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SUBSCRIPTION
ISSN 1810-035X
Patron–in–Chief
Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqi
Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh and
Chairman, Board of Governors
Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
Sindh –Pakistan
Editor
Dr Lutfullah Mangi
Professor Dr Zhang Li
Director
Centre South Asia–West China Cooperation
and Development Studies, Sichuan University,
Chengdu, 610064,
People’s Republic of China
Dr Toshihiko Suda
Associate Professor
Faculty of International Relations
Daito Bunka University,
Higashimatsuyama–City, Saitama, Japan.
Dr Guihong Zhang
Deputy Director
Institute of International Studies
Zhejiang University, Zhejiang
People’ s Republic of China.
Dr Shang Quanyu
Professor,
Department of Politics and History Studies,
Zhejiang University, Guangdong,
People’s Republic of China
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed Choudhry
Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Sargodha University,
University Road, Sargodha
Ms Firdous Nilofer
Associate Professor
Area Study Centre
Far East & South East Asia,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro
CONTENTS
Ambassador (R)
Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty
China no longer faces the problems and constraints that made the
friendship with Pakistan critically important. It has diplomatic
relations with most of the world, and no longer needs Pakistan as
an intermediary to deal with countries that do not recognize it.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (4)
From the beginning, both China and Pakistan have based their
relations on these principles, which is why their friendship has a
secure foundation, leaders of both used to say, in the early years,
that their relationship was not based on expediency. Such
statements are no longer considered necessary, as this friendship
not only conforms to principles but also to the interests of their
people. Their cooperation in virtually all fields, ranging from trade
and joint ventures to agriculture and peaceful uses of nuclear
technology, is flourishing, and its scope is being expanded to
achieve the shared objective of promoting the prosperity and well-
being of their people. China’ s peaceful rise is setting an example to
other developing countries to emulate. Pakistan stands out among
China’ s neighbours as one with which there are no problems and
disputes, and both the governments and the people have achieved
a high level of mutual trust and confidence.
References
1 Hu Shisheng, “China South Asia Policy and its Regional Impact”, in
Major Powers and South Asia, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, pp
311-314.
Ambassador (R)
Najmul Saqib Khan
males in the 15-19 age group and 85 percent for females in the
same age group, laying the groundwork in the words of a
perceptive observer for ‘ participatory economic expansion
possible in a way it would not have been in India then— and is
quite difficult in India even now.’
‘
EDUCATE YOURSELVES BECAUSE WE WILL NEED ALL
YOUR INTELLIGENCE. ROUSE YOURSELVES BECAUSE
WE WILL NEED ALL YOUR ENTHUSIASM. ORGANIZE
YOURSELVES BECAUSE WE WILL NEED ALL YOUR
STRENGTH’
INDONESIAN ECONOMY: AN APPRAISAL
OF MAJOR SECTORS
1. Population
∗
Recent Tsunami cyclone, followed by less intensity rearing typhoons, is
the worst example of the same, has harshly ravaged Indonesian natural
resources, economy and its population.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (19)
nature recreation parks (89 areas), major forest parks (13 areas),
hunting ground (15 areas), nature conservation (179 areas) and
wild life sanctuaries (51 areas).
4 Ibid, p.104
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (21)
7 Ibid, P.110
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (25)
cottage industries, and are spread all over the country (i-e more
than 391 districts and municipalities of Indonesia). More than
202949 workers were working in these industries in the year 2001,
which rose 209058 during 2002, reflecting growth by 3.01%,
whereas its membership increased from 23.6 million to 24.4
million in the corresponding period. In addition to this, saving-
credit scheme co-operatives provide finance to these co-operatives
to produce goods and services on local levels. BDS (Business
Development Services) also work as a “Provider”, for the financial
requirements of national and international agencies like JICA
( Japan International co-operation Agency) and others.
8 Ibid, P.133
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (26)
Inland water ways and ferry crossings play pivotal role in Sumatra,
Kalimantan, Java and Papua, for both the passenger and freight
carrying services. In the year 2003, more than 36 million
passengers and 15 million tons of freight were transported through
ferry services.
9 Ibid, P-125.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (28)
services in the country and abroad. In the year 2003, more than 14
million passengers travelled by air and 0.2 million tones of cargo
was handled by air services.
5. Labour
Conclusion
York, 2003.
11 Robert, B.Dickie and Thomas A., Laymain, Foreign Investment and
Government Policy in the Third World: Foreign Common Interests in Indonesia and
Beyond , Macmillan Press, Ltd. London, 1988.
12 Satish Chandra and Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesia, A New Beginning,
Starting Publishers Pvt., New Delhi, 2002.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (35)
13A Brief Guide for Investment, The Investment Coordinating Board, The
Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004.
14 Various Monthly Indonesian Newsletters published by Consulate General
of the Republic of Indonesia, Karachi.
15Internet Information, various journals, newspapers and magazines and
encyclopedia.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF SANGHA IN
THAILAND’S SACRED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY
Firdous Nilofer
immature.
