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August 2011
August 2011
An Analysis
Siddharth Ramana
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
B7/3, Safdarjung Enclave
New Delhi 110029
91114100 1900
www.ipcs.org
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Siddharth Ramana is a Research Officer at the IPCS, New Delhi.
The author is responsible for the facts, views or opinion
expressed in this essay.
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China‐Pakistan Nuclear Alliance
An Analysis
Siddharth Ramana
Research Officer, IPCS
During the height of the Indo‐US nuclear The nuclear agreement with Pakistan has
agreement, China firmly opposed it on created serious ripples in the non‐
grounds of inequitable approach to the proliferation regime, and holds important
region, thereby arguing that Pakistan too geo‐strategic implications. This paper, shall
should be given the same exemptions which elucidate on the China‐Pakistan nuclear
India had qualified for. While Chinese relationship, and argue how it furthers
opposition waned during the important Chinese intent to proliferate beyond South
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to Asia. It highlights the implications of this
India in August 2008, a sting in the tail soon relationship on the international
followed. In April 2008, China assured community, and suggests measures to
Pakistan all help and support to set up at counteract it.
least four new nuclear power plants to meet
its “growing energy demands.”1 I
ChinaPakistan Relations: A Short
In order to bypass the strident opposition Introduction
following the announcement, China
muddied legal waters relating to the To understand the nuclear alliance between
agreement, by arguing that the sales were in China and Pakistan, it is also useful to
fact “grandfathered”, under a nuclear understand the political relationship
agreement with Pakistan signed in 1986. between the two countries. Pakistan was
China gained membership of the NSG in one of the earliest countries to recognize
2004, and therefore it would be bound by the People’s Republic of China, becoming
the rules and regulations of the NSG only for only the third country, and the first Muslim
agreements signed post 2004. This country to recognize the Communist state
argument was unanimously supported by in 1950. Diplomatic relations were
the NSG during its 23‐24 June 2011 plenary established the following year in 1951,
meeting, clearing the way for the nuclear between Beijing and the then capital‐
transfer. However, what the Chinese Karachi.3 However, relations between the
cleverly sidestepped was the fact that their two countries were not entirely cordial,
pre‐joining declaration to the NSG was to owing to numerous regional issues. These
build an additional reactor for their Chasma included Pakistan’s membership of Western
2 power plant, not to build additional backed alliances, including South East Asian
nuclear plants.2 Treaty Organization (SEATO) as also of the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).4
1 “China Promises Pakistan help to set up four 3 “Timeline of Pakistan‐China Friendship”,
new nuclear power plants”, Hindustan Times, 14 Pakistan Khudafiz blog, 1 October 2009,
April 2008, accessed at accessed at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3‐ http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2
1461712891.html, 09 July 2011 009/10/01/timeline‐of‐china‐pakistan‐
2 Ashley Tellis, “The China‐Pakistan Nuclear friendship/, 09 July 2011
“deal”‐Separating fact from fiction,” Carnegie 4Swaran Singh, “Sino‐South Asian Ties:
Endowment for International Peace, 16 July Problems and Prospects” , Institute of Defense
2010, pg. 5, accessed at Studies and Analysis, April 2003, accessed at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/chin http://www.idsa‐india.org/an‐apr‐03.html, 09
a_pak_nuke1.pdf, 09 July 2011 July 2011
IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011
Review Article, Frontline, volume 19, issue 26,
The appreciation for Pakistan’s situation 21December, 2002‐03 January, 2003, accessed
was referenced in a letter by Chinese leader at
Zhou Enlai to Yahya Khan, who wrote that http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1926/stories
in response to any Indian aggression “The /20030103000507800.htm, 09 July 2011
8 “The spider’s stratagem”, The Economist, 3
Chinese government and people will, as
January 2008, accessed at
always, firmly support the Pakistan http://www.economist.com/node/10424283,
government and people in their just 09 July 2011
9
Yogesh Kumar Gupta, “Common Nuclear
5Ibid Doctrine for India Pakistan and China”, Institute of
6George C. Denney, “Pakistan and Communist Peace and Conflict Studies, 20 June 2004, accessed
China strengthen Cooperation”, US Department at http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/common-
of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, 4 nuclear-doctrine-for-india-pakistan-and-china-
December 1968, accessed at 1413.html, 09 July 2011
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/N 10William Burr, “The China‐Pakistan nuclear
SAEBB114/chipak‐2.pdf, 09 July 2011 connection revealed”, The National Security
Archive, 18 November 2009 accessed at
China‐Pakistan Nuclear Alliance
1986, a formal treaty outlining the nuclear relationship can be established when he
