Indian Political Science Association

AFGHAN PAKISTAN RELATIONS THE PAKHTOONISTAN ISSUE

Author(s): Surendra Chopra
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1974), pp.
310-331
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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 AFGHAN PAKISTAN RELATIONS
THE PAKHTOONISTAN ISSUE

Surendra Chopra*

In his typicalflambouyant styleof diplomacyMr. Bhuttopresenteda

rose to the AfghanAmbassadorin Pakistan,Dr. Ali Mohammad Popal in
earlyNovember1973 and gave hima warmhug. Mr. Bhuttowas reported
to have told Dr. Popal "Let us and the war of roses".1 The membersof
the diplomaticcorpse in Islamabad whohad hosteda dinnerto Mr. Bhutto
cheeredMr. Bhutto'sgesturelustily. AfghanAmbassador,however,made
no comment nor did the Afghan Government. The purpose of this
gimmick; obviouslywas to "portraya postureof peace towardsAfghanistan
and thus by implicationcreatingan impressionthatall would be wellin the
NWFP."2 Bhuttohas also held out a threatthatre-openingof the question
of Durand Line will open up pandora's box, referringto borders of
Afghanistanwith the Soviet Union and Iran. Recently Bhutto has
indiscretelytriedto implicateKabul in an allegedplot to murder him and
in the anti-Ahmediya riotingin Pakistan.
Pakistanhas had anxious momentson theNorth West Frontier ever
since its birth. Before independencethe Pathans of both settled and
unsettledareas of theformerNorthWest FrontierProvince,led by Khan
Abdul GhaffarKhan and his brotherDr. Khan Sahib dreamed of an
independentHomeland. Accordingto thepartitionplan therewas to be a
referendum in the area to ascertainthe view of the people whether they
wantedto join India or Pakistan. The Congresswhich was the majority
party there boycottedthe referendumbecause it did not give themthe
choice of Independence. An impressivenumberof 286370 votes was polled
forPakistanand 2974 forIndia. The total number of votes cast in the
referendumwas less by 83871®than the number of votespolled in the
generalelectionin 1946.
Some of the formerCongress leaders includingDr. Khan Sahib
reconciledthemselvesto the creation of Pakistan but his brotherKhan
Abdul GhaffarKhan and the well known tribal leader Faqir of Ipi
continuedtheirfightfor the creation of Pakhtoonistan-an independent
homelandforthe Pathans. Afghanistan whichhad been a havenfor many
a revolutionary Pathan has cultural,lingual and emotional ties with the

* ReaderinPolitical Kurukshetra
Science, Kurukshetra.
University,
1. TheStatesman, 4 November 1973.
2. ThePatriot"Bhutto'sOliveBranchDoes not ImpressKabul" 9 November
1973.
3. M.A.Chaudhry : "TheRelations Pakistanand Afghanistan",
between Pakistan
, Vol.VIII, 1955,p. 496.
Horizon,

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 AFGHAN
PAKISTAN
RELATIONS 311

people of the area, hencetheycould not see kindlyto the incorporationof

Pakhtoonarea itito Pakistan. Afghanistanwas the onlystatevotingagainst
the entry of Pakistan into the United Nations. Mr. Hosyan Aziz, the
Afghanrepresentative to theU.N. GeneralAssemblysaid :

"This unhappy circumstanceis due to the fact we do not

recognisethe old North West FrontierProvince as Part of
Pakistan so long as the people of the NorthWest Frontier
Provincehave not been givenas opportunityfreefromany kind
of influenceto determineforthemselves,whetherthey wish to
be independentor to becomea part of Pakistan."4

That has been the crux of the problem between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Kabul has continuedits supportto the turbulent,fierceand
warlikePathans. The AfghanGovernmenthas refusedto accept Durand
Line as thefrontierand theyhave not reconciledthemselves to the loss of
the territorieseast of Durand and supported the demand for an
independentPakhtoonistan.
A wordmay be added about theconceptof Pakhtoonistan. Rahman
Pazhwak an Afghancareerdiplomatin a book "Pakhtoonistan"mentioned
the followingterritorieswhich form Pakhtoonistan: Chitral, Hazara,
Kohistan,Swat, Dir, Buner,Peshawar,Tirah, Bajaur, Kohat, Bannu, Dera
G hazi Khan,'Dera Ismail Khan, Waziristan, Khyber, Pazu, Gomal and
Malakand.5
The Pathan territory beginsat the westernend of the Himalayas,
wheretheKarakoram,thePamirsand the Hindu Kush conglomerate. The
North West Frontier Provincelies betweenthe Durand Line on the West
and the Indus Riveron theEast, runningapproximatelyfrom 31 degrees
4 minutesto 36 degrees 57 minutes north latitude and from 69 degrees
16 minutesto 74 degrees7 minuteseast longitude. The total area is nearly
39259 square miles.
Geographicallythe area has three districtsub-divisions: (a) Hazara
District,(b) narrowstripbetweenthe Indus and the hills which includes
Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts,and
( c) the ruggedmountainousareas on the northand westalong the Durand
Line whichconstitutes the tribalAgencies. Politically, however, the area
is divided into two sections: (a) The Tribal Territory whichincludesthe
Malakand, Mohamand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristanand South
WaziristanAgenciescovering25140 square miles and (b) SettledDistricts,
namely: Hazara, Mardan, Peshawar,Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan
covering14119square miles.
The most"practicaltouchstoneof identity"of thepeople of the area,
accordingto Spain is language. Almostall the people speak Pushtu. This
4. General Records
Official
Assembly , 92ndPlenary , 31December
Meeting 1947.
5. Rattan Pazhwak,
Pakhtoonistan
(London, No publisher,
no date),p. 10.

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312 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE

is an EasternIranianlanguage definitely distinctfrom Persian and Urdu

used in theareas to thewestand east of it6.
Duringthe second worldwar,the BritishGovernmentmade certain
moves to pacifythe Indian opinionand it was clear that Britaincould no
longercontinueits strangleholdover India. Kabul approachedthe British
Governmentwitha requestthatthefrontier areas should be allowed the
option of either rejoining their motherland or become independent. This
showsthatAfghanistanhad neverforgotten the loss of Pakhtoonareas. It
is interesting to note thatKabul also made a representationsimultaneously
in the year 1944 that Afghanistanshould be givena corridorto the sea
throughBaluchistan. The British,however, turned down the Afghan
demandsand wentahead withitsplan, whichwas formulatedlater (3 June
1947) to allow the optionof theirjoiningPakistanor India. On the other
hand GhaffarKhan wroteto Gandhi on 11 June 1947 that the option
should be between"Pakistanand freePathan State."7 It is also on record
thatDr. Khan Sahib wroteto Nehruon 2 July1947 thatthefrontier people
had neverthoughtofjoiningAfghanistanand wrotethat "we have learnt
forthefirsttimethatArghanGovernmenthave officiallyapproached the
Government .of India. We have been placed in an unenviable position,
naturally,the AfghanGovernment are takingadvantageof it and exploiting
the situation."8
Afterregistering theirnegativevote in the General Assembly,Kabul
sentNajibullah Khan who, afterhaving talks with Pakistan at Karachi,
said in a broadcastthatit had made threedemandson Pakistan, first,the
tribalareas should be constitutedinto a free, sovereignprovince; second,
Pakistanmustgive Afghanistanaccess to the sea eitherby the creation of
an Afghancorridorin West Baluchistanor by allottinga freeAfghanZone
in Karachi and third,Afghanistanand Pakistanshould enter into a treaty
whichshould permitone partyto remainneutralif the otherwas attacked.9
But nothingcame out of the parleys. Meanwhilea political party known
as Young Afghan Party was reportedto be supporting the cause of
Pakhtoonistanin Afghanistan.10
Pakistan, however, moved diplomatically and wisely. In December
1947,Pakistanwithdrewits garrisonfromRazmak, the fortifiedcamp in
Waziristan,thus removingthe "grip of large scale stateauthorityfrom
one of themostintractably barbaricand turbulentregionsof the world."11
This step was taken to assuage thefeelingsof the turbulenttribeswhich
6. J.W.Spain: ThePathanBorderland (TheHague,MoutonandCo., 1963)p. 40.
7. PyareLai : MahatmaGandhi - The Last Phase (Allahabad,Navajevan,
1956),
p. 273.
8. Ibid.,p. 281.
9. For detailssee I.H. Baqui: "RelationsbetweenAfganistan and Pakistan",
Pakistan Horizon. Vol. 1,September1948.pp. 216-218.
10. Ibid., p. 17.
11. TheEconomist (London)"India'swhitest elephant", 27 December p. 1042.
J947,
AlsoseeSpain,op.cit.p. 34.

