenant of the barrio who arrived at the place where Macaraig was being maltreated shortly after being called by a policeman by order
of the accused Cusi. Macaraig was examined a few days later by the municipal physician, who found that he had several bruises and a circular
wound on the arms, the effect of the trying although the wounds was not serious.

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Benito Cusi and Juan Corona with the crime of coercion, and the corresponding proceedings
were instituted; a demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The judge, after trial, rendered judgment on the 2d of November, 1906, sentencing
Benito Cusi to the penalty of six months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, which however, should not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs; the other defendant, Juan
Corona, was acquitted. From said judgment Benito Cusi has appealed.

The crime defined by article 497 of the Penal Code, and qualified as coercion, has been fully in this case, as may be seen from the facts stated
above, inasmuch as by means of violence and ill treatment Mariano Macaraig was compelled by the accused, Benito Cusi, to confess against his will
that he was one of the thieves who assaulted Teofilo Garcia and Leandro Bulanhagui at the sitio of Dagatan, between the barrios of Pila and San
Mariano, on the previous night, the 18th of March, 1906; the ill treatment of Mariano Macaraig, who was arrested in his house on the morning of
the 19th following and by which he was obliged to make a confession, is testified to not only by himself but also by the wife and a companion of
the injured person, and the lieutenant of the barrio of Natunuan who was called by a policeman by order of the accused, Benito Cusi, and who saw
the accused and his companions on the road not far from the house of Macaraig when the accused Cusi still continued to illtreat him in order to
compel him to confess his culpability. When Mitra, the lieutenant of the barrio, saw what the defendant was doing, he said, according to the
witness, "Why are you illtreating that man?" The accused Cusi answered, "He is a highway robber." The maltreated man then said, "Mr. Councilor, I
am an innocent man," to which the policeman replied, "What councilor are you talking about when you are one of the highway robbers of Dagatan,
and if you do not admit it will kill you." The accused further said to Mariano Macaraig, "If you do not say that you are one of the highway robbers I
will shoot you;" and the arrested man replied, "Even if you shoot me I can not say anything because I am entirely innocent." The defendant then
continued to maltreat him until he fell to the ground, and when managed to get up he was conducted at daylight to the barrio of San Mariano by
order of the accused.

Notwithstanding the denial and exculpatory allegations of the defendant, as well as the declarations of the policeman and roundsmen who
accompanied them, and of Teofilo Garcia and Leandro Bulanhagui, who it is said were the victims of a robbery committed on the night previous to
the arrest of Macaraig, the record contains complete proof of the culpability of the accused as the duly convicted author of the crime of coercion;
notwithstanding the fact that his said witnesses affirmed his denial, that they had not seen him maltreating the arrested man for the purpose of
compelling him to confess that he was one of the person robbed certain travelers at the sitio of Dagatan on the night of the 18th of March, such
attestations can in no way invalidate the substantial and uniform testimony of the eyewitnesses, which testimony confirms the statements of the
person who suffered the ill treatment inflicted for the exclusive purpose of forcing from him an acknowledgment and confession of guilt and
participation in the robbery. This testimony is moreover, corroborated by the examination made by a physician a few days after the affair.

The affirmations of the defense and the declarations of the witnesses of the accused, apart from being contradictory, are notoriously incompatible
with the result of the evidence of the prosecution, and with the existence of the bruises upon the injured person. The record contains no data
whatever to indicate that the wounds were inflicted at the cuartel of the Constabulary where Macaraig was taken a few days later. As appears at
folio 94 of the record, counsel for the accused attempted to prove by means of the declaration of Sergeant Macario Sulit, of the Constabulary, that
the party arrested and coerced, Mariano Macaraig, at the time when he was turned over to the said sergeant showed no bruises whatever on his
body, but the said attorney gave up or waived such plea, because Sergeant Sulit stated that he was unwilling to testify, and then pointed out as
evidence of the ill treatment received by Macaraig at the cuartel of Constabulary, the information filed by the fiscal against Sergeant Sulit and
others; but this last pretension of the defense was overruled by the court.

Even if it were true that Mariano Macaraig had also been maltreated at the cuartel of Constabulary by reason of the robbery imputed to him, the
punishable act of which Benito Cusi is charged would be none the less true, for its commission appears fully proven in the case. One ill treatment
must not be confused with another; such acts may have been performed one after the other, but the truth is that the charge against Benito Cusi is
clearly proven in the case, and it was so considered by the trial judge in the judgment appealed from, which is declared to be in accordance with
the law; the case of the other defendant, Juan Corona, can not be dealt with in this decision, for the reason that he was acquitted by the said
judgment.

With regard to the imputation that the court erred when overruling the demurrer based on the double jeopardy, the record does not show the
nature of complaint filled with the court of the justice of the peace nor the facts stated in the same nor, that a trial was ever had; it appears that
the hearing did not take place and was postponed to another day. Therefore, there was no regular trial in accordance with the law on the other
hand, there is no evidence to show that the complaint was not amended complaint and not an original one as it appears in the record; hence there
is no possible reason for this court to consider that the court below erred when overruling the demurrer base on the double jeopardy.
For the reasons above set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, as we hereby do affirm the same, provided,
however, that only one-half of the costs of the first instance, and all of the costs of the second instance, shall be imposed upon the defendant, with
the accessory penalties of article 61 of the code. So ordered. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Carson and Willard, JJ., dissent.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2503. March 15, 1907. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. F. ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

On the 22d day of November, 1904, the complaining witness, Asuncion Zamora de Paterno, was standing in the door of her house, No. 162 Calle
San Sebastian, in the city of Manila. While standing there the defendant seized her by the wrist, dragged her from the doorway into the street,
along the street for 40 or 50 feet, and, with the assistance of a third person, placed her in a public carromata. The complaining witness made such
resistance as she could to these acts of the defendant.

Such acts constitute the crime of coaccion, unless the defendant was justified in what he did. His justification is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

He was, at the time, a policeman of the city of Manila and was stationed upon the day in question in Calle San Sebastian. The complaining witness
is the wife of Dr. Paterno, a member of the advisory board for Quiapo, and the house in which they lived in is situated, as has been said, in Calle San
Sebastian. The principal story of the house projects over the sidewalk, the sidewalk at that place being 9 feet and 4 inches wide. At about 11 o’clock
on the day in question two boys, servants of the Paternos, were engaged in cleaning and brushing the wall of the house and the part projecting
over the sidewalk. For this purpose they had two benches or stepladders. Dr. Paterno gives the dimensions of these benches as follows: "The large
stepladder was 9 feet 2 inches in height, 3 feet 4 inches in width at the bottom, and 1 foot 10 inches at the top. The smaller ladder was 4 feet 6
inches in height, 2 feet wide at the bottom, and 1 foot 7 inches wide at the top." At the time in question one of these stepladders was near the wall
of the house and the other was against one of the supporting columns of the arcade.

As to what took place on this occasion the defendant testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As I drew near the box I noticed a couple of scaffolds standing on the sidewalk and a number of people on the opposite side staring up at the
muchachos working overhead and noticed it was an obstruction to the sidewalk and that it was an impossibility for the people to get by without
the whole, or part at least of that obstruction, being removed. I hurried and got there and ordered the smaller one of the boys with the small
scaffold to move it away and accompanied him toward the door, and, as I was going along, I told him to call the owner of the house as I wanted to
speak to him, and then walked back toward the larger of the two scaffolds and the one still remaining on the sidewalk, and I called to the boy still
working overhead and asked him if he was going to paint the house and he smiled and said, ’Si, señor.’

x x x

"In a very short time, I can not state exactly minutes or seconds, this native woman came down and out on the sidewalk and up to the foot of the
scaffold where I was standing and I said to her in "pigeon Spanish," ’Have you a permit for obstructing the street in this manner?’ and she answered
me, ’No, señor, porque?, porque?, porque?,’ in a very overbearing manner, as though she had been imposed upon in some manner or form; I do
not know why, but possibly by having been compelled to put in appearance on the street by a policeman; I do not know what else it could have
been, and as I understood her she made a remark to this effect, in Spanish, ’It is coming to a pretty pass if we can not clean our house without
being interfered with by American police,’ uttered in a very overbearing manner. I was about to place her under arrest for obstructing the street
and when I turned and tapped her lightly on the shoulder, saying ’arresto,’ as I understand that meant that she was placed under arrest, and
immediately after that, in fact in almost the same breath, I began to say ’Señora, if you want to get a mantilla or anything to put on your head —’ I
didn’t get any further because she interrupted me and looked back to measure the distance to the door and then said, ’Why do you put your hands
on my person?’ I realized that she was going to try and escape and I wanted to avoid trouble and took one or two quick steps and caught her by
wrist, just as she was at the door; or you might say in the door, and she dragged and dragged me forward and I held on to her and said,
’Dispensame, dispensame, Señora,’ meaning, ’Excuse me, excuse me,’ and she kept pulling and dragging and I told her to let up, that she would
have to go to the police station with me, to go to the cuartel with me, and she yelled ’No, no, no,’ and I do not know what else she did say, she
talked so rapidly — I guess she said about everything a person could say — and then I just simply had no more to say. I held on to her wrist as
loosely as possible; I did not want to handle her roughly and leave the marks of gripping her too tightly and worked away from the door and down
the sidewalk, and I looked around and saw a number of firemen there looking on and I asked Captain Stewart to take hold by the opposite side, and
I looked up and noticed a carromata pulled in alongside the curb and I asked him to assist me to the carromata with her, and he took a hold of her
and the moment he took hold she moved along without any resistance, and when we drew near the carromata we let loose and she got into the
carromata of her own accord, of her own free will, and without assistance from either of us, and I got into the carromata and sat down alongside of
her . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the station house the defendant caused three charges to be entered against the complaining witness, one for resisting an officer, one for
disorderly conduct, and the third for obstructing the street in violation of the ordinance. The brother-in-law of the complaining witness having
arrived, he gave bail for her appearance and she was allowed to depart. The next day the amount of money deposited as bail was returned and the
charges dropped.

As to the details of the arrest, the complaining witness testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. What kind of a dress did you have on when you had the trouble with that policeman that morning?

"A. Just a working dress.

x x x

"Q. Was that dress you had on that day such a dress as you customarily put on to go down into the street?

"A. It was not proper for people in our position.

x x x
"Q. I exhibit to you these articles of clothing and ask you if you recognize them?

"A. Yes, sir; that is the camisa I had on.

"Q. I see it is torn in two pieces; how did that occur?

"A. I do not understand myself how he did that, but from so much dragging of me the sleeves parted, the sleeves did not fall off altogether,
because he had hold of them in his hand.

"Q. In what condition was the camisa when you were taken to the station through the streets?

"A. I had to cover my shoulder with the sleeves which was torn off.

"Q. Show us.

"A. I had the larger half over my shoulders and the other half with the sleeve to cover my other shoulder so the public would not see it.

"Q. Did you wear a handkerchief?

"A. I did not wear a handkerchief, nor tapis, apron, or slippers.

x x x

"Q. And for what reason did you ask the policeman to allow you to put on a handkerchief, tapis, and slippers?

"A. I wished to dress because I was not properly dressed to go into the streets, and the camisa I was wearing was torn, and that did not seem
proper to me, and I wished to dress properly because I did not want people to see me in that way in the street."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is a conflict in the evidence as to the obstruction of the street caused by these stepladders or benches. The evidence for the Government
indicates that they did not prevent people passing along the sidewalk. The evidence for the defense indicates that one would have to pass between
the benches and the wall of the house, with the risk of soiling the clothes, or step into the street. The servants had been at work on this occasion
from 11 o’clock until about a quarter past 12.

That the obstruction, such as it was, was merely temporarily admits of no doubt and the only question to be decided is whether such obstruction
constituted a violation of section 27 of Ordinance No. 11 of the city of Manila. 1 That section is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It shall be unlawful to place or erect any post, fence, stand, building, or other obstruction, in whole or in part upon a street, sidewalk, or public
way, or to obstruct any street, drain, or gutter, without first obtaining a permit from the department of streets, parks, fire, and sanitation."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In the case of Hexamer v. Webb (101 N.Y., 377) the court said at page 386:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The claim that the ladder was suspended in violation of the city ordinance is not well founded. The ordinance referred to prohibits the hanging of
any goods, wares, or merchandise, or any other thing, in front of any building at a greater distance than one foot. It was aimed against the
obstruction of the streets. It is not apparent that the ladder overhung the street, but even if such were the case, it was a mere temporary structure,
erected for the purpose of repairing the building, and not an obstruction within the meaning and spirit of the ordinance, which, it is manifest, was
directed against goods, etc., which were exposed for sale, or for the purpose of attracting public attention thereto. The construction contended for
would prevent the use of scaffolds in the reparation of buildings, which never could have been intended."cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not think the ordinance in question in this case was ever intended to apply to the use of the sidewalk for the temporary purpose for which it
was used in this case. To hold that every time that cleanliness required that the wall of the house or the ceiling of the arcade be cleaned of dust
and cobwebs, it was necessary to secure a permit from the department of public works would be to give the ordinance an unreasonable
construction.

The Charter of the city of Manila, Act No. 183, speaking of the powers of police officers, provides in section 37 as follows: 2

"And within the same territory they may pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest,
or cause to be arrested, without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In the case at the bar the prosecuting witness had committed no offense, nor was she found in a suspicious place or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that she had committed, or was about to commit, any offense. The defendant, therefore, had no right to
arrest her; the arrest was wrongful and illegal and furnishes no justification for the act which he committed. If he had any doubt to whether the act
committed was an offense or not, he could have easily protected himself by procuring a warrant for her arrest. The facts in this case are in some
respects similar to those in the case of the United States v. Ventosa, 1 No. 2550, just decided.

No offense having been committed by placing the stepladders on sidewalk, it is not necessary to inquire whether, if such a placing were a violation
of the ordinance, the defendant would have had a right to arrest the complaining witness who was not using the stepladders in his presence and
who had, in fact, done nothing in his presence which amounted to a violation of the law. The question whether the complaining witness or the
servants using the ladders were the persons to be arrested, if there had been any violation of the ordinance, is a question which we do not
consider.

In conclusion we may say that the impression, formed by us by reading the evidence, is that the defendant did not arrest the complaining witness
because these ladders were on the sidewalk. One of them had already been taken into the house pursuant to his orders before the arrest had been
made, and we are inclined to think that the real cause of detention was the conversation had between the defendant and the complaining witness
when the latter came to the door in response to the summons of the defendant.

The aggravating circumstance, No. 11 of article 10 of the Penal Code, namely, that the defendant took advantage of the public office which he held
in committing the crime, should be taken into consideration. The judgment of the court below is modified by changing the penalty from two
months and one day to four months and one day. In all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs of both instances against the defendant.

After the expiration of ten days of let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court
from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 8608 September 26, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO CABALLERO, Defendant-Appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The crime under prosecution consists, according to the complaint, in that: "In or about the month of May, 1912, the accused, Paulino Caballero,
being, as he then was, the municipal president of the municipality of Badian, Province of Cebu, and availing himself of his office, did, with intent to
obtain gain through the employment of force and intimidation upon the person of Macario Pellire, seize a cow valued at P35 belonging to the said
Macario Pellire, against the will of its owner."chanrobles virtual law library

This complaint was signed and filed by the provincial fiscal of that judicial district, on January 21, 1913, as the result of certain preliminary
examinations held before the justice of the peace court of Badian, of the same Province of Cebu, on June 12, 1912, the record of which proceedings
was transmitted, on June 19, 1912, to the office of the said provincial fiscal, whose files show that it was received on the 25th of the same month
and year. There was, therefore, a delay of about seven months in preparing the complaint within the province itself. The information was
presented to the justice of the peace court on the date aforementioned, June 12, 1912, but bore the date of June 3 of that year; so that the accuser
had it prepared from the 3rd, but did not present it until the 12th of June, 1912.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The criminal acts charged against the accused consists in that, when Macario Pellire passed in front of the house of Paulino Caballero, leading a
cow by the halter, the accused came down out of the house, offered him P4.50 for the animal and tendered him the money, and, because Pellire
would not accept it, "took the rope out of his hand and kept the cow, saying besides that he would send policemen to arrest him."chanrobles
virtual law library

Testifying in connection with the facts bearing on this matter, Macario Pellire stated literally:

Some time about the middle of May, one Monday, I sent my cow to the municipal hall to be branded. I had a companion, one Kikoy (Francisco
Agravante). I bought a certificate and after it had made out I was called by the president, who said: "Step over here."chanrobles virtual law library

Q. And do you go into his office? - chanrobles virtual law library

A. Yes, sir. I had heard that one Kikoy (Francisco Agravante) wanted to buy a half interest in the cow; and the president said to me: "Don't
sell, for I want to buy." But the president wished to pay only P4.50 for a half interest in the cow, and I would not accept the price because it was
very low and I was not tendered the money. The president called Pascual (Canseco), a clerk. While Pascual was still in the president's office, the
president delivered the certificate and sent it to the treasurer in order that the latter might erase my name and insert that of the president; but the
treasurer refused. After the treasurer had given me the certificate, he ordered me to return home; but the president detained me in his office and
took my certificate away from me. As soon as he saw that no other named had been substituted for mine, he put the certificate into his pocket and
went home. After a while, we (myself and Agravante) also left. Kikoy (Agravante) had offered me at P15 for a half interest in the cow, but had not
yet given me the money which he was not to do until the cow should be branded.

The cow was branded with only the municipal iron, for Pellire had no brand; and yet the certificate was issued to him by a clerk of the treasury
while the treasurer was present therein. Francisco Agravante, who accompanied Pellire during all these proceedings, corroborated the statements
above quoted, and a cousin of his, named Balbino Agravante, those of them relative to the incident that occurred in front of the house of the
accused at the time the latter seized the cow and threatened Pellire with imprisonment. Francisco, in relating what happened in the office of the
municipal president, said one thing and gave certain details which Pellire did not say and did not give:

While we two, Macario and I, went in the president's office, the president said to Macario: "Macario, I have heard tat you have offered somebody a
half interest in your cow," and the president said: "Don't offer it to another, for I'll buy it." Macario replied: "I offered it to Kikoy because he asked it
of me some time ago." The president insisted on giving Macario Pellire the P4.50 for a half interest in the cow but Macario would not accept the
money, because the price was very cheap.

Pascual Canseco, the treasury clerk alluded to in Macario Pellire's testimony, corroborated the statement concerning him therein made to the
effect that he was ordered by the president to insert the latter's name, Paulino Caballero, in the certificate issued to Pellire, instead of Pellire's
name, and testified that he consulted the treasurer and that the latter inquired of Pellire: "Have you come to an agreement?" As Pellire answered
that they had not the treasurer delivered him the certificate and told him to go home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense, even prior to this other testimony by the prosecution and subsequent to that given by Pellire, brought up the question as to whether
the facts stated by the latter, though they be admitted to be true, involved the crime of robbery or rather perhaps some other crime that could not
then be determined, and it did so again after all the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution had been taken; but the court refrained from a
final decision of the point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During the course of the trial the defense endeavored to prove that the accusation made by Pellire was the work of the Agravantes and a result of
the political dissensions of the general elections, for the accusation was made on the 3rd of June, the day before the election, which was held on
the 4th. An attempt was also made to prove, by the testimony of the provincial governor, that hard feelings, manifested on several occasions
before the provincial board, existed between the treasurer and his employees and the president and his, of the municipality of Badian; that it was
seen in the elections that the treasurer was the leader of one party and the president of another; that in such wise the contest was carried on at
the polls, the president and his partisans being the successful candidates, and that for this reason on the 12th of June, as soon as the result of the
elections was made known, the accusation against the municipal president was brought forward. The defendant stated in his testimony the
reasons why each of the Agravantes, young men 24 years of age and school-teachers, both of whom had been dismissed, felt resentment against
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The direct defense consists in the alleged fact that Pellire, needing money, went to defendant's house and transferred to him his rights in the cow,
for the price of P27, for which purpose the proper certificates was issued. This document, found in the record, appears to have been issued on June
4, 1912, and was authorized by the treasurer who is said to be an opponent of the president herein prosecuted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Article 502 of the Penal Code prescribes: "Those who, with intent of profiting thereby, shall take possession of the personal property of another,
with violence of intimidation of the person or by employing force with regard to the personal property, are guilty of the crime of
robbery."chanrobles virtual law library
One fact is certain and beyond all discussion, as having been alleged by him who claims to be the offended party, to wit, that the cow which is the
subject matter of this action was an offspring of another that belonged to the defendant. It is also certain, likewise because so affirmed by the
party who claims to have been offended, that the latter was a tenant of the defendant and a herdsman charged with the care of his cows, under an
agreement in the beginning that the calves should be divided between them in equal shares, but by a later stipulation, made at the defendant's
request that of each three calves born two of them should belong to the owner and the third to the herdsman. Continuing his testimony, he who
appears as the offended party stated that the cow in question was the oldest, that there were two other younger ones, and, finally, that the cow
herein concerned was his, as "his share." (Sten. notes, 5.)chanrobles virtual law library

The legal presumption from these facts is that the cow in question belonged to the defendant. Article 354 of the Civil Code provides: "The following
belong to the owner: 1. Natural fruits . . . ."chanrobles virtual law library

Article 355: "Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the brood and all other produce of animals."chanrobles virtual law library

So, for the purpose of obtaining a certificate or ownership, Macario Pellire could not present the document of origin or acquisition that was
necessary to enable him to register the animal in his name, for the reason that the cow that produced the offspring was not his, nor could be
branded iron, wherefore the animal could be branded only with that of the municipality; all of which procedure was a manifest violation of the
provisions of Act No. 1147.

SEC. 2. All owners of large cattle shall register at the office of the treasurer of the municipality of their residence the private brand or brands used
by them in making their cattle . . . .

Pellire had no private registered brand of his own, as he himself testified. (Sten. notes, 6.)

SEC. 6. All unbranded cattle not less than two years old found within the jurisdiction of any municipality, shall be branded on the right hip with the
registered brand of the owner and counterbranded on the left hip with the registration brand of the municipality in which they are found.

Pellire testified that his private brand was not asked of him, for which reason the animal was marked with only the municipal brand. (Sten. notes,
6.)

The branding for which provision is made by this section shall be affected n the presence of the municipal president the municipal treasurer, and
the municipal secretary, . . . (Sec. 6, 2d paragraph.)

According to Pellire's testimony, neither the municipal president nor the municipal secretary was present. "Although he had no brand of his own,
Lorenzo, a clerk of the treasurer, filled out the certificate and gave it to him." (Sten. notes, 6.) "The municipal secretary did not sign the certificate,
nor did I observe that he was there." (Sten. notes, 7.) .

SEC. 9. Persons charged with the duty of branding or registering large cattle and issuing the proper certificates shall satisfy themselves of the
ownership of the cattle so branded or registered, and shall take due care that no certificate of ownership is issued to any person other than the
proper owner.

