Amendments and revision (Art. XVII, Secs.
Whether or Not the COMELEC
1 to 4)
Lambino v. Commission on Elections
G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299, [October 25,
2006], 536 PHIL 1-364
FACTS
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution, they filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under RA 6735. Lambino group
alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided
by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying
sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC
denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling
that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the
initiative petitions.
ISSUES
1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s
initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative.
2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit
its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution.
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3.
committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition.
HELD
According to the SC the Lambino group
failed to comply with the basic requirements
for conducting a people’s initiative. The
Court held that the COMELEC did not
grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the
Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition
Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People The petitioners failed to show
the court that the initiative signer must be
informed at the time of the signing of the
nature and effect, failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders
the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a
clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode
of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the
constitution. Merging of the legislative and
the executive is a radical change, therefore
constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of
Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will
not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This
section states: “Sec. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied) The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission vividly explain
the meaning of an amendment “directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition,” The first cited provision
applies to any form of treaties and
international agreements in general with a
wide variety of subject matter. All treaties
and international agreements entered into by
the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage or particular designation requires
the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective. In contrast, the second cited
provision applies to treaties which involve
presence of foreign military bases, troops
and facilities in the Philippines. Both
constitutional provisions share some
common ground. The fact that the President
referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec.
21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its
concurrence under the same provision is
immaterial.
By People’s Initiative; Requirements and
limitations
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No,
127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin
(President of the People’s Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action or
PIRMA) filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials (Delfin Petition)
through Peoples’ Initiative based on Article
XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
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where Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order:
1. Fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the
country;
2. Causing the necessary publications
of the said Order in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and
3. Instructing Municipal Election
Registrars in all regions to assist
petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations at the
time and dates designated for the
purpose.
The COMELEC through its Chairman
issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition; and setting the
case for hearing.
At the hearing, the petitioner-intervenors
appeared and on the same day, Senator Roco
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
Petitioners filed the special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
1. The constitutional provision on
people’s initiatives to amend the
Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed
by Congress.
2. RA No. 6735 provides for 3 systems
of initiative (Constitution, statutes,
local legislation) but it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution.
3. RA 6735 only covers laws and not
constitutional amendments.
 4. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
(1991) to govern the conduct of
initiative is ultra vires (beyond legal
capacity) because only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to
pass implementing law.
5. People’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution and
not revision.
6. Congress has not yet appropriated
funds for people’s initiatives.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA No. 6735 was intended
to cover initiative on amendments to
the Constitution .
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is valid.
3. Whether the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over a petition solely
intended to obtain an order.
4. Whether the lifting of term limits as
proposed in the Delfin Petition
would constitute a revision or an
amendment to the Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme
Court to take cognizance of the
petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
RATIO:
1. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution is not self-executor
and RA 6735 cannot be the
implementing legislation.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution is not self-executory. The
details for carrying out the provision are left
to the legislature. The interpellations which
ensued on the modified amendment to
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Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Furthermore, the
modified amendment confines initiative to
amendments to and not revision of the
Constitution. However, RA 6735 does not
provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution because there
was no subtitle provided for it. Hence, RA
6735 is not sufficient to be the implementing
legislation for Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
2. The COMELEC Resolution is not
valid.
Empowering the COMELEC, an
administrative body, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under the rule that what
has been delegated cannot be delegated. It
will only be valid if the law a) is complete in
itself; and b) fixes a standard. However,
these requirements were not met.
3. COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over a petition solely intended to
obtain an order.
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing and
thus, becomes the initiatory pleading. The
Delfin petition is not an initiatory pleading
since it does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters (under Sec 2 of
Article XVII), COMELEC has no
jurisdiction before its filing.
 4. There is no need to discuss
whether the petition presents an
amendment or revision of the
Constitution.
The discussion on the issue of whether it is
an amendment or a revision is unnecessary
if not academic since COMELEC has no
jurisdiction.
5. The Supreme Court can take
cognizance of the present petition
for prohibition.
COMELEC has no jurisdiction so it must be
stopped from proceeding further. Moreover,
petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
In this case, the writ is necessary in view of
the highly divisive consequences on the
body politic of the questioned Order. This
political instability and legal confusion
climate begs for judicial statesmanship
because only the SC can save the nation in
peril and uphold the majesty of the
Constitution when the system of
constitutional law is threatened.
-END-
People’s Iniative, Requirements and
Limitations
Lambino, Et Al. vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153,25
October 2006
Facts:
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On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul
Lambino and Erico Aumentado (“Lambino
Group”) commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or
the Initiative and Referendum Act. The
proposed changes under the petition will
shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their
petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least 12% of all
registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its
registered voters; and (b) COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures
of the 6.3 million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due
course to the petition for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Commission
on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated
the matter to the Supreme Court, which also
threw out the petition.
Issues/s:
1. Whether or not the initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on direct
proposal by the people; and
2. Whether or not the initiative violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution disallowing revision
through initiatives

Held:
1. Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution is the governing provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this
provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments, the deliberations of
the framers of our Constitution clearly show
that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on peoples
initiative; and (b) in particular, the people
must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing
such full text.
The essence of amendments “directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be
present.
First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that
every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before –
not after – signing.
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Moreover, “an initiative signer must be
informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed” and
failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative
void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition,
there’s not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the proposed changes in
the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. The
signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people
the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is
most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must
be “directly proposed by the people x x x in
a petition” – meaning that the people must
sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an
issue as amending the nation’s fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of
attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
2. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of
three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon
three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional
convention. The third mode is through a
people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the
first and second modes, applies to “any
amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to “amendments to this
Constitution.” This distinction was
intentional as shown by the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. A people’s
initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress
or a constitutional convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and
under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.
Courts have long recognized the distinction
between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision
if the change alters the substantial entirety of
the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On
the other hand, amendment broadly refers to
a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions
of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a
specific provision of the Constitution
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without affecting any other section or
article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100% to 60% is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail
any modification of sections or articles of
the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do
not also affect the structure of government
or the system of checks-and-balances among
or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on
whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word
“republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and
the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects
basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but
also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions
normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the
other hand, constitutions allow people’s
initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
In California where the initiative clause
allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution,
courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the substantial entirety of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions. The court
examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of
the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such
far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, such a change in
the nature of [the] basic governmental plans
includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches. A change in the nature of the
basic governmental plan also includes
changes that jeopardize the traditional form
of government and the system of check and
balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative
tests, the Lambino Group initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment.
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Quantitatively, the Lambino Group
proposed changes overhaul two articles –
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII
on the Executive – affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government
in the present Constitution are reduced into
two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the
Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone
of one chamber of Congress alters the
system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the
difference between amendments and
revisions is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that
when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions
because members of the deliberative body
work full-time on the changes. The same
substantive changes, when proposed through
an initiative, are called amendments because
the changes are made by ordinary people
who do not make an occupation, profession,
or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC,
however, ruled that the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group’s theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution
are clear and plainly stated, courts do not
deviate from such categorical intent and
language.
Judicial Review of Amendments
Javellana v. Executive Secretary
50SCRA30;
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before
the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit
against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of
the proposed Constitution not found in the
present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class
suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated. Javellana also
alleged that the President had announced the
immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess
of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed constitution upon ground the that
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP is without authority to create the
Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without
power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution;
and the election held to ratify the proposed
constitution was not a free election, hence
null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the
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nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and
any order, decree, and proclamation which
have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is
a justiciable or political question, and
therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory
provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed
Constitution has been acquiesced in
(with or without valid ratification) by
the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are
entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed
Constitution by the 1971
Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new
constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has
been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is
well settled that the matter of ratification of
an amendment to the constitution should be
settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the
alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution
proposed has been ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from
whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution)
shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow
Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of
age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such
Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were
allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And,
since there is no means by which the invalid
votes of those less than 21 years of age can
be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the
Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered
null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the
constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes
cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or
by raising hands – by the persons taking part
in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical,
for, since the early years of the American
regime, we had adopted the Australian
Ballot System, with its major characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballots prepared
and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of
keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,
when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having
been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such
of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took
place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or
even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is
such that there is no reasonable means of
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checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites.
This is another patent violation of Article X
of the 1935 Constitution which form part of
the fundamental scheme set forth in the
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the
"free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite
in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void,
insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an
evidence of ratification. Article X of the
1935 Constitution places COMELEC the
"exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a
certification by the COMELEC in support of
the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies
relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also,
on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged
president of the Federation of Provincial or
City Barangays nor the Department of Local
Governments had certified to the President
the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies
all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed
constitution. It is to my mind a matter of
judicial knowledge that there have been no
such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of
Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other
parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to
concede that the acts the officers and offices
of the Executive Department, in line with
Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition
of or acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot
“recognize” its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a
party of the acts of another. Individual acts
of recognition by members of Congress do
not constitute congressional recognition,
unless the members have performed said
acts in session duly assembled. This is a
well-established principle of Administrative
Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of
martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
Neither does the Court prepared to declare
that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential
orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or
many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or
obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of
the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of
Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning
legislative measures approved by said
Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results
of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution,
an act which Article X of the 1935
Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the
other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there
being more than prima facie showing that
the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, either strictly,
substantially, or has been acquiesced in by
the people or majority thereof; that said
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proposed Constitution is not in force and
effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still
the Fundamental Law of the Land, without
prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for
its ratification or rejection in accordance
with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935
Constitution and the provisions of the
Revised Election Code in force at the time
of such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court,
namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force
by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
4 members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in
their votes on the third question that they
could not state with judicial certainty
whether the people have accepted or not
accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of
the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not
in force; with the result, there are not
enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
Entitlement of immunity, justiciable
or political question?
Holy See vs Rosario GR no.
101949 (1994)
FACTS
Petitioner in this case is the Holy See
(who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City in Rome, Italy) and as
represented in the Philippines by the
Papal Nuncio. Respondent in this
case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his
capacity as the presiding judge of
RTC, Makati, Branch 61, and
Starbright Sales Enterprises, a
 domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business.
The petition started from a
controversy over a parcel of land.
Lot 5A registered under the name of
Holy See, is connected to Lot 5B
under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation. The land was donated
by the Archdiocese of Manila to the
Papal Nuncio which represented the
Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City, Italy for his
residence.
The said lots were sold to Ramon
Licup who assigned his rights to
Respondent Starbright Sales, Inc.
When the squatters refused to vacate
the lots, a dispute arose between
these two parties because both were
unsure as to whose responsibility
was it to evict the squatters from the
said lots. Respondent Starbright
insists that the Holy See should clear
the property while Holy See says
that Starbright should do it or the
earnest money will be returned.
Since Starbright refused to clear the
property, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
returned P100k earnest money. The
same lots were sold to Tropicana
Properties.
Starbright filed a suit for annulment
of sale, specific performance and
damages against Msgr. Cirilios,
Philippine Realty Corporation and
Tropicana.
ISSUE
Can the Holy See invoke sovereign
immunity?
RULING
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 11 | P a g e
YES. The Court held that the Holy
See may properly invoke sovereign
immunity for its non suability. In Art
31(A) of the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
diplomatic envoy (a representative
government who is sent on a special
diplomatic mission) shall be granted
immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable
property.
The DFA certified that the embassy of the
Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local
jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity
rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in
this Court.
Entitlement of immunity, justiciable or
political question
Liang vs. People
FACTS: Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an
economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) , was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with two
counts of grave oral defamation for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against
a fellow ADB worker. Liang was arrested
but later released. The next day, the judge
received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that Liang is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government. Based on the said
protocol communication, the judge, without
notice to the prosecution, dismissed the two
criminal cases. The RTC set aside the MeTC
ruling and ordered the latter court to enforce
the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. Liang
appealed arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement.
ISSUES:
1. Was the judge correct in dismissing the
cases on the basis the protocol
communication without notice to the
prosecution?
2. Is Liang covered with immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government?
HELD:
1. No. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take
on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity.
The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's
advice and in motu proprio dismissing the
two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process
was violated. It should be noted that due
process is a right of the accused as much as
it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry
in what capacity petitioner was acting at the
time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time. At any rate,
it has been ruled that the mere invocation of
the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges.
2. No. Under Section 45 of the Agreement
which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for
the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the
Bank shall enjoy the following privileges
and immunities:
a.)....... immunity from legal process with
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 12 | P a g e
respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank
waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that
the act was done in "official capacity." It is
therefore necessary to determine if
petitioners case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should
have been given the chance to rebut the
DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Likewise, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation,
in the name of official duty. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions. As
already mentioned above, the commission of
a crime is not part of official duty. (Liang vs
People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000)
When a suit is against a state and when it is
not
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar
Apostolic of Puerto Princesa vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as
Commander of the US. 7th Fleet
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the
Philippines requested diplomatic clearance
for the said vessel "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty." On January
17, 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. By
March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage
team had finished removing the last piece of
the grounded ship from the coral reef.
Hence, the Petitioners filed the petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
claiming that the grounding, salvaging and
post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution
of civil, administrative and criminal suits for
acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
over the US respondents.
RULING:
The petition for the issuance of the privilege
of the Writ of Kalikasan is denied.
1) Non-suability of the State in relation to
Doctrine of Incorporation
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 13 | P a g e
The immunity of the State from suit, known
also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity
or non-suability of the State, is expressly
provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued
without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge
Guinto, we discussed the principle of state
immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without
its consent, now expressed in Article XVI,
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as
part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would
still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized
state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon
its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with
these principles in its relations with other
states.
2) Justification for State Immunity
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of
state immunity is based on the justification
given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be
no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends."
There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of
the foreign state sought to be impleaded in
the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. A contrary disposition would,
in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly
vex the peace of nations."
3) Applicability of the doctrine to State
officials
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,
we further expounded on the immunity of
foreign states from the jurisdiction of local
courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in
the courts of a foreign state is a long-
standing rule of customary international law
then closely identified with the personal
immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit
and, with the emergence of democratic
states, made to attach not just to the person
of the head of state, or his representative, but
also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to
a suit are those of a foreign government
done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 14 | P a g e
believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself.
In the same case we also mentioned that in
the case of diplomatic immunity, the
privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it
is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction.
4) Restrictive rule of state immunity
This traditional rule of State immunity
which exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without the
former’s consent or waiver has evolved into
a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State
immunity extends only to acts jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity
is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities
or economic affairs.
5) Limitations of the Doctrine State
Immunity
It is a different matter where the public
official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to
the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set
forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs.
Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or
officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated
by such acts, for the protection of his rights,
is not a suit against the State within the rule
of immunity of the State from suit. In the
same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer
or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption
of authority which he does not have, is not a
suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may
not be sued without its consent.” The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
In this case, the US respondents were sued
in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting
in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds
by the US government, the suit is deemed to
be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents.
Immunity of government agencies
i. Incorporated
Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-
55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National
Irrigation Administration and driven
officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia,
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's
death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit
for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as
Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 15 | P a g e
awarded actual, moral and exemplary
damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA
appealed. The Solicitor General contends
that the NIA does not perform solely and
primarily proprietary functions but is an
agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not
liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE: May NIA, a government agency, be
held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent?
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency
with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a
corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act
of its driver who was not its special agent.
RATIO: ■ Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us
that NIA is a government agency invested
with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government, thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Section
2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that NIA
also has its own assets and liabilities and has
corporate powers to be exercised by a Board
of Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD
552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued
in court. ■ Of equal importance is the case
of National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which
propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is
not an agency performing governmental
functions; rather it performs proprietary
functions . . . ." The functions of providing
water supply and sewerage service are
regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service
rendered caters to the community as a whole
and the goal is for the general interest of
society. Like the NAWASA, the National
Irrigation Administration was not created for
purposes of local government. While it may
be true that the NIA was essentially a
service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA
essentially and purely a "government-
function" corporation. NIA was created for
the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national
irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation
projects." Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited
by the services the agency renders, but these
functions are only incidental to the principal
aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of
lands. NOTES: The liability of the State has
two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or
governmental aspects where it is liable for
the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its
private or business aspects (as when it
engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer.
Immunity of government agencies
ii. Unincorporated
1. Governmental function
G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993
HON. RAMON J. FAROLAN, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and
BAGONG BUHAY
TRADING, respondents.
Facts:
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 16 | P a g e
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No.
170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port
ofManila carrying among others, 80 bales of
screen net consigned to Baging
BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import
was classified under Tariff Heading no.
39.06-B of theTariff and Customs Code at
35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the
duties and taxesdue in the amount of
P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of
Customs ordered a re-examination of the
shipment uponhearing the information that
the shipment consisted of mosquito net
made of nylonunder Tariff Heading No.
62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon
re-examination, itturns out that the shipment
was undervalued in quantity and value as
previouslydeclared. Thus the Collector of
Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of
thegovernment.Private respondent filed a
petition on August 20, 1976 for the release
of the questionedgoods which the Court
denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the
80 bales werereleased to Bagong Buhay
after several motion. The sixteen remaining
bales weremissing. The respondent claims
that of the 143,454 yards released, only
116,950 yardswere in good condition and
the rest were in bad condition. Thus,
respondents demandsthat the Bureau of
Customs be ordered to pay for damages for
the 43,050 yards itactually lost.
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs
may be held liable for the 43,050
yardsactually lost by the private respondent.
Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for
actual damages that the privaterespondent
sustained with regard to its goods.
Otherwise, to permit
privater e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m t
o prosper would violate t
he doctrine of sovereigni
mmunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay
for actual damages it sustained, for which
ultimately liability will fall on the
government, it isobvious that this case has
been converted technically into a suit against
the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that
“state may not be sued without its consent,”
categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without
any separate judicial personality of its own, t
he Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity fro
m suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, it is invested with an inherent
power of sovereignty,namely taxation. As an
agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmentalfunction of collecting revenues
which is defined not a proprietary function.
Thus privaterespondents claim for damages
against the Commissioner of Customs must
fails.
Immunity of government agencies
i. Incorporated
ii. Unincorporated
1. Governmental function
2. Proprietary function
Title: CHINA NATIONAL
MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP.
(GROUP) vs. HON. CESAR D.
SANTAMARIA G.R. No. 185572
February 7, 2012
Petitioner: China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. ( CNMEG)
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 17 | P a g e
Respondents: Court of Appeals, League of
Urban Poor for Action (LUPA), et’al
Ponente: J. Sereno
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary
Injunction against the decision and
resolution of Court of Appeals made on
September 30, 2008 and on December 5,
2008 respectively.
FACTS:
On December 30, 2003, North Luzon
Railways Corporation (Northrail) and China
National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (
CNMEG) executed a Contract Agreement
for the construction of Section 1, Phase 1 of
the North Luzon Railway System from
Caloocan to Malolos. In relation to this, the
Philippine government made a financial
(loan) agreement with Export Import Bank
of China (EXIM Bank), the designated
lending bank of Chinese government for this
project.
On February 13, 2016, the respondents
(LUPA, et’al) filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Contract and Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 145
of Makati City. They alleged that the
contract and loan agreement were in
violation of; 1> Constitution, 2)
Government Procurement Act or R.A. 9184,
3) Government Audition Code or P.D. 1445,
and 3) Adminstrative Code or E.O. 292.
On April 12, 2006, CNMEG filed a Motion
to Dismiss at RTC 145 on the contention
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over :
a) its person since it was an agent of Chinese
government, and b) the subject matter since
the Northrail project was premised on being
an executive agreement. This petition was
denied by the trial court, and the petition for
certiorari filed at Court of Appeals (CA) was
likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity,
precluding it from being sued before a local
court.
2. Whether the Contract Agreement is an
executive agreement, such that it cannot be
questioned by or before a local court.
HELD:
1. No, CNMEG is not entitled to immunity.
Under the doctrine of restrictive theory
which Philippines adhered (affirmed in the
case of JUSMAG v. NLRC), the doctrine of
state immunity can not be invoked for
commercial, private and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis).
The engagement of proprietary acts by
CNMEG was established in the Contract
Agreement dated December 30, 2003,
Memorandum of Understanding dated
September 14, 2002, Letter of Ambassador
Wang to Secretary Camacho dated October
1, 2003, and loan agreement dated February
13, 2006.
a) In the Contract Agreement, CNMEG
made an undertaking for the feasibility study
in the context of business strategy to secure
commercial enterprise.
b) In the letter of Ambassador Wang, the
Northrail project was affirmed to be an
initiative of CNMEG, and not by the
Chinese government. The implementation of
it was intended to generate profit for
CNMEG.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 18 | P a g e
c) In the loan agreement, there was a
provision which stated for the constitution of
private and commercial acts to be done for
commercial purposes under the laws of
Republic of the Philippines. Likewise, there
was a provision for the express waiver of
immunity.
2. No, the Contract Agreement is not an
executive agreement. In the case of Bayan
Muna v. Romula, the SC held that it is
similar to a treaty, but without a need for
legislative concurrence, and usually less
formal and with narrower range of subject
matters. Under the Vienna Convention, the
requisites were; a) the agreement must be
between the States, b) it must be written, and
c) it must be governed by international law.
The Contract Agreement did not satisfy all
requisites. It was not an agreement between
the States, nor to be governed by
international law.
a) The agreement was not entered into by
Philipines and China. Northrail is a
government-owned or controlled
corporation while CNMEG is a corporation
duly organized and created under the laws of
People’s Republic of China. These
companies have distinct personalities from
the Philippine and Chinese governments.
b) The agreement was not to be governed by
international law. As expressly stated in
Article 2 of Conditions of Contract, the
agreement shall be governed by Philippine
law.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
Suability not outright liability
i. Meritt vs. Gov’t. Of the Phil. Islands, 34
Phil 311, No. 11154, 21 March 1916)
MERITT vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311
FACTS:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the
defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, when an ambulance of the
General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an
intersection. By reason of the resulting
collusion, the plaintiff was so severely
injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he
was suffering from a depression in the left
parietal region, a wound in the same place
and in the back part of his head, while blood
issued from his nose and he was entirely
unconscious. The marks revealed that he had
one or more fractures of the skull and that
the grey matter and brain had suffered
material injury.
Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the
plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an
inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a
notable readjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The damages that the
plaintiff got from the collision disabled him
to do this work as a contractor and forced
him to give up contracts he recently had.
As the negligence which cause the collision
is a tort committed by an agent or employee
of the Government, the inquiry at once
arises whether the Government is legally-
liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 19 | P a g e
No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to
bring suit against the GPI and authorizing
the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is
legally-liable for the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
RULING:
No, the Government is not legally-liable for
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
It being quite clear that Act. No. 2457 does
not operate to extend the Government’s
liability to any cause not previously
recognized.That according to paragraph 5
of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among
others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is limited
to that which it contracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a definite order
or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which
gives rise to the claim, and not where the
claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who
can be held to the proper responsibility in
the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court
in not so deciding and in sentencing the said
entity to the payment of damages, caused by
an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the
provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI)
is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for
the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903,
supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not
such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment

appealed from must be reversed, without
costs in this instance. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally
liable for the amount of damages above set
forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, be legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we
are not called upon to determine. This matter
rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 20 | P a g e

Waiver of state immunity
REPUBLIC VS. FELICIANO
G.R. NO. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12,
1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner-appellee,
PABLO FELICIANO and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents-appellants
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio
of Salvacion, representing the Republic of
the Philippines to dismiss the complaint
filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo
Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Land Authority,
for the recovery of ownership and
possession of parcel of land consisting of
four lots. The trial court rendered a decision
declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private
property of Feliciano and the rest of the
property, Lots 2, 3, and 4, reverted to the
public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the
filing of a motion to intervene and to set
aside the decision of the trial court by 86
settlers, alleging that they had been in
possession of land for more than 20 years
under claim of ownership. The trial court
ordered the settlers to present their evidence
but they did not appear at the day of the
presentation of evidence. Feliciano on the
other hand, presented additional evidence.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 21 | P a g e
decision and the trial court ruled in favor of
Feliciano.
The settlers filed a motion for
reconsideration. The case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence. But
before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano
filed a motion for execution with the
Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and
hence the action cannot prosper. The motion
was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the State can be sued for
recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon
a showing that the State has consented to be
sued., either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked
by the courts sua sponte at any stage of
proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
sovereignty will not be interfered lightly, but
must be construed in strictissimi juris (of
strictest right). Moreover, the proclamation
is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.
2. Special Law
a. Arts. 2180 and 2189 of the new Civil
Code

CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and
CA
G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila as he was trying to
board a jeepney, causing injuries which
required him to incur medical expenses.
Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a
complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in
favor of Teotico and dismissing the
amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision
was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as
the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate
sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal
for certiorari by the City of Manila.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be
held liable as the incident happened on a
NATIONAL highway
HELD: the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed
YES
The question to be determined is if present
case is governed by Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila)
reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for
damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 22 | P a g e
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
defective conditions of road, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision
should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas
the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to
the entire Philippines.
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code,
and, we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject-
matter of the provisions above quoted,
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the
City of Manila for: “damages or injury to
persons or property … Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making “provinces,
cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by any person by reason” — specifically —
“of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.”
In other words, said section 4 refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas
Article 2189 governs liability due to
“defective streets,” in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged
defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.
xxxxx
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a
street which is “under the supervision and
control” of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that “the streets aforementioned
were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the
storm drains and manholes thereof covered
by the defendant City and the officers
concerned” who “have been ever vigilant
and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed
upon them by law.“ Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was
and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that
said Avenue is a national highway was
made, for the first time, in its MR of the
decision of the CA . Such assertion raised,
therefore, a question of fact, which had not
been put in issue in the trial court, and
cannot be set up, for the first time, on
appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion
for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either “control or
supervision” over said street or road. Even
if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would
not necessarily detract from its “control or
supervision” by the City of Manila, under
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 23 | P a g e
Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x)
thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The
Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law
to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and
to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to
provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling
of streets and public places; . . . … the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers,
and drains, and all structures in and under
the same …to provide for and regulate
cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . .
… and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts
and culverts; … to regulate the lights used
on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .
Then, again, the determination of whether or
not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and
whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in
connection with the maintenance of said
road, which were decided by the Court of
Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact,
and the findings of said Court thereon are
not subject to our review.
ii. Implied consent
1. By entering into a business contract (Suit
against foreign government)
a. Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity
US vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487
Facts:
This a petition to review, set aside certain
orders and restrain perpetually the
proceeding don by Hon. Ruiz for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United State of America had a naval
base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the
United State invited the submission of bids
for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de
Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US
two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company construed
this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company
received a latter which was signed by
William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the
company did not qualify to receive an award
for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs,
and that the projects were awarded to third
parties. For this reason, a suit for specific
performance was filed by him against the
US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding
for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state
immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity
exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is necessary consequence
of the principle of independence and
equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 24 | P a g e
continually and evolving and because the
activities of states have multiplied. It has
been necessary to distinguish them between
sovereign and governmental act (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and
property acts (jure gestionis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil. The restrictive application
of State immunity is now the rule in the
United State, the United Kingdom and other
states in western Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects
are an integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both the United
states and Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest
order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity
is proper only when the proceeding arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign. Its commercial activities of
economic affairs. A state may be descended
to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued. Only when it enters into business
contracts.
By commencing a suit (Suit against private
individual)
FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL
SHIPPING G.R. No. L-6060
September 30, 1954
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint
against the defendant-appellant, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he
purchased from the Shipping Commission
the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 property. The Republic of the Philippines
down and agreeing to pay the balance in was allowed to intervene in said civil case
instalments. To secure the payment of the praying for the possession of the in order
balance of the purchase price, he executed a that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of may be foreclosed.
the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of Issue: WON THE FILING OF A
the installments, the Shipping Commission COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BY
tool possession of said vessel and considered THE REPUBLIC IS A WAIVER OF ITS
the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping RIGHT TO NON SUABILITY.
Commission chartered and delivered said
Held:
vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
approval of the President of the Philippines. government impliedly allowed itself to be
Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping sued when it filed a complaint in
Commission to the President of the intervention for the purpose of asserting
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet claim for affirmative relief against the
restored him to all his rights under his plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The
original contract with the Shipping immunity of the state from suits does not
Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly deprive it of the right to sue private parties
demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may
Co. the possession of the vessel in question avail itself of the different forms of actions
but the latter refused to do so. open to private litigants. In short, by taking
the initiative in an action against a private
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of
party, the state surrenders its privileged
the bond accompanying his complaint, a
position and comes down to the level of the
writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of
defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
said vessel with all its equipment and
within certain limits, the right to set up
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be
whatever claims and other defenses he might
adjudged to have the rightful possession
have against the state.
thereof . The lower court issued the writ of
replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue Consent to be sued does not include consent
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was to execution
divested of its possession of said vessel.
Municipality of San Miguel vs. Fernandez,
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of 130 SCRA 56
Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale,
for the reason that when the vessel was
delivered to it, the Shipping Administration
had authority to dispose of said authority to
the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have
thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of
P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed
an action to recover possession thereof and
have him declared the rightful owner of said

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 25 | P a g e

 among others,PNB the immediate release of
the sum of P4,953,506.45 which
corresponds to the balance of appraised
value of the subject property. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by RTC and was also denied by CA
on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of RTC
releasing immediately the balance was
valid?

RULING:
The Court ruled that no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the
public funds of petitioner deposited in the
bank absence of an ordinance passed by the
Municipal Council of Makati appropriating
from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under RTC
decision. It also ruled that claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance and the
corresponding disbursement of the
municipal funds.

Immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an

( Consent to be sued does not include
injustice on a citizen
consent to execution)
Wylie vs Rarang

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. CA FACTS:

Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant

administrative officer while petitioner Capt.
FACTS: James Williams was the commanding
officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay,
A Petition for Review was filed by
Olongapo City.
Municipality of Makati on the decision of
the RTC ordering the former, by reason of
Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an
the expropriation proceedings, to pay private
employee in the office of the Provost
respondent Admiral Finance Creditors’
Marshal assigned as merchandise control
Consortium, Inc. the amount of P5,291,666
guard.
minus the advances payment of P338,160.
An order was issued by RTC ordering,

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 26 | P a g e

M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant
administrative officer of the U.S. Naval
Station supervised the publication of the
"Plan of the Day" (POD) which was
published daily by the US Naval Base
station.
On February 3, 1978, the POD made a
publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION
LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain
person named “Auring” who is described as
a disgrace to her division and to the Office
of the Provost Marshal.
The private respondent was the only one
who was named "Auring" in the Office of
the Provost Marshal and was subsequently
proven that it was her being referred to when
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of
apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
The private respondent then filed an action
for damages alleging that the article
constituted false, injurious, and malicious
defamation and libel tending to impeach her
honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and
that the libel was published and circulated in
the English language and read by almost all
the U. S. Naval Base personnel.
The defendants however contended by filing
a motion to dismiss based on the grounds
that the defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt.
James Williams acted in the performance of
their official functions as officers of the
United States Navy and are, therefore,
immune from suit; and the United States
Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
government which cannot be sued without
its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the United
States Naval Base are immune from suit.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 27 | P a g e
HELD:
Such act or omission is ultra vires and
cannot be part of official duty.
It was a tortious act which ridiculed the
private respondent.
In this particular case, the records show that
the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and he
approved it.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in
the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
defamation against the character and
reputation of the private respondent.
As a result of the petitioners' act, the private
respondent, according to the record, suffered
besmirched reputation, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation,
specially so, since the article was baseless
and false.
The petitioners, alone, in their personal
capacities are liable for the damages they
caused the private respondent.
Police Power
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a
Government Agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of
request from the petitioner to open Neptune
Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the
public. The said opening of Neptune Street
will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the
flow of traffic in Makati City. This was
pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the
said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order. Respondent claimed that
the MMDA had no authority to do so and
the lower court decided in favor of the
Respondent. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the lower courts and claimed that
it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the
State that can practice police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the
mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not
have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the
National Legislature. However, police
power may be delegated to government
units. Petitioner herein is a development
authority and not a political government
unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise
police power because it cannot be delegated
to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government.
Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower
the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act
that grants MMDA police power. It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 28 | P a g e
down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area.
Police Power
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of
overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes
Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of
the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the
court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism
providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is
constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power.
RULING:
“[Police power] has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory
reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same
class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification
made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.
Police Power
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 29 | P a g e
Tio vs VRB 151, SCRA 208, 1987
Facts:
On September 1, 1986, Valentino Tio (Tio
for brevity), on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected, filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1987
entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The rationale behind the enactment
of the aforesaid Decree may be summarized
in its eighth (8th) whereas clause stating that
grave emergencies corroding the moral
values of the people and betraying the
national economic recovery program
necessitate the adoption of bold measures
with dispatch. On October 23, 1986, the
Greater Manila Theaters Association,
Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and
Distributors Association of the Philippines,
and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers
Association were permitted by the Supreme
Court (SC) to
intervene in the case over Tio’s opposition
upon the allegations that intervention was
necessary for the complete protection of
their rights and that their “survival and very
existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation
of film piracy.”
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Section 10 of
P.D. No. 1987, which imposes a tax
of thirty percent (30%)on the gross
receipts payable to the local
government is a rider and the same is
not germane to the subject thereof;
(2) Whether or not the tax imposed is
harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade
 in violation of the due process of the
Constitution; and
(3) Whether or not there is
undue delegation of power and
authority;
Ruling:
As to the first issue, the SC held that Tio’s
contention that the tax provision of the
Decree is a rider is bereft and devoid of
merit because the title of the Decree, which
is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory
Board (VRB) aimed at regulating and
controlling the video industry, is
comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions.
Moreover, it is unnecessary to express all
those objectives in the title or that the latter
be an index to the body of the decree. As to
the second issue, the SC held that it is
axiomatic that a tax does not cease to be
valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed. The legislature acts upon its
constituents in imposing a tax; thus, in
general, a sufficient security against
erroneous and oppressive taxation is
afforded the taxpayer. More importantly, the
tax imposed by the Decree is also a revenue
measure. The tax of 30% is exacted for a
public purpose, i.e. to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the
flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. As to the third issue, the SC
held that the grant in Section 11 of the
Decree of authority to the VRB to “solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or
personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the
Board” is not a delegation of the power to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 30 | P a g e
legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329
SCRA 314 (2000)
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100152
Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.
Respondent: The Honorable Court of
Appeals
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of
the City Mayor of Iligan for a business
permit. After consideration of petitioner's
application and the opposition interposed
thereto by local optometrists, respondent
City Mayor issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions: (1)
Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put
up an optical clinic but only a commercial
store; (2) It cannot examine and/or
prescribe reading and similar optical glasses
for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and
similar eyeglasses without a prescription
having first been made by an independent
optometrist or independent optical clinic.
Acebedo can only sell directly to the public,
without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and
similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise
optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can
advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and
frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but
only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent
Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI
lodged a complaint against the petitioner
alleging that Acebedo had violated the
conditions set forth in its business permit
and requesting the cancellation and/or
revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989,
the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of
Resolution and Cancellation of Business
Permit effective as of said date and giving
petitioner three (3) months to wind up its
affairs.
Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the
authority to impose special conditions, as a
valid exercise of police power, in the grant
of business permits
Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute
of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is
essentially regulatory in nature and the
power to issue licenses or grant business
permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit
of this power. The authority of city mayors
to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is beyond cavil. However, the power
to grant or issue licenses or business permits
must always be exercised in accordance with
law, with utmost observance of the rights of
all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 31 | P a g e
In the case under consideration, the business
permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several
conditions. Petitioner agrees with the
holding by the Court of Appeals that
respondent City Mayor acted beyond his
authority in imposing such special
conditions in its permit as the same have no
basis in the law or ordinance. Public
respondents and private respondent SOPI
are one in saying that the imposition of said
special conditions is well within the
authority of the City Mayor as a valid
exercise of police power.
The issuance of business licenses and
permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The
authority, which devolved upon local
government units to issue or grant such
licenses or permits, is essentially in the
exercise of the police power of the State
within the contemplation ,of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government
Code.
What is sought by petitioner from
respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage
in the business of running an optical shop. It
does not purport to seek a license to engage
in the practice of optometry. The objective
of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner's business permit could be attained
by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's
employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrist, from the Board
of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the
conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit,
regulate the practice of a profession. Such a
function is within the exclusive domain of
the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
Police Power
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO
MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO
CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE
BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LAND
TRANSPORTATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
EN BANC
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:l w library
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of
Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 stating for the process
and schedule of Phasing out and
Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis.
The Memo Circular further declares that no
car beyond six years shall be operated as
taxi,
For an orderly implementation of
Memorandum Circular (MC), the MC shall
immediately be effective in Metro-Manila.
Its implementation outside Metro- Manila
shall be carried out only after the project has
been implemented in Metro-Manila and only
after the date has been determined by the
Board. an virtual law l
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 32 | P a g e
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42,
taxi units with year models over six (6)
years old are now banned from operating as
public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the
units involved should be considered as
automatically dropped as public utilities and,
therefore, do not require any further
dropping order from the BOTl law library
Taxi units within the National Capitol
Region having year models over 6 years old
shall be refused registration. The following
schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed
for the guidance of all concerned.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a
Petition with the BOT, seeking to nullify
MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation;
to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of
model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation library
The Petition was instituted with the
following. law library
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the
questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential
Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural
due process? l law
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did
comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101,
would the implementation and enforcement
of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights
to.
(1) Equal protection of the law; c virtual law
library
(2) Substantive due process; and l law
library
(3) Protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable classification and standard?
RULING
On Procedural and Substantive Due
Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the
Board of Transportation the power to fix just
and reasonable standards, classification,
regulations, practices, measurements, or
service to be furnished, imposed, observed,
and followed by operators of public utility
motor vehicles.
lIn support of their submission that they
were denied procedural due process,
petitioners contend that they were not caged
upon to submit their position papers, nor
were they ever summoned to attend any
conference prior to the issuance of the
questioned BOT Circular.c virtual law
library
It is clear from the provision aforequoted,
however, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in
gathering necessary information or data in
the formulation of any policy, plan or
program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the
submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who
may be affected, this being only one of the
options open to the Board, which is given
wide discretionary authority. Petitioners
cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process.
Neither can they state with certainty that
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 33 | P a g e
public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars. operators of public
conveyances are not the only primary
sources of the data and information that may
be desired by the BOT.cy
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the
issuance of the Circulars is neither violative
of procedural due process. virtual law
library
Previous notice and hearing as elements of
due process, are constitutionally required for
the protection of life or vested property
rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding,
generally dependent upon a past act or event
which has to be established or ascertained. It
is not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct of a class or persons or
enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise.
Petitioners further take the position that
fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary
and oppressive because the roadworthiness
of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are
subjected, and, therefore, their actual
physical condition should be taken into
consideration at the time of registration. As
public contend, however, it is impractical to
subject every taxicab to constant and
recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact
that it can open the door to the adoption of
multiple standards, possible collusion, and
even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to an
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and
justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of
experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered,
and a fair return on investment obtained.
They are also generally dilapidated and no
longer fit for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are
in continuous operation practically 24 hours
everyday in three shifts of eight hours per
shift. With that standard of reasonableness
and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement
of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in
question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is
being enforced in Metro Manila only and is
directed solely towards the taxi industry. At
the outset it should be pointed out that
implementation outside Metro Manila is also
envisioned in Memorandum Circular No.
77-42.
The Board's reason for enforcing the
Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of
other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic
conditions are not the same in every city, a
substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause
can hardly be successfully claimed.l law
library
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of
the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of
the riding public from the dangers posed by
old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all
things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare
of society. It may also regulate property
rights.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 34 | P a g e
In so far as the non-application of the
assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment be
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things
or persons Identically or similarly situated.
It permits of classification of the object or
subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences,
and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. What is required under
the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons
under Identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both
in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy
the foregoing criteria. law library
Evident then is the conclusion that the
questioned Circulars do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable. 10chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are
denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.ch virtual law library
Taxation or Police Power?
ANGELES UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION VS CITY OF ANGELES
Petitioner: Angeles University
Foundation
Respondents: City of Angeles, Juliet
Quinsaat, in her capacity as Treasurer of
Angeles City and Engr.
Donato N. Dizon, in his capacity as Acting
Angeles City Building Official
Facts:
Petitioner Angeles University Foundation
(AUF) is an educational institution
established on May 25, 1962 and was
converted into a non-stock, non-profit
education foundation under the provisions of
+Republic Act (RA) No. 6055 on December
4, 1975. On August 2005, petitioner filed
with the Office of the City Building Official
in the City of Angeles Pampanga an
application for a building permit for the
construction of an 11-storey building in its
main Campus. A Building Permit Fee
Assessment and an order of payment for
Locational Clearance Fees was issued by the
said office. Petitioner claimed, through a
letter addressed to respondents City
Treasurer and Acting City Building Official,
that it is exempted from the payment of the
building permit and locational clearance fees
and cited legal opinions rendered by the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents
referred the matter to the Bureau of Local
Government Finance (BLGF) of the
Department of Finance, which in turn
endorsed the query to the DOJ. DOJ replied
and affirmed the claim of the petitioner.
Despite the petitioner’s plea, however,
respondents refused to issue the building
permit. Petitioner then appealed the matter
to the City Mayor but received no written
response. Consequently, petitioner paid
under protest a total of P826,662.99 and the
Building Permit and other documents were
issued
afterwards. Petitioner formally requested the
respondents to refund the fees it paid under
protest through letters dated June 15, 2006
and August 7, 2006. But the respondents
denied the claim for refund. On August 31,
2006, petitioner filed a Complaint before the
trial court seeking for the refund of
P826,662.99 plus interest at a rate of 12%
per annum, and for attorneys fee in the
amount of P300,000.00 and litigation
expenses. On September 21, 2007, the trial
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 35 | P a g e
court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner. Respondents
appeal to the CA which reversed the trial
court’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. So the
petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the building permit fee is a
tax from which petitioner is exempt.
Discussion:
The building permit fee is neither a tax nor a
charge on property. Based on Sections 102,
103 and 104, the building permit fee is a
regulatory imposition on certain activities
the owner may conduct either to build such
structures or to repair, alter, renovate or
demolish the same. Since building permit
fees are not charges on property, they are
not impositions from which petitioner is
exempt. As to petitioner’s argument that the
building permit fees collected by
respondents are in reality taxes because the
primary purpose is to raise revenues for the
local government unit, the same does not
hold water. A charge of a fixed sum which
bears no relation at all to the cost of
inspection and regulation may be held to be
a tax rather than an exercise of the police
power. In this case, the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways who is mandated to
prescribe and fix the amount of fees and
other charges that the Building Official shall
collect in connection with the performance
of regulatory functions, has promulgated and
issued the Implementing Rules and
Regulations which provide for the bases of
assessment of such fees.
The court cited the case of CHEVRON
PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY and explained the difference
between tax and regulation: IN
DISTINGUISHING TAX AND
REGULATION AS A FORM OF POLICE
POWER, THE DETERMINING FACTOR
IS THE PURPOSE OF THE
IMPLEMENTED MEASURE. IF THE
PURPOSE IS PRIMARILY TO RAISE
REVENUE, THEN IT WILL BE DEEMED
A TAX EVEN THOUGH THE MEASURE
RESULTS IN SOME FORM OF
REGULATION. ON THE OTHER HAND,
IF THE PURPOSE IS PRIMARILY TO
REGULATE, THEN IT IS DEEMED A
REGULATION AND AN EXERCISE OF
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE,
EVEN THOUGH INCIDENTALLY,
REVENUE IS GENERATED. THE
CONSERVATIVE AND PIVOTAL
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE TWO
(2) POWERS RESTS IN THE PURPOSE
FOR WHICH THE CHARGE IS MADE. IF
GENERATION OF REVENUE IS THE
PRIMARY PURPOSE AND
REGULATION IS MERELY
INCIDENTAL, THE IMPOSITION IS A
TAX; BUT IF REGULATION IS THE
PRIMARY PURPOSE, THE FACT THAT
REVENUE IS INCIDENTALLY RAISED
DOES NOT MAKE THE IMPOSITION A
TAX.
Held:
The petition was denied and the decision of
the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Eminent Domain or Police Power
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs.
DSWD
GR 199669, April 25,2017
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic
corporation engaged in business of drugstore
operation in the Philippines files a petition
for prohibition with application for TRO
against RA 9257 “Expanded Senior Citizens
Act” and RA 9442 “Magna Carta for
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 36 | P a g e
disabled Persons” particularly the granting
of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines by senior citizens and persons
with disability and respectively, treating
them as tax deduction.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 4 (a)
of RA 9257 “Expanded Senior Citizens Act”
and Section 32 of RA 9442 “Magna Carta
for disabled Persons” are constitutional
Held: Supreme Court find subject
provisions constitutional. The determination
that the cost of the 20% discount will be
recovered as a tax deduction instead of a tax
credit is within the legislative’s power to
tax. The legislative has the power to
determine if particular costs should be
treated as deductions or if it entitles
taxpayers to credit.
Tax Deduction Scheme is
uniform and equitable. Uniformity of
taxation means that all subjects of taxation
similarly situated are to be treated alike both
in privileges and liabilities. The taxes are
uniform if a.) standards used are substantial
and not arbitrary, b.) germane to the purpose
of law c.) law applies, being all things are
equal, to both present and future conditions,
and d.) the classification applies equally
well to all those belonging to same class.
Since 20% discount applies to all senior
citizens and persons with disability equally,
and the tax deductions schemes applies to all
establishments granting the discounts, no
issue on the uniformity of the tax measure.
The exercise of the power of
eminent domain requires that there is a
property that is taken from the Owner. In
this case, there is no private property that
maybe the subject of a constitutional taking.
The subject of the alleged “taking” is the
establishment’s possible profits. Possible
profits cannot be acquired by the State
through the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Possible profits are yet to be
earned, hence, they are yet to be owned.
They are intangible property for which
establishments do not have a vested right.
In the exercise of its police
power, the State may make variances in the
pricing of goods to accommodate public
policy, and to promote social justice. The
States’ determination of how establishments
can recover the cost of the discounted prices
is also a valid exercise of its power to tax, in
this instance, the legislative chose to allow
establishments a partial recovery of the
granted discount through a tax deduction
instead of tax credit.
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
REPUBLIC v. SALEM INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, GR No. 137569, 2000-
06-23
Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was passed
authorizing the expropriation of parcels of
lands in the names of defendants in this
case, including a portion of the land,... five
years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De
la Rama entered into a contract... whereby
the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero
the entire property
Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in
Pasay City a complaint for specific
performance (Civil Case No. 6974-P) to
compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the
sale.
while this case for specific performance was
pending, the Republic of the Philippines
filed the present case... for expropriation
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 340.
Among the defendants named in the
complaint were Milagros... and Inocentes De
la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 37 | P a g e
portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the
expropriated property.
Guerrero filed a motion for intervention[5]
alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to
sell to him the entire... the trial court
approved payment to the De la Ramas at the
rate of P23,976.00 per square meter for the
taking of 920 square meters out of the
1,380... square meters to be expropriated
under B.P. Blg. 340.
Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00
representing 10 percent of the approximate
market value of the subject lands, a writ of
possession was issued on August 29, 1990
in favor of the government.
Meanwhile... the trial court rendered a
decision in the case for specific
performance... upholding the validity of the
contract to sell and ordering the De la
Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of
sale... covering the subject property in favor
of Guerrero.
and that a case for specific performance had
been filed by him against the De la
Ramas.
Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion praying
that the just compensation for the land be
deposited in court pursuant to Rule 67, §9 of
the Rules of Court.
Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for mandamus, certiorari, and
injunction with temporary restraining
order... to enjoin the Republic from
releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any
amount... corresponding to the payment of
the expropriated property and to compel the
trial court to resolve his two motions.
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
granting the writ of mandamus.
Nonetheless, the De la Ramas filed on
March 17, 1993 a Motion for Authority to
Withdraw the deposit made by the Republic
This motion was denied as the trial cour...
allowed the intervention of Guerrero and
ordered the Republic to... deposit the
amount of just compensation with the Clerk
of Court of RTC, Pasay City
The decision in the action for specific
performance... having become final, an
order of execution was issued by the Pasay
City RTC, and as a result of which, a deed
of absolute sale was executed by the
Branch Clerk of Court on March 8, 1994 in
favor of Guerrero
The entire amount was withdrawn and duly
received by the De la Ramas.
Thereafter, the De la Ramas sought the
nullification of the June 22, 1993 order of
the trial court in this case, denying their
motion for execution of the order approving
the recommendation of the appraisal
committee, by filing a petition for certiorari
and... mandamus in the Court of Appeals.
This petition was, however, dismissed... the
Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch
111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of
the 920-square meter expropriated property
and ordered payment to him of just
compensation for the taking of the land.
This decision was subsequently affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
As already stated, the De la Ramas and
Guerrero entered into a contract to sell
This contract was executed... after B.P. Blg.
340 was passed authorizing the
expropriation of a portion of the... land... of
the De la Ramas.
Issues:
who, between the De la Ramas and
Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 38 | P a g e
of just compensation for the taking of 920
square meters of the land in question?
Ruling:
We find the De la Ramas' contention
without merit. We hold that Guerrero is
entitled to receive payment of just
compensation for the taking of the land.
Expropriation may be initiated by court
action or by legislation. In both instances,
just compensation is determined by the
courts.
The expropriation of lands consists of two
stages.
The first is concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit.
The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken."
It is only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed.
Moreover, it is only upon payment of just
compensation that title over the property
passes to the government.
In the case at hand, the first stage of
expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg.
340 was enacted providing for the
expropriation of 1,380 square meters of the
land in question. The constitutionality of this
law was upheld in the case of Republic v.
De Knecht.[29] In 1990, the government
commenced the second stage of
expropriation through the filing of a petition
for the determination of just compensation.
This stage was not completed, however,
because of the intervention of Guerrero
which gave rise to the question of...
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the
title to the expropriated property of the De la
Ramas remained with them and did not at
that point pass to the government.
The Court of Appeals was... correct in
saying that B.P. Blg. 340 did not effectively
expropriate the land of the De la Ramas. As
a matter of fact, it merely commenced the
expropriation of the subject property.
The land, as described above in the Contract
to Sell, includes the land expropriated under
B.P. Blg. 340,... As the trial court in the case
for specific performance ruled, the contract
to sell covered the entire Lot 834, including
the expropriated area, which was then
owned by the De la Ramas.
It is true that the contract to sell did not
convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of
land described therein. However, it created
an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas
to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment
of the suspensive conditions
The... declaration of this contract's validity,
which paved the way for the subsequent
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale...
effectively conveyed... ownership of said
parcel of land to Guerrero.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 39 | P a g e

Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349
SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001
Estate of Jiminezvs.PEZA G.R. No. 137285,
16 January 2001
Facts:
Respondent initiated before the RTC of
Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3
parcels of land in Rosario, Cavite. Petitioner
argued that said lots would only be
transferred to a private corporation, Phil.
Vinyl Corporation; hence, they would not
be utilised for a private purpose.
Issue:
Whether or notthe said expropriation is for
public purpose?
Held:
Yes. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict
use or employment by the public has been
added the broader notion of indirect benefit
or advantage.
Suffice it to say that PEZA can vary the
purpose for which a condemned lot will be
devoted to, provided that the same is for
public use. Petitioner cannot impose or
dictate on the respondent what facilities to
establish for as long as the same are for
public purpose.
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 40 | P a g e
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs.
BERNARDO L. LOZADA
GR No. 176625, February 25, 2010
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-
25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters located in Lahug, Cebu City.
Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine
when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), represented by the
then Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), for the expansion and improvement
of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed
with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil
Case No. R-1881.
During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Bernardo L.
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from
Deiparine.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair
market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at
P3.00 per square meter, with consequential
damages by way of legal interest computed
from November 16, 1947, the time when the
lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada, with the other landowners,
contacted then CAA Director Vicente
Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots,
as per previous agreement.
On November 29, 1989, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum
to the Department of Transportation,
directing the transfer of general aviation
operations of the Lahug Airport to the
Mactan International Airport before the end
of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure
of the Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the public
purpose of the said expropriation (expansion
of the airport) was never actually initiated,
realized, or implemented.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a
complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its
Decision in favor of Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal
to the CA.
After the filing of the necessary appellate
briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
dated February 28, 2006, denying
petitioners' appeal and affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the respondents utterly
failed to prove that there was a repurchase
agreement or compromise settlement
between them and the Government; and
(2) Whether or not the judgment in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was absolute and
unconditional, giving title in fee simple to
the Republic.
Ruling:
The petition was denied.
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein
it is apparent that the acquisition by the
Republic of the expropriated lots was
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 41 | P a g e
subject to the condition that the Lahug
Airport would continue its operation. The
condition not having materialized because
the airport had been abandoned, the former
owner should then be allowed to reacquire
the expropriated property.
More particularly, with respect to the
element of public use, the expropriator
should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should
file another petition for the new purpose.
In light of these premises, it was held that
the taking of private property, consequent to
the Government's exercise of its power of
eminent domain, is always subject to the
condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was
taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or
intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek
the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become
improper for lack of the required factual
justification.
It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch
57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this
factual issue and have declared, in no
uncertain terms, that a compromise
agreement was, in fact, entered into between
the Government and respondents, with the
former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to
the latter if the improvement and expansion
of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued.
The testimony of Lozada was based on
personal knowledge as the assurance from
the government was personally made to him.
 acquired, or any reversion to the former
As regards the position of petitioners that owner.
respondents' testimonial evidence violates
the Statute of Frauds, suffice it to state that
the Statute of Frauds operates only with
respect to executory contracts, and does not
apply to contracts which have been
completely or partially performed. The right
of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88
may be enforced based on a constructive
trust constituted on the property held by the
government in favor of the former.

Principles:

If land is expropriated for a particular

purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property
shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If land is
expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that
the city can only use it for a public street,
then, of course, when the city abandons its
use as a public street, it returns to the former
owner, unless there is some statutory
provision to the contrary. If, upon the
contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple
title, then, of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user
does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use

in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase,
the former owner retains no right in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the
land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 42 | P a g e

Republic vs. Lim, GR No. 161656, June 29,
2005
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, VS.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG
G.R. NO. 135087, March 14, 2000
Facts of the case:
The Sanguniang Panglunsod of
Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No.
396, S-1994 auhtorizing the then Mayor
Benjamin Abalos to institute expropriation
proceeding over the property of Alberto
Saguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto,
Rosario Street in Mandaluyong City. The
intended purpose of the expropriation was
the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos offer to buy
his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong
filed a complaint for expropriation with the
RTC of Pasig. Saguitan filed a motion to
dismiss besed on the following grounds:
1. The power of eminent domain is not
being exercised in accordance with law;
2. there is no public necessity to
warrant expropriation of subject property;
3. the city of Mandaluyong seeks to
expropriate the said property without
payment of just compensation;
4. the City of Mandaluyong has no
budget and appropriation for the payment of
the property being expropriated; and
5. expropriation of the property is but a
ploy of Mayor Abalos to aquire the same for
his personal use.
The trial court denied Suguitan's
motion to dismiss.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 43 | P a g e
Consequently, the trial court issued an order
allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take
immediate possession of the subject
property upon the deposit 15% of the fair
market value of the subject property based
upon the current tax declaration. The City of
Mandaluyong assumed possession of the
subject property by virtue of writ of
possession.
Petitioner assiled the order of
expropriation.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong
may exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain only by means of
an ordinance as required by Section 19 Rep.
Act No. 7160 and not by means of a mere
resolution;
Ruling:
The basis for the exercise of the
power of the eminent domain by local
government unit is Section 19 of R.A. 7160.
However, despite the existence of this
legislative grant in favor of the local
governments, it is still the duty of the Court
to determine whether the power of the
eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegated law.
The court have the obligation to
determine whether the following requisites
have been complied with by the local
government unit concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceeding over a particular private
property;
2. The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or wilfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Sec. 9, Art.
III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws; and
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property souht to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
In the present case, the City of
Mandaluyong seek to exercise the power of
eminent domain over petitioner's property
by means of a resolution, in contravention of
the first requisite.
The law in this case is clear and free
from ambiguity. Section 19 of the code
requires and ordinance, not a resolution, for
the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
The the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance are not synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
a general and permanent character , but a
resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted
differently- a third reading is necessary for
an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sangunian members.
PPI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694. May
22, 1995
PPI vs COMELEC, GR L-119694 (En
Banc) 22 May 1995
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 44 | P a g e
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772
directing newspapers to provide provide free
print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page for use as “Comelec Space” which
shall be allocated by the Commission, free
of charge, among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper, magazine or
periodical is circulated to enable the
candidates to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issues
and their platforms and programs of
government. Philippine Press Institute, a
non-stock, non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers asks the
Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that
it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any
of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just
compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on
behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution
does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers. It merely established guidelines
to be followed in connection with the
procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it
is viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the
police power of the State- a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations
of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the
resolution does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain. To
compel print media companies to donate
“Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use or
purposes without the requisite just
compensation. The extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a
case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property.
The monetary value of the compulsory
“donation,” measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use are the
necessity for the taking and the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown
by respondent Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal
rates to Comelec for election purposes.
Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart
of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that
Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or
by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use
is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of “just
compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And
apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for “Comelec space” is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission.
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 45 | P a g e
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220 (1983)
Facts:
 Philippine Ports Authority filed four
(4) complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares
of rolling land situated in Malubog
and Bagbag, Cebu City, under PTA’s
express authority “to acquire
purchase by purchase, by negotiation
or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the
tourist zones” for purposes indicated
in Section 5, paragraph B (2), of its
revised Charter (P.D. 564) more
specifically, for the development into
integrated resort complexes of
selected and well defined geographic
areas with potential tourism values.
 Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction
challenging the constitutionality of
P.D. 564, raising the following
grounds:
1. Actions to expropriate their
properties are constitutionally
infirm because nowhere in
the can a provision be found
which allows the taking of
property for the promotion of
tourism;
2. There is non-compliance with
the public use requirement
under the provision of
eminent domain in the bill of
rights.
Issue:
Whether or not there is non-
compliance with the public use requirement
under the provision of eminent domain in
the bill of rights.
Ruling:
 Petition was dismissed for lack of
merit;
 PTA had complied with the
requisites of eminent domain;
 PTA’s restrain and development of
the land is for public use and had
complied by paying the right amount
of just compensation;
 The State’s power of eminent
domain extends to the expropriation
of land for tourism purposes
although specific objective is not
expressed in the Constitution;
 “Public use” does not mean “use by
the public” in expropriation cases;
Expropriation of several barangays for
provocation of tourism and construction of
sports and hotel complex constitutes
expropriation for “public use”
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Petitioner,
vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED,
ROBINSON’S LAND CORPORATION,
SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION
and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,
Respondents.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the decision of
CA which affirmed the decision of RTC,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 46 | P a g e
which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged
that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated
(Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation
(Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation
(Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
(SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide
free parking spaces in their malls to their
patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and
Commerce found that the collection of
parking fees by shopping malls is contrary
to National Building Code and figuratively
speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the
land for parking. Also, Committee stated
that the collection of parking fees would be
against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer
Act of the Philippines) as to the State’s
policy of protecting the interest of
consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the
National Building Code gives the
responsibility for the administration and
enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
including the imposition of penalties for
administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This is not being
strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to
discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH
instead of DPWH instead.
As such, Senate Committee recommended
that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should
institute the action to enjoin the collection of
parking fees and enforce the sanctions for
violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI
pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the
provisions of Code relative to parking; and
3) Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the
collection of parking fees and its waiver of
liability.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the
recommendation of the Committee and filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule
63 of the Revised Rules of Court against
DPWH and local building officials,
contending that: 1) Rule XIX of
Implementing Rules and Regulations of
National Building Code is unconstitutional
and void; 2) respondent has the legal right to
lease parking spaces; and 3) National
Building Code IRR is ineffective as it was
not published for 3 consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation as
mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from
collecting parking fees and contending that
their practice of charging parking fees is
violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity
to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition
for declaratory relief is proper since all the
requisites are present; 3) the Building Code
with its IRR does not necessarily impose
that parking spaces shall be free of charge
and providing parking spaces for free can be
considered as unlawful taking of property
right without just compensation; and 4) there
was no sufficient evidence to justify any
award for damages. They deemed that the
respondents are not obligated to provide
parking spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying
that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking
spaces to be free of charge. On the other
hand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal
to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC erred in
failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as
unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to
declare IRR ineffective for not having been
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 47 | P a g e
published as required by law; 3) RTC erred
in dismissing the OSG’s petition for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4)
RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has
no legal standing as it is not a real party-in-
interest.
CA denied the appeals of both petitioners
and respondents on the following grounds:
1) OSG did not fail to exhaust
administrative remedies and that an
administrative review is not a condition
precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one and
nothing of an administrative nature is to be
or can be done; 2) the validity of National
Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as
it was not discussed in RTC and the
controversy could be settled on other
grounds without touching the issue of
validity since the courts should refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of a law;
and 3) Section 803 of National Building
Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that
they are only intended to control the
occupancy of areas and structures, and in the
absence of provision of law, respondents
could not be obliged to provide parking
spaces free of charge.
As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the
instant Petition for Review.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the
ruling of RTC that respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces to
their customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for
prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a
valid exercise of the police power of State.
Held:
1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the
ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC
found no merit in the OSG’s petition:
Sec 803 of National Building Code.
Percentage of Site Occupancy states that
maximum site occupancy shall be governed
by the use, type of construction, and height
of the building and the use, area, nature, and
location of the site; and subject to the
provisions of the local zoning requirements
and in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING
SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National
Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following
provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below
are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for
buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile
parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal
parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
parallel parking. A truck or bus
parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters.
The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and
the total number of which shall be indicated
on the plans and specified whether or not
parking accommodations, are attendant-
managed. (See Section 2 for computation of
parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1
slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 48 | P a g e
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and
public welfare, consistent with the principles
of sound environmental management and
control; and to this end, make it the purpose
of this Code to provide for all buildings and
structures, a framework of minimum
standards and requirements to regulate and
control their location, site, design, quality of
materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking,
the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the
aim of safeguarding “life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental
management and control.” Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to
alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access
thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to
control — partially or, as in this case,
absolutely — the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that
respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should
provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square
meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection
(or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term “parking fees”
cannot even be found at all in the entire
National Building Code and its IRR. One
rule of statutory construction is that if a
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without
any attempt at interpretation. Since Section
803 of the National Building Code and Rule
XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees,
then simply, said provisions do not regulate
the collection of the same
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the
National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code
and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG
limits its citation to the first part of Section
102 of the National Building Code declaring
the policy of the State “to safeguard life,
health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control”;
but totally ignores the second part of said
provision, which reads, “and to this end,
make it the purpose of this Code to provide
for all buildings and structures, a framework
of minimum standards and requirements to
regulate and control their location, site,
design, quality of materials, construction,
use, occupancy, and maintenance.” While
the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code lays down the State policy, it
is the second part thereof that explains how
said policy shall be carried out in the Code.
Section 102 of the National Building Code
is not an all-encompassing grant of
regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary
and local building officials in the name of
life, health, property, and public welfare. On
the contrary, it limits the regulatory power
of said officials to ensuring that the
minimum standards and requirements for all
buildings and structures, as set forth in the
National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in
addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for
buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also
mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of charge.
If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 49 | P a g e
law, then it cannot be added to or included
in the implementing rules. The rule-making
power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceedings to carry into effect the law as
it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit
collection of parking fees is not a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that
“the power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings
and structures carries with it the power to
impose fees and, conversely, to control,
partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the
imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees
within the power of regulatory agencies to
impose are regulatory fees. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad
and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and
property carries with it the undeniable power
to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the
enactment of specific measures that govern
the relations not only as between individuals
but also as between private parties and the
political society. True, if the regulatory
agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also
have the power to remove the same. Even
so, it is worthy to note that the present case
does not involve the imposition by the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials
of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the
collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking
facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that
the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials do have regulatory powers over the
collection of parking fees for the use of
privately owned parking facilities, they
cannot allow or prohibit such collection
arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing
or prohibiting the collection of such parking
fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials must pass the test of
classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the
ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is
actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including
the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities of parking fees from the
public for the use thereof. The Court finds,
however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees,
the State would be acting beyond the bounds
of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of the property of the owner.
The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate. Police power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of
property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare; for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 50 | P a g e
When there is a taking or confiscation of
private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but
another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables
the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be
availed of only to impose a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is a settled rule that
neither acquisition of title nor total
destruction of value is essential to taking. It
is usually in cases where title remains with
the private owner that inquiry should be
made to determine whether the impairment
of a property is merely regulated or amounts
to a compensable taking. A regulation that
deprives any person of the profitable use of
his property constitutes a taking and entitles
him to compensation, unless the invasion of
rights is so slight as to permit the regulation
to be justified under the police power.
Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use
business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and
the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or
possession of the parking facilities remain/s
with respondents, the prohibition against
their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is
already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is
not only requiring that respondents devote a
portion of the latter’s properties for use as
parking spaces, but is also mandating that
they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive
intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further
prohibited from profiting from its use or
even just recovering therefrom the expenses
for the maintenance and operation of the
required parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against

the collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking
facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also
cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of
just compensation.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for

Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and
Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision
dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil
Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 51 | P a g e

When Entitled to Compensation?
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-
08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and
consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007,
to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural
entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation
and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.),
filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified
the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of
Republic Act No. 7160.
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No.
0309-07 valid and constitutional.
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had
validly exercised police power under the
General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code; that the ordinance, being
based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other
methods of pesticides application because it
exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift; and that
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 52 | P a g e
the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality, and could be invalidated
only upon a clear showing that it had
violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its
assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance
No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for
being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation
between the purpose of protecting the public
and the environment against the harmful
effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and
the imposition of the ban against aerial
spraying of all forms of substances, on the
other.
Issues:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable
and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-
month transition-period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section
5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of
the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6
thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its
corporate powers... the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an
issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under
this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who
are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due
to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies
the motivation behind the enactment of the
ordinance. The City of Davao has the
authority to enact pieces of legislation that
will promote the general welfare,
specifically the health of its constituents.
Such authority should not be construed,
however, as a valid license for the City of
Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to
discharge its mandate. A thin but well-
defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due
Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted
within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the
following substantive requirements, namely:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) it must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) it
must not be unreasonable. In the State's
exercise of police power, the property rights
of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the Government. A local government
unit is considered to have properly exercised
its police powers only if it satisfies the
following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 53 | P a g e
The first requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. Substantive due process
requires that a valid ordinance must have a
sufficient justification for the Government's
action. This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact
the ordinance regardless of its salutary
purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public
purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals
regulated, the ordinance must survive a due
process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion
to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As
such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of three months.
Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period
under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.
The respondents posit that the requirement
of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6
of the ordinance violates due process for
being confiscatory; and that the imposition
unduly deprives all agricultural landowners
within Davao City of the beneficial use of
their property that amounts to taking without
just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we
have thoroughly explained that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially
divests the owner of the beneficial use of its
property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal
Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The
guaranty equal protection secures every
person within the State's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through
the State's duly constituted authorities. The
concept of equal justice under the law
demands that the State governs impartially,
and not to draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental
objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal
application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit
legislation by limiting the object to which it
is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. In other word, a
valid classification must be: (1) based on
substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 54 | P a g e
The petitioners correctly argue that the
rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we
shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship
between the means and the purpose of the
ordinance; and (2) examine whether the
means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things
similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against
aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience
and harm to the residents and degrades the
environment. Given this justification, does
the ordinance satisfy the requirement that
the classification must rest on substantial
distinction? We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not
limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide
application. Even manual spraying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift that
may bring about the same inconvenience,
discomfort and alleged health risks to the
community and to the environment.[141] A
ban against aerial spraying does not weed
out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance
suffers from being "underinclusive" because
the classification does not include all
individuals tainted with the same mischief
that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A
classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the
legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring property valued at One Thousand Five
Ordinance No. 0309-07 Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per
annum.