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 AFGHAN
PAKISTAN
RELATIONS 313

have a fiercelove of independence. Pakistan'sstep was economicallyand

politicallyshrewdmove because themaze of ruggedand barrenmountains
which lie to the west of middleIndus is not economically an attractive
possession.ltwould havebeena greatstrainon its slenderresources.Again,
withdrawalof PakistangarrisonfromWaziristanincreasedthe mobilityof
its armedforcesto face a militarydisasteron Pak-Jammu-Kashmir Border.
Politically it created an impression that the Pakistan Governmeat was
friendly to its Pathan brethern. Pakistan also used the Pathans of these
ruggedmountainsin the'OperationGulmarg'misadventure thustemporarily
diverting the attention of those people from depradationsin the Pakistan
plains to Jammu and Kashmir. The involvementof the tribes in the
invasionof Kashmirwas explainedaway by Pakistanirepresentative in the
SecurityCouncil in a disingenousmanner. The tribais, said Zafrullah
Khan, wenttherein supportof their"Muslim brethren".12Though in the
same breath,Pakistani'srepresentative maintainedthattheuse of Pakistan's
armywas resortedto checkthe advanceof the Indian armylesttheyshould
establishcontactwiththetribalarea and starta pin ^r movementwith the
help of Afghanistan.13Coupled withthe method of pacifyingthe tribais
by exploitingtheir religion, Pakistan adopted the traditionalmethodof
givingthemsubsidies,in spiteof its limitedresources.14
As faras Afghanistanwas concernedPakistantried"to deprecatethe
problemto the pointof ignoringit".15 Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan called the
talk of selfdetermination as "figmentof Afghanistan'simagination".16At
anotheroccasionLiquat Ali said :

"While the Governmentof Pakistan are willingto establish

friendly relationswith the Royal Governmentof Afghanistan
they cannot be expected foreverto continue pleading for
friendship,and while theyhave not givenup hopes thatsanity
theymust reiteratein
will dawn on therulers of Afghanistan,
clear and unambiguouslanguage thatnot one inch of our land
will be surrenderedto anybody."17

The Afghanclaim on ethnicgroundswas too dangerous for Pakistan to

accept, forPakistan itself was based on religionratherthantheethnicor
lingual bases, the bases of modern states. A Pakistani writeris of the
view that the idea of independentPakhtoonistanwas "not as fantasticas

12. S/PV228and229,16and17January 1948.

13. For details Chopra,U.N.Mediation
seeSurendra inKashmir : A Study
in Power
VishalPublications,
Politics(Kurukshetra, 1971).
14. TheTimes(London),29June1949.
15. J.W."Pakistan'sNorthWestFrontier Province"MiddleFast Journal , 1954?
Vol 8. No. 1.
16. Pakistan,Constituent
Assembly Vo'. II, 1950,
Debates(Legislative)
17. Ibid,

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314 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE

Mr. Khan wantedeveryoneto believe, because, historicallyspeaking, the

disputedarea was connectedwiththe area whichis now Afghanistan."18
The war in Kashmircame to an end on 1 January 1949. Some of
thetribaiswho straggledback homeleavingtheirkinsmendead inthousands
at various theatresof war in Kashmir, obviously disgustedwiththeir
misadventure createddisaffection
amongstthetribaisagainst the Pakistani
Government. The Afghan king Zahir Shah opened the seventh
sessionof theAfghan National Assemblywith sharp utterancesagainst
Pakistanand in favourofthe Pakhtoons'rightto self determination.The
Assembly passed a resolutionrepudiatingall treaties,conventionsand
agreements concludedbetweenAfghanGovernmentand the BritishIndian
Governmentthus repudiatingthe Durand Line. The resolution also
condemnedPakistanGovernment forfollowingrepressivepolicies against
the Pakistanpeople.
Some troublestartedbrewingup in the tribalarea and Pakistan had
to resortto aerial bombingand a fewbombshit a villageacrossthe borders
on 12 July1949 whichcreateda stirnot onlyin thetribalarea but even in
Afghanistan. Pakistan claimed that the bombing was accidentaland in
orderto pacifythefeelingsof the people on both sides of Afghan border
promptlypaid damages.19
Duringthisperiodit was reported that the Faqir of Ipi had been
electedPresidentof SouthernPakhtoonistanand variousregionalassemblies
werebeingelectedto set up a CentralGovernmentof Pakhtoonistanand a
PakhtoonNational Assembly.20
Pakistan'sdecision to seek the American protectiveumbrellaalso
provokedsharpprotestsfromthe Afghan people as it would strengthen
Pakistan's colonial stranglehold over the "freedom-seekingpeople of
Pakhtoonistan".21
Pakistan, however,tried to show sweet reasonablenesstowards
Afghanistan. A Pakistaniwriterwhile commentingon the soft attitude
adopted by Pakistanwrites:
"One of thereasons of Pakistan'sconciliatoryattitudèwas that
Pakistan did not welcome a close relationship between
Afghanistanand Soviet Union. She did not wantto create
anarchyin Afghanistan because that would again make thearea
a hot-bedof international
intrigueand Pakistan might then be
facedwitha situationmore dangerousthanthe prevailingstate
of affairs.22
The Pak-Afghandispute took an ugly turn in March 1955. The
18. ArifHussain, Pakistan: Itsideologyandforeign
policy(LondonFrankCass &
Co., 1966),p. 122.
19. See Dawn,15July1949.
20. IndienNewsChronicle, 4 March1950.
21. NewYorkTimes, 23 December 1953.
22, AnfHussain,Ibtd.,p. 122,

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 AFGHANPAKISTAN
RELATIONS 315

Governmentof Pakistan decided to integratethe provinces of Punjab;

