A Litany of Errors Pakistan Kashmir

Irfan Waheed Usmani: A Litany of Errors
A LITANY OF ERRORS: PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR

POLICY (1996-99)
IRFAN WAHEED USMANI

GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE
PAKISTAN
ABSTRACT
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy became more and more

inconsistent as was evident by the fact that instead
of following one clear‐cut agenda Pakistani policy‐
makers seem to follow three parallel agendas, i.e.,
traditional rhetorical emphasis on Kashmir cause for
public consumption, Nawaz Sharis’s twin track
approach, and the use of jehadi organizations, thus
exposing glaring inconsistencies in our policy‐making
and policy execution. These inconsistencies became
more pronounced with the outbreak of Kargil
conflict, which represented the height of inconsistent
policy making.

KEY WORDS: Kargil operation, India, Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, Chanab
Line Formula, Back Channel Diplomacy, Pervaiz Musharraf.

This article explores the inconsistencies in Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy
from 1996 to 1999. It also examines the changes in Kashmir policy by
bringing to fore at least three parallel agendas followed by Pakistan’s
policy makers during this period: (i) Perusal of traditional Kashmir
Policy. (ii) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s twin track approach towards
Kashmir leading to back‐channel diplomacy, peace initiative and secret
negotiations on Chenab line formula. (iii) Military agenda pursued by
military and other hawkish elements (like ISI and its sponsored
militant outfits).
The implementation of these agendas caused confusion and
kept Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy quite ambivalent. The
operationalization of this policy further exposed the vulnerabilities of
Pakistan’s policy. The manner in which these agendas were pursued by
the civilian governments and military authorities amply demonstrated
the lack of coordination among the Pakistan’s policy‐makers as well as
the tussle between the forces of change (extraneous and internal
pressures) and the forces of status quo (jingoistic press, military
23
establishment, right‐wing political parties) which eventually compelled
Pakistan’s policy‐makers to look for other options. This article is
divided into three parts: first part deals with the Kashmir policy of
civilian government. The second portion highlights the two parallel
agendas within the Pakistani official circles, one was pursuing peaceful
means with the Indian government through secret or back‐channel
diplomacy while the other parallel streak was military strategy
designed by the military elite aimed at internationalizing Kashmir by
increasing India’s occupation cost. This military strategy culminated
into the Kargil crisis in 1999. The third part of this article explores the
contradictions of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy as manifested during the
Kargil fiasco. It also highlights Kargil operation as a tragedy of errors as
case in point to unpack the inconsistencies in Pakistan’s Kashmir
policy.

(I)

This part of the paper deals with the Kashmir policy of Nawaz Sharif’s
second government. It highlights its salient features like (i) reiteration
of traditional stance (ii) its comparison with Benazir’s Kashmir policy
(iii) dialogue process and its concomitant effects (iv) impact of
deterioration of Indo‐Pak relations because of Bhartia Janta Party’s
(BJP) aggressive policy leading to the nuclear detonations. It also
examines the reconciliatory efforts of the two governments resulted in
Lahore Declaration (February, 1999) and progress on Chenab Line
formula.
The first discernable feature of Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy was,
what Victoria Schofield calls, “traditional rhetoric” about the
Kashmiri’s right of self‐determination. 1 This traditional policy was
manifested in the plethora of policy statements by various civil and
military circles, their public posturing. Pakistani leadership appeared
to place rhetorical emphasis on Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy to
demonstrate its commitment to the Kashmir resistance movement
along with highlighting the atrocities perpetrated by Indian troops.
These rhetorical policy statements remained a dominant feature of
official propaganda in print and electronic media. Perhaps these were
used, at least, for public consumption to highlight government’s role in
keeping the Kashmir issue alive. Mostly these statements made by
th
Pakistan authorities on the occasion of Kashmir day, 5 February,
th
Kashmir accession day 14 July, Jammu martyr’s day 6 November.
Moreover, statements in reaction to the day to day developments in
Kashmir reflected the same thrust. The perusal of this strategy even
surprised many as Victoria Schofield puts it:
24
Privately some Pakistani expressed the wish that, from his