Besides the monks there are a large number of novices and temple
boys associated with the Sangha. Temple boys (dek wat) minister
to the needs of monks and novices. They are usually young boys
who learn the rudiments of reading and writing at the wat school
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (38)
and live in the wat. However there are no definite age limits. A
number of adult men, for one reason or another choose to live in
wats and serve as temple boys.5
Novices are youths of at least eight years of age. They live in the
monastery, wear monastic robes and have their heads shaved.
Under the tutorship of senior monks they are trained over the
years in the doctrinal knowledge, the ritual procedures, and the
rules of the monastic order.6
In northern Thailand, which is largely rural, the prevailing custom
is for young boys between 10 and 18 years of age to become
novices. Many of them leave the wat before 20 years of age; only
one in four or five eventually continues to become a professional
monk. This practice provides many boys from poor rural areas
with the opportunity to acquire education and economic security,
which they could not secure otherwise. Today, as in the past,
though to a lesser extent, religious education in a wat still
continues to be for many disadvantaged youths an avenue of social
mobility.
In the past, the monasteries were the only available means for
pursuing education beyond the primary grades. Today, with the
increasing availability of secular education, a smaller number of
boys become novices. But the institution of novicehood is by no
means finished. Many villages still lack secondary schools, and
many families are unable to afford to educate their sons. In certain
places, such as northern part of Thailand secular schools are
inadequate in number or relatively inaccessible because of poor
communications. In all these cases the wat still continues to attract
boys of peasant background and provides them with intellectual
and moral education. A monk’ s vocation is more often the result
of the novice’ s experience of living in a wat rather than an
antecedent motivating factor. The most able monks eventually
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (39)
Aside from its religious function in the community, the wat also
performs a large variety of social functions. Usually there is a wat
committee consisting of the abbot and his assistants and some
senior male laymen with the task of acting as lioson between the
wat and the community, and of creating interest among the
villagers for all wat activities.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (43)
References
1 Frederick M. Bunge, Thailand: A Country Study, Washington D.C., 1981,
p-92.
3 Ibid.
6 Richard Maidment and Colin Mokenas, Culture and Society in the Asia
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
The last phase of trade relations cashiered from the early 1970s
until the end of cold war which was dominated by Japan’ s trade
surplus between two countries. Aided by massive domestic saving
and an undervalued yen, Japan enjoyed a huge trade surplus with
the United States. The gap became so wide that many American
people felt economic challenge from Japan.
In the United States, the debate was raised whether military threats
from the Soviet Union or the economic threat from Japan, be
considered on prime priority of policy making. In a series of polls
in 1989 and 1990, most respondents considered the challenge from
Japan a more serious. On the other hand Japanese opinion was
showing greater confidence in Japan’ s orbital to handle its own
affairs without much reliance on Washington.
In 2003, Japan’ s trade surplus expanded 3.1 percent from the year
2002 to 10.19 trillion yen, the second consecutive annual increase,
it excided 10 trillion yen for the first time in the three years.
In the year 2002 the total value of exports to United States was
14,873,326 million yen. Major commodities were transport
equipments, chemical product, electrical machinery general
machinery, metal and metallic product and textile etc. and the
total value of imports from U.S.A during the same year were
7,237,176 million yen. Major commodities were food stuffs,
chemical product raw material fuel machinery and equipment,
iron steel and textile.
Japan’ s trade surplus grew to its highest level in almost five years
during January – June, 2004 period. As a record surplus with Asia
Made up for Lackluster growth in the surplus with the U.S.A.
Japan’ s trade surplus in the first six months of the year 2004 rose
to 42.4% from the year earlier corresponding year to ¥ 6.18
trillion (US$ 56.2 billion) i.e. topped the ¥ 6 trillion mark for first
time since the second half of 1999.8
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (50)
Table No.1
Value of Japan’
s Exports by Destination and Commodity, 2002
(¥ Million)
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (51)
Table No.2
Value of Japan’
s Imports by Destination and Commodity, 2002.
(¥ Million)
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (52)
Table No.3
Table No.4
Table No. 5
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (54)
Table No.6
Table No.7
Japan’
s Imports Exports With U.S.A 2002
“In the United States, Japan and elsewhere, the effect on growth
would have been greater had it not declined in importance as an
input to world economic activity since 1970s”.12 The impact of
high prices on economic growth and inflection was likely to the
less severe then during the 1970s oil price spikes.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (56)
Japan’ s exports totaled 417 billion US dollars in the year 2002, the
third largest figure after United States and Germany. Its imports
totaled 338 billion US dollars. As a share of total world trade
Japanese exports accounted for 7.8 percent of global exports and
6.5% of global imports in 199613 as percentage of the country’ s
GDP, exports accounted to 8.9 percent and imports 7.6 percent.
United States purchase 27 percent of Japan’ s total export and
supplied 23 percent of its imports.
Japan’ s main trading partners are the United State, East & South
East Asian countries, and the countries of the European Union
(particularly Germany and the United Kingdom).14 In 1996 the
United States purchased 27 percent of Japan’ s exports and
supplied 23 percent of its imports.
As of the late 1990s, Japan had run a trade surplus (meaning its
exports exceeded its imports) every year since 1965, with the
exception of the oil shock years. In the 1980s and 1990s the size
of the surplus fluctuated up and down depending on the yen
exchange rate and the relative growth rates of Japan and its trading
partners.17
Conclusion
Greenspan told business leaders here. “In the United States, Japan
and elsewhere, the effect on growth would have been greater had
oil not declined in importance as an input to world economic
activity since the 1970s,” he said in a speech devoted to energy
issues.
“We and the rest of the world doubtless will have to live with the
geopolitical and other uncertainties of the oil markets for some
time to come.”Greenspan also said the impact of high oil prices
on economic growth and inflation was likely to be less severe than
during the 1970s oil price spikes. Taking into account inflation, the
average price of crude oil was still below the peak of February
1981 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, when oil hit the
equivalent of $75 a barrel in today’ s prices.21 Oil is also only two-
thirds as important as an input in world gross domestic product
now as it was three decades ago, he noted. This meant the recent
surge in prices “is likely to prove significantly less consequential to
economic growth and inflation than the surge in the 1970s”.22
There would be increases in oil efficiency in the rapidly growing
economies of East Asia along the lines of those seen in Japan, the
United States and Europe, he said. But as China’ s economy grows,
its rising oil consumption would offset energy efficiency savings
elsewhere in the world, Greenspan said, noting China uses
roughly twice as much, oil per dollar of output as the United
States. The price of crude hit an all-time record of $70.85 at the
end of August after Hurricane Katrina devastated production and
refining capacity in the Gulf of Mexico. Greenspan said that even
before this year’ s hurricanes, world oil markets had been subject
to a degree of strain not experienced for a generation. Rising
demand and production constraints had wiped out significant
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (62)
slack in supply that had contained oil prices between 1985 and
2000. These views express the latest reflection of US-Japan Trade
relations in a transparent way.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (63)
Reference
1
Edward J. Lin Colne, US–Japan Trade Relations in 1990s, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1997, p.321.
2
Mastunduno, Michael, “Setting Marketing Access Pirovities: The use of
Super 301 in US Trade with Japan”. The World Economy, Vol.15 No.6,
November 1992, Washington D.C., pp. 729–753.
3
Wood Robert Chapman, Japan’s Leading Imports Barriers are its Timing,
Houses Stories Policy Review, New York, 1987, p. 42.
4
Parkhas Aruind, “U.S. National Security Export Controls: Implications for
Global Competitiveness of U.S High–Tech Firms”, Strategic Management
Journal, January / February, 1992, New York, pp.47–66
5
Ostrom, Douglas “US–Japan Trade Relations: Bilateral Verses Multiletral
Options”, Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 43 A, Tokyo, November 14,
1997, p.124
6
Simcon, Herman, “Market Entry in Japan: Barriers, Problems and
Strategies”, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Washington
D.C., 1986, pp.105–116.
7
United States International Commission, Japan’s Distribution System and
Option for Improving U.S. Access, USITC Publishing No.2291, June,
Washington D.C., 1990, p.1–125.
8
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 167, No. 31, August 5, 2005, Hong
Kong, p.10
9
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 167, No. 27, Hong Kong, July 8, 2004,
p.12
10
Facts and Figures of Japan, Foreign Press Centre Japan, Tokyo, 2004,
pp.86–91
11
Hollerman, Loen, Japan and the United States Economics and Political
Adveraries, West View Press, Boulder, 1980, p.94
12
Klein, LawRence and Ohkawa, Kazushi, Economic Growth the Japanese
Experience Since the Meiji Era, United States of America, New York, 1998,
p.126.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (64)
13
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan Statistics, Tokyo, 2000,
pp.173–175.
14
Kurt, Steincr, “The Revision of the Crisis”, The Far Eastern Economic
Review , Vol.xxx, No. 36, August 10, 2005, Hong Kong, p.21
15
Zhang Yunlin, China-US–Japan Relations in Transitions Social Science,
Publishing House, Beijing, 1997, p.211
16
Tariq Anwar Syed, “The Impact of the Structural Impediments Initiative
on U.S.-Japan Trade Issues and Progress”, Pakistan Management Review,
Pakistan Institute of Management (PIM), Islamabad, Vol. xxxiii No.3–4,
1992, p.163
17
Tung Rosalie, “Global Orientation in the 21st Century” in Robert Moran et.
al., Global Business Management in the 1990s, Beackman Publishing Inc.,
Washington D.C., 1990, p.113
18
Leonard J. Schoppa What America Pressure Can Do and Can not Do,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p.406
19
Hanns Gunther, Hil pert, “Two American Views on Trade with Japan”
Social Science Japan Journal, University of Tokyo, Vol5 No.1, April 2002,
p.26
20
Dawn, Karachi, October 19, 2005, www.dawn.com
21
Ibid.,
22
ITO, Takatoshi, The Japanese Economy, Combrige MIT, Press, Tokyo,
1992, p.44
SOUTHEAST ASIA: IMPACT OF
SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
Naureen Memon
Introduction
The name for the region— Southeast Asia was first coined in the
20th century. It was previously known as ‘ Further India’ as
opposed to the Indian subcontinent. The Southeast Asia consists
of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
The Southeast Asian islands are one of the major source of world
petroleum supplies; the region is also a center for logging.
Southeast Asia has experienced great economic growth since the
1980s; Singapore was one of the four original "East Asian Tigers"
and in recent years Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand have often been considered a new brood of "tigers".
Tiger refers to the rapid growth of these economies. Much of this
growth has been driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) in local
industries; the money came from the U.S. and Japan and later
from international investment portfolios. This growth was
effected badly by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which
occasioned a period of more cautious, slower growth.1
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (66)
It was expected that the end of the Cold War will bring peace to
the world. Unfortunately, the miserable events in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and many more
shattered that hope by posing the most serious danger to national
and international stability.3 Particularly, Southeast Asia
experienced a number of separatist movements and conflicts. For
instance, Moro’ s conflict in the Philippines, Aceh movement in
Indonesia, and Muslim separatist movement in provinces of
Pattani, Yala, and Narithiwat in Southern Thailand. The demands
of these movements range from socio-economic and political
rights to regional autonomy to secession and independence. Some
of the more serious conflicts have witnessed human rights abuse,
created large number of refugees, and generated complex political
and humanitarian emergencies.2
The province of Aceh, rich in natural resources (oil and gas) and
with a population of around 5 million is located on the northern
part of Sumatra. Since Aceh was a Sultanate and not under Dutch
colonial rule, the Acehnese claim that it should not have been
included in the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. During the
Soeharto era, as a result of the unequal distribution of revenue
earned from the exploitation of the natural resources of this
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (68)
Conclusion
who live on the islands carry guns with them at all times. More
than a few underpaid police and military officers supplement their
incomes by selling their own ammunition. Kidnappings of tourists
for ransom or for media attention by separatist groups have
become more common. Piracy is also a growing concern in the
waters off the Philippines. Many of the countries in Southeast
Asia are oil producers who rely heavily on secure shipping lanes
for their oil tankers.
References
1 Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org
2 Ganguly, Rajat and Macduff, Ian (eds.), Ethnic Conflict & Secessionism in
South & Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions, Sage Publications Pvt.
Ltd., New Delhi, 2003, p.16.
3 www.answers.com/topics/separatism
4 Ganguly, Rajat and Macduff, Ian (eds.), op.cit., p.11.
5 Haseman, John B., “Indonesia: A Difficult Transition to Democracy”,
in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek (eds.), Asian Security
Handbook: Terrorism and the New Security Environment, M.E.Sharpe, Inc.,
Armonk, New York, 2005, p. 130.
6Abuza, Zachary, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder Co. U.S.A. 2005, pp.65-68.
7 Haseman, John B., op.cit., pp. 131-132.
8 Wincek, David G., “Thailand: Resurgent Extremism and Other
Murtaza G. Khoso
Introduction
This paper will examine Japan’ s early UN Policy and also the
Security Council issue in its United Nations policy. The paper also
examined why Japan deserves the seat in the United Nations
Security Council and why its neighbors oppose Japan’ s bid.
diplomacy has been far from UN centric’ .5 This view has been
shared by some in the US and in the international community to
the extent of labeling Japan a” free rider” of multilateral
institutions from GATT to the United Nations.6
the phrase used in 1993 when the government for the first time
went public with the bid for permanent Security Council
membership, and before it was forced by domestic opposition to
revert to the reference of the Constitution in 1994.
finality.
Japan’
s foreign and security policy in the 1980s was very much
shaped by Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-7). While being a
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (92)
Nakasone later confirmed himself his interest in the bid and the
deletion of the enemy clauses in an interview with his former
Foreign Ministry secretary:
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (93)
expenditures.26
It is not clear where the idea for this new category of a permanent
Security Council member had come from, but it was an idea which
had been floating in the UN reform debates since the 1950s. 36 It is
strongly reminiscent of the American proposal of ‘ quasi UN
membership’(that is without voting rights) between 1953 and
1954 to overcome Soviet opposition to the admission of 14
Western countries to the UN. In 1954, Japan (together with Korea
and Jordon), had finally accepted such a compromise despite
strong initial objection to such a second class status and fear of
delaying full membership.37 It is not also clear what exactly was
meant by ‘ quasi’permanent Security Council membership, but
almost likely it was to mean that certain countries would be
continuously on the Security Council, thus not applying Article 23,
para.2. This, however, would also have required a revision of the
UN Charter. In its opinion to the Secretary General in 1972,
Canada refers to such semi-permanent members.38 Wherever
Nakasone and his advisers had picked up the idea, it was soon
abandoned since Nakasone’ s successors were not very interested
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (97)
During the period from 1960s to the end of the 1980s, the
confrontation between the East and the West and Japan’ s US
focused bilateralism did not allow an open and explicit candidature
for a permanent Security Council seat. At the same time, these
factors did not prevent the pursuit of policies which not only kept
the issue alive, but actually prepared the ground for pursuing an
open candidature for the time when circumstances would be
judged more conducive, as Ohira had put it already in 1964. These
policies were aimed at making Japan a major UN member and at
setting into motion a movement resulting in the review and
ultimately revision of the Charter. These policies were general
enough to find early on a broad consensus in the bureaucracy. At
the same time, there were always bureaucrats and political leaders
willing to promote the bid in a more explicit way. However, the
two highest ranking politicians who were keenest on a permanent
Security Council as well as on the deletion of the enemy clauses,
Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi and Prime Minister Nakasone, were
after all too much involved in their bilateralist agenda to invest
more efforts in promoting the bid. Despite these ups and downs,
one can assume from interviews that, some time during the mid
80s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had achieved some consensus
about the two goals of making Japan a major UN member and
pursuing Charter revisionism to be no longer an end in itself with
some vague hope of permanent membership in the distant future,
but to obtain a seat in the not too distant future. However, it
would take until 1989-90 before the means to do so were agreed
upon.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (98)
TABLE –1
Ratio between Members of the United Nations
and Members in the Security Council
Non–
UN Security Permanent
Year permanent
Members Council Members
Members
1945 51 11 5 6
1965 115 15 5 10
1996 185 15 5 10
2004 191 15 5 10
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/un/reform/index.html).
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (99)
TABLE –2
Geographical Distribution of
the Security Council Seats
Number of
Number Number of
Non–
Regional Group of Permanent
permanent
Countries seats
seats
Asia 48 2 1 (China)
Africa 53 3 0
Central and Latin 33 2 0
America
Western Europe and 27 2 3 (US,
others UK,
France)
Eastern Europe 20 1 1 (Russia)
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/un/reform/index.html).
At the moment, the United Nations Security Council has only five
permanent members, the so called P-5, and the Security Council is
represented by the major victors of the World War II. These P-5
members are the United States of America, Great Britain, Russia,
France and China. There is no great difference among the
permanent members when it comes to using their veto power to
push the deliberations of the Security Council in a direction that
suits them. For example, the real reason for China’ s 1999 veto of
an extension of the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia is
widely regarded as having been Macedonia’ s establishment of
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And in 2002 Washington used
its veto to prevent the International Criminal Court for having
jurisdiction over cases involving US soldiers.
and other countries like Britain, France and Germany have been
proposing.
Since the year 2005 will also make an important juncture as the
fifth anniversary of the Millennium Summit, it would be possible
to characterize the 2005 Summit as an opportunity to review the
progress towards achievement of the agenda set forth in the
Millennium Declaration adopted at the 2000 Summit. It would
thus offer a natural way of creating a political opportunity to give
momentum for progress towards the goal of strengthening the UN
particularly toward the reform of the Security Council, which was
stressed in the Millennium Declaration.
Although the United States has publicly voiced support for Japan’ s
candidacy to become a permanent Security Council member, it is
widely believed to be reluctant to expand the membership because
it could make consensus-building harder. Some argue that the
United States does not want any expansion in the UN Security
Council. John Bolton, the ambassador of the United States of
America to the UN remarked, “If I were doing the Security
Council today, I had only one permanent member (the US)
because that is the real reflection of the distribution of power in
the world.43 The critics further argue that the United States will
not participate in an institution whose purpose is to limit its
power.44
There are few reasons for Japan to seek a permanent seat on the
Security Council: first to secure greater say in international
politics, second to transform the United Nations from a post
World War II organization to an organization befitting the 21st
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (104)
Opposition by Neighbours
Not only China but all Japanese East Asian neighbors are
considering Japan’ s bid for becoming a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council very seriously, because of Japan’ s
mistreatment to the region before and during the World War II.
North Korea clearly opposed Japan’ s bid through a letter to the
UN Secretary General Kofi Anan by their ambassador to the UN
Pak Gil Yon. The North Korean ambassador called Japan’ s bid a
military threat to the region.51 “Japan’s permanent membership of
the UN Security Council can not be tolerated at all as it
contravenes the main mission of the United Nations, considering
its past crimes against humanity, today’ s revival of its militarism
and threats to neighboring countries”, Pak Gil Yon further wrote
in his letter.52
Though South Korea and Japan not only both are frontline allies
in the region but also are partners in their efforts to end the North
Korean nuclear programme but South Korea never compromised
with Japan on its past atrocities and continued diplomatic struggle
in order to force Tokyo for an official apology. South Korean
President Roh Moo Hyun urged Japan to consider making a fuller
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (108)
Japan not only beware of the Koreans for its bid but also hardly
needs healthy relations with China in order to receive Chinese
support both in General Assembly as well as in the Security
Council.
Conclusion
References
1 Views of the Government of Japan on the Equitable Representation on and
Law, prepared for the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, Japan and
the United Nations , Manhatan Publishing Co., New York, 1958, p.17.
8 Ibid., Chapter 11.
9 Koji Sato, “The Pursuit of the Principle International Cooperation in the
pp.57-58.
12 Ibid., p.81.
13 “Defining UN Security Role Problematic for Japan”, The Japan Times,
October 20, 1990.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (112)
14 Interview conducted by Reinhard Drifte the author of Japan’ s Quest for a
Permanent Seat on the UNSC:A Matter of Pride or Justice, MacMillan Press, London,
2000, p.20.
15 The Diplomatic Theses and Documents of Dr Morinosuke Kajima, Tokyo, Japan
February 6, 1993.
22Quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japan’ s Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC: A
Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.48.
23 Ibid., p.48.
24 The Japan Times, May 9, 1985 and Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1985.
25 Ibid.
26 Interview with Nakasone Yasuhiro by ambassador Hasegawa, February 6,
1993 quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japan’ s Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC:
A Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.49.
27 Robert Immerman, “Japan in the United Nations”, in Craig Garby and Mary
Brown Bullock (eds), From Japan: A New Kind of Super Power?, Woodrow Wilson
Centre Press, Washington DC, 1994, p.188.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (113)
28 “A Greater UN Role for Japan”, The Japan Times, Oct 29, 1986. On
Address by the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the 59th session of the
49
Introduction
For the most part, the Madurese who came in West Kalimantan
bring their old traditions and customs, such as carrying sharp
weapons, murdering, stealing, robbing and forcing their will on
others. In cities, for example, if a potential passenger does not
want to ride on one of their pedicabs, water taxies or minivans, he
is pulled, shoved, and threatened with a knife.
Four years after the earlier out break in 2001, there are still an
estimated 40,000 Madurese refugees living in wretched conditions
in ‘temporary’ camps in west Kalimantan’ s provincial capital
Pontianak.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (124)
• Cultural differences;
• Unfair competition;
• Gangsterism and criminality;
• Very centralized policies of the central government;
• Uneven, unfair social- economic structure and competition,
and
• The inability and powerlessness of the local apparatus
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (125)
Faced with grassroots Dayak and Malay community who are lower
class and almost uneducated , the substitution of hatred became
easier and proceeded smoothly , and even was utilized by society
leaders and political elite of the local community in WK and CK,
for the pursuit of narrow economic and political interests .
Recommendations
Conclusion
References
1 Chris Wilson, Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and
2001, p.45
7 Sachdeva and Gupta, “A Simple Study of Sociology”, Students Welfare
8 Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryans Turner, The Penguin Dictionary
of Sociology , Penguin, London, 1996, p.63
p.41
10 http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/Kalimantan.htm
11 http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/Kalimantan.htm
12 http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/Kalimantan.htm
13 http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/Kalimantan.htm
14 http://www.downtoearth.org.in/default.asp?foldername =20010531
p.25
17Parsudi Suparlan, “Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Indonesia”, KULTUR,
Volume I, Number 2, 2001, p.50
18 Alqadrie, Syarif Ibrahim, Cultural Differences and Social Life Among the Three
Samreen Fatima
Introduction
The paper points towards the secret and open intensions of USA,
which she tried to achieve after acquiring control over post war
Japan and Japanese response in consequence. The role of bipolar
politics is of critical importance, which had indirectly contributed
to the recovery of Japan. As Kenneth Waltz adds that “Politics is
pre-eminently the realm of unintended and unexpected
consequences… one is powerful to the extent that he affects others
more than they affect him”.6 During 1948, the American attitude
gradually changed as cold war developed in Europe and
Koumantang crumbled in China, they felt the need for a strong
ally in Southeast Asia and began to encourage Japanese economic
recovery. An analysis of the facts and the way occupation was
conducted is also included here. An historical perspective of the
politico-economic survey that provides an insight of U.S personal
interest for which it had long been aspiring for, will rationalize U.S
degree of involvement under the shield of Allied occupation of
Japan. It will also explain that the occupation of Japan was in all
respect an American Undertaking.7
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (135)
Historical Perspective
Up to the first war 1914, USA was adhering strictly to the policy
of isolation and resorted to same policy soon after the end of
First World War. This state of affairs continued on the whole till
the outbreak of World War-11 in 1939 and even some times after
that. Second World War introduced a new phase of US foreign
policy when Japanese forces attacked on Pearl harbour, brought
America on the forefront and become responsible in enhancing its
influence in the whole world particularly in the Asia Pacific via
Japan. Mean while the European war had become a truly global
war.
The 1st centres of the interest were Samarai in the South Pacific
and Hawaii in the mid Pacific. Here American concern was
mainly naval since possession of the base in Soma would provide a
screen for the protection of an Isthamaran canal, a project that
had figured in American Political and military thinking since the
middle of the century. “Hawaii was of greater and moral lasting
importance”too.15 In fact U.S interest in the islands goes back to
the early part of the 19th century, while vessels began to put into
there for water and supplies mostly latter. Traders and
missionaries also followed these passages. To further these
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (139)
“Both the super powers, the United States and Soviet Union along
with China and Japan were vitally interested in the politics and
economic potential of the region”. In terms of bipolar politics U.S
was apprehended of U.S.S.R while U.S.S.R of the United States
and both could not permit Beijing to bring the states of Far East
and Southeast Asia into a subservient relationship as China had
done previously. Since this victory would have enlarge the
parameters of communist power generally and China’ s power
particularly. In fact the whole Asia was full of potential and
energetic resources. Particularly United States could not permit
communists to gain influence in Southeast Asia, besides this
security concern, a communist dominance might have deprived the
rest of the world, largely unexploited, immense and precious
minerals and oil deposits of the area, in addition to denying as easy
access from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.
This was and really is a matter Japanese vital interest. Since Japan’
s
power was and is based on economy, industrial and technological
power’ s survival depends on her trade and transport of oil and raw
materials from the Middle East, Africa, India, and Southeast Asia
as well. In addition Japan dispatch her finished goods to the
markets of all these areas and in European markets through
Southeast Asian sea lanes, obviously involving American interest
as well, since is Japan is the strategic partner and ally of America
since 1952. It is also worth noting that at any time have is a
Japanese tanker or fighter almost every one hundreds nautical
miles in the Indian Ocean area.
Conclusion
The occupation of Japan can easily divided into three phases, each
was essential for Japanese development and fulfilment of
American interest in the Pacific. During the first phase (1945-
1947) Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (ACAP) attempted
to demilitarized and democratize Japan.” The Second phase is
called, as an economic revitalization phase (1947-50) in which
Japan was developed as the workshop of Asia and all efforts were
made to promote Japan’ s product in world markets, in order to
boost its economy. The third phase was pushed by the extension
of Cold War in Asia.
When in 950, the war in Korea was started and America felt
essential to remilitarize Japan. Therefore remilitarization phase
started from (1950- 1952). Since then, Japan is continuously under
the pressure of America to share American responsibilities in the
region. However whatever the interest of America behind its
undertaking of Japanese undertaking, may be, the fact is that it
resulted in rapid modernization, great power status for Japan and
international recognition of these accomplishments. “Soon after
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (142)
The Japanese alliance with USA meant that Japan felt well
protected and was therefore able to invest in industry that would
otherwise have gone on armaments. For American interest, an
economically healthy Japan was vital for providing strong bulwark
against communist in Southeast Asia. Therefore Japanese goods
were allowed into American markets on favourable terms and the
USA supplied aid and new equipment. Profits from export were
fully utilized, as a result Japanese goods (motorcycles, cars,
televisions and hi-fi equipments and ships were therefore highly
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (143)
It is probably true that the United States could not have agreed to
a peace treaty of such a generous nature if it had not also received
military bases.”The containment of communist influence in East
Asia and Southeast Asia was the major driving force for US
interest. The start of Korean War on June 25, 1950 further
enhanced the geo- strategic significance of Japan and accelerated
mutual security arrangement between Japan and the United States.
The American bases in Japan were also to be used for protecting
South Korea and Taiwan. Under Article -111 of peace many
Japanese islands i.e. Benin, Ryakyu and Okinawa were put under
the American Jurisdiction.
References
1William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21st Century,
Wardsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont, 2001, p.364.
3 Parkash Chandra, International Politics, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1979, p.6.
4Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th
ed, Knopf, New York, 1973, p.28.
5 Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, Smith, New York,
1936, 1950.
7 W.G. Beasely, The Modern History of Japan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1963, p.280.
8William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21st Century,
Wardsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont, 2001, p.7.
9 Ibid.
p.xiii.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (145)
14 D.R. Sardesai, South East Asia: Past and Present, 2 nd edition, West View Press,
1989, p.3.
15 Ibid.
Dr Saifullah Joyo
The “Silk Road”which is dated back to more than 2,000 years ago
is also a historical testimony of traditional economic and cultural
exchanges between China and Central Asia. The “Silk Road”also
testifies to the great contributions that China and Central Asia
have made to the development of world civilizations. The “Silk
Road”, which has now been revived at the dawn of the 21st
century, is likely to exert greater impact on Central Asia.
China shares the largest border with Central Asia and Russia.
Three out of five successor states to the former Soviet Union in
Central Asia, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share
more than 3,000 km border with China.2 Their independence has
drastically reduced China’ s common borders with Russia,
especially in Northwest China. It has also created a large buffer
between China and Russia. It has so happened because, sixty
percent of Sinkiang’s (China) 15 million population are: Uighurs
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (147)
At the end, we can say that there are two aspects of Central Asia’
s
independence for China — positive and negative. The positive
impacts can be seen for example, in the following:
in Sinkiang.
References
1 “Tashkend Defied Communism to Keep its Traditions Intact–IV”, The
Pakistan Times, Mid Week, July 14, 1992.
2 Kazakhstan has 1,700 km of common border with China, Kyrgyzstan about
1,000 km, and Tajikistan has more than 400 km.
3 The News International, 21 April, 1994, p.8.
4 Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds.), Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders:
Chinese and Russian Perspective of the Central Asian Conundrum, Macmillan Press
Ltd., London, p.88, (here after cited, Zhang and Azizian, Ethnic challenges
beyond borders).
5Joyo Saifullah, Post Soviet Central Asia: An Analysis of Internal Conditions and
External Relations – A Case Study of Uzbekistan, Area Study Centre for Russia,
China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar, 2000, p.357.
6Keith Martin, “China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and suspicion”,
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.25, 1994, p.29.
7 Liz Fuller, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 80, 27 April 1994.
8Tariq Aqil, “Kazakhstan: A Role in Euro–Asian Security”, The News on Friday,
31 March 1995, p.33.
9 Zhang and Azizian, Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders, op.cit., p.183.
10 Qaisrani Shahnawaz, The Newly Independent Republics of Central Asia: An
Overview, Central Asian Culture and Trade Foundation, The Netherlands, 1993,
p.80
11 “China and Central Asia”, The Economist, 23 April 1994
CHINA’
S ENERGY PROBLEM
Growing Demand
The year 2004 saw many coal–fired power plants in China sound
the alarm bell of running out of coal, and 22 provincial areas
imposed brownouts due to power shortage. China produced 170
million tons of crude oil in 2004 and imported about 100 million
tons of crude and refined oil.4
Energy Inefficiency
China has been obtaining oil from Russia via train but this is
expensive and only allows limited supply. Similarly its bid to build
a pipeline to access east Siberian oil has been frustrated. Beijing
has been competing with Japan to obtain Moscow’ s blessings for
two alternative pipeline proposals. China’ s proposed route is 2400
kms and will cost $2.5 billion. Ending at Daqing city, it will serve
the Chinese market only. Japan’ s proposal is 3900 kms. long route
and will cost two to three times the cost of the Chinese route, but
it is backed by $7.2 billion worth of Japanese finance. The pipeline
is to end in the port city of NakhodKa, on Russia’ s Far-East coast
and theoretically can serve markets other than Japan. Japan has
won the deal though it proposes to build an even longer pipeline
to accommodate a branch to Daqing (city of China).20
Conclusion
Even after taking into account the social costs of coal–fired power
generation, and ignoring the substantial environmental concerns
about massive nuclear and hydroelectric development, China’ s
abundant coal reserves ensure that most alternatives are simply
more expensive per unit of power produced. In fact, the only
sizeable and affordable alternatives to coal over the medium term
are oil and natural gas, primarily from imported sources.21
China consumes about 150 million tons of oil a year and its
production capacity is estimated to be about 200 million tons a
year in 2020. With increased automobile use, oil demand is likely
to grow somewhat faster than overall energy demand, so oil
import could easily reach 300 million tons a year in 2020.
Although the cost of these imports at current prices ($42 billion)
will be less than 5% of China’s expected export earnings of $700
billion.
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (162)
References
1 China’
s Energy: A Forecast to 2015 China Energy Data Book, p.1
2 Xinhua News Agency Article, January 6, 2005
3 Ibid
4Hamilton Tyler, China’
s Energy Leap’The Toronto Star, Canada, February 9,
2005, p.2
5 bid, p.3
6 Santhanam K., Palli Konda, Asian Security and China 2000— 2010 New Delhi,
2004, p.2
11 Asian Security and China, op. cit. p.73
12 Ibid
13 Eva Cheng, op.cit. p.3
14 Radio Free Asia, “China’
s West — East Pipeline Highlights Energy
Problems”. www.rfa.orp
15 Ibid
16 World Bank Report 1997
17 “Asian Security and China”, op. cit, p.487
18 Ibid
19 Ibid. p.488
20 Eva Cheng, op. cit. p.3
21 World Bank Report 1997
EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS
IN INDONESIA: AN OVERVIEW
Jamila Jarwar
In 1942, the Japanese army and navy captured the East Indies,
ousted the Dutch colonist, and ruled the territory until the
Japanese themselves were defeated by Allied troops in late
1945.following the Japanese surrender, the Dutch returned to
reclaim the region. However, on August 17, 1945, the indigenous
peoples of the archipelago declared their independence and then
fought the Dutch army over the next four years until the won
uncontested self-rule at the close of 1949.
Such ethnic and linguistic variety has posed problem for both
political leaders and educator s. the question of what language
would best serve as national tongue, unifying the many sub
societies, was settled when independence was declared in 1945. the
republic’ s leaders choose a version of Malay as the official
language and labeled it Indonesian has been leaned willingly by
virtually everyone. It has served as the language of government, of
mass communication, and of instruction at all educational levels
above the second grade of primary school. Local languages have
been the media of instruction in the first two primary grades and
have been taught as subjects in upper grades. Such a pattern of
instruction is designed to promote the national motto of “unity in
diversity” (bhinneka tunggal lka). This language policy has faced
educators with special problems in textbook production, teacher
training, and teacher placement.
The growth of higher education over the 30-year period from 1950
was even more dramatic than that of primary and secondary
schooling. Since private schools were not obliged to send statistics
to either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Religion, the
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (168)
In the early 1950s, after the Republic had emerged from four years
of Japanese military occupation followed by the four year
revolution against the Dutch, the nation suffered an acute shortage
of teachers. Not only had the existing supply of teachers been
depleted by the social upheaval of the latter 1940s, but the nation
was now seeking the entire population rather than the minority
served during colonial times.
References
1 Postlethwaite T N, Thomas R.M, Schooling in the ASEAN Religion. Pergamon,
4 Thomas R.M, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education: The First Half Century
C O N T R I B U T O R S
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah, Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh.
Firdous Nilofer, Associate Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh.
Altaf Hussain Ansari, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East
& South East Asia, University of Sindh
Jamila Jarwar, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East & South
East Asia, University of Sindh.
Ghulam Murtaza Khoso, Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Naureen Nazar, Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro.