Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19034 February 17, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, a plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The appellants were prosecuted and tried in the Court of First Instance of Cavite and sentenced by said court as follows:

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde guilty as principals, and Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba,
and Bartolome Caguiat as accomplices, of the consummated crime of abduction through violence, without any modifying circumstance and sentences the first
three to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal and the last three to eight years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories
prescribed by law and to pay each a one-sixth part of the costs.

Pedro Crisostomo is further sentenced to pay to the offended party the sum of P500 as an endowment.

Such is the judgment from which all of the accused appeal to this court, alleging at the trial court erred:

1. In holding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient and that the facts alleged in the information were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. In holding that the conspiracy and connivance between the accused at the time of committing the supposed crime of abduction were duly proven.
3. In sentencing the accused Pedro Crisostomo to pay the supposed offended party the sum of P500 as an endowment.
4. In holding that the crime committed by the accused falls within the provision of article 445 of the Penal Code and in sentencing them under said article.

It is an undisputed fact that after 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning of December 26, 1920, Macaria Gabriel, the offended party, and the accused Pedro Crisostomo
were found in the barrio of Salinas, municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. Neither is it disputed that the other accused were there on that occasion. Where the
prosecution and the defense disagree it is in that while the former contends that the offended party was abducted by the accused against her will, the latter
asserts that there was an agreement between her and Pedro Crisostomo and that both of them, by mutual accord, had escaped from the parental house of said
Macaria Gabriel when the latter's brothers Constantino Gabriel overtook them.

The evidence shows sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt that while Macaria Gabriel and her aunt Candida Acuña were walking in the direction of their
houses from that of Gregoria Acuña, to whom Macaria had paid the sum of P30, the accused met them on the way and Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and
Casimiro Garde, who were with the accused, dragged Macaria Gabriel along and took her against her will to a rice field, Macaria Gabriel not having been able to
prevent it by her cries and strife, and the insults proferred by her against those people who maltreated her in such a way, while the other defendants, Segundo
Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida Acuña, thus preventing her from helping her niece until another woman, Gregoria
Acuña, attracted by the cries of Candida, repaired to the place and, with a club with which she was provided, attacked those who were holding Macaria Gabriel,
and they lastly released her. As soon as Candida Acuña was released by her aggressors, she went to the house of Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter to
the latter's brother, Constantino, who ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her, which they did upon seeing
Constantino.

Aside from the earmarks of veracity prevailing in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, whom the trial judge saw while testifying and gave credit
to, it must be taken into consideration that the manner of eloping planned, according to the defense, by Macaria Gabriel, is improbable in the case of a woman
like the offended party who, by reason of her 30 years' age, must be presumed more reflexive and cautions in carrying out a preconceived plan than a young
woman, on account of the vehement impulse of passion, does not usually take any precaution and possess a serene judgment which by its own nature is the
lesser development, the tender is her age. If it were true that it was Macaria's object to escape, she would not have done so in the daytime, nor would she have
gone in company with Candida Acuña, nor would she have, so childishly and in the presence of several persons, as the defense pretends, taken advantage of the
circumstances (which does not appear to have been sought by her) of her companion entering the house of Gregoria Acuña to speak with the latter for some
minutes. It does not appear that the offended party was under the vigilance of her relatives and, in view of her age, she would have naturally enjoyed a certain
degree of liberty such as to go, as she did, to the barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, from her residence in Palicot, Imus; with which liberty she could have planned and
carried into effect with full success her escape from the parental house.

Furthermore, the accused Pedro Crisostomo spontaneously, admitted to Lieutenant Sotto of the Constabulary having, with his companions, deemed it advisable
to abduct Macaria, in view of the fact that she firmly answered in the negative to his proposal and, on another occasion, he requested Epifanio Gabriel, another
brother of the offended party, to intervene in his favor and that he considered the fault committed by him as an offense not only against Macaria but also
against her family.

The record as whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away Macaria Gabriel against her will.

But in order that this fact may constitute abduction, it is necessary that the other element thereof should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs.

The defendant Pedro Crisostomo testified that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married with her in Bacoor. While it was not proven that the
offended partly consented to such an elopement, the violent taking away is not incompatible with such intention to marry the woman taken away. Does this
intention to marry constitute unchaste designs? Our answer is in the negative in this particular case in which not only the woman, but the man as well, had the
required age for consenting to marriage, and it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it.

In arriving at this conclusion we are not unmindful of the fact that as a general proposition the intention to marry may sometime constitute unchaste which may
vitiate such an intention, as in the case of abduction of a minor with the latter's consent, in which the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the
marriage and yet he elopes with her. In an abduction of this nature seduction is presumed by the law which may very well be covered by the intention to her
married.

For this reason, Viada, in defining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says in general as follows:

By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent
to marry or to corrupt her (libidinis causa).

But when, in explaining abduction through violence, he specifies the elements constituting the same, he says:

The elements constituting this crime are these: . . . 3. That it be committed with unchaste designs, that is to say, with intent to abuse her. If such an intention
does not exist, the act will no longer constitute the crime of abduction, but a crime against liberty, or that of illegal detention defined and punished in article
495 and following of this Code.
Consequently, the unchaste designs that constitute the essential elements of the crime of abduction through violence is the intention to abuse the abducted
woman.

Therefore, even considering it as proven that in kidnapping Macaria Gabriel, Pedro Crisostomo had the intention to marry her, such designs cannot in this case
be considered as unchaste.

There is, however, the testimony of the offended party, the only one of course on this point, to the effect that, while the accused and his two companions held
her and dragged her along, he kissed her many times against her will. However, she herself says the following:

They dragged me along and at a certain distance I got seasick became unconscious etc. (Folio 2, transcript of stenographic notes.)

Those acts that she thought were kisses under those circumstances in which she was seasick and unconscious cannot be considered proven, and the kissings
cannot be held to be such in fact and no merely accidental collisions of heads or faces in those moments in which, according to her, Pedro Crisostomo had
caught hold of her by the waist and the back and her head was hanging (folio 9, transcript of stenographic notes); and much less can such kissings be held
proven over the categorial denial of Pedro Crisostomo of having kissed her (folio 49, id.).

Furthermore, it does not appear from the evidence that outside of those supposed kissings, the accused or any of them ever committed any slight unchaste act
with the offended woman during the whole time in which she was in their hands, the length of which time is not specified in the evidence, but which ought to
have been sufficient for them to commit any unchaste act, inasmuch as the offended party was under the control of her abductors during the long period of
time that elapsed from the moment that her companion Candida Acuña was seized by the other three accused until Gregoria Acuña succeeded in driving them
away from the time that Candida Acuña took the way and to the barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, where the affair occurred, and then to the barrio of Palicot, Imus,
where the house of the offended party was, reported the matter there to Constantino Gabriel and the latter went to barrio of Salinas and saw the abductors,
until the latter saw him and released their victim.

If Pedro Crisostomo was in such a state of passion that he kissed several times the offended party, while he and his companions were pushing her and dragging
her along, it cannot be conceived why the same or greater exteriorations of such a vehement and disorderly passion were not made during the rest of the
period, which was long enough, in which he held Macaria Gabriel in his power.

But such testimony alone of the offended party as to Pedro Crisostomo's having kissed her, perceived by her in those moments in which she was excited and
was doing all her efforts to escape and was seasick, and which was positively denied by the said accused, cannot be considered proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the defendants were actuated by unchaste designs, but such unchaste designs were not proven. It was not
necessary to show that such unchaste designs were carried into effect, but it was required to establish the existence itself of the unchaste intention; but no act
or circumstance tending to show such a fact was proven in the record.

We have, therefore, the kidnapping of a woman which was not proven to have been committed with unchaste designs. Abduction, being one of the ways which
illegal detention, can be committed, specially qualified by lewd intention, the kidnapping of a woman without unchaste designs must according to Viada and to
our Penal Code, be considered as illegal detention.

And the act proven in the record constitutes this last crime. It is no argument against this constitution that the accused deprived the offended party of her
liberty without placing herein an inclosure; because illegal detention as defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but also
in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty. Our Penal Code says:

ART. 481. Any private individual who shall lock up or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.

Neither is it an argument against this finding in the present case that the information by which this prosecution was initiated is for another crime, for it is
alleged therein that the "defendants conspiring and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and criminally and with unchaste designs" (the latter
were not proven) and "through force kidnap" (the information gives the verb in singular but it must be considered as plural, it being a grammatical error)
"Macaria Gabriel on a road leading to Salinas, Bacoor, Cavite, taking her therefrom to a rice field in said municipality against her will." As may be seen, it is
alleged in this information that the defendants, in the manner aforesaid deprived the offended party of her liberty.

It was intimated in the discussion of this case among the member of the court that the crime committed as shown by the record may be held to constitute
attempted coercion in so far as the defendants attempted through force to compel the offended party to marry Pedro Crisostomo. In the first place, while it is
not sufficiently proven that the defendants, or any of them, had any lewd design in performing the act, yet it is not proven also that they did in fact attempt to
compel the offended party to contract marriage. According to the facts proven, it can rather be supposed, which hypothesis is incompatible with compulsion to
contract marriage, that the accused merely tried to take the offended party away from the environment of the family, in the hope that, in that way, she might
be persuaded without force or violence whatsoever to marry Pedro Crisostomo. Finally there is doubt as to whether the acts committed by the defendants may
be held as directly tending to compel the offended party to get married, for, in order that there may be an attempt to commit such a crime, the acts performed
must be direct; that is to say, they must be the beginning of the execution of the crime, with a direct, rational, and necessary tendency to produce the aforesaid
result. The mere fact of taking away the offended party which is an external act, in view of the evidence introduced, might as well have been for the purpose of
injuring or affronting her, or of compelling her through force to marry Pedro Crisostomo. Viada gives an example which appears to us clear:

A criminal decides to poison his father, which is an internal act and which is beyond the sanction of the law. He buys a poisonous substance. There we have an
external act. But is it in itself sufficient to constitute a crime? Certainly, not, for said poison might as well have been bought for the purpose of killing a person,
or for getting rid of venomous animals; in a word, it is an act which is not necessarily connected with the crime. (Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, pp. 34, 35, edition of
1890.)

Turning now to the participation of the defendants in the commission of the crime, there can be no doubt that Pedro Crisostomo took part therein as principal.
Neither can there be any doubt that the defendants Lorenzo Alcoba and Casimiro Garde, who held the offended party and dragged her along to a rice field,
assisted by Pedro Crisostomo, are likewise principals for having taken direct part in the commission of the crime (art. 13, No. 1, Penal Code).

As to the defendants Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, who, according to the evidence, did not lay hands on the offended party, but
did hold the latter's companion Candida Acuña, evidently for the purpose of preventing said Candida from helping Macaria, they must be held to be accomplices
for having cooperated in the performance of the crime by simultaneous acts (art. 14, Penal Code).

The defense alleges that there is not in the record any proof of the confederacy and conspiracy between the defendants. It is true that no witness testified to
having seen or heard the accused conspire or confederate. But in view of the simultaneous act of the defendants — three seizing Macaria Gabriel and the other
three getting hold of her companion to prevent her from helping Macaria in any manner possible, which is a joint act and tends to the same end, to wit, that of
illegally depriving Macaria of her liberty — it cannot be conceived that there was no agreement between the defendants and, for this reason, said act
constitutes in itself evident and sufficient proof of the conspiracy and confederacy.
The errors assigned by the appellants to the action of the trial court are groundless, except the one concerning the classification of the crime committed, which
we find to be that of illegal detention defined and punished in article 481 of the Penal Code, and as to the endowment which Pedro Crisostomo was sentenced
to pay to the offended party, it cannot be upheld, this not being a case of abduction, but illegal detention.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants found guilty, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, of the crime of illegal detention.
Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde, as principals, and Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, as accomplices, and each
of the first three above-mentioned is sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories of the law, provided in article 61 of the Penal
Code; and the three appellants lastly mentioned, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law provided in said
article 61 of the Penal Code. Each of the appellants shall pay his proportionate part of the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Malcolm, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-3273. July 13, 1907. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUIRINO PERALTA and VICENTE PERALTA, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On the 18th day of April, 1904, a complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned fiscal accuses Quirino Peralta and Vicente Peralta, now on bail, of the crime of kidnapping with lesiones leves, defined and punished by article
484 in connection with article 587 of the Penal Code, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Esteban Gemefino, a servant, having run away from the house of the above-named Quirino Peralta and Vicente Peralta, father and son, respectively, on the
morning of November 1, 1903, the latter went to the house of Isabel Geranda, at a place named Naga, within the former town of Cabancalan, now consolidated
with the town of Ilog, in this province, and employing violence upon the said Isabel Geranda, whom they kicked, breaking one of her right ribs, and seized and
took away with them Cenon Gemefino, a child under 2 years of age, a grandson of the latter. They took the child to their house and tied it to a wooden pillar, for
the purpose of holding it until the said Esteban Gemefino, an elder brother to said Cenon, should make his appearance or return to the house of the accused.
This act being a violation of the law."cralaw virtua1aw library

In our opinion, the facts stated in the foregoing complaint have been fully proven in this case. It has been clearly established that the accused went to the house
of Isabel Geranda on the morning of November 1, in search of Esteban Gemefino who had run away while in their service. As they did not find him there, they
caught hold of Cenon, a child about 2 years old, brother to the missing Esteban, and as his grandmother Geranda, who carried him in her arms, refused to
deliver the child, both the accused Quirino and Vicente ill-treated her, and forcibly took the child away from her. they then compelled a young woman named
Petronila Lagotar, of 15 years of age, who at that time was in said house, to carry the child to the house of the accused, and when the latter arrived there, they
tied the child to a wooden pillar of the house and as the girl Petronila commenced to weep on seeing what they were doing to the child Cenon, the accused
dismissed her.

Petronila then went in search of Juan Gemefino, the child’s father, and informed him of what had happened. In the afternoon of that day Juan Gemefino
reported the case to the justice of the peace of Cabancalan who, on the following day, ordered the arrest of the accused, and directed the child to be taken to
this court.

If should be noted that at midnight of the same date, November 1, the child Cenon was untied by his brother Urbano, who was also in the service of the
accused, because of pity for the child and at a time when the accused Peralta were asleep.

It can not be denied that when the accused seized and removed the child to their house from which he was recovered by two policemen, their intention was
only to compel the parents of Esteban, the runaway, to look for him, thus using pressure on them through the seizure of a creature of tender age, for the
purpose of compelling the runaway Esteban to make his appearance, because the Gemefino family owed them 100 pesos.

The important question which this cause offers is, How should the crime which the commissions of such acts implies, be classified? The complaint merely refers
to the crime as that of kidnapping, prescribed and punished in article 484 of the Penal Code, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The abduction of a child under 7 years of age shall be punished with the penalty of cadena temporal" (imprisonment for a number of years).

The commentators do not agree as to whether such facts as have been proven in this cause constitute a violation of said article. Apparently, Viada thinks
affirmatively, since at page 288 of volume of his commentaries to the code, he says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The object of the provision contained in this article is to punish severely the sequestration of children, which unfortunately is still too frequently committed,
either for the purpose of obtaining ransom from the afflicted parents, or to employ the child as victim of vile passions, or to make of it a puppet-player or the
like, or for the purpose of imploring public charity, etc.

"The abduction being carried out for any of the above-mentioned objects, or for others similar to them, the victim being a child of either sex under the age of 7,
whether it was effected by means of violence or by fraud, we have the crime herein defined and punished with cadena temporal, to its full extent."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Pacheco, commenting on article 408 of the Penal Code of 1850, which is the equivalent of article 484 of the present code in force in these Islands, states on
page 249 of the third volume of his commentaries, the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The abduction of a child, whatever may have been the reasons inducing thereto, is a crime of unusual gravity by itself, of great perversity on the part of the
person who commits it. Whether it be to cause him injury, and even if it were to do him good, it is always a step which attacks the holiest and most intimate
affections, and the most sacred rights. The law has at all times and in every country looked upon it with just severity, a and the article under examination
finishes it, as it should be punished, with one of the heaviest penalties which the code inflicts. This is more than the detention referred to by us in the preceding
chapter, a and there would be no justice if it were not punished more severely.

"We do not believe that any difficulty will occur in applying this article. Would any person who seized a child for the sole purpose of locking it up and depriving
him of liberty, unless afterwards returned to liberty or to its parents, fall within the provisions of the same? No. Such an action comes under the provisions of
articles 405 and 406, which are equivalent to articles 481 and 482 of the Penal Code now in force. The question at issue here is the abduction of a child for the
purpose of keeping it, or to cause it to lose all notion regarding its origin, the possession of its true and actual existence. It is like the alleged custom of gypsies,
or what a person desiring to suppress the rights of others might do, and for such purposes abducts minors and when in possession of them finds that they are
an obstacle to him."cralaw virtua1aw library

Groizard has evidently the same opinion as Pacheco, since at page 575 of volume 5 of his commentaries he says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The crime of abduction of a minor, in view of these reasons and on account of the indications made by us in the introduction of this chapter, has no reason to
be thus considered in most of the cases, according to the literal terms of this article. In our opinion, its special meaning should be limited to include only such
parties who abduct minors for purposes other than to obtain ransom, for unchaste designs, to change the status of the abducted party, or to commit any other
crime expressly defined and punished by the code."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the culpability of the indicted parties as principals, justly convicted of the crime of illegal detention, has been fully proven, although
they had no manifest intention of retaining the child permanently, or to cause him to absolutely disappear from the home of his parents, but simply to keep him
until Esteban, the abducted child’s brother, who had run away from the house of the accused, appeared and returned to their service. For this reason we adopt
the view taken by Pacheco in his commentaries, and hold that the act committed by the accused is not included within article 484, but is covered by article 481
of the Penal Code now in force.
The question at issue is a crime against the liberty and safety of a person, and the complaint states facts which actually constitute the crime of illegal detention,
and not that of abduction of a minor, as it has been wrongfully termed by the provincial fiscal. In view of the fact that such an error in the classification does not
affect any of the rights which the penal law insures to the accused, and whereas the court, upon accepting the opinion of the judge who rendered the decision,
considers the offense under a light which, in its opinion, leads to a more exact and proper interpretation of the law, to the benefit of the accused, because of
the fact that the penalty is comparatively lower, it is proper, as we deem it, that the accused be punished in accordance with the provisions of the first
paragraph of said article 481, in its medium degree, because no mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present.

Nor can the lesser penalty prescribed in the third paragraph of said article be applied, since it has not been shown that the accused spontaneously set at liberty
the child that they had so cruelly abducted. The liberation, on the contrary, was ordered by the authorities after proceedings had been commenced upon the
strength of the information filed by his own father.

Therefore, basing our opinion on the facts above set forth, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed and the accused, Quirino Peralta and Vicente
Peralta, are each sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, to the accessories prescribed by article 61 of the code, and to pay one-
half of the costs in both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39051 June 29, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTINO DEL MUNDO, alias Commander Sumulong, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks, members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines.

Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong, admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim, Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio
captain of Barrio Balitucan, Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial
board member. (p. 11, Brief; p. 140, Rollo).

Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the trial court erred in convicting him
of the said complex crime and in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua (p. 12, Brief).

For his part, the Solicitor General submits that Del Mundo is guilty of that complex crime and should be sentenced to death.

The evidence shows that between five and six o'clock in the afternoon of October 13, 1969 Felixberto Macalino (alias Commander Berting), Numeriano Cabrera,
Bartolome Lacson, Fernando Macasaquit and four other persons, all armed with firearms, were in Barrio Balitucan, looking for Miranda. Not finding him in his
house, the armed group, accompanied by Ponciano Salvador, cruised around the barrio in a jeepney driven by Policarpio Avenir.

Near a brook around two hundred meters from Miranda's house, the group saw a truck driven by Miranda. Cabrera talked with Miranda who shortly thereafter
instructed Avenir to drive the truck to his (Miranda's) house. The group brought Miranda, whose hands were handcuffed (No. 19, Exh. D), to Barrio Sta. Lucia,
Magalang and delivered him to Commander Joe Bombay, Commander Mike and two persons.

The following day, October 14, Faustino del Mundo and Ricardo Pangilinan brought Miranda in a jeepney to Sitio Cauayan, Barrio Pampang, Angeles City. After
the jeepney was parked near a bamboo grove, Del Mundo interrogated Miranda in the presence of Maximo Licup, Tomas Licup, Dionisio Angeles, Domingo
Ocampo and Bernardo Pineda (son-in-law of Del Mundo, Exh. B-1) who had followed the jeepney upon Del Mundo's instruction. Del Mundo asked Miranda why
he was fighting Tiglao. After Miranda denied that imputation, Del Mundo boxed him. Del Mundo threatened to kill him if he did not tell the truth.

Meanwhile, Angeles, Ocampo, Tomas Licup and Maximo Licup started digging a grave. As Miranda persisted in his denials, Del Mundo directed Pangilinan to
bind Miranda and bring him near the grave. Pangilinan complied. Del Mundo told Miranda to say his prayers.

While Miranda was praying, Maximo Licup, acting on a signal given by Del Mundo, struck Miranda with a pipe. Miranda fell into the grave. Del Mundo told him
that he (Miranda) would rot in the grave for not telling the truth. Angeles, Ocampo and the two Licups covered the grave. Then, Del Mundo and his companion
left the place.

The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the Huks. He supported Rafael
Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate (No. 15, Exh. 1-Cabrera).

More than six months later, or on May 8, 1970, a team of Constabulary soldiers, acting on the information furnished by Pineda, ordered some detainees to
exhume the body of Miranda in Barrio Cauayan. Two corpses in an advanced state of decomposition but with the clothes partly preserved were exhumed in the
spot where Miranda was buried. The city health officer issued an exhumation report wherein he noted that one of the skulls showed the absence of six upper
teeth and a linear fracture in the upper jaw and that the nasal bones were fractured (Exh. A).

Miranda's skeletonized remains were Identified by his wife, Eufracia Quiambao, and by his brother, Domingo. Eufracia recognized the cadaver as that of her
husband because of his clothes and the fact that his molars were missing. Domingo confirmed the absence of the six molars which, according to him, were
removed by the dentist when Miranda was still single. Domingo also Identified the body by means of the hair which was reddish. On the basis of that
Identification, a death certificate was issued and the Government Service Insurance System paid Miranda's wife P5,000 as the insurance compensation due to
the heirs of a barrio captain who was killed.

Even before that exhumation, or on January 24, 1970, a Constabulary investigator filed, in connection with the killing of Miranda, in the municipal court of
Magalang a complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against Cabrera, Macasaquit, Lacson, Commander Berting and four other persons. The
complaint was based on the statements of Salvador and Avenir (Exh. 1-Cabrera and Exh. 1-Macalino).

On November 4, 1970, another Constabulary investigator filed an amended complaint for kidnapping with murder. Del Mundo and others were included in the
amended complaint. Del Mundo (Tanda) was supposed to be the second highest officer of the Huks (No. 9, Exh. C). The case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance at Angeles City. On June 18, 1971, the fiscal filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at San Fernando, Pampanga an information for kidnapping with murder
against Del Mundo, Pangilinan, Macasaquit, Cabrera, Macalino, Angeles, Lacson, Ernesto Meneses, Leonardo Salas, Domingo Ocampo, Maximo Licup, Tomas
Licup and others not Identified.

Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with Pangilinan, Macasaquit and
Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas
died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed.

His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him (p. 9, Brief).

That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was forcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for several hours and was then
brought to another place where he was killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already being prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him,
caused him to fall into his grave.

We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective. From the surrounding
circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was
intended to terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.

Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for
that offense.
The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209 and other cases).

Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the
graver penalty for kidnapping, which is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo
(Parulan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 855; People vs. Parulan, 88 Phil. 615, 624).

This case has some parallelism with People vs. Umali and De la Cruz, 100 Phil. 1095, where the accused, who with 47 companions, kidnapped three persons on
the night of September 20, 1948 in Barlis, Cabanatuan City and took them to Barrio Buliran of the same city where they were killed, was found guilty of three
separate and distinct complex crimes of kidnapping with murder.

However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78) years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him (Art. 83, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in article 40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27352 October 31, 1969
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN ABLAZA, defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Crim. Case No. 13526) convicting therein accused Ruben Ablaza for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death with all the accessory penalties set by law.

In an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Ruben Ablaza, John Doe and Peter Doe were accused of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, said to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of March 1963, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being then private individuals, conspiring, and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, take and carry away and detain one Annabelle Huggins a female, 20 years of age, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle.

The prosecution, through its lone witness, complainant Annabelle Huggins, tried to establish that in November, 1962 accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her
from her aunt's place in Caloocan City and brought her to a house in a barrio in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she was criminally abused by her abductor. After her
rescue by the Philippine Constabulary men, a criminal case for forcible abduction with rape was filed against Ablaza in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

On 22 March 1963, and while that case in Bulacan was still pending, Annabelle Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt's house in Makati, Rizal, was
again grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a taxicab where a third man, who turned out to be Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle sped away before
anybody could come to the aid of the struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle was seated at the rear between Ablaza and a companion; her head was pressed
down to the floor of the taxi, with Ablaza covering her mouth with his hand to prevent her from crying out for help. She was first brought to the house of
Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan, but then, informed that the police were already in their pursuit, she was moved to the house of another compadre, where she
was kept for a week. Later, at the instance of Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to Bulacan to ask for the complaint against him be dropped. This did not materialize,
because when they were inside the Malolos municipal building Annabelle's uncle, in company of Constabulary men, came and took her. She also testified that
for the duration of her detention the accused and his compadres were always guarding her to prevent her escape.1

For the defense, only accused Ruben Ablaza took the witness stand, and gave an entirely different version of the incident. According to this accused, in 1962, he
and complainant Annabelle Huggins were sweethearts; that as Annabelle was complaining of being maltreated by her aunt, they decided to elope, which they
did in November, 1962. He and Annabelle stayed in the house of his uncle in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where they were later found by the police authorities.
Thereafter, he was charged for abduction with rape before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

Sometime in March, 1963, he received a letter from Annabelle asking him to get her from her aunt's residence in Makati, Rizal (Exhibit "1"). The accused took a
taxicab and went to the place indicated in the letter, and there he saw Annabelle; that, at his call, she came near and entered the cab with him; that they agreed
to get married, but upon complainant's suggestion, they first went to Malolos so she could drop the case against him; that when they were in the municipal
building, however, the Philippine Constabulary men and the aunt arrived and Annabelle changed her mind. With the above testimonies, both parties rested
their cases.

On 7 March 1967, the court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and sentenced him to death. In reaching this verdict, the lower court said:

In deciding and resolving the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, Ruben Ablaza, this Court more than ever realizes its grave responsibility of
ascertaining the truth and finding the real facts as the accused is charged with a capital offense. The task of fact-finding in this particular case is delicate and
difficult because all that the Court has before it are the directly conflicting testimonies of the complaining witness, Annabelle Huggins, and the accused, Ruben
Ablaza, and our Decision will essentially be predicated on testimonial credibility.

Simply stated, the question is: who of the two, Annabelle or Ruben Ablaza, is telling the truth?

Several factors or circumstances lead us to believe and find that Annabelle Huggins is the one who told the truth.

The decision then went on to state that it was the complainant's sincerity and frankness while she was on the witness stand, coupled by her timidity and
modesty, that convinced the court that the events as narrated by her were the true facts.

As correctly designated by the accused himself, the issue in this review of the aforesaid judgment of the court below revolves around the credibility of
witnesses, i.e., whether or not the trial court was correct in giving more weight to the testimony of the complainant and in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged and sentencing him to death.

The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is by now settled. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court.2 For, having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witness while testifying, the
trial court more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting
evidence for both parties.3

In the present case, there is no reason for us to overrule the judgment of the trial judge giving credence to the declarations of the complainant. The records of
the case are convincing that the complainant's testimony on the facts of her kidnapping on 22 March 1963, and of her detention for a week, rang of truth. Not
only was her narration of the events coherent and plausible, and remained unshattered by the cross examination by the defense counsel, but also no motive
has been adduced by this witness, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore, would have wanted least public exposure of her
harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the accused, other than the desire to tell the
truth. Her reluctance after her marriage to publicize her harrowing experiences with the accused is attested by the warrant for her arrest, issued by the trial
court on 16 January 1967 (Record, Court of First Instance, pages 90-91), that left her no alternative but to take the witness stand on 18 January.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code —

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days;

xxx xxx xxx

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be minor, female, or a public officer.

xxx xxx xxx

The accused, however, assails the decision finding him guilty of kidnapping defined and penalized by the above-quoted provision. It is being claimed that
considering the testimony of complainant that she was raped by the accused while in the house of the latter's compadre in Caloocan, and again while in the
house of his uncle in Bulacan, he (the accused) should have been adjudged guilty of abduction with rape instead.

There is no merit in the allegation. The accused stood trial for kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of complainant's liberty, which is
the essential element of the offense,4 was duly proved. That there may have been other crimes committed in the course of the victim's confinement is
immaterial to this case. The kidnapping became consummated when the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the
prosecution of the herein accused under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The surrounding circumstances make it clear that the main purpose of
Annabelle's detention was to coerce her into withdrawing her previous charges against appellant Ablaza, thus obstructing the administration of justice. The acts
of rape were incidental and used as a means to break the girl's spirit and induce her to dismiss the criminal charge.

While the accused presented a letter which he claimed to have been sent him by the complainant asking him to take her away, the authorship of said missive
was not established. Appellant's personal belief that it came from her is not enough, considering that he made no attempt to even show his familiarity with her
handwriting or her signature. Hence, the lower court was correct in giving no weight to said document.

It is likewise contended that it was error for the lower court to consider the aggravating circumstance of motor vehicle as attending the commission of the
crime, the prosecution allegedly having failed to substantiate this allegation of the information. The contention is untenable. Contrary to the protestation of the
accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle, which facilitated the taking away of the complainant and her consequent detention, was established not only by the
latter's declaration in court but also by the accused's own admission that he took away the said complainant from her aunt's residence in Makati, Rizal, in a
taxicab.5

Considering, therefore, the extant evidence on record, we fully agree with the trial court that accused Ruben Ablaza has committed the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of the person of complainant Annabelle Huggins. The offense being attended by one aggravating circumstance, the use of motor
vehicle, with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code should be imposed in its maximum period.
The Court is thus left no alternative but to confirm the death penalty imposed by the court below.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-37908 October 23, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. BENJAMIN ONG y KHO, and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS y SUMALJAG previously convicted as affirmed in G.R.
No. L-34497, accused, BLDOMERO AMBORSIO, alias "VAL", Defendant-appellant.chanrobles virtual law library

On the night of April 23, 1971, victim Henry Chua was last seen alive in the company of his friend Benjamin Ong. As Chua failed to return to his home,his family,
alarmed by his mysterious desappearance, sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Manila Police Department, and the Philippine
Constabulary to locate him. Knowing that Bajamin Ong was the last person with Chua before the disappearance of the latter, the NBI tried to contact Ong. Ong
also disappeared, so the various police agnecies began a manhunt for the apprehension of Ong.chanrobles virtual law library

Banjamin Ong was apprehended on August 29, 1971, in Stio patanda, Barrio Balugo, Oas, albay, Brouth to Ligao, Albay, Ong denied any knowledge of the
desappearance of Chua. When Ong was transferred to CampVicente Lim in Laguna, he attempted to commit suicide. On September 1, 1971, when Ong was
turned over to the NBI for investigation, he unhesitatingly confessed his responsiblity for the killing of Henry Chua. Ong implicated Bienvienido Quintos as one of
his companions in the cirme. When quintos was arrested he also admitted his participation in the crime, and pointed to Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio
as their companions in the perpetration of the crime, stating the details of its execution.chanrobles virtual law library

Based on the confessions of Ong and Quintos, the NBI and the Manila Police Department were able to recover the body of Henry Chua in a state of advanced
decomposition. The Identity of the body of Chua was confirmed by Siy Giap Chua, brother of Henry. 1 both Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried
(CCC-VII-922-Rizal, for "kidnapping with Murder") and convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, Seventh, Judicial District, (Judge Onofre A.Villaluz)
in the "Sentence", dated October 11, 1971. 2 As both Ong and Quintos were sentenced to death, the criminal case was elevated on automatic review to this
Court (G.R. No. L-34497). This Court in its decision dated January 30, 1975, 3 found the two accused Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and use of motor vehicle offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analoguous to passion or obfuscation, thereby imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both of them. 4 Said decision became final and executory on February 19, 1975. 5

At the time Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried and convicted by the trial court, accused Baldomero Ambrosio and Fernando Tan, Alias Oscar Tan,
were still at large. 6

After the arrest of accused Baldomero Ambrosio sometime in August of 1972, 7 an information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against him, to wit:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Benjamin Ong y Kho, Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag, Fernando Tan alias "Oscar Tan", and Baldomero Ambrosio alias
"Val" of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder, committed as follows:

That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above named accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating totether and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known premeditation and for the purpose of killing one Henry Chua and thereafter extorting money from
his family through the use of a ransom note, kidnapped and carried away said Henry Chua, initially by means of friendly gestures and later through the use of
force, in an automobile, and later after having taken him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan City, with the use of force detained him (Henry Chua) and killed
him in the following manner, to wit: The accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua and repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if he
would write and sign a ransom note for the payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would not be killed and would be released upon receipt of
the ransom note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region, several times with an ice-pick, inflicting
upon him (Henry Chua) mortal wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death.chanrobles virtual law library

All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:

(a) Evident premeditations;

(b) Grave abuse of confidence;

(c) Nighttime;

(d) Use of an motor vehicle ;

(e) Use of uperior strenght;

(f) Cruelty. 8

The accused Baldomero Ambrosio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on August 26, 1972, was tried, and the trial court rendered its decision dated October
17, 1973, with dispositive portion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Baldomero Ambrosio, Guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidanapping with Murder as defined under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267 thereto, as charged in the Information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral damges in the amount of P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00 as exemplary
damges jointly and severally with Benjamin Ong and Bienvienido Quintos; and to pay his proportionable share of the costs.chanrobles virtual law library

So Ordered. 9

The evidence for the prosecution, essentially the same as presented and reviewed by automatic appeal, by this Court in G.R. No. L,34497, established its version
as follows:

Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that he conducted the autopsy of the deceased Henry Chua, and
prepared the necropsy report Exh. "M". The body of the deceased at the time of the autopsy was already in a far advanced state of decomposition. The brains,
lungs. and other soft tissues of the body were already tot:ally decomposed while some of the internal organs, like the heart and the liver were already autolized.
Dr. Ibarrola located two stab wounds on the liver, caused by a sharp pointed piercing implement, most probably an ice-pick. He attributed death to these stab
wounds, although he gave the considered opinion that death could have been hastened by asphyxiation as the probability existed that Henry Chua was by alive.
10

The body of Henry Chua was Identified by his brother, Siy Giap who was present when the body was exhumed from a shallow grave in Barrio Makatipo Caloocan
City. His Identification of the body was based on the clothes and shoes worn by the deceased, as well as the personal effects found on it, including an expensive
Piaget white gold watch, a lighter, a wallet with driver's license, Diner's card and other personal papers. 11

Agents Enrique Lacanilao and Diego Gutierrez of the National Bureau of Investigation investigated the accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos. The
original and supplementary extrajudicial confessions of Ong and Quintos 12 which led to the successful discovery of the place where Henry Chua was buried and
the subsequent exhumation of the body 13 were Identified by these agents. These witnesses also revealed the recovery of the rope with which Chua's hands
were tied and the flannel cloth with which he was gagged when he was killed. 14 Both agents testified on the re-enactment of the crime." 15 In the course of
investigation of accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos, the accused Baldomero Ambrosio was implicated. When accused Ambrosio was arrested in
August of 1972, he was brought to the NBI office by the Chief of Police of Batan, Aklan. Ambrosio voluntarily gave the extrajudicial statement Exhibit "S". 16

Ceferino Castro of the Baliwag Police Department narrated the discovery of Henry Chua's Mustang car with Plate No. 1602 which was abandoned near a
gasoline station at barrio They, Baliwag, Bulacan. The pictures of the car were identified. 17

Patrolman Marciano Roque of the Caloocan City Police Department, narrated the alleged plan to kin Chua as initiated by Benjamin Ong. Roque knew Ong for
more than five years as the Assistant Manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber and Plastic Corporation, a company situated in Caloocan City, owned by Ong's
brother-in-law Chua Pak. During the first week of April, 1971, Roque went to the Acme office to get a pair of rubber sandals. Benjamin Ong invited Roque for a
ride in Ong's car, where Ong revealed his plan to kidnap a person who allegedly cheated Ong in gambling games. Roque tried to discourage Ong from carrying
out his plan. The latter insisted and asked Roque to assist him during the several meetings that followed between Ong and Roque. Roque claimed he was taken
by Ong to Barrio Matipo, Caloocan City, and shown the place where Ong planned to bury the person he planned to kidnap and kill. In one of the meetings
between Roque and Ong, the former saw a man seated at the rear of Ong's car and the latter referred to that man as his godson who will help him in the
execution of the crime. That man turned out to be the accused Baldomero Ambrosia Ong tried to persuade Roque to join the plan as the father of the intended
victim happens to be a very rich man and the ransom money they expected to get would enable Roque to leave the police force and retire. Roque tried to avoid
Ong and urged the latter to forget the matter. 18

Bienvenido Quintos who was previously accused and convicted of the crimes," of murder, 19 implicated Balintawak. Ambrosio when the former testified in his
defense during that trial of CCC-VII-922-Rizal against Ong and Quintos. 20 Quintos stated that he could recognize his co-accused, then at large, Fernando Tan
and Baldomero Ambrosia On April 23, 1971, Quintos and Tan met Ong and Ambrosio at the Barrio Fiesta restaurant in Caloocan City. At about 9:00 p.m. they
went to the Brown Derby restaurant at Quezon Boulevard Extension, riding in the Chevrolet car of Ong. They , proceeded afterwards to Roxas Boulevard where
Ong ordered his driver Ambrosio to stop at the Amihan Night Club. While Ambrosio and Quintos stayed in the car, Ong and Tan went inside the night club. Tan
returned to the car and invited Quintos to go to the nearby Wigwam Night Club. After a while, Tan and Quintos returned. Tan sat beside the driver Ambrosio
while Quintos sat at the rear seat. They followed another car - a Mustang - from Dewey Boulevard to Cruelty Hall, then to Quiapo, Espana and Quezon
Boulevard Extension, Quezon City. They passed Sto. Domingo Church, made a U-turn, and turned right to Talayan Village. Quintos saw the car they were
following stop in a dark place, and Ambrosio alighted from their Chevrolet car. Tan pulled a gun as he went to the other parked car - the Mustang. Quintos
followed the two and he saw Tan approach and point a gun at a man while Ambrosio pulled that man out of the Mustang. That man was the victim, Henry Chua.
Tan and Ambrosio forced Chua to the rear seat of the Chevrolet car, then compelled him to lie down on the floor. Ambrosio took a rope and tied the feet and
hands of the victim, while Tan took a flannel cloth and gagged that man. They took the route going to San Francisco del Monte Avenue. In the meantime, Ong
rode in the Mustang car and followed them. They, all went to Novaliches road. At a narrow street along the way both cars stopped. Tan and Ambrosio took the
victim from the car as Ong arrived. That man was made to walk and then made to lie down face up. Ong gave Tan an ice-pick and ordered "patayin na iyan " (kill
him already), who in turn gave the ice-pick to Ambrosia For his part, Ambrosio gave the ice-pick to Quintos. However, Quintos returned it to Tan, who said
"Hindi ka pa pala puwede " (You are not capable yet). Whereupon, Tan told Ambrosio to focus a flashlight on the center of the front side of the body of Henry
Chua. Tan stabbed Chua twice on the chest. While Tan lighted their way, Ambrosio carried the upper portion of the body, while Quintos carrying the lower
portion. When Quintos got tired, Tan gave him the flashlight while Tan and Ambrosio carried the body to a hole. The hole was covered by Ambrosio Ong then
stepped repeatedly over the covered hole to compress the earth. They, returned to the car. Ong drove the Mustang car together with Tan. Quintos and
Ambrosio rode in the Chevrolet car, driven by the latter. They, followed the Mustang to the highway. Later, it was parked and abandoned near a gasoline
station. Then Ong and Tan joined Quintos and Ambrosio in the Chevrolet and they proceeded to Manila. 21

The version of the defense is as follows:

Accused Baldomero Ambrosio stated that in 1971, he was a family driver of Roger Chen, and before that employment, he worked for seven years at the Acme
Shoes Rubber Corporation. Accused Benjamin Ong was the manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation while the accused Tan was a supervisor in the same
company. Ambrosio alleged that Tan was a man of bad reputation, involved in a killing incident and kidnapping of a woman. 22
In the evening of April 23, 1971, Ong, with Tan and Quintos, picked up Ambrosio from his place so that the latter could drive for Ong. They, went to a restaurant
at Balintawak known as Barrio Fiesta. They then went to the Amihan Night Club at the Dewey Boulevard. Ong, Quintos and Tan alighted from the car while
Ambrosia remained in the car and he slept. (Barrio trio woke up Ambrosio at about 1:00 a.m. Tan and Quintos rode with Ambrosio where Ong was riding. They
went towards Espana. At the Araneta Avenue, the car where Ong was riding stopped. Tan ordered Ambrosio to stop in front of the car. Tan and Quintos went to
the other car. Tan introduced himself as a policeman, then he opened the door of the car and pulled the driver out. 23

'The narration of Ambrosio as to how the crimes," happened substantially coincided in details to the manner it was described by Quintos. 24 Ambrosia however,
claimed that he did not participate voluntarily in the crime, but rather he was ordered by Tan as to all the acts he did during the execution of the
offense.chanrobles virtual law library

Accused Ambrosio admitted that at about 4:00 p.m. of April 24, 1971, he and his wife went to Arayat, Pampanga. They, stayed two days in Arayat, then he
proceeded to his brother's place in Balintawak. He then went to Aklan up to the time he. 25 He denied that Ong pointed was arrested in August of 1972. to him
as a godson in the presence of Patrolman Roque. 26 Ambrosio likewise denied that even before April 23, 1971, he was already with Ong, Quintos and Tan and
that Ambrosio already dug that hole in Novaliches where the body of Chua was placed. 27

He also claimed that the extrajudicial statement Exhibit S " was signed by him because he was maltreated. 28

The principal thrust of the defense's argument that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case (complex crimes," of
kidnapping with murder) because its jurisdiction as a Circuit Criminal Court is limited to ... (a) crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and
crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complex with other crimes," and kidnapping is not one of
the crimes that may be tried and decided by that court, becomes of no moment when this Court in G.R. No. 34497 ruled that Ong and Quintos were guilty of
murder and not kidnapping with murder. 29 The co-accused of Ambrosio were, therefore, tried and convicted of the crimes," of murder, a crimes," against
persons, certainly within the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal court that rendered judgment in this case.chanrobles virtual law library

The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the accused Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime. That the crimes," of
murder was committed has already been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt when this Court convicted Ong and Quintos in G.R. No. L-
34497. This Court already ruled that "Conspiracy, connivance and unity of purpose and intention among the accused were present throughout in the execution
of this crime. The four participated in the planning and execution of the crimes," and were at the scene in all its stages. They cannot escape the consequences of
any of their acts even if they deviated in some detail from what they originally thought of. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every
detail of the execution. Thus, treachery should be considered against all persons participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime." 30

The defense of the accused Ambrosio that he was an unwilling participant in the killing of Henry Chua because of threats made by Fernando Tan, to Our mind,
cannot be given credence. Quintos, as shown in his testimony, (Exh. "1") by narrated how Ambrosio participated in the crime, manifesting voluntariness in his
acts throughout the execution of the same. Ambrosio was the one who pulled Chua from the Mustang car. Ambrosio provided the rope and tied the hands and
feet of Chua. He was the one who drove the car with the victim inside to that place in Novaliches where they by Chua after killing him. He focused the flashlight
on the chest of the victim when Tan stabbed him. He helped carry the victim to the hole where he was buried, and Ambrosio covered the hole with earth using
a spade. Exhibit "I" for the defense is certainly binding on it.chanrobles virtual law library

Ambrosio admitted that he went to different places and to Aklan after the crimes," was committed, and he was arrested only in August of 1972, nearly two
years after the crimes," was committed. He never revealed to the authorities the crimes," that he alleged to be an unwilling participant of in that long span of
time. He also admitted that there were at least two times when he could have escaped from the group of Ong when the crimes," was being executed and yet
Ambrosio never did so. During the execution of the felon', Ambrosio never by act or deed protested to the group regarding its cruel commission. We also cannot
fully understand why Ambrosio had to join the group of Tan, if according to Ambrosia himself, Tan was a man of bad reputation. 31 Tan has never been
apprehended. The defense of Ambrosio that he was threatened by Tan to participate in the crimes," stands uncorroborated, as contradicted by the testimony of
Quintos.The inevitable conclusion is that Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime.chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court did not err in discrediting Ambrosio's claim that he was maltreated by the agents of the law to extract his extra-judicial statement. (Exhs. "S"). He
never did protest the alleged maltreatment before the Regional Director Nestor Gonzales before whom he signed the statement. Although he had all the
chances to do so, he never filed charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him. 32 The confession of the accused Exhibits "S" is, therefore,
admissible against him.chanrobles virtual law library

As to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, this Court already ruled in G.R. No. L-34497, that treachery
(alevosia) qualified the killing of Chua to murder. Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged when he was stabbed twice with an ice-pick. Chua was
defenseless and helpless enabling the accused to commit the crimes," without risk to them. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery because in this crimes," treachery arose from
the defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while nighttime was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate immunity in the commission of the
crime. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado) is also present, due to the deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio Makatipo
Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim. Abuse of confidence cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance present in the crime,
because it does not appear that the victim Chua ever reposed confidence on Ong. Chua knew that he was far stronger in money and influence than Ong. The
fact that Henry Chua invited Ong night clubbing on that fatal evening and accommodated the latter in his car did not show that Chua had confidence in
Ong.chanrobles virtual law library

The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes," can be considered present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to
trail the victim's car and to facilitate the commission of the crimes," and the escape of the accused.chanrobles virtual law library

Cruelty (ensañamiento) cannot be considered because there is no evidence that the victim Chua was by while still alive to make him suffer.chanrobles virtual
law library

Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused meditated, planned, and tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of
the crime.chanrobles virtual law library

Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analogous to passion and obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened
Ong for non-payment of debt arising from gambling, causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34

Taking into consideration the above aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ong was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 35 Accused Quintos, although no
mitigating circumstance could be appreciated in his favor, was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Ong and Quintos were also sentenced "jointly and severally
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the amount of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 36

The present case (G.R. No. L-37908) already pending review iii this Court when G.R. No. L-34497 was decided on January 30, 1975, should have been decided
together with the latter case, as they arose from the same crime, involving the same accused.chanrobles virtual law library

It is Our considered view that the accused Baidomero Ambrosio stands in this case on a similarly situated position as convicted accused Bienvenido Quintos in
G.R. No. L-34497, and should, therefore be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and not death.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated October 17, 1973, is hereby, MODIFIED, finding the accused Baidomero Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetual to indemnify jointly and severally with his co-accused, the heirs of the deceased Henry
Chua in the asphyxiation of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay his
proportionate share of the costs.chanrobles virtual law library

SOORDERED.

Fernando, C.J, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006 Decision1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) Judgment2 in Criminal
Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo Macias (Macias) and several John Does were charged in three separate Informations, which read as
follow:

In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and
detain the minor, JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom
for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of ₱1,320,000.00 in cash and ₱175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber
Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents.3

In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and
detain the minor, JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom
for his release, which after payment thereof in the amount of ₱1,320,000.00 in cash and ₱175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber
Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents.4

In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:

That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away and
detain NIMFA CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her of liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for her release, which after payment thereof
in the amount of ₱1,320,000.00 in cash and ₱175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused between and/or among themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victim.5

The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.6 Finally, the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996. Appellant and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels,
however refused to enter a plea. This prompted the RTC to enter a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police
Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as
follows:

At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves
family, together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for
Yusan, Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one woman
described as a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and accused him of hitting the son of a
Presidential Security Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless
jeep while the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson Kevin was sitting on
the tomboy’s lap. They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque.7

While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to the secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they were in
Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car undetected and after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside
the comfort room.8

Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He received a call from his wife asking him if Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for
them at Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier. After 15 minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical because she could not find the car when
she roamed around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his sons were missing. When Jepson
arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their whereabouts. When Jepson got
back to his office, his secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them that he has custody of the children and demanded ₱26 Million.9

Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He asked Nimfa for information regarding her name and her
employer’s telephone number. She feigned ignorance of those information. She even claimed that she was merely a new employee.10 Sarge informed Nimfa
that they were in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go home. Nimfa chose to stay with her wards. When the phone rang, Sarge went out of
the house and Nimfa again sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that they were being held up in Merville Subdivision.11

Jepson, through Jaime’s help, went to the house of then Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at 8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel
Canson (Gen. Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue
Jepson’s sons and arrest the kidnappers.12

At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to ₱10 Million.13 That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two men handed the
telephone to her. She recognized one of them as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer’s office sometime in the first week of December
1993.14
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was
able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked for at least a hundred times during a
span of two to four years.15

On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of ₱1.5 Million. Jepson offered ₱1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as
jewelry and a pistol.16 Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson
and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off.17

At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk to Jepson and the latter informed her that they would be released that afternoon.18 At 3:00 p.m.,
Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the money inside a gray bag and put it
on the backseat. Jepson received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for
ten (10) minutes without turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and
helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the
corner of the gas station.19

P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center, together with two other police officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and
positioned themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off. He took a
total of 24 shots.20 He identified Macias together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one who took the ransom.21

P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati on 22 December 1993 to take a video coverage on the
supposed pay-off. He witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money from the car trunk of Jepson.22

P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and one of the team leaders of Special Project Task Force
organized on 22 December 1993 with the primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves’ children and helper. His group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio to await instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received
information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed. They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they
heard on their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it
reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately
approached the vehicle.23

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a
scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside.
P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp Crame for questioning.24

At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the
office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was
asked to identify them.25

A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the bag.26 It was found out that a portion of the ransom money was missing. It was then that appellant
revealed that the missing money was in the possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his team to the residence of Macias in Camp
Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed him under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom
money was and Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized property from
Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt.27

Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville Subdivision where the kidnap victims were detained. She stated that she leased the house to appellant.
On 23 December 1993, it came to her knowledge that said house was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of the comfort room was reversed so
that it could only be locked from the outside. She considered this unusual because she personally caused the door knob to be installed.28

The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr. Leal), and retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).

Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989 as the importer of police equipment and accessories.
Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who was then selling his security agency in
July 1993. He admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his total borrowings amounted to ₱8.5 Million in December 1993. Appellant
also knew Nimfa since 1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson where Nimfa usually served him coffee.29

In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to
said place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.

At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson asking for ₱1 Million, as partial payment of his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons
were kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity, appellant agreed. He actively
participated in the negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully negotiated a lower ransom of ₱1.5 Million.

On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to the kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He
asked Macias, who was in his office that day, to accompany him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the Makati area and wait for further instructions.
Appellant called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the money to appellant once instructions were given by the kidnappers. The kidnappers finally
called and asked appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter asked appellant to meet him in
Magallanes Commercial Center where he would just put the money inside the car trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money from Jepson’s car and
put it inside his car trunk and proceeded to Shell Gasoline station.30 Appellant and Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepson’s children at the station. He
tried calling Jepson but failed to communicate with him. They then decided to go back to the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he received a call from
the kidnappers who were cursing him because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline Station and noticed that there were many policemen stationed in the
area, which prompted them to release the victims. Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go home in Dasmariñas Village, Makati. When he was about
ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt. Rodica and two other men alight from the car and
were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him with their firearms.31

Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December 1993 when she was told by the secretary, who appeared shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant.
She saw appellant arrive at the office with Macias.32

Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the medico-legal certificate of appellant and testified that the
injuries of appellant could have been sustained during the scuffle.33

Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was privy to the loan transactions between appellant and Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter.
He even served as guarantor of some of the obligations of appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case
against Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, wherein the latter was eventually acquitted.34
While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.35

On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for
three (3) counts together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the amount of ₱150,000.00 as
moral damages.

The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan Sentra 4-Door Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the
government.

The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center, Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said
accused to the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is ordered to inform this court in writing soonest
as to when the said official took custody of the accused.36

The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the required quantum of evidence that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were present and
that appellant was the author of said crime.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo,37 this Court in a Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.38

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial Region, Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93-
132606, and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto Uyboco of three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.39

A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22 December 2006. Hence, this appeal.

On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25 October 2007, appellant’s counsel filed a withdrawal of
appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing a Supplemental Brief.40 Meanwhile, this Court appointed the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de
oficio for appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is merely adopting all the arguments in the appellant’s brief submitted before the Court of
Appeals.41

Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three (3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the disturbing whispers of doubt replete in the prosecution’s theory.

II. The trial court erred in giving credence to Nimfa Celiz’ testimony notwithstanding the incredibility of her story.

III. The trial court erred in presuming regularity in the performance of official functions over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused uyboco.

IV. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Jepson dichavez notwithstanding his displayed propensity for untruthfulness.

V. The trial court erred in admitting most of the object evidence presented against the accused-appellant since they were procured in violation of his
constitutional rights.

VI. The trial court erred in finding of fact that the Merville property leased by accused-appellant from ms. Carolina alejo was the very same house where nimfa
celiz and her wards were allegedly detained.

VII. The trial court erred in holding that accused uyboco as having participated in the abduction of jeson Kevin, jeson Kirby, and nimfa celiz as not a single
evidence on record supports the same.

VIII. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused considering that abduction, an important element of the crime, was never established against him.

IX. The trial court erred in holding the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom without discussing the participation of accused macias considering that the
charge was for conspiracy.42

The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts,
this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.

In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.43

We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court that these elements were proven by the prosecution, thus:

1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;

2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified persons/companions of accused Uyboco, referred to as John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private
complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their maid or "yaya" Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction
occurred at about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The three victims were on board Jepson’s Isuzu pick-up driven by Jepson’s driver Pepito Acon.
The moving pick-up was in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white t-shirt and brown vest
accosted driver Pepito for having allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general working at the Presidential Security Group. Pepito was made to ride in a
jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila, where the victims were illegally detained from December
20 to 23, 1993.

xxxx
3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the three victims was indubitably illegal. Their detention was not ordered by any competent authority but by the
private individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion for personal gain;

xxxx

5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents of the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get
the huge amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x x x.44

These facts were based on the narrations of the prosecution’s witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children
abducted and the person from whom ransom was extorted.

Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in the morning of 20 December 2003 and detained in a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque, thus:

A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded the pick-up and then we left, Sir.

xxxx

A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2) children and myself, Sir.

xxxx

A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.

xxxx

Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?

A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the street to go to Metrobank, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next?
A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself made a right turn and we entered an alley, Sir.

xxxx

Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any untowards incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: What?
A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian Church and Sta. Rita College there was a stainless jeep that block our path, Sir.
Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if you know?
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
Q:How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?
A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on the stainless jeep to stay on the side, sir.
Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign was made to him?
A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?

xxxx

A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct because when we then make a turn at Kentucky a stone was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG
from Malacañang, Sir.

xxxx

Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?

A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: Then what followed next?
A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from the stainless jeep boarded and he was the one who drove, Sir.

xxxx

A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird who also boarded on the passenger’s side, Sir.

xxxx

Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision, where did you proceed?
A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do not know and when we went straight as to my estimate we were going back to the main gate, Sir.

xxxx

A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the gate, Sir.
Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house which is low, what happened?
A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low house, Sir.
Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?
A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered the pick-up inside, Sir.

xxxx

Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?

A: When we entered the house we were confined at the comfort room, Sir.45

Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom from him and eventually got hold of the money, thus:
A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for 1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and then suddenly Uyboco was again the one continuing the conversation, Sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for my wife to talk to because according to him I was very hard to
talk too, Sir.

ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?
A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.
Q: What followed?
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x.

xxxx

Q: And after that what followed?

A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.
Q:Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5 million, Sir.
Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?
A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.
Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.
Q: How about the other balance?
A: My jewelry, Sir.46

xxxx

Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of the money, the jewelries, the gun and the bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.
Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?
A: The ₱1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted jewelries.
Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?
A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake House at the

Magallanes Commercial Center.

Q: Where did you place that bag?

A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when I was going to the Pancake House.

xxxx

Q: What else did he tell you?

A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my trunk compartment, leave it and lock the car, and walk away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q:After that instruction, what happened, or what did you do?
A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive and park the car beside the car Mitsubishi Colt Mirage with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.
Q: And then, what did you do?
A: I followed his instruction.
Q: And what followed next?
A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I am in front of the Mercury Drug Store already.
Q: And what was your answer?
A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards the Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: And?
A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.

ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: Did you comply with that instruction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back for more than ten (10) minutes.
Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how far was your car the parked form that Colt Mirage?
A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking back and then I turned to the back of the supermarket and I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is
gone already.
Q:And what followed thereafter?
A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my sons were at the shell station after the Magallanes Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.47

Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these witnesses by imputing inconsistencies, untruthfulness and incredibility in their testimonies.

Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated that on the day they were to be released, they, together
with Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias
and appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second, Nimfa could not properly identify the number of kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her
affidavit and during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun, but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible
that Nimfa was able to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe house because she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it was strange for Nimfa to
say that two persons, Macias and appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her. Sixth, it was
impossible for Nimfa to have access to an operational telephone while in captivity.48 The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as
immaterial, in this wise:

The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number; hence, the reference thereto would understandably vary. The rule is
that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their
veracity or the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and discrepancies of the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not of such nature as would warrant
the reversal of the decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz’ testimony as they erase
suspicion that the same was rehearsed.
The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or tied up their victims goes to show their brazenness in
perpetrating the crime. Besides, familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime improbable, but has in fact at
times even facilitated its commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable phone in the house where Celiz and the kids were held captive only proves
that, in this real world, mistakes or blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the
incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions. Verily, in committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom,
they adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the police authorities, the victim, and the family of the victims.49

Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of lying under oath when he claimed that appellant owed him only ₱2.3 Million when in fact, appellant
owed him ₱8.5 Million. Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying his closeness to him when in fact they had several business deals and Jepson would address
appellant as "Ernie." Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was supposedly talking to was
appellant. Finally, appellant claims that Jepson’s motive to maliciously impute a false kidnapping charge against him boils down to money. Among the
businesses that Jepson owns was along the same line of business as that of appellant, which is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate
competition and possibly procure all contracts from the PNP and considering his brother’s close association to then Vice-President Estrada, Jepson crafted and
executed a frame up of appellant.

And the Court of Appeals had this to say:

For one, the strategy used, which is the use of unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves’
children is, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise, the police operatives’ call or prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that said
agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall presume regularity in their performance of official duties and disregard Uyboco’s unsubstantiated claim that he
was framed up.

Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution and the determination of which evidence to present are not for Uyboco or even the trial
court to decide, but the same rests upon the prosecution. This is so since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly vests in the prosecution the
direction and control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution had other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently prove the case against Uyboco, its
non-presentation of other witnesses cannot be taken against the same.50

Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.51

We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both
pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them.
As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.52 While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in
a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the
basis of his decision.53

Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to instill doubt on the prosecution’s theory, thus:

If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping syndicate, why would he demand only ₱1.325M x x x as ransom? Why would he be the one to personally
pick-up the ransom money using his own car registered in his son’s name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom to check its contents? Why
would he be the one to personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any mask covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to his family residence x x x
with the ransom money still intact in the trunk of his car?

If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were they not tied x x x?

xxxx

If it is true that the house at Merville, Parañaque was used by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of the alleged detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the
lease contract under his own name? x x x Certainly, any person with the education attainment of at least high school degree, much more so an established
businessman like accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence.

x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x x Why is their story focused only on the day of the ransom
payment? Why did they not apply for a warrant of arrest against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly knew that from day 1, he was the kidnapper?

Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which recorded the conversations between the kidnappers x x x.54

Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as an established and well-off businessman negates any motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.

If we indulge appellant’s speculations, we could readily provide for the answers to all these questions – that appellant originally demanded ₱26 Million but this
had been substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the ransom money because he could not
trust anybody to do the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then out of fear, would deliver
as instructed; that appellant did not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant went back to his family
residence because he never thought that Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or tied
because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to the kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would be emboldened to escape; that appellant never
thought that the police would discover the place of detention; that the police employed a different strategy, which is to first secure the victims before they
apprehend the kidnappers; that to secure a warrant would be futile as the police then did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to the crime of
kidnapping; that there were no actual record of the telephone conversations between Jepson and the kidnappers.

However, to individually address each and every question would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of endless speculations, which do not have a place in a
court of law where proof or hard evidence takes precedence. On the other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and evidence to prove that kidnapping
occurred and that appellant is the author thereof.

Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument that he has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of
the police officers who participated in the operation. Appellant claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged detention, the police did not try to rescue
the kidnap victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan denies installing any listening device to record the conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson,
the interview made by a reporter for a television network shows that Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of appellant’s alleged negotiations for the
ransom with Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped conversations do exist.

Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview, if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of P/Supt. Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant
failed to prove the existence of the alleged taped conversations. The matters of failure of the police officer to properly document the alleged pay-off, the non-
production of the master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to debunk the presumption of
regularity. In the absence of proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on the credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over the
accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-up.55

Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search conducted inside his car in absence of a warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to
Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)

The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can
be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.56

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the
pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then
relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with
their own eyes.57

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed
appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.

Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that
appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but
also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person
of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.58 Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving
it when he was arrested.

Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was present and in fact participated in the abduction of the victims. Lacking this element, appellant should
have been acquitted. In a related argument, appellant contends that conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime, therefore, appellant’s
participation was not sufficiently established.

The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to wit:

The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the Dichaves’ children were kept was being leased by
Uyboco; 2) Uyboco was present in the said house at the time when Celiz and the Dichaves’ children were being kept thereat; 3) there being no evidence to the
contrary, Uyboco’s presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in his possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that Uyboco was the one who
told them that the balance of the ransom payment is with Macias. All these circumstances clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several unidentified
persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to commit kidnapping for ransom.

xxxx

x x x Uyboco’s claim, that since it was not proven that he was one of the passengers of the jeep which waylaid the Dichaves’ vehicle on December 20, 1993, he
could not be convicted of kidnapping for ransom considering that his participation, if any, was merely to provide the house where the victims were kept, is
misplaced.lawph!l

Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their
criminal scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom payment, to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their
nefarious plan.59

The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to the participation of appellant. While he was not present during the abduction, he was present in the
house where the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the phone to Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded ransom from Jepson. The conspiracy
was likewise proven by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with Macias and other John Does in committing the crime. Therefore, even with the absence
of appellant in the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.60

Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellant’s conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco y
Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187534, April 04 : 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO CHUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the Decision[1] dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 00499, affirming with modification the
Decision[2] dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding Appellants Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva and
Eduardo Chua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia "a.k.a. Alice" Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to
kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting surveillance on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall,
Cubao, Quezon City. However, the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February 5, 1998, a second attempt was
made, but they encountered an accident before they could even execute their original plan.

Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB,
Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of P350,000.00. She requested Rosalina to bring the land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.

Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was
with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia
introduced appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place.

When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former where they were going. Alicia answered that they had to drop
by the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally
reached a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.

Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then
opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael
trailed Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina was walking
behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw
Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw "Jessie Doe" place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a
gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with "Jessie Doe" to have pity on Rafael because of his existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald
rushed towards her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon
which, Rosalina said that if they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina was
untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's chest
while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's personal belongings,
which include his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.

Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to
help her escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped them
off as the kidnap victims. When asked who they were, Jonard refused to reveal their identities.

Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain female visitors arrived. After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to
the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A
little later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive.

Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he
was brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.

Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car and placed at the back seat, together with
Jonard and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover
Rosalina's head with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of
Robert. She then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was Robert. Rosalina cried, "Robert, Robert, why did you do
this, we did not do anything to you" and Robert responded, "Pasensiyahan na lang tayo."

By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house
familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men
guarding her that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The man then seated himself beside
Rosalina and warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room,
Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same house near the swimming
pool.

Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that
the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would
deal with her upon his return.

Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for
the sake of her children.

When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the room. The room was only illuminated by a light
coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by
modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land
titles and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, "That's
impossible," and then left the room. He gave instructions to his members and left.

At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to panic and cry. She then implored the help of
Jonard for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions
immediately cocked their guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told
Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should
escape. They all agreed to escape in the early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney
bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and
gave the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would further
need their help, left their address with Jonard.

When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard which
hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer,
Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.

The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their
homes, while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald
and Dima as her kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the body of
Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.

Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171), with the following allegations:

Criminal Case No. 123-V-98

That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA
REYES against her will and detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 124-V-98

That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then a private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL
MENDOZA against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice
Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on the merits
ensued.

On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against the appellants for the crime of kidnapping, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping and in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused
NORVA and MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Mendoza the amount of Php 71,000.00 in actual
damages and Php 50,000.00 as moral damages.

As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on reasonable doubt of the charge of kidnapping. Consequently, The Jail Warden of Valenzuela
City Jail is hereby ordered to cause the immediate release of the said accused from detention unless she is otherwise being detained for some other legal and
lawful cause.

With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be ARCHIVED pending their apprehension. Meantime, let
an alias warrant issue for their apprehension.

Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR, NORVA and CHUA, let the entire records of these cases be elevated to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate review of the judgment herein rendered.

SO ORDERED.

On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on accused Montanir and
Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua to conform to and in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered
to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present appeal.

In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following assignment of errors:

DIMA MONTANIR:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
EDUARDO CHUA:

I.

THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE COMMISSION OF KIDNAPPING.

RONALD NORVA:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, is the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide. After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, now provides:

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.

As expounded in People v. Mercado:[3]

In People v. Ramos,[4] the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and
sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with
murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:

x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated
the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the
killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659.

This Court further discussed the nature of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide in People v. Larrañaga,[5] thus:

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide,[6] (2) robbery with
rape,[7] (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,[8] (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,[9] and (5) rape with homicide.[10] In a special complex crime,
the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that
this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the
victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering
that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection"[11] between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component
offense forming part of the herein special complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,[12] and People vs. Mercado,[13] interpreting Article 267,
we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under
Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no
consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the
maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and
detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the
dispositive portion, merely stated that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, however, its mention of the
phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused Norva and
Montanir, clearly refers to the crime committed as that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore, were correctly
punished under the last paragraph of Article 267 as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael
Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the kidnapping.
Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in this Court, their corresponding briefs pose a single common argument - the prosecution did not
present sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime charged against them. In particular, they questioned the
inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. According to them, the said inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish their credibility.

This Court finds otherwise.

The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.[14] For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great
respect on appeal.[15] This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and
binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered.[16] Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect
the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.[17]

Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the one who whispered to appellant Ronald to
transfer Rosalina to another room so that the latter would have no idea that Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard testified that it was Ronald
who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to a different room. Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he resided in
Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue
that in her testimony, Rosalina declared that she was with four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in
his own testimony, stated that there were four of them including Rosalina seated at the back of the car.

A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer only to minor details and collateral matters and do not affect
the veracity and weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed.[18] They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury.[19]

Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits and that of the testimonies in court, this Court has already ruled that testimonies in court are given
more weight than affidavits, thus:

x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their formulation.[20] In
general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing
the statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation of such affidavits. As this
Court has often said:

An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject."[21]

We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and ignorant, the language presented to the court is not
his; it is; and must be, the language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous
inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not
understand what is said in a language so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it
translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not
intended by him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).[22]

For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.[23]

Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the minor discrepancies in his testimony by saying that he whispered to
appellant Ronald that Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was appellant Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus:

Atty. Basco:
Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20 of the TSN dated February 24, 1999 referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, in your statement
here when asked:
Q.
Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you answered in the manner? And your answer was:
A
Ronald Norva told me, "Pare, the old man is in bad condition, you better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room so that she could not see the condition of the old
man."
Q
So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who gave order or instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it was he who gave instruction?
Atty. Gabi:
Can we have the translation of that statement?
Atty. Basco:
That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?
A:
This is like this, ma'am.
Atty. Basco:
Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr. Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your testimony on February 24 in open court?
A:
The two are true, ma'am, because when I whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he gave me instruction to transfer Mrs. Reyes to another
room.[24]

The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig, thus:

Q
Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang Salaysay of February 19, 1998 that you were residing in Taguig at Maharlika Village sometime in October 1987? Do
you confirm that?
Atty. Mendoza:
May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.
A
No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.
Q
So you are correcting your answer in your salaysay of February 19, 1998 under paragraph No. 13 wherein you answered: "Ako po ay nakikitira sa kaibigan kong
si Ting sa Muslim Area, Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila nuong buwan ng Oktubre, 1987." You are changing the 1987 to 1997?
A
The truth is 1997, sir.[25]
Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the commission of the crime because he was merely the
house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that
there was no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will point to his clear participation in the crime because he was just the driver of the car
that brought the victims to the place where the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that he was not a participant in the offense charged in the
Information. Basically, the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.

In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally found the existence of conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[26] Verily, when conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony.[27] Each conspirator is responsible for
everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even
though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[28] Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of
law, chargeable with intending that result.[29] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and
substantively from that which they intended to commit.[30] As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,[31] "when a conspirator embarks
upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them."

A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err in finding conspiracy among the appellants, as they each played a role in the commission of the
crime. The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had knowledge of the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellant's bare denial is a weak
defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive
narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.[32] The trial court ruled:

As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible than his testimony applying the same principle that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the common experience and
observation of mankind can show it as probable under the circumstances.

Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande because he was a house boy of accused Chua after he admitted
the circumstances under which he has to live there a few days before the victims were brought there.

To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua because he was looking for a permanent job is hardly
credible because he himself admitted that when he was brought by accused Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was the understanding
that it would be accused Uy who would be paying his salary. Why would accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house boy of
accused Chua? Evidently, the only plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused Montanir is because he was actually working for the former
and only posted in the house of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is bolstered by
accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all those times that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as in fact, he took
orders from accused Uy.

Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to the house of accused Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow
reason that he had no companion at Ciudad Grande when precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy was on vacation.[33]

The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his exact participation in the execution of the crime, by the
witnesses for the prosecution, thus:

WITNESS JONARD
Q
Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened, Mr. Witness?
A
When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I heard like a commotion inside the house.
Q
Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness, what did you do?
A
What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru the window near the lavatory.
Q
And what did you see, Mr. Witness?
A
I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza.
Q
Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a gun?
A
When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr. Mendoza at his back they forcibly entered the room.[34]
WITNESS ROSALINA
Q
And then what happened, Ms. Witness?
A
And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.
Q
And what happened?
A
I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.
Q
What did he do?
A
And he helped me.
Q
After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what happened to Mr. Mendoza?
A
While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy removing the things of Mr. Mendoza.
Q
When you said things to which are you referring to?
A
His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket and gave it to Ronald Norva.[35]
xxxx
A
When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested were already there and when I saw them I recognized them that they were the ones.
Q
Could you tell us the people whom you said were there?
A
Dima Montanir.
Q
Can you point to him?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom when asked his name, answered: Dima Montanir).
Q
And who else, Ms. Witness?
A
Ronald Norva.
Q
Can you point to him also?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom when asked his name, answered: Ronald Norva).
Q
Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were able to recognize them?
A
I told that they were the ones.[36]

In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not outweigh the testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying
him as one of the culprits, thus:

WITNESS JONARD
Q
Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Why did you follow the instruction?
A
Because they are my Boss.
Q
When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you referring to?
A
Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q
You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she there at the vicinity?
A
She was not there when the incident happened on February 17, 1998.
Q
Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one of your bosses, Mr. Witness?
A
Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the middle of that month, Josie Herrera tipped to the group that Mr. Rafael Mendoza is a good victim because he
has lots of money and engaged in a lending business.
Q
Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr. Mendoza?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Where was this, Mr. Witness?
A
At the house of Robert Uy.
Q
Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?
A
Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon City.
Q
That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have referred as one of your Bosses is around this courtroom, could you please point to her?
(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom whom when asked her name, answered: Josie Herrera).
Q
You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you say so that he was one of your bosses?
A
Because they were the ones planning how they could get Mr. Mendoza.
Q
And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?
A
The five (5) of them, ma'am.
Q
Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?
A
Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo Chua.
Q
And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?
A
When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that December, the group made a surveillance to be familiarized with the face of Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes.
Q
And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this happened when you said they were planning?
A
At the house of Robert Uy.
Q
Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.[37]
xxxx
Q
And where did you count the surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A
Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.
Q
And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A
They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes. Robert Uy pointed to the two (2) as our victims.
Q
Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr. Witness, what else took place?
A
On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping will took (sic) place on January 5, 1998 because they want to make it quick.
Q
Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
On January 5, 1998?
A
No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap them when we went to Ali Mall but we were not able to see them.
Q
You said that there was a first try, was there another try, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
When was that, Mr. Witness?
A
On February 5, 1998.
Q
What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness?
A
Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
Q
And did the kidnapping take place on the second try, Mr. Witness?
A
We were not able to take them, ma'am.
Q
Then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A
On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap them, we were not able to get them because in Ali Mall the car of Alice Buenaflor was bumped by a taxi.
Q
Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr. Witness?
A
On that February 5, when we were not able to take them; they changed the plan.
Q
And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?
A
Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q
Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified earlier, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Then what happened, Witness?
A
After the second try, we were not able to take them, so the plan was changed.
Q
What was the plan that was changed? What was the new plan?
A
They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones planning and I was only being utilized by the syndicate.[38]

It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other,
the former generally prevails.[39]

It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were brought was owned by appellant Eduardo. The trial court was
also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely lent his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had
been so accommodating to him and had facilitated his loan, thus:

Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of the incident, this Court
nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle
used in abducting the victims and the house where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be believed must come from the mouth of a credible witness which accused Chua is not.
Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of accused Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply too good to be true that he
allowed Mangelin and accused Montanir to stay at his house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers were having a vacation. Neither could this
Court find cogent reason why accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle and house totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused Uy.
Nor is it credible that accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle just to follow up his loan application and then after the same had been released
he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria, Bulacan or to Ciudad Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence of accused Uy, waited for
him until the wee hours of the morning of the following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going home.

It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he would spend it in going to Davao with his daughter on 18
February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever and suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that one of the victims,
Mendoza, had died in the course of the kidnapping.

Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally indicate accused Chua's complicity with the
criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said accused's plea of innocence.[40]

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable
and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.[41] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[42]
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result.[43] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.[44]

Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the perpetration of the crime. Thus, all of the appellants, having been proven
that they each took part in the accomplishment of the original design, are all equally liable for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court. The penalty imposed by the trial court, which is Death is now
reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.[45]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the
special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Sereno,* JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181822 April 13, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal before the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 25, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 02370, which affirmed with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 3, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 03-218310, finding herein appellant Joel Baluya
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated September 4, 2003, appellant was indicted before RTC of Manila for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about August 31, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, take, detain and carry away one GLODIL CASTILLON Y MAAMBONG, a minor, nine (9) years old, son of Gloria Castillon y Maambong, while
the latter was playing outside of their residence along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, this City, by poking a knife on his back, twisting his hands and forcibly bringing
him to Novaliches, Quezon City, thus detaining and depriving him of his liberty under restraint and against his will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On November 5, 2003, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.4

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

Around 10:30 a.m. of August 31, 2003, the victim, Glodil Castillon (Glodil), who at that time was nine (9) years old, was playing in front of their house located
along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila.5 While in the midst of play, he saw herein appellant. Appellant then called Glodil's attention and summoned him to
come forth.6 Immediately thereafter, appellant seized him by twisting his right arm, pointed a knife at him and told him that if appellant's wife, Marissa, would
not show up Glodil's mother would not see him anymore.7 Appellant and Glodil then boarded a jeepney and went to Blumentritt.8 When they were in
Blumentritt, appellant called up Glodil's mother, Gloria, telling her to show him his wife so that she will also be able to see Glodil.9 Gloria then asked appellant
to allow her to talk to her son as proof that Glodil was indeed with him.10 Appellant then passed the telephone to Glodil, but the latter was only able to
momentarily talk with his mother because appellant immediately grabbed the telephone from him.11 Thereafter, Glodil's mother reported the incident to the
police.12 Meanwhile, appellant and Glodil again boarded a jeepney and went to Novaliches.13 It was Glodil's first time to reach Novaliches.14 Upon reaching
Novaliches "Bayan," they headed straight to a barbershop where they fetched appellant's three minor children.15 They then proceeded to a church where
appellant left his children and Glodil in the playground within the church premises.16 Glodil played, ate and slept with appellant's children until the afternoon of
the same day. During that period, appellant returned from time to time to check on them and bring them food.17 At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, appellant again
called up Gloria and, while shouting, asked if his wife was already there.18 He then threatened Gloria by saying that "kapag hindi mo ipakita sa akin si Marissa,
hindi mo na makikita ang anak mo."19 Subsequently, Gloria was able to talk to Marissa and convince her to meet with appellant at the Novaliches public
market.20 Unknown to appellant, the police already had a plan to arrest him, which they did when he showed up to meet with his wife. In the meantime,
around 4:00 p.m. of August 31, 2003, Glodil was able to seize an opportunity to escape while appellant was away.21 He walked from the place where appellant
left him in Novaliches until he reached their house and it took him around four hours to do so.22 He was able to trace back their house by reading the signboard
of the jeepneys and following the route of those that pass by his place of residence.23

On the other hand, the defense interposed the defense of denial alleging that on August 31, 2003, appellant went to the house of his common-law-wife's aunt,
Gloria, at Laon Laan St. in Sampaloc, Manila for the purpose of asking the latter if his wife, with whom he has been separated, has been there.24 Gloria told him
that his wife went to their house once but has not seen her since then.25 After an hour of talking with Gloria, appellant bid her goodbye. It was then that Glodil
approached him and asked if he could go with him to Novaliches.26 Since Glodil already went with him to Novaliches several times in the past, appellant
acceded to the child's request on the condition that he ask his mother for permission, which the latter readily gave.27 Appellant and Glodil then proceeded to
the former's house in Novaliches.28 After taking lunch, appellant took his children and Glodil to the playground and left them there.29 When he returned
around 4:30 p.m., Glodil was no longer there.30 His children told him that Glodil's aunt, by the name of Rosaly, fetched him.31 Appellant then brought home his
children. Around 6:00 p.m. of the same day, the police, together with Gloria and his wife, arrived at his house wherein he was apprehended and brought to a
police station in Novaliches.32 After having been subjected to a medical examination, he was turned over to Police Station 4 in Balic-Balic, Manila, where he was
subsequently charged with kidnapping.33 Appellant alleges that his wife and her aunt came up with the scheme of accusing him with kidnapping so that his wife
would be able to take their children from him.34 Appellant also claims that Gloria is angry with "warays" and because he is a "waray" she is also angry with
him.35

In its Decision dated April 3, 2006, the RTC found the version of the prosecution credible and, accordingly, rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Joel Baluya GUILTY of the crime of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.36

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The parties filed their respective appeal briefs.37

On September 25, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED APRIL 3, 2006 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that accused JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE is ordered to pay to victim
Glodil M. Castillon the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and of ₱15,000.00 as nominal damages.

Costs of suit to be paid by the accused.

SO ORDERED.38
On October 24, 2007, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision.39

On June 16, 2008, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired.40 Both appellant and appellee, however,
manifested that they were adopting their previous arguments and that they were willing to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted.

Thus, the following Assignment of Errors in appellant's brief, dated October 27, 2006, are now deemed adopted in this present appeal:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WAS FORCIBLY TAKEN AND
DEPRIVED OF HIS LIBERTY UNDER RESTRAINT AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND CONSENT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ALLEGATION OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM.41

Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the crime charged. In particular, the defense contends that there is no
evidence to show that the victim was deprived of his liberty.

The Court is not persuaded.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 26742 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:

1. the offender is a private individual;

2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.43

In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved all the aforesaid elements of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.

The presence of the first element is not in issue as there is no dispute that appellant is a private individual.

As to the second element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.44 It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement
or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.45 If the victim is a child, it also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the
custody of the child.46 In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of
the accused to effect such deprivation.47 In the present case, Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange and unfamiliar to him.
Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil's
parents of his custody is also indicated by appellant's actual taking of the child without the permission or knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling up
the victim’s mother to inform her that the child is in his custody and of threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to show his wife to him.

Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no
evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the
offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the
offender forcibly restrained the victim.48 As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom
to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty.49 For under such a situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor.50 It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his way home from the place where he
was left. It just so happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where appellant
left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of
residence.

Appellant alleges that Glodil was not forcibly taken, but instead voluntarily went with appellant to Novaliches. The general rule is that the prosecution is
burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed.51 Aside from his self-serving
testimony, appellant failed to present competent evidence to overcome such presumption. Thus, the presumption stands that Glodil, being only nine (9) years
old on August 31, 2003, is incapable of giving consent and is incompetent to assent to his seizure and illegal detention.

The defense further argues that appellant had no intention to detain Glodil and that his purpose is to merely use him as "a leverage against Glodil's mother, who
refused to produce Marissa, his live-in partner." The Court, however, cannot fathom how appellant could have used Glodil as leverage or bargaining tool to
force Marissa to meet with him without depriving him of his liberty. In any case, appellant's motive is not relevant, because it is not an element of the crime.

With respect to the third element of the offense charged, the prosecution proved that appellant's act of detaining the victim was without lawful cause.

As to the last element of the crime, appellant contends that the victim's minority was not sufficiently proven. However, the Court agrees with the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the victim's minority was alleged by the prosecution in the information and was not disputed.52 During his direct examination, the
victim testified as to his minority claiming that, at the time that he was presented at the witness stand, he was only 10 years old.53 This fact was affirmed by his
mother who also testified as to his minority at the time that he was abducted.54 As correctly contended by the OSG, appellant did not raise any issue as to the
victim's minority when the victim's and his mother's testimonies were offered.

Central to the issues raised in the Brief filed by appellant is a question of the factual findings of the RTC. More particularly, appellant questions the credibility of
the witnesses for the prosecution claiming that it is easy for the victim to fabricate his story and falsely claim that he was forcibly taken at knife point.

However, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Glodil and his mother finding them to be trustworthy and believable. The age-old rule is that the
task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as
witnesses testify before it.55 It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect,
for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.56 Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment
of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed
absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.57 In the instant
case, the Court finds no reason to depart from this rule. Appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC and the CA overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.1âwphi1

Also, against the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant can only offer the defense of denial. However, denial is a self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.58 Like alibi, denial is an
inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.59 Denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.60

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02370, dated September 25, 2007, finding appellant Joel Baluya y Notarte guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556, affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.

Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo (Dick), Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder
and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, which read:

For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)

That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad,
driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.

Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.

For Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)

That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA,2 both employees of
the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days.

That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her
abductors.

Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659.

When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a
joint trial ensued.

As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established by the evidence of the prosecution are as follows:

About 3 o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay
Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were out of the house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7).
Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding under her
blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, "We only need money, we only need money." Thereafter, she heard someone talking in Ilocano which she could not
understand. Then she heard somebody say, "Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu." AAA heard the persons conversing which she estimated
about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).

Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Tañedo, a certain Fred and
appellants Alberto Anticamara alias "Al Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias "Lando Calaguas." One of the intruders approached her and told her not to
move (TSN, ibid., p. 8).

Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her.
Someone, whom she later recognized as Dick Tañedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Tañedo, "Why Kuya?" Tañedo replied, "Somebody will die." After a brief
commotion, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What shall we do now?" They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her
outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).

The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita Tañedo there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and
led him away (TSN, December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 5-8).

Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." When Cita
Tañedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred" boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded
towards San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where they kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002 (TSN, December 4,
2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).

On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Tañedo would kill her. Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he
would leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert Tañedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually molested AAA.
Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her over to Fred and Bert Tañedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to
his house. Later, Fred, Bert Tañedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13).

AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA,
threatening her that he would give her back to appellant Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might also kill her (TSN,
ibid., pp. 14-16).

On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of
Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p. 17).
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight,
Susana called AAA's brother in Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they
immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a Sworn Statement (Exh. "D," TSN, ibid., pp. 18-20).

Meanwhile, Dr. Ronald Bandonil, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sulpacio Abad. Dr.
Bandonil prepared Autopsy Report No. N-T2-23-P (Exh. "A") which contains the following findings, to wit:

x Remains placed in a sealed metal coffin, wrapped in two (2) layers of black, plastic garbage bags, and covered in (sic) a red-stripped cotton blanker. A thick
layer of lime embeds the whole torso.

x Remains in a far advanced state of decomposition, with the head completely devoid of soft tissue. A cloth is wrapped around the eyesockets and tied to the
back of the skull. The skull does not show any signs of dents, chips nor fractures. The other recognizable body part is the chest area which retained a few soft
tissues and skin, but generally far advanced in decomposition. The whole gamut of internal organs have undergone liquefaction necrosis and have been turned
into grayish-black pultaceous masses. Worn on top of the remaining chest is a sando shirt with observable holes at the left side, both front and back. A large
hole is seen at the area of the left nipple, with traces of burning at its edges and inward in direction. A tied cloth is also observable at the remnants of the left
wrist.

x At the upper chest, which is the most recognizable, remaining and intact part of the torso, a hole, 1.0 cm. x 2.0 cms., with signs of burning, edges inverted, is
seen at the left anterior axillary line just below the left nipple. Another hole is seen 1.5 cms. x 2.5 cms. in diameter, edged averted (sic) at the right chest, along
the right anterior axillary line, 5.0 cms. below the right nipple. A 3rd hole, almost unrecognizable is seen at the left groin area.

x The other parts of the cadaver are too far advanced in decomposition to have remarkable findings.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

GUNSHOT WOUNDS, TRUNK3

In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002,
he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan.

Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said
that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the
members of his family who were in Cebu.

On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

A. Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;

B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the presence of
aggravating circumstance of pre-meditation, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2)
accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). They are also ordered jointly and severally [to] pay the heirs of the
victim Abad Sulpacio the following:

1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages;

2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as indemnity for the death of the victim;

3) Fifty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and Thirty Centavos (₱57,122.30) as actual damages; and

4) The cost of suit.

II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:

A) Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;

B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of the victim AAA as charged, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 7659. Considering that the victim AAA was raped during her detention, the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two
accused, Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The two accused are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the victim AAA the amount of:

1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as moral damages;

2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

3) Cost of suit.

As to the rest of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be set to the archives until they are apprehended.

SO ORDERED.5

In light of the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,6 the records of the cases were forwarded by the RTC to the CA for its review. The CA rendered a Decision dated
December 15, 2006, affirming the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However, in view of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Lando had assigned the following errors in
his appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION, AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE
THAN THAT OF THE PROSECUTION

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7

On January 9, 2007, Al, through the PAO, appealed the Decision of the CA to this Court. Al had assigned the following errors, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH FOR THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF [TWO] SEXUAL ABUSES
AGAINST THE VICTIM.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE CONSPIRED WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE SAME.8

In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

Circumstantial Evidence

The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the
perpetrators of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason
and common experience .9 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.10 A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:

The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:

1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place;

2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter uttering "somebody will die";

3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;

4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;

5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;

6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that,
time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;

7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one
left is for this girl."12

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our
agreement is that whoever comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted
his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the
Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that
several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds.
The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied
at the remnants of the left wrist.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio
away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

Conspiracy

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent
or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.14

In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of
the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes their way will be eliminated.15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of the
Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the small
door and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that opening.16 After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle
with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA
was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing
the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of their
conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.

Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were
threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under
the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with
freedom.18 To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.20

There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would
suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the
house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while
all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the
house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the
group proceeded to the Estrellas’ house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when
the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
AAA.23 Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or any
person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or
detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.24 Therefore, it
is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.

Alibi and Denial

Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at
Tarlac, together with his family. On the other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her
and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives
great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of
voice of a witness while testifying; thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.251avvphi1

Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce
prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.27

As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it
was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between
the two places.28 Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.29 During the trial of the case,
Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40)
kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.30 Thus, it was not physically impossible
for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it
impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.31

Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances

In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to murder and evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of
death. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.32 Two conditions must
concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.33

In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and blindfolded. Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio,
still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the vehicle by the group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy report
indicated that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull and another cloth was also found tied at the left wrist
of the victim. There is no question therefore, that the victim's body, when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found
shows without doubt that he was killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was present in the commission
of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:

x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity
to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take them away with them.
Later that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-appellants. The following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-
tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds had been inflicted on the victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose,
Ronilo and Reymundo Cuizon had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier tied their hands. The fact that there were
twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the attainment of accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves.35

The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed by treachery.36

The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.37 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.38 From the time the group met at the landing field at
around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up to the time they took Sulpacio away from the
Estrellas’ house and eventually killed him thereafter at around past 3:00 a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to. Instead, appellants evidently clung to their determination and
went ahead with their nefarious plan.

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code39 are: (1) the offender is a
private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b)
it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.40

The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a
female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac,
whereby she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.41 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from
going home.42 Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time appellant Lando and his wife
went out of the house, they brought AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant Lando and his family.

The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and
intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant
Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being
delivered to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's
testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction.45
This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended
party.46

The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga,47 this provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
Thus, We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in
Criminal Case No. 4481-R.

However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al liable for Rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48
We ruled that once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing
rape.49 Also, in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:

x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as convincingly suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery
only; and there is no evidence that the other members of the band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they
could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x

The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape is a special complex crime defined in and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and the crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special complex crime as held in the case of
People v. Larrañaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the subsequent events that transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the
kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with
appellant Lando. AAA even testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she never saw appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the
day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more during the trial of the case.53 Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of
AAA.

The Penalties

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon
the appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.54 In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,55 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,56 without eligibility for parole.57

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346,
the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable penalty for appellant Lando is reclusion
perpetua.

As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The Damages
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission
of the crime.61 In People v. Quiachon,62 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the award of
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is proper.

Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.64 However,
consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.65

The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the
commission of the crime.66 The Court awards the amount of ₱30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.67

Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses in the amount of ₱57,122.30, which was duly supported by
receipts.68lawphil

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of
rape.69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,71 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the
fact of rape.72 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.73 Such award is separate and
distinct from the civil indemnity.74 However, the amount of ₱100,000.00 awarded as moral damages is reduced to ₱75,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.75

The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of ₱50,000 is hereby reduced to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.76

As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not collective.77 Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of
serious illegal detention, he is jointly and severally liable only to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil
indemnity is in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.78

Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of ₱50,000.00.79 Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for almost
one (1) month.80

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Sulpacio Abad the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱57,122.30 as actual damages.

(b) In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole, and to pay the
offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Appellant Alberto
Cabillo Anticamara alias "Al" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is also directed to pay, jointly and severally, with appellant Fernando Calaguas Fernandez alias "Lando," the victim AAA the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., Defendant and Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271,1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape
through sexual assault.

Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA,2 whom he claims to be his live-in
partner. The records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly, We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.

THE FACTS

AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.

It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB.3

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped
her shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man’s name at the police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla,
Jr.4 He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They
slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they
reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with
Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de
Legazpi in Rawis.5

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants.6 When she defied him, he
slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them
inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper
at her,8 as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.

When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.

At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his
penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and
drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and
pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned Mirandilla to
move out. And they drove away.9

They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her
shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina.10

The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved
her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and
was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was
allegedly raped 27 times.11

One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed
outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out
of people’s sight for two nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police
station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the police
presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.12

The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The
doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina -
AAA had contracted gonorrhoea.14

Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.

Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached
him. They had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good.15

Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her,16 and, after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became
lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.

Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house
in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the park’s comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as
the CR’s guard.17 They decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who
owned the house, rented it to them for ₱1,500.00.18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000.19 From 12 December 2000 until 11 January
2001,20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellana’s house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.

Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAA’s menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000.21
In late December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach
pain.22 AAA had abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in
January 2001 after quarrelling for days.23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA missed her menstruation in December 200024 and that he would not have
known she had an abortion had she not confessed it to him.25

THE RTC RULING

Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5, with kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape
(Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).

The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault with this
finding:

This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of
xxx, on or on about midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells situated in
the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force and
intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and xxx. At least once, Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and force.26

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING

On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape
(instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault.27 It rejected Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA were
live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual.28 It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain his
defense.29

Hence, this appeal.

Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was not a credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy
they expressed in consensual sex.

OUR RULING

We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.

Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they
were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation
mainly because of AAA’s intentional abortion of their first child to be – a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.

In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which
Mirandilla raped her 27 times.

First Issue:

Credibility of Prosecution Witness

Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself – tested by
human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.30

Daggers v. Van Dyck,31 illuminates:

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.32

First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA’s manner and demeanour on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA
appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious contradictions."33 The court
continued:

The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence
of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.

When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe
Mirandilla Jr.’s response was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x.34

Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s ordeal was entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape,35 negating
opportunity for concoction.36 While in Mirandilla’s company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw,
or talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who discovered
the presence not only of hymenal lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.

More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination. The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.

We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when affirmed by the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence.38 This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide
the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under gruelling
examination.39 Thus, in Estioca v. People,40 we held:

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the
findings of the lower courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to
examine their demeanour when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible
witness.41
Second Issue

"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven

Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.42
Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.43

The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden
to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.44

This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof;45 after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case,46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual.48

A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue
in litigation.49

Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to
overthrow one when created against him."50(Emphasis supplied)

Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia
Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret.

Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on 30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park.51
They approached her and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first,
before AAA finally came.52 She also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with the
version that she met them previously, three times at least, in the previous month.53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000
at the park.54

The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao only after his imprisonment.55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s
claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001.56

Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be
reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAA’s abortion only through the latter’s admission.57

Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to
infer that they concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.

As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be reconciled,58 it being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected
to give error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.59 But, this principle, learned from lessons of human
experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters – innocent lapses that do not affect witness’ credibility.60 They do not apply to self-contradictions on
material facts.61 Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies,62 and apply the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. Thus,

To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material
point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In other words, its requirements, which must concur, are the
following: (1) that the false testimony is as to one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity.63

Crimes and Punishment

An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902
landmark case of U.S. v. Abijan,65 which is now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:

SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court,
remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)

The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy
and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.66

To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim.
Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more
than three days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will.67

The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It
was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a
knife.68

Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of
her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.

Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx

An imminent Spanish commentator explained:

la detención, la prición, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte
interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad."69

Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a
special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v. Larrañaga,71 this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses.72

Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape.73 This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only
one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case,
there is only one crime committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia,74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times,
the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each
of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.75

It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA
several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape,
warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,76 the penalty
of death is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua,77 without eligibility for parole.78

We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the
above discussion.

As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.

This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil damages ex delicto is mandatory.79 As we elucidated in People v.
Prades,80 the award authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.81 Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is,
restitution, reparation, and indemnification,82 all correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code.83

In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,84 the Court enunciated that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the
victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT85 less than ₱75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes..."86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)

After the enactment R.A. 9346,87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor88 ruling. Thus, in
People v. Quiachon,89 the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of
₱75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
penalty of death attended the commission of the offense.90 As explained in People v. Salome,91 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.92 (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code,93 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the
fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral damage in rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades,94 where we held that:

The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed,
the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape
with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are
too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge
of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven through a
testimonial charade. (Emphasis supplied)95

AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, pursuant to the present jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74630 September 30, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAIDA TOMIO alias SATO TOSHIO and NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO alias YAMADA TAKAO, accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Appellants were arrested at about 3:45 o'clock in the afternoon of 12 May 1986 at the main branch of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in
Makati, Metro Manila, while allegedly receiving the partial payment of the ransom money from Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese tourist. On 15 May 1986, an
Information for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom (Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code) was filed against them with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila by Vivencio Dionido, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-45055. The accusatorial portion of the Information
reads:

That on or about May 2, 1986, and subsequently thereafter, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with six
(6) others whose true names, real Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, being then private individuals, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the immediate family of TATSUMI NAGAO, kidnap or detain the latter and
deprive him of his liberty, without legal justifications and against his will.

Contrary to Law.

The information was filed after an ex-parte preliminary investigation, conducted pursuant to General Order No. 39, since the offended party is a tourist. This
General Order grants civil courts concurrent jurisdiction with the military tribunals over crimes where the offended party is a tourist or a transient, which the
former has to dispose of within twenty-four (24) hours after their filing by the arresting officers.1

On 16 May 1988, the trial court issued an Order setting the arraignment and trial of the appellants on 19 May 1986 an appointing Citizens Attorney Abdulkalim
Askali of the CLAO (now PAO.) as counsel de officio for the accused.2

On 19 May 1986, appellants, through a de parte counsel, Jose T. Arroyo, filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila a Very Urgent Motion For Re-
investigations3 alleging therein that the Information was filed without the benefit of a preliminary investigation and that they are innocent, which they can
prove at a preliminary investigation.

However, the records fail to show that Atty. Arroyo insisted on this motion. On the contrary, at the arraignment on 19 May 1986, he categorically stated that
the appellants were ready for arraignment, and even requested for a Japanese interpreter, which was not favorably acted upon since the appellants understand
and can speak English and Tagalog.4 Both having entered a plea of not guilty, trial proceeded immediately.5

At the trial on that day and the succeeding two days, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely: Pat. Eugenio Guillermo, Pat. Marlon Ursua, Cpl.
Virgilio Cabural, complainant Tatsumi Nagao, Sgt. Jovito Gutierrez, Wally Martinez and Daishin Nagao, and offered documentary exhibits.

For their defense, appellants relied on their own testimonies which they gave in open court on 22 May 1986.

On 27 May 1986, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing each of
them to suffer the death penalty and to pay the costs.6

The case is now before Us for automatic review.

The facts of the case, as established by the evidence for the prosecution and summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee, are:

Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-day vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn (pp. 5-6, tsn, May 21,
1986).

On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having lunch alone at the coffee shop of the hotel, two (2) Japanese men approached his table and asked him if he were a
Japanese to which he answered in the affirmative. Later, he came to know one of the men as Maida Tomio alias Sato Toshio and the other as Mitamura. They
joined him at his table and informed him that they have been in the Philippines for quite a time and offered themselves as his guides in Manila. Thereafter,
Mitamura brought him to the sauna bath of the hotel and a department store in Manila. Eventually, they ended up at the Leo's Restaurant located along Roxas
Boulevard at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening where they had dinner. Before leaving the restaurant, Nagao's companion placed a pack of cigarettes on his
(Nagao's) shirt pocket and him to just wait because he has to talk to a taxi driver. After taking few steps from the restaurant, Nagao was approached by five (5)
plainclothesmen who Identified themselves as policemen. They bodily searched him and found the pack of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen
claimed contained marijuana. Thereafter, the policemen brought him to the Southern Police District Station (pp. 23-26 tan, May 20, 1986).

While Nagao was at the police station, accused-appellant Tagahiro Nakajima alias Yamada arrived. Later, Sato Toshio alias Maida Tomio also arrived. Both acted
as interpreters for him. One of them inform him that if he is found guilty of possession of marijuana, he can sentenced from six (6) to twelve (12) years
imprisonment. The two (2) then suggested that Nagao give money to the policemen who, they claim, demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed.
Thereafter, Toshio and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced the payment of the bribe money to the policemen who, accordingly, agreed to release
him (pp. 36-41, tsn, May 20, 1986).

Thereafter, Nagao returned to his hotel escorted by the appellants and a policeman. While there, his escorts did not allow him to leave the hotel. They also
demanded that he immediately call up his parents in Japan for the money they allegedly advanced. Instead of calling up his parents, he called up a friend and
told him of his predicament. The three escorts stayed with him in the hotel up to 10:00 o'clock the following morning. Thereafter, they checked out and
transferred to the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Appellants again ordered Nagao to call up his parents. Later, appellants transferred Nagao to the Philippine
Village Hotel where they again asked him to call up his father in Japan about the money. Nagao's father refused to pay the amount demanded but when Sato
talked to him over the phone, he agreed to pay three million yen (pp. 17-31, tsn, May 21, 1986).

From the Philippine Village Hotel, Nagao was brought by the appellants to the Virra Condominium in Makati. When he called up his father upon orders of the
appellants, he learned that his father had already remitted money to the Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) in Makati. Forthwith, appellants
brought Nagao to RCBC where he withdrew U.S. $1,850.00 and gave it to them. Upon leaving the bank, they were met by policemen from the Western Police
District whose help had been earlier sought on May 8, 1986 by the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Appellants and Nagao were brought to the Western Police
District for investigation (pp. 38-40, tsn, May 19, 1986).

Appellants were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ...7
Upon the other hand, the version of the accused-appellants, as testified to by them, is summarized by the trial court as follows:

The version given by the defense in exculpation of the accused is as follows:

On May 2, 1986, the accused NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO alias YAMADA TAKAO met for the first time Tatsumi Nagao at the Southern Police District headquarters in
Manila. Tatzumi had been arrested by the police earlier for possessing marijuana cigarettes and since he could not speak English very well he was contacted to
act as Nagao's interpreter. Nagao intimated to him that he (Nagao) wanted to settle the case and offered money to the police. The accused MAIDA TOMIO alias
SATO TOSHIO later came and together they requested the police to release Nagao because according to him the marijuana was not his but belonged to
somebody who gave it to him. Nagao told the accused that he offered to pay the amount of US $100,000 to the police which he said he would borrow them
from a friend. Yamada told Nagao that the amount was too much and suggested that he (Nagao) should call his father in Japan to send the money here. Nagao
was ultimately released by the police for some reason not known to Yamada and he went back to his hotel at Holiday Inn together with the accused YAMADA
and SATO.

At the hotel Nagao called up his friend in Japan with the help of YAMADA who placed the call since Nagao cannot speak English. YAMADA did not have occasion
to talk to Nagao's friend over the phone. After 30 minutes, another call was made by Nagao to Japan. That night of May 2 both accused slept with Nagao in the
latter's room at Holiday Inn due to Nagao's request not to leave him inside the hotel.

The following day, May 3, Nagao did not know where to go so the accused suggested they look for the cheapest hotel or one where they could stay on credit.
The accused MAIDA then made arrangements with a travel agency and, after checking in at the Intercontinental Hotel, they checked out at Holiday Inn and
transferred to the Intercontinental Hotel where they stayed up to May 7. At this hotel, Nagao made many phone calls to Japan the accused YAMADA always
placing the calls for Nagao. During their stay at the hotel the accused and Nagao went on foot to see a movie at the Quad Theater and to eat at a Japanese
restaurant. They also went to Maalicaya Sauna Bath in Quezon City about four times around 10:00 to 11:00 in the evening where Nagao was left alone in one of
the rooms with his massage girl attendant. On some of those occasions Nagao would finish and would wait for the accused at the lobby. Twice Yamada brought
Nagao to his house because Nagao requested him not to leave him. On one occasion, the three of them brought down a Filipina girl from their hotel room but
only Nagao accompanied her outside the hotel for five to fifteen minutes to see her off and then he came back to the hotel.

Yamada denies that he and Sato were always guarding Nagao. As a matter of fact, one time while they were at Virra Condominium the accused went out
together to meet some Japanese in Roxas Boulevard around midnight and went back to the hotel almost 4:00 in the morning leaving Nagao alone in the hotel
room in the meantime. At Virra Condominium they stayed for two (2) or three (3) days together in one room with Nagao sometimes holding the key to the
room. There Nagao also would go out to buy something, eat meals and have some fun. He even bought Nagao, who was with him, a t-shirt in Makati where
there were many people. With the help of accused Maida, Nagao made an overseas call to Japan at Virra.

The reason they went along with Nagao to the RCBC bank on May 12 was that he did not know how to go there so they brought him to the bank so that he
could withdraw the remittance from Japan which was intended as payment for his hotel accommodation and other expenses. After their arrest at the bank they
were brought to the WPD headquarters about 4:30 in the afternoon where he (Yamada) was hit by the policemen on his face, body and abdomen. He was also
brought inside a room where his hands and feet were tied with a rope and his face covered with cloth after which water was poured on his nose and mouth
while the police were asking him questions. In fact, they started hitting him at the bank while he was handcuffed. Besides, his watch costing around 250,000
yen, his 100 grams 18-karat gold bracelet and his necklace were all taken from him and his Mustang car confiscated. His driver's license was also taken and he
lost his money in the amount of almost P3,000.00. The police did not even want to accept the name that he gave them which was Nakajima Tagahiro but
insisted on adopting Yamada as his name. When his statement was taken he was not asked to seek the assistance of a lawyer. It was the investigator who made
the answers in the statement and he was not even allowed to read it but just to sign it which he did almost 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning already after being
subjected to blows on his face. He declared that he never demanded money from Nagao for his release.

On cross-examination Yamada admitted he is an immigrant and has stayed in the Philippines for almost 12 years but is always going back and forth to Japan.

TOMIO MAIDA alias Sato Toshio also met Tatsumi Nagao for the first time on May 12, 1986 but at the coffee shop of Holiday Inn where Tatsumi was staying.
SATO had a Japanese guest who needed to change his Philippine pesos to Japanese yen since he was going back to Japan and it was Tatsumi whom SATO saw at
the coffee shop and whom he requested to make the currency exchange. Tatsumi was subsequently invited by a Mr. Mitamura to SATO's table where there
were many Japanese. Sato left ahead for the airport leaving Tatsumi and Mitamura in conversion. When SATO saw Tatsumi again it was at the Southern Police
District headquarters that same day being arrested for illegal possession of marijuana. He talked to the policemen and requested for an interpreter for Nagao
since he cannot understand and speak English well. He found out Nagao had promised to pay the policemen $100,000 already but he was not able to put up the
amount. Anyway, he went to the Holiday Inn and there discovered that Nagao had no more money and they talked about the hotel accommodation and other
expenses starting the following day. Nagao tried and was able to speak over the phone with Mr. Nagao in Japan who asked him to explain what happened. From
Holiday Inn they transferred to Intercontinental Hotel where Nagao was able to check in without his passport as SATO brought him an accommodation request
from El Sol travel agency. While they were at the Intercontinental Hotel there was no reason Nagao could not leave the hotel as he was always free to leave it.
They also went to Maalicaya Sauna Bath where they each had separate rooms.

When he was arrested at the bank with his co-accused his watch, his wallet and his money totaling around P900.00 were taken by the policemen including his
necklace and gold bracelet. They also boxed him. During the investigation they let him lie down on the table with his hands handcuffed and, while his face was
covered with cloth, they poured water on it. Since he was afraid of what the policemen would do to him he just signed the statement. He did not even know the
lawyer Bienvenido de los Reyes who was supposed to assist him during the investigation. He was not allowed to read the statement before he signed it.

From Intercontinental Hotel they transferred to Virra condominium. He brought Tatsumi there because he requested him to look for a cheaper hotel.

On cross-examination SATO disclosed that the Japanese Mitamura whom he met for the first time on May 2, 1986, informed him that a Japanese was arrested
by the police for possessing marijuana and that when he arrived at the police headquarters he found out it was Nagao who was the one arrested.8

The trial court ruled that the accused-appellants were guilty as charged because they deprived the offended party, Tatsumi Nagao, of his liberty for the purpose
of extorting ransom from him. It said:

It must be noted that during all this time, from the evening of May 2 until the arrest of the accused in the afternoon of May 12, it cannot be denied that the
accused were always with Tatsumi, singly or both of them, at his hotel room and never losing sight of him. As a matter of fact, the only instance he was ever
allowed to go out on his own was at the Intercontinental Hotel when he accompanied a girl out of the hotel to send then the accused were likewise downstairs
at the hotel that Tatsumi thought he was only being tested by the accused whether he would escape. Besides, we have to consider that as far as Tatsumi Nagao
was concerned he was in a foreign country with no relatives nor close friends. He could not speak or understand any Philippine Language. On top of this, he had
no more money as this was taken from him by the police and, worse, his passport was being held by the accused thus destroying any hope of escape from them.
Even if he did escape, where would he go without any money or passport and how would he be able to communicate with people since he could not speak
English or tagalog? Moreover, what was foremost in his mind was that he was merely on a temporary leash (sic) from the police who were poised arrest him
anytime he reneged on his alleged promise to pay. This would mean at least six years imprisonment not to mention ignominy he would cause on his person and
the consequent scandal since he is a Buddhist priest. During all this time that he was with accused he knew that the only way he could prevent any further
restraint on his person was to pay the accused from the remittance of his father in Japan. That is why, even the accused were not armed and did not physically
restrain his movements, all these circumstances taken together created in Tatsumi Nagao such fear which actually restrained him from doing what he freely
wanted to do and resulted in a deprivation of his liberty. In other words, while there was no money to give to the accused he was stuck with them.
The Court does not believe the allegation of the accused that they were not demanding any money from Tatsumi Nagao for why would they, who only came to
know Tatsumi Nagao on May 2, stick to him like a leech that date until they were arrested on May 12? It could not have been being simply charitable since it
would have been more logical to take Nagao temporarily into their homes to avoid more expenses if their intention was really only to help their fellow
countryman.

What was then the purpose in demanding for the money? The accused suggest that it was for the purpose of reimbursing them for the expenses they had
incurred in accommodating Tatsumi Nagao in the hotels and other places. Even if the purpose of the deprivation of Liberty of Tatsumi Nagao alleged by the
defense be accepted — that is, to compel payment for the expenses incurred by the accused — under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1084, the offense is still kidnapping for ransom. Under American rulings, "ransom" has been held to mean in its ordinary sense as "money,"
price or reconsideration paid or demanded by for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity' (See 75 C.J. 458; 36
Words and Phrases, 102; Keith vs. State, 163, So. 136 120 Fla. 487). Since the accused in this case demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing
Tatsumi Nagao from their hold, whatever other motive may have impelled them to do so, the money is still "ransom" under the law.9

On 22 July 1986, Atty. Arroyo filed with this Court his Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel for the appellant Maida Tomio.10 the law firm of Atienza, Tabora,
Del Rosario and Castillo then entered its appearance for the latter.

On 18 August 1986, before they could file their Brief, appellants, through another lawyer, Atty. Dominador R. Sta. Maria, Jr., filed with this Court a petition for
habeas corpus,11 which was docketed as G.R. No. 75576. They allege therein that the decision of the court below in Criminal Case No. 86-46055, subject of G.R.
No. 74630, is "void and illegal" because, among other things, before being investigated, they were tortured, threatened and deprived of their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws; moreover, aside from the fact that no preliminary investigation was conducted, the complainant's father
influenced the Judge directly making the latter's decision "partial, bias (sic) and prejudiced," and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged as it
was committed at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, not in Manila. In the resolution of 19 August 1986,12 the Court noted that the questions
raised in the petition are also the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. 74630; consequently, the former is but a duplication of the latter which is awaiting the filing
of briefs. However, without giving due course to said petition, it required respondents to comment thereon.

In the meantime, specifically on 29 August 1986, appellant Tagahiro Nakajima filed his Brief in G.R. No. 7463013 wherein he ascribes to the trial court the
commission of the following errors:

... IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING;

II

... IN FINDING THAT FROM THE EVENING OF MAY 2 TO MAY 12, THE ACCUSED WAS ALWAYS WITH NAGAO;

III

... IN CONCLUDING THAT ESCAPE FOR TATSUMI NAGAO WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE HE IS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY WITH NO CLOSE RELATIVES AND FRIENDS,
BECAUSE HE COULD NOT EVEN SPEAK OR UNDERSTAND ENGLISH WELL OR UNDERSTAND ANY PHILIPPINE LANGUAGE, AND BECAUSE HE HAD NO MONEY AND
PASSPORT, WITH NOWHERE TO GO;

IV

... IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HELD THE PASSPORT OF TATSUMI NAGAO;

... IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE LOGICAL IF THEY TOOK NAGAO TO THEIR OWN HOUSES;

VI

... IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED DEMANDED FOR RANSOM: and

VII

... IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED DEMANDED RECEIVED MONEY AS PREREQUISITE FOR RELEASING NAGAO.

By way of an additional assigned error, which is unnumbered, but which he claims to invoke for the first time, he alleges the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the crime charged because it was not committed in Manila; if it were committed the Holiday Inn Hotel, which is not located in Manila but Pasay City, it is the
proper court of the latter city which has jurisdiction over it.

Upon the other hand, appellant Tomio Maeda, through counsel, filed his Brief14on 18 October 1986. He contends that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS HURRIED AND RAILROADED DISPOSITION OF THE CASE OF THE ACCUSED TOMIO MAEDA AND TAGAHIRO NAKAJIMA WHOSE
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND FAIR AND IMPARTIAL PUBLIC TRIAL WERE DENIED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE POSITIVE AND CATEGORICAL TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED TOMIO MAEDA AND TAGAHIRO
NAKAJIMATHEY DID NOT KIDNAP OR DETAIN COMPLAINANT NAGAO NOR DID THEY DEMAND MONEY FOR HIS RELEASE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM WERE PRESENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WERE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSE TOMIO MAEDA AND TAGAHIRO NAKAJIMA ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On 27 November 1986, the Plaintiff-Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion for leave to file a consolidated Appellee's Brief,15 which
the court granted in the resolution of 2 December 1986.16

Then, on 4 December 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment for the respondents in G.R. No. 7557817 asserting therein that considering that
petitioners (accused-appellants) perfected their appeal from the challenged decision, they cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus since the main purpose of
the latter is to determine whether or not a petitioner is legally detained.18 The issues then in the petition should threshed out in the appeal.

In the resolution of 29 January 1987,19 We dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that, per Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, where
the commitment is pursuant to a judgment of conviction, the writ of habeas corpus will not lie. We further said:

In the present case, the petitioners have been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with ransom. They were accordingly sentenced and are now
suffering imprisonment by virtue thereof. Dismissal of the petition is thus warranted, for their assertion that they are being illegally deprived of freedom is
without support in law.

Moreover, considering that the substance of the issues under consideration is closely interrelated or shows a "parallelism" to the errors allegedly incurred by
the trial court and assigned by petitioners in their briefs filed in G.R. No. 74630, the Court agrees with the submission of the Solicitor General that the matters in
controversy should be resolved in G.R. No. 74630. This is in conformity with the settled rule that "when a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the
person of the accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, for this cannot be made to perform the
function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous." (Sotto vs. Director of Prisons, 5 SCRA 293, citing Vda. de
Talavera vs. Superintendent and Warden of the Correcional (sic) Institution, 67 Phil. 538).

Unsatisfied with the said Resolution, petitioners filed on 17 March 1987 a motion for its reconsideration,20 focusing on the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court, which a Comment was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on 10 April 1987.21 Thereafter, petitioners filed a reply the comment.22

This motion remains unresolved.

On 14 April 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General filed Appellee's Brief in G.R. No. 74630 wherein it prays that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction but
reduce the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the new Constitution.23

The assigned errors of both appellants in G.R. No. 74630 boil down to the following issues:
1) Jurisdiction, which, as admitted by appellant Nakajima, is raised for the first time;
2) Denial of due process, as raised by appellant Tomio Maeda; and
3) Sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution prove the crime charged.

There is no merit in the claim of lack of jurisdiction. From totality of the evidence presented by both parties, the conclusion is inescapable that during the period
from 2 to 12 May 1986, the complainant was brought to or taken from different places by the appellants. More specifically, on 2 May 1986, the day when they
made their initial, but crucial move on the target, the complainant (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Nagao), appellants, through the overt act of accused Tomio
Maeda alias Sato Toshio and another Japanese, brought complainant "some other places in Manila"24 after they succeeded in getting his trust and confidence,
following a conversation over lunch in a coffee shop at Holiday Inn Hotel.

The essential ingredients of the crime charged were thus committed in various places.

The case can, therefore, be filed with the appropriate court in any of the places where the complainant was brought to by appellants in the pursuit of or in
connection with the crime charged. Section 15 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.25

Moreover, in the proceedings below, there was not even the slightest suggestion from the appellants to express their doubts as to the jurisdiction of the court
over the case. They did not present any evidence to show that all of the acts involved in or related to the offense charged took place outside Manila. On the
contrary, from their arraignment until the promulgation of the decision, they unequivocally recognized and then yielded to the trial court's jurisdiction over
their persons and the offense charged. They voluntarily expressed their readiness to be arraigned,26 as in fact they were, abandoning in effect their urgent
motion for reinvestigation. They took very active part in the trial by extensively and exhaustively cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution, testifying
for themselves in the most detailed manner as possible to conform with the strategy of their counsel, and allowing themselves to be cross-examined by the
prosecuting fiscal. There can be no doubt that such active participation was motivated by one desire and was riveted to one goal: a judgment of acquittal on the
merits, which necessarily carried with it an unqualified invocation of the jurisdiction and authority of the court. Settled is the rule that a party who voluntarily
submitted his cause before a trial court, actively participated in the hearings therein, or invoked its jurisdiction, may not be heard to question its jurisdiction.27
It would be placing a premium on bad faith and yielding to attempts to make a mockery of the judicial process if a party would be permitted to question the
very power and authority which he invokes for his own benefit or advantage once he fails to obtain it.

II

Anent the denial of due process, the main grievance of appellant Tomio Maeda focuses on the alleged "railroaded disposition of the case." The filing of the case
pursuant to General Order No. 39, which mandates that it should be disposed of within twenty-four (24) hours after filing by the arresting officer, is inconsistent
with the need to make a thorough review assessment of the facts, considering the gravity of the imposable penalty. He further claims that they were tortured
and forced to sign statements in the absence of their lawyer, and that the trial on the merits was an example of "justice in haste, justice denied."

We are not impressed by the plea.

In the first place, the statements they made during custodial interrogation were not taken into account against them. On the contrary, the trial court rejected
such statements in toto and deplored the failure of the police to comply with the procedure prescribed by this Court in making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation. Said the trial court:

At the outset, it may not be amiss to immediately point out in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 638, and reiterated in the more recent case of
People vs. Galit, G.R. No. 51770, March 20, 1985,28 the Honorable Supreme Court laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting custodial investigation, thus:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and counsel, and that any statement he might make could be use against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or
by letter messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition of either the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The Court notes in this case that there was not even an attempt on the part of the police investigators to allow or give a chance to the accused to be assisted by
a counsel of their own choice during the custodial investigation. When, indeed a lawyer was provided the accused he turned out to be, after all, a team member
of the same police force investigating the accused. When the accused finally signed their respective statements it was already in the early morning of the
following day when the said lawyer who was supposed to assist them was no longer around. Even the waiver of the accused Yamada of his right to counsel has
not been shown to have been assisted by counsel. The Court therefore doubts the voluntariness of the statements of the accused (Exhs. "C" and "K"). Hence,
the same must be rejected in toto.

In the second place, while it may be true that the trial lasted only for a few days and the decision was promulgated on the twelfth day after the filing of the
information, there is nothing on record that may cast any doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the judge or on the fairness of his decision which, as We
observe, manifests a careful and thorough analysis of the evidence. Appellants made no protest in the court below as to the manner the trial was conducted.
After they completed their testimonies and offered their Exhibit "1," their counsel announced that "we are respectfully submitting our case for decision of this
Honorable Court."29 They did not even ask for time to submit a memorandum to aid the court in appreciating the evidence, if indeed the facts and the issues
were complicated. They cannot now be heard to complain that it hastily decided the case, or that it did not make a thorough review and assessment of the
evidence.

In the third place, all the requisites of due process are present in this case, to wit: (a) a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) jurisdiction lawfully acquired by it over the person of the appellants and over the offense; (c) the appellants were given an opportunity to
be heard; and (d) judgment was rendered upon lawful hearing.30

In People vs. Castillo, et al.,31 We ruled that if an accused been proceeded against under an orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry or
investigation upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment rendered within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due
process. In the instant case, as stated in the discussion above on jurisdiction, the accused-appellants actively participated in hearing of the case before the trial
court and had full an unhampered opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present their own evidence.

That General Order No. 39 directs civil courts to dispose the case within twenty-four (24) hours after its filing by the arresting officer, considering that the
offended party is a tourist, does not detract from the above conclusion that appellants we not deprived of due process. The requirement, which is merely
directory, is not wanting in reason or purpose. The stay of tourists in the country is limited in duration. Tourism is a major dollar-earning industry which the
Government has been to promote. Corollarily, it must have to adopt policies to attract tourists and to insure their safety and security while they are in the
country. Special laws bearing upon procedure, with the end in view of expediting the hearings and disposition of criminal cases where tourists are the offended
parties, may be validly enacted provided that there is substantial compliance procedural due process and non-impairment of substantive due process.

III

The third issue requires a determination as to whether or the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense charged.
Appellants contend that it has not, for Mr. Nagao was not restrained of his liberty; he was free and could have easily escaped. As to the ransom, appellant
Tagahiro Nakajima asserts that:

The money remitted by Nagao's fatter was for the payment of his son's hotel bills, and not for ransom purposes (p. 96, tsn., May 21, 1986). Further Nagao's
father testified that "That reason why I remitted this money because I want to know whether my son can get this money and to know the whereabout of my
son, sir."(p. 107, tan., May 21, 1986).32

However, appellant Tomio Maeda has a different version. According to him, it was in payment of the sum which they advanced to the police for and in behalf of
Mr. Nagao to secure the latter's release, and the amount spent for hotel accommodations and additional expenses they incurred in his behalf. Otherwise stated:

... a simple contract of loan existed between complainant and the accused whereby the complainant incurred a legal as well as moral obligation to pay for the
expenses advanced by the 2 accused in his favor. This is another reason why complainant stayed in the company of the accused. In the words of the
complainant himself, he deemed it "an obligation upon himself to pay for the expenses" advanced by the 2 accused in accommodating him (tsn, May 21, 1986,
p. 24-25). Thus, there was no force or compulsion in exacting payment from the accused. There was no demand, as there was no need for it. The complainant
knew that he had an obligation and that he had to comply with it. The money to be paid was rightfully due to the 2 accused. It was nothing more than a
payment for a debt in money.33

The trial court found otherwise. Its findings were based on its appreciation of the evidence for the parties which, in turn, revolved upon the credibility of the
witnesses. It is well-settled that the conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect; and, unless there are
substantial facts and circumstances that have been overlooked, which if considered might effect the result of the case, such findings are generally not disturbed
on appeal. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to observe the deportment and demeanor of witnesses to determine the veracity of
their answers;34 it has the inestimable advantage of observing the detailed demeanor of the witnesses.35

We find no reason to depart from this rule. A painstaking review of the evidence in this case clearly discloses the correctness of such findings.

The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully
designed plan to kidnap Mr. Nagao in order to obtain ransom from him. The plan was effectively carried out at lunchtime on 2 May 1986 at the coffee shop in
Holiday Inn Hotel when appellant Tomio Maeda alia Sato Toshio approached Mr. Nagao to find out if the latter had Japanese yen to be converted to Philippine
pesos because a friend was to leave for Japan and needed the yen; Tomio succeeded in having P1,100.00 exchanged for 10,000.00 yen belonging to Mr. Nagao.
Then, another Japanese companion of Tomio, one Mr. Mitamura, invited complainant to join them at their table. Tomio left them and proceeded to the airport
to send off his friend who was to depart for Japan.36 By his addition admissions on cross-examination, he clearly revealed, though rather unwittingly, how the
plot would be pursued with the assistance of law enforcement authorities. As early as 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, Mr. Mitamura called Tomio by
telephone to inform him that a Japanese was arrested for having marijuana in his possession, although the name of the latter was not mentioned. Without even
being informed as to where the arrested party was brought, Tomio proceeded to the Southern Police District and, upon arriving there at 4:00 o'clock, merely
informed the police that a Japanese has marijuana in his possession. He could not, however, mention the name of said Japanese.37

It should be stressed that at that time, Mr. Nagao had not yet been "arrested" by five (5) policemen of the Southern Police District for possession of a pack of
cigarettes allegedly containing marijuana. He was arrested after seven o'clock that evening following a dinner at Leo's Restaurant.

This visit then of Tomio to the Southern Police District must have had something to do with a conspiratorial arrangement with some personnel of said office,
more specifically the five policemen who, at past 7:00 o'clock that evening, pounced on Mr. Nagao and "arrested" him for alleged possession of marijuana.

From the Southern Police District, Tomio called Mitamura, who was in the complainant's room at Holiday Inn Hotel; Mitamura told him that they were to take
their dinner at Leo's Restaurant. They did in fact have dinner at Leo's Restaurant,38 although on direct examination, he said that after the meeting at lunchtime,
he saw complainant again only at the Southern Police District.39

At Leo's Restaurant, Tomio claims:

a ... Later on we saw one Japanese holding marijuana inside the restaurant and then Mr. Mitamura requested to call or contact the police in order that this
Japanese who was in possession of marijuana be arrested.
q So you were informed by Mitamura to contact the southern police district (sic) that there was this two (sic) Japanese inside the Leo's restaurant who was in
possession marijuana cigarette (sic)?
a Yes, sir.
q These two Japanese were left at Leo's restaurant and one Japanese was in possession of marijuana cigarettes?
a Yes, sir.
q And did this police officer arrested (sic) these (sic) Japanese who is (sic) in possession of marijuana?
a Yes, sir.
q And who made this plan?
a What plan, sir?
q About you and the southern police. At about 7:00 o'clock were (sic) this Japanese holding marijuana was arrested?
a That was not a plan, sir. I got only the information fro Mr. Mitamura that some Japanese were in possession of marijuana.
q You just gather (sic) this information from Mr. Mitamura but you really inform,(sic) the police?
a Yes, sir.
q So that is the plan of Mr. Mitamura?
a I think so, sir.40

Other than Mr. Nagao, no other Japanese was "arrested" for alleged possession of marijuana at Leo's restaurant in the evening of 2 May 1986, after a pack of
cigarettes was place inside his left shirt pocket by, according to him, a Japanese.

After complainant was "arrested" by the five policemen from the Southern Police District and brought to the headquarters, Tomio showed up, talked to Mr.
Nagao and the policemen an recommended the assistance of an interpreter since, according to him, Mr. Nagao cannot understand and speak English well.41
The interpreter he had in mind was his co-accused Tagahiro Nakajima, who he forthwith called; the latter lost no time in coming to the Southern Police District
to act as Mr. Nagao's interpreter.42 Mr. Nakajima offered additional information not disclosed earlier, i.e., the policemen "found" in the possession of
complainant, not just one pack of cigarettes containing 15 stick of marijuana, but a smuggling belt.43

At the Southern Police District, appellants informed Mr. Nagao that if found guilty of possession of marijuana he can be sentenced anywhere from 6 to 12 years
of imprisonment. The two then proposed that he should give money to the policemen, who, they claimed, demanded U.S.$100,000.00. They informed him that
if he will not give the money, his name and his case would be published in the newspapers because, at that time, there were some newspaper reporters
outside. Mr. Nagao, however, did not have the money; he proposed to contact his parents. However, after they talked to the police in another room, they
informed him that they had advanced the payment to the police who thereafter released him. The appellants and a policeman then brought him to his room at
the Holiday Inn Hotel.44

The foregoing scenarios were part of the script. With the obvious connivance of the police, they put the pressure on the complainant by demanding, allegedly
for and in consideration of his release, the amount aforestated. Under the circumstances, with the threat of adverse publicity and imprisonment, it was easy to
work on him. To show that they commiserated with him, they made it appear that they advanced the money to the police. We are, however, convinced that the
accused-appellants never advanced the money. That is why they stuck to the complainant like "a leech," as vividly described by the trial court, after he was
eventually "released" by the police. There is no doubt in Our mind that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the accused-appellants were arrested on 12
May 1986, complainant was moved from one hotel to another by the appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, while it may be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go
wherever he pleased."45 To keep him within their control, appellant Tagahiro Nakajima, who is a businessman and a resident of 101 Peter's Street, BF Homes,
Parañaque, Metro Manila, had to abandon his business and his family to be with Mr. Nagao. Thus, as he admitted upon question by the court, he was, from 3 to
12 May 1986, with the complainant at Holiday Inn Hotel, Intercontinental Hotel, Philippine Village Hotel and Virra Condominium. He slept there, not in his
residence.46 The suite (73) which they occupied Virra Condominium is owned by his co-accused Tomio Maeda.47

Moreover, appellants never refuted the testimony of Nagao made during cross-examination, that at the hotel they told him that if he did not pay them the
amount demanded the policemen, plus the hotel bills and other expenses, would do something to him; they kept on telling him that if he did not pay them, the
policemen would arrest him.48

We are not persuaded by the theory of the appellants that money involved was not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills (as claimed by Tagahiro
Nakajima) or for reimbursement of the sum they advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and additional expenses spent for complainant
(as claimed by Tomio Maeda). In the first place, none of them claimed that either or both of them advanced the money to the police. As a matter of fact,
Tagahiro Nakajima testified that he saw the complainant counting the money:

q Awhile (sic) ago you stated that he even offered money the police?
a Yes, sir.
q How much?
a When I was reaching (sic) to them, they are (sic) writing papers, after that I think he was counting dollar and he told us one hundred thousand US dollar, but
suring (sic) that time I was doubtful how come that big amount he cannot pay the (sic) amount of (sic) One Hundred Thousand US dollar (sic).
q Now, after that, what happened next?
a After that he told me that he will just borrow from his friend One Hundred Thousand US dollar. I told him that is impossible and that is too much, and I also
told him better talk to your father to send money then after that he called up to Japan (sic).
q Now, was he released by the police?
a Yes, sir.49

Upon the other hand, as far as could be gathered from the testimony of Mr. Tomio Maeda on direct examination, the money given to the police did not also
come from him. Thus:

q Did you know as to how much money did he promised (sic) to the police?
a Yes, sir.
q How much?
a One Hundred Thousand US. Dollar (sic) ($100,000.00), sir.
q And do you know if he was able to put up that amount to the police?
a No, sir.
q Now, from the headquarter (sic), where did you go?
a At Holiday Inn Hotel, sir.
q And upon reaching Holiday Inn Hotel, what happened or what did you do?
a Mr. Nagao don't (sic) have any money anymore so we are talking (sic) about hotel accommodation and other expenses starting the next day and he is (sic) also
trying to contact his friend, sir.50
What then was the money they advanced to the police? Nothing. However, they succeeded in making it appear to Mr. Nagao, after they came out of the room
at the Southern Police District, that they advanced the amount to the police, for which reason he was released. This was part of the stratagem to give a
semblance of legality to the demand for ransom.

Now then, if indeed the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the money "paid" to the police, and that they were merely motivated by a desire to help a
fellow Japanese in distress, why did they have to bring him from one expensive hotel to the other, thereby incurring more expenses? Why did they not bring
him to their homes, as the trial court asked, if only to show their genuine concern for him?

Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan contract between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant
Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. In
People vs. Akiran, et al.,51 this Court, through Justice J.P. Bengzon, ruled that even if the kidnapping were to compel the victim to fulfill his promise of defraying
the hospital expenses of a brother of one of the accused, there is still kidnapping for ransom, since if that were indeed the purpose, the accused need not
kidnap the victim. Elaborating thereon, the Court stated that the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1084, which
took effect on 15 June 1954, which increases the penalty for kidnapping and serious illegal detention if it is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances mentioned in said Article were present in the commission of the offense is:

... derived from statutes of the United States, particularly the Lindbergh Law. Thus, American jurisprudence thereon has persuasive application. "Ransom" under
American rulings, as used in statutes making kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been held to mean in its ordinary sense as "money,
price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity."52 Since the accused in this
case demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a person from captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled them to do so, the money is
still ransom under the law.53

The doctrine in the Akiran case is applicable here.

Thus, even if the theory of Tomio is correct, it was not necessary for him and his co-accused Nakajima to deprive the complainant of his liberty to compel him to
pay the alleged loan.

We thus hold that upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the
trial court committed no error in convicting them accordingly. In view, however, of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which abolishes the death
penalty and provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, the penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

In the light of the foregoing, the motion of appellants dated 16 March 1987 to reconsider Our resolution of 29 January 1987 in G.R. No. 75576 must also be
Denied for lack of merit.

This should not, however, end the story of Mr. Nagao. As adverted to earlier, other parties, namely, Mr. Mitamura, a Japanese national, and the five policemen
from the Southern Police District, could be deeply involved in the conspiracy to kidnap him for ransom. Our examination of the records fails to show that Mr.
Mitamura and the policemen were investigated or prosecuted in connection with this case. This Court would be remiss in its duty if it were to close its eyes on
this matter, more specifically on the alleged involvement of the policemen. Policemen are supposed to enforce the law, protect the people, and maintain peace
and order. At the people's expense, they don the uniform of authority and are allowed to carry the instruments of legal violence. As such, they are bound to
faithfully adhere to the Constitutional directive to be at all times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.54 When they fail in that sacred duty and become the lawbreakers, they have no business staying a minute longer in their offices and wearing their
uniforms. They deserve nothing but the severest criminal and administrative penalties the law provides. The people's taxes should never be used to maintain
and support scalawags in our law enforcement agencies who may use their uniforms and their lawfully issued weapons as convenient shields or instruments for
the perpetration of their evil deeds. Accordingly, We direct the Philippine National Police to conduct a thorough investigation, if none has been done so far, into
the involvement of the five policemen of the Southern Police District and, should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases
against them. As regards Mr. Mitamura, if he is still in the Philippines, efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in coordination
with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and prosecuted, should the evidence warrant. No alien should be allowed to abuse
Philippine hospitality and make our country a happy hunting ground for his criminal activities.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In G.R. No. 74630, AFFIRMING, subject to the above provision of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the decision of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 86-45055, and

2. In G.R. No. 75576, DENYING, for lack of merit, the motion to reconsider the resolution of 20 January 1987.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65152 August 30, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FEDERICO MERCADO OR ALBERTO MERCADO, defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision, dated September 9, 1982, of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XI, in Criminal Case No. 32112, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused is convicted of the crime charged and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. (p. 44, Rollo)

As stated by defense counsel, the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense are correctly summarized in the decision of the trial court, as follows:

The prosecution evidence shows that the accused was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant Yvonne Baylon. On September 1, 1979,
Susan left the family residence for an unknown place. The accused suspected that it was her elder sister Yvonne who instigated her to leave. At about 8:30
o'clock in the morning on the following day while Yvonne was walking on a road at San Carlos Subdivision, Binangonan, Rizal, the accused came from behind
her. Without any warning, the accused suddenly grabbed Yvonne by the neck and pointed a knife on her throat. Thereupon, the accused dragged Yvonne to the
house of Norma Guerrero, a friend of his. Upon reaching the porch of the house, Yvonne asked the accused why he was acting that way. The accused replied
that he was angry with her and demanded that she produce her sister, Susan. At this juncture, the accused dragged Yvonne this time to the road side. Then the
brothers of Yvonne and some neighbors arrived asking the accused to release Yvonne. But instead of doing so, the accused raised the blouse of Yvonne and
inserted his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. Thereafter, the accused dragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police and some
policemen talked to him. The accused told the Chief of Police that he wanted to see Susan and also demanded that he be given transportation and money. This
situation lasted up to about 12:00 noon with the policemen surrounding the accused and Yvonne about 15 meters away. After being given some food to
partake, the barrio captain arrived and he was able to take hold of the accused and subdue hint him. Yvonne, because of the traumatic experience she was
subjected to, lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital. Her fingers suffered injuries, abrasion on her neck and a small wound on her stomach.

On the other hand, the accused averred that Susan Baylon was his wife. Although they were not legally married they had been living together for sometime in
her family house at Tayuman. Sometime in August 1979, he quarelled with Susan about her relatives. He told Susan that he could no longer live with them and
that they better separate from her sister, Yvonne, and brothers. Thereafter, while he remained upstairs in the house, Susan went down when Yvonne invited
her to eat. When Susan did not return, he went down and inquired from Yvonne where Susan had gone. Yvonne replied that she did not know and he told her
that Susan had left without telling him where she was going. He then went out of the house, looked for Susan and inquired from their neighbors and relatives
about her whereabouts. When he returned to the house unsuccessful in his search, he found his clothes already placed in a box near the doorway. Yvonne, who
was standing near the door, then told him to leave the house and he did so after thanking her for his stay. On September 2, 1979, at about 8:30 in the morning
he saw Yvonne sitting on a bench inside a store located at Tayuman. Yvonne at the tune was holding a knife and was about to stab him from behind. Because a
friend was able to warn him he immediately grabbed the knife from the hand of Yvonne and succeeded in doing so. When he asked Yvonne why she wanted to
stab him she replied that Susan complained to her. It was while he was in the act of holding Yvonne and pointing the knife on her chest when the barrio captain
and the policemen arrived who thought that he was going to stab Yvonne. He was asked by the barangay captain what he wanted from Yvonne and he replied
that he just wanted Susan produced because he wanted to talk to her. He also asked the barangay captain for a vehicle but he did not ask for any money. When
he lost the knife, the people ganged up on him. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)

Appellant claims that the lower court erred (1) in not ruling that his guilt has not been proven; (2) in convicting him of kidnapping and serious illegal detention;
(3) in not crediting him with the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation; and (4) in not crediting him with the period of his preventive detention.

The elements of the crime of illegal detention, as defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or

(b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or

(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. (Reyes, Revised Penal Code 1975 Revised Edition, Book 11, page 468)

The issue in this review of the aforesaid judgment revolves around the credibility of witnesses, i.e., whether or not the trial court was correct in giving more
weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the testimony of appellant, in finding him guilty of the offense charged and, in sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the rule is now settled that "... [u]nless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower court. For, having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses while testifying, the trial court, more than
the reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both
parties." (People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173,176)

In the case at bar, We find no justification to overturn the judgment of the trial court giving credence to the declarations of five (5) witnesses, three (3) of whom
are policemen who did not know appellant before the incident. The records of the case are convincing enough that Mercado forcibly brought Yvonne from place
to place so that the latter would reveal the whereabouts of Susan, his common-law-wife. For almost five (5) hours, he held Yvonne in a store before he was
subdued. Pictures of the incident (Exhibits D, D-1 to D-4) clearly show appellant's hand around the neck of complainant, with a knife poked at it. On the other
hand, as correctly observed by the trial court, "[i]f it was true that it was the complainant who tried to stab the accused and it was the latter who succeeded in
subduing the complainant, the incident would not have lasted several hours and attracted a throng of onlookers and policemen." (p. 43, Rollo)

The argument advanced by the defense that appellant should be convicted of grave coercion only since his purpose was "to force Miss Yvonne Baylon to
produce Miss Susan Baylon" (p. 38, Rollo), is without merit. In the Ablaza case (supra), "the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that
makes proper the prosecution of the herein accused under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The surrounding circumstances make it clear that the main
purpose of Annabelle's detention was to coerce her into withdrawing her previous charges against appellant Ablaza, thus obstructing the administration of
justice." (p. 178, Ibid) The extant evidence on record shows that "the accused held complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who was
the common-law wife of the accused." (p. 44, Rollo)
The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from the desire to compel Susan to live with him cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose
relationship with her was illegitimate. The obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments.

We agree, however, with appellant that he should be credited with the period of his preventive detention. He has been detained since September 2, 1979 and,
therefore, in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of his preventive detention should be deducted from the term of his sentence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs. Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment upon a
showing that he agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the
time of such preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, J., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 84048, February 15, 1990 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LETICIA SANIDAD DE DEL SOCORRO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:

In an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 57828 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Leticia Sanidad de Del Socorro was charged with the
crime of Kidnapping committed as follows:
"That on or about the 11th day of February, 1984, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CLAIRE SANCHEZ, a minor below seven (7) years old, for
the purpose of permanently separating said child from EVELYN SANCHEZ y TEJERO and ANTONIO SANCHEZ, parents of the said child and there-after sold to one
DRA. APOLONIA VILLAMAYOR, in the amount of P700.00."

The defendant was duly arrested and brought before the court. When arraigned, she pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged in the Information. She was
placed on trial and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial, Judge Domingo R. Garcia found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the
Information and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penal-ties provided for by law, without pronouncement as to
costs.

From this sentence, the defendant has appealed to this Court.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that between 10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 February 1984, while Evelyn Sanchez was in her
residence at No. 162 Kalentong St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, cooking food for lunch, her four-year old daughter named Claire Sanchez went out of the
house to play with other children. After she had finished cooking, Evelyn called her child to get inside and eat her lunch. Receiving no response, she went out of
the house and looked for her child in the neighborhood. But the child was nowhere to be found. She inquired from the other children who were playing where
her daughter Claire was and she was informed that Claire was taken by a woman whom the children thought was the aunt of Claire. She was also informed that
her child had resisted in going with the woman and cried for her mother, but the woman carried the child and got on board a jeepney and left the place. The
disappearance of Claire Sanchez was, consequently, reported to the Mandaluyong police.[1]

Several days after the disappearance of the child, the distraught mother was informed by a relative that a certain doctor in Angono, Rizal, had bought a child
who fitted the description of her daughter, Claire.[2] Forthwith, she went to Angono, Rizal and with some town policemen, went to see the lady physician, one
Dr. Villamayor, who told the policemen that she had given the child to her aunt whose house was at E. de la Paz Street. The child was then taken from the aunt
of the doctor and brought to the municipal building of Angono where he was re-united with her mother. The lady physician advised the mother and the
policemen however, not to leave immediately as the woman who brought the child to her was coming back on that day to collect some money.[3]

The lady physician, Dr. Apolonia Merced Villamayor, declared that at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 11 February 1984, a woman, whom she later
identified to be the accused, Leticia Sanidad de Del Socorro, came to her clinic at No. 91 Int. Quezon Ave., Angono, Rizal, with a baby girl. She asked the accused
what was wrong with the child and the accused answered that nothing was wrong with the child, but that she wanted the lady physician to take care of the
child, whom she referred to as her daughter, because her husband had died just two (2) months ago and she could not afford to feed her brood of four (4) girls
and two (2) boys. The accused also asked for the amount of P700.00, as a "donation", to enable her to open a small sari-sari store. Feeling pity and compassion
for the child, she gave the accused P400.00 which she had at the time, and told her to come back the following Saturday for the balance. After the accused had
left, she gave the child to her spinster aunt, Lourdes Saguinsin who lived in E. de la Paz St., Angono, Rizal.

The following Saturday, two (2) policemen from Angono, Rizal, came to her clinic and inquired if she had seen a girl of about four (4) years of age. She told the
policemen that a child was given to her for adoption the previous Saturday, and that she gave the child to her aunt Lourdes. She also told the policemen that the
woman who brought the child to her was coming back that day to collect the balance of P300.00. She asked them to wait for her.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, sure enough the accused came back to the clinic. Dr. Villamayor pointed out the accused to the policemen who then
arrested her and brought her to the municipal building for investigation.[4]

The accused admitted having brought the child, Claire Sanchez, to Dr. Villamayor in Angono, Rizal. But she denied having kidnapped the child, or having sold her
to the doctor. Her version of the incident, as testified to by her in court, is that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 February 1984, while she was on her
way home to the Javier Compound, San Francisco Village, Muzon, Taytay, Rizal, she saw the child, Claire, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Jose Rizal
College in Mandaluyong. The child was crying and when she asked why, the child told her that two (2) children had quarelled with her. The child also told her
that her lola had refused to take her along. She asked the child where she was living, but the child did not point to any particular place or direction. Out of pity
for the child, she brought the child along with her. They waited for a bus for Angono, Rizal, and upon reaching Angono, she entrusted the child to Dr. Villamayor
for safekeeping. She denied having asked or received money from Dr. Villamayor.[5]

In this appeal, the defendant-appellant, through counsel, raises mainly the question of credibility of witnesses. Defendant-appellant assails the trial court for
giving weight and credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution despite the contradictions and inconsis-tencies in their testimony which would
render them doubtful and unreliable.

We find, however, that the variance between the testi-mony of the prosecution witnesses in court and their sworn statements, as well as the alleged
contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by the appellant in her Brief, are not substantial as to destroy their credibility. The alleged variance refers to
minor details which would tend to show the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them.

Besides, the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, unlike the denial of the defendant-appellant, appears to be consistent with the truth and the
natural course of things. Furthermore, these witnesses had no motive to falsify the truth and impute to the defendant-appellant, whom they met only on the
occasion complained of, the commission of so grave an offense as kidnapping of a minor child.

The claim of the defendant-appellant that the child, Claire Sanchez, went voluntarily with her, cannot be given credence. Evelyn Sanchez, the mother of the
child, Claire, declared that when she asked her daughter upon their reunion if she went voluntarily with the defendant-appellant, the child answered that she
did not. Evelyn further declared that when she asked the children in the neighborhood, with whom her daughter was playing, if Claire had resisted, the children
answered that Claire had resisted, so that the accused had to carry her to the jeep.[6]

Besides, the defendant-appellant herself testified that when she picked up the child in Mandaluyong, her only thought was to bring the child to Dr. Villamayor in
Angono, Rizal.[7] She did not bring the child to her (defendant's) own home in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal even if this place is nearer than Angono, because, according
to the defendant, she already has many children of her own and they have no food to eat.[8] But if she really pitied the child whom she described as crying on
the sidewalk, why, it can be asked, did she not bring her to the nearest police station in Mandaluyong? And, why did she think only of Dr. Villamayor who,
according to her, she did not even know personally, but only in name?[9] Her explanation is as follows:

"Q
Why of all people in the Philippines in general Taytay and Angono in particular, why do you have to entrust this child to Dr. Villamayor?
A
Because I trusted Dr. Villamayor in the same manner that she trusted me and I know where we will give the child."[10]
Is it possible then that the defendant-appellant went directly to Dr. Villamayor because of the common knowledge in the neighborhood that her spinster aunt
wanted to adopt the child?[11] One, of course, can only surmise.

To cut down on the illicit traffic of children, we urge the prosecution of persons to whom children are sold or given away for a valuable consideration.
Oftentimes, it is only the abductor or kidnapper who is prosecuted. Yet, the person to whom the kidnapped child is given and who may have wittingly or
unwittingly given the motivation for the abduction, goes scot-free, even as the intention of this person is to keep and raise the child as his own. By keeping the
child, under these circumstances, is he not guilty of serious illegal detention?

Back to the case at bar, it is our opinion, and we so hold, that the evidence adduced during the trial is sufficient to justify the conclusions of the trial court.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 86454 October 18, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARMEN LIM @ "MAMENG LIM", defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, the dispositive portion of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Carmen Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing her to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 22)

The information filed against the accused and John Doe reads:

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about July 1, 1986, in the afternoon thereof, at Zurbito Street, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this court, the said accused who are private persons conspired and mutually helped each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
Aida and Avelyn both minors and surnamed Villanueva; separating them from their parental care; Aida Villanueva was detained for about twenty (20) days in
the house of Carmen Lim alias "Mameng" while Avelyn Villanueva was detained and brought to Cebu City by the co-accused thereby depriving the two, Aida and
Avelyn of their personal liberties. (Records, p.1)

The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summarized as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That in the morning of July 1, 1986, Aida Villanueva and her younger sister Avelyn Villanueva, 10 and 7 years old, respectively, were sent on an errand by their
father Charlito (should be Charito) Villanueva to buy rice in Masbate, Masbate. The Villanuevas lived in Mobo, a neighboring town of the capital of the province.
Upon their arrival at the poblacion of the capital town of Masbate at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Aida and Avelyn went to the pier, staying there up to
12:00 noon, to meet their mother whom they thought would arrive by boat from Manila. They left the pier when their mother did not arrive and went to Helen
Theatre on Zurbito Street, Masbate, Masbate, to see a picture.

At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day while they were in front of the Helen Theatre, they were called by the accused Carmen Lim, in a loud
voice. "Come here Nene" and asked them to go to her house just infront of the moviehouse. Aida and Avelyn went to the house of the accused and got inside
passing through the front door.

After a brief conversation with the two children, the accused gave Aida and Avelyn rice and kangkong for lunch. After they had finished eating, Aida was told by
the accused to take a bath. The accused gave Aida a dress to wear.

From July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the house of the accused doing household chores such as cleaning the kitchen, scrubbing the
floor, washing the plates including removing lice from the head of the accused and fanning her. Avelyn, the younger sister of Aida, was brought by Carmen's
mother (should be sister) in Cebu on the same day they arrived in the house of the accused.

On July 15, 1986, Charito Villanueva, father of the two minor children, found his daughter Aida in the house of the accused. He asked the accused to let Aida go
home with him, but the accused refused.

Charito came back to the house of the accused the following day, July 16, 1986, accompanied this time by Sgt. Antonio Ariate of the 266th PC Company at Camp
Bonny Serrano, Masbate, Masbate, who had with him an armalite. After Identifying himself to the accused, the soldier told the accused that he was taking Aida
with him.

Without resistance but uttering slanderous remarks, the accused released Aida to Sgt. Ariate. Charito Villanueva and his daughter Aida were brought by Sgt.
Ariate to the 266th PC Company Headquarters where the complaint of Charito was recorded in the blotter by CIC Vincent Elliot Vasquez of the I & I Section.
(Rollo, p. 12)

The appellant's version, on the other hand, is summarized in her brief as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

On or about 1:30 in the afternoon of I July 1986, the sisters went to Helen Theater, located along Zurbito St., Masbate, Masbate, to look at the pictures
displayed outside. Helen Theater is located across the store and residence of the appellant.

The sisters then proceeded to appellant's store which she was tending at that time. Appellant noticed the sisters and caged them over. She inquired from the
sisters as to the whereabouts of their parents as they were apparently alone. The sisters replied that their parents had separated and that their mother had
gone to Manila, and that their father was in Buenavista, Uson, Masbate. The sisters claimed that they were driven away by their father and that they were not
given any food to eat.

Taking pity on the sisters, appellant gave the sisters food and allowed them to take a bath. Concerned for their safety, appellant offered to shelter the sisters. As
the younger sister of appellant was at that time visiting appellant, appellant proposed to Aida to let Avelyn accompany appellant's sister to the latter's home.
Aida agreed, on condition that she and Avelyn could meet every week.

Aida stayed in appellant's residence for about two (2) weeks. To help in the house, Aida would go to the market to buy bread, fish and salt for appellant's
household. Aida also helped watch over appellant's store from time to time.

On or about 9:00 a.m. of 15 July 1986, Charito Villanueva, the complainant and father of the sisters, went to appellant's store. Charito introduced himself to
appellant as the father of the two sisters and informed appellant that he was going to bring the sisters home. Charito talked to Aida and asked her to go home
with him. Aida, however, refused to go with her father. As a result, Charito left. When asked by appellant why she refused to go with her father, Aida replied
that she was afraid that her father would beat her up.
On 16 July 1986, Charito returned to appellant's store, this time accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate, Jr. of the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Ariate introduced
himself to appellant. Charito again talked to Aida to convince her to go home with him. This time, Aida agreed to go home with her father. (Rollo, pp. 44-46)

The appellant raises the following assignment of errors in her appeal, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT DESPITE THE DESISTANCE OF THE COMPLAINANT

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES' TESTIMONY WHICH WERE REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND
CONTRADICTIONS

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT AIDA VILLANUEVA WAS NOT DETAINED BY THE APPELLANT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT APPELLANT HAD NO MOTIVE TO DETAIN AIDA AND AVELYN VILLANUEVA
(Rollo, pp. 47-48)

The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, then
such facts should be carefully taken into account by the reviewing tribunal. (People v. Torre, G.R. No. L-44905, April 25, 1990)

In the case at bar, after a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same to be insufficient to sustain a conviction.

The uncorroborated testimony of the alleged kidnapped victim, Aida Villanueva, which was mainly relied upon by the trial court in convicting the appellant, was
not clear and convincing enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an
essential element in the crime charged, was not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. (See People v. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501, 506 [1984]; US v. Cabanas, 8 Phil. 64, 67 [1907]). The appellant's residence has a store fronting the
street where many customers presumably come and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically
restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.

There are other circumstances which create grave doubts in Aida's version of her two week detention. In her testimony, Aida claimed that she attempted to
escape three times but she was not able to do so. (TSN, July 21, 1987, p. 34). Just how she tried to escape or why she did not succeed is not explained clearly.
When Aida saw her father for the first time on July 15, 1986, she inexplicably did not shout for help or run to him but just observed him and the appellant talk
for half an hour. (TSN, July 21, 1987, p. 23) The Solicitor General counters the appellant's claim stating that Aida did ask for help from her father when the latter
was about to leave, but the appellant pushed her and refused to let her go with her father. (TSN, July 21, 1987, pp. 25-26).

The actuations of both Aida and her father are highly incredible. They are not the natural reactions of a ten-year old child who has been detained against her
will for two weeks and who has tried unsuccessfully to escape three times.

The fact that her father was already there was the perfect opportunity for Aida to try and get away from the appellant. She could have clung to him from the
moment he came in instead of quietly observing him and the appellant talk for some time. Aida did not go with her father because the appellant allegedly told
her not to go. For someone who had been detained against her will, as between her father and her detainor, Aida would have disregarded the appellant's order
and would have run to her father. Neither is it believable that a father who has been desperately looking for his two minor daughters for two weeks would just
calmly accept the appellant's refusal to let go of his daughter.

The Court is not unaware of previous pronouncements that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction.
(People v. Aldeguer, G.R. No. L-47991, April 3, 1990; People v. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 415416 [1988]) But as discussed above, the testimony of Aida
Villanueva does not inspire credibility. Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it
must be credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind. (People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990; People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, 297 [1987])

The fact of detention is also denied by the testimony of one of the prosecution witnesses. Sgt. Ariate stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

Q You also saw Aida Villanueva?

A Yes, sir.
Q Where did you see her?
A By the door of her store ... going inside. (TSN, October 22, 1987, p.10)

It is apparent that Aida had free access going in and out of the appellant's residence. In fact, Aida could have escaped at that particular period of time. She was
three feet away from the appellant when Sgt. Ariate saw her (TSN, October 22, 1987, p. 10) so she could have made a run for it if she really wanted to go.

There is also the question of Sgt. Ariate's conflicting statements as to the answer of Aida's father about his missing daughters which was dismissed by the trial
court as a minor inconsistency. In his testimony, he stated that Aida's father said that he just sent his two daughters on an errand and they were already missing
(TSN, October 22, 1987, p. 9) while in his answer to the questions propounded to him he stated that Aida's father admitted that his daughter ran away.
(Records, p. 15)

Such conflicting statements taken together with the statement of Charito Villanueva, the father of the victim that "Aida Villanueva and Avelyn Villanueva, 10
and 6 yrs. old were (sic) left their house without his consent," (Records, p. 126) recorded in the blotter dated July 23, 1986 cast doubt on the criminal liability of
the appellant. The answer of Sgt. Ariate to the questions propounded to him and the statement in the blotter corroborate the appellant's testimony that the
two children ran away from home. (TSN, April 22, 1988, pp. 4-5)

The unbelievable and conflicting evidence of the prosecution strengthens the version of the appellant that she took pity on the two runaway children and
decided to give them food and shelter. Whether or not she treated them like unpaid servants is not in issue. What is apparent from the records is the absence of
proof showing kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Another circumstance that belies the kidnapping charge is the unexplained delay in the lodging of the complaint against the appellant. An entire week passed
before the complaint was lodged on July 23, 1986. (See People v. Antonio, 161 SCRA 72, 81 [1988])

The fourth circumstance present which calls for the reversal of the conviction is that there is no motive whatsoever for the appellant to kidnap the two children.
The appellant is a woman of sufficient means. It is undisputed that she is the owner of a store and was the employer of two maids at the time of the incident.
She did not know the two children prior to the incident. Had she wanted to hire an additional maid, she could certainly afford to hire another one without going
to the extent of committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. There was no need to kidnap a minor and force her to work against her will. The appellant had
everything to lose and nothing to gain if it is true that she kidnapped the two children. No motive was ever propounded by the prosecution. We are thus
ushered to applying the precept that though proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction, yet a void in the evidence in this respect discloses a weakness in
the case for the prosecution. (People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36, 46 [1968] It has also been held in People v. Zamora, 59 Phil. 568, 569, [1934]):

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, no motive for the killing has been established, and granting that proof of particular motive for taking the life of a human being is not
indispensable to conviction for homicide, the absence of such motive is nevertheless important in determining which of two conflicting theories is more likely to
be true. (Emphasis supplied)

And finally, the execution of the affidavit of desistance by Charito Villanueva, complainant in the kidnapping case, stating that his daughters were not detained
after all by the appellant taken together with the circumstances abovementioned has the effect of exculpating the appellant from the charge of kidnapping. As
held in Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (135 SCRA 620, 630 [1985]):

xxx xxx xxx

It is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal offenses under the full control of the fiscal and that the dismissal of criminal cases by
the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. However, it is also true that an affidavit of desistance may create
serious doubts as to the liability of the accused. At the very least, it calls for a second hard look at the records of the case and the basis for the judgment of
conviction. Jurisprudence on the effect of desistance notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. (Emphasis
supplied)

The instant case falls under the exception where an affidavit of desistance is given due consideration. Significantly, the father of the two girls testified in open
court on November 24, 1987 that he was withdrawing the case and that his children were not detained. The prosecution had every opportunity to cross-
examine or tear apart the retraction and prove that the facts were as earlier alleged. It failed to do so.

The Solicitor General quotes the trial court's statement that:

xxx xxx xxx

If the accused thought that the evidence of the prosecution was fabricated or false, the accused could have presented her two maids as witnesses to testify to
rebut said evidence. Her failure to introduce them as witnesses could only mean that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses about the detention of Aida
in her house were all true. (Rollo, p. 21)

It is a well-entrenched rule in our jurisprudence that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense.
(People v. de Dios, G.R. No. 58174, July 6, 1990; People v. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620, 626 [1988]) In this case, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant Carmen Lim is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102645. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO PADICA y LORICA, LESLIE GANS y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO FABRIGAS, ROMEO PRADEZ, LEONARDO MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO MARAJAS and LEON
MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, ** accused. LEON MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:

Accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXVI, dated January 8, 1990, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for ransom with murder upon an amended information dated November 16, 1984 and reading
as follows:

"That on or about the 8th day of February, 1978, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together with John Doe @ Boy Taga, Peter Doe @ Eddie Boy Marajas, Richard Doe @ Tito and Edward Doe @
Elmer whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, with the use of three (3) firearms with the
different caliber (sic) by means of craft, violence against and intimidation of person, did then and there kidnap Francis Banaga, detain and deprive him of his
liberty for a period of three (3) days and demanded (sic) five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for his release and while thus illegally detaining the latter,
said accused, pursuant to said conspiracy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery shoot Francis Banaga,
thereby inflicting on him gunshot wounds on the head and other parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death as a consequences." 1

The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were
originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms before Military Commission No. 27 in
Criminal Case No 27-163 thereof. However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for the transfer of the case to the civil courts. 2

On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an information for kidnapping for ransom with murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Pq-81-
1596-P, before Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Pasay City against the aforementioned accused, but with the exception of herein appellant whose
name was inadvertently not included therein. 3 A separate charge for illegal possession of firearms was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional Trial
Court but the case was later placed in the archives some time in 1985. 4

Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were both arraigned on January 15, 1982 and, with the assistance of their respective counsel, both pleaded not
guilty. 5 It appears, however, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of "Leonardo Marajas." 6 Trial thereafter ensued but,
subsequently, the case was reraffled to Branch CXVI, Pasay City, of the Regional Trial Court where it remained until the conclusion of the trial in 1990.

Earlier thereto, however, upon discovery of the omission of herein appellant's name in the original information, the prosecution filed a motion on November 16,
1984 for the admission of an amended information including appellant's name as one of the accused. 7 On May 30, 1985, the trial court issued an order
admitting the amended information. 8 Thereafter, or on July 17, 1985, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the
amended information. 9 On the other hand, in an order dated August 27, 1985, 10 accused Padica was discharged from the information to be utilized as a state
witness.

The People's brief, drawing principally from the factual findings of the court a quo based on the evidence adduced in this case, with supplemental data and
documentation of the testimonial evidence as borne out by the transcripts, which we find to be correct, presented the prosecution's case in this wise:

"On or about 9:00 o clock in the morning of February 8, 1978, appellant and his brother, Leopoldo Marajas, using a car driven by Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica
in his house in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Leopoldo requested Padica, his compadre, to drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and
his classmates, giving Padica P100.00 for the purpose. Upon receiving the amount, Padica, pursuant to the instructions of Leopoldo, drove the car, with
Leopoldo and appellant on board, and proceeded to Samson Tech in Pasay City, arriving there at about 10:00 A.M. Leopoldo left the vehicle and, upon coming
back after a while, he told Padica that they were going to Sukat, Parañaque. In Sukat, the three stopped at a restaurant when (sic) they ordered something to
eat (TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 6-10).

"Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car, they proceeded to the Superville Subdivision, also in Sukat, where they arrived at about 11:30 A.M. of the same
date. Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga, both fourteen (14) years of age, more or less, were in said subdivision. Leopoldo alighted from the car and talked
to them. Subsequently, Leopoldo together with Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car. All of them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica still driving the
vehicle. Seated beside Padica was Leopoldo Marajas, while appellant and Eddie Boy occupied the back seat, with Francis Banaga between them (Ibid, pp.-10-
13).

"Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date, Leopoldo Marajas told Padica, to drive the car into the sugarcane plantation at the side of the
road. Once inside the plantation, Padica stopped the car when told to do so by Leopoldo, who then alighted from the vehicle and told Francis Banaga to alight.
However, Francis refused to get down from the car. Notwithstanding his resistance, he was forced out of the car by Leopoldo Marajas, Eddie Boy and appellant,
who pulled him out of the vehicle. Thereafter, the three brought Francis Banaga to a place inside the sugarcane plantation, more or less ten (10) meters away
from the car, while Padica remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo Marajas then delivered several stabbing blows at Banaga after which appellant shot Banaga with a
handgun. Banaga fell on the ground. Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel from Padica and drove the car to
Muntinlupa, where Padica alighted and was left behind with Leopoldo warning Padica, 'Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang.' (Ibid., pp. 10-19).

"On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day, while in his house at Gatchalian Subdivision in Parañaque, Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became alarmed when his
son failed to come home. A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of (the) same date, someone called up by phone, telling Tomas not to look for his son as he was in good
condition, and demanding P500,000.00 for his (Francis') release. Tomas reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary authorities in Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, Sgt. Villanueva and Sgt. Cierlito were dispatched to the Banaga residence (TSN, January 15, 1982, pp. 4-6).

"On February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second phone call in the course of which the caller reduced the amount demanded to P200,000.00. On February 10,
1978, there was another phone call with (the) caller lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and giving instructions that the money be wrapped in a newspaper,
placed in a paper bag, and delivered by a girl wearing a T-shirt to Luneta, in front of the National Library, under a true with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. of February
10, 1978 (Ibid., pp. 6-10).

"Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas Banaga, volunteered to deliver the money as the maid of (the) Banaga family who was supposed to do it was scared.
Between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978, Camello was brought by Sgt. Bucao and CIC Ocampo in front of Bayview Hotel at Roxas Blvd., Manila. At
about 8:00 P.M. of the same date, she went to the National Library at Luneta and positioned herself under a tree with red flowers, pursuant to the instructions
of the caller. A few minutes later, a taxicab arrived. Appellant alighted from the vehicle, approached Camello and got the money from her which was in a paper
bag, saying: 'Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata mamaya sa bahay.' (TSN, Sept. 19, 1985, pp. 6-12). When appellant returned to the waiting taxicab and was
about to board it, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those sent to Luneta to entrap the person who would receive the ransom money, apprehended and arrested
appellant (TSN, March 11, 1986, pp. 2-5).

"(At) or about 2:00 P.M. of February 11, 1978, pursuant to the information given by appellant during the investigation, a Philippine Constabulary team led by Lt.
Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by appellant, went to Calamba, Laguna search for the body of Francis Banaga. Appellant led the team to the place where the
cadaver was dumped, which was inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters away from the road. The team recovered the body of Francis Banaga and
brought it to the Municipal Health Officer of Calamba for autopsy (TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 10-17).

"According to the necropsy report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban of the Calamba Municipal Health Office, Francis Banaga sustained two (2) entry gunshot wounds,
one on the head and the other on the chest, with two (2) exit gunshot wounds and several lacerated wounds. The death of Francis was caused by 'intra-thoracic
brain hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.' (TSN, July 25, 1986, pp. 17-69).

"After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for his life, Romeo Padica finally revealed to Lt. Cruz (sic) of Regional Security Unit Intelligence Division, Lucena City
that he (Padica) witnessed the killing of Francis Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near the Lucena City Market and after making the disclosure, surrendered
to the authorities (TSN, December 12, 1988, p. 6)." 11

Appellant predictably presented a different narration of the events that led to his arrest. He insists that he was the victim of an elaborate frame-up by the
military authorities assigned to investigate the case. Appellant claims that on February 8, 1978, the day that the victim disappeared, he was in Batangas
province, where he was a resident. In the early morning of February 10, 1978, he decided to go to Manila, with Sto. Tomas, Batangas as his point of departure,
in order to thresh out some financial matters in connection with his business of buy and sell. 12

He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and proceeded to the office of Mrs. Aquilina Marquez-Marajas, his sister-in-law, at Mabini Street in Malate to talk to
his brother, Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo there, he then went to the house of his sister, Nelly Marajas, a neighbor of the Banaga family, at Gatchalian
Subdivision in Parañaque. He was about to board a tricycle at the main gate of the subdivision at around 9:30 A.M. when he was suddenly accosted by two
Metrocom officers in civilian clothes who forcibly took him to a car. Appellant was later brought at about 12:00 noon to the Siesta Court Hotel, also in Malate,
where he was repeatedly beaten and subjected to torture by his abductors who tried in vain to extract information about the disappearance of Francis Banaga.
13

In the evening of the same day, he was taken out of the hotel and was taken by the men to an unspecified safehouse where, once again, his ordeal at their
hands was resumed. Unable to bear the maltreatment any further, appellant then tried to fool them by admitting that the missing Francis Banaga could be
found in Paete, Laguna. He then led a group of his captors to the said place but they found no trace of the missing boy. Incensed at the deception, the men took
him back to the safehouse. 14

Later, appellant was again taken out of the safehouse and, together with another captive whom he identified only as "Florentino," he was brought to an isolated
sugarcane plantation. There Florentino led the military team to the cadaver of Francis Banaga. 15 Appellant and Florentino were later brought back to the
safehouse. The former claims that he was kept there for about two months, during which time he helped in the maintenance and care of the safehouse and its
surroundings. He also met at the safehouse Leslie Gans, one of the accused, but he had no occasion to discuss their predicament with him. After appellant's
confinement, he was turned over to the prison authorities of Bicutan Rehabilitation Center where he remained until the start of the trial. 16

After more than eight years of trial, which for one reason or another was punctuated by numerous and needless postponements, the trial court rendered its
assailed decision pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga, father of Francis Banaga, the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the child, without pronouncement a to costs.
17

Appellant is now before us insisting on the reversal of the judgment of conviction by theorizing that the court below erred: (a) in ruling that the guilt of
appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt; (b) in giving full credence to the testimony of state witness Romeo Padica; (c) in laying emphasis on the
weakness of the defense interposed by appellant; and (d) in disregarding the inconsistencies raised by the defense as minor and insubstantial. 18

After a careful and exhaustive review of the records, the testimonial and documentary evidence, and the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, we are
satisfactorily persuaded that the prosecution has duly discharged its onus probandi insofar as the culpability of appellant is concerned, but we do not adopt as
correct the nature or categorization of the offense for which he must do penance.

1. At the outset, from the evidence on record, we are not convinced that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was committed as charged in both the original and
amended informations. Rather the crime committed was murder, attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength, and
not the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as found by the trial court without objection by either the prosecution or defense. The essential
element in the crime of kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty, 19 or that he was transported away against his will with
the primary or original intent to effect that restraint, is absent in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts when they invited the
trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not to confine or detain him for any length of time or for any other purpose.

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, 20 and this is true even if,
before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. 21 Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill
them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the
subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, 22 hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component
felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et al., although the accused had planned to
kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not
convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder. 23

That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim can readily be deduced from the manner by which they
swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence
whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the
contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim's family very much later
that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.

It will be observed that under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance that the kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom raises the
imposable penalty to death. 24 It is essential, however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty of the victim be present. The fact alone that
ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim
is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such
determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.

In addition, Francis Banaga, then already fourteen years of age and a fourth year high school student, was neither forced nor coerced unlawfully into going
along with his killers. He voluntarily boarded the car and went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna. The victim had every reason to trust them as they were his
neighbors in Gatchalian Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers, accused Leonardo Marajas alias "Eddie Boy," was his schoolmate and a playmate. 25
There was treachery since, under the aforestated circumstances, the victim was lured by his killers into going with them to Laguna without the slightest inkling
of their nefarious design, coupled with the sudden and unexpected assault by the malefactors on the hapless victim in the isolated sugarcane plantation in
Calamba, which thereby divested him of an opportunity either to effectively resist or to escape. 26 Abuse of superior strength was likewise present, for the
accused deliberately resorted to their collective strength for the purpose of overpowering whatever feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer. 27 They
thus insured the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all to themselves.

Under the factual features present in the commission of the crime, however, we are inclined to grant that the circumstance of superior strength should not be
appreciated distinctly but should be considered as being absorbed in and by treachery, 28 and the same is true with regard to the allegation of craft. Hence,
abuse of superior strength may not be taken into account separately in this case, either as a qualifying or as an aggravating circumstance. On the other hand,
although the trial court and both parties herein have again passed sub silentio thereon, it is evident that the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was
present since appellant and his co-accused obviously and deliberately chose the desolation and isolation of the sugarcane plantation to perpetrate the crime far
from the gaze of potential eye-witnesses. 29 This circumstance is underscored by the fact that they committed the crime at about 12:00 noon, a time of day
when any passersby or assistance could hardly be expected in the vicinity of the locus criminis. 30 This aggravating circumstance of despoblado should,
therefore, be considered against appellant even if it was not alleged in the informations since it was duly proved. 31

Appellant's defense that he was in another place at the time of Francis Banaga's disappearance and killing must necessarily fail. Indeed, trite as our innumerable
reiterations have already made this statement of rejection, we must perforce again reprobate appellant's alibi as an inherently weak defense decidedly easy of
concoction. Apart from that, it is considered as clearly negative in nature. Hence, when arrayed against the positive declarations of the witnesses for the
prosecution, the same would all the more be given little consideration. 32

For it to prosper, it must be shown that not only was the accused at some other place at the time of the commission of the offense, but that it was also
physically impossible for him to have been there when it happened. 33 Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the trial court in its decision, appellant was not even
sure as to his whereabouts on February 8, 1978. He simply offered as an explanation therefor that he was "more or less" in Batangas, which allegation was
completely uncorroborated. 34

In light of the foregoing, appellant's further denial that he was entrapped on the night of February 10, 1978 by the authorities after receiving ransom money
from Norma Camello must likewise be rejected. Both Norma Camello and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the police operatives, positively and without hesitation
identified appellant as the person who was collared at Luneta Park. 35 Moreover, the police report clearly and definitely bears out the fact that appellant was
arrested by the investigating police officers on that night pursuant to the dragnet plan that was prepared for the purpose, 36 the veracity of which record
further enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which appellant failed to rebut.

2. Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of Romeo Padica as it is incredible and inconsistent with the other
evidence on record. He affects surprise as to why the Marajas brothers would go to the extent of hiring Padica to drive for them when, in fact, Padica himself
knew that Leopoldo Marajas was a skilled driver. Moreover, he expresses disbelief that Romeo Padica never conversed with the group while they were on the
road and that, although the latter claims to be a close friend of Leopoldo, he never even knew what was Leopoldo's profession and what was the surname of
their common "compadre." He likewise characterizes as incredible the circumstance that he and his cohorts supposedly carried out the crime in broad daylight
and that thereafter they simply dismissed Padica with a casual threat of "Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang."