What information there was before the issuance of the certificate to Pellire is not shown by the record, for the treasurer did not testify at the trial.
Had Pellire testified that the animal was an offspring of a cow that belonged exclusively to the defendant, it can only be conjectured what action
would have been taken by the treasurer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

So it does not appear strange that the defendant, upon learning that a certificate of ownership had been issued to Pellire, should have demanded
that it be made out in his name, which, although he might not have been well possessed of his rights, was the proper lawful course to pursue, in
view of those unquestionable facts against which none other were established destructive of such a legal presumption. It was impossible for the
coowner to call himself the exclusive owner of the thing held in common, without proof of a partition or division thereof, and thereby such thing
would have ceased to be property of joint ownership. This proof was not given, nor even offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Moreover, this court finds the following question in the record of the testimony of Macario Pellire:

The COURT. Would you have sold the cow (a half interest in the cow was meant) for P15, if the president had offered you the money? -
chanrobles virtual law library

A. I did not give it to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. But you were willing to give it him for P15, if he had made you the offer? - chanrobles virtual law library
A. I did not wish to sell.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Why did you wish to sell to Francisco Agravante, and not to the president? - chanrobles virtual law library
A. Because I had already closed the bargain with Francisco Agravante. The cow was still a heifer when it was promised to Francisco
Agravante. (Sten. notes, 7.)

As hereinbefore stated, he had previously testified:

I was called by the president, who said: "Step over here."chanrobles virtual law library

Q. And did you go into his office? - chanrobles virtual law library
A. Yes sir. I heard that one Kikoy (Francisco Agravante) wanted to buy a half interest in the cow. (Sten. notes, 2.)

Be that as it may, and even if it be admitted as true that the oldest offspring, the one herein concerned (and not one of the two younger animals,
for example, the youngest) might pertain to the herdsman, Macario Pellire, as a real one-third interest alloted to him by the agreement, and
though it also be conceded as true that he had sold a half interest in that offspring to Francisco Agravante for P15, still the owner of the cow which
produced that offspring was entitled to redeem the latter after its sale, for the same price at which it had been sold to that third party.

A coowner of a thing held in common may exercise the redemption in case the shares of all the other coowners, or of any of them, are sold to a
third party. (Civil Code, art. 1522.)
Supposing such a sale to have been made in the present case, it would appear unjust that Francisco Agravante, merely through the will of Macario
Pellire, assuming that the community of interests was unbroken, should have arrogated to himself rights in Caballero's stock, by claiming to by the
coowner of a one-third interest in an animal in which Caballero recognized that Pellire alone had a share.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Among the legal redemptions established by the Civil Code, is that of coowners. Article 1521 says: "Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated,
with the same conditions stipulated in the contract, in place of the person who acquires a thing by purchase or in payment of a debt."chanrobles
virtual law library

The code refers to things in general. It applies the word thing, without adding the qualificative of chattel or of real property. (Manresa,
Com.)chanrobles virtual law library

All the foregoing legal considerations indicate this to be, in its true aspect, a civil question requiring judicial determination before final judgment
can be awarded, and which, before any crime was charged, should have been fully examined in the proper jurisdiction. This is not a common case
of a public officer wresting through intimidation from the possession of its legitimate owner a thing genuinely another's, as this court has
sometimes held was done, nor is it a case of one's seizing a thing belonging to his debtor with the purpose therewith to satisfy the debt, which act
is defined by article 498 of the Penal Code as a crime of coercion. Upon the hypothesis that the facts charged are true, it is probable that the
defense would have conjectured these conclusions, had it raised, before continuing with the case, a preliminary question relative to the nature of
the crime. It is evident that Paulino Caballero did not act as a creditor toward a debtor and seize a thing belonging to the latter in order therewith
to satisfy the debt, but, at the worst, his conduct was that of a coowner who, under his own authority (if the charges are true, which is not
admitted) wished to exercise the right of redemption with which unquestionably he was civilly vested, a right not comprised within the said article
498.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The present status of the case is that of a title of transfer upon which, rightly or wrongly, the defendant relies, a title which, neither civilly nor
criminally, has been assailed as false and can not be passed by without the proper judicial pronouncement thereon, inasmuch as it is in form a legal
title authorized by a public officer designated by the law, such as was the municipal treasurer of Badian who issued it as the certificate of
ownership now required and which constitutes, pursuant to Act No. 1147, a presumption juris tantum that the animal in question belongs to the
person designated in the said certificate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment appealed from is reversed, with the costs of both instances de oficio and the reservation to both parties of such civil action as may lie
in their behalf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-7712. March 23, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. BERNARDO REYES, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

DECISION

PARAS, C.J.:

On October 5, 1953, the City Fiscal filed in the Municipal Court of Manila an information reading as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The undersigned accuses Bernardo Reyes and Mariano Reyes of the crime of coercion committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“That on or about the 26th day of August, 1953, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping each other, through deceit and misrepresentation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously seize, take and hold
possession of passenger jeep bearing plate No. TPU-2695 belonging to Agustin Blasco, without the knowledge and consent of the latter, for the
purpose of answering for the debt of the said owner, and despite repeated demands made upon them to return the said jeep, they refused and still
refuse to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.”

Upon motion of the Defendants, the court dismissed the information because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that
the offense charged was coercion under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, in the first paragraph, that “Any person who, by
means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor, for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.” An appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Manila having been dismissed for lack of merit, the prosecution has elevated the case to us in third instance, contending
that the offense charged is coercion or unjust vexation under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
“Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both,” under which violence
is not an essential element.

We agree with Appellant’s contention. Although the offense named in the information is coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable
provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of “coercions”. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include
violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in the second paragraph. The offense falling
under the second paragraph cannot include violence as an element; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise it would come under the first paragraph.

Another view we take of the case is that the information, though wrongly calling the offense charged as coercion, alleges facts sufficiently
constituting unjust vexation, now mixed with coercion and also penalized under the second paragraph of Article 287. Under the old Penal Code,
other coercions and unjust vexations were considered misdemeanors against persons treated under a separate chapter. The principal feature of
coercion under the first paragraph is that there be a taking by a person of his debtor’s property for the purpose of applying it to the payment of
debt. This feature is recited in the information, consummated not by violence (distinguishing element specified in the first paragraph of Article
287), but thru deceit and misrepresentation no less effective than actual force in depriving the offended party of his free will.

The decision in U. S. vs. Tupular, 7 Phil., 8, relied upon by the court of origin, is not controlling, because the offense involved therein was coercion
defined in Article 498 of the old Penal Code which expressly called for violence, and which is the counterpart of the first paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code.

The contention of Defendant-Appellees that the present appeal would place them in double jeopardy is unfounded. “Where the complaint or
information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is dismissed upon petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or information
is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the same offense and the Defendant is estopped from alleging in the
second prosecution that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was valid.” (Morgan, Comments on the Rules of
Court 52 ed., Vol. II, p. 802.)

Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the case is ordered remanded to the Municipal Court of Manila for further proceedings. So ordered,
without costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2958. November 23, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRAULIO TUPULAR, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On a written complaint filed by the assistant provincial fiscal of Albay on the 13th of June, 1905, Braulio Tupular was charged with the crime of
coaccion, in that on or about the 13th of July, 1904, he the said Tupular, in the town of Caramoran, Island of Catanduanes, Province of Albay,
without being lawfully authorized, compelled the Chinaman Chan Chinco to deliver to him certain goods belonging to the said Chinaman, such as
cloth, rice, and other articles of merchandise, to the value of P2,000, more or less, in payment of a certain indebtedness, and, notwithstanding the
protest and refusal of the Chinaman, the defendant, aided by his agents, took and seized the said goods and carried them to his house without
order of court. All of this contrary to the statute in such made and provided.

The case having proceeded to trial upon the said complaint, the court, after hearing the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 4th of
September, 1905, convicting the defendant of the crime charged and sentencing him to six months’ imprisonment (arresto mayor), to pay a fine of
325 pesetas, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, this not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty,
with the accessories of the law and the costs of proceedings, reserving to the Chinaman the right to institute a civil action to recover his property or
the value thereof and such damages as he had incurred, from which judgment and sentence the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence in this case that the Chinaman Chan Chinco was engaged in mercantile business in the town of Calogbon, Island of
Catanduanes, Province of Albay; that at the suggestion of the defendant, the Chinaman took the goods which he had in his store to the town of
Caramoran of the same province, in a parao, or baroto belonging to the defendant; that in July, 1904, the defendant went to Caramoran and
notified the said Chinaman that he had come there for the purpose of collecting what the latter owed to Antonio de la Riva, of Manila, from whom
he claimed to have ample power to collect and demand payment of said debt; that the Chinaman Chan Chinco answered that he had no money
with which to pay him, whereupon the accused informed him that he would proceed to make an inventory of all the goods then in the Chinaman’s
store for the purpose of ascertaining the value thereof, to which the Chinaman did not object; that the inventory was made on the 11th of July of
the same year by the defendant with the assistance of three Chinamen who were employed for that purpose, the taking of the inventory being
begun in the morning and finished in the afternoon; that upon the completion of the inventory the defendant insisted upon the payment of the
debt and the Chinaman told him that he would speak to another Chinaman to get him to guarantee the debt, to which the defendant agreed; that
about the 12th or 13th of July the defendant returned to the store of the Chinaman Chan Chinco and stated to him that he must either pay the
debt or he, the defendant, would take the goods, and in view of the fact that neither the Chinaman nor his surety, Dy Biangco, had money, the
defendant, Tupular, by means of his cargadores, took from the store of the Chinaman all the goods which the latter had, together with a trunk,
several pictures, the Chinaman’s certificate of registration, and about P130 in cash, and carried them to another house near by, notwithstanding
the protest and refusal of the Chinaman, the defendant ignored the Chinaman’s objection and the latter did not show any further opposition for
the reason that he knew that the defendant had a revolver in his trunk, which had been left in his, the Chinaman’s store, and thus the goods were
forcibly taken away by the defendant; that, according to the Chinaman, these goods were worth P2,600; and that it appears from the record that
the Chinaman Chan Chinco actually owed to Antonio de la Riva, of Manila, the sum of P1,004, on account of which the indebtedness the Chinaman
had already paid to the defendant the sum of P800.

The facts as established in this case show the commission of the crime of coaccion as defined in article 498 of the Penal Code which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"He who with violence shall appropriate a thing belonging to his debtor in order to pay himself therewith shall be punished with the penalties of
arresto mayor in its minimum degree and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case under 325 pesetas.

The defendant, as the agent of the creditor, Antonio de la Riva, took forcible possession of the goods which the debtor, the Chinaman Chan Chinco,
had in his store in the town of Caramoran, Island of Catanduanes, Province of Albay, against the will and regardless of the objection of the debtor,
in order to pay the debt of his principal therewith.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and alleged that after the goods were inventoried he ordered that the same be removed from the Chinaman’s
store to another place with the consent of the debtor, who voluntarily transferred these goods to him in payment of his indebtedness to De la Riva,
no receipt for the said goods having been given nor any document evidencing the payment of the debt executed, for the reason that the account of
the Chinaman had not been definitely settled.

The evidence, however, is insufficient to support the claim of the defendant that the Chinaman had transferred to him the said goods in payment
of the debt. If this were true there would have been no necessity for him imposing upon the Chinaman, ignoring his protest, and forcibly taking the
goods for the purpose of paying the claim of his principal with the said goods. The defendant employed violence and intimidation upon the owner
of the said goods, and he also employed physical violence when he forcibly removed the goods from the store.

As to the exact value of the goods in question there is no definite proof, and in view of contradictory testimony of the parties upon this point the
doubt thus arising from such conflicting evidence should be decided in favor of the defendant who claims that the goods were worth P600, and this
for the purpose only of fixing the penalty that should be imposed under article 498 of the Penal Code, without prejudice to the right of the
Chinaman to recover in a proper civil action such damages as he may thereby have incurred in addition to the actual value of the said goods.

There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in connection with the commission of the crime, nor even the special
circumstance provided in paragraph 11 of article 10 of the Penal Code, as it does not appear that the defendant took advantage of his official
position as auxiliary justice of the peace of the town of Calogbon, which is distinct from the town of Caramoran where the crime was committed,
and the penalty should therefore be inflicted in its medium degree.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court below and hereby sentence Braulio Tupular to one month and twenty days’ imprisonment
(arresto mayor) with the accessories prescribed in article 61 of the code, to pay a fine of P600, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty with the costs of both instances, and without prejudice to the rights of the Chinaman
Chan Chinco to maintain a civil action for damages against the defendant Tupular.

After the expiration of ten days from the rendition of final judgment, the record will be remanded to the court below the execution. So ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165065 September 26, 2006
MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the September 3, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan convicting
petitioners of unjust vexation in Criminal Case No. 24309.

On October 22, 1997, an Information2 was filed before the Sandiganbayan (First Division), charging the following with grave coercion: Municipal
Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan; and Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police
Station Chief, together with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo Oledan, Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora. The Information
reads:

That on or about the 27th day of January 1997, at about 2:20 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Palanay, Municipality of Caibiran, Biliran,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all public officers, having been duly elected, appointed and
qualified to such public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with (sic) each other, by means of violence and intimidation, without any authority of law, with deliberate intent did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly eject one Medaria Verutiao from the market stall she was occupying and leasing from
the Municipality of Caibiran, thereby compelling her to give up her possession and occupation to said market stall against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of said Medaria Verutiao and detriment of public service.

Contrary to law.3

On arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 The Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order5 signed by all the parties,
where it was stipulated, among others, that all of the accused were government officials; Verutiao was physically in possession of one of the stalls
in the public market of the Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997; on January 21, 1997, the premises had been padlocked
previously by Mayor Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods were inside the stall, and she was unable to transact any business; on January 27, 1997,
the locks were opened by the government upon the authority of the mayor, the goods in the premises were inventoried and taken to the police
station where they have remained up to the present.6

The Case for the Prosecution7

The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She paid a
monthly rental of P200.00.8 She was allowed to finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the
Municipal Treasurer.9 She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,10 provides that, to facilitate the development of the public
market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other structures for commercial purposes
may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business.11

She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized statement of expenses12 she submitted to then Municipal
Treasurer Jose Lee on February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the construction, she then
opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in 1993.

On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract,13 renewable every year with a monthly rental of
P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact
that the contract has not yet expired.

In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall.14 However, considering that
she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent.15 Almost weekly, she went to the
Municipal Treasurer to request for the reimbursement.16 She was told by then Treasurer Lee and his successor, Lorenzo Dadizon, that the
Municipality had no money and she had to wait for another budget hearing.17 The treasurers did not collect her rents for they knew that the
Municipality still owed her money.18

On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays.19 She returned to Caibiran
on January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the
stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall.20 As of January 1997, Verutiao had an unpaid rental of
P2,532.00, after deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been
cancelled.

On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter21 to the Mayor, stating, among others, that they can only be ejected from
the market stall if the Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the construction of the stall and if the Municipality was no
longer willing to lease the subject premises. They admitted that Verutiao had not paid any rent since 1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,22 she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed, as the rentals due would be debited from
50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of the market stall, and that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have
reimbursed her expenses in the construction.

On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises.23 The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27,
1997. The contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for safekeeping.24 While these were
being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall.25 She considered the act of the Mayor as a
political harassment, given that her husband, was then a candidate for councilor under the ticket of the opposition; and that she was a leader of
the opposing party.26

The Case for the Accused27

Except for the accused Victor Maderazo, the other accused opted not to testify. Victor Maderazo declared that as of January 27, 1997, he was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran. On said date, he was at the stall of Verutiao at the public market in the company of Seniforo Perido,
who was the Chief of Police of Caibiran, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Rico, Revenue Collector Orlando Mocorro, and Faulio Quizo, and other laborers.
All of them witnessed the inventory of the goods in the stall of Verutiao which Victor Maderazo made upon the request of Mayor Melchor
Maderazo. Earlier, Verutiao was informed, by letter, of the inventory of the goods in the stall, which, however, she failed to attend. One of the
employees of the Municipality brought the key to the stall and opened it. Victor Maderazo then conducted an inventory of the goods, each was
described, while someone was listing the goods. The inventory was orderly.

The goods were then brought to the police station where the supplies were kept.

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On September 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment28 convicting the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and Victor
Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no authority to
padlock, open and inventory the contents of the subject stall and take the same to the police station. Although, he had the power to cancel the
lease contract, as Mayor, he could not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and seizure of the goods contained
therein. The remedies of the Municipality in cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees and rentals are provided in the Local
Government Code.

The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use violence, threats or intimidation.
Verutiao could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she was not at the market stall when the same was padlocked, and
its goods inventoried and hauled. The court, however, held the said accused criminally liable for unjust vexation even if the private complainant
was not at the stall because the overt acts of the accused caused her annoyance, irritation and vexation. The court ruled that if the second element
of grave coercion under Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking, the crime committed falls under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the same Code. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, accused SENIFORO PERIDO and VICTOR MADERAZO JR. are hereby
CONVICTED of the crime of Unjust Vexation, in Criminal Case No. 24309 and hereby ordered to pay a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00).
Accused RODOLFO RICO, accused ORLANDO MOCORRO, accused RODOLFO AZUR, accused REYNALDO OLEDAN, accused JORDAN GERVACIO, and
accused JOSE CESORA are hereby ACQUITTED of the Crime of Grave Coercion in Criminal Case No. 24309 for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the cash bond they have posted for their provisional liberty are hereby CANCELLED and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Caibiran,
Biliran Cashier is hereby ordered to release the said Cash Bond to accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan,
and accused Gervacio.

The Hold Departure Order issued against accused Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and accused Gervacio are
set aside and any Hold Departure Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation pursuant thereto is hereby recalled. However, the
Hold Departure Orders issued against accused Maderazo, accused Maderazo, Jr., and accused Perido stand.

SO ORDERED.29

The Petition Before the Court

The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition30 and rely on the following grounds:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME OF UNJUST VEXATION.

II

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER MAYOR MADERAZO HAS NO POWER TO PADLOCK A MARKET STALL AND TO
HAUL THE GOODS CONTAINED THEREIN.

III

THE SACROSANCT RULE IS THAT WHERE THE PROSECUTION FAILS TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT EVERY
FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME FOR WHICH THE ACCUSED IS BEING HELD TO ACCOUNT -- AS IN THE CASE AT BAR -- THE ACCUSED
MUST PERFORCE BE ACQUITTED.31

The threshold issue is whether or not the People adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust vexation.

Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao was not prevented from doing something not
prohibited by law. She could not have been possibly intimidated or forced by petitioners, and could not have been prevented from doing business.
In fact, she was not transacting business at the time. Verutiao was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods inventoried; hence, she could
not have been vexed.

Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting Verutiao from her stall on January 27, 1997, thereby
compelling her to give up her possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However, they were convicted by the trial court of unjust vexation
because they allegedly padlocked the stall, hauled and/or seized the goods contained therein. It was petitioner Mayor Maderazo who had
padlocked the stall earlier on January 21, 1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not involved in the padlocking of the stall. For his
part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not at the stall on January 27, 1997; he cannot, thus, be guilty of unjust vexation for the overt acts of his co-
petitioners on January 27, 1997.

Verutiao’s refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper demand and despite the fact that she was no longer operating the
same, rendered her a deforciant, and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994. Consequently, petitioner Mayor Maderazo
had every right to consider the subject stall vacant; and proceed in accordance with Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, which provides:
Section 44 - Vacancy of Tienda or Stall before expiration of lease.

Should any reason (sic), a tienda, stall or stand holder or leases (sic) discontinues or be required to discontinue his business before the expiration of
the lease, such tienda, stall or stand shall be considered vacant and its occupancy thereafter shall be disposed of in the manner herein prescribed.

Petitioners posit that a Municipal Mayor has the duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and the
exercise of its corporate powers and must ensure that all taxes and revenues of the Municipality are collected. He is empowered to issue licenses
and permits and to suspend or revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits were issued; to adopt adequate
measures to protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or
judicial proceedings for violation of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges. Under Sec. 174 of the Local Government Code, among the
civil remedies for the collection of delinquent local taxes, fees or charges, and other revenues is "by administrative action through distraint of
goods, chattels or effects, and other personal property of whatever character, including stocks and other securities, debts, credits, bank accounts,
and interest in and rights to personal property, and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real property."

Petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the right to padlock the stall of Medaria Verutiao on January 21, 1997, after she refused to vacate the stall
despite his demand. Verutiao had no more lease contract and was no longer operating the stall for the purpose it was intended, in violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984. Moreover, she was delinquent in the payment of monthly rentals. Under the circumstances, and in view
of her violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo was duty-bound to institute the necessary
administrative proceedings or to take immediate action to correct the violation, protect the property of the Municipality, and ensure that the
delinquent revenues from the subject stall would be collected.

Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected therefrom but was merely stopped from improperly using it, in the exercise
of petitioner Mayor Maderazo’s power and duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and the exercise
of its corporate powers.

The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that, under the Local Government Code, the local government concerned may avail of the following
remedies, either alternatively or simultaneously, for the collection of fees or charges: 1) the administrative remedies of distraint of personal
properties or levy upon real properties; and 2) by judicial action. But from the evidence, petitioner Melchor Maderazo cancelled the lease contract
and ordered, which the other petitioners obeyed, to padlock and to subsequently cart and haul the goods of spouses Verutiao inside their market
stall to the precinct, under the guise that it was done in accordance with the law. He did not avail of the judicial action which is specifically provided
in the Local Government Code. He failed to avail of the administrative remedies of distraint and levy and its procedure as provided in Section 175
thereof.

Even if Verutiao was delinquent in the payment of their rentals, petitioner Melchor Maderazo is mandated to consider and resolve the exemptions
being claimed by the former and which were properly communicated to him. Petitioner Melchor Maderazo cannot take the law into his hands, and
order the seizure of the goods of the spouses Verutiao which was implemented by the other petitioners, in clear violation of the law.

He maintains that nowhere in the Local Government Code is the Mayor of a Municipality authorized to take the law into his own hands. Instead,
the Local Government Code provides specifically for the measures, procedures and remedies to be undertaken in cases of delinquency in the
payment of fees or charges due to the local government concerned. Ordering to padlock, and to subsequently cart and haul the goods inside the
market stall being rented by Verutiao to the police precinct without any court order or notice of distraint and levy prejudiced the spouses.
Petitioner Mayor Maderazo’s duties of protecting the properties of the Municipality and enforcing the law do not include depriving Verutiao of her
means of livelihood. Perido and Maderazo, Jr. cannot escape criminal liability by merely saying that they were following the orders of Melchor
Maderazo as only lawful orders deserved to be followed and obeyed. The participation of petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. went beyond just
being witnesses because they admitted that "they opened the stall and x x x accounted for the goods and special effects contained inside."
Petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. were invited to be at the vicinity as witnesses but they acted beyond their participation as mere witnesses;
they became participants to an illegal and unauthorized act.

Petitioners Seniforo Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. occupy the positions of Station Commander and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively. They are public servants, and as such, owe the constituents of the Municipality of Caibiran, including Verutiao, the performance of
their official duties and obligations to a higher degree of commitment and standards, and must necessarily conform to the norms of conduct set
forth by the law.

