Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Author(s): Lawrence Ziring

Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 5 (May - Jun., 1975), pp. 295-307
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Recent Trends in Pakistan's
Foreign Policy

LAWRENCE ZIRING

I N 1974-75, the foreign policy of Pakistan entered a new

phase. This article focuses on the events leading up to the transition,
and suggests the course that Pakistani policy can be expected to follow
in the period ahead.
When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto received the transfer of power from
General Yahya Khan in December 1971, Pakistan was a shambles.
The civil war in East Pakistan had precipitated an Indian invasion, and
the Pakistani garrison there had been compelled to surrender. Bangla-
desh became a sovereign, independent state. Pakistan, the Muslim
nation carved out of the Indian Subcontinent by Mohammad Ali
Jinnah and his Muslim League in 1947, lost approximately 60 percent
of its population. The loss of East Pakistan seemed to threaten severe
economic dislocation, insecurity for tens of thousands of non-Bengalis
living in the new state of Bangladesh (and for Bengalis living in the
provinces of West Pakistan), and the perhaps fatal weakening of Pak-
istan's two-nation theory-the deepseated belief that the Muslims of
South Asia were a separate and distinct community, and hence entitled
to a separate political entity founded upon Islamic principles.
It is often said, too, that Bhutto inherited a demoralized country,
a rump state without purpose, raison d'etre, or future. Subsequent
events have shown this to be somewhat overdrawn. Those Pakistanis
who were in fact shocked by the defection of Bangladesh belong to
the sophisticated, articulate, and reasonably well-informed minority.
The vast majority of West Pakistanis, those who inhabit the rural areas
or pass their days amid the squalor of urban slums, were little affected
by the dismemberment of their country. Moreover, even those who
were genuinely shocked by events soon proved able to shrug off their
295

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296 Asian Affairs

sense of loss. In considerable measure, this has been due to Bhutto's

vigorous efforts to construct a "new" Pakistan, and to restore the
country's status among the Third World and Muslim countries. Bhutto
has been especially active in the field of foreign policy, and his innova-
tions here have borne some positive results.
Throughout his tenure, Bhutto has been noted for his outspoken-
ness on foreign policy issues. He has seemed to symbolize Pakistan's
"independent"foreign policy. He gained notoriety both as a friend of
China and as a statesman who could deal with the Soviet Union on a
basis of reciprocity. He was also on record for closer relations with
the Muslim states, especially the Arab countries, and for breaking the
"grip"that the United States and the British Commonwealth allegedly
still held on the "old" Pakistan. Bhutto made repeated journeys to the
Middle East in the months following his assumption of power. His
decision to sever ties with SEATO and withdraw from the Common-
wealth were also predictable. Moreover, these moves won almost unan-
imous support from the people of Pakistan. The popular encourage-
ment he received at home also enabled him to tackle the hard issues
that were the immediate consequence of the 1971 war with India.
It has been Bhutto's style seemingly to dramatize the demands and
desires of the Pakistani nation. He wants it to appear that he is only
carrying out the dictates of his people. Some form of public sanction
is sought prior to and following virtually all delicate negotiations. This
has been particularly true in relations with India and Bangladesh.
Bhutto used his popularity to good advantage in dealing with Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi in Simla in Summer 1972. A year later, it
helped him to negotiate the release of 93,000 Pakistani POWs still
languishing in Indian prison camps. Ultimately, it enabled him to rec-
ognize the independence of Bangladesh, to welcome Mujibur Rahman
to Lahore, and himself to go to Dacca in 1974. These were no mean
achievements.
Bhutto found the 1973 Arab-Israeli War a special opportunity.
Muslim solidarity and klan were never so pronounced as in the weeks
following that conflict. Bhutto took advantage of the prevailing
euphoria to suggest a Muslim summit meeting, with Pakistan as host.
Bhutto's timing proved to be acute. The key Muslim states ac-
cepted his invitation, and any reluctant governments were pressured