There is no merit in all the foregoing submissions and pretensions of appellant. It is true that the testimony of a particeps criminis is to be invariably viewed with
much caution, coming as it does from a polluted source. 37 However, in the case at bar and after a careful evaluation, we find no plausible reason to depart
from the favorable appreciation by the trial court of Padica's testimony which the said court characterized as reasonable and probable, given in a clear,
straightforward and convincing manner thereby leaving no doubt in the mind of said court that he was telling the truth. 38

Jurisprudentially embedded is the rule that the stamp of approval given by the trial court on the testimony of a particular witness as a consequence of its factual
findings is normally accorded finality by appellate courts, the court below having had the opportunity to observe closely the manner by which such witness
testified. 39 Furthermore, not a single shred of evidence was introduced by the defense to show any ill motive on the part of Padica to impute such a serious
crime on appellant and his brothers, thus entitling to considerable credit his testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding Francis Banaga's death. These
conclusions we confirm, not by mere reliance on dicta, but from our own review and calibration of the evidence.

There is certainly nothing strange in the matter of the Marajas brothers requesting Padica to drive for them. As testified to by the latter, he was then a close
friend of one of the brothers, Leopoldo, who was the one who requested him to drive, and the latter presumably had full confidence in him as he was at the
time a professional driver of taxicabs. Romeo Padica, likewise, can not be discredited just because of his silence on the road and for not knowing Leopoldo's
profession and the surname of a common "compadre." It is of common knowledge that there are persons who are taciturn and not as inquisitive as others, or
who disdain prying into the affairs even of their close friends.

Be that as it may, this witness did testify to and narrate in his sworn statement some personal matters regarding the Marajas siblings, such as the fact that
Leopoldo was staying at a house adjacent to that of the Banagas in Tionguiao Street at Gatchalian Subdivision together with his wife, children and Eddie Boy
Marajas; that said house was owned by a sister of the brothers; and that Francis Banaga, whose picture he positively identified in court, was a playmate and
schoolmate of Eddie Boy Marajas, thus lending credence to his claim of close and fraternal ties with Leopoldo Marajas. 40

The fact that appellant and his co-accused carried out the murder of Francis Banaga in broad daylight is hardly surprising. As pointedly noted by the Solicitor
General, "it is not difficult to believe that appellant and his co-accused committed the crime in broad daylight because there were no other persons at the scene
of the incident," as the same was inside a desolate sugarcane plantation in the outskirts of Calamba, Laguna and the crime was perpetrated at noon of that day,
as we have earlier explained.

Having demonstrated to Padica the brutal and merciless manner in which they disposed of Francis Banaga, appellant and his brothers were undoubtedly secure
in the thought that Padica would have been sufficiently terrorized thereby and would thereafter keep his silence, and so, just for good measure, they uttered
the threat on the latter's life simply as a reminder of what they had in store for him should he waver and ignore that injunctive warning.

It is further contended by appellant that the trial court should not have granted the motion to discharge Romeo Padica from the information, as one of the
conditions for its grant has not been met, namely, that the prosecution has not shown that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty. Incidentally, appellant
slurs over the fact that this order of the trial court was sustained by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16302 which denied appellant's petition for certiorari
and prohibition assailing said order, the judgment therein having become final and executory on January 20, 1989. 41

Appellant has also clearly lost sight of the rule that the discharge of an accused to be a state witness, lies within the sound discretion of the court before whom
it is sought and in the exercise of that discretion, it is not required that the court be absolutely certain that all the requirements for the proper discharge of a co-
accused be present. 42 In the case under consideration, the prosecution presented enough evidence to support its motion for the discharge of Padica. The trial
court's reliance thereon and its consequent finding on the basis thereof that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty must be respected as it was in better
position to evaluate such evidence.

Appellant likewise points to portions in the testimony of Padica which are allegedly not substantiated by the evidence on record. Thus, appellant argues that
while Padica claimed that the victim was stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas and then shot at four times by appellant, yet the necropsy report of the medico-legal
officer, Dr. Eusebio P. Panganiban, showed no stab wounds but only lacerated wounds and two gunshot wounds. Further, Padica's testimony that the victim was
dragged inside the plantation and instantly stabbed and shot to death is supposedly belied by the findings in the necropsy report that Francis Banaga's body had
several hematomas and contusions. 43

We nonetheless agree with and give due credit to the following explanation of the court below regarding these seeming conflicting aspects:

"The defense counsel also capitalized on the supposed inconsistency between the allegation of Padica that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Banaga four (4) times and the
autopsy report stating that the victim sustained two (2) entry gunshot wounds. Padica testified that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Francis Banaga four (4) times without
stating that the victim was hit also four (4) times. The fact that he suffered two (2) entry gunshot wounds clearly indicates that Francis was shot, supporting the
version of Padica that the child was fired upon by Leon Marajas, Jr.

"Also pointed out as a basis for not believing the testimony of Padica is the supposed conflict between his assertion that Leopoldo Marajas stabbed Banaga with
a knife and the finding of Dr. Panganiban that the victim, aside from the gunshot wounds, sustained only lacerated wounds and contusions. The defense implied
that Banaga was not stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas as there is no finding that he sustained stab wounds. A logical analysis of this point shows that there is no
inconsistency. Padica stated that he saw the accused Leopoldo Marajas stab the victim but he did not say that Banaga was hit by the stabbing blows delivered
by the said accused. It could also be that one of the blows hit the boy but without piercing his body, causing only lacerations thereon." 44

As for the several hematomas and contusions that were discovered on the body of Francis Banaga, it is entirely possible that the same were inflicted when the
victim put up a furious struggle for his life against his assailants. According to Padica, the Marajas brothers forcefully pulled out Banaga from the car when they
stopped by the roadside. They continued to inflict physical harm on the boy while prodding him to proceed inside the sugarcane plantation until they reached a
clearing where, after Leopoldo Marajas delivered stabbing blows on the victim which may not have inflicted knife wounds but contusions from the assailant's
clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr. then fired away with the fatal shots. All the while and just before he was shot to death, Padica narrated that the victim
desperately exerted all efforts to ward off the assault on his person. 45

Appellant also raises as an issue the questionable manner in which Padica surrendered, after nearly three years of hiding, to Lt. Cesar Perez of the Lucena PC
Regional Security Unit whom he met only for the first time at the Lucena City marketplace.

But, as Padica candidly revealed, and we find his explanation satisfactory and credible, he had desired all along to surrender as he had grown tired of constantly
fearing for his life and of his difficult plight as a fugitive from justice. He was obviously always on the lookout for persons in authority whom he could trust
during his stay of two to three months in Lucena City where he had in the meantime found work as a porter in the public market. In the course of his stay there,
he had heard about the "kind-hearted" Lt. Perez, a ranking officer of the local constabulary. 46 His subsequent meeting and surrender to Lt. Perez at the
marketplace was no strange coincidence as it is obviously a place where all kinds of people go to and cross paths.

That it may have taken Padica over two years to finally give himself up to the authorities is understandable. He had witnessed a heinous crime perpetrated on a
defenseless fourteen-year old boy by his killers, and the latter had threatened him with bodily harm should he reveal what they had done. In view thereof, it
was but natural that Padica would hide, away from the possible clutches of the Marajas brothers, and keep unto himself the dark secret lest he suffer the same
grim fate that befell Francis Banaga.

3. Appellant finally contends that the failure of the prosecution to charge him as an accused in the original information is a fatal defect. Again, we find no merit
in this fatuous assertion.

The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name of the accused, failing which the complaint or information would be rendered
invalid. The test of sufficiency is laid down in Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which states:

"Sec. 7. Name of the accused. — A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has
been or is known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown.

If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is disclosed by him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the true name of the accused
shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the original information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the
name of "Leonardo Marajas." At that juncture, appellant should have raised the error as to his identity by filing a motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over his person, in line with the doctrine explained in People vs. Narvaes 47 laid down as early as 1934.

But, as aforestated, appellant did not do so but instead voluntarily appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty thereat, albeit under a different name.
Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person and it could have rendered a valid judgment of conviction based on the original information
even without need of an amendatory information to correct appellant's name. What we stated in Narvaes is worth repeating:

". . . (w)hen the appellant was arraigned under the name of Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely entered his plea of 'not
guilty' under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should have for the first time raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the
court's lack of jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Pedro Narvaes, not Primo Narvaes. Not having filed the said demurrer, it
must necessarily be understood that he renounced it and therefore he is now estopped from raising, or insisting to raise, the same question, not only in this
appeal but even at the trial . . ."

The subsequent amendment to insert in the information Leon Marajas, Jr.'s real name involved merely a matter of form as it did not, in any way, deprive
appellant of a fair opportunity to present his defense. 48 Moreover, the amendment neither affected nor altered the nature of the offense charged since the
basic theory of the prosecution was not changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. 49 Such an amendment is explicitly allowed under the second
paragraph of Section 7, in relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that "(t)he information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused." At any rate, whatever irregularity
may have attended the inclusion of appellant's name as an accused in the amended information has been waived by his subsequent appearance and entry of
plea at his arraignment under said amendatory information.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y
Ramos of the crime of murder and IMPOSING upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the late
Francis Banaga the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, in line with current jurisprudential policy, and likewise to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C .J ., Padilla Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118570 October 12, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "Bennie", accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC-Br. 78, Quezon City, in Crim. Case No. Q-94-58036 finding accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA
guilty of two (2) separate heinous crimes — kidnapping for ransom and murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each case and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for funeral expenses. 1

On 13 July 1994, at about six-thirty in the morning, an American pastor named Malcolm Bradshaw was driving his car along EDSA to take his daughter Michelle
to school. At the bus stop between Corinthian Gardens and the corner to White Plains Avenue, Quezon City, he saw a woman, later identified as the victim Alicia
Abanilla, struggling to break away from the arms of a man known later to be accused-appellant Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias "Bennie." The woman hailed a
passenger bus and then a white car to no avail. Perhaps no one comprehended the situation she was in. Realizing that the woman was in deep trouble,
Bradshaw stopped his car and blew his horn repeatedly to attract the woman's attention. She was hysterical and Bradshaw was to her heaven-sent. She
grabbed the opportunity and ran towards Bradshaw's car and hopped in at the back seat. Unfortunately for her, Ramos caught up with her and squeezed
himself into the same car.

From EDSA Bradshaw turned right towards White Plains Avenue where he was flagged down by a traffic policeman. As Bradshaw slowed down Ramos pulled
out his gun and ordered him to go straight ahead, which the latter obeyed. As they cruised along White Plains Avenue, Alicia handed her wallet to Michelle and
asked the latter to look in there for some medicine herself. Later she took back her wallet and tried to look for her medicine herself. As she went through the
contents of her wallet a receipt fell off and landed on the left side of Michelle. Alicia then asked the accsused, "Bennie, has Cecil had her baby?" "No," replied
Ramos. "Is she having it by caesarian?" Ramos did not answer. "Does Cecil know that you are doing this to me . . . . that you are holding me hostage?" Again
Ramos did not answer. 2

Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue in front of Blue Ridge Subdivision, Ramos told Bradshaw to stop at Rajah Matanda Street, Project 4, Quezon City, where he got
off and pulled Alicia out of the car. She clung to the shoulders of Michelle muttering, "God bless you. Pray for me and notify my family." Then she placed her
arm around Bradshaw's neck and softly whispered to him, "I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." At about ten of seven,
Ramos finally succeeded in pulling Alicia out of the vehicle.

Soon after, Bradshaw discovered the receipt dropped by Alicia Abanilla which contained her name and residence telephone number. Thus after taking his
daughter to school, he proceeded to his office, called the number in the receipt and inquired about Mrs. Abanilla. The maid informed him that Mr. and Mrs.
Abanilla had already left for work at Meralco. Later that morning, at the instance of Bradshaw, one of his employees called up a friend at Meralco to inquire
about Mrs. Abanilla, and the former was told that Mrs. Abanilla was at that time apparently being held hostage by a man who was demanding ransom for her
release.

Meanwhile, at around seven-fifteen, Alicia called up her boss, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for whom she worked as a confidential secretary at Meralco. Atty. del
Rosario was still in bed. She begged him not to ask any question but said that she needed P200,000.00 in cash immediately, otherwise, she might not be able to
go home anymore. She assured him that she had enough funds in the bank to repay him. She then requested him to give the money to Inday, a lady messenger
at Meralco, with instruction to deliver the money to her at Glori Supermart at Sikatuna Village. Atty. del Rosario suggested that the money be delivered instead
by a Meralco security personnel but she refused, saying, "Please not security, I do not want them to know what happened to me." Towards the end of their
conversation, Alicia entreated, "Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I cannot turn to anyone else. Please help me. " 3

Del Rosario hurriedly gathered P200,000.00 in cash, placed the money in a white envelope and tucked it in a plastic bag. He then ordered his driver, Serrano
Padua, to fetch Inday from Meralco. When Inday arrived, Del Rosario gave her the money and told his driver to take her to Mrs. Abanilla at Glori Supermart with
specific instruction to give the money to no one else but Mrs. Abanilla. 4

At around seven-thirty, a taxi cab driven by Antonio Pineda passed by. Ramos and Mrs. Abanilla boarded the cab and took the back seat. They proceeded
towards Anonas Extension in Sikatuna Village near Glori Supermart. Ramos instructed Pineda to park his taxi in front of the supermarket as they had to wait for
someone. For P700.00 Pineda agreed to wait for them so he could take them later to Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Driver Serrano Padua and Inday finally arrived at their rendezvous. Pineda, who was requested by Alicia to receive the money, approached them and asked
about the package for Mrs. Abanilla. However, Inday refused to give the money saying that she was instructed to deliver it only to Mrs. Abanilla. Pineda went
back to the taxi and informed his passengers of Inday's refusal. Mrs. Abanilla gave her identification card to Pineda and told him to ask Inday to face the taxi and
show herself through the window. Pineda went back to Inday, gave Mrs. Abanilla's ID and asked her to approach the taxi to see Mrs. Abanilla. Inday recognized
Alicia so the former handed the money to Pineda. Thereupon, Ramos told Pineda, "Tara, deretso tayo sa Norzagaray."

On the way to Norzagaray travelling along Commonwealth Avenue, Ramos suddenly changed his mind and decided to head for Bocaue, Bulacan, instead. During
the entire trip, Pineda noticed Alicia looking very pale, fidgety and apparently perturbed.

Upon arriving in Bocaue, they went straight to the St. Paul Hospital compound where they parked. Pineda and Ramos got off to relieve themselves by a fence.
Pineda noticed a revolver tucked in Ramos' waist. Afterwards, Ramos told Pineda to leave the taxi for a while as he was going to discuss something with his
companion. Obviously, he was interested in counting the money in the plastic bag. As Pineda waited for his passengers to call him, he observed that his woman
passenger kept opening and closing the rear door of his taxi as if trying to get out.

Pineda became uneasy. He slowly inched himself towards his taxi. There he saw Ramos strangling his woman companion. So he told Ramos, "Boss, iba na yata
iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan!" He boarded his taxi and asked his passengers to transfer to another vehicle as he did not want to get
involved in what was going on. But Mrs. Abanilla pleaded, "Mama, huwag mo akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na
babae." Ramos retorted, "Hoy! pati iyong isip ng driver nililito mo." Then he ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway where they would take
another ride.

As Pineda drove out cf the hospital compound, Mrs. Abanilla panicked and held him by the shoulder pleading, "Huwag mo akong iiwanan dito." When Pineda
reached MacArthur Highway near Sto.

Niño Academy in Bocaue he saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, who was directing traffic. He, had a gun on his waist. Upon seeing the armed traffic aide, Pineda
stopped his cab, got of: and told Domanais that his male passenger had been strangling his female companion. He also narrated that his passengers, who had
been with him since morning, refused to get off his cab and he had not yet been paid by them. Domanais suggested to him to bring his passengers to the police
station.
Domanais peeped through the window of the taxi and saw Ramos with his left arm around the shoulders of Alicia. She was crying. She told Domanais that
Ramos was armed with a revolver and was hurting her. At that moment Ramos pulled out his gun prompting Domanais and Pineda to run away and take cover.
Ramos then transferred to the driver's seat and drove the cab away. In a desperate effort to free herself, Alicia opened the left rear door and jumped out of the
cab; unfortunately, her blouse was caught in the process. As a consequence, she was dragged by the vehicle. Ramos suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Alicia
attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at the back of his hapless victim, fired at her twice, hitting her just above her nape. Domanais, who was armed with a .38
caliber pistol and witnessing the shooting, fired at Ramos; but he missed him. Then he called for police assistance as Ramos fled on foot.

On the same day, responding elements of the Bocaue Police Station apprehended Ramos in a grassy area at the Violeta Metroville Subdivision. The police
connfiscated his .22 caliber Smith and Wesson Magnum with four (4) live ammunitions and two (2) spent shells, and recovered a bag containing P138,630.00
consisting of P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills.

Mrs. Abanilla's body was left at the scene of the shooting, lying face down parallel to the taxi. Dr. Benito B. Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of the Province of
Bulacan, conducted the autopsy and testified that the cause of death was "shock due to massive external. . . intracranial. . . . hemorrhage due to gunshot wound
in the head penetrating the skull and the brain tissues." 5

Thereafter an Information was filed against Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias "Benni" charging him with the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder, to which he pleaded not guilty. To expedite the proceedings, the prosecution and the defense agreed during the pre-trial that the testimony of their
witnesses would be in the form of affidavits which would be the bases for the cross-examination. Trial on the merits than ensued.

For his part, Ramos denied having kidnapped and killed the victim. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay 6 he narrated his versio of the incident.

3. Na, ang bintang sa akin na "kidnapping for ransom with murder' ay walang katotohanan sapagkat ang totoo ay ang mga sumusunod: a. Ang yumaong si Alicia
Abanilla ay aking ninang sa kasal noong ikinasal kami ng aking asawang si Cecillia Pascual noong 17 October 1993 sa Sta. Rita Parish Church, Quezon City. Bago
ako at ang aking asawa ikasal sa nabanggkit na simbahan ay kasal na kami sa isang civil marriage noong June 30, 1993 sa City Hall ng Maynila . . . d. Na, dahilan
sa wala akong hanapbuhay mula ng ako'y tanggalin sa Meralco, ako'y nagsabi sa aking ninang Alice na ako ay paluwagan ng kaunting halaga ng pera dahil sa ang
aking asawa ay manganganak at wala akong panggastos. Ang una kong sabi sa kanya ay noong unang linggo ng Hulyo, 1994 sa pamamagitan ng telepono sa
Meralco. Ang sabi niya sa akin huwag akong mag-alala pagkat tutulong siya sa akin kapag manganganak na ang aking asawa. Ngunit pinagbawalan niya akong
magpunta sa kanilang bahay o kaya sa kanyang opisina, kaya sa telepono lamang kami nag-uusap . . . g. Sapagkat ako'y ayaw papuntahin ng aking ninang Alice sa
kanyang at sa kanyang opisina, at ang sabi niya ay abangan mo na lamang siya sa EDSA kanto ng White Plains, ang ginawa ko siya sa kanyang rota patungo sa
kanyang opisina. Ng kami ay magkita sa EDSA sa may kantong patungong White Plains, sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangan ko na 'yong ipinangako niyang
tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at doon din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo,
pagkat sabi ko sa kanya pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera. Habang kami nagtatalo, may dumating na sasakyang Toyota
Corolla Station Wagon na ang driver ay Amerikano at pinara ng ninang Alice ko at hinintuan kami ng kano na napag-alaman ko nitong bandang huli na si
Malcolm Bradshaw, at isinakay si ninang Alice at sumakay na rin ako . . . . j. Ng kami ay dumating sa St. Paul Hospital Bocaue, napag-alaman kong wala doon ang
asawa ko, kaya't sabi ko kay ninang Alice tutuloy kami sa Norzagaray, sa bahay ng aking biyenan at baka nandoon pa si Cecil. Ayaw ng sumama ni ninang Alice sa
Norzagaray dahil nahihiya daw siya sa biyenan ko, kaya't kami nagtalo. Gusto kong makumbinsi si ninang Alice na sumama sa Norzagaray kaya pinakiusapan ko
ang driver ng taxi na lumayo muna sandali pagkat may pag-uusapan kami ng ninang Alice at sumunod naman ang driver na lumayo sa taxi . . . . k. Sinabi ko kay
ninang Alice na kailangan sumama siya sa akin sa Norzagaray at siya ang magbigay ng pera kay Cecil upang malaman ni Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa kanya. Ito
sa dahilan na kung ako ang magbibigay ng pera sa asawa ko, baka itong si Cecil ay magduda na masama ang pinanggalingan ng pera at matakot, at magkaroon
ng shock at duguin. Ang aking pangamba na baka magduda si Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa masamang paraan ay dahil sa ako nga ay napagbintangan na
nagpalsifica ng tseke ni Atty. del Rosario at yun din ang dahilan ng aking pagkakatanggal sa trabaho ko sa Meralco . . . . 1. Hindi kami nagkasundo ng ninang ko at
maya-maya dumating na ang driver at nagyaya na dahil gutom na raw siya. Pumayag ako na lumakad na ang taxi at ang plano ko ay ituturo ko sa driver ang daan
patungo sa Norzagaray, ngunit pagdating sa MacArthur Highway, hininto ng driver ang taxi sa kanang parte ng Highway patungong Maynila at bumaba ang
driver at kinausap yung traffic aide na may baril at nakatayo sa tabi ng highway. Hindi ko narinig kung ano ang sinabi ng driver sa traffic aide ngunit ng
makapagusap na sila, ang traffic aide ay lumapit sa taxi na para bagang magiimbestiga. Ng sumilip ang traffic aide sa bintana ng taxi sa tapat ng driver na noon
ay nakabukas, sinabi ng ninang Alice na may baril ang kasama ko. Ang traffic aide ay natakot at biglang lumayo at kumuber sa tabi ng pader at ang driver naman
ay tumakbong palayo. Ang ginawa ko ay lumipat ako sa lugar ng driver at ang plano ko ay ako na ang magmamaneho patungong Norzagaray pagkat ang driver
tumakbo na at nangagamba ako na baka kung ano na ang nangyayari kay Cecil at wala sa ospital . . . . m. Ng lumakad na ang taxi, si ninang Alice na noon ay
nakaupo pa rin sa likuran ng driver seat, biglang tumayo at dinampot ang baril na dala ko na noon ay nasa tabi ko sa upuan ng driver at biglang binuksan ang
kaliwang pinto sa hulihan at bababa ngunit nahawakan ko ang damit niya ng aking kaliwang kamay pagkat nakahawak sa manibela ang kanang kamay ko at siya
ay hindi nakababa agad. Sa aming pagbubuno pagkat hinihila ko siya na mapaupo muli at siya naman ay pilit na bumababa, pumutok ang hawak niyang baril ng
dalawang beses. Maya-maya may pumutok na isa at biglang tumumba si ninang Alice at bumagsak sa kalsada na ang ulo ay patungo din sa direksyon ng taxi . . . .
n. Ng makita ko si ninang Alice na bumagsak sa kalsada, bigla akong bumaba at dinampot ko yung baril na noon ay nabitiwan na ni ninang Alice at dinampot ko
rin ang bag ng ninang ko at tumakbo akong papalayo pagkat naalala ko yung traffic aide na nakakuber sa tabi ng pader na noon ay malapit pa sa taxi.

After trial, the court a quo convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimes — kidnapping for ransom and murder — instead of the complex crime charged in the
Information. It held that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to make the offense a complex crime. Thus, the
killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought making accused-appellant liable for two (2) separate offenses.

In this petition, accused-appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors: First, the lower court erred in concluding that his guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt; Second, the lower court erred in disregarding vital pieces of evidence in his favor; and, Third, the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the
crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder.

Specifically, accused-appellant argues that kidnapping was never sufficiently established. He maintains that all throughout the incident the victim was not under
detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner of her liberty; that if there was some kind of pressure or force employed upon the victim, such
pressure or force did not amount to a deprivation of liberty but was merely a matter of persuasion that moved the victim to go with him voluntarily.

We resolve. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659, 7
is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part of the malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended
party' liberty. The term "actual deprivation of liberty" consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of detaining a person or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty. 8

In the instant case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work at
Meralco and taken instead against her will to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted by her abductor who, armed with a .22 caliber Smith
and Wesson revolver which instilled fear in her, compelled her to go with him to Bulacan. This is clear from the testimonies of witnesses Bradshaw and Pineda,
thus —

Bradshaw:

4. On 13 July 1994, at around 6:30 a.m., I was driving from my home in Wilson St. to the Marcos Highway, to bring my seventeen (17) year old daughter,
Michelle, to school. I was driving a 1981 Toyota Corolla station wagon, with plate no. PAZ 395. Between the gate of Corinthian Village and the right turn towards
White Plains Avenue, at the bus stop, I saw a lady, struggling and breaking away from an unidentified male (the "male").
xxx xxx xxx

25. The male got down and started to pull out the lady from the car. The lady held on to my daughter and in a quiet voice, whispered to her, "God bless you,
please tell my family my situation." The male kept trying to pull her out. As she was about to be pulled out of the car, she then held on to me with her right arm
and in a quiet voice, whispered to me, I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." I asked her, "How can we? We don't even
know your name." 9

Pineda:

Q54: Habang nasa biyahe kayo ay wala ka bang nakitang takot o tanda ng pangamba sa panig ng babae?
S: Meron po. Pag tumitingin ako sa rear view mirror ko ay napapansin kong maputlang-maputla yung babae na parang takot na takot.

xxx xxx xxx

Q56: Pag nagsasalita ba yung babae ay may napapansin ka bang nerbiyos so boses niya?
S: Meron ho.

xxx xxx xxx

Q71: Pagkatapos ay ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

S: Noong naiinip na ako bumalik na ako sa dalawa at nagtanog ako ng ganito "ano ba boos?" ang sagot sa akin ng lalaki ay bigyan ko uli sila ng fifteen minute na
pag-uusap. Ang ginawa ko ay lumayo uli at nakipagkuwentuhan sa isang driver na gumagawa ng pintuan ng kaniyang kotse. Pagkatapos tinanong ko ang
kakuwentuhan ko kung anong oras na at ang sabi ay 12:45 p.m. na raw kaya inip na inip na ako. Paglingon ko sa taxi ay napansin kong bukas-sara iyong pintuan
sa side ng babae at sa wari ko ay parang gustong bumaba ng taxi, maya-maya ay napansin kong sakal-sakal na noong lalake iyong babae.

Q72: Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos mong makita na sinasakal iyong babae?
S: Lumapit po ako at sinabi ko sa lalake na "Boss, iba na yata iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan." Pagkasabi ko ay binitiwan noong lalake iyong
babate na parang gustong palabasin parang walang nangyari. Pumasok ako sa taxi ko at sinabi ko sa lalake na "lumipat na lang kayo ng sasakyan baka
mapadamay pa ako diyan." Ang sabi sa akin ng babae "Mama, mo akong iiwanan dito, dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae. " . . . At
habang inilalabas ko ang taxi ay nagpapanic na ang babae at kumakapit na sa kaliwang balikat ko at umiiyak na nagsasabing "huwag mo akong iiwan dito" . . . 10

From the narration of facts by the prosecution witnesses we note that on at least three (3) occasions the victim tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to get away from
appellant: the first attempt was at EDSA when she struggled to free herself from his clutches and hailed a bus and a white car but without success, and later,
when she jumped into the car of Bradshaw to escape; the second was at St. Paul Hospital, Bocaue, when witness Pineda noticed from a distance the rear door
of his taxi being repeatedly opened and closed by his woman passenger as if trying to get out; and, finally, at MacArthur Highway when the victim jumped out of
the taxicab but her blouse was caught at the rear door (although appellant claims he grabbed her blouse and forced her back into the cab 11). It was during this
final attempt to free herself that she was gunned down from behind by accused-appellant in cold blood. If there really was no restraint on her person, as
appellant insists, there would have been no reason for her to attempt to escape.

Furthermore, from her statements to witnesses Bradshaw, Del Rosario and Pineda, the victim clearly hinted at her abduction and the imminent threat on her
life. She whispered to Bradshaw, "I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." To Atty. Del Rosario she said, "I need P200,000.00
in cash immediately, otherwise I might not be able to go home anymore; Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I cannot turn to anyone else. Please
help me." And, to witness Pineda, "Mama, huwag mo akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae."

It may be observed at this juncture that the victim kept on repeating she was going to die. She even exclaimed to Pineda that she would be killed by accused-
appellant. One thing is certain from those statements of the victim, i.e., that she was virtually at the mercy of her tormentor who at that moment was already in
complete and effective control of her.

The claim of the defense that the force or pressure employed against the victim was in fact merely a matter of persuasion and not constitutive of restraint on
the victim's liberty, taxes credulity. Definitely, the acts of forcibly pulling the victim out of the car of witness Bradshaw, strangling her while inside the taxi of
Pineda, pulling her back into the cab when she attempted to flee, and eventually shooting the victim twice in the head and hitting her, can hardly be considered
as "merely a matter of persuasion." On the contrary, these circumstances are positive indications of the victim's detention by appellant against her will.

The victim might have carried occasional conversations with the accused, but this fact did not negate the existence of kidnapping. Evidently, that was just the
victim's way of mentally and emotionally coping with the harrowing and dangerous situation she was in. After all, appellant was not a total stranger to her, she
being a principal sponsor at his wedding. She had to start a conversation not only to calm herself down but also to appease her captor.

For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is enough that, as in the
instant case, she was in any manner deprived of her liberty, unable to move — and get out — as she pleased. 12

Accused-appellant next contends that there was no proof he demanded or received money from anybody, since it was the victim herself who asked money from
Atty. Del Rosario, and her statement that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately, otherwise, she might not be able to go home anymore," does not suggest that
someone was demanding money from her or that she was being kidnapped; that if his intention was to kidnap the victim for the purpose of extorting ransom,
then he could have just left the victim and brought the money with him; that, in fact, when the victim gave the money to him after it was delivered to her by
Pineda who received it in turn from Inday, he (appellant) just dropped the money on the floor of the taxi and it was the victim who picked it up and placed it in
her bag.

The arguments are as puerile as they are untenable. The statement of the victim that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately otherwise she might not be able to
go home anymore," should not be interpreted in isolation. Rather, its true meaning should be ascertained in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.
When the victim called up Atty. Del Rosario, she was already being held hostage against her will by the accused who; armed and violent, had no qualms in
maltreating his Ninang and subsequently shooting her twice and killing her.

By his own admission, accused-appellant really did ask for money from the victim although he tried to impress upon the trial court that it was merely a loan.
Consider the following statement of accused-appellant —

. . . sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangnn ko na 'yong pinangako niyang tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at doon din
sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko so kanya pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng
pera. 13

The tenor of the foregoing statement unmistakably shows that accused-appellant was not merely borrowing but was actually demanding money from the
victim, reminding her of her supposed promise to lend him money for his wife's delivery. Common experience tells us that when borrowing money, persuasion
is used, for debt implies a favor, a request. Thus, the words of accused-appellant "hindi ako pumayang," "doon kami nagtalo," and "ngayon din kailangan ko ng
pera," are inconsistent with his excuse that he was just borrowing money from the victim.
Moreover, while the records do not disclose that accused-appellant specified the exact amount he needed, the victim was nevertheless explicit in her plea to
Atty. Del Rosario to procure for her P200,000.00 in cash immediately. The nagging questions are: Why P200,000.00? Why not just, say, P50,000.00 or even
P100,000.00, which was more than enough to cover the hospitalization expenses of appellant's wife? Why "loan" a hefty sum to a person who had been out of
work for quite sometime due to a previous misconduct likewise involving money, and whose capacity to pay was doubtful?

Nonetheless, the explanation of the accused that what happened was just a simple case of borrowing money coupled with a request that the victim accompany
him to Bulacan so his wife would believe the money was really borrowed and did not come from an illegal source, was too lame and anemic, and disproved by
subsequent events. Indeed, it hardly conforms to human nature that after appellant was loaned a considerable amount he would suddenly turn vicious toward
his own benefactress, strangle her and shoot her to death for no sane reason than that she refused to go with him to Bulacan.

From all indications, therefore, no other logical meaning can be ascribed to the victim's statement to Atty. Del Rosario than that the money was intended as
ransom, i.e., as consideration for her release from captivity.

While it may be true that it was the victim, not accused-appellant, who made the call and asked for the money, it must be stressed nonetheless that actual
demand for ransom by the accused from the relatives or friends of the victim is not necessary, much less essential, as the demand may be made directly on the
victim herself. This convenient method commonly resorted to by kidnappers, more often, proves to be very effective not only in compelling the relatives and
friends of victims to pay ransom but also in concealing the identities of the malefactors.

The fact also that the money was delivered to and received by the victim personally did not make it any less a ransom prize. After it was handed to the victim,
she gave it to accused-appellant, who was seated beside her at the back seat of the taxi. Clearly, accused-appellant, who was in total control of the situation,
obtained actual and constructive possession of the ransom money when it was delivered to the victim. 14

On his conviction for murder, accused-appellant points out contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Pineda and Gil Domanais
concerning their positive identification of appellant as the one who shot the victim. According to accused-appellant, Antonio Pineda testified on direct
examination thus —

Q: Sinabi mo kanina na nakita mong binaril ng dalawang beses sa ulo yung sakay mong babae noong kasama niyang lalaki, nakita mo ba ito?
A: Oo, po. 15

And on cross-examination Pineda testified —

Q: But you did not see the person who fired the shots?
A: No, sir.
Q: And you ran away, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir. 16

The same witness also gave two (2) places of his birth, namely, tubo sa Baclaran and tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina) —

T: Ano ang iyong tunay na pangalan, edad, tirahan at ibang bagay hinggil sa iyong pagkatao?
S: Antonio Pineda Jr. y, Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila at nakatira/stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik St.,
Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F-28, Lot 9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmariñas,
Cavite. 17

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Pakisabi ang iyong buong pangalan at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na maaaring mapagkakilalan sa iyo?
S: Ako po si Antonio Pineda Jr. y Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina) at stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik
St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F-28, Lot 9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas,
Dasmariñas,
Cavite. 18

Moreover, according to appellant, Pineda gave two (2) different versions as to who caused the taxi to stop at MacArthur Highway —

S: . . . Tuloy-tuloy po ako ng pagtakbo ko at pagdating ko sa kanto ng MacArthur Highway na malapit sa Petron station at Sto. Niño Academy ay may nakita
akong traffic aide na nakauniporme ng khaki at may sukbit na baril. Ang ginawa ko ay bigla akong nagpreno sa tabi sabay labas ng taxi at nilapitan ko iyong
traffic aide. 19
T: Ano ang ginawa ninyo sa Highway kung mayroon?
A: Pinatigil po ni Bennie yung taksi at nagtalo silang dalawa ng biktima. 20

On the part of witness Gil Domanais, appellant draws our attention to the witness' statement to the police that appellant shot the victim twice in the head,
while on cross-examination the same witness declared —

Q: But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who fired the gun, is that right?
A: I know, sir.
Q: Why do you say you know?
A: Because the shots came from inside the taxi, sir.
Q: But you did not know who actually fired the shots?
A: I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court: Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A: I saw it sir.
Q: But you did not hit him because actually you cannot (sic) see him when you fired your gun, is that correct?
A: I saw him and it was the upper shoulder that was showing, sir. 21

Accused-appellant stresses that witness Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-appellant who fired at the victim. Thus, insofar as the murder is
concerned, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt.

We disagree. The shooting of the victim took place in the presence of and within the auditory perception of witness Pineda who was just ten (10) meters away
from the scene. He heard the shots from the taxi whose lone occupant at that time was accused-appellant. In addition, witness Pineda explained that he earlier
saw appellant attempting to kill the victim by strangulation; thus, he concluded, and rightly so, that it was appellant who shot the victim to death.

With respect to Pineda's supposed inconsistent statements on where he was born, this was sufficiently explained by him during his cross-examination —

Q: Mr. Pineda, you gave your statement to the police on July 13, at about 11:40 in the evening, and you were asked about your name and other personal
circumstances. Your answer is (sic) —You are Antonio Pineda, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Now in your second statement given to Atty. Abad on
the 26th of July, you were asked the same question and you answered you are (sic) Antonio Pineda, tubong Bisaya. Now will you explain to us why in your first
statement you said that you are (sic) tubong Parañaque and then in your second statement, you are (sic) tubong Bisaya, which is correct?
A: My father is a Visayan and my mother is a Bicolana and I was born here in Manila, sir.
Q: In other words, you were not born in the Visayas?
A: No sir. 22

By saying therefore that he was "tubong Bisaya" despite the fact that he was born in Manila, Pineda was merely disclosing his Visayan origin on his father's side.

The other alleged inconsistencies in Pineda's sworn statements — as to who caused the cab to stop along the highway — refer to minor details which cannot
impair his credibility. On the contrary, such consistencies even guarantee that his testimony was not a product of perjury. 23 As succinctly observed by the trial
court —

. . . although the testimonies of the two (2) prosecution witnesses, namely, Antonio Pineda, driver of the taxi cab wherein accused and the victim rode from
Quezon City up to Bocaue, Bulacan, and Gil Domanais, the traffic aide, contained minor inconsistencies, the same even bolstered their credibility showing that
their testimonies were unrehearsed. So, also, prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. 24

As for the allegation that Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-appellant who fired at the victim, suffice it to state that Domanais categorically
testified that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim in the head. On cross-examination, he gave a detailed account of how the shooting took place —

Q: But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who fired the gun, is that right?
A: I know, sir.
Q: Why do you say you know?
A: Because the shots came from inside the taxi cab, sir.
Q: But you did not actually saw (sic) who fired the shots?
A: Im very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court: Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A: I saw it, sir.

Court: Where were you?

A: I was on the side of the taxi, sir.

Court: I thought you ran and took cover on the wall.

A: The wall where I hid was only low, sir, that is why when I stood up, I could easily see, sir. 25

As can be seen from the foregoing dialogue, the trial court clarified the matter with witness Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as the
assailant. Moreover, in his sworn statement Domanais categorically stated —

. . . . Sakay po siya ng isang taxi at siya po ay tumalon ngunit nakawit po sa pinto ang damit niya kaya po siya nakaladkad ng taxi ng kaunti at ng ihinto po ng
suspect ang taxi dahilan po sa bago nangyari ito ay tumakbo po ang driver ng taxi ay dinukwang na lang po ng suspect ang biktima at binaril nga po ng dalawang
beses sa ulo. 26

The suggestion that it was witness Domanais' shot which hit the victim is belied by the evidence. The medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim testified that
the entry wound at the back of the victim's head measured 0.75 centimeters and that based on the character of the wound the bullet causing it was fired from a
.22 caliber gun similar to that confiscated from accused-appellant. Therefore, the fatal shot could not have come from witness Domanais' .38 caliber pistol. 27
Moreover, witness Domanais affirmed that it was only after he saw accused-appellant shot the victim twice in the head that he opened fire at accused-
appellant.

The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is well-settled. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and was in a better position to gauge their
credibility and appreciate properly the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. 28

In the present case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the judgment of the trial court giving credence to the declarations of prosecution witnesses Pineda
and Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, the accused anchored his defense on bare denial.
Certainly, this negative assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the prosecution witnesses describing in sufficient detail how accused-
appellant shot the victim. In the face of the clear and positive declaration of witnesses, the defense of denial hardly assumes probative value and goes even
farther down the drain in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witnesses to impute so grave a wrong against accused-appellant. 29

Thus when accused-appellant suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning, shot the victim from behind twice after the latter failed in her attempt to escape
but was dragged instead by the cab where she was held captive, and while in a pitiable state of utter helplessness, the crime committed cannot be any less than
murder qualified by treachery.

Considering the evidence extant on record, we agree with the trial court that victim Alicia Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by
accused-appellant. But the kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be treated as separate crimes for which two (2) death penalties must as a
consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should be convicted of the special
complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER and impose upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH.

Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the
crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, 30 or two (2) separate crimes of
kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime
committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means
of committing the murder. 31 On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an
afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. 32

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which provides —

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course
of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659.

Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted provision of Art. 267, as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was
already consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom — even before the ransom was delivered — the deprivation of liberty of the victim
persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by accused-appellant while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be
considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom."

Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 33 that RA No. 7659 insofar as
it prescribes the penalty of DEATH is unconstitutional, nevertheless, accede to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that
the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "BENNIE" is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for
burial expenses.

Conformably with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of the case be
forwarded forthwith to the President of the Philippines for the exercise at his discretion of his power to pardon the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Pardo, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127452. June 17, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAGANI LUARTES y PASTOR, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is another wicked offense - kidnapping of a minor three (3) years of age.

On 21 December 1994 the City Prosecutor of Manila charged that on 19 December 1994 the accused Isagani Luartes y Pastor, a private individual, without
authority of law, willfully and feloniously kidnapped, detained or deprived of her liberty one Junichi Monique Macairan, a girl three (3) years of age, against her
will and consent.

The evidence shows that in the afternoon of 19 December 1994 Evelyn Macairan went to shop at the Isetann Department Store along Claro M. Recto Avenue,
Manila. With her was her three (3)-year old daughter Junichi Macairan. While strolling on the second floor of the store she noticed that Junichi was no longer by
her side, so she immediately informed a sales attendant about her missing daughter. The sales attendant instructed her to proceed to the paging section on the
ground floor and have her child paged.

Evelyn waited anxiously for the return of Junichi after paging her. Fifteen minutes later an MMA traffic enforcer by the name of Francisco Lacanilao, together
with two (2) policemen, entered the department store with Junichi. Lacanilao asked Evelyn if she was the mother of the child. When Evelyn answered in the
affirmative, Lacanilao immediately released Junichi to her. He informed Evelyn that a person had just been arrested for the kidnapping of her daughter, and so
he requested Evelyn to go with him to the police station to give her statement.

On the way out of Isetann she saw the now accused Isagani Luartes outside the department store being mauled by irate bystanders on the sidewalk. He was
handcuffed. On the way to the police station on board their Ford Fiera Evelyn asked him why he abducted her daughter Junichi. His reply was that he was
merely interested in the jewelry worn by the child.1

Traffic enforcer Francisco Lacanilao testified that on 19 December 1994 he was stationed along Recto Avenue in front of Isetann Department Store and that at
around 2:50 in the afternoon he noticed something unusual with a passenger jeep along Recto Avenue. Passengers were alighting from the jeep and he could
hear a child crying inside the vehicle. He approached the driver and asked him if there was anything wrong and the driver whispered, "Kidnap ito." Then
Lacanilao noticed a man seated at the back with a child crying. Lacanilao asked the man, "Pare, anong nangyayari?" and he replied that the child was only afraid
of people. When the man alighted from the jeep, Lacanilao placed his arm around his shoulder and said to him, "Halika, pare." But the man scampered away
carrying the child with him (karga-karga niyang patalikod). Lacanilao gave chase and with the assistance of a motorcycle cop he was able to apprehend the
suspect later identified as the accused Isagani Luartes y Pastor. The girl he was carrying turned out to be Evelyn Macairan's daughter Junichi.2

The defense offered a different version. According to accused-appellant Isagani Luartes, in the afternoon of 19 December 1994 he was doing his Christmas
shopping at Isetann - Recto when he noticed a little girl crying beside the escalator. He took pity on her and asked her why she was crying. The child answered
that she was looking for her mother.3 He decided to accompany the child to the paging station but to reach there he had to go out of the building and use an
outside entrance.4 However, on the way out he informed a security guard about the lost child. In fact, he said he requested the guard to watch the child while
he went down to the paging section but the security guard refused to take custody of the child; thus, he was forced to carry the little girl outside the
department store to reach the paging section.5 But once outside, the child continued crying as he carried her to the ground floor. It was at this time that
Lacanilao approached him and asked him why the child was crying, at the same time telling him in a loud voice, "Kinidnap mo yata yan, ah!6

Bystanders and onlookers then started milling around him. Fearing that they would harm him and the child he decided to board a passenger jeep bound for Sta.
Mesa. But when the jeepney driver refused to move the vehicle and his passengers started dispersing, Luartes took the child and went down the jeep.7 By this
time the crowd had already swelled and gotten more hostile so he panicked and sought the assistance of a motorcycle cop nearby. However, to his surprise,
instead of lending him succor, the police arrested him for kidnapping.

Rebutting the testimony of the accused, SPO2 Antonio Gabay, the motorcycle cop who assisted in the arrest of Luartes, narrated that in the afternoon of 19
December 1994 he saw Lacanilao chasing Luartes near Isetann - Recto. Luartes, with a child in tow, and Lacanilao were running in his direction. He blocked the
path of Luartes and asked him why he was running. The latter replied that there was nothing wrong and the child was his niece.8

When Lacanilao informed SPO2 Gabay that Luartes was a kidnapper, he held on to Luartes and did not let him go. Gabay asked the child if she knew Luartes but
she merely shook her head and cried, "Mama, mama!9 The accused together with the child was then taken back to Isetann where Evelyn Macairan was eagerly
waiting for Junichi.

Giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the trial court found Isagani Luartes y Pastor guilty of kidnapping three (3)- year old Junichi Macairan,
penalized under Art. 267, par 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties under the
law.10

Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal claiming that the evidence against him was too insufficient for his conviction.11 He stresses that he does not
question the motives of the prosecution witnesses who implicated him;12 however, he maintains that this does not mean that their accusations are gospel
truth as they only misconstrued his actuations in the afternoon of 19 December 1994. He insists that he did not kidnap Junichi but was merely helping her find
her lost mother.13

The essence of kidnapping under Art. 267 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.14 Accused-appellant
banks on the question of intent to neutralize the seemingly overwhelming evidence against him. He depicts himself simply as a good Samaritan who, despite the
crowded department store, was the only one who showed pity on Junichi and who took pains to bring her back to her mother's arms.15 According to him, it is
appalling that a court, which in a criminal case is duty-bound to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by clear and convincing evidence,
based its conviction on mere suspicion and presumption.16

We disagree. The insistence of accused-appellant that he was only helping Junichi find her mother without any intention to kidnap the child is belied by the
evidence. His supposed lack of intent to take custody of the child away from her mother was completely discredited by the prosecution in the rebuttal
testimony of SPO2 Gabay. Thus -

FISCAL CO

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, Isagani Luartes claimed that x x x he was merely helping Junichi L. Macairan to locate her parent when you arrested him. What can you say
about that?

A: What I can say, is that, I arrested him x x x because of the suspicious actuation, sir x x x x You see, sir. x x x x I saw him running and he was carrying a child and
also I saw a traffic enforcer chasing after him, sir. x x x x when the accused was running, he was running towards me, so what I did (was) I stopped him and
asked him why he was running, and he informed me that there was nothing wrong as the child was his niece, sir.
Q: After that, what else transpired, if any?

A: Lacanilao, the traffic enforcer who was chasing x x x him informed me that he was a kidnapper x x x x And at that time I held on to him, sir. x x x x He told me
that he was going to make a phone call. I did not let him go and I asked the child whether she knows this person, and the child (shook) her head and then x x x
started to cry x x x mama, mama, sir.

Q: After that, what else transpired, if any?

A: So I brought them to the Security Guard of the Isetann, I requested the security guard x x x to page for any parent who lost a child, and after fifteen (15)
minutes the mother came over and then mother and child saw each other they embraced each other, sir (Underscoring supplied).17

If indeed accused-appellant was trying to help the lost child, why then did he misrepresent himself as her uncle? He avers that when the crowd outside Isetann
turned hostile, he alighted from the passenger jeepney and sought assistance from SPO2 Gabay. However when the police officer questioned him why he was
running, he did not mention anything about a lost child. Instead he claimed that the girl he was carrying was his niece. And, if his intention was only to help the
child look for her mother, why did he have to board a passenger jeepney taking the child with him? The attempt on his part to mislead SPO2 Gabay destroyed
whatever exculpating evidence he might have had in his favor. Thus the trial court correctly concluded -

Here credibility appears to be pivotal in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In any event, this court is more inclined to give credence to
the versions of the prosecution witnesses than to the accuseds plain denial and alibi, that in taking away the girl, he was merely after her welfare. Except on
purely sense of duty to tell the truth, the evidence on record is bereft of any showing to prove that Police Officers Francisco Lacanilao and SPO2 Gabay were
prompted by any ulterior motive to falsify against the accused.18

As for the nature of the crime committed, Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides -

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The established fact is that on 19 December 1994 accused-appellant Luartes was caught in flagrante kidnapping Junichi Macairan, then three (3)-years old,
outside Isetann Recto. The mother of the victim, Evelyn Macairan, testified in court that Junichi was missing and presumably under the control of accused-
appellant for about thirty (30) minutes. Were it not for the alertness and swift action of traffic enforcer Lacanilao and SPO2 Gabay accused-appellant would not
have been apprehended and Junichi returned to her distraught mother. Thus, the crime clearly comes under par. 4 of Art. 267 of the Penal Code. The detention
was committed by Luartes who was a private individual and the person kidnapped was a three (3)-year old minor. That his guilt has been established beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be gainsaid. His positive identification by the prosecution witnesses who had no reason to prevaricate must prevail over his bare
denials and totally unacceptable alibi.19

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant ISAGANI LUARTES Y PASTOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a
minor as defined and penalized under Art. 267, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
under the law, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 124299 April 12, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR LACANIETA alias "Boy Alog", JERRY BALLENAS alias "Marlon Marquez" and Carlito Gamad, accused, JERRY BALLENAS, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Consorcia Tayo (Consorcia) claims that her daughter, 19-year-old WILMA TAYO (WILMA) was abducted at gunpoint on March 20, 1987. WILMA was found dead
the next day, her body bore signs that she was first raped then brutally stabbed ten times. Four persons were suspected as perpetrators of the crime: JERRY
BALLENAS (BALLENAS) alias MARLON MARQUEZ, CESAR LACANIETA (LACANIETA) alias BOY ALOG, ALBERTO SALVADOR (SALVADOR) and CARLITO GAMAD
(GAMAD). SALVADOR was shot dead during the police investigation and GAMAD was also shot dead after the re-investigation conducted by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of San Jose, Antique.

Based on the records of this case, LACANIETA and BALLENAS were already charged with murder at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique.
Since BALLENAS had already been arraigned for murder, an Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed on October 12, 1987 against BALLENAS and
LACANIETA before the same court. LACANIETA thereafter posted bail, but he eventually absconded. The Information was then amended on June 19, 1989 to
read as follows:

At the instance of the mother of the deceased offended party, Wilma Tayo, who has subscribed and sworn to a complaint attached to the records of the above-
entitled cases, the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses JERRY BALLENAS alias "MARLON MARQUEZ" of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with Cesar Lacanieta who is still at large and Alberto Salvador and Carlito Gamad, both deceased, being
then armed with gun and knife and by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct and carry away Wilma Tayo at a gun point (sic) to an uninhabited place and while there,
by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the said Wilma Tayo against the latter's will.

Contrary to the provisions of article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 of the same Code.1

Trial fiscal Juan C. Mission, Jr. was of the opinion that the proper charge against BALLENAS is forcible abduction with rape "because an independent act of
forcible abduction preceded the rape and murder of the deceased Wilma Tayo," and not the special complex crime of rape with homicide.2

The arraignment of BALLENAS for forcible abduction with rape came belatedly because it was only after the case was already submitted for decision when the
trial court discovered that BALLENAS had not yet been arraigned. Both the prosecution and defense then agreed to arraign BALLENAS and to consider all the
evidence earlier presented as reproduced. BALLENAS was accordingly arraigned on the Amended Information on February 18, 1992; he pleaded not guilty. The
evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Consorcia and Florencio Millones (Florencio) and Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" as documentary
evidence, while the defense presented BALLENAS as its lone witness.

The version of the prosecution as summarized by the trial court is as follows:

On March 20, 1987 about 7 o'clock in the evening, the Wilma Tayo (sic) and her mother Mrs. Consorcia Tayo were in their house at Sitio Bulho, Cubay-Sermon,
Sibalom, Antique. They were about to eat supper when someone called to them asking to light a cigarette. Wilma Tayo asked who was calling and the answer
was "I am Junior, let me light my cigarette". Wiima Tayo opened the door slightly and there stood accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez. Accused did not
light his cigarette but instead blew the gas lamp and put out the light. He held Wilma Tayo by the wrist.

Accused Jerry Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma Tayo and Consorcia Tayo. Accused told Wilma Tayo to accompany him to Maria Leong-on, his girlfriend.
Wilma Tayo refused as they were about to eat supper. Consorcia Tayo also told her daughter, Wilma Tayo not go out (sic) because it was already dark. Accused
Jerry Ballenas forced Wilma Tayo to go out with him and struck the hand of Consorcia Tayo and pointed the handgun at her. Accused held Wilma Tayo tightly
and took her away.

Because of the abduction, Consorcia Tayo sought the help of a neighbor, Andres Mallorca, whose house is about 20 meters away from her house but to no avail,
Andres Mallorca shut the door on her for fear of Jerry Ballenas as the letter is known as a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the New People's Army.

The following morning, Consorcia Tayo reported the abduction of Wilma Tayo to her son-in-law who is a member of the Integrated National Police. She learned
from Aurelio Gamad that her daughter Wilma Tayo was already dead. The police then proceeded to the scene of the incident.

At the time Wilma Tayo was abducted, she was 19 years old. She was single and a third year student in the Polytechnic State College of Antique, Sibalom,
Antique.

Consorcia Tayo spent P30,000.00 for the funeral of Wilma Tayo. Consorcia was shocked and she felt pain with the death of her only daughter Wilma Tayo. To
Consorcia Tayo no amount of money could compensate the death of her daughter Wilma Tayo whom they loved so much.

BALLENAS disavows any participation in the abduction, rape and killing of WILMA and offered this version, viz:

In the afternoon of March 20, 1987, at about past 4:00 p.m., he was in the house of CARLITO GAMAD. When darkness came, CARLITO asked him to accompany
CEZAR LACANIETA (a boarder of the GAMAD's), to the house of victim WILMA TAYO. Victim was the girlfriend of LACANIETA. On the way, LACANIETA told him of
his plan to elope with victim, and asked him to talk to her. He proceeded to the house of victim, while LACANIETA was left behind near the irrigation canal. Upon
reaching the house of victim, he called out and the mother answered his call and then victim came out of the house. He told victim that LACANIETA had
something to tell her and that he was waiting for her at the irrigation canal. Both of them proceeded to where LACANIETA was waiting and after he led victim to
LACANIETA, he went home (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, August 9, 1990).3

On May 29, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique rendered its Decision4 finding BALLENAS guilty of forcible abduction with rape, the
judgment declares:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and Article 48 of the same
Code with reclusion perpetua to death by reason of the use of a firearm by accused Jerry Ballenas in the abduction of Wilma Tayo. And applying Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed should be the greater penalty of death there being two aggravating circumstances but because the
present Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty accused Jerry Ballenas is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Wilma Tayo the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay Consorcia Tayo, the sum of P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses incurred by her for the funeral of the deceased Wilma Tayo and to pay
the cost.
SO ORDERED.5

In this appeal, BALLENAS questions the quoted decision on these grounds:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH
RAPE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00, THE SUM OF P30,000.00
FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES AND TO PAY THE COSTS. 6

This Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in concluding that BALLENAS is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the forcible abduction and rape of
WILMA. In asserting his innocence, BALLENAS foists the defense of alibi, a defense that has long been considered as intrinsically the weakest of all defenses.7
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to
the crime because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.8

In this case, Consorcia, the mother of WILMA, positively identified BALLENAS as the person who went to her house and abducted her daughter at gunpoint that
fateful night. Moreover, the testimony of Florencio fortifies the theory of the prosecution that after the abduction of WILMA, BALLENAS together with
LACANIETA, SALVADOR and GAMAD raped and stabbed WILMA. According to Florencio, he was passing through the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom,
antique when he saw "Boy Alog" (LACANIETA) lying on top of WILMA.9 The hands of WILMA were then held down by BALLENAS and SALVADOR. 10 Surprised by
the presence of Florencio, LACANIETA stood up and told the former that they were just having a "happy-happy". 11 Florencio then left and after reaching three
brazas, he hid to see what the group was up to. 12 Florencio testified that he thereafter saw four men take turns in ravishing and stabbing WILMA. 13 The
following testimony of Florencio establishes the participation of BALLENAS in the crime charged:

Q: Mr. Millones, you said that you are a resident of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique, how long have you been a resident of that plade?
A: I was born there.
Q: Are you still a resident in that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On March 20, 1987, were you still a resident of that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On that day, about 7:00 o'clock in the evening can you recall where you were?
A: Yes, sir, I was walking on the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique and it was already past 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q: Where did you come from?
A: I came from Durog leading to Catmon.
Q: Where were you going then?
A: I was intending to go to the house of my deceased mother whose wake falls on that night.
Q: While walking from Durog towards your house, can you recall if you were able to observe any unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that about?
A: While I was in the street of Brgy. Catmon, Sibalom Antique, I saw four persons, three are squatting, while the other one is lying flat on his stomach and I
thought there (sic) were all drinking.
Q: As you pass by these four persons, did you start any conversation with them?
A: While I was approaching them and when I reach that place, the fellow who was lying flat on his stomach, stood up and told me that they were just having a
happy happy so I will just pass by my way.
Q: What else did you see when he stood up?
A: When he stood up, he told me I will proceed on my way and I saw that the three persons were holding a girl.
Q: You said they were holding a girl, do you know that girl?
A: Yes, sir, Wilma Tayo, daughter of Consorcia Tayo.
Q: Aside from Marlon, do you know that three other persons?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: They were Alberto Salvador, Carlito Gamad, Marlon and Boy Alog.
Q: And who was that person who was lying flat on his stomach?
A: Boy Alog.
Q: If these three persons are inside the courtroom, could you please point to them?
A: Only one is here inside the courtroom.
Q: And who was that?
A: Jerry Ballenas.

