CABRERA vs LAPID

Facts: The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit filed in November 1995 by petitioner Amelia M.
Cabrera with the Office of the Ombudsman. In her 3-page affidavit, petitioner accused respondents of violating
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. In her
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan
over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. A month later, petitioner learned from
newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow
of the Pasak River. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The
property was demolished by dynamite blasting.

Governor Lapid also argued that under the law, the Department of Agriculture (DA) is the government agency
authorized to enter into licensing agreements for fishpond operations, and as per certification by the DA Regional
Director, petitioner's fishpond operation was not covered by a fishpond lease agreement or application. On May
1996, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based
on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise
of the police power of the State. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to
grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities. But the Ombudsman affirmed its May 1996 Resolution. Thus,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: WON the filing of petitioner of the petition for review on certiorari to seek reversal of the Resolution of the
Ombudsman was correct

Held: Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

In this case, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to
law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a
reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the
Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and
conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not
sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as
the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's supervision
and control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The rule is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.

CATINDIG V MENESES
FACTS:Catindig maintained that he bought the Masusuwi Fishpond from respondent and her children in January
1978, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Catindig further argued that even assuming that respondent was
indeed divested of her possession of the Masusuwi Fishpond by fraud, her cause of action had already prescribed
considering the lapse of about 20 years from 1975, which was allegedly the year when she was fraudulently
deprived of her possession over the property.

ISSUE: WON, CA ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS JOINTLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HIS CO-DEFENDANT; AND IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS A LESSEE IN GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

RULING: While petitioner Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that the
assailed findings of the CA, that Roxas is jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not considering
him as a lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible
by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute,
the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and
jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. 19 Where the issue
or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

REPUBLIC V BELLARTE

FACTS: Angeles Bellate3 filed Free Patent Application. Enriquita Bellate-Quizan6 filed a protest against Angeles
before the Land Management Bureau (formerly, Bureau of Lands).7 She prayed for the annulment of the FPA in
favor of Angeles. She said that the FPA was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation because Angeles did not
state the fact that the land had other occupants aside from him. Republic filed a case against Angeles and spouses
Cabanto and MarietaJuanerio (Juanerio) for the reversion of land to the mass of public domain and for the
annulment of the granted free patent and title with the RTC of Calbayog City

ISSUE: WON THE SC HAS THE POWER TO REVIEW QUESTIONS OF FACT

RULING: YES. The court may review the case under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

"The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive."32 In several decisions, however, the Court
enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA.33

In the present case, we agree with the Republic that the petition falls within the exceptions because the lower
courts’ findings of fact are conflicting.

Contrary to the respondents’ claim, the case of Fuentes v. CA34 is inapplicable. In Fuentes, the Court held that
"[p]revailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the
CA, are binding upon this Court." A review of Fuentes, however, reveals that it is not applicable to this case. In
Fuentes, the RTC of Ozamis City affirmed the Municipal Circuit Trial Court’s findings of fact, deleting only the
monetary award in favor of the private respondents therein.

While both the RTC and the CA decisions ruled in favor of the respondents, the Republic correctly observed,
however, that the RTC and the CA arrived at contradicting findings of facts. The RTC’s findings that Lot No. 2624
was not the same parcel of land originally owned by Eusebia cannot be reconciled with the CA’s findings that Lot
No. 2624 was part of the 27,930-square-meter land of Eusebia.

SUNTAY V GOCOLAY

FACTS: Petitioners and private respondent were buyers of condominium units from Bayfront. Petitioners paid in
advance the full amount for their units. Bayfront, however, failed to deliver them despite the due date. Failing to
get a reimbursement from Bayfront, petitioners filed an action against it in HLURB.Bayfront's titled properties were
levied on by the sheriffs of RTC Manila. At the subsequent public auction of Bayfront's properties, petitioners were
the highest bidders. The corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Respondent Gocolayclaims that she entered
into a contract to sell with Bayfront for the purchase on installment basis of the same Unit G. DOAS and CCT were
annotated the notice of levy and certificate of sale in favor of petitioners.Gocolay filed before the Expanded
National Capital Regional Field Office of the HLURB a complaint for annulment of auction sale and cancellation of
notice of levy from her title.