Verutiao was not at the subject stall and could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused. She could, likewise, not be prevented
from doing business because they were not transacting business at that time. By the actuations of the petitioners, Verutiao was tormented and
distressed. Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion which is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

The Ruling of the Court

On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the
guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation.

Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same
to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no
case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.32 Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime of
unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the
crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is
whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.33 The
main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands
and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.34

In the present case, petitioner Melchor Maderazo opted not to testify in his behalf. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners of unjust vexation
on its findings that petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the stall of Verutiao padlocked and had it reopened, and had the contents of the stall
inventoried and taken to the police station. However, the padlocking of the stall of Verutiao by petitioner Melchor Maderazo took place on January
21, 1997 and not on January 27, 1997. Petitioners were charged with grave coercion, but were convicted of unjust vexation for the eviction of
Verutiao on January 27, 1997 and not on January 21, 1997 following the inventory of the contents of the stall and the transportation thereof to the
police station. The only events that took place on January 27, 1997 were the unlocking of the padlock of the stall, the inventory of its contents by
petitioner Victor Maderazo on order of petitioner Melchor Maderazo, and the transportation of the goods to the police station where it was
stored. Petitioners Victor Maderazo, Jr. and Seniforo Perido were not present when the stall was padlocked on January 21, 1997.

We agree with respondent’s contention that based on the evidence on record, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor
Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered
petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the
goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member, obeyed the order of the Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the
crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime
was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of
the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein,
hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.

Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust
Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby preventing her from doing business therein and selling
her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall
and her means of livelihood.

Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on January 13, 1997 without having been renewed, and petitioner Mayor
ordered Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to
recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said premises.35 Verutiao insisted on her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do
business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and prevent those believing themselves entitled
to the possession of the property resort to force to gain possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert their claims.36 It
was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade the property and oust
the lessee who is entitled to the actual possession and to place the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property right.37

An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings established for the purpose of providing expeditious means of
protecting actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven. As this Court emphasized in Dizon v. Concina:38

Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry action: "In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the parties
cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute.39

Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and to implement all
approved programs, projects, services and activities of the Municipality40 and to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are
collected.41 He is obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the recovery of funds and property.42
However, in the performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony.
A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform
his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.

Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we find petitioner Seniforo Perido
deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other petitioners. He was at the situs of the stall merely to
witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the police station presumably
to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed the same or the disposition thereof
determined by the authorities concerned.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The bail bond posted by him for his provisional liberty is cancelled. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000.]
ONG CHIU KWAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust
vexation. 1

On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information
charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a business establishment
owned and operated by Mildred Ong. 2

On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and water lines of
"Crazy Feet," because said lines posed as a disturbance. 3 However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing
him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment. 4

After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation, 5 and sentenced him to
"imprisonment for twenty days." 6 The court also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the
electric, water pipe and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet" caused the interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to the detriment of its
owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded exemplary damages to complainant "as a deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in the
future and to pay attorney’s fees." 7 The trial court disposed of the case as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of unjust vexation provided under Article 287 par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days and to pay private complainant the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

P10,000.00 - moral damages

P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages.

P 5,000.00 - attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of this suit."cralaw virtua1aw library

SO ORDERED.

Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.

(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA

Judge" 8

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the
lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so. 9

On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. 10 On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal, 11 agreeing with the lower court’s finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
unjust vexation.

Hence, this petition for review. 12

The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the
Regional Trial Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their corresponding memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its
memorandum, and also with the defense.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify,
reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto." 13

The Constitution requires that" [N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based." 14 The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that" [T]he judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted
by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based." 15

Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its own. 16

Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a
simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself." 17

Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on decision
writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the constitutional requirement of contents of a decision.
However, considering that this case has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the evidence and decide
the case.

Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone .lines of complainant’s business establishment because these
lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permits or authorization to relocate the lines. Also,
he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus,
petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to be without basis. Moral damages may be recovered
if they were the proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 18 An award of exemplary damages is justified if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 19 There is no evidence to support such award. Hence, we delete the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, Accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a
fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1340 October 13, 1947
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION (CLO), petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE and BISIG NG CANLUBANG (NLU), respondents.

PERFECTO, J.:

Petitioners prays for the annulment of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated February 21, 1947, in case No. 44 — V(1), entitled Bisig
ng Canlubang (NLU) vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate," and of all the proceedings taken therein. The dispositive part of the order sought to be annulled is
as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, his Court orders:

(1) That all laborers, whether they belong to the Bisig ng Canlubang (NLU), or to the new union Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO), should return to
their respective work immediately, but not later than 6 o'clock a.m., on February 24, 1947, with the admonition that those who will fail to report
will not only lose any concession that may be considered by this Court in the main case, but that the respondent company, upon its petition, is
hereby authorized to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report at the above stated hour and
date. Beginning Sunday, February 23, 1947, at 6 o'clock a.m., picketing under any guise or form, is hereby entirely prohibited.

(2) That for the maintenance of peace and order in Canlubang Sugar Estate, to protect the property of the respondent Company, and also to
protect those laborers who may report to work in accordance with this order, the request for assistance of the Military Police, or any other law-
enforcing agency, is hereby granted, and government police agencies are hereby requested to extend such help and protection.

Upon its request, the respondent company is hereby authorized to reopen on Sunday, February 23, 1947. However, to allow all the workers to be
notified of this order, the Court has fixed 6 o'clock Monday morning, February 24, 1947, as the dead line for them to report, in other words, those
who fail to report can be substituted in order to enable the respondent company to operate.

The parties are hereby notified of this Order in open court.

Petitioners contend that this order, requiring the laborers to return to their work, and, upon failure to do so, authorizing the Canlubang Sugar
Estate to employ new laborers to take their place, and prohibiting picketing under any guise or form, is contrary to law and has been issued without
and/or in excess of the jurisdiction of he Court of Industrial Relations. They also complain that notwithstanding the fact that the Canlubang
Worker's Union (CLO) or its members are not party to the case and were not given the opportunity to answer and defend the charges against them
or to be heard in connection therewith, the members of said motion were likewise ordered to return to work and to desist from exercising their
right to picket.

The Court of the Industrial Relations answered, alleging that it has the authority and jurisdiction to issue the order of February 21, 1947, by virtue
of the provisions of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103; that said jurisdiction is merely incident to the jurisdiction acquired by the court
in case No. 44-V, Bisig ng Canlubang vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate, in virtue of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended, that said order is
only complementary to the order of the same tribunal dated December 11, 1946; that both orders were issued only in order to maintain the status
quo of the parties in case No. 44-V which was pending decision by the court, and they were of interlocutory character; that Hermogenes Mortera
and the signatories and the members of the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) were members of the Bisig ng Canlubang at the time the court issued
the orders of December 10 and 11, 1946, in case No. 44-V and therefore were parties in said case; that the information and organization of the
Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) by Hermogenes Mortera while case No. 44-V was pending, did not have the effect of excluding said Hermogenes
Mortera and the signatories and members of the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO) from the effect of said orders.

The Canlubang Sugar Estate alleged in its answer that the order complied of by petitioners was issued by the Court of Industrial Relations in virtue
of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103; that the order against picketing is authorized by said section; that petitioners became parties in the
case when they appeared in case No. 44-V after receipt of notice of the hearing and copy of the urgent motion giving rise to the order, when they
asked for postponement of the hearing of the case, when they cross-examined witnesses in the trial which was instigated by the members of the
petitioning union and offered evidence in their defense in connection with the urgent motion.

Upon the evidence presented before it, the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of February 21, 1947, found that in connection with the case of
Bisig Ng Canlubang (NLU) vs. the Canlubang Sugar Estate, No. 44-V, the petition union of December 2, 1946, presented several demands relative to
increase of wages, vacation with pay and the granting of gratuity for faithful and long service. Lacking action on these demands, the workers
declared a strike on December 9, 1946. The Bisig Ng Canlubang filed on the same date a petition against the Canlubang Sugar Estate covering the
three demands submitted to the estate. At the preliminary hearing set on December 11, 1946, the parties agreed that the company would reopen
and that it will readmit all the striking laborers with pay from December 9, 1946, when the strike was declared, and that any concession that may
be justified by the evidence will be made retroactive as of December 9, 1946. The question of vacation with pay and gratuity was left o the sound
discretion of the Court. Although maintaining that there is no law which authorizes the payment of gratuity, respondent company manifested that
the question will be left to the sound discretion of the court. Evidence shall be received on the question of the increase of wages. As a result, the
laborers were ordered to return to their work under the same conditions existing before the strike and that none of them shall be suspended
except for that cause and after the authority of the court is obtained. The workers were also ordered not to declare any strike while the final
determination of the case is pending. On February 17, 1947, around six or seven hundred laborers declared a strike. According to petitioners, said
laborers formed a new union, the Calamba Workers Union (CLO) due to the failure of the company to accede to their demands of February 11,
1947. When the main case was tried and submitted, and especially at the time of the issuance of the order of December 11, 1946, which was
violated by the strike declared in February 17, 1947, Mortera and the six hundred striking workers were members of the Bisig ng Canlubang.

The Court of Industrial Relations stated that respondent is engaged in the manufacture of sugar, a very important and essential food, of which
there is lack of supply in view of the destruction of sugar centrals of many provinces. Sugar is important in the life of the people. This makes
imperative the reopening of the company for the production of sugar and to help the workers belonging to the two unions.

The main question in this case decisive of the whole controversy is whether petitioners were parties in case No. 44-V, entitled Bisig ng Canlubang
(NLU) vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate, wherein the order of December 11, 1946, prohibiting the workers from striking was issued. This question
specifically requires a ruling on the proposition that the fact that petitioners have formed another union, the Canlubang Workers' Union (CLO),
thereby separating themselves from the Bisig ng Canlubang (NLU), after the order of December 11, 1946, was issued and when the case was
pending decision, had the effect of excluding petitioners from the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations in case No. 44-V.lawphil.net

The contention that petitioners' secession from the Bisig Ng Canlubang (NLU) and their formation of another union should have the effect of
divesting the Court of Industrial Relations of its jurisdiction over the petitioners in the case wherein they appeared and came to the Court of
Industrial Relations as the member of the Bisig Ng Canlubang (NLU), is not supported by any law, authority or reason. When petitioners appeared
for the first time before the Court of Industrial Relations as members of the Bisig Ng Canlubang (NLU), they appeared as workers of the Canlubang
Sugar Estate. When they seceded from said union to form another, they remained to be workers of the Canlubang Sugar Estate. The order of
December 11, 1946, prohibiting the workers from striking pending decision of the case was addressed to the workers of the Canlubang Sugar
Estate. The splitting of the Canlubang Workers' Union into two unions cannot effect the jurisdiction of the may even dissolve the union completely
but that would not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Otherwise, we would be giving our approval to a scheme by which a workers' union, in case
of an adverse decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, may always make a mockery of orders and decisions of said court. Such a result is against
the administration of justice and is violative of the principles and the purposes for which Commonwealth Act No. 103 was enacted. Under he
authority granted by the Constitution, the National Assembly sought through Commonwealth Act No. 103 to set up a system of settling labor
disputes orderly, justly, and to the best interest of the parties concerned in particular and of the people in general. Both the Delegates of the
Constitutional Convention and the Members of the National Assembly, without depriving laborers of their essential rights, and rather having heir
benefit in mind sought to avoid in the Philippines the repetition of the interminable strikes occurring in the United States of America. Their evil
effects may easily be absorbed by the enormous economic capacity of the American people but certainly will be disastrous to the economic life of
the Philippines.

The second and last question which we have to consider is the blanket prohibition against picketing in any guise or form contained in the order of
February 21, 1947. The prohibition should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful
picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial
Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means.

Petitioners have not shown why the order of February 21, 1947, should be annulled. The order proceedings in case No. 44-V (1) which petitioners
also seek to be annulled are not specified and no grounds have been adduced in support of the prayer.

For all the foregoing, the petitioner is dismissed.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9604 November 19, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANA LIM, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

TORRES, J.:

This action has come before us on appeal raised by the defendants Sionga Yap, Sana Lim, and Dina Lim, from the judgment of December 8, 1913,
whereby the Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, judge, sentenced Tiburcio Ricablanca, Jing Kong Kiang (alias Esteban), Sionga Yap, Sana Lim, and Dina
Lim each to the penalty of six years ten months and one day of prision mayor, and to pay, each of them, one ninth of the costs. In the same
judgment Rufino Cortes and Pedro Blando were acquitted, and by two orders of the same date, December 3, 1913, upon the petition of the
provincial fiscal, the case was dismissed with respect to Eleno Suizo, in order to use him as a witness, and also Manuel Balbuena, with the costs de
officio. (Record, pp. 24 and 25.)

The record in this case shows that it was duly proven that some days prior to September 11, 1913, the Moro named Jamilassan disembarked from a
vinta or small native boat, in which he and other moros were travelling, upon the beach of the barrio of Simala, pueblo of Sibonga, Island of Cebu,
carrying with him 101 tins of opium, belonging to his employer, the Moro Tahil, for the purpose of selling the drug; that Jamilassan thereupon went
to the store of the Chinaman King Kong Kiang (alias Esteban), situated in the said barrio and near the shore, to sell the opium, but that this
Chinaman, instead of agreeing to buy it, went to the town of Sibonga and proposed its purchase to another Chinaman named Sionga, who in turn
approached another Chinaman named Sana for the same purpose; that, as Sana did not have the money, Sionga then went to the municipal
treasurer of the pueblo, Tiburcio Ricabalnca, to report the fact that the opium was being offered for sale; that Ricabalnca thereupon conceived the
idea of seizing the opium brought by the Moro Jamilissan, with the intent to obtain in lawful gain, and, with this purpose in view, arranged that one
of the Chinaman should pretend that he would buy the opium and upon his acquiring it the treasurer and his accomplices would proceed to arrest
the Moro, seize the opium for the purpose of appropriating it to themselves, substitute molasses for a part of it and it deliver t the authorities the
molasses and a part of the opium so seized, together with the bearer of the drug.

In order to carry out the plan thus conceived, the Chinamen Sionga and Dina went to the pueblo of Carcar to buy molasses from the Chinaman Yap
Chian, while the treasurer Ricablanca gave orders to the police sergeant Eleno Suizo to take two subordinates, dressed as civilians and without
uniforms, and accompany those who were to execute the deed. On the night of the said 11th of September, 1913, the Moro Jamilassan, who, with
his companions and his employer Tahil, was in the small boat anchored off the shore of the said barrio, believing that the Chinaman would buy the
opium, went ashore carrying a sack that contained 101 tins of opium worth P3,333, or P33 a tin. Prior to his leaving the boat, the defendants had
posted themselves in the vicinity of the place where the Moro was to land. When Jamilassan, who was carrying the opium, drew near to Sionga,
the pretended purchaser, the latter, according to an arrangement previously made with his companions, twice lit some matches, whereupon the
defendants appeared upon the scene preceded by the sergeant and his policemen who, brandishing their weapons to frighten the Moro, arrested
him and seized the opium he was carrying in the sack. At this moment, as the Moro succeeded in escaping toward the boat, the sergeant fired his
revolver four times and the treasurer Ricablanca also fired his. Thereupon the Moros in the boat precipitately filed from the shore, but the one who
carried the opium was finally captured.

The defendants then appropriated to themselves 77 tins of the opium, set aside 12 of them, and for the contents of the remaining 11 tins they
substituted molasses, 1 tin having been lost. These 12 tins of opium and 11 tins of molasses were delivered by them to the authorities as having
been legally seized the possession of the Moro Jamillasan, the bearer of the drug.

By reason of the foregoing facts, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance a criminal complaint against the Chinese appellants, the
municipal treasurer of the pueblo of Sibonga, some policemen and others who took part, charging them with having seized opium of the value of
P3,300, the property of a Moro named Tahil, willfully, maliciously, and criminally, with intent to gain and by the use of violence and intimidation
against the person of the Moro Jamilassan, who was carrying the said drug.lawph!1.net

Article 502 of the Penal Code prescribes that the crime of robbery is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
property by the use of violence or intimidation against any person or force upon any thing.

Although the subject matter of the robbery was an article whose introduction, use, and keeping were, and are, strictly prohibited by the laws in
force in these Islands, wherefore all public officers vested with authority, and their agents, are under obligation to prosecute any violation of the
law and to seize the prohibited drug and all similar substances which are of course confiscated, unless their use or keeping has been expressly
authorized by competent authority; yet, when it has been fully proved at the trial that the capture and seizure of the opium was effected by a
public officer, assisted by agents of the authorities, with the decided intent to gain thereby the price or value of the opium so seized, and not with
the intention to comply with the law and further the purposes of the Government in the eradication and suppression of the vice of its use, one
which is very prevalent among the Chinese residents of these Islands and is also spreading among the active inhabitants; and when the commission
of the unlawful act was attended by violence and intimidation against the person who was carrying the opium, it is improper to consider such
taking and seizure as lawful and permissible, even though executed by agents authorized to arrest and prosecute opium smugglers, inasmuch as
the seizure of the opium was effected with intent to gain and by the use of violence and intimidation, in the present case, against the person of the
Moro who, is the agent of its owner, had possession of the drug.

The seizure of the opium and the arrest of its bearer by the agents of the authorities is indeed permissible and perfectly lawful; but that such
agents, with the intent and purpose of appropriating to themselves the opium seized and of deriving benefit from its use or sale, should, with
impunity and entire security, possess themselves of the opium, cannot be tolerated. Until the agents of the authorities have taken charge of it in
the manner prescribed by the administrative law, it is the property of the owner. The Moro Jamilassan having been deprived of the 101 tins of
opium, which, by order of the owner of the drug, he was carrying to sell, and this taking having been effected with violence and intimidation on the
part of the agents of the authorities, who acted in apparent compliance with the law, but really with intent to obtain unlawful gain, it is
unquestionable that the crime of robbery, provided for and punished by articles 502 and 503, paragraph 5, of the Penal Code, was committed. The
legality and correctness of this classification of the crime are in no wise affected by the circumstance that the persons who committed it were
agents of the authorities, assisted by some private parties, since the public character with which these agents were invested does not justify the
criminal intent that prompted the execution of the punishable act, nor can it change the nature of the crime they committed, inasmuch as, on the
occasion of its perpetration, they acted, not as agents of the authorities in the fulfillment of the duties imposed upon them by the law, but as mere
private parties, accompanied by some Chinamen, all of whom conspired together and concerted, under the direction of the treasurer Ricablanca,
for the purpose of seizing a considerable quantity of valuable opium which was not their property, but belonged to the Moro Tahil, and which is an
article that, upon seizure and confiscation within the territory of this Archipelago, becomes the property of the Government. In this connection it is
to be noted that the treasurer Ricablanca, before proceeding to seize the opium, gave no notice either to the municipal president or to the local
chief of the Constabulary, nor did he request the latter's assistance; all of which shows that he did not act in good faith and according to the law.

Without discussing the guilt of the defendant Ricablanca and the Chinaman King Kong Kiang, neither of whom has appealed, we shall confine
ourselves in this decision to inquiring into that of the appellant Chinamen Sionga Yap, San Lim, and Dina Lim. Their participation in the robbery
under prosecution was very different from that of the first two, inasmuch as Sionga Yap was present with the policemen during the perpetration of
the robbery, he took a direct part therein and cooperated in its commission by the performance of acts without which, perhaps, his co-participants
would not have succeeded in seizing the opium. It was he who pretended to purchase the drug by placing himself in direct communication with the
Moro who carried it, and arranged the place and time when the latter should appear on the beach at Simala with the opium for sale; it was this
same Chinaman who, in accordance with the agreement he had made with his codefendants, went to the shore ahead of the latter there to await
the Moro Jamilassan who was expected with the opium; he, too, it was, who signaled the arrival of the Moro on the shore, by lighting two matches,
at which signal the policemen and their companions came up and the former rushed upon the Moro, held him fast, and by force possessed
themselves of the opium, the securing of which was the purpose of the common action of the plotters. It cannot be denied, therefore, that Sionga
participated as a co-principal in the perpetration of the robbery in question.

We are of the opinion that the other appellants, Sana Lim and Dina Lim, acted as accomplices in the commission of the crime. They cooperated by
acts prior and simultaneous with its perpetration, but the record does not show that they performed acts that were necessary and indispensable
for its realization. With knowledge of the commission of the robbery and with the intent to obtain unlawful gain, they accompanied the principals
in the crime up to a certain distance from, though not near, the place where it was perpetrated, but did not approach that place until after the
robbery took place and when then for the sole purpose of sharing in the booty or the division of the opium stolen. Hence, as these two defendants
do not fall within any of the three classes specified in article 13 of the Penal Code, which treats of principals, the said Sana Lim and Dina Lim are to
be considered as mere accomplices of the principals in the robbery.

Counsel for the defendants, arguing against the classification of the crime, alleges that at most it should be defined as estafa, and in support of his
contention cites several decisions of this court and of the supreme court of Spain, where the principle is laid down that such acts should be
qualified as estafa and not robbery, for the reason that the agents of the authorities were authorized to seize the opium and the persons having it
in their possession or who were its owners, and because the officers of the law could not, in the act of the seizure of a prohibited article, have
exercised violence and intimation upon the person of a transgressor; that it after the seizure of the opium, they conceived the purpose of gain and
it was then that they appropriated to themselves the opium seized, they would in such a case have committed the crime of estafa, but not that of
robbery.

In answer to these allegations we must state that the robbery was engendered from the very moment when the principals resolved to possess
themselves of the opium carried by the Moro Jamilassan, with the fixed and malicious intent to obtain unlawful gain from the said drug which, as
was well and publicly known, obtained a high price, among the Chinese, its chief consumers. With that end in view, they came to an agreement,
formed a conspiracy among themselves and, under the direction of the treasurer Ricablanca, decided upon the method by which they should
possess themselves of the opium so that they might derive profit from its sale. They later took the opium the possession of its bearer by means of
violence and intimidation, since four shots were fired by one of the policemen and another by the treasurer Ricablanca, who was present at the
commission of the robbery. There is, therefore, no question that the persons who, with malicious intent to obtain unlawful gain and by the use of
violence and intimidation, forcibly possessed themselves of the opium carried by the Moro Jamilassan, proceeded and acted in the same manner as
robbers usually do who, with intent to gain, take possession of another's property against the will of its owner.

In the cases cited by the defense to show that the crime under prosecution should be classified as estafa and not as robbery, the guilty persons first
acted in good faith in the discharge of their duties and without any unlawful intention, and the intent to derive illicit gain was formed only after
they had legally seized the property. For this reason those acts cannot be classified as robbery, only as estafa, because prior to and at the time of
their performance, they acted as agents of the authorities and in accordance with law, and only after they were in possession of the property, did
they conceive the idea of deriving profit therefrom by appropriating it to themselves for personal gain.