INTERPRETER:

At this juncture, the witness pointed to a man seated inside the courtroom and when asked by the Interpreter what his name is, identified himself as Jerry
Ballenas.

Q You said that three persons were holding on to Wilma Tayo, will you please tell us who among these three persons were holding Wilma Tayo and on what
part of the body?
A: Carlito Gamad was holding the hands of Wilma Tayo and the hands of the girl are both stretched above his head.
Q: How about the two other persons?
A: While Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, Jr. were holding on each of the leg of the girl.
Q: How did these Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, how were they holding the legs of Wilma Tayo.
A: Wilma was lying flat on his (sic) back on the street and each of these persons were holding on each of the leg of Wilma Tayo.
Q: Are the legs of Wilma Tayo held fell (sic) to the ground or raised up?
A: The legs are joined to the ground in V-position.
Q: Do you know if Wilma Tayo saw you pass by?

ATTY. ABIERA:
Incompetent, your Honor.

COURT:
Sustained.
FISCAL MISSION:
After you were told that they were just there for a happy happy, what did you do?
A: I told them I will pass my way.
Q: After that, what did you do?
A: I walk farther and observe.
Q: How far did you walk and observe these persons?
A: I walk from the place about three brazas so that I could observe what they were doing.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to the court by pointing inside the courtroom how far more or less is three brazas?

INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to the wall of the other courtroom of Branch 11 which is more or less 8 to 9 brazas.

FISCAL MISSION:
Q: Now, upon reaching that place about 8 brazas to make some observation, what did you do?
A: I hid and observe what they were doing.
Q: Did you observe anything else?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you observe?
A: I saw them. These four took turns in raping the girl.
Q: Then what else did you see?
A: After raping Wilma Tayo, they also took turns in stabbing her.
Q: How long did you observe the group?
A: I could not determine the length of time I stayed in that place because I do not have a watch.
Q: After making such observation, what did you do?
A: After I have witnessed that horrifying incident, I just proceed to the house of my deceased mother. 14

The autopsy report made by Dr. Julito V. Osunero, Chief of the Ramon Maza Memorial District Hospital, Sibalom, Antique confirms the testimony of Florencio.
The report contains these findings:

1. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
2. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
3. Stab wound, 1 inch long Left side neck and point of exit Right side Neck thru and thru, cutting carotid and jugular vessels.
4. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Epigastric Area perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Liver.
5. Stab wound, 1 inch diameter perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Stomach.
6. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right anterior Chest perforating thoracic Cavity penetrating Right Lung.
7. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right Lumber Area perforating Abdominal Cavity penetrating Kidney.
8. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Lumbar Area Right, perforating Abdominal Cavity.
9. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
10. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
11. Contusion both thigh, 2 inches diameter, left and 3 inches diameter, right.
12. Hymen Lacerations 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock, Fresh. 15

The cause of the death of WILMA is reported as due to hemorrhage secondary to wounds on the neck, chest, abdomen and back. 16

The trial court opined that the contusions on the thighs of WILMA show that her legs were forcibly set apart to facilitate the rape of WILMA. That WILMA was
raped is evidenced by hymenal lacerations, still found fresh on March 21, 1987, the day the autopsy was conducted. We agree with the trial court that based on
the evidence, it could readily be concluded that the perpetrators stabbed WILMA several times after the commission of the rape. 17

In a desperate attempt to reverse the decision of the trial court, BALLENAS impresses upon this Court his theory that if he indeed committed the crime charged,
he would not have exposed himself to Consorcia at the time that WILMA was abducted. 18 BALLENAS also points out that his return to Catmon the following
Monday after the death of WILMA and on which date he was arrested, belies his participation in the despicable crime. 19 BALLENAS argues that if he was guilty
of the crime, he would not have returned to Catmon to face the possibility of being arrested since the victim was with him on the night of March 20, 1987. 20

We are not persuaded. A telling detail in this case is the fact that the mother of the victim witnessed first hand the abduction of her daughter at gunpoint.
Consorcia has no reason to wrongfully implicate BALLENAS. As the mother of the deceased victim, Consorcia would want nothing short of justice for her dead
daughter. BALLENAS does not deny the fact that he went to see WILMA to fetch her that evening of March 20, 1987. In professing his innocence, BALLENAS
merely denies the allegations of Consorcia that he took away WILMA at gunpoint and offers the defense that he merely talked to WILMA to convince her to
meet with LACANIETA. Well-settled is the rule that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credence. 21 An affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 22 The
fact that BALLENAS exposed himself to Consorcia all the more indicates his brazenness in abducting WILMA. The return of BALLENAS to Catmon after the death
of WILMA cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence. It is the credible and unwavering testimony of Consorcia that stands as solid proof of the guilt of
BALLENAS.1âwphi1.nêt

BALLENAS assails the testimony of Florencio on the ground that it "abounds in inconsistencies" 23 and is not credible. The alleged inconsistencies are however
not clearly established. Notably, Florencio unequivocally said that he saw LACANIETA, BALLENAS, SALVADOR and GAMAD rape and stab WILMA. We have no
reason to doubt the credibility of Florencio in light of the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit. 24 The initial
reluctance of Florencio to get involved in this case is understandable and does not cast doubt on his credibility as a witness. Whenever the issue boils down to
credibility, we have always maintained that the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 25 Findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. 26

We therefore see no cogent reason to reverse the judgment of the trial court convicting BALLENAS of the crime of forcible abduction with rape. The trial court
ruled that there are two aggravating circumstances in this case, nighttime 27 and that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission 28 . We however digress from the finding of the trial court that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission are present in the case at bar.

Based on the records, BALLENAS abducted WILMA around 7 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1987 and that BALLENAS blew off the lighted kerosene lamp
offered by WILMA to BALLENAS to light his cigarette. 29 However, Consorcia testified that there was some light coming from another kerosene lamp upstairs
that "reflected (sic) the door" and that Consorcia also had a kerosene lamp with her that BALLENAS also put off. 30 In the case of People vs. Pallarco, 31 the
scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp, hence we ruled in that case that nocturnity cannot be appreciated if it can be shown that the
place was adequately lighted. 32 The prosecution also failed to prove that nighttime was specially sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him or that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, circumstances which must be present before the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be appreciated.
We also do not agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty attended the commission of the crime charged. The aggravating
circumstance of cruelty is present when "the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission". 33 There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in
the consummation of the criminal act. 34 In People vs. Ferrer 35 , the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was not appreciated in the absence of positive proof
that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13) wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the blows which
snuffed out his life. In this case, WILMA sustained ten (10) stab wounds, but these multiple wounds alone do not prove that the accused deliberately inflicted
the injuries to prolong unnecessarily her physical suffering. Thus, the trial court improperly considered the aggravating circumstance of cruelty in the case at
bar.

What is present in this case is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Consorcia testified that her house has a ladder that leads to the main door; that
BALLENAS was at the main door when he called WILMA; and that when WILMA refused to go with BALLENAS, it was there that BALLENAS forced WILMA to go
with him. 36 Without a doubt, WILMA was abducted while she was still in her house. Thus, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
considering that it is not necessary that the accused should have entered the dwelling of the victim. 37

BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and 48 of the
same Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs 38 . The crime of forcible abduction
with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 39
BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that
took effect on December 31, 1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion
perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven in court, should have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctfully ruled that the
penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of
reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of a crime. 40

This Court is however constrained to disallow the amount of P30,000.00 for the burial expenses incurred by Consorcia. We can only give credit for actual
damages such as burial expenses if there are receipts that can support the claim. 41 The records in the case at bench do not substantiate the P30,000.00 burial
expenses sought by Consorcia, except for her lone assertion.

The P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court must be modified. Instead of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
considering that the crime was committed with the use of a weapon as alleged in the information and proven in court. In consonance with jurisprudence, the
increase of the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is justified if the crime was committed under circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. 42 In
People vs. Bañago 43 , the accused committed the crime of rape with the use of a gun on October 15, 1993, before the passage of RA 7659. This Court was thus
precluded from meting out the death penalty, but nevertheless the accused was ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. 44

In spite of the death of the victim in this case, we cannot award the higher amount of P100,000.00, the civil indemnity awarded in cases of rape with homicide.
45 The information in the case at bar is merely for forcible abduction with rape and not for rape with homicide.

Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are also hereby granted to the heirs of the victim. The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the
victim in a criminal proceeding without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental or physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at trial. 46 Here,
Consorcia testified as to the inconsolable loss that she felt when her only daughter was abducted, ravished and killed. 47

Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 48
Since dwelling is appreciated in this case as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is therefore in order.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, antique is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant Jerry
Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is deleted.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185388 : June 16, 2010]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RODRIGO AWID ALIAS "NONOY" AND MADUM GANIH ALIAS "COMMANDER MISTAH" AND ALSO KNOWN AS
"MIS," ACCUSED. MADUM GANIH ALIAS PROMULGATED: "COMMANDER MISTAH" AND ALSO KNOWN AS "MIS," APPELLANT.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This is a kidnapping for ransom case where the complainant identified one of the accused as he stood with three others in front of the police station while she
sat in her tinted vehicle.

The Facts and the Case

On May 31, 2001 the city public prosecutor filed a second amended information[1] for kidnapping with ransom and serious illegal detention against the accused
Madum Ganih alias "Commander Mistah" or "Mis," Rodrigo Awid alias "Nonoy," Ernesto Andagao alias "Nestor," and three others who were known only by the
names of "Adjing," "Hasbi," and "Maing" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case 16635.

Mrs. Juanita Bernal Lee, married to Joseph "Nonoy" Lee, with whom she had four daughters, testified that she and her husband were in the storage and foundry
business.[2] They lived in a house surrounded by a 12-foot concrete fence, topped by three strands of barbwires strung on embedded steel bars. All in all, the
fence rose to about 18 feet. It had just one steel gate of about 12 feet in height.[3]

On January 9, 2000 only Mrs. Lee was left in the house, accompanied by three housemaids, and the accused Ernesto Andagao, a gardener-houseboy. They all
slept in an extension of the main house, which extension had three rooms. Mrs. Lee was in one with her 11 Japanese Spitz puppies. Next to hers was the room
where Andagao slept, and then there was the room of the housemaids.[4]

Part of Mrs. Lee's night routine was to let her puppies out of her room about midnight so they could take a leak. At the early dawn of January 10, 2000, after
opening the door of her room to let her puppies out, Mrs. Lee was surprised to see a stranger, a man, standing a few meters from her door. She immediately
went back in and tried to shut her door close but the man succeeded in pushing the door open and pulling her out of the room just as another man appeared.
Someone struck Mrs. Lee with a gun on both shoulders and kicked her on the ribs. When she fell down, she received a kick on her buttocks.

Mrs. Lee could not recognize the two men who assaulted her as they wore bonnets that covered their faces. They dragged her into the maids' quarters where
they covered her mouth with masking tape and tied her hands behind her with telephone wires. One of the men tore a swathe of cloth from the bed sheets and
used it to cover her mouth as well. They blindfolded her with a black cloth and covered her head with a black bag that reached down to her chest. They then
took her to the garage barefooted. [5]

At the garage, the men forced Mrs. Lee to get into the backseat of her Nissan Sentra.[6] They traveled for about 20 to 30 minutes at normal speed. When the
car stopped, the men made Mrs. Lee go down after removing the black bag that covered her head. But she remained blindfolded. They then made her walk
barefooted down a muddy ground. Because she walked too slowly, one of her abductors slung her on his shoulder and carried her to a pump boat where they
removed the cloth and masking tape that covered her mouth. After a while, they also removed her blindfold and untied her hands.[7]

Though it remained dark, Mrs. Lee managed to note that two men rode with her on the pump boat while a white speedboat led them away from land. She did
not know where they were heading but she noticed that they left Zamboanga City. [8]

After traveling for about three to four hours, the pump boat berthed on an island lined with coconut trees. Her abductors gave Mrs. Lee a hooded jacket to
wear, then took her to a well for her to take a bath. From there, they took her to the bushes where two armed men guarded her.[9] At about 6:30 p.m., they
took her to a two-storey house where they held her captive for almost four months. Mrs. Lee later learned that the house where they had taken her belonged
to Suod Hussain and his wife Fatma.[10]

At about past 9:00 p.m. of January 10, 2000, Mrs. Lee met accused Madum Ganih who said to her, "Ako si Kumander Mistah. Ako na ang hawak sa `yo."[11]
After keeping her in captivity for about 20 days, her captors took Mrs. Lee out to sea on a pump boat to talk to her husband through a cell phone.[12] When
they let her call him a second time, Ganih ordered her to tell her husband to pay her kidnappers P15 million in exchange for her. Her husband told her to
bargain for a lesser amount since all he had was P1 million. Ganih demanded a partial payment of P200,000.00 but Mrs. Lee's family could give only P50,000.00.
Mrs. Lee's eldest daughter, Michelle,[13] testified that she gave the money to a certain Geater Libas but Ganih later complained that he got only
P35,000.00.[14]

Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their demand to P4 million and threatened to cut off Mrs. Lee's head unless this was paid.[15] At their
last call to her husband, Mr. Lee requested the kidnappers to release his wife for P1.2 million. Ganih did not respond immediately as he said he still had to
confer with their leader, a certain "boy," whom Mrs. Lee could not recognize as he always covered his face whenever he came to visit.[16]

In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they would release her the next day. At about 4:00 a.m. of May 6, 2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee
to Arena Blanco in Zamboanga City where Ganih gave her P100.00 for fare and an M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got home.[17]

Sometime after, Police Chief Inspector Gucela and his men arrested a certain alias "Mis" at Sta. Barbara, Zamboanga City.[18] They asked Mrs. Lee to see if she
can identify him at the police station. She came on board her Pajero with Gucela by her side but she refused to go out of her tinted vehicle because she did not
want to be seen. She could, however, clearly see those outside of it. Subsequently, the police officers brought Ganih and three others to stand in front of the
police office. Mrs. Lee recognized and identified Ganih as one of her kidnappers.[19]

For his part, Ganih, denied the charge against him. He testified that he had been known as "Madz," not "Mis," and that he had never been known as "Kumander
Mistah." He claimed that he was at home in Barangay Kaliantana, Naga, Zamboanga del Sur, the whole day of January 10, 2000. Further, he said he attended the
birthday party of Barangay Chairman Hassan Arani at his house at 2:00 p.m. on May 6, 2000. He also claimed that the police did not make him stand in a proper
police line-up for identification.[20]

On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment,[21] convicting Ganih of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC, however,
acquitted Awid for insufficiency of evidence. The court also ordered Ganih to return the ransom money of P1,250,000.00 as well as the value of Mrs. Lee's
diamond earrings and Rado wristwatch, which totaled P95,000.00.

Upon review, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision dated November 12, 2007,[22] affirming the conviction of Ganih but amending the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua. The CA also awarded Mrs. Lee P1,250,000.00 in actual damages, P25,000.00 in temperate damages, P50,000.00 in civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 in moral damages, and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages.

The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, kidnapped Mrs. Lee for a ransom.

The Court's Ruling

To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a) that the accused was a private person; (b) that he kidnapped or detained or in any manner
deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) that the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. [23] All
these have been proved in this case.

The Court entertains no doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee to trade her freedom for a price. Ganih initially demanded P15 million for
her but he reduced his demand when Mr. Lee could raise only P1.2 million. The kidnappers actually received this ransom as evidenced by the fact that they
immediately released Mrs. Lee after the last negotiation.

Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against
him. His other contention is that the police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving her some improper
suggestions.

But the manner in which Mrs. Lee identified Ganih was substantially the same as in any proper police line-up except that this one took place outside the police
station on account of Mrs. Lee's desire not to be seen while making the identification. The police did not show Ganih alone to Mrs. Lee, which would suggest
that he was their suspect. They made three other men stand with Ganih in front of the police station while Mrs. Lee gazed on them behind the tinted windows
of her vehicle.[24]

What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified.[25]
Besides, granting that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lee's court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified Ganih independently
of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample
opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with them.[26] Indeed, she was candid
and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive,
straightforward, and categorical.

Moreover, Ganih was unable to impute any improper motive to Mrs. Lee for telling her story as it was. It defies reason why she would falsely testify against him
if her motive was other than to bring to justice those who kidnapped her.

Ganih claims that he was at Barangay Kaliantana on January 10, 2000 and joined the birthday celebration of Barangay Captain Hassan Arani on May 6, 2000. But
it is not enough that he claims being elsewhere when the crime was committed. He also must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[27]

Here, the defense witness said that he saw Ganih on January 10, 11 and 12, 2000 and May 6, 2000 at Barangay Kaliantana.[28] But the witness' memory was
selective since he had no idea where Ganih was from January 13 to May 5, 2000. During the hearing, Ganih himself admitted that it took only four hours by bus
to travel from Naga to Zamboanga City.[29] It was easy for him to go to Zamboanga City and not be missed.

In fine, the totality of the prosecution's evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The
crime was punishable by death at the time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the imposition of such penalty, the CA
was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[30]

As for damages, even if the death penalty cannot be imposed, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper since the qualifying circumstances that would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty attended the offense.[31] In addition, under Article 2219 (5) of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest.[32] This is predicated on Mrs. Lee's having suffered serious anxiety and fright during his four
months of detention. An award of P100,000.00 in moral damages is warranted.[33]

Further, the rule is that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning of
Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Since the offense in this case was attended by a demand for ransom, an award of P100,000.00 in exemplary damages by way
of example or correction is in order.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and AFFIRMS the November 12, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00384-MIN, which found
appellant Madum Ganih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Juanita Bernal Lee P1,250,000.00 in actual damages, P75,000.00 in civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 in moral damages, and P100,000.00 in exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Perez,* JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186472 July 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ, ERIBERTO ENRIQUEZ y GEMSON, GEORGE HAYCO y CULLERA, and ALLAN BONSOL y PAZ, Accused,
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ and ALLAN BONSOL y PAZ, Appellants.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court for review is the September 20, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the guilty verdict rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City,2 promulgated on November 6, 2000, against appellants Antonio Siongco (Siongco) and Allan Bonsol (Bonsol), with modification on
the penalty imposed and the amount of damages to be paid to their victim, Nikko Satimbre (Nikko).3 This review is made, pursuant to the pertinent provisions
of Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122 and Section 13 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

The factual findings of both courts show that between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. of December 27, 1998, 11-year-old Nikko, a resident of Balanga, Bataan, was induced
by Siongco to board a bus bound for Pilar, Bataan, together with the latter’s friends, Marion Boton (Boton) and Eriberto Enriquez (Enriquez). Nikko was told that
the two would accompany him in getting the "Gameboy" that Siongco promised. Siongco was no stranger to Nikko as he used to be a security guard at
Footlockers shoe store where Nikko’s mother, Elvira Satimbre (Elvira), works as a cashier. After a short stop in Pilar, Bataan, the three proceeded to Mariveles,
Bataan, where they met with George Hayco (Hayco). The boy was then brought to Dinalupihan, Bataan, where he was kept for the night.4

Meanwhile, Elvira arrived home at 7:00 p.m. and found that her son was not there. She searched for him in the places he frequented, but to no avail. As her
continued search for the child proved futile, she reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.5

The following day, December 28, 1998, Enriquez and Siongco took Nikko to Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.6 On December 29, 1998, Elvira received a phone call
from a man, later identified as appellant Siongco, who claimed to have custody of Nikko and asked for ₱400,000.00 in exchange for his liberty. Elvira haggled
with her son’s captor until the latter agreed to reduce the ransom money to ₱300,000.00. Elvira was also able to talk to her son who was only able to utter
"Hello Ma" as Siongco immediately grabbed the phone from him. Siongco warned Elvira to refrain from reporting the matter to the police. He also threatened
that Nikko would be killed if she fails to give the ransom money at 6:00 p.m. of the next day at Genesis Bus Station in Pasay City.7 That night, Elvira telephoned
the Office of the Chief of Police of Balanga, Bataan and reported that Nikko was kidnapped.8

On December 30, 1998, Enriquez and Siongco moved Nikko to Pateros and cautioned him not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped. They stayed at the house
of Heracleo San Jose (Heracleo), a relative of Enriquez. They again called Elvira who failed to keep her appointment with them in Pasay City. She explained that
she was still gathering funds for the ransom money. The captors reiterated their threats and, at midnight, they called and instructed her to proceed to Avenida
with whatever available money she had, subject to a subsequent agreement as to the balance. Elvira refused and insisted that she preferred to give the amount
in full.9

In the morning of December 31, 1998, Siongco called Elvira several times with the same threats and demands. Elvira agreed to meet them that afternoon at the
Genesis Bus Station in Pasay City. Nikko was allowed to speak with his mother and he assured her that he was not being maltreated. After the call, Enriquez
informed Nikko that his mother wanted a "kaliwaan" (face to face exchange) deal. Soon thereafter, Enriquez and Siongco left to meet Elvira, while Nikko stayed
behind.10

On the same day, Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Azurin, Jr. (Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr.) was on duty at Crimes Operation Division of the Philippine Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) office in Camp Crame, Quezon City. At 11:00 a.m., Elvira arrived and requested for assistance for the recovery of her
kidnapped son. The PAOCTF team then instructed her to bring to the pay-off site a brown envelope with a letter asking for extension of payment. After briefing,
Azurin and other police operatives proceeded to Genesis Bus Station in Pasay City. While waiting for Elvira, they noticed two (2) male persons, later identified as
Enriquez and Siongco, restlessly moving around the place. At around 2:30 p.m., Elvira arrived carrying the brown envelope. As instructed by the kidnappers, she
positioned herself near a tree and tied a white kerchief around her neck. Shortly thereafter, Enriquez approached Elvira and took the brown envelope from her.
As he was walking away, the PAOCTF team arrested him. Thereafter, they followed Siongco, who hurriedly hailed a taxicab and sped away. Siongco was arrested
at the residence of Heracleo in Pateros where Nikko was also rescued. Thereafter, Siongco and Enriquez were brought to Camp Crame.11

The investigations of Nikko and the two detainees, coupled with the follow-up operations of the PAOCTF, led to the arrest of appellant Bonsol, and the other
cohorts, Hayco and Boton.12

On January 4, 1999, an Information13 was filed in court, charging herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol, together with Enriquez, Hayco, Boton, and a John Doe,
with KIDNAPPING and SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Arraigned on February 24, 1999, the five accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.14 Trial then ensued; in the course of which, the prosecution
presented in evidence the oral testimonies of its witnesses: 1) the victim himself, 11-year-old Nikko; 2) his mother, Elvira; 3) Heracleo, relative of accused
Enriquez; 4) Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr. of the PAOCTF; and 5) Police Superintendent Paul Tucay, the one who arrested Bonsol, Hayco and Boton.15

With the exception of Boton, all of the accused took the witness stand. Hayco and Bonsol denied knowledge of and participation in the crime. Siongco testified
that, on December 27, 1998, he saw Nikko at a "peryahan" in Balanga, Bataan but he did not mind the boy as he was busy conversing with Enriquez about their
business of selling toys. He went to Manila and stayed at the house of Heracleo on December 28 and 29, 1998 to collect installment payments from customers.
On December 31, 1998, he went to his brother’s house in San Juan, Metro Manila and when he came back to Pateros on the same day, he was arrested by
PAOCTF agents.

Enriquez declared that Nikko voluntarily went with them. He affirmed that he travelled with Nikko and Siongco to Manila. They stayed in Bicutan and then
moved to Pateros. He alleged that they called Nikko’s mother because the boy kept asking for a "Gameboy." He went to the Genesis Bus Station to meet Nikko’s
mother, who, according to Siongco, would have something tied around her neck.16

The RTC rejected the denials and alibis raised by the accused and held that they conspired and mutually helped one another in kidnapping and illegally detaining
Nikko by taking him through a circuitous journey from Balanga, Bataan to Manila where ransom demands for his liberty were made.

In a decision dated November 6, 2000, the RTC convicted Siongco, Bonsol, Enriquez and Hayco of the offense charged in the Information and meted upon them
the extreme penalty of death. Boton was ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The pertinent portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Antonio Siongco y Dela Cruz, Eriberto Enriquez y Gemson, George Hayco y Cullera and Allan Bonsol y Paz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the purpose of extorting ransom, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the Supreme penalty of Death and indemnify the victim,
Nikko Satimbre, and his mother, Elvira Satimbre, each, in the amount of ₱50,000.00, as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.

On the ground of reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused Marion Boton y Cereza NOT GUILTY of the crime charged in the Information.

SO ORDERED.17

From the RTC, the case went directly to this Court for automatic review.18 The parties were then required to file, as they did file, their respective appellants’19
and appellee’s20 briefs. Consistent with this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,21 the case was transferred to the CA22 for intermediate review and disposition.

Upon review, the CA concurred with the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified the penalty
imposed to reclusion perpetua. The CA increased the amount of moral damages to ₱100,000.00 and awarded ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, to be paid
jointly and solidarily by the accused to their victim, Nikko. The fallo of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 6, 2000 of the RTC Branch 166, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 115317-H, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to jointly and solidarily pay private
complainant Nikko Satimbre the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.23

Only herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol were able to perfect an appeal24 of the CA Decision. Consequently, in its September 29, 2008 Resolution,25 the CA
declared the conviction of accused Enriquez and Hayco as final and executory, and a Partial Entry of Judgment was made against them.26 In a Resolution dated
April 13, 2009,27 this Court accepted the appeal interposed by Siongco and Bonsol.

We deny the appeal.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.

In the recent People of the Philippines v. Christopher Bringas y Garcia, Bryan Bringas y Garcia, John Robert Navarro y Cruz, Erickson Pajarillo y Baser (deceased),
and Eden Sy Chung,28 we reiterated the following elements that must be established by the prosecution to obtain a conviction for kidnapping, viz.: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill
him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female, or a public officer. If the victim is a minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of detention becomes immaterial.

The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.29

As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the prosecution indubitably proved beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention obtain in the case at bar. Accused-appellants are private individuals who, together with their cohorts, took 11-year-old Nikko out of his hometown in
Balanga, Bataan on December 27, 1998. They brought him to Manila on December 28, 1998, where demands for a ₱400,000.00 ransom were made to his
mother.

Appellants contend that the essential element of detention or deprivation of liberty was absent because Nikko voluntarily went with them and that he was free
to move around and play with other children. We disagree.

The deprivation required by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted
or impeded in his liberty to move.30 In this case, although Nikko was free to move around, he was at all times under the alternate watch of appellants and their
cohorts. He was in their physical custody and complete control as he was kept in places strange and unfamiliar to him. While he was allowed to play in the
houses where he was kept, the fact remains that he was under the control of his captors who left him there, as he could not leave the house until they shall
have returned for him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty.1avvphi1

As to the contention of appellant Siongco that there was no force or intimidation involved in the taking, this Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ernesto
Cruz, Jr. y Concepcion and Reynaldo Agustin y Ramos31 that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element of
deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the accused on a false inducement, without which the victim would not have done so. In the present case,
when Nikko boarded the bus bound for Pilar, Bataan, he was under the impression that Bonsol and Enriquez were to be trusted as he was assured by Siongco
that the two would accompany him to get his much desired "Gameboy." Without such assurance, Nikko would not have boarded the said vehicle. In kidnapping,
the victim need not be taken by the accused forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will
after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can
either be made forcibly or, as in the instant case, fraudulently.32ten.lihpwal

Equally significant is the fact that, in kidnapping, the victim’s lack of consent is also a fundamental element.33 The general rule is that the prosecution is
burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. In this case, Nikko was only 11
years old when he was kidnapped; thus incapable of giving consent, and incompetent to assent to his seizure and illegal detention. The consent of the boy could
place appellants in no better position than if the act had been done against his will. A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because he is
ingenious enough to conceal his true motive from his victim until he is able to transport the latter to another place.34
The identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts likewise show that the actuations and roles played by appellants Siongco and Bonsol
undoubtedly demonstrate that they conspired with Hayco and Enriquez in kidnapping and illegally detaining Nikko. Being sufficiently supported by evidence on
record, we find no reason to disturb the same.

Siongco was the one who promised Nikko a "Gameboy." He told the boy to go with Bonsol and Enriquez and get the toy in Pilar, Bataan. On December 28, 1998,
he arrived in Dinalupihan, Bataan to fetch Nikko. From there, he, Enriquez and Nikko left for Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila in a bus. The following day, Siongco,
Nikko, Enriquez, and the latter’s friend went to the marketplace and called Nikko’s mother. Siongco demanded from her payment of ₱400,000.00 as a condition
for the boy’s release. Siongco repeatedly telephoned Elvira with the same demand and threats over the next couple of days. On December 31, 1998, he
instructed Enriquez to meet Elvira at the Genesis Bus Station to get the ransom money.

It is immaterial whether appellant Bonsol acted as a principal or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and his participation therein have been established. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.35 On the pretext of getting Nikko’s much desired
"Gameboy," Bonsol and Enriquez were able to conveniently whisk Nikko out of Balanga and bring him to Pilar, then to Mariveles, and eventually to Dinalupihan,
where Siongco fetched him. Thus, Enriquez and Siongco’s plan of bringing Nikko to Metro Manila, a terrain unfamiliar to the boy and where the two could enjoy
anonymity to carry out their ultimate goal of extorting ransom money from Nikko’s mother, was accomplished. As shown by the evidence, without the
participation of appellant Bonsol, the commission of the offense would not have come to fruition.

Finally, appellants bewail that they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde
(Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the pre-trial conference, direct examination and cross-examination of the prosecution’s principal witness,
Nikko. This was so, despite Atty. Moralde’s manifestation during Nikko’s cross-examination that the defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with
that of the other accused.36

A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants’ counsel de oficio in six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio,
Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorney’s Office P AO), was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as
early as practicable under the continuous trial system.37 The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen
counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and independent, to
enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the
accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.38

The fact that Boton’s defense conflicts with that of appellants is immaterial because, as borne out by records, Atty. Moralde expressly declared that the
questions he propounded to Nikko were only for his client Boton. Thereafter, Atty. Antoniano was furnished with copies of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the proceedings she missed and was given ample opportunity to conduct her own cross-examination during the subsequent hearings. Eventually, she
adopted the cross-examination conducted by the other defense counsels.391avvphi1

The CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code40 is death. However, R.A. No. 934641 has banned the
imposition of death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.42 In line with prevailing jurisprudence,43 an
award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity is proper. The award of ₱100,000.00 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000.00 considering the minority of Nikko.44 As
the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Nikko is entitled to ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages as correctly
awarded by the CA.45

WHEREFORE, the September 20, 2007 Decision..of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00774, finding appellants Antonio Siongco y dela Cruz and Allan
Bonsol y Paz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of KIDNAPPING and SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that a ₱50,000.00 civil
indemnity is awarded and the amount of moral damages is increased to ₱200, 000.00.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179570 February 4, 2010
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan,
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, finding accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim2 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape in Criminal
Case No. 12281 and finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No.
12309.

In view of our decision in People v. Cabalquinto,3 the real name and identity of the rape victim, as well as the members of her immediate family, are withheld.
In this regard, the rape victim is herein referred to as AAA; her mother, BBB; and her father, CCC.

In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were charged with the crime of abduction with rape in an Information4 dated
March 17, 1995, which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and helping one another and by means of force, threat, violence and
intimidation, while armed with a bladed weapon known as "Badong", did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a girl
of 16 years of age, against her will and consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said accused by means of force, threat, violence and
intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron Lajim by acting as look-out during the commission of the said crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were charged with the crime of serious illegal detention in an Amended
Information5 dated August 28, 1995, which reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15, 1994, at Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and detain AAA, an unmarried woman under 15
years of age in the house of Egap Madsali thereby depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a result of that illegal detention, said AAA was not
able to go home to her mother for a period of more than five (5) months.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No. 12309 was consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 12281, pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50.

Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on September 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12309. He pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Egap was arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12309. Maron was arrested and, later,
arraigned on March 11, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial ensued. However, in July 1996, Egap escaped while under the
custody of prison guards.

The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:

On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub,
Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held
the hair of AAA and told her, "Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you." Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her.
Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his
waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, "If you will not go, I will shoot you." Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon
Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her
hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on.
While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared.
Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood
on her private parts. She was sexually abused three times on the ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA
was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day and
brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.

On July 2, 1994, AAA’s mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of
fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities.6 Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she
refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read.

Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's
wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the
place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused
her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was
also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.

On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the house of
Egap from July 2, 1994 until December 15, 1994. On December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their
elopement. During the period of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free will.
The sexual intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The defense further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he
did not pay the dowry (dower) in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay the dowry because he had already rendered
services to AAA's family for about three years prior to his marriage with AAA. After the marriage, Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's father to his
house in Balabac, Palawan. They stayed there for about four months. Then they went to Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the house of Egap for
about two weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only learned that a case for abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he
was being interrogated by the Bataraza Police.

On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron
were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to suffer imprisonment as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 12281, the accused Sa[j]iron Lajim and Maron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or forty (years) and
each of the accused are ordered to indemnify the complainant AAA the same amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity;

2. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the accused Egap Madsali and Sa[j]iron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and both accused
are ordered to separately indemnify the complainant AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,8 the
case was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 12281 and 12309.

Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE IMPLICATION OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN
REPORTING THE ALLEGED ADBUCTION AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER; AND

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S OWN FATHER.

With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month inaction of BBB through his failure to report the alleged abduction and illegal
detention of her daughter is totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that she was abducted and illegally detained.

We are not persuaded.

Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape
is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.9 BBB explained that she did not immediately report the abduction, rape and
detention of her daughter to the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA,10 who was then in his custody.

Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report the matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap
learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and shot her at the back.11 Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months
should not be taken against her.

Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted testimonies of CCC and Imam Musli Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on the
charge against them. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and proposed marriage after their three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave his
consent to the marriage of his daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage, CCC said that he was even able to talk to his daughter and his wife, and both were
amenable to the marriage. AAA never mentioned to him anything about having been kidnapped or raped. Neither did his wife tell him of their daughter's
alleged harrowing experience. He and his wife were present during the marriage celebration.

Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she had never seen her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned them.12
BBB testified that she and her husband had been separated for a long time, and she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC left their place in
March 1983 to go to Malaysia, and that was the last time she saw him.13 CCC's allegation that his wife was present during the marriage celebration was also
controverted by the testimonies of AAA, her mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for CCC's self-serving allegations, he could not muster any
sufficient evidence to beef up those allegations. It is also very surprising that CCC, after his long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC
would like to impress upon this Court that he has maintained constant communication with his family; however, no single witness was presented to corroborate
this claim.

Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay14 dated December 28, 1995, alleged that in 1991, his wife wrote and informed him that Sajiron asked
for their daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he was giving his permission for their daughter to marry. In the same salaysay, he also said that Egap
wrote him a letter on July 4, 1994 and instructed him to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to discuss the intended marriage of AAA and Sajiron. However, records
are bereft of proof of the existence of these letters. Clearly, these allegations, being unsupported by evidence, are self-serving and cannot be given any
probative value.

Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness, attested that the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not present during the
marriage,15 thus controverting CCC's allegation that he was present and gave consent to the marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented as
an accused witness, recanted his earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding, the same cannot be given credit. Recantations are frowned upon
by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated.
Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.16
Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his
mind for one reason or another.17

As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the
declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have
any ill motive to testify against petitioner.18

The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him was his failure to pay the ₱10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as
true. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle holds
true.19 When the offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if their accusation
were not true.20
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to the accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her
family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged non-payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to
expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves.

Neither is the Court convinced of the "sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused, by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to
their elopement and marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would have been
to cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation,21 right after
she was rescued by the authorities.

Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him
the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.22 The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not
present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts.23 In the case at bar, Sajiron
was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to
exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently
denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house.24

More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is
credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction.25 This is so because, owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that
can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.26

In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held that AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and consistent. She remained
steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given in court on the unfortunate incident.27 The trial court found that AAA positively identified
Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest. AAA recounted her sordid experience as follows:

AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.

Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you were?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Where were you?
A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, ma’am.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: What was that incident?
A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my hair. He was carrying a Barong and he was forcing me to go with him but I refused ma’am.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to hold the hair of Inon Dama who came to my rescue, ma’am.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?
A:He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was hit, ma’am. And Sahiron Lajim left and I was forced to go with him telling me, "go with
me if you do not want to die."
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone with Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim told me to go with them but I refused. What they did was to tie my hands behind my back and my mouth was covered by them by
a piece of cloth, ma’am.
Q: And after that what happened next?
A: Then they brought me to the forest ma’am.
Q: And when you were in the forest what happened next?
A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while his father was watching ma’am.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim raped you?
A: When we reached the forest my hands were untied and my dress were removed and only my bra was left ma’am.
Q: Who removed your dress?
A: Sahiron Lajim ma’am.
Q: ANd you stated that it was only your bra that was left in your body how about your panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was undressing you what did you do, if any?
A: I pleaded to him not to pursue his intention and Sahiron Lajim threatened me that if I will allow him to do such thing to me he will not kill me, ma’am.
Q: And did he hold the private parts of your body?
A: Yes ma’am. (witness pointing to her bust, and the lower part of her body)
Q: What other part did Sahiron Lajim touch in your body?
A: My private part, my vagina, ma’am.
Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his organ to my vagina. Then after raping me he required me to wear my blouse. He repeated the act again for two times up to the following day,
ma’am.
Q: How long was the private part of Sahiron Lajim inside your private part?
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1) hour.
Q: That was the first time his organ entered your private part?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Did you notice anything in your private part?
A: I have seen blood. I was even pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time when his organ was inside your private part?
A: It was painful, ma’am.
Q: And you stated that his organ entered your private part again for the second time, how long?
A I did not notice anymore how long was it, ma’am.
Q: And you stated Madam Witness that you were repeatedly raped that night, is that correct?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Up to what time?
A: The first time that he raped me was about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, the second was midnight. And the third was 3:00 o’clock in the morning.
Q: Were you able to sleep that night?
A: No ma’am.
Q: At the time when you were raped for the first time where was the father of Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding ma’am.
Q: How far was his father?
A: He was near a tree which was 10 meters away from us.
Q: Now, the place where you were brought by Sahiron Lajim is a forest?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest?
A: None ma’am, we were at a place where there were big trees, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say you were raped on the ground?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Without any blanket?
A: He got some leaves of trees, ma’am.
Q: what did he do with that leaves of trees?
A: He secured some leaves and placed it on the ground, which served as mat, ma’am.
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where was his father?
A: He was also there, ma’am.28 (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus, putting it in a better position to determine whether a witness was lying or telling
the truth.29

However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in
Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties30 Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.

A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused
with forcible abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was
the act of rape. Upon further perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although the information does not specifically allege the term "kidnap or detain," the information specifically used the terms "take" and "carry away." To
"kidnap" is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away.31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into one's hand or
into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem.32 Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information,
was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.

Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts
as alleged in the body of the information.33 Simply put, the crime charged is determined by the information's accusatory portion and not by its denomination.

The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on
the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.35

In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will.
The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty.36 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.37 Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.38 In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined in an
enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very
easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and
intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.

Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.39 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made
by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of
each of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all.40 In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to
prevent AAA from resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and stood guard to
make sure that no one would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against AAA. Maron did not endeavor to prevent his son from raping
AAA thrice. The next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.

The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga,41 the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime:

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course
of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659."

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex
crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with
murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the
same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original)

Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in
Criminal Case No. 12281.

In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention.

All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was
raped in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2,
1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape.42 She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her and
her family if she attempted to flee.43

AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.44 Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from
leaving.45 In fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives of her loved
ones.

To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the marriage between her and Sajiron is considered irregular under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the law provides that no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the essential
requisite of mutual consent of the parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent of either party is vitiated by violence, intimidation,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its celebration.

AAA did not give her consent to the wedding.46 The marriage was solemnized only upon the instruction of Egap.47 She was also forced to sign the marriage
contract without the presence of her parents or any of her relatives.48 She did not want to marry Sajiron because she did not love him.49 The Imam who
solemnized their marriage did not even ask for the consent of the parties.50 He was merely compelled to solemnize the marriage because he was afraid of Egap,
and the latter threatened him.51 Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused in an attempt to exculpate themselves
from criminal responsibility.

Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A. No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole.53

As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency of his case and his subsequent unexplained absence during the promulgation
of the decision convicting him of the crime charged has divested him of the right to avail himself of any remedy that may be available to him, including his right
to appeal. In a recent case, this Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from it.54 Hence,
insofar as accused Egap is concerned, the judgment against him became final and executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment.

As to the award of damages.

In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of
rape.55

In People v. Quiachon,56 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is
proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,57 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for
AAA is ₱75,000.00.

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code,58 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the
fact of rape.59 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.60 Such award is separate and
distinct from the civil indemnity.61 Therefore, the Court awards the amount of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.1avvphi1

In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious illegal detention, the trial court's award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was proper, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.62

We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of
illegal detention.63 This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for more than five months. Thus, the Court
awards the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.64

Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There was no showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had
sexual relations with other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8,
1995, the baby must have been conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be logically
deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code,65 he is civilly liable for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is
directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice
and hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code.66

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay jointly and severally, the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further ordered to support the offspring born as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support shall
be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in arrears to be reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by
the trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3512. September 26, 1952.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NESTORIO REMALANTE, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 18 March 1948, while Mercedes Tobias accompanied by Eusebio Gerilla and Lucia Pelo was on the way to her home in
the barrio of Guinarona, municipality of Dagami, province of Leyte, coming from her farm in Maanghon, she met a group of more than ten men all armed with
rifles, some of them with beard reaching the breast. Nestorio Remalante, one of the bearded men, approached, took hold of and dragged Mercedes Tobias. She
remonstrated and entreated him not to take her because she had done him no wrong. Remalante continued to drag and struck her with the butt of his rifle on
different parts of her body. The companions of Mercedes were told to continue their way. They saw Mercedes being dragged toward the sitio of Sawahon.
Hardly had they walked one kilometer when they heard gun reports. The following day Mercedes Tobias was found dead in Sawahon with two gunshot wounds,
the points of entry being at the back and of exit at the left breast and shoulder (Exhibit A).

Nestorio Remalante was charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. His companions have not been apprehended. After trial the Court of First
Instance of Leyte found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs. He has appealed.

The appellant claims that at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day while he together with Emeterio Arellano was working on his farm at Binog the
dissidents apprehended and detained him because they were not satisfied with his answers as to whether he had been furnishing the constabulary soldiers
information about them; that as he begged to be excused from going with them they beat him up with their rifles hitting him on the head and causing him to
lose consciousness; that when he came to the dissidents took him together with another male prisoner along with them and on their way they met Mercedes
Tobias and her companions; that upon orders of the leader of the band he (the appellant) took hold of Mercedes Tobias and when he informed the leader that
she refused to go with them the leader again beat him up (the appellant); that the dissidents together with the three captives continued their way; that after
walking 100 meters they stopped; that the leader commanded five soldiers and the two male prisoners to prepare the meal and the other soldiers to take
Mercedes Tobias away; that not long thereafter the appellant heard gun reports from a place about a kilometer away; and that after taking their meal he (the
appellant) was further questioned and the dissidents satisfied that he was not an informer released him.

The appellant admits he took hold and dragged Mercedes Tobias on that occasion, although he pretends it was upon orders of the leader of the band. If it is
true that he was illtreated by the captors and fell unconscious as a result thereof, it is strange that he did not exhibit or show any bruise or wound which would
have left a scar. The corroborative evidence of his claim is given by Emeterio Arellano who is the husband of his mother’s sister. The fact that the appellant grew
beard reaching his breast as some of his companions did is a positive and clear proof that he was a member of the group of marauders, dissidents, bandits who
were harassing the peaceful inhabitants of the town of Dagami and its environs. It is true that no one witnessed the killing of Mercedes Tobias, but the acts of
the malefactors show and constitute conspiracy which renders the appellant liable for the crime committed by his companions.

There is no sufficient evidence of intention to kidnap because from the moment Mercedes Tobias was held and dragged to the time when the gun reports were
heard nothing was done or said by the appellant or his confederates to show or indicate that the captors intended to deprive her of her liberty for sometime
and for some purpose and thereafter set her free or kill her. The interval was so short as to negative the idea implied in kidnapping. Her short detention and
illtreatment are included or form part of the perpetration of the crime of murder. It is murder because of the concurrence of at least one qualifying
circumstance, either of treachery, or of abuse of superior strength, or with the aid of armed men, the first shown by the entry of the shots at the back and the
second and the third by the number of the armed captors, the appellant and his companions, some or one of whom killed Mercedes Tobias. For lack of
sufficient number of votes as required by law, the death penalty recommended by the Solicitor General cannot be imposed.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15024 December 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FELIPE SACAYANAN, Defendant-Appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting defendant-appellant of kidnapping with murder (in Case No. 19636)and
kidnapping with frustrated murder (in Case No. 19704), and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal, for the crimes charged; to
indemnify the heirs of deceased victim Juan Galaraga, and the other victim, Victor Alamar, in the sums of P6,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively; and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is not contested that around midnight of June 17, 1952, a group of five armed men converged on the house of the deceased Juan Galaraga, in barrio San
Pedro Apartado, Alcala, Pangasinan. Three of them went inside, one stayed at the door, while another remained at the foot of the stairway. Rousing the
occupants of the house from their sleep, and ordering the male members of the household to lie face down on the sala, they forcibly brought down with them
the deceased, Juan Galaraga, and his son-in-law Victor Alamar. Heading northward, and at a distance of about 40 meters from their house, Juan Galaraga and
Victor Alamar were almost simultaneously fired upon by their captors, who hit Juan Galaraga mortally (Exhibit "B") and wounded Victor Alamar in the lumbar
region (Exhibit "A"), causing injuries that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. Only appellant was arrested and charged; the
others remain at large.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The case hinges on whether appellant Felipe Sacayanan was sufficiently identified as one of the group of aggressors. The record shows that defendant-appellant
was pointed out by the prosecution witnesses as one of the men who, on the night of June 17, 1952, forcibly brought down Juan Galaraga and Victor Alamar
from their house. Concepcion and Adriatico Galaraga, and one of the victims himself, Victor Alamar, all testified to having recognized Felipe Sacayanan when
one of the intruders, lighting the way with a flashlight, illuminated the face of defendant-appellant who was standing by the door. Although the flashlight was
directed downwards, the floor on which appellant Sacayanan stood was about � meter lower than the sala, bringing his face well within range of the flashlight
beam. Aside from this, the house was not exactly engulfed from total darkness, because a lamp was lighted by Juana Picu, the wife of the deceased Galaraga,
though its dim light could not entirely penetrate the surroundings. Felipe Sacayanan had been well-known to both Concepcion and Adriatico Galaraga long
previous to the incident, defendant-appellant being the cousin of their sister-in-law (Exhibit "F-1", Exhibit "H-1"). Upon the other hand, one of the victims, Victor
Alamar, had been close to defendant-appellant when the latter's face was lighted up on the way down from the house, and was at a vantage point for purposes
of identification; and the circumstance that the men conducted Alamar and the deceased Juan Galaraga for a distance of 40 meters before shooting, gave Victor
more than ample opportunity for closer observation. According to the latter's testimony, Felipe was the man walking behind and somewhat to the left of the
deceased Juan Galaraga, while he (Victor) followed with two (2) men holding him by the arms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Adriatico Galaraga did not reside in the house of his deceased father, Juan Galaraga, but upon hearing the dogs bark, he went to the window and saw five men
on the way to his father's house. He followed them, and upon reaching his father's house, hid himself under the kitchen, behind one of the posts. From there, at
a distance of less than three meters, Adriatico saw two men at the stairs, one of whom he recognized as Felipe Sacayanan when his face was lighted by the
electric torch borne by one of those coming down the house. Upon verifying from his sister Concepcion that his father and his brother-in-law had been taken,
Adriatico sounded the alarm by pounding on a "colloong" (a wooden trough for pounding palay); but the alarm was answered by a volley of shots. Neighbors
rushed to help but arrived to see Juan Galaraga dead and Victor Alamar grievously wounded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For her part, Concepcion Galaraga (Victor Alamar's wife) was right in the sala from where the flashlight was beamed in the direction of Felipe Sacayanan, who
was standing at the door, thus being likewise afforded a reliable view of the person of the accused due to her relative proximity. The witnesses asserted that the
raiders wore hats, but their faces were neither covered nor painted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As correctly observed by the trial court, the killing was not without motive. A land dispute appears to exist over a tract of land between the Pindangan
Agricultural Corporation to which the deceased, Juan Galaraga, belonged, on one hand, and on the other, a certain "Union" or association of claimants, of which
Simplicio Sacayanan, the father of Felipe, was a member. The Galaragas and the Sacayanans thus were ranged on opposing camps of the controversy, and the
bone of contention between the two families, in particular, was a parcel of about several hectares forming part of the disputed area. It is on record that at
around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 14, 1952 (three days before the killing), while the deceased Juan Galaraga and Victor Alamar were plowing the
disputed land, Simplicio Sacayanan, defendant-appellant's father, in a state of agitation, appeared and addressed words of warning to the two. Brandishing a
long bolo in a belligerent mood, he said -

Why did you plow again this land? How courageous you are and as if you have no shame. Why did you continue plowing when I have already prohibited you to
plow this land? (t.s.n. Abalos, p. 35).

and after admonishing the two that something will happen if they persisted, Simplicio Sacayanan left the premises, ominously muttering under his breath.
Despite the warning, Juan Galaraga and Victor Alamar plowed the field again the following day. The foregoing explains why one of the five men, addressing Juan
Galaraga before the latter was shot, demanded "Why it is old man that you are plowing land which is not yours?"; to which the deceased could only meekly
reply, "No, my son." The land dispute was certainly a sufficient motive. Men have been driven to as much, if not greater, lengths in the struggle for a piece of
land, and while appellant was not directly involved, he stood up to ultimately benefit by whatever success his father attained in the
dispute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Much stress is placed on the alleged failure of the family of the victims to name any of the malefactors to different investigators immediately after the killing.
We see no error in the trial court's acceptance of the explanation given by the family of the victims that they feared for their own safety; that they were then
very much worried and in deep grief; and they did not want to expose themselves to further trouble at a time when their deceased father had not yet even
been interred. Fear and confusion compounded by their distraught condition arising from grief, explains their immediate reactions to their misfortune. The fear
was understandable, considering that their house was situated in a relatively inaccessible barrio, about 6 to 7 kilometers from the town proper and from the
nearest post of peace officers, much too far for effective rescue against any attempted reprisal. The defense witnesses, including Julian Domingo of the
Philippine Constabulary (who investigated the following day), admitted that the family were in an obviously distressed state of mind after the killing; according
to Juan Domingo, questions had to be repeated many times before the family could give their answers, which were made slowly and in attitudes of
grief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In particular, Victor Alamar, hovering between life and death in those instances he was allegedly queried on the identity of his assailants, could not have been in
a fully sensible state. We are more prone to believe the testimony of one of the defense witnesses, Maximo Ablao, that when Victor Alamar was asked by
Tagama about the identity of the culprits, the former "was not able to tell anything" (66, t.s.n., Rollolazo). At any rate, only four days after the killings, or on
June 21, 1952, Concepcion and Adriatico Galaraga revealed that Felipe Sacayanan was in the group of 5 men (Exhibit "F-1"; Exhibit "H-1"), a lapse of time which
does not seriously militate against their credibility under the facts shown. .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The testimonies of Macario Fronda and Casimiro Cabreros that they heard policemen Antonio Aquino coaching the family of the victims to point to Felipe
Sacayanan as the man they recognized, impresses us merely as a desperate attempt to breach the damaging evidence of defendant-appellant's culpability. As
narrated, its details are so self-contained as to permit of concoction. Fronda admits that he could not remember other investigations that took place in the
municipal building, much less the details thereof, in the same way that he remembers the investigation that was conducted by Aquino. Queer is also his claim
that the following day after his release on July 2, 1952, without any showing of special relationship between him and Felipe, he (Fronda) went to Felipe's house
and allegedly told him what he heard, while that it was only sometime on May 26, 1957 that Felipe told him that he (Felipe) was being accused in the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense of alibi, that Felipe was in his house the whole evening up to morning time due to a stomach trouble, was correctly disregarded by the lower court.
It is strange that Marcelo de los Santos, who had no medical training or experience, should be called by Teodora Sacayanan to treat her husband, and that
Santos did not exert any effort to fetch his niece who lived only a very short distance away. Moreover, according to Santos, he and Dionisio Tadeo were
together in going to Felipe's house; while Tadeo's testimony is to the effect that he proceeded to Felipe's house earlier than Santos. Also, since Santos and
Tadeo left between 11:00 to 12:00 o'clock p.m., it was not physically impossible for defendant-appellant to have gone to San Pedro Apartado to accomplish his
purpose. He could have made it in 30 minutes by vehicle. Finally, Felipe's father and mother were living right there in San Pedro Apartado, where defendant-
appellant was known to have paid visits prior to June 17, 1952, which renders his alibi still weaker and unreliable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

It was error for the trial court to convict the accused of the complex crimes of kidnapping with murder (in Case No. 19636) and kidnapping with frustrated
murder (in Case No. 19704). The victims had been taken only about 40 meters from their house when they were shot. Nothing was said or done by the accused
or his confederates to show that they had intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for some time and for some purpose. There was no appreciable
interval between their being taken and their being shot from which kidnapping may be inferred (see People vs. Remalante, 92 Phil., 48; 48 Off. Gaz., [9]3881).
The crimes committed, therefore, were murder and frustrated murder, qualified by treachery. Abuse of superior strength and nighttime are absorbed by
treachery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, defendant-appellant should be sentenced to the murder (in Case No. 19636) to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the medium degree of that provided by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No period was fixed by the trial court in imposing the penalty for frustrated murder. Pursuant to Article 248 in connection with Paragraph 3, Article 61 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for frustrated murder (Case No. 19704) is prision mayor maximum (14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months),the
same to be imposed in its medium period, or reclusion temporal minimum(12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 3 months), as per paragraph 4, Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, defendant-appellant should be sentenced for the frustrated murder to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, and not more than 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the decision under appeal is modified as above stated, and affirmed in all other respects. Costs against defendant-
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 138456 : October 23, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, v. ROLANDO DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias BATMAN AND ISAGANI MAAGO (ACQUITTED), accused.
ROLANDO DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias BATMAN, Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated February 20, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 94-10874 finding the
appellant, Rolando Deduyo alias Batman, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

The information charged the appellant, Rolando Deduyo, and his co-accused, Isagani Maago, with the crime of kidnapping for ransom, as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January 1994, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused, including one alias Bayani who is still at large, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and detain thereby restraining the liberty of one Johnny Mauricio y Patasin, a minor 16 years of age, with threats to kill him
while carrying knives, for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P100,000 or P50,000 from his parents.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon arraignment on June 7, 1994, the appellant, Rolando Deduyo, and his co-accused, Isagani Maago, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.3 Before the trial proper which was scheduled to start on September 20, 1994, the appellant escaped from the Rizal Provincial Jail in a mass
jailbreak at dawn on July 29, 1994.4 As he had already been arraigned, trial on the merits ensued (trial in absentia). On February 19, 1998, the warden of the
Rizal Provincial Jail informed the court of appellants re-arrest and detention. On March 30, 1998, in the presence of the appellant and his counsel, the court
promulgated its decision dated February 20, 1998:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Isagani Maago has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and he is hereby ACQUITTED from the
charge.

However, the Court finds the accused Rolando Deduyo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer and undergo
imprisonment of reclusion perpertua, and to pay the costs.

Let alias warrants of his arrest be issued furnishing with copies thereof the NBI Director, Manila; the Chief, CIG, Camp Crame, Quezon City; the PNP Provincial
Director, Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal; the PNP Station Commander, Sariaya, Quezon and the Station Commander, Antipolo PNP Station, Antipolo, Rizal.

SO ORDERED.5cräläwvirtualibräry

The facts of the case follow.

At about 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1994, Johnny Mauricio, a sixteen-year-old boy, was on board his tricycle waiting for passengers beside Mercury Drug Store,
Sumulong St., Antipolo, Rizal. Appellant Rolando Deduyo alias Batman approached and asked Johnny to accompany him to the airport to get a baggage which
they would bring back to Johnnys house.6 Johnny refused because he had not asked permission from his mother. Appellant told him that he already did on his
behalf. Since Johnny knew the appellant, a former lessee of their other house at General Luna St., Antipolo, Rizal for more than a year, he trustingly went with
the appellant and left his tricycle with an acquaintance named Baby.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant and Johnny boarded a passenger jeep and alighted at Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. They proceeded to a house where two persons were drinking
gin. The two persons were appellants co-accused, Isagani Maago, and a certain Bayani. Appellant joined the drinking session. An hour after, appellant told
Johnny that he and Isagani would be the ones to get the baggage at the airport. Johnny asked permission to go home but appellant told him to stay behind and
wait for the baggage. Johnny was left with Bayani who continued drinking alone. While drinking, Bayani took out his fan knife, played with it and threatened
Johnny that ang puma pasok dito ay hindi na nakakalabas ng buhay (whoever enters this house will never come out alive). Johnny was afraid of what he heard
but he did not run away because Bayani might do what he had just said.8cräläwvirtualibräry

An hour after, appellant and Isagani returned. They resumed drinking with Bayani and some people in the neighborhood. Appellant introduced Johnny as his
nephew. Around 10:00 p.m., they went to sleep. There was no partition or bed in the small house which measured only about 3 x 4 square meters. They slept
on the floor with Johnny between appellant and Isagani, and Bayani beside the door. Johnny noticed that Bayanis knife was tucked in his waist. When Johnny
woke up the next day, Isagani, Bayani and the appellant were already awake, talking to each other. Johnny again asked permission from the appellant to go
home but the appellant assured him that they would go back together to Antipolo with the baggage.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Johnny wanted to go home but he did not have any money. While Bayani was preparing their meal, he noticed that the door was closed. When he asked
permission to urinate, Bayani accompanied him outside the house. He was afraid of Bayani because of what latter had told him the night
before.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Around noontime, appellant and Isagani again left to get the baggage at the airport. Around 3:00 p.m., appellant returned without Isagani. He first talked to
Bayani alone and thereafter called Johnny and gave him P12 as his fare to go back to Antipolo. He accompanied Johnny to where he could take a ride
home.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Once home, Johnny was surprised to know that the appellant demanded ransom from his family. In his anger, Johnny went wild and threw all his clothes. The
victim did not even know he had been kidnapped. The police fetched Johnny and brought him to the police station where they took his statement. During trial,
Johnny identified and affirmed his sworn statement.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Johnnys mother, Salvacion Mauricio testified that around 5:00 p.m. on January 30, 1994, she was tending her clothing store at the second floor of the Antipolo
public market when her co-vendor handed her a handwritten letter. The letter demanded a ransom of P100,000, or at least P50,000, otherwise she would not
see her son again. The letter instructed her to be ready with the money the next day and bring it to the Antipolo Church around noontime. The letter warned
her not to tell the police otherwise itutumba namin kayong lahat (we will kill all of you). The kidnap group claimed that they were members of the New Peoples
Army (NPA) and warned Salvacion that her house and store were being watched by them. Salvacion was too frightened to report the incident to the police.
However, after conferring with her family, they secretly alerted the police.13cräläwvirtualibräry

The next day, as instructed in the ransom letter, Salvacion proceeded to the Antipolo Church around noontime. She brought money with her but only in the
amount of P5,100 because that was all she was able to borrow. She waited inside the Church but nobody approached her. On her way out at around 1:30 p.m.,
a man wearing a green shirt walked beside her and asked lnang, dala mo bang pera? She answered yes but asked to see her son first. But the man immediately
ran away. He was chased by a police officer in plain clothes. The man was later identified as Isagani Maago.14cräläwvirtualibräry
When asked by Salvacion who kidnapped her son, Isagani told her that it was Batman (the appellant). Thereafter, Salvacion and the police officers proceeded to
Bagong Ilog, Pasig to look for Johnny. They did not find him there but they were able to catch and arrest the appellant who was about to escape on board a
tricycle. Appellant told Salvacion that Johnny was already in Antipolo. Salvacion knew the appellant since he used to rent their other house in Gen. Luna St.,
Antipolo, Rizal from 1991 to 1992 and he was the husband of her store helper. Appellant and Johnny were close friends. At about 1:00 p.m. on January 30, 1994,
Salvacion recalled that she saw the appellant at the second floor of the Antipolo Public Market. He even went to her store and asked about the whereabouts of
her brother.15cräläwvirtualibräry

PO3 Eduardo Salabit testified that he was a member of the surveillance team which monitored the kidnapping. He positioned himself in front of the Antipolo
Church at about 11:00 a.m. on January 31, 1994. He saw Salvacion Mauricio enter the church and when she came out two hours later, a man followed her
closely and talked to her. As the man was acting suspiciously, he called his attention but he immediately ran away. He gave chase and, together with Police
Officer Dominador Demdam, he caught the man later identified as Isagani Maago. He handcuffed and frisked the man, and retrieved a fan knife from him. He
turned over the knife to their investigator, SPO2 Delfin Grutta. At the station, lsagani Maago told them that he had companions and the mastermind was the
appellant. He told them they could find the appellant in Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig. Upon proceeding there, they caught the appellant in the act of escaping on
board a tricycle. His team was able to identify the appellant as one of them knew him.16cräläwvirtualibräry

SPO3 Dominador Demdam corroborated the testimony of PO3 Eduardo Salabit. Their surveillance team positioned themselves near the church. After a short
while, he noticed PO3 Salabit running after a man. He joined the chase and together they caught the man who was later identified as Isagani Maago. They
recovered a fan knife from him which they turned over to the custodian of Rizal Provincial Prosecutors Office in Pasig City. During investigation at the police
station, Maago told them he had other companions who were in Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig. With this information, they immediately conducted a follow-up
operation in Bagong Ilog where they caught the appellant while trying to escape. He frisked the appellant and recovered a fan knife which his team turned over
to the custodian of the Prosecutors Office.17cräläwvirtualibräry

SPO2 Delfin Grutta testified that he was the one who took the sworn statements of the victim, his mother Salvacion Mauricio, and Police Officers Salabit and
Demdam. He identified in court the statements he took. He presented in court the ransom note and the knife turned over to him by the apprehending officers.
He kept the note and the knife in a locked filing cabinet to which only himself and their chief investigator had access.18cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellant was at large during the trial so he was not presented to testify. The defense presented appellants co-accused, Isagani Maago, and Romulo Amargo.

Romulo Amargo testified that he was a resident of Muntingbayan, Sariaya, Quezon for about ten years. He had known lsagani Maago for the same period of
time as the latter was also a resident of Sariaya, Quezon. In the afternoon of January 29, 1994, he was with Isagani on their way home from work. Isaganis house
was along his route in going to and from work. When they arrived at Isaganis house at around 6:00 p.m., appellant was there waiting. He heard appellant ask
Isagani to accompany him to pick up a package at the airport in Manila. After a short while, Amargo went home and did not see either Isagani or the appellant
anymore the following day. He remembered the day he saw the appellant with Isagani Maago because it was the day he paid for the installment of his pants
and t-shirt.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Isagani Maago denied participation in the kidnapping. He testified that, on January 30, 1994, he was with the appellant in the house of Bayani at Bagong Ilog,
Pasig. He arrived there with the appellant at around 8:00 a.m. from his hometown in Quezon Province. Appellant left and returned in the afternoon with Johnny
Mauricio whom he introduced as his nephew. The next day, appellant asked lsagani to accompany him to Antipolo to get a package. They arrived in Antipolo
around lunchtime. Appellant told Isagani to wait for him in front of the Antipolo Church. When appellant failed to return, he decided to go back to Bagong Ilog,
Pasig but, on his way to the jeepney terminal, he heard somebody shouting at him. When he looked, a man was running towards him holding a gun. He ran but
the man caught up with him and boxed him. He told the man he did not do anything wrong but they still brought him to the PNP headquarters at Hilltop,
Taytay, Rizal. Upon investigation by the police, he told them the appellant could be found in Pasig. He was made to go to Pasig with the policemen and, once
there, he saw appellant inside a mobile car lying face down with his mouth bleeding.20cräläwvirtualibräry

After weighing the evidence presented, the trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom but acquitted
appellants co-accused, Isagani Maago:

The court believes that the conspiracy of accused Deduyo and Maago as alleged in the Information was not convincingly established. The only damaging
circumstance against accused Maago was that he accompanied Deduyo from Sariaya, Quezon to Pasig, Metro Manila and that he was apprehended near the
Antipolo Church after asking Salvacion Mauricio if she had the money. What bothers the mind of the court was the manner Maago testified. He appeared so
frank and confident in denying the charge against him. He did not stammer during his entire testimony, and the court did not observe any mannerism that
would betray his innocence. He claimed that he did not do anything wrong - that he did not know anything about the whole incident.

However, with regard to the prosecution evidence against accused Rolando Deduyo who was tried in absentia the court is convinced that he masterminded the
crime charged - and he alone appears to be criminally liable. The court is moreover convinced of his guilt, because of his escape from Rizal Provincial jail during
the pendency of this case. His flight is clearly indicative of his guilt. The ransom note (Exh. C) demanding for the sum of P100,000 for the safety of Johnny
Mauricio characterizes the crime as one of kidnapping for ransom.

Aggrieved, appellant Rolando Deduyo filed the instant appeal with a lone assigned error:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM.

The appeal has no merit.

The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. The
elements are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) that the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) that the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer. It is not necessary
that any of the foregoing circumstances (letters a to d) be present if the kidnapping is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.21cräläwvirtualibräry

The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his liberty. It is not necessary for the
victim to be locked up or placed in an enclosure; it is sufficient for him to be detained or deprived of his liberty in any manner.22 In the present case, the
testimony and sworn statement of the victim showed that he was effectively restrained of his liberty. He candidly testified that he went with the appellant in
the belief that, with his mothers permission, they were going to get a baggage from the airport and bring it back to their house in Antipolo. When they
proceeded instead to Pasig, the victim thought they would just be dropping by. When the appellant told him to stay in the house in Pasig while he and his
friend, Isagani Maago, instead got the baggage, the victim immediately asked permission to go home. To make him stay, the appellant assured him twice that
they would return to Antipolo together with the baggage - first, on the night of January 30, 1994 and second, in the morning of January 31, 1994. In addition to
being tricked by the appellant to stay in Bayanis house in Pasig, the victim was also so afraid of Bayani that he could not leave the place even if he wanted to.
Bayani had a knife in his waist even while sleeping and even threatened the victim ang pumapasok dito ay di na nakakalabas ng buhay. Bayani guarded him on
the two occasions that appellant left, even accompanying the victim to urinate outside the house. Given all these circumstances, the victim was effectively
restrained of his liberty - the primary element of the offense of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Pertinent portions of his sworn statement and
testimony follow.
SWORN STATEMENT:

Tanong Ng ikaw ay mapilitang sumama kay Batman, siya ba ay may hawak na anumang uri ng patalim?
Sagot Wala po.
T Bakit ka sumama sa kanya (Batman)?
S Dahil sa nagpapasama siya na may kukuning baggage sa airport at di umano ay dadalhin sa bahay namin sa Carigma St., Antipolo, Rizal.

xxx xxx xxx

T Kayo ba ay nakarating sa airport?

S Hindi ho, dahil niloko lang nila ako na pupunta sa airport pero sa Pasig lang pala ang punta namin.
T Ng nalaman mong sa Pasig lang pala ang punta ninyo, ano ang ginawa mo?
S Ang ginawa ko ho ng sabihin ko sa kanilang uuwi na ako ng Antipolo ay hindi ako pinaalis at ang sabi nila Batman at Isagani ay hindi ako pwedeng makaalis at
sila ang pupunta sa airport.
T Nakaalis ba naman sila Batman?
S Oho.
T Ng makaalis sila Batman, bakit hindi ka umalis din para makauwi?
S Hindi ho ako makaalis dahil binabantayan ako ni Bayani at isa pa ay wala akong perang pamasahe dahil kinuha lahat ni Batman ang aking pera pati na ang
aking singsing.

xxx xxx xxx

T Ng ikaw ay magising hindi ka ba nagsabi sa kanila na ikaw ay uuwi na?

S Nagsabi ako sa kanila na uuwi na, subalit ang sabi nila ay isasabay ako pauwi sa Antipolo kapag nakuha na nila ang bagahe sa airport.
T Ang ibig mong sabihin ay umalis uli sila papuntang airport?
S Oho, si Batman at si Isagani.
T Bumalik ba silang dalawa?
S Si Batman lang ho ang bumalik.
T Ng makabalik si Batman, anong oras ito?
S Mga magaalas-3:00 :00 ng hapon.
T Sinabi ba niya kung bakit hindi niya kasama si Isagani?
S Sangayon sa kanya ay iniwan siya ni Isagani at tinawag niya si Bayani subalit hindi nila ako pinapalapit at nag-usap sila ng mga ilang sandali at narinig kong
sinabi ni Bayani na pupunta siya sa Makati at si Batman naman ay tinawag ako at binigyan ako ng P12.00 pamasahe pauwi sa Antipolo at di umano ay pupunta
siya ng Olongapo.

xxx xxx xxx

T Ng ikaw ay makauwi, ano ang nalaman mo?

S Nalaman ko na lang ng makauwi ako na ako pala ay ipinatutubos ng isandaang libong piso.23cräläwvirtualibräry

DIRECT TESTIMONY:

ATTY. CORNAGO:
Q: What time was it when you arrived at that house in Bagong Ilog?
A: At about six oclock in the evening.
Q: You were referring at the same day January 30, 1994?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How long did the drinking last?
A: About an hour, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After that what happened then, if any?

A: Batman and Isagani left.
Q: Did you know where they leave for (sic)?
A: According to them, they were going to get the baggage.
Q: Did you go with them to get the baggage?
A: They did not let me go with them.
Q: Why?
A: According to them they will be the ones to get the baggage.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when Rolando Deduyo and Isagani Maago left to get the baggage purpotedly (sic) who was left with you in that house?
A: Bayani, sir.
Q: When you were left with Bayani what did Bayani do?
A: He put out a knife and told me that Ang pumapasok dito ay hindi na nakakalabas ng buhay.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Was Batman or Rolando Deduyo and Isagani able to return that same day?
A: Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: At about ten oclock in the evening what happened then?

A: Bayani invited us to go to sleep.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Where?
A: We slept together and I was surrounded by them when we sleep (Sic).
Q: What do you mean you were cornered?
A: I was placed in the middle when we went to sleep.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How about the three, Batman, Bayani, and Isagani where did they lie down to sleep also?
A: Isagani and Batman were beside me, I was in the middle while Bayani was near the door.
Q: At the time you lied (sic) down did you notice where the knife of Bayani, which you was (sic) shown earlier was (sic)?
A: It was still stuck to his waist.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And how far was Bayani in relation to the door of the house where you slept?
A: Bayani was beside the door.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When did you wake up?

A: About seven oclock of the following morning.
Q: When you woke up where were the three, Batman, Isagani, and Bayani?
A: We were still beside each other.
Q: What were they doing if they were doing anything?
A: They were talking with each other.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Why? Did you not try to go home in Antipolo at that time?
A: Because Bayani told me not to and I felt threatened when Bayani uttered ang pumapasok dito ay hindi na lumalabas ng buhay. Also, I did not have the money
for my fare.

ATTY. CORNAGO:
That morning of January 31, what did Bayani, Isagani and Batman do if they did anything?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Batman and Isagani leave (sic) again and Bayani was left with me.
Q: When you were left alone with Bayani what happened if any?
A: We stayed inside the house, sir.
Q: For how long was (sic) Isagani and Batman away?
A: Batman arrived at about three oclock in the afternoon.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said that you were brought to a house at Bagong Ilog in the evening of January 30, 1994, for how long did you stay in that house?
A: Up to January 31, in the afternoon.
Q: You stayed there up to the afternoon of January 31 why did you not leave that house earlier?
A: I was afraid because of the threat of Bayani.

CROSS-EXAMINATION:

ATTY. MENDOZA:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said Bayani pulled out a small knife?

A: Yes sir.
Q: He did not open the said knife in front of you?
A: He opened the knife and he also played with it.
Q: At that time Bayani in your opinion was drinking, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And when he uttered the statement ang pumapasok dito ay hindi nakakalabas ng buhay He did it jokingly, is that correct?
A: He was serious when he uttered those remarks.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: From the time you arrived in that house up to the time you left you did not urinate?
A: I did.
Q: Where did you urinate?
A: Just outside the door.
Q: While you were urinating where were Bayani, lsagani Maago and Rolando Deduyo?
A: Bayani was following me.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While Bayani was cooking lunch in the kitchen you remained in the sala?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why did you not ran away from Bayani and shouted that you were being kidnapped?
A: I could not ran (sic) because the door was closed.24 (emphasis ours)

The appellant contends that there was no kidnapping because the victim voluntarily went with him. This contention holds no water. In the case of People vs.
Santos,25 we ruled that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went
with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. Such is the situation in the present case - the victim, a boy 16 years of
age, would not have voluntarily left with the appellant if not for the false assurance that his mother had supposedly permitted him to accompany the appellant
to the airport to get the baggage and bring it back to the victims house. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, in kidnapping, the victim need not be taken
by the accused forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to
take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or
fraudulently.26cräläwvirtualibräry

Since the crime charged is kidnapping in its qualified form, that is, committed for the purpose of exacting ransom, the abduction must in addition be shown to
have been committed for such purpose. Actual demand for, or payment of, ransom is not necessary; it is enough if the crime is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom.27 In the present case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove that appellant abducted the victim for ransom, thus:

1. in the afternoon of January 30, 1994, appellant tricked Johnny into accompanying him to the airport allegedly to get a baggage;
2. instead of going to the airport, appellant brought Johnny to his friends house in Pasig where his co-accused Isagani Maago was waiting;
3. at the same time that appellant enticed Johnny to go with him, Johnnys mother received a ransom letter demanding P100,000, or at least P50,000, for
Johnnys release;
4. before the mother received the ransom letter, she saw appellant at the public market; he even talked to her, looking for her brother;
5. around noon the next day, appellant and his co-accused Isagani Maago, left allegedly to go to the airport leaving Johnny behind in the house of Bayani;
6. at around the same time, Johnnys mother, as instructed in the ransom letter, went to the Antipolo church;
7. after she had waited for two hours inside the church, she went out and Isagani approached her asking if she brought the money;
8. Isagani ran away when a police officer shouted at him;
9. when apprehended, Isagani pleaded innocence and pointed at the appellant as the mastermind, revealing where he could be found, and
10. the police went to Bagong Ilog, Pasig where they caught the appellant as he was about to escape on board a tricycle.

While appellant was not the one who approached Johnnys mother at the Antipolo Church to get the ransom, there was enough circumstantial evidence that it
was the appellant who planned the entire kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims parents. The defense evidence itself showed that the
appellant went to Sariaya, Quezon Province, the day before the kidnapping to persuade his co-accused, Isagani Maago, to help him carry out the kidnapping.
This the appellant did not controvert nor deny in his appeal before us. And, as aptly observed by the trial court, appellant was in a position to know the financial
capacity of the victims family since he was the husband of their store helper and he stayed in their other house for more than a year. All these circumstances,
coupled with the victims positive testimony that it was the appellant who kidnapped him, lead us to no other reasonable conclusion than that it was the
appellant who planned and executed the kidnapping for ransom.

It is well settled that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which the court may draw its conclusion and make a finding of
guilt. Conviction can just as well be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to the fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.28 Such is the situation here.

Moreover, the flight of the appellant only served to strengthen the finding of guilt. He escaped from jail and was able to evade arrest for nearly three years (July
29, 1994 to March 26, 1997). His flight clearly evinced a consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. Indeed, the wicked flee, when no man
pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion.29cräläwvirtualibräry

Because the appellant escaped, trial in absentia proceeded against him. Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution allows trial in absentia provided the accused has been
arraigned and his failure to appear after due notice is unjustifiable. In the present case, trial in absentia was properly conducted by the trial court inasmuch as
the appellant had already been arraigned when he escaped. By escaping, the appellant waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until his
custody was regained.30cräläwvirtualibräry

The crime was committed after the death penalty was reimposed by RA 7659 on December 31, 1993. Since kidnapping for ransom carries the penalty of death
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, no other penalty can be imposed on the appellant. Thus, we modify the penalty imposed
by the trial court from reclusion perpetua to death.

Lastly, the trial court correctly did not award any damages. Article 2219, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be granted in cases of
illegal or arbitrary detention. Nothing in the records, however, shows that the victim or his family suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety or other similar
injury. Inasmuch as moral damages are granted not to enrich but rather to compensate the victim for the injury suffered, proof of moral suffering must be
introduced, failing in which such an award is not proper.31cräläwvirtualibräry

Three members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 94-1 0874 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
the penalty imposed. The appellant, Rolando Deduyo alias Batman, is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these case be
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[ G.R. No. 3241, March 16, 1907 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS CABANAG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
TRACEY, J.:

The accused, an Igorot, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya of the crime of unlawful detention, under article 481 of the Penal Code,
which punishes "any private person who shall lock up or detain another or in any way deprive him of his liberty."
An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age, was taken from the possession of her grandmother, Ultagon, in the rancheria of Anao, in the Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, by one Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was done with or against the will of the grandmother is not altogether clear in the evidence. We
accept the version least favorable to the accused that of the child who testified that in the daytime Buyag came to the house and took her away, although the
grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that little girl," but not speaking when she went away. The man brought her to his house, about a half mile
distant, where she was not confined, but on the contrary was allowed to go back alone to her grandmother, with whom she would spend a little while, returning
the same day. She testified that on last leaving, the grandmother was angry and did not wish her to go, but did not prevent her. According to her recollection
she remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her grandmother's residence, some two or three months.

Buyag testified that more than two years before, in order to help the family after the father's death and for the purpose of keeping the child at home, he had
bought her for three pigs, twenty-five hens, two measures of rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her mother, with whom she remained until the third year,
when (her mother presumably having died) she was brought away by one Eusebio, at the instance of himself and another Igorot named YogYog, who had
furnished part of the purchase price. Together they instructed Eusebio to sell her for a carabao and 50 pesos. Eusebio, together with his sister, Antonia, brought
her to Quiangan, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.

In respect to this last sale, the stories of Tomas, Antonia, and the girl substantially agree. Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl by one Mariano
Lopez of Caoayan, to whom after a few days Gamaya was delivered in return for the price, which appears to have been 200 pesos. In his hands she remained for
about two months until she was taken away by an officer of Constabulary. Afterwards this prosecution was instituted. Although Gamaya made objection to
leaving the house of Cabanag, she appears to have gone without actual constraint and at no time in any of these places was she physically restrained of her
liberty; she was not under lock or key or guard, went into the street to play, returned at will, and was not punished or ill used in any way, but was employed
about the household tasks; in short, she appears to have been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household servant and to have been well cared for while in the
custody of the accused.

It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to dispose of children to pay the debts of their fathers, the transaction in the native language being termed a
sale, and the defendant appears to have engaged in the business of buying in Nueva Vizcaya children to sell in the lowlands of Isabela.

In his sentence, the judge below said:

"However much may be said in extenuation of the alleged custom among the ignorant Igorots of seizing and abducting children for sale and even in selling their
own children voluntarily, there is nothing in all this to palliate or extenuate the conduct of the accused in this case.

"The Congress of the United States has declared that human slavery shall not exist in these Islands and while no law, so far as I can discover, has yet been
passed either defining slavery in these Islands or fixing a punishment for those who engage in this inhuman practice as dealers, buyers, sellers, or derivers, the
facts established in this case show conclusively that the child Gamaya was by the defendant forcibly and by fraud, deceit, and threats unlawfully deprived of her
liberty and that his object and purpose was an unlawful and illegal one, to wit, the sale of the child, for money, into human slavery. This constitutes the crime of
detencion ilegal, defined and penalized by article 481 of the Penal Code and this court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information.

"There are neither extenuating nor aggravating circumstances found in the case.

"The court therefore sentences the accused, Tomas Cabanag, to eight years and one day of prision mayor and to pay the costs of this instance with the
accessories of the law."

This sentence can not be sustained. There can be no unlawful detention under article 481 of the Penal Code without confinement or restraint of person, such as
did not exist in the present case. (U. S. vs. Herrera, March 28, 1904, 3 Phil. Rep., 515.)

Under the complaint for this crime it is possible to convict for coaccion upon proof of the requisites of that offense (U. S. vs. Quevengco, 2 Phil. Rep., 412), but
among those requisites is that of violence through force or intimidation, even under the liberal rule of our jurisprudence (U. S. vs. Quevengco, supra; U. S. vs.
Vega, 2 Phil. Rep., 167; U. S. vs. Ventosa,[1] 4 Off. Gaz., 573); consequently the charge of coaccion against the accused can not be sustained upon the evidence.

The Penal Code, chapters 2 and 3, title 12, articles 484 to 490, provides punishment for those who carry off children under 7 years of age or those who devote
children under 16 years of age to certain hazardous occupations; but none of these articles can apply to the case before us, except article 486, which punishes
him who induces a child over 7 years of age to abandon the house of its parent or guardian. Under this article it is possible that on full proof of the facts, Buyag
might be held, but not the accused. It was not the design of the law to prevent parents or grandparents from devoting their children to customary work, nor
from receiving compensation for such work in wages or otherwise. Such agreements binding out minors are sanctioned in most countries, usually, however,
subject to stipulations for their welfare expressly prescribed by statute. In the absence of proof of what the agreement of the parties or the custom of the
people called for in respect of the use, treatment, and care of the child, the term of her service and her final disposition, and particularly in respect of the
maintenance of her relations with her grandmother and the prospect of an ultimate return to her, it is not possible to hold that the arrangement was a criminal
or even an illicit one. The name applied to it by the custom of the Igorots is not enough to establish that in truth and in effect it was a sale, or anything more
than a contract for services. While there is much in this practice to condemn, we do not feel it to be our province to strain the law in order to bring this local
custom of this mountain people to an end. This condition may present matter for the consideration of the legislature but not for action by the criminal courts.
Not even the abhorrent species of traffic apparently carried on by the accused justifies a sentence not authorized by law.

The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the Philippines contained in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in said Islands." This constitutional provision is self-
acting whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or contract providing for the servitude of a person against his will is forbidden and is void. For two
obvious reasons, however, it fails to reach the facts before us:

First. The employment or custody of a minor with the consent or sufferance of the parents or guardian, although against the child's own will, can not be
considered involuntary servitude.

Second. We are dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal charge, in relation to which the Bill of Rights defines no crime and provides no punishment.
Its effects can not be carried into the realm of criminal law without an act of the legislature.

It is not unnatural that existing penal laws furnish no punishment for involuntary servitude as a specific crime. In the Kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula, even in
remote times, slavery appears to have taken but a surface root and to have been speedily cast out, the institution not having been known therein for centuries.
It is only in relation to Spain's possessions in the American Indies that we find regulations in respect to slavery. In general they do not apply in their terms to the
Philippine Islands where the ownership of man by his fellow-man, wherever it existed, steadily disappeared as Christianity advanced. Among the savage tribes in
remote parts, such customs as flourished were not the subject of legislation but were left to be dealt with by religious and civilizing influences. Such of the
Spanish laws as touched the subject were ever humane and radical. In defining slavery, law 1, title 21 of the fourth Partida, calls it "a thing against the law of
nature;" and rule 2, title 34 of the seventh Partida says: "It is a thing which all men naturally abhor." These were the sentiments of the thirteenth century.

To sum up this case, there is no proof of slavery or even of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it has not been clearly shown that the child has been disposed of
against the will of her grandmother or has been taken altogether out of her control. If the facts in this respect be interpreted otherwise, there is no law
applicable here, either of the United States or of the Archipelago, punishing slavery as a crime. The child was not physically confined or restrained so as to
sustain a conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the accused brought within any of the provisions of the law for the punishment of offenses against
minors; consequently the conviction in this case must be reversed, in accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, with costs de oficio, and
the prisoner is acquitted.

After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it
came for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1208. August 6, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. JOSE QUEVENGCO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

Sotera Jico was in the house of the defendant for three days. During that time she was employed as a servant therein, had the freedom of the house, and left it
at times to visit her mother, who lived upon the same estate. At those times she was accompanied only by a small child. These facts do not show the
commission of the crime of detencion ilegal.

She was, by the servants of the defendant and a soldier of the Constabulary, compelled, against her will, to leave her house and go with them, in company with
her aunt, to the defendant’s house. these facts prove the commission of the crime of coaccion, punished by article 497 of the Penal Code.

The offense charged in the complaint is detencion ilegal. That crime can not be committed without committing that form of coaccion which consists in
compelling one to do what he does not wish to do. The latter is therefore necessarily included in the former, and under this complaint for detencion ilegal the
defendant can be convicted of this form of coaccion, (G.O., No. 58, sec. 29.)

The aggravating circumstance of sex, mentioned in No. 20 of article 10 of the Penal Code, should be taken into consideration.

The judgment below is reversed and the defendant is found guilty of the crime of coaccion, and is sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, to a fine of 325
pesetas, and the payment of 25 pesos as indemnity to said Sotera Jico, and to the payment of costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1660. March 28, 1904. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. GREGORIA HERRERA ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

The defendants were convicted in the court below of the crime of detencion ilegal, committed on the person of a girl 17 years old named Marcelina Aralar.

There is no doubt that the girl frequently went out of the house in question, No. 49 Calle Arranque, Manila, both in company of the defendant Gregoria and
alone, between July 7 and 18, the period of her alleged detention. She was not, therefore, during that time deprived of her liberty within the meaning of article
481 of the Penal Code.

This case can not be distinguished from cases heretofore decided by this court. (United States v. Quevengco, No. 1208, August 6, 1903; 1 United States v. Chu
Cheng, No. 1112, April 2, 1903. 2)

The judgment is reversed and the defendants acquitted, with costs of both instances de oficio, and without prejudice to the presentation of a complaint against
the defendant Gregoria for corruption of minors and a complaint against the defendant Arsenio for estupro.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1297. March 28, 1904. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. JULIO MENDOZA ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On March 24, 1903, the prosecuting attorney filed a complaint against the three defendants, charging them with the crime of illegal detention committed as
follows: That on or about the 21st of March, 1903, the said Julio Mendoza, Santiago Santos, and Cirilo Cueto did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and by
impersonating peace officers, detain and deprive of his liberty in Manila, Philippine Islands, one Mateo Ventura, a youth of 11 years of age, and inflict upon him
serious wounds, thereby endangering his life, and confined him in the office of the pail-system station in Tondo, and did actually bind his hands and feet with a
rope and tie him to a post, in which state he remained twelve hours, more or less, contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided.

From the record of the trial had, it appears that the lad, Mateo Ventura, testified under oath that one night, date forgotten, he was detained on Aceiteros Street
by the defendants, who maltreated him and then took him to the police station, where he was given his liberty; that Cirilo Cueto then took him to the office
where they were employed, and on his arrival there Santiago Santos maltreated him and then bound his hands and feet with a rope to a post and that he
remained in this state, watched by Julio Mendoza, till the morning of the following day, when Mendoza set him at liberty; that his hands and feet showed the
marks of the rope, he having bound very tightly and having thereby suffered all the hours of his detention; that this ill treatment was due to the fact that,
feeling the necessity of relieving himself, he had entered a public water-closet near the sea, and in order to see if the seat was clean, he had lighted a match
which he then threw in the bowl, causing some paper in it to burn; that he was then caught by Cirilo Cueto, who accused him of being an incendiary and took
him to the police station, where Corporal Jadoc set him at liberty; that, notwithstanding this, the said Cueto took him to the office of the pail system, and here
Santiago struck him and bruised him on the shoulder and continued striking him despite his cries and tears; that the said Santos and Cueto slapped him and
struck him with their fists; that Santos then ordered his detention in the said office.

Police Corporal Simplicio Jadoc confirmed Ventura’s statements and testified that the latter was brought to the police station by Cirilo Cueto between 9 and 10
o’clock of the night of the 20th of March; that upon investigation he found the charge unfounded and set the lad at liberty; that the following day the lad came
back, while Pail Inspector Rusca was there, and on examination it was found that his hands should rope marks. Police Captain Jose Crame testified that the boy,
Ventura, was brought to him the morning of March 21, having been arrested as an incendiary the previous night; that he held an investigation and the boy told
him what he had done in the public water-closet, and of his maltreatment and detention; that Corporal Jadoc had confirmed the boy’s statements; that finding
no reason for holding the boy, he set him at liberty; that he had the defendants called before him; that Santos confessed to the detaining of the boy to avoid his
escape and for the purpose of reporting the matter to Inspector Rusca on the following day.

The facts in this case, fully established by the testimony of trustworthy witnesses and by the confession of two of the defendants, constitute th crime of illegal
detention defined and punished under article 483 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the defendants, lacking authority therefor, and not being peace officers, did
apprehend the boy, Mateo Ventura, and detained him in the health inspector’s office for over eight hours with his hands and feet bound to a post, this without
just cause. Even though we accept the theory advanced that he was detained for the purpose of delivering him to the authorities, through Inspector Rusca, for
attempted incendiarism, the defendants are still liable, not only because they maltreated the boy when they arrested him, and afterwards when they bound
him to the post, but also because, after taking him to the police station where he was discharged after the investigation held, they detained him again and took
him to their office and there maltreated him once more, keeping him tied to the post till the following day. There is no doubt that the defendants are guilty of
the crime defined in article 483 of the Penal Code.

Defendants pleaded not guilty. Cirilo Cueto stated under oath that no one ordered the detention of the boy, Mateo Ventura; that he simply took him to the
office of the pail system, where he left him to wait for the arrival of the inspector; that he had ordered no one to hold the boy in said office; that the following
day he learned that Santiago Santos had beaten the boy, but denied having maltreated him when he arrested him at the public water-closet and before taking
him to the police station; that although the boy had been set at liberty by the police corporal, defendant had taken the boy to his office to report to the
inspector, in whose absence defendant left the boy in charge of a woman, who appears to be a servant, and who was to tell the said inspector; that Julio
Mendoza was there.

Julio Mendoza testifies that Mateo Ventura was detained one night by Cirilo Cueto; that the boy was kept in the office from 10 o’clock at night until 6 the
following morning; that defendant remained that night in the office where Cueto had charged him to watch the boy; that it was Santiago Santos who bound the
boy, but that four minutes after Cueto had left, Santos untied the boy by order of the wife of the then absent inspector; that he did not know who had ordered
the arrest of the boy nor who had maltreated him.

Burt H. Burull, a witness called rebuttal, testified that he was acquainted with Cirilo Cueto, who is in charge of the water-closets of Aceiteros Street; that neither
Cueto nor any other person in charge of said closets had authority to arrest anybody.

Despite the statements of the defendants, their guilt of detaining the boy without any just cause is clearly demonstrated, especially in view of the fact that he
had been discharged by the police of the district through the uncertainty of the charge. Even though defendants may have intended to send the boy to the
authorities through their inspector, Rusca, they should have reported the matter to said inspector without waiting till he came to the office the next day. In the
meantime defendants maltreated the boy and tied him to the post without any reason whatever and contrary to law. Such unlawful abuses can by no means be
allowed, particularly when the victim is a lad of 11 or 12 years of age.

In the commission of this crime aggravating circumstance No. 6 of article 10 of the Penal Code must be taken into account in view of the maltreatment inflicted,
which was certainly unnecessary punishment and, as there is no mitigating circumstance, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.

For the reasons stated it is our opinion that the sentence of the court below must be reversed, and we sentence Julio Mendoza, Santiago Santos, and Cirilo
Cueto each to six months of arresto mayor, the accessories of article 61, to pay a fine of 1,250 pesetas, and in case of insolvency to subsidiary imprisonment not
to exceed two months, and payment of one-third of the costs each. The record will be returned to the court below with a certified copy of this decision and of
the judgment to be entered thereon. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1652 December 21, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERMIN SUAREZ (alias CULUPING), ET AL., defendants.
ATILANO MALLARI (alias SALICSIC), OSCAR SANTOS and ALFREDO TAYAG (alias EDONG), appellants.

PERFECTO, J.:

Before November 22, 1946, Esteban Mungcal and his wife Ambrosia Valencia had returned to their house in barrio Talaga, municipality of Capas, Tarlac, where
they used to live and from which they had previously evacuated together with all the other residents of the place who until that date had not yet returned. At
about 8 o'clock in the of November 22, 1946, when Ambrosia was in her house already lying down in bed, she was awakened by several armed men who were
looking for her husband. Among those persons were appellants Oscar Santos, Alfredo Tayag, and Atilano Mallari with whom she was well acquainted because
they also used to be residents of that barrio. After she had told them that Esteban Mungcal was out, they left and went westward towards the direction of a
dike. Apprehensive of what those armed men were going to do to her husband, she followed them. On the way the men met her husband, and two of them
immediately held Esteban Mungcal by his hands and they told him to go along with them. At first Esteban refused to follow, but Oscar Santos told him that they
would kill him if he would not got with them. So, Esteban had to keep quiet and follow. Ambrosia and her husband were afraid because the kidnappers were
carrying firearms with them. Although Ambrosia cried, she could not do anything as her only companions then were her children. They took Esteban Mungcal in
the direction of Karamatan, a hilly place in Capas. The next morning Ambrosia reported the matter to her brother-in-law, Pablo Mungcal.

Several months later, and upon indication of Fermin Suarez and Atilano Mallari, two of the accused, the remains of Esteban were recovered. Ambrosia
recognized the remains to be that of her husband because of the positions of the missing upper and lower teeth and of the gray hair on the skull which was
shown to her. Cenon Mungcal, son of Esteban, was likewise able to recognize the remains to be that of his father because of the positions of the missing teeth
and gray hair on the skull, and because of the initials CBM on the clothes he was wearing and which given by him to his father.

The record of this case also shows that Oscar Santos had thumbmarked a written statement on April 30, 1947, before the Mayor of Capas, Victor Tison, (Exhibit
E) and another one on May 5, 1947, before the Justice of Peace of Capas, Francisco B. Sanchez (Exhibit A-1); that Alfredo Tayag had thumbmarked a written
statement on May 4, 1947, before Mayor Tison (Exhibit B), and the next day another one before Justice of the Peace Sanchez(Exhibit A-2); and that Atilano
Mallari had thumbmarked a written statement on April 30, 1947, before Mayor Tison (Exhibit C), and another on May 5, 1947, before Justice of the Peace
Sanchez (Exhibit A). All these documents were introduced as part of the evidence for the prosecution, and admitted by the trial court. In all of their statements,
the appellants invariably admitted having participated in the taking away of Esteban Mungcal, although they denied having participated in the killing, which,
according to these statements, was perpetrated without their presence by Fermin Suarez alias Culuping, one of the accused who pleaded guilty during the trial
and who was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal.

During the trial, Atilano Mallari declared that he belonged to the Hukbalahap organizations, where he was knows by the name (Salicsic. Similarly, Oscar Santos
declared that he was a member of the Hukbalahap before he had surrendered; while Alfredo Tayag also declared that he belonged to the same organization.

There is no doubt in our minds that all the appellants participated in the kidnapping of Esteban Mungcal. This fact is sufficiently established by the clear and
convincing testimony of Ambrosia Valencia an eyewitness to the commission of the crime. Ambrosia could not have been mistaken as to the identity of the
three appellants because she was already well acquainted with them, even before November 22, 1946, — they had been residing with her in the same barrio of
Talaga, — and, at the time the kidnappers took place, she had the opportunity to see and talk to them, for they even asked her for her husband. Moreover,
there is nothing in the record to show why Ambrosia should make any false imputation against the appellants. Our conviction as to the guilt of the appellant is
further clinched by the written statements, thumbmarked by them (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, C, D, and E), which contain admissions of their guilt.lawphil.net

The defense tried to show that the appellants were not with the band who kidnapped Esteban Mungcal that the appellants did not make the declarations
contained in the written statement they had thumbmarked, and that they were merely compelled to thumbmark them because of threats and torture inflicted
upon them by Cenon Mungcal and others, even showing to the trial court some scars of the wounds supposedly inflicted upon them to compel them to admit
participation in the kidnapping.

To support the appellants' contention that they did not take part in the kidnapping, they offered their own testimony and that of Fermin Suarez, who declared
that the kidnapping was done by one De Hora together with as companion, and Suarez himself. Their testimonies are however, contradicted by the very
admissions of the appellants contained in their written statements, Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, C, D, and E. Of course, by the testimony of Mariano Santos and Elias
Mallari, the defense attempted to prove maltreatment as the principal cause of their giving these statements; but their assertions are belied by the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution, — Chief of Police Salvador Baun, Policeman Cenon Mungcal. Mayor Victor L. Tison and Justice of the Peace Francisco D.
Sanchez, — whose veracity has not been impeached.

But even without totally precluding the possibility that the appellants may have been actually maltreated to a certain extent, still there are testimony of
Ambrosia revealed the truth. The facts contained in those written statements could not have been given by any one else but by the appellants themselves. The
remains of the victim were, according to the witnesses for the prosecution, found upon indication of the accused Atilano Mallari himself. This fact is
substantially corroborated by the testimony of Fermin Suarez himself when he stated that Atilano Mallari was present when the remains of Esteban Mungcal
were being exhumed, although he claimed that he (Suarez), not Atilano, was the one who pointed to the police authorities the place where the deceased was
buried by his killers.

From the facts proven, it appears evident that the three appellants are guilty of the crime of kidnapping, penalized under paragraph 1 article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18m the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death:

If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

xxx xxx xxx

Counsel for the appellants contends that these should be convicted only as accomplices. He claims that there being no evidence to show that they had taken
part in a conspiracy to kill Esteban Mungcal, — because according to the evidence for the defense, after De Hora, his companion and Fermin Suarez had hogtied
Esteban Mungcal, the appellants were left in a house and had nothing to do with the killings of Esteban, — they cannot be held guilty as co-principals of the
crime of kidnapping. This contention principals of the crime of kidnapping. This contentions however, based on the erroneous assumption that the fact of the
killing of Esteban Mungcal constituted the principal element of the offense for which the appellants were prosecuted before, and found guilty by the trial court.
But the appellants were not accused of the murder of the killing of Esteban; they were accused of kidnapping as defined and punished under article 267,
paragraph 1, of the Revised penal Code. The essential element or act which makes the offense of kidnapping is the deprivation of an offended party's liberty
under any of the four instances enumerated in said article, the illegal detention of the victim for more than five days being one such instances. The fact that an
accused person has directly participated in the kidnapping or illegal detention of another is sufficient to make him guilty as coprincipal in the crime of
kidnapping; it is immaterial whether or not the victim was subsequently killed any or all of them. In the present case there is no doubt that the appellants had
taken active part in the kidnapping off Esteban Mungcal and that the acts committed by them have made guilty as co-principals. The facts that they may have
taken part in the subsequent killing of Esteban Mungcal has only the effect of making them less guilty than those who actually took part in the killing, — but
they are guilty the same. As above stated, the appellants should therefore be held liable as coprincipals in the crime of kidnapping penalized under article 267,
paragraph 1, as amended, of Revised Penal Code.

The offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed with the aid of armed men which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction. The trial court sentenced each of the appellants to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to
pay proportionate the costs of the proceedings. This penalty is in accordance with law, and we find no reason for modifying the same. The trial court, however,
failed to provide for an indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim, Esteban Mungcal, which it should have done. Consequently, as recommended by the
prosecution, the appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the deceased the sum of P6,000 (People vs. Amasec, 927, 45 Off. Gaz. [Supp.
to No. 9] 51.) 1 With this modification, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4741. May 7, 1952.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELIGIO CAMO and BUENAVENTURA MANZANIDO, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

For the death of Patricio Matundan, Eligio Camo and Buenaventura Manzanido were accused of the crime of murder with kidnapping, in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas (Quezon). After trial, they were both found guilty of simple murder, Camo as principal and Manzanido as accomplice, and they were
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 16 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, respectively; to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P4,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Both appealed from that decision.

That Patricio Matundan was killed in the evening of May 17, 1946 by gunfire as he was being led from his home in the barrio of Conda to the barrio of Talaan,
both of Sariaya, is not questioned. What is disputed is the manner, by whom, and why, he was shot.

The theory of the defense is that appellant Camo since the year 1945, was a member of the Hukbalahap organization in Sariaya, being in charge of the
department of supplies; that Patricio Matundan had all along been discrediting this organization, calling its members "common cattle thieves and bandits", as a
result of which adverse propaganda the Hukbalahap organization was embarrassed and found it difficult to recruit and enlist new members as well as get
supplies not only in the barrio of Conda, but also in the other barrios of Sariaya, and so, finally, to remove this thorn in the side of the Hukbalahap organization,
it was decided to arrest Patricio; that in the evening of May 17, 1946, appellant Camo accompanied by his superior officers, Major Julie and Lt. Filemon de las
Alas, and Antonio Once and Filemon Ambat, all members of the organization and all armed with rifles, passed by the house of defendant Manzanido and
ordered him to join them which he did under compulsion; that the group then proceeded to the house of Patricio Matundan, called him down and then took
him toward the mountains; but on the way he tried to escape and on order of Major Julie the group fired at him and he was killed; Camo obeying the order to
shoot also wanted to shoot, but because of his being clumsy with his gun, he failed to fire.

The story of the prosecution naturally differs, and radically, from the preceding version. According to the government evidence, about a month prior to the
night of the killing, appellant Camo surprised his wife, Fortunata Rabano, in the lap of Patricio Matundan, the two kissing and otherwise caressing each other;
that he chased both to chastize them, but Patricio was able to escape and Camo upon overtaking his wife in the house, beat her up; that since that day Camo
had decided to kill Patricio at the first opportunity in order to avenge the wrong done to him, but Patricio fearing reprisal, absented himself from his home for
two weeks; that thereafter he returned home, still feeling insecure and in fact he told his son, Pedro Matundan, that Camo planned to kill him because he
suspected him of maintaining illicit relations with Fortunata; that on the day of the killing, Camo requested his friend and co-appellant Manzanido to join and
help him in going after Patricio, a request which Manzanido because of friendship could not well refuse; that in the evening of that day the two appellants
passed by the houses of Antonio Once and Filemon Ambat both of whom they compelled by threats to join them; that the four then went to the house of
Patricio, and upon arrival there, at the suggestion of Camo and to avoid suspicion, Manzanido called Patricio and asked him to come down which the latter did
upon which the group tied his hand and took him toward the barrio of Talaan; that on the way Camo made himself known to Patricio by saying to him "Do you
know me, now you will pay to me" ; that upon reaching a place near mangroves the group stopped and Camo ordered Patricio to turn around and then seizing
the Springfield rifle of Manzanido, Camo shot Patricio in the back killing him; that thereafter, he untied the hands of the dead man and then warned his
companions under penalty of death not to tell anyone of what had happened that night. This story is based not only on the testimony of the witness for the
prosecution, but also on the affidavits, Exhibits C and D which Camo and Manzanido, respectively swore to and ratified before the Clerk of Court. According to
the Constabulary officers and men in charge, the contents of said affidavits were based on the statements made and given by the two appellants freely and
voluntarily.

The decision in this case depends in great measure upon the credibility of witnesses, — which set of witnesses told the truth and which version should be given
credit. The trial court presided by Judge Antonio Cañizares has analyzed the testimony of the witnesses and carefully observed their demeanor on the witness
stand and is of the opinion that the witnesses for the prosecution are more worthy of credit. We quote with favor the pertinent portion of the decision of the
trial court:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is no dispute as to the death of Patricio Matundan, a fact which the defendants themselves admit.

"The question now for resolution is whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Patricio Matundan. The testimonies of the two
witnesses for the prosecution, namely, Antonio Once and Filemon Ambat, are assailed by the defense as being incredible and not trustworthy for the reason
that they are co- participants in the commission of the crime charged. Counsel for the defense stresses the point that being co-participants in the commission of
the offense charged, their testimonies came from a polluted source and, therefore, should be subjected to the most painstaking scrutiny and should be received
with the greatest caution on the part of the Court. It is for this reason that the Court has taken pains in carefully scrutinizing the testimonies of the said
witnesses, and taking into account their interest and motive in so testifying against the defendants.

"After carefully studying the testimonies of the said witnesses in connection with the extra-judicial confessions, Exhibits C and D, of the defendants, and their
demeanor and manner of testifying, the Court is convinced as to the truthfulness of the testimonies of the said witnesses, because their testimonies find
sufficient corroboration not only from the testimony of Pedro Matundan, the son of the deceased, but also from the contents of the extra-judicial confessions of
the defendants themselves. The fact that the said witnesses for the prosecution have guilty knowledge and had participated in the commission of the crime
charged, does not necessarily render their testimonies incredible and untrustworthy. Nor the fact too that they had not been indicted along with the defendants
in this case, makes their testimonies inadmissible. (See 16 C. J., Sec. 1928, p. 654.)"

And, if there is any further doubt as to the guilt of the appellants and as to which version, that of the prosecution or that of the defense, is to be accepted by the
court, there is the fact that at the preliminary investigation when the two appellants were arraigned, they both pleaded guilty.

Realizing that they (two appellants) had practically convicted themselves by the statements and admissions contained in their affidavits, Exhibits C and D,
particularly Camo who had a motive for the killing, namely, his consuming desire to take revenge upon Patricio for alienating the affections of his wife and
maintaining illicit relations with her, both appellants repudiated their affidavits, claiming that they were involuntary and were obtained through intimidation
and torture. These claims were flatly and successfully denied and refuted by the Constabulary authorities.

In a last ditch defense, appellant Camo invokes the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation 76 issued in favor of the leaders and members of the Hukbalahap
organization.

The trial court correctly found that he was not entitled to the benefits of said Amnesty Proclamation for the simple reason that at the time of the killing, he was
not a Hukbalahap. According to the evidence, the Hukbalahap association or branch in Sariaya where Camo resided, was organized only in 1948, and at that
time Camo was already in jail for he had been captured in a raid conducted by the Constabulary in 1947. He and Manzanido were captured as common bandits
operating in and around Sariaya. But even supposing for a moment that this claim that he was a member of the Hukbalahap organization were true, it has been
satisfactorily proven that the killing of Patricio Matundan was not done in furtherance of the dissident movement but for purely personal reason, namely, that
Camo wanted to avenge the dishonor brought upon him and his family by the deceased.
The Solicitor-General contends that Manzanido should be held liable as principal and not a mere accomplice as found by the trial court. Considering the role
played by Manzanido in the tragedy, from a liberal point of view, we are inclined to agree with the trial court. He had no motive in harming Patricio. According
to his affidavit he joined Camo only out of friendship, and all his participation was his calling Patricio down from his house and then accompanying the group to
the scene of the killing. It is true that it was his Springfield rifle that was used by Camo in shooting Patricio to death but according to the very evidence for the
prosecution, he did not offer this rifle but it was grabbed from him by Camo.

The Solicitor-General next contends that the offense committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. Again, we are inclined to agree with the trial
court that the crime committed was simple murder. It is true that Patricio was taken from his home but it was solely for the purpose of killing him not for
detaining him illegally for any length of time or for the purpose of obtaining ransom for his release. In quite a number of cases decided by this Court where the
victim was taken directly from his home to the place where he was killed, kidnapping was not considered to raise the offense to the category of a complex
crime.

That the killing was committed with treachery under which may be included night time and the fact that Patricio was shot in the back and while his hands were
tied, is clear. The crime is therefore that of murder. The trial court found that the killing was aggravated by the circumstance of evident premeditation. This
finding is correct. For about a month previous to the killing, appellant Camo had been planning to kill Patricio. If he could not carry out his plan earlier, it was
because Patricio sensing the reprisal and vengeance coming to him, purposely absented himself from his home. To offset this aggravating circumstance as
regards Camo, we may consider in his favor the mitigating circumstance of outraged feeling or passion behind the tragedy. The penalty as to Camo should
therefore be imposed in the medium degree, namely, reclusion perpetua. As a mere accomplice, Manzanido is entitled to a penalty one degree lower.

The indemnity of P4,000 fixed by the trial court should be raised to P6,000. With this modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-appellants
Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.

Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information
dated May 4, 1999 which reads:

That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic),
conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct
Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter,
thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-large.

At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts3cräläwvirtualibräry

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a
carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modestos wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their
16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as
their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and
the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto
and Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the
house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.4 Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the
house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel,
who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and
Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.

As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before
and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his
father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from
Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.

At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned
to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was
bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives
immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.

When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw the
cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized
Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police investigators.6 Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog
and Labayog to no avail.

The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:

SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed

SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:

- no significant internal findings

CAUSE OF DEATH:

GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.7cräläwvirtualibräry

The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald,
Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.9cräläwvirtualibräry

To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan
about two kilometers away from Modestos house.

He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him
upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.

Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had
been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city
where he was a stay-in worker.

Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His sister,
Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between
Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City
from January 1998 up to February 1999.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister,
Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila,
Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.

The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the
commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court
sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; the Court
likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen
(15) days from date of promulgation.

The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald
and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.12cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as
separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail the decision alleging that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the
deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the
house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of
deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused
with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not
criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.

It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in
relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be
alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his
freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:

x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the
victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking
their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.15cräläwvirtualibräry

If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of
kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.16 The crime committed would
either be homicide or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the
accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.

Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is
used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively
desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing
the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping
and murder are specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as
established by the evidence on record.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal
activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged
such as murder.20 The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial.21 Crime is rarely rational. In murder,
the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused
cannot be convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the
motive is revenge.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that
he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of
his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon are guilty of murder.

In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment.24cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency
in the commission of the act.25 Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26 In
homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by
the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act
or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist
inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.28cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained
seven (7) stab wounds,29 defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim
as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the
consequences flowing therefrom.30 As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31cräläwvirtualibräry

This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men
generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus
acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that
it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show
that it was otherwise.

The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of
proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.32 What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as
anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:

x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.33cräläwvirtualibräry

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed
by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged.34 For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.35 If the
prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused
to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation with their
co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:

1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while
Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:

FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?

A We were eating, sir.

Q You Said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is
pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.

COURT: How did they get your father?

A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?

A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, Stay in your house, and guarded us.

COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?

A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.

COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?

A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.36cräläwvirtualibräry

Randys account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:

PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper three (3)
armed men entered inside your house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?

A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.

ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are these three (3) persons who entered your house in
Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood guard by the door of the
house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:

FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did you and your mother do while these three persons were
taking out of your house?

A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel
then?
A They were at the door, sir.

COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?

A Because they were at the door, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?

A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked, answered, Leon Delim).38cräläwvirtualibräry

3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their
house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.

4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the
housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of decomposition:

Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?

A The same place and at 3:00 oclock P.M., we were able to find my father.

COURT: Where?

A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 oclock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.

COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.

FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you saw him dead?

A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).39cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms
crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and
forearm:

PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?

WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny
white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition that they will bury
immediately. Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also
determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x
40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left
arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect
D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.40cräläwvirtualibräry

The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the
cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors
determinative of the exact death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:

Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:

Time Since Death Condition of the Body

48 hours Ova of flies seen.

Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present.

Moving maggots seen.

72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and

disfigured. Hair and nails loose.

Tissues soft and discolored.42cräläwvirtualibräry

The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the
state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the
prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.

5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were nowhere to be found:

COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.43cräläwvirtualibräry

6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and Rita:
COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husbands name is Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
A Yes, sir.44cräläwvirtualibräry

The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of
Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence
against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed
Modesto.45cräläwvirtualibräry

It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were
not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before the
incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or
persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that nowadays persons have
killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.46 In this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a
handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with
Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in
the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the
connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence,
that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the mind.47 The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be
trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.

Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and explain what happened to
the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may have
been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any explanation.
Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.

Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and
accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.48 Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of
evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime.50 It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.51 This is
based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:

x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts and declarations of his principal. What is so
done by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere instrument. Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G.
& J. 28, 33 (1839). If the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the
common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of the co-conspirators. R. v. OConnell, 5
St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.52cräläwvirtualibräry

In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and
declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.53cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house
while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to
leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the
killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain
in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait
accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at
the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.56 If part of a crime has been committed
in one place and part in another, each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the
conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as
principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. 57cräläwvirtualibräry

Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by inconsistencies:

1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the
direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;

2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later changed her testimony and declared that it was
Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;

3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the three men brought out the victim, the two
other accused entered the house and guarded them there;

4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy
testified that he was alone when he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.58cräläwvirtualibräry

We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their
testimonies before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.
Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other
accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight.59 The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them
incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a persons sense
of observation is impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing
of statements dilute neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with
respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.62cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated questions
propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers
thereto.63cräläwvirtualibräry

Randys testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father
towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they
went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been
consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leons counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached
her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency
conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning
them.64cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of her.65 As to whether Rita and Randy were
together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood
guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.

This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and
grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events
which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.

Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and probative weight to their evidence to prove their
defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.

We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is easy to concoct
between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.66 It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial
court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis
at the time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said crime.67 They failed to discharge their
burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he
was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he
was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he
resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.

The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise
appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor
General contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere
conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68 As this Court held: No matter how
truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant.69 Article 14,
paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the
employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.70 Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was
assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald.
However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked
and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and
stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority
in strength.74 In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when
Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that
the three took advantage of their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.75cräläwvirtualibräry

In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with
reclusion temporal in its full period.

Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that
Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866
as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.76 Neither can dwelling, although proven,
aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.77 Although
this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the
rule is favorable to the accused.78cräläwvirtualibräry

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of
which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.

Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be
reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.79 The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.80 In addition, civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.81cräläwvirtualibräry

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon
Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Vitug.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21991 March 31, 1964
LUIS ASISTIO, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX, Respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:chanrobles virtual law library

This is a verified petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, praying for the annulment and setting aside of the orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in its
Case Q-5388) denying bail to the petitioners herein, and that the said parties be granted bail by this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

It is not contested that on July 22, 1963, petitioners Luis Asistio alias Baby, Pedro Rebullo alias Pita, Edgardo Pascual alias Ging, Lorenzo Meneses alias Lory,
Alfredo Caimbon alias Tatoo, Benigno Urquico alias Bening, Federico Zaragoza alias Det, and Jose Baello alias Celing, were, with various other persons, accused
by the Quezon City fiscal of the crime kidnapping for ransom, in violation of the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 18. The amended information describes how the crime was committed in the following terms:

That on or about the 26th day of December, 1962, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, being private individuals with the exception of the
accused VICTORINO ARANDA and LORENZO MENESES who are public officers, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with threats to kill the person of CHUA PAO alias "SO NA", and for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) from the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" or from his wife did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain and deprive the
person of the said CHUA PAO alias "SO NA" of his liberty, to his damage and prejudice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the aforestated crime:chanrobles virtual law library

1. That the accused VICTORINO ARANDA and LORENZO MENESES took advantage of their public positions as peace officers of Caloocan City and Quezon City,
respectively;chanrobles virtual law library
2. That the aforestated offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;chanrobles virtual law library
3. That in the commission of the aforestated offense, craft and fraud were employed by the accused;chanrobles virtual law library
4. That the aforestated crime was committed by means of motor vehicles; andchanrobles virtual law library
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the aforestated offense was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for it
commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to law.

Petitioners applied for bail on the ground that the record of the ex parte investigation conducted by the fiscal showed, from the testimony of the offended party
himself, Chua Pao alias So Na, that the latter was (a) voluntarily released by his captors (b) within 24 hours from seizure and (c) without any ransom being, in
fact, paid. The applicants contended that under the last paragraph of Article 2678 of the Revised Penal Code, bearing in mind the three circumstances previously
mentioned, the penalty imposable upon them, even if found guilty, could only be prision mayor, in its minimum and medium periods, and a fine not exceeding
700 pesos; that their crime, therefore, could not be a capital one, so that, even if the evidence were strong, they were entitled to
bail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The respondent judge, in view of the State's opposition to the bail petition, proceeded to hear the evidence of the State in support thereof, and, after
considering said evidence, on November 8, 1963 denied the application for bail. Thereupon, the accused resorted to this Court, alleging abuse of discretion, and
reiterating their position in the court below.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This proceeding not being an appeal from the order denying bail, we need not pass upon the pronouncement of the court below that the evidence of guilt is
strong. That conclusion, based upon the trial court's appreciation of the evidence, can not be deemed to be capricious and whimsical so as to justify our issuing
a writ of certiorari, in the absence of other circumstances to the effect, and none are here urged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We will, therefore, confine ourselves to considering the legal point raised by the petitioners, i.e., whether the crime committed by them can be held non-capital,
in view of the special feature alleged by said petitioners, to wit, that the person kidnapped was (a) voluntarily released by his captors; (b) that he was voluntarily
released within 24 hours from the kidnapping; and (c) that no ransom was actually paid for his release, although ransom had been
demanded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The resolution of the question depends upon the interpretation to be given to Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Acts No.
18 and 1084. These articles provide that:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:chanrobles virtual law library

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or public officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The penalty shall be death 1 where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. (As amended by Republic Acts No. 18 and
1084).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the
next proceeding article without the attendance of any of circumstances enumerated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the commencement of the detention, without having
attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos. (As amended by Republic Act no. 18, approved Sept. 25, 1946)

Petitioner vigorously argue that the las paragraph of Article 2678 applies not only to slight illegal detention but also to kidnapping and serious illegal detention
penalized by Article 267; so that even if the detention was made for the purpose of extorting ransom, the penalty would be reduced to prision mayor and fined
if the requisites of Article 268, last paragraph, do obtain. Upon the other hand, the prosecution sustains the proposition that under the last paragraph of Article
267, all that is required for the imposition of the death penalty is that (a) there be kidnapping, and (b) that the kidnapping be resorted to for the purpose of
extorting ransom, since said last paragraph explicitly provides that punishment "even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned (i.e., in the preceding
paragraphs of Article 267) were present in the commission of the offense", and that the third paragraph of Article 268 modifies only slight illegal detentions
under that article and does not apply to the acts described in Article 267.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Consideration of the legislative history of these articles will show that the legal thesis propounded by the petitioners in this case is untenable, and that the view
of the prosecution was correct. As originally enacted in 1928, the Revised Penal Code (Act 3815 of the pre-Commonwealth Philippine Legislature) provided, in its
Articles 267 and 268, the following:

Art. 267. Detencion ilegal grave. - Sera castigado con la pena de reclusion temporal el particular que secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le
privare de libertad:chanrobles virtual law library

1. Si el encierro o detencion hubiere durado mas de veinte dias.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. Si se hubiere ejecutado con simulacion de autoridad publica.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

3. Si se hubieren causado lesiones graves a la persona, encererada o detenida, o se le hubiere amenazado de muerte.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Art. 268. Detencion ilegal leve. - Sera castigado con la pena de prision mayor el particular que cometiere el delito de que se trata en el anterior sin la
concurrencia de ninguna de las circunstancias previstas en el mismo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

En la misma pena incurrira el que proporcionare lugar para la ejecucion del delito.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Si el culpable diere espontaneamente libertad al secuestrado o detenido dentro de los tres dias de su detencion sin haber logrado el objeto que se propusiere ni
haberse comenzado alguna investigacion o proceso contra el, las penas seran prision correccional en sus grados minimo y medio y multa que no exceda de 500
pesos.

Five things are immediately apparent from a comparison of this original version and the text as it stood when petitioners committed the crime charged, and
they are:

1. That Kidnapping under Article 267 depended solely on the circumstances in which the kidnapping took place, irrespective of the end sought by the
kidnapper;chanrobles virtual law library

2. That the third paragraph of Article 268 already existed in the original version, and plainly was not intended to apply to crimes under Article 267;chanrobles
virtual law library

3. Article 268 then described two variants of slight illegal detention:

(a) Slight detention where none of the circumstances specified in Article 267 was present (Article 268, par. 142), penalized by prision mayor;chanrobles virtual
law library

(b) Slight detention where, in addition to the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267, there were, besides three other circumstances, the
voluntary release of the kidnappee with 3 days from seizure, plus the fact that the purpose intended (whatever it should be, ransom, marriage, disclosure of
secrets, etc.) was not attained, plus the third fact that the release was effected before the institution of criminal proceedings against the culprits or culprits.

Clearly, therefore, Articles 267 and 268 were originally mutually exclusive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. Kidnapping for purposes of ransom was made an independent variant with a heavier penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) only in 1946, when the Legislature
enacted Republic Act No. 18, which added a last paragraph to Article 267. It is under this paragraph that petitioners stand indicted. The penalty for kidnapping
for ransom was raised in 1954 to death (without alternatives) by Republic Act No. 1084.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

5. The same Republic Act No. 18 increased by one degree the penalties provided in Article 268, first paragraph, from prision mayor to reclusion temporal, and,
under the third paragraph of the article, from prision correccional and P500.00 fine to prision mayor and fine of P700.00.

Now then, if originally (in 1928) the third paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal code did not relate at all to the crimes penalized under Article 267, it can
not be seriously contended that said paragraph should be intended to cover any of the crimes in Article 267 when in 1946 the Legislature (by Republic Act No.
18) established the delict of kidnapping for ransom for the first time as a distinct form of serious illegal detention under Article 267, and prescribed a heavier
penalty for it. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Republic Act No. 18 in amending Article 267, did not make any change in the wording of Article 2678,
but merely increased the penalties provided therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Nowhere, therefor, are indicia to show that by Republic Act No. 18 the legislator desired to make the last paragraph of article 268 applicable to Article 267, as
petitioners now contend.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Had the Legislature intended that the third paragraph of Article 268 should apply not only to slight illegal detention under Article 267, it would have either so
expressed or at least made of said third paragraph a separate article when it enacted the Code, or either one of Republic Acts Nos. 18 and
1084.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Finally, slight illegal detention being penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 268, first paragraph, it is rational that the penalty should be reduced by one
degree to prision mayor, where the special mitigating circumstances, mentioned in paragraph 3 of said article, are present (i.e., early voluntary release before
indictment and non-attachment of purpose). But why should these very same circumstances operate to reduce the death penalty (provided for kidnapping for
ransom in Article 267) also to prision mayor, when it would then represent a reduction of not less then three (3) degrees? What reason is there to hold the
same circumstances (early release, etc.) to be more efficacious in lowering the penalty for serious illegal detention (Art. 267) than in slight detention for which a
lesser penalty (Art. 268) is prescribed?chanrobles virtual law library

It is argued that unless the reduction of penalty provided for in the third paragraph of Article 268 is made applicable to kidnapping for ransom under Article 267,
the life of the person kidnapped would be endangered, since his captors would find no reason to release him, as by so doing they would not benefit from a
reduction of penalty. This argument appears to us to be better addressed to the discretion of the lawmaker that dictates the policies to be followed in
repressing lawlessness. It is certainly a consideration that would not justify the Court's disregard of the evident intent of the law, as disclosed by the structure
and the historical development of Article 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code, heretofore discussed, and which, in our opinion, render it clear beyond doubt
that the third paragraph of Article 268 was not, and could not have been, intended by the lawmaker to apply in any way to kidnapping or serious illegal
detention punishable under Article 267. The successive increases in the gravity of the penalty for kidnapping for ransom merely evidences the law's intent to
deter such crime from being committed at all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It being thus shown that the crime of which petitioners stand accused is a capital one, and that the Court of First Instance, after due hearing and consideration
of the evidence before it, has found that in its judgment of the evidence against the accused is strong, there is no alternative but to declare that the
extraordinary writs of certiorari and habeas corpus applied for should be, as they hereby are, denied. Costs against petitioners.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18760 September 29, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KAMAD AKIRAN, ET AL., defendants.
KAMAD AKIRAN, JARANG ASKALI, ALAMMARA DUMPAS and KASTIRI SAPPARI, defendants-appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

As amended information for kidnapping with ransom was filed on December 22, 1960 by the Provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Sulu against Kamad
Akiran, Jarang Askali, Jamiri Hawadji, Alammara Dumpas and Kastiri Sappari. It alleged that on July 26, 1960, in the municipality of Maimbung, Province of Sulu,
the abovementioned five accused together with five other persons still at large, namely, Ahaddin Panning, Isirani Askali, Abdusali Jadji, Jammang Dahim and
Ammang Akiran, armed with firearms, in pursuance of a conspiracy, kidnapped Isirani Sakili and brought him to a house in Bud Katinganan, of the same
municipality, where he was detained for nine hours and released only when the said accused persons succeeded in extorting a ransom of P1,000, in violation of
Article 267, last paragraph, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

At the instance of the Provincial Fiscal, for lack of evidence, the charge was dismissed as to Jamiri Hawadji. The remaining four accused pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented the alleged kidnap victim himself, Isirani Sakili, 45 years old, married, a merchant, who testified that on July 26, 1960 his brother
Hadji Hassan, his driver, Bairulla, and he were on the way to Jolo after having loaded his truck with copra in Tambaking, Maimbung District. At Kilometer 16 of
the Indanan-Lapa road, they were stopped by a group of men armed with carbines and garands, who, led by the accused Jarang Askali, ran to the middle of the
road and pointed their weapons at them. As they stopped, Jarang Askali shouted for him to come down from the truck. When Isirani Sakili and his brother
stepped off the truck, Jarang ordered Hadji Hassan to go home and produce P1,600 that very day or else Isirani Sakili would be killed (I tsn., 39-30). Hadji Hassan
boarded the truck and left. Isirani Sakili was then brought to an abaca plantation in Bud Katinganan where he stayed from 9 A.M. to 1 P.M. of the same day,
guarded by Jarang and Ahaddin, as the rest had gone home (I tsn., 46). When Jamiri Hawadji came, Isirani Sakili was brought to the former's house upon Jamiri's
own suggestion. At about 6 P.M. that day he was released, after his brother Hadji Hassan and father-in-law, Saddawani Sadda, came and gave to Jarang Askali
P1,000, promising that the remaining P600 will be given the next day (I tsn., 38). Isirani Sakili identified among his kidnappers the four accused: Jarang Askali,
Ahaddin Panning, Kastiri Sappari, Isirani Askali, Abdusali Jadji, Alammara Dumpas, Jammang Dahim, Kamad Akiran and Ammang Akiran (I tsn., 32), claiming that
he knew them because they were neighbors and grew up together (I tsn., 44).

Hadji Hassan, corroborating his brother's testimony, also identified the four accused as among Isirani Sakili's kidnappers (II tsn., 1-3). He added that after he left,
he told Isirani's wife, Nunung what happened. She was able to give him only P1,000. The remaining P600 he tried to raise from neighbors and friends, but failed.
He then proceeded to the private market of Imam Juaini where he met Isirani Sakili's father-in-law, Saddawani Sadda, who told him he already found Isirani
through Jamiri Hawadji, through whom also Jarang Askali sent word about the P1,600 ransom (II tsn., 1-5). Because they could not get P600 more, they
proceeded to the house of Jamiri Hawadji and found there Isirani Sakili, Jarang Askali, Ahaddin Panning and Jamiri Hawadji. After he personally handed the
money to Jarang Askali, Isirani Sakili was released at about 6 P.M., with the promise of Hadji Hassan to bring the P600 the next morning. Hadji Hassan went
home while Isirani Sakili went to Jolo (11 tsn., 5-7).

Saddawani Sadda — another prosecution witness testified that he had requested Jamiri Hawadji, a close relative of Jarang Askali, through Unsul and Beilaji, to
intercede for Isirani Sakili (II tsn., 24). After they gave the money to Jarang Askali, Hadji Hassan went home while Isirani Sakili went to report the matter to the
Philippine Constabulary. Then, together, they proceeded to Jolo (II tsn., 29).

In defense, it was testified to by Panglima Tagayan, that earlier, on June 5, 1960, his son-in-law Hayani Askali, Jarang Askali's brother, was shot by Tingkahan and
Sakkan, brothers or cousins-in-law of Isirani Sakili. Hayani Askali, although wounded, lived (II tsn., 45). Five days after he was shot, Hayani went with a brother of
his and Panglima Tagayan to the Provincial Fiscal to lodge a complaint. Subsequently, Isirani Sakili offered to pay Hayani P1,600, provided the latter would not
proceed with the complaint.

Salama Sahawi, sister-in-law of Jamiri Hawadji and mother-in-law of Alammara Dumpas, stated that while drinking soft drink in the store of Imam Juaini, she
saw a cargo truck pass by, on which were Isirani Sakili, his wife, Hadji Hassan and others she could not remember (I tsn., 71-72). The truck stopped and she saw
and heard Jarang ask in a loud voice "Why did you not comply with your promise, you did not comply with it?" (I tsn., 72). Then she saw Isirani Sakili and Jarang
Askali with his companions head for Bud Katinganan with Isirani leading the way. Meanwhile Isirani Sakili's companions went towards Jolo.

Layha Bismark claimed that in the afternoon of July 26, 1960, he overheard a group, among them Kamad Akiran, Jammang Dahim, Hadji Hassan and Saddawani
Sadda talking (11 tsn., 49-51). He found out that Hadji Hassan and Saddawani Sadda were going to Jamiri Hawadji's house, where Isirani was kept, to give P1,000
to Jarang Askali to defray the hospital expenses of Hayani.

Accused Jarang Askali, 37, married, and a resident of Kabbun, Jali, Indanan, Sulu, testified that Isirani Sakili had arranged with his uncle Panglima Tagayan to pay
the expenses of Hayani (II tsn., 56). On the day of the alleged kidnapping he and some companions were on the way to a certain celebration when they saw
Isirani Sakili on his truck with Hadji Hassan and their wives. They waved for him to stop and when he did, they conferred regarding the payment of his brother's
expenses. Then he and his companions, Jammang Dahim, Abdusali Jadji, Ahaddin Panning, with Isirani Sakili leading, went to Jamiri Hawadji's place where Isirani
Sakili proposed to make payment (II tsn., 57-63). Before they reached Jamiri's house, they were joined by Hadji Hassan and Saddawani Sadda. Since Jamiri,
before whom payment was to be made — as he was a sort of a leader in the place — was not there, Jarang Askali was made to swear before a grave that he
would not file a complaint. After he swore, he was given P1,000 and some jewelries to guarantee payment of the remaining P600, which guaranty he did not
accept as he already considered Isirani Sakili a blood brother whose word could be trusted.

As to Alammara Dumpas, Jarang testified he was also with Isirani Sakili in the hauling truck, Jammang Dahim, he further testified, is already dead (II tsn., 61).
Jarang added that he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and so went into hiding and came home only after nine days (II tsn., 72), and
surrendered himself and also the gun he bought with part of the money he got.

Taking to the witness box, Kamad Akiran, 22, single, herder and resident of Indanan, Sulu, denied all of Isirani Sakili's charges, denied having known him at all
and claimed that at the time of the alleged kidnapping, he was husking coconuts (I tsn., 17-18), and knew of the incident only from rumors that went around.
And he added that it was Isirani Sakili's wife who caused his arrest while he was selling copra in town (I tsn., 21).

After trial, judgment was rendered on June 29, 1961, finding the four accused guilty, and charged beyond reasonable doubt and in view of Republic Act 1084
raising the penalty of kidnapping for ransom to a single penalty of death, sentenced them to death and ordered them jointly and severally pay Isirani Sakili
P1,000 and to pay the costs.

Automatically, therefore, the case is before Us for review.

The resolution of the issues herein hinges on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. In such a case the rule followed is that
appellate Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court, as the latter is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed behavior and the manner of their testimony during the trial. The exception to this rule is when it is shown that the trial
court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the case.1

Jarang Askali claimed that they were on their way to a celebration when he saw Isirani's truck, waved for it to stop, conferred with Isirani and then, with Isirani,
proceeded to Jamiri's place where the payment was to be made. This meeting was unarranged. It is not likely for the alleged transaction to have been carried
out without preparations on both sides. Furthermore, the money which was supposed to be for the hospital expenses of Hayani was never given to Hayani. And
instead Jarang admitted having bought a gun with part of the money he received.

Isirani Sakili, who denied the assertions of the defense, and Hadji Hassan, positively identified the four accused as the authors of the crime. As against the
allegations of the defense which were not sufficiently and convincingly presented, the trial court's finding in favor of the prosecution should be upheld. As
aforestated, said court is better situated to determine the credibility of the witnesses.

It is however argued in defense, that granting that there was kidnapping, the lower court erred in ruling that there was conspiracy to extort ransom. It is urged
that only Jarang Askali was active while the rest remained passive and silent. Furthermore, at the time the money was given to Jarang, of the other alleged
kidnappers, only Jammang Dahim was present. We cannot agree. The trial court found that, heavily armed, they all waited for Isirani's truck and stopped it
when it came. The others fully concurred in Jarang's criminal resolution when he demanded P1,600 for Isirani's release and affirmed their assent when they
escorted Isirani to the abaca plantation where he was confined. Even if they went home afterwards or did not get any part of the money, the fact is that they
fully and directly cooperated and did their part so that Jarang's resolution would be carried out.

It is further maintained that the accused should not be convicted of kidnapping with ransom because the intention was at most merely to compel Isirani to fulfill
his promise of defraying Hayani's hospital expenses. If this were the purpose, the accused did not have to kidnap Isirani. The latter wanted, if the allegations of
the defense are true, to prevent the filing of the complaint, to the extent of paying P1,600. All there was to do to compel was to threaten to continue the
complaint and that would have alarmed Isirani into submission. No kidnapping would have been necessary.

We state in passing that even if the purpose alleged by the defense be accepted — that is, to compel the alleged payment — under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084 effective June 15, 1954, the offense is still kidnapping for ransom. Said amended last paragraph, which increased the
penalty for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, provides:

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

This provision was derived from statutes of the United States, particularly the Lindbergh Law. Thus, American Jurisprudence thereon has persuasive application.
"Ransom" under American rulings, as used in statutes making kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been held to mean in its ordinary
sense as "money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity." 2 Since the
accused in this case demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a person from captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled them to do
so, the money is still ransom under the law.1awphîl.nèt

With regard to Alammara Dumpas, We cannot believe that Isirani Sakili would accuse him of a capital offense if he was really Isirani's companion in the truck.
The truth must be that he was among the kidnappers who stopped the truck, as pointed out by those admittedly aboard said truck, namely, Isirani and Hadji.

Neither do We find credible the alibi of Kamad Akiran that he was husking coconuts — it is not stated where — at the time of the alleged kidnapping. No other
witness was presented in his behalf. Alibi is so easily and conveniently manufactured. And to be sustained it must be shown — which has not been done herein
— to preclude the physical presence of the accused at the place of the crime at the time of commission. As ruled by this Court, alibi dwindles into nothingness in
the face of positive identification, as in this case, of the accused as participants of the crime.3

Appellants' brief states that Kastiri Sappari was not present in the scene of the crime, citing Jarang Askali's testimony (II tsn., 61) that Kastiri was not with him
when he stopped the truck, and the testimony of another defense witness, Salama Sahawi (I tsn., 76), who merely said she could not identify who were the
other companions of Jarang, but did not state that Sappari was not there. Such evidence — so dependent upon credibility — cannot prevail over Sappari's
positive identification by Isirani and Hadji.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed, with the sole modification, for lack of the necessary votes to impose the penalty of death,
that the four accused are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead of death. No costs in this instance. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 139445-46. June 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO GONZALES y OPENA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases are here on automatic review of the decision 1of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon, Metro Manila, finding accused-appellant Rodrigo
Gonzales guilty of two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each count, to pay complainant the amounts of P150,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P70,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to acknowledge and support the child born of complainant Remelie Tria.

Except for the dates of the commission of the rapes, the two informations against accused-appellant alike read:

That on or about [date],2 in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the stepfather of Remelie Tria y Simeon, a minor of 16 years old, with lewd design, and exercising ascendancy over said Remelie Tria y Simeon
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did, then and there, have sexual intercourse with Remelie Tria y Simeon
against her will and without her consent. 3cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereupon the two cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

The prosecution presented evidence showing the following:

Complainant Remelie Tria is the daughter of Teresita Simeon, while accused-appellant Rodrigo Gonzales is Teresita Simeons common-law husband. On January
7, 1995, at around 2:00 in the morning, while complainant Remelie Tria was alone sleeping on the second floor of their house in Sitio 6, Barangay Catmon,
Malabon, she felt someone touching her private parts. When she opened her eyes to find out who it was, she saw accused-appellant, her mothers common-law
husband. Remelie sat up and threatened to report accused-appellant to her mother if he did not stop molesting her. This angered accused-appellant who boxed
complainant and continued making advances on her. Complainant resisted but she was pinned down on the bed and accused-appellant succeeded in ravishing
her. Because of the threat that accused-appellant would kill her and her mother if she reported the matter to anyone, complainant kept the incident to herself.
4cräläwvirtualibräry

More than two years later, on November 1, 1997, at around 1:30 in the morning, while complainant was sleeping inside her room, she was awakened by the
sound of an object falling on the floor. When she tried to see what it was, she found that accused-appellant was in the room. The latter held her hands,
undressed her, and forced himself on her. Accused-appellant warned Remelie not to report the incident to anyone or he would leave her mother and her
siblings with no one to support them. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

Later, Remelie decided to tell her mother of accused-appellants sexual molestation. As a result, her mother drove accused-appellant from their house and
reported the matter to their barangay officials. Somehow, however, accused-appellant was able to return to their household. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 25, 1997, complainant watched on television about Bantay Bata, the program for abused children of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. She went to the DSWD and made a complaint against accused-appellant. A DSWD social worker took her to the police station where complainant
executed a complaint-affidavit against accused-appellant. A few days later, members of the Malabon police arrested accused-appellant. 7cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 27, 1997, Dr. Bernadette Madrid, head of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, examined complainant. Her findings,
contained in a report, are as follows:

FINDINGS

Well nourished, well developed, ambulant, cooperative,

Head & Neck, Chest, Lungs, Abdomen: Normal

Extremities: Normal

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Hymen: Estrogenized with a hymenal opening of 12 mm.

Healed laceration at 5 oclock position and deep notch at 8 oclock position.

IMPRESSION:

Findings of the genital examination is consistent with penetration.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Madrid reiterated in court her findings. She stated, however, that she could not tell when the genital lacerations were inflicted. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

On August 6, 1998, or about nine months after the second rape, complainant gave birth to a baby boy. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant denied having raped complainant. He claimed that in the early morning of January 7, 1995 and November 1, 1997, he was at the dumpsite in
Catmon, Malabon scavenging for garbage with several individuals whose names he allegedly did not know. 11 He admitted, however, that the Catmon garbage
dumpsite is only about a kilometer away from his house and that the distance could be traversed in 15 minutes by foot. Accused-appellant claimed that
complainant could possibly have harbored resentment against him because he reported her to her mother for going to the house of her boyfriend for which
reason complainants mother scolded her. 12cräläwvirtualibräry

On July 16, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 18899-MN, the Court finds accused Rodrigo Gonzales y Opena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE penalized under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay Remelie Tria the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P35,000.00 as exemplary damages plus the cost of the suit;
2. In Criminal Case No. 18900-MN, the Court finds accused Rodrigo Gonzalez y Opena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE (Republic Act No.
8353) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay Remelie Tria the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P35,000.00 as exemplary damages plus the cost of the suit.

Further, accused Rodrigo Gonzales y Opena is hereby ordered to acknowledge the filiation of [the] victims offspring and to give support, the amount of which
shall be determined after due notice and hearing.13cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY SINCE THE CORRECT RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACCUSED WITH THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT
PROPERLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.14cräläwvirtualibräry

In his reply-brief, accused-appellant alleged another ground for the modification of the penalty imposed on him, to wit: that the prosecution has allegedly failed
to sufficiently prove that complainant was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the alleged rapes. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

Considering that these cases are before the Court on automatic review, we will first consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial courts
finding that accused-appellant is guilty of the two counts of rape. Only if we find the evidence to be sufficient will we consider accused-appellants contention
relative to the imposition on him of the death penalty for each count of rape.

In reviewing convictions for rape, this Court has been guided by the following principles: (1) that an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and
even more difficult to disprove; (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 16cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court has carefully gone over the records of these cases and finds nothing to justify a reversal of the trial courts findings. The prosecution was able to prove
all the elements of rape committed through force or intimidation. In a clear, straightforward, and unaffected manner, complainant Remelie narrated in the trial
court how her surrogate father twice succeeded in raping her through force and intimidation, let alone because of his moral ascendancy over her. Her testimony
was corroborated by the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Madrid.

Accused-appellant relies solely for his defense on denial and alibi. However, alibi cannot prevail over complainants positive identification of accused-appellant.
17 Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was impossible for the accused to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 18 In these cases, accused-appellant himself admitted that the garbage dumpsite where he allegedly was at the time of the commission of the
rapes is only a kilometer away from his house and it would take only 15 minutes to negotiate the distance by foot. Thus, even if he was in that place at the time
material to these cases, it was not impossible for him to go home and commit the crimes, and then be back at the dumpsite. It is noteworthy that although
accused-appellant said he was with other people at the dumpsite, he did not present any of them to support his alibi.

As for accused-appellants contention that the charges brought against him were trumped up, the trial court correctly gave no weight to the same. As the trial
court noted:

The Court does not believe that Remelie would fabricate a story of defloration against her own stepfather, allow her private parts to be examined, (Exh.A and A-
3), and make public her painful and humiliating experiences which are better kept in secret or forgotten just to get even with the accused for telling her mother
about her coming to the house of her boyfriend . . . [were it not for] her desire to obtain justice for the grievous wrongs committed against
her.19cräläwvirtualibräry

Coming now to the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant, we find that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Under 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty is imposed in rape cases where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is . . . the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. Being in the nature of special qualifying circumstances, the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must
be both alleged and proved with certainty. 20cräläwvirtualibräry

In the cases at bar, although the informations against accused-appellant alleged that he is the stepfather of Remedios Tria y Simeon, a minor of 16 years old, the
evidence shows that complainants mother, Teresita Simeon, was not married to accused-appellant. 21 Accused-appellant confirmed this when he stated that
complainant Remelie is Teresita Simeons child by another man. 22cräläwvirtualibräry

In People v. Manggasin, 23 the informations alleged that the accused was the victims stepfather but the evidence showed that he was in fact merely the
common-law spouse of the complainants mother. This Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed since the accused was not in fact the
complainants stepfather. Indeed, a stepfather has been defined as the husband of ones mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person
spoken of is the offspring. 24 For the foregoing reason, the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Neither is there sufficient evidence to prove complainants minority. Although the presentation of the birth certificate or other corroborative evidence is not
indispensable to prove the victims age for purposes of imposing the death penalty, this becomes necessary when the complainants age at the time of the
commission of the rape is alleged to be between 15 to 17 years old. At these ages, it is not easy to determine by mere physical appearance the age of
complainant. 25 Thus, in People v. Javier, 26 where the prosecution presented only the testimony of the victim to prove her minority (also allegedly 16 years
old), we said:

In the case at hand, the complaints stated that the rape victim is 16 years old . . . . However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the
birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case
considering that the victims age which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any
difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass
may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it
is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed
under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving
the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged
must be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.27cräläwvirtualibräry

Indeed, not only did the prosecution in these cases fail to present other evidence than complainants testimony to prove her age, the uniform allegation in the
two informations that she was 16 years old cannot be given credence considering that the dates of commission of the two rapes (January 7, 1995 and
November 1, 1997) are two years apart. If, as complainant said, she was born on June 4, 1982, 28 she would be 12 years old on January 7, 1995 and 15 years old
on November 1, 1997. In either case, she would not be 16 years old as alleged in the informations. The variance between complainants testimony and the
allegations in the informations puts in serious doubt the actual age of complainant at the time she was raped.

Accordingly, in each of the two cases under review, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The trial court correctly ordered accused-appellant to acknowledge and support complainants child. A person guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction shall be
sentenced to indemnify the offended woman, acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and in every case support the
offspring. 29 No impediment exists to prevent the Court from requiring accused-appellant to acknowledge complainants child as his natural child since he is not
married to complainants mother. Considering that the complainant gave birth within a period 9.3 months (the average period of pregnancy) 30 from the date
complainant was raped on November 1, 1997, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay support to complainants child.

In view of the reduction of the penalties for both counts of rape, the amount of P75,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity should correspondingly be reduced to
P50,000.00 each, in line with current case law. 31 On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape is affirmed. 32 The trial
court also correctly awarded exemplary damages to complainant since, as held in People v. Villanueva, 33 the rape of the child of accused-appellants common-
law spouse is attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence. This is applicable in these cases, there being the relation of trust and
confidence between complainant and accused-appellant who, as in Villanueva, was regarded by the latter as her father. 34 In accordance with the ruling in that
case, the amount of the award should be reduced to P20,00.00. 35cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon, Metro Manila is MODIFIED and accused-appellant is sentenced in each of the
criminal cases herein to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and the further sum of
P20,000.00 exemplary damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148991 January 21, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision1 dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-179698. The
trial court found Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao ("appellant") guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape and imposed on him the death penalty.

The Charge

The Information charging appellant with the crime of serious illegal detention with rape reads:

That on or about January 1, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual and without authority of law, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and illegally detain (sic) ROWENA RIANZARES Y MIRANDA by then and there taking and locking her inside his room located at 1932
Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, this City, and preventing her from going out of said room for a period of three (3) hours, more or less, thereby depriving her of her
liberty and during the said period of time, said accused by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking a knife, threatening to kill her should she
resist and choking her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.2

Arraignment and Plea

When arraigned on 14 February 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.3

The Trial

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) complainant Rowena Rianzares ("Rowena"); (2) Dr. Mirasol Pangan of the U.P. Philippine General Hospital
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, who examined the complainant; (3) Eldee Eusebio; and (4) Dante Magat.

The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution’s version of the incident in the People’s Brief as follows:

On December 31, 1999, about 7 o’clock in the evening, appellant and his companions (names not on record) were having a drinking spree outside the house of
Jun Rianzares xxx. (p. 5, TSN, May 22, 2000).

About 2 o’clock in the morning of the following day or right after the New Year’s eve celebration, Jun Rianzares left their house to see a friend. His wife, Rowena
Rianzares, was left behind sleeping inside the room of their house with their daughter [six (6) years old] and son [three (3) years old] (pp. 3-4, ibid.).

After a while, Rowena Rianzares heard a knock at the door of their room. Consequently, she rose from the bed and partially opened the door to look [at] who
was knocking. It was appellant. Appellant tried to push open the door, telling Rowena Rianzares that her husband was asking for money to buy liquor. Rowena
Rianzares got suspicious because her husband had money at that time and he would not ask money from her. Rowena Rianzares thus closed the door (pp. 3-5,
ibid.)

Thereafter, Rowena Rianzares went back to sleep. A few minutes later, she heard appellant upstairs repeatedly shouting that her husband was very mad
because he did not have money to buy liquor. When she heard appellant say that her husband was allegedly mad, she opened the door of their room and went
out. She went inside appellant’s room which was located in front of their room to confront him. She told appellant: "Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo may
pera naman siya?" Immediately thereafter, appellant rushed to her back and placed his left arm around her neck with his right hand holding a kitchen knife,
about twelve (12) inches long (pp. 5-6 and 12, ibid.).

Rowena Rianzares got surprised and, consequently, pushed appellant’s left arm. In the process, Rowena Rianzares got off balance and fell down xxx the stairway
screaming. She asked for help shouting her husband’s name (p. 11, ibid.)

Appellant immediately went after Rowena Rianzares and upon catching up with her, appellant held her hair and left arm. He then dragged her upstairs towards
his (appellant’s) room (pp. 5-6, ibid.)

Inside the room, appellant asked Rowena Rianzares to undress while pointing the knife he was holding at her right rear side of the body. He threatened to kill
Rowena Rianzares if she did not undress herself. Out of fear, she was forced to undress herself.

Then, appellant kissed the different parts of her body. Rowena Rianzares struggled and resisted. She grappled for possession of the knife and succeeded in
holding its bladed portion causing her injury on the right palm. She persisted in grappling for possession of the knife but failed. In the process, she sustained a
further injury on her left arm. Instead of relenting, appellant pulled her and slapped the back of her head. Thereafter, appellant dragged and forced her to lie
down on the lower portion of the double [deck] bed located inside appellant’s room (pp. 6-13, ibid.).

While Rowena Rianzares was xxx lying down xxx with her legs spread apart, appellant placed himself on top of her. He placed his left foot under Rowena
Rianzares’ left leg and his right foot on Rowena Rianzares’ right leg. While in that position, appellant forced his private organ into Rowena Rianzares’ private
part. Rowena Rianzares continued to shout for help but appellant poked the knife at the left side of her body. While appellant was raping her, he pointed the
knife at Rowena Rianzares’ private part and told her that he wanted to get [a] thrill out of it because he could not get a full erection since he was under the
influence of "shabu." Rowena Rianzares pleaded [with] appellant to stop and assured him that she would help him get out xxx but appellant remained unmoved
(pp. 13-17, ibid.).

About ten (10) minutes after Rowena Rianzares was dragged by appellant to his room, somebody knocked at appellant’s door and shouted: "Bernie ano ba ang
ginagawa mo dyan?" Appellant answered back: "Umalis kayo kundi papatayin ko ito. " (pp. 18-19, ibid.).

Eldee Eusebio, a neighbor of spouses Jun and Rowena Rianzares at Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, Manila (p. 7, TSN, May 30, 2000), testified that on January 1, 2000,
about 2:15 in the morning, he went to the house of his Kuya Jose "Jun" Rianzares because he was summoned by the latter (p. 4, TSN, May 30, 2000). When he
was about to enter the house, Eldee Eusebio heard Rowena Rianzares shout. Immediately, Eldee Eusebio kicked the entrance gate of the house to open it. He
then hurriedly went upstairs and saw Rowena Rianzares using her feet in trying to prevent the door of appellant’s room from closing. After the door was closed,
he immediately knocked at the door. Appellant, however, shouted, telling him to leave and nobody should go up; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares
(pp. 4-5, ibid.).

Consequently, Eldee Eusebio went outside the house to look for Jun Rianzares because he did not see him inside the house. When he found Jun Rianzares, he
told him that there was a problem in his house (p. 5, ibid.).

About thirty (30) minutes later, Rowena Rianzares’ husband arrived. Jun Rianzares knocked at appellant’s door and asked appellant what was he doing to his
wife. Appellant pounded the floor, using the handle of the knife and shouted. He asked Jun Rianzares to leave him alone; otherwise, he would kill his wife (pp.
18-19, May 22, 2000).

Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, together with her husband, Dante Magat, arrived. She and her relatives negotiated for Rowena
Rianzares’ release. However, appellant told them to leave; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares. While they were negotiating for Rowena Rianzares’
release, appellant was still on top of her (Rowena Rianzares) (pp. 19-20, ibid.).

After more than an hour of failed negotiations by Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, the policemen took over (pp. 2-4, TSN, July 11, 2000).

The policemen (names not on record) forcibly opened the door and immediately, thereafter, they got hold of appellant. Before they could get hold of appellant,
however, he (appellant tried to stab Rowena Rianzares but the latter was able to evade the thrust. Instead, she was hit on her left arm. Then a certain Colonel
Castro pulled Rowena Rianzares and immediately covered her with a blanket (p. 20, TSN, May 22, 2000).

xxx

Dr. Mirasol Pangan testified that she was the one who physically examined Rowena Rianzares. She testified that she examined Rowena Rianzares’ body from
head to foot. She found the following injuries on her body:

1. one (1) hematoma on the right neck;

2. two (2) abrasions at the left lower hip approximately 0.5cm.;
3. one (1) abrasion at the left forearm;
4. one (1) abrasion hematoma-circular at the left lower arm;
5. multiple abrasion hematoma at the volar aspect of the second, fourth digits of right hand and under the nose;
6. one (1) hematoma at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measures 6 x1 cm.;
7. one (1) stab wound at the left forearm; and
8. one (1) hematoma measuring two cm. at the right labia minora of the genitalia.4

Version of the Defense

Appellant Leonardo Nuguid was the sole witness for the defense. The Public Attorney summarized the defense’s version of what transpired, as follows:

Leonardo Nuguid testified that he knew the victim because he worked in the latter’s Manila K-9 college as their dog trainer. He had been working with the
Rianzares [spouses] for five (5) years. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-4)

On December 31, 1999 at about 10:30 p.m., Rowena Rianzares entered his room. He asked her what she wanted but Rowena did not answer and instead she
kissed him on the lips. He had sex with Rowena and the latter’s husband arrived. Jun called up for Rowena but the latter told her husband that she was in the
accused-appellant’s room talking with the latter. Jun left at around 11:00 pm and Rowena stayed in his room until the police called by her husband arrived. He
told Rowena to go out of the room but the latter refused to do so. The police kept on convincing them to go out of the room but Rowena told them that they
were just talking and they would go out soon. The police kicked the door open and he was arrested. He was brought to the police station wherein he was
mauled and was forced to confess that he raped Rowena. The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was the middle of 1998 when they went to
Bulacan. Rowena told her then that she saw in him what was lacking in her husband. Rowena’s husband was an alcoholic and a drug user. He does not know
why she filed [t]his serious illegal detention with rape [charge] against him. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-15)

He testified that he had worked with Rianzares from 1995-2000. There was a time he had an argument with Jun so he was asked to leave the Rianzares’ house.
(TSN, September 11,2000, pp. 15-16)

The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was when they went to Bulacan to get rice from Rowena’s parents. Prior to January 1, 2000, he had
several sexual intercourse (sic) with Rowena. Rowena gave him several lovenotes but he lost them all. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 15-16)

On January 1, 2000, he did not notice that Rowena was bleeding when she emerged from the room. He was holding a knife when the police arrested him
because he was forced to fight back at the police who were mauling him inside his room. He had a kitchen knife inside his room because Rowena’s husband told
him to bring the kitchen knife inside him (sic) room so that he could easily open the box of firecrackers in case anybody came to buy. (TSN, September 11, 2000,
pp. 24-30)5

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court considered the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses to be straightforward and credible. The physical injuries Rowena
suffered, confirmed by the examining physician and observed by the trial court, corroborated her version of the events.

On the other hand, the trial court found dubious appellant’s story that he and Rowena were sweethearts. The trial court held that:

The accused’s sweetheart defense is of doubtful nature and undeserving of credence. Firstly, the accused’s version of the incident is unnatural and contrary to
common human experience. If it was true that the complainant was in the accused’s room on the second floor at 11:00 p.m., when her husband called her from
the ground floor, she would surely had quickly gotten out of the room, instead of coolly telling her husband that she was with the accused in the latter’s room.
Secondly, the accused’s declaration is contradicted not only by the straightforward, convincing and believable testimonies of the complainant and prosecution
witnesses Eusebio and Magat, but also by the physical evidence of the injuries sustained by the complainant on the occasion of the commission of the crime,
Exhibits "F" and "F-1 ".6

The trial court ruled that the acts of the appellant in locking up Rowena against her will in his room for three hours, threatening to kill her and then sexually
assaulting her, constituted the crime of serious illegal detention with rape. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision of 16 May 2001 reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao, is hereby convicted of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Penal Code
and sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection and accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.

On the civil liability of the accused, he is also sentenced to pay the complainant, Rowena Rianzares y Miranda, moral and nominal damages in the respective
sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.7

Hence, this automatic review.

The Issues

Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH RAPE WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.8

Appellant, arguing through the Public Attorney, alleged that the trial court erred in rejecting his sweetheart defense, which was not unlikely since he spent most
of his time with Rowena. In the alternative, appellant claims he is liable only for simple rape because the prosecution failed to show that his primary purpose
was to detain Rowena, thus:

xxx It is undeniable that the accused-appellant’s primary purpose was to have carnal knowledge of Rowena Rianzares. The accused-appellant immediately
ordered Rowena Rianzares to undress and raped her. As a matter of fact, even at the time the police forcibly opened the door, Rowena and the accused-
appellant were still both naked and the accused-appellant was still positioned on top of Rowena.9

The Solicitor General agreed that appellant is only liable for simple rape under Article 33510 of the Revised Penal Code because: (1) it necessarily follows from
the Court’s ruling in People v. Lactao11 that there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape;12 and (2) appellant did not release Rowena after the rape
only because her husband and the police were outside appellant’s room.

In the Reply Brief, the Public Attorney raised as an additional ground for reversal the presiding judge’s alleged lack of impartiality in deciding the case.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court shall first discuss the Solicitor General’s contention that there is no complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape. In People v. Lactao, the Court
ruled as follows:

It may be worth to mention at the outset that there is no complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention. If the purpose is to deprive the offended party of
liberty, the crime committed is illegal detention. And, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended party is raped, a separate crime of rape is
committed; in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. However, if the objective of the offender is to rape the victim only, and in the process, the
latter had to be illegally detained, only the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape.

Hence, in People v. Ching Suy Sionga, Sionga was found guilty of two independent crimes, i.e., serious illegal detention and acts of lasciviousness, because the
two acts did not come within the purview of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code which applies to complex crimes, for certainly, one cannot be considered as a
means to commit the other. xxx13 (underscoring supplied)

The decision in Lactao, promulgated on 29 October 1993, explained the rules on the treatment of serious illegal detention and rape at that time. Prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 ("RA 7659") on 31 December 1993,14 when the person kidnapped or illegally detained was raped, two independent crimes
of kidnapping and rape were committed.

RA 7659, however, amended the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on serious illegal detention and kidnapping to read:

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.

Under this provision, when the person kidnapped or illegally detained is raped, the offense committed is the special complex crime of serious illegal detention
or kidnapping with rape, punishable with the maximum penalty of death.15 The last paragraph of Article 267 applies only to instances where the person illegally
detained or kidnapped is raped. It does not provide for a complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention. As the Court ruled in Lactao, there is no complex
crime of illegal detention with rape under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is also no complex crime of kidnapping with attempted rape under Article
48 because there is no single act which results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. Neither is illegal detention a necessary means for committing rape.16

Nonetheless, the Court concurs with the Public Attorney and the Solicitor General that the crime committed in this case is not serious illegal detention with
rape. Rather, appellant is guilty of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.18

The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victim’s liberty. The prosecution must prove actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that
such deprivation was the intention of the appellant.19 The accused must have acted purposely or knowingly to restrain the victim because what constitutes the
offense is taking coupled with intent to restrain.20

We agree with the Public Attorney that the facts in the present case indicate that appellant’s principal objective was not to deprive Rowena of her liberty. We
quote from the findings of the trial court:

xxx Caught by surprise, the complainant struggled to free herself from the hold of the accused and ran down the stairway, but in her haste she stumbled and fell
down. The accused followed her down; held her hair and left hand and dragged her upstairs to his room, while she shouted for help. Once inside the room, the
accused forced the complainant to undressed (sic) and then he kissed all the parts of her body. The complainant tried to resist and in the process, she sustained
a wound in her left arm and a knife wound in her right palm, Exhibit "F". The accused forced the complainant to lie on a bed and placed himself on top of her
and at the same time position his knees between her legs and forced them to separate. After which he proceeded to rape her, and while doing so, he remarked
to her, "Weng (complainant’s nickname), pasensiya ka na. Nakabato kasi ako." (Please forgive me because I am high on drug[s]). He further told her that he
would insert the knife he was holding in her vagina to enhance his excitement. xxx Finally, at around 5:00 a.m., the police officer forced open the door and
barged inside the room, and subdued the dumbfounded accused who was then on top of the complainant.21 (Emphasis supplied)

From this narration, it is clear that appellant’s real aim was to have carnal knowledge of Rowena. Appellant took Rowena no further than to his room - which
was only across the hall from Rowena’s room - where he immediately forced her to undress. In fact, appellant was so intent on raping her that he was still naked
and on top of her when the police broke into the room.22 Taken together, these circumstances engender doubt that the intention of appellant was to detain
Rowena. The detention was merely incidental to the real objective of appellant.
It is true that appellant kept Rowena inside his room for more than an hour while the police tried to negotiate with him. However, this does not constitute
illegal detention in light of the fact that appellant was on top of Rowena raping her even while he was shouting at the police and other people outside. This is
borne out by Rowena’s testimony:

Q: Could you tell us what was the position of the accused when the policemen forcibly opened the door?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: For how long [did] the accused stayed (sic) on top of you?
A: Almost two hours from the very start.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant maintained this position until the police barged into the room and subdued him.24 Given these facts, appellant is not liable for the crime of serious
illegal detention with rape.

However, appellant is still liable for the crime of rape. When the information charges a complex crime and the evidence fails to support one of the component
offenses, the defendant is still liable for the other offense supported by the evidence.25 Thus, in People v. Oliva,26 the Court found Carlito Oliva guilty of
statutory rape even if the information charged him of kidnapping with rape.

Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, provide:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxx.

Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court held that appellant, with the use of a knife, succeeded in raping Rowena in the early hours of 1 January 2000. The trial court found the
testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses "straightforward, convincing and believable" and supported by the evidence of the injuries
sustained by Rowena.27

The weighing of the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the trial court since it is in the best position to discharge that function.28 The trial judge has the
advantage of personally observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not available to an appellate court.29 Absent compelling reasons,
we will not disturb on appeal the trial court’s findings on the credibility of a witness.

The Public Attorney argues that Judge Laguio was biased against appellant, and that it was clear from the judge’s remarks that he had already concluded that
appellant was lying before appellant had finished presenting his evidence, to wit:

PROS GURAY:
Q: You mean to tell the court that the husband on December 31, 1999 in the evening he left the house?
A: After we have a drinking spree he left the house.

xxx

THE COURT:
Q: What time was that?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Was it past 11:00?
A: I cannot remember the time.
Q: You do not know what time the husband left the house?
A: I cannot remember.

xxx

Q: But you said that it was around 10:30 when Rowena entered your room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how did you know the time? [Y]ou h[a]ve a wristwatch?
A: In my room there was a wall clock.
Q: So you know that the husband of Rowena went out or left the house before 10:30?
A: Yes, sir. Before he left we were drinking together.
Q: Yes. And you said that it was after the two of you drank together that he left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you, went up in the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many minutes after you entered your room did Rowena entered (sic) your room?
A: 10:30 ho.
Q: Ilang minuto ang nakaraan pagpasok mo sa kuwarto mo na pinasok ka ni Rowena. Huwag ka ng magmamaangmaangan eh. Nagtatanga-tangahan ka pa eh. O
Ilang minuto ang lumipas? Hindi ka naman mukhang tanga eh. Mukha ka ngang intelihensiya eh.
A: Hindi ko na ho alam eh.
Q: Kaya nga huwag ka ng magtangatangahan. Pagkapasok mo sa kuwarto ilang minuto ang lumipas bago pumasok sa kuwarto mo si Rowena
A: 10 minutes, sir.
Q: That means that you knew that the husband of Rowena left the house before 10:30 p.m.?
A: (Witness cannot answer)

THE COURT:

Make it on record that the witness cannot answer. Alam mo yung mga taong nagsisinungaling ganyan hindi makasagot pag nakokorner. People who tell a lie
they cannot usually answer when they are cornered. I don’t think there is a need to further cross-examine this witness.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from these admittedly deplorable comments, the Court finds no other indications of partiality or bias in the records of the case. The subject remarks were
made after appellant was subjected to extensive direct and cross-examination.31 The examination of appellant was no more rigorous than that of Rowena’s, in
which Judge Laguio also frequently intervened by posing clarificatory questions. The trial court did not prohibit appellant from presenting additional evidence or
witnesses, although appellant chose not to do so. At the request of appellant’s counsel, Judge Laguio ordered a continuance for the defense to continue its
presentation of evidence after appellant’s testimony.32

Further, contradictions and inconsistencies marred appellant’s testimony. Appellant initially stated that at 1:00 o’clock in the morning on 1 January 2000 he was
"helping in the house doing household chores like cleaning the plates and cleaning the house."33 This conflicts with his narration that Rowena entered his room
at 10:30 o’clock in the evening on 31 December 1999 and stayed with him until the police arrived and kicked his door open.34 Appellant also stated that he had
never gone out with Rowena in the 5 years that he had worked for her husband.35 However, appellant later testified that he accompanied Rowena to her
parents’ house in Bulacan in 1998, where they had sexual intercourse for the first time.36 Likewise, appellant originally claimed that he and Rowena had two
sexual encounters in 1998 - once in Bulacan and 3 weeks afterwards in the house of Rowena and her husband.37 He changed this later to many times, more
than 20 times, and then to about 50 times in 1998.38 Finally, appellant failed in four instances to answer the questions propounded to him during cross-
examination.39

We stress that this does not excuse the assailed remarks of Judge Laguio. More circumspect conduct is expected from a judge of our courts. It is the duty of all
judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial.40 In the future, Judge Laguio should adhere more closely to the rule that "a judge should so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."41

Nevertheless, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the assailed Decision insofar as it found appellant to have
raped Rowena. The testimony of Rowena, corroborated by the results of the medical examination and the testimonies of other witnesses, establish beyond
reasonable doubt that: (1) appellant forcibly succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Rowena on 1 January 2000; and (2) that appellant committed the crime
with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife.

In contrast to appellant’s erratic testimony, Rowena was candid and steadfast in her claim that appellant raped her, thus:

Q: And what did you [do] after the accused uttered Ate Weng galit na sa iyo si Kuya Jun?
A: I opened the door and went out of our room and I asked Bernie Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo may pera naman siya.

THE COURT:
Q: At that time where was the accused?
A: When I talked to him he was inside his room and all of the (sic) sudden he was at my back.

THE COURT:
Continue.

PROS. GURAY:
Q: And what did [he] do after that?
A: He placed his left arm around my neck and his right hand which was holding a knife (stop) and I saw his right hand holding a knife.
Q: And how did you react when the accused placed his left hand [on] your neck and you saw him holding a knife?
A: I was surprised. ("Nagulat po ako.")
Q: And what did you do?
A: And at the same time I pushed the left area of the accused and in the process I fell to the stairway all the way down.
Q: And what did the accused do after you fell down?
A: He immediately went down as he held my hair and my left arm and he dragged me upstairs.
Q: And to what place upstairs did the accused drag you?
A: To his room.
Q: By the way, how far is his room [from] your room?
A: The room of the accused is in front of my room.

xxx

Q: When he succeeded in dragging you inside his room what happened next?
A: He asked me to undress.
Q: And did you oblige?
A: He poked the knife he was holding at me and he threatened me. He threatened to kill me.

THE COURT:
Q: So what did you do?
A: I undressed.
Q: While he was poking his knife at you and threatening to kill you. What exactly [were] the words uttered by him?
A: Sige, maghubad ka. Kung hindi papatayin kita.
Q: And what was he doing with his knife while he was uttering those words?
A: He was poking his knife at the right rear side of my body.
Q: And how did you feel at that time?
A: I was very frightened. And I was trembling.
Q: Now, you said that he was poking a knife at your back. Did you sustain injuries?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you still have scars up to the present?
A: Yes, sir.

PROS. GURAY:
May I be allowed, Your Honor to (interrupted)

THE COURT:
We will have a lady staff to look [at] the scars. xxx (At this instance the court interpreter, Ma. Elena Arcenal, accompanied the complainant inside the chambers
of the presiding judge to take a look at the scars sustained by the complainant xxx)

xxx

THE COURT:
Later the court interpreter informed the court that the complainant [had] 2 scars, one is on the middle right side of her body and the other one is on the upper
left side of her back.

PROS. GURAY:
Upper right side.

THE COURT:
Yes, upper right side.

PROS. GURAY:
Q: Now, by the way when you fell on the stairs and you were grabbed by the accused did you shout?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you shout?
A: I shouted Jun, tulungan mo ako.

xxx

Q: xxx Now after you removed your dress what did the accused [do]?
A: He kissed all the parts of my body.
Q: And what did you do after that?
A: I struggled and resisted.
Q: What did the accused do?
A: I grappled with him for the possession of the knife he was holding.
Q: Were you able to grab possession of the knife?
A: I was able to hold it but in the course of our grappling my left arm sustained (stop) the handle of the knife forcefully hit the left portion of my arm. (Witness
showing to the court slight visible scar)

THE COURT:
Will the defense and the prosecution confirm the observation of the court?

ATTY. GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor.

PROS. GURAY:
It is very apparent.

xxx

Q: You also mentioned that you also sustained injury on your right hand. What cause[d] the injury on your right hand?
A: Because I was able to get hold of the bladed portion of the knife and it sliced my right palm.
Q: By the way, will you please describe to the court the knife that was used by the accused in threatening or intimidating you?
A: The bladed portion of the knife is about 12 inches more or less and the handle is about 6 inches more or less.

xxx

Q: So when you were not successful in grappling the knife from the accused what did the accused do next?
A: He pulled my hair and slapped the back of my head.
Q: And what else did he do?
A: He dragged me and forced me to lie down on the double bed.

xxx

Q: And after he dragged you to the lower bed what else did you do?
A: Yung pong paa ko eh ginanoon niya po sa paa nya. Kinross niya po.

THE COURT:
Q: You mean doon sa pagitan ng ano mo!
A: Yuong d[a]lawa ko pong paa ginanyan nya po yung paa ko.
Q: Sige i-demonstrate mo.
A: Inangkla po.
Q: Kaya nga pinagitan nya yong sa paa niya sa side mo?
A: Hindi po. Ganito po. Yung paa niya ginanyan po niya.
Q: Kaya nga. Di nakabuka yung paa mo.

PROS. GURAY:
Q: Di ba nakabukhang ganyan?

THE COURT:
Oo.
PROS. GURAY:
Tapos yung paa niya nakaganoon.
A: Opo.

PROS. GURAY:
Pareho.
A: Opo.

PROS. GURAY:
I do that myself so I know. (Atty. Garcia laughs)

ATTY. GARCIA:
Very incriminating. (laughs)

THE COURT:
Witness demonstrating by opening her legs and then pointing out that the accused placed his left foot under the left leg of the complainant and then locked it
by raising his left leg of the accused and the same thing was done on her right leg.

THE COURT:
Q: So you were unable to move both your legs when the accused did that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that juncture at that time you did not have anymore underwear?
A: I did not have anymore underwear.

xxx

PROS. GURAY:

xxx

Q: Now what did the accused do next after placing his two legs in between your legs?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said he raped you, you mean his private parts were forced into your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you do when the accused inserted his penis into your private part?
A: I continued struggling and resisting but he poked the knife he was holding at the left side of my body. And I was so frightened.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: He did everything to me. He kissed me, he inserted his fingers in my sex organ. Everything.

THE COURT:
Q: After he satisfied his lust on you what did the accused do?
A: He did not allowed (sic) me to leave the room.

PROS. GURAY:
Q: What else did he do with that knife to you?

A: While he was in the act of raping me the accused at one time pointed the knife he was holding at my private part and he said that he would insert it in my
private part to get [a] thrill out of it because he was high on shabu. Because he could not have a complete or full erection because he was under the influence of
shabu ("Bato").

THE COURT:
Q: But despite the fact that he was not able to have a complete or full erection he succeeded in penetrating you with his sex organ?
A: Yes, sir.42

Rowena’s account of her resistance and struggle with appellant was consistent with the results of the physical examination. Dr. Mirasol Pangan, the examining
physician, testified on the gynecologic emergency sheet43 of Rowena dated 1 January 2000 and discussed the findings, as follows:
Q: Could you tell us your findings on the victim?
A: There’s the hematoma at the right neck, two abrasions at the left lower lip approximately 0.5cm. There’s abrasion at the left for[e]arm, an abrasion
hematoma circular at the left lower arm, multiple abrasions at the volar aspect of the second ... fourth digits of right hand, under the nose, hematoma at the
back and the anterior tract the largest of which measured 6x1 cm. There’s a stab wound at the left forearm. In the examination of the genitalia, there’s the two
cms. hematoma at the right la[b]ia minora.
Q: How about the organ of the victim, did you ... (interrupted)
A: Yes, the last part I read was the genitalia, that referred to the organ of the victim, the right la[b]ia minora have two cms. abrasions hematoma. In reference to
the vagina, the cervix, the uterus and the ovary which have no significant findings.

xxx
Q: You have a note here at the lower portion of the report "Sexual and Physical abuse on the victim", was this your conclusion based on the physical
examination?
A: Based on the areas involved, the findings that we have, the arm and the trunk aside from the findings on the genital organ.

xxx
Q: Could normal intercourse cause such injuries to the organ of the victim without use of violence?
A: No, sir.

xxx

PROS. GURAY:
Q: xxx you stated, Doctor that the kind of injuries in the genitalia of the victim could not have been caused by a normal sexual intercourse. [M]y question is,
could it be the result of forceful and unwelcome penetration by a firm penis?
A: Yes, sir, it could be caused.
Q: It could be caused by a forceful thrust of a human finger?
A: Yes, sir, it could also be caused.44

Appellant’s claim that he and Rowena had consensual sex was contradicted not only by Rowena but also by neighbor Eldee Eusebio, who testified that: (1) he
heard Rowena scream for help; (2) he saw her trying to sandwich her feet against the door to keep the door to appellant’s room from closing; and (3) appellant
shouted "papatayin niya lahat ng tao sa loob" when he knocked on the door.45 Together with the physical injuries sustained by Rowena - which appellant said
he did not even notice46 - these statements belie appellant’s assertion of consensual sex.

The sweetheart defense employed by appellant also deserves scant consideration. Aside from being inherently weak, it was uncorroborated by any evidence
other than the self-serving testimony of appellant. Appellant admitted that he had no notes, letters, gifts or any other item to show for an affair that had
allegedly been ongoing since 1998.47

The Information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the rape and the prosecution proved that appellant used such a
weapon. Under Article 266-B, the use of a deadly weapon qualifies the rape and the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

Since reclusion perpetua to death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code applies. Article 63 provides:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.

In rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to death.48 In the present case, appellant raped
Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.49 However, the Information did not specifically
allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Gallego,50 the Court ruled that where the information did not allege the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, dwelling could not raise the penalty to death. The Court held:

xxx The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life
and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties’ evidence." This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the
aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the
Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of
the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.51

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require the complaint or information to state the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an
offense.52 When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the offense a greater
penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proved to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.53

Further, the circumstance of dwelling could not be considered in the present case even if it were properly alleged in the Information. Where the offender
resided in the same house as the victim when the offense was committed, dwelling could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance.54 It is undisputed
in this case that appellant was a "live-in" dog trainer and that he stayed in the Rianzares’ house in a room across Rowena’s room. Therefore, the penalty
imposable on appellant is reclusion perpetua.

A word on the examination of Rowena. A rape victim is physically, socially, psychologically and emotionally scarred, resulting in trauma which may last a
lifetime.55 It was thus highly inconsiderate for the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time Rowena was reliving her harrowing
experience.56 Courts are looked up to by people with high respect and are regarded as places where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.57 Levity has no place in the courtroom during the examination of a victim of rape, and particularly not at her expense.

The trial court awarded moral and nominal damages but failed to award indemnity ex delicto. An award of indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of
guilt in rape cases.58 We thus award P50,000 to Rowena as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral damages is reduced
to P50,000. The award of nominal damages is deleted for lack of legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-179698, is MODIFIED. Appellant
LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO is adjudged guilty of RAPE, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Rowena Rianzares P50,000 as
civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129970 April 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS y CRUZ, accused, EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case no. Q96-65214 entitled People vs. Eduardo
Pavillare y Varona, a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom.

On March 14, 1996 the accused-appellant and his co-accused were criminally charged as follows:

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses EDUARDO PAVILLARE Y VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS Y CRUZ of the crime of kidnapping for Ransom, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with another person, whose
true name, identity and whereabouts had not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and/or intimidation did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one SUKHJINDER SINGH at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, this City, and thereafter
brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston street, this City, for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the amount of P20,000.00 Philippine
currency, thereby detaining and depriving him of his liberty for more than three hours, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty".

The accused Sotero Santos y Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge against him for failure of the private complainant to identify him as one of the
malefactors. On February 28, 1997 the trial court granted the motion and acquitted accused Sotero Santos. The trial of the case proceeded only as against the
accused-appellant Pavillare.

The private complainant, an Indian national named Sukhjinder Singh testified in court that at about noon of February 12, 1996 while he was on his way back to
his motorcycle parked at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three men blocked his way. The one directly in front of him, whom he later identified as
herein accused-appellant, accused him of having raped the woman inside the red Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men
nevertheless forced him inside the taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St. Joseph's College in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his
motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh testified that the accused-appellant and his companions beat him up and demanded one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) for his release but Singh told him he only had five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) with him. The accused-appellant forced him to give the
phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and the appellant made the
call. The private complainant also stated in court that it was the accused-appellant who haggled with his cousin for the amount of the ransom.1 When the
amount of twenty five thousand was agreed upon the complainant stated that the kidnappers took him to the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston streets
and parked the cab there. The accused-appellant and two of the male abductors alighted while the driver and their lady companion stayed with the complainant
in the car. When the complainant turned to see where the accused-appellant and his companions went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and
together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The
ransom money was handed to the appellant by the complainant's cousin, after which the accused-appellant counted the money and then, together with his
cohorts, immediately left the scene.2

Lakhvir Singh, the complainant's cousin, testified in court that the kidnappers made about three to four phone calls a few minutes apart. The kidnappers
allowed him to talk to the private complainant to prove that he is indeed in their custody. The kidnappers also told Lakhvir that his cousin, Sukhjinder, raped
their companion and threatened that unless Lakhvir pays one hundred thousand pesos for Sukhjinder's release "tutuluyan namin ito". Lakhvir told the
kidnappers he does not have that much money and after some haggling the kidnappers settled for twenty five thousand pesos.3 The kidnappers also gave
instructions to deliver the money outside the Aurora Boulevard branch of the Land Bank near the old Arcega's movie house. Lakhvir stated in court that he did
as instructed. When he and another relative reached the designated place three men approached him and one of them, whom he identified in court as the
accused-appellant herein, asked him "Ano dala mo ang pera?" Lakhvir said "yes" but he refused to give the money until he saw his cousin. One of the
kidnappers told him to follow them and they proceeded to a mini-grocery nearby. A few minutes later one of the kidnappers came with his cousin. Lakhvir
handed the money to the accused-appellant who counted it before leaving with his companions.4

SPO1 Eduardo Frias testified for the prosecution that he was the police officer who took the sworn statement of the private complainant on February 14, 1996
pertaining to the February 12, 1996 incident.5 When the accused-appellant was apprehended in connection with another case involving the kidnapping of
another Indian national the private complainant herein again showed up at the police station on March 11, 1996 and identified the accused-appellant as one of
his kidnappers. Another sworn statement was executed by the private complainant after he identified the accused-appellant at the police station.6

For the defense, the accused-appellant testified that on the whole day of February 12, 1996, the alleged date of the incident, he was at the job site in Novaliches
where he had contracted to build the house of a client and that he could not have been anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the complainant was allegedly
kidnapped.7 One of his employees, an electrician, testified that the accused-appellant was indeed at the job site in Novaliches the whole day of February 12,
1996. 8

On July 15, 1997 the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding EDUARDO PAVILLARE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of ransom, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death; to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P20,000.00, as actual damages, with interest at 6%
percent per annum from February 12, 1996; to pay him the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.

The Branch clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review.9

This case is before us on automatic review.

The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was apprehended in connection
with the kidnapping of another Indian national. While under police custody the appellant was required to stand in a police line-up where he was supposedly
identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors. Five separate charges arising from five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of whom were Indian
nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he was identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors because the Indians needed a "scapegoat"
for the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian nationals then pending.

The appellant argues that the private complainant could not identify his captors by himself which is shown by the inconsistencies in his testimony and by the
improper suggestion made by the investigating police officer pointing to the accused-appellant as one of the malefactors. In court the private complainant
stated that he described his abductors to the police investigator while the latter typed his sworn statement. He said that two of the abductors look like
policemen, the third one was "tall, a little bit aged" and the other one was the driver. Their female companion was pretty. Pavillare points out however, that the
sworn statement given by the private complainant does not contain a physical description of the kidnappers and that SPO1 Frias, who took the complainant's
statement, testified in court that the complainant described one of his abductors as short, bejeweled and with a pock marked face. The different descriptions
allegedly given by the private complainant and the absence of a physical description of the kidnappers in his sworn statement supports the accused-appellant's
contention that the complainant could not describe his abductors. Pavillare contends that his arrest in connection with a different case for the kidnapping of
another Indian national provided the complainant an improper suggestion that he was indeed one of the culprits in this case. The appellant claims that SPO1
Frias pointed to him and conversed with the private complainant before the latter was asked to identify the kidnappers. The time interval from the date of the
incident on February 12, 1996 up to the day the accused-appellant was identified at the police line-up on March 11, 1996 further weakened the complainant's
vague recognition of the culprits. Pavillare finally argues that he should not have been convicted of kidnapping for ransom but only of simple robbery as it is
borne by the undisputed facts that the offenders were motivated by an intent to gain and not to deprive the complainant of his liberty. The money demanded
by the offenders was not ransom money but one in the nature of a bribe to drop the accusation for rape of their lady companion.

The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the affirmance in toto of the appealed decision. The appellee contends that in court the private complainant
unhesitatingly and consistently identified the accused-appellant Pavillare as one of the kidnappers. Throughout his narration of the incident in court the
complainant referred to Pavillare as one of the kidnappers because he was the one who made the phone call and the one who received the ransom money. The
complainant had more than adequate opportunity to observe his abductors and he testified in court that Pavillare is one of them. As a sign of the complainant's
candor, he admitted in court that he does not recognize the other co-accused, Sotero Santos, as one of his abductors and for which reason the case was
dismissed against him. The complainant's failure to state an accurate description of the kidnappers in his sworn statement does not belie his identification of
Pavillare in court as it is the general rule that affidavits are often inaccurate and incomplete. The argument of the accused-appellant that his identification in the
police line-up was made with improper motive either from the other Indian nationals who were at the police station or from SPO1 Frias is without evidentiary
basis. Moreover, the complainant's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of his cousin who met the kidnappers and handed over the ransom money to
them. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the complainant's identification of Pavillare as one of the abductors.

The Solicitor-General further contends that the accused-appellant's alibi that he in Novaliches when the crime was committed cannot stand against the positive
identification of two witnesses and that his alibi does not make it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it happened. As regards
accused-appellant's plea to be convicted instead of simple robbery is without legal nor factual basis. The complainant was restrained of his liberty even if only
for a few hours and his captors demanded money for his release which in fact they did after the ransom money was paid. Whether or not the kidnappers only
wanted money from the complainant the manner by which they compelled him to give money, i.e. by restraining his liberty until the ransom money was paid,
constitutes kidnapping for ransom. Finally, the submission that the offenders demanded a bribe and not ransom money is likewise unfounded. There is no
evidence that any one of the kidnappers was a public officer in the performance of his duties when they demanded money from the complainant in exchange
for his liberty.

Accused-appellant Pavillare filed Reply brief to reiterate his contention that the prosecution did not controvert his testimony to the effect that the complainant
could not recognize his abductors and that it was SPO1 Frias who pinpointed him to the private complainant as one of the malefactors. Pavillare cites the
complainant's failure to identify his own relative who met him at the police station after the arrest of the accused-appellant and argues that considering that
the complainant was held captive only for about two hours and the interval of almost one month from the day of the incident up to the time the accused-
appellant was identified at the police line-up, the complainant was deprived of any reliable recollection of his captors. The complainant's failure to give a
physical description of the abductors when he gave a sworn statement to the police two days after the incident supports the accused-appellant's contention
that the complainant could not identify his captors. It is also claimed that the improper identification of the accused-appellant at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel renders the said identification, including that made in court, inadmissible in evidence.

The appeal is without merit.

The accused-appellant's defense that the identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the
line-up without the assistance of counsel is without merit.

Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. 10 The prohibition however, does not
extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. 11 It has been repeatedly held that
custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. 12 The stage of an investigation wherein a
person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. 13 It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the
admissibility of an in-court identification. 14 The identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his
abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel. In court, the private complainant positively identified Paviallare
as one of his captors and testified as follows:

Q: Were you able to recognize the faces of the men and woman who abducted you on the afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: Yes, sir I can recognize if I see them again.
Q: If you see them in court will you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to them if the accused are inside the court room?
A: That man, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing at a man seated inside the court room and when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Other than the accused Pavillare, do you recognize anybody else in this court room if among those who abducted you in the afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: None, sir.
Q: Tell us how were you abducted by the accused Pavillare and his companions in that particular date in the afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: While I was returning to my motorcycle, they blocked my way and asked for my name, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Who blocked your way and asked for your name?
A: He was infront of his companions, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness referring to accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: If you know, Mr. Singh, where were you taken by the accused after they abducted you at the corner of Roces Avenue and Scout Reyes St., Quezon City?
A: It was a deserted street somewhere in St. Joseph College, Quezon City, sir.
Q: After you reached that deserted place, what happened next, if any?
A: They asked me for P100,000,00 and I told them that I have only P5,000.00 and they told me that if I give P100,000.00 they will let me go, sir.
Q: Who demanded the amount of P100,000.00 from you?

WITNESS:
A: He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:

Again, witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Pavillare.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: Could you tell us what did your abductors tell to Lakhvir while they are talking over the telephone?
A: They told him that they should pay the amount of money for my release, sir.
Q: Incidentally, can you tell us who among your abductors who actually talked to Lakvir over the telephone?
A: He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Again, witness is referring to accused earlier identified as Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Why do you know that it was the accused Pavillare who was talking to Lakhvir over the telephone?
A: Because I was near him and I saw him talking to Lakhvir, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Where did the two of you go?
A: Inside the mini-grocery, sir.
Q: After you went inside this mini-grocery, what happened next, if any?
A: I saw my cousin Lakhvir. He asked me if I am okey and I told him that they bit me up but I am still fine, sir.
Q: After you told your cousin that you are okey except for the beating that you got but you are fine, what transpired next, if any?
A: Lakhvir gave the P20,000.00, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: To whom did Lakhvir handed the P20,000.00?
A: To him sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the accused Pavillare earlier identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Why do you know that only P20,000.00 was handed over by accused Pavillare?
A: Because they counted the money and they complained about it, sir.
Q: Who counted the money?
A: He was the one who counted the money, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused Pavillare earlier identified.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Were you present when Pavillare counted the money?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After Pavillare got the P20,000.00, what happened next, if any?
A: They left immediately and they left me too, and we went to get my motorcycle, sir. 15

On cross-examination the complainant stood firm on his identification of the accused-appellant as one of the abductors. He testified:

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You said that at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon of February 12, 1996 while you are going back to your motorcycle you were blocked by four persons, is
that correct?

ATTY. CRUZ:
Misleading, he said 3 persons, your Honor.

COURT:
Reform.

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You were blocked by 3 persons, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was the person immediately in front of you when you were blocked?
A: He was the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was earlier identified.

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: What about the two (2) other persons?

WITNESS:
A: They were behind me, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: What was the distance if you can tell us?
A: Almost together and then when they asked me my name I replied and they hold my arms, sir.
Q: Who hold your arms?
A: He was the first, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was identified earlier.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You said that there were 5 persons who abducted you?
A: Yes, sir. 4 male and one female.
Q: On March 11, 1996 your cousin informed you or your friend informed you that there were persons apprehended because also of kidnapping incident?
A: Yes, sir. There were 4 of them arrested and when I went to see them I only recognized one of them, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Who was that person?
A: He is the one, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. MALLABO:
That would be all for the witness, your Honor.

COURT:
Any redirect?

ATTY. CRUZ:
Few redirect, your Honor.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Mr. Witness, before you went to the police station on March 11, 1996 you were aware of how many suspects were in custody of kidnapping of Gormel, is it
not?
A: Yes, sir they were 4 of them.
Q: You were aware that 4 persons were arrested for the kidnapping of your friend Gormel?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: These 4 people were shown to you, were they not?
A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: But when you were asked to identify who among them were involved in your kidnapping you only pointed one of them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not point to the other accused?
A: No, sir.
Q: The only one whom you pointed as being involved in your kidnapping was none other than the person of the accused Pavillare?
A: Yes, sir. 16

Moreover, the complainant's cousin Lakhvir Singh who met the kidnappers to pay the ransom money corroborated the complainant's identification of the
accused-appellant Pavillare. Lakhvir Singh testified as follows:

Q: After reaching the designated area somewhere along Aurora Boulevard, what happened next, if any
A: As we parked our motorcycle near Land Bank, the kidnappers immediately approached us, sir.
Q: How many kidnappers approached you?
A: Three (3) of them, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: How were you able to know that they are the kidnappers?
A: Because when they approached us one of them said: "Ano dala mo and pera?"
Q: Tell us, were you able to recognize the faces of these three persons who approached you and demanded to you whether you brought the money?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you see anyone inside the courtroom, please point to him.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing at a man sitting inside the courtroom and when asked to identify himself, he gave his name as EDUARDO PAVILLARE.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After Pavillare demanded to you whether you brought with you the money, what did you do next, if any?
A: I told them "I have the money with me but I would not hand the money to you until I see Sukhjinder Singh."
Q: What was the response of the accused Pavillare after you told him that Sukhjinder Singh be first shown to you before you turn over the money?
A: One of them told us to follow him and they would bring Sukhjinder Singh, sir.
Q: From that place, where did you go if you can still recall?
A: We proceeded to a small grocery store near Land Bank, sir.
Q: After going inside this grocery store near Land Bank, tell us what happened next, if any?
A: After a few minutes, one of the kidnappers arrived together with Sukhjinder Singh, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After you saw Sukhjinder Singh together with one of his kidnappers, what did you do next, if any?
A: I immediately approached Sukhjinder Singh and I asked him if he was hurt by the kidnappers and he said "yes but I am now okey."
Q: After Sukhjinder confirmed to you that he was previously beaten and that he was already okey at that time, what did you do next, if any?

WITNESS:
A: After that, one of the kidnappers said: "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibinigay mo sa akin ang pera".

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Who among the kidnappers who said that?
A: That person, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After Pavillare demanded that you turn-over to him the money, what did you do next, if any?
A: I gave him the money, sir.
Q: When you said "him", to whom are you referring to?
A: To him, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.

ATTY. CRUZ:
If you recall, how many money all in all did you give to Eduardo Pavillare that afternoon of February 12, 1996?

A: P20,000.00, sir. 17

xxx xxx xxx

We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the identification in open court of the accused-appellant by the private complainant
and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The complainant had
close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His
cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact
with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his
abductors if he sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who
blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private complainant
admitted that he does not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the case was dismissed against him. It bears repeating that the finding of
the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely
observe the demeanor of the witness in court.

As regards the alibi forwarded by the appellant, we find that the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses for the prosecution pointing to the appellant
as one of the kidnappers prevails over it. The appellant's employee who testified to corroborate his alibi only stated that in the month of February 1996 the
accused-appellant was at the Novaliches job site everyday. 18 The trial court properly took judicial notice that it will take only a few hours drive from
Novaliches, where the accused-appellant claimed to be on the day of the incident, to Roces Ave., in Quezon City, where the complainant was kidnapped. 19
Absent any competent proof that Pavillare could not have been at the scene of the crime at the time and day it was committed, the trial court correctly denied
weight and credence to the appellant's alibi.

Pavillare's argument that the complainant could not have identified his abductors were it not for the improper suggestion made by the police investigator is
based on the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the accused-appellant himself. The police investigator was not confronted with this accusation 20 and the
defense did not present any evidence to support it. It is on record that when Pavillare's counsel made an attempt to question the police investigator, SPO1 Frias,
on a matter not covered by the direct examination, i.e., where SPO1 Frias recorded the physical description given by the complainant of his abductors, the trial
court suggested that the defense may later call SPO1 Frias to the stand as a defense witness apparently to give the defense a chance to prove its allegation that
the complainant did not give any physical description of his abductors and that the identification at the police line-up is tainted with an improper suggestion. 21
The defense counsel never called SPO1 Frias to the stand. The appellant must prove the veracity of his own defense 22 and the prosecution could not
controvert what was not presented in evidence. In the same vein, the defense did not present any competent proof that Pavillare was identified by the
complainant only as a scapegoat for the four other kidnapping cases committed against other Indian nationals.

The cited variance between the complainant's testimony in court and his affidavit on whether or not the complainant gave a physical description of his
abductors before the police investigator pertains to a minor detail. Both the complainant and police investigator SPO1 Frias testified that the former gave a
physical description of the abductors to the police. The complainant testified that he gave the physical description of the kidnappers while the police typed his
affidavit but no such physical description of the kidnappers is stated in the affidavit. On the other hand, the police investigator testified that the said description
was entered in the police logbook. The defense never required SPO1 Frias to produce the logbook in court to ascertain whether such a description was given
during the investigation. As a rule, variance between the private complainant's affidavit and his testimony in court, as long as it does not deviate from the
nature of the crime as stated in the Information, does not weaken the credibility of the testimony in court. 23

Finally, the accused-appellant's argument that he should have been convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves
that the prime motive of the accused-appellant and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours, are both
unmeritorious. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2 If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is the subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed. 24
The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are replete with positive declarations that the accused-appellant and his companions demanded
money for the complainant's release. The pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not supported by the
evidence. The complainant's cousin testified that at the agreed drop-off point Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated, "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo
ibigay mo sa akin ang pera". The accused-appellant released the complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money Pavillare
and his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of the private
complainant. The death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court. 25

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed.1a\^/phi1 The crime of kidnapping is committed by
depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. 26 As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted
the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

Four Members of the court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nonetheless they submit to the
ruling of the majority of this Court i.e., that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed in this case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q96-65214 finding the accused-appellant Eduardo Pavillare y Varona
guilty of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the DEATH penalty and the awards for actual and moral damages is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 124299 April 12, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR LACANIETA alias "Boy Alog", JERRY BALLENAS alias "Marlon Marquez" and Carlito Gamad, accused, JERRY BALLENAS, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Consorcia Tayo (Consorcia) claims that her daughter, 19-year-old WILMA TAYO (WILMA) was abducted at gunpoint on March 20, 1987. WILMA was found dead
the next day, her body bore signs that she was first raped then brutally stabbed ten times. Four persons were suspected as perpetrators of the crime: JERRY
BALLENAS (BALLENAS) alias MARLON MARQUEZ, CESAR LACANIETA (LACANIETA) alias BOY ALOG, ALBERTO SALVADOR (SALVADOR) and CARLITO GAMAD
(GAMAD). SALVADOR was shot dead during the police investigation and GAMAD was also shot dead after the re-investigation conducted by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of San Jose, Antique.

Based on the records of this case, LACANIETA and BALLENAS were already charged with murder at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique.
Since BALLENAS had already been arraigned for murder, an Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape was filed on October 12, 1987 against BALLENAS and
LACANIETA before the same court. LACANIETA thereafter posted bail, but he eventually absconded. The Information was then amended on June 19, 1989 to
read as follows:

At the instance of the mother of the deceased offended party, Wilma Tayo, who has subscribed and sworn to a complaint attached to the records of the above-
entitled cases, the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses JERRY BALLENAS alias "MARLON MARQUEZ" of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with Cesar Lacanieta who is still at large and Alberto Salvador and Carlito Gamad, both deceased, being
then armed with gun and knife and by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct and carry away Wilma Tayo at a gun point (sic) to an uninhabited place and while there,
by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the said Wilma Tayo against the latter's will.

Contrary to the provisions of article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 of the same Code.1

Trial fiscal Juan C. Mission, Jr. was of the opinion that the proper charge against BALLENAS is forcible abduction with rape "because an independent act of
forcible abduction preceded the rape and murder of the deceased Wilma Tayo," and not the special complex crime of rape with homicide.2

The arraignment of BALLENAS for forcible abduction with rape came belatedly because it was only after the case was already submitted for decision when the
trial court discovered that BALLENAS had not yet been arraigned. Both the prosecution and defense then agreed to arraign BALLENAS and to consider all the
evidence earlier presented as reproduced. BALLENAS was accordingly arraigned on the Amended Information on February 18, 1992; he pleaded not guilty. The
evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Consorcia and Florencio Millones (Florencio) and Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" as documentary
evidence, while the defense presented BALLENAS as its lone witness.

The version of the prosecution as summarized by the trial court is as follows:

On March 20, 1987 about 7 o'clock in the evening, the Wilma Tayo (sic) and her mother Mrs. Consorcia Tayo were in their house at Sitio Bulho, Cubay-Sermon,
Sibalom, Antique. They were about to eat supper when someone called to them asking to light a cigarette. Wilma Tayo asked who was calling and the answer
was "I am Junior, let me light my cigarette". Wiima Tayo opened the door slightly and there stood accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez. Accused did not
light his cigarette but instead blew the gas lamp and put out the light. He held Wilma Tayo by the wrist.

Accused Jerry Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma Tayo and Consorcia Tayo. Accused told Wilma Tayo to accompany him to Maria Leong-on, his girlfriend.
Wilma Tayo refused as they were about to eat supper. Consorcia Tayo also told her daughter, Wilma Tayo not go out (sic) because it was already dark. Accused
Jerry Ballenas forced Wilma Tayo to go out with him and struck the hand of Consorcia Tayo and pointed the handgun at her. Accused held Wilma Tayo tightly
and took her away.

Because of the abduction, Consorcia Tayo sought the help of a neighbor, Andres Mallorca, whose house is about 20 meters away from her house but to no avail,
Andres Mallorca shut the door on her for fear of Jerry Ballenas as the letter is known as a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the New People's Army.

The following morning, Consorcia Tayo reported the abduction of Wilma Tayo to her son-in-law who is a member of the Integrated National Police. She learned
from Aurelio Gamad that her daughter Wilma Tayo was already dead. The police then proceeded to the scene of the incident.

At the time Wilma Tayo was abducted, she was 19 years old. She was single and a third year student in the Polytechnic State College of Antique, Sibalom,
Antique.

Consorcia Tayo spent P30,000.00 for the funeral of Wilma Tayo. Consorcia was shocked and she felt pain with the death of her only daughter Wilma Tayo. To
Consorcia Tayo no amount of money could compensate the death of her daughter Wilma Tayo whom they loved so much.

BALLENAS disavows any participation in the abduction, rape and killing of WILMA and offered this version, viz:

In the afternoon of March 20, 1987, at about past 4:00 p.m., he was in the house of CARLITO GAMAD. When darkness came, CARLITO asked him to accompany
CEZAR LACANIETA (a boarder of the GAMAD's), to the house of victim WILMA TAYO. Victim was the girlfriend of LACANIETA. On the way, LACANIETA told him of
his plan to elope with victim, and asked him to talk to her. He proceeded to the house of victim, while LACANIETA was left behind near the irrigation canal. Upon
reaching the house of victim, he called out and the mother answered his call and then victim came out of the house. He told victim that LACANIETA had
something to tell her and that he was waiting for her at the irrigation canal. Both of them proceeded to where LACANIETA was waiting and after he led victim to
LACANIETA, he went home (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, August 9, 1990).3

On May 29, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique rendered its Decision4 finding BALLENAS guilty of forcible abduction with rape, the
judgment declares:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and Article 48 of the same
Code with reclusion perpetua to death by reason of the use of a firearm by accused Jerry Ballenas in the abduction of Wilma Tayo. And applying Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed should be the greater penalty of death there being two aggravating circumstances but because the
present Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty accused Jerry Ballenas is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Wilma Tayo the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay Consorcia Tayo, the sum of P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses incurred by her for the funeral of the deceased Wilma Tayo and to pay
the cost.
SO ORDERED.5

In this appeal, BALLENAS questions the quoted decision on these grounds:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH
RAPE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00, THE SUM OF P30,000.00
FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES AND TO PAY THE COSTS. 6

This Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in concluding that BALLENAS is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the forcible abduction and rape of
WILMA. In asserting his innocence, BALLENAS foists the defense of alibi, a defense that has long been considered as intrinsically the weakest of all defenses.7
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to
the crime because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.8

In this case, Consorcia, the mother of WILMA, positively identified BALLENAS as the person who went to her house and abducted her daughter at gunpoint that
fateful night. Moreover, the testimony of Florencio fortifies the theory of the prosecution that after the abduction of WILMA, BALLENAS together with
LACANIETA, SALVADOR and GAMAD raped and stabbed WILMA. According to Florencio, he was passing through the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom,
antique when he saw "Boy Alog" (LACANIETA) lying on top of WILMA.9 The hands of WILMA were then held down by BALLENAS and SALVADOR. 10 Surprised by
the presence of Florencio, LACANIETA stood up and told the former that they were just having a "happy-happy". 11 Florencio then left and after reaching three
brazas, he hid to see what the group was up to. 12 Florencio testified that he thereafter saw four men take turns in ravishing and stabbing WILMA. 13 The
following testimony of Florencio establishes the participation of BALLENAS in the crime charged:

Q: Mr. Millones, you said that you are a resident of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique, how long have you been a resident of that plade?
A: I was born there.
Q: Are you still a resident in that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On March 20, 1987, were you still a resident of that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On that day, about 7:00 o'clock in the evening can you recall where you were?
A: Yes, sir, I was walking on the street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique and it was already past 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q: Where did you come from?
A: I came from Durog leading to Catmon.
Q: Where were you going then?
A: I was intending to go to the house of my deceased mother whose wake falls on that night.
Q: While walking from Durog towards your house, can you recall if you were able to observe any unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that about?
A: While I was in the street of Brgy. Catmon, Sibalom Antique, I saw four persons, three are squatting, while the other one is lying flat on his stomach and I
thought there (sic) were all drinking.
Q: As you pass by these four persons, did you start any conversation with them?
A: While I was approaching them and when I reach that place, the fellow who was lying flat on his stomach, stood up and told me that they were just having a
happy happy so I will just pass by my way.
Q: What else did you see when he stood up?
A: When he stood up, he told me I will proceed on my way and I saw that the three persons were holding a girl.
Q: You said they were holding a girl, do you know that girl?
A: Yes, sir, Wilma Tayo, daughter of Consorcia Tayo.
Q: Aside from Marlon, do you know that three other persons?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: They were Alberto Salvador, Carlito Gamad, Marlon and Boy Alog.
Q: And who was that person who was lying flat on his stomach?
A: Boy Alog.
Q: If these three persons are inside the courtroom, could you please point to them?
A: Only one is here inside the courtroom.
Q: And who was that?
A: Jerry Ballenas.

INTERPRETER:
At this juncture, the witness pointed to a man seated inside the courtroom and when asked by the Interpreter what his name is, identified himself as Jerry
Ballenas.
Q You said that three persons were holding on to Wilma Tayo, will you please tell us who among these three persons were holding Wilma Tayo and on what
part of the body?
A: Carlito Gamad was holding the hands of Wilma Tayo and the hands of the girl are both stretched above his head.
Q: How about the two other persons?
A: While Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, Jr. were holding on each of the leg of the girl.
Q: How did these Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, how were they holding the legs of Wilma Tayo.
A: Wilma was lying flat on his (sic) back on the street and each of these persons were holding on each of the leg of Wilma Tayo.
Q: Are the legs of Wilma Tayo held fell (sic) to the ground or raised up?
A: The legs are joined to the ground in V-position.
Q: Do you know if Wilma Tayo saw you pass by?

ATTY. ABIERA:
Incompetent, your Honor.

COURT:
Sustained.

FISCAL MISSION:
After you were told that they were just there for a happy happy, what did you do?
A: I told them I will pass my way.
Q: After that, what did you do?
A: I walk farther and observe.
Q: How far did you walk and observe these persons?
A: I walk from the place about three brazas so that I could observe what they were doing.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to the court by pointing inside the courtroom how far more or less is three brazas?

INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to the wall of the other courtroom of Branch 11 which is more or less 8 to 9 brazas.

FISCAL MISSION:
Q: Now, upon reaching that place about 8 brazas to make some observation, what did you do?
A: I hid and observe what they were doing.
Q: Did you observe anything else?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you observe?
A: I saw them. These four took turns in raping the girl.
Q: Then what else did you see?
A: After raping Wilma Tayo, they also took turns in stabbing her.
Q: How long did you observe the group?
A: I could not determine the length of time I stayed in that place because I do not have a watch.
Q: After making such observation, what did you do?
A: After I have witnessed that horrifying incident, I just proceed to the house of my deceased mother. 14

The autopsy report made by Dr. Julito V. Osunero, Chief of the Ramon Maza Memorial District Hospital, Sibalom, Antique confirms the testimony of Florencio.
The report contains these findings:

1. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
2. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru and thru.
3. Stab wound, 1 inch long Left side neck and point of exit Right side Neck thru and thru, cutting carotid and jugular vessels.
4. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Epigastric Area perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Liver.
5. Stab wound, 1 inch diameter perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Stomach.
6. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right anterior Chest perforating thoracic Cavity penetrating Right Lung.
7. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right Lumber Area perforating Abdominal Cavity penetrating Kidney.
8. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Lumbar Area Right, perforating Abdominal Cavity.
9. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
10. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle depth.
11. Contusion both thigh, 2 inches diameter, left and 3 inches diameter, right.
12. Hymen Lacerations 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock, Fresh. 15

The cause of the death of WILMA is reported as due to hemorrhage secondary to wounds on the neck, chest, abdomen and back. 16

The trial court opined that the contusions on the thighs of WILMA show that her legs were forcibly set apart to facilitate the rape of WILMA. That WILMA was
raped is evidenced by hymenal lacerations, still found fresh on March 21, 1987, the day the autopsy was conducted. We agree with the trial court that based on
the evidence, it could readily be concluded that the perpetrators stabbed WILMA several times after the commission of the rape. 17

In a desperate attempt to reverse the decision of the trial court, BALLENAS impresses upon this Court his theory that if he indeed committed the crime charged,
he would not have exposed himself to Consorcia at the time that WILMA was abducted. 18 BALLENAS also points out that his return to Catmon the following
Monday after the death of WILMA and on which date he was arrested, belies his participation in the despicable crime. 19 BALLENAS argues that if he was guilty
of the crime, he would not have returned to Catmon to face the possibility of being arrested since the victim was with him on the night of March 20, 1987. 20

We are not persuaded. A telling detail in this case is the fact that the mother of the victim witnessed first hand the abduction of her daughter at gunpoint.
Consorcia has no reason to wrongfully implicate BALLENAS. As the mother of the deceased victim, Consorcia would want nothing short of justice for her dead
daughter. BALLENAS does not deny the fact that he went to see WILMA to fetch her that evening of March 20, 1987. In professing his innocence, BALLENAS
merely denies the allegations of Consorcia that he took away WILMA at gunpoint and offers the defense that he merely talked to WILMA to convince her to
meet with LACANIETA. Well-settled is the rule that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credence. 21 An affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 22 The
fact that BALLENAS exposed himself to Consorcia all the more indicates his brazenness in abducting WILMA. The return of BALLENAS to Catmon after the death
of WILMA cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence. It is the credible and unwavering testimony of Consorcia that stands as solid proof of the guilt of
BALLENAS.1âwphi1.nêt

BALLENAS assails the testimony of Florencio on the ground that it "abounds in inconsistencies" 23 and is not credible. The alleged inconsistencies are however
not clearly established. Notably, Florencio unequivocally said that he saw LACANIETA, BALLENAS, SALVADOR and GAMAD rape and stab WILMA. We have no
reason to doubt the credibility of Florencio in light of the doctrine that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit. 24 The initial
reluctance of Florencio to get involved in this case is understandable and does not cast doubt on his credibility as a witness. Whenever the issue boils down to
credibility, we have always maintained that the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 25 Findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. 26

We therefore see no cogent reason to reverse the judgment of the trial court convicting BALLENAS of the crime of forcible abduction with rape. The trial court
ruled that there are two aggravating circumstances in this case, nighttime 27 and that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission 28 . We however digress from the finding of the trial court that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission are present in the case at bar.

Based on the records, BALLENAS abducted WILMA around 7 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1987 and that BALLENAS blew off the lighted kerosene lamp
offered by WILMA to BALLENAS to light his cigarette. 29 However, Consorcia testified that there was some light coming from another kerosene lamp upstairs
that "reflected (sic) the door" and that Consorcia also had a kerosene lamp with her that BALLENAS also put off. 30 In the case of People vs. Pallarco, 31 the
scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp, hence we ruled in that case that nocturnity cannot be appreciated if it can be shown that the
place was adequately lighted. 32 The prosecution also failed to prove that nighttime was specially sought by the accused or taken advantage of by him or that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, circumstances which must be present before the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be appreciated.
We also do not agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty attended the commission of the crime charged. The aggravating
circumstance of cruelty is present when "the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission". 33 There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in
the consummation of the criminal act. 34 In People vs. Ferrer 35 , the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was not appreciated in the absence of positive proof
that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13) wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the blows which
snuffed out his life. In this case, WILMA sustained ten (10) stab wounds, but these multiple wounds alone do not prove that the accused deliberately inflicted
the injuries to prolong unnecessarily her physical suffering. Thus, the trial court improperly considered the aggravating circumstance of cruelty in the case at
bar.

What is present in this case is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Consorcia testified that her house has a ladder that leads to the main door; that
BALLENAS was at the main door when he called WILMA; and that when WILMA refused to go with BALLENAS, it was there that BALLENAS forced WILMA to go
with him. 36 Without a doubt, WILMA was abducted while she was still in her house. Thus, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
considering that it is not necessary that the accused should have entered the dwelling of the victim. 37

BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and 48 of the
same Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs 38 . The crime of forcible abduction
with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 39
BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that
took effect on December 31, 1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion
perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven in court, should have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctfully ruled that the
penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of
reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of a crime. 40

This Court is however constrained to disallow the amount of P30,000.00 for the burial expenses incurred by Consorcia. We can only give credit for actual
damages such as burial expenses if there are receipts that can support the claim. 41 The records in the case at bench do not substantiate the P30,000.00 burial
expenses sought by Consorcia, except for her lone assertion.

The P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court must be modified. Instead of the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
considering that the crime was committed with the use of a weapon as alleged in the information and proven in court. In consonance with jurisprudence, the
increase of the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is justified if the crime was committed under circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. 42 In
People vs. Bañago 43 , the accused committed the crime of rape with the use of a gun on October 15, 1993, before the passage of RA 7659. This Court was thus
precluded from meting out the death penalty, but nevertheless the accused was ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. 44

In spite of the death of the victim in this case, we cannot award the higher amount of P100,000.00, the civil indemnity awarded in cases of rape with homicide.
45 The information in the case at bar is merely for forcible abduction with rape and not for rape with homicide.

Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are also hereby granted to the heirs of the victim. The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the
victim in a criminal proceeding without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental or physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at trial. 46 Here,
Consorcia testified as to the inconsolable loss that she felt when her only daughter was abducted, ravished and killed. 47

Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 48
Since dwelling is appreciated in this case as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is therefore in order.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, antique is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant Jerry
Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is deleted.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 131619-20. February 1, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BERNIE CORTEZ y NATANIO, RICARDO CALLOS y PULGO and ROGELIO BETONIO y LUPO, Accused-
appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Accused BERNIE CORTEZ was charged with the crimes of kidnapping and illegal possession of explosive, while co-accused RICARDO CALLOS and ROGELIO
BETONIO were charged solely with kidnapping. The Information against Cortez in Criminal Case No. 2681 reads:

"That on or about the 18th day of December 1994 in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and have in his possession, custody and control a handgrenade
without first securing license or permit from the proper authorities."

The Information against Cortez, Callos and Betonio in Criminal Case No. 2682 reads:

"That on or about the 18th day of December 1994 in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippine(s) and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and they (sic) mutually helping and assisting one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take away and kidnap and detain one Lolita Mendoza."

Trial ensued after the accused pled "not guilty" at the arraignment.

LOLITA MENDOZA , the kidnap victim, recounted her ordeal, thus: On December 18, 1994, at about 6:00 a.m., she was in her house, in Sitio Catmon, San Rafael,
Rodriguez, Rizal, when accused BERNIE CORTEZ, RICARDO CALLOS and ROGELIO BETONIO, all armed with bolos, arrived. They were looking for Lolita's cousin,
SANTOS ESMINDA, and were threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos, they decided to abduct Lolita to prevent her from reporting the incident to
the police. Accompanied by the other two, accused Callos pointed his bolo at Lolita's back and dragged her to the mountain. They brought her to the house of
PABLO TORRAL, an uncle of accused Cortez, and thereafter continued their search for Santos.1 Hours later, the policemen and the barangay captain rescued
Lolita in the house of the Torrals.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Lolita's testimony was corroborated by her cousin, CAROLINA ESMINDA, the wife of Santosinda. On said date and time, Carolina was in her house when she
heard a woman shout: "Lina, tulungan mo ako." She looked around and saw Lolita surrounded by the three accused, all armed with bolos. Accused Cortez was
clasping Lolita's hand, accused Callos was gripping Lolita's other arm, while accused Betonio was pushing her. She heard accused Cortez bellowed at Lolita,
demanding to know the whereabouts of Santos. Frightened, Carolina scampered to the house of her neighbor, JAIME FRANCILLO. After a few minutes, the three
accused proceeded to Francillo's house looking for Santos. When Francillo informed them that he has not seen Santos, the accused angrily hacked the door of
Francillo's house before they left.3cräläwvirtualibräry

Carolina rushed to the Montalban municipal hall and reported Lolita's abduction. PO2 ROLANDO SANTOS and SPO2 JAIME SEXON accompanied Carolina back to
the crime scene to gather more information. Further investigation disclosed that accused Cortez resided in the mountainous area of Sitio Lagundi.4 They
proceeded to the residence of accused Cortez. PO2 Santos saw accused Callos and Betonio in front of Cortez' house. The two were unarmed and appeared
uneasy upon seeing them. As his suspicions were aroused, PO2 Santos decided to approach them. However, accused Cortez suddenly emerged from his house
with a bolo tucked to his waist. PO2 Santos arrested and handcuffed accused Cortez and confiscated his bolo. He also searched the vicinity of Cortez' house for
other weapons. In the house, he saw a live grenade on the bamboo bed near the door and a bolo on top of a house post. He confiscated these weapons. On
further search outside the house, he saw and got another bolo on top of a chicken coop. He turned them over to SPO2 Sexon for
safekeeping.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused Cortez divulged to PO2 Santos that they brought Lolita to the house of his uncle, Pablo Torral. PO2 Santos then handcuffed the three accused and with
barangay captain ROGELIO COLARINA, rushed to the house of the Torrals. Carolinainda and SPO2 Sexon stayed in the house of accused Cortez, together with
the three accused.6cräläwvirtualibräry

PO2 Santos and barangay captain Colarina found Lolita outside the nipa hut of the Torrals, conversing with Pablo Torral. Lolita told them that the Torrals did not
prevent her from leaving their house. However, she did not attempt to escape for fear that the accused would make good their threat to kill her. PO2 Santos
brought her back to the house of accused Cortez7 where she identified the three accused as her abductors. The police then took the accused into
custody.8cräläwvirtualibräry

The three (3) accused foisted the defense of denial and alibi. Accused BERNIE CORTEZ recounted that on December 17, 1994, he worked in Dulongbayan. His
friend Raffy informed him that the father and son of Santosinda were looking for him in his house in Sitio Lagundi. He decided to go home the next
day.9cräläwvirtualibräry

En route to his house, he met two policemen who asked him if he knew a man by the name of Bernie Cortez. He identified himself to the police officers as the
man they were looking for. The policemen handcuffed him and asked where he resided. Accused Cortez brought the police officers to his house. One of them
entered his house and told him to wait outside. After a few minutes, the policeman emerged carrying three bolos and a live grenade. Accused Cortez denied
ownership of these weapons10 and disclaimed knowledge of Lolita's whereabouts. It was Carolinainda who informed the police that Lolita was taken to the
house of the Torrals. Forthwith, one of the policemen and the barangay captain rushed to the house of the Torrals. Accused Cortez was left in his house, with
the other policeman guarding him. After about an hour and a half, the policeman and the barangay captain returned with an old lady whose identity was
allegedly unknown to accused Cortez. The police officers then brought accused Cortez to the municipal hall11 and incarcerated him. He met his two co-accused
for the first time in the jail. He also learned that his uncle, Pablo Torral, had earlier filed a robbery case against Santosinda who was arrested four (4) days prior
to the alleged abduction.12cräläwvirtualibräry

For his part, accused ROGELIO BETONIO recounted that in the morning of December 18, 1994, he was en route to Sitio Catmon, Rizal, when he saw his former
co-employee accused RICARDO CALLOS in a jeepney. Callos was also on his way to Montalban, Rizal.13 They alighted in Montalban and were walking towards
the direction of Sitio Catmon when they met two policemen who were carrying some bolos. Accused Cortez, then already in handcuffs, was with them. For no
apparent reason, the policemen placed them under arrest. The identity of accused Cortez was unknown to him at that time.14cräläwvirtualibräry

JAIME FRANCILLO , a neighbor of theindas, testified for the defense. He claimed that on December 18, 1994, at about 7:15 a.m., the three accused went to his
house unarmed and looking for Santosinda. Unable to locate Santos, the three left, together with Lolita, who appeared to have voluntarily accompanied the
accused in their search for her cousin Santos.15cräläwvirtualibräry

After trial, Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr.16 found all the accused guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"a) In Crim. Case No. 2681, finding accused Bernie Cortez y Natanio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of P.D. 1866 and is hereby
sentenced, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

"b) In Crim. Case No. 2682, accused Bernie Cortez y Natanio, Ricardo Callos y Pugo and Rogelio Betonio y Lupo are hereby found guilty of the crime of
kidnapping, defined and penalized by RA 7695 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

"SO ORDERED." (Emphasis supplied)

Hence this appeal where appellants impugn their conviction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

On the charge of kidnapping, appellants maintain that the prosecution failed to establish one of the essential elements of the crime, i.e., deprivation of the
victim's liberty. They point out that PO2 Santos testified that, at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically confined inside the house as they found her
standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress that Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leaving the house. They
also cite the testimony of defense witness Jaime Francillo that when he saw Lolita with the appellants on that fateful day, she did not seem to be under duress.
Moreover, they contend that the charges against them were contrived by Lolita as a leverage for the dismissal of the robbery case earlier filed by Pablo Torral
against Santosinda. Court

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the State has the burden of proving all the essential elements of an offense. For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent
of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable proof.17 However, it is not necessary that the offended
party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion.18 In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by
evidence. When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept her in the house of the Torrals.19 Appellant
Cortez even bound her hands with a belt.20 Although at the time of the rescue, she was found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she
did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the
appellants knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has
been known to render people immobile. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of
actual force or violence21 which is one of the elements of the crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.

Far from bolstering the defense of the appellants, the testimony of defense witness Jaime Francillo sealed their fate. Francillo placed the appellants right in the
vicinity of the crime when he testified that the appellants, accompanied by Lolita, went to his house looking for Santos. While Francillo recounted that the
appellants were unarmed and Lolita appeared to have voluntarily gone with them, his testimony that appellants showed up at his house that day contradicts
appellants' claim that they were nowhere near the kidnap victim on that fateful day and that they were all peremptorily accosted by the police officers on the
street.

We come now to the charge of illegal possession of explosive.

We find that the conviction of appellant Cortez is unwarranted. To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as
amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the
presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same,22 and (b) the negative fact that
the accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive.23mis

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the crime, i.e, the lack of license or permit of appellant Cortez to possess the hand
grenade. Although the hand grenade seized by PO2 Santos from appellant was presented in court, the records bear that PO2 Santos did not submit the grenade
to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit for verification.24 This explains why no certification or testimony was adduced by the prosecution at the trial to prove
that appellant Cortez was not licensed to possess the explosive. The failure of the prosecution to adduce this fact is fatal to its cause.25 We stress that the
essence of the crime penalized under P.D. 1866 is primarily the accused's lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as
possession by itself is not prohibited by law. In the case of an explosive, a permit or license to possess it is usually granted to mining corporations, military
personnel and other legitimate users. As the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that appellant Cortez was not authorized to possess the
grenade seized from his house, his acquittal for illegal possession of explosive is inevitable.

IN VIEW WHEREOF , the impugned Decision is MODIFIED. On the charge of illegal possession of explosive, appellant Bernie Cortez y Natanio is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. However, the conviction of appellants Bernie Cortez y Natanio, Ricardo Callos y Pulgo and Rogelio Betonio y Lupo for the crime of
kidnapping is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C. J. (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2427 June 28, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANATALIO SALIENTE (alias UDTUHAN) and JULIAN MONTILLA, Defendants-Appellants.

REYES, J.:

Found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Leyte of the crime of illegal detention and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months
and 2 day of prision correccional to 7 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, and to pay the costs, the defendants above named have appealed to the Court
of Appeals, but a division of that court has certified the case here as one beyond its jurisdiction on account of the penalty which, in its opinion, should be
imposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence shows that at about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 4, 1946, the defendants came to the house of Telesfora Alentejo in the barrio of
Umating, Abuyog, Leyte, where Telesfora's niece, Juana Briones, was then staying. Telling Juana that the had come for by her by order of their "chief," they
asked her to go along with them and when she refused she was threatened by defendant Montilla with a bolo and by defendant Saliente with a pistol and then
taken against her will to the latter's house in the barrio of Tambis, about two kilometers away. It would appear that the defendants were accompanied by some
soldiers, although these were neither named nor identified. Once in Saliente's house, defendants let Juana know that what they had told her in private so that
he could persuade her into marrying him. Juana retorted that she did not want to marry anybody.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Juana was kept in Saliente's house for two nights and one day, but no attempt was made against her honor, thanks to the presence of Saliente's wife. On the
third day, Juana was able to persuade the defendants to take her to the house of her brother, Brigido Enclona, so that they could talk the matter over with him.
There they were joined by Montilla's father who, in behalf of his son, asked for Juana's hand in marriage. As Juana turned a deaf ear to the proposal, the trio
took their departure, leaving her in the house of her brother.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the evening of that same day, however, the defendants came back and, complaining that Juana had fooled them, they forcibly took her downstairs. Montilla
then led her away, while Saliente stayed behind to wait for Enclona, who, was then absent. Meeting Enclona on the road, Juana warned him that Saliente was
lying in wait for him with the intention of doing him harm. On hearing this, Enclona ran away, while Montilla, on his part, left Juana to herself and went back to
rejoin Saliente.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants Montilla admitted having taken Juana from the house of her aunt, but put up the defense that this was done with her consent, since they had
long been sweethearts and had, on the day in question, exchanged notes regarding their elopement. On this point he was corroborated by Agustin Jayma and
Leonardo Sillar, who claimed to have seen those notes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are with the trial court in rejecting this defense. If Juana were really in love with Montilla and had agreed to elope with him, we do not see why she should
refuse to marry him and even try to send him to jail on a false charge. Proof that Juana had not given her consent is the fact that defendants were obviously
expecting resistance, for they were not only armed but also accompanied by soldiers. The alleged exchange of notes between Juana and Montilla must be pure
fabrication, since it is admitted that these two did not know how to read and write.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense of alibi put up by defendants Saliente has nothing to support other that the biased testimony of himself and his mother and is not sufficiently
convincing to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution as to his participation in the crime. And even supposing that Brigido Enclona
had really a grudge against him because he had confiscated his gun and given him a fist blow besides, this in itself would hardly furnish a sufficient reason for
Juana Briones to implicate him in a crime in which he had no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try this case without a new information after it had been provisionally dismissed without defendant's
consent, and that the reopening of the case after such dismissal placed them in double jeopardy, lacks concrete basis, for the record before us does not disclose
the facts upon which the contention is founded. As the Solicitor General observes, all that can found touching on this point is some vague manifestation of
counsel made at the commencement of the hearing, and such manifestation does not, of course, constitute evidence of the facts now alleged in support of the
plea of double jeopardy and lack of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime committed is that of slight illegal detention under the third paragraph of article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18,
approved on September 25, 1946, it appearing that the defendants voluntarily released Juana Briones within three days from the commencement of her
detention without having attained the purpose intended and before the institution of the criminal action against them. The penalty prescribed is prision mayor
in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding P700. As the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling,
not compensated by any mitigating circumstances, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Wherefore, the defendants are declared guilty of slight illegal detention and, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced each to a penalty
of from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. They are furthermore sentenced each to pay a fine
of P500. Modified accordingly, the sentenced appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Pablo and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted in favor of this decision.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4580. September 7, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The accused is charged with illegally detaining Apolonio de Peralta and Emeterio Navalta on the 18th day of July, 1907, in the hamlet of Magatel, municipality of
Luna, Province of La Union. The evidence for the prosecution and the defense is conflicting to a degree, but we think that the following facts are established
beyond a reasonable doubt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The defendant, Santiago Fontanilla, went to the hamlet of Magatel, where five men were engaged in tilling a tract of land under the directions of Apolonio de
Peralta. A dispute there arose as to the right of Peralta to cultivate the land, which Peralta claimed to be the property of his brother, but which the accused
insisted belonged to him A fight ensued as a result of which the accused captured and tied with a rope Peralta and one Emeterio Navalta, after having driven the
rest of the laborers away. He then took his two prisoners to the municipal jail, where he turned them over to the jailer in charge. The prisoners were held in
detention a couple of hours at the jail, after which they were turned loose by the orders of the municipal president or the justice of the peace.

There is irreconcilable conflict in the testimony as to the details of the fight, but we do not deem it important for the purpose of this case definitely to
determine what occurred on that occasion. The accused claims that Peralta and his men assaulted him without provocation, and that all he did was to defend
himself and afterwards to arrest two of the party who attacked him. We agree with the trial Judge that this story is incredible, and we are convinced from a
review of all the evidence that the fact is that the accused, finding Peralta and his laborers tilling a piece of land in which he claimed a right of possession,
ordered them off the land, and undertook to drive them away by force, thus precipitating the dispute in which he was clearly the aggressor. It does not appear
that the persons whom the accused arrested committed any crime which would justify their arrest without warrant by a peace officer, and the evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that there was no justification whatever for their arrest by a private person. The accused was not a peace officer, and was not
exercising any public function when he made the arrest, nor did he have any authority to seize trespassers upon his land and commit them to the public jail, yet
the fact remains that he did apprehend and detain these parties, and turn them over to the authorities.

Article 483 of the Penal Code provides that any person who, cases permitted by law being excepted, shall without sufficient reason, apprehend or detain
another, in order to turn him over to the authorities, shall be punished with the penalties of arresto menor and the fine of 325 to 3,250 pesetas, and the offense
committed by the accused clearly falls under the provisions of this article. The trial court was of opinion that the offense committed is that prescribed by article
481, which provides that any private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of
prision mayor. We think, however, that the fact that the accused, after he had apprehended the complaining witnesses, immediately conducted them to the
municipal jail, and thus turned them over to the authorities, takes the offense out of that article and brings it within the purview of article 483.

The penalty prescribed under this article is that of arresto menor, which seems hardly adequate in view of all the circumstances of this case, but it is the penalty
prescribed by law and the only one which can lawfully be imposed. Viada in his third volume of Commentaries on the Penal Code of Spain (p. 288), commenting
on article 497 in that code which corresponds to article 483 in the Penal Code in force in the Philippine Islands, makes the following
observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Arresto menor, a light penalty under the general scale of penalties set out in article 26, is here applied for the first and only time in this code to a ’delito
correccional’ (offense greater than misdemeanor). It would appear that in place of this offense it was intended to prescribe arresto mayor; but the error which
had already been committed in the Code of 1848 was repeated in the Code of 1850, and has not been amended in the Code of 1870, thus gravely marring the
classification of crimes and misdemeanors set out in article 6 of this code, and of those which preceded it."cralaw virtua1aw library

However this may be, it is our duty to impose the penalty prescribed by law and no other, but in view of all the circumstances, and the court having authority to
exercise its discretion within the limits of the penalty prescribed, without dividing that penalty into maximum, medium, and minimum degrees, we think the
light penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its utmost severity.

The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be and are hereby reversed, and in place thereof, this court finds the accused guilty of the offense of
unlawful detention defined and penalized in article 483, and sentences him to thirty days of arresto menor, to the payment of a fine of 3,250 pesetas, and in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, as prescribed by law, not to exceed one-third the term of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs in
both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.