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 297

to follow the road that led to Lahore on February 22, 1974. The con-
ference lasted three days, and was attended by the representatives of
37 countries (including Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, who was accorded the honors normally
reserved for a head of state). Among the conferees were King Faisal
of Saudi Arabia, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, President Houari
Boumedienne of Algeria, President Moammer Qadaffi of Libya, Pres-
ident Hafiz Assad of Syria, and Sheikh Sabah al Salim al Mubarak of
Kuwait. Even Mujibur Rahman arrived in Lahore on February 23,
1974. Bhutto seized the occasion to comment that the Islamic Summit
was the reason for extending recognition to Bangladesh. Hence, he
could argue that the decision had not been his alone, but one de-
manded by Muslims everywhere.
The Lahore Declaration issued at the conclusion of the confer-
ence paid tribute to such standard shibboleths as the "solidarity of the
Islamic peoples," and their "identification with the joint struggle of
the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." It saluted the "cause
of the people of Palestine," which was the "cause of all those who
believe in the right of a people to determine its own destiny"; and
asserted that "no agreement, protocol, or understandingwhich postu-
lates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the holy city of Jerusalem
or its transfer to any non-Arab sovereignty . . . will be acceptable to
the Islamic countries." In general, the Summit provided a dramatic
opportunity for Muslim leaders to reaffirmtheir unity of purpose. But
there is no question as to which Muslim leader profited the most from
its sessions.
By the winter of 1974, Bhutto's Pakistan was being challenged
on a number of fronts. Worldwide inflation and spiraling fuel prices
had undermined the country's economic recovery. Increasing expendi-
tures for military and police programs left little for developmental
needs. Unrest in Baluchistan and on the Northwest Frontier allegedly
involved the political opposition in machinations with foreign conspira-
tors. Sindhi nationalism grew in strength at the expense of the long-
domiciled muhajir or refugee community that had settled in the prov-
ince, and especially in Karachi, after the 1947 partition of British
India. In the Punjab, strong-armtactics by provincial political leaders
had infuriated the intelligentsia and, in turn, weakened Bhutto's Pak-

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298 Asian Affairs

istan People's Party (PPP). Religious fundamentalism was also on

the ascendent, and the Ahmadiya and Qadiani communities in the
Punjab came under renewed attack. There was growing disenchant-
ment among the student population, which had hitherto given signifi-
cant support to the PPP, and the principal cities were again the scene
of youthful protest. The fact that Pakistan could host the Islamic
Summit in the face of such difficulties is testimony to the effectiveness
of Bhutto's regime.
Despite the growing domestic disillusionment with Bhutto's rule.
holding the conference in Pakistan stimulated popular pride. Disaffec-
tion shifted from Bhutto to his lieutenants, who, as time would show,
were expendable. As Bhutto's prestige in his own country increased.
so too did his stature grow in the eyes of foreign leaders. Pakistan, it
appeared, would be the recipient of largesse from the oil-rich Muslim
states. Moreover, Pakistani skills and talents were needed in the Arab
world, particularly in the small sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, and
plans were made to step up the out-migration of professionals and
other trained manpower. In short, the Summit also paid concrete divi-
dends.

II
Afghanistan has now become Pakistan's bate noire even more than
India. The 1973 coup that chased Zahir Shah from his throne and re-
turned Mohammad Daud to power did not augur well for Pakistan.
Within days of consolidating his authority, Daud reasserted his support
for Pushtunistan, the concept that the Pushtus on the Northwest Fron-
tier of Pakistan should constitute an independent state. Relations with
Afghanistan have seldom been good, in spite of repeated Pakistani
efforts to resolve outstanding differences between the two countries.
The problem was intensified by the failure of Bhutto's PPP to win broad
acceptance on the Northwest Frontier. The emergence of powerful
opposition groups in the region and their apparent complicity with
the Afghans have heightened tensions.
The main opposition leader on the Northwest Frontier has been
the National Awami Party (NAP) stalwart, Wali Khan, the son of
Ghaffar Khan, the octogenerian founder of the Kudai Khidmatgar, or
Frontier Redshirts. Wali Khan, like his father before him, has been

