Article IX: Constitutional Commissions

A. Common Provisions

Section 1. Independent Commissions

1. Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003
In this case, by vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend,
and revise the IRR for RA 9189 otherwise known as the The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority
and trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.

2. Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005

Although constitutional agencies such as the Office of the Ombudsman has
the authority to appoint its officials in accordance with law, such law does not
necessarily imply that their appointment will not be subject to the Civil Service Law
and Rules. All matters pertaining to appointments are within the realm of expertise
to the Civil Service Commission, all laws, rules and regulations it issues on
appointments must be complied with.

Section 2. Prohibition on Members

Section 3. Salary

Section 4. Power to Appoint

Section 5. Fiscal Autonomy

1. CSC v. DBM, 482 SCRA 233
The Constitutional Commissions such as the CSC shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.” In this case, the “no report, no release” policy by the DBM
violates such constitutional provision and may not be validly enforced against
offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being “automatic” connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory.

Section 6. Promulgation of Rules

1. Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
(REPEATED CASE)
The COMELEC, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either
the executive or legislative departments of government. Only the COMELEC itself
can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by
the majority of its members, and such rules and regulations may be reviewed by
the Court only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

2. Sabili v. COMELEC, GR 193261, April 24, 2012

The COMELEC has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure,
invoking Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any
of its offices. In this case, COMELEC Order relative to the holding of the country’s
first Automated National Elections had necessitated the COMELEC to suspend the
rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all
resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.

Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions

Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions:

1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions

1. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

In this case, an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of bid does not come within the purview of a “final order” because
it was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
 of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections. Hence, said
resolution may not be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

2. Saligumba v. CA, 117 SCRA 669

This case is about Saligumba’s petition for review to the court after COA
dismissed his administrative complaint against Estrellas, asserting that she was
raped in many occasions. The power of the Court to review the decisions of the
COA only refer to money matters in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions
and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel in the
exercise of their administrative functions.

3. PTTC v. COA, 146 SCRA 190 (1986)

The two letters of the COA are not proper subjects of appeal and/or review
by this Court. The COA, in the said letters, did not decide the issue. It did not render
a decision, order or final award. It merely expressed an opinion. Hence, the COA
cannot render a “final order, decision or award” on the question of whether
petitioner should pay 1 ½ % or ½ % of franchise tax. This is not a matter falling
under the jurisdiction this Court.

4. Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582 (1987)

The Court held that the 2-1 decision by the First Division was a valid
decision under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three
members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also
valid under the constitutional provision.

5. Estrella v. COMELEC, GR No. 160465, May 27, 2004

The court abandoned the doctrine laid down in the case of Cua vs.
COMELEC and holds that the COMELEC en banc shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority of “all its members” and not majority of the members
who deliberated and voted thereon. The provision of the Constitution is clear that
decisions by the COMELEC en banc should be the majority vote of all its members
and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.

6. Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445 (1990)

The TSO Manager nor COA Chair had the power to render and promulgate
a decision for the Commission. Commissions are collegial bodies, the decisions
are made by the body and not by individual members of the body. No individual
member may make decision acting for the Commission.

7. Paredes v. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 653 (1984)

For the Court to exercise its power to review the rulings or findings of fact
of the Commission on Elections, such rulings or findings of fact be lacking in
arbitrariness. In this case, the COMELEC rendered its decision after a careful
study of the evidence. The record shows no cause for disqualification based on
turncoatism. There being no taint of arbitrariness in the conclusion arrived at its
finding is entitled to be accorded full respect.

8. Ambil v. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358 [2000]

A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated
and not before. There is no decision until the draft is signed and promulgated.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the
final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution
or decision. In this case, Guiani vacated office without the final decision or
resolution having been promulgated. Hence, there was no valid resolution or
decision to speak of.

9. Mateo v. CA, GR No. 113219, August 14, 1995

Prior to 1991, decisions could be only reviewed by the supreme court by
certiorari. Now, however, judgements or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies may
 be appealed to the court of appeals within fifteen days from the notice thereof. The
change is pursuant to Section 7 which says “unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution by law”.