cooperation between the two states was wrote “Upon my personal request, the
signed. 1986 is also significant, since it Chinese Minister . . . had gifted us 50
came at the height of the Cold War conflict kilograms of weapon‐grade enriched
in Afghanistan, and therefore, an ideological uranium.”(sic)14 Additionally, transfers
battle for influence in the region was being included blueprints to develop the nuclear
fought by the two superpowers. Pakistan weapons. These letters are corroborated by
recognized its frontline role in being the American journalist Bill Gertz, who in 1996,
vanguard for the Islamic world against wrote that Chinese diplomats refused in
Communism, following which President Zia 1982 to give an “unequivocal answer” to
ul Haq rhetorically declared the following queries about nuclear weapons aid to
about nuclear weapons: “It is our right to Pakistan.15
obtain technology. And when we acquire
this technology the Islamic world will Cooperation between the two countries
posses it with us.”11 steadily increased in the years following,
with substantial transfers occurring in the
The 1986 treaty, as mentioned, was the decade of 1986‐1996. According to media
formalization of a robust nuclear transfer reports during this period of time, in
which was already underway between the addition to assisting with the Kahuta
two countries. According to letters written nuclear reactor, the Chinese also
by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of transferred tritium gas, which is used in the
Pakistan’s nuclear program, serious nuclear manufacture of a hydrogen bomb.16 Beijing
cooperation between the two countries is also supplied heavy water (D2O) to the
documented as early as 1982. safeguarded Kanupp reactor (originally
supplied by Canada) at a rate to make up
In his letters, he cited the case of a Pakistani heavy‐water losses of 2 to 4 per cent a
military C‐130 which left the Chinese city of year17. It is also believed that China offered
Urumqi with enough weapons‐grade
uranium for two atomic bombs12. The yield
for these weapons is estimated at 20‐
25KT.13 The official patronage given to this
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers7
http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/t %5Cpaper682.html, 09 July 2011
he‐china‐pakistan‐nuclear‐connection‐ 14R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, Op Cit
revealed/ 09 July 2011 15 Burr, William, “China, Pakistan and the bomb:
11Quoted in Rajesh Kumar Mishra (Dr), “Nuclear The declassified file on US policy, 1977‐1997”,
and missile threats to India: China‐Pakistan National Security Archives, Electronic Briefing
nexus in South Asia”, South Asia Analysis Group, Book‐114, 5 March 2004, accessed at
paper 296, 17 August 2001, accessed at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSA
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers3 EBB114/index.htm, 09 July 2011
%5Cpaper296.html, 09 July 2011 16William Van Kemenade, “The Fragile Pakistani
12R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “Pakistani State‐Ally of the United States and China”,
nuclear scientist’s accounts tell of Chinese Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
proliferation”, the Washington Post, 13 pg.15 , accessed at
November 2009, accessed at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐ 20080300_cdsp_paper_kemenade.pdf
dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR20091112 17Monica Chansori (Dr)., “Role of China as
11060.html?sid=ST2009111300578, 09 July Pakistan’s nuclear and missile patron”, Indian
2011 Defense Review, Volume 24, Issue 4, October‐
13Deepak V Ganpathy, “Hissing Dragon, December 2009, accessed at
squirming Tiger‐China’s successful strategic http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolit
encirclement of India”, South Asia Analysis ics/Role‐of‐China‐as‐Pakistans‐nuclear‐and‐
Group, paper 682, 7 May 2003, accessed at missile‐patron.html, 09 July 2011
IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011
its test facilities at Lop Nor in 1989, to an interview, when she admitted that a cold
conduct a Pakistani nuclear test.18 test had been conducted in 1989.21
While the international community was Despite international scrutiny, in 1991,
increasingly aware of such transactions, the China agreed to build the Chashma 300‐MW
response to them was limited owing to a nuclear power reactor for Pakistan. In order
variety of geo‐strategic and diplomatic to lend international credibility to this
considerations. One of them was economic; exercise, Pakistan was asked to sign an
in 1985 the Chinese and US governments IAEA safeguards (limited‐scope) agreement
signed a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement for the reactor at Chashma.22 Significantly,
(NCA) that, when enacted, would allow while these proliferation rings were being
American firms to apply for licenses to sell strengthened, China was not a part of the
nuclear reactors to China. Implementing the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty, and
agreement on the US side required the therefore not violating its principles. China
president to certify to Congress that China signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
was not proliferating nuclear weapons.19 in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Additionally, the Pressler Amendment was Treaty in 1995.
