The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

General Notions

The conflict between Rationalism and Empiricism, which was protracted

over a century and a half, had resulted in a general loss of respect for the
teachings of both philosophy and science. Rationalism had failed in its
attempt to establish the transcendence of God over nature. Instead, it had
become hopelessly ensnared in the implicit pantheism of Descartes,
Malabranche, and Leibniz, and in the explicit pantheism of Spinoza.

On the other hand, Empiricism had failed in its endeavor to prove the
existence of the world of nature distinct from thought, and had lost itself in
Skepticism. This failure of Rationalism and Empiricism was but the logical
outcome of the phenomenalism upon which both were based -- that is, the
teaching that man does not know things (reality), but only
the appearances which these things produce in us.

Kantian Criticism represents an attempt to unite Rationalism and

Empiricism in a superior kind of phenomenalism. For Kant, it is man who
constructs his own world. The human spirit, through certain a priori forms,
organizes the blind data of experience and builds the sciences of
mathematics and physics; through the autonomous will it constructs the
world of morality; through sentiment it considers reality in relation to some
end and reads into all things on inherent tendency to unity.

These varied examples of human activity comprise what Kant called his
"Copernican Revolution," which may be summed up as follows: That which
man must know, do and believe finds its justification not in reality existing
in itself (noumenon), as traditional metaphysics held, but in the theoretical,
practical and aesthetic faculties of man. A knowledge of the activities of
these faculties is, according to Kant, the necessary preparation for all
metaphysics. (The term "noumenon" is hardly translatable. It is taken to
mean the "res in se" -- Kant's "Ding-an-sich" -- the thing in itself, or the
object, as opposed to the phenomenon, the subjective effect produced in our
consciousness.)

If in retrospect Kantian Criticism marks the crossroads and the sublimation

of the Rationalism and Empiricism which preceded it, it is no less true that
Kantian Criticism contains within itself the germ of all subsequent
philosophical thought, including contemporary philosophy. The two major
philosophical movements of the last century, Idealism and Positivism, have
their source in the teachings of Kant.
Idealism, rejecting the noumenon entirely, reduces reality to the status of the
phenomena of an impersonal "ego" displaying its activity dialectically.
Positivism, on its part, reduces reality to mere phenomena of matter. From
Idealism and Positivism comes contemporary Existentialism, a philosophy
devoid of metaphysics and purporting to give knowledge of a world acting
by means of immanent forces. Of course, Existentialism, like its forebears,
is unable to give any definitive solution to the perennial problems of
philosophy.

Life and Works

Immannuel Kant (picture) was born in Konigsberg in East Prussia on April

22, 1724. He began his studies at the Collegium Fredericianum, one of the
celebrated centers of German Pietism. Later he enrolled in the school of
philosophy at the University of Konigsberg, where he studied the
rationalistic philosophy of Wolff and the mathematics and physics of
Newton. On leaving the university he spent nine years as tutor in several
distinguished families.

He returned to Konigsberg in 1755 and published his General Natural

History and Theory of Heavens, in which he discusses the hypothesis that
the solar system had taken its origin from primitive nebulous matter. The
following year Kant began teaching at the University of Konigsberg, and
remained there until 1797. The year 1756 marked a renewal of interest in
philosophical inquiry. Under the stimulus of the empiricism of Hume and
the naturalism of Rousseau, he began to plan a critical revision of the
dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, to which he had adhered during
the period he called his "dogmatic slumber."

The resulting doubts found their expression in the work The Dreams of a
Visionary Illustrated with the Dreams of Metaphysics, which Kant wrote
in 1766. The visionary of whom he spoke was the Swedish metaphysician
Swedenborg, whose teachings were the subject of much heated discussion at
that time. Named to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of
Konigsberg in 1779, Kant inaugurated his course of lectures with the
dissertation De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis formis et principiis, in
which he shows for the first time his tendency to adopt an independent
system of philosophy.

However, it was not until ten years later that his "pre-critical" period was
brought to a close. In 1781 Kant emerged as the exponent of transcendental
criticism with the publication of his first Critique. The "critical period" thus
begun endured until 1794. Following his publication of certain religious
works which were at variance with the principles of traditional Christianity,
Kant received orders from King Frederick William II enjoining him to
abstain from further concern about religious matters in his teaching and
writing. Kant submitted to the royal command.

Retired from teaching on account of age and infirmity, Kant spend his last
years in reediting his works. He died in his native city on February 28, 1804.

The principal works of Kant's "critical period" are the following:

the Critique of Pure Reason, in which he examines human reason and
concludes that it is capable of constructing science but not metaphysics. In
1783 he published the Prolegomena or Prologues to any Future
Metaphysics, wherein he examines the problem from another point of view.
In 1785 his Foundation for the Metaphysics of Ethics appeared, followed
by the Critique of Practical Reason, in which he treats the moral problem
according to the principles of transcendental criticism. In his Critique of
Judgment he examines the problem of finalism in nature and the aesthetic
problem. The three Critiques form a single masterpiece and are an
exposition of Kant's definitive thought.

"Critique of Pure Reason"

Rationalism and Empiricism undertook to resolve the problem: "What value

has that which I know (ideas or impressions) in relation to my obtaining
knowledge of the physical world, and in relation to what I must do?" The
problem was both epistemological and ethical. To solve the difficulty,
Rationalism -- from Descartes to Leibniz -- had begun with the assumption
that the human mind is endowed with innate ideas. Proceeding by
deduction from these innate ideas, Rationalism had constructed a knowledge
endowed withuniversality (since innate ideas are common to all minds)
and necessity (a quality which all scientific and philosophical knowledge
must possess). But it had not been able to show the validity of this
knowledge in reference to the world of nature without falling into
pantheism. Furthermore, in any consideration of a transcendent God, the
order of ideas remained always separate and distinct from the order of
things.

Empiricism, on the other hand, had sought a solution to the same question
by beginning with sense impresssions, which it declared to be copies of the
object perceived and hence valid for a knowledge of the world of nature.
However, it had not succeeded in demonstrating the universality and
necessity of such knowledge. Every perception, even though multiplied ad
infinitum, remains always particular. This criticism, advanced by Hume,
can be regarded as conclusive. In order to evade this difficulty, Hume had
recourse to a new psychological element, the habit of association, which
connects impressions with one another and clothes them with universality
and necessity. However, it might be observed that if the intellect can link
phenomena to one another and give them the notes of universality and
necessity, such an intellect is no "tabula rasa," as Hume asserted it to be; it
evidently possesses the innate concept of universality and necessity, which
it attributes to the particular phenomena when it links them together in
groups or classes.

These highly unsatisfactory theories were uppermost in the mind of Kant

when he undertook to solve the same problem, namely, that of the objective
and ethical value of our knowledge. In his endeavor to present a conclusive
solution, Kant composed his three Critiques -- so named because, in the
true sense of the word, "to criticize" means to discuss and judge. Thus
Kant's entire work is a careful examination and judgment of Rationalism and
Empiricism, with a view to determining the merits and deficiencies of the
two.

According to Kant, Rationalism is a type of "analytic judgment," in so far as

it constructs a system of knowledge that is endowed with universality and
necessity. However, such knowledge is tautological and sterile; that is, it is
unable to lead us to an understanding of nature. To mark an advance of
knowledge, according to Kant, a judgment must be "synthetic"; that is, it
must be a judgment whose predicate extends our knowledge beyond the
subject. On the other hand, Empiricism is a type of "synthetic" judgment,
but it is an a posteriori synthetic judgment, one whose predicate is a fact of
experience, and consequently deprived of universality and necessity. Such
judgments, devoid of universality and necessity, cannot serve to build up
true or philosophical knowledge.

Kant teaches that there is another type of judgment called synthetic a

priori, which leads to true scientific knowledge. It enjoys the universality
and necessity of analytic judgments without being tautological, and
possesses the fecundity of synthetical a posteriori judgments without being
restricted to the particular beings existing in the empirical world. For the
formation of any synthetic a priori judgment it is necessary to
have form and matter.

• The form is given by the intellect, independent of all

experience, a priori, and signifies the function, manner and law of
knowing and acting, which the subject finds in itself prior to all
experience.
• The matter is the subjective sensations which we receive from
the external world.

Through these two elements the benefits of Rationalism and Empiricism are
united in the same judgment: the form represents the universal and
necessary element, while the matter represents the empirical data. The
judgment thus resulting (synthetic a priori) is universal and necessary in
virtue of the form, and valid for the empirical world in virtue of the matter.
It is to be noted that for the formation of a synthetic a priori judgment it is
necessary to have both elements: Form without matter is empty and void;
matter without form is blind.

Clearly, a knowledge obtained through Kant's synthetic a priori judgments is

of phenomenal value only; it does not give a valid understanding of the
objects "in se" or as they exist in nature (noumena), but only in so far as
they are thought by the subject. Kant's thinking ego does not assimilate the
object, as traditional philosophy maintains, but constructs it. In fact, both
matter and form (sensations) are subjective elements and do not bespeak
reality; this remains ever separate and distinct from the subject.

Kant presents his study of synthetic a priori judgments in the Critique of

Pure Reason. This work is divided into three parts:

• In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant investigates the

elements of sensible knowledge in reference to a priori forms of space
and time. The object of this study is to justify mathematics as a
perfect science.
• The Transcendental Analytic is an inquiry into intellectual
knowledge. Its object is the physical world, and its scope is the
justification of "pure physics" (mechanics) as a perfect science.
• Transcendental Dialectic has for its object that reality which
lies beyond our experience; namely, the essence of God, man and the
world. Kant reduces these objects of traditional metaphysics to
"ideas," about which reason fruitlessly revolves, without hope of ever
arriving at any definitive result.

1. Transcendental Aesthetic

The beginning of knowledge is in sensibility, in the reception of sensations.

In order to constitute knowledge, sensations must be located in space, if
they come to us through the external senses; and in time, i.e., succeeding
one another, no matter what their origin -- even if they be simple states of
consciousness, such as pleasure and pain.

Now, for Kant, space and time are not realities existing in themselves, as
Newton believed, nor are they realities coming from experience, as Aristotle
maintained. They are, instead, a priori forms, that is, exigencies of our
knowledge. Sense knowledge (pure intuition) carries within itself the
following exigencies; Every sensation must be located inspace, i.e., above
or beneath, to the right or to the left, and in time, that is, antecedent,
subsequent, or concomitant to other sensations. Hence space and time are
conditions, not of the existence of things but of the possibility of their being
manifested in us. In a word, they are subjective forms.

Now, arithmetic and geometry are based on space and time. Consequently,
they are based on subjective forms, and the universality and necessity we
find in them come through these subjective forms. In other words, arithmetic
and geometry are absolute sciences, not because they represent a universal
and necessary aspect of the physical world but because they are a priori
constructions of the human spirit and receive from it there universality and
necessity.

2. Transcendental Analytic

The pure intuitions of time and space give us a manifold but disorganized
knowledge of nature. The human spirit, which tends to the unification of
knowledge, cannot stop at these confused intuitions. It feels impelled to
progress to a higher degree of understanding which is centered in the
intellect and whose activity consists in organizing the sensible data
dispersed in space and time. This is possible through the a priori forms or
categories with which the intellect is endowed. The function of such forms
or categories is the following:

• In the intuition, for example, of a tree, I had certain sensible

data (colors, leaves, branches, etc.) existing in space and in temporal
succession.
• The intellect sets to work on these data in accordance with its
nature -- that is, according to its a priori forms -- and stabilizes, as it
were, these sensitive and ephemeral data with the concept
of substance. Substance, then, is one of the categories of the intellect.
But the intellect does not rest here.
• It proceeds still further and, placing the present data in relation
to the data that have preceded the tree, it associates them in a second
concept, that of cause. This is the second category, by virtue of which
phenomena are bound to one another by a universal and necessary
connection, in such a way that, given the antecedent phenomenon (the
cause), another phenomenon (the effect) must follow always and
everywhere.

The categories of the intellect are twelve, and are divided by Kant into four
classes -- quantity, quality, relations, and modes. These categories, by
giving permanence and necessity to sensible data, serve as a framework in
reference to which the mechanical laws of nature are understood. It is
likewise to be noted that this permanent unification of sensible data is
possible only on condition that the unifying intellect remains identical with
itself. If the intellect be diverse for every sensible datum, no permanent
unification would be possible. Hence the universality and objectivity of
science imply the permanence of the intellect in its identity.

3. Transcendental Dialectic

The classification of sensible intuitions, performed by the intellect through

its categories, does not attain perfect unity. It remains always in the world of
phenomena, in a phenomenal series which extends itself indefinitely in
space and time. Within us, however, there is the tendency to achieve a
definite unification of phenomena, and as a consequence there arise in us
certain "ideas" which serve as a point of reference and organization for the
totality of phenomena. These "ideas" are three:

• Personal ego, the unifying principle of

all internal phenomena;
• The External world, the unifying principle of all phenomena
coming from without; and
• God, the unifying principle of all phenomena, regardless of
their origin.

The personal ego, the world, and God (the supreme realities of traditional
metaphysics), are called noumena, i.e., realities in themselves,
suprasensible and unconditioned beings. Kant presents these three entities in
the Transcendental Dialectic, the third part of the Critique of Pure
Reason.

Thus the Transcendental Dialectic brings us to the third grade of human

knowledge. The faculty which busies itself with these "ideas" Kant calls
reason. The aim of this third part of the Critique of Pure Reason is to see
whether the ideas of ego, the world, and God allow us to know the reality
they represent, or whether such knowledge is impossible, these ideas being
then a kind of empty subjective exigency, and nothing more. Clearly Kant's
Criticism ends in Skepticism. Pure reason is always connected with sensible
intuitions, and therefore it cannot arrive at the knowledge of the personal
ego, of the world, and of God; these are realities which are beyond the data
of intuition.

In regard to the "personal ego" (substance) -- the object of rational

psychology in traditional philosophy -- Kant observes that it vanishes in
paralogisms, i.e., in sophisms, false reasoning. Indeed, contrary to
Descartes, Kant believed that spiritual substance is not known directly.
What we know directly is the action of knowing (phenomenon). A series of
these actions, even if extended ad infinitum, will never give us knowledge
of a reality such as the personal ego, which must lie beyond this series.
Moreover, for Kant, substance is a category of the intellect that has relation
only to sensible data, and it is consequently useless in the quest of a
knowledge of suprasensible realities. Kant's criticism on this point is
directed against Descartes, who maintained that the soul, a spiritual
substance, is the first object of knowledge.

In reference to the external world, to which traditional philosophy dedicates

its studies in cosmology, Kant says that it is lost in antinomies, that is, in
contradictory propositions, and that the intellect is not capable of
distinguishing which of the opposed propositions is true. These antinomies
are four in number, each one being made up of a thesis and its
corresponding antithesis. They are the following:

• Thesis: The world must have a beginning in time and be

enclosed in finite space. Antithesis: The world is eternal and infinite.
• Thesis: Matter is ultimately divisible into simple parts (atoms
or monads) which are incapable of further division. Antithesis: Every
material thing is divisible; there exists nowhere in the world anything
that is simple.
• Thesis: Besides the causality which is in accordance with the
laws of nature (and therefore necessary), there is a causality which is
free. Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes
place entirely according to the laws of nature.
• Thesis: There exists an absolutely necessary Being who
belongs to the world, either as a part or as a cause of
it. Antithesis: Nowhere does there exist an absolutely necessary
Being, either in the world or outside it.

The first two antinomies (the opposition existing between a finite and
infinite universe and between divisible and indivisible matter) pertain to the
physical world. According to Kant, they not correspond to the "thing in
itself" (noumenon), for they consist in an illegitimate application of the
categories of space and time to the "thing in itself." In other words, in these
two antinomies the physical world is considered at the same time as a "thing
in itself" independent of the mechanical necessity of nature (space and time)
and as a subject of this same mechanical necessity. Any opposition derived
from this contradictory position is necessarily false.

The other two antinomies are concerned, the first with the spirit (freedom),
the second with God; and they may be true from the noumenical and the
phenomenal point of view. Indeed, there will be the same contradiction as
noted above, if freedom and God are conceived of as beings subject to
mechanical causality. But the spirit and God may be affirmed without any
consideration of space and time; and in this case the theses of the two
antinomies do not imply any contradiction.
Thus the theses are true if they are affirmed simply from the noumenal point
of view; likewise the antitheses are true if they are affirmed simply from the
phenomenal point of view. Hence Kant concludes his criticism, leaving the
door open for the affirmation of the existence of spirit and God. However, it
has to be noted that such a conclusion cannot be called true knowledge,
because it is not based on any intuition; for Kant intuition alone gives origin
to true knowledge. Later we shall see that Kant affirms the existence of
spirit and of God as postulates of practical reason.

Finally, in reference to the idea of God, Kant reduces the arguments which
rational theology brought forward to prove the existence of God to the
following:

• Ontological Argument (St. Anselm, Descartes. Kant

proclaims this proof inefficacious not only because God is not the
object of intuition, but also because the passage from the phenomenal
world (thought) to the noumenal world (reality) is illegitimate.
• Cosmological Argument. Kant declares this argument
inefficacious because it is based on the principle of causality; and
causality is, for him, a category valid only in the world of experience
and not for what lies beyond experience.
• Teleological Argument. This argument shows us that where
there is finality or purpose there is an Intelligence, an architect. But,
as Kant rightly observes, this does not mean the most perfect Being,
i.e., God.

Thus the Critique of Pure Reason concludes that our knowledge does not
attain metaphysical realities (noumena). Kant does not deny the existence of
God and of the external world, nor the immortality of the soul; but he says
that such entities are closed to scientific inquiry. This latter has the
phenomenal world as its object, and is utterly incapable of penetrating the
supra-phenomenal world, i.e., the world of the noumena, the unconditioned.
According to Kant, God, the world and the soul are attainable through
another activity, practical reason, which we shall now examine.

"Critique of Practical Reason"

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes the essential elements of all
knowledge (universality and necessity) dependent, not on the content of
experience, but on a priori forms. Likewise, in the Critique of Practical
Reason he makes the universality and necessity of the moral law dependent,
not on the empirical act and the end that we might intend in our actions, but
on a categorical imperative, in the will itself. For an act to be morally
good, the will must be autonomous; it must be determined to act, not in
view of the result of its action but only in view of its duty. "Duty for
duty's sake": this is Kantian morality in all its rigidity. This means that
among all the imperatives that can determine the will to action it is
necessary to distinguish the hypothetical from the categorical.

Hypothetical imperatives impose a command in order to attain an end and

are hence conditioned on that end; for example, you must take the medicine
required if you wish to be cured. Categorical imperatives impose themselves
automatically, by force of duty, without regard to the good or evil that might
result from them -- for example, "Do this because it is your duty." Only
categorical imperatives enjoy universality and necessity, and hence only
they can be the foundation of morality.

An essential difference must be noted between the a priori forms of the

intellect (categories) and the a priori forms of the will (categorical
imperatives). The former, deprived of their material element, are void; they
need an empirical element in order to be determined. The a priori forms of
the will, on the contrary, are not empty; they possess the determining
element in themselves. In other words, an inversion must be made: It is not
the empirical element which determines the form (the imperative); rather, it
is the form which determines the empirical element and makes it moral.

For example, the command "Do not lie" is determined, not because people
do not lie (empirical element), but because this command comes from the
will itself as the regulator of the empirical element. The will is an
autonomous legislator in the field of action. "So act," says one of the
Kantian categorical imperatives, "that your will can be considered as
instituting a universal moral legislation." But if we act thus, we are already
in the suprasensible and unconditioned world. This conclusion deserves
examination.

According to the Critique of Pure Reason we cannot attain the

suprasensible (noumenon) because our forms of knowledge (categories) are
empty: their content is only phenomenal, conditioned matter. Now, instead,
the form of the will (categorical imperative) possesses the content
independently within itself; it is not conditioned by any material element. It
is the will itself which makes the human act morally good, and not vice
versa. In fact, according to Kant, the empirical act will be good only on
condition that it be done for the sake of duty. Hence the will is beyond the
phenomenal and mechanical world; it pertains to the world of noumena, of
the unconditioned.

Once having attained the world of the suprasensible (note well: through
practical exigency, not by way of cognitive reason), Kant undertook to
examine what might be the postulates (necessary conditions) that make
morality possible. In this investigation Kant maintains that there are three
postulates that establish morality, namely, liberty, theimmortality of the
soul, God. These are the three supreme realities of traditional philosophy;
and Kant, who had denied our ability to attain them through theoretical
knowledge, believed that he could affirm their existence by practical
exigency.

• First of all, he observes that the will is independent of all

allurements that come from the phenomenal world, because the will is
autonomous. It could not be such if it were subject to causal
mechanism. Therefore, the will is free. (First postulate.)
• Secondly, Kant observes that virtue is the supreme good. But
our desires would not be fully satisfied unless happiness necessarily
followed upon virtue. Now, in this present sensible world, it is
impossible to attain happiness through virtue. From this fact -- that
happiness is beyond attainment in the present life -- arises belief in
the immortality of the soul. (Second postulate.)
• Lastly, since we are certain that happiness follows virtue
necessarily, this certitude gives rise to belief in the existence of God.
(Third postulate.)

Thus Kant believed not only that he had reconstructed the world of
traditional metaphysics but also that he had established it on a more solid
basis, on a foundation above and beyond any doubt. For Kant, the will has
primacy over the intellect.

"Critique of Judgment"

Both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical

Reason have established a dualism -- of phenomenon and noumenon, of the
sensible and suprasensible, the conditional and unconditional, mechanical
necessity and liberty. No acceptable philosophy can conclude with such a
dualism, for the ego is at one and the same time the subject of both the
theoretical and the practical world. Hence it is necessary that the two aspects
-- theoretical and practical -- through which reality is revealed, be
synthesized in a unity centering in the ego.

Kant maintains that such a synthesis is possible through the judgment of

sentiment, the study of which he presents in the Critique of Judgment.
The judgment of sentiment is not to be confused with the synthetic a priori
judgment already considered in the Critique of Pure Reason. This latter
presupposes an empty or void form of the intellect (category), which is
determined by the particular element grasped by the sense. Hence Kant calls
the synthetic a priori judgment a determining judgment, and it is that
which gives us true and proper but phenomenal knowledge.
The judgment of sentiment, on the other hand, consists in referring the
apprehended object to a form that is not in the intellect, but in the affective
power of the will (emotion). The form which appears in sentiment is
intermediate between the theoretical and the practical. Such a judgment of
sentiment is possible because the subject (the ego), byreflecting on the
apprehended data, judges these data to be adapted to the sentimental
activities of the subject. Hence Kant calls this operation a reflecting
judgment. It is to be noted that the reflecting judgment has its origin outside
the a priori forms of the intellect. Consequently, it does not give us true and
proper knowledge, but only manifests anexigency of the ego.

In the Critique of Judgment Kant presents only two reflecting judgments --

that which arises from the finality of nature, and that which is
called aesthetic.

1. Teleological Judgment

The creative activity of nature develops itself in a successive series of

phenomena connected with one another mechanically, that is, through the
laws of causality. Reflecting upon this mechanical succession, one soon
notes that the individual elements of the series are harmoniously coordinated
toward a common end, as if the parts were disposed by a regulating Mind
for the actuation of a determined purpose (finality). Such a finality can be
observed especially in living organisms, in which it is easy to note how the
parts develop toward the production of the perfect living organism.