ISSUE: Does the HLURB, a quasi-judicial agency, have jurisdiction over an action seeking the annulment of an
auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy and damages with prayer for the issuance of a preliminaryinjunction
and/or temporary restraining order?

RULING: HLURB had no jurisdiction over the spouses Suntay. Petitioners were condominium buyers, not
project/condominium owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen against whom a case cognizable by the
HLURB could be brought. HLURB had no jurisdiction over the issue of ownership, possession or interest in the
disputed condominium unit. BP 129 vests jurisdiction over these matters on the RTC which exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction.

VETTE INDUSTRIAL VS CHENG

FACTS:Sui) alleged that on October 24, 2001, he executed a Deed of Assignment,5 where he transferred his 40,000
shares in the company in favor of Kenneth Tan, Vevette Cheng, Felesavette Cheng, and Yvette Tan (Petitioners-
Assignees). To implement the Deed of Assignment, the company acknowledged in a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA),6 that it owed him P6.8 million pesos. He was issued 48 postdated checks but after the 11th check, the
remaining checks were dishonored by the bank.

ISSUE: WON, TC granted MR without basis in law

RULING: Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without
jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with
the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in
excess of his jurisdiction.

CADIMAS V CARREON

FACTS: complaint5 for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through her
attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales, against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo. Petitioner averred
that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract To Sell, petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town
house. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated paragraph 8 of said contract when she transferred ownership
of the property to respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the latter to
manage and administer the property for and in behalf of respondent Carrion. respondent Carrion failed to file a
responsive pleading within the reglementary period. Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss8 on her behalf
and on behalf of respondent Carrion on 18 November 2004, citing the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the
case on the part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint

ISSUE: WON petitioner, as the owner and developer of the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was
guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices.

RULING: Nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter
or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise,
would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. HLURB A. Unsound real estate business
practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer or salesman. Petitioner sought the cancellation of the contract and the recovery of possession
and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. For an action to
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action. It is an
elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of
the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.

GUSTILO V GUSTILO III

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent are heirs of their natural father, the late Atty. Armando Gustilo (they have
different mothers), who owned several properties and was, prior to his death, the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial
Corporation (A.G. Agro) in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. On August 31, 1993, following their father's death, Mary
Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), adjudicating between themselves their
father's properties. One of these was Hacienda Imelda which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. As it happened,
however, the hacienda's title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took possession of the land
through Mila Barco, her mother and natural guardian, and planted sugarcane on it.
Over three years later or in 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda Imelda and its farm
implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop years from 1997-1998 to 2001-2002. Being
financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother were pained to watch Young take over the land. When the lease
contract was about to expire, however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young to surrender the land to her. But the
latter refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to
file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for recovery of possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease
contract, and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide
intra-corporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.
On June 15, 2004 the RTC granted Jose Vicente's motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to its re-filing in the proper court.
On August 11, 2006 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision, prompting Mary Joy to file the present
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Joy's action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the jurisdiction of a
specially designated commercial court.

HELD: It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

It can be gleaned from Mary Joy's allegations in her complaint that her case is principally one for recovery of
possession. Immediately upon the execution of the MOA in 1993, Mary Joy took possession of Hacienda Imelda,
through her mother, and started planting sugarcane on it. In 1997 Young, with the use of force, took over the
property with the farm equipment and implements. Despite several demands to vacate and surrender Hacienda
Imelda, Young continued to cultivate and plant sugarcanes on the property up to 2002, and even entered into a
new lease contract with Jose Vicente.
It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he is entitled to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right.
Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the subject property is in
the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intra-corporate.
The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise
the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of
ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession when it is inseparably connected to the
issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.

ALICANDO V PEOPLE
FACTS: BBB, the father of four-year old AAA, was having a drinking spree with a group composed of Ramil
Rodriguez, Remus Montrel, Russel Autencio and the petitioner at his house at x x x. At about 4:45 o’clock in the
afternoon, the petitioner left while BBB conducted his other companions to Lapuz. The petitioner was residing at
his uncle’s house about five (5) arm’s length away from BBB’s house. Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, was surprised
when answering the call of nature outside his house, he chanced upon the dead body of AAA. It was covered by a
fish basin and surrounded by ants. The child was crouched as if she was cold, with her hands on her head.
Immediately, the girl’s parents were informed.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in convicting him on the basis of evidence obtained from an uncounselled
confession

