CANON 11

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2
May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation
and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the
"Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and
his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash
the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner
alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to
institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence
that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and
void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon,
within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,

effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special
Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No.
80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-
01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's
lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition:
(1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner
Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court
issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan).
The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent,

the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party
respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order
of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit
vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal information
consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further
 orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan
to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People
of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner
to submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused
the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can
aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe
in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only
the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against
him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter
wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio
Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft
charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they
involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against
two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court,
I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that
affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
 He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while
she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She
said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know
their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time
could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be
informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis
supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was
asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "

2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by
a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two
Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2
May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of
April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
 2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the
media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly,
to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the
administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in
writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the
"Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily
Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had
taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases
against some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of
persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to
render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too
hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate
Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers
'without due process.

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3)
members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its
official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to
this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and
to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten
(10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to
respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension
and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts
whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality."
Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion
to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in
an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
That denial was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante

Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4
June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this
Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted
by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The
power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with
the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish
for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the
nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.

Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the
'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts
 as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there
be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident
of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded
that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does
not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy
demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements
of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from
sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-
B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme
Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any
case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did
not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part,
having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved
here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve
such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set
out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of
retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices
cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April
1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that
matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure
the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal
merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon
respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very
difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this
Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in
complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September
1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated
Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also
ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately
ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner
Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon
the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case
No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue
pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a
reprisal simply against respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they
have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes
had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been
made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation
made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once
again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one
hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be
seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics
of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was
trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying
judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court
as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to
examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations,
he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to
explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were
both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the
Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and
in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to
above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the
following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and
anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an
impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as
well as in the possible administrative charge;

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible
administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in
its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the
impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the
members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that
a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare
the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap
still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements
justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public
scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent,
emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their
most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The
universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court
as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the
Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our
jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals.
He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was
terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals
and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a
slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the
justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:

I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified
true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by
Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may
well know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up
deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances
that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in
and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt,
the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow
respondent del Mar's logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule
138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger
brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer
 of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in
G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found
no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances,
both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under
their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for aid tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the
land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter
this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their
hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and
its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247:
emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to
the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect
does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion
for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September
1968 asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and
the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
 prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.
The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments.
The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side
comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about
respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there
was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition
is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices;
who may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more.
This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest
for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the
graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to
the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to
the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million
dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a
'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case
even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it
would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been
known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less
likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.'
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He
points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that
loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen
in our country, 'although the process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may
be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices
inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a
thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze
the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system
of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus
transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or
the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that
 time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that
McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its
favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return.
There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the
decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned
any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court.
Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and
had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the
contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to
him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned
to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought
 to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of
Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of
Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on
the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means,
because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction
and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not
want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the
Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their
temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to
perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810;
emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express
his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these
explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is
but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has
been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza,
52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati
vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty
party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy
all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number
of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30
days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his
paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law,
but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of
the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional
sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it
is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The
Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-
598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he
should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
 To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the
one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602;
emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which
has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter
of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim,
and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and
of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we
wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil.
at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the
Court held:

... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of
the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged
with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties,
and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging
and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived,
means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th
ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
 many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion

contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the
author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his
attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to
be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in
the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise
than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of
the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In
the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed
above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

 7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April
1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67
Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled
to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for
the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some
impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint
for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a
complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can
be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a
free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent
means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right
must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its
 tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is
the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot
be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and
the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent
and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears
to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility
of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism
is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of
27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first
place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding
of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being
required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage
there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered.
The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is
not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the
stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case
and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of
libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is
by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot
be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER

SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in

Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the
sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C.
Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002,
Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring
that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove
the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the
counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground
that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was
not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from
further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an
impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix
the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided
by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge
Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed
the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November

12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated
February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders
dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the

publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article,
entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out," reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a
murder suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on
a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with
murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But

Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to
bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it,
Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser
inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals
and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the
judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there
who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to
explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge
with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge
Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it
was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared
in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself
from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted

that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He
disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of
murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such
lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr.
Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear
reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference,

but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until
after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the
trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half
truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine
of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in
the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of
this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him
to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of
Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby
ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered
to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond
of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of
the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to

the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the
integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the proceedings of
Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from
receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media
interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule
13.02 of Canon 13.9

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun
Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003
and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003.
He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003,
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews,
respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a
liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of
equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also
prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It
stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings,
and that respondent's actions and statements are detailed in the Order of
October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared

in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an
Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor
Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered him to appear on
January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in
contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October
20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of
January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated
January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be
interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the
hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked
him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment
does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also
admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's
instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise
of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to
offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has

grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is

hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days
to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the]
disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10

The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his
interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the
court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng
panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon
nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed
your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang
pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka
abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are
ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon
nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod,
magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga
bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga
inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga
Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . .
Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili
lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining
iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are
ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new
jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case
against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his
license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be
removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako
nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang
kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that
this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state
the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug
miingon siya,BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to
appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. .
..

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his
gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon

matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang
hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo
hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in
fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the
case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is
not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said
was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the
law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana,
pero unsa may iyang katuyoan - ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto
kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso,
pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP,
intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka
ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang
diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due process of law - you did not accord me due
process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in
order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me
imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For
God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law.
What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator?
No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is
entitled to due process of law - you did not accord me due process of law. . .
.)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga

maaksiyonan kini,with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with
all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang

akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon
ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya
madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges

who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law
has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero)
and that is why he is studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an
officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the
practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the
causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the
opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the
requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule
139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to
the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's
suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the
order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its
officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated November
12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with
Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by
respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with
when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent
chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial
court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that
the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a

patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an
attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly
immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer
does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer
must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on
similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer
"shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the

holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to
be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which
appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case
No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13,
which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated

Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against
Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court
and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that
as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the
law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct

[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have
set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica19held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but
the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so,
precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found

guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition
of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses
WILFREDO and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, J.:

In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel
for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:

. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the
petition as borne out by the following statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the
petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has
"failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .

which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his use
of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified by his characterization of the
decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the winning
party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it
was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character," although the
petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did
not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit
confused — with that confusion which is the natural product of having been born,
nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied
class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had
not owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor was already either
Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; — in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter
lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of
Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire, and
dignified "mien"; and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the
defendants and their counsel in a scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the
possession and fruits of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to
the Order of 30 May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer,"
or "blasphemer."

In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:

If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is
because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic]
First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber"
(Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26)
and "abetter" of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the other
hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is
indeed cross-eyed — particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8)
letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and
therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully
expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is
therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned does not
deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.

and prays:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this
Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning the undersigned into a martyr
to his principles.

Yet, he added the following:

WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING

LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).

It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before
it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the
respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his
use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously
frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he
volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge
a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."

Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons:
first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition'
second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address
squarely the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September
1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the
circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the
relevance of the harsh words and phrase to his petition.

We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all
read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt
for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put
them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty
to render justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have
the effect of "encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).

In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the
respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose
glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and
his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant
petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the
respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary,
or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE

TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all
good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty
under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . .
. to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can
only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error,
fettered by fallibility.

Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board vs. Cloribel(31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration in the administration of
justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of the
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice." [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In
re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]).

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize
the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of
such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
 Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).

"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity
to become conversant with the character and efficiency of out judges.
No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, or no other class has as
great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench."
(State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it
their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned,
"the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers
— even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech. No

one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration justice. There is no antimony
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community.

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and
abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language
(Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless,
and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158
SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or
of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and
malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division, and the
scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only
come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come
from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law
and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice
whatever does not accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When
such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other
intemperate words in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26
September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from
turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL
APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can
extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and
his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in this Court.

Padilla, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no par

LEAH P. ADORIO, Petitioner, v. HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, respondent.

PHILIP SEE, Intervenor.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to set aside the Order
of Judge Lucas P. Bersamin1 dated May 5, 1995 insofar as it holds petitioner
in direct contempt and sentences her therefor. The dispositive portion of said
order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion For Inhibition And For Re-raffle Of Cases is hereby
granted.

The complainant Philip See y Go and his former private prosecutor, Atty.
Leah P. Adorio, of the King & Adorio Law Offices, with address at No. 40
Landargun Street, Quezon City, are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of
this Court for disrespect to the Court and its Presiding Judge and are
accordingly sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) days in the City Jail
of Quezon City and to pay a fine of P200.00 each.

For the pupose of the execution of their sentence, complainant Philip

See y Go and Atty. Leah P. Adorio are hereby directed to appear in person
before the Court on May 23, 1995 at 10:00 oclock in the morning.

Pending execution of the sentence, the transmittal of the records to the

Honorable Executive Judge, through the Office of the Clerk of Court, for
purposes of re-raffle shall be held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.2 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

Petitioner was counsel for Philip G. See, the private complainant in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22
pending before the sala of respondent Judge.3 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Pre-trial in these cases was concluded on January 16, 1995. Upon

agreement of the parties, trial on the merits was set on March 8, 15 and 22,
all at 8:30 a.m.4 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary

Unknown to petitioner, counsel for the accused filed several requests

addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court for the issuance of subpoenas duces
tecum requiring officials of several banks to bring before the court on March
8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m., microfilm copies of various checks. The
subpoenas duces tecumwere issued on February 6, 7 and 14, 1995.5 chanroblesv irtuallaw lib rary

On March 8, 1995, which petitioner supposed to be the date of the

presentation of the prosecutions evidence, petitioner came to court and was
surprised by the presence of the bank officials therein.6During the hearing,
respondent Judge called for a recess to enable counsel for the accused to
confer with the bank officers.7 When the case was again called, the following
arguments took place:
Atty. Adorio:

Before we call our witness, your honor, may I now make of record that I was
surprised with the move this morning of all the bank officers, I was not
informed about any request for subpoena to the bank officers today. No copy
of such request was given to the Private Prosecutor. And I also notice, your
honor, that the subpoena or rather no copy issued by this court was ever
given to the private prosecutor. Atty. Rivera knows, he had already entered
his appearance and he knows my address, why did he not furnish me a copy
of his request for subpoena, your honor, considering that I have the right to
examine his request, the materiality of his request. I would like also to make
of record, your honor, why they keep it as a secret, as a rule, the opposing
party must be a party to whatever paper the other party may file, it seems
that Atty. Rivera is hiding something from us. Whatever he wants to ask the
Court, I am entitled to know.

Atty. Rivera:

I dont think there is a reason or there is a need to be furnished with my

request for subpoena, that is the reason why she was not furnished, your
honor. Besides, my request for subpoena this morning is not a litigated
motion. I made this request for advance in order that, when the defense
turn to present evidence, it wont be delayed because of non-availability of
these exhibits.

Atty. Adorio:

This is our day of presenting evidence, your honor. This is only my

observation, your honor and may I request Atty. Rivera to give us all copies
he submits to the Court.

Atty. Rivera:

May I request for particular rule for that....

Atty. Adorio:

Your honor, copies must be given to the opposing counsel, there is a ruling
on that your honor....

Atty. Rivera:

This is not a litigated motion your honor.

C o u r t:

What is the problem of Atty. Adorio?

Atty. Adorio:

My only observation, your honor. And may I request Atty. Rivera to give us
all copies he submits to the Court.

Atty. Rivera:

May I request for that particular rule for furnishing request for subpoena to
the other counsel, your honor...

C o u r t:

What is this rule, will you cite the rule so that we can examine your protest
you are insinuating to the Court that there was something here, we dont
even know the request for subpoena. If anyone of my staff is.... towards the
other side, you call me I can discipline them...

Atty. Adorio:

There was an instance, your honor, when this case was called by the Clerk
for arraignment, the Clerk would say that the accused would be coming. And
one time, your honor, the Court already issued an Order of arrest, and it was
already past 10:00 oclock in the morning when the accused arrived....8 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Petitioner was apparently referring to an incident that allegedly occurred on

July 13, 1994, the date set for the accuseds arraignment. According to
petitioner, the accused failed to appear in court on said date even after the
third call at around 11:00 a.m. Consequently, the Court ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the
accuseds bail bond. The clerk in charge of the record then went to the door
separating the courtroom and the staffs office and whispered to someone in
the office. After two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat, went
back to the door, and announced to the Court that the accused would be
late. Respondent Judge replied that the Court will wait for the accused.9 chan roble svirtual lawlib rary

However, on March 8, 1995, Philip See allegedly examined the record but
found that the incidents which purportedly transpired during the arraignment
were not reflected therein.10
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The above revelations by Atty. Adorio prompted the following response from
respondent judge:

C o u r t:

Will you call everybody, all the staff inside.... and you point to me who is
that....? If you want me to be disqualified in these cases, you make it in
writing. You file your motion to inhibit, I will disqualify myself because I dont
want to hear such accusations. Any participation of my staff which I am now
parading before you... I dont like that kind of accusation.

Atty. Rivera:

I will join the court.

C o u r t:

Order

As prayed for, the private prosecutor is hereby directed to file a Request for
inhibition in writing stating the grounds.

Pending consideration of the Request for Inhibition, hearing is hereby

suspended.

So ordered.11 chanroblesv irtuallaw lib rary

Pursuant to said order, petitioner filed a Motion for Inhibition and for Re-
Raffle of Cases in behalf of her client, alleging that:

The filing of the request for issuance of subpoena duces tecum and the
issuance of the subpoena without notice on the private prosecutor were
irregular for the following reasons:

[a] The pre-trial of the case had beem terminated and the evidence for the
prosecution was scheduled to be heard on March 8, 1995. Thus, it was
plaintiffs turn to present evidence. Whatever request defendant wanted to
make with the court which would affect the right of the plaintiff to present
evidence on the date scheduled would therefore be of notice to private
prosecutor so that no surprises would result and so that plaintiff could also
prepare questions for these bank officers involved and make use of their
presence.
[b] The act of the Court in issuing the subpoena for the bank officers to
testify on March 8, 1995 upon request of the defendant when it was not yet
his turn to present evidence is disruptive of orderly court procedure and
shows bias on the part of the court. It shows the control of the accused over
the court and court procedure.

[c] This control was also manifest on July 13, 199[4], when accused was
scheduled for arraignment, when the latter failed to appear before the court
despite the third call at about 11:00 a.m. The Court then issued an Order for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the confiscation/cancellation of the
bail bond. After this Order was given orally in open court, the clerk who took
charge of the records went to the door between the sala and the office and
whispered something to someone in the office. After about two minutes, the
same clerk again rose from her seat and went back to the door and
thereafter, she announced to the Court that the accused would be late and
the accused would be arriving. The Court then said that it will wait, if Alvin
Tan is coming. It is puzzling how the clerk knew that Alvin Tan would be
coming when he was not even present in court. However, none of these
facts appeared in the Order or in the Constancia.12 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Petitioner prayed that (1) the judge inhibit himself from hearing the criminal
cases; (2) said cases be re-raffled to another court; and (3) the hearing of
said cases be suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for
Inhibition.13
chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

The trial court granted said motion in an Order dated May 5, 1995. In the
same order, declared petitioner and her client, in direct contempt. He
explained thus:

The imputation that the Court has come under the control of the accused on
account of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum upon his request but
without notice to the complainant or the public prosecutor is most unfair and
disrespectful to the Court and is a highly irresponsible accusation on the part
of the private complainant and the private prosecutor (who had meanwhile
withdrawn from the case). The issuance of a subpoena at a partys instance
is not subject to prior or simultaneous notice to the adverse party of the
request therefor, for, such notice is not required by the Rules of Court. The
grounds for disqualification are unworthy of any consideration. The
questioning by the private prosecutor of the issuance of the subpoena is
unfounded and due to a misplaced sense of procedural requirements.

xxx
As far as the text and language of the motion are concerned, the Court
considers them to be irresponsible and disrespectful, especially the
accusation that the Court had come under the control of the accused and
had committed an irregularity of procedure. These statements amount to
an unmitigatedly disrespectful attitude towards the Court and its Presiding
Judge. They also display the dangerous tendencies of a party and counsel
who probably think of themselves as beyond reproach. There is therefore no
recourse but to find both the complainant and his former private prosecutor
guilty of direct contempt.14 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

On May 22, 1995, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order. This Court, in a Resolution dated
June 5, 1995, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
Judge from enforcing the impugned order.

A perusal of the trial courts order reveals that what respondent judge found
particularly contemptuous were petitioners statements in her motion alleging
that (1) the issuance of the subpoenas duces tecumwas irregular; and (2)
the court and court procedure were subject to the control of the accused.

Whether or not these statements constitute direct contempt is the issue

which confronts this Court.

We rule in the affirmative.

Contrary to petitioners allegations, there was nothing irregular in the

issuance of the subpoenas duces tecum. Requests by a party for the
issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action.
No violation of due process results by such lack of notice since the other
parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and
documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court.15 chanro ble svirt uallawl ibra ry

Petitioner however argues that:

On March 8, 1995, the prosecution was scheduled to present its first

witness, the private complainant, Philip See, after a very long pre-trial
period which started sometime in September 1994. The regular [as against
the irregular] procedure would have been for the prosecution to proceed
with the presentation of evidence pursuant to Rule 119, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. The prosecution was not, however, able to move along, due
to the presence of numerous bank officials from various banks who appeared
pursuant to the subpoenas issued to them by the court.
Moreover, the person who requested for the subpoena was the counsel for
the accused. The regular or usual procedure would have been for the
subpoena to be issued during the pre-trial stage or during the time that the
defense is presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation of
evidence by the prosecution as what happened in this case.

We do not find any merit in petitioners contentions. Rule 119, Section 3 of

the Rules of Court which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does
not preclude the defense from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the
time of the prosecutions presentation of evidence. In this case, counsel for
the accused felt that he needed the documents subject of the subpoenas for
his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, respondent
judge called a recess to enable said counsel to secure said documents from
the bank officials. The order of trial was not in any way altered; counsel for
the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank officials to the
stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered
unreasonable nor irregular.

Nor do we find anything irregular in the accuseds arraignment. As counsel

for the accused points out:

xxx the fact that the Presiding Judge issued a warrant of arrest and ordered
the cancellation of the accuseds bond shows that he gives no special favor to
the accused. And it is of common knowledge that orders like that are easily
reconsidered/lifted even for excuses like traffic, ill health or failure to
remember the hearing. The fact that the Presiding Judge opted to wait for
the accused upon information that the latter is coming only shows that he
was very aware of the common practice. Waiting saved so much of the
courts and parties time as it did away with the usual motion for
reconsideration and the necessity for a resetting.

xxx. Court personnels [sic], practitioners and even judges know, of course
that it is not uncommon for litigants, especially those coming for trial late, to
call the courts office by phone. It is likewise not uncommon for litigants who
follows-up [sic] matters in the office (like bailbonds, [sic], release of rulings,
etc.) to get acquainted with or even become friends of - court clerks,
secretaries, typists, stenographers or sheriffs, in the office.

xxx. Besides, if the plaintiff found it necessary to have those matters stated
in the Order or placed on record, there were two (2) lawyers (the private
and the public prosecutors) who could have stood up and made the proper
manifestations or requests. But that incident happened way back 13 July
1994 and it is only now, in their motion of 15 March 1995, that they mention
the same in their vain attempt to create an issue on the impartiality and
fairness of the Presiding Judge. xxx.16chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Petitioners allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were
irregular therefore lacks basis. Such statement, when read with petitioners
remark that the so-called irregularities show the accuseds control over the
court and court procedure, is nothing short of contemptuous.

The latter statement is particularly alarming for it implies that court

proceedings are a mere farce, and the court a mere stooge, a marionette
subject to the manipulation of the opposing party. It suggests that the judge
was moved by considerations other than his sense of justice and fair play
thereby calling into question the integrity and independence of the court.
Such statement tends to bring the authority and administration of law into
disrespect and constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically:

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the courts.

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by
the record or having no materiality to the case.

Consequently, we rule that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt.

However, we find the penalty imposed by respondent Judge upon petitioner

too severe. Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective
principle to vindicate the authority and dignity of the courts and the
administration of justice.17 Accordingly, we reduce the same to a fine of
P200.00.

While petitioners client, Philip G. See, did not question the contempt order
against him -- his motion for intervention and the accompanying motion for
issuance of clarificatory order merely questioned the scope of the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court -- the reduction of the penalty in favor
of his former counsel should likewise benefit him. Under the rules of criminal
procedure, the judgment of the appellate court shall affect even those
accused who did not appeal insofar as said judgment is favorable and
applicable to them.18 By analogy, this rule should apply in contempt cases.
Contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense,19 and the mode of
procedure in contempt proceedings is assimilated as far as practicable to
those adapted to criminal prosecutions.20 chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, the Order dated May 5, 1995 issued by respondent judge is

MODIFIED in that the penalty of imprisonment for Two (2) Days and a fine
of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) imposed on petitioner Leah Adorio and
intervenor Phillip See is REDUCED to a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00)
only. The Temporary Restraining Order is LIFTED and Criminal Case Nos. Q-
94-55933 to Q-94-55957 is ordered re-raffled to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

RE: LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an en banc Resolution dated July 22, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-3-304-SC, the Court adjudged Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda guilty of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for maliciously attacking the Court and its members for the manner they resolved several cases
mentioned in his letter of February 21, 2005 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. For this
infraction, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Sorreda as a member of the Bar and prohibited him
from engaging in the practice of law unless the Court orders otherwise.

In a subsequent letter of February 4, 2006, Atty. Sorreda continued with his old obnoxious ways and,
in a virtual repeat of what he said previously but with more venom this time, Atty. Sorreda embarked
on another assault against the dignity of the Court, adding that he "has not the slightest intention" of
apologizing for his misdeeds "either now or in the future." Worse still, he even dared the Court to up
the penalty of suspension to disbarment.

In the expectation that Atty. Sorreda would mend his ways if given another chance, the Court merely
imposed a strong warning. Accompanying the warning, however, was the caveat that any further
derogatory remark from him, be it embodied in a letter or pleading, shall warrant an even more
severe sanction, of which there is none other than disbarment.

In his present MANIFESTATION AND MOTION under date of July 18, 2006, Atty. Sorreda has
raised a step further the level of his obstinacy and defiance. In a clearly insulting tone reflecting a
remorseless and boorish person, he states that he has from the start defied the suspension order
meted him by the Court and has continued with his professional practice as a lawyer both in the
lower courts and before this Tribunal.

The Court's patience has been stretched to the limit by Atty. Sorreda's arrogance and disrespect. At
the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect. By taking the lawyer's
oath, they become guardians of the law and an indispensable instrument in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice. Deliberately veering away from the path which a lawyer ought to follow as
called for by his oath and his profession cannot be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining
authority. So it must be here. Atty. Sorreda has proven himself to be incorrigible. By his demeanor,
as demonstrated by his penchant for addressing malicious letters and pleadings to this Court, Atty.
Sorreda is unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda is DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let his name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Let copies thereof furnished the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Sorreda's personal record; the National Office and the Quezon City Chapter of the
IBP; the Philippine Judges Association; and all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals
and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to
insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et
al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate
upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or
motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten
the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former
allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation
against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for
damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City
Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the
Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of
Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five
hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three
hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to
the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First
Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals
by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No.
46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan
and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on
Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of
petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M.
Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words
must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded
that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for
Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by
mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and
"judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself
to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of
October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court
rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It
admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court
of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for
reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all
penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles
171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the
proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in
its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he
reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered
respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should
not be punished for contempt of court.

On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the
Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the
Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter
to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the
President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into
consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10,
1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same
Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against
Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if
provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind
whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his
own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other
words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation
and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with
law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot
more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon
the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to
respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the
merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged
error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on
the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable
for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or
unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but
the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his
(respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his
Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was
under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted
authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-
called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even
the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is
found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the
practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to
the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this
order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial
Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for
damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable
for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by
compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral
damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del
Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his
threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in
accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973,
before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be
ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate
Court.

Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us
when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and
wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court
who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring
his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our
resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating
brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished
me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of
the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for
him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to
obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination"
(Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate
Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the
Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal
beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice,
was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his
manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and
our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a
vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo
is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang
man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is
foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the
latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over
the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man
gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in
G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R.
No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's
finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning
its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court
of Appeals was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not
be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an
explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal
case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno
S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he
complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it
not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As
manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to
God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous
statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled
threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally
at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an
additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and
injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me
that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion,
leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as
compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without
even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft,
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances
that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of
the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and
We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of
a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or
warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are
absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to
circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12,
1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973,
respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to
submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there
was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule
138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated
that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable
mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things
and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked
for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal
Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified
his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that
he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the
confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to
retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme
Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as
regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment
as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's
previous statements. We quote:
 The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme
Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case
was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of
an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be
civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the
Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the
Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains
incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any
definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his
physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly
stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire
from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on
him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of
whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings
cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the
inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We
resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to
his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them
of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble
mission of administering justice.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error,
fettered by fallibility.

... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle
does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R.
No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of
the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter
conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the
conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the
accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory
and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his
disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a
member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to
the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G.
No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and
imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider
their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be
anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of
both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that
they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of
his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his
personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the
integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his
supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing
that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law
and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the
minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be
wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves
into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We
view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification
for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and
a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares
to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have
nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law
practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor.
To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds
that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5,
1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of
November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take
effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the status of
their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This is because he is
always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign
sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Antecedents

On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against
respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970
entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu
City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional misconduct by
Atty. Abellana, to wit:chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case
No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint
was actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial
court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it
three months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;

and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes, namely: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the
cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2

2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued
on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal offer of plaintiff’s
exhibits is rather very late;”3 and

3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the
counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to
the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4

On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10,
1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling
P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on
paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of
dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the
answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply
(Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial
on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his non- attendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained
that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having
attended the arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his
arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time,
pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his
request because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been
dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their
agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the
filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the
P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also
demanded any receipts.

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change counsel,8 stating that the
latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his
obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch
Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried
Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9

On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying additional charges of
falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty.
Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was
not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in
Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp
affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the official rubber
stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of
exhibits, and reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during
his testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.

Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services stipulated the
equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid
Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for
Atty. Abellana’s services after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.

On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
 Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at 10:00 am on
November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times
more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town,
but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being
cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until further notice.19

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on the part
of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the postponement of the
hearings.

Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on February 9,
2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.

On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory conference on
June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to
submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the
clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24

Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana requested an
extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents
from the trial court.26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter deemed
submitted for resolution.

On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his allegations
against Atty. Abellana.27

Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17, 2005,28 in
which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had nonetheless efficiently
discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused any delay in the case; that it was
Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant
had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the complainant
filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had
filed on behalf of the complainant, except the above-stated replies.

On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling certain
aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with counterclaims in order to
deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed the
reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by
the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty.
Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an
attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30noted that he had
twice resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been
filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on
June 14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the
reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial
court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had explained
that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainant’s failure to pay the
agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his
having actually filed such in court.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana, observing as
follows:
cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry

x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has shown a facility
for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of diligence in
pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of
deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Gines Abellana
be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for
failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits a member of the bar. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above- entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful
practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N.
Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)

On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following grounds:32

A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of
law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;

B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;

C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that it
is hearsay and self-serving.

In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated that the
“enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached as
Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9
of Atty. Abellana’s position paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued
that both documents were already part of the records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or certification to the effect that both
documents were inexistent. He reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents “seemed to be
falsified documents” based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for reconsideration.36

In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty. Abellana;
insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted that the reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and motion for
reconsideration.

On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit certified true copies
of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38

On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.40

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41

Ruling

We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being substantiated by
the records.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical
burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s
Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession, thus: chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as
be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty,
integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings with
Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint
in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so.
His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit
the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse
the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever
reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater
value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in explaining
his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no less. To
counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted two
documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents
to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense
against the administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his
forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official
marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly
certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely
claiming that “court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber
stamp.”44 In these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely warranted. He
admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in
behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had
himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that
the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the
interest of justice.

In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana challenged the
sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such proof had consisted of
merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, clearly
preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent
lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of one party is greater
than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the
following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in
the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.

The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To start
with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on “4” but justified himself by claiming that he had
done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required.
Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court by
using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his document
was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating that
court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the
court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana
did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court.
His omission to prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty.
Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex
8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he
represented them to be.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to bolster
his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must
not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his client's case; and that the
latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had
been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the
respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing in court that the
complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no such
agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to
amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his
client by stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but
his invocation was false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice
of law for six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore,
suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition
suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED
FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the
stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a member of the
Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala
were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty.
Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant
"on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality,
independence and integrity." The motions were denied.

After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6, 2006,1 sought the
investigation of complainant for bribery.

In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P.
Cardeño,2 a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of
complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court did
not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain Alex of
EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he came to learn
that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released by complainant in favor
of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by
EDC were thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.

By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondent's complaint against complainant, approved the
recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated
and motivated by plain unfoundedsuspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional
retirement" (underscoring supplied).

Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint4 of complainant against respondent,
for disbarment.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

From the Report and Recommendation5 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is
gathered that despite the January 12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he
failed to do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare him in default.

It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a mandatory conference
on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers. In compliance with the
Order, complainant submitted his verified position paper.6 Respondent did not.

Defined as issues before the IBP were:

(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant before the Office of the Court
Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.

(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondent's complaint against herein complainant
false and untruthful, it noting that respondent's complaint was dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of
evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows a "failure on the part of respondent to prove his allegations"
against complainant.

Noting, however, this Court's August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondent's complaint "unsubstantiated
and motivated by plain, unfounded" suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent
"knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based simply on
his bare suspicion and speculation." (underscoring supplied)

On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant,
respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly
promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit" including baseless administrative complaints against judges and
other court officers and employees.

The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that

while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in respondent's affidavit-complaint
against herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly
and maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against
complainant;7 (Underscoring supplied) cralaw lib rary

and that he violated Canons 10,8 11,9 & 1210 and Rule 11.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
under his oath of office.

He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,12 informs that on November 22, 2007, it
adopted the following Resolution adopting and approving with modification the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's violation of Canons
10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional responsibility for filing a groundless suit against
complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warningthat a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original)

The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.

Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the
evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere
allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay.13

No doubt, it is this Court's duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it is
also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass them.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000)
Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.