10. Reyes v. Regional Trial Court, GR No. 108886, May 5, 1995

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that a certiorari may be resorted to
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. But reconsideration is
a speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a case may be brought to the Supreme
Court only after reconsideration. As a consequence, in the case of decisions of the
COMELEC, only decisions en banc may be brought to the Court by certiorari since
Article IX-C (3) of the Constitution states that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

11. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 611

In this case, The Supreme Court dispensed with the need to file for a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC since elections were already very close
and there was no more time for another speedy remedy. This case is about the
exit polls. (COMELEC prohibited the ABS-CBN to conduct exit polls)

12. Salva v. Makalintal, GR 132603, September 18, 2000

13. Garces v. CA, GR. No. 114 795, July 17, 1996
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the Constitution that may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX-A are those that
relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective regional, provincial and city officials. In this case, what was being
assailed was the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac office
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency.

14. Dumayas v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 141952-53, April 29, 2001

A decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is
promulgated a member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered
his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be
withdrawn or cancelled. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if
they had not signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining
commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of deciding the
controversy.
In the case, with the cancellation of the votes of the two retired
Commissioners, the remaining votes among the four commissioners at the time of
the resolution’s promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of Bernal. Noteworthy,
these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum.

15. Aguilar v. COMELEC, GR No. 185140, June 30, 2009

In this case, petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing
his appeal was not resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC
First Division, in obvious violation of the provisions of the Constitution and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Stated differently, the division, after dismissing
petitioner's appeal, arrogated unto itself the en banc's function of resolving
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Being a violation of the Constitution and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the assailed orders are null and void. They were
issued by the COMELEC First Division with grave abuse of discretion.

16. Cayetano v. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011

The Court has no jurisdiction to review a final or interlocutory order, or even
a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can
only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc.
 However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the
commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. Where there is
none, the Courts are without jurisdiction to review such case.

17. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, COA, GR 180989, February 7, 2012

Decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the court via a petition
for certiorari only when these refer to decisions and orders which were rendered
by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. In the case at bar, the Circular was
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and not
under its quasi-judicial powers. Hence, it is not reviewable by certiorari.

18. Cagas v. COMELEC, 663 SCRA 644 (2012)

The power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does
not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

Section 8. Other Functions

B. Civil Service Commission

Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term

1. Gaminde v. COA –347 SCRA 655 (2000)
The extension of the term did not affect the term. Thus, reckoning the seven
year term, the starting point is always a February 2 even if the appointee took office
after February 2. Through this rotational system the staggering of the terms is
preserved. It is uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first
appointees terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment

2. Mathay Jr. v. CA, GR No. 124374, December 15, 1999

Sanggunian Ordinance declaring the personnel absorbed in the department
the department of public order and safety, after PD 51 creating office was declared
never to have been published, is considered invalid. Ordering the absorption of
personnel is an act of appointment. The city council has no power to appoint.

Section 2. Scope of the system

1. Cuevas v. Bacal, GR 139382, December 6 2000
Respondent not having the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public
Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and
she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. The mere fact that
a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it.

Under Civil Service Law

PARAGRAPH 1
1. MWSS v. Hernandez – 143 SCRA 602 [1986]
MWSS is a government-owned or controlled corporation created after Republic
Act No. 6234. Therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed not by the Labor Code
but by the civil service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from that
employment are not cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission but of
that Civil Service. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter having been rendered without
jurisdiction, are hereby declared void and set aside.

2. NSC v. NLRC – 168 SCRA 122

 3. UP v. Regino – 221 SCRA 598 [1993]
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under
the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a
special law and has an original charter. The President and Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining,
suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University.

4. Mateo v. CA – 247 SCRA 284 [1995]

Hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules
and Regulations. Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

5. DOH v. NLRC – 251 SCRA 700 [1995]

The DJRMH, originally known as the Tala Leprosarium, was one of three
leper colonies established under Commonwealth Act No. 161. Maintained to this
day as a public medical center and health facility attached to the DOH, the DJRMH
exercises strictly governmental functions relating to the management and control
of the dreaded communicable Hansen’s disease, commonly known as leprosy. As
it is clearly an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well within the scope
and/or coverage of the Civil Service Law.

6. Juco v. NLRC – 277 SCRA 528 [1997]

In this case, NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction because National Housing Corporation is a GOCC and thus covered
with the Civil Service rules.

7. Feliciano v. Gison – 629 SCRA 103 [2010]

Water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a
special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, P.D. 198. Therefore,
COA has the authority to audit water districts.

GOCCs Under the Corporation Code

1. BLISS v. Calejo – 237 SCRA 271 [1994]
Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is a government-owned corporation
created under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter thus should be governed
by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law. 1987 Constitutional provision
that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter; therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include
government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized under the
general corporation law.

2. Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis society – 479 SCRA 628

Philippine Tuberculosis Society is a non-profit but private corporation
organized under the Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the
Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law.

3. LRTA v. Venus – 485 SCRA 301

The employees of METRO cannot be considered as employees of LRTA.
Since the employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and are
under the jurisdiction of the DOLE, whereas the employees of petitioner LRTA, a
government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, are covered
by civil service rules.

PARAGRAPH 2
Classifications and Appointments
1. HIGC v. CSC – 220 SCRA 148 [1993]
In this case, the CSC erred in the appointment of permanency of Cruz in the
HIGC. The 1987 Constitution states that the appointments in the civil service is based
on merit and fitness except those positions that are policy-determining primarily
 confidential or highly technical. The appointment of Cruz was ruled to be invalid
because the position he held did not follow the third level of the career service; the
position was not identified by the Career Executive Service Board; and was never
appointed by the President.

2. Mauna v. CSC – 232 SCRA 388 [1994]

In this case, CSC had committed grave abuse of discretion by invalidating
the appointment of the petitioner and ordering the respondent to take the place
instead. The court ruled that the petitioner had no authority to invalidate the
appointment of the petitioner under the power of appointing authority of the CSC.
The CSC can only disapprove and approve the appointment after determining if
the appointee has the civil service eligibility or the required qualifications.

3. Rimonte v. CSC – 244 SCRA 498 [1995]

The Civil Service Commission is the single arbiter of all contests relating to
the civil service and its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court cannot engage in
a review of facts found or even of law as interpreted by the CSC unless the
supposed errors of fact or law are so serious and prejudicial as to amount to a
grave abuse of discretion.

4. Gloria v. De Guzman – 249 SCRA 126 [1995]

A temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without
the employee’s prior consent. However, the temporary transfer cannot be done
when such transfer is a preliminary step towards his removal or to lure the
employee away from his permanent position. This trample the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.

5. Atty. Ellas Omar A Sana v. Career Executive Service Board, GR 192926, 15

November 2011

Competitive
1. Samson v. CA – 145 SCRA 654[1986]
The position of Secretary to the Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to
the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions. While both individuals may be
called “secretary,” nevertheless, one is certainly of al higher category and rank
than the other with the added distinction that a Secretary must enjoy the
confidence of the Mayor. However, the position of Assistant Secretary being of a
lower rank, need not carry the requisites attaching to the primarily confidential.
position of the actual Secretary to the Mayor. An “assistant secretary” although
termed a “secretary and may perform work that is confidential is technically
different from a “secretary” to the mayor.

Non-Competitive
1. Astraquillo v. Mangalupas – 190 SCRA 280 [1990]
Petitioners' appointments to the Foreign Service pertains to non
competitive. Their appointment were not based on merit and fitness determined by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, hence, their
tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasures.

2. Office of the President v. Buenaobra – 501 SCRA 302

Respondent who is the Chairman of the KWP is a non-career service
personnel whose tenure is limited to seven years as provided under R.A. No. 7104.
Since her tenure is fixed by law, her removal from office is not at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. There is constitutional and statutory guarantee of security
 of tenure extended to both those in the career and non-career service positions,
and An employee who belongs to the non-career service is protected from removal
or suspension without just cause and non-observance of due process.

Policy-Determining

Primarily Confidential
1. Borres v. CA – 153 SCRA 120 [1987]
In this case, there was grave abuse of discretion from the Acting Mayor of
Cebu City to terminate the service of the private respondents. The court ruled that
the private respondents Lumpac , Elizondo and Lao are appointed positions which
are primarily confidential in nature. Lumpac and Elizondo both hold permanent
positions while Lao holds a temporary position. The position of primarily
confidential should not be interpreted as an appointment that is deemed
permanent can be removed without a formal change with a specific ground for
removal and without providing the opportunity to be heard.

2. Grino v. CSC – 194 SCRA 458 [1991]

The position of the provincial attorney and his legal subordinates are
primarily confidential in nature to where the service of the one’s holding the said
terms can be terminated as loss of confidence. The court cannot agree with the
petitioner since the petition to the CSC was in a month’s time from their termination
in which the protest is made within a reasonable amount of time.

3. Santos v. Macaraig – 208 SCRA 74 [1992]

In this case, the presumption of primarily confidentiality was inherent
towards the petitioner who had been appointed a prestigious role by the President.
The dishonesty which resulted to estafa had withdrawn her inherent primarily
confidentiality. Therefore, the appointment bestowed to the petitioner may be
terminated.

4. Hilario v. CSC – 243 SCRA 206 [1995]

The position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one, it is deemed to be
co-terminous with that of the appointing authority. However, the petitioner could
not only be directly removed by the mayor but also the CSC. The CSC can
determine whether or not such person is still entitled to the position of city legal
officer, which is provided under the Administrative Code.

5. Rosete v. CA – 264 SCRA 147 [1996]

In this case, there was abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent to
raise a formal charge against the petitioner. The position of the petitioner as the
Chief of the Hospital is primarily confidential. The petitioner holding the position
cannot be removed or dismissed without just cause.

6. CSC v. Salas – 274 SCRA 414 [1997]

7. Acahacoso v. Macaraig – 195 SCRA 235 [1991]

8. Felix v. Buenaseda – 240 SCRA 139 [1995] (par.2)

In this case, a residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty
is never a permanent one. Residency connotes training and temporary status. It is
the step taken by a physician right after post-graduate internship (and after
 hurdling the Medical Licensure Examinations) prior to his recognition as a
specialist or sub-specialist in a given field.

9. Pamantasan ng Maynila v. CSC – GR No. 107590 [1995]

10. Province of the Camarines Sur v. CA – 246 SCRA 231 [1995]

In this case, Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he
was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden, he had not yet qualified in an
appropriate examination for the position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made
his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent
entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.

11. PEZA v. Mercado – 614 SCRA 683 [2010]

In this case, the respondent did not go through the four stages of CES
eligibility examinations. For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the
Career Executive Service (CES) and be entitled to security of tenure, she/he must
pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other
requirements prescribed by the CES Board and be appointed to a CES rank by the
President.

12. CSC v. CA – 635 SCRA 749 [2010]

The position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require
appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the Career
Executive Service (CES)—therefore, the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and
Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II do not require third level eligibility
pursuant to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Permanent
1. Luego v. CSC – 143 SCRA 327 [1986]
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authorityis limited
to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the
Civil Service Law.

2. Pangilinan v. Maglaya – 225 SCRA 511 [1993] (par.2)

In this case, Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because he did not
have the requisite qualifications. Therefore, he could not claim security of tenure.
Furthermore, the fact that Pangilinan was qualified for his initial appointment as
agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other positions he might
later occupy in the civil service.

Reorganization
1. Santiago v. CSC – 178 SCRA 733 [1989]
All the commission is actually allowed to check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion
is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the
decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper
authorities.

2. Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, GR NO. 131954. June 28, 2001

3. Gatmaitan v. Gonzales – 492 SCRA 591

 4. Nieves v. Blanco – 673 SCRA 638 [2012]

Appointment vs. designation

1. Binamira v. Garucho – 188 SCRA 154 [1990] (par.2) (designation by Dept. Sec.)
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another,
the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties
to another.

Removal for Cause/Security of Tenure

Cause for Removal: PARAGRAPH 3

1. Loss confidence
1. Hernandez v. Villegas – 14 SCRA 544 [1965]
Officials and employees holding primary confidential positions continue only
for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation
can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of
office.

2. Abolition of Office
1. Briones v. Osmena – 104 PHIL. 588 [1958]
The Municipal Board’s decision to abolish the office was invalid. The court
emphasized that the abolition of office does not imply removal of the employees.
The right to abolish can not be used to discharge employees in violation of the civil
service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.

2. Eugene v. CSC – 243 SCRA 196 [1995]

CSC encroached the legislative power of the congress in abolishing the
CESB. Thus it cannot be considered as valid. CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature.

3. Reorganization
1. Romualdez-Yap v. CSC – 225 SCRA 285 [1993]
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign
internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of service
may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Martinez’ appointment and reassignment does not result
to a demotion.

2. Fernandez v. Sto Tomas – 242 SCRA 192 [1995]

The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for no causes What it seeks to prevent is the capricious
exercise of the power to dismiss. But, When legislature puts a ground to transfer
a class of employee. There can no be capriciousness so long the remedy proposed
is to cure a perceived evil.

3. Chato v. Natividad – 244 SCRA 787 [1995]

Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred
from one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;
provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service
and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall
be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years.
 4. Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas – 244 SCRA 595 [1995] (par.3)
The unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the
Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause, hence,
invalid as it tampered the security of tenure. When Nacario was extended a
permanent appointment and assumed the position, she acquired a legal right to
the position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution.

5. Vinzon-Chato v. Zenarosa, GR 120539, October 20, 2000

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or reassign
internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies of service
may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Martinez’ appointment and reassignment does not result
to a demotion.

6. De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 129118, July 19, 2000

(SAME MAIN POINT WITH FERNANDO V. SANTO TOMAS)
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for no causes What it seeks to prevent is the capricious
exercise of the power to dismiss. But, When legislature puts a ground to transfer
a class of employee. There can no be capriciousness so long the remedy proposed
is to cure a perceived evil.

7. Cuevas v. Bacal, GR 139382, December 6, 2000

Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred
from one position to another and from one department to another; provided that
such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves
no reduction in rank or salary.

3. Qualification for Eligibility

1. Mayor v. Macaraig – 194 SCRA 672 [1991
In this case, the petitioners have the right to remain in office until the
expiration of the terms for which they have been appointed, unless they are
removed “for cause provided by law.” A recognized cause for removal or
termination is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried
out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and
explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.

5. Abandonment; Acceptance of Incompatible/Other Employment

1. Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 [2001]

2. Salvador v. CA, GR 127501, May 5, 2000

The main point of the case is that an officer who accepted coterminous
positions brought about by necessity cannot be terminated and questioned. In this
case, Salvador accepted the coterminous appointment because it was brought
acceptance of the coterminous appointment on the lower position in DENR was
practical and the right thing to do. Therefore it cannot be construed against him
and to bar his right to question the legality of his termination and claim the position
he had previously held.

Due Process in Removal

1. Enrique v. CA – 229 SCRA 180 [1994]
In this case, petitioners were informed of the charges leveled against them
and were given reasonable opportunity to present their defenses. Petitioners even
admitted that they filed their answer to the formal charges against them and
 submitted additional evidence when asked to do so. Petitioners even moved for a
reconsideration of the CSC decision. After the denial of their motion, petitioners
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which, in turn, considered said
appeal. Hence, the supposed denial of administrative due process has been cured.

2. CSC v. Magnaye – 619 SCRA 347 [2010]

3. Rubenecia v. CSC – 244 SCRA 640 [1995]

In this case, the petitioner Rubenecia claims that the CSC did not acquire
jurisdiction over his case because he had not been notified by individual written
notice sent by mail that his case had been elevated to the CSC as required by
CSC Resolution. However, the CSC Resolution did not require individual written
notice sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending before the MSPB.
Even if Rebenecia did not receive the individual notice, the commission deemed
to have substantially complied with the requirement of written notice in its own
Resolution by publishing it to a newspaper of general circulation.

4. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board Of Directors v. Marie Jean C.

Lapid, GR 191940, 12 April 2011
Casual employment will cease automatically at the end of the period unless
renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment. Casual employees may
also be terminated anytime though subject to certain conditions or qualifications
with reference to the CSC Form No. 001.

Security of Tenure
1. Chua v. CSC – 206 SCRA 65 [1992]
Security of Tenure shall not be discriminatory between regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. This shall also apply with regards to the
benefits arising from holding such employment.

2. NLTD v. CSC – 221 SCRA 145

The petitioner cannot claim for the security of term since all positions in the
Land Registration Commission are deemed nonexistent. When offices are
subjected to abolition, it shall not be equated to vacancy. The Abolition of a position
does not mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists
and that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in law no
occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of.

3. Cabagnot v. CSC – 223 SCRA 59

The CSC has the obligation to implement the constitutional provision on
security of tenure and due process however it cannot order reinstatement when a
termination of employees is not due to reason of reorganization.

4. Marohombsar v. CA, GR 126481, February 18, 2000

Ad interim appointment only talks of the manner of an appointment however
an employee by ad interim appointment cannot be prejudiced to have condition or
limitation as to tenure. In this case, the appointment extended to private
respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor
limitation as to tenure.

5. Ong v. OP – 664 SCRA 413 [2012]

In this case, Ong lacked the eligibility required for the position of Director III
and his appointment was “co-terminus with the appointing authority.” His
appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature can be revoked by
the President even without cause and at a short notice.

Electioneering or Partisan Political Activity

 1. Santos v. Yatco – 106 PHIL 21
In this case, the court ruled that the prohibition on electioneering or partisan
political campaign does not apply to the Cabinet members or department
secretaries. However, it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their
subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited
in the Election Code.

2. People v. De Venecia – 14 SCRA 864 [1965]

In this case, the court ruled that RA 2260 allows officers or employees from
expressing his views on current political issues or mentioning the names of
candidates for public office whom he supports. However, this does not includes
money contribution for election purposes because this could be considered as
aiding a candidate and thus punishable for imprisonment.

Right to Self-Organization and Right to Strike

1. SSS Employees v. CA – 175 SCRA 686 [1989]
SSS employees, or other government workers, have the right to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities. However, the constitution does not say that government employees may
be given the right to strike, unlike employees in the private sector.

2. Balingasan v. CA – 276 SCRA 557 [1997]

In this case the court ruled that the Public School teacher don’t have the
right to strike. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It was
undisputed that at the case at hand, there was work stoppage and that the
petitioner’s purpose was to realize withholding of ther servies.

3. Jacinto v. CA – 281 SCRA 557 [1997]

In this case, despite the fact that the teachers participated in mass action
by absenting themselves from classes and ignoring report-to-work orders. Their
dismissal is unreasonable. A 6-month suspension was enough, and they are still
entitled to back wages.

4. De la Cruz v. CA – 305 SCRA 303

The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes
is highly prejudicial to the best interest of public service. Thus, they will incur
reasonable penalties.

5. GSIS v. Kapisanan – 510 SCRA 622

The constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize
but they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.

Temporary Employees
1. Gloria v. CA, GR 119903, August 15, 2000
(SAME MAIN POINT WITH GLORIA V. DE GUZMAN)
A temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without
the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary
step towards his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.

Section 3. Purpose of a Civil Service System

1. Lazo v. CSC, 236 SCRA 469
In this case the court ruled that the Civil Service Commission is the central
personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining
questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil
service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to
revoke a certificate for being null and void.
Section 4. Oath or Affirmation
Section 5. Standardization of Compensation

Section 6. Prohibition of Appointment of “Lame Ducks”

1. People v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 164185, July 23, 2008
A “lame duck” or an unsuccessful person is prohibited from being appointed
to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. In this case the court ruled the decision
of the Sandiganbayan null and void. The losing candidates is disqualified from
being appointed during the one-year period even if he or she has the other
qualifications needed for the position.

Section 7. Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment

1. Flores v. Drilon – 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
In this case, for an elected official to be able to accept an appointment in
any other office or employment in a government or any of its subsidiaries, other
than his elective position, he must first resign from said elective position.

2. In re Eduardo Escala, 653 SCRA 141

In this case, Escala was employed Supreme court as Chief Judicial Staff
Officer in Security division while subsistingly employed in PNP. It is a well settled
rule that Government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, are
prohibited from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government.
It was clear that the respondent transgressed the constitution and Civil Service law
prohibiting double employment.

3. La Carlota City v. Rojo , GR 181367, 24 April 2012

In this case, the respondent was able to resign as a member of SP when
after a day he was appointed as the vice mayor. His appointment cannot be
considered void. The prohibition against dual employment does not provide any
duration as to how much the gap between the resignation from the actual
appointment for as long as the requirements are properly complied.

Sec. 8 Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign Gift/Office/Title

99. Sedusasta v. Municipality of Surigao – 72 PHIL. 482 [1941]
It is a well settled rule that "no officer or employee of the Government shall
receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.
In this case, there was no law that authorizes the appeallant to claim for his
additional compensation as sanitary and waterworks engineer. Therefore, he
cannot claim such compensation.

100.Peralta v. Mathay – 38 SCRA 296 (1971)

In this case, the court ruled that a public office is a public trust. It is expected
of a government official or employee put high demands to public welfare. He is
there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the
performance of the functions entrusted to him.

101.Santos v. CA – GR No. 139792, Nov. 22, 2000

The SC ruled that Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that
for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be
excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in
the Metropolitan Manila Authority. Whereas, Republic Act No. 7924 allows the
grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the
separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the Metropolitan
Manila Authority; The separation pay must relate only to the employment thus
affected.

102.Cabili v. CSC, GR No. 156503, June 22, 2006

The court ruled that all allowances and benefits, other than per diems, are
prohibited to directors of water districts. The compensation of directors of water
districts is governed by P.D. No. 198 that No director shall receive other
 compensation for services to the district. Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be
subject to approval of the Administration.

103.Benguet State University v. Colting, GR No. 169637, June 8, 2007

BSU cannot assert academic freedom to disburse its funds and grant
additional benefits sans staturory basis. Academic freedom pertains to the freedom
of the institution of higher learning to determine who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The guaranteed
academic freedom does not grant an institution of higher learning authority to
disburse its funds and grant additional benefits sans statutory basis. Unfortunately
for BSU, it failed to present any sound legal basis that would justify the grant of
these additional benefits to its employees.

104.Herrera, et al v. NPC, GR No. 166570, December 18, 2009

Absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and
retirement benefits from one single act of separation from employment would
amount to double compensation.

105.NEA v. CSC – 611 SCRA 14 [2010]

In this case, respondent’s finding that payment to NEA personnel
designated to cooperatives of allowances and other benefits on top of their regular
salaries from petitioner becomes violative of their own charter which does not
provide for such payment and, thus, inimical to the best interest of public service.
It also violates the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution,
which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Doctrine of Finality – Refers to a rule that a court will not judicially review an
administrative agency’s action until it is final. RES JUDICATA

106.Yap v. COA – 619 SCRA 154 [2010]

107.Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al v. Board of Airlines, GR 193247

Appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions which
includes the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals.

108.Office of the President v. Board of Airlines, GR 194276, 14 September

2011

109.PEZA V. COA – 675 SCRA 513[2012]

The amendatory law, R.A. No. 8748, purposely deleted the last paragraph
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 that authorized the grant of per diems to Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board members as it was in conflict with the
proscription laid down in the 1987 Constitution. In this case, there is the lack of
legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board, including
their representatives, has already been settled.

110.Dimagiba v. Espartero – 676 SCRA 420 [2012]

The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and
indirect compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation
for services. rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected
with his basic work. The prohibition against additional or double compensation,
 except when specifically authorized by law, is considered a “constitutional curb” on
the spending power of the government.

C. Commission on Elections

Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term

111.Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991)
112.Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990)
**It is expressly stipulated in S1(2) that no member can be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
113.Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49
Ad interim appointments are permanent.
114.Hayudini v. Comelec, GR No. 207900, 723 SCRA 223, April 22, 2014

115.Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

**A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three
consecutive terms.

116.Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

**To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates
of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. —To minimize the
logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may
be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be
“motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an
opportunity to be heard.”

117.Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

**To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. Does not talk about qualification of COMELEC’s Chairman and Commissioner.

Section 2. Powers and Functions

Administrative Power
118.Alfiado v. Comelec, GR 141787, September 18, 2000
119.Columbres v. Comelec, GR 142038,September 18, 2000
120.Sahali v. Comelec, GR 134169, February 2, 2000
121.Claudio v. Comelec, GR 140560, May 4, 2000
122.De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 129118, July 19, 2000
123.Social Weather Station, Inc v. COMELEC, GR NO. 147571, May 5, 2001
124.Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, GR 159139, Jan 13, 2004
125.Buac v. Comelec, 421 SCRA 92
126.Capalla v. COMELEC – 673 SCRA 1 [2012]

Election Contests
127.Flores v. COMELEC – 184 SCRA 484 [1990]
128.Galido v. COMELEC – 193 SCRA 78 [1991]
129.Mercado v. BES – 243 SCRA 422 [1995]
130.Relampagos v. Cumba – 243 SCRA 690 [1995]
131.People v. Delgado – 189 SCRA 715 [1990]
132.Garces v. CA – 259 SCRA 99 [1996]
133.Zarate v. Comelec and Lallave – GR 129096, November 19, 1999
134.Regalado v. CA, GR 115962, February 15, 2000
135.Faelnar v. People,GR 140850-51, May 4, 2000
136.Tan v. Comelec, GR 148575, Dec. 10, 2003
137.Alauya v. Comelec, GR 158830, August 10, 2004

Powers Not Given

Deputizing Law Enforcement Agencies
138.People v. Basilla – 179 SCRA 87[1989]

Registration of Parties and Organization

139.LDP v. Comelec, GR 161265, February 24, 2004
140.Atienza v. COMELEC – 612 SCRA 761 [2010]
141.Lokin v. COMELEC – 674 SCRA 538[2012]

Prosecution of Election Offenses

142.People v. Inting – 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
143.Corpus v. Tanodbayan – 149 SCRA 281[1987]
144.COMELEC v. Silva – 286 SCRA 177[1998]
145.Comelec v. Hon. Espanol, GR 149164, Dec. 10, 2003
146.Arroyo v. DOJ – 681 SCRA 181[2012]

Recommendatory Powers

Section 3. Decisions
147.Pangilinan v. COMELEC – 228 SCRA 36[1993]
148.Sarmiento v. Comelec – 212 SCRA 307[1992]
149.Carnicosa v. COMELEC – 282 SCRA 512[1997]
150.Ramas v. COMELEC – 286 SCRA 189[1998]
151.Garvida v. Sales – 271 SCRA 767[1997]
152.Velayo v. Comelec, GR 135613, March 9, 2000
153.Sebastian v. Comelec, GR 139573, Mach 7, 2000
154.Soller v. Comelec, GR 139853, September 5, 2000
155.Barroso v. Ampig et al, GR138218, March 17, 2000
156.Maruhon v. Comelec, GR 139357, May 5,2000
157.Balindong v. Comelec, GR 153991, Oct. 16, 2003
158.Jaramilla v. Comelec, GR 155717, Oct. 23, 2003
159.Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796-97, Oct. 23, 2003
160.De Llana v. Comelec, GR 152080, Nov. 28, 2003
161.Repol v. Comelec, GR 151418, Apr. 28, 2004
162.Pedragoza v. COMELEC – 496 SCRA 513
163.Cayetano v. COMELEC – 479 SCRA 514
164.Munoz v. COMELEC – 495 SCRA 407
165.Tan v. COMELEC – 507 SCRA 352
166.Enriquel v. COMELEC – 613 SCRA 809
167.Mendoza v. COMELEC – 616 SCRA 443
168.Maria Laarni L Cayetano v. Comelec, GR 193846, 12 April 2011 (also in Sec.
7, Art IX-A)

Section 4. Supervision/Regulation of Public Utilities, Media Grants, Privileges

1. 169.Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
2. 170.Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
3. 171.Osmena v. COMELEC – 199 SCRA 750 [1991]
4. 172.Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR No. 119654, May 22, 1995
5. 173.Telecom v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337 [1998]
6. 174.ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000
7. 175.SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001

Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension

of Sentence

Section 6. Free and Open Party System

1. 176.Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771, May 6, 2010

Section 7. No Block-Voting

Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties

Section 9. Election Period

Section 10. No Harassment and Discrimination

Section 11. Funds

D. Commission of Audit

Section 1. Qualifications; Term

1. 177.Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445

Section 2. General Function; Powers

Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures

1. 178.Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Tantuico – 163 SCRA 716 [1988]
2. 179.DBP v. COA – 231 SCRA 202 [1994]
3. 180.Eslao v. COA – 236 SCRA 161 [1994]
4. 181.J.F.F. Manacop v. CA – 266 SCRA 235 [1997]
5. 182.Polloso v. Gangan, GR 140563, July 14, 2000
6. 183.Uy v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000
7. 184.Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan – 265 SCRA 121 [1996]
8. 185.DBP v. COA, 422 SCRA 459 [2004]
9. 186.Home Development Mutual Fund v. COA, GR 142297, June 15, 2004
10. 187.DBP v. COA – 498 SCRA 537 [2006]
11. 188.Nava v. Palattao – 499 SCRA 745 [2006]
12. 189.Gualberto De Llana v. COA, GR 180989, 7 Feb. 2012
13. 190.Candelario L. Versoza Jr. v. Guillermo N Carague, GR 157838, 7
February 2012
14. 191.Philippine Coconut v. Republic – 663 SCRA 514 [2012]

Audit Jurisdiction
1. 192.Caltex v. COA – 208 SCRA 726 [1992]
2. 193.Mamaril v. Domingo – 227 SCRA 206[1993]
3. 194.Philippine Airlines v. COA – 245 SCRA 39 [1995]
4. 195.CIR v. COA – 218 SCRA 203 [1993]
5. 196.CSC v. Pobre, GR 160568, Sept. 15, 2004
6. 197.Luciano Velos, et al. v. Commission On Audit, GR 193677,6 Sept.
20011
7. 198.Boy Scout of the Philippines v. COA, GR 177131, 7 June 2011
8. 199.Dela Llana v. COA – 665 SCRA 176 [2012]

Settle Government Account

1. 200.Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor General, 94 Phil 868 [1953-
1954]
2. 201.ICNA v. Republic, 21 SCRA 40 [1967]
3. 202.Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 [1988]
4. 203.NHC v. COA – 226 SCRA 55 [1993]
5. 204.Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 30 [2006]

Define Scope and Techniques of Auditing Procedures

1. 205.Danville Maritime v. COA,175 SCRA 701 [1989]

Promulgate Accounting and Auditing Rules

1. 206.Leycano v. COA, 482 SCRA 215

Decide Administrative Cases Involving Expenditures of Public Funds

1. 207.NCMH v. COA, 265 SCRA 390 [1996]
2. 208.Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
3. 209.Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
4. 210.City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711 [1974]

Section 3. COA Jurisdiction

 1. 211.Luciano Veloso v. Commisssion on Audit, GR 193677, 6 September
2011

Section 4. Annual Report to the President and to Congress