position of strength in the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharif would
officially sanction the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir on the
understanding that Pakistan would be better off without the Kashmir
issue continuing to burden both its economy and its economic
development. 2
Without taking any further initiative 3 Nawaz Sharif soon
restored to the traditional posturing. As a logical corollary, Pakistan’s
government refused to consider the third option of independence. 4
Nawaz Sharif’s government during this period imposed Kashmir tax
and also established a Kashmir fund for supporting Kashmir cause. To
official circles, Kashmir remained the major stumbling block in the
smooth sailing of Indo‐Pakistan relations. The resumption of bilateral
dialogue in 1997 could not bring any diplomatic gain because of
divergent approaches. 5 Indians were insisting on managing the
Kashmir conflict within the ambit of Shimla accord (1972) whereas
Pakistan’s government was persisting long‐term solution of Kashmir
dispute either through its internationalization or through meaningful
dialogue on Kashmir enshrined in the principle of reciprocity. In other
words, India emphasized on moving from peripheral (like economy,
confidence building measures to de‐escalate the tensions) to core
issues (like Kashmir and other long standing territorial disputes) quite
contrary to Pakistan’s approach. Muhamad Akram Zaki, then the
chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, out rightly
rejected the Indian proposal for trade without settling the issue of
6
Jammu and Kashmir.
Nawaz Sharif government’s twin approach towards Kashmir
dispute was qualitatively different from Benazir’s policy, as Mincheal
Krepon observes that, “Nawaz Sharif was pursuing a two‐track
approach he was prepared to negotiate confidence building measures
with India. And he was still trying to get the issue of Kashmir on the
table to discuss with India”. 7 He argues that Benazir government
closed down both tracks because for her, “new confidence building
measures are not possible as long as the Kashmir problem remains in
such an unsatisfactory state”. 8 It is corroborated by Kashmir Study
Group (KSG) Report which was published in 1997. 9 This report speaks
pointedly of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif moderation and pragmatism
above all his “suitability for dialogue” and his “earnestness and
determination to success at it”. Nawaz Sharif without any doubt was
“very keen” to move ahead on Kashmir and “normalisation”. 10 This
approach was more pragmatic than the one adopted by previous
regimes. 11 While commenting on this report, AR Siddique, a veteran
defence analyst, describes Nawaz Sharif’s personal view about Indo
25
12
Pakistan relation as “positive”. Stephen P. Cohan also believes that
“Nawaz Sharif saw India quite differently from the ‘army’s’ more hard‐
line element”. 13 Indian government also began to realize this shift.
India’s top policy‐makers like J.N. Dixit and N.N. Wohra commented,
“India would offer Nawaz Sharif anything in the world to keep him in
power as the alternative could be a fundamentalist Taliban regime
which would be more difficult to deal with”. 14
Two factors may be attributed to this “pragmatic” shift in
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif government’s policy towards Kashmir: (i)
During his election campaign he had expressed an interest in
improving relations with India and his re‐election to the office of Prime
Minister opened the space for the implementation of a moderate
agenda. After assuming power he slowly moved in that direction. 15 (ii)
More importantly, Nawaz Sharif took this step after he had sufficiently
concentrated powers in his office. Apart from appointing a plaint
president with substantially reduced power, he had secured the
resignation of the chief of army staff, Jehangir Karamat. These
successes probably gave him the feeling that he could embark upon a
different policy towards India. 16
This flexible attitude repeatedly found expression in the
Prime Minister’s policy statements. He maintained that his
government was committed to resolve all outstanding issues with
India through negotiations. 17 During SAARC summit in Maldives, Sharif
met his Indian counterpart I.K. Gujral. At their meeting in Maldives,
Gujral and Sharif announced a plan to constitute joint “working
groups” to consider all outstanding issues. After the foreign
secretaries met in June in Islamabad, they agreed to form eight
working groups to consider all the major issues including Kashmir. 18
Nawaz Sharif also emphasized on the meaningful dialogue within a
definite timeframe for resolving the Kashmir dispute. 19
India and Pakistan also pursued the policy of back channel
diplomacy 20 as manifested in form of Track II Dialogue. In late 1980’s
and early 1990s, both countries had also initiated such dialogues but
Nawaz Sharif’s second stint as Prime Minister added a new
momentum to this process. An important round of these Track II talks
was held in Islamabad in November 1997 on nuclear non‐proliferation,
establishment of nuclear free zone in South Asia and the resolution of
Kashmir dispute. During these talks various modalities concerning the
Kashmir dispute also came up under discussion. The whole process of
dialogue is shrouded in mystery as various circles interpreted it
differently. For instance, Pakistani authorities maintained that these
were merely pertained to “education”, whereas, the diplomatic circles
contexualized it by linking it to the American interests. Nevertheless,
26
this Track II diplomacy played a key role in bringing Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee close to
the resolution of lingering Kashmir dispute. 21

(II)

The dialogue process also led to the two major developments
concerning Kashmir and Indo‐Pakistan relations i.e. (i) Lahore
Declaration, (ii)Progress over Chenab Line Formula. Before going in to
the details, it would be pertinent to mention other developments
which led to the estrangement to an alarming proportion in the Indo‐
Pakistan relations. These include coming of the BJP to power, the role
of Pakistan backed Jehadi outfits in Kashmir, Pakistan’s growing nexus
with Taliban and Indian threat perceptions regarding the upsurge of
extremism. These relations touched their nadir in the wake of Indian
nuclear test (on 11 May 1998) which further emboldened India’s
aggressive stance towards Kashmir. Pakistan decided to give a tit‐for‐
tat response by detonating its nuclear device (on 28 May 1998). All
these developments apparently nullified the reconciliatory gestures
shown by the two sides.
The first development which caused deterioration in Indo‐
Pakistan relations was coming of the BJP government in power. Upon
assuming the office of Prime Minister, Vajpayee’s government
adopted a very belligerent policy towards Pakistan leading to the
further deterioration between the two countries in 1998. This period
also witnessed the escalation of violence in Kashmir. The Indian
government blamed the Jehadi outfits supported by Pakistan’s military
establishment. In the late 1990s, the Lashkar‐e‐Tayaba (the army of
the pure), Harkat‐ul‐Ansar and Hizb‐ul Mujaheddin were the most
dominant groups among the jehadi organizations operating in the
22
Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan’s support to Taliban also proved to be a major
irritant in Indo‐Pakistan relations. India blamed Taliban of igniting
insurgency in the Indian held Kashmir. India also alleged that
organizations involved in Kashmir resistance movement like Hizbul
Mujahideen, Jash‐e‐Muhammad and Lashkar‐e‐Tayaba were in league
with the Taliban and received training in Afghanistan. 23 In November
1997 Harkat‐ul‐Ansar was declared terrorist organization by the US on
the grounds that it had links with Al Faran (many Al Faran members
including Hamid al Turki, were ex‐Harkat members). In order to avoid
US restrictions on travel and funding it immediately renamed itself
Harkat‐ul‐Mujahideen. 24 Later on, a splinter faction, Jaish‐e‐
Muhammad, emerged from the same organization which had direct
27
links with the Taliban in Afghanistan. They high‐jacked a plane of the
Indian Air Lines and asked for the release of Maulana Masood Azhar
who was then brought to Afghanistan.
The Indo‐Pakistan relations plummeted to their lowest ebb
when India after exploding the nuclear devise asked Pakistan to
change its policy over Kashmir. The Indian establishment in alliance
with the state government of Farooq Abdullah threatened Pakistan
with dire consequences if it did not reverse its policy on Kashmir. For
instance, the State Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah advised the
government of India to launch a very strong and decisive battle against
Pakistan and “taunted Pakistan to detonate its nuclear devise if it had
25
one”. The Indian Foreign Minister said, “Pakistan should re‐consider
its position in South Asia because the strategic equation has
changed”. 26 L.K. Advani the Home Minister stated that, “we are going
into Pakistan and takeover those parts of Kashmir which are in
Pakistani hands”. 27 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said
that: “The strategic equation has changed, the Pakistan’s should
understand it”. 28 These provocative statements of Indian leadership
made the situation very volatile and the intensity of the crisis further
augmented when India resorted to frequent shelling across the line of
control which led to the low intensity conflict.
The provocative statements made Pakistani government
believe that India’s nuclear policy was firmly attached to the Kashmir
issue and its resolve to retake Kashmir could not be ignored. Sardar
Abdul Qayyum Khan echoing Pakistan’s concern told Victoria Schofield
that:

Two things aggravated the situation following
India’s recent test…Firstly, Pakistan’s
information sources told us that the Indian
Army had brought its attacking forces
paratroopers, helicopter gun‐ships and
artillery—up to the cease‐fire line in Jammu
and Kashmir. Their purpose was to try and over
run Azad Kashmir which could then have been
used as a bargaining chip in return for
Pakistan’s agreement to some accommodation
29
over the valley of Kashmir.

All these factors prompted Pakistan to detonate its nuclear devise.
One of the underlying assumptions behind these nuclear tests was to
thwart Indian designs to invade Azad Kashmir. After the nuclear tests
Pakistan projected the Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flash point to
28
attract the attention of the world and to stress the need for involving
international community to resolve the Kashmir problem. 30
This crisis gradually de‐escalated on account of three factors:
(i) India realized that Pakistan had become a nuclear power and in
view of the dominance of hawkish elements it might not behave like a
responsible nuclear state. For instance, Foreign Minster Gowher
Ayub’s statement also pointed out Kashmir as a nuclear flash point:
“These weapons have been made by both countries and are not
meant to display in parades, oil and clean them and apply polish on
them…There is a possibility of war. These is a flash point, the world
leadership must come as a third party and encourage to resolve
31
Kashmir dispute”. (ii) On account of world pressure as evident from
imposition of sanctions on both countries (iii) At the same time, both
states also realized the resumption of dialogue to ease tensions. When
the both prime ministers met at SAARC in Sri Lanka in July, they
agreed to resume formal talks.
On 23 September 1998, the two Prime Ministers agreed that
“an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national
interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues,
including Jammu and Kashmir is essential for this purpose”. 32 In
October 1998 Indian Foreign Secretary K. Ragunath met his Pakistani
counterpart Sahmshad Ahmed in Islamabad. Keeping in view with the
mood of reconciliation, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary again referred
to Kashmir in the light of their changed nuclear status. 33 The both
sides hoped that, “in this drastically changed environment it is
important that we join together for durable peace and durable
solution”. 34 The culmination of these discussions was Atal Behari
Vajpayee’s historic visit at the inauguration Delhi‐Lahore bus service
on 20 February, 1999. Vajpayee attended a banquet at the Lahore Fort
which is described as one of the most symbolic meetings between the
two prime ministers. Vajpayee also visited the Minar‐e‐Pakistan,
where M.A. Jinnah announced the League’s scheme for an
independent Muslim state in South Asia. The foreign secretaries
signed an eight‐point memorandum of understanding which pledged
to “engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear
doctrines as well as renewing their communication links, confidence
building measures, consultation of security troops disarmament’s and
35
non‐proliferation issues”. In the Lahore declaration Nawaz Sharif and
Atal Behari Vajpayee agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all
the issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmir”, 36
and to “refrain from intervention and interference in each other
international affairs”. 37 As regards Kashmir issue the Lahore
declaration made no mention of the UN resolutions on Kashmir, thus
29
repudiating Pakistan’s claim that the dispute should be resolved in
accordance with these resolutions. 38
The second major development indicating Pakistani civil
government’s flexible policy towards Kashmir was the progress over
Chenab Line Formula. 39 Niaz A. Naik, who played a key role in this
secret deal between the two counteries, revealed that “back channel
diplomacy had achieved a breakthrough on Kashmir and would have
led to an accord by September October had Kargil not happened”. 40
In one of his disclosures made before Lahore Bus Yatra of
Vajpayee the Indian Prime Minister. Naik had stated that he had held
discussion in New Delhi with Birjish Misra the political advisor of
Vajpayee. To pursue the talks further Misra had secretly traveled to
Lahore to discuss the formula of Chenab Line. Naik disclosed that
Misra asked him to provide a copy of the map of state of Jammu and
Kashmir to enable him to undertake the geographical locations along
41
the river Chenab. According to the same version Indian Prime
Minister did not oppose the idea when he was briefed. 42
The underlying assumption of Chenab Line formula was to
arrive at a compromise solution on Kashmir dispute keeping in view
the sensitivities of the both sides. It was devised to seek a resolution
of Kashmir dispute so that it may not look like a political defeat of
either side. 43 Under this formula, the Kashmir was to be divided on
communal lines between the two countries. According to the proposal
Muslim majority areas on the right side of the Chenab river would be
given to Pakistan and the rest to India. The whole city of Jammu and
many districts of Jammu province were to be retained by India as
these areas were largely Hindu dominated. Muslim majority areas
such as Srinagar were to be given to Pakistan. 44 On the right bank of
river Chenab, Pakistan was further to get the area stretching towards
the right bank of river Chenab which included: half of mountainous
Doda district, the entire Gulab Garh Teshil of Udhampur District, the
entire districts of Rajouri and Poonch which were contiguously linked
with Kashmir. Thus Pakistan was to get six districts having 98 per cent
Muslim population. 45 India was to get areas located towards the left
bank of the Chenab. These included the Hindu majority districts of
Jammu province i.e. Udhampur (excluding Gool Gulab Garh tehsil),
Jammu and Kathua. 46 Ladakh would have fallen with in Pakistan which
reportedly Pakistan was willing to give up in India’s favour if the plan
was accepted. 47

30
(III)

All these initiatives were sabotaged by a parallel agenda pursued by
Pakistan’s military establishment. To keep this issue alive, it
systematically pursued this agenda by devising a strategy which
involved: covert planning of Kargil operation, increasing reliance on
Jehadi outfits.
There is enough circumstantial evidence to corroborate this
contention that Pakistan’s military often sought a military solution of
Kashmir from 1996 to 1999. For example former Prime Minister,
Benazir Bhutto revealed that the military authorities presented to her
alternate military solution thrice, 48 but she vetoed it as it might
turnout to be a great conflict. 49 Former President Farooq Leghari also
conceded that military tried to seek his approval for this operation
during his presidentship in 1997. 50 This point is further substantiated
by the ISI former chief, Lt. General (Retd.) Javed Nasir’s assertions,
who revealed that:

In 1996, the UN proposed to shelve all those fifty
years old disputes which were pending without any
progress. These also included the resolutions passed
by the UN in favour of Kashmiri’s right of self‐
determination. As Pakistan was party to these
resolutions, therefore, this plan was totally
unacceptable for Pakistan. For Pakistanis the issue of
Kashmir was a matter of life and death. Therefore, in
order to make this issue effective before the UN
such a move (Kargil operation) was imperative. It
was intended to make Kashmir a “hot‐issue”
between India and Pakistan as well as to draw the
51
international attention towards it.

These maneuvers later culminated in form of operation Kargil. Even
India believed that Pakistan’s military was involved in derailing the
peace process and all this operation was initiated to “scuttle Lahore
process”. 52
The second tactic used by military was increasing reliance on
Jehadi organizations. Pakistan’s policy makers believed that militancy
could be used as a tool to achieve political objectives in Kashmir. They
believed that conflict could be kept alive by promoting these Jehadi
elements. They could be used to pressurize India to negotiate with
Pakistan. They could also be used to make Kashmiris believe that
“Pakistan has not given up their cause”. Therefore, militancy through
31
Jehadi outfits conveniently fitted as a tool to answer these questions.
This contention that form the mid 1990 the Jehadi outfit backed by
Pakistan assumed a pre‐dominant role in Kashmiri resistance
movement could be further substantiated by the following arguments:
In 1995, two more Jehadi outfits the Lashkare Tayeba and
Harkat ul Ansar joined the resistance movement. 53 In mid 1990s
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front denounced militancy and vowed
to continue political struggle. 54 The most plausible reasons behind this
change could be that it had little militancy capacity, 55 as compared to
the Pakistani backed militant groups. Moreover, it represented the
“Azadi element” therefore, its struggle right from the very beginning
of the Kashmiri resistance movement was not backed by Pakistan.
Rather Pakistani agencies tried to discourage its role by introducing
their own actors represented by Jehadi element and assigned them
the agenda “Kashmir benay ga Pakistan” (Kashmir will be the part of
Pakistan).
Till mid 1990s there appeared visible dissension or split with
in the ranks of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The Indian
government noticed a split in Kashmiri resistance movement. APHC
was broadly divided into two factions. One faction comprised Abdul
Gani Lone and Syed Ali Shah Gilani and the other Omar Farooq, Abdul
Ghani Bhatt, Maulvi Abbas Ansari with tacit support of Shabir Shah. 56
The former represented the Jehadi streak.
The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan proved to be a further
incentive in pursuing this strategy. A perceptive analyst on Kashmir
Samina Yasmeen is of the view that: “Pakistan’s emphasis on low‐level
insurgency in the Indian part of Kashmir entered a new phase in 1996
with the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan”. 57
The role played by the ISI in their rise to power created a
space for a triangular alliance (training camps, madaris, and jihadi
organizations) which proved instrumental in executing this Jihad
policy. Training camps were established in Afghanistan that were used,
among others, to train Jihadis for engaging Indian forces in Jammu and
Kashmir. A number of madaris (religious schools) in Pakistan with close
links to the Taliban became the supplier of these Jihadis. Some Arabs
based in Afghanistan also joined these groups particularly in the
58
second half of 1990. According to one estimate, approximately
80,000 Pakistani militants had received training and fought with the
Taliban till December 1999. 59
This strategy of jihad policy culminated into Kargil
operation. 60 This operation in one way or the other exposed the
inconsistencies in the Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Right from its
inception till its dramatic end everything is shrouded in mystery. For
32
instance, all the major aspects of the operation like its authorship,
statements of those who were at the helm of affairs (as briefly
discussed above) concerning the existence of Kargil operation, denial
of these claims by top military brass and subsequent vindication of the
stance of civilian leaders by Javed Nasir (former ISI chief) and Lt‐Gen.
Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani (who briefed prime minister Nawaz Sharif at
the General Head Quarter‐GHQ). The litany of errors associated with
the operation did not end here rather the blame game between the
civilian prime minister and the military chief regarding the question of
ownership further mystified this incident. In the nutshell what was
witnessed was “unending series of secret deals, behind the scene
negotiations and compromises……The manner in which this area was
vacated it further led rise to various untold stories, speculations as
well as provided an opportunity to conspiracy theorists and spin
61
doctors to weave and aura of mystery around all this episode”. What
made the situation worse was that tarnished Pakistan’s image as it
exposed the visible contradictions in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. For
instance, Pakistan’s government projected Kargil as a product of
indigenous and spontaneous uprising whereas what it actually turned
out to be a smoke screen. This operation is also described by its critics
as an attempt to derail of peace initiative. And last but not least of
Pakistani policy makers seemed to pursue two parallel agendas. On
the one hand, very aggressive military policy was pursued on the
other, “hawkish policy makers” did not leave the door of secret
negations close by tacitly backing the civilian government’s
endeavours to diffuse the tension and bail the military out of this
crisis. Ironically soon after the withdrawal the later placed the onus on
the shoulders of civilian government by accusing it of betraying
Kashmiris.
The shifts in Islamabad policy over the Kargil crisis, made
things further complicated. The diplomats and civilian leadership
appeared confused, first they denied the presence of Pakistan backed
Mujahideen in Kargil, later on they admitted it. Such denials and
affirmative statements posed serious questions about the creditability
of Pakistan’s stance on Kargil. 62 Mujahideen’s sudden withdrawal from
Kargil soon after the Washington Agreement further lent credence to
accusations of Pakistan’s direct involvement in this operation. It is also
highlighted by Victoria Schofield as she maintains that: “Numerous
commentators point out, how could the Pakistani Prime Minister
honour his pledge to Clinton to put pressure on the infiltrators to
withdraw; if as he had already maintained he did not control them”. 63
In India the ruling BJP leaders perceived Kargil as an attempt
to “sabotage” the Lahore peace process by Pakistan’s military. L.K.
33
Advani believed that the Kargil infiltration must have been underway
when “Pakistan” was engaging India in Lahore peace process. 64
George Fernandes blamed the Pakistan Army for planning the Kargil
operation without the government’s approval. 65 Indians contended
that “if it was not meant to scuttle the Lahore process what was the
idea behind occupying the Kargil peaks? To cut off the Srinagar Leh
road was not a big deal. The Indian troops on Siachen largely
depended on air supplies and a new road link via Himachal Pradesh
had also been established”. 66 It is further substantiated by Niaz
A.Naik’s statement who played a key role in “back channel
Diplomacy”. He claimed that: ‘Back channel Diplomacy achieved a
breakthrough on Kashmir and would have led to an accord by
September October had Kargil not happened.’ 67 Not only Indians, the
US officials also perceived that it was Pakistan Army Chief, General
Pervaiz Musharraf, who “was determined to humble India once and
for all”. 68 They also believed that the Pakistani civilian leadership was
genuinely serious in a peace‐deal with the Indian government.
The secret backchannel diplomacy which was pursued as a
parallel agenda during this crisis also further exposed the
inconsistencies of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy regarding Kargil. During
Kargil conflict Niaz A. Naik paid three visits to New Delhi as a special
emissary of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. 69 In New Delhi, he met
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and other Indian officials.
As part of backchannel diplomacy and Indian journalist R.K. Mishra
also paid five visits to Pakistan as a special emissary of Indian Prime
Minister. 70 The foreign office initially disassociated itself with Naik’s
Indian visits, but later confirmed that he went there as Mr. Sharif’s
special emissary. 71 Two Pakistani federal ministers (Foreign &
information minister) 72 also conceded the backchannel diplomacy
during the Kargil conflict. 73 Initially everything appeared smooth as
“Nawaz Sharif agreed to an Indian offer of a phased withdrawal of the
‘infiltrators’ three weeks before the withdrawal actually took place”. 74
Later, this process was certainly suddenly stalled in the middle which
led Indians to believe that “Nawaz Sharif failed to follow through an
unofficial peace initiative” as “he was playing at both sides of the
fence”. 75 139 The Indian believed that it caused delay in withdrawal
and resulted in the further loss of lives. 76 140 The main reason was
that “it was not until the infiltrators started to encounter military
reversals that he made his visit to Clinton in the US”. 77
After holding talks with the Indian Prime Minister on 28 June,
Naik revealed that the Director‐Generals of Military Operations
(DGMOs) would prepare a schedule of withdrawal explicating its
timings and modalities. 78 The foreign office spokesman denied having
34
anything to do with Mr. Niaz A. Naik’s India visit. 79 Against this
confusing backdrop, the reports that the DGMO’S of the two countries
did meet on 1st July which was described to be a “a routine flag‐
meeting” but it could also be seen in the context of Naik’s visit to
India. 80 This mysterious diplomacy also invited the criticism in the
press. In its editorial, The Nation commented that: “transparency is
laudable in governance but seems misplaced in delicate and sensitive
negotiations…The virtual open debate means either that our
government is once again tripping over its on feet or else that the
exchange has failed totally”. 81
It would not be out of place to mention here that on one
hand the civilian government was pursuing its backchannel policy
through Niaz A. Naik but on the military establishment was viewing
these developments with suspicion. It distanced itself with these
developments. When ISI former Chief Javed Nasir was asked why Niaz
A. Naik was sent to India? He replied: “Niaz A. Naik is not Pakistan’s
but America’s man. America had floated the idea of 3rd option and for
this purpose it had sponsored a so‐called study group Niaz A. Naik is a
member of that group. It comprises many other American stooges and
Niaz A. Naik is one of them. If he had visited India he would have gone
at the behest of America not on Pakistan’s desire”. 82 On 30 September
1999, General Pervaiz Musharraf, informally talking to the journalists
at the reception hosted by Chinese Ambassador, Lu Shulin at the
Chinese Embassy projected Kargil “as a great military success”. 83 But
the information gleaned from General Zinni’s account suggests that
the decision of withdrawal was taken by the military. It also reveals
that the army pulled out of Kargil willingly and not because of Nawaz
Sharif. 84 150 As Khalid Hasan contends that: “In fact, if there was any
resistance to pull back, it was on the part of the Prime Minister not the
Army chief who later made many heroic claims about Kargil, accusing
Sharif of “surrender”. 85 151 Controversy also surrounds the mysterious
role played the US during Kargil crisis. Shireen Mazari contends that:
“it is equally clear the real US intent was not to play a neutral
mediator in the conflict”. 86 152 She asserts that: “Many military
commanders in interviews, insisted that it was the US that prevented
India from coming to the negotiating table with Pakistan at the time of
Sharif’s visit to China. Even earlier around June 9, 1999, Kissinger
visited India apparently carrying a message from the US government
not to negotiate with Pakistan”. 87 153 This contention is further
corroborated by various reports published in the Pakistani press
during the June‐September 1999. 88
The Kargil conflict reveals that gradually the things got out of
hands of the government. From Pakistan’s side there were three
35
parties to the Kargil conflict which were pursuing their separate
agendas the government was just one of three elements in the entire
conflict—the two others were army and the militants and their parent
political parties. 89 As the operation intensified Pakistan’s Kashmir
policy betrayed the signs of confusion and dysfunction, “these short
comings of the Pakistan’s national security decision making that were
revealed by Kargil conflict were not episodic but systemic”. 90

