Vivencio Villagracia vs Fifth Shari’a District Court and Roldan E.

Mala
G.R. No. 188832
April 23 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Shari’a Distict Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.

Facts

On February 15, 1996, Roldan Mala purchased a 300 square meter parcel of land in
Maguindanao from Ceres Canete. On March 3, 1996, a TCT covering a parcel of land was
issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the purchase, Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. By
2002, Villagracia secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo issued by the LRA allegedly
covering the same parcel of land. It was only on October 30, 2006 when roldan had the parcel
of land surveyed, found out that Villagracia occupied the said parcel of land.

Failing to settle at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the
parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008,
respondent ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of
land. It ordered Villagracia to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay damages as
well as attorney’s fees. A notice of writ of execution was sent to Villagracia giving him 30 days
from receipt of notice to comply with the decision.

Meanwhile, Villagracia filed a petition for relief of judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if
both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, hence the respondent had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
However, respondent denied Villagracia’s petition for lack of merit.

Hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO to enjoin the implementation of
the writ of execution issued against Villagracia. Roldan argued that since the respondent had
jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of possession, he argued that the proceedings
before it were valid. Respondent acquired jurisdiction over the person of Villagracia upon
service of summons upon hi, When Villagracia failed to file his answer, he effectively waived his
right to participate in the proceedings before the respondent and he cannot argue that his rights
were prejudiced.

Issue
Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim.

Ruling

Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdition
with existing civil vourts over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the
parties involved are Muslims. In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Villagracia is a Muslim. When the latter stated in his petition for
relief, Roldan did not dispute this claim. Thus, respondent had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s
action for recovery. All its proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
decision dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case
No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an
action with the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

City of General Santos represented by Hon. Darlene Magnolia Antonio vs COA

G.R. No. 199439
April 22, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.

Facts

The Mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series
of 2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. This
was patterned after Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004 entitled Directing a
Strategic Review of the Operations and Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing
Options and Incentives for Government Employees who may be Affected by the Rationalization
of the Functions and Agencies of the Executive Branch and its implementing rules and
regulations.

Mayor Pedro B. Acharon, Jr. declared the city's byword of Total Quality Service in his state of
the city address in 2005. This was followed by the conduct of a process and practice review for
each department, section, and unit of the local government. The product was an organization
development master plan adopted as Executive Order No. 13, series of 2009. This was followed
by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting for the mayors support for GenSan SERVES,
an early retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing
rules and regulations, designed to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health
reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package.

This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not
contested by respondent Commission on Audit. The ordinance, as amended, provides that
qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly
employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of the
incentives under the program. In other words, the ordinance provides for separation benefits for
sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age.

In a letter dated February 10, 2010, the city's audit team leader, through its supervising auditor,
sent a query on the legality of the ordinance to respondent Commission on Audits director for
Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City.

In his second indorsement dated March 15, 2010, respondent Commissions regional director
agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commissions Office of General
Counsel, Legal Services Sector, for a more authoritative opinion.

The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010021 on March 25, 2010. The
opinion explained that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary
retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended, prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or
pension plans from the time the Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while
those plans already existing when the charter was enacted were declared abolished.

In fine, since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City
Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the
absence, however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary
consequence.
Petitioner city, through then mayor, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., filed a letter-reconsideration dated
June 7, 2010. They followed through with two letters addressed to respondent Commissions
chairman dated July 26, 2010 and October 6, 2010, respectively, for the reconsideration of
COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.20

Respondent Commission on Audit treated these letters as an appeal. On January 20, 2011, it
rendered its decision denying the appeal and affirming COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.21 It
also denied reconsideration by resolution.

Issue

Whether respondent Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion when it

considered Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009, in the nature of an early retirement program
requiring a law for it validity.

Ruling

The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of
Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned.
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and
approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever
retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Mendoza vs People of the Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc.

G.R. No. 197293
April 21, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

The conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of
probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.
 Facts

On January 8, 2008, a complaint filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul
Evangelista, for qualified theft and estafa, against Alfredo Mendoza. Juno Cars alleged that it
hired Alfredo as employee. Its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the
used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by the accused without
Garcia's or the finance manager's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor Rey Delgado issued a
resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information against accused
for qualified theft and estafa. Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He
then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. While Alfredo's motion for
reconsideration was still pending, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed
before the Regional Trial Court. Mendoza filed a motion for determination of probable cause
before the trial court. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. Juno Cars Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Juno Cars then filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It
argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a
criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.

Issue

Whether or not the determination of probable cause belongs to the public prosecutor and not
the trial court.

Ruling

The court ruled that conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of
the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. The
conduct of preliminary investigation the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of
the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to
find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court. Once
the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos.
MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles alias “Rod and John Lennon”
G.R. No. 208007
April 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse.

Facts

The victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old was allegedly raped by Rodrigo. According to the
victim, she went home from school around noon to have lunch and on her way home, she met
Rodrigo at his house. She narrated that she was brought to his room and he laid her down on
the bed where he had carnal knowledge with her. An information was filed against him where he
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape. Rodrigo appealed to the CA
claiming that the victim’s testimony fell short of the requirement of the law on the quantum of
evidence required.

Issue

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape.

Ruling

In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be
given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who
barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as
rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the
earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this case-motivates her to testify falsely
against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, the more so when she is a minor,
says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The
accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.24

AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to the
discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies
of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was sexually abused.

Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt. He noted that
her house was just near his house where the incident happened.

This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put up out of desperation.

Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had
known him for a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in the family of AAA
had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his status allowed him, he took advantage of
AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To cover this up and seemingly
justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew that
what he did was wrong; AAA would have probably doubted whether such act was normal
among adults.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo
Gutierez y Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is ordered to
pay AAA the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher
Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
G.R. No. 196735
May 5, 2014
Leonen, J.
 Doctrine

Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state
an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.

Facts

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and
separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members.

RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered
archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue

Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off.

Ruling

No. The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the
charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the
information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit in the
appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were presenting testimonial
evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in
the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such.

It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of

“wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence,
introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a

concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused in the commission of the offense they were
being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is
also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act
of one is the act of all.” This would mean that all the accused had been one in their plan to
conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not
have done so.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November
26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor
Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the
MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.

SO ORDERED.

Victor C. Lingan vs Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga

A.C. No. 5377
 June 30, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Every notary public shall keep a register known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be
made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any
part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore.

Facts

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and
Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000. The complainant alleged that respondents, both notary
public, falsified certain public documents. Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga both admitted
the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith of
their secretary and legal assistants to whom they had left the task of entering all his notarial
documents.

Issue

Whether or not the respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law

Ruling

It is clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register.
Section 245 of the Notarial Law provides that every notary public shall keep a register known as
the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall
supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and
paying the legal fees therefore.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from
the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED.

Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos vs Dan T. Lim, doing business
under the name and style of Quality Papers & Plastic Products Enterprises
G.R. No. 206806
June 25, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform one of them.

Facts

Lim works in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons, and other raw materials, under
the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products, Enterprises, to factories engaged in the paper mill
business. Lim delivered scrap papers to Arco Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. The parties
allegedly agreed that Arco Pulp and Paper would either pay Dan Lim the value of the raw
materials or deliver to him their finished products of equivalent value. Arco Pulp and Paper and
a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum of agreement where Arco Pulp and Paper bound
themselves to deliver their finished products to Megapack Container Corporation, owned by Eric
Sy. The liability of Arco Pulp was now transferred to Megapack in paying Lim. Dan Lim sent a
letter to Arco Pulp and Paper demanding payment but no payment was made to him. Now Lim
filed a case against Arco Pulp. The Arco Pulp now contends that their agreement was novated
because of the MOA agreed upon Sy and Arco.

Issue

Whether or not the obligation between the parties was an alternative obligation.

Ruling

Yes. The rule on alternative obligations is governed by Article 1199 of the Civil Code, which
states:

Article 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely

perform one of them.
 The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other
undertaking.

In an alternative obligation, there is more than one object, and the fulfillment of one is sufficient,
determined by the choice of the debtor who generally has the right of election.” The right of
election is extinguished when the party who may exercise that option categorically and
unequivocally makes his or her choice known.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED in part. The decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 95709 is
AFFIRMED.

Petitioners Arco Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos are hereby ordered solidarily to
pay respondent Dan T. Lim the amount of ₱7,220,968.31 with interest of 6% per annum at the
time of demand until finality of judgment and its full satisfaction, with moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and attorney's fees in
the amount of ₱50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Nestor T. Gadrinab vs Norat Salamanca, Antonio Talao and Elena Lopez

G.R. No. 194560
June 11, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res
judicata and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of
consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgment bars courts from modifying decisions that
have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact
or law.

Facts

The respondents are siblings and heirs of the late Spouses Talao. The Spouses died intestate,
leaving a parcel of land in Sta. Ana, Manila. The five Talao children divided the property among
themselves through an extrajudicial settlement. Subsequently, Arsenia Talao waived her share
over the property in favor of her siblings.

Respondent Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against her siblings Antonio, Elena
(deceased, represented by husband), and Adoracion (deceased, represented by petitioner heirs
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab) before the RTC of Manila.

On April 10, 2003, RTC approved the compromise agreement, and it became final and
executory on April 10, 2003. Nestro filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement.
He demanded his ¼ share in the accumulated rentals. Pursuant to the compromised
agreement, Cuervo Appraiser appraised the property. Unsatisfied, Antonio Talao moved for the
property’s reappraisal which was denied by the RTC. The portion that Nestor refused to vacate
remains unsold. Salamanca moved for the physical partition of the property before the RTC
Manila. Nestor and Francisco opposed the motion contending that the judgment on the
compromise agreement has already become final and executory and had the effect of res
judicata.

Issue

Whether or not the contention of Nestor and Francisco is correct.

Ruling

Yes. A compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “A judgment based on
a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits” of the case. It has the effect of res
judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence. Thus, Article 2037
of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.

In Spouses Romero v. Tan, This court said: It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the
effect of res judicata and is immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside (by
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the
compromise agreement).

There is res judicata when the following concur:

1. Previous final judgment;
2. By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
3. On the merits of the case;
4. Between identical parties, on the same subject matter and cause of action.
 Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment
on the compromise agreement is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Oliver A. Buclao

G.R. No. 208173
June 11, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Facts

Informations were filed against Oliver Buclao for the crime of rape against his minor daughter on
two separate occassions. According to the victim, she was threatened by her father that he will
kill her if she tells anyone about the incidents. However, in 2004, she told her grandmother
about the rape incidents which led to the filing of the informations. The trial court rendered a
consolidated judgment finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling

Yes. In this case, both the trial court and Court of Appeals found that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified rape. This court sees no reason to depart
from the findings of the lower courts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s
recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was able to
positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. Her testimony was given in a
"categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner."
We recently held that "It is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal."

As to accused-appellant’s argument that the absence of hymenal lacerations admits the

possibility thatthere was never any sexual abuse, we find our disquisition in People v. Araojo
applicable:

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being,to repeat, an element
of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling proof of
defloration. However, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s
testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated November 8, 2012 finding the
accused-appellant Oliver Buclao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count of rape, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to ₱150,000.00, the
moral damages to ₱150,000.00, and the exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00, for each of the
two counts of rape. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Light Rail Transit Authority represented by its Administrator Melquiades A. Robles vs

Aurora A. Salvaña
G.R. No. 192074
June 10, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and
lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there
must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority.
 Facts

On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles,
issued Office Order No. 119, series of 2006. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña's
designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her
instead to handle special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be
assigned to her" by the Administrator. Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with
the Office of the President.

In the interim, Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to
May 31, 2006. In support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate issued by Dr.
Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue the medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied
having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate.

Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaña
to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the notice "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her "for not complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a
falsified medical certificate.

Salvaña filed her explanation on June 30, 2006. She alleged that as a member of the Bids and
Awards Committee, she "refused to sign a resolution" favoring a particular bidder. She alleged
that Office Order No. 119 was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and
vindictiveness"over her refusal to sign.

The LRTA's Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. It issued a formal
charge against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

On August 5, 2006, "Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation." None of the pleadings
alleged that this irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the
Fact-finding Committee alluded to Administrator Robles' acceptance of the resignation letter.

In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued. On October 31, 2006, the
Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaña guilty of all the charges against her
and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from service with all the accessory penalties." The
LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding Committee.

Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. "In her appeal, she claimed that she was
denied due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support the charges against
her. The Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364.
The Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She
was meted a penalty of suspension for three months. LRTA moved for reconsideration of the
resolution which was denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil
Service Commission's findings. Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent’s resignation mooted its proceedings.

Ruling

Yes. In the response of the Administrator to the letter of resignation filed by Respondent there
was no unconditional acceptance of the same. In fact it was specified therein that her
resignation is "without prejudice to any appropriate action on any malfeasance or... misfeasance
committed during her tenure.” There can be no other conclusion from the above that her
resignation does not prevent the administration from proceeding with any charge/s appropriate
under the circumstances.

Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires the acceptance of the proper
government authority. In Republic v. Singun, the court stated:

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and
lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there
must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an
acceptance by the proper authority.

In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office.
Resignation to be effective must be accepted by the competent authority,either in terms or by
something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public
officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is
subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive
act of a resignation's acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not
be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified
therefor.

Although the response of Administrator Robles was not attached to the record, it can be
concluded from the resolution of the Fact-finding Committee that he accepted the resignation,
albeit with the qualification that it be "without prejudice to any appropriate action on any...
malfeasance or misfeasance committed during her tenure."

The qualified acceptance of Administrator Robles, however, did not affect the validity of
respondent's resignation. Section 1, Rule XII of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 15, series of 1999, requires:

Sec. 1. Resignation. The following documents shall be submitted to the Commission for
record purposes: a. The voluntary written notice of the employee informing the
appointing authority that he is relinquishing his position and the effectivity date of said
resignation; and, b. The acceptance of resignation in writing by the agency head or
appointing authority which shall indicate the date of effectivity of the resignation.

An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his
case without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings until finally terminated.

The qualification placed by Administrator Robles on his acceptance does not make respondent's
resignation any less valid. The rules and regulations allow the acceptance of resignations while
the administrative case is pending provided that the proceedings will still continue. Because of
her resignation on August 5, 2006, any modification as to the service of her suspension became
moot. Her permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November 11, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No. 071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the
Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora
A. Salvaña, is found guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty. The Civil Service Commission is
DIRECTED to attach a copy of this decision to respondent's permanent employment record.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate the proper
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña.

SO ORDERED.

Juliet Vitug Madarang and Romeo Bartolome, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and
acting in their personal capacities, Rodolfo and Ruby Bartolome vs Spouses Jesus d.
Morales and Carolina N. Morales
G.R. No. 199283
June 9, 2014
 Leonen, J.

Doctrine

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional
circumstances. To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties must file the petition
within 60 days from notice of the judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment or final
order was entered; otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed outright.

Facts

Spouses Morales filed with the RTC QC a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot
located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City. They alleged that Spouses Bartolome loaned P500,000
from them and agreed to pay within 2 months with interest of 5% per month. To secure the loan,
Spouses Bartolome mortgaged the Bago Bantay property to them.

The period to pay the loan has lapsed and the Spouses failed to pay. Only after demand, did
they pay a part of the loaned amount. Spouses Bartolome died thus the Spouses Morales filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure of the property against Juliet Madarang, Romeo Bartolome and
Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Bartolome.

In their answer, the defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage
covering the property, specifically the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They
added that the complaint has already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch of
the RTC QC for failure to comply with an order of the RTC.

The TC ordered the defendants to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000 plus 7% interest per
month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from judgment. If the
defendants fail to pay, the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants filed an MR but was denied. They filed a notice of appeal which was also denied for
having filed out of time. Defendants filed a petition for relief for judgement blaming their 80-year
old lawyer who failed to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period. The TC stil denied
due to filing beyond 60 days from finality of TC’s decision. Defendants then fild a petition for
certiorari with the CA which was denied outright.

Issue

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s petition for certiorari for failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
 Ruling

No. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final
order.

This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the
trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of
the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the
60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ resolutions
dated July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120251 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs Victor Cogaed y Romana

G.R. No. 200334
July 30, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Stop and frisk searches (aka as Terry searches) should be balanced with the need to protect
the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance
lies in the concept of “suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself in.

Facts

Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Brgy. Lun-Oy during a checkpoint, the
driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying
marijuana inside his bag. The police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused
about the contents of his bag. The latter replied that he did not know what was inside and that
he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened
the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police.

Issue

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure and whether the confiscated marijuana is
admissible as evidence.

Ruling

No. There is no valid search and seizure and the confiscated marijuana is inadmissible. As a
general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. The warrant requires the existence of probable
cause that can only be determined by a judge.

There are; however, instances when searches are reasonable even without a warrant. The
following jurisprudential instances are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view
3. Search of a moving vehicle
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Stop and frisk searches (aka as Terry searches) should be balanced with the need to protect
the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance
lies in the concept of “suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself in.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La
Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Miguel Cirera y Ustelo vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 181843
July 14, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the attack does not always
equate to treachery.

Facts

Two informations for frustrated murder were filed against the petitioner. Austria testified that he
was playing lucky nine when Miguel arrived asking for money to buy liquor. He then asked the
latter to keep quiet and Naval arrived and asked Austria to go home. Austria stood up and he
was stabbed. Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground and before the former could hit him
again, he hit him with a bench. The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
2 counts of frustrated murder. It also ruled that there was treachery on petitioner’s end
considering the length of time it took the private complainants to realize that they were stabbed.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner.

Issue

Whether or not there was treachery.

Ruling

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. The
means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the
crime.

In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected
on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage.

The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or imagined
provocation offered by the victim." In this case, petitioner was not only dismissed by Austria
when he approached him for money. There was also an altercation between him and Naval.
The provocation might have been enough to entice petitioner to action and attack private
complainants.

Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination to ensure
success in committing the crime. What was more likely the case, based on private complainants’
testimonies, was that petitioner’s action was an impulsive reaction to being dismissed by
Austria, his altercation with Naval, and Naval’s attempt to summon Austria home.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is found guilty of two (2)
counts of frustrated homicide. He is sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium
as maximum, for every count. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify a) Romeo Austria
₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱88,028.77 as actual damages and b) Gerardo Naval
₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate or moderate damages.

Petitioner is also ordered to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. vs Victor S. Chiongbian, Benjamin D.Gothong and Carlos A.
Gothong Lines Inc., (CAGLI)
G.R. No. 19730
July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Forum shopping is committed by instituting 2 or more suits in different courts, either

simultaneously or successively, to ask them to rule on the same issues and to grant the same
reliefs on the supposition that one of the courts would grant the instituting party/ies a favorable
decision.

Facts

ASC, CAGLI and WLI agreed to pool their resources and merge their businesses under WG&A.
Their agreement stipulated arbitration as a means of settling disputes. CAGLI gave more than
that was stipulated, but the excess was returned. Later on, CAGLI claimed that the excess was
not yet returned. AEV acquired the shares of ASC and WLI and renamed the business to ATSC.
CAGLI filed an application for arbitration with RTC Cebu against Chiongbian, ATSV, ASC and
AEV for the return of the excess inventories. AEV filed a motion to dismiss arguing that there
was no cause of action against it as there was no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI and
AEV. RTC discharged AEV and ordered the other parties to proceed with arbitration. CAGLI
filed another application for arbitration in view of the return of the same excessive inventories.
AEV filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum shopping, failure to state a cause of action,
res judicata and litis pendentia. RTC denied the MTD and subsequent MR hence this petition to
the SC.

Issue

Whether or not there is forum shopping.

Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that CAGLI engaged in forum shopping and the second
complaint was barred by res judicata, but not by litis pendentia. Also, there was no agreement
binding AEV and CAGLI to arbitrate.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated May 5, 2011 and June
24,2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. CEB-37004 are
declared VOID. The Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 10 is ordered to DISMISSCivil
Case No. CEB-37004.

SO ORDERED.

Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Pablo R. Olivares vs Benjamin Castillo

G.R. No. 1926251
July 9, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

The right to rescind reciprocal obligations does not apply to contracts to sell.
 Facts

Castillo was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT 19972. The Philippine Tourism
Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land based on TCT 18493. Castillo
and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo Olivarez, entered into a contract of
conditional sale over the property. The details were as follows:

1. Under the deed of conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty; with
Olivarez Realty delivering the downpayment and the rest to be paid in 30 equal monthly
installments every 8th of the month beginning in the month that the parties would receive a
decision voiding the PTA’s title to the property.

2. Under the same deed, Olivarez Realty will file the action against PTA with full assistance of
Castillo; and that should the petition be denied, Castillo shall reimburse all the amounts paid by
Olivarez Realty.

3. Under the same contract, Olivarez Realty undertook to pay the legitimate tenants of the land
disturbance compensation, while Castillo undertook to clear the land of the tenants within 6
months from the signing of the deed; that should Castillo fail to clear the land within 6 months,
Olivarez Realty may suspend its monthly downpayment until the tenants vacate the property.

4. The parties agreed that Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately occupy the property
upon signing of the deed. Should the contract be cancelled, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed
to return the property’s possession to Castillo and forfeit all the improvements it may have
introduced on the property.

Olivarez Realty failed to comply with the conditions, to wit: a) pay the full purchase price; b)
failed to file any action against PTA; c) failed to clear the land of the tenants nor paying them
disturbance compensation. For breaching the contract, Castillo prayed for rescission of contract
under Art. 1191 of Civil Code, plus damages.

In their defense, Olivarez Realty alleged that Castillo failed to fully assist in filing the action
against PTA; that Castillo failed to clear the property of the tenants within 6 months from the
signing of the deed. Thus, they had all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments to
fully pay the purchase price.

Both RTC and CA ruled that Olivarez Realty breached the contract and ordered the rescission
of the sale plus damages.

Issue
Whether or not rescission of the contract is proper.

Ruling

No. The Supreme Court characterized the contract as a contract to sell, not a contract of
conditional sale. In a contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the
property upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is “by operation of law
without any further act having to be performed by the seller.” In a contract to sell, transfer of title
to the prospective buyer is not automatic. “The prospective seller must convey title to the
property through a deed of conditional sale.” The distinction is important to determine the
applicable laws and remedies in case a party does not fulfill his or her obligations under the
contract. In contracts of conditional sale, our laws on sales under the Civil Code of the
Philippines apply. On the other hand, contracts to sell are not governed by our law on sales but
by the Civil Code provisions on conditional obligations.

Specifically, Article 1191 of the Civil Code on the right to rescind reciprocal obligations does not
apply to contracts to sell. Failure to fully pay the purchase price in contracts to sell is not the
breach of contract under Art. 1191. Failure to fully pay the purchase price is merely an event
which prevents the seller’s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. This is
because there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still nonexistent, the suspensive
condition (the condition of having the buyer pays the full purchase price) having not happened.

In this case, Castillo reserved his title to the property and undertook to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon Olivarez Realty Corporation’s full payment of the purchase price. Since
Castillo still has to execute a deed of absolute sale to Olivarez Realty Corporation upon full
payment of the purchase price, the transfer of title is not automatic. As this case involves a
contract to sell, Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines does not apply. The contract to
sell is instead cancelled, and the parties shall stand as if the obligation to sell never existed.

SC cancelled the deed of conditional sale. Olivarez Realty was ordered to return to Castillo the
possession of property, together with all improvements that it introduced. Olivarez Realty was
also ordered to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees to Castillo.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision
dated July 20, 2010 and in CA-G.R. CV No. 91244 is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION.

The deed of conditional sale dated April 5, 2000 is declared CANCELLED. Petitioner Olivarez
Realty Corporation shall RETURN to respondent Benjamin Castillo the possession of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19972 together with all the improvements
that petitioner corporation introduced on the property. The amount of ₱2,500,000.00 is
FORFEITED in favor of respondent Benjamin Castillo as reasonable compensation for the use
of petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation of the property.

Petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation shall PAY respondent Benjamin Castillo ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees with
interest at 6% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until
petitioner

corporation fully pays the amount of damages.144

SO ORDERED.

AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) vs Republic of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 180086
July 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

The period of possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable
agricultural land is included in the computation of possession for purposes of acquiring
registration rights over a property if the land has already been declared as such at the time of
the application for registration.

Facts

On July 10, 1997, the AFP-RSBS filed an application for original registration of parcels of land in
Silang, Cavite. The parcels were allegedly acquired from Ambrad, Alberto Tibayan and Restituto
Tibayan on March 13, 1997. It was also alleged that their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the properties since June 12, 1945. MCTC approved application directed the
Register of Deeds to register properties. Republic appealed alleging improper identification of
the properties. RTC granted the appeal. CA reversed, finding that the properties had no pending
land application and that there were no overlapping lots, hence, no person needed to be notified
of the land registration proceedings. However, since the lot was declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15 1982, the period of possession of the predecessors-in-interest
before that date should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Hence,
AFP=RSBS’s possession could not ripen into ownership.
 Issue

Whether or not the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession for purposes of original registration.

Ruling

The court rule for the petitioner. The period of possession prior to the declaration that land is
alienable and disposable agricultural land is included in the computation of possession for
purposes of acquiring registration rights over a property if the land has already been declared as
such at the time of the application for registration.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of January 10, 2007
and resolution of October 5, 2007 are SET ASIDE. The July 28, 2001 trial court decision is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

City of Dagupan, represented by the City Mayor Benjamin S. Lim vs Ester F. Maramba
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact Johnny Ferrer
G.R. No. 174411
July 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine
Mistake so gross committed by the counsel can amount to extrinsic fraud.

Facts

Respondent Maramba filed a case for damages against Petitioner for having her commercial
fishing center destroyed without notice. The complaint was riddled with alterations to make it
look like the amount claimed is more than the actual damages. The RTC granted the complaint
and awarded 10 million to Maramba. After the MR was denied a petition for relief from judgment
was filed subsequently, alleging that the City Legal Officer’s mistake that caused them to lose
their case and allowed Maramba to claim a huge amount of money against them. The RTC
denied the petition for relief of judgment. However, despite the denial, the amount of damages
claimed was still reduced to 75,000. A petition for certiorari was thereafter filed by Maramba
before the CA. CA held that the RTC’s decision as to the amount was final and executory. A
Rule 45 petition was thereafter filed to the SC.

Issue

Whether or not the mistake can be a ground for granting relief from judgment.

Ruling

Yes. Rule 38, Section 1 of the Rules of Court require that for a petition for relief of judgment be
granted there must be a showing of either excusable negligence, fraud, accident or mistake. In
this case, the mistake committed by the Legal Officer of Dagupan City is so fatal considering the
amount awarded to Maramba. Such nature of mistake was so gross that it constituted extrinsic
fraud.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ June 15, 2006 decision and
August 14, 2006 resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court orders dated
August 25, 2005 and November 30, 2005 are AFFIRMED.

Cathay Metal Corporation vs Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative

G.R. No. 17220
July 2, 2014
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

Substantive law takes precedence over procedural rules.

Facts
Respondent is a cooperative recognized under the R. A. No. 6657. It allegedly entered into a
joint venture agreement with farmer-beneficiaries through CLOA in Silang, Cavite. While
respondent was negotiating with farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner entered into Irrevocable
Exclusive Right to Buy contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries. Under the IERB, the F-B
committed themselves to sell to the petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion to
industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from
transferring title to the properties.

In 1996, the respondent caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the F-B certificates of
title. In 1999, the petitioner and F-B executed contracts of sale of the properties, and the TCTs
were also issued in the former’s name.

The respondent wrote two letters relative to its adverse claims in an attempt to amicably settle
what seemed then as a brewing dispute. The letters were written on the letterheads indicating
the address “No. 167, Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna”.

On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse
claims on its TCTs with the RTC Tagaytay. It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to
respondent’s official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.” The petition was
returned to sender because respondent could not be found at that address. The postman issued
a certification stating that the reason for the return was that the “cooperative was not existing”.
Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon respondent personally; however, this
service failed for the same reason.

Upon the motion of the petitioner, the RTC issued an order declaring petitioner’s substituted
service apparently by registered mail. Respondent filed a manifestation that they have never
received a copy of the summons. It argued that petitioner was not being fair when it served
summons to respondent’s old address despite knowledge of its actual address. Petitioner
argued that summons could only be validly served to respondent’s official address as indicated
in its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority.

Issue

Whether or not there is a valid service of summons through registered mail.

Ruling

None. Respondent was not validly served with summons. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules
ofCourt provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that
summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:
 Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service
of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.

This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If
summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices,
summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.

Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect
its new address as an excuse from sending or attempting to send to respondent copies of the
petition and the summons. The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the
enumerated officers. Petitioner failed to do this. Nonotice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Register of Deeds of Cavite is ORDERED to

cancel the annotations of adverse claims on the transfer certificates· of title.

SO ORDERED.

Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System vs The Local Government of Quezon City

G.R. No. 194388
November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

A government instrumentality exercising corporate powers is not liable for the payment of real
property taxes on its properties unless it is alleged and proven that the beneficial use of its
properties been extended to a taxable person.

Facts
Congress enacted RA 6234 creating the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. It
was granted the power to exercise supervision and control over all waterworks and sewage
systems within Metro Manila, Rizal and a portion of Cavite. It was initially created as a
corporation without capital stock. In July 2007, MWSS received several Final Notices of Real
Property Tax Delinquency from LGC of QC. It then issued warrants of levy on properties due to
MWSS’s failure to pay. MWSS then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO. It argued that its real properties in QX were exclusively
devoted to public use, thus were exempt from real property tax. CA denied the petition for lack
of merit. CA found that since MWSS was not a municipal corporation, it could not invoke
immunity in Sec. 133 of LGC.

Issue

Whether or not the MWSS is liable for RPT.

Ruling

No. According to the parameters set by Manila International Airport Authority, a government
instrumentality is exempt from the local government unit's levy of real property tax. The
government instrumentality must not have been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
even though it exercises corporate powers, administer special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through its charter. Its properties are exempt from real property tax because
they are properties of public dominion: held in trust for the Republic, intended for public use, and
cannot be the subject of levy, encumbrance, or disposition.

A government-owned and controlled corporation, on the other hand, is not exempt from real
property taxes due to the passage of the Local Government Code

Petitioner is categorized with other government agencies that were found to be exempt from the
payment of real property taxes.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals October 19, 2010 Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 100733 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders
issued by this Court on January 26, 2011 and September 7, 2011 are made PERMANENT.

The real properties of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System located in Quezon
City are DECLARED EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the Local Government of
Quezon City. All the real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax
delinquencies, issued by the Local Government of Quezon City on the real properties of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System located in Quezon City are declared VOID,
except for the portions that are alleged and proven to have been leased to private parties.

SO ORDERED.

Sindophil Inc. vs Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204594
November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

The presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent purchaser for value is disputable
and may be overcome by contrary evidence. Once a prima facie case disputing this
presumption is established, the adverse party cannot simply rely on the presumption of good
faith and must put forward evidence that the property was acquired without notice of any defect
in its title.

Facts

Republic filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title
before the RTC Pasay and impleaded Sindophil as one of the defendants. It alleged that the
TCT issued by the RD of Pasay, the Tramo property was initially registered under the name of
Teodoro who then sold it to Puma, who sold it to Ty who finally sold it to Sindophil which caused
for the issuance of TCT 132440. The Republic claimed that the TCT in the name of Teodoro
was spurious or of doubtful authenticity. In their answer the defendants countered that the
Republic was estopped from questioning the transfers considering that it had allowed the series
of transfers and even accepted the tremendous amounts paid as capital gains tax.

Issue

Whether or not the certificates of title emanating from TCT No. 10354 are null and void.

Ruling

With the Republic having put forward evidence that the Tramo property claimed by Sindophil
belongs to the Republic, the burden of evidence shifted to Sindophil to prove that its title to it
was valid. Concomitantly, it had the burden of proving that it was indeed a buyer in good faith
and for value. As this Court said in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals,87 "the burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status"88 and
"[i]n discharging that burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith,
i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is [essential here] is
integral with the very status which must be proved."89

Unfortunately for Sindophil, it utterly failed to discharge the burden of evidence because its
counsel failed to attend the scheduled initial presentation of evidence.

Further, looking at the records, the defects in Sindophil's title could be inferred from the
annotations in TCT No. 129957, the certificate of title held by Sindophil's immediate
predecessor, Ty. A certain Antonio C. Mercado had filed an adverse claim against Ty because
the Tramo property had been previously sold to him by Puma, Ty's predecessor.90 The alleged
double sale should have prompted Sindophil to look into Puma's title, TCT No. 128358, where it
can be gleaned that Teodoro likewise filed an adverse claim.91 These annotations show that
the Tramo property is controversial and has been the subject of several adverse claims, belying
Sindophil's contention that it acquired the property in good faith.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The June 19, 2012 Resolution
and November 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96660 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Jerson Tortal vs Chizuru Taniguchi

G.R. No. 212683
November 12, 2018
Leonen, J.

Doctrine

An allegation of a trial court's lack of jurisdiction to render the assailed judgment, final order, or
resolution must be brought in a separate action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Facts
When Tortal married Taniguchi, they lived in a house registered in the name of Tortal, married
to Taniguchi. Not more than a year has passed,Taniguchi filed a petition for nullity of her
marriage, which the RTC granted.In the same decision annulling their marriage, the RTC
declared the house and lot to be Taniguchi’s exclusive property. Tortal did not move for
reconsideration so it the decision became final and executory.While the petition for nullity of
marriage was pending, Sales filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Tortal.
The two entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. In accordance
with the RTC’s compromise judgment, Tortal and Taniguchi’s house and lot was levied and then
sold at a public auction to Sales. This prompted Taniguchi to file aComplaint against Tortal and
Sales. The RTC nullified the sale so Tortal and Salesappealed to the CA. It was only then when
Tortal raised the defects of the decision nullifying his marriage with Taniguchi.

Issue

Whether or not the appeal for the nullity of Tortal’s marriage with Taniguchi be given due
course.

Ruling

It is doubtful that defendant Tortal could in the instant case assail the validity of the final
decision of RTC Br. 260. Following the principle of res judicata, the dispute on ownership was
deemed to have been put to rest with the finality of the said decision. Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be
deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation
between the same parties and for the same cause. Certainly, the remedy available to defendant
Tortal is not in this proceeding, but through a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court
of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The assailed Court of
Appeals December 13, 2013 Decision and May 14, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 98955
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

People’s General Insurance Corporation vs Edgardo Guansing and Eduardo Lizaso

G.R. No. 204759
November 14, 2018
 Leonen, J.

Doctrine

As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons. Substituted
service is the exception to this general rule. For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, there
must be a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions showing that a defendant cannot be
served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. These details are contained in the sheriff's
return. Thus, the sheriffs return is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Courts may allow
substituted service based on what the sheriffs return contains.

Facts

Lizaso, Guansing’s employee was driving the latter’s truck along Sampaloc when he hit the rear
portion of Yokohama’s Isuzu Crosswind. Yokohama’s car was insured with People’s General
Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy. PGIC
claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing.
PGIS sought from Guansing reimbursement of the amount paid to Yokohama but Guansing
dialed. PGIC filed a complaint for a sum of money against Guansing and Lizaso. The sheriff’s
return did not explain why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing. Guansing
filed a MTD for lack of jurisdiction against his person alleging that he did not personally receive
the summons. PGIC argued that summons was properly served since substituted service was
an alternative mode of service.

Issue

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guansing through service of
summons.

Ruling

No. In this case, the sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt personal service
before he resorted to substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is established
by a sheriff's failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within
this period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to
personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriff's return why these
attempts are unsuccessful.50
Sheriffs are tasked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with care, diligence, and
promptness so as not to affect the speedy disposition of justice. They are compelled to give
their best efforts to accomplish personal service of summons on a defendant.51 Based on the
Sheriffs Return in this case, the sheriff clearly failed to meet this requirement.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals December 10, 2012
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 96720 is REVERSED and the Regional Trial Court January 28,
2010 Decision is AFFIRMED. Respondent Edgardo Guansing is ordered to pay:
The sum of P437,800.00 for the reimbursement of the remaining cost of the Isuzu Crosswind
plus interest69 of twelve percent (12%) per annum from August 28, 2006, the date of filing of
this case, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;

The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

Costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Case List

1. Villagracia vs Fifth Sharia District Court and Roldan E. Mala

a. G.R. No. 188832
b. April 23 2014
c. Leonen, J.
2. City of General Santos represented by Hon. Darlene Magnolia Antonio vs COA
a. G.R. No. 199439
b. April 22, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
3. Mendoza vs People of the Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc.
a. G.R. No. 197293
b. April 21, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
4. People of the Philippines vs Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles alias “Rod and John Lennon”
a. G.R. No. 208007
b. April 2, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
5. People of the Philippines vs Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher
Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
 a. G.R. No. 196735
b. May 5, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
6. Victor C. Lingan vs Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga
a. A.C. No. 5377
b. June 30, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
7. Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos vs Dan T. Lim, doing business
under the name and style of Quality Papers & Plastic Products Enterprises
a. G.R. No. 206806
b. June 25, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
8. Nestor T. Gadrinab vs Norat Salamanca, Antonio Talao and Elena Lopez
a. G.R. No. 194560
b. June 11, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
9. People of the Philippines vs Oliver A. Buclao
a. G.R. No. 208173
b. June 11, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
10. Light Rail Transit Authority represented by its Administrator Melquiades A. Robles vs
Aurora A. Salvaña
a. G.R. No. 192074
b. June 10, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
11. Juliet Vitug Madarang and Romeo Bartolome, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and
acting in their personal capacities, Rodolfo and Ruby Bartolome vs Spouses Jesus d.
Morales and Carolina N. Morales
a. G.R. No. 199283
b. June 9, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
12. People of the Philippines vs Victor Cogaed y Romana
a. G.R. No. 200334
b. July 30, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
13. Miguel Cirera y Ustelo vs People of the Philippines
a. G.R. No. 181843
b. July 14, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
14. Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. vs Victor S. Chiongbian, Benjamin D.Gothong and Carlos
A. Gothong Lines Inc., (CAGLI)
a. G.R. No. 19730
b. July 9, 2014
 c. Leonen, J.
15. Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Pablo R. Olivares vs Benjamin Castillo
a. G.R. No. 1926251
b. July 9, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
16. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) vs Republic of the
Philippines
a. G.R. No. 180086
b. July 2, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
17. City of Dagupan, represented by the City Mayor Benjamin S. Lim vs Ester F. Maramba
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact Johnny Ferrer
a. G.R. No. 174411
b. July 2, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
18. Cathay Metal Corporation vs Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative
a. G.R. No. 17220
b. July 2, 2014
c. Leonen, J.
19. Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System vs Local Government of Quezon CIty
a. G.R. No. 194388
b. November 7, 2018
c. Leonen, J.
20. Sindophil Inc. vs Republic of the Philippines
a. G.R. No. 204594
b. November 7, 2018
c. Leonen, J.
21. Jerson Tortal vs Chizuru Taniguchi
a. G.R. No. 212683
b. November 12, 2018
c. Leonen, J.
22. People’s General Insurance Corporation vs Edgardo Guansing and Eduardo Lizaso
a. G.R. No. 204759
b. November 14, 2018
c. Leonen, J.