EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC,

INC., Respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law."chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as

follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA. chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.

8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON chanroble s virt ual law li bra ry

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa

Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US

Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-
0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above

reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of

publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the

issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether
or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this

case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent

endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction.
For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of
law?

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make
issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the
IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services). chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of

this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal services. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services

to the public, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because
this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be

traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent -
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like
a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the
term medical clinic connotes doctors. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the

advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that
it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from
Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain
as to the nature of the service or services being offered. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering
"legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal
services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services"
and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of
the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the

performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public
policy.chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the

advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . . chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual la w libra ry

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a

marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a

man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that

the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law,
by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At
the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for
the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements

such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a
cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications
for a marriage license.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily

be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend
to the place where the crime is committed. chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"

respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from

causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any
other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering
some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from
offering such services to the public in general. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal

research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should
not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct
of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be

better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even
if both are (equal) in skill. c hanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow
or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the
protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to

perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent
would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and
which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar
may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings
because of the factual considerations involved. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's

services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on
which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law. chan roble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed

exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But

nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation,
and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

 xxx xxx xxx. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but
includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39). chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual la w libra ry

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the

practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in
it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association: chanrob les vi rtual law libra ry

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the

issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but

also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and

punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized
practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It

claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5
of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on

Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and
such other related laws.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the

aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto,
the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle: chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount

consideration should be given to the protection of the general public
from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-

year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law. chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an

aid to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions,
courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now
be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in
the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide
to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in
the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected

from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration,
visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name - The
Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions

of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave
an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines: chanroble s virtual law lib rary

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to

solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the
above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country. chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an

advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral
in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the
public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other

countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable. c han roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project

that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they

could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this
country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such
as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run
by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law
does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law - accurate or inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has
been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
chanroblesvi rt uala wlibra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized

profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider

his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the
path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the
law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building
the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills. chan roblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the

employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation before the
agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974],
at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a

lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that: chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-

legal problem;. cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtua l law lib rary

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to

members of the bar; . chanroblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

virtua l law lib rary
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any

particular client as a whole. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code
of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct: chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or

occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
libra ry
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render

wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles virtua l law lib rary

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,

absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and
"B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines
on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take. chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving

information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated
or readily identified person in a particular situation - in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly

non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that
if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for
the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give

the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of

law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt u al law lib rary

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires

the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It

includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally

engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice
and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a

lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is
also practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17One who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it,
is, to that extent, practicing law. 18 cha nroble s virtual law l ib rary

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the

doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as: chanroble s virtual law lib rary

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the

application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on

court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St.
23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising

person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association

v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation

in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of

work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill,
a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in

and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at
bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
chanroble s virt ual law l ibra ry

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support

services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information

by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the gathering, processing,
storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to
the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20 chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation

merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal

information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function
is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all
the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish
a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law
and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and
be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
libra ry
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal

Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along
U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend
in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who
cannot afford the services of the big law firms. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also.
They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take
your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on.
That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or

follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter
of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt

with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.

WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered

by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those

individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24 chanrob l es virt ual law li bra ry
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines
there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who
have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who,
by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26The justification for excluding from the practice of law those
not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar
from competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27
chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position

that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that
this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As

admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal
Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of
paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited

acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law
are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30chanroble s virtual l aw lib rary

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in

the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,

the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return
for, publicity to attract legal business. 35Prior to the adoption of the
code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or
is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36 chanroble s virtual law lib rary
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law
is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs.
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant

violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best

advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product
of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.

The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41 cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists,

in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42 chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43chanro bles virtual law lib rary

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.

The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number
and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44 chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the

advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of

Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to
the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons
of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can
be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at
bar.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar

Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately
by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of
utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain
the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,

subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is
the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or

illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained
to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly
not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in
the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who
can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virt u al law lib rary

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which
is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B"
of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides: jg c:chan roble s.com. ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years."
(Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office. chan roble s virtual lawl ibra ry

Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles .com.p h

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public
service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."chanrobles vi rt ual lawli bra ry

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am
quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for
at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority
of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
[West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image
and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). chan roble s.com:c rala w:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept
of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and
the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more
legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least some
legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will
shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types —
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-
policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or
a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and
type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a
staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
chan roble s v irtua lawlib rary chan roble s.com:ch anro bles. com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved
in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the
Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management responsibilities; and
(3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing.
The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle
of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems
— physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.
In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. chanrob les lawl ibra ry : redna d

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate activities,
he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to
grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4). chanrobles law lib rary : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis
supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted
to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A
good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: chanroble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . .
. (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution
which provides: jgc: chan robles .com.p h

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice."
. . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice
is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how
can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified,
how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown. chanroble s lawlib ra ry : rednad

Additionally, consider the following: c hanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer
is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." cra law virtua1aw li bra ry

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-
hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what
had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch
his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit
of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ib rary

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof,
be confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not
only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting
for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the
Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess
the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior
to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority
of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active,
habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,

enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It
states:jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such
as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law
(U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in
the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected,
`all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."cralaw vi rtua1aw lib rary

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior
to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There
are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our review. chan roble s virtual law lib rary

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to
choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one
does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation." cra law virt ua1aw lib ra ry

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and
he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or
government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He
can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts
involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility
vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . .
in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The
decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed
in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law
whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional
Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year
period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of
his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully
vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind
on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. chanrob les law li bra ry

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience
in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are
not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in
the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is
stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have
been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to
the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate
choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission
on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the
Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer,
he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving
that advice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. chan robles lawlib rary : re dnad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the
age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is
useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly
assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use
of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which,
under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v.
Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in
People ex rel . Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901."
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).

For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to
the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

x x x

"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for
the parties during the twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked if it would
be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did not recall making the statement
to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall
exactly what was said.’ When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he
finally answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.’

x x x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that

x x x

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his
stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-
professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.’ Abb.
Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of law,
legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties
of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his
secrets confided to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law
Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to do or perform frequently,
customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaining; . . . to carry on in
practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.;
as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus,
we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary

x x x

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component
of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such
as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U
S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and
files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the
country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing
State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the
use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within
the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC
Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissents.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

December 3, 1948

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in

the 1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the
Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel
J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that
appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the
headline in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly
smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the
name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the
news item in full:
 Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the
law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject,
days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on
said subject fully one week before the tests.

The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually
given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university
holding proudly around the city.

The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the
Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the
leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of
those tests before the examinations.

The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the
heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the
University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come
into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr.
Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners
for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the
assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In
this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and
its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of
the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a
Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the
report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and
examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he
testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted
that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith
and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which
formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the
information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence
of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court
which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme
Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their
charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate
Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of
Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation
conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in
the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:

In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of
September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which
examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E.
Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of
the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive
the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news
item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were
taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new
chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for
the consideration of this Court.

From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and
consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have
given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated
appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable this Court to
conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to
authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the
interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources
of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the
revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr.
Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result.

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on
October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest
of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information
and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in
general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of
the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who
are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and
correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the
confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar
examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in
investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the
persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and
evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from
which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under
the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the
editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at
his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared,
accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence
of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before
this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the
Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of
which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of
Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report
or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that
such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does
interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel
contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53
means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only when National
Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or
sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the
Justice is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly
the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body
when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that
the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher,
editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be
compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section
1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the
author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee
— "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said
clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various
Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such
exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be
committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto
amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the
Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may
be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the
names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a
newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He
argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a
vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the
phrase "public interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and
substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too
elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in
the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases
involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last
amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the
state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations
on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably
by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended
by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator
Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest
of the State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee
and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the
exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the
Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two
phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of
objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the
second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft
of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he
meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase
"interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public
safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The
phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where
it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section
10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Title I, — Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes
against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2,
and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682
creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine
Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it
could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public
safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not
do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and
that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception
when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and
broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest"
which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for
instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks,
markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and
does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations, not
only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is
interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of
justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law
or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the
three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of
their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court
takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed
the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar
examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination
candidates who are found to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to
practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the
Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the
Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to
the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of
this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral
character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by
passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great
demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most
popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and
colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one
important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of
the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments
of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and
general interest and national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get
into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof
some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted
to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members
of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would
not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose
confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court
to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom
he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and
adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had
succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations
illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees
who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations
and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be
under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those
who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the
morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later
preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born
the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not
difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the
Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent
lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of
Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or
more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made
possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the
questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court
itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion,
as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the
members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these
considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to
fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not
only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal
profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee
of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections
with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the
three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court,
we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of
the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the
investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.)
As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his
informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication
already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, informants,
law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the
alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If
those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with
expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a
newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished
or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead
of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination
questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a
certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements
and answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were
involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No
one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day
of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions,
although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law
subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know
even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948,
approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for
each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the
eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying
these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two
hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said
ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded.
Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had
actually been committed, — evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged
copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or
subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of
or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the
7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the
answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart
from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings
and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of
evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to
conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the
identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid
and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges
contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or
foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of
his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on
which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean
and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for
membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who
cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting
the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law.
These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the
charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack
of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this
Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and
cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly
committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties,
if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to
the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every
examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the
correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the
examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to
understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the
examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge
and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his
correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees,
especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and
prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the
examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were
too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade
below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent
Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news
items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed
contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the
names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted
and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule
64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely
until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common
or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a
heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe
penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave,
and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this
Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a
period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:

The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify
conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal
to obey an order of this Court.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It
would protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in
the law should be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the
whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can
be gleaned in the Senate journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the
words in question, that can justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they
embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the state.

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts
within the ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude.
There is no legal basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a
minimum that, if given effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional
enactment. Such would be violative of the Constitution.

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the
Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide
area of public interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation
was pushed up to the place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No
one is authorized to push that line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the
state. We have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any
limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate
or in Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject
in the statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat
the legislative intent. There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and
wait for a more respective mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the
disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demand obedience for their effectiveness.
Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial
orders is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing
because it means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will
never allow such a thing to obtain.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive
department or without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress
functions only one third of the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation
does not suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is
more normalcy than during the Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment
of new laws cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in
the way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society without
some effective system of administration of justice, functioning without long interruptions.

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and
this Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should
mete out to all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or
favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to
disagree with the penalty imposed upon respondent.

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared
invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The provision of law applicable to respondent
is contained in section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum
not exceeding P1,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there
are mitigating circumstances that attenuate respondent's responsibility, — youthfulness, honest but
wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, — we should not impose
upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-
2781, the very one which, as can be gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of
Republic Act No. 53.

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to
reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him.
The penalty should be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the
discretion of the guilty one. His future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his
responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be
attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be undone.
These are verities no one can eloign.

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the
story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the majority, in good faith and
in a spirit of public service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants,
thereby enabling this Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to
"institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annual the
test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at least have tried to
secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to underscore is that newspaper reporters
should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in substantiating their truth. And if I am
constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my
opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 — which
this Court is bound to enforce — providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of
any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the
source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in
believing that the phrase "interest of the state," as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters
affecting the security or safety of the state.

In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto
provided for absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws, however, inserted an
amendment by adding the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest." Senator Sotto's attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the
remarks of the Chairman of the committee presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to
change the words "public interest" into "interest of the state," a proposal that was readily accepted.
Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.

Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state," as intended
by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the original intention of the author of the
bill was to provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated
by any subsequent exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the
deliberations of the lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing
Senator Sotto's advocacy of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator
Cuenco gave the example of a newspaperman who publishes an information regarding theft of plans
of forts and fortifications, in which case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes
mismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the
change of "public interest" to "interest of the state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as
to the essential difference between the two phrases, explained that "La diferencia esta en que puede
haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el
Estado y no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase `public interest' es muy elastica. En cambio, se se
pone `interest of the state,' claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, el
periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, it should be
noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of
the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of the
information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the
respondent, the security or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the
state" was intended to be limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and
fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely affect the security or safety
of the state.
It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national Security," or
"public security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" were interchangeably used in
the discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers
definitely knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey.
Conjectures cannot prevail over the clear legislative intent.

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the
main purpose of the law. This would further make the law more consonant with the spirit of the
constitutional provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise"(Article III,
section 1, paragraph 5), and that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press (Article
III, section 1, paragraph 8).

It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his information
does not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the
truth of the alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story in
question, to admit the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of
evidence or of the refusal of those who know to come out and testify.

In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election

Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing

that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this
regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school

records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a

notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to

the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the

Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements
for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino
mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a

Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic,
L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
 For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.

Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[B.M. NO. 1154 : June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR

EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs,
one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed

with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.

In the Petition , Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No.15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred

on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people.Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Courts Resolution2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling

filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez.Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated.Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the
acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word Attorney as they
were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the

OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:ςηα ñrοb lεš ν ιr† υαl l αω lιb rαrÿ

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed

against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous.He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor.In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending.Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character.Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly
by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case.What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus: ςηαñrοblε š νιr†υαl lαω lιb rα rÿ

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really
is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known.Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him

makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.5 ςrνll

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to
say:ςηαñrοblε š νιr†υαl lαω lιb rαrÿ

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters,
the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice

of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron
S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.As held
by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect
contempt of court.6 ςrνll

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to

take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event
that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.7 ςrνll

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the

OBC.Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations.This
renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is

not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.9ςrνll

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take

the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or
she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any
court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine

whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of
the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against
the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the
test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well

that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked.In Alawi v.
Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar.The respondent therein,
an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in
Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in
connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in
his private capacity.The Courtdeclared that: ςηαñrοbl εš νι r†υα l lαω lι brα rÿ

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts.While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney.The title
attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12 ςrνll

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such
as Meling in this case.The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein,
from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues
of honesty and integrity.Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity
to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of
law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the

imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in

the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as
a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the
dispositive portion of which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby
resolves to —

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos
& Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the
said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which
identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of
Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in
the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the
petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to
become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the
same in order to pay tribute to his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of
rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he
was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City.
During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the
President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he
spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the
holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to
excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in
Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a
Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free
legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law
Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed.
Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow
Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he
was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar
Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather
unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a
consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the
Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner
concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised
the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he
cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also,
he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar
examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling
experience to make him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements
of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:

1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De
Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to
be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran
ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik
sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast
People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;

3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek,
Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang
Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;

4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado"
dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
 5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of
the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses
and Llantino Law Offices;

6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly

Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G.
Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);

8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang

Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig
Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of
Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City,
Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and
for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);

10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of
Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of
Law, San Sebastian College – Recoletos;

11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G.
De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight,
Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National
High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;

12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and

14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice,
Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness
and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually
foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with
the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V.
De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a
judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we
do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent
attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our
compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to
exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be
applied in the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No.
2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years
when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising
future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested
to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the
community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense
desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several
social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could
be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending
his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of
character and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination questions from Atty.
Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out
to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all
commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that
his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that
petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as
proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition

for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which
suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence,
petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner
1avvphi 1.zw+

worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the
practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2 While the Court
is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when
the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on
the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his
public life during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.6

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in
allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since
his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted
long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards
public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by
his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval
and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his
positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to
reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is
warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is
hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 000 July 18, 1975

IN RE: PEDRO A. AMPARO (1974 Bar Candidate), petitioner,

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Pedro A. Amparo of Guindulman, Bohol filed a petition to take the 1974 Bar examinations. This
petition was granted.
In the afternoon of December 1, 1974 he was at his assigned seat no. 17, room 401, fourth floor,
Manuel L. Quezon University Building on R. Hidalgo, Manila. The Bar examination that afternoon
was in Criminal Law.