Sind and North WestFrontieťinto one unit. The Afghans reacted very
sharply.23 A mob attackedthe Pakistanembassy,burntthe furnitureand
tore down the Pakistani flag aud hoisted Pakhtoonistan flag. The
PakistaniConsulates at Kandhar and Jalalabad werealso attacked. This
resultedin ruptureof diplomatic relations,and the borderremainedclosed
forfivemonths.The Afghanattitudeirkedthe PakistanPriméMinisterwno
reacted: "We have tolerated the Anti-Pakistanactivitiesof the Afghan
ruling Junta for long, in the hope that wiser counsels mightperhaps
eventuallyprevail. We shall not toleratesuch activitiesany longer". Leo
Jirga, Afghanistan'sGrand National Assembly adopted a resolution
stipulatingthe non-recongitionof Pakhtoonterritories as partof Pakistan.2*
In December 1955,the Sovietleadersmade an unequivocaldeclaration
in Kabul thattheysympathised with the Pakhtoon demand. The Soviet
leadersalso offereda creditof 100 million dollars for economic develop-
ment. It may be pointed out here that Afghanistanis an important
recipientof Sovietmoneyand arms. The SovietUniod is reportedto have
equippedtheAfghanistanarmyof 35000 to 40000 men.25
The relations,however,improveda littlein 1956 as a result of good"
officesof spme MuslimCountriesand PresidentIskanderMirzas' visit to
Kabul in August 1956. Daud Khan and Suhrawardyalso exchanged
visits. Zahir Shah paid a royal visit to Pakistanduringthisperiodand
everything seemedwell tillthe beginningof I960, when another incident
createdstirin Pakistan. The Pakistan Governmenttook militaryactiotf-
againsttherulerof Dir, a princelystateof NorthWesternborderof Pakistan,
whichresultedin sabre rattlingon the Afghanborder.
While tension between Pakistan and Afghanistanwas at a high
pitchMr. Krushchevreiteratedhis fullsupportto Afghanistan in herdispute
withPakistan.26
Paul Grimesofthe Daily Telegraph,reportedfrom Peshawar that
there was widespread criticism in Pakistan against Mr. Krushchev's«'
remarks.87The Pakistanpressnotably Dawn and Pakistan Tintes made
causticcommentson his statment. The Dawn opined :
"Having failed either to bribe or browbeat Pakistan into
becominga Sovietsatelliteunderthe guise of neutralism,Mr.
Krushchevhas now evidentlydecidedto make himselfas much
nuisanceto thiscountryas he possiblycan.28
The Pakistan Times, was of the view that Krushchev's "present

23. M.A.Chaudhri, op.cit.,pr123.-

op.cit, P. 501.,ArifHussain,
1955,p. 521.
24. AsianRecorder,
25. NewYorkTimes,25 June1958.
26. Hindustan 4 March1960.
Times,
12MarchI960,
27. DailyTelegraph,
28. Dawn,23 MarçhI960.

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316 OF POLITICALSCIENCE
THE INDIANJOURNAL

diatribe"againstPakistanwas an "exceptionallyoffensiveand alarming

expressionof Soviet hostilityand it clearlyamountsto serious interference
in our internalaffairs".29In anotherhard hittingeditorialthe same paper
pointedout thatthe Sovietswantedto reduceAfghanistan to the status of
a satellite and use it as a base forhostileactivityagainstPakistan. It
insistedthattherewas no demand forPakhtoonistanin the area.30Inciden-
tallyan influentialIndian daily followedthe same line and maintainedthat
Pakistan had made a conspicuoussuccessof their frontier policywhereas
the Britishrecordwas one of constantwars.31
Reactingto Krushchev's unequivocal support to the Afghan and
Pakhtoon stand, Manzoor Qadir, the then Foreign Ministerof Pakistan
made an interesting suggestion. He said, if a referendum was held on the
Afghan side he was certain that people would opt forPakistan.32 This
proposal was characterisedby the SovietAmbassadorin Pakistanas a joke.33
The Soviet Ambassador's remarks were severelycriticisedby Pakistani
press.34
The BritishGovernmentand old Indian hands fully supported the
Pakistani stand.35 Olaf Caroe a distinguishedexperton BritishIndia's
borders in a letter published in the Times (London) pointedout that
Pakistanhad a betterclaim to Kabul than Afghanistanhad to Peshawar
and added thatthe Pakhtoonistanidea was a "real jest amongstPathans".36
The U 2 incidentoccuredduringthisperiod of crisis on Pakistan's
borders. Kabul lodged a strongprotestagainstthe aircraft'sflightover
Afghanistan.37On the heels of this incident the Afghan Deputy Prime
Minister warned Pakistanon Pakhtoonistanissue and said thatexceptfor
a minordisputewithIran overthe watersof AilmundRiver,Pakhtoonistan
remainedAfghanistan'sonlyexternalproblemand was the main cause of
growing deteriorationin Pak-Afghanrelations.38Afghanistanthreatened
thatin view of Pakistan'scontinuedirrendentism, Kabul might divert the
course of Kabul riverand jeopardisethe Rs. 60 millionWarsak Project39
whichchagrinedthe militarydictatorsof Islamabad.
The Daily Telegraphcorrespondent GeorgeEvans reportedfromKabul
thatthe AfghanGovernmenthad refused to renew visas and residence

29. Pakistan Times, 5 March1960.

30. Ibid.,8 March1960.
31. TheStatesman , 8 March1960.
32. PakistanTimes , 8 March1960.
33. DailyTelegraph , 14March1960.
24. Dawn.13March,Pakistan Times.16March1960.
35. For the British PrimeMinisterMacmillans'
viewsonthequestions
SeePakistan
Times , 21 May1960.
36. Times, (London),21 March1960.
37. Pakistan Times, 21 May1960.
38. Times ofIndia, 23 May1960.
39. Pakistan Times9 4 June1960.

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 RELATIONS
AFGHANPAKISTAN 317

permits to Pakistani personnel serving in the British and American

embassies, causing serious shortage of personneland concernto boththe
Britishand Americanembassiesin Kabul.40 Armedconflictwas preceded
"
by a war of words. Pakistancreateda new weapon like Azad Kashmir
Radio", called "Free Afghanistan"whichblaredforthstingingattackson
the Afghanruling class. According to the Daily Telegraph the tirades
against Afghanistan were "not only offensiveand tactless" but also
"patentlyuntrue".41
Afghanistanforce-landedtwo PakistanAir Force "Fury" aircraftsat
Kandhar in Afghanistanand in a stronglywordednote accused Pakistanof
repeatedlymaking provocative violations of Afghanair space in thelast
two months. Therewereabout thirtysuch violationsbefore the "Furies"
were foreeddown,42thenoteadded. The Pakistan Government,however,
gave out a different
story,usual when a reconnaissanceaircraftis forcedto
land, maintaining that the aircraftlandingat Kandhar was "entirelythe
resultof some navigationalerrorand was purelyaccidental" and regretted
the incident.43
Beforethe dust could settle, Manzur Qadir, announced that the
Afghan lashkars infiltratedinto Pakistan territoryand that they were
repulsedbythe Mohamand tribewiththehelp of Charamangiand Sularzai
tribes of Pakistan with heavy casualties rangingbetween400 and 500.44
Afghan authoritiesdismissed this as intra-tribalclash and denied the
Pakistan charge of Afghaninfiltration and concentration of troopson the
Afghanside of the borderand accused the PakistaniGovernmentof "false
propaganda to cover up its militaryoccupationof Malakand, Shabqadur,
Chakdara and otherstrategicareas in the Pakhtoon region"45and that
Pakistanhad createdalarmin orderto send troopsin the tribalareas.46
Reportsof borderskirmishes continuedto pour in. On 20 May 1961,
PakistanTimesreportedan Afghanattackon a Pakistani post which was
repulsed by Pakistani troops47Ayub Khan told newsmen thatregular
Afghanarmywas involvedin the attack.Making thisattacka smokescreen,
Pakistanair forceplanes attackedtheAfghanterritory one mile across the
Durand Line, in orderto dislodgethe "Afghanagents" who werecreating
troublein the area.48
While the situation on the borders continued deterioratingthe
Pakistani press gave the impressionthat therewas an initiativeof talks

40. DailyTelegraph , 18JulyI960.

41. Ibid.
42. Times ofIndia, 10August1961.
43. Pakistan Times, 16August and21 AugustI960*
44. Ibid.,29 September 1960.
45. Ibid.,1 October I960*
46. TheHindustan Times , 11October1960»
47. Pakistan Times,21 May1961.
48. Ibid.,22 May1961.

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3Í8 THE INDIANJOURNAL
<0FPOLITICAI,
.SCIENCÊ

from Kabul but the Kabul News Agency Bakhtiàr suggestedthat thé
proposal had emanated from Rawalpindi. The purposeof initiatingthe
talks with a Government which according to Pakistan propaganda
machinerywas tottering was presumablyto impressthe U.S. of Pakistani
intentionsof improvingPak-Afghanrelations duringAyub's impending
to U.S. Therecould be another reason of overtures. Kabul was
(yjfiit
planningto raisethe Pakhtoonistanissue at the UnitedNations whichwas
extremelydistastefulto Pakistan. In order to placate Afghanistan,
Pakistanwantedto starta dialogue withit.
The relationsworsenedduringAyub's visit,to the U.S. The Afghan
Ambassadorto theU.S. expressedto PresidentKennedy,his Government's
'concern over reports of increasingmilitaryaid to Pakistanand sought
assurancethatit would not be used, against Afghanistan. The Afghan
ambassadorapprisedPresidentKennedyand Dean Rusk of the continued
cbombingof the Pushto villages. The Americanleaderstold himthat they
recognizedDurand Line as Pak-Afghanborderbut theydid not favourthe
use of U.S. armsin that area.49
The orderof closureof Pakistaniconsulatesat Jalalabadand Kandhar
•and the closure of Afghan consulates at Quetta and Peshawar,was an
extremestep initiatedby Pakistan.6» It may be mentionedthat Pakistan
had earlierarrestedofficialsof theconsulate,in April 1961,even after that
gross provocation Afghanistandid not close the consulates. Kabul
threatenedto severediplomaticrelationsif Pakistan Governmentdid not
rescindits decision to close down Afghanconsulatesand tradeofficesin
Pakistan. The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan made effortsto prevent
diplomatic rupture. Jf diplomatic relations between the two countries
weresevered,Afghanistanwas bound to lean more heavilythan before on
the Soviet Union, a situationwhichAmericahad been struggling hard to
prevent.61The U.S. Ambassadorseemsto have failedin his effortswhen
a white paper was released by Pakistan Governmentlistingits charges
againstthe AfghanGovernment. Afghanistanclosed the consulates and
trade Agencifeson 4 September and diplomatic ties were severed on
6 September. The rapidlydeteriorating relationsbetweenAfghanistan and
Pakistancame to a climaxthanksto Pakistan. It was PakistanGovernment
which precipitatedthe matter but after the diplomatic relations were
snapped a spokesmanof PakistanForeignofficedescribed Kabul's action
as an "extrememeasure" and said Pakistanfelt"verysad and sorry".62
Severance of diplomatic relations resultedin closureof the border
arid since the demarcationof theDurand Line in 1893,a woodenbarrier

49. PakistanTimes,editorial
"Afghan 22June1961.
offer,"
50. TimesofIndia,24August1961.
51. TimesofIndia.2 September1961.
52. TheStatesman,2 September 1961,

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 AFGHANPAKISTAN
RELATIONS 319

went up at Tokhram just two feetfromtheinternationalborderon the

Afghanistanside forthe firsttime.63
Closure of the borderand suspensionof tradeadverselyaffectedthe
Afghan economy and if its trade wereroutedthoughthe SovietUnion
that would increase Afghanistan'sdependence on the SovietUnion. In
this situation, the non-alignedpositionof Afghanistanwas likelyto have
beencompromised. This was againstthe long-terminterestsof Pakistan
too. The Afghan Governmentcould have come out more openly in
support of the Pakhtoonistan movement,whichin spiteof thePakistani
denialsdid existat thattime.That could have also resultedin more border
clashes and would have strengthenedthe hands of the protagonistsofa
vigorousborderpolicyincludingLt. Gen. Sheikh.
Such a border policy would have considerably alienated the
independenttribaiswho had been sore because of the aerial bombingofthe
areas. And then it could have also caused a lot of heartburning,because
closureof tradeaffectedthemeagreincomeof the tribais.
The Soviet Union offeredto buy the Afghan fruit which was
exported to Pakistan and to India via Pakistan. The psychological
impact of such a measureon Afghantradersand cultivatorscan be easily
imagined.
Pakistan papers reported that the SovietUnion had offered to build
fruitcanning factoriesand distilleriesin Afghanistanto ensurea more
profitableuse of the fruitgrown in that country. Again, Kabul was
offeredthe use of Sovietportsin the Black Sea. A largepart of Afghan
foreigntradewas said to have been divertedto the Black Sea ports. It may
be mentionedherethattheroad the SovietUnion was building across the
Hindukushmountainsin NorthAfghanistanconnectsKabul withTashkent
havingtremendonspotentialfor the Soviet-Afghan trade. The set-back
caused to the US interestsin Afghanistanby Pakistan'sunilateral decision
and its consequent impacthas been far-reaching.The US construction
of road in South Afghanistanand Kabul University fellbehindschedule,
whileher aid goods rottedin Pakistaniwarehouses.54
Meanwhile therewere reportsabout Iranian offerof mediation.
Though not speciallymentioned,Manzur Qadir admittedthat there were
somediplomaticmovesto settlePakistan-Afghanistan dispute.55The Afghan

53. Timesof India,16 September 1961. The Indianpressgenerally expressed

concernat thisuglyturn. Seeforexample TheHindueditorial"Pak-Afghan
rupture"8 September1961,NationalHerald,editorial
"Pak-Afghan Rupture"8
September 1961,The Statesman,"Broken 8 September
Relations", 1961,Indian
"A DangerousDevelopment".It is interesting
Express,editorial, tocompare
thereactions
ofIndiaat Pakistan's
discomfiture& Pakistan's
reactionat India's
embrassementin1962whenChinese hordesdescended'
onIndia.
54. Sithansu
Das,"Pakistan andAfghanistan: Strained IndianExpress,
Relations",
10August1963.
55. TheStatesman,18September 1961.

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320 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE

Premiertold a WestGermannews AgencythatPakistanshould guarantee

the Pukhtoonsthe rightto self-determination nations like
and the friendly
the U.S. should underwritethe guaranteeand demandedthewithdrawnof
Pakistanitroopsfromthetribalarea.56
Pakistan rejected the terms laid down by Kabul for talks. A
spokesman of the Foreign Office said thatAfghanistan's"rulingJunta"
continued to be what he called "greedy, covetous and obstinate".87
PresidentAyub describedthe conditions"too absurd" to be accepted by
a respectablecountry.68
The closure of trade resulted in holdingof 346 railwaywagonsat
Peshawarladen withgoods in transitto Afganistanand 2,000 tons ofcargo
meantforAfghanistanin transitsheds in Karachi. Accordingto Pakistan
Government,20,000 tons of cargo consistingof wheat,cementand other
US aid goods was due shortlyat Karachi fordespatchto Afghanistan.And
the US was understandably keenon the despatchof American supplies to
Afghanistan. Islamabad, however, resented American "softness" for
Afghanistanbut Kabul on the otherhand feltthatthe U.S. had a hand in
the Pakistandemand forthe closureof Afghanconsulates.69
PresidentKennedywas reportedto have conveyeda personalmessage
to King Zahir Shah. The American diplomatic circlesin Kabul had a
feelingthat Daud was pro-sovietand that may be the reasonfor Mr.
Kennedy'spersonalcommunicationto the King.80
The New YorkTimes,however,reportedthatPresidentKennedyhad
writtento both President Ayub and King Zahir that,ifthe leaderswere
willing,theU.S. could possiblymake some proposalsthatmighthelpbridge
the gulf between the two nations. The President,accordingto official
sources offered"consultativeServices" of the U.S. President. To these
overturesAyub reacted:

Whose friendshipis of any worth to you ? The timefora

choice has come-in fact it came long ago. A good deal of
pragmaticand hard thinkingis required.61

It also reportedthe Afghan willingnessto accept theU.S. good

offices.62The Dawn, however,vigorouslydenounced the U.S. mediation
bid. It accused theAmericansof beingincapableof seeing facts because
theywere"obsessed withthe red-bogey".63This editorial seems to have

56. TimesofIndia,27 September 1961.

57. Ibid.
58. Hindustan 30September
Times, 1961.
59. Hindustan Times,23September 1961.
60. Ibid.,1 October1961.
61. NewYorkTimes, 5 October
1961.
62. Ibid.,1 October
1961.
63. Dawn,7 October1S61.