In the case at bar, both the treasurer Ricablanca and the Chinese appellants, from the moment they proposed to seize the opium which the Moro
Jamilassan carried for sale, had the intention to appropriate to themselves the greater part of the drug. They even planned to deceive the
authorities by substituting molasses for the contents of 11 of the 23 tins of opium which they presented to the said authorities as legally seized
from Jamilassan. They kept 77 of the tins so seized and made no report of them to their superior, nor does the record show that these tins were
afterwards recovered from the possession of the defendants. Therefore it is just and proper that the crime in question should be classified as
robbery, and not as estafa.

In the commission of the crime account must be taken of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance No. 15, to wit, that the crime was
committed in the nighttime and in an uninhabited place, without any extenuating circumstance to offset its effects. No weight can be given to
abuse of superior strength, that circumstance being inherent in the crime of robbery, even though it were not committed by a band of armed men.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are deemed to have been refuted, the said judgment is
affirmed in so far as it degrees with this decision and reversed in so far as it does not, and we hereby sentence the Chinaman Sionga Yap, as a
principal, to the penalty of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor and to the accessory penalties of article 57, and each of the other
Chinamen, Sana Lim and Dina Lim, as accomplices, to six months of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties of article 61. Furthermore, Sionga is
sentenced to restore, jointly and severally with his co-principals, the opium stolen or to pay the value thereof to the Government of the Philippine
Islands, ad the accomplices, Sana Lim and Dina Lim, are held to be bound, also jointly and severally between themselves and subsidiary in default of
fulfillment, for the civil liabilities incurred by the principals, and each of the three appellants shall pay one-third of the costs of this instance. The
opium seized and all quantities thereof that may be recovered shall be confiscated.

Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG, defendants-appellants.

STREET, J.:

This case is submitted to the Supreme Court for review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, sentencing the
defendants Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging the crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the
circumstances stated below.

It appears that in the year 1912 some ten or a dozen people were living on the small island of Sicogon, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Balasan, Province of Iloilo. Two of these were an aged couple named Francisco Seran and his wife Juana. Two others were Roman Estriba and his
wife Rosa. The latter couple had two children Miguela and Bartolome, aged at that time respectively about 14 and 9 years. Upon the night of the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint the two children were staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a house some distance removed
from that occupied by Roman and Rosa and located farther back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach as was his
custom to watch for turtles. After the grandmother and the children had gone to rest on a mat where they slept together, and probably only a
short while after it had become dark, the two accused appeared and demanded money of Juana. She gave them P100 in money in response to this
demand, and the accused then required the three to leave the house and go in the direction of the sea. When the party had arrived at or near the
beach, a further demand was made upon the old woman for money, which demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy then struck her
with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The two children were at the time close to their grandmother, and being greatly frightened,
they ran away separately for some distance and remained hidden during the night in the bushes.

The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old couple had lived, which was vacant; but they there found each other and
proceeded together to the house of their parents. Going in that direction they stopped at the house of their sister, the wife of the defendant
Madanlog. When they went a little later to the house where their parents had lived, the fact was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had
also been killed. All the bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the two accused, assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of
Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela and Bartolome say that they were threatened with death if they should make complaint. Nevertheless their
lives were spared, and for sometime they stayed with their sister in the home of Madanlog; and after staying for a long time on the island, they
were afterwards taken to the home of another sister, named Dionisia Estriba, at Escalante, on the Island of Panay. They here revealed the facts
above narrated. This sister, Dionisia, afterwards filed the complaint in this case. Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was examined
before the justice of the peace, he made a confession in which he stated that the four deceased persons had been killed by Madanlog, with is
assistance.

At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and of the murder of their grandmother; but the boy said that he did not
remember that Madanlog was present when Lahoylahoy struck the fatal blow. Another important witness for the prosecution was Eugenio
Tenedero, the son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. This witness testified that the defendants killed the four deceased persons, and that early in the morning
they came to his house and required him to help them bury the dead, which he did. The accused gave no explanation to Tenedero of their motive
or of the reason for the commission of the deed, and told him not to tell anybody. During the next day or two after the tragedy above narrated, the
defendant Madanlog went to the house where Francisco and Juana had lived and carried away some palay, some dawa, three pigs, and a trunk
containing wearing apparel. We believe that the asportation of these things should not be considered as a continuation of the acts of robbery and
murder previously committed, but rather as a spoliation of the state of a deceased person. It results that the only property taken in the act of
robbery was the P100 obtained from Juana.

As against Madanlog, the case rests chiefly upon the testimony of Miguela, who says he was present at the robbery and at the murder of Juana. His
guilt is also indicated by his own conduct subsequent to the murder. We are satisfied with the conclusion reached by the lower court with respect
to the sufficiency of the evidence, and we have no doubt of the guilt of both the accused.

An important question arises upon the matter of the complaint in connection with the proof as to the ownership of the property which was taken
by the accused. The part of the complaint here material to be considered reads as follows:

The aforesaid accused taking advantage of the darkness of the night, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and by means of force on the things, took
and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof, the sum of P100, 5 bayones of palay, 4 bayones of
dawa, and 1 trunk which contained various wearing apparel, of the total value of P150, the property of Roman Estriba; in consequence thereof and
on the occasion of the said robbery, the aforesaid accused criminally and with known premeditation and treachery, killed Roman Estriba, Rosa
Galoso, Francisco Seran, and Juana.

According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint charges that the property taken belong to Roman Estriba. What is the
effect of this variance between the language of the complaint and the proof? Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a
complaint or information shall show, among others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was
committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle,
in charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential. But of course if his name cannot be
ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown.

From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be alleged as unknown it should not be inferred that the naming of
such person, when known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the crime
charged, the complaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown. (Wharton, Criminal
Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., secs. 111, 112.) It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to
the proper description of the offense.

To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses, malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of
another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be
fatal. It is also necessary in order to identify the offense. (Clark's Criminal Procedure, p. 227. See also page 338.)
Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide must necessarily charge each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. It is well recognized in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses the defendant
can be convicted of the other. The mere circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the
principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that
he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is
subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of
former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon
the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and
the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.

Reference to a few accredited decisions from American courts will make this clear.

In Comm. vs. Hoffman (121 Mass., 369), it was held that an acquittal on an indictment for breaking and entering the dwelling house and stealing
therein, the property of A, is no bar to a complaint for stealing in the same dwelling house at the same time the property of B, without proof that A
and B are the same persons.

In Comm. vs. Andrews (2 Mass., 409), the defendant in an indictment for receiving stolen goods which were the property of A, alleged that he had
been convicted of receiving stolen goods the property of B. The plea was adjudged insufficient, although it was alleged that the two parcels of
stolen goods were received by the defendant of the same person, at the same time, and in the same package, and that the act of receiving them
was one and the same.

In Alexander vs. State (21 Tex. Cr. App., 406; 57 Am. Rep., 617), it was held that where the goods of two different owners were stolen at the same
time, an acquittal on an indictment for stealing the goods of one would not constitute a bar to an indictment for stealing the goods of the other;
though it was observed that if the defendant had been convicted upon the first trial, he would have been protected from the second prosecution.
(See Wright vs. State, 17 Tex. Cr. App., 152.)

In Comm. vs. Wade (17 Pick. [Mass.], 395), the offense of burning a building was charged, and the indictment stated that the owner was a certain
individual (naming him). It was held that, although the name might possibly have been omitted altogether, yet as the indictment did allege the
name, the allegation of ownership was material, being descriptive of the offense, and must be proved.

It should be borne in mind that the plea of former conviction or acquittal, or former jeopardy, is supposed to be proved by the pleadings and
judgment in the former case, supplemented only by proofs showing the identity of the party, or parties. Courts are not accustomed to determine
the plea of former jeopardy by examining the proof to discover just what facts may have been developed in the former case. (Henry vs. State, 33
Ala., 389; Grisham vs. State, 19 Tex. Cr. App., 504.) In fact it is not always practicable or even possible to produce for inspection upon the trial of
this issue the evidence which was adduced in court at the trial of the former case.

The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have been described with sufficient certainty to
identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this provision can have no
application to a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar; and at any rate, supposing the
allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one
now before us, that the defendants "took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof the sum of
P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is
a saying to the effect that money has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can be
described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the
offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no conviction.

In United States vs. Kepner (1 Phil. Rep., 519), this court had before it a case where the defendant was charged with estafa in the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority. It was said that the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the check, when in reality the bank, which cashed the warrant was the sufferer, was
immaterial. This observation was, we think, correct as applied to that case, for the act constituting the offense of estafa was described in the
complaint with sufficient fullness and precision to identify the act, regardless of the identity of the offended person. Section 7, General Orders No.
58, was therefore properly applicable. It should be added, however, that the observation to which reference has been made was, strictly speaking,
unnecessary to the decision, for it is further stated in the opinion that there was in fact an injury to the owner of the check, which consisted of the
"delay, annoyance, and damage caused by the unlawful misappropriation of the warrant." (U.S. vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. Rep., 519, 526.) There is
evidently nothing in the case cited which can afford support for the idea that an erroneous allegation in a complaint as to ownership of the
property robbed is immaterial. If we should hold that a man may be convicted of robbing one person when he is charged with robbing another, the
complaint instead of being a means of informing him of the particular offense with which he is charged would rather serve as a means of
concealing it.

It is important to note that the complaint in this case is not defective in form, for the charge is clear, direct, and unambiguous. No formal objection
could possibly be made by the defendants to this complaint; and their only course, if desirous of making any defense, was to plead not guilty, as
was done in this case. The difficulty of the case arises from the facts adduced in evidence. Section 10, General Orders No. 58, declares that no
complaint is insufficient by reason of a detect in matter of form which does not tend to prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the
merits. This provision has no application to such a case as that now before us; and all arguments based upon the circumstance that the defendants
made no objection to the complaint in the Court of First Instance are irrelevant to the matter in hand.

The case of United States vs. Manalang (2 Phil., Rep., 64) has been called to our attention as an authority upon the point that insufficiency of a
complaint is waived by failure of the defendant to object thereto in the Court of First Instance. It there appeared that the statutory offense with
which the defendant was charged could only be committed by a Constabulary officer. There was no allegation in the complaint that the defendant
was such; but he appeared at the trial, testified in his own behalf, without questioning his character as such officer. It was held upon appeal that
the objection to the complaint on the ground stated was unavailing, "as no exception was taken to this defect by counsel for the defendant in the
court below, in which it might have been successfully raised by demurrer."

The following cases are also found in our Reports, showing that a complaint may be held sufficient although the commission of the offense is
charged by inference only, provided no objection is made in the court below. (U.S. vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. Rep., 570; U.S. vs. Vecina, 4 Phil. Rep., 529;
U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.) In all of these cases the complaint was demurrable for defect of substance, but the language used was so far
sufficient that the commission of the crime could be inferred. These cases are not relevant to the case at bar, as the complaint is not demurrable
for defect of any sort.

In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the
ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore they
cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the Penal Code. No such
difficulty exists, however, with respect to the quadruple homicide committed upon the persons named in the complaint; and in conformity with the
provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties corresponding to all these crimes must be severely imposed. This court has already held in
United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more than one offense (not complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the
accused fails to demur or ask for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses which are charged and proved may be imposed.
The doctrine announced in that case applies with even greater propriety offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11, General Orders No. 58.)

The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased must be qualified as homicide, as the record does not satisfactorily show how and in what
manner they were executed.

Even conceding the benefits or article 11 of the Penal Code, this circumstance, as regards both defendants is counterbalanced by the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place, and, as respects Marcos Madanlog, by that of relationship
by affinity. The accused Pedro Lahoylahoy has accordingly become liable to four penalties, each of seventeen years four months and one day,
reclusion temporal, and his co-accused Marcos Madanlog also, to the same number of penalties of twenty years each, reclusion temporal, for the
homicide of the four deceased, each also being liable to one-half of the costs.

In view of rule 2 of article 88 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the maximum duration of three times the length of the most severe of the penalties to
be imposed upon the accused exceeds forty years, the judgment reviewed is reversed, and we find that each of the accused Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog should be, as they are hereby, sentenced to suffer of aforesaid penalties of reclusion temporal, not to exceed forty years, to the
accessories prescribed by article 59, to indemnify, severally and jointly, the heirs of each of the deceased in the amount of P1,000 and each to pay
one-half of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Brown v. State, 136 S.W. 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911)
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Judges: HARPER, JUDGE.

Appellant was charged by indictment with robbery by the use of firearms and convicted and his punishment assessed at ten years confinement in
the penitentiary. The indictment was drawn under article 856 of the Penal Code, which is as follows:

"If any person by assault or violence or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury shall fraudulently take from the person or possession of another any
property with intent to appropriate the same to his own use he shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life or for a term of not
less than five years; and when firearms or *Page 336 other deadly weapon is used, or exhibited in the commission of the offense, the punishment
shall be death or by confinement in the penitentiary for any term not less than five years."

1. This is a case in which the State relied on circumstantial evidence to convict. R.L. Williams, the person alleged to have been robbed, testified that
on the night of the 17th day of last October, as he was walking from a neighbor's to his home, someone hailed him, came to the fence, and said, "I
want your coat." "That is what I understood, and I turned and walked out a piece, and said, `Is that you, Bud?' Bud is a nigger that works for me,
and I thought maybe he wanted to borrow my colt. He borrowed it sometimes, and about that time the form crouched and moved a little, and I
could see a gun, and he says: `Throw up your hands and pull off your coat.' I pulled it off and started to pitch it to him, and he says: `Drop it at your
feet.' In a few seconds he told me to go, and I left." The witness also testified that the day before he was in the Gibbs' National Bank and drew two
hundred dollars and put it in his coat. That defendant was present when he drew the money, and saw him put it in his coat, and defendant at the
time remarked, "Cap, that looks mighty good."

In a bill of exceptions defendant complains of the admissibility of this testimony. As before stated, this is a case of circumstantial evidence, and, as
a link in the chain of circumstances, this testimony was admissible. Counts v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 450; Hedrick v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 532,
and cases there cited.

2. In another bill complaint is made that while the defendant's wife was on the stand the State was permitted, over the objection of defendant, to
ask her if she did not testify at the examining trial: "I do not know whether defendant left home that night (the night of the robbery) with a gun or
not," and required her to answer the question, and to which question she answered that she did so testify. Defendant's objection was that this in
effect was compelling the wife to testify against her husband. The defendant had placed his wife on the stand to testify in his behalf, and on direct
examination she had testified that her husband did not leave home on the night of the robbery, and we think this legitimate cross-examination. A
wife called to testify in behalf of her husband is subject to cross-examination like any other witness, limited only that the cross-examination must
be confined to the matters testified to by her in direct examination. Johnson v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 17; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 87;
Merritt v. State, 39 Tex.Crim. Rep.. And in Hampton v. State, 45 Tex. 154, it is held that where the wife is called to testify in behalf of her husband,
the prosecution has the right to cross-examine her touching her testimony on a former trial or examination of the same case.

3. Defendant complains of the failure of the court to give special charges Nos. 2, 3, and 4. They all relate to the matter, and are in *Page 337 effect
that if they believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the party who held up Williams with a gun, and caused him
to pull off his coat and leave it, and that his object was to steal money which he believed to be in the coat, he should be acquitted. The indictment
charged that defendant did with a gun, by putting Williams in fear of his life, fraudulently take from him one coat of the value of $10. The
testimony showed that someone made him take off his coat and leave it on the ground. The court did not err in refusing to give the special charges
requested.

4. Defendant complains of the court's general charge in two or three respects. The first is that the court in the following paragraph did not present
the law: "If any person by assault or violence or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury shall fraudulently take from the person or possession of
another any property with intent to appropriate the same to his own use, he shall be deemed guilty of robbery, and when a firearm is used or
exhibited in the commission of the offense the punishment shall be by deaths, or by confinement in the penitentiary for any term not less than five
years." This is the language of the statute.

He also complains that the court did not instruct the jury that the "taking must be without the consent of the owner and fraudulently done." The
statute does not require that the court charge that the taking must be done without his consent, but that the taking is done by "putting in fear of
life or bodily injury" and the court so instructed the jury, and also instructed the jury that the taking must have been done "with the fraudulent
intent on the part of defendant to deprive W. of the value of the same." The criticisms of the charge are, we think, without merit.

4. The contention of defendant in this case was that he was at home, and therefore could not have committed the offense. This defense was clearly
and fully presented in the charge on alibi.

The sheriff carried his dogs to the scene of the robbery, and he testified the dogs next morning trailed the tracks to defendant's house; he testified
he found tracks leading to defendant's house, and that one shoe made a track as if "careened over;" that one of defendant's shoes was run down;
he had a gun, and three negroes testify to seeing him come home with a gun a short time after the hour of the alleged robbery. The court
presented the law of circumstantial evidence, and told the jury the circumstances taken as a whole must be of a conclusive nature, leading to a
satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant and no other person committed the offense
charged; and must exclude to a reasonable and moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the defendant, and if
they did not so find to acquit him. *Page 338

The defendant's counsel seemed to think that whoever held Williams up with the gun, had him to leave his coat with the view of getting the money
that had been placed in it the day before, and as this was evidently the intention, the fact that he took the coat, carried it off a short distance and
threw it away, this would not constitute robbery under the statute. In this we can not agree with him. Whenever a party is held up, and put in fear
of his life by having a gun presented at him, and told to put up his hands and drop certain property, and he is forced to do so, and the party with
the gun takes charge of the property, the offense of robbery is complete, and it is immaterial whether he not only expected to get other property
as well as that he knows he is taking through force and fear.

The judgment is affirmed.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMINIO BARUT, ALEJO RAMISCAL and ERNESTO QUEBRAL, accused-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

Herminio Barut (Barot), Alejo, Ramiscal and Ernesto Quebral appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, convicting them of
robbery with homicide, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay solidarily the heirs of Evaristo Tuvera (Tobera) an
indemnity of P12,000. The trial court also ordered the return to Francisco Lazaro of the articles taken from him which were recovered near the
scene of the robbery after the accused had fled (Criminal Case No. IV-202-'74).

According to the prosecution, shortly after sundown, on June 15, 1969, while Marcelino Grospe was pasturing his carabao in his farm at Sitio
Basilio, Barrio San Jose, Roxas, Isabela (p. 4, Record), he saw Herminio Barut, Alejo Ramiscal, Ernesto Quebral, Juan Agustin and Castor Acson,
persons known to him, going towards the hut or camarin of Francisco Lazaro, an octogenarian. Acson was armed with a carbine. Sensing that the
group had evil intentions, Grospe rode on his carabao, crossed the Siffu River and informed his neighbors that Lazaro was in trouble.

Acson held up Lazaro and at gunpoint got his money amounting to twenty-three pesos. Acson's companions went up the hut, ransacked it and took
his carpentry tools worth one hundred pesos and parts of a carbine. These articles were later recovered and presented as evidence (Exh. B to F).

Grospe and his neighbors, Lorenzo Soriano, Saturnino Sales, Maxims Saludares, Alejandro Tuvera and Evaristo Tuvera, armed with guns and bolos,
constituted themselves as a rescue party and repaired to the vicinity of Lazaro's hut. They deployed behind the banana plants. There was a brief
exchange of fire between the two groups. Acson was killed while in Grospe's group Evaristo Tuvera was the lone fatality. The malefactors fled from
the scene of the fight. Alejandro Tuvera saw them running away (54 tsn June 28, 1974).

Evaristo sustained an entrance gunshot wound in the chest. The bullet penetrated his heart and right lung and exited in the right scapular region or
shoulder blade (Exh. A).

The incident was investigated by the Constabulary. The affidavits of Grospe, Lazaro, Alejandro Tuvera (son of Evaristo) and Lorenzo Soriano were
taken and sworn to before the municipal judge of Roxas on June 23, 1969. On the basis of those affidavits, a complaint for robbery in band with
homicide was filed against Barut, Ramiscal, Quebral and Agustin in the municipal court of Roxas by a Constabulary investigator on July 7, 1969.

At the preliminary examination on July 16 and 17, 1969, the municipal judge interrogated Lazaro, Grospe, Soriano, Consolacion Cabutaje, the
widow of the deceased Evaristo Tuvera, and Doctor Luis R. Tamayo who conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased Evaristo Tuvera.

However, the warrant of arrest dated July 17, 1969 was served upon Barut, Quebral and Ramiscal a few years later or only on December 30, 1972,
August 27, 1973 and December 31, 1973, respectively (p. 3, CFI Record).

The municipal judge conducted the second stage of the preliminary investigation and took Quebral's statement on December 10, 1973. He took the
statements of Barut and Ramiscal on December 31, 1973.

The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance only on January 9, 1974. The fiscal filed against the same accused an information for robbery in
band with homicide dated February 10, 1974. As already stated, the trial court convicted them (except Agustin who is at large in Mindoro) of
robbery with homicide.

Appellants Barut, Ramiscal and Quebral contend that the trial court's decision does not state the ultimate facts on which the judgment of
conviction was based. That contention is devoid of merit. After meticulously summarizing the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial
court synthesized its findings and concisely narrated how the robbery with homicide was perpetrated by the accused. Then, it ratio its conclusion
that the robo con homicidio was not committed by a band. It justified its view that the alibis interposed by the accused are not worthy of credence.

The trial court's decision conforms with the requirement that the judgment should contain and distinctly a statement of the facts proven or
admitted by the accused and upon which it is based (Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rule of Court; Sec. 12, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution; Sec. 9, Art. X, 1973
Constitution).

The appellants argue that the case, should have been investigated by the police and not by the Constabulary soldiers. That is a baseless or flimsy
argument. The term "peace ofricer" in section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the persons who are competent to file a
criminal complaint, includes members of the Constabulary. They are directly charged with the preservation of peace, law and order. It is their duty
to investigate crimes and bring criminal offenders to justice. (See secs. 825, 826, 831 and 848, Revised Administrative Code.) Generally, they are
more competent and experienced than policemen to investigate crimes.

Appellants' other assignments of error, which deal with the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, do not merit any serious consideration.
Appellants' arguments as to the discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence are fully answered in the prosecution's brief.

Appellants' uncorroborated alibis have no exculpatory value. When the robbery with homicide was committed, appellant Barut was allegedly in
Barrio Malbog, Tagkawayan, Quezon Province where he was working on a farm owned by his uncle; appellant Quebral was at Barrio Baua,
Gonzaga, Cagayan, while appellant Ramiscal was at Barrio Salindingan, Ilagan, Isabela. The three appellants allegedly stayed in those places for four
years.

The three appellants are admittedly close friends (15-16 tsn September 25, 1974). Together with Acson and Agustin, they were all residents of
Barrio Masigun, Roxas. The probability is that immediately after the occurrence of the incident in question they fled from Barrio Masigun and
stayed for more than three years in those aforementioned places as fugitives from justice in order to avoid arrest and prosecution. They then
utilized their stay in those places as the basis of their alibis.
As has been repeatedly observed in cases of similar nature, appellants' alibis cannot destroy the positive Identification made by the prosecution
witness, Marcelino Grospe, who is acquainted with the appellants and who had no motive for fabricating evidence against them.

The robbery was proven beyond reasonable doubt. After the exchange of fire between the rescue party and the five malefactors, the latter in their
excitement and confusion left the objects of the robbery at the scene of the encounter. Those articles were recovered and presented as evidence in
court (Exh. B to F).

Although the killing of Evaristo Tuvera was perpetrated after the consummation of the robbery and after the robbers had left the victim's house,
the homicide is still integrated with the robbery or is regarded as having been committed "by reason or on the occasion" thereof, as contemplated
in article 294(i) of the Revised Penal Code.

In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with homicide "cuando con motivo o con ocassion del robo
resultare homicidio". "Basta que entre aquel este exista una relacion meramente ocasional No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa como medio
de ejecucion del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencion de matar, el delito existe segun constante jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra o
homicide, incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo o con ocassion del robo, siendo
indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetanea o posterior a este" (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Pemt 1975 14th Ed. p. 872).

There is robo con homicidio even if the victim killed was an innocent bystander and not the person robbed. The law does not require that the
victim of the robbery be also the victim of the homicide (People vs. Moro Disimban, 88 Phil 120; People vs.- Salamuddin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670; People
vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371).

In the instant case, the robbery spawned a fight between the robbers and the neighbors of Lazaro, the robbery victim. The killing of Evaristo Tuvera
resulted from that fight. Hence, it was connected with the robbery.

The three appellants, together with Agustin and Acson, were co-conspirators. They are all responsible for the homicide. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is in conformity with articles 63(2) and 294(l) of the Revised Penal
Code. Band is not aggravating because it was not proven that four of the five malefactors were armed.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the slight modification that the appellants should pay solidarily to Francisco Lazaro the sum
of twenty-three pesos (P23) which was taken from him by one of the robbers. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2725 February 27, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTEBAN SEBASTIAN Y PANGILINAN (alias ERNING) and MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA, defendants.
MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA, appellant.

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting appellant of robbery.

Appellant was, together with his co-accused in the court below, charged with robbery in an inhabited house, committed, in the language of the
information, as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1948, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and
helping each other, and at night time purposely sought to better accomplish their ends, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter house No. 179 Simon street, in said City, inhabited by Mr. and Mrs. Jose Rivera and by means of threat and intimidation to wit: by pointing a
.45 caliber pistol at the said Mr. and Mrs. Jose Rivera and that they will be shot if they will make a false move, and with intent of gain and without
the consent of the owner thereof, took, stole, and carried away cash money amounting to P28, one palm beach trousers, one knitted skipper color
green, one white polo shirt, two pairs of men's shoes, one white and other tan, one gold lady's ring with one diamond, two electric flat irons (GE)
and one eversharp fountain pen, all valued at P537.30, belongings to the said Mr. and Mrs. Jose Rivera, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the said amount of P537.30, the Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the above information, but he changed the plea to that of guilty after hearing the testimony of
the offended party, whereupon the lower court convicted him of robbery under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 7,
Republic Act No. 18, and taking into consideration his plea of guilty, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay indemnity and costs.

The appeal raises only a question of law, and we agree with both the Solicitor General and the attorney de oficio that the lower court erred in
convicting appellant under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in applying to him the penalty therein provided. Aside from the
fact that the information to which appellant pleaded guilty does not allege that the robbery was committed under any of the circumstances
enumerated in said article, such as entering the house through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, the breaking of doors, etc., it is now
settled that were robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling
qualification", so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because
where violence and intimidation against the person is present there is a greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the
individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil.,; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 89.) And this is view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to
be applied under article 294 is lighter than which would result from the application of article 299. (See last case cited.) In accordance with this view,
appellant should have been declared guilty of robbery under paragraph 5 of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No
18, since the charge to which he pleaded guilty alleges robbery through intimidation of persons. His criminal liability is aggravating by the
circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling and not mitigated by his plea of guilty, which was not entered until after the offended party had already
testified. (Art. 13, No. 7, Rev. Penal Code; People vs. Chang, 60 Phil., 293; People vs. De la Cruz, 63 Phil., 874; People vs. Hernandez, 64 Phil., 403;
People vs. Bawasanta, 64 Phil., 409.)

The penalty prescribed for the offense committed is prision correctional in its maximum period to prision mayor in it s medium period, which,
because of the presence two aggravating circumstances, should be applied in its maximum degree, or from 8 years and 21 days to 10 years of
prision mayor. Applying should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, and not less than 8 years and 21 days nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from in so far as appellant is concerned, he is hereby declared guilty of robbery under paragraph 5 of
article 294 of the Revised penal Code, as amended, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correctional as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, jointly and severally with his co-accused to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P39.50; and to pay proportionate costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p

Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band and sentences Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer
imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6) years, prision correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the offended
party, Ignacio Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of the principal
penalty and the accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio
Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and all three to pay the proportionate part of the costs.

The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a
store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the
presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber
revolver, went down the store to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having been forcibly pushed and
opened by 4 men, one of them holding and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon
receiving from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men. The fact,
however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor
for money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag
containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the
wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered
them with blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and
Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary.

Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner Ignacio Peñaflor
with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the robbers bore a hole on the
sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they removed the adobe
stone and that is the place where they passed through" (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning, policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing
suspicious characters passing through a nearby field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5
bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of Police)...

It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa,
Bataan. Named as defendants in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila,
alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis,
Malana, Anila and Casimiro having waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as defendants
therein, of Antonio Bededia alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and
Paul Doe, it is alleged in said information: .

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose
Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko
and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the intent to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45
pistols and two (2) revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR and
CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack, assault and hit Ignacio
Peñaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then
leave him; that the same accused approached Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point and demanded money; that the same accused
while inside the said house searched and ransacked the place and take and carry away the following cash money and articles belonging to said
spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira L. Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at P350.00, One (1)
licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the damage and prejudice of said spouses in the
total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".

At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and

Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the offended parties, Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman
Peñaflor , Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police of
Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre and Malana,
respectively, admitting their participation in the commission of the crime charged.

Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under which the
affidavit Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramento dwelt on the investigations
conducted by them and the circumstances under which said defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and
Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre and
Malana, respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he was in
his house in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.

Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the crime
charged and said that, although reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the advice of his wife Engracia Mendoza — who
sought to corroborate him — and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery that took place in
Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.

Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la
Cruz.

In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed to
the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and
Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred — .

I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime charged based upon a lurking error of identity.

II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-judicial confession extracted through duress.

III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the evidence on record adduced during the trial.

IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been sufficiently identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime
charged. In support of this contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peñaflor was due to a picture of appellant taken by Lt.
Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then brought
to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor identified him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture
she had seen before he was taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not have recognized appellant herein, in the
evening of the occurrence, because the same was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused downward.

Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that the authorities were notified immediately after the occurrence;
that, soon after, peace officers — Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento — repaired to the house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor and investigated
them; that based upon the description given by Mrs. Peñaflor , one individual was apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peñaflor , who said
that he was not one of the thieves; that another person subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly, exonerated by her; that in
the course of the investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor to the offices of the police
force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of police characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she noticed that of appellant herein,
who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore, arrested and brought to Mrs. Peñaflor , who positively identified him
as one of the malefactors.

In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peñaflor , through the aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the thieves.
It was she who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the fact that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the first
two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she were not reasonably certain
about it.

Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it was he who demanded money from her and to whom she
delivered P2,000 in cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands
and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in her presence, consumed sufficient time — from 10 to 20 minutes — to allow her
eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two flashlights
switched on, namely, that of her husband, and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focused downward, it had to be
aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he opened and
ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by other circumstances presently to be mentioned, in connection
with the consideration of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.

The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise — that appellant's conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession and that
the same had been made under duress.

Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in concluding that
the evidence for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth. Besides, appellant's confession
was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals had the following to say: .

Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's identification, we have the extra-judicial confession of appellant Nicanor Napolis,
marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said accused on October 26, 1956, 25 days after the occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal Eleno L.
Kahayon, the 64-year old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His testimony shows that he
read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he understood it to which appellant Napolis answered "yes";
inquired whether he was coerced to which he replied "No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his (Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further testified that he saw no
signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant who appeared normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A, appellant
Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio Bededia (still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio Peñaflor and who hit him
(Peñaflor ) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested Peñaflor 's revolver. For his part,
appellant Napolis admitted that it was he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he who got the money bag. The loot, according to him,
was split from which he received a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned appellant Bonifacio Malana as the
owner of the greasegun and the one who got Peñaflor 's revolver from the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz. ... .

It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are final,
except — .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2

and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.

The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of
credence. Counsel for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peñaflor said that the thieves had entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs.
Peñaflor testified that their entry was effected through an excavation by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that the malefactors
had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs.
Peñaflor consisted of two (2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a door leading
thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a wall thereof,
and this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of wood from said wall. Upon
the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the dwelling proper, as distinguished from the store.

In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the trial
Judge, who had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the first three (3) assignments of error are untenable.

The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed
persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and,
accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in accordance with said legal
provision.

In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife,
thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299, although,
factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had previously ruled — .

... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification,"
so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by
violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or
intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38
Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under article 294 is
lighter than that which would result from the application of article 299. ... . 3

Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly
weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art.
299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decision,5 if, aside from performing
said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1)
to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be much lighter.6 To our mind, this result and the
process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to
justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary
robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above
cited — reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is,
to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without
entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the
case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime. In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos7 and applied in U.S. v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan
v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temp oral.

Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against herein appellant,
Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., took part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32202-04 July 25, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ONTING BIRUAR, EUGENE RUSLIN, ABRAHAM LIM alias Titing Lim, ANGEL DY alias Baba Isa, CEFERINO CATURAN alias Fred, EDGARDO SEÑERES
alias Broke, ROMUALDO RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO, defendants, ABRAHAM LIM alias Titing Lim, CEFERINO CATURAN alias
Fred, ROMUALDO RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO, defendants-appellants.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

REVIEW of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding the accused Abraham Lim, alias Titing Lim, Angel Dy, alias Baba Isa, Ceferino
Caturan, alias Fred, Edgardo Señeres alias Broke, Romualdo Raboy, alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band,
Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries, and sentencing each of them, in (1) Crim. Case No. 9987, for Robbery in Band, to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, Gorgonio Mosende in the
amount of P720.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; (2) Crim. Case No. 9988, for Arson, to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George Kalitas the
amount of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; (3) Crim. Case No. 9989, for Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries, to suffer the death penalty, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George Kalitas in the
amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The inculpatory facts are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2, 1966, while Gorgonio Mosende and his wife, Fausta, were
preparing to go to sleep in their house in Sitio Suapit, Barrio Limot, Mati, Davao, several persons arrived and called: "Good evening, tiyo. " Thinking
that they were relatives of his wife, Mosende invited the callers to come up. Two men, armed with .45 cal. pistols, later ientified as the accused
Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Señeres came up and demanded: "hain na ang iyong armas "where is your firearm? Mosende denied having a
firearm, but his wife was so frightened that she told the armed menn: "Do not kill my husband, if you want the arm, the shotgun is here," and
raised the mosquito net covering their sleeping mat and pointed to the shotgun. The accused Edgardo Señeres took the gun and asked the couple
for money. Fausta, in fear, opened their aparador which the accused Edgardo Señeres then ransacked, taking therefrom P170.00 in coins and paper
bills. The two accused then left, taking with them the shotgun of Mosende valued at P550.00. Not long thereafter, Mosende heard gunshots
coming from the direction of the house of George Kalitas, about 25 meters away. Mosende and his wife went down their house and sought cover
behind a coconut tree. A few minutes later, Mosende saw a blaze start from the house of George Kalitas which spread rapidly until the entire house
was engulfed in flames and completely burned down. 1

All the inmates of the house of George Kalitas were fast asleep when the firing started and were awakened by the gunfire. George Kalitas, a 70-year
old paraplegic, was sleeping inside their bedroom with his wife, Sylvia Mingming, his grandchildren Jessie Renopal and "Bebot", and their maid's
son, Fortunato "Ato" Malapong. 2 Narciso Bauyot, a nephew of George Kalitas, slept in the dining room, while the maid Babbadon Odal slept in the
kitchen. 3

Upon hearing the fusillade, Babbadon Odal rushed to the master's bedroom to get her son, "Ato." But, as she was about to raise the mosquito net
covering her son, she was hit by a bullet on the left wrist and immediately lost consciousness, regaining the same only at the Mati Baptist Hospital,
where she was brought for treatment of her injury. 4

Jessie Renopal, the 11-year old granddaughter of George Kalitas, was also grazed by a bullet in the head when she stood up upon hearing the
volley. 5 She felt pain, but she did not lose consciousness, thus enabling her to see five robbers enter the house while two others remained by the
door. 6

Narciso Bauyot who was sleeping in the dining room, ran to the kitchen upon hearing the gunfire and hid in an aparador. But, when the toilet of the
main house of George Kalitas was set on fire, he left his hiding place and went out of the house, passing through a small window in the kitchen. He
landed safely on the ground only to fall into the hands of the accused Romualdo Raboy who pointed a gun at his abdomen telling him: "you
surrender, if you will not surrender, I will kill you." The accused Edgardo Señeres also told Narciso to surrender and raise his hands, which Narciso
did. Señeres then continued firing at the house of George Kalitas. Another armed man, later Identified as the accused Saturnino Galliano, also
approached Narciso and threatened to pour a can of kerosene on him. But, Narciso pleaded: "Don't pour it on me because I might be burned," and
was spared. The accused Saturnino Galliano, instead, poured the can of kerosene on the walls of the kitchen of the house and ignited it with some
dried fronds. 7

The robbers then started to break open the main door of the house with an axe. 8 After the robbers had broken the door and gained access to the
sala, George Kalitas fired at them with his "Stevens" 12-gauge shotgun, 9 hitting one of them. 10 George Kalitas had crawled with his wife and
grandchildren after Jessie Renopal and Babbadon Odal were hit by bullets. 11 The armed men fired back, hitting George Kalitas, who dropped his
shotgun. His grandson, Bebot, picked up the shotgun, but, when the robbers shouted: "surrender, surrender, throw that gun to us; throw the gun
below, by the stairs," he panicked and threw the shotgun to them. 12

Immediately, thereafter, four (4) armed men, later Identified as the accused Angel Dy, Romualdo Raboy, Saturnino Galliano, and Abraham Lim
rushed them. Angel Dy held Mrs. Kalitas by the neck and kicked the wounded George Kalitas, while the others went inside the bedroom of George
Kalitas and forcibly opened a trunk placed under the bed which contained the amount of P40,000.00, in cash, at the last counting two months
before the incident. They also took some old coins which Mrs. Kalitas had kept in a container inside the trunk. Saturnino Galliano and Angel Dy also
got the money of Jessie Renopal. 13

After getting the money, the robbers left.14 The inmates of the house also went out because of the fire and brought the wounded to the hospital.
But, George Kalitas died before they could reach the hospital in Mati. 15

Meanwhile, the fire continued to spread until the main house of George Kalitas and his bodega, including their contents, and a truck parked in
between the buildings, all valued at P34,545.00. were completely destroyed. 16

The crime was reported to the police authorities immediately thereafter and Sgt. Jose Biones of the 433rd PC Company stationed at Mati, Davao,
conducted an investigation. He learned that a light green Buick Electra 225 Sedan, 1964 model, with Plate No. H-6357-Manila-'65, had refueled at a
Caltex gasoline station in the poblacion of Mati and then proceeded towards Barrio Limot at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2, 1966, and
was seen again parked at some distance from the house of George Kalitas. PC Sgt. Blones also went to the still smouldering house of George Kalitas
and recovered twenty-nine (29) spent cartridges of various calibers and a mutilatedqqq slug, which he turned over to the PC Company investigator.
An alarm was, likewise, flashed to intercept the Buick car and apprehend its occupants. 17

At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1966, Pat. Bonifacio Daño of the Davao City Police Department, received a telephone call from the
Sasa Police Precinct that the wanted car was spotted going towards Davao City. Pat. Daño and two (2) companions boarded a jeep to intercept the
car, and at Bajada, near the EMCOR, they saw the car stop and a man with a sack alighted therefrom. They gave chase, but the car sped away. They
then tried to run after the man with the sack, but the man threw the sack away and disappeared in the tall cogon grasses. They recovered the
abandoned sack and found it to contain a pistolized carbine, a .45 cal. pistol, with several rounds of ammunition, a barong tagalog, four (4)
flashlights, and a pair of gloves. The next day, July 4, 1966, a police team saw the wanted car parked in the corner of Monteverde and Guerrero
Streets, in front of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, in Davao City. They found the accused Angel Dy inside the car who, when asked who the owner
of the car was, pointed to Onting Biruar at the Kingston Hotel. The policemen went to the hotel and found Onting Biruar together with Romualdo
Raboy and Edgardo Señeres whom they brought to the police headquarters for investigation. Upon questioning, Angel Dy informed the police
investigators that the car was driven by Abraham Lim on the night of July 2, 1966, and led a police posse to Barrios Obrero and Piapi, both in Davao
City, in an effort to catch the said Abraham Lim. But, they failed to find him. Instead, they found the accused Ceferino Caturan in Barrio Piapi, who
was nursing a bullet wound on his left upper leg. From Piapi, Angel Dy brought the police team to a house in Toril, Davao City, where they finally
found Abraham Lim in the company of Eugene Ruslin. The policemen found a .45 cal. pistol, with seven rounds of ammunition under the pillow
used by Abraham Lim. 18

Later, the police team arrested the accused Saturnino Galliano who was implicated in the crime. 19

The Buick sedan was turned over to the PC detachment and PC Sgt. Diomedes Cagas, upon inspection of the said car, recovered a .45 cal. pistol,
with seven rounds of ammunition, hidden under the floor mat, near the gas pedal of the said car. 20

As a consequence, Onting Biruar, Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Angel Dy alias Fred, Edgardo Señeres alias Broke, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy,
Eugene Ruslin, and Saturnino Galliano were charged with Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries before the
Court of First Instance of Davao, in three (3) separate informations docketed therein as Crim. Case Nos. 9987, 9988, and 9989, respectively.

All the accused denied the commission of the crimes charged and, except for the accused Abraham Lim, interposed the defense of alibi. The trial
court summarized the evidence of the defendants, which they claim to be substantially correct, as follows:

1. TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED ONTING BIRUAR

Defendant Onting Biruar testified that on June 28, 1966 he came to Davao City to renew the coastwise license of motor boat; that he rode on his
Buick (Electra) car; that he registered in a room at Kingston Hotel, Davao City and did not go out until the following day; that on June 29, and 30,
1966, he went to the Customs office to renew his license, but he failed to obtain his purpose; that on July 1, 1966 Abraham Lim came to his hotel to
borrow his car for the purpose of bringing his wife to a hospital to deliver; that he consented and gave his car; that as the car was not returned he
became apprehensive and he began looking for it; that on the same day, he met Romualdo Raboy y alias Romy and Edgardo Señeres alias Broke
and one Sammy, driver of the Provincial Governor of Cotabato and asked them to help him find his car to which they acceded; that from that day
they began the search and continued until the next day but in vain; that on July 3, he (Onting Biruar) was apprehended by the D.C.P.D. Commando
Unit in his hotel on a charge that his car was used in the commission of the crimes charged herein at Limot, Mati. Later, he corrected a mistake that
it was on July 4 when he was arrested and not July 3. It was explained to him that his involvement with other accused lies solely in his being the
owner of the car subject of the present inquiry; that he admitted that he was taken at the P.C. barracks where he was investigated by Sgt.
Abalayan.

2. TESTIMONY OF BERNARDINO SAMSON:

Bernardino Samson, driver of the Provincial Governor of Cotabato corroborated the statement of Onting Biruar referring to his having joined the
party to search for Onting's car.

3. TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM LIM:

Accused Abraham Lim testified that he came from Cotabato City and arrived at Davao City in the afternoon of June 29, 1966 in response to a
telegram that he received from accused, Angel Dy alias Baba Isa; that he took a Minrapo bus and he met his wife in the house of his uncle, Candido
Ramos at Piapi, Davao City; that he brought her to San Pedro Hospital on the following day (June 30) where she delivered; that on July 1st morning
at about 7:00 he was able to borrow the car of defendant, Onting Biruar after assuring the latter that he would use it only for service of his wife
who delivered in the hospital; that from that time the car was under his exclusive control until July 2, 1966. On July 4, 1966 he was arrested by the
Davao City Commando Unit at Toril, Davao City together with Eugene Ruslin, one of the accused herein.

Abraham Lim admitted that he used the said car in going to Limot, Mati, Davao Oriental without the knowledge and permission of the owner; that
on July 2, 1966, he left Davao City in company with Ceferino Caturan, Cesar Go and another unidentified man and arrived at Mati at about ten
o'clock at night; that he proceeded to the house of George Kalitas with his men, but as no one was familiar with the road and the place, he needed
a guide; that he passed at the house of Saturnino Galliano which was about 5 kilometers from the house of Kalitas and invited him to be his guide;
that the latter accepted although that was the first time that Lim met him in Betty's store; that the purpose of accused Abraham Lim in going to
Kalitas house is to collect accounts, an alleged indebtedness of George Kalitas in the amount of P15,000.00 which was advanced by him for the
purchase of coprax; that on demand, Kalitas refused to pay; that Lim pressed him more and asked him to pay in kind particularly pointing to the
coprax store in Kalitas bodega; that this must have irked Kalitas and he commanded his nephew, Narciso Bauyot to get his carbine from his bed, but
he was calmed down and promised to pay him on the first week of July; that as he insisted on his demand, Kalitas drew his pistol which was timely
grabbed by him and at the same time he drew his own 22 caliber magnum pistol and pointed at the back of Kalitas head and dragged him towards
the main door; that upon reaching the stairs they were fired upon by some people whom Lim suspected to be the neighbors of Kalitas; that the old
man was hit in the upper part of his body and he (Lim) saw blood streaming down from his wound; that although wounded and under his (Lim)
control, Kalitas shouted at his men to surrender which was heeded; that Aguedo, Mosende and four other neighbors came and surrendered their
firearm to Lim which consists of one carbine and 5 pistols and were ientified by Lim.

Aguedo surrendered his 45 cal. pistol, Mosende his 45 cal. pistol; confiscated from George Kalitas, is a nickel plated pistol marked Exh. "B", one
carbine from Narciso Bauyot and another 45 caliber pistol (Exh. "C") from Mosende, one barong-tagalog, Exh. "BB" which is his own (Lim) dress;
that after the surrender of these firearm they went back to Davao City; that he saw Saturnino Galliano grab the carbine from Narciso Bauyot which
he fired at the latter in order to scare the men of Kalitas, but his intention was only to shoot Narciso's shirt; that Galliano was with him and Kalitas
when they were seeking shelter in the pile of lumber near the kitchen of Kalitas' house while there was shooting directed at them,

Accused Lim also admitted that he was investigated by the Davao City Police Commando and subsequently by the P.C. (Exhs. "O", "O-1" to "O-4");
that he signed both affidavits taken by these investigators only under compulsion of force and duress; that he was kicked by his probers on his
knees and pellets were inserted between his fingers and pressed so strong that it caused him pain, in order to make him confess.

Lim also admitted that he was convicted by final judgment rendered by the City Court of Davao City for illegal possession of firearm filed against
him in Crim. Case No. 2490-C; that he was arrested at Toril, Davao City on July 4, 1966; that he explained that his appearance there was due to his
purpose to see his friend, Joselito Ambrosio from whom he would borrow money to defray the hospital expenses of his wife, but he failed; that
before the incident in question, he (Lim) was engaged in the business of buying and selling coprax corn, rice and other agricultural products
covering the coastal towns of Cotabato and the eastern old province of Davao; that he did not have license in his name, but he borrowed the
license of his cousin, Felipe Uy; that pursuance to the operation of his business he came to know the deceased, George Kalitas since 1965; that they
have a deal-Kalitas would be his agent to buy coprax and grains in his neighborhood; that on August 1965 he happened to meet Kalitas in a bus
while on his way to Mati, that being an old man he could trust him; that he advanced to him P15,000.00 as capital for their business; that this
money was given to Kalitas in his house at Limot in the presence of Saturnino Galliano and Kalitas' family; that Kalitas signed a receipt for said
amount but he lost it during that scuffle incident in Kalitas' house including a notebook containing an entry of their business transaction; that
Kalitas delivered to him a truckload of coprax worth P5,000.00; that he does not know how much additional cash advances he gave Kalitas; that he
was investigated by the municipal judge of Mati on July 12, 1966; that during the investigation he did not tell the truth that he was kicked and
maltreated by the Davao City Police and by the P.C. agents for fear of revenge.

4. TESTIMONY OF ANGEL DY:

Accused Angel Dy testified that he left Dadiangas, Cotabato on June 29, 1966 at about 7:00 AM together with the wife of accused Abraham Lim and
a maid; that upon arrival in Davao City in the afternoon they proceeded to Piapi in the house of an uncle of Abraham Lim; that he met the latter in
the CBC terminal on June 30, 1966 at about five o'clock in the afternoon; that on July 1, 1966 they went out to see accused Onting Biruar, to
borrow his car for the purpose of bringing Lim's wife to the hospital; that Lim's wife was brought to the hospital only on July 2 in the afternoon on
Onting's car escorted by him and Abraham Lim and a housemaid and Caturan (t.s.n., 674-675 Barlaan); that on July 1 they spotted the car of Onting
parked in a gasoline station; that accused Abraham Lim borrowed it and had full control thereof from that day; that from that time he was taking
care of the car, that while he was watching it in the premises of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor the Davao City Police Commando came and seized
the car, telling him (Dy) it was used in committing the crime of robbery and homicide in Mati, that he told them he did not go to Mati, however, he
was brought to Agdao where he was maltreated, then he was transferred in the office of the Police Detective Division boxed and manhandled by
the police; that on July 4, 1966 he guided the police to locate the accused, Abraham Lim at Toril, Davao City; that Abraham was found there and
was arrested together with Eugene Ruslin; that they were brought to the P.C. barracks and were jailed there; that he did not sign any state
judgment; that he admitted he is also known as Baba Isa and he is the uncle of Abraham Lim; that he rode in Onting's car together with Abraham
and hi4 wife on July 1, 1966 in going to Talomo and back to Piapi.

On cross examination this witness (Dy) incurred in self-contradiction. He declared that he went to meet accused Abraham Lim in the CBC terminal
after lunch on June 29, 1966 and testifying further he said that he arrived in Davao City from Cotabato at about 4:00 same day; that on July 1 at
8:00 A.M. Lim brought his wife to a clinic at San Pedro Street riding in Onting's car; that he slept in the hospital until July 4, 1966; that on that day
from the hospital he brought the car to the premises of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor where it was taken by the police.

5. TESTIMONY OF ROMUALDO RABOY:

Accused Raboy alias Romy testified that on June 22, 1966 he came for the first time from Cotabato City to take vacation in Davao City; that he was
accompanied by his cousin, Nelly Agravante; that he lodged in her house at Talomo, Davao City, from June 22 to July 2, 1966; that he stayed in said
house without going to any other place outside Davao City; that on July 2, 1966 he took permission from his cousin to go to CBC terminal to make
arrangement for him to take the last trip to Cotabato; that on his way at Acacia at about 7:30 A.M. he saw accused, Onting Biruar in Kingston Hotel,
Onting whistled and called him and asked him to help him find his car to which he agreed; that he desisted from continuing his plan to go to
Cotabato; that they searched the car during the whole day of July 2, but in vain; that he slept with Onting Biruar in Kingston Hotel; that on the
following day (July 3) they failed again to see the car; that on July 4, 1966 they were arrested in Kingston Hotel by the D.C.P.D. Commando, he,
Onting Biruar and Edgardo Señeres that he was brought to the office of the Police Detective Division; that he denied that he was in the house of the
latter George Kalitas on July 2 and 3, 1966; that he does not know, nor met Silvia Kalitas; neither Narciso Bauyot, nor Gorgonio Mosende.

On cross examination he declared that his nickname is Romy, that he did not know Abraham Lim, Ceferino Caturan, Angel Dy and Eugene Ruslin;
that he first met accused Onting Biruar for the first time at P.C. barracks at Davao City before he was brought to Mati by the P.C. that he did not
register his name in Kingston Hotel; that he was arrested in said hotel together with Onting Biruar and Edgar do Señeres that from the Detective
Division he was transferred to the PC barracks; that he was not investigated there; that the car finally arrived at 5:30 on July 3 according to what
Onting Biruar informed him.

6. TESTIMONY OF NELLY AGRAVANTE:

Nelly Agravante, cousin of accused Romualdo Raboy has corqqq roboratedqqq the statement of the latter covering that portion, from the time he
arrived in Davao City on June 22, 1966 until he took permission from her to go back to Cotabato on July 2, 1966.

7. TESTIMONY OF SATURNINO GALLIANO:

Saturnino Galliano testified that he is 37 years old; that he is a resident of Waywayan, Mati, Davao Oriental; that since 1960 he cultivated a farm
about four hectares with two cousins; that he was arrested on July 5, 1966, in the same place by the Mati Police; that he does not know the
defendants Onting Biruar, Edgardo Señeres, Romualdo Raboy, Ceferino Caturan, Eugene Ruslin and Abraham Lim; that he met them only on July
12, 1966 at Mati when they were investigated; that he denied having robbed, the houses of Gorgonio Mosende and the late George Kalitas on July
2 late at night and in early morning of July 3, 1966; that he denied having poured petroleum and set on fire the house of the latter; that he just met
for the first time Silvia Kalitas, Narciso Bauyot, Mosende and others on July 12, 1966 in the Municipal Court of Mati; that it is not true that he
participated in the commission of robbery, killing and arson as charged in the information; that he resembled the accused Ceferino Caturan.

8. TESTIMON OF CEFERINO CATURAN:

Ceferino Caturan declared that on the second week of June he was brought to Davao City by his employer, co-accused Abraham Lim to assist the
latter's wife to deliver in the hospital- that they came in Davao City in a PU car together with the wife of Abraham Lim, a maid and himself; that
upon arrival they proceeded to the house of his uncle at Piapi, Davao City; that for about six months he was employed as a checker of Lim in his
motor launch; that before the incident in question his master, Abraham Lim was engaged in the business of buying and selling coprax corn and rice;
that Lim returned to Cotabato and came back on June 29, 1966 and rejoined his wife at Piapi; that on June 30, he brought Lim's wife to the
hospital: that they rode on a hired taxi because he was not able to borrow Onting Biruar's car; that Lim's wife delivered on June 30, 1966 at night;
that on the following morning he, Abraham Lim and Angel Dy took their breakfast in a restaurant; that on the afternoon of July 2, 1966 at about
one o'clock he was brought by Abraham Lim to Mati; that they have started from a restaurant with three (3) companions; that along the way they
picked up six other persons at Bajada; that he cannot see any of them in the Courtroom; that at the start he did not know the purpose of Lim in
going to Mati, now he knows that it is to rob a certain house in Mati; that upon reaching Mati they refueled in a gasoline station and went to eat in
a restaurant; that they met one Angelo Montero there who invited Lim to go inside; that after eating they left with Montero guiding them until
they reached a certain place where the car could no longer proceed due to bad road; that he received instruction to guard the car; that all the
riders left and went towards certain direction, that after some time he heard successive shots coming from some distance; that at about two
o'clock the following morning (July 3) two of his companions returned; that one of them is wounded; that one of them shot him hitting his thigh;
that half-hour later the bigger group with Abraham Lim arrived; that they started for Mati and from there they proceeded to Davao City passing at
Kingking bridge where two or five of their companions got off the car; that they arrived at Davao City on July 3, 1966 at about 3:00 p.m.; that on
July 4, 1966 he was apprehended by the Commando Police and brought to the P.C. barracks, Davao City where his affidavit (Exh. 'HH') was taken by
Sgt. Almazar; that he did not sign it after it was typewritten but only on the following day after his wound was operated in the Davao General
Hospital; that while he was confined in said hospital, Fiscal Angel Matondo arrived, but before he came he has already signed it; that he was weak
and not feeling well when he signed his affidavit before it was explained to him.

On cross examination he declared that one of those 6 men who joined them in the car brought a sack wrapped in Manila paper; that Abraham Lim
is the one who drove the car going to Mati; that he did not talk with him during the trip in going to and on return.

This witness (Caturan) was confronted with his answer to question 17 of his affidavit (Exh. "HH")wherein he stated that he saw six of his
companions being armed with pistol of different calibers and one carrying carbine and Abraham Lim carried his own 45 caliber pistol. Caturan
explained that it is true that he saw his companions carry firearms, but it was during that time when they returned to the car from the place where
they went. (t.s.n., p. 735, Barlaan)

This statement refers to that incident when the car stopped to a certain place when it could no longer proceed due to bad road, where all the
riders except Caturan went off the car and came back later after 4 or 5 hours covering a period from July 2 at about 10:00 at night to 2 or 3 o'clock
early morning of July 3, 1966.

9. TESTIMONY OF EDGARDO SERERES:

Defendant Edgardo Señeres testified that he came from Cotabato City and arrived at Davao City on June 28, 1966 riding on a CBC bus; that he had
no companion; that his purpose in coming to Davao City is to deliver shrimps for sale in a place near the public market at Bankerohan; that upon
arriving he proceeded to his aunt's house at Washington Street and stayed there continuously for 5 or 6 days; that he knew accused Onting Biruar,
but not Romualdo Raboy, Eugene Ruslin, Ceferino Caturan; Angel Dy and Saturnino Galliano; that on his way to CBC station on July 2, 1966, Onting
Biruar saw him passing his hotel and called him; that he asked him to help in looking for his car which was borrowed by someone and was not
returned; that he agreed; that they have started the search but they could not find it on that day; that from that time he lodged in Kingston Hotel
with Onting and Romualdo Raboy; that on July 4, 1966 in the morning he was apprehended by the Davao City Police together with Onting Biruar
and Romualdo Raboy; that he did not know the cause of his arrest; that they were brought to Agdao, then transferred to the office of the detective
division and finally to the P.C. barracks; that he was investigated there; that he was maltreated by the P.C. soldiers at the time he signed his
affidavit; that he just met Ceferino Caturan; Angel Dy and Abraham Lim there; that he met Galliano at Mati; that he was detained together with
others at the P.C. barracks at Mati on July 6, 7 and 8, 1966; that he did not go to Limot, Mati on July 2 or July 3, 1966; that he always was in Davao
City during those days; that he denied statements of Narciso Bauyot; that he was seen in the house of Kalitas on the night of July 2, 1966, that he
denied the statement of Mosende that he was one of the two men who robbed his house on the same day; that the first occasion he met
Romualdo Raboy was in P.C. barracks, so also Ceferino Caturan, Angel Dy and Eugene Ruslin; that he is known as Broke; that he knows Onting
Biruar for he used to deliver crabs to him; that he does not know Fiscal Matondo; that his affidavit taken by the P.C. (Exh. 'N') has been extracted by
force and duress.

The trial court, however, rejected the denials and excuses of the defendants and found that an of them, except Onting Biruar, the owner of the
Buick car used in the commission of the crimes, and Eugene Ruslin, who was found sleeping with Abraham Lim in Toril, Davao City, when the said
Lim was arrested by a police team, did, in fact, actively participate in the commission of the crimes complained of, and that their claims that they
were elsewhere when the crimes were committed are unavailing against their positive Identification by the witnesses for the prosecution who
testified in a natural and straightforward manner and had no motive or reason to pervert or suppress the truth or testify falsely against them.

We have examined the record of the cases with great care and found no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that the accused
were the perpetrators of the offenses charged. The claim of Abraham Lim that he went to the house of George Kalitas to collect what the latter
allegedly owned him is improbable and not worthy of belief. The following observations of the trial judge is more logical and consistent with human
conduct:

(3) Referring to improbabilities and inconsistencies of the defendants' statements, Abraham Lim declared that his purpose in going to the late
Kalitas' house that night in question was to collect accounts from the deceased. if this is true, why did he bring along no less than four armed men
with him and made demand at about midnight in the dwelling of Kalitas? He admitted in cross examination that by chance he met Kalitas in a bus
while he was on his way for Mati in 1965; that being an old man he could trust Kalitas and he advanced to him P15,600.00 as capital for their
business.

If he could trust the late Kalitas with such big amount, why did he make that demand in the presence of armed men who made use of force and
terror to attain their aim?

Again he related that on demanding payment of the debts, Kalitas was irked and he drew his pistol and aimed at Abraham Lim but the latter in turn
grabbed it and drew his own 22 caliber magnum pistol and grazed it at the back of Kalitas head and then dragged him outside. In the ensuing
scuffle he lost the receipt of the said loan of P15,600.00 and also a notebook containing an entry of their transaction.
This is another brand of Lim's statements which is not only improbable and unnatural but is outright incredible. Kalitas was an old, sickly man who
was alone facing a menacing group of armed men who shot their way to his bedroom. Would he, in his senses dare to provoke them in that
manner?

At least two inmates of the house declared that he was already shot during the first burst of gunfire coming from outside the house and before the
defendants came up. This seem to be true because he was carried by two of them towards the main door and Lim admitted that they dragged him
outside. How could Kalitas drew his pistol when he was severely wounded and could not even talk.

Abraham Lim continued his story by stating that when Kalitas was brought outside, he was shot at the upper part of his body by others whom he
suspected to be Kalitas' neighbors and yet he was able to shout at his men calling them to surrender and in fact, Mosende, Aguedo and four others
surrendered to Abraham their respective firearms consisting of one carbine and five pistols which he Identified in the courtroom. If his story is true,
then no other logical conclusion can be drawn therefrom except that Abraham Lim and his men went to Kalitas' house on that night in question to
fight, plunder and subdue Kalitas and his neighbors and in fact, according to him, they succeeded in forcing them to surrender thru Kalitas not only
their persons but also their arms, but the Court would prefer to believe that a sham story of this nature is rather false, exaggerated and
unbelievable because if Kalitas was really shot at a vital part of his body he could not have talked and moved, how then could he shout? Granting
arguendo that Kalitas shouted at his men to surrender, the latter following the natural instinct of self-preservation would flee from the scene of the
crime and would not give up their arms and persons to such ruthless and dangerous foe under that horrible circumstances of firing, killing and
burning of a house. There is no evidence that they were cornered or trapped in such a tight situation that no other remedy could be availed of
except to surrender . . . If Lim's story is to be accepted the Court cannot find good reasons to justify him to capture Kalitas and his neighbors if his
purpose is only to collect debts.

Besides, the attack on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution is based upon trial matters. Thus, counsel for the accused claims that the
testimony of the prosecution witness Alfredo Matiga is not credible since the said witness even failed to recall, during his cross-examination, the
number of the house where he was living and his birthdate. It should be noted, however, that the said witness testified to only one detail, and that
is, the fact that he saw the Buick car of Onting Biruar refueling at a gasoline station in the poblacion of Mati on the night of July 2, 1966, which fact
is admitted by the accused Abraham Lim and Ceferino Caturan.

The testimony of Narciso Bauyot is also assailed on the ground that he signed his sworn statement before the Municipal Judge during the
preliminary investigation without reading its contents, or without having then read and explained to his. The conviction of the accused, however,
was not based upon the sworn statement of the witness, but, on the collective testimony of Narciso Bauyot and the other prosecution witnesses
who were subjected to a rigid cross-examination by the defense counsel during the trial of the case. Besides, counsel failed to point out how the
failure of this witness to understand the substance of his affidavit could have cast serious doubt on the guilt of the defendants,

The testimony of Gorgonio Mosende regarding the robbery in his house is also impugned as improbable because the said Mosende had testified
that the accused Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Señeres had announced their presence to Mosende before coming to the house, which they need
not have done in order to rob the couple. While it may be true that the accused had made known their presence to Mosende and that the latter
had invited them to come up his house, Mosende did so because he thought that the callers were relatives of his wife. It may have been unwise for
Mosende to do so, but that does not render his story improbable considering that the incident happened in the rural areas where the people are
generally more hospitable. Besides, Mosende is a poor man and he had no reason to expect that he would be robbed. At any rate, the accused
failed to impeach the testimony of the said Gorgonio Mosende.

Defense counsel also claims that no robbery was committed in the house of George Kalitas since there is no positive evidence presented to show
the existence of the money allegedly taken from George Kalitas as well as the act of taking the same. To support his contention that no money was
taken from George Kalitas, counsel quoted a portion of the testimony of Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of George Kalitas, which shows that the
trunk where the money was kept was burned without its being opened. Counsel further stated that the accused were apprehended within 48 hours
after the commission of the crime and yet the money stolen or a part thereof was not traced to, nor recovered from the accused, much less
presented in court.

The contention is devoid of merit. It had been positively established that the late George Kalitas had kept money in a trunk placed under his bed
which the accused took on the night in question. Martillana Kalitas categorically stated in court that her father, George Kalitas, had money,
amounting to P65,000.00, which he kept in a trunk placed under his bed, because he had no trust in banks. 21 Jessie Renopal testified that the
accused broke open the said trunk with an axe on the night of July 2, 1966 and took the money placed inside. 22 Her testimony is corroborated by
Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of George Kalitas. Silvia Mingming Kalitas declared, however, that the money kept by her husband amounted to
only P40,560.00 at the last counting. 23

The testimony of Silvia Mingming Kalitas which was quoted by counsel for the accused, does not support his contention that no money was taken
from George Kalitas on the night in question. The testimony, adverted to, reads, as follows:

COURT:

Q Now, the Court wants to know whether that trunk which you have mentioned from which they got the P40,560.00 cash was taken before or after
the house was set on fire. Which is which?

A The fire was beginning, when it was advancing, that the time when the robbers came up.

Q Was that trunk from which the money was taken burned?

A It was burned; nothing is left, including the clothes.

Q Before it was burned, was it already opened?

A Before it was burned, it was not yet opened. It was they themselves who opened it. 24

It is clear therefrom that the accused opened the trunk and took the money placed inside before it was burned.

The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion thereof, should have been presented in evidence in order to make the transportation
credible, is untenable. Where the property stolen was not recovered, it would be impossible to present it in evidence. Besides, there is no law nor
jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to prove that it had been taken away. It appears of record that there
were other persons who participated in the commission of the offenses, but have not been charged. Ceferino Caturan stated that there were 9 of
them inside the car when they went to the house of George, Kalitas on the night in question, and Abraham Lim testified that one of his companions
in going to the house of George Kalitas on the said night was one Cesar Go. 25 However, only 8 persons have been Identified and charged and
Cesar Go is not one of them. The money could be with him. Moreover, the accused were not apprehended immediately after the commission of
the crimes, but a day later, or on July 4, 1966. The accused could have disposed of the money before their arrest. The failure of the prosecution to
present in evidence the money stolen does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

It is also contended by the accused that only one offense was committed since the robbery in the houses of Gorgonio Mosende and George Kalitas
is one continuing offense, committed at the same time and on one occasion, and arising out of one criminal resolution, and the burning of the
house of George Kalitas was the means to commit the crime of robbery. Counsel cites the case of People vs. De Leon 26 in support of his
contention.

The contention is without merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he found two fighting cocks
belonging to different persons and took them. In this case, however, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in band in the house of
Gorgonio Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule enunciated in the cited case cannot be made applicable since the herein accused performed different acts with
distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes. The Court also rejected the applicability of the cited case of People vs. De Leon
in the case of People vs. Enguerro, 27 and found the accused therein guilty of three (3) separate crimes of Robbery in Band, where the said
accused, after committing a robbery in band in a store, went to another house where they committed a second robbery, and after committing it
proceeded to another house where they committed a third robbery, and in the same barrio during the period from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of the
same day.

The burning of the house of George Kalitas was not the means in committing the robbery. The evidence shows that the accused gained entry into
the house of George Kalitas by breaking down the door with an axe and not by burning the same. 28

Finally, the accused Abraham Lim pleads that he had been denied the right to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of
the proceedings against him, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. He claims that the trial court proceeded with the
trial of the cases despite his absence therefrom although he was charged with a capital offense.

The contention is devoid of merit. The provisions of the Rules of Court 29 Securing to an accused person the right to be present in all criminal
prosecutions against him must be understood as securing to him merely the right to be present during every stage of his own trial and not at the
trial of another. Since the accused Abraham Lim was present during his arraignment and jumped bail after giving his testimony in court and was
absent only when his co-accused were presenting their evidence, none of which are prejudicial to the interest of the accused Abraham Lim his
attorney was present during this time, and also present when the sentence was read to him, there was no infringement of the said defendant's
right to be present at every stage of the proceedings against him.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias
Romy, and Saturnino Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries.

The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of
motor vehicle, use of unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The use of unlicensed firearm, however,
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989 (Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries)
since the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely applicable to robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal
Code. 30

This, notwithstanding, the death penalty imposed upon the accused Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy
alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano in Crim. Case No. 9989, for Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries, is within the range of the penalty
provided for by law. However, for lack of the necessary affirmatory votes, the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court is hereby reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

We also find that the trial court had inadvertently ordered the defendants to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George
Kalitas the amount of P20,000.00 for the money stolen from him and not recovered in Crime Case No. 9988, and the amount of P12,000.00 for the
death of the said deceased in Crim. Case No. 9989. Crim. Case No. 9988, however, is a prosecution for Arson, for the illegal burning of the property
of George Kalitas valued at P34,545.00, while Crim. Case No. 9989 is one for Robbery with Homicide and Physical injuries where the evidenced
showed that the amount of P40,000.00 was taken from the house of George Kalitas. The Solicitor General recommends that the defendants be
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late George Kalitas the amount of P34,545.00 in Crim. Case No. 9988, and the amounts of P12,000.00, for the
death of the said deceased and P40,000.00, for the money stolen from him.

We further note that the penalty imposed upon the defendants in Crim. Case No. 9987 is less than what the law prescribes for the offense
committed. In said case, the defendants were found guilty of Robbery in Band, attended, among others, by the aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. However, Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
that if the robbery mentioned in pars. 3, 4 and 5 is committed by a band, the offenders shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper
penalties, and Article 296 of same Code, as amended, also states that when any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided for by law.
Hence, the penalty to be imposed upon the defendants should be the maximum of the maximum period of the penalty, even without the
concurrence of any other aggravating circumstance, 31 or an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing
Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnine Galliano are sentenced: (1) to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum in Crim. Case No. 9987; (2) to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case No. 9989; and (3) to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George Kalitas
the amount of P34,545.00 in Crim. Case No. 9988, and the amount of P40,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 9989, for the money stolen from the said
deceased. The indemnity for the death of George Kalitas is hereby increased to P30,000.00. 32 With costs against the accused Abraham Lain alias
Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano in this instance.

Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN
MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution.1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to
which he pleaded not guilty.2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide,
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped.3 The respondent judge, learning
later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest.4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances.5 The respondent judge
denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused.6 The order of the trial court is now before us on
certiorari and mandamus.7

The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he
should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment.

The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:

Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustified.

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times
completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avanceña 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial
which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these
stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities,
insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured.

The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply
escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly
notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.

The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because
he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has
escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his
escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under
the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even
in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.

The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will
Identify the accused.9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him
of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his
escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned.
His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the
respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong
should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of
the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction.

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors.
That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges,
we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its
enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.

The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the
withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty days.

WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The
respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it
is terminated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9369 December 24, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO ALBAO, Defendant-Appellant.

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the crime of robbery. On the 8th day of July, 1913, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu presented a
complaint in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Cebu. On the same day a warrant for the arrest of the defendant was
issued. On the same day the defendant was detained and was admitted to bail upon a bond in the sum of P5,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

On the 21st day of August, 1913, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said
province, charging the defendant with the crime of robbery. The complaint alleged:

That in or about the last part of the month of June, 1913, within the municipality of Cebu of this province and judicial district the said accused
Alejandro Albao did, willfully, maliciously, and criminally, and with intent of gain, through violence and intimidation upon the person of Vicente
Lizarraga of the municipality of Cebu, seize a quantity of opium worth P14,000 belonging to the said Vicente Lizarraga; in violation of law.

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested, and pleaded not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime of robbery, and was sentenced
to be imprisoned for a period of ten years of presidio mayor, and to pay the costs, in accordance with the provisions of article 502, in relation with
paragraph 5 of article 503 of the Penal Code. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of
error:

I. The court erred in holding that, on June 25, 1913, "Vicente Lizarraga was the unlawful possessor of 202 tins of opium, which then had a value of
about P14,000." chanrobles virtual law library

II. The court erred in holding that, on the same night of June 25, "Vicente Lizarraga took the 202 tins of opium to the house of Francisco Jurado in
accordance with the agreement" (with Ciriaco Singson and Anatalio Alviola).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. The court erred in holding that "Albao, on the night of the crime (the aforesaid 25th of June), did, through threats, intimidation, and violence
against the person of Vicente Lizarraga," seize the 202 tins of opium, and appropriate them to himself afterwards, instead of delivering the opium
to the authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IV. The court erred in rendering a judgment of conviction against Alejandro Albao, instead of acquitting of him.

With reference to the first assignment of error, the lower court found: "On and before June 25, 1913, Vicente Lizarraga was the unlawful possessor
of 202 tins of opium, which then had a value of about P14,000. Testifying as a witness, he stated that he found them by accident on the shore of
Mabolo, a suburb of the municipality of Cebu, which statement, it is needless to say, is a falsehood. Neither was he the owner of the said tins of
opium, but rather simply an agent for their sale in representation of the owners, whose names he abstained from revealing and they are not
indicated by other evidence." chanrobles virtual law library

From an examination of the record, we find that the following witnesses declared during the trial as follows, relating to the facts charged in the
complaint: chanrobles virtual law library

First. Vicente Lizarraga, who testified, in part, as follows:

Q. Where were you about the latter part of June of the present year? - A. On the night of the 25th I was in Calle Legaspi, in the house of a man
named Jurado. I went there with 202 tins of opium to sell them to Ciriaco Singson. After the tins had been counted and placed in a valise, Alejandro
Albao appeared, accompanied by three others. Alejandro Albao, pointing his revolver at me, told me not to move and commanded me to halt
before the police.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you know his companions? - A. No, sir; but if I saw the one who carried the palasan, I could identify him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Where are the tins of opium now? - A. I do not know, because Alejandro Albao and his companions took them away with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you see them take the tins away? - A. Yes, sir; for I went out of the house after they did; they went out first, for Alejandro Albao told me that
they were going to leave first with the tins.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Describe what happened. - A. Ciriaco Singson, Anatalio Alviola, and I were squatted on the floor and engaged in counting the tins and seeing
whether or not they were genuine, for Singson said that he knew them from the way they were soldered. We had already counted all the tins
which numbered 202. I separated from the rest four of them that were crushed. While I was replacing them in the same valise in which I had
brought them, we heard someone on the stair say in Visayan "Good evening," and Alejandro Albao entered and pointed his revolver at me. The
first thing he said was "Halt before the police. Let no one move." chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How many were they? - A. Four, with Alejandro Albao. Albao pointed his revolver at me. One of the men who entered had a cane. Albao then
asked me to whom those tins belonged. I answered that they were mine. Then he asked me whether they were genuine. I replied to him: "I think
that they are genuine." Just then while he was there talking, the owner of the house and another man whom I was unable to identify came
out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who was the owner of the house? - A. Francisco Jurado. Then Albao asked for a penknife to open a tin and Francisco Jurado fetched a pair of
scissors. They opened the tin and then Albao said that that was not very good opium, and they plugged up the hole with paper and Francisco
Jurado put the tin under a table. Then Ciriaco Singson said to the policeman that it would be better to arrange the matter amicably, and then I also
supported that proposal, saying that it would be better to arrange the matter amicably. After we had been talking a little while Ciriaco Singson
disappeared through a back door. When Albao inquired where Singson was, the owner of the house said that he had already left. Then Anatalio
Aviola and I made an agreement with the policemen that we would pay P6,000 to each of them, as a bribe, in order that they might release
us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Who is this man Anatalio? - A. I found him there with Ciriaco Singson. I did not know him until that moment. I told him that I had no money with
which to guarantee the P6,000, and Anatalio Alviola said to me that it did not matter, that he would get the tins and would pay the P6,000 to the
policemen. Then they came to an agreement, for he said there were two more men waiting below, that P1,000 should be paid to each one of the
policemen. Then Albao said to us that they were going to take away the tins, for I had said to him that I would take them with me, as, without those
tins, I would have no money with which to pay. They told me that I should not do so, for, if I did, I would be caught again immediately by other
policemen and I would not know where to take the tins. Then he told me to wait there a while, that they were going to go down. After a little while
Anatalio Alviola and I went down and did not find anybody in the street. I went with Anatalio Alviola and he showed me his store and from there I
went home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How long since it had been that you had had an understanding with Singson in regard to that opium deal? - A. On the 23d, in the morning, I
spoke to Alburo in regard to his finding a purchaser.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Which Alburo? - A. Isabelo Alburo. Then he took me with him at about 12 o'clock. He took me to the house of Graciano del Mar, on Calle
Martinez, and Graciano del Mar told me that he was going to call Ciriaco Singson in order that the latter might have an understanding with me. We
made an appointment to meet at Mr. Alburo's house at half past 12, after dinner. Then Isabelo Alburo and I went to his house for dinner.
Immediately after dinner Ciriaco Singson came, accompanied by Graciano del Mar, and asked me how many tins I had and whether he might take
as a sample one opened tin and one closed. I took my bicycle, came to Cebu, got two tins and showed them to him. He told me, for I had asked of
him P75 for each tin, that he was willing to pay P68. I refused this offer and said that my lowest price was P70. He then replied to me that he was
going to look for money; whereupon I left. On the following day Isabelo Alburo came to the store where I was employed and told me that they
were looking for money, that he could do nothing. On the morning of the 25th Alburo told me to go to the Plaza de la Independencia, at 6 o'clock,
the time of vespers, to confer with Ciriaco Singson, for they now had money. At about half past 6 o'clock I went to the Plaza de la Independencia
and met Isabelo Alburo, who told me that Ciriaco Singson had already been there and that if had been arranged that I should meet him at 8 o'clock
sharp in the Merchant Caf_,_ for the purpose of designating a place where the sale was to be made. At 8 o'clock sharp I was in the Merchant
Caf_,_, drinking a lemonade. Five minutes afterwards Ciriaco Singson entered and after he too had drunk a lemonade we left. We walked along
until we came in front of the government building where we took a vehicle and went to Calle Logarta and there paid for the vehicle. In Calle Zulueta
he showed me a warehouse and told me that the sale could be effected there, but that another house he was going to show me was safer. We
then went to Calle Zulueta and he pointed out his house to me; "That is my house; we also could make the sale there, but I very closely watched."
We even went to Calle Legaspi and there in Calle Legaspi he told me that that was a good place, that I could take the tins there. I told him to wait
for me there. I went home to get the tins and took them to him in the said house on Calle Legaspi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. What time was it when you arrived there with the tins? - A. A quarter to 9.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Does a batch of 202 tins of opium weigh much? - A. Yes, sir; they were so heavy that I had to be helped up the stairs between Anatalio Alviola
and Ciriaco Singson.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Since when was Anatalio Alviola concerned in this matter? - A. Right there in Calle Legaspi, in the house of Francisco Jurado. Upon my asking him
who he was, he told me that he was another one of the purchasers; that he could not pay for all the opium; that he brought Alviola so that the
latter might buy what he could not, and that Alviola carried money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. What price did you people agree should be paid for your opium? - A. P70 a tin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you really know now whether or not the opium is in the possession of the Government? - A. No, sir; it is not in the possession of the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Was it all opium? - A. Yes, sir; all of it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know whether or not Albao was a municipal policeman in Cebu? - A. Yes, sir; because afterwards upon my identifying him I had an
inquiry made at the municipal building and they told me that until the 28th.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How long have you known Ciriaco Singson?

The COURT. We are talking about whether or not he was a policeman. On the night of the crime, was he wearing a uniform like that worn by
policeman or agents of the authorities? - A. No, sir; but he carried a regulation revolver.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The COURT. Was he wearing a badge? - A. No, sir.

Q. Will you please explain to the court why you gave the opium to Albao; why you did not wish to keep the opium? - A. Because he said to me that
if I took the tins with me I would not know where to put them, that they would catch me again. Anatalio Alviola told me, besides, that on the
following day he would get them back by the payment of a bribe of P6,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did the accused have his revolver in a holster? - A. It was in the holster. After I had told him not to point it at me, he put it into the
holster.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did he point it at you? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. At whom else did he point it? - A. Only at me.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Was it at that moment that the opium was seized, or was it long afterwards? - A. At that moment when the four men entered and caught (sic.)
for we got away from the tins.

Cross-examination by Mr. Sotto:

Q. Then do I understand that you gave up the opium to the accused and to his companions under the promise made by Anatalio Alviola that you
would pay them P6,000 as a bribe - that is, P1,000 to each one? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. And did you agree to give the P6,000 when you should have them? - A. When they should return the opium to me.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Where was the delivery of P6,000 to be made? Did you folks make no agreement? - A. On the departure of the policeman, Albao told Anatalio
Alviola that on the following day he should go to that place. I do not know what place he meant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. Who told him? - A. Albao told Anatalio Alviola.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. What I want to know is: Did you folks have an agreement as to when the opium was to be delivered, when it was to be returned, and the
delivery of the money was to be made? - A. It was our understanding that Anatalio Alviola was to pay the policeman and keep the
opium.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. When? - A. Right there he and I agreed to that. As I had said to him: "I have not a single centavo with which to pay the policeman;" he replied to
me: "I have brought money with me. I will attend to paying the policemen and will return to you to-morrow what remains of the price of the
opium." chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Then he obligated himself to deliver the P6,000 to the policemen? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. So he promised you that he would pay the P6,000 to the policemen, as a bribe; that he would keep the opium; and that he would pay you the
remainder of the price of the opium after deducting the payment of the P6,000 to the policemen, did he not? - A. He said that he would, on
condition that he recovered the opium.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How many tins did you folks open for examination? - A. One.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who kept the tin that he opened? - A. The policeman Albao afterwards again asked the owner of the house for the tin which the latter carried in
his hand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know whether or not Anatalio Alviola gave the accused and his companions the P6,000 agreed upon? - A. The next day he told me that
he had not found the opium.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Answer my question. You are clever enough to know. Do you know whether or not Anatalio Alviola delivered to the accused and his five
companions the P6,000? - A. No, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know whether Anatalio Alviola delivered the P6,000 to the accused and his companions? - A. I do not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know whether the accused delivered the opium to Anatalio Alviola? - A. I know nothing of that, either.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Where did you get that opium? - A. I found that opium there in Mabolo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. When? - A. That same day, the 23d, in the morning.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. In what place? - A. In front of Mr. Isabelo Alburo's house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. On dry land, or in the sea? - A. In the sea.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Why were you there on the 23d? - A. Because for the past month I had been in the habit of bathing every morning in
Mabolo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. And were you bathing on that day? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. In what condition did you find that opium? I mean: Where was it placed? - A. Those tins were placed in another large tin which I found in the
mud.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Where did you afterwards carry it? - A. I carried it afterwards to the house where I live on Calle Magallanes, to the upper floor of the furniture
store.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How did you carry it? - A. In a tartanilla (carriage).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Are you sure that it was on the 23d? - A. I think so. It was that very day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. The 23d of June of this year? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know why Anatalio Alviola was in the house on Calle Legaspi on the night of the occurence? - A. According to what Ciriaco Singson told
me, it was because he, also, wished to buy the tins that might be left over.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know Francisco Jurado by sight, the owner of the house? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who personally carried the opium after it had been taken away from you? - A. It was carried by two men.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Q. Who? - A. I was unable to observe who were the two that carried the opium, but they carried it by the order of Albao and of the other man who
had the palasan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. When did the interview take place that was had between you and Isabelo Alburo, relative to finding purchasers for the opium? - A. On the 23d,
at about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning.
Examination by the fiscal:

Q. You said this morning, in reply to the cross-questions of the attorney for the accused, that a bridge was offered to the policemen who were
there. Who offered the bribe? - A. Anatalio Alviola and I. It was rather Ciriaco Singson who first made the proposal.

Second. Isabelo Alburo, who testified, in part, as follows:

Q. Where were you on the 23d of June of this year? - A. In Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know Mr. Vicente Lizarraga? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did something happen between you and Lizarraga on that 23d day of June of this year? - A. On that day, at a little after 11 o'clock, I went to the
furniture store to collect from Mr. Solsiaga a bill of P43.10, the amount due for 100 pieces of bamboo which he obtained from me for the purpose
of repairing his house and for several cartloads of stone. After the account had been settled, I inquired of Mr. Lizarraga whether he had any
objection to going to my house, because, a week before that day, as the furniture store sold or installments, my wife had taken a combination
wardrobe and mirror, to be paid for at the rate of P10 a month; and as the wardrobe that was delivered at the house had a bad lock, I begged Mr.
Lizarraga to go to the house to fix it, if he had no objection. On that day Mr. Lizarraga had no objection in accompanying me to the house. We
went, both on bicycles, at a little after 11 o'clock. We passed along Calles Magallanes and Martires. While travelling on Calle Magallanes Mr.
Lizarraga inquired of me: "Do you know of anybody who wishes to take a lot of opium?" I replied, saying: "It is publicly known that there is a good
Filipino buyer here, who is Mr. Ciriaco Singson. I was present at the hearing of the case against the engineer of the Rubi, Ben Rice, and it appears
that every body knows that Ciriaco Singson buys opium." Mr. Lizarraga then said to me: "Have you no objections to introducing me to Mr.
Singson?" I told him that I could not introduce him; that though it was true that he (Singson) was an acquiantance of mine, there was no intimacy
between us. During our passage through Calle Magallanes we came in front of the market and the house of Mr. Graciano del Mar. I said to him
(Lizarraga): "This gentlemen is one of Mr. Singson's friends and I am very intimate with him. Sunday before last he was at my house with Duterte's
family to take a bath in the sea. This gentleman can, if you wish, introduce you to Mr. Singson." Mr. Lizarraga said to me: "See if you can introduce
me to that gentleman (Del Mar)." I got off my bicycle and said to Graciano del Mar, who was at the window: "This gentleman, it seems, desires to
talk with you." Graciano invited us upstairs. Upon going up he requested us to be seated, and I said to Lizarraga: "Here is Mr. Del Mar." They both
engaged in conversation, and I heard one of them say: "I have a lot of opium. If you can find a purchaser, I shall be very glad to dispose of that lot."
Mr. Del Mar said that he had no objection to speaking to Mr. Singson. After it had been agreed upon that he should speak to Mr. Singson, as it was
a quarter to 12, we took leave of Mr. Del Mar and departed. While we were on the last step of the stair Del Mar inquired of us: "Where are you
going now?" and I said: "The gentleman is going to my house to fix the wardrobe." Del Mar inquired: "Have you any objection, in case I should meet
Mr. Singson, to our going to your house?" I said to him: "Anyone may enter our house any time that we are there." Thereupon Lizarraga and I both
left on our bicycles. When we arrived at the house we set to work to fix the wardrobe. As the clock was striking 12, just for courtesy's sake I invited
Mr. Lizarraga to have dinner and partake of such food as there was in the house. Mr. Lizarraga accepted and remained for dinner. At about half
past 1 o'clock the little girl, my daughter, said: "Papa, there are two gentlemen on the stairs." I said that they might come up. Mr. Graciano del Mar
and Mr. Ciriaco Singson came up. As master of the house, I introduced Mr. Singson to Mr. Lizarraga, saying: "This is Mr. Singson." They seated
themselves and Graciano and I withdrew to one side out of politeness. I said to Graciano del Mar: "The Sunday that you folks were here to bathe,
did you have a bath robe with you?" Ciriaco Singson and Lizarraga were talking. After a little while, two friends of mine entered. We were talking at
the other side of the balcony. While I was talking with those friends, Ciriaco Singson and Mr. Lizarraga were talking and Graciano del Mar
approached. A short while afterwards Mr. Lizarraga went out. He rode away on his bicycle. About twenty minutes afterwards he returned. Upon
Lizarraga's return his pocket was full. I was still talking with my friends. Pretty soon he took out a paper and showed some tins. I saw them at a
distance. I saw that there was a broken tin and that the paper was stained black. I immediately approached and on seeing that it was opium
immediately said: "Gentlemen, please go out. Indeed this is a strange thing. An agent of the authorities may come and you folks may cause harm to
the owner of the house. You may go down, for I can not allow you to make this deal here in the house." Mr. Lizarraga picked up the paper bundle
and went down. Shortly afterwards Graciano del Mar and Ciriaco Singson also went down.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. On the following day, the 24th, what happened in connection with that opium? - A. Some few minutes after 2 o'clock while I was sleeping Mr.
Singson came in, awoke me, and merely charged me to tell Mr. Lizarraga that up to that time the whole of the money was not
secured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. The next day, the 25th? - A. I do not know if it was Graciano del Mar who was at the house in behalf of Mr. Singson. He charged me to tell Mr.
Lizarraga that he wanted him to wait here in the Plaza de la Independecia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you transmit the message? - A. Yes, sir; because as an employee of Mr. Bustillo, I happened to be at the customhouse, and when I came out
of the building they were playing a serenade in the plaza. I was listening there. Pretty soon Mr. Singson came up and inquired for Mr. Lizarraga and
I told him that Mr. Singson had been waiting for him that he had arrived late he charged me merely to tell him that he (Singson) would wait for him
in the Merchant Cafe at 8 o'clock in the evening. Immediately thereafter Mr. Lizarraga and I separated.

Cross-examination by Mr. Sotto:

Q. You spoke of an open tin, the contents of which, the opium, had run out on the paper. Where was that tin opened? - A. I do not know if those
tins were broken, but when Mr. Lizarraga opened (the paper) there was a stain, the tin was leaking.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Q. Did they not open the tin there? - A. No, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Were there two tins? - A. Two tins.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Two opened? - A. One closed tin and another tin which was a little damaged and its contents were leaking out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Was this your first knowledge of Lizarraga's having opium? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did Lizarraga actually come to see you in the Plaza Libertad, and did you transmit to him Ciriaco Singson's message? - A. Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. At what time did you transmit to Lizarraga Singson's message? - A. At half past 5, I think, when I came out of the customhouse. When Ciriaco
Singson say me he inquired of me whether Lizarraga was upstairs. I told him that he was not. He said to me: "Please tell Lizarraga that at 8 o'clock
this evening I will wait for him in the Merchant Cafe." chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know whether or not that opium which Lizarraga wished to sell to or place with Singson, was sold by Lizarraga some days subsequent to
the 25th? - A. I learned from Lizarraga the next day that the police had taken if from him.

Third. Miguel Batoto, who testified, in part, as follows:

Q. Are you acquainted with Alejandro Albao? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. With Ciriaco Singson? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know where Mr. Ciriaco Singson was about the 23d of last July, very late in the evening? - A. In his house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Where were you? - A. In my house also. On the afternoon of the 23d, at about 3 o'clock, he sent the little boy Juan, a younger brother of
Candoy's wife, Pia, to call me.

The COURT. What is the name of that Candoy? - A. I do not know his surname. They call him Candoy.

Q. What else? - A. Juan told me that Ciriaco needed me; I did not know for what. I went over at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. When I arrived at
Ciriaco Singson's house, the latter told me that there was a good chance to do business in opium in view of the fact that a person had offered 200
tins for sale. I inquired whether he had money. Ciriaco Singson replied to me that there was no need of money, that an arrangement could be made
to get the opium by a swindle, since it was an article of contraband. Ciriaco suggested to me that I find a policeman who would seized the opium,
and that, in case it could not be obtained in this manner, we should have the office arrest the man, in which event we would receive a certain
amount from the Government, as a reward. I said in reply: "Yes, sir; right way." At 5 o'clock in the afternoon I met Albao and told him that Ciriaco
Singson needed him, and we went to Singson's house. I met Albao in Calle Magallanes, in David Sommer's store. From David Sommer's store,
where I met Albao, we, Albao and I, went to Singson's house. We found the latter in the corridor of his house, near the stair. Thereupon Albao
asked Ciriaco Singson what he desired. Singson told him that a certain person had offered to sell him 200 tins of opium and that he desired to have
them seized from him. Ciriaco Singson said: "Do we agree, Albao?." and Albao said: "Yes." When we were near the porch that faces the street, I
asked Albao: "What do you think of it?" and he said to me that if there really was opium he would arrest the person who had it.

Fourth. Graciano del Mar, who testified, in part, as follows:

Q. Are you acquianted with Vicente Lizarraga? - A. I have known him only recently. I got acquainted with him on June 24, for the first time, at my
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. How did he come to enter there? Did he go up there into your house? - A. Yes. One morning while I was at the window Vicente Lizarraga passed
by, in the company of Mr. Isabelo Alburo; and when Mr. Alburo saw me at the window he asked me whether he might come up. I told him that he
might. Then Mr. Alburo came up alone and Mr. Lizarraga remained below. After Mr. Alburo had come up he proposed to me the purchase of 325
tins of opium. I told him that I could not buy them as I had no money, and that, besides, I was not dealing in that drug. He said: "Well, you have
acquaintances there who buy drug. You can tell me who can buy it." I said to him: "I do not know whether Ciriaco Singson can buy it from you;" and
Isabelo said to me: "Go and tell that to Ciriaco." Then Isabelo Alburo said "The owner of the drug is the man who is downstairs. Do you wish him to
come up? I will call him." I said to him: "There is no objection. He may come up." And Vicente Lizarraga came up into the house and then Mr.
Isabelo Alburo introduced him to me as Mr. Vicente Lizarraga. Alburo then said to me that I might eat in his house with Ciriaco Singson, in order to
make the deal. I replied that I could not eat there, but that after dinner I would immediately go to look for Ciriaco Singson and tell him about the
affair. I went to the house of Ciriaco Singson and told the latter that there was a lot of opium which Isabelo Alburo told me he wished to sell. After
Ciriaco Singson had finished his dinner, for he was eating when I came in, he dressed and accompanied me to Mabolo. There in Mabolo we found
Vicente Lizarraga and Isabelo Alburo waiting for us in his (Alburo's) house. Then the three men, Ciriaco Singson, Isabelo Alburo, and Lizarraga,
engaged in a conversation there. After a little while Vicente Lizarraga went out and we three remained in Isabelo Alburo's house, waiting for
Lizarraga, for Isabelo Alburo said that Lizarraga would return. We had waited about half an hour when Lizarraga came, bringing two tins of opium
which he showed to Ciriaco Singson. I could not well hear the agreement they were making, because I was very near the window that faces the
street, watching to see whether anyone might come to surprise us. Then, after that, I don't know whether or not they came to an agreement;
Vicente Lizarraga went down carrying the two tins with him. We two, Ciriaco Singson and I, returned here to the city and in the street I asked
Singson whether they had agreed upon the purchase. Ciriaco told me that they had not, for the reason that he had not enough money to buy all
the tins which Mr. Lizarraga had for sale, for what Mr. Lizarraga wanted was to sell all the tins and Singson did not have sufficient money.
Furthermore, he said that he was afraid that sale of opium involved some deceit, that the article was not really opium. After that, we returned to
our houses. I remained in ours and he went to his.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you see the opium? Was it really opium? - A. I saw there two tins of opium, one well closed and another half
opened.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Did you hear Ciriaco Singson say anything about that opium? - A. I asked him about that and he told me that the samples were good, but I do not
know whether the other tins that were there were the same as these.

Cross-examination by Mr. Sotto:

Q. How were Isabelo Alburo and Vicente Lizarraga traveling when you saw them from the window of your house? - A. On bicycles, both of
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Then when Isabelo Alburo went up into your house and Lizarraga waited below, Isabelo Alburo did not know what persons could buy the opium,
and asked you? - A. He asked me whether I wished to buy it. I afterwards told him that I could not, and he himself mentioned the name of Ciriaco
Singson, who is a friend of mine, as one who could buy this opium. I told him that I knew nothing of it, but could speak to Singson about it, if he
wished to. He said that he did, and added: "Go there soon and we will wait for you at the house for dinner." I said that I could not take dinner at his
house.

Fifth. Dionisio Jakosalem, who testified, in part, as follows:

As provincial fiscal I declared under oath that no municipal policeman or other person has presented in my office, nor directly to me nor to my
assistant, Mr. Miguel Raffiñan, the 200 tins of opium seized from Vicente Lizarraga. As provincial fiscal I also declare under oath that I have
ascertained from the justice of the peace court of Cebu - the only court after that of First Instance that can initiate proceedings in the matter of the
unlawful possession of opium - I have there ascertained, I repeat, that the seizure of 200 tins of opium from Vicente Lizarraga in or about the
month of last June was not the subject matter of any consideration or action on the part of the said justice of the peace court. And, as provincial
fiscal, I also declare under oath that the tins of opium reffered to in the present case have not yet been the subject matter of any prosecution.

The defendant presented five witnesses to support his defense. The first was Ciriaco Singson. He attempted to deny any relation whatever with
Vicente Lizarraga, in relation to the opium in question. After repeated denials of that alleged fact, however, he finally admitted that Vicente
Lizarraga offered him two "latas de opio," but says that the opium was offered to him during the daytime, and not at night. Such a denial is in effect
an admission. He admitted that in relation with one Ben Rice and others, he had attempted to import opium (pp. 91, 92); that he was "un agente
de importar opio." In Exhibit A (p. 10) he also, in a confession before the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu, admitted the existence of
the opium and that Vicente Lizarraga tried to sell the same to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The second witness, Francisco Jurado, also denied that the parties were in his house on the day in question (June 23, 24, or 25). He admitted,
however, that he had been condemned twice for smoking opium (pp. 100, 101), and that at the very time he was testifying, another action was
pending against him for the same crime (p. 101).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Anatolio Alviola testified. He also, on direct examination, denied any relation with Vicente Lizarraga, in relation to the opium in question, but on
cross-examination, testified as follows:

Q. Do you know whether Vicente Lizarraga had opium in or about the month of June? - A. Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Q. Since when have you known it? - A. The 26th.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Who told you so? - A. Ciriaco Singson.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. So that Ciriaco Singson had negotiated with Vicente Lizarraga in regard to that opium? - A. Ciriaco Singson invited me to pay for 300 tins of
opium belonging to Vicente Lizarraga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. On about the 26th? - A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. What conversation did you and Ciriaco Singson have in regard to Lizarraga's opium? - A. Ciriaco Singson came to my house on the 26th, at about
3 o'clock in the afternoon, to invite me to buy Vicente Lizarraga's opium. That opium belonged to Vicente Lizarraga, but it was Isabelo Alburo who
invited Ciriaco Singson to buy it. So I asked Ciriaco Singson whether it was good opium. Ciriaco Singson told me that it was, because Isabelo Alburo
had shown him a tin as a sample. Then I told Ciriaco Singson not to trust Alburo, as he was an unreliable man.

Emiliano Fernandez, a policeman of the city of Cebu, also testified on behalf of the defendant, for the purpose of showing an alibi. He testified that
he had seen the defendant, Alejandro Albao, in the public plaza, in the city of Cebu, at or about 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the day in question.
Admitting that fact to be true, the defendant still had time, after this witness saw him, to go to the place where the alleged robbery was
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Alejandro Albao testified in his own behalf. He denied positively that he had any relation whatever with the opium in question and that he was not
at the house of Francisco Jurado on the night in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Dionisio Jakosalem, prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cebu, was recalled as a witness, and related the circumstances under which the
confession of Ciriaco Singson was made, as appears in Exhibit A (p. 10).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We think the proof adduced during the trial of the cause, the important parts of which we have set out above, not only shows that the lower court
did not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error, but that he did not commit the other errors complained
of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During the pendency of the appeal in this court, the appellant presented a motion for a new trial. As a part of said motion he annexed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu, rendered in the case of United States vs. Ciriaco Singson (No. 3132, Court of First Instance), as
well as a certificate of the stenographer, to the effect that the witnesses who testified in the case of United States vs. Ciriaco Singson were the
same witnesses who testified in the original case of United States vs. Alejandro Albao (No. 2999). It appears from the decision rendered in said case
(U. S. vs. Singson, No. 3132) that the said Singson had been, after the conclusion of the case against Albao, prosecuted for a violation of the Opium
Law. In the decision in that case the judge of the lower court commented in extenso upon the credibility of the witnesses who had been presented
against the defendant. He stated that he did not believe their testimony and for that reason acquitted the defendant (Singson) While it does not
clearly appear from the decision (in the case against Singson) yet, it would seem that the theory of the prosecution was that Singson was an
accomplice of the defendant Albao, in relation with the opium in question. It will be remembered, however, that while there is an intimation in the
proof presented in the case of United States vs. Albao that Ciriaco Singson operated with Albao, in an indefinite way, in relation with the opium in
question, yet there is no positive proof of that fact. While it is a fact that the lower court did not believe the witnesses in the case against Singson
(No. 3132), yet, nevertheless, he reaffirms his findings of fact in the case of United States vs. Albao, in the following language:

Aside from this question, it is evident that on the night of the crime the accused was at the house of Francisco Jurado; that, in accordance with the
agreement, the offended party Vicente Lizarraga arrived at the house, bringing with him 202 tins of opium; that while they were in the act of
effecting the sale and were recounting the tins of opium, there appeared at the door a man by the name of Albao, armed with a revolver and
accompanied by other persons; and that Albao, declaring himself to be a policeman and in the name of the law, seized the opium and took all the
tins away with him; that these tins have not been returned or delivered to any authority and assuredly have been divided between Aldao and his
accomplices and associates in the crime. The said Albao has been sentenced by this court to ten years of prision mayor for his participation in this
robbery.

In view of the foregoing, we do not believe that the mere fact that the lower court did not believe the witnesses in one case but did believe them in
another, is sufficient ground upon which to grant a new trial. Therefore the motion for a new trial is hereby denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
From a careful examination of the record we are of the opinion that the following facts are proved, beyond a reasonable doubt: chanrobles virtual
law library

First. That on or about the 25th day of June, 1913, Vicente Lizarraga was in the possession of 202 "latas de opio," which were of the value of about
P14,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Second. That on the day in question, after repeated efforts to sell the said opium, Vicente Lizarraga met Ciriaco Singson together with others, in the
house of one Francisco Jurado, for the purpose of consummating the sale of the 202 "latas de opio." chanrobles virtual law library

Third. That on the night in question (25th of June, 1913), while Vicente Lizarraga and Ciriaco Singson, in the house of Francisco Jurado, were
negotiating for the sale of said opium, the defendant Alejandro Albao, together with others unknown, appeared at the house of Francisco Jurado
and demanded that the opium be turned over to him, by means of threats and violence, using a revolver and pointing the same at Vicente
Lizarraga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Fourth. That by reason of said threats, intimidation and demands, by using his revolver, the defendant, Alejandro Albao, took possession of said
202 "latas de opio," against the will and consent of Vicente Lizarraga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Fifth. That after the said opium had been delivered in the manner above indicated to Alejandro Albao, he promised to return the same upon the
payment to him and his unknown associates of the sum of P6,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Sixth. That the defendant, Alejandro Albao, had been and was a policeman in the city of Cebu at the time; that he makes no pretense or claim that
he was acting in his capacity as a policeman at the time he took forcible possession of the opium in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Seventh. That the opium in question was never returned to Vicente Lizarraga, nor to any public authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Eighth. That the defendant, Alejandro Albao, took possession of the said 202 "latas de opio" by the use of violence and intimidation against the
person of Vicente Lizarraga, with the intent, then and there, to appropriate the same to his own use. (U. S. vs. Smith, 3 Phil Rep., 20; U. S. vs.
Ginete, 3 Phil. Rep 641; decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 24, 1875; 3 Viada, 341; U. S. vs. Howard, 4 Phil. Rep., 238; U. S. vs. Barot, 15
Phil. Rep., 463; U. S. vs. Navarro, 18 Phil. Rep., 357; U. S. vs. Flores, 19 Phil. Rep., 178; U. S. vs. Osorio, 21 Phil. Rep., 237; U. S. vs. Recio, 21 Phil.
Rep., 511; U. S. vs. Martin, 23 Phil. Rep., 58; U. S. vs. Sanchez, 26 Phil. Rep., 83; U. S. vs. Sana Lim, 28 Phil. Rep., 404).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of the United States vs. Navarro (18 Phil. Rep., 357), it appears that the accused, with certain other companions, entered the store of a
Chinaman by night, displayed a badge and pretended to be revenue officers. The accused made a search of the premises and then pretended that
they had found a small amount of opium. Two of them drew their revolvers and ordered said Chinaman to follow them; whereupon the accused
offered to release him if he would pay them P400. After compelling the Chinaman to follow them in the direction of the municipality, they finally
succeeded in obtaining from him the sum of P260. It was held that these acts of the defendants constituted the crime of
robbery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of United States vs. Recio (21 Phil. Rep., 511), the defendant, by means of intimidation and threats of arrest for the violation of the
Opium Law, obtained from the offended person the sum of P1,000. This court held, following the decisions of United States vs. Smith (3 Phil Rep.,
20); 3 Viada 341; decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 24, 1875; and United States vs. Flores (19 Phil. Rep., 178), that the defendant was
guilty of the crime of robbery, punishable under paragraph 5 of article 503 of the Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

During the trial of the cause there was an effort made to show that Vicente Lizarraga was not the owner of the opium and that said opium was
contraband goods, and that, therefore the crime of robbery could not have been committed with reference to said property. In the commission of
the crime of robbery, it is not necessary that the person from whom the property is taken, by means of threats and violence, shall be the owner. It
is sufficient if the property is taken from him by means of threats and violence, for the purpose of gain, on the part of the person appropriating it.
(Art. 502, Penal Code.) The possession of the property is sufficient. Ownership is not necessary. (Stegar vs. State, 39 Ga., 583; People vs. Durand, 47
Michigan, 332; Commonwealth vs. Clifford, 8 Cushing (Mass.), 215; Rex vs. Bramley, Russ. and R., 478; Reg. vs. Webster, 9 Cox's Criminal Cases, 13;
Kennedy vs. State, 12 Southern Reporter (Fla.), 858; States vs. McRae, 111 N. C., 665; State vs. Allen, 103 N. C., 433.) chanrobles virtual law library

Robbery may be committed from a bailee (Rex vs. Bramley, Russ. and R., 478) or from a person who himself has stolen it (Commonwealth vs. Finn,
108 Mass., 466; Ward vs. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 369) and it has even been held that the taking of clothing from the body of a dead person constitutes
robbery, as the property of the executor. (Hayne's, 12 Coke, 113.) Even the owner of property may be guilty of robbery when, for instance, he takes
it from the possession of a bailee, with the intent to charge the bailee with its value. (Palmer vs. People, 10 Wendell (N. Y.), 166; People vs.
Thompson, 34 Cal., 671; Commonwealth vs. Greene, 111 Mass., 392; People vs. Long, 50 Michigan, 249; State vs. Rivers, 60 Iowa, 381.) chanrobles
virtual law library

In our opinion, in view of the foregoing discussion, it is unnecessary to discuss particularly the other assignment of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

After a careful examination of the record, we are fully persuaded that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, beyond a
reasonable doubt. The lower court imposed the penalty provided by law in its maximum degree, holding that there existed the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. In our opinion, there is nothing in the record which indicates for the purpose of committing the crime in question.
There being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, the defendant should be punished in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
5 of article 503, in relation with article 502 of the Penal Code, or in the medium grade of presidio correccional to presidio mayor in its medium
grade. In our opinion, the defendant should be sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six years and one day of presidio mayor, and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby modified, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the defendant be sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of six years and one day of presidio mayor, and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 2658. August 23, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSA ALCANTARA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

The defendants in this case were charged with the robbery of certain jewels of the value of 11,185.50 pesetas, and convicted thereof in the Court
of First Instance, the defendant Alcantara as principal and the defendant Nisayas as an accessory after the fact. The former was sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment (prision mayor) and the latter to pay a fine off 750 pesetas. The defendant Nisayas did not appeal. Her codefendant, however,
did appeal. Two separate complaints were presented successively for the same act charged in this case. In the first complaint the defendants were
charged with theft. It was the prosecution instituted upon the first-mentioned complaint. The appellant in this case alleged in the Court of First
Instance that she had been placed twice in jeopardy for the reason that she had been acquitted in the former trial, but failed into present the
necessary proof in support of her allegation, and relied upon the fact that such acquittal appeared from the record in the other case. The court
below, in discussing this point, merely says that the crime of robbery, and consequently that the defendants in this case can not set up the defense
of having been placed twice in jeopardy. With nothing except what we have now before us we can not determine with certainty whether this one
of the cases covered by the provisions of section 27 or 28 of General Orders, No. 58. This of itself, without the necessity of passing upon the merits
of the questions of law involved in the aforesaid plea of jeopardy, perhaps, would be sufficient to overrule such plea, the defendant having failed to
support her allegation of a former acquittal if the merits of the present case did not make it unnecessary to make an express declaration upon this
point.

The complaining witness in this case was the owner of a jewelry store on Calle Rosario of this city; she lived in Calle Soler. Her custom was to take
the jewels to the store in the morning and to take them back to her house at night. For this purpose she had employed a clerk who had been in her
employ for seven years. On the morning of the 29th of July, 1904, this clerk took the jewels, as usual, in order to carry them to her place of
business, while the owner was in church attending mass. These jewels were contained in two small boxes locked with keys. The jewels did not
reach the store, the clerk having lost them on the way. The fact was reported to the authorities, who, on the evening of the same day, found the
said jewelry in the possession of the defendant, the boxes in which the jewels had been contained having been broken open.

As to the manner in which the clerk of the complaining witness lost possession of the property in question, it seems that there was no other
eyewitness than the clerk himself, who, by the way, was not called as a witness in the case. The only evidence of record in regard to this matter is
the testimony of the complaining witness herself, who testified as to what she had heard from the clerk. She testified that she met her clerk
hurrying by the church about 8 o’clock in the morning, inquired from him as to the whereabouts of the jewels and that he informed her that the
appellant, who had been a servant in the house of the complaining witness for the two days under the name of Francisca, had taken them away.
After his we find in this testimony of the complaining witness the following questions and answers:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Where did Francisco Llamoso (the clerk) tell you that woman (the appellant) had taken the jewel boxes away from him? — A. In Calle
Misericordia in the store of a Chinaman. He said it was raining, and that the girl told him to put the boxes inside the Chinaman’s store.

"Q. Did Francisco explain to you how she (the girl) took possession of the boxes? — A. When Francisco went out with the two boxes she followed
him and told him that she was going to sell something; that the lady had gone out calling, and as I have said before, when they arrived at a
Chinaman’s store she told him, as it was raining , to put the two boxes inside the Chinaman’s store, and at the same time asked Francisco to go and
buy some pineapples for her."cralaw virtua1aw library

It seems that when the clerk returned to the Chinaman’s store the appellant had already disappeared, taking the jewelry with her.

The testimony indicates, and we believe that it actually so happened, that the boy who was carrying the jewels turned them over to the appellant
for sale-keeping while he went after the pineapples for her. It is not probable that he would have left the jewelry in the Chinaman’s store under any
another circumstances. He was not acquainted in the store and merely stopped there casually to shelter himself from the rain. This being so, it can
not be said that there was any actual taking (apoderamiento) of the jewels. The appellants did not, in fact, possess herself, or take the property in
question, in the technical and legal sense in which the words "to take possession of" and "to take" are used in the Penal Code in connection with
the crimes of robbery and theft, but simply "to receive" them from the clerk in turn having received the same from the owner, the complaining
witness in this case. If there were no actual taking, there could have been no robbery because this crime can not be committed except by taking
possession of the personal property of another against the latter’s will. (Article 502 of the Penal Code.)

The fact that the jewels in question had been delivered to the defendant temporarily for safe-keeping certainly did not authorize her to keep them,
but on the contrary she was obliged to return the same to the person from whom she received them. There can be no question as to this; neither
can there jewels by the appellant under such circumstances constituted an offense is not and can not be that of robbery with which the appellant
in this case is charged.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the trial court and acquit the appellant of the charge of robbery with the costs of both instances de oficio.
After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment, let the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance for proper procedure. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1043 May 15, 1903
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
vs.
JULIAN ATIENZA, defendant-appellee.

MAPA, J.:

The accused was acquitted in the First Instance of the charge of robbery, upon which he was prosecuted. The complaining witnesses and the
provincial fiscal appealed against the judgment of acquittal.

The evidence in the record shows: (1) That the accused, who was employed as a secret-service agent by the military authorities, received orders
from Lieut. J. B. Hennesy to seize all the money in the possession of Father Angel Ilagan, the complaining witness, it being believed, upon
information received by the said lieutenant, that the money referred to was the property of a revolutionary officer; (2) that in obedience to the
said order the accused, together with three sergeants of scouts, whom the lieutenant had put under his orders to assist him in the execution of the
command, proceeded to the dwelling house of Father Ilagan and that of Sixto Rojas, to which Father Ilagan's family had removed, and seized a
certain amount of money; (3) that the accused appropriated part of this money before delivering to Lieutenant Hennesy the funds seized, turning
over to him a sum less than that which was really found by him in the house of Father Ilagan and that of his family.

The record does not disclose the exact amount of money converted by the accused. The information charges that it amounted to 1,381 pesos and
15 1/2 cents. This may have been the fact, but we do not consider the evidence conclusive upon this point. In the document appearing on pages
138 and 139 of the record, signed by the accused, and which, according to the testimony of Cecilio Rosal and Marciano Arguelles, contains a
statement made by the accused before the provost judge of Lipa, Mr. Johnson, he acknowledges and confesses that he appropriate the sum of 300
pesos. The authenticity of this document has not been denied by the accused at the trial, and the witnesses Rosal and Arguelles affirm that they
were present and heard the statement made by the accused before the provost judge, as recorded in the said document. Consequently, it may be
regarded as proven that the accused converted at least the sum mentioned, 300 pesos.

Nevertheless, this act does not constitute the crime of robbery, with which the accused is charged in the complaint. The seizure of the money in
Father Ilagan's house and that of his family was not in itself unlawful, because it was done in obedience to a lawful order given for that purpose by
competent authority. The unlawful and punishable appropriation took place subsequently to this act, when the money appropriated was lawfully in
the possession of the accused. The order given to him by his commanding officer was for the precise purpose of the seizure of this money, and
consequently the seizure in itself does not constitute an act of unlawful taking, a necessary element for the existence of the crime of robbery, as
well under the different cases covered by article 502 and the other articles included in the chapter of the Penal Code, which deals specifically with
robberies, as in the special case covered by article 206 of the said Code.

The subsequent conversion by the accused, after getting the money into his possession, by keeping part of it instead of turning it all over to the
officer who had directed the seizure, may perhaps constitute the crime of malversation of public funds or that of estafa, according to whether the
accused may or may not be regarded as having been in the discharge of the duties of a public officer when committing the deed, and that the
money converted came into his possession by reason of his office. Upon this point we can not at this time express an opinion, as that would be to
prejudge a question which is not presented to us for our decision. The prosecuting attorney is at liberty to file such information as he may see fit
upon these facts.

For the reasons stated, and upon the sole ground that the facts proven in the case do not constitute the crime of robbery charged in the
information, and without prejudice to the presentation by the prosecuting attorney of the corresponding information upon the facts, the judgment
appealed is affirmed, with the costs of this instance de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard and Ladd, JJ., concur.