Badge:

casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, judge, justice of peace, and election

Caption:
G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appelle
Justice Regala, ponente.

Syllabus:
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" means a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the
said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the
purview of Section 54.

Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election
or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".

Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was
omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Whether or not a justice of peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Ruling:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance
and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of
the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected
in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-
appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar,
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges".
Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but
rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.

Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are
now within its encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".

Fallo:
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this
case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Badge:
Attempted murder and Each to Each

Caption:
GR Nos. L-22160 & L-22161
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
Justice Aquino, ponente

Syllabus:
Reddendo singula singulis – latin term for each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its
corresponding object. It is a rule of construction used typically in distributing property.

Facts:
On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted murder. On
February 25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently filed for a motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a denial order
to the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed the
lower court’s decision. Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending that
the appeal should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15-day period of appeal from the date
of notice and not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47
days late.

Issue:
Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the date of notice
of the decision.

Ruling:
Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring
to “judgement”, while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore
58 days late, not 47, as appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the of the
notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible
miscarriage of justice.”

Fallo:
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed on the appellant for the killing of Siyang. (Arts. 64 [1] and 248, Revised Penal Code). The use of
the term "life imprisonment" is not proper (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).

WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Badge:
Decree, jurisdiction, and relative and qualifying terms

Caption:
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
MAPA vs. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Justice Regalado, ponente

Syllabus:
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest
antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context.

Facts:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa
defaulted to pay the instalment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The
latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of
the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those
requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the
contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements,
and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans.

Issue:
Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of
last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.

Ruling:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for
the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it
was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause
20, no further written commitment was made by the developer. The words “which are offered and
indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but
also to “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words,
but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.

Fallo:
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
Badge:
Context and related Clauses, barangay chairman, and election recall

Caption:
GR 123169, 4 November 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondentJustice Davide Jr., ponente

Syllabus:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.—It is a rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.

Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995,
A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC
resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s
opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial
court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall
election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant
to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date
of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election",
petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set
on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.

Ruling:
No. recall election in question is not violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government
Code. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal
that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a
law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.

Fallo:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is
hereby made permanent.
Badge:
Intrinsic Aid, Punctuation Mark, Vagrancy

Caption:
G.R. No. L-884, November 21, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appllee, vs.
WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD, defendants-appellants
Justice Trent, ponente

Syllabus:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute which will give it
effect.

The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere
punctuation found in the printed Act.
If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the
legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of
the statute as thus punctuated.

But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions
of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of them was earning a living
at a lawful trade or business sufficient enough to support themselves.

Appellees’ Arguments:

Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase “no visible means of support” only applies to the clause “tramping or
straying through the country” and not the first clause which states that “every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” thus making the 3 appellants guilty of vagrancy.

Further, Intention for “without visible means of support” to qualify the first part of the clause, either the
comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else a comma after country would have been
inserted.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 – divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause enumerates a certain
calls of person who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants.
“Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; every person found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of
support; … … …”

Issue:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-General’s argument
based on a mere grammatical criticism.

Ruling:
No. The Attorney-General has based his argument by a "mere grammatical criticism" of the second
paragraph of the Act. 519, that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or a lawful
calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy.

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect.
The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere
punctuation found in the printed Act.

Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the habitually idle and
harmful parasites of the society. That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is necessary under
these statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not even
negative by the punctuation employed.

In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a degree of
comfort higher than the average. It is believed that Act No. 1757 is adequate, if enforced, to suppress the
gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at a lawful trade or business.

Fallo:
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the costs de oficio.
Badge:
Words phrases proviso and sugar cane laborers

Caption:
G.R. No. 79869 September 5, 1991
FORTUNATO MERCADO, SR., ROSA MERCADO, FORTUNATO MERCADO, JR., ANTONIO MERCADO, JOSE
CABRAL, LUCIA MERCADO, ASUNCION GUEVARA, ANITA MERCADO, MARINA MERCADO, JULIANA
CABRAL, GUADALUPE PAGUIO, BRIGIDA ALCANTARA, EMERLITA MERCADO, ROMEO GUEVARA, ROMEO
MERCADO and LEON SANTILLAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), THIRD DIVISION; LABOR ARBITER LUCIANO AQUINO,
RAB-III; AURORA L. CRUZ; SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE BORJA and LETICIA DE BORJA; and STO. NIÑO REALTY,
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Justice Padilla, ponente

Syllabus:
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows.27 Thus, it has been
held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision
to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof.28 The only exception to
this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately
preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

Facts:
Petitioners were agricultural workers of the private respondent's sugar land who were dismissed. They
had worked in all agriculture phases for several years in the said sugar land. The respondent denied that
petitioners were regular employees alleging that their services were engaged through 'mandarols' or
supply workers to do a particular phase of the agricultural work.

As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioners
were not regular employees and the NLRC affirmed this ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers.

Ruling:
No, they are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed
for a specific project or undertaking, the completion has been determined at the time of engagement, or
where work or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the season. As such,
the termination of employment cannot be considered as illegal dismissal. The petitioners are free to
contract their services to work for other farm owners.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows.27 Thus, it has been
held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision
to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof.28 The only exception to
this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately
preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under review, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Frabrication of jewelry

Caption:
G.R. No. 171427: March 30, 2011
STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) and
JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as General Manager of LLDA, Respondents.
Justice Nachura, ponente

Syllabus:
Political Law- Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including,
inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a
corporation and the estate of a decedent.

In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is crystal clear that
the same is a defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage industry.

Facts:
Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are manufactured
in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located
in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City.

For creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant, one of petitioners
neighbors filed a complaint with the Barangay. During conciliation proceedings, petitioners management
undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that effect.
However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and continued to manufacture its products in its
Brgy.

Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor filed a complaint before the barangay and a formal
complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of Violation and a Cease and Desist Order (CDO)
were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit,
as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850.

Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Contending
that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from
the LLDA. The RTC denied the petition. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appeals
to the CA. The CA however dismissed the appeal. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision,
but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from the
LLDA to operate its business.

Ruling:
No. CA Decision Affirmed. Petitioner argues that its assets amount to onlyP312, 500.00, representing its
paid-up capital at the time of its SEC registration. The law then in force was R.A. No. 6977, which, to
recapitulate, states: SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. "Small and medium
enterprise" shall be defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in industry, agribusiness and/or
services, whether single proprietorship, cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets,
inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's
office, plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under the following categories:
xxx
cottage:P50,001 P500,000

Accordingly, it should be considered as a cottage industry, petitioner insists.

The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already subscribed and paid up by the
company's stockholders. It does not, however, represent the totality of its assets, even at the time of its
registration. By the expert opinion of petitioners own consultant, independent CPA Maximiano P.
Sorongon, Jr., it does not mean that the paid-up capital is the only source of funds of the corporation for
it to support its recurring operational requirements, as well as its increased financial requirements later
on, as and when the business grows and expands.

In other words, its paid-up capital is not the only asset of the company. Under R.A. No. 6977, the term
total assets was understood to mean "inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on
which the particular business entity's office, plant, and equipment are situated."

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter alia, for
certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a corporation and
the estate of a decedent. It is the entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate that is
applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or its debts.

Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets. The law speaks
of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself,
shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet
presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17
by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the maximum prescribed by law for cottage
industries.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry. Therefore, it is
not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 30, 2005
and the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79889 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Negative vs. Affirmative words, Adoption, and Step-Children

Caption:
G.R. No. L-5387. April 29, 1954
In the matter of the Adoption of the minors MARIA LUALHATI MAGPAYO and AMADA MAGPAYO. CLYDE
E. MCGEE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellant.
Justice Montemayor, ponente

Syllabus:
1. ADOPTION; PURPOSE OF. — The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child
already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimates and step-children, it
would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of
parent and child through adoption.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NEGATIVE WORDS PREVAIL OVER AFFIRMATIVE WORDS. — Under
the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
3. PERSONS WHO CANNOT ADOPT. — Pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1 of the
new Civil Code, a step-father who already has a child may not adopt a step-child regardless of the
provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and
applicable to those step-fathers and step-mothers who have no children of their own.

Facts:
Petitioner Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen, is married to Leonarda S. Crisostomo by whom he has one
child. The minors Maria and Amada, both surnamed Magpayo are Leonarda’s children by her first
husband Ernesto Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee filed a petition
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and Amada.

The Government filed its opposition to the petition on the ground that petitioner has a legitimate child
and consequently, is disqualified to adopt under Article 335, Paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code which
provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children
by legal fiction cannot adopt.

However, the trial court overruled the opposition and granted the petition, applying the provisions of
Article 338, Paragraph 3 of the same Civil Code, which provides that a step-child may be adopted by his
step-father or step-mother.

Issue:
Whether or not McGee is qualified to adopt his step-children
Ruling:
No. The Court explained that the purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation
where none existed before. And so, where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists
whether by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it would be unnecessary
and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through adoption.

Furthermore, the Court said that the terms of Article 335 are phrased in a negative manner — the
following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of Article 338 is only affirmative — the following may
be adopted. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.

Fallo:
In conclusion, we hold that pursuant to the provisions of article 335, paragraph 1, a step-father who
already has a child may not adopt a step-child regardless of the provisions of article 338, paragraph 3 of
the same Code, the latter provisions being confined and applicable to those step-fathers and step-mothers
who have no children of their own. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the petition for
adoption is denied. No pronouncement as to costs.
Badge:
Mandatory v Permissive, Land Title, Heirs, and Publication

Caption:
G. R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 276
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, Respondents.
Justice Panganiban, ponente

Syllabus:
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.

Facts:
On 8 December 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 sq.m. of land under PD 1529, howeve, during the pendency of the petition, Teodoro died
hence his heirs were substituted as applicants, represented by their aunt, who was appointed as their
guardian ad litem.

The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that the applicants failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring the Applicants to publish the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and was only published in the
Official Gazette and thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant petition for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.

The case was appealed by the private respondents in the CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The motion for reconsideration
was denied, thus this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is
MANDATORY or DIRECTORY in relation to Section 23(1) of PD 1529.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used the term “SHALL” and
denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute, its importance
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, and the Court holds that the present case
must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

Land registration is a proceeding in rem and as such is validated essentially in publication this being so the
process must be strictly complied with, in that the one who is instituting the action must be able to prove
his title against the whole world. Hence, before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and
registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose, the
reason of which is DUE PROCESS.

In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. The
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application and there is no alternative. Thus, the case was dismissed
without prejudice to reapplication after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Mandatory v Permisive, Appeal

Caption:
G.R. No. L-35910. July 21, 1978
PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch
XIV, TAN THAT and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
Justice, Makasiar, ponente

Syllabus:
As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced

Facts:
Petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said respondent
Judge to decide petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case
submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner
and respondents.

The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows: Courts of First Instance shall decide such
appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts:
Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested.

A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent
Court. The respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of defendant–appellant
to prosecute her appeal, with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court
denied the motion for reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file
second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No.
296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum
mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on
the ground of failure to Prosecute.

Ruling:
NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15,
1972 are set aside as null and void. The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It
cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the
memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the
appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit
the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis
of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts.

In other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an
appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court’s mandatory duty to decide the case on
the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word “may” when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon
vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left
with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or
made on request.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED AUGUST 4, 1971, OCTOBER 30,
1971 AND MARCH 15, 1971 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. C-2036 ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.
Badge:
Mandatory v Permisive, loan, discretionary, and back pay certificate

Caption:
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952)
RAMON DIOKNO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Justice Labrador, ponete

Syllabus:
In its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be
construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

Facts:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel
Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis
was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned
or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not
more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes.
Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the
law is merely directory. The lower court sustained Respondent company.

Issue:
Whether or nor petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to respondent company

Ruling:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not
absolute; it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
The modifier, “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be charged,
that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose
and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose
benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to
when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary
interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the
availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be
allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds.” In other words, acceptance or
discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

Fallo:
For all the foregoing considerations, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal, with coasts against the
appellant.
Badge:
And/or, retirement plan and housing plan

Caption:
G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL
FUND
Justice Davide Jr., ponente

Syllabus:
The term `and/or' means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive
"or"; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the
purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a
construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the
alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone.

Facts:
Petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm,
was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by
respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan.

The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No.
1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As
amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of
Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior
to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

Petitioner submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In
that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752,
as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be
delegated to HMDF.

HDMF disapproved Petitioner’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both
a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase “and/or,” and that the
Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely
implement the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13
of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver in order to
effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing “and,” the Board has clarified the confusion
brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.

PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
Ruling:
YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or.” It seems to us clear from the
language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident
plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If
the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan
in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or.”

Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the
features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates
that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless
to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans
would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the
basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the respondent Board has
exceeded its authority.

It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No.
7742 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the
product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from
the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished
that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment
and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the
Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with
the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law,
but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the
law.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of 31 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in
CA~G.R. No. SP~43668 and its Resolution of 15 October 1997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
disapproval by the Home Development Mutual Fund of the application of the petitioner for waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage is SET ASIDE, and the Home Development Mutual Fund is hereby directed
to refund to petitioner all sums of money it collected from the latter.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
And/or and copyright

Caption:
G.R. No. 166391 OCTOBER 21, 2015
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. ROLANDO D. MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA, doing
business as DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY, Respondent

Syllabus:
Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 defied logic and common sense because it focused on terms
like “copy,” “multiply,” and “sell,” but blatantly ignored terms like “photographs,” “photo-engravings,”
and “pictorial illustrations.”

Facts:
Petitioner (Microsoft Corporation) is the copyright and trademark owner of all rights relating to all
versions and editions of Microsoft software (computer programs) such as, but not limited to, MSDOS (disk
operating system), Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft
Access, Microsoft Works, Microsoft Powerpoint, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Flight Simulator and
Microsoft FoxPro, among others, and their user’s guide/manuals.

Private Respondent-Rolando Manansala is doing business under the name of DATAMAN TRADING
COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY with business address at 3rd Floor, University Mall Building, Taft Ave.,
Manila. Private Respondent Manansala, without authority from petitioner, was engaged in distributing
and selling Microsoft computer software programs.

Mr. John Benedict A. Sacriz, a private investigator accompanied by an agent from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was able to purchase six (6) CD-ROMs containing various computer programs
belonging to petitioner. As a result of the test-purchase, the agent from the NBI applied for a search
warrant to search the premises of the private respondent.A Search Warrant was issued and served on
the private respondent’s premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft programs.

Subsequently, petitioner, through Atty. Teodoro Kalaw IV filed an Affidavit-Complaint in the DOJ based
on the results of the search and seizure operation conducted on private respondent’s premises. However,
in a Resolution dated March 20, 2000, public respondent State Prosecutor dismissed the charge against
private respondent for violation of Section 29 P.D. 49 in this wise, to quote: ‘The evidence is extant in the
records to show that respondent is selling Microsoft computer software programs bearing the copyrights
and trademarks owned by Microsoft Corporation. There is, however, no proof that respondent was the
one who really printed or copied the products of complainant for sale in his store.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner insists that printing or copying was not essential in the commission of the crime
of copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49; hence, contrary to the holding
of the DOJ, as upheld by the CA, the mere selling of pirated computer software constituted copyright
infringement.
Ruling:
Yes, Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged the existence of computer programs as
works or creations protected by copyright. To hold, as the CA incorrectly did, that the legislative intent
was to require that the computer programs be first photographed, photo-engraved, or pictorially
illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement invites ridicule.
Such interpretation of Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 defied logic and common sense because
it focused on terms like “copy,” “multiply,” and “sell,” but blatantly ignored terms like “photographs,”
“photo-engravings,” and “pictorial illustrations.” Had the CA taken the latter words into proper account,
it would have quickly seen the absurdity of its interpretation.

The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show the existence of
probable cause for copyright infringement. There was no need for the petitioner to still prove who copied,
replicated or reproduced the software programs. Indeed, the public prosecutor and the DOJ gravely
abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s charge for copyright infringement against the
respondents for lack of evidence. There was grave abuse of discretion because the public prosecutor and
the DOJ acted whimsically or arbitrarily in disregarding the settled jurisprudential rules on finding the
existence of probable cause to charge the offender in court. Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the
dismissal by the DOJ of the petitioner’s petition for review. PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby, recommended that respondent be charged for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code. The charge for violation of Section 29 of PD No. 49 is recommended dismissed for
lack of evidence.’
Badge:
Plural v Singular and testamentary succession

Caption:
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Justice Bengzon, ponente

Syllabus:
Children:— It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996
could or should be read (and so applied): "if the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the
surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this
case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children", the consequences would be tremendous,
because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles

Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective
shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon. On November 21, 1953,
Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son Claro, and his wife,
Perfecta Miranda.

During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. About four years after
his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was
entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds:
(a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta
Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties;
(b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most
of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario;
(c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and
(d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was
better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed
administratrix of the estate.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the order of the lower court is final and therefore appealable to this Court.
2. Whther or not the Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father’s estate on Art. 892, of the New
Civil Code which provides that:

Ruling:
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996
comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro
cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father’s estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime
of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may
indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when
they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled
to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession
shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of
“Children,” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child”; consequently Art. 892 (and Art.
888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair
because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get
1/2 in intestate.

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular.

So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): “If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are
left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child.” Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article
to this case on the ground that “child” is not included in “children,” the consequences would be
tremendous.

Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is
only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in
intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or
inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower “gets only one-
fourth.” She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of
the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).

This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code’s chapter on legal or intestate succession,
the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is
quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one
legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as
follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share
equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although
the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular is applicable in this case.

Fallo:
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
Badge:
Law construed as a whole and in relation to other laws, Apartment, and Lease

Caption:
G.R. No. 83414, July 31, 1989
TONY CAUDAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REMEGIO E. ZARI, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, Branch 98, QUEZON CITY, and DIONISIO O. CU, respondents.
Justice Fernan, ponente

Syllabus:
Residential Unit refers to an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used
for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling
places.

Facts:
Private respondent Dionisio Cu, his wife and five (5) children rented first an apartment at No. 269-A D.
Tuason, Quezon City but later transferred to No. 38 Silencio St., Santol, Quezon City because the owner
of the former apartment needed it for his personal use. The period of lease of the second apartment was
from 16 September 1984 up to 16 March 1986.

In February 1984, Cu in his desire to provide his family with a permanent abode acquired a parcel of land
situated at 157 E. Garcia, Quezon City, together with the existing improvements thereon, consisting of a
six (6) door apartment building from Julieta Esguerra.

On 2 July 1984, Cu notified petitioner who was then occupying one of the units therein, of the termination
of the lease contract by giving him until October 1984 within which to vacate the premises. Yet despite
the demand, petitioner refused to comply by remaining in the premises even after October 1984, thereby
compelling Cu to bring the matter to the office of the Barangay Captain who issued a certification to file
a complaint. Dionisio Cu filed an ejectment case, against petitioner Tony Caudal before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch.

In his complaint, Cu alleged that he and his family were residing at 38 Silencio St., Santol, Quezon City
merely as tenants; that neither plaintiff nor any member of his family, namely: his wife, Juanita nor his
children — Selwyn, Anneli, Lynn, Devon, and Irma was owner of a house or dwelling unit in Quezon City
or Manila, except a, six (6) door apartment located at 157 E. Garcia St., Cubao, Quezon City; that one of
the apartment units was being leased to defendant Caudal on a monthly basis; that plaintiff and his family
were transferring to the six (6) door apartment, two (2) of which would be merged into one dwelling unit
for his son Selwyn, who planned to get married, and the remaining apartment units would be utilized as
conjugal home of plaintiff and his family.

In his answer, defendant alleged that he had a verbal contract with the owner Julieta B. Esguerra on the
subject premises at the monthly rate of P150.00 since July 1967; that Mrs. Esguerra failed to claim the
rental for November 1984 causing the defendant to deposit the same in a bank; that as the subject parcel
of land had an area of 1,000 sq. m. more or less he proposed that the 600 sq. m. fronting the 6 door
apartment be used for the construction of plaintiffs dwelling.

The Metropolitan Trial Court on 26 March 1986 rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of the
plaintiff.

On 6 June 1986, the RTC of Quezon City reversed the decision of the inferior court. Its decision in favor of
Cu was based mainly on the latter's right to possess the said property after Cu had bought the 6 door
apartment from vendor Esguerra.

Issue:
Whether or not Cu may eject petitioner from the premises.

Ruling:
Yes. Cu the present owner is within his rights in ejecting Caudal to enable the former to use the premises,
a ground undisputably allowed under Sec. 5(c) of B.P. 877.

As to the proviso under the same section of B.P. 877 that the lease for a definite period has expired, there
is no question that under existing jurisprudence, the verbal contract of lease between the original owner
and the lessee on a month-to-month basis is a lease with a definite period, 23 which has expired upon
Cu's notice given to Caudal on July 2, 1984, that the lease contract has been terminated; and that Caudal
had until October 1984 or a period of three (3) months within which to vacate the premises. In fact, this
Court has clearly ruled that an oral month to month lease is terminable on a 30 days' notice.

As an intrinsic aid in fully appreciating the term "residential unit," must refer to the Rental Law Batas
Pambansa 877. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute. Clauses
and phrases of the statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Folio:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 January 1988 is hereby affirmed.
Badge:
Title of the Law, Cadastral Proceeding, 40-year period

Caption:
February 28, 1969
City of Baguio v Marcos, G.R. No. 26100
Justice Sanchez, ponente

Syllabus:
The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be
supplied or remedied by its title.

Facts:
In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral
proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio
Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case
on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation
of the land since Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on
the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the
issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the reopening of the petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931,
which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the reopening of cadastral proceedings. The title of RA 931 was “An Act to
Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land
that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next
Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account
of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue
of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title
is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case
which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.
Fallo:
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed
thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that
statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November
13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's orders of
August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the
cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So
ordered.
Badge:
Preamble, deadly weapon, and illegal possession

Caption:
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
People of the Philippines
 vs.
 Honorable Judge Amante P. Purisima, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, and Porfirio Candelosas, Nestor Baes, Elias L. Garcia, Simeon Bundalian, Jr., Joseph C. Maiso,
Eduardo A. Libordo, Romeo L. Sugay, Federico T. Dizon, George M. Albino, Mariano Cotia, Jr., Armando L.
Dizon, Rogelio B. Pareno, Rodrigo V. Estrada, Alfredo A. Reyes, Jose A. Bacarra, Reynaldo Bogtong, And
Edgardo M. Mendoza
Justice Muniz, Palma, ponente

Syllabus:
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to
be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." While the
preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and
difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does
not exist."

Facts:
This case has been decided together with nine other cases with the same question of law. Informations
were filed in the courts of the respondent Judges charging the respective accused with “illegal possession
of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 9. Upon a motion to quash filed by the
accused, all the respondent Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Information on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by PD No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. The main argument of the petitioner is that a perusal
of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused
who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that
P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of
the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless
violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.

The Court held the offense in question carries two elements: (1) the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and (2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. It is the second
element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the
statute. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree
is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of some statute when the
circumstances so warrant. It was held that the respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to PD No. 3.

Upon proper construction of the presidential decree and perusing its preamble, the Court ruled that it is
to be presumed that PD No. 9(3) was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent
to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one
person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.

Fallo:
Wherefore, the Supreme Court denied the 26 Petitions for Review and affirm the Orders of respondent
Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to its observations made in its
Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under
Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the
facts may warrant.
Badge:
Punctuation marks and payment of backpay certificate

Caption:
GR No. L-8792, 98 Phil. 959, 28 April 1956
Marcelino B. Florentino and Lourdes T. Zandueta v. Philippine National Bank
Justice Jugo, ponente

Syllabus:
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be
noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from
the preceding ones.

Facts:
Florentino filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus against PNB to
compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines
(RP), to pay an indebtedness to the PNB in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage on certain
properties. Said loan was incurred on 2 Jan 1953, which is due after on 2 Jan 1954.

Florentino has a backpay certificate dated 6 Oct 1954 with the amount of P22,896.33 by the virtue of RA
894 which was approved on 20 June 1953. The petitioner offered to pay their loan through the backpay
certificate on 27 Dec 1953 but the respondent refused 2 days later.

Sec. 2 of RA 879 provides: The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified
in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and
regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the
recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one hereof, and notice of such
acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or
wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within
ten years from the date of their issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to
such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness
may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or
wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of
such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment
of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant
may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations
owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such
settlement.

The contention of PNB is that said qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the Florentino’s
contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

Issue:
Whetherthe clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement" refers to all antecedents "the
Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any association or
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.

Ruling:
Yes. The PNB should accept the backpay certificate of Florentino. Grammatically, the qualifying clause
refers only to the last antecedent. It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any
citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones.

The qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance
of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not
government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act
No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by
compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at
a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one.

Fallo:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to accept
the backpay certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment of his
above cited debt to the appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he offered
said backpay certificate in payment. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.
Badge:
Headnotes or epigraphs and recidivist

Caption:
G.R. Nos. 115719-26. October 5, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRENE YABUT, IRENE CORTEZ and FLORENCE MADRID[1,
accused-appellant.
Justice, Quisimbing

Syllabus:
Headnotes, headings or epigraphs of sections of a statute are convenient index to the contents of its
provisions. They are prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute for ready reference or classification. In
case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature, they may be
consulted in aid of interpretation.

Facts:
On August 1, 1932, appellant Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, hit
Sabas Arceo, also a prisoner in the Bilibid Prison, with a wooden club inflicting upon various physical
injuries on different parts of the body which caused the latter’s death after 24 hours. At the time of the
commission of the crime, the appellant was a recidivist, he having been previously convicted twice of the
crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by a
competent tribunal. The Court of First Instance of manila, in punishing the appellant, applied article 160
of the Revised Penal Code which states that: “Commission of another crime during service of penalty
imposed for another previous offense –Penalty—Besides the provision of Rule 5 of Article 62 any person
who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed
by law for the new felony.

The appellant advances that the lower court erred in applying Article 160 of the RPC. The appellant places
much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the headnote of article 160
and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the
new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which
he is serving sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not the term “another” in the epigraph of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies only
in cases where the new crime is different in character from the former crime for which the defendant is
serving the penalty.
Ruling:
No. It is a familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is
neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for the
interpretation of the text especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords
or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

Recidivist – is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC.

Habitual delinquent – when a person within a period of ten years from the date of release, or last
conviction, is found guilty of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or
falsification a third time or oftener.

Quasi-recidivist – any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same shall be punished with the maximum
period of punishment prescribed by law for the new felony.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Fernando Cortez y
Vega guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify complainants in the amounts
stated therein, EXCEPT that only P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00 should be paid to complainant Fely
M. Casanova, with interest at the legal rate from the time of filing the information until fully paid. Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Conflicting provisions, Tariff Law, dust shields

Caption:
G.R. No. L-30264,March 12, 1929
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Justice Malcolm, ponenete

Syllabus:
Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which is embraced in
the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to
effect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular
enactment.

Facts:
The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be classified for the purposes
of the tariff? The Insular Collector of Customs decided that dust shields should be classified as under
paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909. On the other hand, the trial court overruled the former’s decision
and held that dust shields should be classified as under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the same law instead.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant erred in classifying dust shields under the Tariff Law of 1909.

Ruling:
Yes. It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their
provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are
construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to
be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.

Fallo:
We conclude that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8
of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the
law. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed in its entirety, without special taxation of
costs in either instance.
Badge:
Meaning of word qualified by purpose of the statute

Caption:
G.R. No. 111168, June 17, 1998
JOAQUIN E. DAVID, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
Justice Mendoza, ponente

Syllabus:
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit"

Facts:
Herein petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide for the fatal
shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latter’s brother, Narciso Nora, Jr., on March 28,
1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila.

The antecedent facts of the event are as follows:

On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel, Noel and Narciso were
walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, they saw petitioner near the compound of his house.

Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted him about derogatory remarks allegedly made by the latter.
Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun.

When the Nora brothers reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets, he shouted at them
Putang ina ninyo (You sons of a bitch) and other epithets, and then fired four times at them. One shot hit
Noel, killing him. Another shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of Arturo Nora.

Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of Flerida
and Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. However, upon
reaching the place, he found that Noel had brought along his three (3) brothers and other companions
who ganged up on him.

The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in both cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision rendered on October 29, 1992, modified the sentence
after crediting petitioner with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Then on July 29, 1992,
the appellate court further modified the sentence on petitioner on the ground that the evidence did not
show that he had a police record or that he was incorrigible.

The claim of self-defense was denied by the court. However, the court pointed out one circumstance not
raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case—minority.

In his statement to the police given on April 2, 1981, petitioner gave his personal circumstances as follows:
Joaquin David y Ejercito, 17 taong gulang, 2nd year college, binata at naninirahan sa 12-C Flerida St.,
Acacia, Malabon, Metro Manila. At the hearing on November 11, 1987, petitioner’s mother stated that he
was 16 or 17 years old when the shooting incident happened.

Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable in the case at bar

Ruling:
Yes, herein petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

The court said, “It is clear that on March 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he (the petitioner)
was only 17 years old.”

According to the court, if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim by
contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. And that any doubt in respect of the accused
is resolved in his favor.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, for the crime
of homicide, the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum, and, for the crime of frustrated homicide,
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor.

In addition, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the following:

1. To the heirs of the deceased Noel Nora, the sums of P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of
Noel Nora; P22,000.00, as actual damages; P30,000.00, as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as attorney's
fees;

2. The sums of P1,928.65, as actual damages, and P20,000.00, as moral damages and P20,000.00, as
attorney's fees to Narciso Nora, Jr. for wounding the latter.

SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Words construed in their ordinary sense, cigarretes and liquors, and tax exemption

Caption:
G.R. No. L-11176, June 29, 1959
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA LODGE NO. 761 OF THE BENEVOLENT
& PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
Justice Concepcion, ponente

Syllabus:
'The term 'business' as used in law imposing a license tax on business, trades, etc. ordinarily means
business in the trade or commercial sense only, carried on with a view to profit or livelihood.'

Facts:
This is an appeal from two decisions of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue assessing and
demanding from the petitioner herein the sums of P1,203.50 and P332.00, respectively representing
fixed taxes as retail dealer in liquor, fermented liquor, and tobacco, allegedly due from petitioner for the
period from the 4th quarter of 1946 to 1953 and the period from 1954-1955pursuant to subsections (i),
(k) and (n) of section 193 of" the Tax Code, in relation to 178 of the same Code.

The petitioner, Manila Lodge No. 761 is admittedly a fraternal, civic, non-stock, non-profit organization
duly incorporated under Philippine laws. It owns and operates a clubhouse located at Dewey Boulevard,
Manila, wherein it sells at retail, liquor, fermented liquor, cigar and cigarettes only to its members and
their guests. B.I.R. agents discovered that the Manila Elks Club had not paid for the period in question
the privilege tax for retail liquor dealer (B-4), retail dealer in fermented liquor (B-7), and retail tobacco
dealer (B-9-a) prescribed in section 193 of the Tax Code.

On November 19, 1953, the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed against and demanded from the
petitioner the payment of the sum of P1,203.50 representing fixed taxes, as retail dealer, for the period
from its 4th quarter of 1946 to 1953, exclusive of the suggested compromise penalty of P80.00. The
petitioner, claiming that it was exempted from the payment of the privilege taxes in question, requested
that the said assessment be reviewed by the Conference Staff of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The
Conference Staff, after due hearing, upheld and reiterated the assessment made by the respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue. Forthwith, the petitioner appealed to this Court on June 1, 1955.
During the pendency of the original petition for review in the above-entitled case, respondent issued
another assessment covering fixed taxes for the years 1954 to 1955 in the amount of P332.00, exclusive
of the suggested compromise penalty of P50.00. Consequently, petitioner with leave of Court filed a
supplemental petition for review which included the latter assessment.

Petitioner bases its claim for exemption from the payment of the privilege taxes' in question on the
grounds that it is not engaged ,in the business of selling at retail liquor, fermented liquor, and tobacco
because the sale of these aforementioned specific goods is made only to members of the club and their
guests' on a very limited scale in pursuance only of its general purpose as a fraternal social club, to
provide comfort, recreation, and convenience to such members, and merely to provide enough margin
to cover operational expenses.'

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that persons selling articles subject to specific tax, such as
cigars, tobacco liquor and the like, are subject to the fixed taxes imposed by section 193 of the Tax Code,
irrespective of whether or not they made profit, and whether or not they are civic or fraternal dubs
selling only to their members and their guests. This contention is based on a ruling promulgated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue made in 1921.

Petitioner herein maintains that:

1. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the petitioner-appellant
which held the respondent club liable for fixed taxes.
2. The The respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that before respondent club's liability
for the privilege taxes imposed by section 193 of the Tax Code attaches it is necessary that it
be engaged in the 'business' of selling liquor and tobacco.
3. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that a fraternal, civic, non-stock, non-profit
organization like the respondent club selling at retail liquor and tobacco only to its members
and their guests with just enough margin to cover operational expenses should not be held
liable for the fixed taxes incident to the business of selling at retail, liquor and tobacco.
4. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that the administrative construction of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue on the matter in question is outside the ambit of, and is inconsistent
with, the Revised Administrative Code and Tax Code."

Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary tha Manila Lodge be engaged in business of selling liquor and tabacco
before it can be held liable for the the privilege taxes imposed by Sec.193 of Tax Code

Ruling:
Undoubtedly, these definitions must be given all the weight due thereto, in the interpretation of section
193 of the Tax Code. As used therein, the phrases above referred to are, however, part and parcel of the
provisions contained, not only in said section 193, but, also, in section 178 and other parts of the 'Tax
Code, all of which must be given effect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and integrated
unit, not as a mass of heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences.

In other words, the phrases in question should be construed in the light of the context of the whole Tax
Code, of which they are integral parts. And when this is done when we consider that section 193 requires
"retail liquor dealers", "retail dealers in fermented liquors" and "retail tobacco Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Manila Lodge No. 761 of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks and the CTA dealers" to
pay the taxes on business" therein specified; that said section 193 is entitled "Amount of tax on business";
that said section 193 merely implements the general provision in section 178, to the effect that "a privilege
tax must be paid before any business or occupation hereinafter specified can be lawfully begun and
pursued"; that the term "business" is used in said section 178 six (6) times; and that the aforementioned
sections 178% 193 and 194 are part of Title V of the Tax Code, entitled "Privilege taxes on business and
occupation" it becomes crystal clear that the "retail liquor dealers", "retail dealers in fermented liquors"
and "retail tobacco dealers" alluded to in said section 193 are those engaged in "business", not fraternal,
civic, non-stock, non-profit organizations, like herein respondent, which sells wines, distilled spirits,
fermented liquors and tobacco, exclusively to its members and their guests, at such prices as are merely
sufficient to cover operational expenses.

Fallo:
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Badge:
General words construed generally, “any elections”, “any candidates”, “influence”

Caption:
G.R. Nos. L-32560-61 October 22, 1970
ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN, petitioner on his behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Justice Makasiar, ponente

Syllabus:
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is
expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning.

Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that “donations of billboards to the Commission by
foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code.”

The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election
Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of
the Philippines and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly
situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special election. Petitioner, as a
candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint with the
COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of the
Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that: No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or
indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner any elections.The prohibited active intervention
of foreigners there under may consist of: (1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;(2)
taking part in any election; and (3) influencing in any manner any election.

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioner’s motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to
the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not
made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space
for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election. He then
filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary to
law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave abuse of its
discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was
issued as COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the term “any elections,” “foreigner,” and “any candidate;” as well as the terms “aid,”
“take part,” and“influence,” as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other
meanings

Ruling:
The term “any elections” definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates Constitutional
Convention. “Foreigner,” on the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations
or organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the
application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. “Any candidate” likewise
comprehends ‘some candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The terms “aid,” “to take part,” and“influence,” were
also construed in their general sense with “aid” referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen
or to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means
to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect
on the nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to
affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially
in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to
effect or sway by modifications, feelings or conduct. There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which
impliedly or expressly prescribes a different meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should
be understood in their general sense. There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the
meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited.

Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is
expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in this case, “generalia verba
sunt generaliter intelligenda” applies.

Fallo:
“WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated
respectively on August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are hereby declared illegal and null and void.
Writ granted, without costs.”
Badge:
Generic Words, Importation

Caption:
G.R. No. L-33500. August 30, 1971
ROLANDO E. GEOTINA, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and UNITRADE, INC., Respondents.
Justice Teehankee, ponente

Syllabus:
Use of generic words include things that arise after enactment of the law

Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines. On December 22, 1970, the vessel M/V ‘Mindanao Sea’ arrived at the Port of Manila carrying
37,042 cartons fresh apples consigned to herein petitioner. After payment of the taxes and duties on the
portion of the shipment consisting of 10,000 cartons of fresh apples, covered by Bills of Lading Nos. PM-
1, PM-2, PM-3 and PM-4, the necessary transfer permits were issued by the Collector of Customs of
Manila. While this portion of the importation was being unloaded from the carrying vessel and
transported to the designated cold storage house, the Collector of Customs, on December 22, 1970, issued
warrants of seizure and detention (S.I. Nos. 11993 to 11996) ordering the seizure of a portion, of the goods
already unloaded and their detention for allegedly having been imported in violation of Central Bank
Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code ‘pending
termination of the seizure proceedings thereof and/or until further orders.’ Before the entire shipment
could be unloaded, the Collector of Customs apparently changed his mind and ordered that the goods
already unloaded be returned to the vessel.

Issue:
Whether or not the goods in question are articles of prohibited importation under Section 102 (k) of the
Tariff and Customs Code?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that goods in question are articles of prohibited importation under Section 102
(k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Revised Administrative Code is a general legislation. As such, it
must have been intended to meet not only the peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment
but also designed to comprehend those that may normally arise after its approval. To our mind, the term
‘merchandise of prohibited exportation’ used in the code is broad enough to embrace not only those
already declared prohibited at the time of its adoption but also goods, commodities or articles that may
be the subject of activities undertaken in violation of subsequent laws.
Fallo:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered annulling and setting aside the decision, dated April 23, 1971
and the resolution dated May 23, 1971 of the court of tax appeals. The decision of petitioner
commissioner of customs appealed from by private respondent is instead affirmed and the petition of
said respondent in the lower court is dismissed, with costs in both instances against said Respondent.
Badge:
Words and phrases construed in relation to other provisions

Caption:
G.R. No. 140560, May 04, 2000
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.
Justice Mendoza, ponente

Syllabus:
"Recall" in paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local Government Code refers to the election itself and does
not include the preparatory steps taken to initiate a recall. Thus, the initiatory proceedings undertaken
before the actual election is not included in the prohibitive period of one year.

Facts:
Jovito O. Claudio was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office
on July 1, 1998. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads,
and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as
mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition
were in public areas throughout the City.

The petition was opposed on grounds that it violated the one-year prohibitory period from assumption of
office and the pendency of an election case seeking the annulment of the proclamation of the incumbent
mayor, a prejudicial question. The petition was, nevertheless, granted by the COMELEC, ruling that recall
starts with the filing of the petition. Aggrieved, petitioners filed separate petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for recall was file within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the
Local Government Code

Ruling:
Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself. We can agree that recall is a process which begins
with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of
the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or
petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the
recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b)
of Section 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should
retain their local official or elect his replacement.

Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power
vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official
into office, the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In
other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening
of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a
recall. The limitations in Section 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the
registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall
- which paragraph (b) of Section 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one
year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall. It is the power to recall and not the
power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A recall resolution "merely sets the stage
for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to
continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains
in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on
whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition
in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office,
cannot apply to such proceedings.

Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall. The purpose of the first limitation
is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this
case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a
recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. Including the convening
of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly

To construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of
discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional
right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election
to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed
public opinions takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of
the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent. The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period

Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not
only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.

The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is included
for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely
limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be
held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30
following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the
middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period
to eight months. Such an interpretation
must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local
government units “more responsive and accountable.”

Fallo:
The petition was DISMISSED. SC Affirmed COMELEC.
Badge:
Where the law does not distinguish

Caption:
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Justice Quison, ponente

Syllabus:
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.

Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his
certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13,
1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24,
1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-
2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three
days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered
the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy
for election

Ruling:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. In the case
at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a
candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth
paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided
that “the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy
did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Badge:
Proper Action, Attachment, Third-party Claimant, Preliminary Injunction and Use of Technical Terms

Caption:
G.R. No. L-4268 January 18, 1951
MANILA HERALD PUBLISHING CO., INC., doing business under the name of Evening Herald Publishing Co.,
Inc., and Printers, Inc., petitioner,
vs.
SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MACARIO A. OFILADA, Sheriff of City of
Manila, ANTONIO QUIRINO and ALTO SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents.
Justice Tuazon, Ponente

Syllabus:
Section 14 of rule 59, which treats of the steps to betaken when property attached is claimed by the other
person than that defendant or his agent, contains the proviso that "Nothing herein contained shall
prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."

Facts:
Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit, docketed as civil case No. 11531, against Aproniano G.
Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the Daily
Record, a daily newspaper published in Manila, asking damages aggregating P90,000. With the filing of
this suit, the plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond, and the
Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the
premises of the Daily Record.

Thereafter the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with the sheriff separate third-
party claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. Whereupon, the sheriff
required of Quirino a counter bond of P41,500 to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc.,
and another bond of P59,500 to meet the claim of Printers, Inc. These amounts, upon Quirino's motion
filed under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, were reduced by the court to P11,000 and P10,000
respectively.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash the attachment, on October 7, 1950, the Manila Herald Publishing
Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co. Inc., in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the
attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as civil
case No. 12263.

Whereas case No. 11531 was being handled by Judge Sanchez or pending in the branch of the Court
presided by him, case No. 12263 fell in the branch of Judge Pecson. On the same date, in virtue of an ex
parte motion in case No. 12263 by the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc., and Printers, Inc., Judge Pecson
issued a writ of preliminary injunction to the sheriff directing him to desist from proceeding with the
attachment of the said properties.
After the issuance of that preliminary injunction, Antonio Quirino filed an ex parte petition for its
dissolution, and Judge Simeon Ramos, to whom case No. 12263 had in the meanwhile been transferred,
granted the petition on a bond of P21,000. However, Judge Ramos soon set aside the order just mentioned
on a motion for reconsideration by the Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printer, Inc. and set the
matter for hearing for October 14, then continued to October 16.

Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit memoranda on the
question whether "the subject matter of civil case No. 12263 should be ventilated in an independent
action or by means of a complaint in intervention in civil case No. 11531." Memoranda having been filed,
His Honor declared that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and so
dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do
was intervene in Case No. 11531.

Issue:
Whether or not proper action limits the third party’s remedy to intervene in the action in which the writ
of attachment is issued

Ruling:
No, the proper action does not limit the third party’s remedy to intervene in the action which the writ of
attachment is issued. Section 1 Rule 2 defines proper action as an “ordinary suit in a court of justice by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or prevent redress or
wrong” while Sec 2 Rule 2 of Rules of Court entiled “Commencement of Action” says that “Civil action
may be commenced by filing a complaint with the proper court”. In this case, the word commencement
indicates the origination of the entire proceeding. It was appropriate to use proper action in 1st statute
than intervention, since asserted right of third party claimant necessarily flows out of pending suit; if the
word ‘intervention’ is used, it becomes strange.

Fallo:
The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the respondent Judge.
Badge:
Use of associated words

Caption:
G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993
Dra. Brigida Buenasida, et al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier, et al.
Justice Quiason, ponente

Syllabus:
Noscitur a sociis, A rule of interpretation or construction of an otherwise unclear statute, contract or
estate document: that the meaning of an unclear word may be known from accompanying words.

Facts:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of
the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The
Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power
to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case”.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.

Ruling:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside. When the constitution vested on the
Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it
referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word “suspension” in
said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which
it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Badge:
Use of associate words, use of jingle, election and freedom of speech

Caption:
G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Justice Fernando, ponente

Syllabus:
The general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to.

Facts:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers.

The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it
is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin.”

COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

SC ARGUMENT SENSE OF SIGHT/EARS: Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on
the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within
the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note
that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the
candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The
campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the
voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively
and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend
some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or
carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be
an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.

Issue:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
Ruling:
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and
expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a
reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and
arbitrary.

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle
form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s
approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis.
It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance
to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable
but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.
SECTION 12(G) R.A. 6132 "All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures,
contributions or donations which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the
candidacy of any candidate, shall file a statement of all such expenditures and contributions made or
received on such dates and with such details as the Commission on Elections shall prescribe by rules. The
total expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the knowledge and consent of the
candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos."

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Badge:
ejusdem generis, interpretation, trademark, patent

Caption:
G.R. No. 78413, November 8, 1989
CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., Represented by its President, Rogelio Q. Lim, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA, INC., respondents,
Justice Regalado, ponente

Syllabus:
The rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of
the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such
intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by the appreciation of the
rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.

Facts:
In 1953, La Toneda Inc. (LTI) registered with the Philippine Patent Office pursuant to Republic Act No.
623 the 350 c.c. white flint bottles that they were using for their gin popularly known as "Ginebra San
Miguel"

In 1981 LTI filed Civil Case for injunction and damages against Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. for using
their bottles with the mark "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped by filling the same with
Cagayan's liquor product bearing the label "Sonny Boy" for commercial sale and distribution, without LTI's
written consent. This is in violation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No.
5700.

Cagayan alleged that LTI did not have cause of action; that it cannot claim protection under RA 623
because it was not able to satisfy some requirements for patenting of trademarks, that under Republic
Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, because its products, consisting of hard liquor, are not
among those contemplated therein. What is protected under said law are beverages like Coca- cola, Royal
Tru-Orange, Lem-O-Lime and similar beverages the bottles whereof bear the words “Reg. Phil. Pat. Off.;”,
that no reservation of ownership on its bottles was made by LTI; and that There was no infringement of
the goods or products of LTI since Cagayan uses its own labels and trade-mark on its product.

Trial Court ruled in favor of Cagayan. LTI’s complaint has no cause of action and Cagayan was not guilty of
contempt of court. The Trial Court awarded damages in favor of Cagayan so LTI appealed to the CA in
which decision was in favor of said appellant. Then Cagayan filed motion for reconsideration but was
denied by CA and they seeks for nullification of the decision of the CA

Issues:
1. Whether or not W/N display/print the words "Registered in the Phil. Patent Office" or "Reg Phil.
Pat. Off.," is a requirement for RA 623 to become effective.
2. Whether or no hard liquor is not included under the term "other lawful beverages" as provided in
Section I of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700
Ruling:
1. No, the omitted words "property of” are dispensable; omission will NOT remove the bottles from
the protection of the law. The owner of a trade-mark or trade-name, and in this case the marked
containers, does not abandon it by making minor modifications in the mark or name itself. Even
without said words the ownership of the bottles is easily Identifiable. The words "La Tondeña Inc."
and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped on the bottles, even without the words "property of," are
sufficient notice to the public that those bottles so marked are owned by LTI.
2. No, the words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general sense, referring to all beverages not
prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although
regulated, is not prohibited by law; hence it is within the purview and coverage of Republic Act
No. 623, as amended. The proposition that Republic Act No. 623 protects only the containers of
the soft drinks enumerated by petitioner (CAGAYAN) and those similar thereto, is unwarranted
and specious. The rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage of
the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will
defeat the very purpose of the law.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and AFFIRMING the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner is hereby declared in contempt of court and ORDERED to pay
a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with costs.
Badge:
Express mention and implied mention, Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius, appointment

Caption:
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III And Juanito G. Arcilla vs.
Intervenor: Salvador Mison, In His Capacity As
Commissioner Of The Bureau Of Customs, And Guillermo Carague, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The
Department Of Budget, Respondents, Commission On Appointments
Justice Padilla, ponente

Syllabus:
Intent of the framers of the constitution and of the people adopting it must be given effect. -“an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated..”

Facts:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements
in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by the President is valid
even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?

Ruling:
No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: "The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is readily apparent that
under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:

The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Officers lower in
rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration
of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say
and provide.

Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without
costs. SO ORDERED.
Badge:
Necessary implication

Caption:
G.R. No. 96663 August 10, 1999
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
 HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-
ARBITER NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-
UOEF, respondents.
Justice Narvasa, ponente

Syllabus:
LABOR LAWS; MED ARBITER; JURISDICTIONS INTRA-UNION AND INTER-UNION CONFLICTS, EXPLAINED. —
No definition is given by law of these precise terms, "intra-union and inter-union conflicts." It is known,
however, that intra-" and "inter-" are both combining forms, prefixes — the first, "intra-," meaning
"within, inside of [intramural], intravenous];" and the other, "inter-," denoting "1. between or among: the
second element is singular in form [interstate] 2. with or on each other (or one another), together, mutual,
reciprocal, mutually, or reciprocally [interact]. "18 An intra-union conflict would therefore refer to a
conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried
on between or among unions.

Facts:
In June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification
election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola
Philippines, Inc.

On July 23, 1990, Pepsi filed with Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke
Charter Affiliation of the Union.

On October 12, 1990, Pepsi filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with the Secretary of
Labor, questioning the setting of the certification election. On November 12, 1990, the Secretary of Labor
denied the appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. Pepsi then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

The Petition to Cancel, Revoke or Set Aside the Charter of the Certificate of the private respondent is
anchored on the alleged ground that certain managerial employees are included as members thereof. The
ground for the cancellation were set forth in Sec. 7 of Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code, and the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the grounds.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank
and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as
amended, by Republic Act 6715.
2. Whether or not confidential employees can join labor union of the rank and file.
Ruling:
The affiliation of UOEF with the Federation does not violate the prohibition set forth in Art. 245 of the
Labor Code as amended by Republic Act 6715. In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, “The
prohibition against a supervisors’ union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors’ wantig to join a rank-
and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is
clear especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees
whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.”

As to issue concerning confidential employees, in National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) – Republic
Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Hon. R. D. Torres, et. al., it has been held that, “A confidential
employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care
and protection of the employer’s property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial
employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in
a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated in several cases; x x x.”

Fallo:
Wherefore, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991,
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is MODIFIED in that Credit and Collection Managers and
Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees not eligible for membership in a supervisors’
union. No pronouncement as to costs.