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 AFGHAN
PAKISTAN RELATIONS 321

been provokedby a USIS releaseon 5 OctoberdatelinedWashingtonwhich

merelyexpressedtheUS desireforresumptionof thenormaltradechannels.64
Hindustan Times correspondent, reporting from Rawalpindi,
maintained that theU.S. interestin the matter,stemmedmainlyfromthe
suspenseattendingtheU.S. goods worthabout 15 milliondollars in transit
to Afghanistan.The US was also worriedthatthe supplies,especiallywheat
urgentlyneeded in Afghanistanwas held up in Pakistanand the purpose
forwhichthe assistancehad been givenwas beingdefeated.65
The U.S. efforts at findingout some way out continued. The White
House announcedon 17 Octoberthe Pak-Afghan acceptanceof U.S. good
offices.PresidentKennedy,however, named Mr. LivingstoneT. Merchant
U.S. Ambassador to Canada, as his personal representativeto tryto
restore trade between Pakistanand Afghanistan.66It maybe mentioned
thatPakistanhad emphasizedthat talks will confineto transittradeissue
and would not in any way be relatedto Pakhtoonistanor any otherissue67
and Afghanistaninsisted on the reopening of consultants and trade
agencies.
The prevailingmood in both thecountrieswas such thata detente
seemednear impossible.The Pakistaniinsistenceof guaranteefromKabul
that the Afghan consulates, if re-opendedwillnot take undue interestin
internal matters like the red shirtmovementwas a difficult pre-condition
fortalks. Acceptanceof thisdemandwould amountto admissionthatthe
Afghanconsulateshad been interfering in theinternalaffairs of Pakistan.
Afghan insistence on the otherhand, of considerationof Pakhtoonistan,
was firmlyrejected by Pakistan as a stunt and refusedto have it even
mentionedin seriousdiscussions.68
Meanwhile a dramaticchangeoccured in the Govermentalcirclesin
Pakistan. Lt. Gen. Shekh,the architectof thediscreditedforwardpolicy,
which had resulted in the rupture, was divested of the portfolioof the
Foreign Region States. President Ayub, himselfa Pathan, knowingthe
mood of thePathans,took overtheportfolio.69Presumablythiswas done
at the advice of the US mediatorMr. Merchant,in orderto bringsome
sort of a rapproachement. But the U.S. mediation bid failed.70Mr.
Merchant, however, announced that the American good offices will
continue.71
In an interview,Daud affirmed that Kabul would follow the
traditionalpolicyof non-alignment unless theWestabandonedAfghanistan.
64. TimesofIndia, 8 October 1961.
65. Hindustan Times , 7 October 1961.
66. TimesofIndia, 18October 1961.
67. TheStatesmen (NewDelhi),19 October. 1961.
68. HindustanTimes , 19October 1961.
69. TimesofIndia,2 November 1961.
70. Fora critical
analysis oftheimplications ofthefailure
oftalkssee PaulGrimes'
reportin NewYorkTimes , 8 October1961.
71. PakistanTimes , 9 November 1961.

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 i2í ŤHE IÍSÍDIAÑ Oř POLITICALSCIENCE
JOURNAL

The Premier also declared that if Pakistancontinuedwhathe called the

policy of "pressureand provocation"againstAfghanistanthat would be
"most dangerous for Pakistan and thewhole area and Asia". He also
pointedout feasibilityof an openingthroughIran. He, however,admitted
that Afghanistanwas in direneed of United States assistance.72
But thepeople who werehithard by thecontinuedstrained relations
wereabout 500,000Powindahtribesmen who had beentraditionallycrossing
overthe Durand Line withoutany formalities and checks at regular check
posts and spendingwinterroundthe areas wheregrazing ground for their
cattle and shelter for them could be available. They had enjoyedthe
privilegesaccordedto thepermanentresidents,like sugarand wheat ration
cards during the Britishperiod and was followedby the Governmentof
Pakistan.73The Powindahsgot pasturesfortheircattleand Pakistancheap
seasonal agriculturallabour. Politicallyfree flow of Powindahs helped
Pakistanas theycarriedstoriesof prosperityon theEast of Durand Line.74
PakistanGovernmentimposedrestrictions on them and theircatties' entry
into Pakistan. The explanationgivenby the Pakistaniauthoritieswas that
the measurestheyhad been takingover the past fewyearsto bringstability
and a settledway of lifeto theirown tribal areas along the North West
Frontierwerebeingfrustrated by the uncontrolledPowindah immigrations.
A PakistanGovernmentCommission,appointedtwo years previously
whichincludedBritishand Americanexpertadvisers,had reportedthatthe
Powindahsbroughtin humanand cattlediseases. Theywere also causing
soil erosion. Pakistan Governmentwanted that theyshouldtravelwith
propertraveldocuments.75 The Powindahs'allegedforcibleentryresulted
in clashesand considerableloss of life. PakistanTimes, editoriallypointed
out thattheAfghanGovernmentinsteadof informing thePowindahsabout
the decisionrelatingto traveldocumentshad been "instigating themto enter
Pakistanby force."76The Powindahs,however,learntthehard way. After
terribleloss in lifeand cattlein 1961,thePowindahsbecamemoreamenable
to some sortof permanentsettlement.77
Comingback to the US mediatoryefforts,most of the Pakistani
papers reported that the U.S. had not givenup the idea of mediationand
may be makingsome hard proposalsto bringthe two countries round to
some agreement.78Nothingwas heard of mediation till it was officially
announced in July that the Shah of Iran had offeredhis good officesin
straightening out the differencesbetweenPakistan and Afghanistan. The

72. NewYorkTimes , 17November1961.

fromtherecordsof theGovernment
73. Selection of India, 1952''Memorandum,
DeraIsmailKhan",(Calcutta,Government ofIndia,n.d.).
74. Fora briefaccountofPowindahs, seeSpam,op.cit.
75. DailyTelegraph, 19January1962.
76. PakistanTimes, 20January1962.
77. TheTimes (London), 28August1963.
78. PakistanTimes, Dawn,CivilAndMilitary , 20 May,1962#
Gazette

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 AFGHAN relations
PAKISTAN 323

offerwas appreciatedby both the parties.79The Dawn welcomingthe move

warnedthatit was "usefulnevertheless to be cautious in the optimism".80
Pakistan Timesalso welcomed Tehran gesture.81In both the editorials
therewas a markedchangein tone about Afghanistan, both expressedhope
of betterrelationship.
The Shah of Iran arrivedin Kabul on 26 July1962 and held discus-
sions withKing Zahir Shah and then proceeded to Pakistan where he
stayed for only eighthours. The indicationsin Rawalpindiwerethatthe
negotiationswerein a delicatestage. Shah's mediatoryefforts wereconfined
to the restorationof diplomaticties betweenKabul and Rawalpindi and of
transitand tradefacilitiesforAfghanimportsand exports. It was reported
thaitPakistanwas agreeableto thisbut Kabul was insistingon thereopening
of the consulates and trade officesat Peshawar and Quetta to which
Pakistanwas opposed. The Times(London) reportedthat there was an
impressionin Pakistanthatwhile the AfghanKing was anxious to have
friendly tieswithPakistan,his PrimeMinister was adopting a somewhat
stubbornattitudebecause of Moscow influence.82
A joint communique issued after the visit of Shah of Iran to
Afghanistan said thatviewswereexchangedand thattheShah of Iran would
continuehis mediatoryefforts for the normalisationof relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.83
A meetingbetweenthe ForeignMinistersof Pakistanand Afghanistan
was planned at Tehranin the second week of Septemberwherethe Shah of
Iran was also to have participated. But the meetingwas postponedbecause
theAfghanForeignMinisterexpressedhis inabilityto be presentat Tehran
in thosedays.84 Meanwhile,resignationof Sardar Daud who was regarded
as pro-SovietUnion was announced in March 1963 which came as a
surprise. The new Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Yusaf in his first
broadcast,also supportedthe demandforan independent Pakhtoonistanand
accused Pakistanforthe continuedstrainedrelations between Afghanistan
and Pakistan.85
But theunceasingefforts of theShah of Iran,did bear fruit.Pakistan's
ministry of External Affairs
announced thatPakistan'sforeignMinisterwill
meetAfghanistan's Prime Minister who was also its foreignministerat
Tehranon 22 May.86
Pakistan Times, editoriallywelcomedthe announcementbut it was of

79. Pakistan , 5 July1962.

Times
80. Dawn, editorial,
"Cautiousoptimism",
5 July1962.
81. PakistanTimes
, ''Welcome
editorial, gesture", 1962.
5 July,
82. TheTimes (London), 1 August,
1962.
83. Dawn, 2 August 1^62.
84. Pakistan , 25 August,
Times 1962.
85. Ibid,20 March,1963.
86. Ibid, 19May,1963.

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324 OF ÎOLînCAL SCIENCE
THE INDIANJOURNAL

theview that :
The understanding will be incompleteand uncertainif Kabul
continues harp Pakhtoonistan. On this question, so far
to on
Pakistanis concernedthereis no room forcompromise.87
The Times (London) welcomingtheproposedparleysattributed the change
in Afghanattitudeto the change in the officeof Prime Ministershipin
Afghanistan.88
The Tehranmeetingshowedtheexpectedresult. The two ministers
agreedto resumediplomaticrelations. It may be mentionedthat Pakistan
had to agree to the openingof the consulatesat Quettaand Peshawar and
could open consulatesat Kandhar and Jalalabad on reciprocal basis. The
AfghanGovernmentalso got the rightto open tradeagencies at Peshawar
and Chaman whichwould be of temporarynaturetill the completionof the
proposedrailwayline fromChaman and Landikotalto Afghanistan.89 Thus
the borderre-openedaftertwentytwo months.
The Tehran accord paved the way for friendlyrelations between
Afghanistanand Pakistan. The Dawn editoriallyshoweredencomiaon the
sagacityof Shah of Iran and statedthattheTehranaccord :
"Shall not fail to exercise a beneficial influence on the
developmentof happyrelationshipbetweenthetwocountries."90
Mr. Bhuttoon his arrivalat Karachi fromTehran said :
Pakistanhas arrivedat peacefulsettlementwithall neighbouring
countries,like China, Nepal, Afghanistanand Burma, except,
unfortunately, India which refuses to make the necessary
adjustments bringlastingpeace to the sub-continent. I hope
to
we can give undividedattentionto one questionwhich Pakistan
faces- solutionof theKashmirproblem.91
Mr. Bhutto'sstatementmay be comparedin its tone and style with
the statementof Chinese leaders made after they concluded border
agreementswithNepal, Burma,Pakistanand Afghanistan.
This seeminglysuccessfuldialogue was followed by a significant
achievementof Pakistan'sForeignPolicy. Pakistanenteredinto a trilateral
arrangement withIran and Turkey(RCD). Ayub invited Afghanistanto
become a memberof the RCD but Kabul declinedwhichbetrayed Afghan
distrustfor the move. However, thaw in their relationshipdid start

87. Pakistan Times, 22 May,1963.

88. TheTimes(London),23 May1963.
89. Dawn,29 May1963: Forthe fulltextof the agreement
see PakistanTimes
30 May,1963.
90. Ibid.,editorial
"Accordat Tehran",30 May1963«
91. TheTimes(London),30 May,1963.

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 AFGHANPAKISTANRELATIONS 325

appearing. The kingtold a Pakistanireporterthatit was the colonial rule

which had created the present problems between the two countries,
otherwise,Afghanistan and Pakistan,just over a hundred years ago, were
reallyone countrywithone religion,one culture and common traditions.
The king,how ever,added therub thatKabul could not forgetabout the
problemof Pakhtoonistanbecause of its heavycommitments.92
AftertheIndo-Pakistanconflict(1965) Ayub wentto Kabul to apprise
theAfghanleadersof the background of the conflict.93Pakistani press
reportedthatthe Afghan king expressedunderstanding and sympathyfor
Pakistanistandon Kashmir.94 A spokesmanof the Pakistani delegation
said thattheyhad agreedto explorethe avenues for greater collaboration
betweenPakistanand Afghanistanparticularly in the economic, social and
culturalfields. The two parties were also reported to have agreed in
principleto set up a steel milljointlybased on therecentlydiscovered rich
ironore depositsin Afghanistan.95
Mr. MohammedHashim Maiwandwal, the Afghan Prime Minister
told the pressmen that Pakistan and Afghanistan would settle their
problems "in a mutually agreeable manner as a resultof thegoodwill
createdby this(PresidentAyub's) highlybeneficialvisit,"and describedthe
discussionas "veryuseful".96
The joint communique released after Ayub's visit was brief and
couched in general terms. It only said that"both sides expressedtheir
pointsof view overmutualproblemsand commendedthe Soviet initiative
of arranginga conferencebetween Shastri and Ayub at Tashkent".97
The radical improvementin the relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan was reflectedin theGeneral Assemblywhen Syed Sharifuddin
Pirzada,Pakistan'sForeignminister,extended ''the warmestfelicitation"
on behalfof theGovernmentand the people of Pakistan to Afghanistan's
Abdul Rahman Pazhwak on his electionas Presidentof the21st session of
the GeneralAssembly. It was a pleasantsurpriseto the observersat the
U.N.98
Again in February1967,theAfghanKing accompaniedby the Queen
visitedPakistanwheretheroyal guestswere accordedwarmwelcome. The
Dawn in an editoriallauded the role of theking in democratisingpolitical
institutionsin Afghanistan. It also pleaded forgreaterco-operationin the
exploitationof natural resourcesand encouragingtrade.99 While talking
to Basic Democratsat Kabulpur near Hyderabad,the Afghan king termed
92. Pakistan Times
, 29June1964.
93. Dawn , 1 Janurary1966.
94. Ibid.,3 January 1966.
95. Ibid.,3 January 1966.
96. Ibid.,4 January 1966.
97. Ibid, 4 January 1966.
98. Ibid.,22September 1966.ForPirzada'sspeechseeG.A.O.R.
, twenty Session
first ,
Plenary Meeting1409, 20 September1966.pp.13-14.
99. Ibid.,Editorial
''Distinguished 8 February
guests," 1967.

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326 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE
the Basic Democracies systemas an inspiringexperiment and said that he
had of late also introduceddemocraticreformsin Afghanistanon similar
pattern.100
For almostfouryears,Pakhtoonistanissuelay dormantand not much
was heard of it internationally.Then in August,1967 on the occasion of
Afghanistan'sindependenceday, the Afghan Prime Minister Hashim
Maiwandwal,restatedAfghanistan'sdetermination to supportthe demand
of the people of Pakhtoonistanfor theirrightto self-determination and
hurledbitteraccusationagainstPakistan.
Again, Mohammed Pazhwak, while addressing the U.N. General
Assemblyaccused Pakistanof applyingdouble standards,one in regard to
Kashmirand anotherin regard to Pakhtoonistan. He pointed out the
fallacious nature of Pakistan's argumentthatPresidentAyub Khan was
himselfa Pakhtoon,hence all was wellwithPakhtoonsin Pakistan.101
On the 50thanniversary of Afghanstatethe Afghan Prime Minister
spoke at length about Pakhtoonistan "The Afghanstatehas the right and
duty" he said, "of continuing its to solve this problem which is a
efforts
remnantof Westerncolonialismin thispartof theworld."102
The freshanti-Pakistanpostureadopted by Kabul was the result of
Pakistan's persistentrefusal since the Indo-Pak war of 1965 to allow
Afghanistanto tradeoverlandwithIndia which seriouslyhit the Afghan
economy. Afghanistan'scenturies-old tradingroutesthroughKhyberPass
to the Punjab wereseveredexceptfor 10 weeks each summer when the
transportof freshfruitwas permitted. Otherwise,trading was conducted
throughKarachi and Bombay a route involving heavy costs and long
delays. Afghanistan justifiablyplannedseveringeven thislink by trading
instead through the new Persian port of Bandar Abbas on thePersian
Gulf,whichwould obviouslybe to Pakistan'sloss.
Afghanistan's relationswithPakistanare also strainedoverPakistan's
oppositionto theproposedconstruction of east-westand north-south trans-
Asian road linkingT urkey,Persia,Afghanistan, SouthernRussia, Pakistan,
India and Nepal. Such a road link would boost Afghanistan's economybut
Pakistanopposed thatmove because of India's participationin the project.
Whilethere was littlebordertensionbetweenPakistanand Afghani-
stan the frontiers wereheavilypatrolled and guarded.103 This continued
duringYahya's regime. Therewas a show of sweetreasonablenesson the
part of Pakistanprimarily because of theimprovementin its relation with
the Soviet Union whichbecame quite clear afterthe TashkentAgreement.
The decisionto breakup the one Unit' plan in 1970 too had a salutary
effecton theirrelationsas thisassuaged theinjuredfeelings of thePakhtoons
and therewas a chanceforthe fulfilment of theiraspirations.
100. Ibid.,12February 1967.
101. TimesofIndia+16October 1968.
102. ChristianScienceMonitor, 13January
1969.
103.DailyTelegraph, 1 November 1969.

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 AFGHANPAKISTANRELATIONS 327

During this period the Soviet Union to3 seemedto be lukewarm

towards''Afghanirredenta." A littlebeforethe Daud "coup in Afghanis-
tan, Mr. PodgornyignordKing Zahir Shah's referenceto Pakistan which
was a clear enoughhintthatthe Soviet Union was not prepared to annoy
Pakistanunnecessarily.
Bhutto's"coup" in NWFP and the ouster of NAP led government
thereevokedsome criticalcommentsin Kabul. ButDaud's emergenceas the
presidentof theRepublicanAfghanregimein July1973 once again sparked
offthe age-old conflict. PresidentDaud lamentedthat Pakistan was the
onlycountrywithwhichAfghanistan had the differences
which emanated
fromthe Pakhtoonistanissue. Again in an exclusiveinterviewto an A.P.
reporter,he warned that Afghanistanwould not be indifferent to the
situationin Pakistan'stwo troubled provinces of Baluchistan and NWF
and affirmed thatKabul would supportthe Pathan and Baluchi people's
rightto self determination.Daud re-emphasisedthat the happening in
thesetwo provinceswerea nationalistmovmentby people who wanted to
live freelyand achieve ť'national entity".104Recentlyin an interviewto
theeditorof Rawalpindi paper, New Times, Daud reiteratedhis earlier
standthus:
The onlyway to improverelationsis thatthe problemshouldbe
studiedin its reality. I thinkif goodwill existed, there is no
problemwhichcannot be solved. I wish to tell you clearly
that between Afghanistan and Pakistan no other problem
exists,exceptthatof Pakhtoonistan. If a solution based upon
realityis foundforit...no otherproblemwillremain...105
Anotherimportantincidentwhichhappened a littlebeforethe Daud
coup Kabul may be mentionedhere. An arms-runningconspiracywas
in
reportedto have been unearthedin Baluchistan and certain incriminating
material supportingthe independence of Baluchistan comprisingthe
Baluch areas of Iran as well Pakistan were also found. That provoked
the Shah of Iran to say that Iran will not be an idle spectatorif therewas
troublein Baluchistan. There wereloud protestsfromthe NAP quarters
in Baluchistan and NWFP against Shah of Iran's statementand NAP
leadershipdemandedthatMr. Bhuttoshould cancel his proposed tour of
Iran in May 1973.
In a long article Nawa-e-waqt , leading Urdu daily of Lahore/
Rawalpindia Pakistaniwritermade a blistering attackon the NAP demand
to call off Bhutto's visit to Iran. It pointed out thatthe NAP leader
Wali Khan was blantantlysidingwiththeenemiesof Pakistan- Afghanistan,
Soviet Union and India. Bnt Wali Khan did have a word to say
about Afghanistan's- aggressiveinterference in the internal affairsof

104. Indian
Express 1974.
, 15Janury
, 2Q April1974,
105,Statesmen

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 328 THE INDIANJOURNAL
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Pakistaneven though,thewriteralleged,thatAfghanistan had imperialistic

designs on Baluchistan and NWFP.106
Meanwhilethe developmentin Baluchistantook an ugly turn. The
Central Government removed the NAP governmentand imposedNawab
Bugti as Governor in place of Bizengo who was an NAP nominee.
Intertribalrivalryseems to be moreat the root of the troubleinBaluchistan
thanpartyaffiliation.During NAP regimethe Mengal and Marri tribes
weredominantwhichalienatedZehriand Bugtitribes.EventheformerNAP
ChiefMinisteradmittedthat the proposals of take over of certainmining
concessionsprovokedstrongresistancefromsome chieftains. Mr. Bhutto
was quick to graspthis opportunity and imposedNawab Bugtias Governor
of Baluchistan. The Nawab obviously with the connivance of Bhutto
nabbed the triballeaders,Bizengo, Mengal and Marri who were opposed
to Bugti and owed allegiance to the NAP. Kabul reactedto the arrest
very sharply.107Kabul's protestwas regardedas an act of interference in
theinternalaffairsof Pakistanand Pakistan Times called it unwarranted
and "misplacedconcern".108
Guardianreportedexchangeof sharp wordson the arrest of sixteen
leaders of BaluchistanoppositionNAP. It also reportedthatAfghanistan's
Deputy ForeignMinistersummonedPakistan's Ambassador in Kabul to
express his Government'sdispleasure and anxiety whilePakistanHome
Minister warned Kabul not to "poke its nose" into his country'sinternal
affairs.109
Jungan influential Urdu daily of Karachi in an editorial unleasheda
scathing attackon Afghanistan. It warnedKabul of seriousconsequencesof
interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. Showing "undue concern" at
the arrest of some political workers was uncalled for and Kabul had
"neitherlegal nor moral right"to intervene, said the editorial.110
Apart fromthe above controversyanother irritantfollowed on its
heels. There was a counter-revolutionto overthrowDaud regime in
Afghanistan,Kabul vigorously denounced Pakistan for its hand in the
coup and maintainedthatit had documentsto provePakistan'sinvolvement.
More recentlyDaud Khan repeated the charge in an interviewto a
Pakistanijournalist.Daud said that "instigationsand unfriendlymoves"
by Pakistanand its agents against the republican regime have been the
reason why relations between Kabul and Islamabad have not been
satisfactory.111 Bhutto,however,has deniedthe chargewith"all the force
at his command".112
106. HidayatAkhtar,"Pak-IranRelations : Are we entitled
to accuse Iran of
Intervention,"
Nawa-e-Waqt, 23May1973.
107. Ibid.
108. Pakistan Times,ed.,"Kabul'sConcern,"
21August1973.
109. Guardian,(London),20August1^73.
110. Jung(Karachi)ed.,"WhyForeign 24August1973,op.cit.
Intervention,"
111. Statesman, op.cit.,20Apnl1974,
112. Ibid.,1 May1974,