passed which required the US government
to certify at the start of each fiscal year, that China’s tactics to violate their international
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. obligations were evident during the
The government did so, since Pakistan was immediate period after the end of the Cold
a frontline ally, against the Soviet forces in War, with Chinese firms acting as fronts for
operation in Afghanistan. transferring European technology to
Pakistan. This was highlighted in an
On 30 May 1989, American officials American cable, outlining a Chinese ploy to
questioned Chinese diplomats over Chinese buy German cooling equipment for reactors
cooperation with Pakistan; an unidentified to supply Pakistan, for use in its Chasma
Chinese diplomat denied the allegations, reactors. A similar attempt earlier was
instead stating that Beijing's accession to rebuffed by Germany, when it was disclosed
the IAEA in 1984 required all its that Pakistan was to be the end recipient.23
transactions to be conducted under Similarly, further attempts at proliferation
safeguards.20 It was largely owing to were seen in 1995, when 5,000 specially
Chinese efforts that Pakistan was nuclear designed ring magnets from the China
weapons capable by 1989 itself. A partial Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation
admission was provided by Former
Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in
21Benazir Bhutto, (interview by Shyam Bhatia ),
“Pakistan had the bomb by 1989”, Rediff News,
18“China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to 10 March 2004, accessed at
Pakistan”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Research http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/09int
Library, 14 November 2003, accessed at er.htm, 09 July 2011
http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm, 09 22Oliver Meir, “Germany Opposes United States
July 2011 on China‐Pakistan Nuclear Deal”, Arms Control
19Denny Roy, “Going Straight, but somewhat Now, 21 June 2011, accessed at
late: China and Nuclear Non‐proliferation”, Asia http://armscontrolnow.org/2011/06/21/germ
Pacific Center for Security Studies, February any‐opposes‐united‐states‐on‐china‐pakistan‐
2006, pg.4, accessed at nuclear‐deal/, 09 July 2011
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi‐ 23US Department of State, “China’s Nuclear
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A445082&Location=U2&doc Reactor Deal with Pakistan; Chinese Steps
=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed 09 July 2011 Toward Joining NPT,” Cable 09394 to US
20William Burr , “China, Pakistan and the bomb: Embassy China, 10 January 1992, accessed at
The declassified file on US policy, 1977‐1997”, www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/
Op Cit NSAEBB114/ chipak‐22.pdf, 09 July 2011
China‐Pakistan Nuclear Alliance
(CNEIC), were sold to an un‐safeguarded This cooperation continued into the late
Pakistani nuclear facility.24 1990s, culminating with alleged assistance
to Pakistan in its response to the Indian
China denied any such transfers, with a nuclear test of 1998.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman calling
the reports “groundless”, in talks with US According to former US Air Force Secretary
officials, China eventually privately Thomas Reed, suspicions surround the
admitted that the sale had taken place, but Chinese role in Pakistan’s tests in May 1998.
argued that China should not be penalized He pointed out that the United States itself
for two reasons. First, China insisted that took over two weeks to retaliate to a Soviet
CNEIC had arranged the sale without the nuclear test, despite having the weapon for
knowledge or consent of the central years. Therefore, the Pakistani device was a
government. Second, China argued that the pre‐engineered one, which their scientists
ring magnets were not magnetized, and the had great confidence in.27
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List
only covers ring magnets magnetized at a Chinese proliferation has not seen periods
specific tolerance.25 China escaped punitive of low activity, even during periods of
measures with a warning, after it publicly tumultuous developments in the region,
reiterated its commitment to the Non‐ including the Kargil Conflict of 1999, during
Proliferation Treaty. which China maintained a neutral position.