Petitioners thus elevated the matter to the

When Just Compensation Shall Accrue? Supreme Court in a petition for review
Interest? on certiorari. The only issue resolved by the
Court in the assailed decision is the amount
[ G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015 ] of just compensation which respondents-
movants are entitled to receive from the
government for the taking of their property.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
Both the RTC and the CA valued the
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
property at One Thousand Five Hundred
AND DISTRICT ENGINEER
Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, plus six
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS,
percent (6%) interest from the time of the
PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES
filing of the complaint until full payment.
HERACLEO AND RAMONA TECSON,
We, however, did not agree with both courts
RESPONDENTS.
and ruled instead that just compensation
should be based on the value of the property
FACTS:
at the time of taking in 1940, which is
Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square
In 1940, the Department of Public Works
meter.[4] In addition, and by way of
and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-
compensation, we likewise awarded an
movants' subject property without the
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
benefit of expropriation proceedings for the
1940 until full payment.[5]
construction of the MacArthur Highway. In
a letter dated December 15, 1994,
Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby
respondents-movants demanded the
move for the reconsideration of said
payment of the fair market value of the
decision on the following grounds:
subject parcel of land. Celestino R.
Contreras (Contreras), then District
A. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY
Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering
LOOK INTO THE "JUSTNESS" OF
District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the
THE MISERABLE AMOUNT OF
subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos
COMPENSATION BEING
(P0.70) per square meter, per Resolution of
AWARDED TO THE HEREIN
the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC)
RESPONDENTS; and
of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents-movants demanded the return
B. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY
of their property, or the payment of
SETTLE FOR A HAPPY MIDDLE
compensation at the current fair market
GROUND IN THE NAME OF
value.[3] Hence, the complaint for recovery
DOCTRINAL PRECISION AND
of possession with damages filed by
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.[6]
respondents-movants. Respondents-movants
were able to obtain favorable decisions in
At the outset, it should be stressed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 55 | P a g e

 that the matter of the validity of the
State's exercise of the power of
eminent domain has long been
settled. In fact, in our assailed
decision, We have affirmed the
ruling of the CA that the pre-trial
order issued on May 17, 2001 has
limited the issues as follows: (1)
whether or not the respondents-
movants are entitled to just
compensation; (2) whether or not the
valuation would be based on the
corresponding value at the time of
the taking or at the time of the filing
of the action; and (3) whether or not
the respondents-movants are entitled
to damages.[8] Moreover, it was held
that for failure of respondents-
movants to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings for a long
period of time, they are deemed to
have waived and are estopped from
assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the
public use for which the power was
exercised.[9]
What is, therefore, left for determination in
the instant Motion for Reconsideration, in
accordance with our Decision dated July 1,
2013, is the propriety of the amount awarded
to respondents as just compensation. The
court holds that the reckoning date for
property valuation in determining the
amount of just compensation had already
been addressed and squarely answered in the
assailed decision. To be sure, the justness of
the award had been taken into consideration
in arriving at our earlier conclusion.
In the case of Forfom, the payment of just
compensation was reckoned from the time
of taking in 1973; in Eusebio, the Court
fixed the just compensation by determining
the value of the property at the time of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 56 | P a g e
taking in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot
at the time of taking in 1972 served as basis
for the award of compensation to the owner;
and, in Republic, the Court was convinced
that the taking occurred in 1956 and was
thus the basis in fixing just compensation.
Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay
premium to the property owner for
appropriating the latter's property; it is only
bound to make good the loss sustained by
the landowner, with due consideration of the
circumstances availing at the time the
property was taken. More, the concept of
just compensation does not imply fairness to
the property owner alone. Compensation
must also be just to the public, which
ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.[16]
In Republic v. Court of Appeals the court
ruled that if property is taken for public use
before compensation is deposited with the
court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest[s]
on its just value to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court. In fine, between the taking
of the property and the actual payment,
legal interest accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.
Accordingly, the prevailing interest rate for
loans and forbearance of money is six
percent (6%) per annum, in the absence of
an express contract as to such rate of
interest.
Lastly, from finality of the Court's
Resolution on reconsideration until full
payment, the total amount due to
respondents-movants shall earn a straight six
percent (6%) legal interest, pursuant to
Circular No. 799 and the case of Nacar.
Such interest is imposed by reason of the
Court's decision and takes the nature of a
judicial debt.
Clearly, the award of interest on the value of
the land at the time of taking in 1940 until
full payment is adequate compensation to
respondents-movants for the deprivation of
their property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. Such interest,
however meager or enormous it may be,
cannot be inequitable and unconscionable
because it resulted directly from the
application of law and jurisprudence—
standards that have taken into account
fairness and equity in setting the interest
rates due for the use or forbearance of
money.[41] Thus, adding the interest
computed to the market value of the
property at the time of taking signifies
the real, substantial, fulland ample value of
the property. Verily, the same constitutes
due compliance with the constitutional
mandate on eminent domain and serves as a
basic measure of fairness.
In addition to the foregoing interest,
additional compensation shall be awarded to
respondents-movants by way of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in view of the
government's taking without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings.
Temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered if pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot be proved
with certainty from the nature of the case.
Here, the trial and appellate courts found
that the owners were unable to plant palay
on 96,655 square meters of the Property for
an unspecified period during and after NIA's
construction of the canals in 1972. The
passage of time, however, has made it
impossible to determine these losses with
any certainty. NIA also deprived the owners
of the Property of possession of a substantial
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 57 | P a g e
portion of their land since 1972. Considering
the particular circumstances of this case, an
award of P150,000 as temperate damages is
reasonable.
Considering that respondents-movants were
deprived of beneficial ownership over their
property for more than seventy (70) years
without the benefit of a timely expropriation
proceedings, and to serve as a deterrent to
the State from failing to institute such
proceedings within the prescribed period
under the law, a grant of exemplary damages
in the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) is fair and reasonable.
Moreover, an award for attorney's fees in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) in favor of respondents-
movants is in order.
In sum, respondents-movants shall be
entitled to an aggregate amount of One
Million Seven Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight
Pesos and Thirty-Two Centavos
(P1,718,848.32) as just compensation as of
September 30, 2014.
All told, We hold that putting to rest the
issue on the validity of the exercise of
eminent domain is neither tantamount to
condoning the acts of the DPWH in
disregarding the property rights of
respondents-movants nor giving premium to
the government's failure to institute an
expropriation proceeding. This Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its
first and fundamental duty is the application
of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when
such literal application is impossible.
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 Vicenta Panganiban b. Lot 1409-B-2 co
owned by Francisco Progalidad and
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III) Medardo Progalidad c. Lot 1406 registered
in the name of Salud Jimenez.
PEZA VS. PULIDO 656 SCRA 315
During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406
was subdivided into Lot 1406A and 1406B.
4. On July 11, 1991, RTC sustained the right
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE
of the petitioner to expropriate the 3 parcels
AUTHORITY (NOW PHILIPPINE
of riceland, but later partly reconsidered and
EXPORT ZONE AUTHORITY), Petitioner,
released Lot 1406A from expropriation.
vs.
Petitioner appealed to the CA 6. On Jan 4,
JOSE PULIDO, VICENTA 1993, petitioner and the Estate of Salud
PANGANIBAN, RURAL BANK OF Jimenez (died on Oct 30, 1984) entered into
SALINAS, INC., FRANCISCA M. a Compromise Agreement, stipulating:
PRODIGALIDAD, ABELARDO
a. That the petitioner “agrees to withdraw its
PRODIGALIDAD, CARMEN PRECIOSA
appeal from the Order of the Honorable
TABLANTE, CARMENCITA M.
Court which released lot 1406A from the
PRODIGALIDAD, MELVIN J.
expropriation proceedings” and the estate of
BOUCHER, MARY LOU M.
Jimenez, in turn “agrees to waive, quitclaim
PRODIGALIDAD, SALVADOR MENES,
and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of
JR., DELILAH M. PRODIGALIDAD,
income which it sustained by reason of the
NANNETTE M. PRODIGALIDAD,
possession of the said lot from 1981 up to
ANSELMO M. PRODIGALIDAD III,
the present.”
GREGORIO M. PRODIGALIDAD, AND
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, b. The parties agree that the estate of Salud
Respondents. Jimenez would transfer Lot 1406B to the
petitionerin exchange for “Lot 434”
c. The swap arrangement “recognizes the
DECISION
fact that the lot 1406B … is considered
BERSAMIN, J.: expropriated in favor of the government”
and the payment for which being Lot 434
d. The parties “agree that they will abide by
FACTS: the terms of the foregoing agreement in
good faith and the Decision to be rendered
This is about the plea of the owner of based on this Compromise Agreement is
expropriated property for the much-delayed immediately final and executory.”
payment of just compensation. It is an action
of expropriation of 3 parcels of irrigated
riceland situated in Rosario, Cavite that the
petitioner commenced on May 15, 1981 in The CA remanded the case to the
CFI of Cavite against the several individual RTC or the consideration and approval of
owners. The parcels of riceland were a. Lot the Compromise Agreement . RTC approved
1408 in the names of Jose Pulido and the Compromise Agreement. Contrary to its
express undertaking under the Compromise

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 58 | P a g e

Agreement, the petitioner failed to transfer
the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez because the registered owner was ISSUE:
Progressive Realty Estate Inc. not the
Whether or Not the just
petitioner.
compensation should be based on the value
As a result, the Estate of Salud Jimenez filed or the assessment rate prevailing in 1981 or
a Motion to Partially Annul the Order. 9. On in fair market value in 1981, the time of the
Aug 4, 1997, RTC annulled the Compromise filing of its expropriation complaint, which
Agreement and directed the petitioner to was the time of the taking.
peacefully return Lot 1406B to the Estate of
Salud Jimenez. Petitioner went to the CA by
petition for certiorari and prohibition, HELD :
essentially to nullify the order.
The just compensation for Lot 1406B
In its decision, the CA partially granted the
should be based on the value or assessment
petition for certiorari and prohibition, set
rate prevalent in 1993, the year the parties
aside the order of the RTC on the return of
entered into the Compromise Agreement
the Lot 1406B to the Estate of Salud
and thereby agreed that the just
Jimenez; and directed that the RTC
compensation for Lot 1406B was Lot 434.
determine the just compensation for Lot
The just compensation of Lot 1406B was
1406B. The Court explained that the Estate
P6,200/square meter as substantiated by the
of Salud Jimenez had already acknowledged
several documents presented to show the
the propriety of the expropriation of Lot
value of properties adjacent to Lot 1406B
1406B by entering into the Compromise
namely: 1. the Deed of Sale of Lot 1406A
Agreement, and that the provisions of the
executed in 1994 whereby it was sold to
Compromise Agreement had consequently
MERALCO for P6,395/square meter 2. a
related only to the form or mode of payment
certified true copy of the 1998 zonal
of the just compensation for Lot 1406B,
valuation of properties along the PEZA road
that, in lieu of cash, another lot (Lot 434)
containing the zonal valuations of residential
was to be delivered as just compensation to
and commercial properties in the area to be,
the estate of Salud Jimenez, stating: The
respectively P4000/sq meter and P8000/sq
only issue for consideration is the manner
meter. 3. an appraisal report on Lot 1406B
and amount of payment due to the estate. In
by an independent appraiser stating that the
fact, aside from the withdrawal of PEZA’s
value of properties in the vicinity of Lot
appeal to the CA concerning Lot 1406A, the
1406B was P7500/sq meter in 1997 4. other
matter of payment of just compensation was
documents showing payment of just
the only subject of the compromise
compensation by PEZA to the owners of
agreement. Under the compromise
previously expropriated properties adjacent
agreement, the estate was supposed to
to or near Lot 1406B The total
receive Lot 434 in exchange for lot 1406B.
compensation to be paid should bear interest
When PEZa failed to fulfill its obligation to
at the legal rate reckoned from Aug 23,
deliver, the estate can again demand for the
1993. The doctrine of the law of the case
payment but not the return of the
means that whatever is irrevocably
expropriated lot. This interpretation by the
established as the controlling legal rule
CA is in accordance with Sec 4-8, Rule 67
between the same parties in the same case,
of the Rules of Court.
whether correct on general principles or not,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 59 | P a g e
continues to be the law of the case for as
long as the facts on which the legal rule was
predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court. It applies in a situation
where CA has made a ruling on a question
on appeal and thereafter remands the case to
the lower court for further proceedings; the
question then settled by the CA becomes the
law of the case binding the lower court and
any subsequent appeal, and questions
necessarily involved and dealt with in a
former appeal will be regarded as the law of
the case in a subsequent appeal, although the
questions are not expressly treated in the
opinion of the court inasmuch as the
presumption is that all the facts in the case
bearing on the point decided have received
due consideration whether all or none of
them are mentioned in the opinion. B.
P6200/sq meter is the correct just
compensation for Lot 1406B With the
annulment of the Compromise Agreement,
the payment of just compensation for Lot
1406B now has to be made in cash. In that
regard, the order of the Court to remand to
the RTC for the determination of just
compensation was undubitably for the sole
objective of ascertaining the equivalent
monetary value in 1993 of Lot 1406B or Lot
434. C. Estate of Salud Jimenesz entitled to
interest of 12% per annum The power or
eminent domain is not an unlimited power.
Sec 9, Art 3 of the 1987 Constitution sets
down the essential limitations upon this
inerent right of the State to take private
property, namely: a. that the taking must be
for a public purpose b that just
compensation must be paid to the owner.
The State must first establish that the
exercise of eminent domain is for a public
purpose, which, here, is already settled.
What remains to be determined is the just
compensation. The owner is entitled to legal
interest from the time of the taking of the
property until the actual payment in order to
place the owner in a position as good as, but
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 60 | P a g e
not better than, the position he was in before
the taking occurred. It is undeniable that just
compensation was not promptly made to the
Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot
1406-B by the petitioner. The move to
compensate through the swap arrangement
under the Compromise Agreement was
aborted or amounted to nothing through no
fault of the Estate of Salud Jimenez. The
petitioner, which should have known about
the inefficacy of the swapping of Lot 434 for
Lot 1406- B, could even be said to have
resorted to the swapping for the purpose of
delaying the payment. Thus, it was solely
responsible for the delay. In fact, the Estate
of Salud Jimenez was compelled to seek the
rescission of the Compromise Agreement, a
process that prolonged even more the delay
in the payment of just compensation. In
view of this, the CA's fixing of legal interest
at only 6% per annum cannot be upheld and
must be corrected, for that rate would not
ensure that compensation was just in the
face of the long delay in payment.
Wherefore, we deny the petition for review
on certiorari filed by PEZA, and affirm the
decision promulgated by the CA, subject to
the modification that the legal interest
chargeable on the unpaid just compensation
for Lot
When Other Methods of Valuation is
Allowed.
Republic vs. Judge Mupas and PIATCO,
G.R. No. 181892, 8 September 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HON. JUDGE JESUS M. MUPAS and
PIATCO
G.R. No. 181892 September 8,
2015
JUSTICE ARTURO BRION
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, Asia’s Emerging
Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government-
through the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) and the
Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) for the construction and
development of NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and transfer arrangement.
DOTC constituted the Pre Qualification
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project and submitted
with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA,
which approved the project.
On September 20,1996, the consortium
composed of People’s Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air
and Ground Services, Inc.(PAGS) and
Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively,Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to
Paircargo Consortium. The latter
corporation was subsequently incorporated
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 61 | P a g e
into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged
undue preference given to PIATCO and
reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and
PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement
for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger
Terminal III” (1997 Concession
Agreement). The Government granted
PIATCO the franchise to operate and
maintain the said terminal during the
concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with
the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997
Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be
for twenty-five (25) years commencing from
the in-service date, and may be renewed at
the option of the Government for a period
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the
end of the concession period, PIATCO shall
transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged
with the maintenance and operation of the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing
concession contracts with various service
providers to offer international airline
airport services, such as in-flight catering,
passenger handling, ramp and ground
support, aircraft maintenance and
provisions, cargo handling and warehousing,
and other services, to several international
airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the
international airline service providers,
claiming that they would lose their job upon
the implementation of the questioned
agreements, filed a petition for prohibition.
Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA,
on her speech, stated that she will not
“honor (PIATCO) contracts which the
Executive Branch’s legal offices have
concluded (as) null and void.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily
take over a business affected with public
interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere
contractual stipulation, contravene the
Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the
government to pay “reasonable cost for
the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex.”
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 62 | P a g e
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of
the State in times of national emergency,
and in the exercise of its police power, to
temporarily take over the operation of any
business affected with public interest. The
duration of the emergency itself is the
determining factor as to how long the
temporary takeover by the government
would last. The temporary takeover by the
government extends only to the operation of
the business and not to the ownership
thereof. As such the government is not
required to compensate the private entity-
owner of the said business as there is no
transfer of ownership, whether permanent
or temporary. The private entity-owner
affected by the temporary takeover cannot,
likewise, claim just compensation for the
use of the said business and its properties as
the temporary takeover by the government is
in exercise of its police power and not of its
power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987
Constitution envisions a situation wherein
the exigencies of the times necessitate the
government to “temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with
public interest.” It is the welfare and interest
of the public which is the paramount
consideration in determining whether or not
to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the
temporary takeover is exercising its police
power. Police power is the “most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its
exercise therefore must not be unreasonably
hampered nor its exercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence
of damage due to arbitrariness of its
exercise. Thus, requiring the government to
pay reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to
the operation of the business contravenes the
Constitution.
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. DALAUTA
G.R. No. 190004
Aspect of covered by the digest: Eminent
Domain
Justice Mendoza:
Facts: Respondent was the registered owner
of an agricultural land in Butuan City with
an area of 25.2160 hectares and which was
placed by DAR under compulsory
acquisition of CARP as reflected in the
Notice of Coverage. Petitioner LBP offered
₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land,
but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being
too low.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 63 | P a g e
The case was referred to the DARAB
through the PARAD of Butuan City, who
affirmed the valuation made by LBP, after a
summary administrative proceeding was
conducted. Respondent filed a petition for
determination of just compensation with the
RTC, sitting as SAC. He alleged that LBP’s
valuation of the land was inconsistent with
the rules and regulations for determining the
just compensation of lands covered by
CARP’s compulsory acquisition scheme.
The SAC ruled in favor of the respondent.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal
to the CA avering (just one of the
averments) that the PARAD’s decision on
has already attained finality. However, the
CA sustained (with modifications) the
SAC’s ruling.
Issues: Whether or not the trial court had
properly taken jurisdiction over the case
despite the finality of the PARAD
Resolution.
Ruling: Wherefore, the Court hereby
Declares that the final determination of just
compensation is a judicial function; that the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is original
and exclusive, not appellate; that the action
to file judicial determination of just
compensation shall be ten (10) years from
the time of the taking; and that at the time of
the filing of judicial determination, there
should be no pending administrative action
for the determination of just compensation.
Ratio decidendi: The Court agrees with the
CA in this regard. Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." In
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay
the Court ruled that the valuation of property
in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies. "The executive
department or the legislature may make the
initial determination, but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the
Bill of Rights that private property may not
be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the 'justness' of
the decreed compensation. " Any law or rule
in derogation of this proposition is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
and is to be struck down as void or invalid.
Furthermore, Sec 57 of R.A. 6657 states that
Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to
landowners." This "original and exclusive"
jurisdiction of the RTC would be
undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials original jurisdiction
in compensation cases and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions. Thus, although the
new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting
as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators andto convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to
Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus,
direct resort to the SAC by private
respondent is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking
of property under R.A. No. 6657 is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by
the State.The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 64 | P a g e
judicial function which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of respondent's petition for
determination of just compensation.
Eminent Domain (Section 9, Article III)
ALFONSO vs LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES and DAR
Facts: Cynthia Palomar (Palomar), the
registered owner of two (2) parcels of lot
being subject to RA 6657. After refusal by
Palomar of the valuation presented by DAR,
a valuation case was filed before the DAR
Provincial Adjudication Board (PAB).
While the case was Pending, Palomar sold
her rights over to petitioner Ramon Alfonso
(Alfonso). Applying DAR Administrative
Order, a valuation by the Provincial
Adjudicator was ordered. PAB denied the A
Motion for Reconsideration filed by LBP.
Both parties filed separate actions for the
judicial determination for just compensation
of the subject properties before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) as Special Agrarian Court
(SAC). Upon motion of Alfonso the cases
was consolidated, and a private appraiser
was appointed. The SAC ruled in favor of
Alfonso, favoring the appraisal made by the
private appraiser.
Issue: Whether or not the court ruled erred
in the valuation
Held: No, the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The
"justness" of the enumeration of valuation
factors in Section 17, the "justness" of using
a basic formula, and the "justness" of the
components (and their weights) that flow
into the basic formula, are all matters for the
courts to decide.
Time and again, the Court has held that it is
a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the
facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis
et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the
facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent
any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.
Principle of checks and balances
1. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE
OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR
No. 196231, 2014-01-28
Facts: This involved two separate cases
involving Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Gonzales was
accused of delay in acting on a criminal case
pending before his office while Sulit was
said to have entered into an apparent one-
sided plea bargaining agreement which drew
public outrage. By reason of said cases,
Gonzales was dismissed while Sulit was
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 65 | P a g e
subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the
Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the
powers granted by Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6770. Gonzales challenged the
constitutionality of said law granting the OP
to discipline the Ombudsman while Sulit
sought to restrain the proceedings
questioned the OP jurisdiction.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that
the President has disciplinary jurisdiction
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed
the OP ruling. In view of the Court's ruling,
the OP filed the present motion for
reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the OP has administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Ruling: Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
vesting... disciplinary authority in the
President... over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates... the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman and is thus...
unconstitutional... subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are
subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk
the... independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional
mandate, includes its key officials, all of
them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but inevitably with the principle of checks
and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court
resolved to maintain the validity of Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is
concerned. The Court did not consider the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to
the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
Civilian supremacy clause (Art. II, Sec. 3)
a. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, GR No.
198554, 30 July 2012
G.R. No. 198554 GARCIA v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012), 677
SCRA 750
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special
General Court Martial NR 2, was charged
with and convicted of violation of the 96th
Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the
97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline) for
failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net
worth for the year 2003 as required by RA
3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 66 | P a g e
Garcia, among others, argued that the
confirmation issued by the OP directing his
two-year detention in a penitentiary had
already been fully served following his
preventive confinement subject to Article 29
of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was
released on December 16, 2010 after a
preventive confinement for six years and
two months. He was initially confined at his
quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
before he was transferred to the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and
latter to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week
after the OP confirmed the sentence of the
court martial against him, Garcia was
arrested and detained and continues to be
detained, for 2 years, at the maximum
security compound of the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated
that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in
Military Courts for it is separate and distinct
from ordinary courts.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the
RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and
(2) Whether or not the application of Article
29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause
of the 1987 Constitution
HELD: (1) The Court ruled that applying
the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) (Period of preventive
imprisonment deducted from time of
imprisonment), the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement
should be credited to the sentence confirmed
by the Office of the President, subject to the
conditions set forth by the same law.
It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification,” held the
Court.

The Court held that “the General Court

Martial is a court within the strictest sense of
the word and acts as a criminal court.” As
such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar
as those that are not provided in the Articles
of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial,
can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any
provision as to the application of a criminal
concept in the implementation and execution
of the General Court Martial’s decision, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically Article 29 should be applied. In
fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia)
period of confinement to his sentence has
been recommended in the Staff Judge
Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the

application of Article 29 of the RPC in the
Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. “The concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 67 | P a g e

The right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16)
a. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792
[1993]
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083
July 30, 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by
minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing,
or appraising new TLAs;
They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property
he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him;
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 68 | P a g e
2. The issues raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a
cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests?”
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which
indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as
the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to
come.
Constitution in the curricula (Art. XIV, Sec.
3[1])
i. ..and Panitikan - Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines (CoTeSCUP) v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 09,
2018
Council of Teachers vs. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930 October 9,
2018.
FACTS:
Before the Court Supreme Court are
consolidated petitions under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No.
10533 (K to 12 Law), RA No. 10157
(Kindergarten Education Act), and related
issuances of the Department of Education
(DepEd), Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), Department of Labor Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and Technical
Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) implementing the K to
12 Basic Education Program.
As part of the history of the Philippines’
basic education system, both the 1935 and
1973 Philippine Constitution did not state
that education at any level was compulsory.
This changed in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which made elementary
education mandatory.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 69 | P a g e
Subsequent legislations implemented the
policies stated in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Thus, secondary education was
provided for free in RA No. 6655,[34]
otherwise known as the Free Public
Secondary Education Act of 1988. Under
RA No. 6655, students in public high
schools were free from payment of tuition
and other school fees.[35] And in response to
the mandate of the Constitution to promote
and make quality education accessible to all
Filipino citizens, RA No. 6728,[36] otherwise
known as Government Assistance To
Students and Teachers In Private Education
Act, was enacted in 1989 where the voucher
system under the Private Education Student
Financial Assistance Program (PESFA)[37]
was implemented.
The voucher system was expanded in RA
No. 8545,[38] or the Expanded Government
Assistance to Students and Teachers in
Private Education Act.
In the same law, elementary and secondary
education were redefined. Elementary
education was the first six (6) years of basic
education, excluding pre-school and grade
seven;[39] while secondary education was the
next four (4) years after completion of basic
education.[40]
In 2001, RA No. 8980[41] or the Early
Childhood Care and Development (ECCD)
Act was implemented. This law established a
national ECCD system which "refers to the
full range of health, nutrition, early
education and social services programs that
provide for the basic holistic needs of young
children from birth to age six (6), to promote
their optimum growth and development."[42]
These programs include, among others,
optional center-based and home-based early
childhood education.[43]
In the same year, RA No. 9155[44] or the
Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001
was enacted. Section 2 thereof declared it as
a State policy "to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality basic
education and to make such education
accessible to all by providing all Filipino
children a free and compulsory education in
the elementary level and free education in
the high school level."[45] Basic education
was defined in this law as "the education
intended to meet basic learning needs which
lays the foundation on which subsequent
learning can be based. It encompasses early
childhood, elementary and high school
education as well as alternative learning
systems for out-of-school youth and adult
learners and includes education for those
with special needs." It was also in this law
where the then Department of Education
Culture and Sports was renamed the DepEd.
Education for
All 2015 and the
Kindergarten
Education Act
In 2000, at the World Education Forum in
Dakar, Senegal, one hundred sixty four
(164) governments, including the
Philippines, pledged to achieve, by 2015, the
following six (6) Education for All (EFA)
goals: (1) expansion and improvement of
early childhood care and education; (2)
universal access to complete free and
compulsory primary education of good
quality; (3) equitable access to appropriate
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 70 | P a g e
learning and life skills program for youth
and adult; (4) improvement of levels of adult
literacy, especially for women; (5) gender
parity and equality in education; and (6)
improvement of all aspects of the quality of
education and ensuring their excellence.[48]
On January 20, 2012, the Philippine
Congress took a pivotal step towards the
realization of the country's EFA goals with
the enactment of the Kindergarten
Education Act. Section 2 thereof declared it
the policy of the State "to provide equal
opportunities for all children to avail of
accessible mandatory and compulsory
kindergarten education that effectively
promotes physical, social, intellectual,
emotional and skills stimulation and values
formation to sufficiently prepare them for
formal elementary schooling" and "to make
education learner-oriented and responsive to
the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity,
the circumstances and diversity of learners,
schools and communities through the
appropriate languages of teaching and
learning."
The Kindergarten Education Act
institutionalized kindergarten education,
which is one (1) year of preparatory
education for children at least five years
old,[53] as part of basic education, and is
made mandatory and compulsory for
entrance to Grade 1.[54] It also mandated the
use of the learner's mother tongue, or the
language first learned by a child, as the
primary medium of instruction in the
kindergarten level in public schools, except
for the following cases wherein the primary
medium of instruction would be determined
by the DepEd.
On April 17, 2012, DepEd, in consultation
with the Department of Budget and
Management, issued DepEd Order (DO) No.
32, the Kindergarten Education Act's
implementing rules and regulations. DO No.
32 provides that the Kindergarten Education
General Curriculum (KEGC) shall focus on
the child's total development according to
his/her individual needs and socio-cultural
background.
The K to 12 Law and related issuances.
Before the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the
Philippines was the only country in Asia and
among the three remaining countries in the
world that had a 10-year basic education
program. The expansion of the basic
education program, however, is an old
proposal dating to 1925.
Despite these proposals, the 10-year basic
education cycle remained in force. Thus,
prior to the enactment of the K to 12 Law,
the Philippines, joined only by Djibouti and
Angola, were the only countries in the world
with a 10-year basic education system.
One of the salient features of the K to 12
Law is the expansion of basic education
from ten (10) years to thirteen (13) years,
encompassing "at least one (1) year of
kindergarten education, six (6) years of
elementary education, and six (6) years of
secondary education x x x. Secondary
education includes four (4) years of junior
high school and two (2) years of senior high
school education."[63] The K to 12 Law also
adopts the following key changes in the
Basic Education Curriculum (BEC). Apart
from mastering core subjects, the additional
two (2) years of Senior High School will
allow students to choose among academic,
technical-vocational, or sports and arts, as
specialization, based on aptitude, interest
and school capacity.[68] Hence, graduates of
Senior High School under the K to 12 BEC
are envisioned to already be prepared for
employment, entrepreneurship, or middle-
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 71 | P a g e
level skills development should they opt not
to pursue college education.[69]
Furthermore, the K to 12 Law extends the
benefits provided under RA No. 8545 to
qualified students.[70] DepEd is mandated to
engage the services of private education
institutions and non-DepEd schools offering
Senior High School through the programs
under RA No. 8545 and other financial
arrangements based on the principle of
public-private partnership.
The K to 12 Law also imposes upon the
DepEd, CHED, and TESDA, the task to
promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations, which shall provide, among
others, appropriate strategies and
mechanisms to ensure the smooth transition
from the existing 10-year basic education
cycle to the K to 12 cycle addressing issues
such as multi-year low enrollment and
displacement of faculty of Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) and Technical Vocational
Institutions (TVIs).[71]
DepEd is likewise mandated to coordinate
with TESDA and CHED in designing the
enhanced BEC to ensure college readiness
and avoid remedial and duplication of basic
education subjects; [72] and to consult other
national government agencies and other
stakeholders in developing the K to 12 BEC,
which shall adhere to the several standards.
In compliance with the foregoing mandate,
DOLE organized three area-wide tripartite
education fora on K to 12 in Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao. DOLE also conducted
regional consultations with HEIs, teaching
and non teaching personnel.[78]
As a result of the tripartite consultations,
DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and CHED issued
on May 30, 2014 the Joint Guidelines on the
Implementation of the Labor and
Management Component of Republic Act
No. 10533 (Joint Guidelines). The Joint
Guidelines was issued to (a) ensure the
sustainability of private and public
educational institutions; (b) protect the
rights, interests, and welfare of teaching and
non-teaching personnel; and (c) optimize
employment retention or prevent, to the
extent possible, displacement of faculty and
non-academic personnel in private and
public HEIs during the transition from the
existing 10 years basic education cycle to
the enhanced K to 12 basic education.
The K to 12 basic education was
implemented in parts. Five (5) school years
from SY 2012-2013, the implementation of
the K to 12 basic education was to be
completed. In 2018, the first group of Grade
6 and Grade 12 students under the K to 12
BEC are set to graduate.
Accordingly, to accommodate the changes
brought about by the K to 12 Law, and after
several public consultations with
[83]
stakeholders were held, CMO No. 20,
entitled General Education Curriculum:
Holistic Understandings, Intellectual and
Civic Competencies was issued on June 28,
2013. CMO No. 20 provides the framework
and rationale of the revised General
Education (GE) curriculum. It sets the
minimum standards for the GE component
of all degree programs that applies to private
and public HEIs in the country.
ISSUES:
I raise constitutional issues and to review
WHETHER OR NOT THE K TO 12
BASIC EDUCATION PROGRAM
VIOLATES VARIOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS?
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE
KINDERGARTEN EDUCATION ACT,
K TO 12 LAW, K TO 12 IRR, DO NO.
31, JOINT GUIDELINES, AND CMO
NO. 20 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL?
HELD:
The Supreme Court disagrees that the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition sought
by Petitioners are unwarranted.
The political question doctrine is "no longer
the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield
that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review"
under the expanded definition of judicial
power of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes
courts of justice not only "to settle actual
case controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but
also "to determine whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
It is noted that contrary to the Solicitor
General's assertion, it has long been
judicially settled that under the Court's
expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari
and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, any act of any

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 72 | P a g e

branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
It is said that the Court's power is not
unbridled authority to review just any claim
of constitutional violation or grave abuse of
discretion. The following requisites must
first be complied with before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review,
namely: (1) there is an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the petitioner has
standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the
act or issuance; (3) the question of
constitutionality is raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case.
These consolidated cases present an actual
case or controversy that is ripe for
adjudication. The assailed laws and
executive issuances have already taken
effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty
members, students and parents, are
individuals directly and considerably
affected by their implementation.
Under the circumstances alleged in their
respective petitions, the Supreme Court
finds that petitioners have sufficient legal
interest in the outcome of the controversy.
And, considering that the instant cases
involve issues on education, which under the
Constitution the State is mandated to
promote and protect, the stringent
requirement of direct and substantial interest
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 73 | P a g e
may be dispensed with, and the mere fact
that petitioners are concerned citizens
asserting a public right, sufficiently clothes
them with legal standing to initiate the
instant petition.
The Supreme Court holds that, contrary
to petitioners' contention, the K to 12 Law
was validly enacted.
First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior
consultations is belied by the nationwide
regional consultations conducted by DepEd
pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38[133]
and 98,[134] series of 2011. The Philippine
Congress, in the course of drafting the K to
12 Law, also conducted regional public
hearings between March 2011 to February
2012, wherein representatives from parents-
teachers' organizations, business,
public/private school heads, civil society
groups/non-government
organizations/private organizations and local
government officials and staffs were among
the participants.
Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in
this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,"
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed is
conclusive not only as to its provisions but
also as to its due enactment.
Third, there is no undue delegation of
legislative power in the enactment of the K
to 12 Law. The K to 12 Law adequately
provides the legislative policy that it seeks
to implement and for this purpose, the State
shall create a functional basic education
system that will develop productive and
responsible citizens equipped with the
essential competencies, skills and values for
both life-long learning and employment.
Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12
Law are the standards to guide the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA in carrying out the
provisions of the law, from the development
of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and
training of teaching personnel and to the
formulation of appropriate strategies in
order to address the changes during the
transition period.
DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable
DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation
addressed to DepEd personnel providing for
general guidelines on the implementation of
a new curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in
preparation for the K to 12 basic education.
It is established that the K to 12 Law and its
related issuances were duly enacted and/or
validly issued, the Court now discusses
whether they contravene provisions of the
Constitution.
Police power of the State
From the legislative history of the Philippine
education system as detailed above, one can
easily discern that the enactment of
education laws, including the K to 12 Law
and the Kindergarten Education Act, their
respective implementing rules and
regulations and the issuances of the
government agencies, are an exercise of the
State's police power.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 74 | P a g e
Here, petitioners essentially assail the State's
exercise of police power to regulate
education through the adoption of the K to
12 Basic Education Program, because the K
to 12 Law and its related issuances
purportedly violate the Constitutional
provisions as enumerated in the outline of
issues above.
Every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The
grounds for nullity must be clear beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for the Court to
nullify the assailed laws, petitioners must
clearly establish that the constitutional
provisions they cite bestow upon them
demandable and enforceable rights and that
such rights clash against the State's exercise
of its police power under the K to 12 Law.
It is with these standards and framework that
the Court examines whether the enactments
of the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to
12 Law and their implementing rules and
regulations, were valid exercises of the
State's police power to regulate education.
Non-self-executing constitutional
provisions
As defined, "a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action."
The Court has, in several cases, had
occasion to already declare several
Constitutional provisions as not self-
executory. In specific application to the
present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,the Court also ruled that Section 1,
Article XIV on the right of all citizens to
quality education is also not self-executory.
The provision "for the promotion of the right
to 'quality education' x x x [was] put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights.”
Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of
the Filipino language as a medium of
instruction is also not self-executory.
Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of
labor and security of tenure, was also
declared by the Court in Agabon v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[192] (Agabon)
as not self-executory. Reiterating Agabon,
the Court explained in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc.,[193] that Section 3,
Article XIII, does not automatically confer
judicially demandable and enforceable rights
and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article
XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a
positive enforceable right to stave off the
dismissal of an employee for just cause
owing to the failure to serve proper notice or
hearing. As manifested by several framers of
the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on
social justice require legislative enactments
for their enforceability. (Emphasis added)
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 75 | P a g e
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be
treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which
the questioned clause may be declared
unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk
opening the floodgates of litigation to every
worker or union over every conceivable
violation of so broad a concept as social
justice for labor.
Compulsory
Elementary and
High School
Education
There is no conflict between the K to 12
Law and related issuances and the
Constitution when it made kindergarten and
senior high school compulsory. The
enactment of the K to 12 Law was the
manner by which the Congress sought to
realize the right to education of its citizens.
The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not
being retroactively applied because only
those currently enrolled at the time the K to
12 Law took effect and future students will
be subject to the K to 12 BEC and the
additional two (2) years of senior high
school. Students who already graduated
from high school under the old curriculum
are not required by the K to 12 Law to
complete the additional two (2) years of
senior high school.
Right to select a profession or course of
study
Petitioners have failed to show that the State
has imposed unfair and inequitable
conditions for senior high schools to enroll
in their chosen path. The K to 12 Program is
precisely designed in such a way that
students may choose to enroll in public or
private senior high schools which offer the
strands of their choice. For eligible students,
the voucher program also allows indigent
senior high school students to enroll in
private institutions that offer the strands of
their choice.
Mother Tongue as medium of instruction
Supreme Court said that there is no conflict
between the use of the MT as a primary
medium of instruction and Section 7, Article
XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
CMO No. 20
does not
contravene any
other laws
It must be noted that nothing in these laws
requires that Filipino and Panitikan must be
included as subjects in the tertiary level.
Further, as already established, it is within
the authority of the CHED to determine the
GE distribution requirements. The Court
also reiterates that the study of Filipino and
Panitikan can easily be included as courses
in the tertiary level, if the HEIs wish to.
Thus, petitioners' arguments that CMO No.
20 violates the aforementioned laws must
fail.
The K to 12 Law
does not violate
substantive due
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 76 | P a g e
process and
equal protection
of the laws.
Again, the Supreme Court disagrees. There
is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and
right of due process of the students.
Substantive due process, the aspect of due
process invoked in this case, requires an
inquiry on the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to
his property. In Abakada Guro Party List vs.
Ermita,[246] the Court held:
Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the
substantive due process of petitioners. The
assailed law's declaration of policy itself
reveals that, contrary to the claims of
petitioners, the objectives of the law serve
the interest of the public and not only of a
particular class.
For this purpose, the State shall create a
functional basic education system that
will develop productive and responsible
citizens equipped with the essential
competencies, skills and values for both
life-long learning and employment.
It is a fact that the K to 12 IRR confirms the
inclusiveness of the design of the Enhanced
Basic Education in mandating that the
enhanced basic education programs should
be able to address the physical, intellectual,
psychosocial, and cultural needs of learners.
Other arguments
against the
constitutionality
of the K to 12
Law
The control and administration of
educational institutions shall be vested in
the citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be
established exclusively for aliens and no
group of aliens shall comprise more than
one-third of the enrollment in any school.
The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to schools established for foreign
diplomatic personnel and their dependents
and, unless otherwise provided by law, for
other foreign temporary residents.
Proprietary educational institutions,
including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions
subject to the limitations provided by law
including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
Policy issues
Policy matters are not the concern of the
Highest Court. To reiterate, government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of
the political branches of the government. It
is not for the Court to look into the wisdom
or propriety of legislative determination.
The Supreme Court should not be
thought of as having been tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the
entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear
showing of constitutional infirmity or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the Court's exercise
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 77 | P a g e
of the judicial power, pervasive and
limitless it may seem to be, still must
succumb to the paramount doctrine of
separation of powers. After a careful
review of the records of the case, we find
that this jurisprudential element of abuse of
discretion has not been shown to exist.
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, the courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution, but also
because the judiciary, in the determination
of actual cases and controversies, must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of
the government. The Court, despite its vast
powers, will not review the wisdom, merits,
or propriety of governmental policies, but
will strike them down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality
and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion.For
having failed to show any of the above in
the passage of the assailed law and the
department issuances, the petitioners'
remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with
the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions
are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
Court declares Republic Act No. 10533,
Republic Act No. 10157, CHED
Memorandum Order No. 20, Series of 2013,
Department of Education Order No. 31,
Series of 2012, and Joint Guidelines on the
Implementation of the Labor and
Management Component of Republic Act
No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated April
21, 2015 issued in G.R. No. 217451 is
hereby LIFTED.
Academic Freedom (Art. XIV, Sec. 5[2])
i. Cadet 1CL Cudia vs. The Superintendent
of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, 24 February
2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF
P. CUDIA vs THE SUPERINTENDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY
GR NO. 211362 February 24, 2015
FACTS:
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of
SiklabDiwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the
country's premiere military academy located
at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City.
On November 14, 2013, the combined
classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL
cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on
Operations Research (OR432) under Dr.
Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr.Costales) at
the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule
from the Headquarters Academic Group, the
4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-
3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th
period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05
p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong
(Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued
a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 78 | P a g e
CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2)
minutes in his Eng 412 class x xx. "
In his Explanation of Report dated
December 8, 2013, Cadet lCLCudia
reasoned out that: "I came directly from
OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late
by our instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel
Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him the
penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Immediately, Cadet lCLCudia clarified with
Maj. Hindang his alleged violation.
Several days passed, and on January 7,
2014, Cadet lCLCudia was informed that
Maj. Hindang reported him to the
HonorCommittee for violation of the Honor
Code. The Honor Report stated: “Lying that
is giving statement that perverts the truth in
his written appeal, stating that his 4th period
class ended at l 500H that made him late in
the succeeding class.”
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a
team to conduct a preliminary investigation
on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1
CL Cudia. Soon after, the team submitted its
Preliminary Investigation Report
recommending that the case be formalized.
The first formal hearing started late evening
of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early
morning the next day. Cadet lCLCudia was
informed of the charge against him, as to
which he pleaded "Not Guilty."
Deliberation among the HC voting members
followed. After that, the ballot sheets were
distributed. The members cast their votes
through secret balloting and submitted their
accomplished ballot sheets together with
their written justification. The result was 8-1
in favor of a guilty verdict.
Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet
lCLLagura) was the lone dissenter.
Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman
Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer
and voting members went inside a chamber
adjoining the court room for further
deliberation. After several minutes, they
went out and the Presiding Officer
announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1
CL Cudia, who already served nine (9)
touring hours, was then informed of the
unanimous votes finding him guilty of
violating the Honor Code. He was
immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D.
Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of
Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and
recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar
Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the
separation from the PMA of Cadet
lCLCudia for violation of the First Tenet of
the Honor Code. Vice Admiral Abogado
approved the recommendation to dismiss
Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCLCudia
submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting for
reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a
cadet but it was denied.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a
letter to President Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching
thereto the Appeal Memorandum. On the
same day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 79 | P a g e
by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and PMA senior officers to
conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining
to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal
Memorandum. The focus of the inquiry was
not just to find out whether the appeal has
merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other
cadets and members of the command related
to the incident and to establish specific
violation of policy or regulations that had
been violated by other cadets and members
of the HC.
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the
President sustained the findings of the AFP
Chief of Staff and the CRAB.
ISSUE
W/NOT PMA ENJOYS THE
ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH
AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND
PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR
NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
The PMA has the inherent right to
promulgate reasonable norms, rules and
regulations that it may deem necessary for
the maintenance of school discipline, which
is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the
premiere military educational institution of
the AFP in accordance with Section
30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58
and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII,
Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative
Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution
that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.
In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,(2000 case) it was held that
concomitant with such freedom is the right
and duty to instil and impose discipline upon
its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr.
v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. and
Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong, the PMA has the freedom on who
to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given
the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to form
part of the AFP.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning, has been
enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935,
1973, and 1987. In Garcia, this Court
espoused the concurring opinion of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which
enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of
a university: To determine for itself on
academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2)
what may be taught, (3) how it shall be
taught, and (4) who may be admitted to
study. An educational institution has the
power to adopt and enforce such rules as
may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very
object of incorporation, and indispensable to
the successful management of the college. It
can decide for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them, free from
outside coercion or interference except when
there is an overriding public welfare which
would call for some restraint. Indeed,
"academic freedom has never been meant to
be an unabridged license. It is a privilege
that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly. An equally telling precept is a
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 80 | P a g e
long recognized mandate, so well expressed
in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every
'person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."'
The right of the states to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials and
employees (Art. XI, Sec 15)
a. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, et. al. v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 130140, Oct. 25, 1999
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-
FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL
C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and
ORLANDO SALVADOR, as Consultant,
Technical Working Group of the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans VERSUS
HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO as
Ombudsman, JOSE Z. OSIAS,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, EDUARDO V.
ROMUALDEZ, FERNANDO C.
ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO
ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of
Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc;
CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES. GR NO. 130140, October
25, 1999
FACTS:
In the year 1992, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Administrative Order No, 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Laons, with
the Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
as Chairman. The committee was directed to
perform: 1. Inventory of all behest loans; 2.
Identify borrowers who were granted
“friendly waivers” and 3. Determine the
courses of action that government take to
recover the loans. In addition, President
Ramos issued Memorandum to include “all
non-performing loans which shall embrace
both behest and non-behest loans.
The Committee reported that the
Philippine Seeds Inc. (PSI) were one of the
corporations which obtained behest loans.
PCGG filed with the OMBUDSMAN a
complaint against the Directors for violation
of Sec. 3 of Republic Act No, 3019 as
amended, which was docketed as OMB-0-
96-0968.
In a resolution the OMBUDSMAN
dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription arguing that the prescriptive
period commenced to run from the time of
the commission of the crime, not from
the discovery thereof. The Committee,
on the other hand, argues that the right of
the Republic of the Philippines to recover
behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is
imprescriptible pursuant to Section 15,
Article XI of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OMBUDSMAN
gravely abused his discretion in holding that
the complaint had already prescribed.
RULING:
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 81 | P a g e
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the Commission.
It is clear from the facts of the case
that what has been violated was a special
law, the applicable rule in the computation
of prescription is Sec. 2 of RA 3326 which
provides that: Sec. 2. Prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
In the present case, it was well-nigh
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired
with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus,
the Supreme Court agree with the
COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period
for the offenses with which the respondents
in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of
such commission.
Since the computation of the
prescriptive period for the filing of the
criminal action should commence from the
discovery of the offense, the
OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing outright
Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have
first received the evidence from the
complainant and the respondents to resolve
the case on its merits and on the issue of the
date of discovery of the offense.
Regalian Doctrine (Art. XII, Sec. 2 relate
with Art. XII, Sec. 5 and Art. II, Sec. 22)
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral
Natural Resources and Environmental domains are not part of the lands of the
Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian public domain. They are private lands and
Doctrine belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which
is a concept of private land title that existed
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership and
FACTS: possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa domains is a limited form of ownership and
filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as does not include the right to alienate the
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the same.
constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR
on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not
contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State
and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 82 | P a g e


Utilization of natural resources (Art. XII,
Sec. 2)
i. Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec.
Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April
2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMALS OF THE
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON
STRAIT vs. Reyes
G.R No. 180771 21 April 2015 756 SCRA
513-605
Facts; The Pettioner in the original Petition
for Certiorari , Mandamus and Prohibition
which enjoin respondents for implementing
SC-46 and to have it nullified for the willful
and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution
and certain international and municipal laws.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively
referred to as the Resident Marine Mammals
in the petition are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porposises, and other certain
species, which inhabit the waters in andtheir
Legal guardian and the friends to be
Stewards who allegedly empathize with seek
the protection of, the aforementioned
marine mammals species. Japex committed
to drill one exploration JPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact
STATEMENT SYSTEM, Including other
Environmental Management Related
Measures and For Other Purposes.
Issues; Whether or not Service contracts
No.46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Statutes.
HeLd; No, Petitioners maintain that SC-46
transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 83 | P a g e
paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution 1987 Constitution because
JAPEX is 100% Japanese owned.
Furthermore, The FIDEC asserts that SC-46
cannot be considered as a technical and
financial assistance agreement validly
executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision. The petitioners claim that La
Bugal-Blaan Tribunal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos laid down the guidelines for the
serice contracts, one of which is that there
must exist a general law for oil exploration
before a service contract may be entered into
by the government . The petitioners thus
allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which
involved mining contracts under Republic
Act No. 7942,does not apply in this case.
The petitioners also argue that Presidential
Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972 cannot legally
justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been
repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
subsequent laws, which enunciate new
policies concerning the enrivonment. In
addition, petitioners in G.R. no. 180771
claim that paragraph 2 and 3 of the Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution mandate
the exclusive use and enjoyment by the
Filipinos of our natural resources, and
paragraph 4 does not speak of service
contracts but of FTAAs or Financial
Technical Assistance Agreements.
The President may enter into agreements
with foreigner-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration,
development , and conditions provided by
the law, based on the real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The president shall notify the Congress of
every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, with thirty days from its
execution
Franchise, certificate and authority for
public utilities (Art.XII, Sec.11)
Case: Jose M. Roy III v. Chairperson
Teresita Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246-11-22
Facts:
On June 28, 2011, the court issued
the Gamboa Decision that the term capital in
Section 11 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting
p[referred shares).
The Gamboa decision attained finality on
October 18, 2012, nd Entry of Judgement is
thereafter issued on December 11, 2012.
On May 20, 2013, the SEC to the
Respondent Chairperson Teresita J.
Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8
Section 2 all covered corporations
shall at all times, observe the Constitutional
and statuotory ownership requirement. For
purposes of determining compliance
therewith, the required percentage of the
Filipino ownership shall be applied to
BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors; and (b)the total number
of outstanding share of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote in the election of directors.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 84 | P a g e
On June10, 2013, Petitioner Roy, as
lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition
assailing the validity of SEC-MC No.8 for
not conforming to the letter and spirit of the
Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for
having been issued by the SEC with grave
abuse of discretion.
Issues:
Whether the SEC gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing the SEC-MC No.8 in
the light of the Gamboa Decision and
Resolution
Ruling:
SEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued SEC-MC No.8,
To the contrary, the Court finds SEC-MC
No. 8 to have been issued in fealty to the
Gamboa Decision and Resolution
Gamboa Decision
“Capital” in Section XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares of stocks
entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and thus in the present case only to common
shares and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non0voting
preferred shares)
Foreign Investment Act of 1991 (FIA)
Gamboa Resolution put to rest the Courts
Interpretation of the term capital
Full beneficial ownership of stocks
coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential… reiterates and confirms the
interpretation that the term capital in
Section11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to the shares with voting
rights as well as with full beneficial
ownership.
Section 2 of SEC-MC No.8 clearly
incorporates the Voting Control Test or the
controlling interest requirements. In fact
Section 2 goes beyond requiring a 60-40
ratio in favor of the Filipino Nationals in the
voting stocks, it moreover require the 60-40
percentage ownership in the total number of
outstanding shares of stocks, whether voting
or not. The SEC formulated the SEC-MC
No.8 to adhere to the Court’s unambiguous
pronouncement that “full beneficial
ownership of the 60% of the outstanding
capital stock, coupled with 60% of the
voting rights is required.” Clearly, SEC-MC
No.8 does not expressly mention the
Beneficial Ownership Test or full beneficial
ownership of stocks requirements in the
FIA, this will not as it does not, render it
invalid meaning, it does not follow that the
SEC will not apply this test in determining
whether the shares claimed to be owned by
Philippine National are Filipino, i.e., are
held by them by mere title or in full
beneficial ownership. To be sure the SEC
takes its guiding lights also form the FIA
and its implementing rules, the Securities
Regulation Code.
Houses of Congress
a. Senate
i. Composition (Art. VI, Sec. 2)
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON.
OSCAR PIMENTEL SR.
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008
FACTS:
 July 27, 2003, a group of more than
300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati
City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
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 On the same day, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a
state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.
 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV
was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of
Makati.
 4 years later, petitioner, who has
remained in detention, threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate
with a 6-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be allowed to attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
 The trial court denied all the requests
in the Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not membership in
Congress exempt an accused from statutes
and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general
HELD:
 No, it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial
detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail
security; and while pre-trial detainees do not
forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention
makes their rights more limited than those of
the public.
 When a person indicted for an
offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission
of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him,
unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance.
 Presumption of innocence does not
carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such
an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special
class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
iii. Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 8 December
2008
BAGABUYO VS COMELEC
(December 8, 2008)
FACTS:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan De
Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G,
Jaraula, filed and sponsored House bill NO.
5859: An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Loan Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or
RA#9371. It increased Cagayan De Oro’s
legislative district from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would
be classified as belonging to either the first
or second district, depending on their place
of residence. On March 13, 2007,
COMELEC promulgated a resolution
implementing the said act. Bagabuyo file a
petition at the Supreme Court asking for the
nullification of RA#9371 and resolution No.
7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner
argued that COMELEC cannot implement a
law without the commencement of a
plebiscite which is indispensable for the
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division and conversion of a local
government unit.
ISSUE: WON the law, which pertains to the
legislative apportionment of a city, involve
the division and conversion of a local
government unit, necessitating a plebiscite.
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld the respondent’s
arguments saying that such law only
increased the representation of CDO in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglunsod. Creation, division, merger,
abolition and alteration of boundaries
under Art. X Sec.10 requires the
commencement of plebiscite, while
legislative apportionment or reappointment
under Art. VI, Sec. 5 need not. There was
no change in CDO’s territory, population,
income and classification.
Legislative apportionment is
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of
representatives which a State, country or
other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a
legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district
lines as to equalize population and voting
power among the districts.
Reapportionment on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement
of equality of representation. RA 9371 does
not have the effect of dividing the city of
CDO into two political and corporate units
and territories. Rather than divide the city
either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter
more and greater say, both in Congress and
in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

The City, for its part, now has twice
the number of congressmen speaking for it
and voting in the halls of Congress. Since
the total number of congressmen in the
country has not increased to the point of
doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressmen (instead of one) from the same
city cannot be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
Congress.
Freedom from arrest – Art. VI, Sec. 11
i. People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3,
2000
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3,
2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS :
Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member
of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts1is pending
appeal. He filed a Motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 87 | P a g e
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative
in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He
adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases. He also claims
that the concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge
his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions
when he is allowed to leave jail.
ISSUE : Does membership in Congress
exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general?
RULING :
The exemption applied only to civil arrests.
Jalosjos could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still
to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal. For offenses punishable by
more than six years imprisonment, there was
no immunity from arrest.
When the voters of his district elected the
accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To
give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
Does being an elective official result in a
substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. The Court cannot validate badges of
inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded.
Therefore, election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
Election of officers – Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1)
Rep. Baguilat vs. Speaker Alvarez GR no
227757 July 25, 2017
The Facts
The petition alleges that prior to the opening
of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016,
several news articles surfaced about Rep.
Suarez's announcement that he sought the
adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo
Duterte's Administration as the "Minority
Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in
the House of Representatives (or the House),
and even purportedly encamped himself in
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 88 | P a g e
Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections
to get the endorsement of President Duterte
and the majority partisans. The petition
further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's
election as the Minority Leader, the
supermajority coalition in the House
allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its
members to feign membership in the
Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the
Minority Leader.
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the
election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader
Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep.
Atienza) had an interchange before the
Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the
following from the former: (a) all those
who vote for the winning Speaker shall
belong to the Majority and those who vote
for the other candidates shall belong to
the Minority; (b) those who abstain from
voting shall likewise be considered part of
the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader
shall be elected by the members of the
Minority. Thereafter, the Elections for the
Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252
Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez,
eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven
[(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining
and one [(l)] registering a no vote," thus,
resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly
elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing
tradition" of the House - where the candidate
who garnered the second (2nd)-highest
number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader
- Rep. Baguilat would be declared and
recognized as the Minority Leader.
However, despite numerous follow-ups from
respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never
recognized as such.
On August 1, 2016, one of the
"abstentionists," Rep. Harlin Neil Abayon,
III (Rep. Abayon), manifested before the
Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did
not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the
21 "abstentionists") convened and elected
Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now,
Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority
Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman
essentially on the ground that various
"irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's
election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a)
that Rep. Suarez was a member of the
Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez,
and that his "transfer" to the Minority was
irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists"
who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of
Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader
are supposed to be considered independent
members of the House, and thus, irregularly
deemed as part of the Minority. However,
Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled,
and consequently, Rep. Suarez was
officially recognized as the House Minority
Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for
mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader
in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition"
in the House where the candidate who
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number
of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the
irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's
election to said Minority Leader position.
Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of
Minority Leader is an internal matter to the
House of Representatives. Thus, absent any
finding of violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
interfere with such internal matters of a
coequal branch of the govemment. In the
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same vein, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker
Alvarez and Majority Leader Farinas
contends, inter alia, that the election of
Minority Leader is within the exclusive
realm of the House of Representatives,
which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant
to the principle of separation of powers, as
well as the political question doctrine.
Similarly, the OSG argues that the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House
Minority Leader was not tainted with any
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents may be
compelled via a writ of mandamus to
recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives; and
(b) petitioners as the only legitimate
members of the House Minority.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do the act required to be done
when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office or which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course oflaw." In Special People, Inc.
Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained
that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that is issued only in
extreme necessity, and the ordinary course
of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a
clear legal right to the performance of the
act to be compelled.
After a judicious study of this case, the
Court finds that petitioners have no clear
legal right to the reliefs sought. Records
disclose that prior to the Speakership
Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting
Floor Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a
parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as
to who would elect the Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas
then articulated that: (a) all those who vote
for the winning Speaker shall belong to
the Majority and those who vote for other
candidates shall belong to the Minority;
(b) those who abstain from voting shall
likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader
shall be elected by the members of the
Minority. Thereafter, the election of the
Speaker of the House proceeded without
any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners.
Notably, the election of the Speaker of the
House is the essential and formative step
conducted at the first regular session of the
17th Congress to determine the constituency
of the Majority and Minority (and later on,
their respective leaders), considering that the
Majority would be comprised of those who
voted for the winning Speaker and the
Minority of those who did not. The
deviation by the Lower House from the
aforesaid rules is not averse to the
Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives,
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 90 | P a g e
Each house shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall be elected by
a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method
and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.
In the case of Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, which involved a dispute on the
rightful Senate Minority Leader during the
11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court
observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a
Speaker of the House of Representative,] it
is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers [of the Lower
House]. All that the Charter says is that '
[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.' [As
such], the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the [House of Representatives] itself, not
by [the] Court. "
Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
vests in the House of Representatives the
sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the
rules of its proceedings." These "legislative
rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts,
for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of
Representatives]. "Hence, as a general rule,
"[t]his Court has no authority to interfere
and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of
[C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of
Representatives]."

As may be gleaned from the circumstances

as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent
deviation from its traditional rules, the Court
is hard-pressed to find any attending grave
abuse of discretion which would warrant its
intrusion in this case. By and large, this case
concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which,
absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, cannot be judicially interfered
with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is

DISMISSED.

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Electoral Tribunals - Art. VI, Sec. 17
a. Cases:
i. Pimentel vs. HRET, 393 SCRA 227
(2002)
Pimentel vs. HRET
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List
System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in
accordance with the Party-List System Act,
national elections were held which included,
for the first time, the election through
popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House.
Subsequently, the House constituted its
HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. In practice, the procedure involves
the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in
the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records,
it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of
the present petitions for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were
composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political
parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F.
Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose
A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate
President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list
representatives to conform to Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the
HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the
Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to
the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET
Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement of even date, referred the letter
to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2
February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this
Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
against the HRET, its Chairman and
Members, and against the CA, its Chairman
and Members. They contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or
at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in
the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et
al. committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to act positively on the letter of
Senator Pimentel.
Issues:
[1] Whether the present composition of the
House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 92 | P a g e

the CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to
the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The petitions are bereft of any allegation
that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in
the election of members of the HRET and
the CA. Neither does it appear that after the
11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the
party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather,
it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time
simply refrained from participating in the
election process. As the primary recourse of
the party-list representatives lies with the
House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at
this time.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 93 | P a g e
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or
lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel.
Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and their internal
rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of
any power to reconstitute themselves.
The power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21)
1. Constitutional requisites / limitations
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, et.al
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
FACTS
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci"
tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her
favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become
the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his
right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their
session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of
the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUE
Whether or not publication of the Rules of
Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senate’s website,
satisfies the due process requirement of law.
HELD
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in
the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient
under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even
provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure
put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 94 | P a g e
violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the
more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It
does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
Commander-in-Chief Clause
G.R. NO. 170165, August 15, 2006
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V.
GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER
F. BALUTAN PETITIONERS, VS.
LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA AS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, COL.
GILBERTO JOSE C. ROA AS THE
PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATING
OFFICER, THE PROVOST
MARSHALL GENERAL OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL, RESPONDENTS.
Facts: Petitioners Brig. Gen. Francisco
Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lt. Col.
Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), are high-
ranking officers of the AFP assigned to the
PMA, the former was the PMA Assistant
Superintendent, and the latter Assistant
Commandant of Cadets.
On 22 September 2005, Sen. Biazon invited
senior officers of the AFP to appear before
Senate Committee hearing on 28 September
2005. Topics concern was the conduct of the
2004 election, particularly allegations of
massive cheating and the audio excerpt
purportedly of a phone conversation
between Pres. GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the
time, Gen. Gudani had been designated as
commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of
"Joint Task Force Ranao". Said task force
was tasked with the maintenance of peace
and order during the 2004 elections in the
provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del
Sur.
On the evening of 27 September 2005, a
message was transmitted to the PMA
Superintendent from the office of Gen.
Senga, stating: PER INSTRUCTION OF
HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE
ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE
HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL.
INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI
AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN
PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another
letter to Sen. Biazon, informing the senator
that "no approval has been granted by the
President to any AFP officer to appear" for
the scheduled hearing. Nonetheless, both
petitioners were present and testified as to
the conduct of the 2004 elections. After their
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 95 | P a g e
testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a
statement that the two officers "disobeyed a
legal order, in violation of Articles 65 and
97 of the Articles of War (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they
will be subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings. Moreover, Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their
assignments then. Petitioners filed with the
SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking the order of PGMA preventing
petitioners from testifying before Congress
without her prior approval be declared
unconstitutional.
Issue: May the President prevent a member
of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the
President has constitutional authority to do
so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. The SC ruling that the
President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress
is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-
in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title
as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to
the position. Again, the exigencies of
military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President's
ability to control the individual members of
the armed forces be accorded the utmost
respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying
the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces.
At the same time, the SC also held that any
chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. It is clear that if the President or
the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member
of the AFP to appear before Congress, the
legislative body seeking such testimony may
seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
Such judicial action should be directed at the
heads of the executive branch or the armed
forces, the persons who wield authority and
control over the actions of the officers
concerned. The legislative purpose of such
testimony, as well as any defenses against
the same — whether grounded on executive
privilege, national security or similar
concerns — would be accorded due judicial
evaluation. All the constitutional
considerations pertinent to either branch of
government may be raised, assessed, and
ultimately weighed against each other. And
once the courts speak with finality, both
branches of government have no option but
to comply with the decision of the courts,
whether the effect of the decision is to their
liking or disfavor. Final judicial orders have
the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
Note: Please read the entire case as this case
digest does not do justice to the great
discussion by the SC of the principles of the
separation of powers and the control of the
President over the action and freedom of
speech of the military personnel.
Judicial privilege
AGCAOILI VS. FARIÑAS
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 96 | P a g e
G.R. NO. 232395, JULY 3, 2018
FACTS:
House Resolution No. 882 was
introduced by Hon. Farinas to conduct a
legislative inquiry pertaining to the use of by
the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte
of its shares from the excise taxes on locally
manufactured Virginia type cigarettes for a
purpose other than that provided for by RA
7171. During the hearing, Agcaoili alleged
that they were subjected to threats and
intimidation. Eventually, they were cited in
contempt. Imee Marcos (Ilocos Norte
Governor) sought for a writ of prohibition
under Rule 65 ROC to declare the
legislative inquiry illegal and in excess of
jurisdiction and to enjoin respondents
Farinas (the Ilocos 6) from proceeding with
it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject legislative
inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may
be enjoined by a writ of prohibition?
RULING:
No. Conducting legislative inquiries
is expressly provided under Sec. 21 Art. VI
of the Constitution which provides that the
“Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected. Thus, if these Constitutionally-
prescribed requirements are met, courts have
no authority to prohibit Congressional
committees from requiring the attendance of
persons to whom it issues a subpoena. The
inquiry must be in aid of legislation. While
there is no question that a writ of prohibition
lies against legislative functions, the Court
finds no justification for the issuance thereof
in the instant case. The hearings only
revolved around the use of Ilocos Norte’s
shares from the excise tax on locally
manufactured Virginia-type cigarettes. In
fact, the cause of petitioners’ detention was
not the perceived or gathered illegal use of
such shares but the rather unusual inability
of petitioners to recall the transactions
despite the same having involved
considerable amount of money.
Legislative contempt
1. Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR No. L-3820, 18
July 1950
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820,
July 18, 1950
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase
by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to
one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American
citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million
for his alleged interest in the two estates that
only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine who
were responsible for and who benefited from
the transaction at the expense of the
government.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 97 | P a g e
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as
agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In
the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of
the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest
Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in
contempt by the Senate and was committed
to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms for imprisonment until he answers the
questions. He thereafter filed a petition
for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his
detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his
right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for
habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power
to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the
[1935] Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change;
and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.
xxx xxx
xxx
[W]e find that the question for the
refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent
to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is
not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is
not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and
it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom the witness gave the P440,000
involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination — it is in fact the very thing
sought to be determined. The contention is
not that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has no
relation or materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated that it
is not necessary for the legislative body to
show that every question propounded to a
witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 98 | P a g e
is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
xxx xxx
xxx
If the subject of investigation before
the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called
relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee
by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the
authority to commit petitioner for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative
session.
We find no sound reason to limit the
power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not
to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. The very reason for
the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to
perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are
performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with
the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment
here in question was adopted by the Senate,
which is a continuing body and which does
not cease exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no
limit as to time to the Senate’s power to
punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in
the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT
rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.
Since according to the witness
himself the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of
Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him. There is
no conflict of authorities on the applicable
rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether
testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer
will incriminate him as he is not the sole
judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and
real to the court, from all the circumstances,
and from the whole case, as well as from his
general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is
the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may
criminate or not. . . The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient
to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time
liable to prosecution and punishment for
such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse,
for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 99 | P a g e
It is the province of the trial judge to
determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. A
witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an
answer might incriminate him, but rather it
is for the trial judge to decide that question.
Legislative contempt
[ GR No. 234608, Jul 03, 2018 ]
ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE
FACTS
This is a case of petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin the
implementation of Senate P.S. Resolution
(SR) No. 504 and the October 18, 2017
Order (Contempt Order) of the Senate
Committee on Public Order and Dangerous
Drugs citing Arvin Balag (petitioner) in
contempt.
On September 17, 2017, Horacio
Tomas T. Castillo III, a first year law
student of the University of Sto. Tomas,
died allegedly due to hazing conducted by
the Aegis Juris Fraternity of the same
university.
On September 19, 2017, SR No.
504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel
Zubiri condemning the death of Horacio III
and directing the appropriate Senate
Committee to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, to hold those responsible
accountable.
On October 11, 2017, Senator
Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee
on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs,
issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum addressed to petitioner
directing him to appear before the
committee and to testify as to the subject
matter under inquiry. Another Subpoena Ad
Testificandum was issued on October 17,
2017, which was received by petitioner on
the same day, requiring him to attend the
legislative hearing on October 18, 2017.
On said date, petitioner attended the
senate hearing. In the course of the
proceedings, at around 11:29 in the morning,
Senator Grace Poe asked petitioner if he was
the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused
to answer the question and invoked his right
against self-incrimination. He was asked
more than twice by Senator Poe and Senator
Lacson but still refused to answer and again
invoked his right against self-incrimination.
Senator Poe then moved to cite him in
contempt, seconded by Senator Villanueva
and Senator Zubiri.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER RESPONDENT
SENATE COMMITTEES ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN CONDUCTING THE
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY AND CITING
PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.
THE COURT’S RULING
No. The petition is DENIED for
being moot and academic. In this case, the
Court finds that there is no more justiciable
controversy. In its resolution dated 12
December 2017, the Court ordered in the
interim the immediate release of petitioner
pending resolution of the instant petition.
Thus, petitioner was no longer detained
under the Senate's authority.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 100 | P a g e
However, the SC found “a genuine
necessity” to limit the Senate’s imposition of
a period of imprisonment, citing Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution which requires
Congress to respect resource persons
appearing in its inquiries.
An indefinite and unspecified period
of detention will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any
person’s right to liberty.
The SC finds that the period of
imprisonment under the inherent power of
contempt of the Senate during inquiries in
aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry.
As the legislative inquiry ends, the
basis for the detention of petitioner likewise
ends.
Immunity vis-à-vis impeachability
RANDOLF DAVID, et al. v. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al.G.R.
Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483,
171400, 171489 and 171424,3 May 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers.
From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the power to declare Martial Law. The
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” But the
President must be careful in the exercise of
her powers. Every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom
of our Constitution,the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation
celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA PeoplePower I,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a
move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow
thegovernment, issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring
a state of national emergency. She cited as
factual bases for the said issuance the escape
of the Magdalo Group and their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections
in the military, particularly in thePhilippine
Marines; and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. On the same day,
she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5)
setting the standards which the Armed
Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) should
follow in the suppression and prevention of
acts of lawless violence. The following were
considered as additional factual bases fo rthe
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the
bombing of telecommunication towers and
cell sites inBulacan and Bataan; the raid of
an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the
death of three soldiers;and the directive of
the Communist Party of the Philippines
ordering its front organizations to join5,000
Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more
from the provinces in mass
protests.Immediately, the Office of the
President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th
People Power I anniversary celebration. It
revoked permits to hold rallies.Members of
the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the
National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who
marched from various parts of Metro Manila
to converge at theEDSA Shrine, were
violently dispersed by anti-riot police.
Professor Randolf David,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 101 | P a g e
Akbayan party-list president Ronald
Llamas, and members of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a
warrant. In the early morning of February
25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila
and confiscated news stories,documents,
pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday
issue. Policemen were stationed inside
theeditorial and business offices, as well as
outside the building. A few minutes after the
search andseizure at the Daily Tribune
offices, the police surrounded the premises
of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya ,
and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The PNP warned that it would take over any
media organization that would not follow
“standards set by the government during the
state of national emergency.”On March 3,
2006, exactly one week from the declaration
of a state of national emergency and after all
the present petitions had been filed,
President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring
that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These
consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017
andG.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion. It is contended
that respondent officials of the Government,
in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democraticinstitutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed
and protected by theConstitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021
rendered the present petitions moot and
academic;
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal
standing;
3.) Whether or not there were factual bases
for the issuance of PP 1017;
4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration
of Martial Law;
5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto
the President the power to legislate;
6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the
President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with
public interest; and
7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are constitutional
HELD:
The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
1.The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic
because all the exceptions to the “moot and
academic” principle are present.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: (1)thereis a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (3)the
constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(4)the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. All these exceptions are
present here. It is alleged that the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the public interest,
involving as they do the people’s basic
rights to the freedoms of expression,of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines
or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the
present petitions, the military and the police,
on the extent of the protection given by
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 102 | P a g e
constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the
contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the present petitions are subject to
judicial review.
2.All the petitioners have legal standing in
view of the transcendental importance of the
issue involved.
It has been held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met: (a)the cases
involve constitutional issues; (b)for
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters,
there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in
question; (d)for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and (e)for legislators, there
must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.Being a mere
procedural technicality, however, the
requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in
the exercise of its discretion. The question of
locus standi
is but corollary to the bigger question of
proper exercise of judicial power.
Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017
and G.O.No. 5 is a judicial question which is
of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. In view of the transcendental
importance of this issue, all the petitioners
are declared to have
locus standi.
3. There were sufficient factual bases for the
President’s exercise of her calling-out
power,which petitioners did not refute. In
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
(338 SCRA 81 [2000]) , the Court
considered thePresident’s “calling-out”
power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual
basis.Nonetheless, the Court stressed that
“this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether
it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion.” Under the
expanded power of judicial review, the
courts are authorized not only “to settle
actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable,”
but also “to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. ” As to how the Court
may inquire into the President’s exercise of
the power, Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448
[1971]) Adopted the test that “judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is
correct,” but that “the President did not act
arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is
not correctness, but arbitrariness.Petitioners
failed to show that President Arroyo’s
exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s
ConsolidatedComment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the
records. Petitioners did not refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Judging the seriousness of the incidents,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 103 | P a g e
President Arroyo was not expected to simply
fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of
faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the
Chief Executive but, at the same time, it
obliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations. PP 1017 is
not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely
an invocation of the President’scalling-out
power. Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a“sequence” of
graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power,the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus , and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that
“whenever it becomes necessary,”the
President may call the armed forces “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” Considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the
country. But the President must be careful in
the exercise of her powers. Every act that
goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires .
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,
the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on
the State’s extraordinary power to takeover
privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest.It is plain in the
wordings of PP 1017 that what President
Arroyo invoked was her calling-out power.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.
As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that
can be done only under a valid declaration
of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants, ban on
public assemblies, take-over of news media
and agencies and press censorship, and
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers
which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a
valid declaration of Martial Law or
suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.
5. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees.
The second provision of the operative
portion of PP 1017 states: “
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.” Theoperative clause of PP 1017
was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former
President Marcos legislativepower. The
ordinance power granted to President
Arroyo under the Administrative Code of
1987 islimited to executive orders,
administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders,memorandum
circulars, and general or special orders. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued
by former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of
the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Law
under the 1973 Constitution.Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. It
follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced.She cannot
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 104 | P a g e
call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws. She can only order the
military,under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
6. PP 1017 does not authorize President
Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(a)there must be a war or other emergency;
(b)the delegation must be for a limited
period only; (c)the delegation must be
subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe; and (d)the emergency
powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
The taking over of private business affected
with public interest is just another facet of
the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art.
XII of the Constitution states that the “the
State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest ,” it
refers to Congress, not the President.
Whether or not thePresident may exercise
such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to her pursuant to
a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof. There is a distinction between the
President’s authority to declare a state of
national emergency and her authority to
exercise emergency powers. Her authority to
declare a state of national emergency
isgranted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. The
exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned
public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can she determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over.
7. The illegal implementation of PP 1017,
through G.O. No. 5, does not render these
issuances unconstitutional. The criterion by
which the validity of a statute or ordinance
is to be measured is the essential basis for
the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion. PP
1017 is limited to the calling out by the
President of the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence,invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end
desired which prompted President Arroyo to
issuePP 1021. But there is nothing in PP
1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or
violate the citizens’ constitutional rights. But
when in implementing its provisions,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the
police committed acts which violate the
citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the
Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.David, et al.
were arrested without a warrant while they
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 105 | P a g e
were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear
and present danger that warranted the
limitation of that right. Likewise, the
dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et
al. were unwarranted. Apparently, their
dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits
to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of
all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
the principle that “freedom of assembly is
not to be limited,much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that the Statehas a right
to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the
Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only
that,the search violated petitioners’ freedom
of the press. It cannot be denied that the
CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties. The search and seizure
of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials
tomedia, are plain censorship.
The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No.
5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5
mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately carry out the “necessary and
appropriate actions and measuresto suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is
still an amorphous and vague concept. Since
there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,”
it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No.
5, who has the discretion to determine what
acts constitute terrorism.Her judgment on
this aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices
and residences, taking over the media
enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration. All these can be effected in
the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far
beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Certainly, they violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Other impeachable officers
Mayor Francisco Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 56384, March 22, 1984
FACTS:
On October 21, 1980, Mayor Francisco
Lecaroz was charged of the crime of Grave
Coercion in Sandiganbayan – for taking
advantage of his public position in
unlawfully and feloniously taking over the
operation of a gasoline station owned by
Pedro Par and sell the gasoline to the public
using the latter’s sales invoice, and
preventing Pedro Par from his possession
and exercise of a lawful trade. On November
27, 1980, the information was amended to
include the words “and ordered his
policemen” between the words “Pedro Par”
and “sell the gasoline”.
Mayor Lecaroz filed a Motion to Quash on
the following grounds:
1. The offense for which he was charged is
not related to his office as Mayor;
2. The offense of Grave Coercion is not
among those mentioned or determined by
Section 4(c), PD 1486, as amended, and
3. Assuming respondent Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to try this case, it committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the
transfer of the hearing of the case to the
Court of First Instance of Marinduque
because all witnesses of both the prosecution
and defense will have to come from
Marinduque, a far away island.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to try the case.
RULING:
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
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Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution,
provides for the creation of a special court
known as the Sandiganbayan and defines the
jurisdiction thereof.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdictional
competence not only over criminal and civil
cases involving graft and corrupt practices
committed by public officers and employees
but also over other crimes committed by
them in relation to their office, though not
involving graft and corrupt practices, as may
be determined by law.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention
that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No.
1486, as amended, is violative of the
provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the
New Constitution because the former
enlarges what the latter limited. Said
constitutional provision delegates to the
lawmaking body the determination of "such
other offenses" committed by public officers
over which the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the President of
the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking
authority and prerogative vested in him by
the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree
No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c)
thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporation,in relation
to their office."
The crime for which petitioner is charged,
grave coercion, is penalized by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00
under the first paragraph of Article 286 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Respondent court, pursuant to the provisions
of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended, has concurrent
jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well
established is the rule that once a court
acquires jurisdiction in a case where said
jurisdiction is concurrent with another court,
it must continue exercising the same to the
exclusion of all other courts. In Laquian vs.
Baltazar, 31 SCRA 551, We ruled that "in
case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is
axiomatic that the court first acquiring
jurisdiction excludes the other courts." Thus,
respondent's denial of petitioner's request for
the transfer of the case to the Court of First
Instance of Marinduque was well-grounded
and certainly not a grave abuse of discretion.