CONCLUSION
A cursory look of the main strands of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
between 1996‐99 suggests that amid the contrasting pulls and strains
this policy was caught up in a mess. It appeared that Pakistani policy‐
makers were working on at least three parallel agendas i.e., for public
consumption the traditional policy was being pursued. Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif was following a two pronged strategy vis‐à‐vis Kashmir
i.e. negotiations of confidence building measures as well as
internationalization of Kashmir issue.
The military with the help of Jehadi organizations was pursing
its own goal of transforming Kashmir into a bleeding ulcer for India in
order to internationalize the issue. The use of Jehadi outfits for the
perusal of this policy further added to confusion. For instance, the use
of insurgency as a mean of changing the status quo came under
gradual scrutiny by the international community in the second half of
1990s. “To some extent this was prompted by the Indian
government’s ability to explore different options in Kashmir while
91
learning to manage the problem”. At the same, India’s emergence as
an aspiring global power and the international reluctance to get
involved in intractable problem of Kashmir resulted in Pakistan finding
few supporters of its Kashmir policy. Neither China nor the Muslim
countries were prepared to risk their relations with New Delhi by
supporting Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. 92 The fear of turning into an
international pariah state, might have forced the Pakistani officials to
roll back their military strategy and resort to the back‐channel
diplomacy. It became more explicit with the emergence of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.
We may conclude that neither the civilian government nor
the military establishment could materialize their agendas. If agenda
pursued by hawkish elements within the Pakistan’s military led to the
derailment of peace process, the objective envisioned by military in
Kargil also remained unaccomplished.