In the years 2000‐2004, Chinese entities
It can be argued that the mid nineties, have been sanctioned by the United States,
should have seen a shift in China’s focus a total of 50 times. In 2004 alone, 14
towards genuine non‐proliferation, Chinese entities were sanctioned a total of
especially since it was the period of time 23 times, most of which are related to the
when North Korea’s nuclear ambitions were Iran Non‐proliferation act,28 which indicates
coming to the fore, however, while China an upswing of proliferation activity,
expressed concern over its Eastern corresponding with increasing American
neighbor, its proliferation activities presence in West Asia and South Asia.
continued Westwards. According to a report
by the CIA Director, published in June 1997, In what was intended to be a corrective
“China was the primary source of nuclear‐ measure, China joined the NSG as a full
related equipment and technology to member in 2004, despite revelations of A.Q
Pakistan, during the second half of 1996.”26
40319/3b2906d5fd60d9fd847123dbd7e92df2/
OSS1997‐04‐13.pdf, 09 July 2011
24“China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation 27Thomas Reed, (interview by Alex Kingsbury),
(CNEIC)”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Databases, “Why China helped countries like Pakistan,
accessed at North Korea build the bomb”, US News, 2
http://www.nti.org/db/china/cneic.htm, 09 January 2009, accessed at
July 2011 http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/
25“China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to 2009/01/02/why‐china‐helped‐countries‐like‐
Pakistan”, Center for Non‐Proliferation Studies, pakistan‐north‐korea‐build‐nuclear‐bombs, 09
Monterrey Institute of International Studies, July 2011
accessed at 28Daniel. A. Pinkston, “Testimony before: U.S.‐
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/chin China economic and security review commission
a/npakpos.htm, 09 July 2011 hearing on China’s proliferation practices and its
26Director of Central Intelligence, “The role in the North Korea nuclear crisis”, US
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons Congress, 10 March 2005, accessed at
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/
Munitions”, July‐December 1996, June 1997, written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/pinkston_da
pg.5, accessed at niel_wrts.php, 09 July 2011
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/0
IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011
Khan’s dealings with the country in the legitimacy to its status as a great power30.
preceding year. This followed a whitepaper Its interest in maintaining non‐proliferation
on non‐proliferation which the Chinese double standards is linked to its great
government released, which strengthened power status, especially one as being the
its case to an international audience. sole accepted nuclear power in Asia.31
Since the initiation of discussions on the It also ties into the strategic outlook of
Indo‐US nuclear agreement began in 2005, China, on what it deems to be its interests
China took an active interest in the regional and what it views as inconsequential
implications for its strategic partner, and irritants. For example, it is argued by T.V
opposed the agreement on grounds that it is Paul, that “South Asia and Middle East are
not equitable, and favored a similar NSG less vital to China than is East Asia. China
exemption for Pakistan. When the has been uncomfortable with the North
international community expressed their Korean nuclear efforts and Beijing shares
reservations on Pakistan’s non‐proliferation the desire of the US and Japan that the
record (based on inputs that Dr. Khan had Korean peninsula remains non‐nuclear.”32
further proliferated Chinese designs to
Libya, North Korea and Iran), China took it Former US Air Force Secretary Thomas
upon itself to strengthen its nuclear Reed articulates China’s thinking on
relationship with Pakistan. It was here that proliferation in the following words, “China
the grandfather nuclear clause was invoked. in about 1982, under Deng Xiaoping,
decided to proliferate nuclear technology to
III communists and Muslims in the third world.
Understanding China’s NonProliferation They did so deliberately with the theory
Views that if nukes ended up going off in the
western world from a Muslim terrorist, well
China has traditionally viewed multilateral that wasn't all bad. If New York was
control regimes to be discriminatory and a reduced to rubble without Chinese
means of control over third world states by fingerprints on the attack, that left Beijing
western powers. “Even as it criticized as the last man standing. That's what the
international non‐proliferation regimes, old timers thought.”33 He adds that, while
however, the Chinese leadership professed this represented the old school of thought,
an opposition to nuclear weapon states the new generation of Chinese leaders
sharing the bomb with non‐nuclear weapon realizes the limitations of such a policy, and
states and proclaimed that China would has therefore tempered their non‐
assist other countries’ nuclear energy proliferation views.
