MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL'

J. R. LUCAS

G6DEL'S Theoremseemsto me to provethat Mechanismis false,

thatis, thatmindscannotbe explainedas machines.So also has it
seemedto manyotherpeople: almosteverymathematical logician
I have put the matterto has confessedto similarthoughts, but has
feltreluctantto commithimselfdefinitely untilhe could see the
wholeargument setout,withall objectionsfullystatedand properly
met.2This I attemptto do.
Godel's theoremstates that in any consistentsystemwhichis
strongenoughto produce simple arithmeticthereare formulae
whichcannotbe proved-in-the-system, but whichwe can see to be
true. Essentially,we considerthe formulawhich says, in effect,
"This formulais unprovable-in-the-system". If this formulawere
provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it
were provable-in-the-system, thenit would not be unprovable-in-
the-system, so that "This formulais unprovable-in-the-system"
would be false: equally,if it wereprovable-in-the-system, then it
wouldnotbe false,but wouldbe true,sinceinanyconsistent system
nothingfalsecan be proved-in-the-system, but onlytruths.So the
formula"This formulais unprovable-in-the-system" is notprovable-
in-the-system, butunprovable-in-the-system.Further, iftheformula
"This formulais unprovable-in-the-system" is unprovable-in-the-
system,thenit is truethatthatformula is unprovable-in-the-system,
that is, "This formulais unprovable-in-the-system" is true.
The foregoing argumentis very fiddling,and difficult to grasp
fully:it is helpfulto puttheargument theotherwayround,consider
the possibilitythat "This formulais unprovable-in-the-system"
mightbe false,show that that is impossible,and thus that the
formulais true; whenceit followsthat it is unprovable.Even so,
the argumentremainspersistently unconvincing: we feelthat there
mustbe a catchin itsomewhere. ThewholelabourofGadel'stheorem
is to showthatthereis no catchanywhere, and thatthe resultcan
I A paper read to the OxfordPhilosophicalSociety on October 30, I959.
2 See A. M. Turing: "ComputingMachineryand Intelligence":Mind, I950,
pp. 433-60, reprintedin The World of Mathematics,edited by James R.
Newman, pp. 2099-123; and K. R. Popper: "Indeterminismin Quantum
Physics and Classical Physics"; British Journalfor Philosophyof Science,
Vol. I (I95I), pp. 179-88. The questionis touchedupon by Paul Rosenbloom;
Elements of MathematicalLogic; pp. 207-8; Ernest Nagel and James R.
Newman; G6del's proof, pp. 100-2; and by Hartley Rogers; Theory of
RecursiveFunctionsand Effective Computability(mimeographed),1957, Vol. I,
pp. 152 ff.
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 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
be established by themostrigorous deduction;it holdsforall formal
systemswhichare (i) consistent, (ii) adequate forsimplearithmetic
-i.e. containthe naturalnumbersand the operationsof addition
and multiplication-andit shows that they are incomplete-i.e.
containunprovable,thoughperfectly meaningful, formulae,some
of which,moreover, we, standing outside the system, can see to be
true.
G6del's theoremmust apply to cybernetical machines,because
it is of the essenceof beinga machine,that shouldbe a concrete
it
instantiation ofa formalsystem.It followsthatgivenany machine
whichis consistentand capable ofdoingsimplearithmetic, thereis
a formulawhichit is incapableofproducingas being true-i.e. the
formulais unprovable-in-the-system-but whichwe can see to be
true. It followsthat no machinecan be a completeor adequate
modelofthemind,thatmindsareessentially different frommachines.
We understandby a cybernetical machinean apparatuswhich
performs a set of operationsaccordingto a definiteset of rules.
Normallywe "programme"a machine:that is, we give it a set of
instructions about whatit is to do in each eventuality; and we feed
in the initial"information" on whichthe machineis to perform its
calculations.Whenwe considerthe possibility thatthemindmight
be a cybernetical mechanismwe have such a model in view; we
supposethat the brainis composedof complicatedneuralcircuits,
and that the information fed in by the sensesis "processed"and
acted uponor storedforfutureuse. If it is sucha mechanism, then
giventhe way in whichit is programmed-theway in whichit is
"wiredup"-and the information whichhas been fed into it, the
response-the"output"-is determined, and could,grantedsufficient
time,be calculated.Our idea of a machineis just this, that its
behaviouris completelydetermined by the way it is made and the
incoming"stimuli":thereis no possibility of its actingon its own:
givena certainformofconstruction and a certaininputofinforma-
tion,thenit mustact in a certainspecificway. We, however,shall
be concernednot withwhat a machinemustdo, but withwhat it
can do. That is, insteadof considering the wholeset of ruleswhich
together determine exactlywhata machinewilldo in givencircum-
stances,we shall consideronlyan outlineof thoserules,whichwill
delimitthe possibleresponsesof the machine,but not completely.
The completeruleswilldetermine theoperations completely at every
at
stage; everystage there will be a definite instruction, e.g. "If
is
the number prime and greater than two add one and divide by
two: if it is not prime,divideby its smallest factor": we, however,
will considerthe possibilityof therebeingalternativeinstructions,
e.g. "In a fractionyou may dividetop and bottomby any number
whichis a factorof both numeratorand denominator".In thus
H II3
 PHILOSOPHY
relaxingthe specification of our model, so that it is no longer
completelydeterminist, thoughstill entirelymechanistic, we shall
be able to takeintoaccounta featureoftenproposedformechanical
modelsofthemind,namelythattheyshouldcontaina randomizing
device. One could build a machinewherethe choice betweena
numberof alternatives was settledby, say, the numberof radium
atomsto have disintegrated in a givencontainerin the past half-
minute.It is prima facie plausiblethat our brainsshouldbe liable
to randomeffects: a cosmicraymightwellbe enoughto trigger off
a neuralimpulse.But clearlyin a machinea randomizing device
could not be introducedto choose any alternativewhatsoever:it
can only be permittedto choose betweena numberof allowable
alternatives.It is all rightto add any numberchosenat random
to bothsidesofan equation,but notto add one numberto one side
and anotherto the other.It is all rightto choose to prove one
theoremofEuclid ratherthananother,or to use one methodrather
than another,but not to "prove" something whichis not true,or
to use a "methodof proof"whichis not valid. Any randomizing
devices must allow choicesonly betweenthose operationswhich
will not lead to inconsistency: whichis exactlywhat the relaxed
specification of our modelspecifies.Indeed,one mightput it this
way: insteadof considering whata completely determined machine
mustdo, we shallconsiderwhata machinemightbe able to do ifit
had a randomizing device that acted wheneverthereweretwo or
moreoperationspossible,noneofwhichcouldlead to inconsistency.
If such a machinewerebuilt to producetheoremsabout arith-
metic(in manyways the simplestpart of mathematics), it would
have only a finitenumberof components, and so therewould be
onlya finitenumberof typesof operationit could do, and onlya
finitenumberof initialassumptionsit could operateon. Indeed,
we can go further, and saythattherewouldonlybe a definite number
of types of operation,and of initialassumptions,that could be
built intoit. Machinesare definite:anythingwhichwas indefinite
or infinitewe shouldnot count as a machine.Note that we say
numberof typesof operation,not numberof operations.Given
sufficienttime,and providedthat it did not wear out, a machine
couldgo onrepeating an operationindefinitely:
it is merelythatthere
can be onlya definite numberof different sortsof operationit can
perform.
If thereare only a definitenumberof types of operationand
initialassumptionsbuilt into the system,we can representthem
all by suitablesymbolswrittendownon paper.We can parallelthe
operationby rules ("rules of inference"or "axiom schemata")
allowingus to go fromone or more formulae(or even fromno
formulaat all) to anotherformula,and we can parallelthe initial
"I4
 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
assumptions (ifany) by a set ofinitialformulae("primitive proposi-
tions","postulates"or "axioms"). Oncewe have represented these
on paper,we can representeverysingleoperation:all we need do
is to give formulaerepresenting the situationbeforeand afterthe
operation,and note which rule is being invoked.We can thus
represent on paperany possiblesequenceofoperationsthemachine
mightperform. Howeverlong the machinewenton operating,we
could, given enough time, paper and patience,write down an
analogueof the machine'soperations.This analoguewouldin fact
be a formalproof:everyoperationofthemachineis represented by
the applicationof one of the rules:and the conditionswhichdeter-
mineforthe machinewhetheran operationcan be performed in a
certainsituation,become,in our representation, conditionswhich
settlewhethera rulecan be appliedto a certainformula, i.e. formal
conditionsof applicability.Thus, construing our rules as rules of
inference, we shall have a proof-sequence of formulae,each one
beingwritten downin virtueofsomeformalruleofinference having
been applied to some previous formula or formulae (except, of
course, for the initial formulae,which are given because they
represent initialassumptions builtintothesystem).The conclusions
it is possibleforthemachineto produceas beingtruewilltherefore
correspond to thetheorems thatcan be provedin thecorresponding
formalsystem.We nowconstruct a G6delianformulain thisformal
system.This formulacannotbe proved-in-the-system. Therefore the
machinecannotproducethe corresponding formulaas beingtrue.
But we can see that the Gbdelianformulais true: any rational
being could followGodel's argument,and convincehimselfthat
theGddelianformula, althoughunprovable-in-the-given-system, was
nonetheless-infact,forthatveryreason-true.Now any mechani-
cal modelofthemindmustincludea mechanism whichcan enunciate
truthsofarithmetic, becausethisis something whichmindscan do:
in fact,it is easy to producemechanicalmodelswhichwillin many
respectsproducetruthsof arithmetic farbetterthanhumanbeings
can. But in thisone respecttheycannotdo so well:in thatforevery
machinethereis a truthwhichit cannotproduceas beingtrue,but
whicha mindcan. This showsthata machinecannotbe a complete
and adequate model of the mind. It cannotdo everything that a
mindcan do, sincehowevermuchit can do, thereis alwayssome-
thingwhichit cannotdo, and a mindcan. Thisis notto say thatwe
cannotbuild a machineto simulateany desiredpiece of mind-like
behaviour:it is onlythat we cannotbuild a machineto simulate
everypiece of mind-like behaviour.We can (or shall be able to one
day) build machines capable of reproducingbits of mind-like
behaviour,and indeed of outdoingthe performances of human
minds:but howevergoodthe machineis, and howevermuchbetter
II5
 PHILOSOPHY
it can do in nearlyall respectsthan a humanmindcan, it always
has thisone weakness,thisone thingwhichit cannotdo, whereas
a mindcan. The Godelianformulais theAchilles'heelofthecyber-
neticalmachine.And therefore we cannothope ever to producea
machinethatwillbe able to do all thata mindcan do: we can never,
not evenin principle, have a mechanicalmodelofthemind.
This conclusionwill be highlysuspectto somepeople.They will
objectfirstthatwe cannothave it boththata machinecan simulate
any piece of mind-like behaviour,and thatit cannotsimulateevery
piece. To someit is a contradiction: to themit is enoughto point
out that thereis no contradiction betweenthe fact that forany
naturalnumbertherecan be produceda greaternumber,and the
factthata numbercannotbe producedgreaterthaneverynumber.
We can use the same analogy also against those who, findinga
formulatheirfirstmachinecannotproduceas beingtrue,concede
that that machineis indeed inadequate,but thereuponseek to
constructa second,moreadequate,machine,in whichthe formula
can be producedas beingtrue.This theycan indeeddo: but then
the secondmachinewill have a Gddelianformulaall of its own,
constructedby applyingGddel's procedureto the formalsystem
whichrepresents its (the secondmachine's)own,enlarged,scheme
of operations.And this formulathe second machinewill not be
able to produceas beingtrue,whilea mindwillbe able to see that
it is true.Andifnowa thirdmachineis constructed, able to do what
thesecondmachinewas unableto do, exactlythesamewillhappen:
therewill be yet a thirdformula,the Godelianformulafor the
formalsystemcorresponding to the third machine'sscheme of
operations,whichthe thirdmachineis unableto produceas being
true,whilea mindwill stillbe able to see thatit is true.And so it
will go on. Howevercomplicateda machinewe construct, it will,
ifit is a machine,correspond to a formalsystem,whichin turnwill
be liableto theGodelprocedure forfinding a formulaunprovable-in-
that-system. This formulathemachinewillbe unableto produceas
being true,althougha mind can see that it is true. And so the
machinewill still not be an adequate modelof the mind.We are
tryingto producea modelofthemindwhichis mechanical- which
is essentially"dead"-but the mind,being in fact "alive", can
alwaysgo one betterthan any formal,ossified,dead, systemcan.
Thanksto G6del'stheorem, themindalwayshas thelast word.
A second objectionwill now be made. The procedurewhereby
the Gddelianformulais constructed is a standardprocedure-only
so couldwe be surethata G6delianformulacan be constructed for
everyformalsystem.But ifitis a standardprocedure, thena machine
shouldbe able to be programmed to carryit out too. We could
constructa machinewiththe usual operations,and in additionan
ii6
 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
operationofgoingthroughtheGbdelprocedure, and thenproducing
the conclusionof that procedureas beingtrue;and thenrepeating
theprocedure, and so on,as oftenas required.Thiswouldcorrespond
to havinga systemwithan additionalruleofinference whichallowed
one to add, as a theorem,the G6delianformulaof the rest of
the formalsystem,and then the Gbdelianformulaof this new,
strengthened formalsystem,and so on. It would be tantamount
to adding to the originalformalsysteman infinitesequence of
axioms,each the Godelianformulaofthe systemhithertoobtained.
Yet even so, the matteris not settled:for the machinewith a
Gddelizingoperator,as we mightcall it, is a different machinefrom
the machineswithoutsuchan operator;and, althoughthe machine
withthe operatorwould be able to do those thingsin whichthe
machineswithoutthe operatorwereoutclassedby a mind,yet we
might expect a mind, faced with a machinethat possessed a
Godelizingoperator,to take this into account,and out-Gbdelthe
new machine,Godelizingoperatorand all. This has, in fact,proved
to be the case. Even if we adjoin to a formalsystemthe infinite
set of axioms consistingof the successiveGodelianformulae,the
resultingsystemis still incomplete, and containsa formulawhich
cannot be proved-in-the-system, althougha rational being can,
standingoutsidethe system,see that it is true.' We had expected
this,forevenifan infinite setofaxiomswereadded,theywouldhave
to be specifiedby somefiniteruleor specification, and thisfurther
rule or specification could thenbe taken into accountby a mind
considering the enlargedformalsystem.In a sense,just becausethe
mind has the last word,it can always pick a hole in any formal
systempresented to itas a modelofitsownworkings. The mechanical
modelmustbe, in somesense,finiteand definite: and thenthemind
can alwaysgo one better.
This is the answerto one objectionput forwardby Turing.2He
arguesthatthelimitation to thepowersofa machinedo notamount
to anythingmuch.Althougheach individualmachineis incapable
of gettingthe rightanswerto somequestions,afterall each indivi-
dual humanbeingis falliblealso: and in any case "our superiority
can onlybe felton suchan occasionin relationto the one machine
overwhichwe have scoredour pettytriumph.Therewould be no
questionof triumphing simultaneously overall machines".But this
is not the point.We are not discussingwhethermachinesor minds
aresuperior, but whether theyarethesame.In somerespectmachines
are undoubtedlysuperiorto human minds; and the questionon
which they are stumpedis admittedly,a ratherniggling,even
I G6del's originalproofapplies; v. ? i init. ? 6 init. of his Lectures at the

Instituteof Advanced Study, Princeton,N.J., U.S.A., 1934.

2 Mind, I950, pp. 444-5; Newman, p. 21IO.

II7
 P H I LO SO P H Y
trivial,question.But it is enough,enoughto showthatthemachine
is notthesameas a mind.True,the machinecan do manythings
thata humanmindcannotdo: but ifthereis ofnecessitysomething
that the machinecannotdo, thoughthe mindcan, then,however
trivialthe matteris, we cannotequate the two, and cannothope
everto have a mechanicalmodelthatwilladequatelyrepresent the
mind.Nor does it signify that it is onlyan individualmachinewe
have triumphed over:forthetriumph is notoveronlyan individual
machine,but over any individualthat anybodycares to specify-
in Latin quivis or quilibet. not quidam-and a mechanical model
of a mindmustbe an individualmachine.Althoughit is truethat
any particular"triumph"of a mind over a machinecould be
"trumped"by anothermachineable to producethe answerthe
firstmachinecould not produce,so that "thereis no questionof
triumphing simultaneously overall machines",yetthisis irrelevant.
What is at issue is not the unequalcontestbetweenone mindand
all machines,but whethertherecouldbe any,single,machinethat
coulddo all a mindcan do. For themechanistthesisto holdwater,
it mustbe possible,in principle,
to producea model,a singlemodel,
whichcan do everything the mindcan do. It is like a game.I The
mechanisthas firstturn.He producesa-any, but onlya definite one
-mechanical model of the mind. I point to somethingthat it
cannotdo, but the mindcan. The mechanistis freeto modifyhis
example,but each timehe does so, I am entitledto lookfordefects
in the revisedmodel.If the mechanistcan devise a modelthat I
cannotfindfaultwith,his thesisis established:if he cannot,then
it is not proven:and since-as it turnsout-he necessarily cannot,
it is refuted.To succeed,he mustbe able to producesomedefinite
mechanicalmodelof the mind-any one he likes,but one he can
specify,and willstickto. But sincehe cannot,in principlecannot,
produceany mechanicalmodelthat is adequate, even thoughthe
pointof failureis a minorone,he is boundto fail,and mechanism
mustbe false.
Deeper objectionscan stillbe made. Gddel'stheoremappliesto
deductivesystems,and humanbeingsare not confinedto making
only deductiveinferences. Gddel's theoremapplies only to con-
sistentsystems,and one may have doubts about how far it is
permissibleto assume that humanbeingsare consistent.Gddel's
theorem appliesonlyto formalsystems, and thereis no a prioribound
to humaningenuity whichrulesout thepossibility ofourcontriving
somereplicaofhumanitywhichwas not representable by a formal
system.
I For a similartype of argument,see J. R. Lucas: "The Lesbian Rule";
PHILOSOPHY, July I955, PP. 202-6; and "On not worshippingFacts"; The
Philosophical Quarterly, April i958, p. I44.
ii8
 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
Human beingsare not confinedto makingdeductiveinferences,
and it has been urgedby C. G. Hempel,and HartleyRogers;that
a fairmodelof the mindwouldhave to allow forthe possibility of
makingnon-deductive inferences,and thesemightprovidea way
of escapingthe Gddel result.Hartley Rogersmakes the specific
suggestionthat the machineshould be programmedto entertain
variouspropositions whichhad not been provedor disproved,and
on occasionto add themto its listofaxioms.Fermat'slast theorem
or Goldbach's conjecturemightthus be added. If subsequently
theirinclusionwas foundto lead to a contradiction, theywouldbe
droppedagain, and indeedin those circumstances their negations
wouldbe addedto thelistoftheorems. In thissortofwaya machine
mightwellbe constructed whichwas able to produceas truecertain
formulaewhichcould not be provedfromits axiomsaccordingto
its rulesof inference.And therefore the methodof demonstrating
themind'ssuperiority overthemachinemightno longerwork.
The construction ofsucha machine,however,presentsdifficulties.
It cannot accept all unprovableformulae,and add them to its
axioms,or it willfinditselfacceptingboththeGbdelianformulaand
its negation,and so be inconsistent.Nor wouldit do if it accepted
the firstof each pair of undecidableformulae,and, havingadded
thatto itsaxioms,wouldnolongerregarditsnegationas undecidable,
and so wouldneveracceptit too: forit mighthappenon thewrong
memberof the pair: it mightaccept the negationof the G6delian
formularatherthan the Godelianformulaitself.And the system
constitutedby a normalset of axioms with the negationof the
Gb5delian formulaadjoined,althoughnotinconsistent, is an unsound
system,not admitting ofthenaturalinterpretation. It is something
like non-Desarguiangeometriesin two dimensions:not actually
inconsistent,but ratherwrong,sufficientlymuchso to disqualifyit
fromseriousconsideration. A machinewhichwas liableto infelicities
ofthatkindwouldbe no modelforthehumanmind.
It becomesclearthatrathercarefulcriteriaofselectionofunprov-
able formulae willbe needed.HartleyRogerssuggestssomepossible
ones. But once we have rulesgenerating new axioms,even if the
axiomsgeneratedare onlyprovisionally accepted,and are liable to
be droppedagainiftheyare foundto lead to inconsistency, thenwe
can set about doinga Gbdelon this system,as on any other.We
are in the same case as whenwe had a rulegenerating the infinite
set ofGodelianformulaeas axioms. In short,howevera machineis
designed,it mustproceedeitherat randomor accordingto definite
rules.In so faras its procedureis random,we cannotoutsmartit:
I In private conversation.
X I957, Vol. I,
Theoryof RecursiveFunctionsand EffectiveComputability,
pp. 152 ff.
II9
 PHILOSOPHY
but itsperformance is notgoingto be a convincing parodyofintelli-
gent behaviour:in so far as its procedureis in accordancewith
definiterules,the Godel methodcan be used to producea formula
which the machine,accordingto those rules, cannot assert as
true,althoughwe, standingoutsidethe system,can see it to be
true.,
Godel's theoremapplies onlyto consistentsystems.All thatwe
can proveformallyis that if the systemis complete,then the
G6delianformulais unprovable-in-the-system. To be able to say
categorically thattheGddelianformulais unprovable-in-the-system,
and therefore true,we must not onlybe dealingwitha consistent
system, but be able to saythatit is consistent.
And,as Gbdelshowed
in his secondtheorem-a corollaryof his first-itis impossibleto
provein a consistent systemthatthatsystemis consistent. Thusin
orderto faultthe machineby producinga formula ofwhichwe can
say boththatit is trueand that the machinecannotproduceit as
true,we haveto be able to saythatthemachine(or,rather,its corre-
sponding formalsystem)is consistent; and thereis no absoluteproofof
this.All we can do is to examinethe machineand see if it appears
consistent.There always remainsthe possibilityof some incon-
sistencynot yet detected.At best we can say that the machineis
consistent,providedwe are. But by what rightcan we do this?
Godel's second theoremseems to show that a man cannotassert
his ownconsistency, and so HartleyRogerszarguesthatwe cannot
really use Godel's firsttheoremto counterthe mechanistthesis
unlesswe can say that"thereare distinctive attributes whichenable
a humanbeingto transcendthislast limitationand asserthis own
consistency whilestillremaining consistent".
A man's untutoredreactionif his consistency is questionedis to
affirm it vehemently: but this,in view of Godel's secondtheorem,
is takenby somephilosophers as evidenceofhisactualinconsistency.
ProfessorPutnam3has suggestedthathumanbeingsare machines,
but inconsistent machines.If a machinewerewiredto correspond to
an inconsistent system,thentherewouldbe no well-formed formula
whichit could not produceas true; and so in no way could it be
provedto be inferiorto a humanbeing. Nor could we make its
inconsistencya reproachto it-are not men inconsistenttoo?
Certainly womenare,and politicians;and evenmalenon-politicians
I G6del's originalproofapplies if the rule is such as to generatea primitive

recursiveclass of additional formulae;v. ? I init.and ? 6 init.of his Lectures

at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton,N.J., U.S.A., I934. It is in
fact sufficientthat the class be recursivelyenumerable.v. Barkley Rosser:
"Extensions of some theoremsof G6del and Church",Journal of Symbolic
Logic, Vol. I, I936, pp. 87-91.
X Op. Cit., p. I54.
3 Universityof Princeton,N.J., U.S.A. in privateconversation.
I20
 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
contradictthemselvessometimes,and a single inconsistencyis
enoughto makea systeminconsistent.
The factthatwe are all sometimes inconsistent cannotbe gainsaid,
but fromthis it does not followthat we are tantamountto incon-
sistentsystems.Our inconsistencies are mistakesratherthan set
policies.They correspondto the occasional malfunctioning of a
machine,not its normalschemeof operations.Witnessto thisthat
we eschewinconsistencies whenwe recognizethemforwhat they
are. If we really were inconsistentmachines,we should remain
contentwith our inconsistencies, and would happilyaffirm both
halves of a contradiction. Moreover,we would be preparedto say
absolutelyanything-whichwe are not. It is easilyshown'that in
an inconsistentformalsystemeverythingis provable,and the
requirement ofconsistency turnsout to be just thatnot everything
can be provedin it-it is not the case that "anythinggoes". This
surelyis a characteristic of the mentaloperationsof humanbeings:
theyare selective:theydo discriminate betweenfavoured-true-
and unfavoured-false-statements: whena personis preparedto
say anything,and is preparedto contradicthimselfwithoutany
qualm or repugnance, thenhe is adjudgedto have "lost his mind".
Human beings,althoughnot perfectly consistent,are not so much
inconsistentas fallible.
A falliblebut self-correcting machinewould still be subject to
Go-del'sresults.Only a fundamentally inconsistent machinewould
escape. Could we have a fundamentally inconsistent,but at the
same time self-correcting machine,which both would be freeof
Godel's resultsand yet would not be trivialand entirelyunlikea
human being? A machinewith a ratherrecherche' inconsistency
wiredintoit, so thatforall normalpurposesit was consistent, but
whenpresentedwiththe G6deliansentencewas able to proveit?
Thereare all sortsof ways in whichundesirableproofsmightbe
obviated.We mighthave a rule that wheneverwe have provedp
and not-p,we examinetheirproofsand reject the longer.Or we
mightarrangethe axiomsand rulesof inference in a certainorder,
and whena proofleadingto an inconsistency is proffered,see what
axioms and rules are for
required it, and reject that axiom or rule
which comes last in the ordering.In some such way as thiswe could
have an inconsistent system, with a stop-rule,so that the inconsis-
tencywas neverallowedto comeout in the formof an inconsistent
formula.
The suggestionat firstsightseemsattractive:yet thereis some-
thingdeeplywrong.Even thoughwe mightpreservethe facadeof
consistency byhavinga rulethatwhenever twoinconsistent formulae
to MathematicalLogic, Princeton,
I See, e.g., Alonzo Church: Introduction

Vol. I, ? I7, p. io8.

I2I
 PHILOSOPHY
appear we wereto rejectthe one withthe longerproof,yet such a
rulewouldbe repugnant in ourlogicalsense.Even thelessarbitrary
suggestionsare too arbitrary.No longerdoes the systemoperate
with certaindefiniterulesofinference on certaindefinite formulae.
Instead, the rules apply, the axioms are true,provided ... we do
not happento findit inconvenient. We no longerknowwherewe
stand.One application of the rule of Modus Ponensmaybe accepted
whileanotheris rejected:on one occasionan axiom may be true,
on anotherapparentlyfalse.The systemwill have ceased to be a
formallogicalsystem,and the machinewill barelyqualifyforthe
titleofa modelforthemind.For it willbe farfromresembling the
mindin its operations:theminddoesindeedtryout dubiousaxioms
and rulesofinference; but iftheyare foundto lead to contradiction,
theyarerejectedaltogether. We tryoutaxiomsand rulesofinference
provisionally-true: but we do not keep them,once theyare found
to lead to contradictions. We mayseekto replacethemwithothers,
we mayfeelthatourformalization is at fault,and thatthoughsome
axiomor ruleofinference ofthissortis required,we have notbeen
able to formulate it quitecorrectly: but we do not retainthe faulty
formulations withoutmodification, merelywith the provisothat
whenthe argumentleads to a contradiction we refuseto followit.
To do thiswouldbe utterlyirrational.We shouldbe in theposition
thaton someoccasionswhensuppliedwiththepremisses ofa Modus
Ponens,say, we applied the rule and allowedthe conclusion,and
on otheroccasionswe refusedto apply the rule,and disallowedthe
conclusion.A person,or a machine,whichdid this withoutbeing
able to givea goodreasonforso doing,wouldbe accountedarbitrary
and irrational.It is partoftheconceptof "arguments" or "reasons"
that theyare in some sense generaland universal:that if Modus
Ponensis a validmethodofarguingwhenI am establishing a desired
conclusion,it is a valid methodalso whenyou,my opponent,are
establishing a conclusionI do not wantto accept.We cannotpick
and choosethe timeswhena formof argumentis to be valid; not
ifwe are to be reasonable.It is ofcoursetrue,thatwithourinformal
arguments, whicharenotfullyformalized, we do distinguish between
argumentswhichare at firstsightsimilar,addingfurther reasons
whytheyare nonetheless not reallysimilar:and it mightbe main-
tained that a machinemightlikewisebe entitledto distinguish
betweenargumentsat firstsightsimilar,if it had good reasonfor
doingso. And it mightfurther be maintainedthatthemachinehad
good reasonforrejectingthose patternsof argumentit did reject,
indeedthe best of reasons,namelythe avoidanceof contradiction.
But that,ifit is a reasonat all, is too gooda reason.We do notlay it
to a man's creditthat he avoids contradiction merelyby refusing
to acceptthosearguments whichwouldlead himto it, forno other
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reasonthan that otherwisehe wouldbe led to it. Special pleading
ratherthansoundargumentis the nameforthattypeofreasoning.
No creditaccruesto a man who,cleverenoughto see a fewmoves
of argumentahead, avoids beingbroughtto acknowledgehis own
inconsistency,bystonewalling as soonas he seeswheretheargument
will end. Rather,we accounthiminconsistent too, not,in his case,
because he affirmed and deniedthe same proposition, but because
he used and refusedto use the same rule of inference. A stop-rule
on actuallyenunciating an inconsistency is not enoughto save an
inconsistentmachinefrombeingcalled inconsistent.
yetremainsthatwe are inconsistent,
The possibility and thereis
no stop-rule,but the inconsistency is so recherche'thatit has never
turnedup. Afterall, naiveset-theory, whichwas deeplyembedded
incommon-sense waysofthinking didnotturnoutto be inconsistent.
Can we be surethata similarfateis notinstoreforsimplearithmetic
too? In a sensewe cannot,in spiteof our greatfeelingof certitude
thatoursystemofwholenumbers whichcan be addedand multiplied
togetheris nevergoingto proveinconsistent. It is just conceivable
we mightfindwe had formalized it incorrectly. If we had,we should
tryand formulate anewourintuitiveconceptofnumber,as we have
our intuitiveconceptof a set. If we did this,we shouldof course
recastour system:our presentaxiomsand rulesof inference would
be utterlyrejected:therewould be no questionof our usingand
not usingthemin an "inconsistent" fashion.We should,once we
had recast the system,be in the same positionas we are now,
possessedof a systembelievedto be consistent, but not provably
so. But then could therenot be some otherinconsistency? It is
indeeda possibility.But again no inconsistency once detectedwill
be tolerated.We are determinednot to be inconsistent, and are
resolved to root out inconsistency,should any appear. Thus,
althoughwe can neverbe completelycertainor completelyfreeof
theriskofhavingto thinkout ourmathematics again,theultimate
positionmust be one of two: eitherwe have a systemof simple
arithmetic whichto the best of our knowledgeand beliefis consis-
tent:or thereis no such systempossible.In theformer case we are
in the same positionas at present:in the latter,if we findthatno
systemcontainingsimplearithmeticcan be freeof contradictions,
we shall have to abandon not merelythe whole of mathematics
and the mathematical sciences,but the wholeofthought.
It maystillbe maintainedthatalthougha manmustin thissense
assume,he cannot properlyaffirm, his own consistencywithout
therebybelyinghis words.We may be consistent;indeedwe have
everyreasonto hope thatwe are: but a necessarymodestyforbids
us fromsayingso. Yet thisis notquitewhatGbdel'ssecondtheorem
states. Gddel has shown that in a consistentsystema formula
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statingtheconsistency ofthesystemcannotbe provedin thatsystem.
It followsthat a machine,if consistent,cannotproduceas truean
assertionof its own consistency:hencealso that a mind,if it were
reallya machine,could not reachthe conclusionthat it was a con-
sistentone. For a mindwhichis not a machineno suchconclusion
follows.All thatGddelhas provedis thata mindcannotproducea
formalproofoftheconsistency ofa formalsysteminsidethesystem
itself:but there no objectionto goingoutsidethe systemand no
is
objection to producinginformalargumentsfor the consistency
eitherof a formalsystemor of somethingless formaland less
systematized.Such informalargumentswill not be able to be
completelyformalized: but thenthe wholetenorof Gbdel'sresults
is thatwe oughtnotto ask, and cannotobtain,completeformaliza-
tion.Andalthoughit wouldhavebeenniceifwe couldhaveobtained
them, since completelyformalizedargumentsare more coercive
thaninformalones,yetsincewe cannothave all ourarguments cast
into that form,we must not hold it againstinformalarguments
that theyare informalor regardthemall as utterlyworthless.It
therefore seemsto me both properand reasonablefora mind to
assertits own consistency:proper,because althoughmachines,as
we mighthave expected,are unable to reflectfullyon theirown
performance and powers,yet to be able to be self-conscious
in this
way is just whatwe expectofminds:and reasonable,forthereasons
given. Not only can we fairlysay simplythat we knowwe are
consistent,apartfromourmistakes,butwe mustin anycase assume
thatwe are,ifthoughtis to be possibleat all; moreoverwe are selec-
tive,we will not,as inconsistent machineswould,say anything and
everything whatsoever:and finallywe can, in a sense,decideto be
consistent, in the sensethat we can resolvenot to tolerateincon-
sistenciesin our thinkingand speaking,and to eliminatethem,if
ever they shouldappear,by withdrawing and cancellingone limb
ofthe contradiction.
We can see howwe mightalmosthave expectedG6del'stheorem
to distinguishself-conscious beings frominanimateobjects. The
essenceof the Godelianformulais that it is self-referring.It says
that "This formulais unprovable-in-this-system". When carried
over to a machine,the formulais specifiedin termswhichdepend
on the particularmachinein question.The machineis beingasked
a questionabout its own processes.We are askingit to be self-
conscious,and say whatthingsit can and cannotdo. Such questions
notoriously lead to paradox. At one's firstand simplestattempts
to philosophize,one becomes entangledin questionsof whether
whenone knowssomething one knowsthatone knowsit, and what,
whenone is thinkingof oneself,is beingthoughtabout,and what
is doingthethinking. Afteronehas beenpuzzledand bruisedby this
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problemfora long time,one learnsnot to pressthese questions:
theconceptofa consciousbeingis,implicitly, realizedto be different
fromthat of an unconsciousobject. In sayingthat a conscious
beingknowssomething, we are sayingnot onlythat he knowsit,
but that he knowsthat he knowsit, and that he knowsthat he
knowsthathe knowsit, and so on, as longas we care to pose the
question:thereis, we recognize,an infinity here,but it is not an
infiniteregressin the bad sense,forit is the questionsthat peter
out, as beingpointless,ratherthan the answers.The questionsare
feltto be pointlessbecause the conceptcontainswithinitselfthe
idea of beingable to go on answeringsuch questionsindefinitely.
Althoughconsciousbeingshave the powerof goingon, we do not
wishto exhibitthis simplyas a successionof tasks theyare able
to perform, nordo we see themindas an infinite sequenceofselves
and super-selvesand super-super-selves. Rather,we insistthat a
consciousbeingis a unity,and thoughwe talk about partsof the
mind,we do so onlyas a metaphor, and willnotallowit to be taken
literally.
The paradoxesof consciousnessarise because a consciousbeing
can be aware of itself,as well as of otherthings,and yet cannot
reallybe construedas beingdivisibleinto parts. It meansthat a
consciousbeingcan deal withGodelianquestionsin a way in which
a machinecannot,because a consciousbeing can both consider
itselfand its performance and yet not be otherthan that which
didtheperformance. A machinecan be madein a mannerofspeaking
to "consider"its own performance, but it cannottake this "into
account" withouttherebybecominga different machine,namely
the old machinewith a "new part" added. But it is inherentin
our idea of a consciousmind that it can reflectupon itselfand
criticizeits own performances, and no extrapart is requiredto do
this:it is alreadycomplete,and has no Achilles'heel.
The thesisthus beginsto becomemorea matterof conceptual
analysisthan mathematicaldiscovery.This is borne out by con-
sideringanotherargument put forwardby Turing.iSo far,we have
constructed onlyfairlysimpleand predictableartefacts.Whenwe
increasethe complexityof our machinestheremay, perhaps,be
surprisesin storeforus. He draws a parallelwith a fissionpile.
Below a certain"critical"size, nothingmuchhappens:but above
thecriticalsize,thesparksbeginto fly.So too,perhaps,withbrains
and machines.Mostbrainsand all machinesare, at present,"sub-
critical"-theyreactto incoming stimuliin a stodgyand uninterest-
ingway,haveno ideasoftheirown,can produceonlystockresponses
-but a fewbrainsat present,and possibilysomemachinesin the
future,are super-critical, and scintillateon their own account.
x Mind, 1950, p. 454; Newman, p. 2II7-i8.
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 PHILOSOPHY
Turingis suggestingthatit is onlya matterofcomplexity, and that
above a certainlevelofcomplexity a qualitativedifference appears,
so that "super-critical" machineswill be quite unlikethe simple
oneshithertoenvisaged.
This may be so. Complexityoftendoes introducequalitative
differences.Althoughit soundsimplausible,it mightturnout that
above a certainlevelofcomplexity, a machineceasedto be predict-
able, evenin principle,and starteddoingthingson its ownaccount,
or,to use a veryrevealingphrase,it mightbeginto have a mindof
its own. It mightbeginto have a mindof its own. It wouldbegin
to have a mindof its own whenit was no longerentirelypredict-
able and entirelydocile,but was capable of doingthingswhichwe
recognizedas intelligent, and not just mistakesor randomshots,
but whichwe had notprogrammed intoit. But thenit wouldcease
to be a machine,withinthe meaningof the act. What is at stake
in the mechanistdebateis nothowmindsare,or mightbe, brought
into being,but how theyoperate.It is essentialforthe mechanist
thesisthatthemechanicalmodelofthemindshalloperateaccording
to "mechanicalprinciples",that is, that we can understandthe
operationof the wholein termsof the operationsof its parts,and
the operationof each part eithershall be determined by its initial
state and the construction of the machine,or shall be a random
choicebetweena determinate numberof determinate operations.If
the mechanist produces a machine whichis so complicatedthat
thisceasesto hold good ofit, thenit is no longera machineforthe
purposesof our discussion,no matterhow it was constructed. We
shouldsay, rather,thathe had createda mind,in the same sortof
senseas we procreatepeople at present.Therewouldthenbe two
ways of bringingnew mindsinto the world,the traditionalway,
by begettingchildrenbornofwomen,and a newwaybyconstructing
very,verycomplicatedsystemsof, say, valves and relays.When
talkingofthesecondway,we shouldtakecareto stressthatalthough
what was createdlooked like a machine,it was not one really,
because it was not just the total of its parts. One could not tell
whatit was goingto do merelyby knowingthewayin whichit was
built up and the initialstate of its parts: one could not even tell
the limitsof what it could do, for even when presentedwith a
Godel-typequestion,it got the answerright.In fact we should
say brieflythat any systemwhichwas not flooredby the Gddel
questionwas eo ipso not a Turingmachine,i.e. not a machine
withinthemeaningoftheact.
If theproofofthefalsityofmechanism is valid,it is ofthegreatest
consequenceforthewholeofphilosophy. SincethetimeofNewton,
thebogeyofmechanist determinism has obsessedphilosophers. If we
it seemedthatwemustlookonhumanbeingsas
wereto be scientific,
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 MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL
determined automata,and not as autonomousmoralagents;if we
wereto be moral,it seemedthatwe mustdenyscienceits due, set
an arbitrarylimitto its progressin understanding humanneuro-
physiology,and take refugein obscurantistmysticism.Not even
Kant could resolvethe tensionbetweenthe two standpoints.But
now,thoughmanyargumentsagainsthumanfreedomstillremain,
the argumentfrommechanism, perhapsthe mostcompellingargu-
mentof themall, has lost its power.No longeron thiscountwillit
be incumbenton the naturalphilosopherto deny freedomin the
name of science:no longerwillthe moralistfeelthe urgeto abolish
knowledgeto make room for faith. We can even begin to see
how therecould be roomformorality,withoutits beingnecessary
to abolish or even to circumscribe the provinceof science.Our
argument has set no limits to scientific enquiry:it will still be
possibleto investigate the working of the brain. It will still be
possibleto produce mechanical models of the mind.Only,now we
can see thatno mechanical model will be completely adequate,nor
anyexplanationsin purelymechanist terms. We can produce models
and explanations,and theywill be illuminating: but, howeverfar
they go, therewill always remainmore to be said. There is no
arbitraryboundto scientific enquiry:but no scientific enquirycan
ever exhaustthe infinitevarietyof the humanmind.

MertonCollege,Oxford.

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