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Other impeachable officers
G.R. No. 237428 REPUBLIC of the
PHILIPPINES, represented by
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA, Petitioner vs. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent
TIJAM, J.:
Facts:
Before this Court is Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno’s (respondent) Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration of this Court's Decision
1dated May 11, 2018, the dispositive portion
of which states: WHEREFORE, the Petition
for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is
found DISQUALIFIED from and is here y
adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY
HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
OUSTED and EXCLUDEDtherefrom. The
position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and
Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process. This
Decision is immediately executory without
need of further action from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof why she should not
be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of
Judicial Conduct for transgressing the
subjudice rule and for casting aspersions and
ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court. SO ORDERED.2 2. Respondent’s Ad
Cautelam Motion for Extension of Time to
File Reply (to the Show Cause Order dated
11 May 2018). Respondent claims denial of
due process because her case was allegedly
not heard by an impartial tribunal. She
reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 108 | P a g e
have inhibited themselves on the grounds of
actual bias, of having personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts, and of having
acted as a material witness in the matter in
controversy. Respondent also argues denial
of due process when the Court supposedly
took notice of extraneous matters as
corroborative evidence and when the Court
based its main Decision on facts without
observing the mandatory procedure for
reception of evidence. She reiterates her
arguments that the Court is without
jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer
through quo warranto; that the official acts
of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and
the President involves political questions
that cannot be annulled absent any allegation
of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition
for quo warranto is time-barred; and that
respondent was and is a person of proven
integrity. By way of Comment, the Republic
of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks
a denial of respondent's motion for
reconsideration for being proforma. In any
case, the OSG argues that respondent's
motion lacks merit as there was no denial of
due process and that quo warranto is the
appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible
impeachable officer. The OSG adds that the
issue of whether respondent is a person of
proven integrity is justiciable considering
that the decision-making powers of the JBC
are limited by judicially discoverable
standards. The OSG maintains that the
petition is not time-barred as Section 11,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply
to the State and that the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case preclude
the strict application of the prescriptive
period. Disputing respondent's claims, the
OSG reiterates that respondent's repeated
failure to file her Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her
non-submission thereof to the JBC which
the latter required to prove the integrity of
an applicant affect respondent's integrity.
The OSG concludes that respondent, not
having possessed of proven integrity, failed
to meet the constitutional requirement for
appointment to the Judiciary.
Issue:
Whether respondent is eligible to occupy the
position of Chief Justice. Whether
respondent met the requisite Constitutional
requirements for the position. Whether the
respondent as an impeachable officer can be
ousted through quo warranto proceedings
Held:
No, having settled respondent's ineligibility
and ouster from the position, the Court
reiterates its directive to the JBC to
immediately commence the application,
nomination and recommendation process for
the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. WHEREFORE, respondent Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno's Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED with
FINALITY for lack of merit. No further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of
judgment be made immediately. The
Constitution, law, and rules clearly require
that the sworn entry SALN "must be
reckoned as of his/her first day of service"
and must be filed "within thirty (30) days
after assumption of office." Evidently,
respondent failed to file under oath a SALN
reckoned as of her first day of service, or as
of 16 August 2010, within the prescribed
period of thirty (30) days after her
assumption of office. In other words,
respondent failed to file the required SALN
upon her assumption of office, which is a
clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of
the Constitution. In light of her previous
failure to file her SALNs for several years
while she was a UP College of Law
Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon
assuming office in 2010 as Associate Justice
of this Court constitutes culpable violation
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 109 | P a g e
of the Constitution, a violation committed
while she was already serving as an
impeachable office. Accordingly, the Court
could, as it did in Estrada, assume
jurisdiction over the instant quo warranto
petition against an impeachable officer. Quo
warranto and impeachment are two distinct
proceedings, although both may result in the
ouster of a public officer. Strictly speaking,
quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster",
while impeachment affords "removal." A
quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine a person's right or title
to a public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action to
inquire into a public officer's eligibility12 or
the validity of his appointment. 13 Under
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto proceeding involves a judicial
determination of the right to the use or
exercise of the office. Impeachment, on the
other hand, is a political process undertaken
by the legislature to determine whether the
public officer committed any of the
impeachable offenses, namely, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 14 It does
not ascertain the officer's eligibility for
appointment or election, or challenge the
legality of his assumption of office.
Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of
theImpeachment, on the other hand, is a
political process undertaken by the
legislature to determine whether the public
officer committed any of the impeachable
offenses, namely, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. 14 It does not ascertain the
officer's eligibility for appointment or
election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of
the impeachable offenses shall result in the
removal of the impeachable official from
office. 15 The OSG 's quo warranto petition
challenged respondent's right and title to the
position of Chief Justice. He averred that in
failing to regularly disclose her assets,
liabilities and net worth as a member of the
career service prior to her appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Court, respondent
could not be said to possess the requirement
of proven integrity demanded of every
aspiring member of the Judiciary. The OSG
thus prayed that respondent's appointment as
Chief Justice be declared void. Clearly, the
OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility
for appointment as Chief Justice and sought
to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's
petition, therefore, is one for quo warranto
over which the Court exercises original
jurisdiction. As the Court previously held,
"where the dispute is on the eligibility to
perform the duties by the person sought to
be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is
the proper action." 16 The Court's quo
warranto jurisdiction over impeachable
officers also finds basis in paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable
officers. With this authority, the remedy of
quo warranto was provided in the rules of
the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET). While an appointment is an
essentially discretionary executive power, it
is subject to the limitation that the appointee
should possess none of the disqualifications
but all the qualifications required by law.
Where the law prescribes certain
qualifications for a given office or position,
courts may determine whether the appointee
has the requisite qualifications, absent
which, his right or title thereto may be
declared void. This Court has the
constitutional mandate to exercise
jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions.
And as Estrada and the PET Rules show,
impeachable officers are not immune to quo
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 110 | P a g e
warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the
Court to take cognizance of this case would
not only be a breach of its duty under the
Constitution, it would also accord
respondent an exemption not given to other
impeachable officers. Such privilege finds
no justification either in law, as impeachable
officers are treated without distinction under
the impeachment provisions34 of the
Constitution, or in reason, as the
qualifications of the Chief Justice are no less
important than the President's or the Vice-
President's. By its plain language, however,
Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a
quo warranto action questioning an
impeachable officer's qualifications to
assume office. These qualifications include
age, citizenship and professional experience
- matters which are manifestly outside the
purview of impeachment under the above-
cited provision. Quo warranto is not a
figment of imagination or invention of this
Court. It is a mandate boldly enshrined in
the Constitution where the judiciary is
conferred original jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other branches of the
government. Quo warranto, not
impeachment, is the constitutional remedy
prescribed to adjudicate and resolve
questions relating to qualifications,
eligibility and entitlement to public office.
Those who chose to ignore this fact are
Constitutionally blind. US Supreme Court
Justice Scalia once said: "If it is in the
Constitution, it is there. If it is not in the
Constitution, it is not there." There is
nothing in Our Constitution that says that
impeachable officers are immuned,
exempted, or excluded from quo warranto
proceedings when the very issue to be
determined therein is the status of an officer
as such. No amount of public indignation
can rewrite or deface the Constitution.
If there is PERMANENT vacancy DURING
the incumbency – Art. VII, Sec. 8
1. Estrada vs. Disierto, GR Nos. 146710-15,
2 March 2001
JOSEPH ESTRADA vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO et. al.,
G.R. # 146710-15 March 2, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Arroyo
was elected Vice President. The long-time
friend of the petitioner accused him of
receiving money from jueteng lords.
Thereafter, House speaker Villar transmitted
the Articles of Impeachment signed by the
115 members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate.
Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial and 21 senators took their
oath as judges with the Chief Justice Davide
presiding. Majority of the Senators ruled
against opening of the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name of Jose Velarde.
The public and private prosecutors walked
out in protest of the ruling. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the 11
senators. On January 18, 2001, the call for
petitioner’s resignation intensified. A 10-km
line of people holding lighted candles
formed a human chain from the Ninoy
Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in
Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to
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symbolize the people's solidarity in
demanding petitioner's resignation. January
19, 2001, the fall from power of the
petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner
agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a
candidate. Secretary of National Defense
Orlando Mercado and General Reyes,
together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. General
Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of
Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our
support to this government.” A little later,
PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
and the major service commanders gave a
similar stunning announcement. January 20,
2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines. Petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. January
22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from "conducting any further proceedings in
any other criminal complaint that may be
filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if
legally warranted." February 6, 2001, Thru
another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to
be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo
is an acting President.
Held:
Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not government
by any formal requirement as to form. It can
be oral or written; express or implied. As
long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act
and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that
petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to
the resignation of the petitioner, it is
important to follow the succession of events
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after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations
of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the
Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment
filed in the House of Representatives which
initially was given a near cipher chance of
succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it
gained the signatures of 115 representatives
or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him.
Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of
Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and
former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected
senior economic advisers resigned together
with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
An examination of Section 11,
Article VII is in order. It provides:
Whenever the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Both Houses of Congress have
recognized Arroyo as the President, and
clearly rejected the petitioner’s claim of
inability.
Hence, even if the petitioner can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress.
Elective (President and VP) and appointive
(Cabinet Secretaries, Usecs. and Asecs.) -
Art. VII, Sec. 13
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No.
83815 February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. PHILIP
ELLA C. JUICO, et al.
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284.
Two petitions were filed seeking a
declaration of its unconstitutionality. The
pertinent provisions assailed are: Sec. 1.
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies
of which the President is the Chairman. Sec.
2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary
or assistant secretary or other appointive
official of the Executive Department holds
more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but
in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary
position. Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the
interest of the government in government-
owned or controlled corporations, at least
one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards
of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
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secretary. In sum, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section
13, Article VII other than those provided in
the Constitution. According to petitioners,
by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution," the only
exceptions against holding any other office
or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (1)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners
further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-
XB on the Civil Service Commission applies
to officers and employees of the Civil
Service in general and that said exceptions
do not apply and cannot be extended to
Section 13, Article VII which applies
specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
or assistants.
ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
Elective (President and VP) and appointive
(Cabinet Secretaries, Usecs. and Asecs.) -
Art. VII, Sec. 13
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No.
83815 February 22, 1991 ANTI-GRAFT
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
et al. vs. PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, et al.
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284.
Two petitions were filed seeking a
declaration of its unconstitutionality. The
pertinent provisions assailed are: Sec. 1.
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies
of which the President is the Chairman. Sec.
2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary
or assistant secretary or other appointive
official of the Executive Department holds
more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but
in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary
position. Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the
interest of the government in government-
owned or controlled corporations, at least
one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards
of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. In sum, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section
13, Article VII other than those provided in
the Constitution. According to petitioners,
by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution," the only
exceptions against holding any other office
or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (1)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners
further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-
XB on the Civil Service Commission applies
to officers and employees of the Civil
Service in general and that said exceptions
do not apply and cannot be extended to
Section 13, Article VII which applies
specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
or assistants.
ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the

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government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
Public Interest Center Inc. vs. Magdangal B.
Elma, CPLC, GR. No. 138965, 30 June
2006
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER VS
MAGDANGAL
(JUNE 30, 2006)
FAST FACTS:
This action seeks to declare as... null and
void the concurrent appointments of
respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman
of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for
being contrary to Section 13, [2] Article VII
and Section 7,... par. 2,[3] Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution.
On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was
appointed and took his oath of office as
Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11
January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed
CPLC. He took his oath of office as CPLC
the following day, but he waived any...
remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
The resolution of this case had already been
overtaken by supervening events. In 2001,
the appointees of former President Joseph
Estrada were replaced by the appointees of
the incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. The present PCGG Chairman is
Camilo Sabio, while the position vacated by
the last CPLC, now Solicitor General
Antonio Nachura, has not yet been
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filled. There no longer exists an actual
controversy that needs to be resolved.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether the position
of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC
falls under the prohibition against multiple
offices
HELD:
To harmonize Section 7, Article IX-B and
Section 13, Article VII, the Supreme Court,
in the case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary construed the
prohibition against multiple offices in this...
manner:
[T]hus, while all other appointive officials in
the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies... and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is... meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President,
the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution permits an
appointive official to hold more than one
office only if "allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.
In this case, an incompatibility exists
between the positions of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the
CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and
agencies and to review... investigations
involving heads of executive departments
and agencies, as well as other Presidential
appointees. The PCGG is, without question,
an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG
Chairman are subject to the review of
theCPLC.
As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required
to give his legal opinion on his own actions
as PCGG Chairman and review any
investigation conducted by the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve
himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases,
questions on his impartiality will inevitably
be raised. This is the situation that the law
seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition
against holding incompatible offices.
Having thus ruled that Section 7, Article IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution enjoins the
concurrent appointments of respondent Elma
as PCGG Chairman and CPLC inasmuch as
they are incompatible offices
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as
neither of them is a secretary,
undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have... the same rank
as the latter positions.
It must be emphasized, however, that despite
the non-applicability of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent
Elma, he remains covered by the general
prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B
and his appointments must still comply with
the standard of... compatibility of officers
laid down therein; failing which, his
appointments are hereby pronounced in
violation of the Constitution.
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The Court cautiously allowed only two
exceptions to the rule against multiple
offices: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the
Vice-President to become a member of the
Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified in Section 13,
Article VII without additional compensation
in an ex- officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of
said... officials' office.
The Court further qualified that additional
duties must not only be closely related to,
but must be required by the official's
primary functions.
Moreover, the additional post must be
exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which
"denotes an... act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office.
Appointment to the position of PCGG
Chairman is not required by the primary
functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
And while respondent Elma did not receive
additional compensation in connection with
his position as CPLC, he did not act as either
CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio
capacity.
The fact that a separate appointment had to
be made for respondent Elma to qualify as
CPLC... negates the premise that he is acting
in an ex-officio capacity.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply
to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG
Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. Even if this Court assumes,
arguendo,... that Section 13, Article VII is
applicable to respondent Elma, he still could
not be appointed concurrently to the offices
of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-
officio capacity, and the primary functions
of one office do... not require an
appointment to the other post. Moreover,
even if the appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, said appointments are
still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-
B, which covers all appointive and elective...
officials, due to the incompatibility between
the primary functions of the offices of the
PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
Court partly GRANTS this petition and
declares respondent Magdangal B. Elma's
concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Executive power – Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17
i. Residual power
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
177 S 668
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for mandamus
and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
etc. to issue travel documents to former
Pres. Marcos and his immediate family
members to enjoin the implementation of the
Pres. Aquino ‘s decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the
right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically Secs. 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
Pres. impair their right to travel because no
law has authorized her to do so.
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They further assert that under International
Law, their right to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed particularly by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Is the President of the Philippines
empowered by the Constitution to prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
HELD:
It must be emphasized that the individual
right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines. These are what the right to
travel would normally connote. Essentially,
the right involved in this case at bar is the
right to return to one’s country, a distinct
right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Politiical Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a State, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one’s country
as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the “right to
freedom of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free
to leave any country, including his own.
Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public
order, public health or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter
one’s country cannot be arbitrarily deprived.
It would be therefore inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return
to ones country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the
right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may
be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and
welfare. Pres. Aquino has determined that
the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past years after the
Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines is not arbitrary. The
instant petition is hereby dismissed.
Power of Control of the President.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM) vs.
CIR, GR No. 198146 [Aug. 8, 2017]
Synopsis:
PSALM was created, through EPIRA law, to
facilitate the sale and privatization of the
NaPoCor. Two (2) power plants were sold
by PSALM. The BIR assessed PSALM with
VAT for such sale; the latter paid under
protest and raised the issue with the DOJ.
DOJ favored PSALM. The BIR moved for
reconsideration, alleging that the DOJ had
no jurisdiction since the dispute involved tax
laws administered by the BIR and therefore
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). CIR filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside
the DOJ's decision for lack of jurisdiction.
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CA found that the DOJ Secretary gravely
abused his discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he assumed jurisdiction.
MR filed by PSALM was also denied by
CA. Hence this appeal to SC.
As to jurisdiction to settle the
controversies; and power of control by
the executive:
DOJ has the power to settle the dispute
between or among two agencies of the
government which are within the executive
department. PD 242 confirms that
jurisdiction to be under the DOJ, as section
3 of the law said so.
It is only proper that intra-governmental
disputes be settled administratively since the
opposing government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities are all under the President's
executive control and supervision. Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution states
unequivocally that: "The President shall
have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
The Congress cannot, by law, deprive the
President of his power of control.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law
that puts a government office in the
Executive branch outside the control of the
President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it
independent. If the office is part of the
Executive branch, it must remain subject to
the control of the President. (Rufino v.
Endriga)
This constitutional power of control of the
President cannot be diminished by the
CTA. Thus, if two executive offices or
agencies cannot agree, it is only proper
and logical that the President, as the sole
Executive, who under the Constitution
has control over both offices or agencies
in dispute, should resolve the dispute
instead of the courts. The judiciary
should not intrude in this executive
function of determining which is correct
between the opposing government offices
or agencies, which are both under the sole
control of the President. Under his
constitutional power of control, the
President decides the dispute between the
two executive offices. The judiciary
cannot substitute its decision over that of
the President. Only after the President has
decided or settled the dispute can the courts'
jurisdiction be invoked. Until such time, the
judiciary should not interfere since the issue
is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication.
Otherwise, the judiciary would infringe on
the President's exercise of his constitutional
power of control over all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.
2. Midnight appointment – Art. VII, Sec. 15
a. In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta, 298
SCRA 408, 9 November 1998
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta 298
SCRA 408, Nov. 9, 1998
Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the
appointments signed by the President dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the
RTC of Baguio City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution. The said constitutional
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 119 | P a g e
provision prohibits the President from
making any appointments two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban
on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in
view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII
of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on
appointments comes into effect once every 6
years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and
Vallarta were unquestionably made during
the period of the ban. They come within the
operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies
in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the
ban.
b. Atty. Velicaira-Garafil vs. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 203372,
16 June 2015
GARAFIL, et. al. V. OFFICE Of THE
PRESIDENT
GR. No. 203327, 2015-06-16
Facts:
1. Petitioners were among the more
than 800 presidential appointees of
outgoing President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to various
positions in several government
offices prior to the conduct of the
May 11, 2010 elections.
2. Accordingly, they are covered by the
ban starting March 11, 2010 on
midnight appointments in Section 5,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which reads: “ Two months
immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the
end of his/her term, a President or
Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.”
3. On July 30, 2010, the newly-elected
President Noynoy Aquino issued
E.O. 2 revoking the said
previously-made appointments for
being unconstitutional.
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioners’ appointment are
valid.
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Held:
1. To be valid, the following should
always concur in the making of an
appointment: ATVR
a. Authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the
authority.
b. Transmittal of the appointment
paper and evidence of the
transmittal.
c. Vacant position at the time of
appointment.
d. Receipt of the appointment
paper, acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee.
Petitioners failed to show compliance with
the four (4) elements of a valid appointment.
They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before
the appointment ban took effect. On the
other hand, they even admitted ‘ taking their
oath of office during the appointment ban’.
c. De Castro vs. JBC, GR No. 191002, 20
April 2010; Relate with Art.
VIII, Sec. 4 (1), 3rd sentence.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the
controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof”
from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January
18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the
JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief
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Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy
in the Supreme Court must be filled within
90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC
may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from
the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly
in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
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Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that
the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Members of constitutional commissions –
Art. IX (B), (C) and (D), Sec. 1(2)
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER,
VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
Powers and Functions of the President,
Power of Appointment
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on
February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA
from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the
COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008,
the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve
as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated
in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the original term of his office
as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in
an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his
appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term
of office, as such chairman, is up to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 123 | P a g e
February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to
that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition,
Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino
III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his
replacement. True to his word, Villar
vacated his position when President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia
Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman.
ISSUE:
WON Villar’s appointment as COA
Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his
seven (7) year term as COA commissioner,
is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under, and the circumscribing
concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of
the Constitution
RULING:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on
Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, one commissioner for five
years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Petitioner now affirms the view that Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within
the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same
position or upgraded position a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft
of merit.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough.
The COA Chairman shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years, and
if he has served the full term, then he can no
longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term
of seven years who likewise served the full
term is barred from being reappointed. In
short, once the Chairman or Commissioner
shall have served the full term of seven
years, then he can no longer be reappointed
to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face,
does not prohibit a promotional appointment
from commissioner to chairman as long as
the commissioner has not served the full
term of seven years, further qualified by the
third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D)
that “the appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor.” In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of
Chairman must conform to the rotational
plan or the staggering of terms in the
commission membership such that the
aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term
to which he will be appointed to the position
of Chairman must not exceed seven years so
as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D).
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The Court is likewise unable to sustain
Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a
completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his
four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made
by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the
word “reappointment,” there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman
or commissioner, or a mix of both positions,
for an aggregate term of more than 7 years.
A contrary view would allow a
circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of
succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-
Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as
COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees,
was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year
aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4
years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with said rule would also be invalid
as the corresponding appointment would
effectively breach the clear purpose of the
Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of
commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7
years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner
like respondent Villar who serves for a
period less than seven (7) years cannot be
appointed as chairman when such position
became vacant as a result of the expiration
of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague). Such appointment to a full term
is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than
seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

5. Members of constitutional commissions –
Art. IX (B), (C) and (D), Sec. 1(2)
Ifurung v. Carpio Morales, G.R. No.
232131, April 24, 2018
IFURUNG vs. CARPIO-MORALES
G.R. No. 232131
April 24, 2018
Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Petitioner, a taxpayer, filed the
instant petition where he seeks the
correction of a recurring statutory wrong and
a declaration from the Court that the
positions held by the respondents are vacant.
Petitioner maintains that the constitutional
issue raised in his petition will finally
determine the correct term and tenure of the
Ombudsman and his deputies and settle the
matter as to the constitutionality of Section 8
(3) of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that in
case of a vacancy at the Office of the
Ombudsman due to death, resignation
removal or permanent disability of the
incumbent Ombudsman and his deputies, the
newly appointed Ombudsman and deputies
shall be appointed to a full term of seven
years, is constitutionally infirm as it
contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8
and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
He also avers that like all constitutionally
created positions the successor to the
positions of the Ombudsman and deputies
should serve only the unexpired term of the
predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that
the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies
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have been overstaying in their present
positions for more than two years
considering their terms have expired on 1
February 2015.
Petitioner states that the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution was to
constitutionalize the Office of the
Ombudsman, i.e., by granting it autonomy
and independence the same as and equal to
those of the other constitutionally created
offices and positions. Petitioner further
avers that with the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, E.O. No. 243 was issued
creating the Office of the Ombudsman. On
17 November 1989, R.A. No. 6770 was
approved. Considering that the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was that the
position of the Ombudsman and the deputies
shall have the same status as the three
constitutional commissions, the limitations
as to the latter’s term of office shall likewise
apply to the Ombudsman and his deputies.
Hence. Petitioner maintains that the grant of
a full term to an Ombudsman’s successor,
when the vacancy in the office is for a cause
other than expiration of term, is an outright
non-observance of the intent of the framers
and Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioner insists that in Gaminde vs. COA,
the Court en banc has determined that the
starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the constitutional
commissions is uniformly set on 2 February
1987. Petitioner claims that Ombudsman
Carpio-Morales should have ceased office
on 1 February 2015 considering that the
unexpired term of the supposed fourth
seven-year term ended on that date; thus,
Ombudsman Morales has been holding the
position in a de facto capacity since 2
February 2015 up to the present. This
observation, petitioner claims, holds true
with the other respondent deputies.
Petitioner further argues, that the Office of
the Ombudsman is not sui generis; thus,
what applies and holds true for all the other
constitutionally created offices and positions
should also apply to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman cannot be an
exception to the rule set by the 1987
Constitution, i.e., to serve for the unexpired
term, so much so that each uncompleted
term creates a fresh term for the appointed
Ombudsman. Petitioner speculates that such
fresh term of seven years could effectively
deprive an incoming President the power
and opportunity to appoint an Ombudsman.
Thus the term of the Ombudsman will be
subject to political maneuverings such that
the outgoing President can divest the next
President of the prerogative to appoint. If
the unexpired term is the policy, every
President can appoint an Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not Section 8(3) of R.A.
No. 6770 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 11 in relation to
Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987
Philippine constitution and applicable
jurisprudence.
Held: The petition is DISMISSED.
The Court held that Section 8(3) of R.A. No.
6770 is not unconstitutional. The Court
stressed that the Office of the ombudsman is
not a constitutional commission. Section 1,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
specifically enumerates the independent
constitutional commissions in the
Philippines, viz: The Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit. Common
provisions among the three constitutional
commissions can be found in Section 2 to 8
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court also held that the undeniable
intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in Sec. 10, Article XI was to
provide that the rank and salary of the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 126 | P a g e
Ombudsman and his deputies shall be the
same as that of the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional
commissions. The Court underscored that
the framers of the Constitution in Sec. 10,
Art. XI limited to rank and salary the
similarity between the Ombudsman and the
deputies on one hand, and the chairman and
the members of the constitutional
commissions on the other.
The constitutional commissions observe the
regular rotational plan which cannot apply to
the Office of the Ombudsman. In Republic
vs. Imperial, the Court established that for
the operation of the operational plan, two
conditions, both indispensable to its
workability, are required, viz: (1) that the
terms of the first three commissioners
should start on a common date; and (2) that
any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term
should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term. Without satisfying these
conditions, the regularity of the intervals
between appointments would be destroyed,
and the evident purpose of the rotation, i.e.,
to prevent that a four-year administration
should appoint more than one permanent
and regular commissioner, would be
frustrated. It was settled therefore that of the
first three COMELEC commissioners
appointed whose office shall all commence
on a common date, one commissioner shall
have a term of office of nine years, the other
for six years, and the remaining one for
three years.
The rotational plan, which was unique for
the COMELEC under the 1935 constitution,
was subsequently applied to the CSC and
the COA pursuant to Art. XII of the 1973
Constitution.
Corollary to these provisions in the 1987
Constitution, the terms of the first chairmen
and commissioners of the constitutional
commissions must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the
first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the regular recurrence of the
two-year interval between the expiration of
the terms.
Unlike the constitutional commissions in the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the
Ombudsman and the deputies do not make a
collegial body, thus, making it implausible
to apply the regular rotation or cycle in its
membership. The Ombudsman and the
deputies, in contrast to the constitutional
commissions, do not decide by a majority
vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before the Office of the
Ombudsman. To stress, the Ombudsman and
the deputies have their respective
jurisdiction; hence, they could not have
common responsibility relative to the
discharge of their separate and distinct
functions.
To the point of being monotonous, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution refers
exclusively to the constitutional
commissions; thus, such proscription as to
the appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity of a member
applies only to the constitutional
commissions and cannot extend to the
Ombudsman and the deputies. Indeed,
Article XI of the constitution does not
provide for such prohibition. What is clear
however, is that the Ombudsman and the
deputies, shall, during their tenure, be
subject to the same disqualifications and
prohibitions as provided for in Sec. 2 of
Article IX(A) of the Constitution.
The ruling in Gaminde vs. COA as to the
terms of office of the chairman and
members of the constitutional commissions
does not apply to the Ombudsman and the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 127 | P a g e
deputies. The Court draws attention to the
fact that its ruling in Gaminde applies
exclusively to the CSC, the COMELEC and
the COA for the reason that Art. IX of the
1987 Constitution pertains solely to the
constitutional commissions. It will be
absurd, as it is devoid of any valid and legal
reason, to extend the application of the
Gaminde ruling to the Office of the
Ombudsman when this office is admittedly
not a constitutional commission.
Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is consistent
with Section 11 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. The provision of the
Constitution is clear and explicit: (a) the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve the
term of seven years; (b) that the
Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be
reappointed; and (c) the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall not run for any office in
the election immediately succeeding their
cessation from office.
For sure, nowhere in the Constitution can it
be gathered that the appointment to any
vacancy for the position of Ombudsman and
the deputies shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. this can only mean
that the appointment to the positions of the
Ombudsman and the deputies, whether it be
for the expired or unexpired term of the
predecessor, shall always be for a full term
of seven years.
In the Court’s review of Section 8(3) of R.A.
No. 6770, Court noted that in case of death,
resignation, removal or permanent disability
of the Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman
shall be appointed for a full term.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3), R.A. No. 6770 is
consistent with Section 11, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution in so far as it provides
that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall
serve for a term of seven years.
The Court summarized in their decision of
dismissing the petition, as follows:
  Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, it is only as to the
rank and salary that the Ombudsman
and the deputies shall be the same
with the chairman and members,
respectively, of the constitutional
commissions.
 Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of
R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for
the positions of Ombudsman and the
deputies, whether as a result of the
expiration of the term or death
resignation, removal, or permanent
disability of the predecessor, the
successor shall always be appointed
for a full term of seven years.
 Unlike the constitutional
commissions in Art. IX of the 1987
Constitution, the seven-year term of
office of the first appointees for
Ombudsman and the deputies is not
reckoned from 2 February 1987, but
shall be reckoned from their date of
appointment. Accordingly, the
present Ombudsman and deputies
shall serve a full term of seven years
from their date of appointment
unless their term is cut short by
death, resignation, removal or
permanent disability.
 The Gaminde vs. COA ruling applies
to the constitutional commissions
and not to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Calling out Power of the President
G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S.
TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI,
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JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1
SATTAL H.
JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his
capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN.
JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO
CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM
KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G.
LATAG, in their capacity as officers of
the Phil. Marines and Phil. National
Police, respectively, Respondents
FACTS:
On 15 January 2009, three members from
the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped by Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). in the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited
the kidnapping incident as a ground for the
said declaration, describing it as a terrorist
act pursuant to the Human Security
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465
of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call
upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence.
In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan
called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety.
On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan
distributed to civic organizations, copies of
the "Guidelines for the Implementation of
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
Declaring a State of Emergency in the
Province of Sulu. These Guidelines
suspended all Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs)
issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed
civilians to seek exemption from the gun
ban only by applying to the Office of the
Governor and obtaining the appropriate
identification cards. The said guidelines also
allowed general searches and seizures in
designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan,
Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad
Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal
H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed
the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,19 claiming that Proclamation 1-
09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
as it threatened fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1
and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for
violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President
sole authority to exercise emergency powers
and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. Additionally,
petitioners claim that the Provincial
Governor is not authorized by any law to
create civilian armed forces under his
command, nor regulate and limit the
issuances of PTCFORs to his own private
army.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not Governor Tan can exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers
as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
HELD:
Only the President is vested with calling-out
powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
Republic
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
it has already been established that there is
one repository of executive powers, and that
is the President of the Republic. This means
that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution,
as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
VII thereof.
Springing from the well-entrenched
constitutional precept of One President is the
notion that there are certain acts which, by
their very nature, may only be performed by
the president as the Head of the State. One
of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the
"calling-out" powers constitutes a portion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Judgment is rendered
commanding respondents to desist from
further proceedings m implementing
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its
Implementing Guidelines. The said
proclamation and guidelines are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Subject to Judicial Review?
IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, 15 August
2000
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August
15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-
Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal
or lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual
determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed
forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, Congress may
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 130 | P a g e
revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the President’s action to call out
the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the
treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the
power to call out because it is considered as
the lesser and more benign power compared
to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that
by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is
“militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of
the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times,
the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real
authority in the operations is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL
LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,
EDGAR R. ERICE, TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR., GARY C. ALEJANO,
AND EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
Petitioners, vs. SENATE PRESIDENT
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER
PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY
BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL REY
LEONARDO GUERRERO,
Respondents.
GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155
February 6, 2018
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 131 | P a g e
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing
the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to
December 31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for
a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to
address the rebellion mounted by members
of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period
set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the
Senate and the House of Representatives his
written Report, citing the events and reasons
that impelled him to issue Proclamation No.
216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S.
Resolution No. 388 while the House of
Representatives issued House Resolution
No. 1050, both expressing full support to the
Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke
the same.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested
the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint
Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2
extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense
Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff
General Guerrero, recommended the further
extension of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao for one year beginning
January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons
based on current security assessment.”
On the basis of this security assessment,
Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar
recommendation to the President “primarily
to ensure total eradication of DAESH-
inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul
Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded
Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs)
and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the
communist terrorists (CTs) and their
coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to
ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and
reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the
attainment of lasting peace, stability,
economic development and prosperity in
Mindanao.”
Acting on said recommendations, the
President, in a letter dated December 8,
2017, asked both the Senate and the House
of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress
may determine.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the
House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4
further extending the period of martial law
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and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
one year, from January 1, 2018 to December
31, 2018.
ISSUE:
PROCEDURAL:
Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to
attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal
to their petitions.
Whether or not the President should be
dropped as party respondent.
Whether or not the Congress was an
indispensable party to the consolidated
petitions.
Whether or not the Court was barred by the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from
examining the persistence of rebellion in
Mindanao.
Whether or not the petitioners may invoke
the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution in seeking review of the
extension of Proclamation No. 216.
Whether or not the manner in which
Congress deliberated on the President’s
request for extension of martial law is
subject to judicial review.
Whether or not the Congress has the power
to extend and determine the period of
martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Whether or not the President and the
Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation No. 216.
Whether or not there is necessity to impose
tests on the choice and manner of the
President’s exercise of military powers.
Whether or not the petitioners were able to
comply with all the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the
petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions.
NO.
The Court held that since Resolution of Both
Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress,
the they can take judicial notice thereof.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides that a court can take judicial notice
of the official acts of the legislative
department without the introduction of
evidence.
Moreover, the Court noted that respondents
annexed a copy of the Resolution to their
Consolidated Comment.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the
President should be dropped as party
respondent. YES.
The Court held that the President should be
dropped as party respondent considering that
he enjoys the presidential immunity from
suit.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:
It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important
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that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many
great and important duties imposed upon
him by the Constitution necessarily impairs
the operation of the Government.
THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the
Congress was an indispensable party to the
consolidated petitions. YES.
The Court held that in cases impugning the
extension of martial law for lack of
sufficient factual basis, the entire body of
the Congress, composed of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, must be
impleaded, being an indispensable party
thereto.
The Court further ruled that in these
consolidated petitions, petitioners are
questioning the constitutionality of a
congressional act, specifically the approval
of the President’s request to extend martial
law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the
Congress as a body, and not just its
leadership, which has interest in the subject
matter of these cases.
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court
was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment from examining the persistence
of rebellion in Mindanao. NO.
The Court held that as to the second
requirement, there was np identity of issues
between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on
one hand, and the case at bar.
Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the
principle of res judicata, bars the re-
litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits. In order to
successfully apply in a succeeding litigation
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
mere identities of parties and issues is
required.
The issue put forth by petitioners in the
earlier Lagman case, which this Court
already settled, refers to the existence of a
state of rebellion which would trigger the
President’s initial declaration of martial law,
whereas the factual issue in the case at bar
refers to the persistence of the same
rebellion in Mindanao which would justify
the extension of martial law.
The fact that petitioners are not barred from
questioning the alleged persistence of the
rebellion in these consolidated petitions is
also supported by the transitory nature of the
Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the
factual basis for a declaration of martial law.
Verily, the Court’s review in martial law
cases is largely dependent on the existing
factual scenario used as basis for its
imposition or extension. The gravity and
scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case
may be, should necessarily be re-examined,
in order to make a justiciable determination
on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as
to justify an extension of a state of martial
law.
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FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the
petitioners may invoke the expanded
(certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the
extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.
The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in
Lagman case where they emphasized that
the Court’s jurisdiction under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is
special and specific, different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. It was further stressed therein that the
standard of review in a petition for certiorari
is whether the respondent has committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions, whereas
under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is
tasked to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President’s exercise of
emergency powers.
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition
for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The Court added that to apply the standard
of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court’s constitutional task
under Section 18, Article VII, which was
precisely meant to provide an additional
safeguard against possible martial law abuse
and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari
petition invoking the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the Congress’ extension of the proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ.
PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW
Congressional check on martial law
Congressional check on the President’s
martial law and suspension powers thus
consists of:
The power to review the President’s
proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and to revoke such proclamation or
suspension. The review is “automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension is made.” The Congress’
decision to revoke the proclamation or
suspension cannot be set aside by the
President.
The power to approve any extension of the
proclamation or suspension, upon the
President’s initiative, for such period as it
may determine, if the invasion or rebellion
persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act
When approved by the Congress, the
extension of the proclamation or suspension,
as described during the deliberations on the
1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint
executive and legislative act” or a
“collective judgment” between the
President and the Congress.
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SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner
in which Congress deliberated on the
President’s request for extension of martial
law is subject to judicial review. NO.
The Court ruled that they cannot review the
rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation.
Petitioners have not shown that the above-
quoted rules of the Joint Session violated
any provision or right under the
Constitution.
Construing the full discretionary power
granted to the Congress in promulgating its
rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela
Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, et al. explained that the limitation
of this unrestricted power deals only with
the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication. It should be added that there
must be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did
not pertain to quorum, voting or publication.
Furthermore, deliberations on extending
martial law certainly cannot be equated to
the consideration of regular or ordinary
legislation. The Congress may consider such
matter as urgent as to necessitate swift
action, or it may take its time investigating
the factual situation. This Court cannot
engage in undue speculation that members
of Congress did not review and study the
President’s request based on a bare
allegation that the time allotted for
deliberation was too short.
SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the
Congress has the power to extend and
determine the period of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is indisputably silent as to how
many times the Congress, upon the initiative
of the President, may extend the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to
the exercise of the congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension are
(1) that the extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (2) that it should be
grounded on the persistence of the invasion
or rebellion and the demands of public
safety; and (3) that it is subject to the
Court’s review of the sufficiency of its
factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the
period of the extension of the proclamation
and suspension. However, it clearly gave the
Congress the authority to decide on its
duration; thus, the provision states that that
the extension shall be “for a period to be
determined by the Congress.”
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to
limit the extension to 60 days was not
adopted by the majority of the
Commission’s members. The framers
evidently gave enough flexibility on the part
of the Congress to determine the duration of
the extension. Plain textual reading of
Section 18, Article VII and the records of
the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission buttress the view that as
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regards the frequency and duration of the
extension, the determinative factor is as long
as “the invasion or rebellion persists and
public safety requires” such extension.
EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the
President and the Congress had sufficient
factual basis to extend Proclamation No.
216. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution requires two factual bases for
the extension of the proclamation of martial
law or of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or
rebellion persists; and (b) public safety
requires the extension.
Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first
condition for the extension of martial law or
of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The reasons cited by the President in his
request for further extension indicate that the
rebellion, which caused him to issue
Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and
its “remnants” have been resolute in
establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in
Mindanao, carrying on through the
recruitment and training of new members,
financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued
attacks.
AFP General Guerrero also cited, among
others, the continued armed resistance of the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies.
Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now
acting as instructors to the new members of
the Dawlah Islamiyah.
Also, it does not necessarily follow that with
the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-
inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary
Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint
Session on December 13, 2017, explained
that while the situation in Marawi has
substantially changed, the rebellion has not
ceased but simply moved to other places in
Mindanao.
Acts upon which extension was based posed
danger to general public
The Court also ruled that the acts,
circumstances and events upon which the
extension was based posed a significant
danger, injury or harm to the general public.
The Court added that the information upon
which the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall be based principally
emanate from and are in the possession of
the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding
capabilities of the Executive Department; in
tum, the Executive Department will have to
open its findings to the scrutiny of the
Court.”
The Executive Department did open its
findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its
“briefing” or “presentation” during the oral
arguments, presenting data, which had been
vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence
reports gathered on the ground,” from
personalities they were able to capture and
residents in affected areas, declassified
official documents, and intelligence
obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP,
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the same presentation, save for updates, was
given to the Congress. As it stands, the
information thus presented has not been
challenged or questioned as regards its
reliability.
The facts as provided by the Executive and
considered by Congress amply establish that
rebellion persists in Mindanao and public
safety is significantly endangered by it. The
Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient
factual basis for the further extension sought
by the President and approved by the
Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses
No. 4.
NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is
necessity to impose tests on the choice and
manner of the President’s exercise of
military powers. NO.
The Court reiterated their ruling in the
earlier Lagman case that the determination
of which among the Constitutionally given
military powers should be exercised in a
given set of factual circumstances is a
prerogative of the President. The Court’s
power of review, as provided under Section
18, Article VII do not empower the Court to
advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon
the President, as to which and how these
military powers should be exercised.
TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the
petitioners were able to comply with all the
requisites for the issuance of an injunctive
writ. NO.
By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden
to establish the following requisites: (1) a
right in esse or a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected; (2) a violation of that
right; (3) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage; and (4) no
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.
Petitioners anchored their prayer for the
issuance of an injunctive writ on
respondents’ gross transgressions of the
Constitution when they extended the martial
law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman
petition likewise alleges that petitioner
Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally
prejudiced by the extension or martial law in
Mindanao “which would spawn violations
of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like
petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of
the Duterte administration and of the
brutalities committed by police and military
forces”.
The alleged violations of the petitioners’
civil liberties do not justify the grant of
injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to
prove that the alleged violations are directly
attributable to the imposition of martial law.
They likewise failed to establish the nexus
between the President’s exercise of his
martial law powers and their unfounded
apprehension that the imposition “will target
civilians who have no participation at all in
any armed uprising or struggle”.
Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what
the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and
how the extension of martial law in
Mindanao would threaten these “civil
liberties” in derogation of the rule of law.
Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or
disputed, and can hardly be considered a
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clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of
an injunctive writ.
This Court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures or guesswork, but must depend
upon competent proof and on the basis of
the best evidence obtainable under the
circumstances. We emphasize that the grant
or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be
properly resolved by suppositions,
deductions, or even presumptions, with no
basis in evidence, for the truth must have to
be determined by the procedural rules of
admissibility and proof.
Incidentally, there is nothing in the
Constitution, nor in any law which supports
petitioners’ theory. Such purported human
right violations cannot be utilized as ground
either to enjoin the President from
exercising the power to declare martial law,
or the Congress in extending the same. To
sanction petitioners’ plea would result into
judicial activism, thereby going against the
principle of separation of powers.
As discussed above, petitioners are not left
without any recourse. Such transgressions
can be addressed in a separate and
independent court action. Hence, petitioners
can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the
prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint
before the appropriate courts against erring
parties.
Requisites for the proper exercise for
both powers
i. Rebellion as Ground, Quantum of
Proof?
LAGMAN VS MEDIADEA
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not
exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
In accordance with Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President, on May
25, 2017, submitted to Congress a written
Report on the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades,
Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated
and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in
his Report, the Maute terrorist group took
over a hospital in Marawi City; established
several checkpoints within the city; burned
down certain government and private
facilities and inflicted casualties on the part
of Government forces; and started flying the
flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a
removal of allegiance from the Philippine
Government and their capability to deprive
the duly constituted authorities – the
President, foremost – of their powers and
prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic
location of Marawi City; the role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole;
and the possible tragic repercussions once it
falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the
briefings, the Senate declared that it found
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“no compelling reason to revoke
Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group
and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis
of President Duterte’s Proclamation of
martial law.
ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate
proceeding” covered by paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review
required by the Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be
factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts? B. Is the President
required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of
National Defense? C. Is the President is
required to take into account only the
situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation
to have not been accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress
jointly or separately;
[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis]
for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters
for review? B. Who has the burden of proof?
C. What is the threshold of evidence?
[5] Whether the exercise of the power of
judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief?
[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May
2017 may be considered, vague and thus
null and void: a. with its inclusion of “other
rebel groups;” or b. since it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational
parameters within the entire Mindanao
region;
[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in
Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of
the President to Congress are sufficient
bases: a. for the existence of actual
rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region;
[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to
terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion
and the requirements of public safety
sufficient to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and
[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216
of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of
recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B.
also nullify the acts of the President in
calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the
Mindanao region.
RULING:
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of
this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a
special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate
proceeding” appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers
to any action initiated by a citizen for the
purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s emergency powers, as in these
cases. It could be denominated as a
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complaint, a petition, or a matter to be
resolved by the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the
full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as
the President could not be expected to verify
the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require him otherwise would
impede the process of his decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense
Secretary is not a condition for the
declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A
plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution shows that the President’s
power to declare martial law is not subject to
any condition except for the requirements of
actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires it. Besides, it would be
contrary to common sense if the decision of
the President is made dependent on the
recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only
on the President can exercise of the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President
has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of
Congress and the review of this Court. Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment
call of the President, the determination of
this Court as to whether there is sufficient
factual basis for the exercise of such, must
be based only on facts or information known
by or available to the President at the time
he made the declaration or suspension which
facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report
submitted by him to Congress. These may
be based on the situation existing at the time
the declaration was made or past events. As
to how far the past events should be from
the present depends on the President.
3. The power of the Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution is independent of
the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand,
Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. The power to
review by the Court and the power to revoke
by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the
sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety
requires it; the first two requirements must
concur; and 3) there is probable cause for
the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable
cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion
or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial
law, and that probable cause is the most
reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President
can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion necessary for a
declaration of martial law or suspension of
the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 141 | P a g e
standard of proof would restrict the exercise
of his emergency powers.
5. The judicial power to review the
sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration
of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not extend to the calibration of the
President’s decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation. To do so would be tantamount to
an incursion into the exclusive domain of
the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies
with the President.
6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does
not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The
term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation
No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in
the context of the words that accompany it.
Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216
refers to “other rebel groups” found in
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way
of reference in its Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational
parameters does not make Proclamation No.
216 vague. Operational guidelines will serve
only as mere tools for the implementation of
the proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine
the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general
orders, arrest orders and other orders issued
after the proclamation for being irrelevant to
its review. Any act committed under the said
orders in violation of the Constitution and
the laws should be resolved in a separate
proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be
deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the
exercise of its power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By
a review of the facts available to him that
there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove
from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to
deprive the Chief Executive of any of his
power and prerogatives, leading the
President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is
being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy
is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs
rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under
the crime of terrorism, which has a broader
scope covering a wide range of predicate
crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the
various means by which terrorism can be
committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the
declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
For a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus to be valid, there must be
concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or
invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the
acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and
the Maute Group were directed not only
against government forces or establishment
but likewise against civilians and their
properties. There were bomb threats, road
blockades, burning of schools and churches,
hostages and killings of civilians, forced
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 142 | P a g e
entry of young male Muslims to the group,
there were hampering of medical services
and delivery of basic services, reinforcement
of government troops, among others. These
particular scenarios convinced the President
that the atrocities had already escalated to a
level that risked public safety and thus
impelled him to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different
category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call
out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and to declare martial law.
Even so, the Court’s review of the
President’s declaration of martial law and
his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily
entails separate proceedings instituted for
that particular purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 result in the
nullification of the acts of the President done
pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact
doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is
recognized as an “operative fact” before it is
declared unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region. The Court
FINDS sufficient factual bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and
DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL.
Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED
 Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a single
Role of the Congress – Power to Revoke vs. deliberative body. The performance of the
Judicial Power to Review – constitutional obligation is allegedly
mandatory, not discretionary. The
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, et. al. vs. discretionary nature of the phrase “may
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES revoke such proclamation or suspension”
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 under said provision allegedly pertain to the
power of the Congress to revoke but not to
Former SenatorWigberto E. Tañada, et. al., its obligation to convene and vote which,
vs. Congress of the Phils. they stress is mandatory.
G.R. No. 231694, July 25, 2017
Issue
Facts of the Case
Whether or not the provision of
On 23 May 2017 President Duterte Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a Constitution mandates Congress to
state of martial law and suspending the writ automatically convene in joint session in the
of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of event that the President proclaims a state of
islands on the grounds of rebellion and martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
necessity of public safety. the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines
or any part thereof.
Within 48 hours after the
proclamation and while the Congress was in Ruling
session, President Duterte transmitted his
Report to the Senate. After a briefing before NO. The Congress is not
the Senate on 29 May 2017 and the House constitutionally mandated to convene in
on 31 May 2017, the former adopted joint session EXCEPT to vote jointly to
Resolution No. 1050, which expressed revoke the President’s declaration or
support for President Duterte’s Proclamation suspension.
No. 216 and to vote thereon.
Article VII, Section 18:
Petitioners claim that the resolutions “The Congress voting
separately passed by the Senate and the jointly, by a vote of at
House of Representatives, which express least a majority of all its
support as well as the intent not to revoke members in a regular or
President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216, special session may
injure their rights as citizens and taxpayers revoke such
“to a proper and mandatory legislative proclamation or
review of the declaration of martial law” and suspension, which
that the continuing failure of the Congress to revocation shall not set
convene in joint session similarly cause a aside by the President.”
continuing injury on their rights. It is the
primary contention of petitioners that a plain
reading of Article VII, Section 18 of the In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
Constitution shows that Congress is required provision grants the Congress the power to
to convene in joint session to review revoke the President’s proclamation of

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martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
prescribes how the Congress may exercise
such power, which is by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members, voting jointly,
in a regular or special session. The use of
the word “may” in the provision is to be
construed as permissive and operating to
confer discretion on the Congress on
whether or not to revoke. However, in order
to revoke, the same provision sets the
requirement that at least majority of the
Members of the Congress, voting jointly,
favor revocation.
Pardon vs. Amnesty
Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
February 9, 1989
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to
indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was
extended by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted (at that time, the
rule was that clemency could be given even
before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to
her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. Her letter
was referred to the Minister of Finance who
ruled that she may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she
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was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner
wrote the Ministry stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be
required to pay the proportionate share of
the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry
referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request
averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive,
entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new
appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit
it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court. While a pardon has
generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as though he
never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of
a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness. A pardon looks to the future.
It is not retrospective. It makes no amends
for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation
to make reparation for what has been
suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This
would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former
post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence,
or for any reason the sentence is not served
by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only
be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
Power of impoundment
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PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article
VI Section 25 - Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663
or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that
allows any members of the Congress the
Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims
that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives are
the ones authorized under the Constitution to
realign savings, not the individual members
of Congress themselves. President signed
the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the
law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is
authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and
Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of
Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House are allowed to approve
the realignment. Furthermore, two
conditions must be met:
1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and
2) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditures to
which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP
Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution. The list of those who may be
authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the
AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.
Power of augmentation - Article VI, Section
25(5)
G.R. No 209287 Feb 3, 2015 Araullo vs
Aquino III
Facts:
This is a motion of reconsideration where
Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in
these consolidated cases were
mischaracterized and unnecessarily due of
the Court’s interpretation of savings can be
overturned by legislation considering that
these savings is defined in the GAA
(General Appropriations Act) making it a
statutory issue. They assert that the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations constitute savings
and may be used for augmentation and that
the Court should apply legally recognized
norms and principles, most especially the
presumption of good faith, in resolving their
motion.
As for the part of the petitioner, Araullo et
al, pray for the partial reconsideration of the
decision that the Court had failed to declare
as unconstitutional and illegal moneys under
DAP (Disbursement Acceleration Program)
that were used for alleged augmentation of
appropriation items that did not have actual
deficiencies. They submit that augmentation
of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the
programs, activities and projects (PAPs)
contained in the budget submitted to
Congress should be declared
unconstitutional.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 146 | P a g e
Issue:
1. Does the acts and practices under the
DAP, particularly their non-
conformity with Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution and the
principles of separation of power and
equal protection, constitutional? NO
2. Did the Court’s Decision invalidate
all DAP-funded projects? NO
3. Did the Court’s Decision throw out
the presumption of good faith of the
authors, proponents and
implementors of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP)? NO
Ruling:
1. Regardless of the perceived
beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
regardless of whether the DAP is
viewed as an effective tool of
stimulating the national economy,
the acts and practices under the DAP
and the relevant provisions of NBC
No. 541 cited in the Decision should
remain illegal and unconstitutional as
long as the funds used to finance the
projects mentioned therein are
sourced from savings that deviated
from the relevant provisions of the
GAA, as well as the limitation on the
power to augment under Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The respondents posit that the Court
has erroneously invalidated all the
DAP-funded projects by overlooking
the difference between an item and
an allotment class, and by
concluding that they do not have
appropriation cover. The Court made
it clear that the Decision did not
declare the en masse invalidation of
the 116 DAP-funded projects and
that it is focused solely on an
abstract consideration of NBC No.
541.
 3. The Court has neither thrown out the
presumption of good faith nor
imputed bad faith to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the
DAP. The contrary is true, because
the Court has still presumed their
good faith by pointing out that “the
doctrine of operative fact cannot
apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless
there are concrete findings of good
faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal,
civil, administrative and other
liabilities.”

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 Requisites for the proper exercise of
the power of judicial review
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE
SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v.
ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY.
Facts:
This case involves the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund
and replacing it with the “Judiciary Support
Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed
Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to
the national treasury and Congress shall
determine how the funds will be used.
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order
to compel this court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against
the perceived hostility of Congress.an This
matter was raised to this court through the
letter dated August 27, 2014, signed by
Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court. The letter is
captioned:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation
to invoke the Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution he letter was referred to the
Clerk of Court En Banc for appropriate
action. It was then docketed as UDK-15143.
anroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the letter-
petition, Mijares alleges that he is “a
Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer.
He filed this petition as part of his
“continuing crusade to defend and uphold
the Constitution”because he believes in the
rule of law. He is concerned about the
threats against the judiciary after this court
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 148 | P a g e
promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund case on November 19,
2013 and Disbursement Acceleration
Program case on July 1, 2014. A petition
was filed arguing that the court gravely
abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of its judicial independence and
fiscal autonomy.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has
sufficiently shown grounds for this court to
grant the petition and issue a writ of
mandamus.
Held:
This court resolves to deny the petition.
Petitioner must comply with all the
requisites for judicial review before this
court may take cognizance of the case. The
requisites are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first
two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of this petition.

“Moot and academic”
- International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.
vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 209271, 26 July 2016
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS v. GREENPEACE
SOUTHEAST ASIA , GR No. 209271,
2016-07-26
Facts:
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of
the Philippines Los Baiios (UPLB), the
implementing institution of the field trials,
conducted a contained experiment on Bt
talong under the supervision of the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines
(NCBP)
The NCBP, created under Executive Order
No. (EO) 430,... is the regulatory body
tasked to: (a) "identify and evaluate
potential hazards involved in initiating
genetic engineering experiments or the
introduction of new species and genetically
engineered organisms and recommend
measures to minimize risks"; and (b)
"formulate and review national policies and
guidelines on biosafety, such as the safe
conduct of work on genetic engineering,
pests and their genetic materials for the
protection of public health, environment[,]
and personnel^] and supervise the
implementation thereof."
Upon the completion of the contained
experiment, the NCBP issued a Certificate...
therefor stating that all biosafety measures
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 149 | P a g e
were complied with, and no untoward
incident had occurred
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the
Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two
(2)-year Biosafety Permits... for field testing
of Bt talong
Consequently, field testing proceeded in
approved trial sites in North Cotabato,
Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and
Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines) (Greenpeace),
Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad
ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others
(respondents) filed before the Court a
Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus
and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO)
(petition for Writ of Kalikasan) against
herein petitioners... alleging that the Bt
talong field trials violated their
constitutional right to health and a balanced
ecology considering, among others, that: (a)
the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), as required by Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1151,... was not secured prior to
the field trials;... b) the required public
consultations under the Local Government
Code (LGC) were not complied with;... and
(c) as a regulated article under DAO 08-
2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to
human health and the environment, and that
there is no independent, peer-reviewed study
showing its safety for human consumption
and the environment
Further, they contended that since the
scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt
talong remained insufficient or uncertain,
and that preliminary scientific evaluation
shows reasonable grounds for concern, the
precautionary principle should be applied
and, thereby, the field trials be enjoined.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued... a Writ
of Kalikasan against petitioners (except
UPLB
May 17, 2013, the CA ruled in favor of
respondents and directed petitioners to
permanently cease and desist from
conducting the Bt talong field trials.
Issues:
the case should have been dismissed for
mootness in view of the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials and
the expiration of the Biosafety Permits;... b)
the Court should not have ruled on the
validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised
as an issue
Ruling:
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in
not dismissing the case for being moot and
academic despite the completion and
tennination of the Bt talong field trials, on
account of the following exceptions to the
mootness principle: (a) the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; and (b) the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Agreeing with the CA, the Court held that
the precautionary principle applies in this
case since the risk of harm from the field
trials of Bt talong remains uncertain and
there exists a possibility of serious and
irreversible harm. The Court observed that
eggplants are a staple vegetable in the
country that is mostly grown by small-scale
farmers who are poor and marginalized;
thus, given the country's rich biodiversity,
the consequences of contamination and
genetic pollution would be disastrous and
irreversible.
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the
field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it
declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 150 | P a g e
failure to consider the provisions of the
NBF. The Court also temporarily enjoined
any application for contained use, field
testing, propagation, commercialization, and
importation of genetically modified
organisms until a new administrative order
is promulgated in accordance with law.
The Court grants the motions for
reconsideration on the ground of mootness.
The Court's Ruling
The Proceedings Before the Court
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate
actual, ongoing controversies.
Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable
An action is considered "moot" when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events
Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these four
instances as exceptions to the mootness
principle.
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest
are involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review
In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the
Court, it was held that (a) the present case is
of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved, and (b) it is
likewise capable of repetition yet evading
review. Hence, it was excepted from the
mootness principle
However, upon a closer scrutiny of the
parties' arguments, the Court reconsiders its
ruling and now finds merit in petitioners'
assertion that the case should have been
dismissed for being moot and academic, and
that the aforesaid exceptions to the said rule
should not have been applied.
I. On the paramount public interest
exception.
However, a survey of cases would show
that, as a common guidepost for application,
there should be some perceivable benefit to
the public which demands the Court to
proceed with the resolution of otherwise
moot questions.
no perceivable benefit to the public -
whether rational or practical - may be gained
by resolving respondents' petition for Writ
of Kalikasan on the merits.
These incidents effectively negated the
necessity for the reliefs sought by
respondents in their petition for Writ of
Kalikasan as there was no longer any field
test to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA
rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013,
the reliefs petitioner sought and granted by
the CA were no longer capable of execution.
To recount, these cases, which stemmed
from herein respondents petition for Writ of
Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed
expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by
the BPI and the completion and tennination
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 151 | P a g e
of the Bt talong field trials subject of the
same
As the matter never went beyond the field
testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks
related to propagation were pursued or the
requirements therefor complied with. Thus,
there are no guaranteed after-effects to the
already concluded Bt talong field trials that
demand an adjudication from which the
public may perceivably benefit. Any future
threat to the right of herein respondents or
the public in general to a healthful and
balanced ecology is therefore more
imagined than real
In fact, it would appear to be more
beneficial to the public to stay a verdict on
the safeness of Bt talong - or GMOs, for that
matter - until an actual and justiciable case
properly presents itself before the Court...
these cases do not fall under the "capable of
repetition yet evading review" exception.
II. The case is not one capable of repetition
vet evading review.Likewise, contrary to the
Court's earlier ruling
Under DAO 08-2002, no specific guidelines
were used in the conduct of risk assessment,
and the DA was allowed to consider the
expert advice of, and guidelines developed
by, relevant international organizations and
regulatory authorities of countries with
significant experience in the regulatory
supervision of the regulated article.
However, under JDC 01-2016, the CODEX
Alimentarius Guidelines was adopted to
govern the risk assessment of activities
involving the research, development,
handling and use, transboundary movement,
release into the environment, and
management of genetically modified plant
and plant products derived from the use of
modern biotechnology.
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that
the regulatory framework now applicable in
conducting risk assessment in matters In fact, in relation to the latter, it is observed
involving the research, development, that the Court should not have even delved
handling, movement, and release into the into the constitutionality of DAO 08-2002 as
environment of genetically modified plant it was merely collaterally challenged by
and plant products derived from the use of respondents, based on the constitutional
modern biotechnology is substantially precepts of the people's rights to information
different from that which was applied to the on matters of public concern, to public
subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot participation, to a balanced and healthful
be said that the present case is one capable ecology, and to health.
of repetition yet evading review.
All told, with respondents' petition for Writ
the Court discerns that there are two (2) of Kalikasan already mooted by the
factors to be considered before a case is expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the
deemed one capable of repetition yet completion of the field trials subject of these
evading review: (1) the challenged action cases, and with none of the exceptions to the
was in its duration too short to be fully mootness principle properly attending, the
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; Court grants the instant motions for
and (2) there was a reasonable expectation reconsideration and hereby dismisses the
that the same complaining party would be aforesaid petition. With this pronouncement,
subjected to the same action. no discussion on the substantive merits of
the same should be made.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the
duration of the subject field tests was too
short to be fully litigated. It must be
emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for
the subject field tests were issued on March
16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid
for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed
out by Justice Leonen, respondents filed
their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on
April 26, 2012 -just a few months before the
Biosafety Permits expired and when the
field testing activities were already
over.[108] Obviously, therefore, the
cessation of the subject field tests before the
case could be resolved was due to
respondents' own inaction.
Moreover, the situation respondents
complain of is not susceptible to repetition.
As discussed above, DAO 08-2002 has
already been superseded by JDC 01-2016.
Hence, future applications for field testing
will be governed by JDC 01-2016 which, as
illustrated, adopts a regulatory framework
that is substantially different from that of
DAO 08-2002.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 152 | P a g e

Proper party (“locus standi”or legal
standing)
1) General Rule: “direct injury test”
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET
AL., VS. SOUTHWING
HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006
FACTS:
On December 12, 2002, Pres. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, through the Exec. Sec.
Alberto G. Romulo, issued Executive Order
156 (EO 156), entitled “PROVIDING FOR
A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL
POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE
MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES.” The said executive
issuance prohibits the importation into the
country, inclusive of the Special Economic
and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay
Freeport, of used motor
vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three
separate actions for declaratory relief before
the RTC Branch 72 of Olongapo City, all
seeking the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Article 3, Section 3.1
of EO 156. The cases were filed by
respondent entities, who or whose members,
are classified as Subic Bay Freeport
Enterprises and engaged in the business of,
among others, importing and/or trading
“used motor vehicles”. Petitioners argue that
respondents will not be affected by the
importation ban considering that their
certificate of registration and tax exemption
do not authorize them to engage in the
importation and/or trading of trading “used
motor vehicles”.
ISSUE:
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 153 | P a g e
Whether or not respondent entities lack
locus standi to question the validity of EO
156.
HELD:
Respondent entities have locus standi. The
established rule that the constitutionality of a
law or administrative issuance can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement has been
satisfied in this case. The broad subject of
prohibited importation is “all types of used
motor vehicles.” Respondents would
definitely suffer a direct injury from the
implementation of EO 156 because their
certificate of registration and tax exemption
authorize them to trade and/or import new
and used motor vehicles and spare parts,
except “uusseedd ccaarrss”. Other types of
motor vehicles imported and/or traded by
respondents and not falling within the
category of “uusseedd ccaarrss” would thus
be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of
their business.
Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal
standing to assail the validity of EO 156.
Legislator’s Suit and Citizen’s Suit for
Assertion of Public Right
Osmena v. Power Sector Assets and
Liabilites
FACTS:
THE POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORP
(PSALM) CONDUCTED BIDDING FOR
THE SALE OF NPPC POWER PLANT.
BIDDERS WERE THERMA POWER
VISAYAS INC AND SPC POWER CORP.
THERMA POWER WON. PSALM
ISSUED NOTICE OF AWARD TO
THERMA POWER BUT SUBJECT TO
THE CONDITION THAT SPC WILL NOT
EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF FIRST YES, THE COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED
REFUSAL. THEN SPC EXERCISED ITS FROM RENDERING A NUNC PRO
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL BY TUNC JUDGMENT TO AMEND THE
PROPOSING TO PSALM THAT IT WILL DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE
EXECUTE LEASE AGREEMENT AND SEPTEMBER 28, 2015 DECISION IN
PURCHASE AGREEMENT OVER THE ORDER TO TRULY REFLECT THE
NPCC POWER PLANT. PSALM AND ACTION OF THE COURT.
SPC EXECUTED SAID AGREEMENTS
AND PSALM CANCELLED THE THE LACK OF DIRECTIVE IN THE
NOTICE OF AWARD. IN ITS PREVIOUS DECISION ON HOW TO PROCEED
DECISION SC RULED THAT THE FROM THE NULLIFICATION OF SPC’S
PROVISION IN THE BIDDING RIGHT TO TOP AND ITS NPPC-APA
GUIDELINES RE RIGHT OF FIRST AND NPPC-LLA CONTRACTS,
REFUSAL OF SPC WAS ILLEGAL AND NOTHING MORE, LEFT THE PARTIES
THE LEASE AND PURCHASE AT A QUANDARY, PROMPTING THEM
AGREEMENTS WERE ALSO ILLEGAL. TO SEEK JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
BUT IT WAS SILENT ON THE EFFECT ANEW.
OF THE DECISION ON THE NOTICE OF
THE COURT MUST, THEREFORE,
AWARD. THERMA POWER THEN
SUPPLY HEREIN WHAT WAS
ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WITH
INADVERTENTLY OMITTED IN THE
PRAYER TO REINSTATE THE NOTICE
DECISION. OTHERWISE, A REJECTION
OF AWARD. SC IN THIS RESOLUTION
OF THE PLEA OF THERMA POWER
REINSTATED THE NOTICE OF
WILL RESULT TO MULTIPLICITY OF
AWARD. SUITS AND CLOGGING OF THE
THE BASIS IS THE SEVERABILITY COURT DOCKET. THIS CONSEQUENCE
CLAUSE IN THE BIDDING IS AGAINST THE ESTABLISHED
GUIDELINES WHICH STATES: IF ANY POLICY OF THE COURT TO PROVIDE
ONE OR MORE OF THE PROVISIONS IN ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE A JUST,
OF THE BIDDING PROCEDURES OR SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE
ANY PART OF THE BIDDING DISPOSITION OF EVERY ACTION AND
PACKAGE IS HELD TO BE INVALID, PROCEEDING.
ILLEGAL OR UNENFORCEABLE, THE
VALIDITY, LEGALITY, OR
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE
REMAINING PROVISIONS WILL NOT
BE AFFECTED THEREBY AND SHALL
REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND
EFFECT.

