The Pak-Afghan Detente

Author(s): George L. Montagno

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Dec., 1963), pp. 616-624
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023487
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THEPAK-AFGHANDETENTE
GEORGE L. MONTAGNO
Last May the Teheran agreement normalizing relations be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan received little attention from a world that
had its eyes focused on big power politics. However, restoration of trade
and vital transit agreements between the Muslim neighbors is welcome
news for the Middle East and for the West.
Continued friction with India and a restive People's Republic of China
on her borders make it impolitic for Pakistan to continue enmities across
the Durand Line, which separates her from the Texas-sized kingdom of
Afghanistan. The Afghans also will profit from improved relations with
the more progressive-minded Pakistanis. Wooed by both power blocks,
and possessing both Russia and China as border mates, the rulers in
Kabul have had a trying time maintaining the traditional independence of
their country. National interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan demand that
lesser squabblesbe buried, or at least set temporarilyaside.
Differenceshave led to two diplomatic crises. The first rupture occurred
in 1955, when the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was attacked by an aroused
mob and the Pak flag burned. The rioters were protesting the announced
incorporation of Pakistan's tribal area into the province of West Pakistan,
a move made for facilitating the framing of the Pakistan Constitution.
Mediation efforts of Iran, Turkey and Iraq had managed to restore dip-
lomatic relations.
The second rupture was forced by Pakistan in September 1961, when
she closed her consulates in Afghanistan, ostensibly because they could not
function properly due to harassment.* She demanded that Afghanistan
close its consulates and trade agencies in West Pakistan because they had
been indulging in subversive and anti-Pakistan activities. Kabul's answer
was to sever relations on September6, seal the border to the passage of all
vehicles, and refuse to accept shipmentsvia Karachi.
Economic consequences were severe for both sides. Pakistan, whose
revenue from the transit trade had been considerable, lost heavily, while
Afghan fruit growers found themselves cut off from traditional markets in
India and Pakistan. Although the Soviet Union rescued Afghan vineyards
from momentary disaster, the establishment of distilleries in Afghanistan
to handle fruit supplies did not provide either an appreciable avenue of
employmentor a competitive advantage against outsiders. Meanwhile, dis-
location of markets and generally mounting shortages of essential con-
sumer items, which a flow of supplies from the Communist bloc failed to
overcome, led to an economic squeeze on Afghanistan. Certain groups
began grumbling against policies putting the country at the mercy of the
USSR for export outlets and economic and political support.
*See White Paper, issued by Pakistan Ministry for External Affairs, reproduced
in Dawn (Karachi), Sept. 3, 1961.
616