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 299

accused of conspiring with the Afghans in promoting the Pushtunistan

issue. He was also the leader of the political opposition in the National
Assembly; and although frequently attacked by the government and
sometimes constrained from speaking at public meetings, he was gen-
erally treated with caution. But the assassination of a close confidant of
Prime Minister Bhutto who was also the dominant PPP figure on the
Northwest Frontier, forced the government to alter its tactics. In Feb-
ruary 1975, Bhutto ordered the NAP banned, and Wali Khan and his
subordinateswere imprisoned. Afghanistan was an outspoken critic of
this action, and the Afghans have now linked an improvement in their
relations with Pakistan to the release of Wali Khan and the restoration
of the NAP.
Although Daud did not attend the Lahore Muslim Summit, he
did send a representative (his Ambassador to New Delhi). But it was
obvious from the outset that the Afghans did not share in the festive
mood created by the meeting. Instead, the Afghan Ambassador, who
was also the lowest-ranking dignitary at the conference, seized the
occasion to propagandize the cause of "oppressedminorities."Afghan-
istan apparently wanted the Muslim world to know the depth of its
animosity toward Pakistan, and that this bitterness had led Kabul to
look with greater friendship on the Soviet Union and India.
A united Pakistan should be able to defend itself against provoca-
tions from Afghanistan. But the situation is complicated by a number
of factors. As already noted, Pakistan's frontiers are a turbulent re-
gion; and the Afghans can, and according to Pakistan have, supplied
arms to a variety of dissidents. Bombing incidents in and around
Peshawar, and even in Islamabad, reinforce this official conclusion.'
Soviet motives are also suspect, although the Bhutto government is
restrained in its comments for fear of making a difficult situation
worse. Reports filtering out of Kabul tell of enormous quantities of
Soviet arms flowing into Afghanistan; and observers are puzzled by
the magnitude of the shipments and Afghanistan's limited ability to
maintain, let alone use, them. One important source asserts that the
Afghans were considering a march on Peshawar during the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan War, and that it was only the Soviet Union that prevented
1 See Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan (Islamabad: Printing Corporation
of Pakistan Press, 1974).

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300 Asian Affairs

them from exploiting the Pakistani defeat. Whatever the truth of this,
it is obvious that Pakistan fears joint action by Afghanistan and India.
In the summer of 1974, Bhutto publicly aired his concern that the
troops of both countries were massing on Pakistan's frontiers in simul-
taneous maneuvers.'
Apparently nothing less than the further dismemberment of Pak-
istan would satisfy Daud and his supporters in Afghanistan and across
the frontier. The Muslim Summit may have brought Bhutto and Mujib
together, but it could not play the same role where Daud is concerned.
Certainly, the Pakistanis are convinced of Afghanistan's continuing
enmity. The Pakistan Times commented, in a lead editorial on Febru-
ary 13, 1975, as follows:

Can anything be more savagely ironical than that the Kabul gov-
ernment, which has all along openly backed and encouraged ter-
rorism in Pakistan's politics, should now wax eloquent in con-
demnation of violence and killings? The support that Kabul has
extended to the saboteurs during the past one year, and the way
it has gloated over their dangerous and heinous deeds in the
Northwest Frontier Province, are all a matter of record.

When Daud called upon the United Nations to establish a fact-finding

committee to investigate conditions in Baluchistan, where a quasi-
insurgency has been active for more than two years, Bhutto sent a
letter of protest to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. He referred
to the Afghan government's alleged designs on Pakistani territory, and
pointed out that the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan had
been agreed to almost a hundred years ago, "at the same time as
Afghanistan's northern frontier with Russia was settled.""Bhutto fur-
ther implied that Pakistan would defend its established frontiers no
matter what the consequences.
The Iranians have never displayed much interest either in the
Pushtunistan issue or in Pakistan's problems with India, including
Kashmir. On the other hand, they have been deeply concerned about
unrest in Baluchistan. When Soviet arms were found hidden in the
2 Pakistan Aflairs, August 1, 1974, p. 1.
3 Ibid., May 1, 1975, p. 1.

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 301

Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, and were alleged to have been earmarked

for subversive elements in both Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, the
Iranian government could not pretend indifference. Since that event,
Bhutto and the Shah have exchanged frequent visits, and officials of the
two governments have been in almost continuous contact. Pakistan is
receiving considerable economic assistance from Iran, and the two
countries are entering into joint projects in Baluchistan. The hope is
that economic development will break down traditional tribal loyalties
and generate greater national consciousness. As in the Northwest
Frontier Province, opposition leaders in Baluchistan have been impris-
oned and stern action taken to root out the dissidents, who have now
retreated into the remote mountains. Iran has not sent troops into
Pakistani Baluchistan (as they have, for example, in the Dhofar region
of Oman), but there is no mistaking Teheran's concern. The Shah is
on record that he would intervene if it appeared that the Baluchi Lib-
eration Movement were gaining the upper hand. His position is that
the integrity of Pakistan is vital to Iran's security, and presumably the
point has not been lost on either the Afghans or the Soviet Union.
Pakistan's dilemma is twofold. First, it must avoid the interna-
tionalization of its domestic problem, since it is clearly not in Pakis-
tan's interest to have Iran, Afghanistan, or any other power introduce
foreign troops into the area; and second, it must make every effort to
block the flow of arms to the dissidents. With respect to the latter,
Pakistan is not depending on regular troops to intercept the shipments.
Rather, Bhutto has put together an elaborate police network appar-
ently dominated by the Federal Security Force. Virtually nothing has
appeared in print about this organization, which seems to bear a strik-
ing similarity to the Iranian SEVAK.
On the other hand, relations between Iran and Pakistan are not
entirely harmonious. The Shah did not attend the Muslim Summit,
mainly because the presence of Arafat and Qadaffi were offensive to
him; but presumably also because he was reluctant to attend such a
meeting with Bhutto as presiding officer. And from Pakistan's point of
view, the Shah's relations with Israel are an embarrassment, and his
interest in India plainly worrisome. The point is that neither Bhutto
nor the Shah operates from purely altruistic motives. Each country
needs the other to compensate for specific weaknesses.

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302 Asian Affairs

III
Since the return of the Pakistani prisoners of war (including those
originally held for alleged war crimes), the exchange of populations
between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the recognition of the latter
by Pakistan, relations with India have been correct. India's detonation
of a nuclear device on May 18, 1974, did not alter the intention of
establishing a via media for the future, nor did New Delhi's decision
to make Kashmir an ordinary state within the Indian Union. It is true
that, in both instances, Bhutto felt it necessary to harangue the Indian
government. But his public declarations were doubtless meant pri-
marily for domestic consumption, and he did not disappoint his audi-
ences. The Indians were soundly condemned, and duly warned that
Pakistan could not stand idly by. Pakistan, too, could build nuclear
weapons if it wished to put its resources into such a program; and
Bhutto called for a nationwide work stoppage to demonstrate Pakis-
tan's dissatisfaction with the Indian decision to absorb Kashmir. But
the bellicosity of the past was noticeably subdued.
India did not have to explode a nuclear device in order to remind
Pakistan's leaders that India was the preeminent power on the Subcon-
tinent. In actual expenditures, India's outlays for armaments, not
including nuclear development, are four to five times as large as Pak-
istan's. More important, India possesses by far the greater capacity
to raise and maintain military forces. Irrespective of its wretched mil-
lions, India is a major power. Its intention to play a leading role in the
Indian Ocean and the marginal seas surrounding it is illustrated by
the water boundary settlements entered into with Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
on June 28, 1974, and Indonesia on August 8, 1974. The removal of
the royal household in Sikkim, and that state's absorption into the
Indian Union, is additional evidence of India's more forceful role in
international politics.
In the first shock of the Indian underground test, much criticism
was directed against India. But public opprobrium soon transformed
itself into quiet respect. From Burma and Bangladesh to Malaysia and
Thailand, India's prestige is again on the ascendent. Even the Arab
countries and Iran have shown a new interest in India's technological
capacity. There has been talk of trading Indian "know-how" for oil.
Egyptian scientists are already at work in the Bhaba Atomic Research

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 303

Center at Trombay, and other arrangementsare forecast with the Arab

world Even the Shah of Iran, who first called upon the United Na-
tions to declare the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean a nuclear-freezone,
now hints at greater collaboration between India and Iran in the
scientific field. The Shah's state visit to India in October 1974 drama-
tized the new relationship between the two countries, as did his pledge
to commit a generous share of Iran's oil revenues to help India's devel-
opment program.
Pakistan under Bhutto's leadership seeks to move with the times.
Status quo politics will not profit him or his country. Hence his empha-
sis on reducing old enmities while making new friends. Although Pak-
istan broke off conversations with the Indians immediately following
the nuclear test, they were resumed in the Autumn of 1974. On Sep-
tember 14, India and Pakistan announced that they had agreed to
examine steps to promote exchanges in the fields of science and cul-
ture. On the same day, an agreement was signed restoring postal, tele-
communications, and travel facilities, which had been suspended since
the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965; and in February 1975, a trade agree-
ment was signed. Discussions aimed at restoring overflight privileges
have not yet borne fruit, however, and were suspended on May 19,
1975. Nevertheless, real progress has been made in a variety of fields.
India has even hinted that it might be prepared to commit itself to a
multilateral undertaking guaranteeing that nuclear energy would only
be used for peaceful purposes.
In a recent speech (May 28, 1975), Pakistan's Ambassador to
the United States, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, candidly admitted that
Pakistan was no match for India in the military field. "The dispropor-
tion of forces is so large that (Pakistan's proposed arms purchases
from the United States) could not possibly be conceived of as an arms
race." For more than two decades, Pakistan harbored the notion that
it was the equal of India, despite that country's vast numerical superi-
ority. As a result, successive Pakistani governments assumed an ag-
gressive posture toward India that made any kind of meaningful
accommodation impossible. Apparently, a new realism has now over-
taken the Pakistani leadership.

4 Ibid., June 1, 1975, p. 1.

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304 Asian Affairs

IV
ZulfikarAli Bhutto has long championed an evenhanded policy toward
the great powers. He was one of the early critics of Pakistan's depen-
dence on the Western countries, and especially the United States.5
Pakistan's civil-military bureaucracy began to monopolize the key
decisionmaking apparatus in 1953, the year in which the first mutual
defense agreements were entered into with the United States. Governor
General Ghulam Mohammad (1951-55), Governor General and later
President Iskander Mirza (1955-58), and Field Marshal and President
Ayub Khan (1958-69) did not conceal their preference for close
alignment with the United States. Their training and temperament
shaped their behavior in the early years of the Cold War, and they
were convinced that communism in any form was a threat to the well-
being of Pakistan.0The Communist Party was therefore banned in Pak-
istan in 1955; and has not been legalized since. Pakistan joined the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact
(now CENTO) in 1955. From 1953 to 1965, the United States was
Pakistan's sole mainstay for modern armaments. In return, Pakistan
provided the United States with limited base rights, perhaps the most
celebrated being the air and intelligence station near Peshawar.
None of these attachments prevented Pakistan from recognizing
the People's Republic of China in 1950, or from maintaining diplo-
matic relations with the USSR. Pakistan's leaders often argued that
membership in the Western military alliances was not incompatible
with amicable relations with China and the Soviet Union. They insisted
that Pakistan's concerns were purely defensive, and both the Soviet
Union and China appeared to accept these assurances. China-Pakistan
and USSR-Pakistan friendship societies were organized, and modest
programs of technic'hiand economic assistance launched. Thus, when
US relations with Pakistan became strained in 1960 (over the U-2 inci-
dent) and again in 1962 (when the United States shipped arms to

5 See Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 1964); The Quest For Peace (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International
Affairs, 1966); The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford, 1969).
6 See S. M. Burke, Pakistan'sForeign Policy, An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford, 1973);
and Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1974).

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 305

India), the USSR and China were in position. So, too, was Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, who was then a very young Minister in Ayuz Khan's Cab-
inet.
Bhutto was an admirer of Ayub Khan. He counselled the Presi-
dent on the need to placate public opinion. The student community
and professional intelligentsia were anti-Indian, not anti-Communist.
The American action in providing arms to India could not be ignored
by the Ayub government. Already, Ayub was judged an American
lackey by many. The Chinese military success in northeastern India
seemed to give Pakistan the opportunity to seize Kashmir. But Ayub
did not give the order to his troops, and many felt he was prevented
from doing so by his Western allies. Moreover, Pakistan by 1962 had
lived through 44 months of martial law, and opposition to Ayub Khan
was beginning to snowball. Rumors were circulating that the United
States had instigated the 1958 coup which brought Ayub to power,
and that the United States was the regime's principal support. Other-
wise, Pakistan would return to a democratic system. It was Bhutto's
view that the Ayub government had to disassociate itself from the
United States, and apparently Ayub was convinced. Bhutto was made
Foreign Minister in 1963, and immediately turned to the task of ver-
balizing a new Pakistan foreign policy.
Bhutto proved to be an electrifying orator, and especially popular
among young people. Large crowds assembled whenever he spoke, and
one theme seemed to pervade his speechs: "Pakistan must normalize
relations with all the great powers, lessen its dependence on the United
States, and develop more intimate connections with the Arab states."
In the same year, Pakistan signed a border agreement with China, and
subsequently became the first non-Communist country to establish di-
rect air links. When the 1965 Indo-PakistanWar broke out, the United
States imposed an embargo on arms shipments to both countries. The
Chinese, on the other hand, threatened India with a new invasion, and
thereby won great credit with the Pakistanis.7
Bhutto was also vindicated by these events, and his popularity
soared just as Ayub's began a precipitous decline. Ayub was heavily

SSee Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale (Amherst:
University of MassachusettsPress, 1974).

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306 Asian Affairs

maligned for agreeing to the Tashkent settlement, which left Kashmir

in Indian hands. Bhutto is believed to have resigned his Cabinet post
rather than become identified with an agreement that many Pakistanis
described as a "betrayal" of legitimate Muslim demands. Soon after
leaving the government, Bhutto joined the political opposition; and in
1969, he played an instrumental role in forcing Ayub's resignation.
Bhutto continued to criticize his country's foreign and domestic
policies throughout the Yahya Khan interregnum. In the 1970 general
elections (the first ever conducted in Pakistan), he and his party, the
PPP, received a majority of seats in West Pakistan. The electoral re-
sults showed Bhutto to be the outstanding political figure in that half
of the country-and with the eventual loss of East Pakistan, in what
remained of the country as a whole. Thus, when Yahya Khan was
forced to step down, the military leadership called upon Bhutto to form
a new government and restore Pakistan's shattered fabric.
Since taking over the government, Bhutto has continued his even-
handed policy toward the great powers. He has, however, tempered
his criticism of the United States; and despite earlier statements and
the decision to quit SEATO, Pakistan is currently more active in re-
gional military planning than at any time prior to 1965. Indeed, ele-
ments of the armed forces participated in a CENTO military exercise
in 1974, the first such activity in almost a decade. Pakistan's interest
in CENTO appears to have been revived in face of India's mutual
assistance pact with the Soviet Union and Leonid Brezhnev's call for
an Asian collective security arrangement. While Pakistan does not
want to antagonize the Soviet Union, and relations between the two
countries are properly amiable, the USSR is clearly judged a threat.
President Nixon's policy in 1971 to "tilt" in favor of Pakistan
during the Indo-Pakistan conflict and the Ford Administration's deci-
sion to lift the ten-year embargo on arms sales to Pakistan, have once
again given the United States a strong hand to play in Pakistan. Wash-
ington is perceived in a different light in the post-Vietnam era. It is
now taken for granted that the United States has only marginal inter-
ests in Asia. Improved US relations with mainland China, and the
withdrawal of American forces and closing of American bases in
Southeast Asia, have tended to sharpen American interests, as well as
delimit them. The United States is seen as primarily concerned with

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Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy 307

resource access and open sea lanes, not with the containment of com-
munism-especially in areas of the world that are not judged vital to
American security. Attention has therefore shifted to the marginal seas
that extend from the Indian Ocean on the east to the Persian Gulf and
Arabian Sea on the west. Only in Korea is the United States militarily
involved on the mainland of East Asia, and that posture is presumably
designed more to insulate Japan than to threaten China. Hence, it may
be possible for the Chinese, Americans, and Pakistanis to find some
common ground in foreign policy.
Both the United States and China are assumed to believe that the
maintenance of Pakistan's territorial integrity is in their interest. This
is not so clear in the case of the Soviet Union, in view of its role in the
Bangladesh drama and its interest in the tribes of Pakistan's western
frontier. Hence, the United States is presumably not unduly disturbed
when China gives arms to Pakistan, and China can accept Pakistan's
role in CENTO with equanimity. In each instance, Pakistan is
strengthened and thus in a better position to defend itself. The delicate
and complicated relationship thus far achieved among the three super-
powers and the countries of South Asia leaves none of them with the
capacity freely to manipulate the overall situation. In the period ahead,
all may anticipate that the politics of the area will continue fluid and
unstable.
As of this writing, it would appear that Pakistan's foreign policy
will anchor on the Middle East. Its border with Iran assures common
interests with high security priorities. The wealth being accumulated
by the Persian Gulf states will make them more independent of great
power manipulation, and a Fourth World of economically powerful
but otherwise small states has already come into existence. Pakistan
under Bhutto seems determined to identify with this new major actor
in international affairs.

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