ISSUE:
WAS IT PROPER FOR SC TO AMEND A
FINAL JUDGMENT?

HELD:

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Legislator’s and Taxpayers’ Suit
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
GR No. 212426, 2016-07-26
Facts:
Petitioners respectfully pray that the
Honorable Court RECONSIDER,
REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision
dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new
Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) entered into by the respondents for
the Philippine government, with the United
States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin
its implementation.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it
ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In
connection to this, petitioners move that
EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in
order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military
bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally,
they reiterate their arguments on the issues
of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear
weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted
itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign
bases, troops, and facilities, based on the
fact that the plain meaning of the provision
in question referred to prohibiting the return
of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except
under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as
referring to an initial entry, the Court has
simply applied the plain meaning of the
words in the particular provision.[10]
Necessarily, once entry has been established
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 155 | P a g e
by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of
entry need not be embodied by a separate
treaty. After all, the Constitution did not
state that foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.
Issues:
Constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between
the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
We find that EDCA did not go beyond the
framework. The entry of US troops has long
been authorized under a valid and subsisting
treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA
along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the
conclusion that an executive agreement such
as the EDCA was well within the bounds of
the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be
declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms
to the Philippines' legal regime through the
MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government's continued policy to enhance
our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may
arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has
not raised any additional legal arguments
that warrant revisiting the Decision.
Principles:
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and
application of the verba legis rule will in fact
result in an absurdity, which legal
construction strictly abhors.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution
should be construed as such and should not
be given a construction that changes its
meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial
entry" mentioned above ventured into a
construction of the provisions of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution which is
patently contrary to the plain language and
meaning of the said constitutional provision.
Writ of Kalikasan vs. Writ of Continuing
Mandamus
Segovia vs. The Climate Change
Commission
Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or
Continuing Mandamus should issue.
RULING:
The petition must be dismissed.
Requisites for issuance of Writs of
Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus We
find that the petitioners failed to establish
the requisites for the issuance of the writs
prayed for a writ of kalikasan to issue, the
following requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation
arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private
individual or entity;
3. the actual or threatened violation
involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 156 | P a g e
It is well-settled that a party claiming the
privilege for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be
violated. In this case, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to
health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology and bare allegations that their right
was violated, the petitioners failed to show
that public respondents are guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a
violation of the petitioners' right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
Moreover, the National Air Quality Status
Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted
by the petitioners belies their claim that the
DENR failed to reduce air pollutant
emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that
the National Ambient Total Suspended
Particulates (TSP) value used to determine
air quality has steadily declined from 2004
to 2007, and while the values still exceed the
air quality guideline value, it has remained
on this same downward trend until as
recently as 2011.
On the other hand, public respondents
sufficiently showed that they did not
unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect
the laws, executive and administrative
orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects
and programs that seek to improve air
quality were undertaken by the respondents,
jointly and in coordination with
stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of
expenditures for climate change adaptation
and mitigation, the Integrated Transport
System which is aimed to decongest major
thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti- Smoke
Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile
Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-
Greening Programs.
In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the
petitioners show that the DENR was, and is,
taking concrete steps to improve national air
quality, such as information campaigns, free
emission testing to complement the anti-
smoke-belching program and other
programs to reduce emissions from
industrial smokestacks and from open
burning of waste . The efforts of local
governments and administrative regions in
conjunction with other • executive agencies
and stakeholders are also outlined.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus
cannot issue. Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC
lays down the requirements for a petition for
continuing mandamus as follows:
RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
SECTION 1. Petition for continuing
mandamus.-When any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment
of such right and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to do an act or
series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 157 | P a g e
This Court cannot but note that this is
precisely the thrust of the petition - to
compel the respondents to act one way to
implement the Road Sharing Principle - to
bifurcate all roads in the country to devote
half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other
to Filipinomade transport - when there is
nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied
issuances that require that specific course of
action in order to implement the same. Their
good intentions notwithstanding, the
petitioners cannot supplant the executive
department's discretion with their own
through this petition for the issuance of writs
of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.
In this case, there is no showing of unlawful
neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the
petitioners that specifically enjoins the
bifurcation of roads to implement the Road
Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they
were and are actively implementing projects
and programs that seek to improve air
quality.
At its core, what the petitioners are seeking
to compel is not the performance of
aministerial act, but a discretionary act - the
manner of implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners'
preferred specific course of action (i.e. the
bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather
sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles) to implement the Road
Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in
law or executive issuances for it to be
considered an act enjoined by law as a duty,
leading to the necessary conclusion that the
continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not
the mplementation of an environmental law,
rule or regulation, but to control the exercise
of discretion of the executive as to how the
principle enunciated in an executive
issuance relating to the environment is best
implemented. Clearly, the determination of
the means to be taken by the executive in
implementing or actualizing any stated
legislative or executive policy relating to the
environment requires the use of discretion.
Absent a showing that the executive is guilty
of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority,"
the general rule applies that discretion
cannot be checked via this petition for
continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
representations. For these reasons, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate
the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings. But petitioners claim
that the means adopted by the cybercrime
law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.
ISSUES
1. The petitioners contend that Section
4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny
standard required of laws that interfere with
the fundamental rights of the people. Is
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access
unconstitutional?

2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3)

suffers from overbreadth in that, while is
Prohibition against third-party standing -
seeks to discourage data interference, it
“As applied” and Facial Challenges
intrudes into the area of protected speech
and expression, creating a chilling and
Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice G.R.
deterrent effect on these guaranteed
Nos. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359,
freedoms.
203378, 203391, 203407, 203440, 203453,
203454, 203469, 203501, 203509, 203515
3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or
& 203518, [February 18, 2014], 727 PHIL
cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
28-430
clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it
will cause a user using his real name to
FACTS
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases
or take the name of another in satire, parody,
These consolidated petitions seek to declare
or any other literary device.
several provisions of Republic Act (RA)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3)
2012, unconstitutional and void. The
violates the constitutional rights to due
cybercrime law aims to regulate access to
process and to privacy and correspondence,
and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is
and transgresses the freedom of the press.
a boon to the need of a current generation
for greater information and facility of
5. Petitioners claim that cybersex violates
communication. And because linking with
the freedom of expression clause of the
the internet opens up a user to
Constitution.
communication from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for
6. Petitioners are wary that a person who
committing theft by hacking into or
merely doodles on paper and imagines a
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or
sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not
credit card or defrauding him through false

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 158 | P a g e

criminally liable for producing child
pornography but one who formulates the
idea on his laptop would be.
7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for
penalizing the transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications?
8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of
both the penal code provisions on libel as
well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It
suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling
and deterrent effect on protected expression.
10.Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree
higher constitutional?
11.Is Section 7 on the prosecution under
both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA
10175 constitutional?
12.Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?
13.Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of
traffic data valid and constitutional?
14.Is Section 13 on preservation of
computer data valid and constitutional?
15.Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer
data valid and constitutional?
16.Is Section 15 on search, seizure and
examination of computer data valid and
constitutional?
17.Is Section 17 on destruction of computer
data valid and constitutional?
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 159 | P a g e
18.Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking
access to computer data valid and
constitutional?
19.Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice
valid and constitutional?
20.Is Section 24 on Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC) valid and constitutional?
21.Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and
functions valid and constitutional?
HELD
1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an
American constitutional construct, is useful
in determining the constitutionality of laws
that tend to target a class of things or
persons. The Court finds nothing in Section
4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental
freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable
act – accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally
condemnable act.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject broadly, thereby invading the area
of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying
without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data
message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer
systems and private documents. All penal
laws, like the cybercrime law, have of
course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect, or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of
citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent
the State from legislating criminal laws
because they instill such kind of fear is to
render the state powerless in addressing and
penalizing socially harmful conduct.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is
reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring
the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive
others who are not ill-motivated of the
rightful opportunity of registering the same.
It is the evil purpose for which one uses the
name that the law condemns.
4. No. The law punishes those who acquire
or use identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail
to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well
as the right to due process. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s
personal right. The Court has defined intent
to gain as an internal act which can be
established through overt acts of the
offender, and it may be presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property pertaining
to another, unless special circumstances
reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in
the quest of news reporting or social
investigation, has nothing to fear since a
special circumstance is present to negate
intent to gain which is required by this
Section.
5. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1)
unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to
persons engaged in the business of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 160 | P a g e
maintaining, controlling, or operating,
directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity
with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended.
6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is
not successfully challenged. The law makes
the penalty higher by one degree when the
crime is committed in cyberspace. But no
one can complain since the intensity or
duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is a rational basis for
such higher penalty.
7. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission
of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which us not accorded the same level
of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this
right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus,
unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
forms of expression.
8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that
these laws imply a stricter standard of
malice to convict the author of a defamatory
statement where the offended party is a
public figure. The elements of libel are: (a)
the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There is actual malice or malice in fact when
the offender makes the defamatory
statement with the knowledge that it is false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. The reckless disregard standard
used here required a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the accused in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of the statement he
published. Gross or even extreme negligence
is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
The defense of absence of actual malice,
even when the statement turns out to be
false, is available where the offended party
is a public official or a public figure. But,
where the offended party is a private
individual, the prosecution need not prove
the presence of actual malice. For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to
regulate the use of cyberspace
communication technology to protect a
person’s reputation and peace of mind,
cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily
and broadly sweep, invading the area of
protected freedoms. If such means are
adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of
what sinister predicaments await internet
users will suppress otherwise robust
discussion of public issues. Penal laws
should provide reasonably clear guidelines
for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting”
constitute broad sweep that generates
chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.
10.Yes, because there exists a substantial
distinction between crimes committed
through the use of information and
communication technology and similar
crimes committed using other means. In
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 161 | P a g e
using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is
able to reach far more victims or cause
greater harm.
11.The Court resolves to leave the
determination of the correct application of
Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the
offender under both the Revised Penal Code
and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases,
with the exception of the crimes of: a.
Online libel as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy;
as well as b. Child pornography committed
online as to which, charging the offender
under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act
10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
constitutes a violation of the same
proscription, and, in respect to these, is void
and unconstitutional.
12.Valid and constitutional, because the
matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a
legislative prerogative.
13.Void and unconstitutional, because
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement
authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the
sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority
that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
14.Valid and constitutional, because the user
ought to have kept a copy of that data when
it crossed his computer if he was so minded.
There was no undue deprivation of property
since the data that service providers preserve
on orders of law enforcement authorities are
not made accessible to users by reasons of
the issuance of such orders.
15.Valid and constitutional, because what
Section 14 envisions is merely the
enforcement of a duly issued court warrant.
Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.
16.Valid and constitutional, because Section
15 merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement authorities that would ensure
proper collection, preservation, and use of
computer system or data that have been
seized by virtue of a court warrant.
17.Valid and constitutional, because it is
unclear that the user has a demandable right
to require the service provider to have that
copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its
storage system.
18.Void and unconstitutional, because
Section 19 not only precludes any judicial
intervention but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on
speech.
19.Valid and constitutional insofar as it
applies to the provisions of Chapter IV
which are not struck down by the Court.
20.and 21. Valid and constitutional, because
cybercrime law is complete in itself when it
directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan.
The law gave sufficient standards for the
CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK) vs. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, 8 August 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA
PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 162 | P a g e
QUEZON CITY, GR No. 225442, August
08, 2017
Facts:
Following the campaign of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances
on minors through police operations which
were publicly known as part of "OPLAN
RODY.”
Among those local governments that
implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents:
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)-
an association of young adults and minors
that aims to forward a free and just society,
in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they:
(1) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine;
(2) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing
or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours;
(3) deprive minors of the right to liberty and
the right to travel without substantive due
process; and
(4) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the
Curfew Ordinances:
(a) are unconstitutional as they deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process; and
(b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing
means that bear no reasonable relation to
their purpose.
Issues:
Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The petition is partly granted.
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition
Case law explains that the present
Constitution has "expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling
actual controversies involving rights that
were legally demandable and enforceable.
They also claim that the Manila Ordinance,
by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which
prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held
that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion
when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2)
executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.In light of the foregoing, petitioners
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 163 | P a g e
correctly availed of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial
function.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts
"[r]requires that recourse must first be made
to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with
the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition. This Court is tasked to resolve "the
issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of
paramount importance and immediately
affects the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people, as in this case. Hence,
petitioners' direct resort to the Court is
justified.
Requisites of Judicial Review."The
prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is
that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided
by the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. In this case,
respondents assail the existence of the first
two (2) requisites.
Actual Case or Controversy.
there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
Applying these precepts, this Court finds
that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly
on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair
the minors' and parents' constitutional rights,
and whether the Manila Ordinance goes
against the provisions of RA 9344.
Legal Standing.
Petitioners must show that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct
injury as a consequence of the enforcement
of the challenged governmental act."
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 164 | P a g e
Among the five (5) individual petitioners,
only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has
legal standing to raise the issue affecting the
minor's right to travel, because: (a) she was
still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court, and, hence, a proper
subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon
City at night after school and is, thus, in
imminent danger of apprehension by virtue
of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other
hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel
Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition
that they are all of legal age, and therefore,
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they
are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any
direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to
raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear
their children as they have not shown that
they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated
association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court. Even
assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to
allege that it was authorized by its members
who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case
on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not
have the required personal interest in the
controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but
not on the alleged violation of the parents'
right.
Indeed, when those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the
Court may exercise its sound discretion and
take cognizance of the suit.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules,
including, among others, the standing
requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the
Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry
out their provisions. They claim that the lack
of procedural guidelines in these issuances
led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel
and Mark Leo, even though they were
already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the
suspected curfew offenders based only on
their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they
conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of
the child, they submit that nowhere does the
said ordinance require the law enforcers to
ask for proof or identification of the child to
show his age.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 165 | P a g e
A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
They do not assert any confusion as to what
conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or
not prohibit but only point to the ordinances'
lack of enforcement guidelines.
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point
out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but
rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to
any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under
the void for vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances
do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow
the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances.
This provision should be read in conjunction
with the Curfew Ordinances because RA
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with
statutory law. Pursuant to Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances are
children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
provisions.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their
Children. Petitioners submit that the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth
without substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing
of their children: Section 12. The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government.
This means that parents are not only given
the privilege of exercising their authority
over their children; they are equally obliged
to exercise this authority conscientiously.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 166 | P a g e
While parents have the primary role in
child-rearing, it should be stressed that
"when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-
being of the child, the State may act to
promote these legitimate interests. Thus, in
cases in which harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to public safety,
peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated,
these legitimate state interests may override
the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children.
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent
right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when
the minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the
State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are
effectively given unfettered authority over
their children's conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate
an over-all plan of discipline for the parents
to apply to their minors nor force parents to
abdicate their authority to influence or
control their minors' activities.[74] As such,
the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement
upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality
of the Curfew Ordinances based on the
minors' right to travel. They claim that the
liberty to travel is a fundamental right,
which, therefore, necessitates the application
of the strict scrutiny.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners'
invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed
any transgression of their rights to free
speech or any inhibition of speech-related
conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council (Southern
Hemisphere),[80] this Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine
is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"[81] viz.:
In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or
speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the
'transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."'[85]...
transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."'[85]
That being said, this Court finds it improper
to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this
case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 167 | P a g e
Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and
guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: Section 6. The liberty
of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers
to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within
the general concept of liberty.[
The right to travel is essential as it enables
individuals to access and exercise their other
rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and
religion
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State[96] may impose limitations on the
exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided
by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public
safety. The restriction on the minor's
movement and activities within the confines
of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is
perceived to reduce the probability of the
minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities.
As to the second requirement, i.e., that the
limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to
children,... Particularly relevant to this case
is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set
curfew hours for children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew
Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this
relation, this Court recognizes that minors
do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights
is not co-extensive as those of adults.[
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court
identified three (3) justifications for the
differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second,
their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed and mature manner; and third,
the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:[118]
It is true children have rights, in common
with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets
afford dangers for them not affecting adults.
And in other uses, whether in work or in
other things, this difference may be
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 168 | P a g e
magnified.[12... i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the
basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three
(3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.[122] The
strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the
basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.[123] The intermediate scrutiny test
applies when a classification does not
involve suspect classes or fundamental
rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such
as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered
by the first two tests.[125]
Considering that the right to travel is a
fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.
Thus, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State
interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest or the means chosen
is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.[132]... a. Compelling State Interest.
This Court has ruled that children's welfare
and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them as parens patriae constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by
the State.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently
established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time
off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not
totally eliminate - their exposure to potential
harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. A
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in
Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon
City and Manila presented statistical data in
their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators,
in their respective localities.[139] Based on
these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances
pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the
Court thus finds that the local governments
have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns
on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/
Narrowly Drawn.
When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to
avoid conflicts with constitutional rights,
then they must be so narrowly drawn.[1
After a thorough evaluation of the
ordinances' respective provisions, this Court
finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance
meets the above-discussed requirement,
while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances
do not.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 169 | P a g e
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4)
exemptions from the coverage of the curfew,
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their
parents, family members of legal age, or
guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency
purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and
(d) those working at night.[146] For its part,
the Navotas Ordinance provides more
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those
who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) those traveling towards home during the
curfew hours; (e) those running errands
under the supervision of their parents,
guardians, or persons of legal age having
authority over them; (f) those involved in
accidents, calamities, and the like. It also
exempts minors from the curfew during
these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's
day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the
day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls'
Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black
Saturday, and Easter Sunda
This Court observes that these two
ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting
the minors' fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in
school or church activities, it hinders them
from engaging in legitimate non-school or
non-church activities in the streets or going
to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively
curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance
does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as
simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas
Ordinance does not accommodate avenues
for minors to engage in political rallies or
attend city council meetings to voice out
their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances
should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of
the curfew regulations, are inadequate to
ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances,
the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel,
to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and
(g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights.
These items uphold the right of association
by enabling minors to attend both official
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 170 | P a g e
and extra-curricular activities not only of
their school or church but also of other
legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression
are also covered by these items given that
the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations
are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike
in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the
free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed
various sanctions to the minor based on the
age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for
Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as
follows: (a) If the offender is Fifteen (15)
years of age and below, the sanction shall
consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person
exercising parental authority. (b) If the
offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST
OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition; For
the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third and
subsequent violation; and For the THIRD
AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10)
days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That
the complaint shall be filed by the Punong
Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local
governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community
service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c)
fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses such
as curfew violations, viz.:... what they
prohibit is the imposition of penalties on
minors for violations of these regulations.
In this regard, requiring the minor to
perform community service is a valid form
of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this
case) could appropriately adopt in an
ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the
City of Manila is likewise consistent with
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is
merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of
community-based programs and admonition
are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the
minor. To be clear, their objectives are to
formally inform and educate the minor, and
for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his
future conduct.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 171 | P a g e
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other
hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as
provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three
Curfew Ordinances have passed the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that
the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of
the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only
issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance
provides for adequate exceptions that enable
minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours,
and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the
State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew
measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit. In fine, the Manila and
Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared
as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.
Principles:
i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental
rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.
The “lis mota” of the case / necessity of
deciding constitutional question
Lalican vs. Vergara 276 SCRA 518 (1997)
Facts: On July 23, 1991, an information for
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, was
filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio
Lalican,1 Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and
Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court
of that city.
Lalican filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense.
Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705
refers to "timber and other forest products"
and not to "lumber," and asserting that
"timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is
sawed into beams, planks or boards,
petitioner alleged that said decree "does not
apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is
"vague and standardless" as it does not
specify the authority or the legal documents
required by existing forest laws and
regulations. Hence, Laliclan asserted that the
information should be quashed as it violated
his constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the law.
The lower court, guided by the principles
that penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and that all doubts should
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 172 | P a g e
be resolved in favor of the accused, issued
an order quashing the information.
The prosecution filed a motion for the
reconsideration of this Order, pointing out
that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of
the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources (DENR), timber is not just any
piece of wood for it may consist of squared
and manufactured timber or one which has
been sawn to pieces to facilitate
transportation or hauling. It stressed that to
consider a person who had made lumber out
of timber as not criminally liable is an
absurd interpretation of the law.
Laliclan the motion for reconsideration
contending that the DENR primer's
definition of "timber" is erroneous because
the law itself distinguishes "timber" from
"sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of
"lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear
legislative intent to exclude possession of
"lumber" from the acts penalized under that
section.
Issue: Laliclan questioned the charge of
illegal possession of lumber since it is
excluded from the crime of illegal
possession of timber as defined in the
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines as
amended to warrant the quashing of an
information charging the former offense on
a nonexistence of a crime.
Held: The petitioner is devoid of merit. A
law should not be so construed as to allow
the doing of an act which is prohibited by
law nor so interpreted as to afford
opportunity to defeat compliance with its
terms, create inconsistency, or contravene
the plain words of the law; The phrase forest
products is broad enough to encompass
lumber which is manufactured timber.

Doctrine of Operative Fact
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA,
HENRICO UVERO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines has sought
the expropriation of certain portions of land
owned by the private respondents. The latter
demand that the just compensation for the
property should be based on fair market
value and not that set by Presidential Decree
No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on
the basis of the assessment by the assessor
or the declared valuation by the owner,
whichever is lower. The RTC ruled for the
private respondents. The CA affirmed said
decision. Hence, the instant petition by the
Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority
(“EPZA”) vs. Dulay, etc. et al., the Court
held the determination of just compensation
in eminent domain to be a judicial function
and it thereby declared Presidential Decree
No. 76, as well as related decrees, including
Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the
contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as
an impermissible encroachment of judicial
prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by
the Republic was reiterated in subsequent
cases.
Issue:
Whether the declaration of nullity of the law
in question should have prospective, not
retroactive, application.
Held:
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 173 | P a g e
There are two views on the effects of a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of a
statute:
The first is the orthodox view. Under this
rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not
been passed. It is therefore stricken from the
statute books and considered never to have
existed at all. Not only the parties but all
persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one
may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts
be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases.
It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent.
Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. The court may give its
reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law,
but the decision affects the parties only and
there is no judgment against the statute. The
opinion or reasons of the court may operate
as a precedent for the determination of other
similar cases, but it does not strike the
statute from the statute books; it does not
repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute. The parties to the suit are concluded
by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7
of the Civil Code, providing that “when the
courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern. . . .
An otherwise valid law may be held
unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed
to operate retrospectively such as, in
pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually
vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive
application may be so declared invalid as
impairing the obligations of contracts. A
judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also
true, may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act
occurring prior to such a declaration.

The fact of the matter is that the

expropriation cases, involved in this
instance, were still pending appeal when
the EPZA ruling was rendered and
forthwith invoked by said parties. The
appellate court in this particular case
committed no error in its appealed decision.
The instant petition is dismissed.

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 Safeguards of Judicial Independence
In Re First Indorsement from Hon. Raul
M. Gonzales dated 16 March 1988
Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan to Comment on an Anonymous
Letter-Complaint ,A.M. Nos. 88-4-54333,
15 April 1988
FACTS
The COURT considered the 1st indorsement
dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul
Gonzales, Tanodbayan/ Special Prosecutor
forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo Fernan a
letter complaint, dated 14 Dec. 1987 with
enclosure by the Concerned Employees of
the Supreme Court, together with a telegram
of Miguel Cuenco, for comment within 10
days from receipt hereof. Justice Fernan had
brought this 1st indorsement to the attention
of the Court en banc in view of the
important implications of policy raised by
said indorsement.
Gonzales was the tanodbayan or Special
Prosecutor. He forwarded to Justice Fernan
a letter complaint. The letter was said to be
from concerned employees of the SC (an
anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to
Gonzales referring to the charges for
disbarment sought by Miguel Cuenco
against Justice Fernan, and asking him to do
something about it. The Court furnished to
Raul Gonzales a copy of the per curiam
Resolution in which, the Court Resolved to
dismiss the charges made by complainant
Cuenco against Justice Fernan for utter lack
of merit.
ISSUE
Whether or not a SC Justice can be disbarred
during his term of office
RULING
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A public officer such as Justice Fernan who
under the Constitution is required to be a
member of the Philippine bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and
who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such
public officer. Further, such public officer
during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any
other court, with any offense which carries
with it the penalty of removal from office.
Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)
Maceda vs. Vasquez
● Office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate offense
committed by judge whether or not
offense relates to official duties
● Jurisdiction to investigate offense
related to official duties subject to prior
administrative action taken against judge
by Supreme Court
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of Public
Attorney’s Office filed a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda. alleged that petitioner Maceda has
falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for
decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact,
petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that
petitioner Maceda also falsified his
certificates of service in 1989 and 1990.
Maceda filed an ex-parte motion to refer the
case to the Supreme Court. The
Ombudsman, however, denied the same. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Thus, Maceda filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order with the Supreme Court.
Maceda contends that he had been granted
by this Court an extension of ninety (90)
days to decide the aforementioned cases. He
also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance
of his official duties, which is under the
control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment
into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty
of supervision over all inferior courts.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman
could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification
submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral
should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Held:
Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
to investigate offense committed by judge
whether or not offense relates to official
duties
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The office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by a judge even if the charged is
unrelated to his official duties.A judge who
falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court
for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
Jurisdiction to investigate offense related
to official duties subject to prior
administrative action taken against judge
by Supreme Court
However, in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by
this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof.
No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a
justification not only runs counter to the certificate of service? As this question had
specific mandate of the Constitution not yet been raised with, much less resolved
granting supervisory powers to the Supreme by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman
Court over all courts and their personnel, but resolve the present criminal complaint that
likewise undermines the independence of requires the resolution of said question?
the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
Procedure to be observed by ombudsman GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby
regarding complaint against judge or directed to dismiss the complaint. (Maceda
other court employee vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22,
1993)
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the
matter of petitioner's certificates of service
to this Court for determination of whether
said certificates reflected the true status of
his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a
determination… In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on
said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said Judge
or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.

Ombudsman cannot subpoena the

Supreme Court and its personnel

The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court,

as one of the three branches of government,
to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint.

The rationale for the foregoing

pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is
this: should a judge, having been granted by
this Court an extension of time to decide
cases before him, report these cases in his

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 177 | P a g e

Safeguards of Judicial Independence
SALVADOR M. DE VERA VS. HON.
BENJAMIN V. PELAYO
G.R. No. 137354, July 06, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against
Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating
Articles 206 (Unjust Interlocutory Order)
and 207 (Malicious Delay in the
Administration of Justice) of the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Office of the Ombudsman referred
petitioner’s complaint to the Supreme Court
for appropriate action. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges
filed against a judge of the regional trial
court in connection with his handling of
cases before the court.
RULING:
Petition is dismissed.
The issues have been settled in the case of In
Re: Joaquin Borromeo. There, we laid down
the rule that before a civil or criminal action
against a judge for a violation of Art. 204
and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order) can be entertained, there
must first be "a final and authoritative
judicial declaration" that the decision or
order in question is indeed "unjust."
The pronouncement may result from either:
(a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a
higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment; or
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 178 | P a g e
(b) an administrative proceeding in the
Supreme Court against the judge precisely
for promulgating an unjust judgment or
order.
Likewise, the determination of whether a
judge has maliciously delayed the
disposition of the case is also an exclusive
judicial function.
"To repeat, no other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service of any other branch,
not any functionary thereof, has competence
to review a judicial order or decision --
whether final and executory or not -- and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint
for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
That prerogative belongs to the courts alone
(underscoring ours)."
Safeguards of Judicial Independence
OMBUDSMAN Carpio -Morales v. CA
and Jejomar Binay G.R. Nos. 217126 -27,
November 10, 2015
FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit was filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of
the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr.,
et al), accusing them of Plunder and
violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as
“The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,”
in connection with the five phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati
City Hall Parking Building. Before Binay,
Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits,
the Ombudsman issued the order placing
Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension
for not more than six months without pay,
during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer
are present, and that their continued stay in
office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against
them. Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA seeking the nullification of
the preventive suspension order, and praying
for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin its implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could
not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five
phases of the Makati Parking Building
project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his
re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against
him moot and academic.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments
before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the
present petition before this Court, assailing
the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay,
Jr.’s prayer for TRO.
The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no
jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a
TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation
should apply in Binay’s case.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
This Court simply finds no legal authority to
sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 179 | P a g e
one class of US rulings way back in 1959
and thus, out of touch from – and now
rendered obsolete by – the current legal
regime. In consequence, it is high time for
this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same,
such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,
and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all
relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this
Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
The condonation doctrine was first
enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in
Pascual’s postulation that the courts would
be depriving the electorate of their right to
elect their officers if condonation were not
to be sanctioned. In political law, election
pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a
public office.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal
basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any
legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of
condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law
under our governing legal mechanisms. May
it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by
no means has it been shown that such a law,
whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest
absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate’s will has been abdicated.

Safeguards of Judicial Independence
Estipona vs. Lobrigo
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was
charged for violating Section 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165. On June 15, 2016,
Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the
Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of
guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.
Respondent Judge Lobrigo denied
Estipona's motion because Sec. 23 of RA
No. 9165 prohibits plea bargaining. Estipona
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional as it encroached upon the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure.
Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the
constitutional right to equal protection of the
law.
Held:
First Issue: Yes. The emerging trend in the
rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.
Time and again, this Court has consistently
held that rules must not be applied rigidly so
as not to override substantial justice.
The Supreme Court held that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now their exclusive domain and
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 180 | P a g e
no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of
powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon
this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by
the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had
rejected previous attempts on the part of the
Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court.
Second issue: The Supreme Court did not
resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to
the constitutional right to equal protection of
the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, the Court deemed
it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition
against plea bargaining on drug cases until
and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.
Mamiscal vs. Clerk of Court Macalinog S.
Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J, 1
July 2015
Title: BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v.
CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S.
ABDULLAH +
Complainant: Baguan M. Mamiscal
Respondent: Macalinog S. Abdullah
Ponente: J. Mendoza
FACTS:
On February 23, 2011, Adelaidah
Lomondot, wife of Baguan M. Mamiscal,
filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) dated
September 26, 2010 with the Office of
Macalinog S. Abdullah, the Clerk of Court
Shari’a Circuit Court and the Circuit Civil
Registrar. On March 24, 2011, Abdullah
issued a Certificate of Registration of
Divorce (CRD) which finalized the divorce
between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
Mamiscal filed a motion to revoke
the CRD and to question the validity of
COD. His contentions for revocation of
CRD were; a) he was deprived of due
process, b) there was a possibility of
reconciliation, and c) their children had
prayed that the court would advise the
mother not to continue with the divorce. His
contentions for COD as being invalid were
premised on his denial of its execution and
filing. On April 20, 2011, this motion filed
by Mamiscal was denied by Abdullah. His
decision to sustain the divorce was based on
the duty which was as a ministerial for the
Circuit Civil Registrar.
In relation to this, Mamiscal filed a
complaint in this Court against Abdullah. He
alleged that by issuing a CRD which was
tainted with irregularity, Abdullah
committed an act with partiality, act in
violation of due process, act with dishonesty
and act with conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.
ISSUES:
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Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to
impose administrative sanction against
Abdullah.
HELD:
No, this Court has no jurisdiction.
The test of jurisdiction is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of offender.
The complaint of Mamiscal against
Abdullah was premised on the acts of
registration of divorce and issuance of CRD.
As such, they were pursuant to duties as
being the Circuit Registrar of Muslim
Divorcees. Likewise, since these were
actual facts recited in the complaint, then the
complaint in relation to “conduct
unbecoming of a court employee” was
deemed immaterial.
In terms of jurisdiction on this
administrative case, Article 185 of Muslim
Code states that the neglect of duty
committed by the circuit registrar in this
code shall be penalized in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act (C.A)
3753. Section 2 of this Act provides the
administrative supervision of National
Government over civil registrars.
The passage of Local Government
Code granted municipal and city mayors the
power of administrative supervision over
civil registrars. This power was provided in
Section 455(b)(l)(x)[35] and Section
444(b)(l)(x)[36] of this Code, in relation to
Section 479[37] under Article IX, Title
V[38] of the same Code.
The Civil Service Commission has
an original concurrent jurisdiction as well
for the administrative cases of civil
registrars. This is provided in Section 9 of
the Revised Uniform Rules in the Civil
Service.
Hence, SC dismissed the complaint
and referred it to the Office of
Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil
Service Commission.
Period to decide cases – Art. VIII, Sec.
15(1) and (4)
- Sesbreno vs. CA, GR No. 161390, 16 April
2008
Sesbreno vs. CA, GR No. 161390, 16 April
2008
ISSUE
Whether or not an appealed case which had
been pending beyond the time fixed by the
Constitution should be "deemed affirmed.”
RULING
No. Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973
Constitution, which reads:
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and
other collegiate appellate courts, when the
applicable maximum period shall have
lapsed without the rendition of the
corresponding decision or resolution
because the necessary vote cannot be had,
the judgment, order, or resolution appealed
from shall be deemed affirmed x xx
That provision is not found in the present
Constitution. The court, under the 1987
Constitution, is now mandated to decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted to it for
determination within specified periods. Even
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 182 | P a g e
when there is delay and no decision or
resolution is made within the prescribed
period, there is no automatic affirmance of
the appealed decision.
The Judicial and Bar Council – Art. VIII,
Sec. 8 and 9
G.R. NO. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NEIL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration
filed by the JBC’s action of allowing more
than one member of the congress to
represent the JBC to be unconstitutional.
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven
members, an eight member was added to the
JBC as two respondents from Congress
began sitting in the JBC- one from the
House of Representatives and one from
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote. Then, the JBC En Banc in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001 decided to
allow representatives from the Senate and
House of Representatives one full viote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Neil C. Tups, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. It should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress. Respondent contends that
the phrase “a representative of congress”
refers that both houses of congress should
have one representative each, and that these
that these two houses are permanent and
mandatory components of “congress” as part
of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. ART VIII Sec.
8 of the Constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having
members from the Senate and the House of
Representative s making 8 instead of 7
sitting members to be unconstitutional as
provided in Art. VIII Sec. 8 of the
Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the
Court held that the phrase “a representative
of congress” should be construed as to
having only one representative that would
come from either house, nor both. That the
framers of the Constitution only intended for
one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of congress as
a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government-to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in
the process. The same holds true in
Congress realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however,
cannot be said in the case of JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
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Property right
Chavez vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004
Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction
seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
“Guidelines inthe Implementation of the
Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence” (Guidelines)issued by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a
licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has
been issued,requested the DILG to
reconsider the implementation of the
assailed Guidelines. However, hisrequest
was denied. Thus, he filed the present
petition impleading public respondents
Ebdane, asChief of PNP; Alberto G.
Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry
L. Barias, as Chief of thePNP-Firearms and
Explosives Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit
to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry
firearms is a vested property right
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-
quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first
and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. The
bulk of jurisprudence is that a license
authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property
right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,
we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested
right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement,
we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.”
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted
broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR.
This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize
lawful holders of firearms to carry them
outside of residence.” Following the
American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say
that a PTCFOR does not constitute a
property right protected under our
Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege
to be exercised under existing restrictions,
and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject
to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit
to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure.
Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the
defendant of any property, immunity, or
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privilege within the meaning of these words
in the Declaration of Rights. The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental
Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to
revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere
license by the State is always revocable.”
Constitutional vs. Statutory Due Process
Agabon vs. NLRC (Constitutional Due
Process versus Statutory Due process)
FACTS:
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon were
dismissed for abandonment of work. They
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims. A decision was
rendered by Labor Arbiter declaring the
dismissal illegal and ordered Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc. payment of money
claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter because it found that the
petitioners had abandoned their work, and
were not entitled to backwages and
separation pay. The other money claims
awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also
denied for lack of evidence. The Court of
Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of
the petitioners was not illegal because they
had abandoned their employment but
ordered the payment of money claims.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were
illegally dismissed
RULING:
The Court ruled that the dismissal was legal.
The dismissal was for just cause or
authorized cause but due process was not
observed.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in
the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee
for the violation of his statutory rights.
Hence, the Court ordered payment of
nominal damages to each petitioner for non-
compliance with statutory due process. The
Court further explained due process as
follows:
Due process under the Labor Code,
like Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized causes of employment
termination under the Labor Code; and
procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.
Procedural due process requirements for
dismissal are found in the Implementing
Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines
in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by
Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches
of these due process requirements violate
the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due
process should be differentiated from failure
to comply with constitutional due process.
Constitutional due process protects the
individual from the government and assures
him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory
due process found in the Labor Code and
Implementing Rules protects employees
from being unjustly terminated without just
cause after notice and hearing.
Equal Protection
Garcia vs Drilon
Facts:
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Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim
of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner
failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial
court issued a modified TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an
“axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of
the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality
in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in
failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in
not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the
law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social
institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring
RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible time so that if not raised in
the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it
may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court
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ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore,
RA9262 is based on a valid classification
and did not violate the equal protection
clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the
Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right
to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a
mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the
court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the
laws. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
 not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by
Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty
executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is
denied for lack of merit.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION V. BSP (2004)
G.R. No. 148208, 446 SCRA 299,
December 15, 2004
Doctrines:
1. Elements of valid class legislation: (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class
2. Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a
statute is constitutional at first does not
mean it is constitutional forever. The
subsequent changes in the original
circumstance surrounding the law would
affect its validity.
Facts:
The new Central Bank Act took effect and
gave way for the creation of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. Other Governmental
Financial Institutions (GFIs) also
amended their charters. After almost 8
years following the amendment of the
GFIs’ charters, BSP’s employees, through
petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition
against the BSP and the Executive
Secretary to restrain the respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in
Sec. 15, Art. II of the New Central Bank
Act (i.e., the exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) of all
employees with salary grade of 19 and the
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non-exemption of those having a salary
grade under 19). They alleged its
constitutionality for being an invalid
“class legislation”.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. The said proviso violates equal protection
clause because only the officers of the
BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19
and up) are exempted from the SSL.
2. Those belonging from 19 and up and
those 19 below do not really differ from
one other in terms of the nature of work
and expertise.
3. Other GFIs, which are the same as the
BSP, exempt all their rank-and-file
personnel from SSL without any
distinction.
BSP’s contention:
1. The proviso is not unconstitutional as it
can stand the constitutional test, provided
it is construed in harmony with other
provisions of the same law, such as the
mandate of the Monetary Board to
“establish professionalism and excellence
at all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management.”
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
Executive Secretary:
1. The proviso is not unconstitutional as the
classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of the new SB Act to
establish professionalism and excellence
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws
and policies of the national government.
Issue: WON the proviso is unconstitutional
for being violative of equal protection
clause.
Held:
YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection
clause.
Equal protection clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate – so long as
the classification is not unreasonable.
Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons
themselves, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the
legislative deliberations that the
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above)
from the SSL was intended to address the
BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to
discriminate against the rank-and-file and
the resulting discrimination or distinction
has a rational basis and is not palpably,
purely, and entirely arbitrary in the
legislative sense. However, in the
subsequent passages of the amendment on
the charters of other GFI, the surrounding
circumstances of the case changed.
The subsequent amendments of the other
GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization
to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure, and
explicit exemption – without distinction
as to salary grade or position – all
employees of the GFI from the SSL)
resulted to the oppressive results of
Congress’ inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and
those of the seven other GFI. In the case
at bar, it is precisely the fact that as
regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only
to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied (not
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to mention the anomaly of the SEC
getting one). The distinction made by the
law is not only superficial, but also
arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences
between the BSP rank-and-file and the
seven other GFIs. The subsequent grant to
the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-
file employees of the exemption from
SSL breached the latter’s right to equal
protection.
The equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality but it requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Availability of right to alien
People of the Philippines vs. Chua Ho San
G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
Facts:
Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police
Station of La Union Jim Lagasca Cid began
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers in response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband.
While monitoring the coastal area he
intercepted a radio call from Barangay
Captain Juan Almoite requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat. Cid and six of his men led by his
Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua
proceeded to Tammocalao shores. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then
walked towards the road. By this time,
Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued
side-arms, became suspicious of the man as
he suddenly changed direction and broke
into a run upon seeing the approaching
officers. Badua, however, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although Cid introduced themselves as
police officers, the man appeared impassive.
Speaking in English, Cid then requested the
man to open his bag, but he seem not to
understand. Cid thus tried speaking Tagalog,
then Ilocano, but still to no avail. Cid then
resorted to what he termed “sign language;”
he motioned with his hands for the man to
open the bag. This time, the man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A
search of the bag yielded several transparent
plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. which was later
found out that it was Shabu. Cid then
gestured to the man to close the bag, which
he did. As Cid wished to proceed to the
police station, he signaled the man to follow,
but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence,
Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of
the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. CHUA was initially charged
with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC
convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his
acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused’s arrest is valid.
Held:
No, the arrest of the accused is not valid.
The Court, finds that these do not constitute
“probab|e cause.” None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent
odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place
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where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior and
suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by
this Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. The
term probable cause had been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man’s belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically, with respect to arrests,
it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto,
arrests, a peace officer or a private person
may without a warrant, arrest a person,
when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore,
must have personal knowledge of such facts
or as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated
as incidental to an arrest. While a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested
may be effected to deliver dangerous
weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search
may extend to the area within his immediate
control where he might gain possession of a
weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid
arrest must precede the search. The process
cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made,
the process cannot be reversed.
Saturnino C. Ocampo vs. Hon. Ephrem S.
Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11,
2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON.
EPHREM S. ABANDO G.R. No.
176830 February 11, 2014
Facts
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was
discovered by elements of the Philippine
Army at Leyte. The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of individuals believed to
be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front
of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to
purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
Complainants from relatives of the alleged
victims of Operation VD swore that their
relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were
never seen again.
Also attached to the complaints were the
affidavits of Zacarias Piedad and five others
who narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
According to them, Operation VD was
ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central Committee. Allegedly, petitioners
Saturnino C. Ocampo et. al., were then
members of the Central Committee.
The Prosecutor on case recommended the
filing of an Information for 15 counts of
multiple murder against 54 named members
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of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an
Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the
crime charged." He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary
liberty.
Hence, petitioner filed the special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65,seeking for the annulment of Order
of Judge Abando and the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero. The petition prayed for
the unconditional release of petitioner
Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the
pendency of the petition.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for
rebellion against him and 44 others was then
pending before the RTC Makati, Branch
150. Putting forward the political offense
doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that
common crimes, such as murder in this case,
are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary
means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.
ISSUES
1. Whether petitioners were denied
due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges
against petitioners should be
dismissed under the political offense
doctrine.
RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual
affair." It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense
and anxiety of a public trial. While the right
to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it
is a substantive right and a component of
due process in the administration of criminal
justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation,
the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord
an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the
accusation. Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the allegations
and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that
a crime has been committed, and that it was
the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound
to dismiss the complaint.
In connection with the foregoing and
pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the respondents were issued and
served with Subpoena at their last known
address for them to submit their counter-
affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit
their counter-affidavits because they could
no longer be found in their last known
address, per return of the subpoenas. On the
other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben
Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
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However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required
Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, allows Prosecutor to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before
him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given
an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in place in
order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of
offenses.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts
were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due process.
It was only because a majority of them could
no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies
of the complaint and the attached documents
or evidence.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides that "no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge
Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding
the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested."
Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the
judge after an examination under oath or an
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is
not necessary for the determination
thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal
examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of
issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally
evaluates the prosecutor’s report and
supporting documents showing the existence
of probable cause for the indictment and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no
probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's
resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine,
"common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance
of a political offense, are divested of their
character as "common" offenses and assume
the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty."
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Any ordinary act assumes a different nature
by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public
prosecutors are obliged to consistently
charge respondents with simple rebellion
instead of common crimes. No one disputes
the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal
charges, including whom and what to
charge, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the public prosecutor.
But when the political offense doctrine is
asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine
whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.
The burden of demonstrating political
motivation must be discharged by the
defense, since motive is a state of mind
which only the accused knows. The proof
showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence supporting
his defense. It is not for this Court to
determine this factual matter in the instant
petitions.
Administrative warrants of arrest
QUA CHEE GAN v. DEPORTATION
BOARD
30 September 1963 GR No. L-10280
TOPIC:
“People” as Inhabitants
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance denied the
petition for writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio
L. Galang charged petitioner before the
Deportation Board. The crimes:
•Purchasing $130,000 with license from
Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong
•Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials.
In effect, Deportation Board issued a
warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398,
series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds,
petitioner was temporarily set free.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the President has authority
to deport aliens.
2. Whether or not the Deportation Board
also has authority to file warrants of arrest.
HELD:
1. YES
Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised
Administrative Code – Deportation of
subject to foreign power. — Asubject of a
foreign power residing in the Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded
from said Islands or repatriated to his own
country by the President of the Philippines
EXCEPT UPON PRIOR
INVESTIGATION, conducted by said
Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed
not less than these days for the preparation
of his defense. He shall also have the right to
be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
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witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.”
* In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29,
1936) created the Deportation Board to
conduct investigations.
2. Yes but only after investigation has
resulted to the actual order of deportation.
Arrest would have been necessary for
deportation to take effect. However, in the
case at bar, investigations were still ongoing
and no order for deportation was yet made.
Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951:
declared illegal
Deportation may be effected in 2 ways: 1.
by order of President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
RAC 2. by Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613Crime was an
act profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing
of US dollars.
Knock and Announce Principle
People of the Philippines vs. Huang Zhen
Hua and Jogy Lee
GR 139301, September 29, 2004
Facts: Appellant Lee is
being identified as the lover
of drug trafficker Henry Lao,
both were living together as
husband and wife. Latter was
killed during an encounter
with raiding team of which
found on his possession,
plastic bags containing shabu.
After the encounter, the
policemen proceeded to their
leased condominium unit.
They have asked assistance
of the security guard assigned
in the premises, they
knocked, introduced
 themselves and stated their
purpose. Policemen
commenced with their search
for prohibited drugs and
positively found illegal drugs
and other materials therein.
They have seized the articles
and evidences and arrested
appellants Lee and Hua.
Issue:
Was there a probable
cause on appellant’s arrest
Was there a violation
of constitutional rights
against unreasonable arrest
and seizure
Rulings:
For the appellant Hua:
The prosecutions evidence
fails to meet the quantum of
evidence required to
overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence;
thus, regardless of the
supposed weakness of his
defense, and his innocence
may be doubted, he is
nonetheless entitled to an
acquittal The constitutional
presumption of innocence
guaranteed to every
individual is of primary
importance, and the
conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness
of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence for
the prosecution.
The evidence of the
prosecution against appellant
Zhen Hua falls short of the
requisite quantum of
evidence to prove conspiracy
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 194 | P a g e
between him, appellant Lee
and Chan or Lao.
For the Appellant
Lee: The rule against
unreasonable search and
seizure forbids every search
that is unreasonable; it
protects all those suspected or
known to be offenders, as
well as the innocent. The
guarantee is as important and
imperative as the guarantee
of the other fundamental
rights of the citizens. All
owes the duty for its effective
enforcement lest there shall
be an impairment of the right
for the purpose for which it
was adopted. The
requirement is not a mere
procedural formality but is of
the essence of the substantial
provision which safeguards
individual liberty. It is
sufficient that the accused has
notice of the officers, their
authority and the purpose of
the search and the object to
be seized.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless
detention and arrest of one at the premises
being searched when the facts and
circumstances within their knowledge and of
which they had reliable and trustworthy
information are sufficient to themselves
warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious
person that an offense has been or is being
committed.
Search incidental to a lawful arrest
PEOPLE vs. NOEL TUDTUD AND
DINDO BOLONG
G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003 The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction,
applied with a degree of consistency, is that,
Facts: a reliable information alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the
Solier informed the police that Tudtud items seized were held inadmissible, having
would come back with new stocks of been obtained in violation of the accused’s
marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted constitutional rights against unreasonable
from the bus, helping each other carry a searches and seizures.
carton/box, one of them fitted the
description of Tudtud. They approached the
two and Tudtud denied that he carried any
drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath
dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped
in a plastic bag and another in newspapers.
Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages and contained what seemed to the
police as marijuana leaves. The two did not
resist the arrest. Charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded
not guilty and interposed the defense that
they were framed up. The trial court
convicted them with the crime charged and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
Whether or not searches and seizures
without warrant may be validly obtained.

Held:
The rule is that a search and seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise
such “search and seizure” becomes
unreasonable within the meaning of the
constitutional provision, and any evidence
secured thereby will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Except in the following instances: (1)
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest, (2) Search in evidence in plain view,
(3) Search of a moving vehicle, (4)
Consented warrantless search, (5) Customs
search, (6) Stop and frisk and (7) Exigent
and emergency circumstances.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 195 | P a g e

Stop-and-frisk Search
MALACAT V. CA G.R. No. 123595.
December 12, 1997
FACTS:
In response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Police officer Yu was on
foot patrol with three other police officers
(all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo,Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted on opposite sides
of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with their eyes moving very
fast.
Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about thirty minutes. They
then approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions. As the
policemen chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended the petitioner. Upon searching,
Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked
inside petitioners front waistline.
The trial court convicted the
petitioner. It ruled that the warrantless
search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a
“stop and frisk”, where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest and whose
object is either to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks
to obtain more information. Probable cause
was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the
situation called for an investigation, hence to
require probable cause would have been
premature.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 196 | P a g e
Furthermore, the trial court ruled
that the seizure of the grenade from
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest,
and since petitioner later voluntarily
admitted such fact to the police investigator
for the purpose of bombing the Mercury
Drug Store, concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether thre was a valid search.
HELD:
The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures refer to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions which are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as regards to
Arrest.xxx
Turning to valid warrantless
searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court
validated the warrantless search as a stop
and frisk with the seizure of the grenade
from the accused as an appropriate incident
to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief
discussion on the nature of these exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
 The Trial court confused the
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These
two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in
their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality
of the arrest is questioned in a large majority
of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made -- the process cannot
be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destroy, and seize any money
or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
Here, there could have been no
valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of
the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly,
the search conducted on petitioner could
not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 197 | P a g e
Customs search –
1. Papa vs. Mago, No. L-27360, February
28, 1968
PAPA VS. MAGO
Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that
were seized, when the truck transporting the
goods was intercepted by the BOC,
questioned the validity of the search
conducted by them since it was made
without any search warrant and whether the
BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited
goods.
Issue: Was the search conducted by the
BOC valid?
Held:
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs
Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, or envelope or any person
on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of
the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search
of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for
customs officers not only to board and
search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop,
search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person on which or whom they should
suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced
into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in
charge of the vehicle or beast or
otherwise, and if they should find any
goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe
had been so unlawfully brought into the
country, to seize and secure the same, and
the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and
forfeiture.
Searches at checkpoints
People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, January
28, 2000
Facts:
 On April 5, 1996, due to election gun
ban, law enforcers of Makati Police
District were manning a check point
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 198 | P a g e
at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat
Avenue and the South Luzon
Expressway. They were checking the
cars going to Pasay City, stopping
those they found suspicious and
imposing merely a running stop on
the others. At about midnight they
stopped the accused- appellants’ car.
PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the
lap of Virgilio Usana seated at the
passenger’s seat. Accused Escano
were also seized of a .45 caliber
firearm. While they were brought at
the police station, accused Usana,
Escano and Lopez were seized of a
bag HASHISH, a prohibited drug,
when Escano agreed and opened the
compartment of his car as the
officers were suspicious of the car
where they boarded.
 Accused-appellants Usana and
Lopez filed their notice of appeal on
the following arguments:
1. The trial court erred in admitting in
evidence the hashish seized without
search warrant when the police
officers already had the opportunity
to secure a search warrant before
searching the bag found at the
baggage compartment at the back of
the car;
2. Assuming that the hashish is
admissible in evidence, the trial court
erred in finding appellants to have
conspired with Escano in
transporting the hashish when the
evidence clearly shows that the
hashish was owned and possessed
solely by Escano;
3. The trial court erred in convicting
appellants of illegal possession of
hashish despite the fact that they
were neither in actual nor
 constructive possession of the illegal
drug;
4. Accused-appellants also assail the
manner by which the checkpoint in
question was conducted.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the checkpoint
should have been announce;
b. Whether or not it was conducted in
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
Ruling:
 Accused-appellants were acquitted.
 Checkpoint conducted in this case is
legal but the accused were acquitted
on the following reason:
1. The car belong to Escano;
2. The trunk of the car was not
opened soon after it was
stopped until the police
station;
3. The car was driven by
policeman from the place
where it was stopped until
police station;
4. The car’s trunk was opened
with the permission of
Escano, without presence of
Usana and Lopez; and
5. After arrival at the police
station and until the opening
of the car’s trunk, the car was
in possession and control of
the oolice authorities.
 For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants nor its
occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routines checks cannot be
disregarded as violative of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 199 | P a g e
individual’s right against
unreasonable search.
Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which
are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude,
to a certain extent, on motorist right to “free
passage without interruption”, but it cannot
be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a
brief detention of travelers during which the
vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a
brief question or two.
Searches and Seizures
People v. De Gracia (1994) G.R. No.
102009, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994
Doctrine:
Where the military operatives had
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was being committed, and had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts, the same
constituted an exception to the prohibition
against warrantless searches.
Facts:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-
Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
staged coup d’état in December 1989 against
the Government. Efren Soria of Intelligence
Division, NCR Defense Command, together
with his team, conducted a surveillance of
the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on
early morning of December 1, 1989, which
surveillance actually started November 30,
1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance
was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report that the said establishment was being
occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP
as communication command post. Near the
Eurocar office, there were crowd watching
the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves and walked towards
their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the
driver to start the car and leave the area.
However, as they passed the area, then 5
men drew their guns and fired at them,
which resulted to the wounding of the
driver. Nobody in the surveillance team
retaliated for they were afraid that civilians
might be caught in the crossfire.
Thereafter, on the morning of December 5,
1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales
Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites,
M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.
Obenia, who first entered the establishment,
found De Gracia in the office of a certain
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping though door. No search
warrant was secured by the raiding team
because, according to them, there was so
much disorder considering that the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by
the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search and
seizure in this case.
Held:
YES, there was a valid search and seizure in
this case.
It is admitted that the raiding team was not
armed with a search warrant at that time. It
was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 200 | P a g e
there was a surveillance conducted on the
premises wherein the surveillance team was
fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants
thereof refused to open the door despite
requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the
office.
The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a
gun store and it is definitely not an armory
or arsenal which are the usual depositories
for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained.
In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter,
the building and houses therein were
deserted.
Under circumstances, SC considered that the
instant case falls under one of the exceptions
to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, in the prevailing
situation, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court
was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.
Search by private persons
People Vs. Marti
193 SCRA 57
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
Facts: Andre Marti and his wife Shirley
wanted to send packages to their friend in
Switzerland and contracted the services of
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
When asked by the forwarder if they could
examine and inspect the packages, Marti
refused, assuring that the packages simply
contained books and cigars.However, the
proprietor opened the boxes for final
inspection as part of their SOP. Upon
opening, they suspected that the contents
were illegal drugs.The proprietor reported
the incident to NBI which confirmed that the
suspected content were marijuana. In the
presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were
opened and found dried marijuana leaves
inside. After Marti was traced by NBI, he
was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Marti assailed the admissibility
of the drugs as evidence against him, which,
according to him, is obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
Issue: May an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, be invoked against
the State?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in the
absence of governmental interference, the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 201 | P a g e
liberties granted by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.The
constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government.Its protection is
directed only to governmental action.This
right do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private
citizen. In this case, the evidence was
primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention of State
authorities. Therefore, there is no reason
why it should not be admitted to prosecute
him. Marti, however, alleged that the NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of
the evidence. The Court pointed out
that: a) It was the proprietor who made a
reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected into a
warrantless search and seizure. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Marti further argued
that since the Constitution expressly
declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and
seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private
individuals. The Court answered that the
Constitution, in laying down the principles
of the government and fundamental liberties
of the people, does not govern relationships
between individuals.
PEOPLE v. MOLINA
GR No. 133917; Feb 19, 2001
Accused were charged and found guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
for having in their possession 946.9 grams
of marijuana and were sentenced to death.
HELD:
NO. Accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad,
accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit, or have
committed a crime. There was no probable
cause in arresting the accused thus making
the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was
illegal, so was the search made by the police
officers. This being the case, the evidence is
inadmissible and the accused are found not
guilty of the alleged offense.
Arrest in hot pursuit
G.R. No. 182601 November 10,
2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT
MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES,
JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION : BRION, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder. Petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that there was
no valid warrantless took place. The RTC
denied the motion and the CA affirmed the
denial.
Records show that an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Moreno Generoso. The latter called the
Central Police District to report the incident
and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 202 | P a g e
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of
the crime and render assistance. SPO2,
together with augmentation personnel
arrived at the scene of the crime less than
one hour after the alleged altercation and
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty.
Generoso then pointed the petitioners as
those who mauled him which prompted the
police officers to “invite” the petitioners to
go to the police station for investigation. At
the inquest proceeding,the City Prosecutor
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon who
fortunately survived the attack. Petitioners
aver that they were not validly arrested
without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioners
were validly arrested without warrant
considering the police officers did not
witness the crime and arrived only less than
an hour after the alleged altercation?
HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly
arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that: When an offense
has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it. The
elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
first, an offense has just been committed;
and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it. The
Court's appreciation of the elements that
"the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. The element of
''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances", however, under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
Circumstances may pertain to events or
actions within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the
police officer at the scene of the crime.
Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still
make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at
the scene of the crime, he could determine
the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime.
The records show that soon after the
report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the
arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact
alone negates the petitioners' argument that
the police officers did not have personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed
- the police immediately responded and had
personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a
crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require
actual presence at the scene while a crime
was being committed; it is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime.
Concept of Informational Privacy
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 203 | P a g e
Mendoza,J.
FACTS:
On March 21, 1982, Cecilia Zulueta
entered the clinic of her husband, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, in the presence of some
family members of the latter and staff of the
said clinic, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet. She took documents including
photos and passport of her husband’s alleged
paramours.
The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
The Regional Trial Court ruled for
Dr. Martin and ordered the return of the
properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the items seized by Zulueta
are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
The documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication
and correspondence (to be) inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband’s infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition of the Constitution is if there is a
“lawful order (from a) court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law”. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding”.
 The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or her.
The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is
a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing
to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.
The petition is denied for lack of
merit.
Anti-wiretapping Act (RA 4200
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 110662
Aspect covered by the digest: Privacy of
Communication and Correspondence
Justice Padilla:
Facts:
The private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed
a complaint before the RTC for annulment
of marriage against petitioner Teresota
Salcedo-Ortanez on the grounds of lack of
marriage license and psychological
incapacity. The private respondent offered in
evidence three cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner
and unidentified persons. The petitioner
objected, but the trial court admitted all of
private respondent’s evidence. The
petitioner challenged the admissibility of the
evidence by filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the CA. However, CA
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 204 | P a g e
ruled in favor of the admission stating that:
“Tape recordings are not inadmissible per
se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes'
depending on how they are presented and
ordered and on how the trial utilizes them in
the interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice.”
Issue:
Whether or not the tapes containing
conversations of the petitioner admissible in
court .
Ruling:
The subject cassette tapes are declared
inadmissible in evidence. Ratio decidendi:
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. The relevant
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as
follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described;
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word,
or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Digester’s note:
The full text of the foregoing case does not
cite the Constitutional provision pertinent to
the violated right under Art. III, Section III
and cited relevant Special Penal Law
instead. This may be because the case was a
resolution to a challenged interlocutory
order of admission; and the court wanted to
be as succinct as possible.
At any rate, Art. III, Section III states:
1. The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Anti-wiretapping Act (RA 4200
NAVARRO vs. CA
Facts: Two local media men, Stanley
Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City
wnet to the police station to report alledged
indecent show in one of the night
establishment shows in the City. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed
between victim Lingan and accused
policeman Navarro who was then having
drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a
fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle
of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow,
followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim
to fell and died under treatment. The
exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made
by Navarro after the altercation that it was
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the victim who provoked the fight. During
the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man,
testified. Presented in evidence to confirm
his testimony was a voice recording he had
made of the heated discussion at the police
station between the accused police officer
Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which
was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the voice
recording is admissible in evidence in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits wiretapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances
of sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party and lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong may
be appreciated in favor of the accused.
Held: 1. Yes, the tape is admissible in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping. Jalbuena's testimony is
confirmed by the voice recording he had
made.
The law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Court of
Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which
immediately preceded the acts of the
accused, constituted sufficient provocation.
Provocation is said to be any unjust or
improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, annoying or irritating
someone. The provocation must be
sufficient and must immediately precede the
act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the
wrong, which must be accordingly
proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong must also be considered.
The exclamations made by Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him
showed that he had no intent to kill the
latter.
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Capt. Garry Alejano, et al. vs.
Gen. Pedro Cabuay, et al., GR No. 160792,
August 25, 2005
G.R. No. 160792 ALEJANO v. CABUAY,
August 25, 2005
FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major
Service Commanders to take into custody
the military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which
required respondents to make a return of the
writ and to appear and produce the persons
of the detainees before the CA. CA
dismissed the petition because the detainees
are already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas
corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees’ confinement is under a valid
indictment.
ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of
habeas corpus?
HELD: The duty to hear the petition for
habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the
remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the
inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal,
the court orders the release of the person. If,
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however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus
very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither
can it substitute for an appeal.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs. Capulong,
160 SCRA 861 (1988)
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs.
CAPULONG
G.R. NO. L-82380
April 29, 1988
FACTS:
Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case
against private petitioners for the production
and filming of the projected motion picture
“The Four Day Revolution,” which relates
to the non-bloody change of government
that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful
intrusion upon the former’s right to privacy.
Petitioners contends that the freedom
to produce and film includes in the freedom
of speech and expression; and the subject
matter of the motion picture is one of public
interest and concern and not on the
individual private life of respondent senator.
ISSUE:
WON the projected motion picture is
guaranteed under the right to free speech.
RULING:
Yes. The EDSA revolution where
private respondent is a major character is
one of public interest. Private respondent is
a public figure due to his participation in the
culmination of the change of government.
The right of privacy of the a “public figure”
is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen.