36

END-NOTES
1
Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: Pakistan and Unfinished War (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.195.
2
Ibid., p.191.
3
Ibid.,p.195.
4
Ibid.,p.195.
5
Smruti S. Patanaik, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Objectives and Approaches”,
Strategic Analysis, vol. 26 (11) (April‐June 2002), p.204.
6
Akram Zaki’s statement on 27 January, 1998 cited in Monis Ahmer, Middle
East and South Asia (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, Karachi University, 2000),
p.78.
7
Michael Krepon, “CBMs and Resolution of the Kashmir Dispute: Is a Two
Track Strategy Possible”, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47(3) (July 1994), p.19.
8
Ibid.
9
The report was prepared by a study team KSG it was entitled “The Kashmir
Dispute at Fifty” The study group comprised the following members: (i) Prof.
Ainslie Embree (Columbia University). (ii) Former Ambassador Howard Shafter
(iii) Prof. Joseph E. Schwatzberg (University of Minnesota) (iv) Prof. Robert G.
Wirsing (University of South Carolina) (v) Prof. Charles H. Kennedy (Lake Forest
University)
The members of this team visited India (March April 1997) and Pakistan (May
1997) and held 78 meeting in India and 40 meetings in Pakistan, involving 182
persons in order to obtain the opinions and attitudes. This report got a write
up in New York Times on October, 12, 1997 and was discussed at the Madison
South Asia Conference and the Asia Society. US Kashmir Study Group Report:
Pakistan Press Comments (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1998).
10
A.R. Siddiqi, “US Kashmir Report: A Tribute to Nawaz Sharif”, The Pakistan
Observer (Islamabad, 16 December, 1997).
11
12
13
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.
151.
14
This was revealed by J.N. Dixit, a former ambassador in Islamabad and N.N.
Wohra a former National Security advisor at Stimson Center on 5 August,
1999. J. N. Dixit and N.N. Wohra’s statement cited in Ahmer, Middle East and
South Asia, p.90.
15
R. Rahman, “Kashmir Prospects and Obstacles”, The Nation (19 January,
2001)
16
Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: The voices of Moderation”,
Contemporary South Asia, vol.12(2) (June 2003), p.18.
17
Jang (Lahore, 18 March, 1998)
18
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p.195. I.K. Gujral as Prime Minister evolved
“Gujral doctrine” a friendlier approach to India’s neighbours, easing tensions
37
in South Asia and improving relations with Pakistan. India Pakistan Joint
Secretary level talks, Joint Statement (23 June 1997)
19
Nawaz Sharif’s statement on 13 August, 1999 cited in Ahmer, Middle East
and South Asia, p. 90.
20
Back channel (a team borrowed from the American CIA lexicon) It is meant
to be secret, so where public positions have hardened, deviating proposals can
be conveyed without any commitment or perhaps more importantly without
exposure to criticism by domestic oppositions. The main rationale behind this
strategy was to maintain contacts through diplomacy resolve a tricky matter.
This strategy is a part of confidence building measure. Some people call them
“conflict‐avoidance measure” The back door diplomacy has a long history in
context of Indo‐Pakistan relations. But this strategy was frequently resorted to
during 1990s particularly in Nawaz Sharif’s second stint it almost lead to a
break through over Kashmir dispute. The CIA director used to fly to Pakistan
unannounced during Afghan war and meet President Zia‐ul‐Haq in his plane so
that their conversation was not monitored by any devise. In context of Indo‐
Pakistan relations the idea of a more expanded CBM regime had been
proposed in 1985 by the state department and belatedly agreed to by Rajiv
Gandhi and Zia‐ul‐Haq after the near‐war‐crisis of 1987. The possibility of
sharing American intelligence information with one or both of sides was raised
in these meetings, but no conclusion was apparently reached on this issue.
Subsequently, when talks with India and Pakistan took place, American
officials adhered to the policy of avoiding the modality of providing
information to one side but not the other.
During this first stint as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, had sent top bureaucrat
Mukhtar Masood to India as part of back channel diplomacy after their Indian
Premier, P.V. Narasimha Roa had told his Pakistani counterpart that his
country wants to resolve the long‐standing Kashmir issue and is ready to talk
about it short of independence. In this back drop Pakistan and India resorted
to Track II Dialogue. Between 1992 to 1997 seven rounds of dialogue were
nd
held. The first was held in Colombo (1994), 2 Karachi (1993), Madras (1994),
th th
4 Calcutta (1995), 7 Islamabad (1997), Apart from these meeting the other
meetings were also occasionally held between the two countries in this
regard. On 18th January 1994, Islamabad presented the Government of India
with an unofficial non paper expressing Pakistan’s willingness to consider new
and innovative methods to ascertain the will of Kashmirirs. Another India
Pakistan Track II dialogue meeting was held in Bellagio (Italy) in September
1994 where knowledgeable participants from India Pakistan and US took
retrospective look on the Brass Tracks Crisis of 1986.
Earlier in 1994, in the month of February, Shanghai Dialogue took place. These
three day discussions were held between 24 February to 26 February; Four
countries US, China, Pakistan and India participated in these discussions. Each
side was represented by its five non‐serving officials. These talks were
sponsored Alton Jones Foundation and were part of US policy of non‐
proliferation in South Asia.
In 1995 and 1996 two meeting on Kashmir were held in Washington and
London. These were followed by talks on Pakistan India security, political
38
issues and talks over South Asia Economic Cooperation. The former were held
in Slazburg and Shanhasi and the later in Kathmandu.
For details see, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohn,
Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia (London: Routledge,
2003),p.99; Michael Krepon, “CBMs and Resolution of the Kashmir Dispute”,
19; Shakil Shaikh, “Track II Talks resume to Promote under Standing”, The
News (23 February, 1997), Pakistan (23 February 1997), Tariq Butt, “Pakistan‐
India Secret ‘back channel Exchanges”, The Nation (30 June 1999).
21
Javed Rana, “Trak II Diplomacy Back on Track”, The Nation (20 January,
2004).
22
Schofiled, Kashmir in Conflict, p.200. The United Jihad Council led by Syed
Salauddin, was an umbrella of organizations of fourteen smaller groups
operating out of Muzaffargarh which included Al Badar and Tehrik‐i‐Jihad.
23
Imran Bashir, “The Rise and Fall of Taliban” The Historian, Vol.1(1) (July
December 2002), pp. 100‐101.
24
Schofiled, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 200. According to an unpublished research
thesis of Alexander Evans, 1999, cited in Schofiled, Kashmir in Conflict, p.47.
Harkat ul Mujahideen was based in Muzaffargarh, it was believed to have a
core group of about 300 militant operating in 1999, who were Pakistanis,
Kashmiris as well as Afghans and Arabsj who had fought in Afghan war.
25
Kamal Matin ud din, “Nuclearization of South Asia” in Spotlight on Regional
Affairs Vol. XVII, No.7 and 8 (July‐August 1998), p.33.
26
Iqbal Ahmed’s Interview by David Barsaman in Himal South Asia, Vol.12(3)
(March 1999), p.19.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Victoria Schofield’s Interview with Sardar Qayyum Khan, on 4 July, 1998
cited in Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 206.
30
Partanaik, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”, p. 207.
31
The Nation (31 July, 1998)
32
Partanaik, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”.
33
Ibid.
34
The Nation (18 October, 1998)
35
MoU signed by Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath and the Pakistani
Foreign Secretary Mr. Shamshad Ahmed, Lahore 21, February 1999.
36
Lahore Declaration signed by Prime Minister of India and Pakistan on 21
February 1999
37
Ibid.
38
Farzana Shakoor, “Pakistan‐US Relations: An Interpretation”, Pakistan
Horizon, vol. 47(3), (July 1999), pp. 29‐30. The critics of Lahore Declaration
believed that despite the enthusiasm over Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan it was
clear that the Lahore Declaration would have no significance if in reality,
neither side could move ahead on Kashmir issue. Even some Kashmiri leader
doubled its utility. Prominent Kashmiri leader Ali Shah Gilani was of view that
‘Relations between India and Pakistan could not be improved with out of a
lasting solution of Jammu and Kashmir being the core issue.’ These sentiments
were also echoed by AJK Prime Minister, Sultan Mehmood: ‘We demand that
39
dialogue for solving Kashmir issue should not be on a bilateral basis between
Pakistan and India. But trilateral as Kashmiris are also a party who should
decide about their future.’
Some critics raised their objection concerning the very spirit of the Lahore
Declaration which was drafted in consonance with the spirit of Simla
Agreement. In this declaration India and Pakistan had reiterated
‘determination to implement the Simla Agreement in ‘letter and spirit’ since in
the opinion of Kashmiri activists, Simla had already failed, there was every
expectation that, yet again the Lahore Declaration would not achieve the
desired results for Kashmiris. Soon after his visit to Lahore the Indian Prime
Minster Mr. Vajpayee soon assumed belligerent posture. Thus the euphoria
associated with Lahore Declaration soon evaporated. For details see: The
Nation (5 March, 1999), The Nation (25 March, 1999), Schofield, Kashmir in
Conflict, p.208.
39
According to this formula River Chenab provided a natural partition of
Kashmir into Muslim and Non‐Muslim zones. The “Chenab Formula” was for
the first time discussed between India and Pakistan in 1962‐63, but the
negotiations could not make any headway. The river Chenab comes out from
Himalyan range of Kullus in the extreme north of Kishtwar in Doda district
(Jammu province) with high mountain range of Himachal (India) adjoining in
the background. It flows through the mountainous areas of Doda, Ramban,
Surukot, Salat, Reasi, Akhnar and enters Punjab (Pakistan) at Head Marala
where a big headwork has been built facilitating construction of two big
channels. India has built salaldam down on it under Indus water treaty. Abdur
Rashid Malik, “The Chenab Line Formula”, The Nation (3 June, 2003).
According to Niaz A. Naik, the Chenab line formula was also presented by late
Bhutto during Bhutto Swarn Singh talks in 1962 and was rejected by India.
40
Khalid Mahmood, “Back Channel Diplomacy”, The News (29 September,
1999)
41
Abdur Rashid Malik, “The Chenab Line Formula”, The Nation (3 June, 2003)
42
Zia Iqbal Shahid, “News Report: Exchange of Non‐Papers on Kashmir
Division soon.” The News (25 July, 2003)
Naiz A. Naik was also quoted telling before the Kargil conflict that the military
leadership might abandon Pakistan’s long standing insistence on UN
sponsored plebiscite for Kashmiri accession to either India or Pakistan and
agree on a compromise solution if India were offer reciprocal concessions’.
43
Javed Rana, “Track II Diplomacy back on Track”, The Nation (20 January,
2004)
44
Ibid.
45
Malik, “The Chenab Line Formula”.
46
Ibid.
47
Moeed Yusuf and Adil Najm, “Kashmir: Identifying the components of a
sustainable solution” in The Troubled Times (Islamabad: SDPI, 2005), p.423.
48
Irfan Waheed Usmani, “Kargil Ki Indrooni Khani” (The inside of Kargil),
Weekly Taquazey, Vol.4(34) (15 September, 1999), p.16.
49
The verbatum of this interview was published in Daily Khabrain, see
“Benazir’s Interview”, Khabrain (10 February, 2005).
40
50
Leghari’s interview cited in Irfan Waheed Usmani, “Kargil Ki Indrooni Khani”
(The inside of Kargil), Weekly Taquazey (September, 1999), p.16.
51
“Javed Nasir’s Interview”, in Weekly Zindagi, Vol.19(6), p.11.
52
Khalid Mehmood, “Back channel Diplomacy”, The News (29 September,
1999)
53
Muntzra Nazir, “The Political and Strategic dimension in Indo‐Pakistan
Relations (1999‐2004)” in Pakistan Vision, Vol.5(2 ), (December 2004), p.38.
54
It indicated that the dissension or fissures had appeared within the ranks of
Kashmiri resistance leaders in June 1994, the JKLF admitted that atrocities
committed by the militants had alienated the people and stated that strict
action would be taken against ‘earring elements’ in the movement. Schofield,
Kashmir in Conflict, p.175; Amnesty International, Torture and Deaths in
Custody (January, 1994), p.59.
55
Muntzra Nazir, “The Political and Strategic dimension in Indo‐Pakistan
Relations (1999‐2004)”, p.38.
56
Indian High Commission Landon’s Report February, 1996, cited in Schofield,
Kashmir in Conflict, p.175.
57
Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”, p.192.
58
Ibid., p.93.
59
Ahmed Rasidhi’s Article cited in Sumita Kumar, “Pakistan’s Jehadi
operations: Goals and Methods”, Strategic Analysis, Vol.XXIV(12), (March
2001), p.2181.
60
See for details, Irfan Waheed Usmani, “Inglorious end to a Glorious
Adventure: Conceiving and Executing the Kargil Operation (1999)”, The
Historian, vol.6 (2), (July‐December, 2008)
61
Ibid., p.108.
62
Shakoor, “The Kargil Crisis”.
63
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 216.
64
The Nation (London, 9‐15 July, 1999) cited in ibid.
65
Mahmood, “Back Channel Diplomacy”.
66
Ibid.
67
The News (29 September 1999)
68
Bruce Ridel, American Diplomacy and 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,
Policy Paper Series, 2002 (Pennsylvania, USA: Centre for Advanced Study of
India, University of Pennsylvania) quoted in Hassan Ali, “India’s Diplomatic
Assault”, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad, 23 May 2003) also see Mantazra
Nazir, “India Pakistan Relations”, p.32.
69
The Nation (30 September 1999)
70
The initiative came from Indian government, Indian Prime Minister’s
Embassy Birjesh Misra visited “Pakistan five times during the month of June
and met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif. Main reason behind
such initiative was Indian compulsions as Indian government had become
greatly perturbed by the Kargil situation and earnestly wanted to resolve this
issue amicably through a “back channel diplomacy”. See Usmani, “Kargil ki
indroni kahani”.

41
71
Raja Zulfiqar, “Naik’s visit nothing to do with government’s foreign office”,
72
These included Pakistan’s foreign minister Sartaj Aziz, and information
minister Mushahid Hussain.
73
Mahmmud, “Back Channel Diplomacy”.
74
75
The Guardian (22 July 1999) cited in Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 218.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
The News (01 July 1999)
79
Editorial, “Mystery Diplomacy”, The News (02 July 1999)
80
Ibid.
81
Editorial, “Backchannel Blue” (01 July 1999)
82
Nasir’s interview, Weekly Zindagi, p.11.
83
Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.91.
84
General Zinni quoted in Khalid Hassan, “Postcard USA: General Zinni on
Pakistan”, Daily Times (6 June 2004)
85
Ibid.
86
Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999, p. 61.
87
Ibid.
88
The journalists such as Naseem Zahra, Ata‐ur‐Rehman, Abu Sheraz and Zia‐
ud‐Din wrote various article and reports in this context. For details see
Usmani, “Kargil ki indroni kahani”.
89
Zafar Abbass, “War Cover Story”, The Herald, (July 1999), p.33.
90
Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999, p.61.
91
Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”, p.193.
92
Ibid., pp.193‐94.
42

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