programs but not weapons programs.”29
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Wang
China’s progression into accepting these Guangya in an op‐ed dated October 16,
multilateral regimes, and gaining 2002, elucidated China’s ‘non‐proliferation
membership to them in contemporary policy and practice’, stating‐ “China has
times reflect its progression in policy, consistently stood for the complete
wherein it accepts some of the elements of prohibition and thorough destruction of all
the international order which gives kinds of WMD and firmly against the
proliferation of WMD and their delivery
systems. For this, China has over the years
29T.V Paul , “Chinese‐Pakistani nuclear/missile
ties and balance of power politics”, The
Nonproliferation Review, Volume 10, Issue 2, 30 Ibid
March 2009, accessed at 31As under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
http://www.tvpaul.com/files/Paul%282003%2 32Paul, T.V, Op Cit
9.pdf, 09 July 2011 33Reed, Op Cit
China‐Pakistan Nuclear Alliance
been an active participant in international According to Robert Ross, China continues
non‐proliferation efforts.” its support for Pakistan by supplying
nuclear and missile technology because
He adds “we have steadfastly pursued a “China views a credible Pakistani deterrent
policy of not advocating, encouraging or as the most effective way to guarantee the
assisting any other country in developing security of its sole ally in Southern Asia
weapons of mass destruction and made our against Indian power.”36 This argument is
contribution with concrete deeds to the also postulated by T.V Paul, that “China
international non‐proliferation process.”34 wants to limit India’s power capabilities to
Furthermore, in closed door interactions South Asia and thereby constrain New
with senior Chinese scholars and former Delhi’s aspirations to become a major
military officials, the Chinese have power in Asia. India’s emergence as a peer‐
continued to maintain their deniability in competitor in Asia would upset China’s
supporting Pakistan’s nuclear predominant position in the region.
weaponization program. However, if acute conflict and an intense
arms race between India and Pakistan
However, proliferation links to China have persist, India would continue to be
allegedly influenced major international bracketed with its smaller regional rival
policy matters in the international stage. Pakistan and not with China.”37
One of the regions in addition to South Asia
is West Asia. This can be attributed to the Proliferation to Pakistan, also offers China a
China‐US rivalry for resources in the region, certain leeway in their doctrinal stance of
especially since China’s growing economy No First Use, since Pakistan does not
becomes increasingly dependent on fossil subscribe to that element. China can make
fuels in addition to alternative energy use of its proxy in instigating a nuclear
resources. By proliferating, nuclear and conflict in South Asia, wherein the affected
missile technology, it seeks to leverage parties would be Pakistan and India, with
against the United States in these regions. China attempting to emerge
The expectation in Beijing is that the supply unscathed.38.For China, using Pakistan as an
of these materials to the Middle Eastern extended deterrence proxy was much more
countries will increase Chinese influence, practical than merely extending its nuclear
thereby reducing American influence.35 umbrella onto Pakistan. This would likely
explain the Chinese aversion to Pakistani
IV Foreign Minister, Shamshad Ahmed’s
Why Proliferate to Pakistan? request in 1998, to guarantee nuclear
protection should India attack.39
China’s proliferation to Pakistan achieves
twin strategic objectives of encirclement of While growing Indian aspirations in the
India, and a proliferation buffer, wherein region are clearly opposed by China, the
Pakistan in turn further proliferate Chinese original reason for the Sino‐Pak
nuclear technology, giving China leeway in
investigations. 36Ibid
37Ibid
38Private interactions with Senior Diplomats and
Military officials in India contributed to making
this argument.
34“China’s Non‐Proliferation Policy and 39Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Chinese Delegation
Measures”, Department of Arms Control, Non‐ Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella”,
Proliferation Issues, 27 May 2010, accessed at The New York Times, 21 May 1998, accessed at
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/ http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/21/world/
fkswt/t410729.htm, 09 July 2011 chinese‐delegation‐seems‐to‐deny‐pakistan‐a‐
35Paul, T.V, Op Cit nuclear‐umbrella.html, 09 July 2011
IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011
Chinese whispers grow”, The Afghan Journal,
Reuters Blog, 26 May 2011, accessed at
http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/05
/26/in‐pakistans‐gwadar‐port‐chinese‐
whispers‐grow/, 09 July 2011 44Paul, T.V, Op Cit
42Mukherji, Op Cit 45“North Korea paid Pakistanis for nuclear tech,
43Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Libyan Arms says AQ Khan”, The Times of India, 7 July 2011,
Designs Traced Back to China”, The Washington accessed at
Post, 15 February 2004, accessed at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/paki
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp‐ stan/North‐Korea‐paid‐Pakistanis‐for‐nuclear‐
dyn/A42692‐2004Feb14?language=printer, 09 tech‐says‐AQ‐Khan/articleshow/9134080.cms,
July 2011 09 July 2011
China‐Pakistan Nuclear Alliance
was never even discussed during my been associated with the nuclear program,
visit.”46 would be well aware of the strategic
implications of the ideological divide
It remains unclear whether the government between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is alleged
was in the know about nuclear transactions. that Saudi Arabia also played a role in
However, the spread of the network to supporting Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, in
countries including Libya, Iran and return for an extended nuclear umbrella
allegedly to Myanmar, make it difficult to against Iran. This is the reason argued for
accept that the Pakistani government or Pakistan’s rapid fissile material production‐
Army headquarters was completely to cater for its own demands, and those for
unaware of these transactions. Especially in West Asian deterrence.49 The Chinese
the realm of nuclear transfers to North ambivalence in pushing for sanctions on
Korea, as pointed earlier, China would have Iran, and its missile transfers to Saudi
been aware of the ongoing transfers, owing Arabia, add to these suspicions of
to the sensitivity of its interests there. The collaboration.50
fact that China did not broach this topic
with Pakistan, and on the contrary VI
continued its nuclear relationship with What can be done about this Alliance?
Pakistan, leads this author to believe that
China tacitly approved of these transfers. With decades having been lost, the China‐
Similarly, the implications of Pakistan Pakistan alliance, and its further
furthering Chinese products to West Asia expansionism is increasingly being accepted
can be seen in how Pakistan is trying to play as fait accompli by countries across the
both sides of an ideological divide, by globe. Despite initial opposition to another
having contributed to the Iranian nuclear blatant violation to the Nuclear Non‐
program, and having a suspected tie up with Proliferation regime, in the form of the
Saudi Arabia to arm them with nuclear grandfathered agreement, the Nuclear
warheads too.47 Suppliers Group acqueisance to the
agreement reflects a deflated hope for
In an interview, A.Q. Khan lauds Iran, saying traditional norms of non‐proliferation to be
“If Iran succeeds in acquiring nuclear applied.
technology, we will be a strong bloc in the
region to counter international pressure”, Jabin Jacob, an India based China analyst,
adding that “Iran's nuclear capability will argues that the American approval to the
neutralize Israel's power.”48 Khan, having nuclear agreement is among other things
“symptomatic of the growing weakness of
the American hand vis‐à‐vis China since the
46Bhutto, Benazir (Interview by Shyam Bhatia),
“Musharraf must explain why he visited Libya”,
Rediff News, 12 March 2004, accessed at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/12int
er.htm, 09 July 2011 49Pervaiz Hoodhboy, (Interview), “Pakistan
47Joby Warrick, “Nuclear Program in Iran Tied linked to Saudi nuclear program”, PM,
To Pakistan”, The Washington Post, 21 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1 July
December 2003, accessed at 2011, accessed at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp‐ http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s32
dyn/A18170‐2003Dec20?language=printer, 09 58998.htm, 09 July 2011
July 2011 50David Dafinoiu, “Saudis Buy Advanced
48Omar Waraich, “Iran Sanctions: Why Pakistan Nuclear‐Capable Missiles from China”, The Wall
Won’t Help”, Time Magazine, 14 September Street Shuffle, 15 April 2011, accessed at
2009, accessed at http://www.thewallstreetshuffle.com/saudis‐
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,85 buy‐advanced‐nuclear‐capable‐missiles‐in‐
99,1922166,00.html, 09 July 2011 china/
IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011
Wall Street Journal, 3 August 2010, accessed at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052
51Jabin Jacob, “China‐Pak nuclear deal and 748704741904575409261840078780.html, 09
American perfidy”, Institute of Peace and July 2011
Conflict Studies, 30 March 2011, accessed at 53Siddharth Vardarajan, “India and the
http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/China‐ Additional Protocol”, The Hindu, 7th March,
pak‐nuclear‐deal‐american‐perfidy‐3351.html, 2009
09 July 2011