Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO LEGASPI, complainants,

vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified
complaint dated March 10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City
with malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which he had collected
for them. They prayed that the respondent be disbarred.1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed
the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of 75.75%).

The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in
the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz
Velez-Gonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were
adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother,
Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint petition dated April
11, 1969, which the respondent signed as counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut
land left by the decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the administrator be authorized
to sell the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be
distributed among the six groups of heirs. The probate court approved that agreement in its order of
April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc. Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental CFI, Exh. A).

The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale only when the respondent
wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the
money we have deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". The respondent
advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).

The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8 because the respondent on
December 7 sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go
to Cagayan de Oro City on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C). On
December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to
Cagayan de Oro City on December 10 because according to the respondent "his postdated checks
can be paid and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet" (Exh. D).

In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received another note, this time from the
respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs.
Daroy's "Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to P4,000 and had spent it. The
letter, a sort of extrajudicial confession or mea culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):
 Dear Fermina,

I wrote this letter with the hope that you will understand me. I have received
P4,000.00 our share in the case filed and is now in my custody.

Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was forced to use our money to solve my
problem.

Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an
Employee of the BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet. So, I am waiting as he
will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and it's close as I have promised to give it on the 10th, I
mean our money.

Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum or at least until Thursday or Friday, I
bring it to you.

I know, my responsibility on this matter.

Thanks

Cousin
Ramon

It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.",
received from Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in
participation of my clients Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of Judge B. K.
Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that
amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and
Teogenes Velez, Jr. the respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in the sum of P4,000 for
each group. Those lawyers turned over the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients (Exh. L).

It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money
deposited could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn
the money before that date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.

Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were made upon the respondent to pay
to the complainants the amount which he had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to
make payment. As complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed their complaint for
disbarment on March 13, 1970.2

Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to this Court's Clerk of Court
dated May 26, 1970, expressed the hope that preferential attention would be given to the case. He
said that he had "reliable information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the respondent "has been
bragging that nothing will happen to this case" (p. 20, Rollo).
1äwphï1.ñët

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In 1973
he requested the City Fiscal of Iligan City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was
finished, the case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the said sum of P4,000 as shown in
the receipt, Exhibit D dated October 20, 1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired
Teofilo Legaspi at Iligan City to see him (the respondent) in his office at Cagayan de Oro City so that
Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the proper disposal" of that amount.

Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and at their conference they
supposedly agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses
which he (Legaspi) described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses seeking
evidence and other expenses relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his
attorney's fees would be equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", an agreement which was later
placed in formal form (referring to 1968 extrajudicial settlement attached to his answer); that the
balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children,
the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such division each
participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412), and
that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The respondent did not present any receipt to prove that
alleged payment.

He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad,
but at the end of October or the first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent)
Vivencio's share. Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a receipt for Vivencio's share.
After paying the shares of Teofilo and Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's
possession amounted to P2,476.

According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused consistently to receive" the said
balance from him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid
to them the sum of P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did not present
any receipt to prove the alleged payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of
P476 to the complainants.

Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi, received the sum of P412 from the
respondent. She said that her father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the
respondent. She said that there was no agreement that the respondent would participate like an heir
in the partition of the sum of P4,000. She denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her
brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that the respondent paid to the complainants
P2,000.

After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that respondent's testimony cannot be given any
credence. In his memorandum he stated that after he received from the sheriff "on October 29,
1969" the sum of P4,000, he "immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to come to Cagayan
de Oro City and that Teofilo "came on October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20, 1969, the
date of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.

The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the sheriff and respondent's office
clerk in their affidavits of March 18, 1975 that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo
Legaspi was a handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B) wherein the respondent made it
appear that the said sum of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine
o'clock". That the respondent in his testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is Annex C
of the complaint for disbarment and which he admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication
that he does not know the facts of his own case and that he had no scruples in trying to mislead and
deceive this Court.

That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his letter (already quoted) to Mrs.
Daroy dated December 7 and 9, 1969, respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his
fabricated theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first week of
November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi
because the latter is dead and could not refute him. However, complainants' documentary evidence
refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.

He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a
supposed typewritten claim against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any
signature. The respondent wants to imply that the complainants were trying to blackmail him. No
probative value can be given to Exhibit 2.

The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are discernible in his Exhibit 1,
which he attached to his answer to the original complaint.

Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the four children
of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty.
Legaspi, all the six being described in the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of
Consuelo Gonzaga, who died on March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo
Gonzaga was not explained.

In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it was signed and acknowledged
before a notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth parcel of land, the spaces for the shares
adjudicated to the heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses and the spaces for the numbers
of the residence certificates and the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument
was signed by the above six persons and duly notarized by a notary whose signature is illegible.

In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have left four parcels of land located
at Barrio Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga.
However, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated April 29, 1969
Consuelo Gonzaga inherited only a one-sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao,
Misamis Oriental.

How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a resident of Alameda, California, was
able to sign it and to appear before a notary was not explained.

The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent Legaspi, casts a reflection on
his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before
whom it was acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to appear herein that respondent
Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The
document does not even mention whether the deceased died intestate.

That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the misappropriation or
breach of trust committed by the respondent.

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of
his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or
use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for
honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and
must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). 1äw phï1.ñët
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal
prosecution.

A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as
attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).

"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d
105). In view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients
does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In
re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).

The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe
punishment" (Sturr vs. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d 897). 1äwphï1.ñët

A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false pretenses
is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who
violates his oath of office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit
cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an
unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil.
24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 131; See Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).

We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for having
misappropriated the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his
repeated failure to appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at the
hearings scheduled by this Court, thus causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time,
demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble profession of law. (See Capulong
vs. Aliño, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 491).

Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that the proper
disciplinary action against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect the court
and the public from the misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the assumption that a
member of the bar should be competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).

Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from
the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p.
242).1äwphï1.ñët

The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to pay them the said amount of
P4,000 plus attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case
amounting to more than P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment proceeding. That amount
should be recovered in an ordinary action.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma,
Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 On July 3, 1975 Matilde Sacay Isip filed in this Court a complaint for disbarment
against the same respondent, Atty. Legaspi, on the ground of malpractice
(Administrative Case No. 1490)..

2 In view of respondent's failure to comply with his promise to pay the said sum of
P4,000 to the complainants, they consulted Attorney Alfredo R. Busico as to what
they should do. Following that lawyer's advice, they sent a telegram to the
respondent on January 10, 1970, requesting him to pay the P4,000 within a week or
they would file civil and administrative actions against him (Exh. F). In reply, the
respondent sent a telegram to Mrs. Daroy, promising that he would be able to make
payment on or before January 30, 1970 (Exh. G). On January 21, 1970 the
complainants sent a wire to the respondent, warning him that if he did not comply
with his commitment within the extended period, they would file actions against him
without any further notice (Exh. H).

Inasmuch as the respondent had reneged on his promise to pay the P4,000 on or
before January 30, Mrs. Daroy, accompanied by Atty. Busico, repaired to Cagayan
de Oro City in order to make a personal demand on the respondent. They were not
able to see him in his office. They left with his secretary an ultimatum, stating that it
would be to respondent's advantage to settle the matter and that, if within a week no
such settlement was made, the necessary actions would be filed in the proper
tribunals (Exh. 1). The respondent requested Atty. Busico as a matter
of compañerismo to give him one week to effect the settlement (Exh. J dated
February 14, 1970).

Atty. Busico in a reply-telegram dated February 17,1970 clarified that the respondent
had until February 21 within which to make payment. He asked the respondent to
wire how the payment would be made (Exh. K). The respondent did not bother to
reply.

3 The Fiscal issued a subpoena to the respondent to attend the hearing scheduled
on August 3, 1973. The respondent did not appear. The Fiscal motu propio cancelled
the hearing in order to give the respondent a chance to be heard. The case was set
for hearing on August 6, 1973 with due notice to the respondent. He did not appear.
Mrs. Daroy testified at the hearing. The complainants presented their Exhibits A to L-
1.
On January 2, 1974 the Solicitor General filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Legaspi (See Sec. 5, Rule 139, Rules of Court). After the respondent had
filed his answer through counsel, which answer is at variance with his answer to the
original complaint, the case was again referred to the City Fiscal of Iligan City for the
reception of respondent's evidence.

He set the case for hearing on June 25 and July 2, 1974 with due notice to the
respondent and his counsel. On those dates the complainants and their counsel
appeared but the respondent and his counsel did not appear. The hearing for July
30, 1974 was postponed at respondent's instance. At his request, the case was set
for hearing on August 2,1974. As usual, the respondent and counsel did not appear.

The case was set for hearing on August 27 for the last time. On that date the
respondent presented his evidence. He asked for a continuance. The continuation of
the hearing was set for August 30. The respondent did not appear. The Fiscal heard
complainants' rebuttal evidence.

Respondents' additional evidence was received in this Court only on April 1, 1975.
His memorandum was submitted in June, 1975.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES
@ "Ross", defendants-appellants.

Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.

Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz
and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.

FERNANDEZ, J.:p

This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of
murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost proportionately.

There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three men
barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots
from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs.
Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the
abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his
brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but
when they returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the
assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.

We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which
was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at
the time.

Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the
appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He
also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at
a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw
Raymundo Madem as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.

In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying,
declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building
took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look
into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana
that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter
agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said dying
declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom
he could not recognize.

The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that
while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify
the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964.
He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building
why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It
must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying
declaration, testified to its lawful execution.

The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the
appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not
militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their
relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed
appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few
hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of
Police when and where they executed their respective sworn statements.

In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the same
date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino
Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.

Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house. He testified on
direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he
slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further
questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that
after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity
of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently
show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could
obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.

Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that
would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.

An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise
have observed.

Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen
edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident
to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that
 which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of the threatened danger
in order to avoid it.2

The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not show that there was a
moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it
was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized
the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?

The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this rule, of the time when the
moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto
Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at
the time of the shooting incident. It reads:

To whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:

1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April
20, at 4:27 A.M.;

2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees
above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;

3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon
having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.

For the Administrator:

(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division

It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no
doubt as to their identities.

It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo
Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having
been conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a negative result even if
the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could
have been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.

The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo
Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.

We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots
at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any
conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera.
Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-
principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q.
Antonio, We held:

It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected
with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the
supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between
and among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a
common design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy,
the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a
finding of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the offense itself.

The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other
hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous
acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition to
the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it
is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it has not been
convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense,
either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the
crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal
or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of criminal cases
that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His
finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up
before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his
noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio
I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed
as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are
hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release
from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.