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GEORGE
L.MONTAGNO 617
So grave was the economic disruption, that Afghanistan attempted to
reverse the direction of commercial traffic, insuring access to non-commu-
nist markets by a 5-year transit agreement with her neighbor to the west,
Iran. However, shipping distances for exports and imports via Khuram-
shahr are considerably longer than established routes via Karachi, and the
road network is highly inadequate, despite extensive efforts by both Soviet
and Americanengineers.'
Economic distress has been further augmented by Pakistan's refusal to
allow some 250,000 powindas, Afghan nomads, to winter their flocks in
Pakistan, as they have done for hundreds of years, unless passport, visa
and health requirementscan be met. To nomadic people in serious difficul-
ties, people who do not understand the intricacies of passport procedures,
the barrier appears an impossible one aimed at virtual exclusion. And so
it is. On the recommendation of the International Food Organization
Commission in 1960, Pakistan is determined to stop the traditional sea-
sonal migration because nomadic flocks denude the limited grazing facili-
ties.2
The Teheran agreement contains the important mutual pledge that rep-
resentatives of both countries will conduct their duties in accordance with
recognized principles of international law, and confine activities "to the
discharge of official functions." If each side respects the sovereignty of the
other by honoring the pledge, a badly-needed new era in Afghan-Pak
relations is on the horizon. Implicit is the necessity for Afghanistan to put
into cold storage the "Pukhtoonistan"demand, which has so poisoned the
relations of the two countries and proved so detrimental to the peace and
security of the Middle East.
Ever since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has faced, with considerable
patience and restraint, the cry of "Pukhtoonistan.X7* The demand con-
stantly raised by Afghan rulers is for a hypothetical state to be created on
the Pakistani side of the border. This state will supposedly grant the nine
million Pushto-speaking Pathans along Pakistan's northwest frontier the
realization of their national aspirations.3Radio Kabul, over the years, has
repeatedly charged that Pakistani Pukhtoons are oppressed and denied the
right of self-determination. Convenient to overlook is the economic ab-
surdity of creating a landlocked, rocky, barren "Pukhtoonistan,"an area
where nature is at its harshest.
lNew York Times, International Edition, April 20, 1962. There are no railways
in Afghanistan.
2lndia banned the entrance of powindas, or Kochi as the Afghans call them,
into Indian territory immediately after partition in 1947.
*Terms "Pukhtoonistan," "Pushtunistan," and "Pathanistan" are used inter-
changeably by writers. The first is preferred and will be used throughout.
3Some Afghan maps show "Pukhtoonistan" as including all of Pakistan west
of the Indus River. The proposed "Pukhtoonistan" extends into areas of Chitral,
Gilgit, and Baltistan, none of which is Pathan territory. The Afghans note that
the British administered these areas separately for their own reasons, not allow-
ing local leaders to unite for independence and freedom as they would have done
under the spirit of Pukhtoon nationalism.

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618 PAK-AFGHANDETENTE

Kabul has made no mention of including any Pushto-speaking areas of

Afghanistan in a future "Pukhtoonistan."This silence would indicate that
the Afghan plea has probably been one "prompted by a veiled irredent-
ism. "4 It would appear that the Pukhtoonistantheme is a move by Afghan
rulers to revive an ancient claim and "to exploit changing political condi-
tions to win back an ancient love.":5Kabul rulers apparently looked back
to the time when the Peshawar Valley and other parts of the Northwest
Frontier plains briefly had been the fairest of their provinces, and Pesha-
war the winter capital of the Durrani rulers. The fact that the Afghan
Durrani Empire extended to the Indus River almost two hundred years ago
does not logically supply strong justification for "Pukhtoonistan"today.6
Sir Olaf Caroe is right in holding that if the cry for "Pukhtoonistan"
had been confined to Radio Kabul alone, the matter would be less porten-
tious, for very little of the sound and fury emanates from the tribesmen.
However, the Soviets have given full support to the appeal, and the cry for
Pukhtoon nationalismhas been heard regularlyfrom Tashkentto Moscow.
Ever since Pakistan infuriated the USSR by joining the Western-spon-
sored SEATO and CENTO pacts, the Soviets have trumpeted loudly for
the principle of self-determinationin the Northwest Frontier Area of Pak-
istan. In a joint communique signed with the Afghan Prime Minister on
March 4, 1960, Mr. Khrushchev "agreed that a sensible way of relieving
tension and assuring peace [of the Pushto-speaking people] . . . is the
implementation for the solution of this problem of the principle of self-
determination on the basis of the United Nations Charter.":7Pravda has
since charged Pakistan with trying to settle the Pukhtoon problem through
force, while denying the "lawful and just desire" of the tribesmen in-
volved.,8 To the Soviets, unpopularity in Western-aligned Pakistan has
been a bearableprice to pay for increased Soviet influencein Afghanistan.
Pakistan's policy toward the Pathan tribes of the turbulent Northwest
Frontier Area has virtually eliminated possibility of a favorable Pathan
response to Afghan irredentism. One would be hard put to find those

401af Caroe, The Pathans (New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 436.

5Ibid., p. 325.
6The present Afghan King, former Prime and Foreign Ministers, are all great-
great-grandsons of Sultan Mohammad Khan who once governed the Peshawar
Valley. The Afghans maintain that Babur could not have won his victory over the
Pukhtoon rulers of Delhi at Paniput in 1526 if he had not first united the
Pukhtoons of the Kabul and Inclus River valleys behind him. Furthermore,
Babur, founder of the Moghul dynasty, chose Kabul as his resting place and left
to his descendants the heritage of Kabul. The period between Admad Shah's
succession to the throne and the end of the reign of Shah Zeman, to which Caroe
attributes present Afghan claims, was not the only period where the common
history of the Pukhtoons in both countries came together.
7Dawn (Karachi), Mar. 6, 1960.
8Pravda, Apr. 3, 1961.

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GEORGE L. MONTAGNO 619

Pathans supposedly suffering for the cause of freedom.9 Winning Pathan

support has not been easy for Pakistan, and there is still resentment over
amalgamation of the western provinces since 1955 and merging of admin-
istration of tribal areas into the rest of West Pakistan.
Inheriting the problems of the tribal belt which the British gladly relin-
quished,10 Pakistan has generally followed the principle of leaving Pathan
tribesmen to their own ways." By evacuating forts, offering new educa-
tional and economic opportunities to bring the less developed areas on a
par with the more developed areas of Pakistan, and exercising restraint in
administration, the Government has pacified once fierce Wazirs, Mahsuds,
Mohmands, and Afridis, and taken them a long way on the road to final
integration with the rest of Pakistani society. The key to present policy in
the tribal areas is recognition of the tribesmen's change of attitude and
wish to become modern.'2
The innate desire of the Pathans for independence from authority, and
their awareness of "The Rus" in the background will very probably keep
them looking east toward Pakistan for their future, rather than west
toward Kabul and Russia. Perhaps the basic flaw in the entire Afghan
position has been Kabul's wrong assessment of the extent to which Path-
ans in the Northwest Area have identified themselves with the new Muslim
state of Pakistan.
Pakistan has consistently questioned Afghan sincerity in seeking justice
for their Pathan brothers of the Northwest Frontier. The demand smacked
of an Afghan desire for domination over the area. In Pakistani eyes, the
Afghan Government has long played a double game of trying to achieve
national cohesion at home by subordinating minority groups, while ex-
ploiting certain ethnic groups abroad for expansionist ends.'3 The Afghan-
9Some trouble since 1947 has been caused by the Khudai Khedmatgar (Serv-
ants of God), followers of Red Shirt Leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, long
detained in Pakistani prisons. This controversial Pathan first tried to get the
frontier areas made part of India. When a referendum in the area showed that
the people were ready to join Pakistan, Khan demanded a separate province, a
Pathan state within Pakistan, where he apparently intended to be the leader.
With the closing of the Afghan consulates in Pakistan in 1961, the Governor of
West Pakistan has claimed that Khan's movement has come to an inglorious end.
10The sensitive area required the major resources of the British Empire to
defend. The authority of various empires which claimed to rule this frontier in
the past really only extended to control over the plains and some of the passes
through the mountains; none of them were able to subjugate the hill tribes.
11The Pakistan Government retained until 1955 a system dating back as far as
the Moghul Emperors in India, and refined when the area was part of the British
Empire. It was a system of payments to keep the tribes peaceful, costing Pakis-
tan about $6 million a year.
12Arnold Toynbee, "Pakistan's Policy in the Tribal Areas," The Pakistan
Society (London), (Summer, 1961), p. 29.
13For an impartial view of Afghan difficulties consult Andrew Wilson, "Inside
Afghanistan-A Background to Recent Troubles," Journal of the Royal Central
Asian Society, Vol. XLVII, Pt. 3 (1960), pp. 286-296. Consult, too, Donald
Wilber, Afghanistan (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 157-
158.

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620 PAK-AFGHANDETENTE

manufactured dispute regarding "Pukhtoonistan" constitutes interference

in Pakistan's internal matters, despite the Afghan Government'sagreement
in 1921 to non-interferencein the affairs of people living to the east of the
Durand Line, the international frontier jointly accepted by Afghanistan
and British India in 1893 after the Second Afghan War.14
Even before transfer of power by Britain in 1947, the Afghan Govern-
ment had made the formal claim that, in the event of British withdrawal,
Pathan territory as far east as the Indus River should revert to pre-1846
Afghan sovereignty. To this was added the insistence that the Durand
Line and the 1921 agreement, because they had been forced upon Afghan-
istan, ceased to have any validity after the British left the subcontinent.
Pakistani spokesmenhave argued that as Britain's successor in the area,
their country inherited all rights and obligations under agreements and
treaties formerly entered into between Great Britain and Afghanistan.15
According to accepted canons of international law, recognition of the
existence, sanctity and permanence of frontiers is one of the cornerstones
on which the law of nations has been built. Once frontiers have been
negotiated and demarcated, they cannot be altered or scrapped save by
bilateral agreementor force, as Pakistani legalists are well aware.
Even Mr. Nehru has admitted that when Pakistan was formed, it inher-
ited whatever interest the Government of India had in the then Frontier
Area. The Interim Government of India in 1947 maintained that any
campaign or position to the contrary constituted an unwarrantedinterfer-
ence by Afghanistan in the internal affairs of India. Pakistanis are quick
to point out, too, that Kabul recognized before 1947 that Pathans living
east of the Durand Line were British Indian nationals.
Nevertheless, Afghan agents operated among Pathan tribesmen for
many years, distributing large amounts of money, ammunition and even
transistor radios in an effort to sway loyalties from Pakistan to Afghanis-
tan, and to develop sentiments for the "Pukhtoonistan"cause. Efforts to
create disaffection proved largely unsuccessful, however, and when Afghan
'4The Durand Line is illogical, of course, from the point of view of geography,
ethnography, and strategy. W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan (Oxford, 1953), p.
188. Naturally, the line aroused resentment among the millions of Pathans cut off
from their fellow tribesmen in Afghanistan. A large percentage boycotted the
British-organized referendum in 1947, in which they were asked to choose between
being citizens of India or Pakistan. The Indian National Congress had demanded
that the N. W. Frontier Province be allowed to vote for independence as well, but
Lord Mountbatten persuaded Nehru and the Congress to avoid complications and
give up the demand. It is this point, not the percentage of Pathans who voted in
the referendum, that has given grief to Afghan rulers. The plebiscite covered only
the administered frontier regions, omitting considerable areas over which the
British forces never had control. The vote cast in the 1947 referendum was
actually 83,871 less than the number of votes cast in the General Election of
1946. Critics differ as to whether 49% or 51% of the Pathans failed to vote in
1947. The remaining Pathans supported the plebiscite and became part of Pakis-
tan.
15Mohammed A. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts (Karachi: East
Publications, 1960), pp. 38-39.

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GEORGE L. MONTAGNO 621

militia (laskhar) were sent against frontier posts in July 1948, September
1950, and more recently on September 23, 1960, and May 19-21, 1961,
they were easily repulsed.16While admitting that the Pakistan Air Force
made some telling strikes to disperse the last abortive effort, the Ayub
Government gave major credit for repelling the several strikes to the
Pathan tribesmen of the area. It is unlikely, however, that Pakistani troop
concentrations on the border, while kept deliberately in the background,
did not participate in the fighting. Pakistanis saw irony in a situation
where Afghan troops were fighting fellow Muslim frontiersmen for whom
they had been shedding crocodile tears.
The Ayub Governmentcommended the solidarity of the Pakistani fron-
tiersmen and their loyalty to Pakistan as evidenced by opposition to the
Afghan laskhar. Afghan claims of a significant section of Pathan popula-
tion being dissatisfied with their present status as Pakistani citizens were
not borne out by the facts. Reportedly, Maliks of the Wazir and Mahsud
tribes demanded to know who gave the autocratic and unrepresentative
rulers of Kabul the authority to demand self-determinationfor Pakistani
tribesmen.'7
Pakistan confidently challenged Kabul to hold a referendum within its
own borders to see if the Afghan Pukhtoons wish to live under the Afghan
or Pakistani flag. There are far more Pushto-speakingpeople in Pakistan
proper than the 3.5 million on the Afghan side, Pakistan officials noted.
Besides, argued a Pakistani White Paper, if the frontier of a country must
be re-determinedon a linguistic and ethnic basis, as the Afghans claim,
the same principle would lead to the disintegration of Afghanistan itself,
with its many ethnic groupings.*
The Pakistani press has reported repeatedly that representativejirgas of
tribesmen in the border districts have condemned Kabul's aggressive
designs, the un-Islamic and treacherous deeds of the present Afghan ruling
house. They have supposedly called on the Governmentto take stern and
effective measures to stop the menace, offered personal sacrifices for the
defense of Pakistan, and requested opportunity to carry out pledges by
actual deeds. As a former Minister for External Affairs candidly admitted,
"the mentality of the people in our areas, contiguous to Afghanistan, is
that you cannot take it lying down all the time."'8
There seems little doubt that if the Afghan plea for Pukhtoonistan is
ever to succeed in winning over the Pathans of the Northwest Frontier
with superior economic inducements, the Soviet Union will have to put
unprecedentedfinancial and propaganda resources at the disposal of the

16Figures as to casualties are highly questionable. Dawn (Karachi), i.e., put

Afghan losses in September 1960 at 1500 killed and 400 injured.
1l7MorningNews (Karachi), Jan. 22, 1962.
*The rest of Afghanistan's 13 million people are Hazaras, Nooristanis, Ghil-
zais, Uzbeks and Turkemans. See Hafeez R. Khan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan,"
Pakistan Horizon (First Quarter, 1960).
18Manzur Qadir, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon (First
Quarter, 1960), p. 11.

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622 PAK-AFGHAN
DETENTE
Afghan Government. As Toynbee notes, "The firmness of the Pakistan
Northwest Frontier is a matter of cost as well as political allegiance.s19
Pakistani officials, too, have great anxiety on this point for their defense
costs and economic reform programs in the frontier areas are exceedingly
costly. On either side of the Durand Line, money can be used to incite
trouble as well as to insure peace.
Leaders in Pakistan have wanted to bury the Pukhtoon issue, which
adds an unwanted element to the problem of frontier security, and have
wanted to develop more cordial relations with Afghanistan. The two coun-
tries are contiguous, share a common religion and culture, and use a
common language in part. However, feeling persists that whenever Afghan
rulers try to incite a section of the people of Pakistan, Pakistan's security
on the Northwest Frontier remains in jeopardy, and the Afghan Govern.
ment plays into the hands of the Soviets who would like to keep the
Muslim neighbors at odds.
President Ayub, himself of Pathan ancestry, has given strong warning
that the Northwest Frontier "is an integral part of Pakistan and that the
country's integrity will be defended at all costs."120 The CENTO powers
must be made to realize, he says, the importance of effective defense of
Pakistan's Northwest Frontier to the larger interests of the non-Commu-
nist world. The Afghan-NorthwestFrontier Areas have seen perhaps more
invasions in the course of history than any other area in Asia. Ayub
argues that by defending the Northwest Frontier, Pakistan defends the
entire subcontinentto a large degree, for the strategic Khyber Pass is one
of the few natural routes for invasion of South Asia. If "Pukhtoonistan"
should ever come into being, the Soviets will have succeeded in eroding a
peripheral area to its power, weakening Pakistan immeasurably, and shift-
ing world balance of power one step further in favor of the Communists.
In his visit to the United States in 1961, President Ayub won the
Kennedy Administration's appreciation of difficulties involved on the
Afghan borders. He answered those Americans who questioned Pakistan's
right to use American arms against the Afghan irregulars making incur-
sions across the 1400 miles of sensitive territory on the Durand Line. The
MorningNews (Karachi) editorialized that "if American military aid
cannot be utilized in warding off attacks on our territory, what is the
earthly purpose of receiving it. We might as well dispense with it." How-
ever, use of American equipment on the Northwest Frontier has long
disturbedthe Afghans, who denounce the United States for giving military
aid to Pakistan on one hand, and for not pressuring that country into a
more pliant posture regarding "Pukhtoonistan."
At the Teheran conference, the Afghan delegation refused to agree that

19A. Toynbee, "Impressions of Afghanistan and Pakistan's Northwest Fron-

tier in Relation to the Communist World," International Affairs (April 1961),
pp. 161-169 for some very astute observations.
20Dawn (Karachi), May 11, 1959, and in radio and public statements since.

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GEORGE L. MONTAGNO 623

broadcasts favoring a "Pukhtoonistan"should cease. While the broadcasts

from Kabul continue, however, there is some indication that they are
slightly less incendiary than previously. Perhaps Afghan leaders have
recognized at long last that there is no united demand among the Pathan
tribes themselves for a "Pukhtoonistan," which would have hardly any
resources, and which would cut tribesmen off from economic benefits they
are now getting from Pakistan.
The dismissal last March of the two highest placed Afghan officials by
their cousin, King Mohammed Zahir Shah, marked the first change in
Afghan politics. It indicated the abandoning of unworkable policies. Dr.
MohammedYusuf, the new Prime Minister, was former Minister of Mines
and Industry, and, because he has no blood ties with the Yahyakhel
dynasty, a comparativelydark horse on the political scene.
Afghanistan's well-wishershope that Yusuf might help his king to chart
the course toward much-needed social reform, and stage a revolution
through evolution in a country whose position would be considered medie-
val by Western standards. Equally important is the need of Afghan
leaders, who possess considerable political acumen, to drop untenable po-
sitions to which they had committed themselves. Such action is essential if
the dogged, ingrained Afghan desire to remain independent at all costs is
to be realized.
In implementing the Shah of Iran's mediation efforts to end the last
diplomatic-economic rupture, Afghanistan re-established consulates at
Peshawar and Quetta in West Pakistan, as well as temporary trade agen-
cies in Peshawar and Chaman, until projected railway lines are extended
into Afghanistan from these points. The transit trade, vital for land-locked
Afghanistan if she is to accept foreign aid goods from the West, was to
have been re-opened by mid-July and operate in accordance with Pakis-
tan's duty-free importation commitments under the Transit Trade Agree-
ment of 1958. However, arrangementswere not completed until the first
week in Septemberfor goods to flow from Karachi to Afghanistan via the
Peshawar-Kabuland Chaman-Kandaharroutes. Delay had been caused by
a dispute over which country's trucks should handle traffic across the
frontier. The problem was resolved by agreeing that traffic should be on a
competitivebasis, with cargoes going to truckerswhose prices are lowest.
In August, Pakistan announced that Lt. General Mohammad Yusuf
Khan, High Commissioner for Pakistan in Great Britain, had been ap-
pointed Ambassador to Afghanistan, an indication of the seriousness with
which Pakistani leaders approachedthe prospect of improved relations.
Afghanistan can best retain her own identity, continue as a traditional
buffer state in Central Asia as she has for the past two centuries, and stay
within the orbit of the Muslim countries, if the trade and transit agree-
ment with Pakistan remains in effect. Only if there is continuation of
Western traffic, which has been open for less than two decades, can Af-

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624 PAK-AFGHANDETENTE

ghanistan avoid being increasingly drawn into the orbit of the Communist
world.

The January and February issues of the

Asian Survey are structured issues surveying
the political trends in each East and South
Asian country during 1963. Additional cop-
ies of these issues are available for 75 cents
per copy. Many instructors have found these
issues useful for classroom purposes as well
as reference sources.

GEORGE L. MONTAGNO, Visiting Professor of American History at the Uni-

versity of Karachi, 1960-62 (sponsored by The Asia Foundation), is currently
Associate Professor of History at Mount Union College.

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