Received: 18 March 2019 Revised: 20 May 2019 Accepted: 12 June 2019

DOI: 10.1111/soc4.12724

ARTICLE

The facts of fake news: A research review

Edson C. Tandoc Jr.

Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and

Information, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore
Correspondence
Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Associate Professor,
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and
Information, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.
Email: edson@ntu.edu.sg
Funding information
Tier 2 Fund, Grant/Award Number: T2-1-042;
Tier 1 Fund, Grant/Award Number:
T1-002-125-05
Abstract
This article offers a review of scholarly research on the phe-
nomenon of fake news. Most studies have so far focused on
three main themes: the definition and the scope of the
problem; the potential causes; and the impact of proposed
solutions. First, scholarly research has defined fake news as
a form of falsehood intended to primarily deceive people by
mimicking the look and feel of real news. While initial
research has shown that only a small fraction of the online
audience is exposed to fake news, for this small group of
individuals, the impact of fake news can be quite substan-
tial. Second, studies have identified cognitive processes that
make individuals more prone to the influence of fake news,
such as confirmation bias, selective exposure, and lack of
analytical thinking. Fake news also derives its power from
its appeal to partisanship, perceived novelty, and repeated
exposure facilitated by both bots and human users that
share them in the online sphere. Finally, while fact checking
has also risen in response to fake news, studies have found
that corrections to wrong information only work on some
individuals.

Fake news has become a serious concern around the world. In August 2018, an angry mob set two men on fire in
Mexico after residents accused them of being part of a group of child kidnappers who, according to a fake news
story that spread through the messaging app WhatsApp, had descended to the streets of the town of Acatlán
(Martinez, 2018). In India, mobs have also attacked and killed dozens of men because of similar fake news stories
spreading on WhatsApp (Frayer, 2018).
In response, some governments have launched investigations (Singapore, 2018) and even considered or
implemented new legislation (Mokhtar & Lim, 2019; Nugent, 2018; Thomasson, 2018) to address the problem of
fake news (Funke, 2018). News organizations and private groups have also started fact-checking initiatives to
debunk disinformation (Graves & Cherubini, 2016). Technology companies, such as WhatsApp and its owner

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https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12724
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Facebook, which have borne the brunt of public blame, have also launched initiatives to control the spread of
fake news by, among other things, deleting user accounts that were engaged in disinformation (Frenkel, 2018;
Wakabayashi & Isaac, 2017).
Fake news has also rightfully attracted the attention of an increasing number of scholars across various disci-
plines, including communication, political science, psychology, economics, and computer engineering, among others.
Understanding fake news is important, considering its harmful real-life implications. Fake news can tarnish reputa-
tions, ruin businesses, muddy public discourse, and sway political decisions. A study also found that continuing media
discourse about fake news can also lower public trust in the media in general (Van Duyn & Collier, 2019). And the
problem might soon worsen: Technology experts warn about the next generation of fake news, called “deep fakes,”
which refer to the use of artificial intelligence to digitally alter video and audio files. For example, computer scientists
at the University of Washington successfully built a program that can turn audio clips into realistic videos showing
people—like world leaders—saying something they have never said (Warzel, 2018). A few months ago, an
“ultrarealistic fake video” created using an app appeared on social media forum site Reddit that superimposed former
US First Lady Michelle Obama's face on the body of a porn actress (Roose, 2018).
This article offers a synthesis of this important and growing body of research on fake news. Studies on fake news
have so far focused on three general themes: defining the term and mapping out the extent of this phenomenon
(e.g., Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2017; Wardle, 2017); investigating factors that affect the extent to which individuals
believe and share fake news (e.g., Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018); and evaluating
the impact of fact checking to counter fake news effects (e.g., Bode & Vraga, 2018; De keersmaecker & Roets,
2017). While this body of research has been illuminating, there are other aspects of the problem that need further
investigation.

1 | D EF I NI NG F A KE N EWS

Recent studies have defined fake news in similar ways, often highlighting the factor of facticity. For example, fake
news has been defined as an “entirely fabricated and often partisan content that is presented as factual” (Pennycook
et al., 2018, p. 1865). But fake news as a term is not new. A review of how the term has been used in academic
research found that fake news has been used to refer to various forms of content, from political satires and news
parodies to state propaganda and false advertising (Tandoc et al., 2017). These definitions vary along two main
dimensions: first, the level of facticity and, second, the actual intent to deceive. Fake news is also distinguished from
other forms of disinformation by its attempt to mimic the traditional news format. Thus, fake news refers to a specific
type of disinformation: It is false, it is intended to deceive people, and it does so by trying to look like real news.

1.1 | Facticity and intention

Earlier uses of the term varied in terms of the degree of facticity. News parodies, such as The Onion, are based on
made-up accounts and fictitious reports, while news satires such as The Daily Show are based on real events and
issues. Both of these, however, have the ultimate intention of humouring audiences—falsity is used as a comedic
instrument. Producers of these types of content enter into a tacit agreement with audiences, who acknowledge that
these pieces of content passing themselves of as real news is required for the humour to work (Tandoc et al., 2017).
News parodies, for example, have explicit disclaimers on their websites, with The Onion describing itself as having “a
daily readership of 4.3 trillion and has grown into the single most powerful and influential organization in human
history” (The Onion, 2017). This tacit agreement, however, also fails sometimes, and some people (and even real
news organizations) have been misled by news parodies (Fisher, 2012).
In contrast, propaganda and advertising are usually based on real accounts, albeit incomplete, retaining only
what's favourable to the political actors or the brands that commission the campaign. And yet, the primary intention
TANDOC JR. 3 of 9

is to mislead audiences. Contemporary definitions of fake news, or those that were proposed after the term rose
again in popularity following the 2016 presidential elections in the United States, highlight this dimension. For
example, recent studies identified two main intentions that motivate the production of fake news: financial and
ideological. Financial motivations refer to the production of fake news with the intention of converting online clicks
into advertising revenues. This motivation fuelled the massive fake news operations that were traced back to teen-
agers operating in a small town in Macedonia (Kirby, 2016). Ideological motivations refer to the production of fake
news with the intention of discrediting certain actors or states, sowing social discord, influencing elections, or insti-
gating violence for political gain (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Bakir & McStay, 2018). The motivations for producing
fake news are usually different from the motivations for spreading it, with ordinary users unintentionally spreading
falsehoods out of their genuine intention to either humour others or show concern to their family or friends (Tandoc
et al., 2018).

1.2 | Weaponized term

Fake news, however, has also been exploited by political actors, who use the term to tag real news organizations—
whose coverage they disagree with—as purveyors of fake news (Holan, 2017). This is why some scholars have
argued against the use of the term fake news. For example, the UK government has banned the use of “fake news”
in policy documents or official communication, arguing that it is “a poorly-defined and misleading term that conflates
a variety of false information, from genuine error through to foreign interference in democratic processes” (Murphy,
2018, para. 2). In Singapore, a high-level committee that investigated the problem of fake news used the term “delib-
erate online falsehoods” instead (Singapore, 2018). Wardle (2017, para. 1) also distinguishes between misinformation
and disinformation: The former refers to “the inadvertent sharing of false information,” while the latter refers to “the
deliberate creation and sharing of information known to be false.” Fake news is a form of disinformation.

1.3 | News format

But while many definitions have highlighted the falsity and the bad intentions of fake news, what distinguishes fake
news from other types disinformation is its attempt to mimic the news format. For example, Lazer et al. (2018,
p. 1094) defines the term as referring to “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in
organizational process or intent.” Allcott and Gentzkow (2017, p. 213) defines fake news as referring to “news arti-
cles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers.” Rochlin (2017, p. 388) also defines it as
when “a knowingly false headline and story is written and published on a website that is designed to look like a real
news site, and is spread via social media.”
These definitions highlight the role of the news format in the potency of fake news as a disinformation device.
Indeed, fake news taps into the social and historical virtues that societies around the world have ascribed to
journalism's main output. By mimicking real news, fake news recognizes and, in the process, potentially bastardizes
the credibility and legitimacy that the public has associated with the language, format, and feel of real news. How-
ever, unlike outlets that produce real news, those who produce fake news “lack the news media's editorial norms
and processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information” (Lazer et al., 2018, p. 1094).

2 | T H E E X T E N T O F T H E P RO BL E M

Fake news rose to buzzword status during the 2016 presidential elections in the United States. It was initially used
to refer to falsehoods that went viral as thousands of individuals mistook them as real news, such as the fabricated
news story that Roman Catholic leader Pope Francis had endorsed the candidacy of Donald Trump and the fake
conspiracy story that presidential candidate Hilary Clinton operated an underground child sex ring in Washington
4 of 9 TANDOC JR.

DC (Lopez, 2016; Silverman, 2016). An analysis done by the entertainment and news site BuzzFeed found that in
the last 3 months of the 2016 US presidential campaign, the 20 top-performing fake news stories about the election
collectively generated more shares, reactions, and comments on Facebook than the 20 best-performing real election
stories combined (Silverman, 2016). However, Trump himself and his supporters also later used the term to describe
news organizations and real news articles that criticized him (Holan, 2017). Thus, fake news became a problem not
only of individuals being exposed to wrong information but also of real journalists being maligned and harassed
(Tandoc, Jenkins, & Craft, 2018).
Despite fake news hogging the spotlight of media coverage and criticism (Tandoc, Jenkins, et al., 2018), as well
as initial analyses that demonstrated the rise in audience engagement with fake news (Silverman, 2016), a few stud-
ies argued that the size of the audience exposed to fake news is rather small, at least in the United States. An exami-
nation of audience online usage data in the months around the 2016 presidential elections in the United States
found that “the fake news audience is small and comprises a subset of the Internet's heaviest users, while the real
news audience commands a majority of the total Internet audience” (Nelson & Taneja, 2018, p. 3732). Similarly, an
analysis of Twitter users in the United States found that of all the accounts examined, only about 0.1% were respon-
sible for almost 80% of shares of content from fake news sources (Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-Thompson, &
Lazer, 2019). The study also found that only about 1% of the Twitter accounts it examined consumed about 80% of
the volume from fake news sources (Grinberg et al., 2019). Fake news audiences, though small in number, are deeply
engaged with the falsehoods they encounter. They also have the potential to, if uncontrolled, influence other audi-
ences. As more and more people rely on their social media networks for their information diet (Gil de Zúñiga & Diehl,
2018), second-hand disinformation also occurs. This is when fake news audiences, though small in number, exert
influence on the opinions and beliefs of other news audiences, backed by social ties or opinion leadership. Thus, it is
crucial to understand what factors make these audiences deeply engaged with fake news.

3 | AUDIENCES AND MESSAGES

Technology companies have been blamed for the spread of fake news. Indeed, social media platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter and messaging applications such as WhatsApp that provide easy and quick delivery of infor-
mation have also become spaces for falsehoods. An analysis of Facebook use found that the amount of time an
individual spends on Facebook is correlated with levels of fake news use (Nelson & Taneja, 2018). Anecdotal
evidence also points to the role of structural contexts: In countries like the Philippines, where telecommunication
companies offer free but limited access to Facebook to their prepaid subscribers, users depend on Facebook for both
information and entertainment. Their limited access means they can see posts but not photos, and even if they click
on the post to read the whole story or verify the information, there is no way they can read the whole post, much
less check it against another source, because their free access is only limited to Facebook (Swearingen, 2018). How-
ever, most studies that examined factors that make individuals believe in and share fake news have focused on two
main categories: characteristics of audiences and factors related to content.

3.1 | Social media users

Many studies have focused on the role of social media users in the spread of fake news. While fake news producers
partly rely on a network of online bots that power fake news sites and spread their content on social media accounts,
“robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that false news spreads more than
the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it” (Vosoughi et al., 2018, p. 1150). Shao et al. (2018)
also found that while social bots are among the most active social media accounts spreading fake news online, some
human social media users also pick up and share fake news from social media bots. So why do some humans believe
and share fake news? One explanation is confirmation bias, or when individuals find information that supports their
TANDOC JR. 5 of 9

pre-existing beliefs as more persuasive that information that contradicts what they believe in (Lazer et al., 2018).
Another explanation is how social media allow users to stay within their filter bubbles, so that users only get exposed
to content that is already consistent with their pre-existing attitudes and interests instead of exposing them to
diverse content (Spohr, 2017). These processes—confirmation bias and selective exposure—simplify information
processing for individuals. But by engaging in these, users become vulnerable to believing in fake news, especially in
a context of information overload, which characterizes social media. Indeed, another study concluded that the lack
of analytic thinking makes users more vulnerable to believing in fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). The study
found that individuals who score higher in analytical thinking (measured using a cognitive reflection test) were
“better able to discern real from fake news regardless of their political ideology” (Pennycook & Rand, 2018, p. 9). This
potentially indicates, the study argues, that individuals fall for fake news not because of biased thinking but because
“they fail to think” (Pennycook & Rand, 2018, p. 10).

3.2 | Message characteristics

Other studies focused on investigating the effects of content characteristics. A content analysis of articles published
in sites often considered as fake news sources during the 2016 presidential elections in the United States found that
most articles published in these sites “employed moderate levels of sensationalism, clickbait, misleading content and
partisan bias” and that partisan bias was the strongest predictor of social media engagement (Mourão & Robertson,
2019, p. 14). Another study also noted that fake news articles tend to be more novel than real news, which can
explain why they spread faster than real news (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Fake news articles also “inspired fear, disgust,
and surprise” based on social media replies (Vosoughi et al., 2018). An experiment also found that message repetition
also made the message more believable: “Indeed, a single prior exposure to fake-news headlines was sufficient to
measurably increase subsequent perceptions of their accuracy” (Pennycook et al., 2018, p. 1876). This effect of repe-
tition is what online bots that are part of fake news and propaganda machines exploit. Swarming the internet with
social media bots and fake news sites that post and share the same piece of fake news can give the fake story some
semblance of legitimacy. For example, an individual user might encounter a fake news post online and decides to
Google it to verify. If that user sees the same fake news posted elsewhere, it might lead the user to wrongly believe
that the post is real (Tandoc, Ling, et al., 2018).
These findings should be able to guide efforts to address the problem of fake news. For example, studies in
computer science and engineering have proposed ways to detect fake news using automation (e.g., Dey, Rafi, Parash,
Arko, & Chakrabarty, 2018; Kim, Tabibian, Oh, Schlkopf, & Rodriguez, 2018; Tschiatschek, Singla, Rodriguez,
Merchant, & Krause, 2018). In mass communication studies, a widely researched area when it comes to addressing
fake news is that of fact checking.

4 | I M P A C T O F F A C T CH E C K I N G

In September 2018, a parliamentary committee in Singapore created to investigate and hold public deliberations on
fake news proposed 22 detailed recommendations to address the problem, including the institutionalization of fact
checking (Singapore, 2018). Technology companies, like Facebook and Google, have also launched fact-checking ini-
tiatives, such as displaying warnings or links to fact-check articles when users search for topics associated with fake
news (Frenkel, 2018; Wakabayashi & Isaac, 2017). Fact-checking groups have also emerged across different coun-
tries. In Europe, for example, many fact-checking groups are affiliated with news organizations, which have existing
resources to finance fact-checking operations (Graves & Cherubini, 2016). But independent fact-checkers have also
emerged, created by non-government organizations, academics, and even supported by governments (Graves &
Cherubini, 2016). In recent years, such independent sites have formed large networks, such as the International
6 of 9 TANDOC JR.

Fact-checking Network (IFCN), which is affiliated with the media think tank Poynter Institute and includes about 60
active members.
The rise of fact-checking organizations assumes that fact checks help in debunking fake news. That is, readers
exposed to a piece of fake news will correctly question the veracity of that information when they are subsequently
exposed to a fact-checking post debunking the fake post. This assumption has also been tested empirically. When
Facebook started placing links to “related stories” that debunked posts that had been flagged as false, a study found
that such algorithmic correction reduced belief in misinformation (Bode & Vraga, 2018). Equally effective is when
such correction is made by another social media user (Bode & Vraga, 2018). However, a survey conducted in
Singapore found that most people just ignore and do not actively challenge or correct fake news posts that they see
on social media (Tandoc, 2017). This is something that academic research has not yet thoroughly explored: What
factors make social media users less likely to correct disinformation when they see one online?
Other studies, however, have found that fact checks are not always effective. Some individuals might not believe
in corrections and instead continue to hold their pre-existing misperceptions even after exposure to evidence (Ecker,
Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 2014). For example, a study found that explicit warnings saying that a headline had
been disputed by a third-party fact checker did not diminish the effect of repeated exposure to fake news
(Pennycook et al., 2018). For some individuals, reading corrections might backfire and even increase their belief in
misinformation (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Another study found that individuals with higher levels of cognitive ability
were more responsive to corrective new information (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). While individuals with lower
levels of cognitive ability also adjusted their evaluations of a target person that was negatively depicted in a message
that turned out to be based on incorrect information, they did so in a lesser degree than individuals with higher levels
of cognitive ability (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). These studies show that while fact checking helps in correcting
disinformation, it only works for some individuals, such as those with higher levels of cognitive ability. To others,
exposure to correction might have a boomerang effect and instead reinforce belief in the original yet incorrect
information (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Thorson, 2016).

5 | MOVING FORWARD

Societies around the world have long been confronted by the spread of falsehoods and its negative consequences.
But fake news, as how it is currently understood, comes in a period marked by technological structures that facilitate
the exchange of information—both good and bad, both real and fake—in speeds and volumes previously unheard of,
widening its reach and increasing its impact. Understanding this phenomenon is crucial, given its short and long-term
effects not only on individuals and organizations but also on societies and cultures. The academic community has
risen up to the challenge, examining the scope of the problem, its likely causes, and the ways it can be addressed.
Specifically, scholarly research has defined fake news as a form of falsehood intended to primarily deceive people
by mimicking the look and feel of real news (Tandoc et al., 2017). While initial research has shown that only a small
fraction of the online audience is exposed to fake news, for this small group of people, the impact of fake news can
be quite substantial (Grinberg et al., 2019; Nelson & Taneja, 2018) and can also lead to what can be termed as
second-hand disinformation. Studies have identified cognitive processes that make individuals more prone to the
influence of fake news, such as confirmation bias, selective exposure, and lack of analytical thinking (Lazer et al.,
2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Spohr, 2017). Fake news also derives its power from its appeal to partisanship,
perceived novelty, and repeated exposure facilitated by both bots and human users that share them in the online
sphere (Mourão & Robertson, 2019; Pennycook et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018). While fact checking has also
risen in response to fake news, it appears that corrections to wrong information only work on some individuals, such
as those with higher levels of cognitive ability (Bode & Vraga, 2018; De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017; Graves &
Cherubini, 2016; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Furthermore, only a few individuals willingly engage in correcting disinfor-
mation that they see online.
TANDOC JR. 7 of 9

Future research should further explore the various impacts of fake news. Currently, negative impact is assumed,
rightly so, but a closer examination of the various negative effects of fake news can better guide initiatives to combat
it. For example, while fake news derives part of its ability to fool individuals by mimicking the look and feel of real
news, no systematic analysis of its effect on perceptions of real news has been conducted (Van Duyn & Collier,
2019). The attacks on real news organizations, branding them as fake news sites, notwithstanding, the rise of fake
news on social media, where more and more individuals get their news supply from, could be poisoning the informa-
tion well as well, which can decrease trust even in legitimate information sources. Such systematic analysis can also
guide journalists and news organizations in reflecting and re-assessing the conventions that have marked their
profession but have also been exploited by fake news providers (Mourão & Robertson, 2019).
Most studies that explored the factors that facilitate the spread of fake news have also focused on individuals,
outlining cognitive processes that make some individuals more prone to being tricked. This body of work can help
guide initiatives to combat fake news, such as in designing media literacy interventions targeted at vulnerable
individuals. While such work is important, the spread of disinformation in general and fake news in particular is also
facilitated by social factors. Indeed, information sharing is a social process. Future studies should also document
social factors that have allowed the spread of fake news. For example, how does trust in institutions, such as the
police force or the national news media, affect the extent to which societies become easy targets for disinformation?
What roles do economic and technological structures play in the rise of fake news?
Literature on fake news is still expanding, and by the time this review article is published, more articles on fake
news would have been published. By providing a peek into the continuously growing research on fake news, this
article hopes to synthesize and move the current conversation forward, especially in light of the next generation of
falsehoods, such as digitally doctored audios and videos, which individuals might find to be more challenging to
detect. It is not enough to fight fake news with facts—we need a more nuanced and up-to-date understanding of
both individual and social processes and interests that create and sustain a vulnerable audience to begin with.

ACKNOWLEDGEMEN T

This research is supported by two grants from the Singapore Ministry of Education: Tier 1 Fund (T1-002-125-05)
and Tier 2 Fund (T2-1-042).

ORCID

Edson C. Tandoc Jr. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8740-9313

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Edson C. Tandoc Jr. (Ph.D., University of Missouri) is an Associate Professor at the Wee Kim Wee School of
Communication and Information at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He is also an Associate Edi-
tor of Digital Journalism. His research focuses on the sociology of message construction in the context of digital
journalism. He has conducted studies on the construction of news and social media messages. His studies about
influences on journalists have focused on the impact of journalistic roles, new technologies, and audience feed-
back on the various stages of the news gatekeeping process. For example, he has done some work on how jour-
nalists use web analytics in their news work and with what effects. This stream of research has led him to study
journalism from the perspective of news consumers as well, investigating how readers make sense of critical inci-
dents in journalism and take part in reconsidering journalistic norms and how changing news consumption pat-
terns facilitate the spread of fake news.

How to cite this article: Tandoc Jr. EC. The facts of fake news: A research review. Sociology Compass. 2019;
13:e12724. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12724