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 RELATIONS
AFGHAN-PAKISTAN 329

The above incidentsput strainson Pak-Afghanrelations.The Afghan

Governmentsteppedup pro-Paklitoonistan propaganda barrage not only
on the Kabul radio and AfghanPressbut in worldforums. In the Algiers
Summittof non-alignedpowers,the Afghanrepresentative, Pazhwak,raised
the question of Pakistani repressionof Pakhtoons and supported the
Pakhtoonistanmovement.Pakistan reacted sharply to Pazhwak's speech
at Algiers,Bhutto, describedit as "baseless and unreasonable criticism
of Pakistan" by the representativeof a neighbouringcountry. He added,
"such speechesdo not solve the problem...Our purposeis not to widenthe
gulfbetweenthe two countries."
Nawct-e-Waqtaccused Daud of harbouringaggressivedesigns on
Pakistaniterritoryupto Attockin theguise of Pakhtoonistan. The coup
in Kabul, according to it, was nothingbuta struggleforpowerbetween
two groupsof the presentrulingclique.113
Pakistanisand theirfriendsin the westhave alwaysblamed India for
the unfortunatebad blood between Pakistan and Afghanistan. A
correspondent of the Times(London) wrotein 1961 when Pakistan-Afghan
relationswereverybitter:

In 1947,whentheAfghanGovernment -committed itselfto the

cause of Pakhtoonistanthere were probably hopes in Kabul
thatPakistanwould not surviveas a nation; such hopes have
been dashed but the commitmentremains.114

Earlier,a correspondentof the same newspaperwrote when the relations

werealso at a low ebb that;

It is, however,a curious fact,,thàtAfghanofficialshabitually

thatPakistanis fated in due course to
expresstheircertainty
and be mergedinto a reunitedIndia, whichsuggests
disintegrate
that the claim to Pakhtoonistanmay possibly have been
formulated,at a timewhen this event seemed more probable
thannow,withan eye an eventualdivisionof spoils.115

Pakistanisalso believethattheCongressin India feltthat Pakistan would

ultimatelycollapse, a Pakistaniwritersays :
The idea seemsto have been passed on to the Afghan rulers
also. In the result, they came out with the denumd for
Pakhtoonistan.116

113. Nawa-e-Waqt , ed. "Afghanistan-SetYourHouseUorpçIn order,"

14September
1973.
114. TheTimes (London)6 September 1961.
115. Ibid.,lÖ'August1956,
116,LatifAhmedSherwani, et.al, Foreign
Pol}eyofPakistan
: AnAnalysis
(Karachi,
theAlliesBookCorporation, 1964)p. 7,

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 330 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE

Some WesternWritersgivecredenceto theview that with the purpose of

destroyingPakistan, India was making diplomatic manoeuvers. Ian
Stephensgoes to the extentof sayingthat:
It was evidentthatif...co-ordinatedmovementsopposed to her
(Pakistan) could be produced in Kashmir and Afghanistan,
both of thempredominently Muslimterritories
and near to one
another,the new Statemightbe stillborn,crushedby a sort of
pincermovement.111
This kindof dangerouswritingsby the imperialistsnot onlykept the
people of India and Pakistan dividedbut the people of Afghanistan and
Pakistanas well. Ian Stephensdoes not cite any evidence from which it
was "evident" thatany "co-ordinatedmovement"was everafoot. In fact
it was Pakistan,withthe help of the imperialistsforces, who misled the
tribaisinto the Kashmirmisadventure. Thereis no evidenceto prove Ian
Stephen's absurd contention- If India pursues friendlyrelations with
Afghanistan thatdoes not in anyway provewhatIan Stephens and other
men of his thinkingregard as something anti-Pakistan. India and
Afghanistanhave genuinelypursuednon alignmentas a matter of faith,
have avoided entanglementin power-politicsand have resentedPakistan
bringingpowerpoliticsat theirthreshold.
A friendly visitof a fewmilitaryleadersfromIndia to Kabul upsets
the Pakistani. A Pakistanijournalistgot a strongrebuffwhen asked for
Mr. Daud's commentson the recent visit of an Indian militarymission
whichhe said had been viewed in Pakistan with "suspicion" and that
whetherany militaryaccord was intended.
Of late Pakistan has shown some resiliencein her
foreignpolicy
options. But herattitudetowardsAfghanistanhas been hedged in by an
importantdomestic determinant.The National Awami Partyin North
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan seems to be a
red-rag to
Mr. Bhutto. Though, to be fair to the patrioticNAP
leaders,theyhave'
nevertalkedof secession,Mr. Bhuttoand his coteriehave been distrustful
of themotivesof NAP leaders. The NAP led Governmentwas
removed
fromofficein an undemocraticmanner. That
sparked off trouble with
Afghanistanonce again. If democracy were extended and
necessary
autonomy,whichis a preconditionof a federal structure,allowed to be
enjoyedby theseareas it is likelythattherelationsof theretwo neighbours
are put on an even keel.
The desirabilityof batterrelationshipbetweenthe two neighbourscan
hardly be over-estimated.There could be closer economic relations.
Pakistans importsfrom Afghanistan are about 1 per centwhereasexport
stand at roughly 1.25 per cent.
Afghanistan'smain imports channelled
t roughPakistanare textiles,vehiclesand
parts, tea, soap, tubbÇFgoods-

Í 17. Ian Stephens,

Horned
Moon(London,1954),p. 108,(Emphasis
added).

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 AFGHAN-PAKISTAN
RELATIONS 331

and some other consumer goods which could be exportedby Pakistan.

Again, some consumercommoditiesexportedby Afghanistanvia Pakistan
could be importedbyit. Pakistancould gainfully permittheflow of trade
between Afghanistanand India which will have, apart fromeconomic
benefit,tremendouspoliticalgain for Pakistanbecause that would disarm
manyan anti-Pakistani elementin both Afghanistanand India.
Pakistanand Afghanistancould establishjoint venturesto gainfully,
makeuse of the resourcesof both the countries for mutual benefit,for
example, hydro-electric projectsand steelmills. A steelmillcould use iron
ore depositsof Afghanistan and Pakistan'ssui gas could be provided to
Afghanistan.
All thisis possibleeven thoughDaud said recentlythattherewas no
real possiblityof improvingeconomic or other co-operation untili the
Pakhtoonistanquestionwas resolved. He said :

"Even if we make efforts

to get closer togetherwe will never
make real progressbecause thePakhtoonistanproblemwill keep
us apart."118

118. TheStatesman
, 20 April1974.

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