Kant extends this view to the whole of nature and sees it culminating in the
advent of spirituality, which is to be attained through culture and
civilization, technical abilities and moral education. This teleological view,
in which we consider the world of beings and of events as ordained to an
end and ultimately to our spiritual exigencies, finds its reason in sentiment
and not in the intellect. As in the Critique of Practical Reason, the solution
is found in an exigency of the unconditioned, and not in the knowledge of
the unconditioned.

2. Aesthetic Judgment

Aesthetic judgment, by which we judge an object to be pleasurable, begins

by our separating the object from every determined concept and from every
practical interest, and by referring the object thus freed to the subject. The
subject then finds the satisfaction of its spiritual faculties in the object thus
referred to it and expresses this satisfaction in an aesthetic judgment: "This
field is beautiful." In aesthetic judgment, therefore, there is lacking (1) all
judgment of knowledge (e.g., "This field is broad"), and (2) all judgment of
interest (e.g., "This field is useful for grazing cattle").
The object of an aesthetic judgment is the "form" of the object considered in
itself (e.g., the composition of colors in a landscape) and referred to the
subject. The subject finds therein the satisfaction of his spiritual faculties. In
becoming aware of aesthetic pleasure, the subject (ego) feels himself free of
any theoretical or practical interest; he feels himself to be one, a person, the
subject of spiritual activity. Thus we are in the sphere of the unconditioned.
It is to be noted that aesthetic judgment is not true knowledge. It is an
exigency of the subject expressing his aesthetic sentiment in the manner
described.

Conclusion

The only true and proper knowledge, for Kant, is that which is scientific,
i.e., that obtained through the categories of the intellect, whose office is to
organize sensible data according to their mechanical succession. Ideal
reality (noumenon), God, the immortality of the soul, the external world are
not objects of sensible intuition, and hence are not objects of that knowledge
which is proper to the intellect.

Without doubt, for Kant, the existence of the suprasensible, God, and the
immortality of the soul are absolutely certain; it is their conceptual
determination that is impossible. For this reason, Kant was forced to
demonstrate their existence as postulated by practical reason and as
an exigency of faculties operating in the sphere of finality and of aesthetics.

But once a true and proper understanding of the existence of God and of the
soul is denied, who can assure us that the postulates and the exigencies of
which Kant speaks so eloquently are not mere illusions of the subject? Will
it not appear more logical to present the subject, the human spirit, as creator
and absolute legislator, and then derive all reality from man by logical
deduction?

This is the trend that has gradually followed Kantian Criticism, and for this
reason Kant is without doubt the father of modern Idealism.

The positive contributions of Immanuel Kant to

the Perennial Philosophy

None. But despite errors, absurdities, and contradictions, Kant's philosophy

has exercised a tremendous influence upon human thinking for over a
century and a half. It exhibits the roots of those weaknesses we have come
to regard as characteristic of what is loosely called "the German
philosophy." It refuses to face reality (witness the wholly subjectivistic
character of knowledge); it unduly stresses the ego (witness the inner and
autonomous character of knowledge and morality); it proclaims the
perfectibility of the will, upon which the followers of Kant were soon to
harp most strongly -- and from Nietzsche to Hitler we are to hear of "the will
to power," the will which makes "the superman" and "the master race."

In The Radical Academy

• Books by and about Immanuel Kant

• Essay: Judgments, by Immanuel Kant
• Essay: Duty is Prior to Happiness, by Immanuel Kant
• Critical Essay: The Origins of Intellectual Insanity: What is
Wrong with Kant's Philosophy?

Elsewhere On the Internet

• More about Kant

• "Critique of Pure Reason," by Immanuel Kant
• "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics," by Immanuel Kant
• Jonathan F. Bennett modern translation: Immanuel Kant Texts