While the examination was in progress, the headwatcher in room 401, Lilian Mendigorin, reported
that examinee Amparo was found reading, at approximately 3:15 o'clock, a piece of paper containing
notes in Criminal Law. He at first refused to surrender the paper, but later gave it to Mendigorin
when she threatened to report the matter to the authorities. A verbal report was relayed to the Bar
Chairman who forthwith gave instructions that no investigation be then made in order to forestall any
commotion that might disturb the other candidates. Amparo was permitted to continue answering the
questions. Headwatcher Mendigorin thereafter submitted a special report on the incident.

On the following day, Clerk of Court Romeo Mendoza filed a formal report. Acting thereon, the
Court en banc, on December 3, 1974, unanimously resolved "to disqualify Pedro Amparo from taking
the Bar examinations still to be given, namely, in the subjects of Remedial Law and Labor and Social
Legislation, on Sunday, December 8, 1974, without prejudice to allowing him to take the Bar
examinations after this year."

In a letter dated December 5, 1974, Amparo requested that "before final action is or becomes
effective" he "be given a chance to explain" his side. On December 5, 1974 the Court reconsidered
its prior resolution and allowed Amparo to take the Bar examinations on the coming Sunday,
December 8, 1974, without prejudice to further action by the Court after a formal and more detailed
investigation of the incident.

As ordered, the Clerk of Court conducted an investigation on December 9, 1974 at which the
respondent Amparo (a) appeared in his own behalf, (b) cross-examined the witnesses against
him.(c) presented himself as his own witness, and (d) presented as his witnesses three Bar
candidates who in the afternoon of December 1 were seated near him in the examination room.

At the investigation, headwatcher Mendigorin identified Amparo as the Bar examinee whom she saw
reading a piece of paper inside the examination room in the course of the examination in Criminal
Law. The piece of paper, later marked as exhibit C, contains handwritten notes, on both sides, on
the durations of penalties and a formula of computing them, particularly reclusion temporal.
Mendigorin testified that she approached Amparo and asked for the piece of paper; that he refused
and put the paper in his pocket; that when she approached him a second time, he fished the paper
from his pocket and gave it to her; that when, at the end of the examination period, Amparo
submitted his examination notebook, he told her that he really had intended to cheat. On cross-
examination, she elaborated that Amparo gave the piece of paper only when she told him that she
would bring the matter up to higher authority.

Vernon B. Vasquez, a watcher under headwatcher Mendigorin, corroborated the latter's testimony.
He declared that from a distance of five meters, he saw Amparo reading a piece of paper on his lap;
that he wanted to approach him but his headwatcher was already ahead of him; and that Amparo
thereupon placed the paper in his pocket, but when Mendigorin threatened to report the matter,
Amparo yielded exhibit C with a smile.

In his testimony, Amparo admitted having in his possession, in the course of the examination, the
piece of paper, exhibit C, explaining that because he was perspiring, he took his handkerchief from
his pocket, and out also came the piece of paper which fell to the floor; that the notes were not in his
handwriting as they were given by a friend, and that it was by accident that he picked up the paper to
find out what it was, as he had forgotten about it, but had no intention to use it; that while he was
reading it, the headwatcher saw him and demanded it from him, but he refused because he thought
that he might need it for "future reference," but when the headwatcher insisted as otherwise she
would report the matter to her supervisor, Amparo surrendered the paper. On cross-examination, he
declared that exhibit C had been in his pocket a long time before December 1; that he had not
changed his pants for three weeks; that when the first bell rang for the examination in Criminal Law,
he was required to put "all his things" out of the room; that he forgot about the paper inside his
pocket; that when he took out his handkerchief to wipe his perspiration, the paper fell to the floor,
and he wondered what it was and then recalled upon reading it that it had been given by a friend;
and that as he was reading it, "that diligent headwatcher came and asked for that paper." He further
admitted that he knew it is contrary to the rules to bring notes and books inside the examination
room.

Bar candidates Jovencio Fajilan, Norman M. Balagtas and Apolinario O. Calix, Sr., who were seated
near Amparo in room 401, were presented by the respondent as his witnesses, but all of them
professed lack of knowledge about the incident as they were engrossed in answering the
examination questions.

It is clear that Amparo, in the course of the examination in Criminal Law, had possession of the piece
of paper containing notes on the durations of penalties and that he knew that it is contrary to the
rules to bring notes and books inside the examination room. It thus results that he knowingly violated
Section 10, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that "Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms."

Amparo's impression that the notes had no "material use" to him is correct, in the sense that they
bore no reference to any question asked in the examination in Criminal Law; even so he committed
an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading the notes, His refusal to surrender the paper
containing the notes when first demanded; his eventual surrender of it only after he was informed
that he would be reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal Law and the
examination then in Criminal Law — all these override and rebut his explanation that he merely read
the notes to find out what they were as he had forgotten about them.

We find the respondent Amparo guilty of (1) bringing notes into the examination room and (2)
attempted cheating. According to the official report of the Bar Confidant, approved by the Court,
Amparo did not pass the 1974 Bar examinations.

ACCORDINGLY, it is the sense of the Court that Pedro A. Amparo should be as he is hereby
disqualified from taking the Bar examinations for the year 1975.

Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before
the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to
raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the
bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on
the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by
the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-
110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline
for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code
No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court
of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted
with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became
the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring
back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based
on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to
5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did
not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,

relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his

misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such

recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction
of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the
last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400)
which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
 number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me
to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as
I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low
grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as
it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I
re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with
the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his
name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade
card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international

law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met
him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained
as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
 5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening
at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did
not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when
I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661,
my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial
law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did
not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books
to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying
that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75% then he would make the general passing average.
 4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any
personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked
that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item
of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same
grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade
of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having
verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
 request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of
such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein

respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also
be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate
the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

 2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of
the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only
one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of
the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be

given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees
that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions
or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of
such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to

bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his

hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
 inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers
having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter
concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good
faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing
that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the
matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building
from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to

look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the
sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that
 is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even
in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from
1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant
up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-
Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these

incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of
whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the
said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to
their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of

the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting
and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but

with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
 (b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average
of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the
time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-
check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless
very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio

Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant
do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
 5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not
far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in
herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this

Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well
as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy
between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners
to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the
custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was
in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that
as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if
he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change
of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that
"they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law,
from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-
evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law
— that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then
the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision
of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of
his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or
decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make
the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned
to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is
84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias

ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971
Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing
of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the
records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and
confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only
66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee
failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark
and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The
averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
 BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him
by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative
data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to
the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave
injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said
re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of
good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to
why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO

RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO
FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of
these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of
the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of
the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing
the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613
(Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing
in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to
their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was
not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the
Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of
the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
 Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political
Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and
must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with
the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it,
the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from
the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the
City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally
to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in

withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of
the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments
against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the
court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member
of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was,
as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case.
Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar,
WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer
of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others,
of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack
of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro,
the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks
without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and
WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-
evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the
average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective
and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on
the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I
cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said
'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the
grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of

the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"

(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
 manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but
he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation
of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE
find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative
thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as
a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does
not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary
as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes,
Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on
April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to
him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a
loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00
was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not
push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965
to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during
the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode
or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed
by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor
of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956

VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car
was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his
1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or
tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent
Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the
money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came
from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the
matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January
15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house
and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once
it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets

and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as
they are part of the records of this Court.
B

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of
the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies
at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his
pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already
19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that
he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-
56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location
of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent
Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof
on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served
into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the
bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS

HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since
1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill
to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in
an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
 or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally
to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of
the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal
finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question
may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar
background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established
here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
 practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in
the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment
providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
 Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of
the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10
Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course
of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
 courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the
court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is
fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has
been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
 If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so.
Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as
is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place
of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service
of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary
to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability."
 But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now
holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind
the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting
the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending
its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he
offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
 he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned
date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for
two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it
is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
 therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal
Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve
as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation
to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must
be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its
aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered
 as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153

as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent
in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then
the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means
his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the
bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained
only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in
1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by
the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years
were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly
not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been
done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what
the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The
grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing
laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article
is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of
the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo
Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
 November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1
cent
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis
P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 55
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco
A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75
 August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 112
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates 2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 163
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates 2,555
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 100
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
V.
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
 68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
 104.
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
110.
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
115.
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
117.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
118.
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
120.
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
126.
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
131.
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
132.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
B.
 135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
138.
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
140.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
148.
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
151.
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
161.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
162.
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
165.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
167.
MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
168.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
171.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
173.
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
175.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
179.
MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
180.
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
182.
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
 201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
204.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
205.
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
206.
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
207.
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
210.
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213.
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
218.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Felicidad
MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
220.
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
221.
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
222.
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
226.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
227.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
 229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
233.
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
234.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
239.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
240.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
241.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
242.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
243.
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
244.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
245.
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
246.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
250.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
251.
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
252.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
255.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
257.
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
263.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
264.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
265.
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
266.
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
269.
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
276.
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
279.
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
280.
MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
281.
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
285.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
286.
 287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
288.
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
292.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
293.
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
295.
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
297.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
302.
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
303.
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
307.
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
313.
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
314.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
 315.
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
316.
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
319.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325.
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
336.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
337.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
338.
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
341.
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
 346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
350.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
351.
MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
352.
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
354.
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
356.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
364.
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
369.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
374.
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
375.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
376.
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
377.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
379.
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
380.
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
382. D.
MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
383.
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
386.
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
389.
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
390.
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
393.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
395.
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
399.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
400.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
 404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
409.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
410.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
411.
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
413.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
415.
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
416.
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
420.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
423.
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
426.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
427.
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
430.
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
431.
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
 432.
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
433.
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
434.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
443.
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
444.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Arellano
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
449.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
453.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
454.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
457.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
458.
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
459.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460.
 461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
462.
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
466.
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
468.
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
473.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
475.
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
477.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
479.
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
482.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
486.
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
488.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
 MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
491.
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
494.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
497.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498.
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
 5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
 MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A
list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those
who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in
the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74
per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those
who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the
Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16
immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled

to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any
other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with
a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.

xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In
other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since
the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to
the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
 Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than
that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general
average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically
and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite
of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this
is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group
of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant
a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No.
371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
 below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court
has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it
is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below
50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last
world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
 If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does
not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils
with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77
L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972
(many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from
the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate
amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the
discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of
applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to
determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a
general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades
lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the
Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per
cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration,
19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a
general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of
1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15,
1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the
Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and
this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set
by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946.
This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar
to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the
study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the
publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division
among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second
bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it
within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon
the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the
resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members
of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice
of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
 The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations
held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the
Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first
place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which
the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the
Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases,
do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process
and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No.
972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the
legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly
suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the
facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by
the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances
of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates
who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been
admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing
the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed,
when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of
69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14
of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing
the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we
are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of
office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public
interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be
more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression
of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may
not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only
hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
its entirety.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from
the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate
amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the
discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of
applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to
determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a
general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion
judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades
lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the
Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per
cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration,
19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a
general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of
1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15,
1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the
Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and
this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set
by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946.
This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar
to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the
study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the
publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division
among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second
bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it
within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the
1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act
No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate
petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon
the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the
resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members
of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice
of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court
and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations
held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the
Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first
place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which
the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the
Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases,
do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process
and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment,
does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due
process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be
that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No.
972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the
legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly
suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the
facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by
the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances
of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the
other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates
who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been
admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be
allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing
the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed,
when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of
69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or
more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14
of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948,
said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to
reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing
the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the
wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This
Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has
consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we
are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of
office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public
interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be
more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression
of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may
not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only
hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in
its entirety.