Atty. Macalintal vs.

PET
G.R. No. 191618.
November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011
J. Nachura
Facts:

November 23, 2010

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its
rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal"
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly
supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005
PET Rules), specifically:

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;

(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and
confidential employees of every member thereof;

(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with
the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of
the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and

(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court
seal.

June 7, 2011

This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal

of the Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010, dismissing his
petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as constitutional. Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged
unconstitutional creation of the PET:

1. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET;
and
2. The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes the ruling on the
constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which
cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with
Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive
Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET
in the absence of an act of legislature.

On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Office of
the Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is “on firm footing on the
basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all election
contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.” In a nutshell, both parties just repeated the same arguments
presented in the original petition aside from the cited issue of PTC’s constitutionality.

Issue: Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this
Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

Ruling:
November 23, 2010

The petition is dismissed.

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), specifically and

exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and
Vice-President. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a
grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. It states that, “The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose." The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President.
There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed. To foreclose all arguments of
petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what
was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our
country cannot be denied.

PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not
unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well
as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight
the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task
of deciding Presidential and Vice Presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.

On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line
between the PET and the Supreme Court. PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in

contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, issue raised is more imagined
than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
"dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to
courts of justice.

Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing

with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of
justice.

June 7, 2011

The Court reiterated that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating
the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an

institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department. The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court,
is the PET.

The MR is denied.