Government-issued Computer?
Pollo v. David, GR No. 181881, October 18,
2011
Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo vs. Chairperson
Karina Constantino-David, et. al., [G.R.
No. 181881, October 18, 2011] 675 Phil.
225.
FACTS:
Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo (the “Petitioner”)
is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist
of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also
the Officer-in-Charge of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na" (“Mamamayan Muna”)
program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-
complaint addressed to respondent Civil
Service Commission Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David (the “Chairperson
David”), marked as "Confidential" and was
received by the Integrated Records
Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC
Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked "Confidential" are
left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given
directly to Chairperson David. The team
proceeded to CSC and informed the officials
of the CSC-ROIV Director IV Lydia
Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III
Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of
Chairperson David's directive.
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The backing-up of all files in the hard disk
of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors
Castillo and Unite who closely monitored
said activity.
After evaluation, Chairperson David
observed that the foregoing files obtained
from the backing up of files are mostly
drafts of legal pleadings or documents,
which ar4e related or connected with
administrative cases pending either in
CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-
Central Office or other tribunals, and an
inclusion of one (1) which is insinuating
collection of fees. The Chairperson
presumed that the Petitioner is the one
responsible or had a hand in their drafting or
preparation considering that the foregoing
draft pleadings were obtained from the
computer assigned to the Petitioner.
Petitioner denied through his Comment that
he is the person referred to in the subject
anonymous letter-complaint, considering
that he is not a lawyer that could do
lawyering for people with cases in the CSC,
and accused CSC officials of conducting a
"fishing expedition" when they unlawfully
copied and printed personal files in his
computer, and subsequently asking him to
submit his comment which violated his right
against self-incrimination.
The CSC found a prima facie case against
the Petitioner, charging him with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). On July 24, 2007
the CSC found the Petitioner GUILTY of
the same merits and meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service with all
accessory penalties through Resolution No.
071420. A Motion for Reconsideration was
filed but the same was denied.
The Resolution was elevated to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari,
which was DENIED (the “CA”) through a
Decision dated October 2007, the CA
dismissed the Petitioner’s Petition for
Certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by Respondents CSC
officials. The Motion having been denied by
the CA, the Petitioner brought the appeal
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER’S
OFFICE COMPUTER AND THE
COPYING OF HIS PERSONAL FILES
WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT ARE TRANSGRESSION ON
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY; AND
II
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WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL
COURT AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED ERRORS OF
LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
BOTH RENDERED JUDGMENT
AFFIRMING AND FAVORING THE
ACTION OF THE RESPONDENTS
FROM THE BACKING UP OF FILES
TAKEN FROM THE PETITIONER’S
COMPUTER IN THE OFFICE.
HELD:
The Supreme Court finds that the Petitioner
failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in
his office or government issued and/or
assigned computer, containing his personal
files.
Moreover, SC emphasized that even
assuming arguendo, in the absence of
allegation or proof of the aforementioned
factual circumstances, that petitioner had at
least a subjective expectation of privacy in
his computer as he claims, such is negated
by the presence of policy regulating the use
of office computers, as in Simons (an
American Case). In fact, the Office
Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer
Use Policy (the “CUP”) explicitly provides,
that: a) the Computer Resources are the
property of the Civil Service Commission
and may be used only for legitimate
business purposes; 2) users shall be
permitted access to Computer Resources to
assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs; 3) use of the Computer
Resources is a privilege that may be revoked To sum up, Petitioner’s claim of violation of
his constitutional right to privacy necessarily
at any given time; 4) no expectation of
failed.
privacy; and 5) Waiver of privacy rights and
for non-exclusivity of computer resources
and users must understand that the CSC
may use human or automated means to The CSC correctly found the Petitioner
monitor the use of its Computer Resources. guilty of the charges and dismissing him
from the service.
SC explained that the right to privacy has
been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected Well-settled is the rule that the findings of
by the guarantee against unreasonable fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC,
search and seizure under Section 2, Article are accorded not only respect but even
III of the 1987 Constitution.1 finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Thus, on the reasonableness of the search
conducted on Petitioner’s computer, the
Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion
emphasizing that the constitutional was committed by the CA in affirming the
guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches CSC's ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave
and seizures but only of "unreasonable" misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial
searches and seizures. Similarly, the search to the best interest of the service, and
conducted was justified at its inception and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of
scope quoting American case of O’ Connor. these offenses justified the imposition on
petitioner of the ultimate penalty of
dismissal with all its accessory penalties,
pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
In the case of the Petitioner, the act of
lawyering for parties having pending cases
with the regional office or the commission,
the nature of the imputation was serious, as WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
it was grievously disturbing. certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated
1 Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after CCTVs? Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, G.R.
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly No. 179736, 26 June 2013
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

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SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA
HING, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY,
SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
On August 23, 2005, spouses Bill and
Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages with
prayer for issuance of a Writ ofof
Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), against respondents Alexander
Choachuy and Allan Choachuy.
That, in order to get evidence to support
the said case, respondents on June 13,
2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two
video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners’ property; that respondents,
through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction; and that
the acts of respondents violate petitioners’
right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed
that respondents be ordered to remove the
video surveillance cameras and enjoined
from conducting illegal surveillance.

Petitioners alleged that they are the

ISSUE
registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot
1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of W/NOT there is a violation of petitioner’s
Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay right to privacy.
Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; that
respondents are the owners of Aldo RULING:
Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo)
The right to privacy is the right to be let
located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to
alone.
the property of petitioners; that respondents
constructed an auto-repair shop building The right to privacy is enshrined in our
(Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C. Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as
“the right to be free from unwarranted
That in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against
exploitation of one’s person or from
petitioners for Injunction and Damages with
intrusion into one’s private activities in such
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125; that
ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an
in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners
individual “to be free from unwarranted
were constructing a fence without a valid
publicity, or to live without unwarranted
permit and that the said construction would
interference by the public in matters in
destroy the wall of its building, which is
which the public is not necessarily
adjacent to petitioners’ property; that the
concerned.” Simply put the right to privacy
court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application
is “the right to be let alone.”
for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s
right to privacy and protects them against

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the State’s abuse of power. In this regard,
the State recognizes the right of the people
to be secure in their houses. No one, not
even the State, except “in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in
the privacy of their homes.
The “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test is used to determine whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation
of the right to privacy, courts use the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.
This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated
that “the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs,
community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individual’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hence
the reasonableness of a person’s expectation
of privacy must be determined on case to
case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere
for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy,
unless the consent of the individual, whose
right to privacy would be affected, was
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obtained. Nor should these cameras be used
to pry into the privacy of another’s residence
or business office as it would be no different
from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
Petitioners have a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” in their property, whether they
use it as a business office or as a residence
and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property
or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of
their right to privacy.
Online Social Networks? Vivares vs. St.
Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666,
September 29, 2014
RHODORA AVE VIVAREZ & SPS.
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA
versus ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE,
ESCUDERO
GR. NO. 202666, September 29, 2014
FACTS:
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and
Julienne V. Suzara (Julienne) were both
minors and graduating students of St.
Therese’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in 2012, while Julia, Julienne and
other were attending an beach party, they
took photos of themselves in their
undergarments. These digital pictures were
uploaded by Angela Tan in her Facebook
profile.
 Back at school Escudero learned
from her students about the posted pictures.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s
students logged in to their respective
facebook accounts and showed her photos of
their students. Upon discovery, Escudero
reported the matter to STC’s Discipline- In-
Charge for appropriate action using one of
her student’s Facebook page.
On March 2012, these students were
castigated by the principal and further
informed their parents that they are barred
from joining the commencement exercises
on March 30, 2012.
Petitioner Tan filed Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against St. Therese’s
College et.al. RTC issued the Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) to which STC filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. Despite
issuance of TRO, STC barred the girls from
joining.
Thereafter petitioner filed before the
RTC Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Data.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data
should be issued. Whether or not the there is
an actual or threatened violation of the
minor’s rights to life, liberty and security.
RULING:
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There is no merit in the petition.
Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy
available to any person whose privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or by a private
individual or entity engaged in gathering,
collecting of storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. The
writ, will not issue on the basis merely of
alleged violation. Availment of the writ
requires the existence of the right to privacy
and the showing of by at least substantial
evidence of the violation of such right.
Without these, the habeas data petition will
not prosper.
The Supreme Court held that STC
did not violate the petitioner’s minors
daughter’s right to privacy as the subject
digital photos were viewable either by the
minor’s Facebook friends of the public at
large. Not one of the petitioners disputed the
sworn account of Escudero that her students
showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This shows that no
special means are needed to be able to show
a view the photos. Considering that the
default settling for Facebook posts is
“Public”, it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioner’s children positively limited the
disclosure of the photographs. If such were
the case, they cannot invoke the protection
attached to the right to informational
privacy.
 Hence, the petition for issuance of
Habeas data be denied.
Freedom from censorship or prior restraint
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED
BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21,
2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to
political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners
posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′)
in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known
as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
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while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the
tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded
that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation
and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners
violated the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies as the
case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may
regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice
and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the
tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of
petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its
message are considered religious
speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
 The Court ruled that the present
case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court
through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution..
The concept of a political question
never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to
choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our
jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-
justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits.
A political question will not be
considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the
official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights
gives the utmost deference to the right to
free speech. Any instance that this right may
be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It
does not fall squarely into any doubt that a
political question brings.
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SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite
that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch
or in this case, organ of government before a
court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right
to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is
already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’
speech.
In the context of this case,
exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution,
laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate
the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of
the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s
expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s
argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the
RH Law and rejecting those who voted for
it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the
tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear
that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political
speech
Political speech refers to speech “both
intended and received as a contribution to
public deliberation about some issue,”
“fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or
censorship refers to restrictions “based on
the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 215 | P a g e
regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place,
or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation
involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must
be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’”
“Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present
danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state
to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though
the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public,
the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property
is likewise protected by the Constitution.
 Any regulation, therefore, which
operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights
is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held
that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is “so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process
of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church
doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of
a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates
on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically into account
not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore
is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 216 | P a g e
exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.
State regulation of mass media
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs.
COMELEC, GR No. 133486, January 28,
2000
ABS-CBN BROADCATING
CORPORATION, petitioner vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000. 323
SCRA 811.
Facts: The Resolution was issued by the
COMELEC allegedly upon information
from a reliable source that ABS-CBN Lopez
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to
conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to make en exist survey of the vote
during the elections for the national officials
particularly for the President and vice
President , results of which shall be (broad
cast }immediately. The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict
with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for the Free Elections
NAMFREL . It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-
CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On the May 09, 1998, this Court issued the
Temporary Restaining Order prayed for by
petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease
and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by the media
without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE; Whether or not the Respondent
Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of
restraining order enjoining the petitioner or
any other group it agents or representatives
from conducting exit polls during the May
11 ,1998 elections.
Held; The freedom of expression is a
fundamental principle of our democratic
government. It is a preferred right and,
therefore, stands on the higher level than
substantive economic or other liberites, this
must be so because the lessons of history,
both political and legal, illustrate that
freedom of thought and speech is the
indispensable condition of nearly every
other form freedom.
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Our Constitution clearly mandates that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or express. In the landmark case,
Gonzales v. Comelec, this court enunciated
that at the very least, free speech and a free
press consist of the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of Expression is a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment of
attaining the truth, of securing participation
by the people in social and political
decision- making and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change. It
represents a profound commitment to the
principle that debates on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open. It means more than the right to
approve existing climate of opinion
measures, or to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent
State regulation of mass media
Case: GMA NETWORK, INC., vs.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
205357, September 2, 2014
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before
the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of
one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowablebroadcast time violates freedom
of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forth coming
elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an
“aggregate total” airtime instead of the
previous “per station” airtime for political
campaigns or advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates’ television and radio guestings
and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
on airtimelimits violates freedom of
expression, of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
YES. The Court held that the
assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling
the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties
to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a
clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and
whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that
the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 218 | P a g e
and dialects spoken among the citizens across
the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through
his advertisements in languages
and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political
speech.
Assembly and petition
In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc
Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC
Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency
in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621,
Sept. 29, 1998
FACTS:
The Office of the Mayor of Las
Pinas refused to issue permit to petitioners
to hold rally a rally in front of the Justice
Hall of Las Pinas on the ground that it was
prohibited under Supreme Court En Banc
Resolution dated July 7,1998 in A.M. No.
98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the
Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies
and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity
of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts."
Petitioners thus initiated the instant
proceedings.
ISSUE:
That the Supreme Court gravely
abused its discretion and/or acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in promulgating
those guidelines.
Held:
We shall first dwell on the critical
argument made by petitioners that the rules
constitute an abridgment of the people's
aggregate rights of free speech, free
expression, peaceful assembly and
petitioning government for redress of
grievances citing Sec. 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution that "no law shall be
passed abridging" them. It is true that the
safeguarding of the people's freedom of
expression to the end that individuals may
speak as they think on matters vital to them
and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the processes of education and discussion, is
essential to free government. But freedom of
speech and expression despite its
indispensability has its limitations. It has
never been understood as the absolute right
to speak whenever, however, and wherever
one pleases, for the manner, place, and time
of public discussion can be constitutionally
controlled. [T]he better policy is not liberty
untamed but liberty regulated by law where
every freedom is exercised in accordance
with law and with due regard for the rights
of others. Conventional wisdom tells us that
the realities of life in a complex society
preclude an absolutist interpretation of
freedom of expression where it does not
involve pure speech but speech plus physical
actions like picketing. There are other
significant societal values that must be
accommodated and when they clash, they
must all be weighed with the promotion of
the general welfare of the people as the
ultimate objective. In balancing these
values, this Court has accorded freedom of
expression a preferred position in light of its
more comparative importance. Hence, our
rulings now musty in years hold that only
the narrowest time, place and manner
regulations that are specifically tailored to
serve an important governmental interest
may justify the application of the balancing
of interests test in derogation of the people's
right of free speech and expression. Where
said regulations do not aim particularly at
the evils within the allowable areas of state
control but, on the contrary, sweep within
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 219 | P a g e
their ambit other activities as to operate as
an overhanging threat to free discussion, or
where upon their face they are so vague,
indefinite, or inexact as to permit
punishment of the fair use of the right of
free speech, such regulations are void.
Prescinding from this premise, the Court
reiterates that judicial independence and the
fair and orderly administration of justice
constitute paramount governmental interests
that can justify the regulation of the public's
right of free speech and peaceful assembly
in the vicinity of courthouses. In the case of
In Re: Emil P. Jurado, the Court pronounced
in no uncertain terms that: "x x x freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements
of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. x x x"
(In Re: Emil P. Jurado, 243 SCRA 299, 323-
324 [1995])
It is sadly observed that judicial
independence and the orderly administration
of justice have been threatened not only by
contemptuous acts inside, but also by
irascible demonstrations outside, the
courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly,
spoil the ideal of sober, non-partisan
proceedings before a cold and neutral judge.
Even in the United States, a prohibition
against picketing and demonstrating in or
near courthouses, has been ruled as valid
and constitutional notwithstanding its
limiting effect on the exercise by the public
of their liberties. X x x. The administration
of justice must not only be fair but must also
appear to be fair and it is the duty of this
Court to eliminate everything that will
diminish if not destroy this judicial
desideratum. To be sure, there will be
grievances against our justice system for
there can be no perfect system of justice but
these grievances must be ventilated through
appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings. Such a mode is in keeping with
the respect due to the courts as vessels of
justice and is necessary if judges are to
dispose their business in a fair fashion. It is
the traditional conviction of every civilized
society that courts must be insulated from
every extraneous influence in their
decisions. The facts of a case should be
determined upon evidence produced in
court, and should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.
Free exercise clause
i. Dual aspect
Dominador L. Taruc, et al. vs. Bishop
Porfirio dela Cruz. GR No. 144801,
March 10, 2005
DOMINADOR TARUC VS DELA CRUZ
(GR#144801 MARCH 10, 2005)
FACTS:
The antecedents show that petitioners
were lay members of the Philippine
Independent Church(PIC) IN Socorro,
Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de
la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the
bishops and parish priest, respectively, of
the same church of that locality. Petitioners,
led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the
transfer of Fr. Florano for another parish but
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 220 | P a g e
Bishop de la Cruz denied the request. It
appears from the records that the family of
Florano’s wife belonged to a political party
opposed to the petitioner Taruc’s, thus the
animosity between the two factions with Fr.
Florano being identified with his political
camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found
this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr.
Florano to another parish Taruc tried to
organize an open mass to be celebrated by a
certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the
town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc
informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the
Bishop tried to dissuade him for pushing
through with it because Fr. Ambong was not
a member of the clergy of the diocese of
Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest
were in doubt. On June 28, 1993, Bishop de
la Cruz declared petitioners
expelled/excommunicated from the (PIC).
Because of the order, petitioner filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before
the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and
one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they
conspired with the Bishop to have petitioner
expelled and excommunicated from the
(PIC). They contended that their expulsion
was illegal because it was done without trial
thus violating their right to due process of
law.
ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction.
HELD: The SC held that the Church and
the State to be separate and distinct from
each other. “ Give to Ceasar what is
Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s”, upon
examination of the decision it will be readily
apparent that cases involving questions
relative to ecclesiastical rights have always
received the profoundest attention from the
courts, not only because of their inherent
interest, but because of the far reaching
effects of the decisions in human society.

Courts have learned the lesson of
conservatism in dealing with such matters, it
having been found that, in a form of
government where the complete separation
of civil and ecclesiastical authority is
insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of
an ecclesiastical nature. The SC agreed with
the CA that the expulsion/excommunication
of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter left to the
discretion of the officials, and the laws and
canons, of said institution/organization.
The amendments of the constitution,
restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged
by appellant, having to do with faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church and having reference to the power of
excluding from the church those allegedly
unworthy of membership, are
unquestionable ecclesiastical matters are
outside the province of the civil courts.
Limitations of Liberty of abode
i. Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil
595 (1950)
G.R. No. 27484 September 1, 1927
ANGEL LORENZO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF
HEALTH, respondent-appelle.
MALCOLM, J.:
Petitioners alleged that he is a leper.
However, he contends that his confinement
in the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of
Manila was in violation of his constitutional
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 221 | P a g e
rights because according to him, leprosy is
not an infectious disease and it is curable.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner’s contention is
tenable.
Article XV of chapter 37 of the
Administrative Code. Codal section 1058
empowers the Director of Health and his
authorized agents "to cause to be
apprehended, and detained, isolated, or
confined, all leprous persons in the
Philippine Islands.
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code
was enacted by the legislative body in the
legitimate exercise of the police power
which extends to the preservation of the
public health. It was place on the statute
books in recognition of leprosy as a grave
health problem. The methods provided for
the control of leprosy plainly constitute due
process of law. The assumption must be that
if evidence was required to establish the
necessity for the law, that it was before the
legislature when the act was passed. In the
case of a statute purporting the have been
enacted in the interest of the public health,
all questions relating to the determination of
matters of fact are for the legislature. If there
is probable basis for sustaining the
conclusion reached, its findings are not
subject to judicial review. Debatable
questions are for the Legislature to decide.
The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories.
Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
leprosy is commonly believed to be an
infectious disease tending to cause one
afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded
from society, and that compulsory
segregation of lepers as a means of
preventing the spread of the disease of
supported by high scientific authority (See
Osler and McCrea, The Principles and
Practice of Medicine, 9th ed., p. 153.) Upon
this view, laws for the segregation of lepers
have been provided the world over.
Similarly, the local legislature has regarded
leprosy as a contagious disease and has
authorized measures to control the dread
scourge. To that forum must the petitioner
go to reopen the question. We are frank to
say that it would require a much stronger
case than the one at bar for us to sanction
admitting the testimony of expert or other
witnesses to show that a law of this
character may possibly violate some
constitutional provision.
Other statutory and inherent limitations
OCA-OAS vs. Heusdens Dec 13, 2011
678 Phil. 328
This case stemmed from the leave
application for foreign travel sent through
mail by Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens
(respondent), Staff Clerk IV of the MTCC,
Tagum City, Davao del Norte.
On July 10, 2009, the Employees Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
received respondent's leave application for
foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to
October 11, 2009. Respondent left for
abroad without waiting for the result of her
application. It turned out that no travel
authority was issued in her favor because
she was not cleared of all her
accountabilities as evidenced by the
Supreme Court Certificate of Clearance.
Accordingly, in a letter dated January 6,
2010, OCA Deputy Court Administrator
Nimfa C. Vilches informed respondent that
her leave application was disapproved and
her travel was considered unauthorized. The
OCA found respondent to have violated
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for failing to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 222 | P a g e
secure the approval of her application for
travel authority.
In this case, respondent knew that she had to
secure the appropriate clearance as to money
and property accountability to support her
application for travel authority. She cannot
feign ignorance of this requirement because
she had her application for clearance
circulated through the various divisions.
She, however, failed to secure clearance
from the Supreme Court Savings and Loan
Association (SCSLA) where she had an
outstanding loan. Although respondent
submitted her leave application for foreign
travel, she failed to comply with the
clearance and accountability
requirements. Thus, her leaving the country,
without first awaiting the approval or non-
approval of her application to travel abroad
from the OCA, was violative of the rules.
On the Constitutional Right to Travel
It has been argued that OCA Circular No.
49-2003 (B) on vacation leave to be spent
abroad unduly restricts a citizen's right to
travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.[10] Section 6 reads:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
[Emphases supplied]
The Court recognizes a citizen's
constitutional right to travel. It is, however,
not the issue in this case. The only issue in
this case is the non-compliance with the
Court's rules and regulations. It should be
noted that respondent, in her Comment, did
not raise any constitutional concerns.
Granting that it is an issue, the exercise of
one's right to travel or the freedom to move
from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to
travel. Section 6 itself provides that "neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided
by law." Some of these statutory limitations
are the following:
1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372.
2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or
R.A. No. 8239.
3] The "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003" or R.A. No. 9208.
4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022.
5] The Act on Violence against Women and
Children or R.A. No. 9262.
6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or
R.A. No. 8043.
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are
those that naturally emanate from the
source. These are very basic and are built-in
with the power. An example of such
inherent limitation is the power of the trial
courts to prohibit persons charged with a
crime to leave the country. In such a case,
permission of the court is
necessary. Another is the inherent power of
the legislative department to conduct a
congressional inquiry in aid of
legislation. In the exercise of legislative
inquiry, Congress has the power to issue a
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a
witness in any part of the country, signed by
the chairperson or acting chairperson and the
Speaker or acting Speaker of the House; or
in the case of the Senate, signed by its
Chairman or in his absence by the Acting
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Chairman, and approved by the Senate
President.
Supreme Court has administrative
supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof
Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the "Supreme
Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof."
This provision empowers the Court to
oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts
and personnel under it. Recognizing this
mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of
the Office of the President, dated July 31,
1986,[16] considers the Supreme Court
exempt and with authority to promulgate its
own rules and regulations on foreign
travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 (B).
With respect to members and employees of
the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their
foreign travel in an unofficial
capacity. Such regulation is necessary for
the orderly administration of justice. To
permit such unrestricted freedom can result
in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and
the society as well. In a situation where
there is a delay in the dispensation of justice,
litigants can get disappointed and
disheartened. If their expectations are
frustrated, they may take the law into their
own hands which results in public disorder
undermining public safety. In this limited
sense, it can even be considered that the
restriction or regulation of a court
personnel's right to travel is a concern for
public safety, one of the exceptions to the
non-impairment of one's constitutional right
to travel.
In the case at bench, respondent should have
exercised prudence and asked for the status
of her leave application before leaving for
abroad.
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292, a
leave application should be acted upon
within five (5) working days after its receipt,
otherwise the leave application shall be
deemed approved. Section 49, Rule XVI of
the Omnibus Rules on Leave reads:
SEC. 49. Period within which
to act on leave applications.
Whenever the application for
leave of absence, including
terminal leave, is not acted
upon by the head of agency
or his duly authorized
representative within five (5)
working days after receipt
thereof, the application for
leave of absence shall be
deemed approved.
Applying this provision, the Court held in
the case of Commission on Appointments v.
Paler that an employee could not be
considered absent without leave since his
application was deemed approved. In said
case, there was no action on his application
within five (5) working days from receipt
thereof.
The ruling in Paler, however, is not
squarely applicable in this case. First, the
employee in said case was governed by CSC
Rules only. In the case of respondent, like
the others who are serving the Judiciary, she
is governed not only by CSC Rules but also
by OCA Circular No. 49-2003 which
imposes guidelines on requests for travel
abroad for judges and court personnel.
Second, in Paler, the employee submitted
his leave application with complete
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 224 | P a g e
requirements before his intended travel date.
No additional requirement was asked to be
filed. In the case of respondent, she
submitted her leave application but did not
fully comply with the clearance and
accountability requirements enumerated in
OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Third, in Paler,
there was no approval or disapproval of his
application within 5 working days from the
submission of the requirements. In this case,
there was no submission of the clearance
requirements and, hence, the leave
application could not have been favorably
acted upon.
WHEREFORE, respondent Wilma
Salvacion P. Heusdens, Clerk IV Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, is hereby
ADMONISHED for traveling abroad
without any travel authority in violation of
OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more
severely.
Requirements to limit right - Genuino v. De
Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
Genuino vs. De Lima
Facts:
The case is a consolidated case of
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
against former DOJ Secretary De Lima for
her issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 Series
of 2010, known as the “Consolidated Rules
and Regulations Governing Issuance and
Implementation of Hold Departure Orders
(HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO) and Allow
Departure Orders (ADO)”. The Petitioners
questions the constitutionality of this DOJ
circular on the ground that it infringes the
constitutional right to travel. The petitioners
in these consolidated cases are former
President Arroyo and her husband, and
Efraim and Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ
Secretary De Lima issued HDO and WLO
against petitioners on the ground that
criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft
and violation of the Omnibus Election Code
were filed against them. Petitioners,
particularly Spouses Arroyo, file temporary
restraining order against the issued HDO
and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant
from court to allow them to travel so that
former president Arroyo may seek medical
treatment abroad. The court granted relief
sought on a condition that petition will file a
bond of Php2M, an undertaking that
petitioners shall report to Philippine
consulate in the countries they are to visit
(Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and
Austria) and shall appoint a representative to
receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and
other legal processes. Petitioners complied
all the conditions.
Instead of following the order of the
court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process
the petitioners travel documents. Hence, this
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the issued DOJ
circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights
of the petitioners to travel and thus an ultra
vires to the constitution.
Ruling:
The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation; it
is deemed written in every statute and
contract. If a law or administrative rule
violates any norm of the constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 225 | P a g e
In this case, the right to travel is a
guarantee of the constitution under the Bill
of Rights. There are allowable restrictions in
the exercise of this right which are for the
interest of national security, public safety or
public health as may be provided by law.
The ground of the respondent in the
issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the
petitioners to be present during the
preliminary investigation of their cases
which is outside the allowable restrictions
provided by the constitution, hence, it is an
ultra vires and has no effect.
Right to Information
Neri vs. Senate, GR No. 180643, September
4, 2008
Neri vs. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations
G.R.No. 180643 04September2008
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has
been called upon to exercise its power of
review and arbitrate a hotly, even
acrimoniously, debated dispute between the
Court’s co-equal branches of government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared
before respondent Committees and testified
for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project
(the “NBN Project”), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and
Communications (“DOTC”) to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”).
Petitioner disclosed that then Commission
on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million
in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on
President Arroyo and petitioner’s
discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege.” To be specific,
petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and
(c) whether or not she directed him to
approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in
knowing petitioner’s answers to these three
questions by requiring him to appear and
testify once more on November 20, 2007.
On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense
with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of
executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show
cause order, unsatisfied with the reply,
therefore, issued an Order citing Neri in
contempt and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved
for the reconsideration of the above Order.
Denied. Petition for certiorari and
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with
Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction) granted by the SC court.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized
presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal
basis to hold that the communications
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 226 | P a g e
elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees
have shown that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical
to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order.
HELD:
I
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees argue as if
this were the first time the presumption in
favor of the presidential communications
privilege is mentioned and adopted in our
legal system. That is far from the truth.
There, the Court enumerated the cases in
which the claim of executive privilege was
recognized, among them Almonte v.
Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG),14 and
Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in
these cases that, “”the right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court
meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-
door Cabinet meetings.”
In this case, it was the President
herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita,
who invoked executive privilege on a
specific matter involving an executive
agreement between the Philippines and
China, which was the subject of the three (3)
questions propounded to petitioner Neri in
the course of the Senate Committees’
investigation. Thus, the factual setting of
this case markedly differs from that passed
upon in Senate v. Ermita.
A President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately.
These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution x x x
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold
that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by
Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is a “quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.”
First, respondent Committees
contend that the power to secure a foreign
loan does not relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power,” because
the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary
Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive. The
fact that a power is subject to the
concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive. The power to
enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority
of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact
that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 227 | P a g e
shall submit to Congress a complete report
of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not
diminish the executive nature of the power.
In the same way that certain legislative acts
require action from the President for their
validity does not render such acts less
legislative in nature.
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity”
was laid down precisely to limit the scope of
the presidential communications privilege
but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also
seek reconsideration of the application of the
“doctrine of operational proximity” for the
reason that “it maybe misconstrued to
expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to
communications between those who are
‘operationally proximate’ to the President
but who may have “no direct
communications with her.”
It must be stressed that the doctrine
of “operational proximity” was laid down in
In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit the
scope of the presidential communications
privilege. In the case at bar, the danger of
expanding the privilege “to a large swath of
the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent
because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term “advisor” of the President;
in fact, her alter ego and a member of her
official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive
privilege is not merely based on a
generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees’ and the President’s
clashing interests, the Court did not
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions
on government transparency, accountability
and disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007
of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in
relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as
the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v.
Ermita, it was held that Congress must not
require the Executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect for a coordinate and co-
equal department.
Privileged character of diplomatic
negotiations
In PMPF v. Manglapus, .” The
Resolution went on to state, thus:The nature
of diplomacy requires centralization of
authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another
essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
With respect to respondent
Committees’ invocation of constitutional
prescriptions regarding the right of the
people to information and public
accountability and transparency, the Court
finds nothing in these arguments to support
respondent Committees’ case.
There is no debate as to the importance of
the constitutional right of the people to
information and the constitutional policies
on public accountability and transparency.
These are the twin postulates vital to the
effective functioning of a democratic
government. In the case at bar, this Court, in
upholding executive privilege with respect
to three (3) specific questions, did not in any
way curb the public’s right to information or
diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 228 | P a g e
This Court did not rule that the
Senate has no power to investigate the NBN
Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing
in the assailed Decision that prohibits
respondent Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. They could continue the
investigation and even call petitioner Neri to
testify again.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show
That the Communications Elicited by the
Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their
Functions
The jurisprudential test laid down by
this Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege
can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling needfor disclosure of the
information covered by executive privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Committees argue that the
information elicited by the three (3)
questions are necessary in the discharge of
their legislative functions, among them, (a)
to consider the three (3) pending Senate
Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by
respondents’ assertions. The burden to show
this is on the respondent Committees, since
they seek to intrude into the sphere of
competence of the President in order to
gather information which, according to said
respondents, would “aid” them in crafting
legislation. Clearly, the need for hard facts
in crafting legislation cannot be equated
with the compelling or demonstratively
critical and specific need for facts which is
so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies.
 For sure, a factual basis for situations
covered by bills is not critically needed
before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the
adjudication of cases by courts of law.
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument
before this Court, the counsel for respondent
Committees impliedly admitted that the
Senate could still come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three
(3) questions. In other words, the
information being elicited is not so critical
after all.
Oversight Function of the Congress:
Anent the function to curb graft and
corruption, it must be stressed that
respondent Committees’ need for
information in the exercise of this function
is not as compelling as in instances when the
purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature. This is because curbing graft and
corruption is merely an oversight function of
Congress.44 And if this is the primary
objective of respondent Committees in
asking the three (3) questions covered by
privilege, it may even contradict their claim
that their purpose is legislative in nature and
not oversight. In any event, whether or not
investigating graft and corruption is a
legislative or oversight function of
Congress, respondent Committees’
investigation cannot transgress bounds set
by the Constitution.
Office of the Ombudsman: The
Office of the Ombudsman is the body
properly equipped by the Constitution and
our laws to preliminarily determine whether
or not the allegations of anomaly are true
and who are liable therefor.
IV
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt
Order
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 229 | P a g e
Respondent Committees contend that
their Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”)
are beyond the reach of this Court. While it
is true that this Court must refrain from
reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional
requirement exists, the Court has the duty to
look into Congress’ compliance therewith.
We cannot turn a blind eye to possible
violations of the Constitution simply out of
courtesy.
Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution states that: The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of person appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that respondent
Committees have the discretion to set aside
their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved
is the contempt power. It must be stressed
that the Rules are not promulgated for their
benefit. More than anybody else, it is the
witness who has the highest stake in the
proper observance of the Rules.
Congress as a “continuing body”
On the nature of the Senate as a
“continuing body,” this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is
“continuing”, as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 230 | P a g e

Membership in subversive organizations to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on
PEOPLE vs. FERRER them without a judicial trial does it become
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972 a bill of attainder.

FACTS In this case, when the act is viewed in its

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against the respondent
Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the government.
actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the member thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is
simple to declare the party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the The term "Communist Part of the
Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another the Communist Party of the Philippines but
criminal complaint was filed with before also to "any organisation having the same
Nilo Tayag and fiver others with subversion, purpose and their successors." Its focus is
as they were tagged as officers of the not on individuals but on conduct.
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a
subversive organization instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for
the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on

the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder;
(2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than
one subject not expressed in the title thereof;
and (4) it denied him the equal protection of
the laws.

ISSUE

Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-

Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

HELD

No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a

statute applies either to named individuals or

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 231 | P a g e

Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs.
Dionisio, 174 SCRA 589
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio
Dionisio
G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989
Facts:
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the subject parcel of land issued in the name
of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains
an annotation to the effect that the lot owner
becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air
Village Association, the respondent, and
must abide by such rules and regulations
laid down by the Association in the interest
of the sanitation, security and the general
welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of
the dues on the following grounds: the
questioned assessment is a property tax
outside the corporate power of the
association; the association has no power to
compel the petitioner to pay the assessment
for lack of privity of contract; the questioned
assessment should not be enforced for being
unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the
respondent association is exercising
governmental powers which should not be
sanctioned.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the association can
lawfully collect dues.
2. Whether or not the acts of plaintiff in
compelling the defendant to be a member is
unconstitutional and outside the scope of its
corporate power.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers
of a registered land are bound by the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 232 | P a g e
annotations found at the back of the
certificate of title covering the subject parcel
of land. The petitioner’s contention that he
has no privity with the respondent
association is not persuasive. When the
petitioner voluntarily bought the subject
parcel of land it was understood that he took
the same free of all ecumbrances except
annotations at the back of the certificate of
title, among them, that he automatically
becomes a member of the respondent
association. One of the obligations of a
member is to pay certain amounts for the
operation and activities of the association.
The mode of payment as well as the
purposes for which the dues are intended
clearly indicates that the dues are not in the
concept of a property tax as claimed by the
petitioner. They are shares in the common
expenses for necessary services. A property
tax is assessed according to the value of the
property but the basis of the sharing in this
case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees
which a member of the respondent
association is required in hiring security
guards, cleaning and maintaining streets,
street lights and other community projects
for the benefit of all residents within the
Bel-Air Village. These expenses are
necessary, valid and reasonable for the
particular community involved.
Limitations upon the ownership of the
petitioner do not contravene provisions of
laws, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. The constitutional
proscription than no person can be
compelled to be a member of an association
against his will applies only to governmental
acts and not to private transactions like the
one in question.
The petitioner cannot legally maintain that
he is compelled to be a member of the
association against his will because the
limitation is imposed upon his ownership of
property. If he does not desire to comply
with the annotation or lien in question, he
can at any time exercise his inviolable
freedom of disposing of the property and
free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the association.
In re: Marcial Edillion, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
In the Matter of IBP Membership Dues
Deficiency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
FACTS: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon (Stty.
Edillon for brevity) is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines and as
such is a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP for brevity). However,
the IBP filed an administrative case against
him on the ground of stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues to IBP.
The INP through its President
submitted the recommendation n of the
board to the Court recommending for the
removal of the name of Atty. Edillon from
its Roll of Attorneys.
The Court requires the parties to
submit their respective pleadings. The IBP
resolution was anchored on paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By Laws
whereas the authority of the Court to issue
the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, Atty. Edillon
countered that the provision constitute as
invasion of his constitutional rights for
compelling him as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing by paying his corresponding dues.
Therefore, it deprived him of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed by the
Constitution. Hence, the same are void and
of no legal effect. Furthermore, he
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 233 | P a g e
contending that this is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has the
power to compel him to become a
member of the IBP, hence, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is
unconstitutional for it infringes on
his Constitutional right of freedom to
associate.
2. Whether or not requiring the member
to pay membership dues is violative
of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the enforcement of
penalty provisions for non-payment
of membership dues is deprivation of
due process.
RULING:
1.The most compelling argument sustaining
the constitutionality and validity of Bar
Integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
“Section 5- The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts, and admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar. xxx”
And Section 1 of the Republic Act
No. 6397, which reads:
“Section 1- Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt Rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar xxxxxxx”
Even without the enabling Act and
looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power provided under
Section 5 (5), it at once indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision
of the practice of law.
2. Provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of membership dues by lawyers is
not violative of the Constitution. The 1973
Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme
Court from requiring the lawyers to pay
reasonable membership fees. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes
of integration.
3. Enforcement of penalty provisions for
non-payment of membership dues is not
deprivation of due process as the practice of
law is not a property right but a privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
it is the unanimous sense of the Court that
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the roll of Attorneys
of the Court.
Non-impairment of contracts
a. When there is impairment
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. ASB HOLDINGS,
INC., ASB REALTY CORP., ASB
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 234 | P a g e
DEVELOPMENT CORP. (FORMERLY
TIFFANY TOWER REALTY CORP.),
ASB LAND, INC., ASB FINANCE, INC.,
MAKATI HOPE CHRISTIAN
SCHOOL, INC., BEL-AIR HOLDINGS
CORP., WINCHESTER TRADING,
INC., VYL DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
GERICK HOLDINGS CORP., AND
NEIGHBORHOOD HOLDINGS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: In 1999, respondent ASB Dev’t.
Corp. was granted a credit line by petitioner
China Bank in the amount of P35 Million.
The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over two lots. In 2000, respondent
ASB Realty Corp., an affiliate of ASB
Dev’t., obtained an omnibus credit line from
petitioner China Bank in the amount of P265
Million. The loan was secured by two real
estate mortgages. On May 2, 2000, ASB
Dev’t. Corp. and its affiliates, filed before
the SEC a petition for rehabilitation with
prayer for suspension of actions and
proceedings, pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 902-A. On May 4, 2000, the SEC,
finding the petition for rehabilitation
sufficient in form and substance, issued a
60-day Suspension Order (a) suspending all
actions for claims against the ASB Group of
Companies pending or still to be filed with
any court, office, board, body, or tribunal;
(b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies
from disposing of their properties in any
manner, except in the ordinary course of
business, and from paying their liabilities
outstanding as of the date of the filing of the
petition
Aggrieved China Bank appealed the
plan's approval to the SEC En Banc.
According to petitioner, the SEC order
compelling the bank to surrender its present
collateral and accept certain properties
located in Pasig City and Parañaque City
(different from those that secured the real
estate mortgages) as payment of the
obligations due it violates the constitutional
proscription against impairment of contracts.
It was likewise argued that the value of the
properties being offered by ASB via dacion
en pago is insufficient to cover the amount
of its outstanding loans; and that the
preference conferred by law to the bank as a
secured creditor has been rendered illusory.
On June 10, 2003, the SEC En Banc
denied with finality petitioner bank's appeal.
China Bank elevated the matter to the CA.
On October 28, 2005, the CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Indicating that the
assailed rehabilitation plan does not violate
the principle of mutuality of contracts. In
fact, the provisions of said plan recognize
the secured creditors' right to refuse or reject
the dacion en pago arrangements proposed
therein.
Issue: Whether or not the ASB Dev’t. Corp.
rehabilitation plan violates the principle of
mutuality of contracts thereby curtailing a
party's freedom to contract
Ruling: The petition is DENIED and the
appealed Court of Appeals Decision
AFFIRMED.
There were cases already resolved by
Supreme Court involving the respondent
corporations. In Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company v. ASB Holdings, Inc.,2 the High
Court held that the approval of the
Rehabilitation Plan does not impair
petitioner bank's lien over the mortgaged
properties. Section 6[c] of P.D. No. 902-A
provides that "upon appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this
Decree, all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships or associations
under management or receivership
2
G.R. No. 166197, February 27, 2007, 517 SCRA 1.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 235 | P a g e
pending before any court, tribunal, board
or body shall be suspended."
By that statutory provision, it is clear that
the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan and
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver
merely suspend the actions for claims
against respondent corporations. Petitioner
bank's preferred status over the
unsecured creditors relative to the
mortgage liens is retained, but the
enforcement of such preference is
suspended. The loan agreements between
the parties have not been set aside and
petitioner bank may still enforce its
preference when the assets of ASB Group
of Companies will be liquidated.
Considering that the provisions of the
loan agreements are merely suspended,
there is no impairment of contracts,
specifically its lien in the mortgaged
properties.
As stressed in Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, such suspension "shall not prejudice
or render ineffective the status of a secured
creditor as compared to a totally unsecured
creditor," for what P.D. No. 902-A merely
provides is that all actions for claims against
the distressed corporation, partnership or
association shall be suspended. This
arrangement provided by law is intended to
give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the
corporation if there should still be a
possibility for doing so, without being
unnecessarily disturbed by the creditors'
actions against the distressed corporation.
However, in the event that rehabilitation is
no longer feasible and the claims against the
distressed corporation would eventually
have to be settled, the secured creditors, like
petitioner bank, shall enjoy preference over
the unsecured creditors.
The Court reiterates that the SEC's approval
of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair
China Bank’s right to contract. As correctly
contended by private respondents, the non-
impairment clause is a limit on the exercise
of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the
hearing panel that heard the petition for
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was
acting as a quasi-judicial body and, thus, its
order approving the plan cannot constitute
an impairment of the right and the freedom
to contract.
The Plan provides that dacion en pago
transaction will be effected only if the
secured creditors, like petitioner, agree
thereto and under terms and conditions
mutually agreeable to private respondents
and the secured creditor concerned. The
dacion en pago program is essential to
eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate
private respondents. If the dacion en pago
does not materialize in case secured
creditors refuse to agree thereto, the
Rehabilitation Plan contemplates to settle
the obligations to secured creditors with
mortgaged properties at selling prices. This
is for the general interest of the employees,
creditors, unit buyers, government, general
public, and the economy.
Exceptions
i. Ortigas and Co. vs. Feati Bank and Trust
Co., GR No. L-24670, December 14,
1979
ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP VS. FEATI BANK
(G.R. L-24670, December 14, 1979)
FACTS:
Plaintiff (formerly known as
"Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited
partnership and defendant Feati Bank and
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 236 | P a g e
Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized
and existing in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real
estate business, developing and selling lots
to the public, particularly the Highway Hills
Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as
vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and
Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into
separate agreements of sale on installments
over two parcels of land, known as Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway
Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong,
Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the
aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez.
Upon completion of payment of the
purchase price, the plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the
deed of sale in favor of Emma Chavez
which contains stipulations and restrictions.
These restrictions were annotated in
TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said
lots and issued in the name of Emma
Chavez. Eventually, defendant-appellee
acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos.
101613 and 106092 issued in its name,
respectively and the building restrictions
were also annotated therein.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the
restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509,
101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092 were
imposed as part of its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of the big
landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where
commercial and industrial sites are also
designated or established.
 Defendant-appellee, upon the other
hand, maintains that the area along the
western part of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to
Pasig River, has been declared a commercial
and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27,
dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-
appellee began laying the foundation and
commenced the construction of a building
on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to
banking purposes, but which defendant-
appellee claims could also be devoted to,
and used exclusively for, residential
purposes. The following day, plaintiff-
appellant demanded in writing that
defendant-appellee stop the construction of
the commerical building on the said lots.
The latter refused to comply with the
demand, contending that the building was
being constructed in accordance with the
zoning regulations, defendant-appellee
having filed building and planning permit
applications with the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly
obtained building and planning permits to
proceed with the construction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is
a valid exercise of police power and whether
the said Resolution can nullify or supersede
the contractual obligations assumed by the
parties.
HELD:
YES.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act," 32
empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 237 | P a g e
regulations"; 33 for the municipality.
Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise
of the power through an ordinance.
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is
not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory
measure within the intendment or ambit of
the word "regulation" under the provision.
With regard to the contention that said
resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant-
appellee – referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of
Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should
be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.
Franchises, privileges and licenses
Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190
SCRA 673
FELIPE YSMAEL v. DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No.
79538, 1990-10-18
Facts:
petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986
to the Office of the President, and another
letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister
Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural
Resources [MNR],... (1) the reinstatement of
its timber license agreement which was
cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA
No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation
without public bidding and... in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3)
the issuance of an order allowing petitioner
to take possession of all logs found in the
concession area
October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber
license agreement designated as TLA No. 87
with the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources,... license to cut, collect...
and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest
land
Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development [hereinafter referred to as
"Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued
a memorandum order stopping all logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino provinces, and cancelling the
logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires... not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the
cancellation of its logging operations... one-
half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly
covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to
Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was
set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the
other half was... allowed to be logged by
Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of
a formal award or license;... latter entities
were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos
Ministry ruled that a timber license was not
a contract within the due process clause... of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 238 | P a g e
the Constitution, but only a privilege which
could be withdrawn whenever public
interest or welfare so demands,... It should
be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request
for reinstatement has been denied in view of
the total ban of all logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya,...
Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for
reasons of conservation and national
security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it
realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic]
in respect to forests.
per MNR Administrative Order No. 54,
series of 1986, issued on November 26,
1986, the logging ban in the province of
Quirino was... lifted.
petitioner waited for at least three years
before it finally filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court attacking the validity of the
assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.
its delay constitutes... unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Issues:
whether or not public respondents herein
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to overturn administrative orders
issued by their... predecessors in the past
regime.
Ruling:
the refusal of public respondents herein to
reverse final and executory administrative
orders does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
petitioner is precluded from availing of the
benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition
within a reasonable period.
The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a
petition for... certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that
had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the
proceeding to annul the same"
Public respondents herein, upon whose
shoulders rests the task of implementing the
policy to develop and conserve the country's
natural resources, have indicated an ongoing
department evaluation of... all timber license
agreements entered into, and permits or
licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is
apparently in response to the renewed and
growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a
balanced ecological system.
While there is a desire to harness natural
resources to amass profit and to meet the
country's immediate financial requirements,
the more essential need to ensure future
generations of Filipinos of their survival in a
viable environment demands effective and...
circumspect action from the government to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 239 | P a g e
check further denudation of whatever
remains of the forest lands.
A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in... matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies
Timber licenses, permits and license...
agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted.
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the
foregoing discussion more than suffice to
justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the
DENR evaluation of timber licenses and
permits issued under the previous regime, or
to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate...
corrective measures by the deprtment.
petitioner having failed to make out a case
showing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of public respondents herein, the Court
finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari
and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs
sought.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is
DISMISSED.
Principles:
The rule of... res iudicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, or to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the... party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it of declined to assert it.
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and
promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
Police line-up
[GR No. 174471, Jan 12, 2016]
PEOPLE v. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino)
and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing the June
16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
The prosecution charged Preciosa
Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino,
Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy
Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso
Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio
Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention before the Regional Trial Court
{RTC), Branch 259, Paranaque
City. Reynaldo was subsequently discharged
after reinvestigation. Only Pepino, Gomez,
and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-
accused remained at large.
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the
RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) and sentenced them to suffer
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 240 | P a g e
the death penalty. The RTC also ordered
them to pay Edward P700,000.00
representing the amount extorted from him;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000
as exemplary damages. The trial court
acquitted Batijon for insuffiency of
evidence.
The RTC held that Edward
positively identified Pepino and Gomez as
two of the persons who forcibly abducted
him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and
who consequently detained him somewhere
in Quezon City for four (4) days until he
was released inside the UP Diliman Campus
after the payment of ransom. The RTC
added that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's
testimony on material points. It also pointed
out that Edward identified both Pepino and
Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the
NBI compound, although Jocelyn only
recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the
accused were already estopped from
questioning the validity of their arrest after
they entered their respective pleas.
The case was automatically
elevated to this Court in view of the death
penalty that the RTC imposed.
In its decision dated June 16, 2006,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages
were increased from P300,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively.
While the case was under the review
of the SC, Accused Pepino filed an urgent
motion to withdraw his appeal which the
Court granted. One of the issues claimed by
Gomez was Edward’s identification of her
during the trial may have been
preconditioned by suggestive identification
made at the police lineup.
ISSUES circumstance test where they consider the
following factors;
Whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the decision of the RTC (1) The witness’ opportunity to
view the criminal at the
THE COURT’S RULING time of the crime;
The SC AFFIRMED the challenged
(2) The witness’ degree of
June 16, 2006 decision of the CA with
attention at that time of the
modifications.
crime;
As to the illegality of the arrest
(3) The accuracy of any prior
Accused Gomez did not question description given by the
before arraignment the legality of her witness;
warrantless arrest or the acquisition of the
(4) The level of certainty
RTC’s jurisdiction over her person, thus, she
demonstrated by the
is deemed to have waived any objection to
witness at the
her warrantless arrest.
identification;
It is well settled that any objection to
(5) The length of time between
the procedure followed in the matter of the
the crime and the
acquisition of the court of jurisdiction over
identification; and
the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; (6) The suggestiveness of the
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. identification procedure.
As to the admissibility of
identification
Applying the totality-of-
The Court finds no merit in accused circumstances test, the Court finds the
Gomez’s claim that the plaintiff’s plantiff’s out-of-court identification to be
identification of her during trial might have reliable and admissible.
been preconditioned by the “suggestive
identification” made during the police line-
up. The right to counsel
Out-of-court identification is The right to counsel is a fundamental
conducted by the police in various ways. It right and is intended to preclude the slightest
is done thru shadow ups where the suspect coercion that would lead the accused to
alone is brought face to face with the admit something false. The right to counsel
witness for identification. It is done thru attaches upon the start of investigation.
mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also Custodial investigation commences
done thru lineups where a witness identifies when a person is taken into custody and is
the suspect from a group of persons lined singled out as a suspect in the commission
up. In resolving the admissibility of and of the crime under investigation. As a rule,
relying on out-of-court identification of police lineup is not part of the custodial
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of investigation hence the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 241 | P a g e
by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police
lineup.
Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only
by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts
the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.chanrobleslaw
Defense witness Reynaldo, however,
maintained that Pepino and Gomez were
among those already presented to the media
as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before
the police lineup was made. In this sense, the
appellants were already the focus of the police
and were thus deemed to be already under
custodial investigation when the out-of-court
identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object
to the in-court identification for having been
tainted by an irregular out-of-court
identification in a police lineup. They focused,
instead, on the legality of the appellants'
arrests.
Kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions
PEOPLE v. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190, J.
Mendoza
May 17, 2000,Appeal from a decision of
the RTC of Manila
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 242 | P a g e
RATIO:
Perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to
the accused without any effort
to find out from him whether he wanted to
have counsel and, if so, whether he had
his own counsel or he wanted the police to
appoint one for him is merely ceremonial
and inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect.
FACTS:
Accused Jimmy Obrero was charged with
the crime of robbery with homicide. He
was apprehended and brought to the police
station where he was provided with a
lawyer who is a station commander of
another police station, and interrogated.
Accused executed extrajudicial confession is
in Tagalog and signed by him in the
presence of Atty. De los Reyes. Atty. De los
Reyes is a PC Captain of the WPD
Headquarters in UN Avenue. He was at
Station 7 of the WPD because he was
representing a client accused of illegal
recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Javier of
the WPD Homicide Section to assist Jimmy
Obrero in executing an extrajudicial
Confession. At the trial, Jimmy Obrero
pleaded not guilty of the crime charged. He
said that he came back from his errand and
remitted the amount of P2000 which had
been paid to him. He also claimed that after
being informed of the charges against him,
he was beaten up and detained for a week
and made to execute an extrajudicial
confession. He denied having known or seen
Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he
did not understand the contents of the
extrajudicial confession which he signed
because he did not know how to read.
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant's
extrajudicial confession is admissible in
evidence.

HELD: Said extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence because counsel
for accused was not independent. At the
time he assisted accused-appellant, he was
the station commander of the WPD and a PC
captain. As part of the police force, he
could not be expected to have effectively
assisted the accused during the investigation.
Right to Cousel
G.R. No. L-60025 September 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGINIA
MATOS-VIDUYA y GALPA, accused-
appellant. The Solicitor General for
plaintiff-appellee.
FACTS:
Appellant Virginia Matos-Viduya appeals
from the decision of the Manila RTC,
Branch 35, finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
The information alleges that on or about the
26th day of August, 1980, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack the person
of ATTY. JOSE VIDUYA, her husband,
stabbing him several times with a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal
stab wounds which were the direct cause of
his death. The prosecution presented the
following evidence: (1) Mrs. Remedios
Domingo, a lessee on the ground floor of the
victim's house, testified that she was
awakened by moaning sounds, followed by
a thud, emanating from the second floor
where the victim lived. Mrs. Domingo, a
lessee in the same house for 25 years and
had known the victim to suffer from a heart
ailment, presumed that the latter was having
a heart attack so she immediately ran
towards the apartment of the victim's family
driver, Melanio Cambel, which was only 4
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 243 | P a g e
meters away and shouted to Melanio as he
was having a heart attack. (2) Cambel
declared that on that evening, he was
aroused from his sleep by the shouts of Mrs.
Domingo. He ran upstairs and was let in by
Lydia Firmanes, cousin of the accused.
Cambel saw the victim clutching the handle
of the refrigerator and leaning thereon for
support. Immediately standing behind the
victim was the accused holding a knife with
both hands. As Cambel approached, the
accused stooped down saying "Diosko,
Diosko”, trying to conceal the knife from
him. Cambel asked the victim what
happened but the latter was too weak to
speak. Cambel then asked the accused why
she stabbed her husband. The accused
initially did not answer, but hesitantly
muttered "Magnanakaw, magnanakaw" after
being questioned for the second time.
Cambel then requested assistance to bring
the victim to the hospital (St. Jude Hospital
in Sampaloc, Manila) but the latter was
pronounced dead on arrival. (3) Florentino
Bagallon, an investigator of the WPD,
declared that he conducted an on-the-spot
ocular inspection of the victim's house and
found in the bedroom a single bed with a
white blanket soaked in blood. He recovered
two pieces of bladed knives at the east yard
(parking lot) of the victim's residence. One
of the knives had a bended blade. On the
east wall, he found a rectangular hole which
used to hold an air-conditioning unit and
also noticed some pieces of wood placed
under a parked heavy truck on the east yard.
The accused informed him that those pieces
of wood used to cover the rectangular hole.
Thereafter, he advised the accused to go
with him to the police headquarters for a
formal investigation. Bagallon testified that
at 3:15 in the morning of August 26, 1980,
the accused executed a salaysay. Significant
portions of the said salaysay are quoted, as
follows: xxx xxx xxx 7. T-Ano ba sa alam
ninyo and dahilan ng kanyang pagkamatay?
S-Sinaksak dahil sa panloloob na ginawa sa
amin. xxx xxx xxx 15. T-Nang marinig
ninyo ang ungol na nanggaling sa inyong
asawa at kayo nga noon ay nagising, ano
naman ang inyong nakita? S-Dalawang
lalaki, ang isa ay nakatayo sa tabi ng kama
ko at may nakatutok na patalim sa aking ulo
at sa kabilang kama naman ay nakita ko na
may isa pa ring lalaki na sumasaksak sa
aking asawa. xxx xxx xxx 26. T-Nakikilala
po ba naman ninyo and dalawang lalaking
pumasok sa loob ng kuwarto ninyo? S-Kung
sakaling makita ko uli ay maaari kong
makilala. 27. T-Ano po ba ang hitsura nila?
S-Yun pong sumaksak sa asawa ko ay
maitim, mga 5'3 po, nakasuot ng dark color
at yong tumutok naman sa akin ay may mga
5'2, kayumanggi, slender, putian and suot na
damit. xxx xxx xxx 31. T-Nang maganap
ang pangloloob sa inyo at pananaksak sa
asawa mo hanggang sa makaalis ang
dalawang lalaki, nasaan ba naman ang mga
taong kasama mo sa bahay? S-Nagising
silang lahat sa pagsigaw ko. 32. T-At ano ba
naman ang isinigaw mo? S-Magnanakaw,
magnanakaw!!! xxx xxx xxx Pfc. Bagallon
also stated that on same day at about 5:30 in
the afternoon, the accused was again invited
for further investigation thereafter executing
a second "salaysay" reiterating her narration
contained in her first "salaysay" executed
earlier that morning. This time, however,
she declared that one of the malefactors was
a certain Edito Pateño, their former
employee. On August 30, 1980 at 2:20 in the
morning, Mrs. Virginia Viduya again
executed a (third) "salaysay". Later, at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same
date, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial
confession wherein she categorically
admitted authorship of the killing of her
husband. However, she claimed that she
merely acted in self-defense. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty
to the charge. The accused alleged that she
was misled and deceived by Pfc. Bagallon
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 244 | P a g e
into signing her extrajudicial confession
since he told her that she will not be
detained if she signs the document. After
due trial, the lower court rendered its
decision adjudging the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in admitting the
extra judicial confession of the accused
RULING:
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987
Constitution mandates that: “Any person
under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.” In this case, it is
undisputed that the extrajudicial confession
was executed without the presence of
counsel. We quote the relevant excerpt from
the extrajudicial confession: xxx xxx xxx T-
Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng
serbisyo ng isang abogado para makatulong
mo sa imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang
makukuha, ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng
libreng abogado, ano ngayon and iyong
masasabi? S- Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal
(pointing to Assistant Fiscal DOMINGO A.
MENDOZA) kaya hindi ko na kailangan
and abogado. xxx xxx xxx The trial judge, in
holding that the extrajudicial confession is
admissible, reasoned out that there is no
prohibition for Assistant Fiscal Mendoza to
act as counsel for the accused as it is his
primordial duty not only to prosecute a case
but also to protect the rights of an accused
and to see that no violence, force, coercion
or intimidation be used to secure from a
person under custodial investigation his
statement. Section 12(1) of Article III of the
1987 Constitution favors the accused and is
fully applicable to this case. It is also
elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor
cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the
same time. In his testimony, Assistant Fiscal
Mendoza stated that his main functions as
Assistant Fiscal in the City of Manila are to
prosecute cases and to render duties as an
inquest fiscal. (an inquest fiscal advises
police investigators as to whether or not a
prima facie case exists in cases which they
investigate.) Whether or not the subsequent
trial of a confessant's case will be assigned
to him as prosecutor is immaterial. He
cannot pretend to act as defense counsel. An
assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter,
cannot exercise the function of defense
counsel even during custodial investigation.
To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the accused
during custodial investigation. What the
Constitution requires in Article III Section
12 (1) is the presence of competent and
independent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client's defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.
Moreover, the answer of the accused
("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi
ko na kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable
indication that she did not fully understand
her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said
that she knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights. The remaining issue left for
determination is whether or not the
prosecution evidence, absent the
extrajudicial confession, is sufficient to
sustain the lower court's conviction of the
accused. A rule firmly entrenched in our
criminal justice system is that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. (People v. Ramirez, 116 SCRA 48
[1982]; People v. Co, 163 SCRA 453
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 245 | P a g e
[1988]) In the case before us, the defense of
the accused is weak. In trying to exculpate
herself, the appellant tried to shift
culpability to another person. The attempt is
not convincing. But though the accused's
defense is weak, the prosecution's evidence
is not strong enough to adduce proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is the
guilty party. A thorough review of the
prosecution's evidence discloses that the
only proof linking the accused to the killing
of her husband is the testimony of Cambel.
It is not shown how twelve stab wounds
could have been inflicted by a woman under
the circumstances of his testimony. Two
knives were involved in the stabbing. Other
than Cambel's testimony, there is no other
evidence pointing to the accused as the
author of the crime. Moreover, the trial
court's complete reliance on only one of 3
extrajudicial statements and its total
rejection of the two other statements without
any independent evidence or proof for such
action, is not explained. Considering the
paucity of the State's evidence, we are not
satisfied that the constitutional presumption
of innocence accorded to the accused-
appellant has been overthrown. The
constitutional presumption of innocence can
be overcome only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which is the degree of
proof that, after investigation of the whole
record, produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the appellant's
culpability. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA
59 [1971]) The prosecution failed to produce
such proof. This Court, therefore, has no
other recourse but to acquit the accused-
appellant. JUDGMENT of the trial court
convicting the accused-appellant is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
entered ACQUITTING her on reasonable
doubt.
Confession given to media – People vs. His interview was shown over the ABS-
Endino, 353 SCRA 307, CBN evening news program TV Patrol. For
his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin
February 20, 2001 disclaimed having taking part in the slaying
of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October
1991 he was in Antipolo to help his
People vs. Endino
common-law wife Maria Marasigan give
birth to their first born. He stayed with her
Facts:
until the 16th of October when she was
BELLOSILLO, J.:
discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity
Clinic.
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for
revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of
Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis
Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love
they once shared. On 18 October 1991, an
Information for the murder of Dennis
Aquino was filed against Edward Endino
and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and
warrants were issued for their arrest.
However, as both accused remained at large,
the trial court issued on 26 December 1991
an order putting the case in the archives
without prejudice to its reinstatement upon
their apprehension. On 19 November 1992,
Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the
combined efforts of the Antipolo and
Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio
Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was
immediately taken into temporary custody
by the Antipolo Police. On their way to the
airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN
television station where accused Galgarin
was interviewed by reporters. Video
footages of the interview were taken
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while
pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as
the gunman. According to Galgarin, after
attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas,
Palawan, where his sister Langging who is
Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging
gave them money for their fare for Manila.
They took the boat for Batangas, where they
stayed for a few days, and proceeded to
Manila where they separated, with him
heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for
Edward to give himself up to the authorities.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 246 | P a g e

Accused-appellant disowned the confession
which he made over TV Patroland claimed
that it was induced by the threats of the
arresting police officers. He asserted that the
videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art.
III, of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial
confession through video taped is admissible
as evidence in court.
HELD: Yes, the extrajudicial confession
made by the accused appellant is admissible
in evidence.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of
accused-appellant's videotaped confession,
we find such admission proper. The
interview was recorded on video and it
showed accused-appellant unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the
presence of newsmen. Such confession does
not form part of custodial investigation as it
was not given to police officers but to media
men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he
could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have
been symphatetic with him. As the trial
court stated in its Decision[13]-
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview
(Exh. H), freely admitted that he had
stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward
Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no
showing that the interview of accused was
coerced or against his will. Hence, there is
basis to accept the truth of his statements
therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent
danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence
of this phenomenon in several cases, it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 247 | P a g e
that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police, with the connivance
of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial
confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused
admit an offense on television. Such a
situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system. We do
not suggest that videotaped confessions
given before media men by an accused with
the knowledge of and in the presence of
police officers are impermissible. Indeed,
the line between proper and invalid police
techniques and conduct is a difficult one to
draw, particularly in cases such as this
where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive
physical or psychological atmosphere. A
word of counsel then to lower courts: we
should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore should
be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.
Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for
the courts to make. It requires persistence
and determination in separating polluted
confessions from untainted ones. We have a
sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Confession given to Municipal Mayor –
People vs. Andan, 269
SCRA 95, GR No. 116437, March 3, 1997
People of the Philippines Vs. PAblito Andan
y Hernandez
G.R. # 116437, March 3, 1997
Facts:
Andan was accused of the crime of
Rape with Homicide of Marianne Guevarra.
The accused invited the victim in his house
to check the blood pressure of his wife’s
grandmother, but nobody was inside the
house. She was punched in the abdomen and
was raped by the accused. Later, she was
attacked by the accused with concrete
hollow blocks in the different parts of her
body, which caused her death. The corpse of
the victim was abandoned in the vacant lot
near the house of the accused. On the
following day, Feb. 20, 1994, the body of
the victim was found and drew public
attention which prompted Mayor Trinidad of
Baliuag to form a crack team of police
officers to look for the criminal. The
evidences gathered by the team led to the
accused. Initially, the accused denied any
knowledge of Marianne’s death but later
relented when the police confronted him of
the evidences. He said that it was his
neighbors, Larin and Dizon who killed the
victim and that he was merely a look out.
When the mayor arrived and proceeded to
the investigation room, the accused
approached and privately confessed his
guilt. The mayor then asked for a lawyer but
since no lawyer was available, he ordered
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 248 | P a g e
the proceedings photographed and
videotaped.
However, upon the arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty. He
testified that during the incident of the
crime, he was at his parent’s house in
Barangay Tangos attending a birthday party
and that the police officers planted
evidences against him.
The trial court convicted the accused
and sentenced him to death.
Issue:
1. WON the lower court erred in
admitting and using as basis of
judgment of conviction the
testimonies of the police
investigators, reporters and the
mayor on the alleged admission of
the accused during the custodial
investigation, the accused not being
assisted by counsel in violation of
the constitution;
Held:
Appellant was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the
police. It was admitted that the police failed
to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. Therefore his confession
before the police officer is inadmissible.
As to the appellant’s confession to the
Mayor, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the
constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence, appellant’s
confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the court.
As to the appellant’s confession to
the media, it was properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. It
was held that statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary
and are admissible in evidence.
The decision of the lower court was
affirmed and accused was found guilty of
the special complex crime of rape with
homicide.
Giving urine samples – Gutang vs. People,
335 SCRA 479 (2000)
G.R. No. 135406 July 11, 2000
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Accused-appellant David Gutang,
together with three others, were arrested by
the PNP NARCOM, in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence in San Juan, Metro Manila. When
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the police operatives served the search
warrant, which was issued by Judge Martin
Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they
found the petitioner and his three (3)
companions inside the comfort room of the
master’s bedroom, at the second floor of the
house. The PNP-NARCOM team also
inspected the cars of the accused. The items
which were confiscated were then brought to
the crime laboratory of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame,
Quezon City for laboratory tests. The results
of the laboratory examinations showed that
the said items found in the master’s
bedroom of the residence of petitioner
Gutang were positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The items found inside the car of Regala
were also positive for shabu.
ISSUE: 1) Whether the Receipts of Property
Seized which contain petitioner’s signature,
inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained
without the assistance of a lawyer, is
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of
the poisonous tree." 2) Whether the Physical
Science Reports and the Chemistry Report
are also inadmissible inasmuch as they are
mere conclusions drawn from the said
Receipts. 3) Whether petitioner’s urine
sample is also inadmissible in evidence
since it was derived in effect from an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession,
allegedly in violation of Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution.
RULING: I. The signatures of the petitioner
on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized
are inadmissible in evidence, the same being
tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is prohibited by the
Constitution. II. The fact that the Receipts of
Property Seized are inadmissible in evidence
does not render inadmissible the Physical
Science Reports and the Chemistry Report
inasmuch as the examined materials were
legally seized or taken from the petitioner’s
bedroom on the strength of a valid search
warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. Since the said materials were
validly seized or taken from the bedroom of
the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory
tests conducted thereon were legally and
validly done. III. The situation in the case at
bar falls within the exemption under the
freedom from testimonial compulsion since
what was sought to be examined came from
the body of the accused. This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to
undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that
petitioner and his co-accused were not
compelled to give samples of their urine but
they in fact voluntarily gave the same when
they were requested to undergo a drug test.
What the Constitution prohibits is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it
may be material.

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Right to Bail
Extradition
1. Government of the USA vs. Purganan,
GR No. 148571, September 24,
2002
Government of the United States of
America vs Purganan
GR No. 148571 dated September 24, 2002
FAST FACTS:
Per RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US
Government sent to the Philippine
Government an extradition request involving
Mark B. Jimenez also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo.
Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO to
prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition which was later
on assailed by the SOJ. The court initially
dismissed the petition, but later reversed its
decision when a Motion for Reconsideration
was filed. The court held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the US Government
(represented by the DOJ of the Philippines)
filed with the RTC the appropriate petition
for extradition. In order to prevent the flight
of Jimenez, the petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez then filed an urgent
manifestation / ex parte motion, praying that
the arrest warrant be set for hearing. The
RTC granted the motion filed by Jimenez
and set a date for hearing. When the arrest
warrant was issued, he was granted bail for
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 251 | P a g e
his temporary liberty in the amount of one
million pesos in cash.
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondent is entitled to
notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
2) WON the respondent is entitled to
post bail.
3) WON there is a violation of due
process.
HELD:
1) No. The word “immediate” was used
to qualify the arrest of the accused
under the Extradition Law. This
qualification would be rendered
useless if the issuance of the arrest
warrant would be set for hearing
because it entails sending of notices
to the opposing parties, receiving
facts and arguments and giving them
time to prepare and present such
facts and arguments.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution also does not require a
notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
Constitution only requires
examination under oath or
affirmation of complaints and the
witnesses they may produce. There is
no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
2) No, respondent is not entitled to bail
because an extradition case is
different from an ordinary criminal
proceeding.
Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution as well as Section 4 of
 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
apply only in cases where a person
has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws.
It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition
courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Jimenez
should have applied for bail before
the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the
extradition court.
3) There is no violation of respondent`s
right to due process. Due process
does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A
subsequent opportunity, for potential
extraditees, is sufficient due to the
flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition
and the answer is the full chance to
be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
Extradition
Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region vs Judge Olalia
and Munoz
GR No. 153675 April 29, 2007
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged
before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of offense of “accepting and
advantage as agent,” in violation of Section
9(1)a of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent. After hearing, Judge
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 252 | P a g e
Bernardo Jr issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high
“flight risk”. Judge Bernardo Jr., inhibited
himself from further hearing and the case
was raffled off to another court. Private
respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion to vacate the above order, but it was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extraditee has a right to
bail?
HELD:
The modern trend in public international law
is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human
rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
individual person may properly be subject of
international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states
was dramatically eroded towards the second
half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after WWII
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized
as violations of the laws of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity.
Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international
law.
On a more positive note, also after WWII,
both international organization and states
gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
UN General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
which the right to life, liberty and all the
other fundamental rights of every person
were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration
are now recognized as customarily binding
upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v Director of
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which the Philippines
signed and ratified. Fundamental among the
rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases,
we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases,
Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases. After all both are
administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extradites to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lied in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Re: Right to Bail of Persons in Military
Jose Comendador vs. Renato S. De Villa,
GR no. 93177 [Aug. 2, 1991]
Synopsis:
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Petitioners, including Comendador, were
officers of the AFP facing prosecution for
their alleged participation in the failed coup
d’ etat in 1989. One of the officers, Ltc.
Jacinto Ligot applied for bail but the same
was denied by General Court Martial. He
thereupon filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC judge issued an order
granting provisional liberty to Ligot. The
commanding officer of the PC/INP jail
disobeyed the order of the RTC. Ligot filed
an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the
order and to declare the commanding officer
in contempt. The commanding officer
countered that since the officers of the AFP
are accused of violations of the Articles of
War, regular courts have no authority to
order their release and otherwise interfere
with the court-martial proceedings.
(1) As to issue of regular court’s
jurisdiction:
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against
inferior courts and other bodies and on
petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto. In the absence of a law
providing that the decisions, orders and
ruling of a court-martial or the Office of
the Chief of Staff can be questioned only
before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the
Regional Trial Court can exercise similar
jurisdiction.
The Court, however, finds that respondents
have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of
jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the
Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners.
 (2) On the right to bail of military:
The right to bail invoked has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available
in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not
exist.
The argument that denial from the military
of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and
does not apply where the subject of the
treatment is substantially different from
others. The accused officers can complain if
they are denied bail and other members of
the military are not. But they cannot say
they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right
that is extended to civilians.
The Court justifies such exception by the
adopting the explanation of the SolGen:
“xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations
should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail
of respondents constitutes
damaging precedent. Imagine a
scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis
on bail, or if the assailed July 25,
1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number
alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that
they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 254 | P a g e
same with a system consonant with
their own concept of government and
justice.”
Equipoise Rule – Corpus vs. People, GR No.
74259, February 14, 1991
CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO.
74259; 14 FEB 1991]
Facts:
Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising
Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He
was designated Acting Supervising Cashier
in the said office. In this capacity, he
received collections, disbursed funds and
made bank deposits and withdrawals
pertaining to government accounts. On April
13, 1981 his designation as Acting
Supervising Cashier was terminated and a
transfer of accountabilities was effected
between him and his successor. The
Certificate of turnover revealed a shortage of
P72,823.00. He was able to pay only
P10,159.50. After a final demand letter for
the total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a
case of malversation was filed against him.
Corpuz did not deny such facts but he insists
a that the shortage was malversed by other
persons. He alleged that Paymaster
Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate
checks (PNB) issued and encashed such
checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting
Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo
Aluning made to post the amount on his
cashbook although he had not received the
said amount. He was convicted in
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or Not Corpuz is guilty of
malversation.

Held:

It is a subtle way of camouflaging the

embezzlement of the money equivalent
when 1 of the 4 checks issued and
encashed in the same day was entered in the
accused’s cash book 3 months after such
encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he
was absent when Paymaster Diosdado
Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks
(PNB) issued and encashed such checks,
was not proven.
Post-Audit is not a preliminary requirement
to filing a malversation case. The failure of
the public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by an authorized
officer shall be a prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds to personal
use.
The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is
the presumption of innocence is applicable
only where the evidence of the parties is
evenly balance, in which case the scale of
justice should be tilt in favor of the accused.
There is no such balance in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome
by the petitioner with his claims. The
presumed innocence must yield to the
positive finding that he is guilty of
malversation.
Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty
as principal of Malversation of Public
Funds.

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Right to be informed
1. Juan Ponce Enrile vs. People, G.R. No.
213455, 11 August 2015
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman
filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John
Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the
Philippines, and within this Honorable
Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine
Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES,
then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s
Office, both public officers, committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices,
conspiring with one another and with
JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN
LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amass, accumulate, and/or
acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts,
as follows:
1. by repeatedly receiving from
NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM,
DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 256 | P a g e
appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
2. by taking undue advantage, on
several occasions, of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at
the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars
before the Sandiganbayan. On the same
date, he filed a motion for deferment of
arraignment since he was to undergo
medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars.
ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper
remedy if the information is vague or
indefinite resulting in the serious violation
of Enrile’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him?
HELD: NO. When allegations in an
Information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to
supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the
accused to properly plead and prepare for
trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one
that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably,
the specifications that a bill of particulars
may supply are only formal amendments to
the complaint or Information. Thus, if the
Information is lacking, a court should take a
liberal attitude towards its granting and
order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the
accused in the position of disclosing certain
overt acts through the Information and
withholding others subsequently discovered,
all of which it intends to prove at the trial.
This is the type of surprise a bill of
particulars is designed to avoid. The accused
is entitled to the observance of all the rules
designated to bring about a fair verdict. This
becomes more relevant in the present case
where the crime charged carries with it the
severe penalty of capital punishment and
entails the commission of several predicate
criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable
period of time. Notably, conviction for
plunder carries with it the penalty of capital
punishment; for this reason, more process is
due, not less. When a person’s life interest –
protected by the life, liberty, and property
language recognized in the due process
clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the
protection of those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the
Information and the motion for bill of
particulars involved the right of an accused
to due process, the enumeration of the
details desired in Enrile’s supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of information and in his
motion for bill of particulars are different
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 257 | P a g e
viewed particularly from the prism of their
respective objectives. In the former, Enrile
took the position that the Information did
not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he
alleged a defect of substance. In the latter,
he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but
is unclear and lacking in details that would
allow him to properly plead and prepare his
defense; he essentially alleged here a defect
of form. Note that in the former, the purpose
is to dismiss the Information for its failure to
state the nature and cause of the accusation
against Enrile; while the details desired in
the latter (the motion for bill of particulars)
are required to be specified in sufficient
detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the
form of conclusions and will not allow
Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
unless specifications are made. That every
element constituting the offense had been
alleged in the Information does not preclude
the accused from requesting for more
specific details of the various acts or
omissions he is alleged to have committed.
The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars. Hence,
while the information may be sufficient for
purposes of stating the cause and the crime
an accused is charged, the allegations may
still be inadequate for purposes of enabling
him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines
to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a
bill of particulars containing the facts sought
that we herein rule to be material and
necessary. The bill of particulars shall
specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to
constitute the “combination or series of
overt criminal acts” charged in
Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the
“kickbacks or commissions” allegedly
received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’
projects where kickbacks or commissions
were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in
2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged
kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the
prosecution should state the year when the
kickbacks and transactions from the
identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-
government organizations (NGOs) which
were the alleged “recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom
Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs.
The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need
not be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not
included in the above are hereby denied.
Speedy Disposition of Cases
CAGANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Nos. 206438 and 206458
Inordinate Delay, Right to speedy
disposition of Cases
July 31, 2018
FACTS:
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s
denial to quash the Informations and Order
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the of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office
of the Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate
delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation.
In February 10, 2003, Office of the
Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint alleging the graft and corruption
at the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani
Province by diverting public funds given as
grants or aid using barangay officials and
cooperatives as “dummies.” The complaint
was referred to the Commission on Audit for
audit investigation.
On November 17, 2011, the OMB filed
Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against Cagang, Camanay,
Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss
with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest.
Cagang argued that there was an inordinate
delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. Citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman,
he argued that the delay violated his
constitutional rights to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases. The OMB, on
the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition
arguing that there was no showing that delay
in the filing was intentional, capricious,
G.R.
whimsical, or motivated by personal
reasons.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to
Quash/Dismiss.
It also found that there was no inordinate
delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals
were involved with direct participation in
more or less 81 different transactions.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss
since the Information filed against him
violated his constitutional rights to due
process and to speedy disposition of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not inordinate delay exists in
this case.
RULING:
What may constitute a reasonable time to
resolve a proceeding is not determined by
“mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires
consideration of a number of factors,
including the time required to investigate the
complaint, to file the information, to conduct
an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-
trial, trial proper, and the submission of the
case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances,
such as unavoidable postponements or force
majeure, must also be taken into account.
This Court recognized that the right to
speedy disposition of cases does not only
include the period from which a case is
submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers
the entire period of investigation even before
trial. Thus, the right may be invoked as early
as the preliminary investigation or inquest.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the
resolution and termination of a preliminary
investigation violates the accused’s right to
due process and the speedy disposition of
cases, and may result in the dismissal of the
case against the accused. The burden of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 259 | P a g e
proving delay depends on whether delay is
alleged within the periods provided by law
or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused
to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the
delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the
given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was
reasonable under the circumstances and that
no prejudice was suffered by the accused as
a result of the delay.
Every accused has the rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and
termination of a preliminary investigation
will result in the dismissal of the case
against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of
the facts and circumstances surrounding
each case.
Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or
her constitutional rights in a timely manner.
The failure to do so could be considered by
the courts as a waiver of right.
Admittedly, while there was delay,
petitioner has not shown that he asserted his
rights during this period, choosing instead to
wait until the information was filed against
him with the Sandiganbayan.
The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division that fact-finding investigations are
included in the period for determination of
inordinate delay is ABANDONED.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
ALIH vs. CASTRO
151 SCRA 279
Facts: a contingent of Philippine marines
and elements of the Home Defense Forces
raided the compound of herein petitioners in
Zamboanga City, in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other explosives,
without a warrant.
People inside the compound resisted the
sudden invasion with a burst of gunfire to
warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, the soldiers
returned fire and a bloody shoot out ensued,
resulting in a number of casualties.
After the shoot-out, sixteen male occupants
were arrested. They were fingerprinted,
paraffin tested and photographed over their
objection. Several firearms and ammunitions
were also seized and confiscated by the
military.
Petitioners filed with this Court a petition
for prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and restraining order.
The purpose of which was to recover the
articles seized form petitioners, to prevent
these from being used as evidence against
them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin testing as
violative of their right against self-
incrimination.
The Court treated the petition as an
injunction suit with a prayer for the return of
the articles alleged to be illegally seized and
referred it to the Regional Trial Court, which
in turn submitted the report and
recommendations of which this opinion is
based.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted
on petitioner’s premises was legal.
Whether or not the act of finger-
printing, photographing and paraffin-
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 260 | P a g e
testing was violative of their right
against self-incrimination.
Held: The search on petitioner’s premises
was declared illegal and all articles seized as
a result are inadmissible as evidence against
the petitioner’s in any proceedings.
However, the said articlesshall remain in
custodialegis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be
filed against the petitioners.
Court held that respondents defied the
precept that “civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military” so clearly
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the
instant case, the respondents simply by-
passed the civil courts, which had the
authority to determine whether or not there
was probable cause to search petitioner’s
premises. Instead, they proceeded to make
the raid without a search warrant on their
own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner’s guilt.
It follows that as the search of the
petitioner’s premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and
ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioner’s.
These articles are “fruits of the poisonous
tree”.
The prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, “The prohibition of compelling a
man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to exort
communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be
material.”
Right Against Self-Incrimination
G.R. No. 75885 May 27, 1987
BATAAN SHIPYARD & issued and acts done on the basis thereof,
ENGINEERING CO., INC.
(BASECO), petitioner, vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, CHAIRMAN
JOVITO SALONGA, COMMISSIONER
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA,
COMMISSIONER RAMON DIAZ,
COMMISSIONER RAUL R. DAZA,
COMMISSIONER QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, CAPT. JORGE B.
SIACUNCO, et al., respondents.
Challenged in this special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition by a private
corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive
Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by
President Corazon C. Aquino on February
28, 1986 and March 12, 1986, respectively,
and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and
other orders issued, and acts done, in
accordance with said executive orders by the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government and/or its Commissioners and
agents, affecting said corporation.
On the strength of the above sequestration
order, Mr. Jose M. Balde, acting for the
PCGG, addressed a letter dated April 18,
1986 to the President and other officers of
petitioner firm, reiterating an earlier request
for the production of certain documents
It is the foregoing specific orders and acts of
the PCGG and its members and agents
which, to repeat, petitioner BASECO would
have this Court nullify. More particularly,
BASECO prays that this Court-
1) declare unconstitutional and void
Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2;
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 261 | P a g e
2) annul the sequestration order dated April-
14, 1986, and all other orders subsequently
inclusive of the takeover order of July 14,
1986 and the termination of the services of
the BASECO executives.
As to order to produce documents it argues
that the order to produce corporate
records from 1973 to 1986, which it has
apparently already complied with, was
issued without court authority and infringed
its constitutional right against self-
incrimination, and unreasonable search and
seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a
violation of BASECO’s Right Against Self-
Incrimanation.
HELD:
BASECO also contends that its right against
self incrimination and unreasonable searches
and seizures had been transgressed by the
Order of April 18, 1986 which required it
"to produce corporate records from 1973 to
1986 under pain of contempt of the
Commission if it fails to do so." The order
was issued upon the authority of Section 3
(e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating of the
PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas
requiring * * the production of such books,
papers, contracts, records, statements of
accounts and other documents as may be
material to the investigation conducted by
the Commission, " and paragraph (3),
Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its
power to "require all persons in the
Philippines holding * * (alleged "ill-gotten")
assets or properties, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, in their names as
nominees, agents or trustees, to make full
disclosure of the same * *." The contention
lacks merit.
It is elementary that the right against self-
incrimination has no application to
juridical persons.
While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions
unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not
follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges
and franchises, may refuse to
show its hand when charged
with an abuse of such
privileges .
Relevant jurisprudence is also cited by the
Solicitor General.
* * corporations are not
entitled to all of the
constitutional protections
which private individuals
have. * * They are not at all
within the privilege against
self-incrimination, although
this court more than once has
said that the privilege runs
very closely with the 4th
Amendment's Search and
Seizure provisions. It is also
settled that an officer of the
company cannot refuse to
produce its records in its
possession upon the plea that
they will either incriminate
him or may incriminate
it." (Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186; emphasis, the
Solicitor General's).
* * The corporation is a
creature of the state. It is
presumed to be incorporated
for the benefit of the public.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 262 | P a g e
It received certain special
privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the
laws of the state and the
limitations of its charter. Its
powers are limited by law. It
can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its
rights to act as a corporation
are only preserved to it so
long as it obeys the laws of
its creation. There is a reserve
right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and
find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold
that a state, having chartered
a corporation to make use of
certain franchises, could not,
in the exercise of
sovereignty, inquire how
these franchises had been
employed, and whether they
had been abused, and demand
the production of the
corporate books and papers
for that purpose. The defense
amounts to this, that an
officer of the corporation
which is charged with a
criminal violation of the
statute may plead the
criminality of such
corporation as a refusal to
produce its books. To state
this proposition is to answer
it. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions
unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not
follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges
and franchises may refuse to
show its hand when charged
 with an abuse of such
privileges. (Wilson v. United
States, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780
[emphasis, the Solicitor
General's])
At any rate, Executive Order No. 14-A,
amending Section 4 of Executive Order No.
14 assures protection to individuals required
to produce evidence before the PCGG
against any possible violation of his right
against self-incrimination. It gives them
immunity from prosecution on the basis of
testimony or information he is compelled to
present. As amended, said Section 4 now
provides that —
The witness may not refuse
to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other
information compelled under
the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony, or other
information) may be used
against the witness in any
criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil 57
FRANCISCO BELTRAN,
PETITIONER, VS. FELIX SAMSON,
JUDGE OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, AND FRANCISCO JOSE,
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF ISABELA,
RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929 ]
Facts:
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 263 | P a g e
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition...
etitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter.
for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not
it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified.
petitioner, in refusing to perform what the
fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the
Jones Law and incorporated in General
Orders, No. 58.
English text of the Jones Law, which is the
original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
Issues:
Whether the constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioner prohibits
compulsion to execute what is enjoined
upon him by the order against which these
proceedings were taken.
whether the writing from the fiscal's
dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence... against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination
Ruling:
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his
case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that
a certain writing or signature is in his own
hand, he may on cross-examination be
compelled to write in open court in order
that the jury may be able to compare his
handwriting with the... one in question.
waived his personal privileges.
But the cases so resolved cannot be
compared to the one now before us.
in the case before us, writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and
in the case at bar writing means that the
petitioner... herein is to furnish a means to
determine whether or not he is the falsifier,
as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states
We say that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence... against himself.
And we say that the present case is more
serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels,
because here... the witness is compelled to
write and create, by means of the act of
writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as... the falsifi
But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
a specimen or specimens without resorting
to the means complained of herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the... constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent... persons.
Wherefore, we find the present action well
taken, and it is ordered that the respondents
and those under their orders desist and
abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose
of submitting the latter... for comparison.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 264 | P a g e
Principles:
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41
Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court
preferred to rest its decision on the reason of
the case rather than on blind adherence to
tradition. The said reason of the case there
consisted in that it was a case of the...
examination of the body by physicians,
which could be and doubtless was
interpreted by this court, as being no
compulsion of the petitioner therein to
furnish evidence by means of a testimonial
act. In reality she was not compelled to
execute any positive act, much less... a
testimonial act; she was only enjoined from
something, preventing the examination; all
of which is very different from what is
required of the petitioner in the present case,
where it is sought to compel him to perform
a positive, testimonial act, to write and give
a... specimen of his handwriting for the
purpose of comparison. Besides, in the case
of Villaflor vs. Summers, it was sought to
exhibit something already in existence,
while in the case at bar, the question deals
with something not yet in existence, and it is
precisely... sought to compel the petitioner
to make, prepare, or produce by this means,
evidence not yet in existence; in short, to
create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.
Statutory immunity
i. Two types – Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
231 SCRA 783, GR No. 100295, April
26, 1994
MAPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
STATUTORY IMMUNITY
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation
of Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices.However he was granted an
immunity from suit by the PCGG related to
the previous charges against him, provided
that he will testify as witness against the
Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the
United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during
the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his
wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for
charges of corruption. All the expenses of
Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when
they flew to New York to testify against the
Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand
Marcos died and La Bella, the American
prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa
and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since
Mapa, was not able to testify, it was
contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect.
However, the record shows that the
petitioners provided information to the
PCGG relating to the prosecution of the
RICO cases against the Marcoses in New
York. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the
PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.
HELD:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has
the separate power to grant immunity to any
person from being prosecuted provided they
will meet the conditions provided by the
PCGG.
In the case at bar, Mapa was granted
immunity from the prosecution or criminal
case where he is being tried, and the PCGG
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 265 | P a g e
even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa
when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the
conditions and the PCGG accepted the
information given by him (MAPA) to testify
against the Marcoses during the RICO trial.
Failure of the petitioner to testify on the
RICO can not nullify the immunity given to
him by the PCGG since the petitioner was
able to satisfy the requirements both of the
law and the parties’ implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were not
able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO,
it can be said that it not their own fault.
Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted
on the basis of the immunity granted by the
PCGG, which under the law has the power
to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE
GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint
he scope of its protection. By its grant the
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offence whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is
only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will
not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution.
Double-Jeopardy
a. Two kinds
i. Same “Offense
G.R. No. 172192, December 23, 2008
LAMERA VS CA
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14
March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig,
Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then
driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino
Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations
were filed against petitioner: (a) an
Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code and (b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on
Abandonment of one's victim.
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its
decision in finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to
the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27
April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for
violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of
not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but
which was denied. He raised before the SC
that that he cannot be penalized twice for an
“accident” and another for “recklessness.”
He maintained that since he is facing a
criminal charge for reckless imprudence,
which offense carries heavier penalties
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, he could no longer be charged under
Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for
failing to render to the persons whom he has
accidentally injured.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 266 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
is a bar to prosecution for abandonment
under Article 275 of the same Code because
it constitutes double jeopardy.
RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles
penalize different and distinct offenses. The
rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner
has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore,
apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
Hence, the petition should be dismissed for
lack of merit.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses
under the Revised Penal Code. In People vs.
Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal
rule that the protection against double
jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. Where two
different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
The two informations filed against petitioner
are clearly for separate offenses. The first,
for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls
under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi
Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. The second, for Abandonment of
one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of
Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of Book Two of the same
Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are
committed by means of culpa. Crimes
against Security are committed by means of
dolo.
Where the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses
charged. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only
where an identity is shown to exist between
the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged.
Same “Act”
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
G.R. No. L-45129, 06 March 1987
FACTS OF THE CASE
On 01 February 1975,
members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the
Batangas Electric Light System,
equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas
City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena
Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned
and operated by Manuel Opulencia.
The police discovered that electric
wiring, devices and contraptions had
been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government,
and “architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building”
owned by Opulencia. During the
subsequent investigation, Manuel
Opulencia admitted in a written
statement that he had caused the
installation of the electric devices in
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 267 | P a g e
order to lower or decrease the
readings of electric power
consumption in the electric meter of
the plant.
On 24 November 1975, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the City Court of
Batangas City an Information against
Manuel Opulencia for violation of
Ordinance 1, Series of 1974
Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance was under its terms,
punishable by a fine “ranging from
Php5.00 to Php50.00 or
imprisonment, which shall not
exceed 30 days, or both, at the
discretion of the cout” Opulencia
pleaded not guilty to the Information
filed. On 02 February 1976, he filed
a Motion to Dismiss on ground that
the crime charged had already
prescribed and that the civil
indemnity sought to be recovered
was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court. In an Order
dated 06 April 1976, the motion was
granted on ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged
was a light felony which prescribes 2
months from the time of discovery
thereof, and it appearing further that
the Information was filed by the
fiscal more than 9 months after
discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975.
On 20 April 1976 or 14 days
after, another Information was filed
against Opulencia, this time for theft
of electric power under Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code. Prior to the arraignment,
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash
dated 05 May 1976 alleging that he
had been previously acquitted of the
 offense charged in the second
Information and that the filing
thereof violated his constitutional
right against double jeopardy. The
motion was granted and the case was
dismissed. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but was
denied by the court. The City Fiscal
filed a petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus was filed before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not under the 2nd
Information, Opulencia could - if he
failed to plead double jeopardy- be
convicted of the same act charged in
the 1st Information, in which he has
already been acquitted.
RULING
Our Bill of Rights deals with
two (2) kinds of double jeopardy.
The first sentence of clause 20,
section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that “no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.”
The second sentence of said clause
provides that “if an act is punishable
by law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” The
first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, while the second
contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act.
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Put a little differently, where
the offenses charged are penalized
either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes,
the important inquiry relates to the
identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is
shown to exist between the earlier
and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one
offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts
which the accused is said to have
committed and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses:
the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the
first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the
offense charged under a statute.
The identity of offenses that
must be shown need not be absolute
identity, the first and second offenses
maybe regarded as the same offense
where the second offense necessarily
included the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first
offense or where the second offense
is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof.
In the instant case, it remains
to point out that the dismissal by the
Batangas City Court of the
Information for Violation of
Batangas Ordinance on ground of
prescription amounts to an acquittal
of the accused for that offense.
 Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based
on prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO,
Respondents. Double Jeopardy Requisites
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections,
Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape, a
relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost.
Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando
designated Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San
Vicente, Palawan. On February 2000,
Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M.
Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was
resolved against Villapando and Tiape and
the two were charged for violation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code with the
Sandiganbayan. Upon arraignment on
September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not
guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape
was dismissed after the prosecution proved
his death which occurred on July 26, 2000.
Villapando filed his Demurrer to Evidence
the Sandiganbayan found with merit and
acquitted him of the crime charged. The
Ombudsman filed a petition through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Villapando can be
prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING: Yes, because the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court
grants the demurrer to evidence, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case
that such ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman
argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because its interpretation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does
not complement the provision on the one-
year prohibition found in the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government
Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution which states no
candidate who has lost in any election shall,
within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or
any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991, for its part, states that except
for losing candidates in barangay elections,
no candidate who lost in any election shall,
within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or
any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
Petitioner argues that the court erred when it
ruled that temporary prohibition is not
synonymous with the absence of lack of
legal qualification. The Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division held that the qualifications
for a position are provided by law and that it
may well be that one who possesses the
required legal qualification for a position
may be temporarily disqualified for
appointment to a public position by reason
of the one-year prohibition imposed on
losing candidates. However, there is no
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code should a person suffering from
temporary disqualification be appointed so
long as the appointee possesses all the
qualifications stated in the law. In this case,
the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency.
Legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification in
order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991. Grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
MRs and appeals
LEJANO VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 176389
January 18, 2011
FACTS:
The SC reversed the judgment of the CA
and acquitted the accused in this case,
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 270 | P a g e
Gerardo Biong of the charges against them
on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, Lauro
G. Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider
its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility;
issued a tainted and erroneous decision;
decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice; or committed
grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence
and prosecution witnesses."
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment of acquittal may
be reconsidered.
RULING:
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be
reconsidered because it places the accused
under double jeopardy. To reconsider a
judgment of acquittal places the accused
twice in jeopardy of being punished for the
crime of which he has already been
absolved. There is reason for this provision
of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the
full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense
after he has been acquitted, the infinite
power and capacity of the State for a
sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms
of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration
after an acquittal is possible. But the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when
the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred.
In any of such cases, the State may assail the
decision by special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65.
Although complainant Vizconde invoked the
exceptions, he has been unable to bring his
pleas for reconsideration under such
exceptions. He has not specified the
violations of due process or acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed.
Kinds of ex post facto law
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A.
No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI,
INC., petitioner.
FACTS:
Kay Villegas Kami, filed a petition
for declaratory relief, claiming to be
duly recognized and existing non-
stock and non-profit corporation
which was created under the laws of
land, praying for the determination
of it validity of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6132 and the declaration of
petitioner’s rights and duties, in
pursuing its purposes through
supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will
propagate its ideology.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 8 of R.A. Np.
6132 violates the due process
clauses, right of association, freedom
of expression, is unconstitutional and
an ex post facto law.
RULING:
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The Supreme Court hereby declare
that the prayer of the petition is
denied. Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 does
not violate any rule of law, is not
unconstitutional, and os not an ex
post facto law. While it is true that
Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any
provision of R.A. No. 6132 including
Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed
after the approval of the law and not
those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law
that remotely insinuates that Sec.
8(a) and 18, or any other provision
thereof, shall apply to acts carried
out prior to its approval. On the
contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the
entire law shall be effective upon its
approval. It was approved
on August 24, 1970.
Bill of attainderPeople vs Ferrer G.R. Nos.
L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against the respondent
Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the government. Co moved to
quash on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another
criminal complaint was filed with before
Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion,
as they were tagged as officers of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a
subversive organization instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for
the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. Tayag also moved to quash the
complaint on the grounds that (1) it is a bill
of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the
title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a
statute applies either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become
a bill of attainder. In this case, when the act
is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the member
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What
it does is simple to declare the party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition. The term "Communist Part of
the Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to
the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also to "any organisation having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct.
Comelec jurisdictions vis-à-vis
HRET jurisdiction
a. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v.
COMELEC, GR No. 207264, 2013-06-25
Facts:
Respondent
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Tan led before the COMELEC
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner on the ground that it... contained
material misrepresentations... she is a
Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an
American citizen.
During the course of the proceedings,...
provides a database record of the Bureau of
Immigration indicating that... petitioner is an
American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport
COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution... cancelling petitioner's COC
The COMELEC First Division found that,
contrary to the declarations that she made in
her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225
Four days thereafter... petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections.
COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of
Finality... declaring
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final
and executory
On same day, petitioner took her oath of
office... before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term
of which officially starts at noon of 30 June
2013.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was
ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed... because pursuant to Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be
the "sole judge of all contests... relating to
the election, returns and qualifications" of
the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Issues:
Whether or not Respondent Comelec is
without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for
the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.
When is a candidate considered a Member
of the House of Representatives?
Ruling:
It is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) appears to be a non-issue
Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications, as well as over the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has
not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins
only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives,...
the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House
of Representatives... only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it
is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over... the question.
once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 273 | P a g e
jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and... qualifications
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be
considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed
office.
To repeat what has earlier been said, the
term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only "at noon on
the... thirtieth day of June next following
their election."
Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported
Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano
Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this
is not the oath of office which confers
membership to the House of
Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the
Rules of the House of Representatives
provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members.
Members shall take their oath or affirmation
either collectively or individually before the
Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or
official taking of the oath it must be made
(1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open
session. Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during... plenary
or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office
was indeed complied with.
Comelec jurisdictions vis-à-vis HRET
jurisdiction
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO VS.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
R. BELMONTE, JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
(Velasco) and respondent Regina Ongsiako
Reyes (Reyes) were contenders in the May
2013 elections for the lone congressional
seat representing the province of
Marinduque. On October 10, 2012, one
Joseph Tan (Tan) a registered voter of the
province filed with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to DENY
DUE COURSE or CANCEL the
CERTIFICATE of CANDIDACY (COC) of
Reyes as candidate on the ground of false
material representation. Docketed as SPA
No. 13-053, on March 27, 2013, the
COMELEC First Division resolved to grant
the petition. Accordingly, Reyes’ COC was
cancelled. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion
for reconsideration (MR) thereto with the
COMELEC En Banc. Pending the resolution
of Reyes’ MR, the synchronized local and
national elections were held on May 13,
2013. Just a day after the election or on May
14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
resolution denying Reyes’ MR and
affirming the resolution of the COMELEC
First Division cancelling Reyes’ COC. Copy
of the resolution was received by the
Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marinduque on May 15, 2013. Likewise,
Reyes’ counsel received a copy of the same
on May 16, 2013. Despite receipt of the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 274 | P a g e
COMELCE Resolution, the Marinduque
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), on
May 18, 2013, proclaimed Reyes as the
winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the
position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque. On May 31, 2013,
petitioner Velasco filed an Election Protest
Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028,
entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On the same date, a Petition for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed
against respondent Reyes before the HRET
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027,
entitled "Christopher P. Matienzo v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes." Meanwhile, on June 5,
2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality in SPA No. 13-053.
On June 7, 2013, respondent Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. administered the
oath of office to Reyes. Thereafter, on June
10, 2013, respondent Reyes filed before the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 207264, entitled
“Regina Ongsiako Reye vs. COMELEC and
Joseph Socorro Tan to assail the (1) May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
that denied her MR of the March 27, 2013
resolution of the COMELEC First Division
cancelling her COC for material
misrepresentations; and, (2) the June 5, 2013
Certificate of Finality. In the meantime,
Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-
010, assailing the proceedings of the PBOC
and the proclamation of Reyes as null and
void. The said petition, however, on June
19, 2013, was denied by the COMELEC.
Petitioner Velasco filed an MR of the said
COMELEC resolution in SPC No. 13-010.
Pending resolution by the COMELEC of
petitioner’s MR in SPC No. 13-010, on June
25, 2013, the Supreme Court promulgated a
resolution in G.R. No. 207264, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC; and thus, dismissing the
aforementioned petition of Reyes and
affirming the May 14, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc upholding the
March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division in SPA No. 13-
053 which cancelled Reyes’ COC. Later,
Reyes would file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Court’s
Resolution in G.R. No. 207264. At noon of
June 30, 2013, however, it would appear that
respondent Reyes assumed office and started
discharging the functions of a Member of
the House of Representatives. Later on July
9, 2013, acting on the motion for
reconsideration of Velasco in SPC No. 13-
010, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the
June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition
and declared null and void and without legal
effect the proclamation of Reyes. It declared
and proclaimed as the winning candidate for
the position of representative in the House
of Representative for the province of
Marinduque the petitioner, Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco. No challenge on the said
resolution was filed nor forwarded
thereafter. When the 16th Congress formally
convened in a joint session on July 22, 2013,
Reyes, as the recognized elected
Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, along with the rest of the
Members of the House of Representatives,
took their oaths in open session before
respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. On
October 22, 2013, Reyes’ MR of this Court's
June 25, 2013 Resolution in G.R. No.
207264 was denied by this Court with order
for Entry of Judgment. On December 5,
2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively,
Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially
demanding that she vacate the office of
Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque and to relinquish the same in
his favor. On December 10, 2013 and
February 4, 2014, respectively, Velasco
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 275 | P a g e
wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
requesting that he be allowed to assume the
position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque but to no avail. On
February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter
to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his
earlier requests to delete the name of Reyes
from the Roll of Members and register his
name in her place as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. As such, petitioner Velasco
related that his efforts proved futile. He
alleged that despite all the letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize
him as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in
the face of numerous written demands for
Reyes to vacate the position and office of
the Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque, she continues to discharge the
duties of said position. Hence, the instant
Petition for Mandamus with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction.
ISSUE:
As argued by respondent Reyes, whether or
not the petition for mandamus as filed by
petitioner Velasco is a veiled petition for
quo warranto involving a member of the
House of the Representatives, for which the
Court has no jurisdiction but the HRET, as it
essentially seeks a declaration that she has
usurped the subject office, and the
installation of Velasco in her place;
HELD:
The petition has merit. Preliminarily, the
Supreme Court noted that the respondents
have taken advantage of the instant petition
to re-litigate what has been settled in G.R.
No. 207264 which resolved with finality
affirming the COMELEC En Banc
resolution upholding the COMELEC First
Division resolution to cancel the COC of
respondent Reyes. The foregoing
collectively has lead the Court to consider
the facts as settled and beyond dispute that -
Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate
for the Representative of the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque. Reyes
argued that the Court is devoid of original
jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
According to respondent, instead, it is the
HRET that is constitutionally mandated to
resolve any questions regarding her election,
the returns of such election, and her
qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives, especially so that she has
already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and
started to discharge her duties as a Member
of the House of Representatives representing
the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. But the Court refuted that the
confluence of the three acts in her case – her
(1) proclamation, (2) oath and (3)
assumption of office - has not altered the
legal situation between that of the petitioner
Velasco and of the respondent Reyes.
According to the Court, the important point
of reference should be the date the
COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
COC of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013.
The Court held that the most crucial time is
when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her
non-eligibility to run as Representative of
the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque - for without a valid COC,
Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in
the election and much less as a duly
proclaimed winner. That the said particular
decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes'
proclamation, and which was affirmed by
this Court's final and executory Resolutions
dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
Moreover, the Court held that it will not
give premium to the illegal actions of a
subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 276 | P a g e
PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May
14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc cancelling Reyes' COC, still
proclaimed her as the winning candidate on
May 18, 2013. That it should also be noted
that as early as May 16, 2013 or a couple of
days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had
already received the said decision cancelling
her COC. These points, said the Court,
clearly show that the much argued
proclamation was made in clear defiance of
the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
The dates and events, as per the Supreme
Court, indicate that there was no basis for
the proclamation of petitioner on May 18,
2013. Without the (1) proclamation, the
petitioner's (2) oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of
office, there can be (3) no valid and
effective assumption of office. Hence,
without the confluence of the three acts in
this case, respondent cannot be deemed a
bona fide member of the House of
Representative to vest the HRET of
jurisdiction and not the Court nor the
COMELEC. Finally, the Supreme Court
ruled that the petition is properly for
Mandamus and not for Quo Warranto.
Hence, the Petition for Mandamus and
Injunction of Velasco is GRANTED.
Abayon v. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondents Lucaban, Jr. et al. filed a
petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against AangatTayo and its nominee,
petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo wasnot
eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent
themarginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Further, they pointed out that
petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified
to sit in the House as a party-list nominee
since she did not belong to themarginalized
and underrepresented sectors, she being the
wife of an incumbent congressional
districtrepresentative. She moreover lost her
bid as party-list representative of the party-
list organizationcalled An Waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10,
2004.
Petitioner Abayon pointed out that
respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over
the petition for quowarranto since the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization was a matter that fell withinthe
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was
Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions
involving her eligibility asfirst nominee, said
Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued
an order, dismissing the petition as against
Aangat Tayo butupholding its jurisdiction
over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
She moved for reconsiderationbut the HRET
denied the same on September 17, 2009,
prompting Abayon to file the present
petitionfor special civil action of certiorari
Issues:
Whether or not respondent HRET has
jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioner Abayon as
nominee of Aangat Tayo party-list
organization, who took the seat at the House
of Representatives
Held:
RA 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests
in the COMELEC the authority to determine
which parties ororganizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the
House of Representatives duringthe
elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto filed with it
insofar as theysought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo. Since petitioner Abayon was
not elected into office butwas chosen by its
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organization under its internal rules, the
HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into
andadjudicate her qualifications as nominee.
But, although it is the party-list organization
that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organizationthat sits and becomes a member
of the House of Representatives. Section 5,
Article VI of theConstitution clearly shows
the Constitution’s point of view that it is the
party-list representatives whoare “elected”
into office, not their parties or organizations.
Petitioners Abayon points out that the
authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-listnominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is
true, initially. But where anallegation is
made that the party or organization had
chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee
tobecome its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure
that goes withthe position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand. Section
17, Article VI of theConstitution provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among otherthings, the
qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed
outabove, party-list nominees are “elected
members” of the House of Representatives
no less than thedistrict representatives are,
the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications
The Party-list System
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list
representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as
members of the House of Representatives.
Upon petition for respondents, who were
party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38
additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list
system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least
20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or
is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should
the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for the party-list seats in the House
of Representatives. The Constitution vested
Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of
its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties
participating in the system to obtain at least
2% of the total votes cast for the party list
system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list
representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20 additional
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 278 | P a g e
representatives of first party = # of votes of
first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of
votes of concerned party/ # votes of first
party x additional seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement
and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold,
Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having
a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state,
all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful
local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the
petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this
Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in
the system. All parties with at least two
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the
other parties. Since the distribution is based
on proportional representation, the number
of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation.
Qualifications of Party-List representatives
(Sec. 9 of RA 7941)
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19,
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203922 & etc., [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL
454-753
FACTS
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties
were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily
for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming elections.
However, since the Court adopts new
parameters in the qualification of the party-
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC
in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for
the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming
elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision. Moreover,
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
"onehalf of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." This
provision clearly shows again that the party-
list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons. First, the
other one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives,
clearly negating the idea that the partylist
system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation
of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means
that, after this period, there will be no seats
reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system. Hence, the clear intent,
express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed:
the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties. R.A. No. 7941 does not require
national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them
from the party-list system is to prevent them
from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 280 | P a g e
intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Qualifications for Public Office are
Continuing Requirements
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193
June 23, 1989
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed
office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter
(hereafter, League), represented by its
President, Salvador Estuye, who was also
suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo
admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on
his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by
its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case
for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order
dated February 21, 1988. He then came to
this Court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to ask that the said orders be set
aside on the ground that they had been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued
a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at
the same time required comments from the
respondents.
ISSUE : Wether or not Juan G. Frivaldo
was a citizen of the Philippines at the time
of his election on January 18, 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the
other issues raised in this petition are merely
secondary to this basic question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the
provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the
Local Government Code that a candidate for
local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on
November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United
States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by
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CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken
these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he
had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the
Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken.
The herein private respondents are seeking
to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to
discharge his office of governor because he
is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
If, say, a female legislator were to marry a
foreigner during her term and by her act or
omission acquires his nationality, would she
have a right to remain in office simply
because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and
not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered
only eight months after his proclamation and
his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a
person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to
another country. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the
status of the natural-born citizen is favored
by the Constitution and our laws, which is
all the more reason why it should be
treasured like a pearl of great price. But
once it is surrendered and renounced, the
gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not
quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty
and love.
-END-
Vice of Ineligibility Cannot be Cured by
Election
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND MUSTAPHA J.
OMAR,Respondents.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 282 | P a g e
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
position of Municipal Mayor of South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar)
filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancel Hayudini's CoC. Omar basically
asserted that Hayudini should be
disqualified for making false representation
regarding his residence. He claimed that
Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a
resident of the Municipality of South Ubian
when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for
Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar
Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition
on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the
COMELEC's First Division dismissed
Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's
CoC for lack of substantial evidence that
Hayudini committed false representation as
to his residency.
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the
case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8,
2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and
ordered the deletion of Hayudini's name in
Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of
voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed
before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S.
Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event
on March 26, 2013.
Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals but was
denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the
mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi.
He was proclaimed and, consequently, took
his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution granting Omars
second petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC.
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc, arguing that its Second Division
committed grave error when it gave due
course to a belatedly filed petition and
treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as
a supervening event. The COMELEC En
Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. The
COMELEC declared Omar as the mayor.
Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Hayudini mainly advances the following
arguments:
ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring Omar as the duly-elected mayor
HELD: The Court finds the petition to be
without merit.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELEC rules of
procedures; liberal construction
Hayudini contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted, and later granted, Omars petition
despite failure to comply with Sections 2
and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by Resolution No.
9523. The subject sections read:
Section 2. Period to File Petition. The
Petition must be filed within five (5) days
from the last day for filing of certificate of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 283 | P a g e
candidacy; but not later than twenty five
(25) days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy subject of the
Petition. In case of a substitute candidate,
the Petition must be filed within five (5)
days from the time the substitute candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned
procedural missteps, the Court sustains the
COMELECs liberal treatment of Omars
petition.
As a general rule, statutes providing for
election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep
in office, for an indefinite period, one whose
right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It
is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared, not only for the benefit of the
winner but for the sake of public interest,
which can only be achieved by brushing
aside technicalities of procedure that
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action. This principle was reiterated in the
cases of Tolentino v. Commission on
Elections and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections, where the Court held that in
exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the
integrity of elections, the COMELEC must
not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes.
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power
to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice,
including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matters pending before it. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective
and efficient implementation of its
objectives - ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC.
Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It
involves not only the adjudication of private
and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling
the uncertainty which beclouds the real
choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has
the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, whom the
people truly chose as their rightful leader.
POLITICAL LAW: false representation in
the certificate of candidacy
The same ruling adequately equipped Omar
with the necessary ground to successfully
have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the
rules, a statement in a certificate of
candidacy claiming that a candidate is
eligible to run for public office when in truth
he is not, is a false material representation, a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.
The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his
date \of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 284 | P a g e
laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
The false representation mentioned in these
provisions must pertain to a material fact,
not to a mere innocuous mistake. A
candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot
serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
These facts pertain to a candidate's
qualification for elective office, such as his
or her citizenship and residence. Similarly,
the candidate's status as a registered voter
falls under this classification as it is a legal
requirement which must be reflected in the
CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the
candidate, if he or she wins, will work for
and represent the local government under
which he or she is running. Even the will of
the people, as expressed through the ballot,
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
the instant case, that the candidate was
qualified.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a
false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Simply put, it must be made with a
malicious intent to deceive the electorate as
to the potential candidate's qualifications for
public office.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state
under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has
a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he
is not a registered voter in the municipality
where he intends to be elected, but still he
states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public
office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation, a ground to
support a petition under Section 78. It is
interesting to note that Hayudini was, in
fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a
voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB
issued a certificate confirm in the
disapproval of Hayudini's petition for
registration. This is precisely the reason why
he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in
the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he
stated in his CoC that he is eligible for said
office," Hayudini made a clear and material
misrepresentation as to his eligibility,
because he was not, in fact, registered as a
voter in Barangay Bintawlan.
Who are Filipino Citizens - Art. IV, Secs. 1-
5 "Vice-President", of the Philippines which
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and
FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
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G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s
disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material
facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy
by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being
foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme
Court may resolve the basic issue on the
case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not it is the Supreme
Court which had jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding “qualification of a
candidate” for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers
to “contests” relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or
the Supreme Court may take cognizance,
and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the
prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s
birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the
latter’s death certificate was identified as a
Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would
have been born in 1870. In the absence of
any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior
his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s
father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as
Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent
was born only before the assailed marriage
had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship
in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
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Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Who are Filipino Citizens - Art. IV,
Secs. 1-5
DAVID vs SET GR no.221538,
September 20, 2016
FACTS
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned
at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was
later adopted and raised by spouses FPJ and
Susan Roces. She took her college degree in
the USA. She returns to the Philippines
frequently.
On July 29, 1991, Sen Poe decided to settle
in the US with her husband and children
lived there for sometime. She was
naturalized and granted American
citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was
subsequently given a US Passport.
When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she
returned to support her father’s candidacy.
After the elections, she returned to the US
on July 8, 2004.
On Dec. 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in
the country until Feb. 3, 2005 to attend her
father’s funeral and to attend to the settling
of his estate.
In 2004, Sen Poe resigned from work in the
US and decided to return home in 2005. She
came back on May 24, 2005. On July 7,
2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and
or Re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship
and derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children were granted. Sen Poe
became a registered voter of Barangay Sta.
Lucia, San Juan City on Aug. 31, 2006.
Sen. Poe made several trips to the USA
between 2006 and 2009 using her US
Passport. She used her passport after having
taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
on July 7, 2006, but not after she has
formally renounced her American
citizenship on Oct. 20, 2010.
On Oct. 6, 2010,Pres. Aquino appointed Sen
Poe as chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB). On Oct. 20, 2010, Sen. Poe
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of
American citizenship.
Sen. Poe executed an Oath/ Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the US on
July 12, 2011.
Sen. Poe decided to run as Senator in the
2013 Elections and eventually won.
David, a losing candidate in the 2013
Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto on Aug. 6, 2015. He contested the
election of Sen. Poe for failing to comply
with the citizenship and residing
requirements mandated by the Constitution.
On Nov. 17, 2015, the SET promulgated its
assailed Decision finding Sen. Poe to be a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified
to hold office as Senator.
ISSUE
Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a
Senator
RULING
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Voting 9-3, the High Court ruled in favor of
Poe.
Foundlings ( children born in the Philippines
with unknown parentage ) were, by birth,
accorded natural born citizenship by the
Constitution. Natural born citizens by legal
fiction the framers of the Constitution were
sufficiently empowered to create a class of
natural born citizens by legal fictions, as an
exception to the jus sanguinis rule. This is
evident from Art. 1 ( State to determine who
are its nationals ) and Art. 2 ( questions on
nationality to be determined by the law of
the State ) of the 1930 Hague Convention.
Poe validly reacquired her natural born
Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, as required
under Sec. 3, RA 9225. Before assuming her
position as MTRCB Chairman. Poe
executed an affidavit of renunciation of
foreign citizenship. This was sufficient to
qualify her for her appointive position, and
later, her elective office as RA 9225 did not
require that her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the US Embassy be
first approved in order that she may qualify
for office. Records of the Bureau of
Immigration show that Poe still used her US
Passport after having taken her Oath of
Allegiance but not after she has renounced
her US citizenship.
Dual Citizen from Birth - Cordora v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 176947, February
19, 2009
CASE DIGEST : CORDORA VS
TAMBUNTING
G.R. No. 176947 February 19,
2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
FACTS : In his complaint affidavit filed
before the COMELEC Law Department,
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made
false assertions. Cordora stated that
Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the
required citizenship and residency
requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a
natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an
American: upon arrival in the Philippines on
16 December 2000 and upon departure from
the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According
to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii
on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
The COMELEC Law Department
recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s
complaint against Tambunting because
Cordora failed to substantiate his charges
against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on
the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an
American passport is not sufficient to prove
that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. The
COMELEC En Banc was convinced that
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Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambunting by sufficient and
convincing evidence.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration
which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution
promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE : WON there is Probable Cause to
Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having
Committed an Election Offense
HELD : Probable cause constitutes those
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed.
Determining probable cause is an
intellectual activity premised on the prior
physical presentation or submission of
documentary or testimonial proofs either
confirming, negating or qualifying the
allegations in the complain
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of
a Filipino mother and an American father.
Neither does he deny that he underwent the
process involved in INS Form I-130
(Petition for Relative) because of his father’s
citizenship. Tambunting claims that because
of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is
both Filipino and American by birth.
Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American
citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s
observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of
his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization
process to acquire American citizenship.
The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at
birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is an American. However,
the same certification showed nine other
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed
dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001
elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both
states
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.
in Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual
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citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship
and desire to run for elective public office in
the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an
oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
The twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served
as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v.
Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v.
COMELEC,14 and Japzon v.
COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-
born Filipinos who later became naturalized
citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the
present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to him.
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed
to meet the residency requirement because
of Tambunting’s naturalization as an
American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because
Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
election laws, includes the twin elements of
the fact of residing in a fixed place and the
intention to return there permanently,16 and
is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora
failed to establish that Tambunting indeed
willfully made false entries in his certificates
of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting
sufficiently proved his innocence of the
charge filed against him. Tambunting is
eligible for the office which he sought to be
elected and fulfilled the citizenship and
residency requirements prescribed by law.
Dual Citizen from Birth
CIRILO R. VALLES VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND ROSALIND
YBASCO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000, August 09, 2000
FACTS:
Private Respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and
Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at
the age of fifteen, she left Australia and
came to settle in the Philippines. On June
27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo
Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate
Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she
has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992,
she ran for and was elected governor of
Davao Oriental. In the 1995 local elections,
Respondent Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent
filed a petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC contesting her Filipino
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citizenship but said petition was dismissed
by the COMELEC. Her citizenship was
once again raised as an issue when she ran
for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles. COMELEC
dismissed the petition for disqualification.
Hence, this petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Citizenship of Private Respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
RULING:
The petition is unmeritorious. Private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is
qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental.
1. RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP
MUST BE EXPRESS
In order that citizenship may be lost by
renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner‟s contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. Thus, the mere
fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do
not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for
an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one‟s citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent
for an alien certificate of registration, and
her holding of an Australian passport, as in
the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were
mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced
the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63,
the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing one‟s
Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioner‟s claim
that respondent must go through the process
of repatriation does not hold water.
2. DUAL ALLEGIANCE, NOT DUAL
CITIZENSHIP, GROUND FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs.
Manzano, the Court clarified “dual
citizenship” as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance.
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and
as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be
also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with
dual allegiance. The Court succinctly
pronounced: “xxx the phrase „dual
citizenship‟ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to „dual allegiance‟.
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.” Thus, the fact that the
private respondent had dual citizenship did
not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it
was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
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certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. The
filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed
to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen. This is so because in the certificate
of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which
is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy
in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.
Recantation of Oath of Renunciation
MAQUILING VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence
of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen
of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and
took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10
July 2008. On the same day an order of
approval of his citizenship retention and re-
acquisition was issued in his favour. In
2009, Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit
of renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and
presented a record indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport in entering
and departing the Philippines. COMELEC
issued an order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer. After Arnado
failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default. In 2010 election,
Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor. It was
only after his proclamation that Arnado filed
his answer. COMELEC first division ruled
for his disqualification. Petitioner
Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of
Kausawagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming
that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy
and the nullification of his proclamation,
him, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En
Banc held that it shall continue with the trial
and hearing. However, it reversed and set
aside the ruling of first division and granted
Arnado’s MR. Maquiling filed the instant
petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that he be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport
after renouncing foreign citizenship amount
to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use
of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
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required to qualify one to run for an elective
position. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides: Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: x x
x x (2)Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. x x x Rommel Arnado took all the
necessary steps to qualify to run for a public
office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is
no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office. By
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was
deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a
foreign citizenship. Arnado himself
subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public
office. Between 03 April 2009, the date he
renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions
that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an
American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a
full divestment of all civil and political
rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship. While the act of
using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position. When Arnado used his US
passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven
days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself
of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of
America." We agree with the COMELEC
En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
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earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local
position. The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one. It
must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack. Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right
of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be
deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his
US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his
situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections. With Arnado being barred from
even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast
in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
Change of Domicile
Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
 COMELEC denied Sabili’s
Certificate of Candidacy for mayor
of Lipa due to failure to comply with
the one year residency requirement.
 When petitioner filed his COC1 for
mayor of Lipa City for the 2010
elections, he stated therein that he
had been a resident of the city for
two (2) years and eight (8) months.
 However, it is undisputed that when
petitioner filed his COC during the
2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral
home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San
Juan, Batangas.
 respondent Florencio Librea (private
respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny
Due Course and to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification
 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared
under oath in his COC that he had
already been a resident of Lipa City
for two years and eight months prior
to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections.
 In its Resolution dated 26 January
2010,41 the COMELEC Second
Division granted the Petition of
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private respondent, declared
petitioner as disqualified from
seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa
City, and canceled his Certificate of
Candidacy for his not being a
resident of Lipa City and for his
failure to meet the statutory one-year
residency requirement under the law.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC, during the pendency
of which the 10 May 2010 local
elections were held. The next day, he
was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Lipa City after garnering
the highest number of votes cast for
the said position. He accordingly
filed a Manifestation42with the
COMELEC en banc to reflect this
fact.
 In its Resolution dated 17 August
2010,43 the COMELEC en
banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner.
 Hence, petitioner filed with this
Court a Petition (Petition for
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a
Status Quo Order and for the
Conduct of a Special Raffle of this
Case) under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the annulment of the 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010
Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issues:
 Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local
elective officials.
Ruling:
 As a general rule, the Court does not
ordinarily review the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. However, exceptions
thereto have been established,
including when the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of
evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error
of jurisdiction. In these instances, the
Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and
correct the COMELEC's error.
 As a concept, "grave abuse of
discretion" defies exact definition;
generally, it refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;"
the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty
 Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave. We have
held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding
an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave
abuse of discretion.
 Closely related with the limited
focus of the present petition is the
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court, that findings
of fact of the COMELEC, supported
by substantial evidence, shall be final
and non-reviewable.
 In light of our limited authority to
review findings of fact, we do not
ordinarily review in a certiorari case
the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep
by the COMELEC in this regard
generally involves an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Non-suffering from Any Term Limitation
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 In exceptional cases, however, when
the COMELEC's action on the
appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being
grossly unreasonable, the Court is
not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene.
When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from
the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgment to one of jurisdiction.
 Before us, petitioner has alleged and
shown the COMELEC’s use of
wrong or irrelevant considerations in
deciding the issue of whether
petitioner made a material
misrepresentation of his residency
qualification in his COC as to order
its cancellation.
 Hence, in resolving the issue of
whether the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that
petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that he had resided in Lipa City for at
least one year prior to the May 2010
elections, we examine the evidence
adduced by the parties and the
COMELEC’s appreciation thereof.
 Basically, the allegations of the
Petitioner Sabili are tantamount to
allege that the COMELEC, in
denying his COC committed grave
abuse of discretion. The court here
defined what grave abuse of
discretion is; and by that chose and
ruled to review the acts of
COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
 Eventually he was able to prove that
he was a resident of Lipa and the SC
granted his petition.
1. Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792,
June 7, 2017
ALBANIA v. COMELEC G.R. No.
226792 June 6, 2017
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado
and Jesus O. Typocowere both candidates
for the position of Governor in Camarines
Norte. After the counting and canvassing of
votes, Typocowas proclaimed as the winner.
Respondent questioned Typoco's
proclamation by filing with the COMELEC,
a petition for correction of a manifest error.
The Petition was decided in respondent's
favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter
assumed the position of Governor of
Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to
June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010
term. Respondent ran again in the 2010 and
2013 National and Local Elections where he
won and served as Governor of Camarines
Norte, respectively. On October 16, 2015,
respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy
as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May
9, 2016 National and Local elections. On
November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered
voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines
Norte, filed a petition for respondent's
disqualification from running as Governor
based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated
the three term limit rule under Section 43 of
RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2)
respondent's suspension from office for one
year without pay, together with its accessory
penalties, after he was found guilty of
oppression and grave abuse of authority in
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the Ombudsman's Order9 dated October 2,
2015.Respondent argued that since the
petition was primarily based on his alleged
violation of the three-term limit rule, the
same should have been filed as a petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC
Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, as the ground
cited affected a candidate's eligibility; that
based on Section 23, the petition should had
been filed on November 10, 2015, but the
petition was filed only on November 13,
2015, hence, the same had already
prescribed and must be dismissed. His
suspension from office is also not a ground
for a petition for disqualification. On the
substantive issues, he denied violating the
three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve
three consecutive terms since he only served
as Governor for the 2007 elections from
March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010. On April
22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division
dismissed the petition for being filed out of
time. It ruled that a violation of the three-
term limit rule and suspension from office as
a result of an administrative case are not
grounds for disqualification of a candidate
under the law. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016. The
COMELEC EnBanc echoed the Division's
findings that the grounds relied upon by
petitioner are not proper for a petition for
disqualification but one for denial of due
course to or cancellation of respondent's
COC, which was filed out of time. It then
continued to rule on the merits finding that
respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010
term as Governor of Camarines Norte, thus,
cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term
threshold.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Edgardo A.
Tallado violated the three term limit rule
under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of
1991
RULING
No, the respondent Edgardo A. Tallado did
not violate the three term limit rule under
Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of
1991 .The Court noted the grounds for
disqualification of a candidate are found
under Sections 12 and 68 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 881, as amended, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, as well as Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, which respectively
provide: SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any
person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. x xxx SEC. 68.
Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission
of having (a) given money or other material
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consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent
in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; x xxx SECTION 40. Disqualifications -
The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of
an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country
or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
A reading of the grounds enumerated under
the above-quoted provisions for a
candidate's disqualification does not include
the two grounds relied upon by petitioner.
Hence, the petition is DENIED. The
Resolution dated August 24, 2016 of the
Commission on Elections En Banc is
AFFIRMED.
Restoration of Pardonee’s Right to Run for substantially complies with the requirement
Public Office of express restoration.

Risos-Vidal vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Facts:

Former President Estrada was impeached

and removed from presidency. He was
convicted of the crime of plunder. During
the term of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, she extended an absolute pardon to
herein private respondent. Estrada filed a
certificate of candidacy for the position of
City Mayor of Manila which was questioned
by petitioner Atty. Risos-Vidal alleging that
his conviction disqualified him from running
for public office. The COMELEC took
discretionary judicial notice on Estrada’s
pardon.

Issue:

Whether or not former President Estrada

is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President
Arroyo

Held:

Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to

vote and be voted for in public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo. It is well-
entrenched that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure. It is this
Court’s firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares
that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights"

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Effects of Disqualification Case: Who shall disqualification so as to bring such
replace the disqualified candidate? awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast
GREGO VS. COMELEC (Judgment of their votes in favor of the ineligible
disqualification has attained its finality candidate.
before election)
Both assumptions are absent in this case.
FACTS: Petitoner failed to support his allegation by
convincing facts of Basco’s alleged
Hamberto Basco ran and won as Councilor disqualification.
of Manila’ Second District, ranking number
6 in his last term. A petition for
disqualification was filed by Grego with
COMELEC. In the disqualification, he
prayed for Basco’s disqualification,
suspension of his proclamation and for
declaration of Romualdo Maranan as 6th
duly elected councilor of Manila’s 2nd
District. Before deciding on the
disqualification, COMELEC proclaimed
Basco as duly elected councilor and
immediately took his oath. Grego sought to
annul the proclamation and prayed anew that
Maranan be declared winner. The petition
was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not 7th placer Maranan

be legally declared a winner.

RULING:
Court ruled that Maranan may not be
declared a winner. Basco was a duly
qualified candidate and received the winning
number of votes which put him in 6th place.
The exception in Labo vs Comelec where it
laid down a possible exception to the rule
that as second place may not be declared a
winning candidate, finds no application in
this case. The exception which is predicated
on the concurrence of 2 assumptions
namely:
(1) The one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and
(2) The electorate is fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate’s

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Effects of Disqualification Case: Who shall process and for want of substantial factual
replace the disqualified candidate? basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second
placer, could not take the seat in office since
Codilla vs De Venecia he did not represent the electorate’s choice.

Facts: 2. Since the validity of respondent’s

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the
election for representative in the 4th district
of Leyte as against respondent Locsin.
Petitioner won while a disqualification suit
was pending. Respondent moved for the
suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By
virtue of the Comelec ex parte order,
petitioner’s proclamation was suspended.
Comelec later on resolved that petitioner
was guilty of soliciting votes and
consequently disqualified him. Respondent
Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon
motion by petitioner, the resolution was
however reversed and a new resolution
declared respondent’s proclamation as null
and void. Respondent made his defiance and
disobedience to subsequent resolution
publicly known while petitioner asserted his
right to the office he won.
proclamation had been assailed by petitioner
before the Comelec and that the Comelec
was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that
the order disqualifying petitioner had
become final. Thus Comelec continued to
exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction
to review resolutions or decisions of the
Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must
also fail since respondent’s eligibility was
not the issue.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent’s

proclamation was valid.

2. Whether or not the Comelec had

jurisdiction in the instant case.

3. Whether or not proclamation of the

winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:

1. The respondent’s proclamation was

premature given that the case against
petitioner had not yet been disposed of with
finality. In fact, it was subsequently found
that the disqualification of the petitioner was
null and void for being violative of due

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If the judgment for disqualification is still authority and jurisdiction to continue the
unresolved or has not yet attained its hearing and eventually decide the
disqualification case. The fact that the
finality before election candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later disqualified for the office to
SUNGA vs COMELEC
which he was elected does not entitle the
Facts: candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of
Petitioner was one of the candidates for the the elective office. Hence, Sunga cannot
position of Mayor in the Municipality of claim the right to take the oath for the
Iguig, Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. mayoral office because the Local
Private respondent Trinidad was then the Government Code clearly provides that in
incumbent Mayor, was a candidate for re- case of disqualification of the one
election in the same municipality. proclaimed for the said office, the vice-
mayor shall assume office.
Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad
of violation of the Omnibus Election Code
for using threats, intimidation, terrorism or
other forms of coercion. Hearings were held
wherein Sunga adduced evidence while
Trinidad opted not to submit any evidence.
The election results showed that Trinidad
garnered the highest number of votes while
Sunga trailed second.
The complaint filed by Sunga was denied by
COMELEC ruling that the petitions filed
shall be deemed to be the amended petition
filed on May 11,1995 which was clearly
filed after the election mandates the
dismissal of the disqualification case.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC can hear and
decide disqualification cases against
winning candidates even after the election.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC is
left with no discretion but to proceed with
the disqualification case even after the
election. The fact that Trinidad was already
proclaimed and has assumed the position of
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of

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Suspension of proclamation
Edgardo C. Nolasco vs. Commission on
Election
Florentino P. Blanco vs. Commission on
Election
G.R. Nos. 122250 and 122258
July 21, 1997
Facts:
Florentino P. Blanco and Eduado A. Alarilla
both vied for the mayoral position of
Meycauayan, Bulacan during the election
held on 8 May 1995, Blanco garnered the
highest number of votes. Edgardo Nolasco
was elected vice-mayor. On 9 May, Alarilla
filed with the Comelec a petition to
disqualify Bianco on grounds that the latter
committed acts in violation of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code, i.e. for giving
money to influence, induce for corrupt the
voters or public officials performing election
functions, for committing acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy, and for spending
in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by the Election Code
(P10 million against 97,000 registered
voters). On 15 August, the Comelec
disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-
buying and ordered the Board of Canvassers
of Meycauayan, Bulacan to reconvene and
to determine the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed. Blanco moved for
reconsideration while Nolasco, as vice
mayor, intervened in the proceedings.
Nolasco urged that as vice-mayor he should
be declared mayor in the event Blanco was
finally disqualified. Both motions were
denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the disqualification of the mayor-
elect warrants the declaration of any of the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 302 | P a g e
remaining qualified mayoral candidates,
upon the canvassing of votes, as mayor.
Held:
In a mayoralty election, the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes
cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified.
Permanent vacancies (i.e. when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office) in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor are
governed by Section 44, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 and Article
38 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991. Vice-Mayor Edgardo C. Nolasco
was adjudged as Mayor of Meycauayan
Bulacan in view of the disqualification of
mayor-elect Florentino P. Blanco.
When COC is valid – Doctrine of Rejection
of the Second Placer
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265,
September 18, 1995
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was
a resident of the aforementioned district for
10 months. Faced with a petition for
disqualification, he amended the entry on
his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections dismissed the
petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration of
the above dismissal, the Commission
on Election later issued an order suspending
the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June,
the Commission on Elections found Aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective
office for lack of constitutional qualification
of residence.
Issue:
W hether “residency” i n t he certi fi ca
t e of candi dac y act ual l y connot es “d
omi cil e” t o warrant t hedisqualification
of Aquino from the position in the electoral
district.
Held:
The place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent
home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law. The
purpose is to exclude strangers
or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that
community
for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate
of candidacy in a previous (1992)
election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years
prior to that election. Aquino’s connection
to the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium
unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City
is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of
time he claims to be a resident of Makati
(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 303 | P a g e
and his claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but
only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully
disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
When COC is void ab initio
a. Diambrang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201809,
October 11, 2016
Diambrang v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201809,
October 11, 2016
Facts
Petitioner Diambrang and respondent Patad
were candidates for Punong Barangay in 25
October 2010 Brgy Elections. Patad
obtained 183 votes while Diambrang
obtained 78 votes. However, the Brgy
Board of Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed
Diambrang as the duly elected Punong Brgy
based on the assumption that Patad was
disqualified for being a fugitive from justice.
The BBOC’s assumption was, in turn, based
on the recommendation of the Provincial
Election Supervisor that was not yet final
and executory because the COMELEC had
not yet issued any ruling on the matter
Patad filed a petition to annul Diambrang’s
proclamation.
When the matter finally reached to the
COMELEC En Banc, the COMELEC
granted the Petition to disqualify and/or
deny Due Course to the Certificate of
Candidacy of Patad on the ground that he is
a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified
from running for public office. The
COMELEC En Bank further ruled that
despite Patad’s disqualification, Diambrang,
is not entitled to be declared elected.
Instead, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that
the vacant position should be filled by the
first ranked KAgawas pursuant to Section
44(b) of the LGC.
Issue
Whether Diambrang can be
proclaimed as the elected Punong Brgy in
view of Patad’s disqualification
Ruling
Clearly, the prevailing ruling is that if the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, the
candidate is not considered a candidate from
the very beginning even if his certificate of
candidacy was cancelled after the elections.
Patad's disqualification arose from his being
a fugitive from justice. It does not matter
that the disqualification case against him
was finally decided by the COMELEC En
Banc only on 14 November 2011. Patad's
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio.
As such, Diambrang, being the first-placer
among the qualified candidates, should have
been proclaimed as the dulyelected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan,
Lanao del Norte. However, since the case
had been overtaken by events that rendered
moot by the election of a new Punong
Barangay of Barangay during the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections, and due
to Patad’s failure to file his comment on the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 304 | P a g e
petition, Diambrang can no longer hold
office
Effect of filing a COC
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs.
COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 December 1,
2009 Equal Protection Clause, Appointed
Officials
NOVEMBER 23, 2017
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition
and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction, assailing Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
They contend that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution. They aver that the
advance filing of CoCs for the 2010
elections is intended merely for the purpose
of early printing of the official ballots in
order to cope with time limitations. Such
advance filing does not automatically make
the person who filed the CoC a candidate at
the moment of filing. Petitioners further
posit that the provision considering them as
ipso facto resigned from office upon the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause in the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are appointed officials considered resigned
upon filing of their certificates of
candidacy? Is Section 13 of RA 9369
violative of the equal protection clause?
RULING:
No to the first question and yes to the RENATOM. FEDERICO, PETITIONER
second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY AND OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA
BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE
AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN GR 199612, January 22, 2013
PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS
COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate Facts: Edna Sanchez and
the situation of disadvantage afflicting Osmundo M. Maligaya were
appointive officials by considering persons candidates for mayor of Sto.
who filed their CoCs as candidates only at Tomas, Batangas, After the
the start of the campaign period, thereby, Edna’s husband died, Edna
conveying the tacit intent that persons withdrew her Certificate of
holding appointive positions will only be Candidacy (COC) for the
considered as resigned at the start of the position of mayor. She then
campaign period when they are already filed a new COC and the
treated by law as candidates. corresponding Certificate of
In considering persons holding appointive Nomination and Acceptance
positions as ipso facto resigned from their (CONA) for the position of
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not governor as substitute
considering as resigned all other civil candidate for her deceased
servants, specifically the elective ones, the husband. Renato M. Federico
law unduly discriminates against the first his COC and CONA as
class. The fact alone that there is substantial substitute candidate for
distinction between those who hold mayor, in view of the
appointive positions and those occupying withdrawal of Edna which
elective posts, does not justify such were considered by
differential treatment. COMELEC.On the same day
Applying the four requisites to the instant Maligaya filed his Petition to
case, the Court finds that the differential Deny Due Course and to
treatment of persons holding appointive Cancel Certificate of
offices as opposed to those holding elective Candidacy of Federico before
ones is not germane to the purposes of the the Comelec, because the
law. There is thus no valid justification to period to file the COC for
treat appointive officials differently from the substitute candidates had
elective ones. The classification simply fails already lapsed after
to meet the test that it should be germane to December 14, 2009, pursuant
the purposes of the law. The measure to Section 13 of Comelec
encapsulated in the second proviso of the Resolution No. 8678. Ballots
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. was printed with then name
9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates of Edna and thereafter has
the equal protection clause. won the election. The
COCVP was issued by the
MBOC bearing the same time
Substitution of Candidates – Sec. 77, OEC and date with the same
number of votes garnered by

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 Edna being credited to
Federico.
Issue: 1) whether
Federico could validly
substitute Edna who
withdrew her candidacy for
the mayoralty position;
(2) whether
Osmundo’s Petition to Annul
Proclamation of Federico as
mayor of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, was filed on time;
and
(3) granting that
Federico was disqualified,
whether he should be
succeeded by Intervenor
Silva under the LGC or
replaced by Osmundo.
Rulings:
Federicos substitution
of Edna Sanchez as
mayoralty candidate was not
valid. His substitution of
Edna was invalid, the
substitute COC and CONA
having been filed after the
December 14, 2009 deadline
provided for under Section 13
of Comelec Resolution No.
8678. The substitute for a
candidate who died or
suffered permanent
incapacity or disqualified by
final judgment, may file his
certificate of candidacy up to
mid-day of election day. If
the death or permanent
disability should occur
between the day before the
election and mid-day of
election day, the substitute
candidate may file the
certificate with any board of
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election inspectors in the
political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or in the
case of a candidate for
President, Vice-President or
Senator, with the Law
Department of the
Commission on Elections in
Manila. No person who has
withdrawn his candidacy for
a position shall be eligible as
substitute candidate for any
other position after the
deadline for filing of
certificates of candidacy.
The votes garnered by
Edna could not be credited to
Federico as he was never a
legitimate candidate. As there
was an invalid substitution,
there could not be a valid
proclamation. In effect, the
second COCVP in his name
had no legal basis. Granting
that those who voted for
Edna had in mind to vote for
Federico, nonetheless, the
fact that there was no
compliance with the rules
cannot be ignored.
As Federico's
substitution was not valid,
there was only one qualified
candidate in the mayoralty
race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas
Osmundo, being the only
candidate, he received the
highest number of votes.
Accordingly, he should be
proclaimed as the duly
elected and considering that
Osmundo was the winner, the
position of Intervenor Silva
that he be considered the
legal successor of Federico,
whom he claims failed to
 qualify, has no legal basis.
There is simply no vacancy.
When there is no vacancy,
the rule on succession under
Section 4442 of the LGC
cannot be invoked.
Choice of Remedy when Ground is
Permanent Residency in a Foreign
Country
CHUA vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607,
April 5, 2016
Facts:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition assailing the Commission on
Elections Resolutions dated October 17,
2013 and January 30, 2015. The
Commission on Elections annulled the
proclamation of Chua as Councilor for the
Fourth District of Manila and directed the
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
proclaim Bacani as Councilor for having
garnered the next highest number of votes.
On October 3, 2012, Chua filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor for
the Fourth District of Manila during the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
After the conduct of elections, Chua
garnered the sixth highest number of
votes. She was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers on May 15, 2013.
On the date of Chua’s proclamation,
however, Fragata filed a Petition to declare
Chua as a nuisance candidate and to deny
due course and/or cancel Chua’s Certificate
of Candidacy, by claiming that Chua was
unqualified to run for Councilor on two
grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen,
and she was a permanent resident of the
United States of America.
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Answering the Petition, Chua contended that
she was a natural-born Filipino, born to
Filipino parents in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija. With respect to her residency, Chua
alleged that she had been residing in
Sampaloc, Manila since 2008 and had more
than complied with the one-year period
required to run for Councilor.
According to Chua, Fragata’s Petition was
belatedly filed, whether it was treated as one
for declaration of a nuisance candidate or for
denial of due course or cancellation of
certificate of candidacy. Fragata filed her
Petition on May 15, 2013, which was
beyond five (5) days from October 5, 2012,
the last day of the filing of certificates of
candidacy. The Petition was also filed
beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012, the
date Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy.
Chua stressed that she had already been
proclaimed on May 15, 2013, the same date
that Fragata filed her Petition; hence,
Fragata’s proper remedy was to file a
petition for quo warranto under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code. Chua prayed
that the Commission dismiss Fragata’s
Petition.
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a Motion to
Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to
Annul Proclamation. Bacani alleged that she
likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth
District of Manila, and that after the
canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh
among all the candidates, next to
Chua. Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani
claimed that she should be proclaimed
Councilor.
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual
citizen, was unqualified to run for
Councilor. Based on an Order of the Bureau
of Immigration, Chua was allegedly
naturalized as an American citizen on
December 7, 1977. She was issued an
American passport on July 14, 2006. Chua
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on September 21,
2011. Nonetheless, Chua allegedly
continued using her American passport.
Moreover, Chua did not execute an oath of
renunciation of her American citizenship.
With Chua being a dual citizen at the time
she filed her Certificate of Candidacy,
Bacani prayed that the Commission on
Elections annul Chua’s proclamation.
In her Comment/Opposition to the Motion to
Intervene of Bacani, Chua argued that the
Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, having been filed after the day of
the elections. According to Chua, the
Motion should not even be considered since
she was already proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers. Thus, Chua prayed that the
Motion to Intervene be denied and expunged
from the records of the case.
Issues:
1. Whether private respondent Fragata filed
a petition for disqualification or a
petition to deny due course or cancel
certificate of candidacy; and
2. Whether the rule on succession under
Section 45 of the Local Government
Code applies to this case.
Ruling:
The Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
was dismissed.
Fragata’s Petition was a petition for
disqualification assailing Chua’s citizenship
and status as a permanent resident in the
United States. The Petition, which Fragata
filed on the date of Chua’s proclamation,
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was filed within the reglementary period.
Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission, a petition for
disqualification "shall be filed any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy, but not later that the date of
proclamation." Private respondent Fragata
filed her Petition on the date of petitioner’s
proclamation on May 15, 2013.
Chua was a dual citizen at the time she filed
her Certificate of Candidacy. Consequently,
she was ineligible to run for Councilor and
was correctly considered a non-
candidate. All the votes casted in Chua’s
favor were correctly disregarded, resulting
in Bacani garnering the next highest number
of votes. Following the case of Maquiling,
Bacani was validly proclaimed as Councilor,
and, contrary to Chua’s claim, the rule on
succession under Section 45 of the Local
Government Code did not apply, with the
disqualifying circumstance existing prior to
the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy.
The rule on succession under Section 45,
would not apply if the permanent vacancy
was caused by one whose certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically
with respect to dual citizens, their
certificates of candidacy are void ab initio
because they possess a substantive
disqualifying circumstance existing prior to
the filing of their certificate of candidacy.
Legally, they should not even be considered
candidates. The votes casted for them should
be considered stray and should not be
counted.
In cases of vacancies caused by those with
void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the
person legally entitled to the vacant position
would be the candidate who garnered the
next highest number of votes among those
eligible. In this case, it is private respondent
Bacani who is legally entitled to the position
of Councilor, having garnered the sixth
highest number of votes among the eligible
candidates.
Principle:
Dual citizens are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. They cannot
successfully run and assume office because
their ineligibility is inherent in them,
existing prior to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy. Their certificates
of candidacy are void ab initio, and votes
cast for them will be disregarded.
Consequently, whoever garners the next
highest number of votes among the eligible
candidates is the person legally entitled to
the position.
Rule applicable to both grounds
EFREN RACEL ARATEA VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION and ESTELA D. ANTIPOLO
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012
FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antonio ran for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010.
Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of
the Ombudsman Election Code to disqualify
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for four (4) consequitive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Lonzanida's certificate of
candidacy.
Lonzanida's motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc remained pending during said
elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered
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the highest number of votes and were
proclaimed Mayor and Vice Mayour,
respectively.
Vice Mayor elect Aratea took his
oath of office as Acting Mayor.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En
Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running
for Mayor based on two grounds: 1)
Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more
than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and 2) Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code.
Second-placer Antipolo intervened
and claimed her right to be proclaimed as
Moyor because Lonzanida ceased to be a
candidate when the COMELEC Division
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy and the strikinf out of his name
form the list of official candidates.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could
not be proclaimed as the winning candidate.
He reasoned that since Lonzanida's
disqualification was not yet final during
election day, the votes cast in his favor could
not be declared stray. Lonzanida's
subsequent disqualification resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor,
and Aratea as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor
was mandated to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether the second-placer or the
Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor
in his this case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court made a
categorical pronouncement that an
“ineligible” candidate is not considered a
candidate at all. A void Certificate of
Candidacy cannot produce any legal effect.
All the votes for the ineligible candidate are
stray votes.
The candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates is not a second placer.
He is technically a first-placer since the
votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate
are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
The position vacated by the
ineligible candidate for the position of
mayor will no longer be surrendered to the
vice mayor but to the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates. Thus, the
rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will no longer apply in
this scenario.
Premature Election Campaigning – Sec. 80,
OEC; Sec. 5, RA 7166
a. Penera v. Comelec, G.R. No.
181613, November 25, 2009
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court
affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera
(Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in
election campaign outside the campaign
period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election
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Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing
that she was not yet a candidate at the time
of the supposed premature campaigning,
since under Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system for the
process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially
a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for
engaging in premature campaigning should
be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for
reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc
held that
Penera did not engage in premature
campaigning and should, thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The
Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009
Decision (or “the assailed Decision”)
considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy
already a “candidate” even before the start
of the campaign period. This is contrary to
the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of
Republic Act 8436, as amended, which
states that a person who files his certificate
of candidacy will only be considered a period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in
candidate at the start of the campaign period, the Decision, which defines a criminal act
and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to and curtails freedom of expression and
a candidate shall take effect only upon the speech, would be void for vagueness.
start of such campaign period.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not
Thus, applying said law: expressly state that campaigning before the
start of the campaign period is lawful, as the
(1) The effective date when partisan political assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment.
acts become unlawful as to a It is a basic principle of law that any act is
candidate is when the campaign period lawful unless expressly declared unlawful
starts. Before the start of the campaign by law. The mere fact that the law does not
period, the same partisan political acts are declare an act unlawful ipso facto means
lawful. that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need
for Congress to declare in Section 15 of
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities
election offense only for before the start of the campaign period are
acts done during the campaign period, not lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
before. In other words, election that “any unlawful act or omission
offenses can be committed by a candidate applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign only upon the start of the campaign period.”
period. Before the start of the campaign The only inescapable and logical result is
period, such election offenses cannot be that the same acts, if done before the start of
so committed. Since the law is clear, the the campaign period, are lawful.
Court has no recourse but to apply it. The
forum for examining the wisdom of the law, (D) The Court’s 11 September 2009
and enacting remedial measures, is not the Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
Court but the Legislature. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, decided on the ground that one who files a
Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
not until the start of the campaign period. This
provide that partisan political acts done by a ground was based on the deliberations of the
candidate before the campaign period are legislators who explained that the early
unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon deadline for filing certificates of candidacy
the start of the campaign period. Neither under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time
does the law state that partisan political acts to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and
done by a candidate before the campaign they intended to preserve the existing
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes election periods, such that one who files his
unlawful upon the start of the campaign certificate of candidacy to meet the early

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 311 | P a g e

deadline will still not be considered as a
candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436,
Congress decided to expressly incorporate
the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision
in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person
who files his certificate of candidacy shall
be considered a candidate only at the start of
the campaign period. Congress wanted to
insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required
by the automated election system would be
disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the
campaign period. This provision cannot be
annulled by the Court except on the sole
ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not
claim that this provision is unconstitutional.
In fact, the assailed Decision considered the
entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision was self-contradictory — reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the said provision.

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Equal Access to Media
GMA Network, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Facts:
 During May 14, 2007 and May 10,
2010, COMELEC issued
Resolutions implementing and
interpreting Section 6 of R.A. 9006,
regarding airtime limitations, to
mean that a candidate is entitled to
afore stated number of minutes per
station.
 Section 6. Of R.A. 9006 specifically
states that:
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time
and Space.-All registered parties and
bona fide candidates shall have equal
access to media time and space. The
following guidelines may be
amplified on by the COMELEC:
xxxx
6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or
registered political party for a
nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than one
hundred twenty (120) minutes of
television advertisement and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes of
radio advertisement whether by
purchase or donation.
(b) Each bona fide candidate or
registered political party for a locally
elective office shall be entitled to not
more than sixty (60) minutes of
television advertisement and ninety
(90) minutes of redio advertisement
whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the
COMELEC shall require any
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 313 | P a g e
broadcast station or entity to submit
to the COMELEC a copy of its
broadcast logs and certificates of
performance for the review and
verification of the frequency, date,
time and duration of advertisements
broadcast for any candidate or
political party.
 For May 2013 elections, Respondent
COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013,
changing the interpretation of said
candidates and political parties’
airtime limitation for political
campaigns or advertisements from a
“per station” basis, to a total
aggregate basis.
 Petitioners assail Resolutions No.
9615 and 9631, amending the earlier
Resolution of the COMELEC as it is
vague and infringes the on the
constitutionally protected freedom of
speech, of the press and of
expression, and on the right of
people to be informed on matters of
public concern.
Issue:
Whether or not the Resolutions
violates the right of the petitioners to
freedom of speech and expression.
Ruling:
 The COMELEC went beyond the
authority granted it by law in
adopting “aggregate” basis in the
determination of allowable airtime.
 R.A. 9006, on its face, does not
justify a conclusion that the
maximum allowable airtime should
be based on the totality of possible
broadcast in all television or radio
stations.
  COMELEC is not free to simply
change the rules especially if it has
consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in
the past.
 If in regard to commercial
undertakings, the owners may have
the right to assert a constitutional
right of their clients, with more
reason should establishments which
publish and broadcast have the
standing to assert the constitutional
freedom of speech of candidates and
of right to information of the public,
not to speak of freedom of the press.
 Freedoms of speech of expression
and of the press are at the core of
civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy. The same must remain
unfettered unless otherwise justified
by compelling state interest.
Electoral Expenditure
Garcia v. Commission on Elections
611 SCRA 55 G.R. No. 170256 January 25,
2010
J. Peralta
Facts: On May 6, 2004, private respondent
Tomas R. Osmeña, then mayoral candidate
in the 2004 national and local elections in
Cebu City, filed an election offense case
against his rival, petitioner Alvin B. Garcia,
for the publication of political
advertisements that allegedly violated the
thrice-a-week publication requirement and
failed to indicate the name and address of
the party or candidate for whose benefit the
advertisements were published. He averred
that the publication of the political
advertisements was in violation of Sections
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4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sections 11
and 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
In his Complaint dated May 6, 2004, private
respondent alleged, thus:
For the period April 26, 2004 up to May 2,
2004, or for a period of one week,
respondent through his family owned
publishing company put up political
advertisements, which we can group into
four basic categories, namely, “MAYOR SA
KATAWHAN,” “IT’S A NO-CONTEST,”
“NO TO TOM TAX OSMENA,” and
“Mayor Alvin Garcia” advertisements.
Private respondent averred that “MAYOR
SA KATAWHAN” was published four
times, that is, on April 27 and 29, 2004 and
May 1 and 2, 2004, all one-half page in size,
in the Sun Star tabloid. Moreover, the “IT’S
A NO-CONTEST” political advertisement
was printed daily, or seven times in Sun
Star, all one-half page in size, from April 26
to May 2, 2004. The “NO TO TOM TAX
OSMEÑA” advertisement appeared thrice,
or on April 28 and 29, 2004 and May 1,
2004, also one-half page in size, in the same
tabloid. The “Mayor Alvin Garcia”
advertisement was published once. Private
respondent alleged that all the political
advertisements did not indicate the true and
correct name and address of the party or
candidate for whose benefit the
advertisements were published.
In his Answer, petitioner denied private
respondent’s allegations. He contended that
the political advertisements had been made
not for a single candidate, but for the entire
slate of his party, KusugKNP Party,
consisting of 20 local candidates, plus
presidential and vice-presidential candidates
Fernando Poe, Jr. and Loren Legarda,
respectively. Petitioner asserted that “22
candidates x 3 a week results to 66 times a
week publication for all the candidates” of
the Kusug-KNP Party. Thus, the publication
of the political advertisements, may it be
seven or 15 times, was way below the
allowable limit of 66 times for the 22
political candidates of the Kusug-KNP
Party. Consequently, the political
advertisements in question had not exceeded
the legal limit provided by R.A. No. 9006,
as implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6520.
Further, petitioner stated that the political
advertisements in question reflected that
they were really campaigns for the benefit of
the candidates of the Kusug-KNP Party, as
in fact, they contained the pictures and
names of the party’s political candidates.
Hence, he contended that the political
advertisements substantially complied with
the requirement provided by the Fair
Elections Act that the advertisement shall
contain the true and correct name and
address of the party or candidate for whose
benefit the election propaganda was printed.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent
violated the rule on published campaign
materials.
Held: No. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006
provides for the requirements for published
or printed election propaganda, thus:
Sec. 4 Requirements for Published or
Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda
− 4.1. Any newspaper x x x or any published
or printed political matter and any broadcast
of election propaganda by television or radio
for or against a candidate or group of
candidates to any public office shall bear
and be identified by the reasonably legible
or audible words “political advertisement
paid for,” followed by the true and correct
name and address of the candidate or party
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 315 | P a g e
for whose benefit the election propaganda
was printed or aired.
xxxx
4.3. Print, broadcast or outdoor
advertisements donated to the candidate or
political party shall not be printed,
published, broadcast or exhibited without
the written acceptance by the said candidate
or political party. Such written acceptance
shall be attached to the advertising contract
and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as
provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 9006 are reflected in Section 13 (3) and
Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520.
To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006
requires that print advertisements donated to
a candidate shall not be published without
the written acceptance of the said candidate,
which written acceptance shall be attached
to the advertising contract and submitted to
the COMELEC.
The requirement for a written acceptance by
a candidate of donated advertisements is a
safeguard provided by law against the
danger of publishing or broadcasting
election propaganda beyond the required
frequency, size and other limitations
imposed by law without the candidate’s
express agreement, since the violation of
such requirements results in the prosecution
of the candidate for an election offense
punishable under the first and second
paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Under Section 264 of the
Omnibus Election Code, a person found
guilty of an election offense “shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years and
shall not be subject to probation.” In
addition, “the guilty party shall be sentenced
to suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage.”
In this case, the COMELEC did not question
petitioner’s averment that the advertisement
in question was paid for by the organization
named Friends of Alvin Garcia. The
advertisement may be considered as a
donation to petitioner under Section 4 of
R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR. Paragraph 4.3,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 explicitly
requires that “print x x x advertisements
donated to the candidate or political party
shall not be printed, published x x x without
the written acceptance by the said
candidate.” Since the advertisement in
question was published by the Sun Star,
there arises a presumption that there was
written acceptance by petitioner of the
advertisement paid for or donated by his
friends in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Under the Rules on Evidence, it is
presumed that the law has been obeyed, and
that private transactions have been fair and
regular.
Electoral Expenditure
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014
In a petition filed by Edgar San Luis to
disqualify ER Ejercito, he claimed that the
advertising between ABS-CBN Corporation
and Scenema Concept International, Inc.
were executed by an identified supporter
without his knowledge and consent as, in
fact, his signature thereon was obviously
forged. Even assuming that such contract
benefited him, he alleges that he should not
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 316 | P a g e
be penalized for the conduct of third parties
who acted on their own without his consent.
Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 2310 [2010], he
argued that every voter has the right to
support a particular candidate in accordance
with the free exercise of his or her rights of
speech and of expression, which is
guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the
1987Constitution. He believed that an
advertising contract paid for by a third party
without the candidate’s knowledge and
consent must be considered a form of
political speech that must prevail against the
laws suppressing it, whether by design or
inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advanced the
view that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
distinguishes between “contribution” and
“expenditure” and makes no proscription on
the medium or amount of contribution. He
also stressed that it is clear from COMELE
Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law
applies only to election expenditures of
candidates and not to contributions made by
third parties.
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of
Ejercito are correct.
Held: The contentions of Ejercito are not
correct. The advertising contracts submitted
in evidence by San Luis as well as those in
legal custody of the COMELEC belie his
assertion. His express conformity to the
advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is considered as an
election offense. (Sec. 13, R.A. No. 9006).
R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that
broadcast advertisements donated to the
candidate shall not be broadcasted without
the written acceptance of the candidate,
which shall be attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the
COMELEC, and that, in every case,
advertising contracts shall be signed by the
donor, the candidate concerned or by the
duly-authorized representative of the
political party. (R.A. No. 9006, Secs. 4.3
and 6.3). Conformably with the mandate of
the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
requires that election propaganda materials
donated to a candidate shall not be
broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the
written acceptance of said candidate, which
shall be in the form of an official receipt in
the name of the candidate and must specify
the description of the items donated, their
quantity and value, and that, in every case,
the advertising contracts, media purchase
orders or booking orders shall be signed by
the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representatives of the party and,
in case of a donation, should be
accompanied by a written acceptance of the
candidate, a party or their authorized
representatives. (Rule 5, Sections 1 and 2).
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also
unambiguously states that it shall be
unlawful to broadcast any election
propaganda donated or given free of charge
by any person or broadcast entity to a
candidate without the written acceptance of
the said candidate and unless they bear and
be identified by the words “airtime for this
broadcast was provided free of charge by”
followed by the true and correct name and
address of the donor. (Sec. 7(b); Emilio
Ramon “E.R.” Ejercito v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014).
Contention on no limitation on campaign
donations.
It was contended that the legislature
imposed no legal limitation on campaign
donations. He vigorously asserted that
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
distinguishes between “contribution” and
“expenditure” and makes no proscription on
the medium or amount of contribution made
by third parties in favor of the candidates,
while the limit set by law, as appearing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 317 | P a g e
only to election expenditures of candidates.
In brushing aside such contention, the
Supreme Court ruled:
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current
allowable limit on expenses of candidates
and political parties for election campaign,
thus:
SEC. 13.Authorized Expenses of Candidates
and Political Parties. – The aggregate
amount that a candidate or registered
political party may spend for election
campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for
President and Vice President; and for other
candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every
voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, a candidate without any
political party and without support from any
political party may be allowed to spend Five
pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00)
for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has
official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or
in kind to any candidate or political party or
coalition of parties for campaign purposes,
duly reported to the Commission, shall not
be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are
not repealed by R.A. No. 7166. These
provisions, which are merely amended
insofar as the allowable amount is
concerned, read:
SECTION 100.Limitations upon expenses
of candidates. – No candidate shall spend for
his election campaign an aggregate amount
exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for
every voter currently registered in the
constituency where he filed his candidacy:
Provided, That the expenses herein referred
to shall include those incurred or caused to
be incurred by the candidate, whether in
cash or in kind, including the use, rental or
hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used
in the campaign: Provided, further, That
where the land, water or aircraft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used
is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby
empowered to assess the amount
commensurate with the expenses for the use
thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the
locality and shall be included in the total
expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101.Limitations upon expenses
of political parties. – A duly accredited
political party may spend for the election of
its candidates in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official
candidates an aggregate amount not
exceeding the equivalent of one peso and
fifty centavos for every voter currently
registered therein. Expenses incurred by
branches, chapters, or committees of such
political party shall be included in the
computation of the total expenditures of the
political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties
shall be considered as expenses of their
respective individual candidates and subject
to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur
election expenditures. – No person, except
the candidate, the treasurer of a political
party or any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer, shall make any
expenditure in support of or in opposition to
any candidate or political party.
Expenditures duly authorized by the
candidate or the treasurer of the party shall
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 318 | P a g e
be considered as expenditures of such
candidate or political party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be
in writing, copy of which shall be furnished
the Commission signed by the candidate or
the treasurer of the party and showing the
expenditures so authorized, and shall state
the full name and exact address of the
person so designated.
The focal query is: How shall We interpret
“the expenses herein referred to shall
include those incurred or caused to be
incurred by the candidate” and “except the
candidate, the treasurer of a political party or
any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer” found in Sections 100 and 103,
respectively, of the OEC? Do these
provisions exclude from the allowable
election expenditures the contributions of
third parties made with the consent of the
candidate? The Court holds not.
When the intent of the law is not apparent as
worded, or when the application of the law
would lead to absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory
construction may be resorted to such as the
legislative history of the law for the purpose
of solving doubt, and that courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of
the law, the deliberations during the
enactment, as well as prior laws on the same
subject matter in order to ascertain the true
intent or spirit of the law.
Looking back, it could be found that
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are
substantially lifted from P.D. No. 1296, as
amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which
specifically provide:
Section 51.Limitations upon expenses of
candidates. No candidate shall spend for his
election campaign an amount more than the
salary or the equivalent of the total
emoluments for one year attached to the
office for which he is a candidate: Provided,
That the expenses herein referred to shall
include those incurred by the candidate, his
contributors and supporters, whether in cash
or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of
land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used in the
campaign: Provided, further, That, where the
land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned
by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby
empowered to assess the amount
commensurate with the expenses for the use
thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the
locality and shall be included in the total
expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim
BatasangPambansa, they shall not spend
more than sixty thousand pesos for their
election campaign.
Section 52.Limitation upon expenses of
political parties, groups or aggrupations. A
political party, group or aggrupation may
not spend for the election of its candidates in
the constituency or constituencies where it
has official candidates an aggregate amount
more than the equivalent of fifty centavos
for every voter currently registered therein:
Provided, That expenses incurred by such
political party, group or aggrupation not
duly registered with the Commission and/or
not presenting or supporting a complete list
of candidates shall be considered as
expenses of its candidates and subject to the
limitation under Section 51 of this Code.
Expenses incurred by branches, chapters or
committees of a political party, group or
aggrupation shall be included in the
computation of the total expenditures of the
political party, group or aggrupation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur
election expenditures. No person, except the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 319 | P a g e
candidate or any person authorized by him
or the treasurer of a political party, group or
aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in
support of, or in opposition to any candidate
or political party, group or aggrupation.
Expenditures duly authorized by the
candidate of the treasurer of the party, group
or aggrupation shall be considered as
expenditure of such candidate or political
party, group or aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be
in writing, copy of which shall be furnished
the Commission, signed by the candidate or
the treasurer of the party, group or
aggrupation and showing the expenditure so
authorized, and shall state the full name and
exact address of the person so designated.
(Emphasis supplied)
Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388
(otherwise known as the “Election Code of
1971”) was enacted. Sections 41 and 42 of
which are relevant, to quote:
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of
Candidates. – No candidate shall spend for
his election campaign more than the total
amount of salary for the full term attached to
the office for which he is a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of
Political Parties and Other Non-political
Organizations. – No political party as
defined in this Code shall spend for the
election of its candidates an aggregate
amount more than the equivalent of one
peso for every voter currently registered
throughout the country in case of a regular
election, or in the constituency in which the
election shall be held in case of a special
election which is not held in conjunction
with a regular election. Any other
organization not connected with any
political party, campaigning for or against a
candidate, or for or against a political party
shall not spend more than a total amount of
five thousand pesos.
Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No.
6132, which implemented the resolution of
both Houses of Congress calling for a
constitutional convention, explicitly stated:
Section 12.Regulations of Election Spending
and Propaganda. The following provisions
shall govern election spending and
propaganda in the election provided for in
this Act:
x xx
(G) All candidates and all other persons
making or receiving expenditures,
contributions or donations which in their
totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further
or oppose the candidacy of any candidate,
shall file a statement of all such
expenditures and contributions made or
received on such dates and with such details
as the Commission on Elections shall
prescribe by rules. The total expenditures
made by a candidate, or by any other person
with the knowledge and consent of the
candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two
thousand pesos.
In tracing the legislative history of Sections
100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said,
therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers
has been consistent through the years: to
regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by
including in the aggregate limit of the
former’s election expenses those incurred by
the latter. The phrase “those incurred or
caused to be incurred by the candidate” is
sufficiently adequate to cover those
expenses which are contributed or donated
in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the
legal requirement that a contribution or
donation should bear the written conformity
of the candidate, a Luis Buendia and Bonifacio Legaspi (herein
contributor/supporter/donor certainly
qualifies as “any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer.” Ubilex non
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 320 | P a g e
distinguit, necnosdistingueredebemus.
(Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should We.) There should be no distinction
in the application of a law where none is
indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by
a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of
election expenses does not trample upon the
free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech
and of expression under Section 4, Article
III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral
regulation,127 the law’s concern is not to
curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with “deep pockets” and
those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only
incidental and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental interest
of promoting equality of opportunity in
political advertising. It bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section
26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and
Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically
result in an unlimited expenditure for
political advertising, which skews the
political process and subverts the essence of
a truly democratic form of government.
Failure of Election
USMAN VS. COMELEC
149 Phil. 769
CASTRO, J.:
On November 12, 1970, Luis Quibranza,
Francisco Abalos, Alfredo Bosico,
after referred to as the Comelec petitioners),
candidates for delegate in the
aforementioned district, petitioned the
Commission on Elections (hereinafter
referred to as the Comelec) for a declaration
of nullity of the election returns from all the
precincts of seven municipalities and
municipal districts - Karomatan, Pantao-
Ragat, Ma-
tungao, Munai, Tangcal, Magsaysay,
and Nunungan - and four barrios -
Kapatagan, Salvador, Lala,
and Kauswagan - of Lanao del
Norte. The Comelec petitioners alleged as
grounds that in the said municipalities and
barrios, no actual voting took place because
of "terrorism and other machinations," and
that "fictitious election returns were
prepared under duress, and the influence of
terrorism and/or bribery wherein, it was
made to appear that certain favoured
candidates obtained most, if not all the votes
fictitiously cast therein, while petitioners
were made to appear as having obtained
very few, if no votes at all."
The Comelec petitioners particularly
stressed that the canvassing of the fictitious
votes and the preparation of the election
returns from the precincts
of Karomatan were in violation of the
procedure laid down in resolution 769 of
the Comelec. They prayed for the holding
of a special election in the municipalities
and barrios concerned
and, ad interim, the suspension of the
canvass as well as the proclamation of the
winning candidates until after hearing and
decision on the merits of the petition.
On November 14, 1970, the Comelec issued
two resolutions ordering the board of
canvassers to canvass the election returns in
Manila, ordering the same board to desist
from proclaiming the winning candidates
until further orders, and setting the petition
for hearing in Manila to ascertain the truth
of the allegation that no voting took place in
the disputed precincts.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 321 | P a g e
On November 24, 1970,
the Comelec petitioners, joined by another
candidate, Potri Ali Pacasum, amended their
petition, asking for the exclusion of the
election returns from the precincts of the
barrios of Kapatagan, Salvador, Lala,
and Kauswagan, except those from precincts
16 and 24 of Kapatagan and precincts 14
and 14-A of Salvador, and repeating their
allegation that no elections actually took
place in the questioned precincts, "and/or in
the remote possibility that elections had
been initiated, they were suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting because of violence or terrorism and
that the votes not cast therein are sufficient
to affect the results of the elections," and
adding that the election returns from the said
precincts "... were prepared prior to the
elections, and/ or had been tampered with
and/or are statistically improbable in that the
number of voters who allegedly cast their
votes is out of proportion to the actual
population in those municipalities and muni-
cipal districts concerned."
At the hearing, four chairmen testified, three
of whom declared that the elections in their
respective precincts were "free, honest and
orderly." Of the three, however, one broke
down on cross-examination and revealed
what really transpired in his precinct on
election day. He related that only about
10% to 20% of the registered voters in his
precinct actually voted and that armed men
prepared and filled up the rest of the
ballots. In addition, he stated that two
unidentified men gave him a piece of paper
with the names of five candidates written
thereon with the corresponding number
of votes "they were supposed to receive in
the precinct." The unidentified men told him
to give the indicated number of votes to the
persons listed the piece of paper; so the
board prepared the election returns in
accordance with their instructions.
The fourth chairman who testified revealed
that on the day before the elections, the
members of the boards of inspectors, having
been summoned, appeared at the office of
the mayor where they were questioned on
their "willingness to cooperate" by making
some candidates win in their respective
precincts. She further testified that
on election day, about
twenty Muslims appeared in her precinct
who prepared and filled up the ballots
and thumbmarked and signed the voting
record.
Anent the testimony of the chairmen of the
boards of inspectors relating to the "free,
honest, and orderly" elections in their res-
pective precincts and the joint affidavits of
the members of the aforesaid boards
attesting to the orderliness and peacefulness
of the elections in the precincts wherein they
served, the Comelec stated that the findings
of its Fingerprint Identification Division and
of the NBI handwriting experts conclusively
belie the statements of the aforementioned
members of the boards of inspectors
of Karomatan. Rejecting the veracity of
their statements, the Comelec opined that
the members of the boards of inspectors
were
"co-conspirators or hostages of the
perpetrators of a deeply rooted practice
spawned by the
political caciquism of Karomatan, unwilling
to tell the truth either because they would
thereby be admitting their guilty
participation or exposing themselves and
their families to reprisals."
Indeed, the case at bar directly confronts this
Court with a problem fraught, not with
fancied serious effects, but with possible far-
reaching consequences attendant to the flood
of pre-proclamation controversies that could
be brought before the Comelec. Mindful of
the vital role of the Comelec of insuring
free, orderly and honest elections pursuant
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 322 | P a g e
to the mandates of the Constitution and the
Election Code, on the one hand, and of the
diverse - and oftentimes, novel - anomalous
devices and schemes aimed at subverting the
popular will ingeniously conceived
and practised by unscrupulous politicians
and their followers, on the Other hand, we
approach and view the problem with utmost
concern and circumspection.
The broad power of the Comelec, conferred
upon it by the Constitution, to enforce and
administer "all laws relative to the conduct
of elections" and to decide all administrative
questions affecting elections "for the
purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest
elections," has been the key in the resolution
of many pre-proclamation controversies
involving the integrity and authenticity of
election returns. Invoking
the aforestated power of the Comelec, we
justified the action and upheld the authority
of the Comelec to order the exclusion of
"obviously manufactured" returns,[5] or
tampered returns,[6] or returns prepared
under threats and coercion or under
circumstances affecting the returns' integrity
and authenticity,[7] emphasizing the duty of
the Comelec to see to the use and inclusion
in the canvass of only genuine and regular
election returns for determining the true
result of the elections.
Several circumstances, defying exact
description and dependent mainly on the
factual milieu of the particular controversy,
have the effect of destroying the integrity
and authenticity of disputed election returns
and of avoiding their prima facie value and
character. If satisfactorily proven, although
in a summary proceeding, such
circumstances as alleged by the affected or
interested parties, stamp the election returns
with the indelible mark of falsity and
irregularity, and, consequently, of
unreliability, and justify their exclusion from
the canvass.
The Court fully agree with the Comelec that
the totality of all the foregoing
circumstances, taken together with the
findings of the Fingerprint Identification
Division of the Comelec and of the
Questioned Documents experts of the NBI,
more than suffices to completely overcome
the prima facie value of the 42 election
returns from Karomatan, strongly belying
their integrity and authenticity.[9] These
circumstances definitely point, not merely to
a few isolated instances of irregularities
affecting the integrity and authenticity of the
election returns, but to an organized, well-
directed large-scale operation to make a
mockery of the elections in Karomatan. We
find and so hold that the election returns
from the 42 precincts in question were
prepared under circumstances conclusively
showing that they are false, and are so
devoid of value as to be completely
unworthy of inclusion in the canvass. We
have no alternative but to affirm
the Comelec's finding that they are spurious
and manufactured.
The only question that remains relates
to Usman's plea for the holding of a special
election in Karomatan. With section 17 (e)
of Republic Act 6132 in
mind, Usman considers it mandatory on the
part of the Comelec to call for a special
election in the precincts concerned if it
found that
"no voting has been held or that voting has
been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting in any precinct
or precincts because of force majeure,
violence or terrorism, and the votes not cast
therein are sufficient to affect the results of
the election."
In resolving this question, as previously
stated, the Comelec commissioners, per the
resolution dated August 21, 1971, failed to
reach a consensus. One commissioner
believed that the canvass should be
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 323 | P a g e
completed on the basis of the valid returns
from, the other precincts of Lanao del Norte
and that the proclamation of the third
winning candidate on the basis of the said
canvass should logically follow; the other
commissioner maintained his original view
that there is need of a special election
in Karomatan.
A reading of section 17 (e) of Republic Act
6132 makes it apparent that Congress has
delegated to the Comelec the power to call
for a special election - a power essentially
legislative in nature, being merely an
incident to or an extension or modality of
the power to fix the date of the
elections.[10] However, in the proper exercise
of the delegated power, Congress saw fit to
require the Comelec to ascertain that (1) no
voting has been held in any precinct or
precincts because of force majeure, violence
or terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast
therein suffice, to affect the results of the
elections. The language of the provision
clearly requires the concurrence of the two
circumstances to justify the calling of a
special election.
The Comelec concedes that what transpired
in Karomatan constitutes "not merely a
simple case of irregularity in the voting but a
case of no voting or no election at all."
However, the Comelec attributes this to
"massive fraud" rather than
to force majeure, violence or terrorism - the
three causes explicitly enumerated by
section 17 (e). Unlike section 17 (d) which
empowers the Comelec to postpone the
election in any political division or
subdivision whenever it finds that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election
therein is rendered impossible by reason of
fraud, violence, coercion, terrorism, or any
other serious cause or causes, section 17 (e)
excludes the situation where no voting has
been held because of fraud. Furthermore,
doubt exists whether or not the irregularities
committed in Karomatan properly partake of
violence or terrorism. This being the case,
we find that the first circumstance is not
attendant.
As to the second circumstance, therefore, we
find it unnecessary to indulge in surmises.[11]
ACCORDINGLY, (1) the petition is
dismissed; (2) the resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated August 21,
1971 is affirmed; and (3) the restraining
order dated March 23, 1971 issued by this
Court is lifted. The Commission on
Elections is directed to order the board of
canvassers to convene without delay and
forthwith proceed with and complete the
canvass of the election returns from all the
precincts of Lanao del Norte,
excluding therefrom all the election returns
from the 42 precincts of Karomatan, and
thereafter proclaim accordingly the winning
candidate for the third Constitutional
Convention seat allotted to the said
province. This judgment is hereby declared
immediately executory. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Election Protest vs. Quo Warranto
103 Phil 453 April 25, 19581-
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
ANACLETO LUISON, protestant-
appellant,
vs.
FIDEL A. D. GARCIA, protestee-
appellee .
FACTS:
Anacleto Luison and Fidel Garcia
were the only candidates for Mayor of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 324 | P a g e
Tubay in the election held last November 8,
1955.The certificate of candidacy of Luison
was filed by the Nacionalista Party of the
locality duly signed by the chairman and
secretary respectively, while the certificate
of candidacy of Garcia was filed by the local
branch of the Liberal Party but it was merely
signed by one who was a candidate for vice-
mayor. For this reason, the executive
secretary of the Nationalists Party impugned
the sufficiency of the certificate of
candidacy filed in behalf of Garcia,
whereupon the Commission on Elections,
after making its own investigation, issued
Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia
ineligible to run for the Office.
Consequently, the Commission on Elections,
after making its own investigation, issued
Resolution No. 23 declaring Garcia
ineligible to run for the Office.
Consequently, the Commission on Elections
who immediately implemented it by striking
out the name of Garcia from the list of
registered candidates. Said secretary also
relayed the instruction of the Commission
on Elections to the board of inspectors of
every precinct and the board of canvassers
so that they may be guided accordingly and
the votes cast for him may not be counted
and instead be considered as stray votes.
At this juncture, Garcia filed an action for
prohibition with the Court of First Instance
of Agusan against the municipal secretary of
Tubay praying that an order be issued
restraining the latter from invalidating his
certificate of candidacy as well as the votes
that may be cast for him, which was
however dismissed on the ground that said
court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling
of the Commission on Elections on the
matter. No appeal was taken from this order
which became final. Meantime, Garcia filed
a motion for reconsideration of Resolution
No. 23 of the Commission on Elections but
the same was denied and no appeal was
likewise taken from the ruling of the
Commission.
Notwithstanding the adverse ruling of the
Commission on Elections, as well as the
dismissal of the petition for prohibition sued
out by Garcia, the latter continued with his
candidacy and the question of his
ineligibility became an issue in the
campaign. And when the time came for the
counting and appreciation of the ballots, the
board of inspectors, in spite of the adverse
ruling of the Commission on Elections,
counted all the votes cast for Garcia as valid
and credited him with them in the election
returns with the result that he garnered 869
votes as against 675 of his opponent Luison.
Consequently, the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed Garcia as the mayor
elect of Tubay, Agusan.
Luison then filed a petition for quowarranto
in the proper court of first instance
believing that Garcia is ineligible to hold
office, for the purpose of disputing his
ineligibility and securing his consequent
ouster from office, but the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit on a motion filed
by respondent. Luison appealed from the
ruling and the case was docketed in the
Supreme Court as G. R. No. L-10916.
Luison also filed a protest in the same court
on the same ground that Garcia was
ineligible because his certificate of
candidacy was declared null and void by the
Commission on Elections.
After the reception of the evidence, the court
found for protestee holding that the
certificate of candidacy filed by the latter
was in substantial compliance with the law
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 325 | P a g e
and that the Commission on Elections erred
in declaring him legally insufficient. It
therefore dismissed the protest with costs
against protestant. Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the protestee being
ineligible and protestant having obtained the
next highest number of votes, the latter can
be declared entitled to hold the office to be
vacated by the former.
HELD:
No, the Court has held , "The
general rule is that the fact that a plurality or
a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate at a popular election
does not entitle the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. In such case the electors have failed
to make a choice and the election is a
nullity" (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil.,
490). In a subsequent case, this Court also
said that where the winning candidate has
been declared ineligible, the person who
obtained second place in the election cannot
be declared elected since our law not only
does not contain an express provision
authorizing such declaration but apparently
seems to prohibit it .
Moreover, a protest to disqualify a protestee
on the ground of ineligibility is different
from that a protest based on frauds and
irregularities where it may be shown that
protestant was the one really elected for
having obtained a plurality of the legal
votes. In the first case, while the protestee
may be ousted the protestant will not be
seated; in the second case, the protestant
may assume office after protestee is
unseated. The first case is brought to court
by a petition of quo warranto, while the
second by instituting an election protest.
Thus, the Supreme Court, in denning these
two remedies, said:
"All election disputes may be divided into
two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain
to the casting and counting of the ballots;
and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility
of the candidates. If there be eases incapable
of being so classified, they have not been
suggested.
"* * * If the nature of the evidence upon
which the eligibility (qualifications) of a
person to hold office must be decided is
considered, it will be seen that such
evidence has nothing to do with the manner
of casting and counting the votes. To what
purpose would be the examination of
registry lists and ballots by officers
appointed and paid for that purpose in
determining the eligibility of a successful
candidate for office? The eligibility of a
person to be elected to a provincial or
municipal office depends upon his
qualifications as a voter, his residence, his
allegiance to the United States, his age, the
absence of disqualifications inflicted by the
courts by way of punishment, etc. That is,
these qualifications and disqualifications do
not depend upon the conduct of election
inspectors, the illegal trafficking in votes,
the method of casting and counting the
ballots, or the election returns. The evidence
required to establish such qualifications or
disqualifications would not aid in any way
in determining the questions relating to the
manner of casting and counting the ballots.
Considering the fundamental difference
existing between the nature of a petition for
quo warranto and that of an election protest,
it may be said that a candidate who files a
protest against one who has been proclaimed
as having received the highest number of
votes basing his protest cannot disguise his
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 326 | P a g e
action so as to make his protest a
justification to be seated in office. In other
words, he cannot convert an action for quo
warranto into an election protest. This is
because these two cases are fundamentally
different in nature and in purpose. In quo
warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, and the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate", while in a protest, "the
question is as to who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots" (Topacio vs.
Paredes, supra). The present action,
therefore, partakes of the nature of quo
warranto and as such has no reason to exist.
This question is already involved in the
other case (G. R. No. L-10916).
The case of Monsale vs. Nico* (46 Off.
Gaz., Supp. No. 11, 211) invoked by
protestant is not in point. In that case the
candidate who was declared ineligible was
not proclaimed because the votes cast for
him were declared nullified and the one
proclaimed is the candidate who received
the next highest number of votes. The trial
court found that the protestant was not
ineligible because it considered his
certificate of candidacy legally sufficient,
and when the case was brought to the
Supreme Court on appeal the latter merely
reversed the ruling of the trial court. In that
case there was no direct pronouncement that
the one who received the next highest
number of votes may by declared seated.
This case cannot be invoked as precedent.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
reversed. The Court declares that neither
protestee nor protestant has been validly
elected and so none is entitled to the position
of mayor of Tubay, Agusan.
Annulment of Election and Proclamation
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO vs.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989 174
SCRA 245
JUSTICE ISAGANI CRUZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor-elect and assume office in due
time. The League of Municipalities filed
with the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that his
naturalization was merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law
Dictator’s agent abroad.
Respondents averred that as naturalized
American citizen who has not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18. 1988 was therefore
not qualified to run for and be elected
governor.
The Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of
the Philippines and had not repatriated
himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure this
defect because the electorate of Sorsogon
could not amend the Constitution, Local
Government Code and the Omnibus
Election Code. OSG likewise joined private
respondents’ argument that what he and the
League were seeking were not only asking
for the termination of Frivaldo’s
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incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election.
HELD: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could
not have the effect of automatically restoring
his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer’s entire tenure.
The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship.If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.
Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from
serving as a Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. He was ordered to vacate his
office and surrender the same to the duly-
elected Vice Governor of the said province
once this decision becomes final and
executory.
Powers of Administrative Agencies/Bodies
Alliance for the Family
Foundation vs. Garin
G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866,
April 26, 20173
Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the
Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) on
re-certifying the contraceptive drugs named
Implanon and Implanon NXT; the basis of
their opposition hinges on the fact that these
drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to
them, they should have been given notice of
the certification proceedings, and a chance
to present evidence that indeed such drugs
are abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that
petitioners are not entitled to notice and
hearing because the said proceedings are
done in the exercise of its regulatory power,
not quasi-judicial power; also, they alleged
that the Honorable Supreme Court is
incompetent to rule on the instant
controversy due to the same reason.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not said controversy is
outside the scope of Judicial Review;
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(b) Whether or not petitioners were deprived
of substantial and procedural due process of
law;
Held/Doctrines:
It is quite fascinating that the Supreme Court
again reminded us the two fundamental
powers of an administrative body, in the
words of the Honorable Court:
“The powers of an administrative body are
classified into two fundamental
powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial.
Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known
as the power of subordinate legislation, has
been defined as the authority delegated by
the lawmaking body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended
to carry out the provisions of law and
implement legislative policy. A legislative
rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof.
The exercise by the administrative body of
its quasi-legislative power through the
promulgation of regulations of general
application does not, as a rule, require notice
and hearing. The only exception being
where the Legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation shall be based
on certain facts as determined at an
appropriate investigation.
Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is
known as the power of the administrative
agency to determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself. As it involves the exercise of
discretion in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise
of quasi-judicial power requires the
concurrence of two elements: one,
jurisdiction which must be acquired by the
administrative body and two, the
observance of the requirements of due
process, that is, the right to notice and
hearing.”
To answer (a) above, the Supreme Court has
this to say, viz:
“On the argument that the certification
proceedings were conducted by the FDA in
the exercise of its “regulatory powers” and,
therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court
holds that it has the power to review all acts
and decisions where there is a commission
of grave abuse of discretion. No less than
the Constitution decrees that the Court must
exercise its duty to ensure that no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Such is committed when there
is a violation of the constitutional mandate
that “no person is deprived of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law.”
The Court’s power cannot be curtailed by
the FDA’s invocation of its regulatory
power.”
With regard to (b), the Supreme Court ruled
that petitioners were deprived of their Right
to Due Process. Perusal of the law and rules
of procedure of the instant agency reveals
the need of an issuance of notice to all
concerned MAHs and a posting of the
contraceptive products for public
comments. These, respondents failed to do.
This was thoroughly explained by the
Court, to wit:
“Due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural. In order that a
particular act may not be impugned as
violative of the due process clause, there
must be compliance with both the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 329 | P a g e
substantive and procedural requirements
thereof. Substantive due process refers to the
intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with
the rights of a person to his property.
Procedural due process, on the other hand,
means compliance with the procedures or
steps, even periods, prescribed by the
statute, in conformity with the standard of
fair play and without arbitrariness on the
part of those who are called upon to
administer it. xxx
xxx To conclude that product registration,
recertification, procurement, and distribution
of the questioned contraceptive drugs and
devices by the FDA in the exercise of its
regulatory power need not comply with the
requirements of due process would render
the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs
and the posting of a list of contraceptives for
public comment a meaningless exercise.
Concerned MAHs and the public in general
will be deprived of any significant
participation if what they will submit will
not be considered.
Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH
Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the
respondents in support of their claims,
expressly allows the consideration of
conflicting evidence, such as that supplied
by the petitioners in support of their
opposition to the approval of certain
contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the
said provision mandated that the FDA utilize
the “best evidence available” to ensure that
no abortifacient is approved as family
planning drug or device. It bears mentioning
that the same provision even allows an
independent evidence review group (ERG)
to ensure that evidence for or against the
certification of a contraceptive drug or
device is duly considered.”
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
 Department of Finance vs Hon.
Marino dela Cruz
G.R. No. 209331, August 24,
20154
Facts:
The case stemmed from the issuance of
Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2
September 2013, which created the Customs
Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the
Department of Finance (DOF)
CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing
the customs administration... policies, rules
and procedures, and thereafter providing
sound recommendations for the
improvement of the same."
Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner
Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon... issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013
(CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding the positions of Collector
of Customs V and VI,... including
respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective
immediately and valid until sooner
revoked."... approved by DOF Secretary
Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima...
espondents filed an action for Declaratory
Relief with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO
for a period... of 72 hours enjoining
petitioners or any person acting for and in
their behalf from implementing CPO 189-
2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
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rder of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-
Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela
Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21
October 2013. She then set the hearing for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
18 October 2013.
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before this Court, with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners alleged that the case involves
personnel action affecting public officers
which is... under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
etitioners also alleged that respondents
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
available
In their Comment, respondents alleged that
the case involves the validity and
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and thus,
it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Co
Respondents further alleged that EO 140
violated Article 2 of the Civil Code...
etitioners alleged that respondents only
assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify
their filing of an action for declaratory relief.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents'
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself
from further hearing the case.
Issues:
The Issues
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents;
Whether respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC;
Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the
Civil Code when it became effective
immediately after its publication; and
Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.
Ruling:
Jurisdiction over the Petition
When respondents raised the issue of
validity and... constitutionality of CPO 189-
2013, the issue took the case beyond the
scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the
matter is no longer limited to personnel
action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
This case clearly falls within the exceptions
where exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be... resorted to by respondents.
Effectivity of EO 140
EO 140 is an internal regulation... that
affects primarily the personnel of the DOF
and the BOC. It remains valid even without
publication.
Validity of CPO 189-2013
The
Respondents allege that under EO 140,
CPRO shall be composed of its organic
personnel, as approved by the DBM upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The
organic personnel was supposed to be
augmented and reinforced by DOF and
BOC personnel. Respondents allege that
they were detailed to CPRO even before its
organic personnel could be constituted.
We rule for respondents.
Respondents were supposed to augment and
reinforce the existing organic personnel of
CPRO. Yet, at the time of respondents'
detail, CPRO had not been formally
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 331 | P a g e
organized. CPRO had no organic personnel
that had been approved by the DBM upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The
DOF Secretary had yet to promulgate rules
and regulations and to prescribe procedures
and processes to enable CPRO to effectively
exercise its powers and duties, as required
by Section 4 of EO 140.
n this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide
for the period of respondents' detail. It only
provided that the order "shall be effective
immediately and valid until sooner
revoked," making the detail of respondents
indefinite.
Indeed, we commend and support the
reforms being undertaken in the different
agencies of the government. However, we
cannot allow department heads to take
shortcuts that will undermine and disregard
the basic procedures of the law
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT
the petition
We rule that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory
relief filed by respondents.
We further rule that Customs Personnel
Order No.
B-189-2013 was not validly issued.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
this general rule is not applicable in this case
because of the allegation of the
unconstitutionality of the law creating the
CPO
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees
of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.[5] The
CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies
relating to the... civil service
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies allows administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas
of their respective competence.[8] The
doctrine entails lesser expenses and...
provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies.[9] Therefore, direct recourse
to the trial court, when administrative
remedies are available, is a ground for
dismissal of the action.
The doctrine, however, is not without
exceptions.
Among the exceptions are: (1) where there
is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (2) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where
there is... unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (4) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (5) where the
question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided... by the courts
of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (7) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (8) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (9) where the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
had been... rendered moot; (10) where there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (11) where strong public interest is
involved; and (12) in quo warranto
proceedings.[10]
The proviso "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to an effectivity date other
than after fifteen days following the
completion of the law's publication.[12]
Thus, it is within the discretion of the
legislature, or the Executive Department in
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 332 | P a g e
this case,... whether to shorten or extend the
fifteen-day period[13] as long as there is
compliance with the requirement of
publication.
In addition, the Court already ruled that
"[interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published."
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an
employee from one department or agency to
another which is temporary in nature, which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status
or salary and does not require the issuance
of another appointment.
The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum
period of one year
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
United Overseas Bank of the
Philippines vs The Board of
Commissioners-HLURB
G.R. No. 182133, June 23,
20155
Facts:
Respondent J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc.
(JOS Managing Builders) is the registered
owner and developer of the condominium
project Aurora Milestone Tower. On
December 16, 1997, JOS Managing Builders
and respondent EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc.
(EDUPLAN) entered into a
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Contract to Sell covering Condominium
Unit E, 10th Floor of the Aurora Milestone
Tower
In August 1998, EDUPLAN effected full
payment, and in December 1998, JOS
Managing Builders and EDUPLAN
executed a Deed... of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit.
JOS Managing Builders failed to cause the
issuance of a Condominium Certificate of
Title over the condominium unit in the name
of EDUPLAN.
EDUPLAN learned that the... lots on which
the condominium building project Aurora
Milestone Tower was erected had been
mortgaged by JOS Managing Builders to
petitioner United Overseas Bank of the
Philippines (United Overseas Bank) without
the prior written approval of the Housing
and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Due to the inability of JOS Managing
Builders to deliver the condominium
certificate of title covering the unit
purchased by EDUPLAN, the latter filed a
complaint for specific performance and
damages against JOS Managing Builders
and United
Overseas Bank before the HLURB praying
that: (a) the mortgage between JOS
Managing Builders and United Overseas
Bank be declared null and void; (b) JOS
Managing Builders and United Overseas
Bank be compelled to cause the issuance
and release of the Condominium Certificate
of
Title; and (c) JOS Managing Builders be
ordered to provide emergency power
facilities, to refund the monthly telephone
carrier charges, and to permanently cease
and desist from further collecting such
charges.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 333 | P a g e
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO APPLY THE EXCEPTION
TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES...
whether the HLURB is correct in declaring
null and void the entire mortgage constituted
by JOS Managing
Builders in favor of United Overseas Bank,
as well as the foreclosure of the entire
mortgage, is a legal question which is an
exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. The thrust of the rule is that courts
must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas
of their... respective competence
It has been held, however, that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are
not iron-clad rules.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,... the
Court... enumerated the numerous
exceptions to these rules, namely:
(e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of... justice
The issue on whether non-compliance with
the clearance requirement with the HLURB
would result to the nullification of the entire
mortgage contract or only a part of it is
purely legal which will have to be decided
ultimately by a regular court of law.
The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience, but one that
would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
here is, thus, no need to exhaust
administrative remedies, under the premises.
The HLURB erred in declaring null and
void the entire mortgage executed between
JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank.
We find the recent view espoused in
Philippine National Bank to be in accord
with law and equity. While a mortgage may
be nullified if it was in violation of Section
18 of P.D. No. 957, such nullification
applies only to the interest of the
complaining buyer. It cannot... extend to the
entire mortgage. A buyer of a particular unit
or lot has no standing to ask for the
nullification of the entire mortgage.
Since EDUPLAN has an actionable interest
only over Unit E, 10th Floor, Aurora
Milestone Tower, it is but logical to
conclude that it has no standing to seek for
the complete nullification of the subject
mortgage and the HLURB was incorrect
when it voided... the whole mortgage
between JOS Managing Builders and United
Overseas Bank.
It should be noted, however, that the failure
of JOS Managing Builders to secure prior
approval of the mortgage from the HLURB
and United Overseas Bank's failure to
inquire on the status of the property offered
for mortgage placed the condominium
developer and the creditor Bank... in pari
delicto.
Hence, they cannot ask the courts for relief
for such parties should be left where they are
found for being equally at fault.
More importantly, it should be understood
that the prior approval requirement is
intended to protect buyers of condominium
units from fraudulent manipulations
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 334 | P a g e
perpetrated by unscrupulous condominium
sellers and operators, such as their failure to
deliver titles to the buyer or... titles free
from lien and encumbrances.[21] This is
pursuant to the intent of P.D. No. 957 to
protect hapless buyers from the unjust
practices of unscrupulous developers which
may constitute mortgages over
condominium projects sans the knowledge
of the... former and the consent of the
HLURB.
Thus, failure to secure the HLURB'S prior
written approval as required by P.D. No. 957
will not annul the entire mortgage between
the condominium developer and the creditor
bank, otherwise the protection intended for
condominium buyers will inadvertently be
extended to the... condominium developer
even though, by failing to secure the
government's prior approval, it is the party
at fault.
From all the foregoing, the HLURB erred
when it declared the entire mortgage
constituted by JOS Managing Builders, Inc.
in favor of United Overseas Bank null and
void based solely on the complaint of
EDUPLAN which was only claiming
ownership over a single condominium unit
of
Aurora Milestone Tower. Accordingly, the
mortgage executed between JOS Managing
Builders and United Overseas Bank is valid.
Principles:
There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and not as to the truth
or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could... be resolved only
tentatively by the administrative authorities.
The final decision on the matter rests not
with them but with the courts of justice.
Rights of Public Officers
a. The Provincial Government of Camarines
Norte vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 185740, July
23,
2013
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OF CAMARINES NORTE v. BEATRIZ
O. GONZALES (G.R. No. 185740 : July
23, 2013)
FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial
administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr.
on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a
permanent capacity. An administrative case
was filed against her for gross
insubordination, this was later on captioned
as Administrative Case No. 001. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad
Hoc Investigation Committee found her
guilty of the charges against her, and
recommended to Governor Pimentel that she
be held administratively liable. On
September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel
adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committees recommendation and dismissed
Gonzales.
On appeal, the CSCmodified Governor
Pimentels decision finding Gonzales guilty
of insubordination and suspending her for
six months. This decision was appealed by
Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied.
The CSC then issued Resolution No.
002245,which directed Gonzales
reinstatement. Governor Pimentel reinstated
Gonzales as provincial administrator on
October 12, 2000, but terminated her
services the next day for lack of confidence.
He then wrote a letter to the CSC reporting
his compliance with its order, and Gonzales
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 335 | P a g e
subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee.
The CSC responded through Resolution No.
030008,which again directed Gonzales
reinstatement as provincial administrator. It
clarified that while the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160)
made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in
nature, this conversion cannot operate to
prejudice officials who were already issued
permanent appointments as administrators
prior to the new laws effectivity. According
to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested
right to her permanent appointment as
provincial administrator and is entitled to
continue holding this office despite its
subsequent classification as a coterminous
position.
Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that
Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines
Nortes incumbent governor, refused to
reinstate her. The CSC responded with
Resolution No. 061988,which ordered
Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial
administrator position, or to an equivalent
position. Thus, the petitioner, through
Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review
before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs
Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No.
061988.
The CA supported the CSCs ruling.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition before
the SC. In its present petition for review on
certiorari, the petitioner argues that the
provincial administrator position has been
converted into a highly confidential,
coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence,
Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of
tenure to the position she held prior to RA
7160s enactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzales should be
reinstated as the provincial administrator or
to an equivalent position
HELD:
No.
Political Law- Congress has reclassified the
provincial administrator position as a
primarily confidential, non-career position
Congress reclassification of the provincial
administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid
exercise of legislative power that does not
violate Gonzales security of tenure.
Having established that Congress has
changed the nature of the provincial
administrator position to a primarily
confidential employee, the next question to
address would be its impact on Gonzales
security of tenure. According to the
petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of
tenure when the provincial administrator
position became a primarily confidential
position. Gonzales, on the other hand,
retorted that the conversion of the position
should not be retroactively applied to her, as
she is a permanent appointee.
Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of
the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales
original permanent appointment under the
old LGC. They posit that Gonzales acquired
a vested legal right over her position from
the moment she assumed her duties as
provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot
be removed from office except for cause and
after due hearing; otherwise such removal
would amount to a violation of her security
of tenure.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 336 | P a g e
The arguments presented by the parties and
ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual
entanglement between the nature of the
position and an employees right to hold a
position. These two concepts are different.
The nature of a position may change by law
according to the dictates of Congress. The
right to hold a position, on the other hand, is
a right that enjoys constitutional and
statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position.
In the current case, Congress, through RA
7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly
modified many of its aspects. It is now a
primarily confidential position under the
non-career service tranche of the civil
service. This change could not have been
aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was
not the only provincial administrator
incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted.
Rather, this change was part of the reform
measures that RA 7160 introduced to further
empower local governments and
decentralize the delivery of public service.
Thus, Gonzales permanent appointment as
provincial administrator prior to the
enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her
removal as provincial administrator. For
purposes of determining whether Gonzales
termination violated her right to security of
tenure, the nature of the position she
occupied at the time of her removal should
be considered, and not merely the nature of
her appointment at the time she entered
government service.
In echoing the CSC and the CAs conclusion,
the dissenting opinion posits the view that
security of tenure protects the permanent
appointment of a public officer, despite
subsequent changes in the nature of his
position.
Security of tenure in public office simply
means that a public officer or employee
shall not be suspended or dismissed except
for cause, as provided by law and after due
process. It cannot be expanded to grant a
right to public office despite a change in the
nature of the office held. In other words, the
CSC might have been legally correct when it
ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales
right to security of tenure when she was
removed without sufficient just cause from
her position, but the situation had since then
been changed.
In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered,
but her services were subsequently
terminated under the law prevailing at the
time of the termination of her service; i.e.,
she was then already occupying a position
that was primarily confidential and had to be
dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the
trust and confidence of the appointing
authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for
lack of confidence was lawful. Thus,
Gonzales termination for lack of confidence
was lawful. She could no longer be
reinstated as provincial administrator of
Camarines Norte or to any other comparable
position. This conclusion, however, is
without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to
retirement benefits, leave credits, and future
employment in government service.
The “Threefold Liability Rule”
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P.
ANDUTAN, JR.
G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all
non-career officials or those occupying
political positions to vacate their positions,
Andutan resigned from the DOF as the
former Deputy Director of the One-Stop
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 337 | P a g e
Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al.
was criminally charged by the Fact Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the
Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and
violations RA 3019. As government
employees, Andutan et al. were likewise
administratively charged of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. The
criminal and administrative charges arose
from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia,
among others. The Ombudsman found the
respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Having been separated from the service,
Andutan was imposed the penalty of
forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other
benefits and privileges, and perpetual
disqualification from reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including
government owned and controlled agencies
or corporations. The CA annulled and set
aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling
that the latter “should not have considered
the administrative complaints” because:
first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that
the Ombudsman “may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained
of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint
was filed after one year from the occurrence
of the act or omission complained of”; and
second, the administrative case was filed
after Andutan’s forced resignation
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770
prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting
an administrative investigation a year after
the act was committed.
2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to
institute an administrative complaint against
a government employee who had already
resigned.
HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that
administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature
pertain to the character of public officers
and employees. In disciplining public
officers and employees, the object sought is
not the punishment of the officer or
employee but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public’s
faith and confidence in our government.
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not
prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting
an administrative investigation after the
lapse of one year, reckoned from the time
the alleged act was committed. Without
doubt, even if the administrative case was
filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in
Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well
within its discretion to conduct the
administrative investigation.
2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer
institute an administrative case against
Andutan because the latter was not a public
servant at the time the case was filed. It is
irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman,
that Andutan had already resigned prior to
the filing of the administrative case since the
operative fact that determines its jurisdiction
is the commission of an offense while in the
public service. The SC observed that indeed
it has held in the past that a public official’s
resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to
the official’s resignation. However, the facts
of those cases are not entirely applicable to
the present case. In the past cases, the Court
found that the public officials – subject of
the administrative cases – resigned, either to
prevent the continuation of a case already
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 338 | P a g e
filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of
one. Here, neither situation obtains. First,
Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice
nor of his own doing; he was forced to
resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his
DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the
administrative case was filed on September
1, 1999, exactly one year and two months
after his resignation. What is clear from the
records is that Andutan was forced to resign
more than a year before the Ombudsman
filed the administrative case against him. If
the SC agreed with the interpretation of the
Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
been separated from the service for a long
time – may still be subject to the disciplinary
authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
Likewise, if the act committed by the public
official is indeed inimical to the interests of
the State, other legal mechanisms are
available to redress the same.
RACCS
i. IA1 Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service
- Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(IAS-PDEA), G.R. No. 198140, 25 January
2016
IA1 ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT,
PETITIONER, VS. INTERNAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE -PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
( G.R. No. 198140, January 25, 2016)
FACTS:
Magcamit and his co-agents were formally
charged with Grave Misconduct for
demanding and/or obtaining P200,000.00
from Luciana M. Jaen (Jaen) in exchange for
her release after she was apprehended in a
buy-bust operation in Lipa City. They were
dismissed on June 5, 2008. Magcamit filed
his motion for reconsideration arguing that
the IAS-PDEA committed errors of law
and/or irregularities prejudicial to his
interest; its decision, too, was not supported
by the evidence on record. Aside from the
procedural lapses Magcamit claimed the
IAS-PDEA had committed, he raised the
fact that his name never came up in the
sworn statements submitted to SI V
Enriquez. Moreover, he argued that the
application of the "doctrine of implied
conspiracy" was misplaced because the
evidence on record did not show any act
showing that he participated in the alleged
extortion. Enriquez denied the motion for
reconsideration of Magcamit and his co-
agents as they had been duly afforded
administrative due process and had been
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side. He added that the absence
of a preliminary investigation was not fatal
to their case. Lastly, he maintained that
direct proof is not necessary to establish
conspiracy as long as it is shown that the
parties demonstrate they concur with the
criminal design and its objective.
Magcamit filed a notice of appeal and
elevating his case to the CSC.
In its March 17, 2009 decision, the CSC
denied Magcamit's appeal and affirmed his
dismissal from the civil service. It ruled that
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers - such as the IAS-PDEA -
are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements especially when
due process has been fundamentally and
essentially observed. It found that Magcamit
was positively identified by CI Paner in his
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 339 | P a g e
sworn statement as the person who
identified the members of the group who
received their respective shares from the
P200,000.00, thus, establishing his
participation in the extortion. The CSC
noted that Magcamit failed to controvert this
allegation against him.
Reiterating the grounds he relied upon in his
appeal to the CSC, Magcamit filed a petition
for review under Rule 43 with the CA,
imputing error on the part of the CSC in
affirming his dismissal from the service.
Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari before this Court
ISSUES:
1. W/N Magcamit’s right to due
process was denied because gross
irregularities attended the
administrative investigation
conducted by the IAS-PDEA; and
2. W/N the evidence on record does not
support his dismissal.
Due process in administrative cases, in
essence, is simply an opportunity to explain
one's side or to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling. For as long as the parties
were given fair and reasonable opportunity
to be heard before judgment was rendered,
the demands of due process were
sufficiently met. There is no violation of
procedural due process even if no formal or
trial-type hearing was conducted, where the
party was given a chance to explain his side
of the controversy. Magcamit had the
opportunity to deny and controvert the
complaint against him when he filed his
reply to the letter-complaint and his answer
to the formal charge. He even had the
opportunity to elevate his case to the CSC
thus, Magcamit was given an opportunity to
be heard.
In cases brought via a petition for review
on certiorari, the SC is limited to the review
of errors of law however, it may review the
findings of fact when they fail to consider
relevant facts that, if properly taken into
account, would justify a different conclusion
or when there is serious ground to believe
that a possible miscarriage of justice would
result.
Here, the affidavits that were attached to the
formal charge for grave misconduct against
Magcamit and four (4) other members of the
PDEA-Special Enforcement Service (SES)
that required them to submit their respective
position papers on the administrative
charge never mentioned the name of
Magcamit.
It was only in an affidavit dated May 7,
2008 that Magcamit’s name was mentioned
- a document that was not part of the
proceedings before the IAS-PDEA.
Given how the evidence against him came
out, Magcamit could not have adequately
and fully disputed the allegations against
him since during the administrative
investigation he was not properly apprised
of all the evidence against him. Magcamit
could not have refuted the May 7, 2008
affidavit of Paner, which was the sole basis
of the CSC's and the CA's finding of
Magcamit's liability; notably, the formal
charge requiring him and his co-accused to
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 340 | P a g e
file their position papers was dated May 5,
2008. Corollarily, Magcamit and his co-
agents were not even furnished a copy of the
affidavits of CI Paner dated April 15, 2008
and April 17, 2008 before the
recommendation for dismissal came out.
Magcamit was thus blindsided and forced to
deal with pieces of evidence he did not even
know existed.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record AND disclosed to the parties
affected," was not complied with. Magcamit
was not properly apprised of the evidence
presented against him, which evidence were
eventually made the bases of the decision
finding him guilty of grave misconduct and
recommending his dismissal.
Although, in the past, we have held that the
right to due process of a respondent in an
administrative case is not violated if he filed
a motion for reconsideration to refute the
evidence against him, the present case
should be carefully examined for purposes
of the application of this rule. Here, the
evidence of Magcamit's participation was
made available to him only after he had
elevated the case to the CSC. Prior to that,
or when the IAS-PDEA came up with the
decision finding him guilty of gross
misconduct, there was no substantial
evidence proving Magcamit was even
involved.
Even if we take into account CI Paner's May
7, 2008 affidavit, we find this document to
be inadequate to hold - even by standards of
substantial evidence - that Magcamit
participated in the PDEA's extortion
activities
After evaluating the totality of evidence on
record, we find that the records are bereft of
substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Magcamit should be held
administratively liable for grave misconduct;
Magcamit was dismissed from the service
based on evidence that had not been
disclosed to him.
Boston Finance and Investment Corporation
v. Judge Gonzalez, A.M. No. RTJ-18-
2520 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4296-
RTJ), October 09, 2018
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 14-4296-RTJ), October 09, 2018 ]
BOSTON FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT, V.
CANDELARIO V. GONZALEZ,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BAIS CITY, NEGROS
ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that on
November 19, 2010, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 10-27-MY, the Estate of Danilo Y.
Uy and Thelma D. Uy, et al. (plaintiffs),
filed a Petition with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC,
praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction/TRO to enjoin the
sale at public auction of the properties that
served as collateral for the loans they
obtained from complainant. Respondent
issued an Order of even date directing
complainant to show cause why an
injunctive writ should not be issued. In the
same order, however, respondent also
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 341 | P a g e
directed the Clerk of Court, as Ex-
Officio Sheriff, and her Deputy Sheriff "to
cease and desist from conducting the
scheduled public auction on November 19,
2010 pending the resolution of the instant
petition" without, however, specifying the
duration of its effectivity.
On December 2, 2010, complainant filed its
Compliance, maintaining that no injunctive
writ should issue in favor of the plaintiffs,
and that the petition should be dismissed on
the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. It appears that the plaintiffs had
instituted a similar case before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City seeking the enjoinment of the
foreclosure sale. Subsequently, complainant
also filed its Answer, praying for the
dismissal of the petition and reiterating the
affirmative defenses in its Compliance.
Furthermore, in a Manifestation with
Motion dated June 14, 2011, complainant
alleged that there were other pending
incidents in the case that respondent needed
to resolve.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to resolve
all pending incidents in connection with the
case for a relatively long time. The
scheduled hearings were also postponed
several times for various reasons, one of
which was the information given to the court
by plaintiffs' counsel that the parties were in
the process of negotiations for a final
settlement.
Thereafter, or on March 18, 2013,
complainant again moved for the prompt
resolution of all pending incidents in the
case. Although it denied that the parties
were currently undergoing amicable
settlement, complainant nonetheless
expressed its willingness to enter into a
compromise agreement with
plaintiffs. However, no compromise
agreement was reached for failure of the
plaintiffs to cooperate with complainant.
Finally, in an Order dated July 24, 2013,
respondent suspended the proceedings in
and archived Civil Case No. 10-27-MY
"pending resolution of the other related case
in Bacolod City."
In his defense, respondent claimed that he
issued the July 24, 2013 Order in the honest
belief that the parties were in the process of
finalizing an amicable settlement, especially
since complainant's counsel did not object
thereto. He explained that the suspension of
the proceedings was not intended to delay
the resolution of the case, but to facilitate
the parties' negotiations preparatory to a
compromise agreement.
In rebuttal, complainant maintained that
respondent's failure to promptly resolve all
pending incidents in the case, i.e., the
motion to lift the cease and desist order and
the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 10-27-
MY, despite repeated pleas for their
immediate resolution, constituted gross
dereliction of duty and violation of A.M.
No. 99-10-05-0. Likewise, complainant
pointed out that its several manifestations
and motions praying for the early resolution
of the pending incidents should have been
sufficient to apprise respondent that it was
no longer willing to enter into a compromise
agreement with plaintiffs. As such,
respondent had no basis to assume that the
parties were close to having an amicable
settlement.
Finally, although respondent admitted that
there were several incidents which remained
unacted upon, he insisted that it was because
the preliminary hearing on complainant's
affirmative defenses has not yet been
terminated due to the latter's failure to
appear. He claimed that complainant
actively participated in the similar case
pending before the MTCC in Bacolod City,
where the parties were allegedly negotiating
for an amicable settlement.
Similarly, the OCA observed that
respondent's failure to expeditiously resolve
the pending incidents in the case resulted in
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 342 | P a g e
the undue and inordinate delay in the
resolution thereof. Moreover, although a
judge may order that a civil case be archived
under several circumstances, the prescribed
period should not exceed ninety (90) days
after which, the case should immediately be
included in the trial calendar. In this case, a
period of two (2) years had already lapsed,
displaying respondent's lackadaisical
treatment of the case.
Under Item No. 1, Section 9, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering an
order is a less serious charge punishable by
suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months, or a
fine of more than P10,000.00, but not
exceeding P20,000.00. Citing jurisprudence,
the OCA recommended that respondent be
fined in the amount of P11,000.00 for this
particular offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should
be held administratively liable?
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious review of this case, the
Court finds respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and undue delay in
rendering an order.
Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is a serious charge
punishable by either: (a) dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled
corporation; or (b) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) months, but not exceeding six
(6) months; or (c) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.On the other hand, undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is a less
serious charge punishable by either: (a)
suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months; or
(b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
Considering that this is the first time that
respondent has been found administratively
liable for both offenses, and in light of
relevant jurisprudence where separate
penalties had been imposed on a respondent
judge who is found guilty of two (2) or more
offenses, the Court metes upon respondent
in this case the penalty of a fine in the
amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law, as well as a fine of P11,000.00 for
undue delay in resolving pending incidents
in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY. Further,
respondent is sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
At this juncture, it may be ruminated: is not
Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) — which provides that
"[i]f the respondent is found guilty of two
(2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to
be imposed should be that corresponding to
the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances" —
applicable in meting out the penalties on
herein respondent"?
The Court is aware that in previous cases, it
had indeed applied Section 50, Rule 10 of
the RRACCS in imposing penalties on
erring judges who were found guilty of
multiple administrative charges or counts.
In Hipe v. Literato the Court found Judge
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 343 | P a g e
Rolando T. Literato liable for two (2)
offenses, particularly gross ignorance of the
law and undue delay in rendering a decision.
Applying Section 50, Rule 10 of the
RRACCS, it imposed a penalty of fine in the
amount of P30,000.00, which corresponds to
the penalty for the most serious charge,
while undue delay in deciding a case was
considered only as an aggravating
circumstance.In Spouses Crisologo v.
Omelio, respondent judge was found guilty
of four (4) counts of gross ignorance of the
law, for which the Court imposed the
penalty for the offense "in its maximum, due
to the presence of aggravating
circumstances."In Re: Anonymous
Complaints Against Bandong, retired Judge
Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong was found
liable for gross misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, and
violation of Supreme Court rules but the
penalty imposed on her was a single fine of
P40,000.00, based on her most serious
charge of gross misconduct, while the rest
were only considered as aggravating
circumstances.
In contrast, in another set of cases (which
were above-cited and applied herein), the
Court had imposed separate penalties on
respondent judges who were found guilty of
two (2) or more offenses. In Re: Evaluation
of Administrative Liability of Lubao, the
Court found Judge Antonio C. Lubao guilty
of various offenses under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and separately penalized the
judge for each violation. In Medina v.
Canoy, Judge Victor A. Canoy was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
undue delay in rendering a decision under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
accordingly, was meted separate fines for
each offense. Similarly, in Reyes v.
Paderanga, Judge Rustico D. Paderanga
was found guilty of two (2) offenses under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and was
separately fined for each offense.
Recognizing these diverging strands of
jurisprudence, the Court finds it opportune
to herein settle the conflict by resolving that
henceforth, in administrative cases
involving judges and justices of the lower
courts, the respondent shall be charged
and penalized under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, and accordingly, separate
penalties shall be imposed for every
offense. The penalty provisions under the
RRACCS shall not apply in such cases. To
avoid any confusion, the underlying
considerations therefor shall be explicated
below.
Fundamentally, the setting of parameters
pertaining to the discipline of all court
personnel, including judges and justices,
clearly fall within the sole prerogative of the
Court. The Supreme Court's exclusive
authority to set these parameters is based on
no other than the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
ARTICLE VIII
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
(Emphases supplied)
In this relation, Section 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution particularly states that
"[t]he Supreme Court en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal x x x."
Anchored on these constitutional mandates,
the Court issued two (2) separate body of
rules to govern judicial discipline cases, to
wit: (a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court to
apply to judges and justices of lower
courts; and (b) the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel (CCCP), which
incorporates the RRACCS, to apply to all
judiciary personnel "who are not justices
or judges." Each shall be discussed in turn.
In its present form, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court is entitled "Discipline of Judges of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 344 | P a g e
Regular and Special Courts and Justices of
the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan." As its titular heading
denotes, Rule 140 was crafted to specifically
govern the discipline of judges and justices
of the lower courts, providing therein not
only a distinct classification of charges but
also the applicable sanctions.A perusal of
the offenses listed therein shows that they
are broad enough to cover all kinds of
administrative charges related to judicial
functions, as they even include violations of
the codes of conduct for judges, as well as
of Supreme Court directives. It is likewise
apparent that the list of offenses therein
includes even violations of the civil service
rules, such as acts of dishonesty,gambling in
public,and engaging in partisan political
activities. The Court therefore holds that
violations of civil service laws and rules are
subsumed under the charges enumerated in
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. On this
score, it is highly-instructive to echo the
observations of retired Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. in his Separate
Opinion in the case of OCA v.
Chavez,explaining the "non-application of
administrative offenses under the ordinary
civil service rules with respect to judges by
reason of them being covered by another set
of rules or law that specially deals with the
grounds for their discipline," viz.:
1. The RRACCS is intended to govern
administrative proceedings in the entire
civil service, in general. Rule 140 of the
Rules of the Court, on the other hand, is
specifically meant to govern the
disciplinary proceedings against members
of the judiciary. Since the RRACCS could
not possibly have repealed Rule 140, the
latter rule ought to be considered as an
exception to the former rule. In other
words, the RRACCS must yield to Rule
140 with respect to matters specifically
treated in the latter.
Among those specifically treated under
 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court are the
different administrative offenses that a
member of the judiciary may be charged
with and held liable under. Viewed thusly,
the administrative offenses under
RRACCS can have no application to
members of the judiciary.
2. The above conclusion is supported by the
1982 case of Macariola v. Asuncion [199
Phil. 295 (1982)].
In Macariola, a judge, who associated
himself with a private corporation as an
officer and a stockholder during his
incumbency, was administratively charged
of, among others, violating a provision of
the Civil Service Rules which was
promulgated by the CSC pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 2260 or the Civil
Service Act of 1959. The issue then was
whether the judge may be held
administratively liable under such a
charge.
Macariola answered the issue in the
negative and dismissed the said charge. It
ruled that administrative charges under the
Civil Service Act of 1959 and the rules
that were promulgated thereunder do not
apply to judges, they being members of
the judiciary and thus covered by the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as to matters
pertaining to grounds for their discipline.
3. While the rules and laws referred to
in Macariola had since been superseded
by more recent issuances and enactments,
the doctrine established therein, i.e., the
non-application of administrative
offenses under the ordinary civil service
rules with respect to judges by reason
of them being covered by another set of
rules or law that specially deals with the
grounds for their discipline, remains
valid. Like it was during the time
of Macariola, the grounds for the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 345 | P a g e
discipline of members of the judiciary are
still provided for under a special set of
rules distinct from the ordinary civil
service rules promulgated by the CSC.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court are the
set of rules especially promulgated by
the Court to govern disciplinary
proceedings against members of the
judiciary. Sections 8, 9[,] and 10 of the
said rule, in turn, provide the specific
administrative charges that can be applied
against a member of the judiciary. These
provisions are completely separate from
the administrative offenses under Section
46 of the RRACCS.
4. There is also practical value in
maintaining the Macariola doctrine. A
contrary rule, i.e., allowing the
administrative offenses under the
RRACCS to be concurrently applied with
those under Rule 140, will only lead to
confusion and even compromise the
court's ability, in administrative
proceedings against members of the
judiciary, to impose uniform sanctions in
cases that bear similar sets of facts. A
couple of examples quickly comes to
mind:
a. A judge who fails to render a decision
within the reglementary period under
the Constitution is liable for the less
serious charge of Undue Delay in
Rendering Decision under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. However, if the
offenses under the RRACCS are
rendered applicable, then another judge
who commits the same fault may
instead find himself charged with the
grave offense of Gross Neglect of Duty
under the said rule.
b. A judge who is an alcoholic and a
habitual drunk is liable for a serious
charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of
 Court. However, should the RRACCS
be made applicable, a second judge who
is every bit as alcoholic and drunk as
the first may instead be held
accountable only for a less grave
offense under the said rule.
The above examples, needless to state, are
merely the proverbial tip of the iceberg of
confusion that may follow should we
allow the aministrative offenses under the
RRACCS to be applied against members
of the judiciary.(Emphases supplied)
Hence, in resolving administrative cases
against judges or justices of the lower
courts, reference need only be made to Rule
140 of the Rules of Court as regards the
charges, as well as the imposable
penalties. If the respondent judge or
justice is found liable for two (2) or more
charges, separate penalties shall be
imposed on him/her such that Section 50 of
the RRACCS shall have no application in
imposing sanctions.
On the other hand, as regards other court
personnel who are not judges or justices, the
CCCP governs the Court's exercise of
disciplinary authority over them. It must be
pointed out that the CCCP explicitly
incorporates civil service rules, viz.:
Thus, to summarize the foregoing
discussion, the following guidelines shall be
observed:
(a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall
exclusively govern administrative cases
involving judges or justices of the
lower courts. If the respondent judge or
justice of the lower court is found guilty
of multiple offenses under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, the Court shall
impose separate penalties for each
violation; and
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 346 | P a g e
(b) The administrative liability of court
personnel (who are not judges or justices
of the lower courts) shall be governed by
the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which incorporates, among
others, the civil service laws and rules. If
the respondent court personnel is found
guilty of multiple administrative
offenses, the Court shall impose the
penalty corresponding to the most
serious charge, and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating
circumstances.
HELD: WHEREFORE, respondent
Candelario V. Gonzalez, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Bais City,
Negros Oriental, Branch 45 is hereby
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and accordingly, meted the penalty
of FINE in the amount of P30,000.00.
Likewise, he is found GUILTY of Undue
Delay in Rendering an Order and
accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in
the amount of P11,000.00. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more
severely.
Furthermore, the Court
hereby RESOLVES that the aforestated
guidelines shall be observed. These
guidelines shall APPLY to all pending and
future administrative cases involving court
employees, subject to revision by the Court
through the pertinent issuance therefor.
Quantum of Proof in Administrative Case
Against Judges
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247 March 2, 2011
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3143-RTJ)
JOCELYN DATOON, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BETHANY G. KAPILI,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Respondent.
FACTS: Before this Court is a verified
Complaint1 filed on March 17, 2009, by
complainant Jocelyn Datoon (Datoon)
charging respondent Judge Bethany G.
Kapili (Judge Kapili), Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court Branch 24, Maasin
City (RTC), with Conduct Unbecoming a
Member of the Judiciary, and Gross
Misconduct amounting to Violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to an
incident which occured at the Salvacion
Oppus Yñiguez Memorial Hospital
(SOYMH) in Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Datoon averred that on December 11, 2008,
at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, she
was in the labor room of SOYMH waiting to
give birth. She was accompanied by her
father, Jose Gagan (Gagan). Suddenly, they
were disturbed by the appearance of Judge
Kapili who appeared to her to be drunk as
his face was reddish and his eyes were
sleepy. She noticed a gun at his waist over
his tucked-in t-shirt and she became
nervous. Judge Kapili entered the labor
room calling "Lor, Lor," looking for his
wife, Dr. Lorna Kapili (Dr. Kapili), a
practicing obstetrician-gynecologist. Not
seeing his wife around, Judge Kapili left and
entered the delivery room, but returned to
the labor room a few minutes later. Datoon
was crying, as she was already having labor
pains at the time. Judge Kapili then pointed
his gun at her and asked "What’s your
problem?" This caused her to start crying
hysterically while saying "Please don’t sir,
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 347 | P a g e
have pity." At this time, she was lying in bed
while Judge Kapili was standing at the left
side of the bed near her head. At that
moment, a woman entered the room and
informed Judge Kapili of the whereabouts of
Dr. Kapili, after which he left. Datoon
claimed that because of this incident, she
was unable to go through normal delivery of
her baby and had to undergo caesarian
operation instead. Her testimony appeared in
the records as follows:
Judge Kapili further asserted that he did not
have a gun and was only carrying a clutch
bag, which Datoon might have mistaken as
containing a firearm. He also stated that
Gagan was not in the labor room and the
only persons present were Datoon and a
midwife named Ermelinda Costillas, who
was the woman who informed him that his
wife was resting in the doctors’ lounge and
whose Affidavit10 was attached to the
Comment. He was unaware that he had
created any disturbance as he had not
received any notice of such until more than
four months later, or on April 16, 2009,
when he received a copy of the Complaint.
Administrative charges against judges have
been viewed by this Court with utmost care,
as the respondent stands to face the penalty
of dismissal or disbarment. Thus,
proceedings of this character are in their
nature highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules of law applicable to
criminal cases. The charges in such case
must, therefore, be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.15
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Kapili should
be charged with Conduct Unbecoming a
Member of the Judiciary and Gross
Misconduct amounting to Violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Held: In light of the evidence submitted in
this case, the Court is of the view that the
charges against Judge Kapili were not
sufficiently substantiated by Datoon who
has the burden of proof in administrative
proceedings.16 The evidence presented was
not sufficient to compel the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers over the
respondent judge as mandated under Article
VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.17
As to Judge Kapili’s alleged intoxicated
state, Datoon only surmised that he was
drunk because his face was flushed and his
eyes were sleepy.22 This was an unfounded
conclusion. His sleepy eyes could be
attributed to the fact that it was 3:00 o’clock
in the morning, while his reddish face could
be explained by his natural coloration, as
observed by the Investigating
Justice.23 Moreover, Datoon admitted that
Judge Kapili did not smell of alcohol or
liquor at the time of the incident.24
Lastly, both Judge Paler-Gonzales25 and
Hernandez26 testified that Datoon admitted
to them that she signed the Complaint and
Affidavit without meeting the lawyers who
prepared the same. Hernandez further bared
that Datoon admitted to him that Judge
Kapili never pointed a gun at her.27 On her
part, Judge Paler-Gonzales testified that
Datoon admitted that she was not sure if the
contents of her Complaint and Affidavit
were true because she was in pain at the
time of the incident.28
Datoon failed to address these accusations as
she was not presented for rebuttal. Section
26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
provides that admissions of a party may be
given in evidence against him or her.
Datoon’s admission against her interest, as
narrated by two credible and neutral
witnesses, militates against the credibility of
her charges. The presumption is that no
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 348 | P a g e
person would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration were true.29
It is clear that Datoon failed to prove her
charges against Judge Kapili. The complaint
against Judge Bethany G. Kapili is
DISMISSED.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC)
i. Civil Service Commission vs. Court of
Appeals, 682 SCRA 353 (2012)
The Facts
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra)
and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the
Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice
President for Administration, respectively,
of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP) in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto
L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal
Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty,
grave misconduct, falsification of official
documents, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, being notoriously
undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva
charged Guevarra with falsification of a
public document, specifically the
Application for Bond of Accountable
Officials and Employees of the Republic of
the Philippines, in which the latter denied
the existence of his pending criminal and
administrative cases. As the head of the
school, Guevarra was required to be bonded
in order to be able to engage in financial
transactions on behalf of PUP. In his
Application for Bond of Accountable
Officials and Employees of the Republic of
the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he
answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
Do you have any criminal or administrative
records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature
thereof NO.
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at
that time, both Guevarra and Cezar
admittedly had 17 pending cases for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing
fully well that both he and Guevarra had
existing cases before the Sandiganbayan,
endorsed and recommended the approval of
the application.
The respondents explained that they
believed "criminal or administrative
records" to mean final conviction in a
criminal or administrative case. Thus,
because their cases had not yet been decided
by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that
Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in
General Form No. 58-A correctly and in
good faith.
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No.
06052110 formally charging Guevarra with
Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
after a prima facie finding that they had
committed acts punishable under the Civil
Service Law and Rules.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case
praying that the case be suspended
immediately and that the CSC declare a
complete absence of a prima facie case
against them. Cueva, on the other hand, filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 349 | P a g e
of Preventive Suspension and an Omnibus
Motion seeking the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension against Guevarra and
Cezar and the inclusion of the following
offenses in the formal charge against them:
Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official
Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously
Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 6713.
In Resolution No. 061141, dated June 30,
2006, the CSC denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents for
being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a
motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited
pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service Commission. It also denied Cuevas
motion to include additional charges against
the respondents. The CSC, however, placed
Guevarra under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary
because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he
was in a position to unduly influence
possible witnesses against him.
Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA essentially questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC over the
administrative complaint filed against them
by Cueva. On December 29, 2006, the CA
rendered its Decision granting the petition
and nullifying and setting aside the
questioned resolutions of the CSC for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of
1987), the second paragraph of which states
that heads of agencies and instrumentalities
"shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction," bestows upon the Board of
Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action
against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In
addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred in
recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva,
reasoning out that the latter should have
exhausted all administrative remedies by
first bringing his grievances to the attention
of the PUP Board of Regents.
THE ISSUE
In G.R. No. 176162, petitioner CSC raises
the sole issue of:
Whether or not the Civil Service
Commission has original concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases falling
under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
The same issue is among those raised by
petitioner Cueva in G.R. No. 178845.
The Court agrees that the only question
which must be addressed in this case is
whether the CSC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed directly with it
against officials of a chartered state
university.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Both CSC and Cueva contend that because
the CSC is the central personnel agency of
the government, it has been expressly
granted by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292
the authority to assume original jurisdiction
over complaints directly filed with it. The
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 350 | P a g e
CSC explains that under the said law, it has
appellate jurisdiction over all administrative
disciplinary proceedings and original
jurisdiction over complaints against
government officials and employees filed
before it by private citizens. Accordingly,
the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction,
together with the PUP Board of Regents,
over the administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar and it can take
cognizance of a case filed directly with it,
despite the fact that the Board of Regents is
the disciplining authority of university
employees.
Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the
other hand, fully adopted the position of the
CA in its questioned decision and
propounded the additional argument that the
passage of R.A. No. 8292 has effectively
removed from the CSC the authority to hear
and decide on cases filed directly with it.
ii. Department of Finance vs. Hon. Mariano
M. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 209331, 24
August 2015
Facts:
The case stemmed from the issuance of
Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2
September 2013, which created the Customs
Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the
Department of Finance (DOF)
CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing
the customs administration... policies, rules
and procedures, and thereafter providing
sound recommendations for the
improvement of the same."
Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner
Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon... issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013
(CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding the positions of Collector
of Customs V and VI,... including
respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective
immediately and valid until sooner
revoked."... approved by DOF Secretary
Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary Purisima...
espondents filed an action for Declaratory
Relief with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO
for a period... of 72 hours enjoining
petitioners or any person acting for and in
their behalf from implementing CPO 189-
2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-
Cacanindin extended Executive Judge Dela
Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21
October 2013. She then set the hearing for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
18 October 2013.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before this Court, with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners alleged that the case involves
personnel action affecting public officers
which is... under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Petitioners also alleged that respondents
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
available
In their Comment, respondents alleged that
the case involves the validity and
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 351 | P a g e
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and thus,
it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Respondents further alleged that EO 140
violated Article 2 of the Civil Code...
Petitioners alleged that respondents only
assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify
their filing of an action for declaratory relief.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents'
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself
from further hearing the case.
Issues:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents;
Whether respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC;
Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the
Civil Code when it became effective
immediately after its publication; and
Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.
Ruling:
Jurisdiction over the Petition
When respondents raised the issue of
validity and... constitutionality of CPO 189-
2013, the issue took the case beyond the
scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the
matter is no longer limited to personnel
action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
This case clearly falls within the exceptions
where exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be... resorted to by respondents.
Effectivity of EO 140
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT
the petition
We rule that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory
relief filed by respondents.
We further rule that Customs Personnel
Order No. B-189-2013 was not validly
issued.

EO 140 is an internal regulation... that

affects primarily the personnel of the DOF e. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and the BOC. It remains valid even without
publication. i. Samson vs. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481
(2011)
Validity of CPO 189-2013
THIRD DIVISION
Respondents were supposed to augment and
reinforce the existing organic personnel of
CPRO. Yet, at the time of respondents'
detail, CPRO had not been formally [G.R. No. 178454, March 28 : 2011]
organized. CPRO had no organic personnel
that had been approved by the DBM upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The
FILIPINA SAMSON, PETITIONER, VS.
DOF Secretary had yet to promulgate rules JULIA A. RESTRIVERA,
and regulations and to prescribe procedures RESPONDENT.
and processes to enable CPRO to effectively
exercise its powers and duties, as required
by Section 4 of EO 140. In this case, CPO
DECISION
189-2013 did not provide for the period of
respondents' detail. It only provided that the
order "shall be effective immediately and
valid until sooner revoked," making the VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
detail of respondents indefinite.
FACTS:
Indeed, we commend and support the
reforms being undertaken in the different
agencies of the government. However, we
cannot allow department heads to take Petitioner is a government employee, being
shortcuts that will undermine and disregard a department head of the Population
the basic procedures of the law Commission with office at the Provincial
Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 352 | P a g e


Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed
to help her friend, respondent Julia A.
Restrivera, to have the latter's land located
in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the
Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reach P150,000 and
accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover
the initial expenses for the titling of
respondent's land. However, petitioner
failed to accomplish her task because it was
found out that the land is government
property. When petitioner failed to return
the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against
petitioner before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of
violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
suspended her from office for six months
without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that
petitioner failed to abide by the standard set
in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
deprived the government of the benefit of
committed service when she embarked on
her private interest to help respondent secure
a certificate of title over the latter's land.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman, in an Order dated March 15,
2004, reduced the penalty to three months
suspension without pay. According to the
Ombudsman, petitioner's acceptance of
respondent's payment created a perception
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 353 | P a g e
that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of
the standard of personal conduct required by
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public
officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage.
While it may be true that [petitioner] did not
actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of
the subject property, we believe, however,
that her mere act in accepting the money
from the [respondent] with the assurance
that she would work for the issuance of the
title is already enough to create a perception
that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.]
No. 6713 mandates that public officials and
employees shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perception of their roles as dispenser
or peddler of undue patronage.
The CA on appeal affirmed the
Ombudsman's Order dated March 19, 2004.
The CA ruled that contrary to petitioner's
contentions, the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction even if the act complained of is
a private matter. The CA also ruled that
petitioner violated the norms of conduct
required of her as a public officer when she
demanded and received the amount of
P50,000 on the representation that she can
secure a title to respondent's property and
for failing to return the amount. The CA
stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
requires petitioner to perform and discharge
her duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of her role as a dispenser and
peddler of undue patronage.

ISSUES:
Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over
a case involving a private dealing by a
government employee or where the act
complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty?
Did the CA commit grave abuse of
discretion in finding petitioner
administratively liable despite the dismissal
of the estafa case?
On the first issue, we agree with the CA
that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
respondent's complaint against petitioner
although the act complained of involves a
private deal between them. Section
13(1),[13] Article XI of the 1987
Constitution states that the Ombudsman can
investigate on its own or on complaint by
any person any act or omission of any
public official or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or
improper. Under Section 16[14] of R.A.
No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or
employee during his/her tenure. Section
19[15] of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 354 | P a g e
the complaint concerns an act of the public
official or employee which is not service-
connected, the case is within the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee
that the Ombudsman may investigate. It
does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from
the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.
On the second issue, it is wrong for
petitioner to say that since the estafa case
against her was dismissed, she cannot be
found administratively liable. It is settled
that administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings, and
may continue despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges.
Taxing power
a) Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP) vs. Colon Heritage
Realty
Corporation, G.R. No. 203754, 16 June
2015
G.R. No. 203754 June 16, 2015
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF
THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
COLON HERITAGE REALTY
CORPORATION
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In 1993, respondent City of Cebu in its
exercise of its power to impose amusement
taxes under Section 140 of the Local
Government Code, passed the "Revised
Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu
(tax ordinance)" which require proprietors,
lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and
other places of amusement, to pay an
amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent
(30%) of the gross receipts of admission
fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of
Cebu City.
On June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA
9167 creating the Film Development
Council of the Philippines (FDCP). Secs. 13
and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax
treatment of certain graded films as follows:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. -
Films which have obtained an "A" or "B"
grading from the Council pursuant to
Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be
entitled to the following privileges:
a. Amusement tax reward. - A grade "A" or
"B" film shall entitle its producer to an
incentive equivalent to the amusement tax
imposed and collected on the graded films
by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila
and other highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines pursuant
to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No.
7160 at the following rates:
1. For grade "A" films -
100% of the amusement tax
collected on such film; and
2. For grade "B" films - 65%
of the amusement tax
collected on such films. The
remaining thirty-five (35%)
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 355 | P a g e
shall accrue to the funds of
the Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and
Remittance. - All revenue from the
amusement tax on the graded film which
may otherwise accrue to the cities and
municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines pursuant
to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160
during the period the graded film is
exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by
the proprietors, operators or lessees of
theaters or cinemas and remitted within
thirty (30) days from the termination of the
exhibition to the Council which shall reward
the corresponding amusement tax to the
producers of the graded film within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters
or cinemas who fail to remit the amusement
tax proceeds within the prescribed period
shall be liable to a surcharge equivalent to
five percent (5%) of the amount due for each
month of delinquency which shall be paid to
the Council.
Thus, except for the City of Cebu, all the
cities and municipalities in Metro Manila
have complied with the mandate of said law.
Hence, FDCP, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, sent demand letters for
unpaid amusement tax reward (with 5%
surcharge for each month of delinquency)
due to the producers of the Grade "A" or "B"
films to the cinema proprietors and operators
in Cebu City:
ISSUE :
WON the above-sections 13 and 14 of RA
9167 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy
What Congress did in this instance was not
to exclude the authority to levy amusement
taxes from the taxing power of the covered
LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether
confiscate, the income to be received by the
LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for
transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing
authority. This is a clear contravention of the
constitutional command that taxes levied by
LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU
and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to
apportion their resources in line with their
priorities.
In the case at bar, through the application
and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167, the
income from the amusement taxes levied by
the covered LGUs did not and will under no
circumstance accrue to them, not even
partially, despite being the taxing authority
therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly
overstepped its plenary legislative power,
the amendment being violative of the
fundamental law's guarantee on local
autonomy.
Local fiscal autonomy includes the power of
LGUs to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. By
earmarking the income on amusement taxes
imposed by the LGUs in favor of FDCP and
the producers of graded films, the legislature
appropriated and distributed the LGUs'
funds-as though it were legally within its
control-under the guise of setting a
limitation on the LGUs' exercise of their
delegated taxing power. This, undoubtedly,
is a usurpation of the latter's exclusive
prerogative to apportion their funds, an
impermissible intrusion into the LGUs'
constitutionally-protected domain which
puts to naught the guarantee of fiscal
autonomy to municipal corporations
enshrined in our basic law.
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It was argued that subject Sec. 13 is a grant
by Congress of an exemption from
amusement taxes in favor of producers of
graded films. Without question, this Court
has previously upheld the power of
Congress to grant exemptions over the
power of LGUs to impose taxes. This
amusement tax reward, however, is not, as
the lower court posited, a tax exemption.
Exempting a person or entity from tax is to
relieve or to excuse that person or entity
from the burden of the imposition. Here,
however, it cannot be said that an exemption
from amusement taxes was granted by
Congress to the producers of graded films.
Take note that the burden of paying the
amusement tax in question is on the
proprietors, lessors, and operators of the
theaters and cinemas that showed the graded
films.
Simply put, both the burden and incidence
of the amusement tax are borne by the
proprietors, lessors, and operators, not by
the producers of the graded films. The
transfer of the amount to the film producers
is actually a monetary reward given to them
for having produced a graded film, the
funding for which was taken by the national
government from the coffers of the covered
LGUs. Without a doubt, this is not an
exemption from payment of tax.
LGUs Share in the National Wealth –
Secs.289-292, LGC
Republic of the Philippines, Represented
by Raphael P.M. Lotilla, Secretary,
Department Of Energy (DOE), Margarito
B. Teves, Secretary, Department Of
Finance (DOF), and Romulo L. Neri,
Secretary, Department Of Budget And
Management (DBM) vs. Provincial
Government Of Palawan, Represented by
Governor Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra
G.R. No. 170867, December 04, 2018
FACTS:
On December 11, 1990, the Republic
of the Philippines (Republic or National
Government), through the Department of
Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract
No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration
B.V. and Occidental Philippines,
Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as
Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of
petroleum operations in the area known as
"Camago-Malampaya" located offshore
northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the
area led to the drilling of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80
kilometers from the main island of Palawan
and 30 kms from the platform.
On February 17, 1998, President
Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 381 which, in part, stated that the
Province of Palawan was expected to
receive about US$2.1 Billion from the
estimated US$8.1 Billion total government
share from the Camago-Malampaya natural
gas project for the 20-year contract period
The Provincial Government of
Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent
(40%) of the National Government's share in
the proceeds of the project. It argued that
since the reservoir is located within its
territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said
share under Section 290 of the Local
Government Code. The National
Government disputed the claim, arguing that
since the gas fields were approximately 80
k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
province and is within the national territory
of the Philippines.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 357 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Camago-
Malampaya reservoir is within the Province
of Palawan's "area" for it to be entitled to
40% of the government's share under
Service Contract No. 38?
RULING:
Under existing law, the Province of
Palawan is not entitled to share in the
proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural
gas project.
Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not
by the local government, but by the law that
creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of
the LGU's exercise of authority, but by
physical boundaries as fixed in its charter.
Unless clearly expanded by
Congress, the LGU's territorial jurisdiction
refers only to its land area. Thus, the
utilization of natural resources found within
the land area as delimited by law is subject
to the 40% LGU share.
Since it refers to a demarcated area,
the term "territorial jurisdiction" is evidently
synonymous with the term "territory." In
fact, "territorial jurisdiction" is defined as
the limits or territory within which authority
may be exercised. Territorial jurisdiction is
defined, not by the local government, but by
the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by
the extent of the LGU's exercise of
authority, but by physical boundaries as
fixed in its charter.
No law clearly granting the Province
of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir. As defined
in its organic law, the Province of Palawan
is comprised merely of islands. The
continental shelf, where the Camago-
Malampaya reservoir is located, was clearly
not included in its territory.
An island is defined under Article
121 of the UNCLOS as "a naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide." The
continental shelf, on the other hand, is
defined in Article 76 of the same
Convention as comprising "the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond (the coastal State's) territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nm from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance."
Where the continental shelf of the coastal
state extends beyond 200 nm, Article 76
allows the State to claim an extended
continental shelf up to 350 nm from the
baselines.
Under Palawan's charter, therefore,
the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is not
located within its territorial boundaries.
Dual criminality principle
Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) v.
Juan Antonio Muñoz
(G.R. No. 207342, November 7, 2017)
FACTS:
In late 1991, Juan Antonio Muñoz,
as head of the Treasury Department of the
Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) was
instructed by its Governor to raise Seven
Hundred Million US Dollars (US$700M) in
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 358 | P a g e
order to fund the buyback of Philippine
debts and the purchase of zero coupon US
Treasury Bonds. To this end, Muñoz
recommended that the amount be obtained
through gold loans/swaps, for which, seven
(7) contracts of about One Hundred Million
US Dollars (US$100M) each were to be
awarded to certain accredited parties. Two
(2) of these contracts were granted to
Mocatta, London. These in turn were rolled
over as they matured, hence, totaling five (5)
gold loan/swap agreements in Mocatta,
London's favor.
As a result of these transactions,
Mocatta (London) paid out rebates worth
US$1,703,304.87 to an account ("the Sundry
Creditors Account") held with MHK for
onward transmission by MHK to
destinations as instructed by Chi. Funds
from this Sundry Creditors Account were
subsequently disbursed to the benefit of Chi
and Muñoz personally.
These agreements are the subject
often (10) criminal cases filed against
respondent-appellant in Hong Kong - i.e.,
three (3) counts of accepting an advantage
as an agent, contrary to Section 9(1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to
defraud, contrary to the common law of
HKSAR.
Petitioner HKSAR posits that
respondent Muñoz must be extradited for the
crime of accepting an advantage as an agent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Juan
Antonio Muñoz could be extradited to and
tried by the HKSAR for the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent.
RULING:

Muñoz cannot be extradited to and
tried by the HKSAR for the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent because
the said offense charged in the HKSAR
deals with private sector bribery hence, the
conditions of the double criminality rule
were not met.
The rule of specialty in international
law states that a Requested State shall
surrender to a Requesting State a person to
be tried only for a criminal offense specified
in their treaty of extradition.
For purposes of the extradition of
Munoz, the HKSAR as the requesting state
must establish the following six elements,
namely: (1) there must be an extradition
treaty in force between the HKSAR and the
Philippines; (2) the criminal charges that are
pending in the HKSAR against the person to
be extradited; (3) the crimes for which the
person to be extradited is charged are
extraditable within the terms of the treaty;
(4) the individual before the court is the
same person charged in the HKSAR; (5) the
evidence submitted establishes probable
cause to believe that the person to be
extradited committed the offenses charged;
and (6) the offenses are criminal in both the
HKSAR and the Philippines (double
criminality rule).
The first five of the elements
inarguably obtain herein, as both the RTC
and the CA found. However, it was as to the
sixth element that the CA took exception as
not having been established. Although the
crime of conspiracy to defraud was included
among the offenses covered by the RP-Hong
Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA
have agreed that the crime was analogous to
the felony of estafa through false pretense
as defined and penalized under Article
315(2) of the Revised Penal Code, it was
disputed whether or not the other crime of
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 359 | P a g e
accepting an advantage as an agent was
also punished as a crime in the Philippines.
As such, the applicability of the double
criminality rule became the issue.
Under the double criminality rule,
the extraditable offense must be criminal
under the laws of both the requesting and the
requested states". This simply means that
the requested state comes under no
obligation to surrender the person if its laws
do not regard the conduct covered by the
request for extradition as criminal.
Section 9(1)(a) of the POBO referred
only to private individuals, not to persons
belonging to the public sector. The offense
of accepting an advantage as an agent
charged against Muñoz in the HKSAR is
one that deals with private sector bribery,
the conditions for the application of the
double criminality rule are obviously not
met. Accordingly, the crime of accepting an
advantage as an agent must be dropped
from the request for extradition.
Conformably with the principle of specialty
embodied in Article 17 of the RP-HK
Agreement, Muñoz should be proceeded
against only for the seven counts of
conspiracy to defraud. As such, the HKSAR
shall hereafter arrange for Muñoz's
surrender within the period provided under
Article 15 of the RP-HK Agreement.
Treaty vs. Executive Agreement
The Commissioner of Customs
and the Collector of Customs vs.
Eastern Sea Trading
(G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961)
FACTS:
 Eastern Sea Trading was a shipping
company charged in the importation of
onion and garlic from Japan into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of
Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture
of the import goods for alleged violation of
Sec1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative
Code. None of the shipments had the
required certificate by Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45 for its release. The said
circulars were pursuant to EO 328 which
sought to regulate the importation of such
non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a
Trade and Financial Agreement between the
Philippines and Japan then). Eastern Sea
Trading questioned the validity of the said
EO averring that the said EO was never
concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the
latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO 328 is subject to
the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
RULING:
1. No, executive agreements are not
like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members
of the Senate.
Treaties are formal documents which
require ratification by the Senate, executive
agreements become binding through
executive action without the need of a vote
by the Senate or Congress.
Further, international agreements involving
political issues or changes of national policy
and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the form of treaties; on the other
hand, international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions
and those involving arrangements of a more
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 360 | P a g e
or less temporary nature usually take the
form of executive agreements. The right of
the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage.
The validity of Executive Order No.
328 is patent even without the concurrence
of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
Two Classes of Executive Agreements
G.R. No. L-10500, June 30, 1959]
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION,
INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
VS. THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
AND APPELLEES.
Issues
The central issue in this litigation
concerns the validity of the Romulo-Snyder
Agreement (1950) whereby the Philippine
Government undertook to return to the
United States Government in ten annual
installments, a total of about 35-million
dollars advanced by the United States to, but
unexpended by, the National Defense Forces
of the Philippines.
The Usaffe Veterans, for itself and
for many other Filipino veterans of World
War II, ex-members of the United States
Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE)
prayed in its complaint that said Agreement
be annulled, that payments thereunder be
declared illegal and that defendants as
officers of the Philippine Republic be
restrained from disbursing any funds in the
National Treasury in pursuance of said
Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further
asked that the moneys available, instead of
being remitted to the United States, should
be turned over to the Finance Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for the
payment of all pending claims of the including the Philippine
veterans represented by plaintiff. Constabulary, about 100,000 officers and
soldiers.
The complaint rested on
plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the For the expenses incident to such
funds to be "returned" under the Agreement incorporation, mobilization
were funds appropriated by the and activities, the Congress of the United
American Congress for the Philippine States provided in its Appropriation Act of
Army, actually delivered to the Philippine December 17, 1941
Government and actually owned by the said
Government; second, that U. S. Secretary
Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to
For all expenses necessary for the
retake such funds from the P, I,
mobilization, operation and maintenance
Government; and third, that Philippine
of the Army of the Philippines, including
Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no
expenses connected with calling into the
authority to return or promise to return the
service of the armed forces of the United
aforesaid sums of money through the so-
States the organized military forces of the
called Romulo-Snyder Agreement.
Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, but shall be expended
The defendants moved to dismiss,
and accounted for in the manner prescribed
alleging Governmental immunity
by the President of the United
from suit. But the court required an answer,
States, $269,000.00; to remain
and then heard the case on the
available until June 30, 1943, which
merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the
shall be available for payment to the
complaint, upheld the validity of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the
Agreement and dissolved the preliminary
Philippines upon its written request, either
injunction it had previously issued. The
in advance of or in reimbursement for all or
plaintiff appealed.
any part of the estimated or actual costs, as
authorized by the Commanding General,
Facts United States Army Forces in the
Far East, of necessary expenses for the
purposes aforesaid.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
called into the service of the In subsequent Acts, the
Armed Forces of the United States, for the U.S. Congress appropriated moneys in
duration of the emergency, all the language identical to the above. The last
organized military forces of the Philippine pertinent appropriation was Public Law No.
Commonwealth. His order was published 301 (79th Congress) known as
here by Proclamation No. 740 of President the Rescission Act. It simply set aside 200
Quezon on August 10, 1941. In October million dollars for the Army of the
1941, by two special orders, General Philippines for the fiscal year ending June
Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General 30, 1946.
of the United States Army Forces in the President Roosevelt issued
Far East (known as on January 3, 1942, his Executive Order
USAFFE) placed under No. 9011 prescribing partly as follows:
his command all the Philippine Army units

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 361 | P a g e

 "2. (a) Necessary expenditures
from funds in the Philippine Treasury for
the purposes authorized by the Act of
December 17, 1941, will be made by
disbursing officers of the Army of the
Philippines on the approval of authority of
the Commanding General, United States
Army Forces in the Far East, and such
purposes as he may deem proper, and
his determination thereon shall be final and
conclusive upon the accounting officers of
the Philippine Government, and such
expenditures will be accounted for in
accordance with procedures established by
Philippine Commonwealth Laws and
regulations.
Out of the
total amounts thus appropriated by the
United States Congress as above itemized,
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to
The Philippine Armed Forces by means
of vouchers which stated "Advance of
Funds under Public Law 353-77th Congress
and Executive Order No. 9011". This
amount was used (mostly) to discharge in
the Philippine Islands the monetary
obligations assumed by the U. S.
Government as a result of the induction of
the Philippine Armed Forces into the U.
S. Army, and of its operations beginning in
1941. Part of these obligations consisted in
the claims of Filipino USAFFE soldiers for
arrears in pay and in the charges for supplies
used by them and the guerrillas.
Of the millions so transferred, there
remained unexpended and uncommitted in
the possession of the Philippine Armed
Forces as of December 01, 1949, about 35
million dollars. As at that time, the
Philippine Government badly needed funds
for its activities, President Quirino, through
Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central
Bank proposed to the
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 362 | P a g e
corresponding officials of the U. S.
Government the retention of the 35-million
dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in
ten annual installments. After protracted
negotiations the deal was concluded, and the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement was signed in
Washington on November 6, 1950, by the
then Philippine Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo, and the then
American Secretary of the Treasury, John
W. Snyder. Principal stipulation therein was
this paragraph:
"3. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines further agrees to pay the dollar
amount payable hereunder to the Secretary
of the Treasury of the United States in
ten annual installments, the first nine
payments to be in the amount of
P3,500,000.00 and the final
residual payment' to be in the amount
determined by deducting the total of the
previous principal payments from the
total amount of dollars to be paid to the
Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, the latter amount to be determined as
provided in Article II hereof.
In compliance with the
Agreement, this Government has
appropriated by law and paid to the United
States up to and including 1954, yearly
installments totalling P33,187,663.24.
There is no reason to doubt that
subsequent budgets failed
to make the corresponding appropriations fo
r other installments.
Ruling
The first ground has proved
untenable.
 The most important argument, "In the leading case of
however, rests on the lack of ratification of Altman vs. U. S., 224, U. S. 583, it was
the agreement by the Senate of the held that Jan international compact
Philippines to make it binding on this negotiated between the representative
Government. On this matter, the defendants of two sovereign nations and made in the
explain as follows: name and or behalf of the contracting
parties and dealing with important
commercial relations between the two
That the agreement is not a 'treaty' countries, is a treaty both internationally
as that term is used in the Constitution, is although, as an executive agreement it is
conceded. The agreement was never not technically a treaty requiring the advice
submitted to the Senate for concurrence and consent of the Senate.
(Art. VII, Sec. 10 (7). However, it must be
noted that a treaty is not the only form that "Executive Agreements
an international agreement may fall into two classes: (1) agreements made
assume. For the grant of the treaty- purely as executive acts affecting external
making power to the Executive and the relations and independent of or without
Senate does not exhaust the power of the legislative authorization, which may be
government over international termed as presidential agreements, and (2)
relations. Consequently, executive agreements entered into in pursuance of acts
agreements may be entered into with other" of Congress, which
states and are effective have been designated as Congressional-
even without the concurrence of Executive Agreements (Sinco, supra, 304;
the Senate It is observed in this Hackworth, supra, 390; McDougal
connection that from the point of view o and Lans, supra, 204-
f international law, there is no 205; Hyke, International Law, 2nd ed.,
difference between treaties and executive Vol. II, 1406; et seq.)
agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned as long as The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may
the negotiating functionaries have fall under any of these two classes, for
remained within their powers The precisely on September 18, 1946, Congress
distinction between so-called executive of the Philippines
agreements' and 'treaties' is purely a specifically authorized the.
constitutional one and has no international President of the Philippines to obtain such
legal significance. loans
"There are now various forms of There was no legislative
such pacts or agreements entered into by authorization, it is hereby maintained
and between sovereign states which do not that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement
necessarily come under the strict sense of' was legally and validly entered into to
a treaty and Which do not require conform to the second category, namely,
ratification or consent of the legislative 'agreements entered into purely as executive
body of the State, but acts without legislative authorization/
nevertheless, are considered valid This second category usually includes
international agreements. money agreements relating to the settlement
of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may
be said that this method of settling such

R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 363 | P a g e

claims has come to be the usual way of
dealing with matters of this kind. Such
considerations seem persuasive; indeed, the
Agreement was not submitted to the U.S.
Senate either; but we do not stop to check
the authorities above listed nor test
the conclusions derived therefrom in order
to render a definite pronouncement, for the
reason that our Senate Resolution No.
15 practically admits the validity and
binding force of such Agreement.
Furthermore, the acts of Congress
Appropriating funds for the
yearly installments "necessary
to comply with such
Agreements constitute a ratification
thereof, which places the question of
validity out of the Court's reach, no
constitutional principle having been invoked
to restrict Congress' plenary power to
appropriate funds loan or no loan.
Importance of Knowing the Distinction
Between Executive
Agreement and Treaty
Bayan v. Zamora G.R. Nos. 138570,
138572, 138587, 138680 & 138698
[October 10, 2000], 396 PHIL 623-691)
FACTS
The United States panel met with the
Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series
of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph
Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998
and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it
by (2/3) votes.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 364 | P a g e
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec.
25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner,
under the provision cited, the “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: a)
it must be a treaty; b) it must be duly
concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so
required by congress, and c) recognized as
such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that
Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that,
what is requires for such treaty to be valid
and effective is the concurrence in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.
ISSUE
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of
Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD
Section 25, Article XVIII, which
specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains
two provisions requiring the concurrence of
the Senate on treaties or international
agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which
respondent invokes, reads: “No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3
of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25
Art. XVIII provides: “After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the RP and
the US concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in and when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the
other contracting state”. The first cited
provision applies to any form of treaties and
international agreements in general with a
wide variety of subject matter. All treaties
and international agreements entered into by
the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage or particular designation requires
the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision
applies to treaties which involve presence of
foreign military bases, troops and facilities
in the Philippines. Both constitutional
provisions share some common ground. The
fact that the President referred the VFA to
the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that
Senate extended its concurrence under the
same provision is immaterial.
Ratification in the Philippines
Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary G.R. No. 158088, [July 6, 2005],
501 PHIL 303-318)
FACTS
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines
through the Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations, signed the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal
Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed the
instant petition to compel the respondents —
the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs — to
transmit the signed text of the treaty to the
Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 365 | P a g e
ISSUE
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate for
ratification the copy of the Rome Statute
signed by a member of the Philippine
Mission to the United Nations even without
the signature of the President.
HELD
NO. The President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole
representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country’s mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence,
the President is vested with the authority to
deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states.
It should be emphasized that under the
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Senate. The role of the Senate, however,
is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Lim v. Executive Secretary G.R. No.
151445, [April 11, 2002], 430 PHIL 555-
604
FACTS
Petitioners and the intervenors challenged
the constitutionality of the joint exercises,
Balikatan 02-1. Petitioners filed suit in their
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers,
while the intervenors claimed that some of
their members are residents of Zamboanga
and Sulu where the exercises would be held,
and, hence, would be directly affected by the
operations.
ISSUE
W/N the petition and the petition-in-
intervention should prosper.
HELD
NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention
are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice
to the filing of a new petition sufficient in
form and substance in the proper Regional
Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. The Court, in relaxing the stringent
rule on the parties' standing to file suit
because of the primordial importance of the
issue involved, held that the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) which has been held valid
gave legitimacy to the Balikatan exercises.
The Court also held that the holding of
Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercise has
not intruded into that penumbra of error that
would otherwise call for correction on the
part of the court. The petition and petition-
in-intervention were dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a new petition in
the proper Regional Trial Court.
LGU’s continental shelf - Republic v.
Provincial Government of Palawan,
G.R. No. 170867, December 04, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 170867
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
RAPHAEL P.M. LOTILLA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE),
MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF),
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 366 | P a g e
AND ROMULO L. NERI, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT (DBM), Petitioners, -
versus - PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
OFPALAWAN,REPRESENTED BY
GOVERNOR ABRAHAM KAHLIL B.
MITRA, Respondent,
BISHOP PEDRO DULAY ARIGO, G.R.
No. 185941 CESAR N. SARINO, DR.
JOSE ANTONIO N. SOCRATES, PROF.
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioners, ·~
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 170867 and 185941 -
versus - HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, HON.
ENERGYSECRETARYANGELO T.
REYES, HON. FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO B. TEVES, HON. BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
ROLANDO D. ANDAYA, JR., HON.
PALAWAN GOVERNOR JOEL T.
REYES, HON. REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO C. ALVAREZ (1st District),
HON. REPRESENTATIVE ABRAHAM
MITRA (2"d District), RAFAEL E. DEL
PILAR, PRESIDENT AND CEO, PNOC
EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 170867 is a petition for review on
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2 dated
December 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Palawan, Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. 3779 which declared the Province
of Pala wan entitled to forty percent ( 40%)
of the government's earnings derived from
the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project
since October 16, 2001. The petition also
seeks ad cautelam to nullify the RTC
Amended Order3 dated January 16, 2006
which directed the "freezing" of said 40%
share under pain of contempt.
G.R. No. 185941 is a petition for review on
certiorarz-4 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution5 dated May
29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 102247 which dismissed
the certiorari petition questioning the
constitutionality of Executive Order (E.0.)
No. 683,6 and the CA Resolution7 dated
December 16, 2008 which denied the
motion for reconsideration.
On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic or National
Government), through the Department of
Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract
No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration
B.V. and Occidental Philippines,
Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as
Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of
petroleum operations in the area known as
"Camago-Malampaya" located offshore
northwest of Palawan.
On February 17, 1998, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 381 14 which, in part, stated that the
Province of Palawan was expected to
receive about US$2.1 Billion from the
estimated US$8.l Billion total government
share from the CamagoMalampaya natural
gas project for the 20-year contract period.
On June 10, 1998, DoE Secretary Francisco
L. Viray wrote Palawan Governor Salvador
P. Socrates, requesting for the deferment of
payment of 50o/o of Palawan's share in the
project for the first seven years of
operations, estimated at US$222.89 Million,
which it would use to pay for the National
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 367 | P a g e
Power Corporation's Take-or-Pay Quantity
(TOPQ) obligations under the latter's Gas
Sale and Purchase Agreements with
SPEX/OXY.
Palawan argued that since the reservoir is
located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is
entitled to said share under Section 290 18
of the Local Government Code. The
National Government disputed the claim,
arguing that since the gas fields were
approximately 80 kms from Palawan's
coastline, they are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the province and is within the
national territory of the Philippines.
The RTC on the dec. 16 205 decided and
case 3779 in favor of Palawan pursuant to
pronouncement of sec. 7 and 10 of 1987
Constitution due this right is an amendment
provsions of enabling act, RA 7160 ThE
Local Government code 1991 computed
based on revenues generated from cawaga
malampayan natural project since oct. 16,
2001.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No.
170867 is GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of the Province of Palawan, Branch 95
in Civil Case No. 3 779 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Court declares that under
existing law, the Province of Palawan is not
entitled to share in the proceeds of the
Camago-Malampaya natural gas project.
The Petition in G.R. No. 185941 is DENIED
A. EO 683 is a usurpation of the power
of the pursue lodged in Congress
under Section 29 (10 and (3) Ariticle
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Since
the proceeds form Camago-
 malampaya project is a production
ashare of the gov’t in as service
contract it cannot be disbursed w/o
an approrptaition
B. E.O 683 IS nothing more than a
realignment of funds covered out in
the crotation of constitutional
provisions giving LGU an equitable
share in the proceeds of utilization
national wealth for the usual
budgeting procedures of Congress,
such share should be included in the
the appropriation for allocation of
the LGU which is classified of the
national GOvt and automatically
released to LGU ‘S .
Palawan's territorial boundaries do
not embrace the continental ~helf
where the Camago-Malampaya
reservoir is located. Contrary to
Dean Raul Pangalagan's view, the
UNCLOS cannot be considered to
have vested the LGUs with their own
continental shelf based on the
doctrine of transformation. The
concept of continental shelf under
the UNCLOS does not automatically
apply to a province.
the Regalian Doctrine could not be
used by the Department Secretaries
as a shield to defeat the
Constitutional provision giving
LGUs an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and
development of national wealth
within their respective areas. The 31
Id. at 112. 32 Id. at I 09. 33 Id. at
109-110. 34 226 Phil. 624 (1986). 35
321 Phil. 395 (1995). 36 86 Phil. 629
(1950). 37 Rollo (G.R. 170867), p.
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 368 | P a g e
111. 'i Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 170867
and 185941 doctrine, said the RTC,
is subject to this Constitutional
limitation and the 40% LGU share
set by the Local Government Code.
38 Finally, the RTC noted that from
1992 to 1998, Palawan received a
total of Pl16,343,197.76 from
collections derived from the West
Linapacan Oil Fields, and that
former President Fidel V. Ramos
issued A.O. No. 381 acknowledging
Palawan's claim and share in the
proceeds of the CamagoMalampaya
project. The RTC, thus, held that by
its previous actions and issuances,
the National Government legally
acknowledged Palawan's claim to the
proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya
project and it was "too late in the day
for [it] to take a 180 degree turn
Dean Pangalangan posited that since
the Constitution has incorporated
into Philippine law the concepts of
the UNCLOS, including the concept
of the continental shelf, Pala wan 's
"area" could be construed as
including its own continental
shelf.301 The Province of Palawan
and Arigo, et al. accordingly assert
that Camago-Malampaya reservoir
forms part of Palawan's continental
shelf.302 The Court is unconvinced.
Dean Pangalangan shares the
Province of Palawan's claim that
based on Section 1, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, the entire
Philippine territory is necessarily
divided into political and territorial
subdivisions, such that at any one
time, a body of water or a piece of
land should belong to some province
or city. 299 The Court finds this
 position untenable. Section 1, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 1. The territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
(Emphasis ours) By indicating that
the LGUs comprise the territorial
subdivisions of the State, the
Constitution did not ipso facto make
every portion of the national territory
a part of an LGU's territory. 296
National Amnesty Commission v.
COA, 481 Phil. 279 (2004).
In the Matter of the South China Sea
Arbitration (Philippines v. China), PCA
Case
No. 2013-19, 12 July 2016
The South China Sea Arbitration (12 July
2016) PCA Case No. 2013-19
BY R . R IDDER HO F ON J U LY 12,
2016 ·
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 369 | P a g e
Today, in the South China Sea Arbitration
Award (12 July 2016) an arbitral tribunal at
The Hague ruled that China’s claim to
historic rights to resources was incompatible
with the detailed allocation of rights and
maritime zones in the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Tribunal
considered that prior to the Convention, the
waters of the South China Sea beyond the
territorial sea were legally part of the high
seas, in which vessels from any State could
freely navigate and fish. Accordingly, the
Tribunal concluded that historical navigation
and fishing by China in the waters of the
South China Sea represented the exercise of
high seas freedoms, rather than a historic
right, and that there was no evidence that
China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters of the South China
Sea or prevented other States from
exploiting their resources. See for more
information: the Peace Palace Library
Special South China Sea Territorial Disputes
CNN Hongkong brought the news as: Court
rules in favor of Philippines over
China Viewed as a decisive win for the
Philippines, the ruling could heighten
friction in a region already bristling with
tension, especially if it unleashes a defiant
reaction from China. The United States,
which has been at odds with China over
freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea, urged all parties "to avoid provocative
statements and actions." (by Katie Hunt,
July 12, 2016)
The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, said
China’s “territorial sovereignty and marine
rights” in the seas would not be affected by
the ruling, which declared large areas of the
sea to be neutral international waters or the
exclusive economic zones of other countries.
He insisted China was still “committed to
resolving disputes” with its neighbours.
The ‘Nine-Dash Line’ and China’s Claim to
Historic Rights in the Maritime Areas of the
South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the
Tribunal considered the implications of
China’s ‘nine-dash line’ and whether China
has historic rights to resources in the South
China Sea beyond the limits of the maritime
zones that it is entitled to pursuant to the
Convention. The Tribunal examined the
history of the Convention and its provisions
concerning maritime zones and concluded
that the Convention was intended to
comprehensively allocate the rights of States
to maritime areas. The Tribunal found that
China’s claim to historic rights to resources
was incompatible with the detailed
allocation of rights and maritime zones in
the Convention and concluded that, to the
extent China had historic rights to resources
in the waters of the South China Sea, such
rights were extinguished by the entry into
force of the Convention to the extent they
were incompatible with the Convention’s
system of maritime zones.
The Tribunal also examined the historical
record to determine whether China actually
had historic rights to resources in the South
China Sea prior to the entry into force of the
Convention. The Tribunal noted that there is
evidence that Chinese navigators and
fishermen, as well as those of other States,
had historically made use of the islands in
the South China Sea, although the Tribunal
emphasized that it was not empowered to
decide the question of sovereignty over the
islands. However, the Tribunal considered
that prior to the Convention, the waters of
the South China Sea beyond the territorial
sea were legally part of the high seas, in
which vessels from any State could freely
navigate and fish. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concluded that historical navigation and
fishing by China in the waters of the South
China Sea represented the exercise of high
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 370 | P a g e
seas freedoms, rather than a historic right,
and that there was no evidence that China
had historically exercised exclusive control
over the waters of the South China Sea or
prevented other States from exploiting their
resources.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, as
between the Philippines and China, there
was no legal basis for China to claim
historic rights to resources, in excess of
the rights provided for by the
Convention, within the sea areas falling
within the ‘nine-dash line’
The Status of Features in the South China
Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the
Tribunal considered the status of features in
the South China Sea and the entitlements to
maritime areas that China could potentially
claim pursuant to the Convention. The
Tribunal first undertook a technical
evaluation as to whether certain coral reefs
claimed by China are or are not above water
at high tide. Under Articles 13 and 121 of
the Convention, features that are above
water at high tide generate an entitlement to
at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea,
whereas features that are submerged at high
tide generate no entitlement to maritime
zones. The Tribunal noted that many of the
reefs in the South China Sea have been
heavily modified by recent land reclamation
and construction and recalled that the
Convention classifies features on the basis
of their natural condition. The Tribunal
appointed an expert hydrographer to assist it
in evaluating the Philippines’ technical
evidence and relied heavily on archival
materials and historical hydrographic
surveys in evaluating the features. The
Tribunal agreed with the Philippines that
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are
high-tide features and that Subi Reef,
Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second
Thomas Shoal were submerged at high tide
in their natural condition. However, the
Tribunal disagreed with the Philippines
regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North)
and McKennan
Reef and concluded that both are high tide
features.
The Tribunal then considered whether any
of the features claimed by China could
generate an entitlement to maritime zones
beyond 12 nautical miles. Under Article 121
of the Convention, islands generate an
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone
of 200 nautical miles and to a continental
shelf, but “[r]ocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf.” The Tribunal noted
that this provision was closely linked to the
expansion of coastal State jurisdiction with
the creation of the exclusive economic zone
and was intended to prevent insignificant
features from generating large entitlements
to maritime zones that would infringe on the
entitlements of inhabited territory or on the
high seas and the area of the seabed reserved
for the common heritage of mankind. The
Tribunal interpreted Article 121 and
concluded that the entitlements of a feature
depend on (a) the objective capacity of a
feature, (b) in its natural condition, to
sustain either (c) a stable community of
people or (d) economic activity that is
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 371 | P a g e
neither dependent on outside resources nor
purely extractive in nature.
The Tribunal noted that many of the features
in the Spratly Islands are currently
controlled by one or another of the littoral
States, which have constructed installations
and maintain personnel there.
The Tribunal concluded that the current
presence of official personnel on many of
the features does not establish their capacity,
in their natural condition, to sustain a stable
community of people and considered that
historical evidence of habitation or
economic life was more relevant to the
objective capacity of the features. The
Tribunal concluded that temporary use of
the features by fishermen did not amount to
inhabitation by a stable community and that
all of the historical economic activity had
been extractive in nature. Accordingly, the
Tribunal concluded that all of the high-tide
features in the Spratly Islands(including,
for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York
Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay,
South-West Cay) are legally “rocks” that
do not generate an exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.
Chinese Activities in the South China Sea
In its Award of 12 July 2016, the
Tribunal considered the lawfulness under
the Convention of various Chinese actions in
the South China Sea.
Having found that Mischief Reef, Second
Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are
submerged at high tide, form part of the
exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of the Philippines, and are not
overlapped by any possible entitlement of
China, the Tribunal concluded that the
Convention is clear in allocating sovereign
rights to the Philippines with respect to sea
areas in its exclusive economic zone. The
Tribunal found as a matter of fact that China
had (a) interfered with Philippine petroleum
exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to
prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,
(c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese
fishermen from fishing within the
Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal,
and (d) constructed installations and
artificial islands at Mischief Reef without
the authorization of the Philippines. The
Tribunal therefore concluded that China
had violated the Philippines’ sovereign
rights with respect to its exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf.
Although the Tribunal emphasized that it
was not deciding sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal, it found that China had
violated its duty to respect to the traditional
fishing rights of Philippine fishermen by
halting access to the Shoal after May 2012.
The Tribunal noted, however, that it would
reach the same conclusion with respect to
the traditional fishing rights of Chinese
fishermen if the Philippines were to prevent
fishing by Chinese nationals at Scarborough
Shoal.
A significant aspect of the territorial dispute
in the South China Sea concerns China's
construction in the area, particularly in the
past few years. China has engaged in large-
scale land reclamation activities in seven
reefs (Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes
Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef) in the
disputed Spratly Islands area of the South
China Sea. These projects have created
seven new artificial land masses in the
Spratlys, see for some examples the
following articles: Massive island-building
and international law and What China Has
Been Building in the South China Sea
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The Tribunal also considered the effect of
China’s actions on the marine environment.
In doing so, the Tribunal was assisted by
three independent experts on coral reef
biology who were appointed to assist it in
evaluating the available scientific evidence
and the Philippines’ expert reports. The
Tribunal found that China’s recent large
scale land reclamation and construction of
artificial islands at seven features in the
Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to
the coral reef environment and that China
has violated its obligation under Articles
192 and 194 of the Convention to preserve
and protect the marine environment with
respect to fragile ecosystems and the habitat
of depleted, threatened, or endangered
species.
Finally, the Tribunal considered the
lawfulness of the conduct of Chinese law
enforcement vessels at Scarborough Shoal
on two occasions in April and May 2012
when Chinese vessels had sought to
physically obstruct Philippine vessels from
approaching or gaining entrance to the
Shoal. The Tribunal found that Chinese law
enforcement vessels had repeatedly
approached the Philippine vessels at high
speed and sought to cross ahead of them at
close distances, creating serious risk of
collision and danger to Philippine ships and
personnel. The Tribunal concluded that
China had breached its obligations under the
Convention on the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and
Article 94 the Convention concerning
maritime safety.
Aggravation of the Dispute between the
Parties
The Tribunal noted that China has (a) built a
large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a
low-tide elevation located in the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines; (b) caused
permanent, irreparable harm to the coral reef
ecosystem and (c) permanently destroyed
evidence of the natural condition of the
features in question. The Tribunal concluded
that China had violated its obligations to
refrain from aggravating or extending the
Parties’ disputes during the pendency of the
settlement process.
The Tribunal considered that the root of the
disputes at issue in this arbitration lies not in
any intention on the part of China or the
Philippines to infringe on the legal rights of
the other, but rather in fundamentally
different understandings of their respective
rights under the Convention in the waters of
the South China Sea
. delimit any maritime boundary between the
[This unanimous Award has been issued
today by the Tribunal constituted under
Annex VII to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
“Convention”) in the arbitration instituted
R2 POLITICAL LAW DIGEST (PARTIAL) 373 | P a g e
by the Republic of the Philippines against
the People’s Republic of China].
Source : PCA Press Release: PCA Case No.
2013-19 - The South China Sea
Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines
v. The People's Republic of China)
"Although the Convention does contain
provisions concerning the delimitation of
maritime boundaries, China made a
declaration in 2006 to exclude maritime
boundary delimitation from its acceptance of
compulsory dispute settlement, something
the Convention expressly permits for
maritime boundaries and certain other
matters. Accordingly, the Tribunal has not
been asked to, and does not purport to,
Parties or involving any other State
bordering on the South China Sea."