RULING: An examination of the assailed decision reveals that the conviction handed by the courts a quo was
primarily based on the testimony of Luisa, as corroborated by Dr. Doromal’s autopsy report, and not on physical
evidence, to wit, the pillow and the blood-stained shirt, which the petitioner claimed were fruits of the poisonous
tree. "Axiomatic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect and are generally
not disturbed by the appellate court, unless they are found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded, or some
substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked,
misunderstood or misinterpreted. This rule is founded on the fact that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to
personally observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand, which
are significant factors in evaluating their honesty, sincerity and credibility. Through its direct observations in the
entire proceedings, the judge can be expected to reasonably determine whose testimony to accept and which
witness to disbelieve. On the other hand, the reviewing magistrate has none of the advantages peculiar to the trial
judge’s position, and could rely only on the cold records of the case and on the judge’s discretion."

LICAROS V LICAROS

FACTS: Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in 1979, they
agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children left for the United States.

In 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on
psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then residing in the United States, the court ordered that summons be
served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and at the same time furnishing Margarita a copy of the
order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at her address in the United States through
the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Margarita was given sixty (60) days after
publication to file a responsive pleading. On November 8, 1991, the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was
declared null and void. Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a
certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros"
inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on
November 8, 1991.

Margarita filed a petition for review on certiorari, insisting that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with summons.
Neither did she appear in court to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held: Yes. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such
writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United
States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property
of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of
the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other
means the judge may consider sufficient.

The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service (service by publication and furnishing her with a copy of
the Order, Summons and a copy of the petition at her address in California thru the Department of Foreign Affairs)
does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This
refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is
exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third
mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.

FERNANDO V DE BELEN
FACTS: A complaint for Recovery of Possession filed by the petitioners against Reynaldo De Belen, herein
respondent, before the RTC, registered in the name of the late Jose, married to Lucila Tinio and Apolonia Fernando,
wife of Felipe Galvez. It was alleged that petitioners are the children of the late Jose and they are in the process of
partitioning their inheritance. However, they could not properly accomplish the partition due to the presence of
the respondent who intruded into a portion of their property and conducted quarrying operations in its immediate
vicinity for so many years, without their knowledge and permission.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. RTC decided which is favorable to the petitioners.
Thus, this appeal raising the issues on jurisdiction for failure of the petitioners to state the assessed value of the
subject property, absence of evidence proving the lawful ownership of the petitioners and the grant of affirmative
reliefs which were not alleged or prayed for.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were
not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal
or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within
the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. A reading of both the
complaint and the amended complaint shows that petitioners failed to state the assessed value of the disputed lot.

After the entire proceedings fully participated in by the respondent, he cannot be allowed to question the result as
having been rendered without jurisdiction. This is the teaching in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al. As reiterated in
Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., where the Court ruled: "While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered." Similarly, as this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking
for affirmative relief, effectively barred the respondent by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. The
Court has consistently upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant who
participated in the court proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting his evidence cannot later on question the
trial court's jurisdiction when judgement unfavorable to him is rendered.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with
Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the
defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the
writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against
CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act
placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of
interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases
in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon
appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party
may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI V CULLEN

Respondent (Cullen) purchased from Meridien Land Holding,Inc. (MLHI) condominium Unit No. 1201 of the
petitioner. Old title was later cancelled and new title (CCT 64218) was issued in respondent's name. On 19
September 2002, petitioner (MPMCC) demanded from Cullen payment for unpaid association dues and
assessments claiming a carry-over of MLHI. Cullen refused claiming they are being religiously paid. Consequently,
Cullen was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted during election of MPMCC's BOD. When MLHI
clarified that his dues had already been settled and upon MPMCC's failure to explain why is such, he filed a
Complaint for Damages against MPMCC in RTC Makati, acting as a regular court. MPMCC and MLHI moved to
dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On 9 September 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB and that the issues raised are intra-corporate
between the corporation and member. On appeal, the CA reversed RTC decision holding that the controversy is an
ordinary civil action for damages within the jurisdiction of regular courts. When motions for reconsideration was
denied, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls within RTC sitting as a special commercial court or an ordinary action for
damages within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

HELD: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. Also
illuminating is the Court's pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.:

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein.