RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, A.C. No.

5736
INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,
Complainant, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

June 18, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors[1] of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc.
(RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and
threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the
management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation.

The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. [2] RBCI alleged that respondent violated
his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos,
Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use
of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay
(Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the
authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of
RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a
termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of
managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step
down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed
the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the
bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault.
1
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already
dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases
he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added
that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none
of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report
and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant
a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just
forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order.Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted
that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over
of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent
of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that
RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarized
affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead,
simultaneously submit their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent
dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of
law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty.[4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP denied
respondents motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.

2
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. [7]

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this
reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. [8] It is his duty
to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong
to their adversaries.[9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not
merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to
protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense,
their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the
expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is
condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

3
A.M. No. 1311 July 18, 1991

RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO S. ALISBO, petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on
January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo against their former counsel, Attorney
Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity. The complaint was
referred to this Court on February 5, 1974.

After the complainants had submitted the required number of copies of their complaint, the respondent was
ordered to file his answer thereto which he did on June 5, 1974.

On August 20, 1974, the complainants filed a reply.

On August 28, 1974, the Court referred the complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On February 2, 1990, or after sixteen (16) years, the Solicitor General submitted his report
to the Court, together with the transcripts of stenographic notes taken at the investigation and folders of
exhibits submitted by the parties.

The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are the following:

4
On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel to
commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto
Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him under the judgment dated April 29, 1961 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of the
judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of Court). The salient
provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were
the following:

1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share
or claim;

2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and

3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid fifty per cent (50%) of the value of the property
recovered.

On April 18, 1970, respondent prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 but
filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 9559, entitled:
"Ramon S. Alisbo, Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito Sales, in his own capacity and as
Judicial Administrator of the deceased Pedro Sales." The complaint was signed by respondent alone.
However, no sooner had he filed the complaint than he withdrew it and filed in its stead (on the same day
and in the same case) a second complaint dated August 31, 1970, with Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff,
praying for the same relief. Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo were excluded as plaintiffs and were
impleaded as defendants instead. Attorneys Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito Jalandoon, Sr. (herein
respondent) signed as counsel.

On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed wherein the plaintiffs were: Ramon S. Alisbo,
assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and eight (8) others, namely: Pacifico S. Alisbo, Ramona
Vda. de Alisbo and Ildefonso, Evangeline, Teotimo, Jr., Reynaldo, Elizabeth and Teresita, all surnamed
Alisbo. The amended complaint was signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the plaintiffs.

On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
action for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already prescribed (Exh. 21). Plaintiffs filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Exh. 22).

On October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the ground
of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on May 30, 1961 yet, and, although a
complaint for revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on September 12, 1970, before the ten-
year prescriptive period expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon Alisbo was insane, hence,
incompetent and without legal capacity to sue when he instituted the action. The subsequent filing of an
Amended Complaint on December 8, 1972, after the statutory limitation period had expired, was too late to
save the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter, nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case.

On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with having
deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having concealed from them the material
fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings.
The respondent filed a general denial of the charges against him.

When Ramon S. Alisbo engaged the services of Attorney Jalandoon to enforce the decision in Civil Case No.
4963, that decision was already nine (9) years old, hence, it could no longer be executed by mere motion
(Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court). Complainants had only about a year left within which to enforce the
judgment by an independent action.

Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he hired Attorney Jalandoon to file Civil Case No.
9559 for him. Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that he (Atty. Jalandoon) had been the
former counsel of Carlito Sales in the probate proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had litigated over their
shares of the inheritance.
5
However, according to Attorney Jalandoon, it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was
called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-
year prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon asked
Alisbo's permission to allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the court about his
untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire therefrom. His request was granted.

In his report to the Court, the Solicitor General made the following observations:

Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling the case for Ramon S. Alisbo which eventually
led to its dismissal, respondent committed several errors, among which are:

1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack
of capacity to sue would not have been at issue.

2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to a motion to resolve
pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered away precious time.

3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as

defendants.1âwphi1 Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in part.

Had not respondent committed the above mistakes, Civil Case No. 9559 in all probability would not
have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. (pp. 9-10, Solicitor General's Report.)

While the Solicitor General does not believe that Attorney Jalandoon's mistakes in handling Alisbo's case
were deliberate or made with malice aforethought because there is no "proof of collusion or conspiracy
between respondent and those who would benefit from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 . . . and that, on
the other hand, respondent stood to gain substantially (50% of the amount recovered) if he had succeeded
in having the judgment revived and executed" (pp. 10-11, Solicitor General's Report), still those errors are so
gross and glaring that they could not have resulted from mere negligence or lack of due care.

Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that the Sales defendants had been
his clients in the past, is unbelievable because:

1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon S.
Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No. 4963.

2. He must have done some research on the court records of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not
have overlooked his own participation in that case as counsel for Carlito Sales, et al.

3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he had to inform himself
about the personal circumstances of the defendants-Carlito Sales, et al. The fact that they had been
his clients could not have eluded him.

In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have
declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon
enough, the Alisbos (herein complainants) would have had enough time to engage the services of another
lawyer and they would not have lost their case through prescription of the action.

The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provide:

6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his
relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence
the client in the selection of counsel.

6
 It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.)

The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney Jalandoon used his position as Alisbo's counsel
precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's action to revive the judgment in his favor
and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had
vigorously opposed. Thus, although Atty. Jalandoon prepared Alisbo's complaint for revival of judgment on
April 18, 1970, he delayed its filing until September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by asking the
Court instead to resolve pending incidents in said Civil Case No. 4963. By doing that, he frittered away what
little time was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of
Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was onlypartially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping
the other plaintiffs, leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent made the
second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the prescriptive period.

After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly found out about Ramon
Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to implead Alisbo's legal guardian as
plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only, or almost five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive period had
run out.

The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his
client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion
that a lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client. There is more than simple
negligence resulting in the extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action; there is a hint of duplicity
and lack of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's disciplinary power.

The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the investigation of this case found respondent Attorney
Benito Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity. Although the Solicitor General recommended
the suspension of respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, the Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of two (2) years from the finality
of this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27231 March 28, 1969

ALFONSO VISITACION, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICTOR MANIT, substituted by his widow LEONARDA MANIT and daughters VIRGINIA DUNGOG,
VICTORIA BATUCAN and MERLINDA MANIT, defendants-appellants.

Amadeo Seno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus P. Garcia for defendants-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
7
 Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and certified by the Court of Appeals to this
Court, since the issues raised on appeal are all questions of law.

The Court of Appeals in its Resolution of January 17, 1967 certifying the case as falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court points out that this appeal is "unique" in the sense that the appellant purports to be
not the original defendant, Victor Manit, now deceased, nor his heirs, his widow and three daughters of age,
substituted for him upon his death, per the title of this case above, but rather his counsel of record, Atty.
Jesus P. Garcia, who on April 13, 1960, after the trial court's adverse decision, filed the Notice of Appeal and
cash bond on Appeal as "Attorney for Victor Manit deceased" and on the same date filed the Record on
Appeal as "Jesus P. Garcia, in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the
deceased." 1 The Record on Appeal and appeal bond were thereafter approved on April 25, 1960 by the trial
court and the case forwarded on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and in turn certified to this Court.

The case originated on January 18, 1956 when plaintiff appellee filed this case against defendant Victor
Manit to hold him liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of plaintiff's son, Delano Visitacion, as a result
of injuries sustained in a vehicular collision involving laid defendant's driver Rudolfo Giron, who was found
insolvent after having been convicted and sentenced in a previous criminal case arising out of said death, to
indemnify the victim's heirs in the amount of P3,000.00.lawphi1.ñet

An Answer to the complaint was filed in due course by Atty. Garcia on behalf of defendant. On June 1, 1956,
the case was heard, without defendant or his counsel being present, and plaintiff presented his evidence and
the case, was submitted for decision. On June 6, 1956, defendant, however, filed a motion for new trial which
was granted by the trial court on June 9, 1956.2

Plaintiff presented his oral and documentary evidence and was cross-examined by Atty. Garcia. 3 The record
further shows that on March 19, 1958, Atty. Garcia commenced the presentation of evidence on behalf of
defendant. He presented defendant's wife, Leonarda Manit who testified that her husband, Victor Manit "had
no business of his own, because he is sickly" and that she was the one operating and managing their
transportation business of three trucks. 4

On October 14, 1958, when the case was scheduled for continuation of the trial, Atty. Garcia manifested
that the original defendant, Victor Manit had recently died, and the trial court on the same date directed him
to furnish plaintiff's counsel the names of the said defendant's heirs, so that plaintiff could amend the
complaint accordingly. On August 11, 1959, plaintiff's counsel submitted a Motion to Admit the Amended
Complaint attached thereto, furnishing copy of said pleadings to Atty. Garcia, who acknowledged receipt
thereof as "Attorney for the defendant." The only amendment in the complaint consisted in impleading the
widow and heirs of the deceased original defendant in substitution for him, pursuant to Rule 3, section 17 of
the Rules of Court. At the hearing of the said motion on the same date, the trial court, after noting that there
was no opposition thereto by Atty. Garcia, admitted the Amended Complaint in its Order of August 11, 1959,
wherein "(A)s prayed for by counsel for the defendants, defendants are hereby given fifteen (15) days' time
within which to file an answer to said amended complaint." 5 No answer to the amended complaint having
been filed, the original answer stood as defendants' answer to the amended complaint, in accordance with
Rule 11, section 3 of the Rules of Court. 6

The case was again set for hearing on January 28, 1960 with notice to the parties through their counsels of
record. One day before the hearing, on January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed a "Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel", alleging that "the heirs of Victor Manit have not hired (him) to represent them and consequently,
(his) continued appearance in representation of a dead client would be illegal" and asking the trial court "that
he be relieved as counsel in the above-entitled case for the reasons stated herein." 7

When the case was called on the next day, neither defendants nor Atty. Garcia appeared, and the trial court
noting "defendants' apparent lack of interest as can be gleaned from the records" considered them to have
renounced their right to appear and present evidence to contest plaintiff's claim. It did not pass upon Atty.
Garcia's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and proceeded to render judgment in favor of plaintiff, the dispositive
part of which provides as follows:

8
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court pronounces judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants; and hereby sentences the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the amount of P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Delano Visitacion, plus P3,000.00 in concept
of moral damages, and the additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of this
action.8

Atty. Garcia's Motion for Reconsideration, based on the same grounds hereinafter discussed having been
denied by the trial court, he filed the present appeal, and assigns the following errors in his "Brief for
Defendant-Appellant":

First Error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONTINUING WITH THE CASE WITHOUT THE NEW
DEFENDANTS BROUGHT TO ITS JURISDICTION BY SUMMONS AND WITHOUT EVEN
INFORMING SAID DEFENDANTS THAT THEY HAVE BECOME PARTIES TO THE CASE.

Second Error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FILED
BY A LAWYER WHO HAD LOST AUTHORITY TO RE PRESENT A DEAD CLIENT.

Third Error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A PREMATURE JUDGMENT IN AN UNFINISHED

CASE WHERE THE NEW DEFENDANTS WERE NOT GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT.

He prayed therein that the appellate Court render judgment:

(a). Annulling the decision appealed from;

(b). Remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings by serving summons on the
defendants and giving them a chance to present their evidence;

(c). Relieving the undersigned counsel from all responsibility in connection with this case in view of
the death of his client; and

(d). Granting such other and further reliefs and remedies in accordance with law and equity.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 10)

We hold this "unique" appeal by the counsel of record, Atty. Jesus P. Garcia, allegedly "in his capacity as
officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased Victor Manit" to be untenable.

There are two fundamental errors on which Atty. Garcia's appeal is premised. First, if he presents this appeal
"in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased Victor Manit", his appeal should
be thrown out, as not being a party to the case, much less a party in interest, he has no legal standing
whatsoever to prosecute this appeal. Second, in filing his Notice of Appeal and Cash Appeal Bond, he
represented himself as "Attorney for Victor Manit, deceased", depositing the sum of P60.00 as appeal bond
"to answer or respond for the costs which the appellate court may award against the herein defendant-
appellant," 9 thus representing anew to the trial Court that he was duly authorized to present the appeal on
behalf of the estate of the original defendant, Victor Manit deceased, who had earlier been substituted in the
case by his heirs, the widow and three daughters of legal age. The trial Court was perfectly correct in relying
upon this representation in accordance with Rule 138, section 21 of the Rules of Court which provides that
"(A)n attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any case in which he appears ...." This
appeal must accordingly be dealt with as an appeal on behalf of said heirs as defendants-appellants and not
in the "unique" concept with which Atty. Garcia would circumscribe it.

9
1. As to the first error assigned, no error was committed by the trial court in continuing with the ease
and handing down its decision against defendants-appellants. The contention that said defendants-
appellants, as substituted parties-defendants by virtue of their being the heirs of the deceased original
defendant pursuant to the trial court's Orders of October 24, 1958 and August 11, 1959 in accordance
with Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court 10 , should have been brought within the Court's
jurisdiction by summons is fallacious. For the record shows that Atty. Garcia at the time acknowledged
receipt of the Amended Complaint substituting said defendants-heirs for the deceased original
defendant as "Attorney for the defendants", presented no opposition thereto, and furthermore prayed
for and was granted by the Court a period of 15 days to file an answer to the Amended Complaint.
Having been duly impleaded and having submitted to the Court's jurisdiction through their counsel,
Atty. Garcia, the issuance of a summons was unnecessary. The other contention that "there is oven
no record showing that these defendants were at all informed that they had become parties to the
above-captioned case" 11 is equally fallacious. Nowhere in appellants' brief is there an assertion by
Atty. Garcia, that, he, as their attorney of record, and in compliance with his duty as such and as an
officer of the Court, failed or neglected to inform them of the admission of the Amended Complaint
substituting them for the deceased original defendant.

2. Appellants claim in their second assignment of error that the trial court erred in ignoring the Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel filed by Atty. Garcia. In the face of Atty. Garcia's previous representations
and appearance as counsel of record for the substituted defendants, his last hour motion to withdraw
as counsel and disclaimer that said defendants have hired him to represent them — which he filed
one day before the date set for resumption of the hearing — came too late and was properly ignored
by the Court. The Court could not accept this turn-about on his mere "say-so." His motion was not
verified. Aside from the fact that his said motion carried no notice, in violation of the requirement of
Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court, and could therefore be treated as a "mere scrap of
paper", 12 the said motion was likewise fatally defective in that it carried no notice to his clients on
record, the defendants-appellants, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, it is well settled that "(A)n attorney seeking to withdraw must make an application to the
court, for the relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least so far
as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the
litigation." 13 The trial court's ignoring of the last-hour motion and its handing down of its decision on
the day of the hearing, upon the failure of defendants and their counsel to appear, in spite of their
having been duly notified thereof, was in effect a denial of counsel's application for withdrawal. Atty.
Garcia's unexplained failure to appear was unexcusable. He had no right to presume that the Court
would grant his withdrawal. If he had then appeared and insisted on his withdrawal, the trial court
could then have had the opportunity to order the appearance of defendants-appellants and verify from
them the truth of his assertion that they had not "hired him to represent them."

3. The trial court, therefore, did not render a "premature judgment in an unfinished case where the
defendants were not given their day in court", as claimed in the last error assigned by appellants. As
stated earlier, the record shows that on March 19, 1958, the original defendant's widow, Leonarda
Manit was placed by Atty. Garcia on the witness stand during the deceased's lifetime and testified
that her husband "has no business of his own, because he is sickly" and that she was the one
operating and managing their transportation business of three trucks since as early as 1952, some
years before the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1956. 14In effect, the widow, Leonarda Manit
had then submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction, asserting as she did that she was the one
operating the business and that her husband had no business of his own. The widow and her three
children of age as heirs of the deceased cannot therefore claim ignorance of the pendency of the
case, and that notwithstanding that she was the actual operator and manager of the business, that
she has been kept in complete ignorance of its subsequent developments, after her husband's death
over 10 years ago. Almost 10 years have elapsed since they were substituted in 1959 as defendants
for the deceased, and it taxes all credibility for them to claim now in their brief that "said new
defendants did not even know that they became parties in the Amended Complaint," 15 and that all
this time not the slightest effort was made by them to find out from Atty. Garcia or from the Court for
that matter what had happened to the case nor did Atty. Garcia in compliance with his duty as an
officer of the Court inform them of the decision handed down by the Court Over 9 years ago. Having
failed to appear on the day set for trial without any justifiable explanation to the Court nor having

10
 presented an affidavit of merits as to the existence of valid and lawful defenses, they cannot now
complain of having been deprived of their day in Court.

The circumstances of the case and the appeal taken all together lead to the conclusion that the last-hour
withdrawal application of Atty. Garcia and his appeal "as officer of the Court and then counsel of the
deceased" was but a device to prolong this case and delay in the execution of the judgment, which should
have been carried out years ago. The imposition of double costs is therefore in order.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with double costs to be paid by the
attorney for defendants. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD, accused-
appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases are before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, finding accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. guilty of four counts of rape of his
minor daughters, Oleby and Maricris Nadera, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for one count of rape and death for each of the remaining three counts. Accused-appellant was
also ordered to indemnify complainants Oleby Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00 and Maricris Nadera
in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. MENDOZAJ

Reversal of the decision is sought on the sole ground that -

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED FULLY
UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCE OF HIS PLEA.[1]

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, born on October
2, 1982; Maricris, born on March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on January 8, 1986; and Sherilyn, born on
September 27, 1987.[2]

On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came home to the Philippines for vacation only
in July 1993. She then left again for Bahrain in September 1993 and did not return until September 12,
1995.[3]

On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they
had been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of
Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant.[4]

After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on
various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.

In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the information[5] alleged-

That on or about the 17th day of May, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust

11
 and lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, nine
(9) years of age at that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the information[6] charged -

That on or about the 17th day of April, 1995 at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that time against
the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the information[7] stated-

That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, sometime in the evening, at Barangay Bayani,
Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by
means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at
that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the information[8] recited -

That on or about the 3rd day of March 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust
and lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter, MARICRIS NADERA,
eleven (11) years of age against the latter's will and consent.

The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A.
Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him.[9] However, on
August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded
guilty to the crime charged in all the informations.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera, Maricris Nadera,
and Daisy Nadera.

Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical Officer IV of the Oriental Mindoro Provincial Hospital, who conducted the
medical examination of both complainants, submitted a report on the result of Oleby Nadera's examination
as follows:[10]

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.

- Breast developed
- Abdomen: flat, soft non-tender.

EXTERNAL GENITALIA

- Minimal pubic hair

- Healed incomplete hymenal lacerations at 5, 7, 12 o'clock positions.
- No bleeding.

INTERNAL SPECULUM EXAMINATION

12
 - Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease.
- Cervix small, firm, close non-tender (-) bleeding.
- Uterus not enlarged.
- Adnexae negative

LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed positive result.

She testified that the hymenal lacerations may have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, the
patient's history of genitalic insertions, a straddle injury, or sitting on hard wood. She could not determine
when these lacerations were sustained because they had healed over a period beyond seven days.[11]

Dr. Fesalbon likewise rendered a report[12] on the medical examination of Maricris Nadera, the pertinent
parts of which state:

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.

- Abdomen, flat, soft.

EXTERNAL GENITALIA:

- Absence of pubic hair healed hymenal lacerations, incomplete at 1, 5, 8, 11

o'clock positions.

INTERNAL EXAMINATION:

- Vagina admits 1 finger with ease.

- Cervix small (-) bleeding
- Uterus not enlarged.
-Adnexae (-).

LABORATORY EXAMINATION

- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed Negative result.

In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr. Fesalbon explained that the hymenal lacerations could have been
caused by penetration such as through instrumentation or insertion of an object inside the vagina. They
could also have been caused by the penetration of the penis. Upon inquiry from the court, Dr. Fesalbon
stated that the fact that Maricris had more hymenal lacerations than Oleby could be due to the difference in
the impact of penetration. She added that the number of times each of the girls had sexual intercourse
could not be ascertained merely from the hymenal lacerations, although it could be concluded that an
object had been inserted in the vagina.[13]

Oleby Nadera testified about the rapes committed by her father against her as follows:

On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy was away working as a domestic helper
in Bahrain, accused- appellant pulled Oleby, then nine years of age, towards a bed, removed her panties
and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into
her vagina. He proceeded to make an up and down motion while on top of his daughter. All the while,
Oleby was crying, pleading with her father, "Huwag po!", "Huwag po!" Accused-appellant again ordered
Oleby to keep quiet lest her brother and sisters were awakened. Afterwards, accused-appellant told Oleby
to put on her panties and shorts and to go to sleep. Oleby went to the bed where her brother and sisters
were sleeping and cried.

13
On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant sent Sherilyn and Maricris to the sari-sari store
while he asked March Anthony to gather firewood. While Oleby was left alone inside their house in
Barangay Bayani, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant again raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at
that time. Accused-appellant closed the door and windows, removed Oleby's panties and shorts and sat
down. While sitting down, accused-appellant placed Oleby's legs on his thighs and inserted his penis into
her vagina. Later on, he told Oleby to put on her panties and shorts and told her to fetch her brother and
sisters.

Oleby was raped by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995. That evening, she woke up to find her
father on top of her, taking off her shorts and panties and inserting his penis into her vagina. As her father
was taking off her clothes, Oleby cried and pleaded, "Huwag po! Huwag po!" Instead of desisting, accused-
appellant told her to keep quiet so as not to awaken her brother and sisters, and threatened her with harm if
she made any noise. Accused-appellant then made a pumping motion, consummating the sexual act with
his daughter.[14]

After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel, accused-appellant's counsel, did not
conduct any cross examination on the ground that he was convinced Oleby was telling the truth.[15]

On that same day, Maricris also testified. She related how she was raped by her father on March 3, 1996,
the year before, when she was 11 years old. At about eight o'clock in the evening of said date, while her
brother and sisters were sleeping, she was pulled by her father towards his bed and told to lie down.
Accused-appellant then placed himself on top of Maricris and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris
pleaded "Papa, huwag po, maawa naman kayo sa amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant
continued raping her by making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she cried. Accused-
appellant afterwards asked Maricris to put on her shorts and panties and return to bed. He told Maricris not
to cry so as not to awaken her siblings. She did not tell anyone what befell her because she was afraid. A
neighbor, named Lita Macalalad, asked her if Oleby had been raped by their father. It turned out Oleby had
told her ordeal to Lita Macalalad while they were washing clothes and talking about Oleby's parents. Oleby
also told Lita Macalalad that Maricris had been raped by their father as well, a fact related to Oleby by
Maricris.[16]

Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's wife, also testified for the prosecution. Her testimony focused on the
dates of births of her children and the fact that she was out of the country when the alleged rapes occurred.
She testified that she and her daughters filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant after
discovering his hideous acts. Thereafter, her children were subjected to a medical examination.[17]

On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case
thereafter.

Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.

On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of
rape against his daughters. The dispositive portion of its decision[18] reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts] with the qualifying circumstance that the
victims are under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent. He is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years for
the rape committed on May 17, 1992 and three DEATH PENALTIES for the rape committed
on April 17 and 24, 1995 and March 3, 1996, together with the accessory penalties provided
by law. He is also ordered to indemnify victim Oleby Nadera the total amount of P150,000.00
in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and Maricris Nadera, the amount of
P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-4985, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

S OO R D E R E D.

14
As already stated, accused-appellant's lone assignment of error is that the trial court accepted his plea of
guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the
consequences of his plea. In support of his contention, accused-appellant invokes the ruling in the case
of People v. Dayot[19] in which this Court ruled that, in criminal cases, the judge must be convinced that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. This could be done by requiring him to narrate the events leading
to the crime, making him reenact it, or asking him to supply missing details. The judge must satisfy himself
that: (1) the accused is voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he is truly guilty and there is a rational basis for a
finding of guilt based on his testimony.

We find merit in accused-appellant's allegations. In addition, we find that there was inadequate
representation of his case in court, thus necessitating the remand of this case for further proceedings.

I.

Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.- When the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's
full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must
ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. [20]

What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v. Alicando,[21] is that the plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of
the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.

In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of accused-
appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood
the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the record that accused-appellant changed his
plea to guilty is the Certificates of Re- Arraignment, dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982 to
C-4985.[22]On what exactly accused-appellant said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had
been told by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that accused-
appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the consequences of such plea.

In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty, thus:

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's
Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, on August 5, 1997, when these
cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused manifested that the
accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial and considering that he actually committed
the acts complained of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above-
mentioned charges. The accused was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the
consequences of a plea of guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May
17, 1992 against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on April 17
and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera,
11 years old at the time], he would be sentenced to death by lethal injection. After having
been informed of this, he insisted that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes
charged and is ready to face the consequences thereof.[23]

15
The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching
inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been
said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient.[24] For more often
than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter
penalty. The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions.[25] He must be completely convinced that
the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask
the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked
whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the
consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic
status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions
concerning them.[26] In this case, absent any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a
searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the trial court.

What the trial court did in this case, as described in its decision, is similar to what happened in People v.
Sevilleno.[27] In that case, the accused was charged with the rape and homicide of a nine-year old girl. The
accused pleaded guilty whereupon the judge asked him questions: (1) Do you understand your plea of
guilt? and (2) Do you know that your plea of guilt could bring the death penalty? This Court held that these
questions did not constitute a searching inquiry.

. . . In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially
where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to
follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material
allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated,
not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining
whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea.[28]

Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently.

II.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[29]

As already stated, the prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and Maricris Nadera, the
results of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of their mother, Daisy, and the physician who
conducted the medical examination of the two girls, Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in
this case, however, persuade us that a remand of this case is necessary.

First. A perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the factual and legal
reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the narration of the prosecution's
evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No.7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
nothing else to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason
given why the court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment.- The judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b) participation of the

16
 accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages
caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
be any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or
waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused
in favor of the offended party.

In People v. Bugarin,[30] we stated:

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It
is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of
facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement
is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by
the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment
on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision
of the trial court in this case disrespects the judicial function.

Second. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public
Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby Nadera; (b)
the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to
present evidence for the accused but also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires.

Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the
accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's
duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal
and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental rights.

In the case of People vs. Bermas,[31] no less than three PAO lawyers were found by the Court to have failed
in performing their duties to their client, an accused charged with raping his daughter. The first lawyer
inexplicably waived the cross examination of the private complainant and later asked to be relieved of her
duties as counsel de oficio. A second lawyer appointed by the court missed several hearings during the trial
and could no longer be located. The third PAO lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties
reluctantly and later ceased to appear for the accused. This Court held that:

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in
mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of
fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and
not a simple perfunctory representation.

Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of advocacy
demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty. A glaring
example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby
Nadera, as revealed in the following portion of the records:

17
 COURT:

.......Any cross?

ATTY. BROTONEL:

.......If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination, because this
representation, from the demeanor of the witness, I am convinced that she is telling the
truth.[32]

It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he
had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's
constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.

It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the complainant against that of the accused,
the two being the only persons present during the commission of the offense. While the lone testimony of
the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Complainant's testimony cannot be
accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the accused's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent.[33] This is where cross examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus to give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt,
the accused is presumed to be innocent.[34]

Indeed, cross examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if her testimony is viewed together with the
results of her medical examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she was last raped by her father on April 24,
1995.[35] Yet, the medical examination conducted on her on April 30, 1996[36] revealed the presence of
spermatozoa in the vaginal canal on that date. This was a year after the last rape allegedly committed by
her father. This evident discrepancy leads to only one natural conclusion: Oleby engaged in sexual
intercourse a few days before she was examined. This raises a number of questions that bear upon the
credibility of Oleby as a witness and upon the guilt of accused- appellant. This may not necessarily mean
that she was lying when she said that on April 24, 1995 she had been raped by accused-appellant, but it
does indicate a necessity-that of cross examining her in order to ferret out the truth.

The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris' testimony. While she was cross
examined by defense counsel, the examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to comply with a lawyer's
obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required considering that a man's life is at stake. The cross
examination centered on what Maricris did or did not do while she witnessed her sister being raped, and on
her failure to report the allegedly incestuous rapes against them. Said cross examination did not even touch
upon the specific details concerning the rape committed against her. Containing lurid details as it may be, it
was nonetheless important to probe Maricris' testimony, especially since it was substantially similar to the
first incident of rape narrated by her sister, and thus raised the possibility that it was a rehearsed, if not
concocted, story.

Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his conformity to the admission of
the same. Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the
records is it shown that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to
present evidence, if he so desires.

Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how
guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more
imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he
was counsel de oficio.

18
In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the case for the proper arraignment and trial of the
accused, considering not only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in
representing his cause. A new trial has been ordered in criminal cases on the ground of retraction of
witnesses, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an
attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a
stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.[38]

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated April 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-4984 and C-4985 are
REMANDED to it for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. The trial court is enjoined to
conduct the proper trial of accused-appellant with all deliberate speed upon receipt of the records of the
cases.

SO ORDERED.2/28/00 9:29 AM

A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016

CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY.

WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA &
PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

19
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on February 11, 2005 by complainant
Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) –
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles
(Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty.
Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles, Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm),
charging them of various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter
alia, refusing to return the money given by complainant in exchange for legal services which
respondents failed to perform.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of respondents to
handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya).
In his meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case
would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining
P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on
the case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee,
and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be around three (3)
to four (4) months from filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which
was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw

From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler.
However, despite his constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any
petition and instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to look for a
psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public
prosecutor; and (c) they were still deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that the
petition would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed without any
petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed since
they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's
petition.4chanrobleslaw

Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler asked for an additional
payment of P250,000.00 in order for them to continue working on the case. Hoping that his
petition would soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23, 2004, which
was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.5 However, to complainant's dismay, no appreciable
progress took place. When complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty.
Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft petition was already
submitted to the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized.6chanrobleslaw

In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text message from Atty. Cruz-
Angeles informing him that the National Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The
latter explained then that this development was favorable to complainant's case because,
instead of the proposed petition for annulment of marriage, they would just need to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She also informed complainant that they would
send someone to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad,
Benguet (Civil Registrar) where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon complainant's
independent verification through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in
the Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records of his marriage was
a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the petition.7chanrobleslaw

Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment, complainant went to
respondents' law office to terminate their engagement and to demand for a refund of the
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler refused to return the said amount, and to complainant's surprise, sent him two (2) billing
statements dated October 5, 20048 and October 10, 20049 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and

20
P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing statement included a fee for
"consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.10 In view of the foregoing, complainant
filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1426.

In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total of P350,000.00 from
complainant,12 but denied that she was remiss in her duties, explaining that the delay in the
filing of the petition for annulment of marriage was due to complainant's failure to give the
current address of Mutya and provide sufficient evidence to support the petition.13 Further,
Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that it was Atty. Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the
petition.14 For his part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a
cause of action, arguing too that complainant filed the present administrative complaint only
to avoid payment of attorney's fees.16chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended
that they be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four (4) months.
However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any liability as his participation in the charges has
not been discussed, much less proven.18chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged the services of Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving
the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as evidenced by their failure to just even draft
complainant's petition for annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) long
months.19 Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, despite their
preliminary assessment that complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler still proceeded to collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse,
they even billed him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00.20 Thus, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that the amounts respondents had already collected and would still want to further
collect from complainant can hardly be spent for research in connection with the annulment
case that was not filed at all. Neither can they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
who did nothing to serve complainant's cause.21chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended
penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cruz-Angeles moved for
reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004, complainant secured the
services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for the purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya,
and in connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the aggregate sum of
P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the passage of more than five (5)
months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler failed to file the appropriate
pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; and worse, could not even show a finished
draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their client

21
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to
serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect
of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable,"25cralawred as in this case.

In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the CPR when they failed to return to complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing
their legal fees, viz. :
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand, x x x.
It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected
or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional
ethics."26chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to complainant that the delay in
the filing of his petition for annulment was due to the fact that they were still looking for a
"friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much of a hindrance in
achieving success in the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2) billing statements dated
October 5, 200427 and October 10, 2004,28 Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler made it appear that
they went to various locations to look for a suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even
paid various amounts to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of Investigation to
act as their "consultants." Such misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing."29Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of such standard when they
committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant.
Their acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they
also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to practice
law.30chanrobleslaw

22
As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not perform acts that would tend
to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can
find a "friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in complainant's annulment
case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution.
Without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.31 This is
the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the
aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized
accordingly, as in this case.[32]chanrobleslaw

Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession" for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the profession
by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that
as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to
safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige,
and reputation of the judiciary.33 In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised the
integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national prosecutorial service, by insinuating
that they can influence a court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the
annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated
Canon 7 of the CPR, and hence, they should be held administratively liable therefor.

Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, jurisprudence provides that in
similar cases where lawyers neglected their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money
and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of misrepresentation
and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for
his legal services which he never performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera, 35 the Court suspended
the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted
to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b) misrepresentation that he
was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the
Court suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to file a petition for
adoption on behalf of complainants, return the money she received as legal fees, and for her
commission of deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already filed such petition when
nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case,
not only did Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file complainant's petition for annulment of
marriage and return what the latter paid them as legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that
they can find a court, judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a favorable
resolution of such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary and the national prosecutorial
service. Under these circumstances, the Court individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler to
return the amount of P350,000.00 they received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to
note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve
around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his
23
client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."37 Hence, since Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as
part of their legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler are
found GUILTYof violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, each
of them is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, effective
upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler
are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as the legal fees they received from
the latter in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.

Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance and be attached
to respondents' personal records as attorney.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

24
Judge ADORACION G. ANGELES, complainant, vs. Atty. THOMAS C. UY JR., respondent. Spped jo

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers must promptly account for money or property they receive on behalf of their clients. Failure to do
so constitutes professional Misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

In a letter dated February 11, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 121) charged Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. with
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant states that respondent's
acts, which had earlier been held contemptible in her February 10, 1999 Order,[1] also rendered him
administratively liable. In the said Order, she narrated the following facts:

"When the case was called for the second time at 11 :25 o'clock in the morning, the private
prosecutor Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. appeared. In open court, accused Norma Trajano
manifested that she had already settled in full the civil aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177
(98) in the total amount of [t]hirty [s]ix [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P36,500.00) [p]esos. She
further alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private complainant and the balance
of P16,500.00 was delivered to Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private
complainant and accordingly produced in open court the receipt for such payment signed by
no less than the aforesaid lawyer. Indeed, the civil liability of the accused had already been
satisfied in full. Miso

"However, the private complainant, Primitiva Malansing [Del Rosario] manifested that she
did not receive the amount of [s]ixteen [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos
which was paid to his lawyer Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., thereby constraining this court to direct
Atty. Thomas C. Uy to turn over the money to the private complainant which he received in
trust for his client. Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money
but the assertion of the lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant,
who manifested in open court x x x her willingness to accept the money. The Court again
directed Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter argued that he kept it in his office.
Consequently, the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money
from his law office which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this
court is located.

"Unfortunately, it is already 12: 15 o'clock past noon but Atty. Uy did not show up anymore
and not even his shadow appeared in Court.

"It cannot be denied that the act of Atty. Thomas Uy in deliberately failing to return to the
Court [the] proceedings [of which] were suspended just because of his representations,
mirrors not only an undisguised disobedience of a court order but also manifests his
propensity to mock the dignity of the Court. Disgustingly, he deliberately ignored his solemn
oath to conduct himself as befitting the status of an officer of the court.

"Indeed, this gross misbehavior of Atty. Uy cannot simply be ignored for it is a raw challenge
to the authority of the Court.

"It must also be pointedly emphasized that Atty. Thomas Uy committed a brazen violation of
the provisions of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Nex old

"x x x x x x x x x

25
 "Obviously, Atty. Thomas Uy fell short of the duties expected from him as a member of the
bar."

In compliance with this Court's March 24, 1999 Resolution, Respondent Uy[2] filed his Comment on June 7,
1999. Denying that he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he explained:

"1). In a criminal case, then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, presided by the complainant Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles,
entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Norma Trajano, et., al', Criminal Case No. C-54176-77
(98), Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr., herein referred to as [r]espondent, was engaged as [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor of the complainant therein, Mrs. Primitiva Malansin Del Rosario. At the outset
Norma Trajano, accused in said criminal case, expressed her desire and offered to settle the
civil aspect of the criminal case against her to which Primitiva Del Rosario acceded. On
separate hearings, Norma Trajano made installment payments to Primitiva Del Rosario
some of which payments were duly acknowledged by the latter in the presence of
[r]espondent;

"2). On a previously cancelled date of hearing of the aforesaid criminal case x x x on

December 14, 1998, Norma Trajano went to the office of the [r]espondent at about 8:45
o'clock in the morning, x x x and met Mr. Romeo C. Jamisola Jr., who is acting as
[r]espondent's personal secretary and at the same time the liason officer of the law firm De
Veyra, Uy and Associates x x x. Mr[.] Romeo Jamisola Jr., is the lone staff of the law firm x x
x. Respondent was at that time not in the office as he was attending a hearing before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Kalookan City, Metro Manila. x x xMani kx

"3). On the aforesaid date and time (December 14, 1998) at the office of the [r]espondent,
Norma Trajano told Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr. that she will make another partial payment to
Primitiva M. Del Rosario because she cannot attend the hearing the following day (8[:]30
o'clock a.m. of December 15, 1999) before Judge Adoracion G. Angeles due to a conflict of
schedule with her [other] case in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan,
where she is likewise the accused for [e]stafa[.] Mr. Romeo Jamisola told Norma Trajano to
wait for a while as he will fetch [r]espondent at the ground floor in the sala of the Honorable
Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, upon being informed of the presence of Norma Trajano in the
office of the [r]espondent by Romeo Jamisola Jr. went to his office and Norma Trajano
immediately told [r]espondent that she knew that the setting for that day (December 14,
1998) was previously cancelled and that she cannot attend the hearing the following day
(8[:]30 o'clock a.m. December 15, 1998) and further told the [r]espondent that she (Norma
Trajano) will make another partial payment to Primitiva M. Del Rosario and that she will just
leave her payment in the sum of [s]ixteen [t]housand [five hundred] [p]esos (P16,500.00),
Philippine [c]urrency, in the office of the [r]espondent. Respondent then told Norma Trajano
to inform Primitiva M. Del Rosario first but Norma Trajano replied that she will just call
Primitiva [Del Rosario]. Nonetheless, [r]espondent told Romeo Jamisola Jr. to call Primitiva
Del Rosario, using the office phone, and let her talk with Norma Trajano, and, if Primitiva Del
Rosario agreed [r]espondent instructed Romeo Jamisola Jr., to just prepare a receipt.
Respondent, fearing that his case (People vs. Rommel Senadrin et al. above-stated) might
have been called in the calendar, immediately left the office and proceeded [at] the sala of
the Honorable Remigio E. Zari. Respondent, after the hearing x x x, returned to his office
and upon learning that his signature was affixed by Romeo Jamisola Jr. upon the insistence
of Norma Trajano scolded Romeo Jamisola Jr. and for his unsuccessful attempt to contact
first Primitiva Del Rosario before receiving the sum of money left by Norma Trajano; Maniks

"4). The following day [o]n the morning of December 15, 1998 [r]espondent arrived at his
office and met Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario and immediately
the trio appeared before the sala of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles in the hearing of the Norma
Trajano case. Returning [to] the office of the [r]espondent after the hearing, Primitiva Del
Rosario and Aurora Del Rosario, being earlier informed that on December 14, 1998 Norma
Trajano went [to] his office and made partial payment in the sum of P16,500 thru Mr. Romeo
Jamisola Jr., the [r]espondent told Mr. Romeo Jamisola to get the money from the filing
26
cabinet and while the money in the envelope [was] being handed over to Primitiva Del
Rosario, [the latter] and her daughter x x x, however, told [r]espondent to just let the money
in the sum of P16,500.00 be kept at the office of the [r]espondent so that future payments of
Norma Trajano will be save[d] in whole and for them to avoid spending the same as what
had happened to the past installment payments of Norma Trajano. Respondent then
acceded to the request of Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter and told them that they
can get the money anytime they want from the [r]espondent's office. Hence, the money was
kept locked [in] the filing cabinet of the [r]espondent where he used to keep all his personal
file[s]. Manikan

"5). On December 23, 1998, early before noon, Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, on a prior invitation, attended the Christmas Party of the office of
[r]espondent and undersigned counsel. x x x Respondent, after the x x x lunch, instructed
Mr. Romeo Jamisola Jr., to give the sum of money (P16,500.00) and for Primitiva Del
Rosario to receive the same for fear of a repetition of a burglary incident before, where some
cash and minor office appliances of undersigned were lost. Primitiva Del Rosario, however,
insisted that said sum of money be kept at the office of the [r]espondent to save in whole the
installment payments of Norma Trajano and that [was] the wish of her son Fernando 'Bong'
Del Rosario, who is a long time friend and a compadre of the [r]espondent. Respondent,
respecting the trust reposed upon him by Primitiva Del Rosario, her daughter Aurora Del
Rosario, and son Fernando Del Rosario, acceded to hold in trust the said sum of [s]ixteen
[t]housand [f]ive [h]undred (P16,500.00) [p]esos, Philippine [c]urrency, which [was] locked
and safely kept [in] the filing cabinet of the [r]espondent until February 12, 1999; x x x;

"6). On February 10, 1999 [during] the hearing of the Norma Trajano case before the Hon.
Adoracion G. Angeles, [r]espondent appeared shortly before 10:30 o'clock in the morning,
pursuant to a 'Motion to Call Case at 10:30 o'clock in the Morning x x x.

"7). When the said Norma Trajano [case] x x x was called on second call at 11[:]25 a.m., [i]n
said February 10, 1999 hearing, respondent was first scolded by the Honorable Court
(Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) x x x [for] giving more preference to the Metropolitan Trial
Court than her Court. Resp[o]ndent, however, beg[ged the] indulgence of the Honorable
Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) and explained why [he] first attend[ed] the
Mandaluyong hearing of Manny Chua's case, to wit; x x x. Oldmis o

"8). That it was during the course of [the] litany of sermon, [i]n that hour, made by the
Honorable Court addressed to the [r]espondent that Norma Trajano x x x butted in and
informed the Honorable Court (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles) that she will be tendering
another partial payment; it was at that moment that Judge Adoracion G. Angeles asked
Norma Trajano how much had she paid Primitiva Del Rosario, and, Norma [T]rajano
answered that she had already paid P36,500.00 as full payment for one case, and that of the
P36,500, P20,000.00 was paid to Primitiva Del Rosario and HESITANTLY said that the
P16,500 was paid to the [r]espondent. Judge Angeles then took the receipt from Norma
Trajano and had it xeroxed by a personnel of the Court. The carbon duplicate original of the
Receipt, dated [D]ecember 14, 1998, showing the receipt by the office of the [r]espondent,
through Romeo Jamisola Jr., whose printed [name] was pre[ceded] by the word 'By',
indicating that he received the sum of money on behalf of or in representation of the
[r]espondent, is hereto [attached] and marked as ANNEX '5', to form part hereof;

"9). That it was perhaps due to the belief [in] and the immediate impression of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles [of the] answer of Norma Traiano that prompted Judge Angeles to
ask, instantaneously in a loud manner, Primitiva Del Rosario IN TAGALOG', the question,
'NATANGGAP MO BA KAY ATTY. UY ANG PERA NA P16,500.00?'. Primitiva Del Rosario,
a seventy-year-old, who was shocked by the tone and the manner she was asked by Judge
Angeles simply just answered 'HINDI PO, KASI GUSTO [KO] PO NA MABUO ANG PERA'.
Primitiva Del Rosario, however, tried to explain her answer 'HINDI PO' and why she did not
yet [receive] the money from the [r]espondent by raising her hand but was prevented by
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from further answering by telling Primitiva Del Rosario to stop.
27
With that answer of Primitiva Del Rosario, [r]espondent butted in to explain Primitiva Del
Rosario's answer of 'HINDI PO' and her having not yet received the sum of money, subject
of the inquisition of Judge Angeles by manifesting to wit; x x x that Primitiva Del Rosario did
not get the money when x x x handed the same on December 15, 1998 because she wanted
[it] to be save[d] in whole together with the future installment payments of Norma Trajano
and to be kept in the office of the [r]espondent as wished by her son Bong Del Rosario; and,
that the said sum of money [was] kept in the filing cabinet in the office of the [r]espondent. All
explanation[s] of the [r]espondent went to x x x naught as the [r]espondent was cut short by
x x x Judge Angeles, [who] in a loud and angry voice orally directed the [r]espondent to get
the money from [r]espondent's office and give the same to Primitiva Del Rosario. It was
already 11 :45 o'clock in the morning, more or less, an the [r]espondent was given fifteen
(15) minutes to comply; [r]espondent requested Judge Angeles to be accompanied by
Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario but both were ordered to stay in
court by Judge Angeles; Ncm

"10). Respondent in compliance with the oral order of Judge Angeles immediately
proceeded [to] his office but only to find out that Romeo Jamisola Jr., who [held] the only key
[to r]esponddnt's filing cabinet, was on errand x x x that morning of February 10, 1999 [for]
Atty. Angel B. De Veyra (the Undersigned Counsel) [who had sent him] to the offices of the
solicitor general in Makati City, and, the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila to [furnish copies
to] both offices; x x x;

"11). Respondent, expecting that Romeo Jamisola Jr. would [arrive] before 12[:]00 noon, x x
x waited for Romeo Jamisola Jr. while at the same time called up [his] wife to immediately
[come] to his office to spare the sum of P16,500.00 as Romeo Ja[mi]sola may not [arrive]
[within] the time allotted by Judge Angeles. The wife of respondent, however, arrived at
about 12:25 P .M., more or less, ahead of Romeo Jamisola Jr. and spared [r]espondent the
sum of P16,500.00 and [r]espondent immediately went [to] the fourth floor, where the sala of
Judge Angeles [was] located but unfortunately the session was already adjourned.
Respondent then talked to 'Armand', one 'of the court personnel and is known as the door
keeper of the chamber of Judge Angeles, and [requested that he be allowed to go inside the
chamber to show [his] compliance, though late. Respondent, however, was told by 'Armand'
that Judge Angeles was on her lunch break an that it [was] better for [r]espondent to take his
lunch too and return a little later;Ncmmis

"12). At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day (February 10, 1999) [r]espondent
returned [to] the sala of Judge Angeles together with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter
Aurora Del Rosario, who likewise returned to the court, to seek an audience in [the] chamber
[of] Judge Angeles. Said audience with Judge Angeles was desired by Primitiva Del Rosario
to let Judge Angeles [witness] the giving of the money to Primitiva Del Rosario. But
request[s] for the same, through 'Armand', were twice denied by Judge Angeles because at
that time Judge Angeles was being interviewed by several media personnel of some TV
stations. The Del [Rosarios], however, left earlier upon knowing that Judge Angeles denied
their request for an audience. [They] told [r]espondent that they will be back the following
day. It was only when Romeo Jamisola arrived at about 3:00 o'clock, more or less, in the
afternoon and went at the fourth floor at the premises of the sala of Judge Angeles and
informed the [r]espondent that he carried with him the key to [r]espondent's cabinet and the
presence of some [squatter] families of Batasan Hills, Quezon City at the office of the
[r]espondent, who has an appointment with the [r]espondent, that the [r]espondent left the
premises of the sala of Judge Angeles. [sic] Respondent, at his office ordered Romeo
Jamisola Jr. to open the filing cabinet and returned to the premises of the sala of Judge
Angeles alone at about 4:00 o'clock P .M. after his meeting with the squatter families. But
again, his request to 'Armand' to talk with Judge Angeles, after the media interview, was
denied. At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, 'Armand', the court personnel, served the
Order, of said date, February 10, 1999 at the office of the [r]espondent;

"13). In the early afternoon of the following day, February 11, 1999, [r]espondent together
with Primitiva Del Rosario and her daughter Aurora Del Rosario went again [to] the sala of
28
 Judge Angeles x x x to seek an audience with Judge Angeles. Their request x x x w[as]
likewise in vain. Primitiva Del Rosario, after the last attempt to seek audience with Judge
Angeles and already tired of going [to] and [from] the sala of Judge Angeles, decided on
February 12, 1999, to receive the sum of money in the amount of P16,500.00 from the office
of the [r]espondent, through, Romeo Jamisola Jr. and executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. x x
x;

"14). The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Primitiva Del Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 as well
as the Acknowledgment Receipt, dated February 12, 199[9] was attached to a Manifestation
caused to be filed by the [r]espondent on March 3, 1999 when the respondent was confined
in Fatima Hospital in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila on March 2, 1999; Scnc m

"15). Learning of the instant administrative case against the [r]espondent, Bong Del Rosario,
the son of Primitiva Del Rosario, upon whose wish the subject sum of money was kept at the
office of the [r]espondent to save the same in whole as well as the future in[s]tallment
payments of Norma Trajano executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, attesting [to] and confirming
the statement of [his] mother Primitiva Del Rosario. x x x"[3]

Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, the Comment contends that the respondent kept the money in his office
because that was the alleged wish of both his client and her son. He allegedly informed them of such
money and tried to give it to them, but they insisted that he retain it. He further maintained that it was only
after Judge Angeles issue the February 10, 1999 Order that his client relented and accepted the money on
February 12, 1999.

After the judge filed her Reply on June 30, 1999, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for report and recommendation. The Court dispensed with the normal referral to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines because the records were complete and the question raised was simple. No further
factual investigation was necessary in the premises.

Bar Confidant's Report and Recommendation

Recommending that Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .be suspended from the practice of law for one month, the
Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1999 said: Sdaa miso

"x x x [I]t is clear that it is the sworn duty of a member of the bar to be accountable, at all
times, for anything which he receives for and in behalf of his client.

"In the case at bar, this Office is more inclined to believe the story of the complainant.

"First, it cannot be disputed that the transcript of stenographic notes is the most reliable
record of what indeed transpired (and what words were uttered by the parties involved) on
February 10, 1999 at the hearing of Crim. Case No. C-54176-77 (98). Records clearly show
that the private complainant in the criminal case, when asked by Judge Angeles as to the
whereabouts of the P16,500.00, spontaneously replied that she had no knowledge of the
same; in effect saying that Atty. Uy has not given her the subject 16,500.00. If, indeed,
Primitiva Del Rosario requested Atty. Uy to keep the money as far back as December 1998,
then she should have told the same to Judge Angeles.

"Atty. Uy's allegation that Judge Angeles prevented Primitiva Del Rosario from saying in
open court the words 'HINDI PO KASI GUSTO KO PO NA MABUO ANG PERA' does not
have any proof as nothing of that sort appears in the transcript of stenographic notes. Atty.
Uy has not even bothered to refute the truth of the contents of the stenographic notes, all the
more bolstering this Office's opinion that the said notes are accurate and truthful. Sdaad

"Second, the affidavits executed by Primitiva Del Rosario and her son, Fernando Del
Rosario, dated February 16, 1999 and June 7, 1999, respectively, attesting to Atty. Uy's
averment that his act of personally keeping the subject P16,500.00 was with and at their
29
 request cannot be given much credence to outweigh the arguments of Judge Angeles. The
said affidavits, both executed after February 10, 1999, are suspect. Caught by surprise when
Judge Angeles inquired of the whereabouts of his client's money, Atty. Uy x x x resorted to
seeking the help of his client to corroborate his defense. Being the clients of Atty. Uy,
Primitiva Del Rosario and her son could have been persuaded to help extricate their counsel
from the latter's predicament.

"In the absence of any contradicting evidence to dispute the allegation that Atty. Uy failed to
immediately remit to his client the money due the latter, it is safe to conclude that Atty. Uy
has violated his sworn duty to uphold, at all times, the trust and confidence reposed in him
by his client(s).

xxxxxxxxx

"In the instant case, Atty. Uy, upon receipt of the P16,500.00 from the accused in the
criminal case, should have promptly remitted the same to his client, Primitiva Del Rosario.
Had Judge Angeles not inquired of the whereabouts of the money, the same would have
remained with Atty. Uy, to the prejudice of the latter's client."[4]

This Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. Scs daad

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being
done for the protection of the client."[5]

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the
Code also states that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client." The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit:

"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Sup rema

"Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."[6]

In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had
received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount had been
entrusted to respondent on December 14, 1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing
that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.

Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario about the payment. He
further avers that he kept the money up n her instruction, as she had allegedly wanted "future payments x x
[to] be saved in whole and for them to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past
installment payments x x x."[7] This assertion allegedly finds support in her answer to the question of Judge
Angeles, who had asked her whether she had received the disputed payment: "Hindi po, kasi gusto [ko] po
na mabuo ang pera."

The Court is not persuaded. Respondent's assertions are contradicted by the following transcript of
stenographic notes:

"Court: This P16,500, did you turn it over to the private complainant?
30
 Atty. Uy: No your Honor, because she wanted the full amount of the settlement.

Court: Private complainant, is it true that you did not want to accept the money?

Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po, sila po ang nagbigayan. Juris

Court: Hindi po ibinibigay sa inyo ni Atty. Uy?

Mrs. Del Rosario: Hindi po.

xxxxxxxxx

Court: Nasaan iyong P16,500? Huwag kayong matakot.

Mrs. Del Rosario: Aywan ko po sa kanilang dalawa."[8]

If it were true that Mrs. Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted it to
respondent, she would have known its whereabouts. That she did not know it showed the falsity of his
claim.

It is noteworthy that respondent did not dispute the foregoing transcript although it belied his allegation that
Mrs. Del Rosario's express wish was to have the payments in full. Sc juris

Neither are we convinced by the affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her son, both of whom affirmed their
intention to have their money in the safekeeping of respondent. It should be stressed that he was her
counsel and the compadre of her son. Moreover, the affidavits were executed after the filing of this
Complaint. As the Office of the Bar Confidant observed, these considerations militate against the credibility
of the affiants. In any event, their affidavits fail to explain adequately why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the
hearing on February 10, 1999, did not know where her money was.

The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs,
Del Rosario acknowledge that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that
respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional
responsibility. Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia,[9] the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of his
clients must be immediately turned over to them. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[10] the Court held that "lawyers are
bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to
do so constitutes professional misconduct."

Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether
the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.[11] In this case, respondent has not done so.
Indeed, we agree with the following observation of the Office of the Bar Confidant:

"Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy
the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This
situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must
not only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice
system would remain undisturbed."[12]Juris sc

In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their
clients and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may
stand unequal.[13] The present situation calls for the exercise of this duty.

For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money they received on behalf of their
clients, some lawyers have been disbarred[14] and others have been suspended for six months.[15] In the
present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report that he received money on
behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation. Under the circumstances, we rule that
he should be suspended for one month.
31
WHEREFORE, Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr .is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on Atty. Thomas C. Uy Jr. at his given address or any other known
one. Copies of this Decision shall also be entered in his record as attorney and served on the IBP, as well
as the Court Administrator who shall circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

32
FERNANDO C. CRUZ AND AMELIA CRUZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO C.
JACINTO, respondents. Jurisä

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In their sworn complaint, spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo Cruz seek the disbarment of
Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo of
the Commissioner on Bar discipline, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, he submitted his Findings and
Recommendation, thusly:

This is a disbarment case filed by the spouses Fernando and Amelia Cruz against Atty.
Ernesto C. Jacinto. This case was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline last 30
January 1991.

The evidence of the complainants show that sometime in June 1990, Atty. Ernesto Jacinto,
lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case, requested the Cruz spouses for a loan in behalf of
a certain Concepcion G. Padilla, who he claimed to be an old friend as she was allegedly in
need of money. The loan requested was for PhP 285,000.00 payable after 100 days for PhP
360,000 to be secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon
City. Scä juris

The spouses, believing and trusting the representations of their lawyer that Padilla was a
good risk, authorized him to start preparing all the necessary documents relative to the
registration of the Real Estate Mortgage to secure the payment of the loan in favor of the
Cruz spouses.

On 4 July 1990, the complainants agreed to the request of Atty. Jacinto and were presented
by the latter with a Real Estate Mortgage Contract and a Transfer Certificate of Title No.
127275 in the name of Concepcion G. Padilla. The amount of PhP 285,000.00 was given by
the spouses to the respondent in cash (PhP 270,000.00) and a PBCom check no. 713929
for PhP 15,000.00.

Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the spouses demanded payment from
Concepcion G. Padilla by going to the address given by the respondent but there proved to
be no person by that name living therein. When the complainants verified the genuineness of
TCT No. 127275 with Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was certified by the said office to
be a fake and spurious title. Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor likewise proved
futile. Jurisä sc

In their sworn affidavits given before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the spouses
claim that they relied much on the reassurances made by Atty. Jacinto as to Concepcion G.
Padillas credit, considering that he was their lawyer. It was also their trust and confidence in
Atty. Jacinto that made them decide to forego meeting the debtor-mortgagor.

The complainants evidence also included the sworn statements of Estrella Ermino-Palipada,
the secretary of the respondent at the Neri Law Office, and Avegail Payos, a housemaid of
Atty. Jacinto. Ms. Palipada stated that:

1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Receipt of the
loan upon the instruction of the respondents;

2. she was a witness to the transaction and never once saw the person of Concepcion G.
Padilla, the alleged mortgagor; and that

33
3. she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to notarize the said contract by signing the
name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri.

Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in turn stated that she was the one who
simulated the signature of one Emmanuel Gimarino, the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Quezon City upon the instruction of Atty. Jacinto. This was done to make it appear that the
real estate mortgage was registered and the annotation to appear at the back of the TCT as
an encumbrance.

On 14 November 1997, a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public documents under Art.
315 was filed against Atty. Jacinto. He was arrested and detained by the NBI.

The defense of the respondent, on the other hand, was embodied in his Answer with Motion
to Dismiss filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline. Therein, he alleged that the criminal
information for estafa thru falsification filed against him had already been dismissed because
of the voluntary desistance of the complainants. MisjÓ uris

In his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that while he indeed facilitated the loan
agreement between the Cruz spouses and Concepcion G. Padilla, he had no idea that the
latter would give a falsified Certificate of Title and use it to obtain a loan. He claimed that he
himself was a victim under the circumstances.

Respondent further alleged that he had not been remiss nor negligent in collecting the
proceeds of the loan; that in fact, he had even advanced the full payment of the loan due to
the complainants from his own savings, even if Concepcion G. Padilla had not yet paid,
much less found.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is every lawyers sworn duty to obey the laws of the land to promote respect for law and
legal processes. The Code of Professional Responsibility command that he shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility) Jjä lex

In the instant case, there was a clear yet unrebutted allegation in the complaint that the
Respondent had ordered his secretary and housemaid to falsify the signatures of the notary
public and the Deputy Register of Deeds respectively to make it appear that the real estate
mortgage contract was duly registered and thus binding.

While it may be true that the complaint for Estafa thru Falsification filed against the
Respondent had been dismissed, the dismissal was because of the complainants voluntary
desistance and not a finding of innocence. It neither confirms nor denies Respondents non-
culpability. Furthermore, it is well-settled that disciplinary proceedings are "sui generis", the
primary object of which is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the professions persons whose disregard of their
oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members
of the bar. Thus, disciplinary cases may still proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or
criminal cases against a lawyer.

A lawyer who does any unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may and should be held
administratively liable therefor. In the case at bar, the Respondent should not be made an
exception. While it may be shown that he indeed advanced the payment due to his erstwhile
clients, such will not exempt him from administrative liability. At best it can only mitigate.
Respondent is recommended to be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.

(Findings and Recommendation, pp. 1-4) NewÓ miso

34
On February 28, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution XIII-97-199 adopting and
approving the Findings and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, respondent
Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for his
unlawful, fraudulent or dishonest act.

(Notice of resolution [dated Feb. 28, 1998]).

In his Comment and Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent averred that complainants have no cause
of action against him as the same has been waived, settled, and extinguished on account of the affidavits
of voluntary desistance and quitclaim executed by them in the criminal case filed against him. Ncmmis

The assertion must necessarily fail. The practice of law is so intimately affected with public interest that it is
both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The
Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. Since the practice of law is inseparably
connected with the exercise of its judicial power in administration of justice, the Court cannot be divested of
its constitutionally ordained prerogative which includes the authority to discipline, suspend or disbar any
unfit and unworthy member of the Bar by a mere execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance and
quitclaim (par. [5], Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution).

A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court (Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408
[1997]), and the complainants who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct are
in no sense a party, and have generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]).

Undeniably, respondent represented complainants in the loan transaction. By his own admission, he was
the one who negotiated with the borrower, his long-time friend and a former client. He acted not merely as
an agent but as a lawyer of complaints, thus, the execution of the real estate mortgage contract, as well as
its registration and annotation on the title were entrusted to him. In fact, respondent even received his
share in the interest earnings which complainants realized from the transaction. His refusal to recognize
any wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is likewise a victim when it was shown that the title to
the property, the registration of the real estate mortgage contract, and the annotation thereon were all
feigned, will not at all exonerate him. Scncm

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. However, the measure of good faith which an attorney is
required to exercise in his dealings with this client is a much higher standard than is required in business
dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client
are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys
favor (Nakpit vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758 [1998]). Further, his fidelity to the cause of his client requires him
to be evermindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.

Verily, a lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence at the highest degree (Maturan vs. Gonzales, 287
SCRA 943 [1998]). Sdaamiso

35
Respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights
and interests of his clients and by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibilities must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the
entire membership of the Bar as a whole.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and orders respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. Sdaad

SO ORDERED.

36
December 8, 1923

VICENTE DIAZ, complainant,

vs.
RUPERTO KAPUNAN, respondent.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

Perfecto Gabriel and Rafael Palma for respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:

This action for malpractice brought by Vicente Diaz against Attorney Ruperto Kapunan, has to do with the
conduct of Attorney Kapunan during the legal proceedings which followed the business troubles of Vicente
Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona, and particularly relates to the conduct of Attorney Kapunan in civil
case No. 2098 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The ultimate question on which we would concentrate
attention concerns the agreement between Diaz and Kapunan at the time of the sale of the property of
Mendoza, whereby Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay him P1,000, agreed to desist from further
participation in the sale, all in alleged violation of article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal
Code.

Omitting the irrelevant matter interjected into this case, the principal facts of record are the following:

In 1917, Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into extensive
business transactions in the Province of Leyte. The capital of the partnership was P380,000. Unfortunately,
however, the business failed to prosper, with the result that on liquidation, it was found to have suffered a
loss of P67,000. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up their affairs, they eventually formulated a
document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of
P80,000 and an additional sum of P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon the hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid
within the term of one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was
unable to meet the payment. There followed the usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale, which, after
considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at public auction.

At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922, there appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his lawyer
Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, is authority for the
statement that Kapunan told him that he, Kapunan, was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order
to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial straits. At any rate, the bidding was opened by
Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz
offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement, of
decisive importance, which we next quote in full:

We, Vicente Diaz and Ruperto Kapunan, both being the bidders at the auction held for the sale of
the properties of Secundino Mendezona, do hereby agreed that Don Ruperto Kapunan should
withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding at the said auction as he does hereby withdraw his bid,
and in consideration thereof, the said Mr. Diaz offers him a premium of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) which, out of consideration to said Don Vicente Diaz, Mr. Kapunan accepts and has, for
this reason, refrained from bidding in competition with said Mr. Diaz.lawphi1.net

Tacloban, Leyte, December 23, 1922.

(Sgd.) "V. DIAZ. (Sgd.) RUPERTO KAPUNAN."

Following the termination of the sheriff's sale, Diaz on December 26, 1922, gave Kapunan P500 of the
P1,000 mentioned in the above quoted document. Diaz further followed the usual procedure to take over
the property of Mendezona pursuant to his bid of P12,500, which covered the amount of the mortgage with
its accumulated interest and with the judicial expenses.

37
Although it was on December 23, 1922, that Diaz and Kapunan entered into the agreement, Diaz could
only wait until January 4, 1923, following, to lay before this court charges against Attorney Kapunan for
alleged unprofessional conduct. Undoubtedly, before Kapunan had knowledge of the disbarment
proceedings, on January 10, 1923, he presented a motion in the Court of First Instance of Leyte asking that
he be permitted to retain the P500 in question, in part payment of his professional fees. Later, on February
4, 1923, when Kapunan must have had knowledge of the disbarment proceedings, he filed another motion,
withdrawing his former motion and asking the court to permit him to turn over the P500 to Diaz, which
Judge Causing refused to do on the ground that it was a personal matter. Nevertheless, on July 10, 1923,
the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Leyte handed the P500 to Diaz who, in turn, receipted for that
amount. lawphil.net

From correspondence, it further is evident that the family of Mendezona was led to believe that the P500
would shortly be sent them. Without doubt, the Mendezona family would have been gratified to receive
even the P500 pittance out of the business wreck in Leyte of the senior Mendezona.

During much of the time here mentioned, Kapunan was the attorney of Mendezona. Kapunan was given
extensive authority by the letter of Mendezona of April 12, 1919. When Kapunan took part in the sale, it
must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his client and for the benefit of the client.

It remains to be said that following the presentation of the charges against Attorney Kapunan in this court,
he was given an opportunity to answer, and the usual investigation of his professional conduct was made
by the provincial fiscal of Leyte acting under the supervision of the Attorney-General. From the report of the
fiscal, indorsed by the Attorney-General, three charges seem to have been considered. The first two,
relating to Kapunan's attempt to represent both the parties in the case, and to molest and disturb Diaz by
frivolous motions, the law officer of the Government finds not substantiated; and with this conclusion we
fully agree. The third charge is more serious and has to do with Kapunan having intervened in the manner
in which he did in the sale of the property of his client Mendezona. The Attorney-General is of the opinion
on this point that the facts constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code
and article 542 of the Penal Code. "In view thereof, it is recommended that corrective measures
commensurate with the irregularity committed by Attorney Kapunan, be taken against him."

Article 1459 of the Civil Code was held in force in the case of Hernandez vs. Villanueva ([1920], 40 Phil.,
775). It provides that the following persons, naming them, "cannot take by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another." The provision contained in the last
paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers, with respect to any property or rights involved in any
litigation in which they may take party by virtue of their profession and office. We do not believe this article
has been infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased property at a public or judicial auction
and because his participation in the auction was in representation of his client. It has been held that an
execution sale to the attorney of the defendant is not unlawful if made in good faith, with the consent of the
client, and without any purpose of defrauding the latter's creditors. (2 R. C. L., 1011; 1 Thornton on
Attorneys at Law, pp. 298, 299; Smith vs. Smith [1848], 1 Iowa, 307.)

The more puzzling question relates to the alleged violation by Attorney Kapunan of article 542 of the Penal
Code. This article punishes "any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a consideration for agreeing
to refrain from taking part in any public auction." The crime is consummated by the mere act of soliciting a
gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining from taking part in the auction. Not permitting our minds to be
confused by the varied explanations of Diaz and Kapunan, the document formulated by them and
hereinbefore quoted, demonstrates that Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from
further participation in the sale of the property of Mendezona, which is exactly the situation covered by
article 542 of the Penal Code.

Public policy discountenances combinations or agreements on the part of bidders at execution sales, the
objects and effects of which are to stifle competition. The courts will consider an agreement between a
judgment creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold under an execution, that neither
shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties concerned know of the arrangement and consent
thereto. Execution sales should be open to free and full competition, in order to secure the maximum
benefit for the debtor. Article 542 of the Penal Code is, therefore, a wise provision even though rarely

38
invoked, and should be used to discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales. (23 C.J., 647;
Packard vs. Bird and Chapman [1870], 40 Cal., 378; 3 Viada, Codigo Penal, 594.)

We conclude that Attorney Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of article 542 of the Penal
Code. But we cannot adopt the vigorous recommendation of the Attorney-General, for we consider present
certain mitigating circumstances which exert an influence in favor of the respondent. In the first place, as
disclosed by the judicial records, no reported prosecution under article 542 has been attempted, which is
eloquent proof of the practical disuse of this article; and the Spanish jurisprudence, while indicative of the
meaning of the article, relies principally on the decisions of the French Court of Cassation. (See Code of
Napoleon, arts. 222, 223; decisions of the French Court of Cassation of October 16, 1844, May 15, 1857,
and January 8, 1863.) In the next place, the complainant Diaz is equally guilty with the respondent
Kapunan. And lastly, Kapunan appears to have been acting in good faith for his client, although adopting
an irregular procedure, and although attempting to make tardy restitution of the money received by him.

Our judgment is that Attorney Ruperto Kapunan shall stand reprimanded and that the complainant, Vicente
Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the P500 received by Diaz
from the clerk and receipted for by Diaz, and the clerk of court shall transmit the P500 to Secundino de
Mendezona or, in case of his absence, to Miss Carmen de Mendezona. Costs shall be taxed in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.

39
LEONITO GONATO and PRIMROSE GONATO complainants, vs. ATTY. CESILO A.
ADAZA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.: Sclaw

At bar is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by the complainant spouses Leonito and Primrose
Gonato against their former counsel, Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza, charging him with malpractice and violation of
trust. Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the Resolution of the Court dated December 1,
1993, the present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

It appears that sometime in February, 1993, complainants engaged the services of respondent as their
counsel in Civil Case No. 92-263 entitled Goking vs. Yacapin, et al." filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, wherein complainants were among the defendants in said case. Complainants alleged
that respondent demanded from them the sum of P15,980.00 to be used in paying the docket fee and other
court fees in connection with the aforementioned case. Said amount was loaned to complainants by a
friend, Vic Manzano, who delivered the same to respondent, as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt
dated February 10, 1993 and signed by respondent's secretary, Mayette Salceda. Thereafter, complainants
asked for the official receipts evidencing the amount of court fees purportedly paid by respondent. Vic
Manzano told complainants that respondent only gave him photocopies of two Republic of the Philippines
receipts with numbers 9627143 (Exhibit "C") dated February 11, 1993, in the amount of P15,830.00; and
7447868 (Exhibit "D") also dated February 11, 1993, in the amount of P150.00. Dissatisfied, complainant
Primrose Gonato personally went to respondent's law office at least three times, and asked for the original
copies of the receipts, but to no avail. Primrose's suspicion grew stronger, and this prompted her to verify
the authenticity of said receipts with the office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City. There, it was discovered that the triplicate original copies of the receipts did not reflect the
same amount contained on the photocopies of the receipts given by respondent. Receipt No. 9627143 in
the Clerk of Court's Office showed only the amount of P2,470.00 and was Dated May 15, 1992, while that
given by respondent bore the amount of P15,830.00. On the other hand, Receipt No. 7447868 per Office of
Clerk of Court records revealed the sum of P4,000.00, while that provided by respondent disclosed the sum
of P150.00, presumably to conform to the amount paid by complainant which was P15,980.00.
Complainants demanded the return of P15,980.00 but respondent refused to do so. Thus, in April, 1993,
complainants urged respondent to withdraw as counsel due to loss of trust and confidence.

For his part, respondent lawyer admits that he received from Vic Manzano the amount of P15,980.00 which
was initially intended to cover the filing fees, sheriff fees, and U.P. Law Center fees in the filing of
counterclaim on behalf of herein complainants. But according to him, after careful study, he realized that
the counterclaim is compulsory and not permissive, and so he applied instead the aforesaid sum of
P15,980.00 to his acceptance and appearance fees, which fact was even communicated to Vic Manzano,
who was complainants' contact or liason person with respondent. Respondent also specifically denied that
he caused the delivery of the falsified photocopies of O.R. Nos. 9627143 and 7447868 to complainant
spouses. Sclex

In its Resolution dated January 28, 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation with an amendment
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found sufficient evidence to sustain complainants' claim that
respondent charged them the amount of P15,980.00 for filing fees when in fact no such fees were due. It
rejected respondent's claim that the subject amount was applied to his attorney's fees as this is belied by
the statement of account he issued to complainants indubitably showing that complainants were charged of
said amount for filing fees.

This Court is in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP that respondent lawyer has
sufficiently demonstrated conduct showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the

40
attorney-client relationship. His act of requiring complainants to pay an exorbitant amount on the pretext
that it was needed for the payment of court fees which were not even substantiated by proper official
receipts, constitutes malpractice which is a serious breach of professional duty toward complainants whose
trust respondent disregarded and violated. Respondent expressly admitted having received the money, but
he persistently refused to return the same despite repeated demands by the complainants. This conduct of
the respondent is clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness, as he was clinging to
something which was not his and to which he absolutely had no right. Respondents shallow excuse that he
applied said money to his attorney's fees is merely an afterthought and cannot justify his refusal to return
the same, as this was made without the acquiescence of the complainants. It is settled that the conversion
by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession (Obia vs. Catimbang, 196 SCRA 23 [1991]). Likewise, respondent
offered no solid proof to support his denial that he delivered the two falsified receipts to complainants. Xlaw

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be
done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).

The facts and evidence obtaining in this case glaringly reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as
a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon 16 which provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession." As a member of the Bar, respondent was and is expected to always
live up to the standards embodied in said Code particularly Canons 15, 16, 17 and 20, for the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith
(Igual vs. Javier 254 SCRA 416 [1996]). The Court believes that a longer period of suspension than that
recommended by the IBP is called for under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is further ordered to restitute to complainants the amount of P15,980.00 within
30 days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his unsatisfied
attorney's fees, if any. Let copies of this resolution be furnished all courts in the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and let it be spread in respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.

41
A.C. No. 7418 October 9, 2007

ANDREA BALCE CELAJE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C. Soriano (respondent) for gross
misconduct.

In the Complaint dated June 1, 2005 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Andrea Balce
Celaje (complainant) alleged that respondent asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond, which
complainant found out later, however, to be unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the
trial court. Respondent also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or to be given to
the judge handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga City, Branch 36.
When complainant approached Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent was saying was true,
Judge Quijano outrightly denied the allegations and advised her to file an administrative case against
respondent.1

In his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that the same were merely
concocted by complainant to destroy his character. He also contended that it was complainant who boasted
that she is a professional fixer in administrative agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that complainant
promised to pay him large amounts of attorney's fees which complainant however did not keep.2

Both parties appeared in the Mandatory Conference and Hearing on January 18, 2006. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision.3

In the Report and Recommendation dated January 24, 2006, IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct in his relations with his client
and recommended that respondent be suspended for three years from the practice of law.4

In the Report, Commissioner Funa found that:

During the hearing conducted, Complainant alleged that she has remitted to Respondent, on
various dates, amounts of money totaling to more or less P270,000.00.

According to Complainant the amounts given in several instances were all undocumented and not
acknowledged in writing.

However, for the alleged amount of P14,000.00 intended for an injunction bond, some
documents in writing were made.

xxxx

While the amounts remitted by Complainant to Respondent were never acknowledged in writing and
were not documented, due credence must be given to Complainant's allegations especially over
the amount of P14,800.00 intended for the injunction. Indeed, there is no ill-motive at all on the
part of Complainant to fabricate charges against Respondent. Unfortunately, none of
the P270,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent was ever documented and therefore
accuracy of the amounts could not be established and substantiated.

What has been documented only pertains to the unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond.
However, it has been established that indeed an accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been

42
 remitted by Respondent to Valentina Ramos and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains
unaccounted for by the Respondent.

During the hearing conducted, Complainant reiterated her accusations against the Respondent and
expressed that she has been aggrieved and misled by Respondent. According to Complainant, this
was made possible because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on legal matters and
practices. Respondent has only offered denials to the charges. However, the circumstances gives
credibility to herein Complainant in the absence of any evil motive on her part.

Accordingly, Respondent is clearly guilty of misappropriating his client's funds in the amount
of P5,800.00. While other amounts may have been misappropriated, Complainant
alleges P270,000.00, the exactness of the amounts could not be established.

Respondent is also guilty of deceiving his client and abusing his client's confidence in requesting
for several amounts of money on the pretense that he had to spend for and pay the trial
judge.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the unaccounted for amount of Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P5,800.00) to Complainant, submitting a Compliance Report
thereon.5

On September 8, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and Approve, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A-; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for misappropriating his client's funds, Atty. Santiago C.
Soriano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise Ordered to
immediately deliver that unaccounted amount of P5,800.00 to complainant.6

The IBP transmitted the Notice of Resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors as well as the records
of the case, pursuant to Rule 139-B.7 Then in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated February 20,
2007, the IBP through Director for Discipline Rogelio Vinluan informed the Court that per records of the
IBP, no Motion for Reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Court agrees with the IBP Resolution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16 thereof, mandates that a lawyer shall
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He shall account for
all money or property collected or received from his client8 and shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand.9

As found by Commissioner Funa, it was established that respondent could not account for P5,800.00 which
was part of the sum given by complainant to him for the purpose of filing an injunctive bond. Respondent
admitted having received from complainant P17,800.00 on April 19, 2002 for the preliminary
injunction10 and admitted to having a balance of P9,000.00 in his promissory note to the Manila Insurance
Co., Inc. dated April 23, 2002, which was reduced to P5,800.00 by reason of an additional payment
of P4,000.00,11 leaving an amount of P5,800.00 unaccounted for. The affidavit of the insurance agent,
Valentina Ramos, dated December 8, 2005 also states that even up to said date, respondent had not yet
paid the balance of P5,800.00.12

Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.13 It is a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics and impairs public confidence in
the legal profession which deserves punishment.14

43
As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to his client.15

The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar
who are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is a privilege.16 The
attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity
and disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.17

In Small v. Banares18 the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the CPR,
particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by his client, and for
failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this
case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in
order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his clients through Andrea Balce Celaje, within 30 days from
notice, the amount of P5,800.00. Respondent is directed to submit to the Court proof of payment within
fifteen days from payment of the full amount.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

44
ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAEZ, respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:

Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein complainant)
was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S. 89-353 and assigned to Prosecutor
Diosdado S. Ibaez (herein respondent) for preliminary investigation. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion
Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System (SSS) contribution in
arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by the
SSS on October 2, 1989.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint
for professional misconduct against Ibaez due to the latters failure to remit the SSS contributions of his sister-in-law. The
complaint alleged that respondents misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascuals SSS contributions amounted to a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of
Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court observing
that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the case, the Tarlac Chapter forwarded the
same to IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascuals request to make payment
to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian charity. Furthermore, he claimed
that the action was moot and academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having already been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly,
he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts complained were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing
lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be reprimanded, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely in the future. On November 5, 1998, the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its Commissions recommendation.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While
there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear
however, that the same was made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the duties of a
provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office.
This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected
and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from Encarnacion
Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS does not
excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to a
lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held that (t)he relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The failure of
respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for
his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.[2]
Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private
lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon
assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because
a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye.[3] Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.[4]

45
 ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the
similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future.
LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

46
G.R. No. L-35702 May 29, 1973

DOMINGO D. RUBIAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ISAIAS BATILLER, defendant-appellee.

Gregorio M. Rubias for plaintiff-appellant.

Vicente R. Acsay for defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as involving purely legal questions, we affirm
the dismissal order rendered by the Iloilo court of first instance after pre-trial and submittal of the pertinent
documentary exhibits.

Such dismissal was proper, plaintiff having no cause of action, since it was duly established in the record
that the application for registration of the land in question filed by Francisco Militante, plaintiff's vendor and
predecessor interest, had been dismissed by decision of 1952 of the land registration court as affirmed by
final judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals and hence, there was no title or right to the land that could
be transmitted by the purported sale to plaintiff.

As late as 1964, the Iloilo court of first instance had in another case of ejectment likewise upheld by final
judgment defendant's "better right to possess the land in question . having been in the actual possession
thereof under a claim of title many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff."

Furthermore, even assuming that Militante had anything to sell, the deed of sale executed in 1956 by him in
favor of plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was concededly his counsel of record in the land registration case
involving the very land in dispute (ultimately decided adversely against Militante by the Court of Appeals'
1958 judgment affirming the lower court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration) was properly
declared inexistent and void by the lower court, as decreed by Article 1409 in relation to Article 1491 of the
Civil Code.

The appellate court, in its resolution of certification of 25 July 1972, gave the following backgrounder of the
appeal at bar:

On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the
ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu-99791 located in Barrio
General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco
Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered
said portions of the lot on two occasions — in 1945 and in 1959. Plaintiff prayed also for
damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-7, Record on Appeal). In his answer with counter-claim
defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of
the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open
and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions
of the lot in question and for the alleged malicious institution of the complaint he claims he
has suffered moral damages in the amount of P 2,000.00, as well as the sum of P500.00 for
attorney's fees. ...

On December 9, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order, after a pre-trial conference
between the parties and their counsel which order reads as follows..

'When this case was called for a pre-trial conference today, the plaintiff
appeared assisted by himself and Atty. Gregorio M. Rubias. The defendant
also appeared, assisted by his counsel Atty. Vicente R. Acsay.
47
 A. During the pre-trial conference, the parties have agreed that the following
facts are attendant in this case and that they will no longer introduced any
evidence, testimonial or documentary to prove them:

1. That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio of
General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be
surveyed on July 18-31, 1934, whereby he was issued a plan Psu-99791 (Exhibit "B"). (The
land claimed contained an area of 171:3561 hectares.)

2. Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
an application for the registration of the title of the land technically described in psu-99791
(Exh. "B") opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors.
However, during the war with Japan, the record of the case was lost before it was heard, so
after the war Francisco Militante petitioned this court to reconstitute the record of the case.
The record was reconstituted on the Court of the First Instance of Iloilo and docketed
as Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852. The Court of First Instance heard the land
registration case on November 14, 1952, and after the trial this court dismissed the
application for registration. The appellant, Francisco Militante, appealed from the decision of
this Court to the Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-GR No. 13497-R..

3. Pending the disposal of the appeal in CA-GR No. 13497-R and more particularly on June
18, 1956, Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land technically
described in psu-99791 (Exh. "A"). The sale was duly recorded in the Office of the Register
of Deeds for the province of Iloilo as Entry No. 13609 on July 11, 1960 (Exh. "A-1").

(NOTE: As per deed of sale, Exh. A, what Militante purportedly sold to plaintiff-appellant, his
son-in-law,for the sum of P2,000.00 was "a parcel of untitled land having an area Of
144.9072 hectares ... surveyed under Psu 99791 ... (and) subject to the exclusions made by
me, under (case) CA-i3497, Land Registration Case No. R-695, G.L.R.O. No. 54852, Court
of First Instance of the province of Iloilo. These exclusions referred to portions of the original
area of over 171 hectares originally claimed by Militante as applicant, but which he expressly
recognized during the trial to pertain to some oppositors, such as the Bureau of Public
Works and Bureau of Forestry and several other individual occupants and accordingly
withdrew his application over the same. This is expressly made of record in Exh. A, which is
the Court of Appeals' decision of 22 September 1958 confirming the land registration
court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration.)

4. On September 22,1958 the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13497-R promulgated its
judgment confirming the decision of this Court in Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No.
54852 which dismissed the application for Registration filed by Francisco Militante (Exh. "I").

5. Domingo Rubias declared the land described in Exh. 'B' for taxation purposes under Tax
Dec. No. 8585 (Exh. "C") for 1957; Tax Dec. Nos. 9533 (Exh. "C-1") and 10019 (Exh. "C-
3")for the year 1961; Tax Dec. No. 9868 (Exh. "C-2") for the year 1964, paying the land
taxes under Tax Dec. No. 8585 and 9533 (Exh. "D", "D-1", "G-6").

6. Francisco Militante immediate predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, has also declared

the land for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 5172 in 1940 (Exh. "E") for 1945; under
Tax Dec. No. T-86 (Exh. "E-1") for 1948; under Tax Dec. No. 7122 (Exh. "2"), and paid the
land taxes for 1940 (Exhs. "G" and "G-7"), for 1945 46 (Exh. "G-1") for 1947 (Exh. "G-2"), for
1947 & 1948 (Exh. "G-3"), for 1948 (Exh. "G-4"), and for 1948 and 1949 (Exh. "G-5").

7. Tax Declaration No. 2434 in the name of Liberato Demontaño for the land described
therein (Exh. "F") was cancelled by Tax. Dec. No. 5172 of Francisco Militante (Exh. "E").
Liberato Demontaño paid the land tax under Tax Dec. No. 2434 on Dec. 20, 1939 for the
years 1938 (50%) and 1959 (Exh. "H").

48
 8. The defendant had declared for taxation purposes Lot No. 2 of the Psu-155241 under Tax
Dec. Not. 8583 for 1957 and a portion of Lot No. 2, Psu-155241, for 1945 under Tax Dec.
No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A" Tax No. 8583 (Exh. "2") was revised by Tax Dec. No. 9498 in the name
of the defendant (Exh. "2-B") and Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A") was cancelled by Tax Dec.
No. 9584 also in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-C"). The defendant paid the land taxes
for Lot 2, Psu-155241, on Nov. 9, 1960 for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year 1950, and
for the year 1960 as shown by the certificate of the treasurer (Exh. "3"). The defendant may
present to the Court other land taxes receipts for the payment of taxes for this lot.

9. The land claimed by the defendant as his own was surveyed on June 6 and 7,1956, and a
plan approved by Director of Land on November 15, 1956 was issued, identified as Psu
155241 (Exh. "5").

10. On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against Isaias
Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo (Exh. "4") to
which the defendant Isaias Batiller riled his answer on August 29, 1960 (Exh. "4-A").
The Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo after trial, decided the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-B"). The plaintiff appealed from the decision
of the Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo which was docketed in this Court as Civil Case No.
5750 on June 3, 1961, to which the defendant, Isaias Batiller, on June 13, 1961 filed his
answer (Exh. "4-C"). And this Court after the trial. decided the case on November 26, 1964,
in favor of the defendant, Isaias Batiller and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-D").

(NOTE: As per Exh. 4-B, which is the Iloilo court of first instance decision of 26 November
1964 dismissing plaintiff's therein complaint for ejectment against defendant, the iloilo court
expressly found "that plaintiff's complaint is unjustified, intended to harass the defendant"
and "that the defendant, Isaias Batiller, has a better right to possess the land in question
described in Psu 155241 (Exh. "3"), Isaias Batiller having been in the actual physical
possession thereof under a claim of title many years before Francisco Militante sold the land
to the plaintiff-hereby dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendant attorney's fees ....")

B. During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent evidence the following:

1. That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A" was formerly owned
and possessed by Liberato Demontaño but that on September 6, 1919 the land was sold at
public auction by virtue of a judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs.
Liberato Demontaño Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of which Yap
Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite
Deed of Sale was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan. 19,
1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10, 1934 (Exh. "1-1").

2. On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco Militante as evidenced
by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940
(Exh. "J-1").

3. That plaintiff suffered damages alleged in his complaint.

C. Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the trial of this case the
following facts:

1. That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and possessed by Felipe
Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in 1920, as
his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and
possession of the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land remains

49
 in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual, open, public, peaceful and
continuous in the concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other
claimants.

2. That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never been in the actual
possession of the land and that they never had any title thereto.

3. That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of the defendant has
been approved.

4. The damages suffered by the defendant, as alleged in his counterclaim."'1

The appellate court further related the developments of the case, as follows:

On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on
the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
which he did, alleging thatplaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the
property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco
Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was
brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid
case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. Invoking
Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:

'Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Those expressly prohibited by law.

'ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a
public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another: .

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.'

defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute
as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp.
22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming
that defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the
same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third
persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal).

On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp.
42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically
agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism
Militante was null and void. In due season plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 50-
56 Record on Appeal) which was denied by the lower court on January 14, 1966 (p. 57,
Record on Appeal).

Hence, this appeal by plaintiff from the orders of October 18, 1965 and January 14, 1966.

50
 Plaintiff-appellant imputes to the lower court the following errors:

'1. The lower court erred in holding that the contract of sale between the
plaintiff-appellant and his father-in-law, Francisco Militante, Sr., now
deceased, of the property covered by Plan Psu-99791, (Exh. "A") was void,
not voidable because it was made when plaintiff-appellant was the counsel of
the latter in the Land Registration case.

'2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant-appellee is an

interested person to question the validity of the contract of sale between
plaintiff-appellant and the deceased, Francisco Militante, Sr.

'3. The lower court erred in entertaining the motion to dismiss of the
defendant-appellee after he had already filed his answer, and after the
termination of the pre-trial, when the said motion to dismiss raised a collateral
question.

'4. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff-appellant.'

The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs "assignment of errors gives rise to two (2) legal posers — (1)
whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law, the late Francisco Militante over
the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his
father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute; and (2) whether or not the lower
court was correct in entertaining defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss after the latter had already filed his
answer and after he (defendant) and plaintiff-appellant had agreed on some matters in a pre-trial
conference. Hence, its elevation of the appeal to this Court as involving pure questions of law.

It is at once evident from the foregoing narration that the pre-trial conference held by the trial court at which
the parties with their counsel agreed and stipulated on the material and relevant facts and submitted their
respective documentary exhibits as referred to in the pre-trial order, supra,2 practically amounted to a
fulldress trial which placed on record all the facts and exhibits necessary for adjudication of the case.

The three points on which plaintiff reserved the presentation of evidence at the-trial dealing with the source
of the alleged right and title of Francisco Militante's predecessors, supra,3 actually are already made of
record in the stipulated facts and admitted exhibits. The chain of Militante's alleged title and right to the land
as supposedly traced back to Liberato Demontaño was actually asserted by Militante (and his vendee,
lawyer and son-in-law, herein plaintiff) in the land registration case and rejected by the Iloilo land
registration court which dismissed Militante's application for registration of the land. Such dismissal, as
already stated, was affirmed by the final judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals.4

The four points on which defendant on his part reserved the presentation of evidence at the trial dealing
with his and his ancestors' continuous, open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner of the
land and the Director of Lands' approval of his survey plan thereof, supra,5 are likewise already duly
established facts of record, in the land registration case as well as in the ejectment case wherein the Iloilo
court of first instance recognized the superiority of defendant's right to the land as against plaintiff.

No error was therefore committed by the lower court in dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon defendant's
motion after the pre-trial.

1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and
justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was
predicated on the sale thereof for P2,000.00 made in 1956 by his father-in- law, Francisco Militante, in his
favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo
land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of Militante's application for
registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively
51
judicially determined. Hence, there was no right or title to the land that could be transferred or sold by
Militante's purported sale in 1956 in favor of plaintiff.

Manifestly, then plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute owner of the land and to be
restored to possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual or legal basis.

2. No error could be attributed either to the lower court's holding that the purchase by a lawyer of the
property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine
Civil Code, reproduced supra;6 and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from
his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to
the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article
1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void
by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived."

The 1911 case of Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez7 relied upon by plaintiff as holding that a sale of property
in litigation to the party litigant's lawyer "is not void but voidable at the election of the vendor" was correctly
held by the lower court to have been superseded by the later 1929 case of Director of Lands vs. Abagat.8 In
this later case of Abagat, the Court expressly cited two antecedent cases involving the same transaction of
purchase of property in litigation by the lawyer which was expressly declared invalid under Article 1459 of
the Civil Code of Spain (of which Article 1491 of our Civil Code of the Philippines is the counterpart) upon
challenge thereof not by the vendor-client but by the adverse parties against whom the lawyer was to
enforce his rights as vendee thus acquired.

These two antecedent cases thus cited in Abagat clearly superseded (without so expressly stating the
previous ruling in Wolfson:

The spouses, Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, were the owners of twelve parcels of
land. Vicenta Macaraeg died in November, 1909, leaving a large number of collateral heirs
but no descendants. Litigation between the surviving husband, Juan Soriano, and the heirs
of Vicenta immediately arose, and the herein appellant Sisenando Palarca acted as
Soriano's lawyer. On May 2, 1918, Soriano executed a deed for the aforesaid twelve parcels
of land in favor of Sisenando Palarca and on the following day, May 3, 1918, Palarca filed an
application for the registration of the land in the deed. After hearing, the Court of First
Instance declared that the deed was invalid by virtue of the provisions of article 1459 of the
Civil Code, which prohibits lawyers and solicitors from purchasing property rights involved in
any litigation in which they take part by virtue of their profession. The application for
registration was consequently denied, and upon appeal by Palarca to the Supreme Court,
the judgement of the lower court was affirmed by a decision promulgated November
16,1925. (G.R. No. 24329, Palarca vs. Director of Lands, not reported.)

In the meantime cadastral case No. 30 of the Province of Tarlac was instituted, and on
August 21, 1923, Eleuteria Macaraeg, as administratrix of the estate of Vicente Macaraeg,
filed claims for the parcels in question. Buenaventura Lavitoria administrator of the estate of
Juan Soriano, did likewise and so did Sisenando Palarca. In a decision dated June 21, 1927,
the Court of First Instance, Judge Carballo presiding, rendered judgment in favor of Palarea
and ordered the registration of the land in his name. Upon appeal to this court by the
administration of the estates of Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, the judgment of the
court below was reversed and the land adjudicated to the two estates as conjugal property of
the deceased spouses. (G.R. No. 28226, Director of Lands vs. Abagat, promulgated May 21,
1928, not reported.)9

In the very case of Abagat itself, the Court, again affirming the invalidity and nullity of the lawyer's purchase
of the land in litigation from his client, ordered the issuance of a writ of possession for the return of the land
by the lawyer to the adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses,
and ruled that "the appellant Palarca is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from
the beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad
faith."
52
As already stated, Wolfson and Abagat were decided with relation to Article 1459 of the Civil Code of Spain
then adopted here, until it was superseded on August 30, 1950 by the Civil Code of the Philippines whose
counterpart provision is Article 1491.

Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs
certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring
such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as
follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and
employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.

In Wolfson which involved the sale and assignment of a money judgment by the client to the lawyer,
Wolfson, whose right to so purchase the judgment was being challenged by the judgment debtor, the Court,
through Justice Moreland, then expressly reserved decision on "whether or not the judgment in question
actually falls within the prohibition of the article" and held only that the sale's "voidability can not be
asserted by one not a party to the transaction or his representative," citing from Manresa 10 that
"(C)onsidering the question from the point of view of the civil law, the view taken by the code, we must limit
ourselves to classifying as void all acts done contrary to the express prohibition of the statute. Now then: As
the code does not recognize such nullity by the mere operation of law, the nullity of the acts hereinbefore
referred to must be asserted by the person having the necessary legal capacity to do so and decreed by a
competent
court." 11

The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of the
Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of the vendor and not void — "that the
Code does not recognize such nullity de pleno derecho" — is no longer true and applicable to our own
Philippine Civil Code which does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly
prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." 12

The Supreme Court of Spain and modern authors have likewise veered from Manresa's view of the
Spanish codal provision itself. In its sentencia of 11 June 1966, the Supreme Court of Spain ruled that the
prohibition of Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code is based on public policy, that violation of the
prohibition contract cannot be validated by confirmation or ratification, holding that:

... la prohibicion que el articulo 1459 del C.C. establece respecto a los administradores y
apoderados, la cual tiene conforme a la doctrina de esta Sala, contendia entre otras, en S.
de 27-5-1959, un fundamento de orden moral lugar la violacion de esta a la nulidad de pleno
derecho del acto o negocio celebrado, ... y prohibicion legal, afectante orden publico, no
cabe con efecto alguno la aludida retification ... 13

The criterion of nullity of such prohibited contracts under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article
1491 of our Civil Code) as a matter of public order and policy as applied by the Supreme Court of Spain to
administrators and agents in its above cited decision should certainly apply with greater reason to judges,
judicial officers, fiscals and lawyers under paragraph 5 of the codal article.

Citing the same decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Gullon Ballesteros, his "Curso de Derecho Civil,
(Contratos Especiales)" (Madrid, 1968) p. 18, affirms that, with respect to Article 1459, Spanish Civil Code:.

Que caracter tendra la compra que se realice por estas personas? Porsupuesto no cabe
duda de que el caso (art.) 1459, 40 y 50, la nulidad esabsoluta porque el motivo de la
prohibicion es de orden publico. 14

Perez Gonzales in such view, stating that "Dado el caracter prohibitivo delprecepto, la consequencia de la
infraccion es la nulidad radical y ex lege." 15

Castan, quoting Manresa's own observation that.

53
"El fundamento do esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No sa trata con este precepto tan solo de guitar la ocasion
al fraude; persiguese, ademasel proposito de rodear a las personas que intervienen en la administrcionde
justicia de todos los retigios que necesitan pora ejercer su ministerio librandolos de toda suspecha, que
aunque fuere in fundada, redundura endescredito de la institucion." 16 arrives at the contrary and now
accepted view that "Puede considerace en nuestro derecho inexistente 'o radicalmente nulo el contrato en
los siguentes cases: a) ...; b) cuando el contrato se ha celebrado en violacion de una prescripcion 'o
prohibicion legal, fundada sobre motivos de orden publico (hipotesis del art. 4 del codigo) ..." 17

It is noteworthy that Caltan's rationale for his conclusion that fundamental consideration of public policy
render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of
government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in
litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code)
has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as
"inexistent and void from the beginning." 18

Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by
ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or
ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded
on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil
Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form
of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the
execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity
of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already
become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may
have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the
parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not
retroact to the date of the first contract." 19

As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to
dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and
plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-appellant. The
principles governing the nullity of such prohibited contracts and judicial declaration of their nullity have been
well restated by Tolentino in his treatise on our Civil Code, as follows:

Parties Affected. — Any person may invoke the in existence of the contract whenever
juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. Thus, if there has been a void
transfer of property, the transferor can recover it by the accion reinvindicatoria; and any
prossessor may refuse to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the contract.
Creditors may attach property of the debtor which has been alienated by the latter under a
void contract; a mortgagee can allege the inexistence of a prior encumbrance; a debtor can
assert the nullity of an assignment of credit as a defense to an action by the assignee.

Action On Contract. — Even when the contract is void or inexistent, an action is necessary
to declare its inexistence, when it has already been fulfilled. Nobody can take the law into his
own hands; hence, the intervention of the competent court is necessary to declare the
absolute nullity of the contract and to decree the restitution of what has been given under it.
The judgment, however, will retroact to the very day when the contract was entered into.

If the void contract is still fully executory, no party need bring an action to declare its nullity;
but if any party should bring an action to enforce it, the other party can simply set up the
nullity as a defense. 20

ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in all instances
against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

54
A.M. No. 2430 August 30, 1990

MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent.

Geminiano M. Eleccion for complainant.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment dated July 5, 1982, Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent Atty.
Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record
of one Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna
in Special Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The complainant
was appointed special administrator after Felix Leong died.

In compliance with a resolution of this Court, respondent filed his comment to the complaint on January 20,
1983. After complainant filed his reply, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In a hearing conducted on May 15, 1985 by the investigating officer assigned to the case, counsel for the
complainant proposed that the case be considered on the basis of position papers and memoranda to be
submitted by the parties. Respondent agreed. Thus, the investigating officer required the parties to submit
their respective position papers and memoranda, with the understanding that with or without the
memoranda, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution after the expiration of 30 days. In
compliance, both parties submitted their respective position papers; but no memorandum was filed by
either party. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

In the pleadings submitted before the Court and the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant alleges that
over a period of 20 years, respondent allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client Felix
Leong and a partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is one of the partners, covering
several parcels of land of the estate, i.e. Lots Nos. 1124, 1228, 2221, 2402, 3939, 3942 and 3957 of the
Tanjay Cadastre, under iniquitous terms and conditions. Moreover, complainant charges that these
contracts were made without the approval of the probate court and in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of
the new Civil Code.

On the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, and other pertinent records of the investigation, the
Solicitor General submitted his report dated February 21, 1990, finding that respondent committed a breach
in the performance of his duties as counsel of administrator Felix Leong when he allowed the renewal of
contracts of lease for properties involved in the testate proceedings to be undertaken in favor of HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS without notifying and securing the approval of the probate court. However, the Solicitor
General opined that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that respondent had allowed the
properties to be leased in favor of his family partnership at a very low rental or in violation of Articles 1491
and 1646 of the new Civil Code. Thus, the Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) months with a warning that future misconduct on
respondent's part will be more severely dealt with [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General,
pp. 1-10; Rollo, pp. 37-46. Also, Complaint of the Solicitor General, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 47-49].

As gleaned from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the
following facts are uncontroverted:

55
 That as early as March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of record for Felix
Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina Zerna, who was appointed as administrator of
the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna in Special No. 460 on May 22, 1961;

That, a lease contract dated August 13, 1963 was executed between Felix Leong and the
"Heirs of Jose Villegas" represented by respondent's brother-in-law Marcelo Pastrano
involving, among others, sugar lands of the estate designated as Lot Nos. 1124, 1228, 2221,
2402, 3939, 3942 and 3957 of the Tanjay Cadastre;

That Felix Leong was designated therein as administrator and "owner, by testamentary
disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of land";

That, the lifetime of the lease contract was FOUR (4) sugar crop years, with a yearly rental
of TEN PERCENT (10%) of the value of the sugar produced from the leased parcels of land;

That, on April 20, 1965, the formal partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS was formed
amongst the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which respondent was a member;

That, on October 18, 1965, another lease contract was executed between Felix Leong and
the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, containing basically the same terms and
conditions as the first contract, with Marcelo Pastrano signing once again as representative
of the lessee;

That, on March 14, 1968, after the demise of Marcelo Pastrano, respondent was appointed
manager of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS by the majority of partners;

That, renewals of the lease contract were executed between Felix Leong and HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS on January 13, 1975 and on December 4, 1978, with respondent signing
therein as representative of the lessee; and,

That, in the later part of 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew Geronimo H. Villegas
as manager of the family partnership.

Under the above circumstances, the Court finds absolutely no merit to complainant's charge, and the
Solicitor General's finding, that respondent committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the approval of
the court in Special Proceedings No. 460 to the various lease contracts executed between Felix Leong and
respondent's family partnership.

Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the
right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore,
exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For
instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving
the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65
Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1 (1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265,
May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].

Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the
estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court
of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to hold
respondent subject to disciplinary sanction for having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special
Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals of the lease agreement
involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.
56
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from
leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned in that
article, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them,
unless the consent of the principal have been given;

(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or
of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which
has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who,
in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property or rights in
litigation or levied upon on execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law

xxx xxx xxx

[Article 1491 of the new Civil Code; Emphasis supplied.]

The above disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on public policy
considerations which disallow the transactions entered into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of
the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised by these individuals over the properties
or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika
Publishing Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9, 1986, 142 SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164,
RTC Fourth Judicial Region, Pasig, G.R. No. 72306, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24,
1989, 169 SCRA 351].

Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose
Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of
the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or
lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to
lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly
prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot
ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later
manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created
between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate
proceedings.

In his defense, respondent claims that he was neither aware of, nor participated in, the execution of the
original lease contract entered into between his client and his family partnership, which was then
represented by his brother-in-law Marcelo Pastrano. And although he admits that he participated in the
execution of subsequent renewals of the lease contract as managing partner of HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS, he argues that he acted in good faith considering that the heirs of Filomena Zerna consented or
acquiesced to the terms and conditions stipulated in the original lease contract. He further contends that
pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Tuason v. Tuason [88 Phil. 428 (1951)] the renewal contracts do not
57
fall within the prohibition of Articles 1491 and 1646 since he signed the same as a mere agent of the
partnership.

Respondent's contentions do not provide sufficient basis to escape disciplinary action from this Court.

It taxes this Courts imagination that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the execution of the original
lease contract between his client and his family partnership represented by his brother-in-law. Be that as it
may, it cannot be denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed the subsequent renewals
of the lease contract. In fact, he actively participated in the lease contracts dated January 13, 1975 and
December 4, 1978 by signing on behalf of the lessee HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS.

Moreover, the claim that the heirs of Filomena Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the assailed lease
contracts does not militate against respondent's liability under the rules of professional ethics. The
prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as far as lawyers are concerned, is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and
confidential association [Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-16917, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 733]. Thus, the law
makes the prohibition absolute and permanent [Rubias v. Batiller, supra]. And in view of Canon 1 of the
new Code of Professional Responsibility and Sections 3 & 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whereby lawyers are duty-bound to obey and uphold the laws of the land, participation in the execution of
the prohibited contracts such as those referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code has been
held to constitute breach of professional ethics on the part of the lawyer for which disciplinary action may
be brought against him [See Bautista v. Gonzalez, Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990). Accordingly,
the Court must reiterate the rule that the claim of good faith is no defense to a lawyer who has failed to
adhere faithfully to the legal disqualifications imposed upon him, designed to protect the interests of his
client [See In re Ruste, 70 Phil. 243 (1940); Also, Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 (1923)].

Neither is there merit in respondent's reliance on the case of Tuason v. Tuason [supra.] It cannot be
inferred from the statements made by the Court in that case that contracts of sale or lease where the
vendee or lessee is a partnership, of which a lawyer is a member, over a property involved in a litigation in
which he takes part by virtue of his profession, are not covered by the prohibition under Articles 1491 and
1646.

However, the Court sustains the Solicitor General's holding that there is no sufficient evidence on record to
warrant a finding that respondent allowed the properties of the estate of Filomena Zerna involved herein to
be leased to his family partnership at very low rental payments. At any rate, it is a matter for the court
presiding over Special Proceedings No. 460 to determine whether or not the agreed rental payments made
by respondent's family partnership is reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the estate
properties.

Considering thus the nature of the acts of misconduct committed by respondent, and the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4) months effective from the
date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be
more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Villegas.

SO ORDERED.

58
A.M. No. 3216 March 16, 1992

DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. JOSEPHINE PALOGAN EDUARTE, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte originally filed with
this Court on April 18, 1988. On August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for investigation, submitted a report confirming in
substance the charge of violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of Office of a lawyer
and recommending the suspension of herein respondent.

The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan,
Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate
of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty.
Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26, 1984.
His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case No. 391
was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of
Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13,
1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed
some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by
herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares of land to
herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the
lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of
Antonia Ulibari.

On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein respondent
on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant
never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of
absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received no
consideration therefor).

On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true and
recommending a one-year suspension of the respondent from the practice of law.

The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of
Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420
square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition that
she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees.

Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject
property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution of the Deed
of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Art.
1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession."

In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of land allegedly conveyed to the
respondent) was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals.
Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity or
of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an attorney
occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of the rule so
59
amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and
of the rights of both." The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in
litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree with the
Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it
and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the
property is still the subject of a pending case.

For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, respondent has
violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting."

The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds
of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefor, when in truth there were none
so received by the seller. In her answer, respondent admitted that Antonia Ulibari did not actually sell the
parcels of land to her children for the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that she (respondent)
"utilized the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate document to effect the transfer of
the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in accordance with her wish that said parcels of land be
given to them.

In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any
falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction, respondent
has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall be mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, respondent is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in the
four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the practice or law
for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year, effective from the date this
judgment becomes final.

SUSPENSION ORDERED.

60
 ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. A.C. No. 5859
ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, (Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES
JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Present:
Complainants,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and
recommending his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed
in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Davao City Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P. Mercado.
Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds
to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused
claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal
prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.[4]

On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of
infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the
practice of law.[5]

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against the
Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the
corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the
61
balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of
the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one
year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems,
and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and
their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.[6] They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases
is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the
respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section
27,[7]Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuits against the
complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but
were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely exhausting
the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the
trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees.

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the case that he and
George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by
the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the contrary, he asserts
that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of extorting
from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find ourselves in
agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood
that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus
to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.[11]In Maligsa
v. Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and
fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

62
 In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his
acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one
year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his
former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the
Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel
of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been dismissed.
The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-
135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases
are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as he does
so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and
fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client
and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after
he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the timing of
the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants family,
the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions [15]all indicate that the
respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act
of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against
him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.

In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for a lawyer to file
frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in
good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of
the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21
June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of
the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty
and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[19]provides:

63
 CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the
client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the
respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the
family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed
by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with
herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

64
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal
case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained
from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco, for
annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been
dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994,
respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. [3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,[4] informing the RTC of Pasig
City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and
docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of
the Revised Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live
Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage
took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than
Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G.
Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;[6] (2)
administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption;[7] (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty
of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No.
PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then
handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action
against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the
complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled
against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against
him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. [10] He
also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the

65
penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was
found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents
and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel.
According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to
the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of
her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to
anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents motion to file his memorandum,
and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner
Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years,
she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative
cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the
guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is
inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-
client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence.
Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate,
exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest.[15] Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The
hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.[16] Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of
justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19] and continues
even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended
on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in
any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. [21] With full
disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish
the existence of the privilege, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance

66
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.[22]

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment.[23]The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with
the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer
to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than
on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period
of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals
would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in
violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the
client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client
delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between
them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the
fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.[26] The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information
to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared
by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,[29] an offer and
counter-offer for settlement,[30] or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity,[31] are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.[32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must
have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.[34]
If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal assistance,[36] and not legal advice,
the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating
to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which
will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence
of facts which the complainant must prove.

67
 Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant
as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult,
if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of
proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.[38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

68
A.C. No. 927 September 28, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO A.

PALANCA. WILLIAM C. PFLEIDER, complainant,
vs.
POTENCIANO A. PALANCA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

The respondent Atty. Potenciano A. Palanca was for sometime the legal counsel of the complainant William
C. Pfleider. According to the complainant, he retained the legal services of Palanca from January 1966,
whereas the latter insists that the attorney-client relationship between them began as early as in 1960.

At all events, the relations between the two must have attained such a high level of mutual trust that on
October 10, 1969, Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328 hectare agricultural land in Hinobaan,
Negros Occidental, known as the Hacienda Asia, for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties
agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the
remainder would be delivered by Palanca to Pfleider's listed creditors.

The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with the filing by Pfleider
of a civil suit (civil case 9187 of the CFI of Negros Occidental) against Palanca for rescission of the contract
of lease on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals. In his answer to the complaint, Palanca
averred full satisfaction of his rental liabilities, and therefore contended that the lease should continue. He
also charged that he had already been dispossessed of the hacienda by Pfleider and the latter's goons at
gunpoint and consequently had suffered tremendous financial losses.

With this history in, perspective, we shall now consider the administrative charges of gross misconduct in
office brought by Pfleider against Palanca. The indictment consists of four counts.

First count. In regard to a criminal case for estafa filed in December 1965 by one Gregorio Uy Matiao
against Pfleider, the latter instructed Palanca to offer in settlement the sum of P10,000, payable in
installments, to Uy Matiao for the dismissal of the case. After sometime, Palanca reported to Pfleider that
the offer has been rejected. Finally in October 1969, Palanca supposedly informed Pfleider that he had
succeeded in negotiating the dismissal of the estafa case by leaving the sum of P5,000 with the
Dumaguete City Court where the action was then pending. Sometime in December 1969, however, Pfleider
was the object of a warrant of arrest in connection with the same estafa case. It turned out, charged the
complainant Pfleider, that Palanca had not deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court, let
alone communicated to Uy Matiao his earlier offer of settlement.

We have closely examined all the pleadings filed by the parties in this case and the annexes thereto, and it
is our view that the first charge is devoid of merit. In support of his claim of alleged assurance made by
Palanca that the estafa case had already been terminated, Pfleinder relies on certain letters written to him
by Palanca. Our own reading of these letters, however, belies his claim. They contain nothing which might
reasonably induce the complainant to believe that the criminal action against him had been finally settled by
his attorney. On the contrary, the letters merely report a continuing attempt on the part of Palanca to secure
a fair bargain for Pfleider. The letter-report of October 10, 1969, invoke by the complainant, states in no
uncertain terms that "I am bargaining this (referring to the estafa case) even for P8,000.00 and I think they
will agree. I'll finalize this and pay Tingyan on Tuesday. I have already left in Dumaguete P5,000.00 to
show them the color of our money and I will bring the balance when I go there Tuesday."

Nothing in the above letter indicates that Palanca had deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete
City Court. What he did state is that he had left that sum in that City to enable their adversaries to see "the
color of our money." In this connection, the veracity of the certification by Felicisimo T. Hilay, Dumaguete
69
branch manager of RCPI, that he (Hilay) had been holding the sum of P5,000 during the early part of
October in trust for Pfleider and his lawyer, has not been assailed by Pfleider.

If Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in December 1969, no substantial blame can be laid at the
door of the respondent Palanca inasmuch as the latter's services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider
when the latter sued his lawyer in October of the same year. While the object of the suit is the rescission of
the contract of lease between the parties, the conflict of interest which pits one against the other became
incompatible with that mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relation. Moreover,
Pfleider fails to dispute Palanca's claim that on October 26, 1968, Pfleider refused to acknowledge receipt
of a certain letter and several motions for withdrawal, including Palanca's withdrawal as counsel in
the estafa case.

Second count. Palanca had fraudulently charged the sum of P5,000 (which he supposedly had left with the
City Court in Dumaguete) to his rental account with Pfleider as part payment of the lease rentals of the
Hacienda Asia. Third count. In the same statement of account, Palanca falsely represented having paid, for
the account of Pfleider, one Samuel Guintos the sum of P866.50 when the latter would swear that he had
received only the sum of P86.50.

These two charges are anchored upon the same "Statement of Disbursements" submitted by Palanca to
Pfleider. It is our view that this statement is but a memorandum or report of the expenses which Palanca
considered as chargeable to the account of Pfleider. By its very tentative nature, it is subject to the
examination and subsequent approval or disapproval of Pfleider, and any and every error which it contains
may be brought to the attention of Palanca for rectification or adjustment. Viewed in relation to the contract
of lease between Pfleinder and Palanca, this "statement" is but one aspect of the prestation required of
Palanca by the contract. Whatever breach he might have committed in regard to this prestation would be
but a civil or contractual wrong which does not affect his office as a member of the Bar.

Final count. It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially" supplied Palanca for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by Palanca, in
violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of Pfleider.

As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, complainant furnished respondent with a confidential list of his creditors." This should indicate that
Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing
between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation therefore of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the
fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert Palanca's claim that there is
no such thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the
same list which forms part of the pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease contract)
now, pending between the complainant and the respondent lawyer, and therefore is embraced within the
category of public records open to the perusal of persons properly interested therein.

In sum, we are satisfied, and we so hold, that nothing in written complaint for disbarment against Palanca
and in his reply to Palanca's answer supports a prima facie finding of such misconduct in office by Palanca
as would warrant further proceedings in this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

70
 CLARITA J. SAMALA, ADM. CASE NO. 5439
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Promulgated:

Respondent. _______________________

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending
parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in
exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2]

The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed
their respective memoranda[3] and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation[4] dated January 12, 2006. He found
respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the
penalty of suspension for six months.

In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.

71
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended
penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City,
entitled Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for
defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an
Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.[7]

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled Editha S.
Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez
against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC,
Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,[8] Presiding
Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz[9] warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both
parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph
J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City, respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission
of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's
former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the
Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. [11] Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez
in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, because Valdez told
him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint
for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already
severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the filing of Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client.[15] He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he
may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. [16] It
springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can

72
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.[17]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty.[18]

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It
springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged
communications of his client.[19]

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from
accepting professional employment from the clients adversary either in the same case [21] or in a different but related
action.[22] A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the former client.[23]

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything
which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation.[26]

In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not
turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is
unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose
interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case
entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests
of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him
and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written
consent of his client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties
in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the

73
 lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients.[29]

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer
shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his client
the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care.[30]

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK upon being warned by the court,[31] but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting
interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and
acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
transactions with his clients.[32]

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted
TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in
the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as
evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.[33] During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent
avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already
in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. [34] Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission
was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and
cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000,[35] before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus
belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was
filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-
MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

74
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new
title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No.
273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002[36] dismissing the complaint
for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the
name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that
he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. [38] He should bear
in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.[39] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty
to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must
never be at the expense of truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law
and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[41]

On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch
272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both
entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed
against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent)
for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he
was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.[42]

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and 01-036162[44] both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion,
respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306[45] for estafa against Lagmay,
and I.S. No. 00-4318[46] against Alvin Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.

75
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the
interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would
be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of
age,[48] while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of
whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.[49] Respondent further
admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not
consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship[50] and does not consider the latter as his second family.[51] He reasoned
that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.[52]

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of
immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that
he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not
consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner
that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no
moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that
respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as
immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance
of the mores and sense of morality of the community. [55] That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after
the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondents personal records.
SO ORDERED.
76
REBECCA J. PALM, A.C. No. 8242
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Promulgated:

Respondent. October 2, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan,
Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing
an interest which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer software
development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for
the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant personally met with
respondent to review corporate matters, including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on
1 October 2003, respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board
meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.

Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable with the close
relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned
and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate
its retainer agreement with respondent effective November 2003.

In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven
C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When
the meeting was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven
and Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow
teleconferencing.

On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account for the amount
of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22
April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply

77
with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors
Office. In the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads counsel.

On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint[1] for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).

In his Answer,[2] respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on process and procedure in acquiring
property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the legal requirements of putting up a domestic
corporation. In February 2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from
February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the
operations of the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech.

Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant met with him regarding the
procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings.

Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy during the 10 January 2004
meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted
that he objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly
amended to allow the participation of board members by teleconferencing.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by
Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the
criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,[3] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in
conflict with that of Comtech as his former client.

The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtechs retained counsel from February 2003 to
November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the course of the meetings for the intended amendments of Comtechs
corporate by-laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the intended amendment to allow members of the Board of
Directors who were outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD
noted that respondent knew that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the teleconferencing. Hence,
when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through
teleconferencing on the ground that the corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a privileged
information he obtained while he was Comtechs retained counsel.

78
The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech, respondent represented an interest
in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-CBD ruled that the fact that respondent represented Soledad after the
termination of his professional relationship with Comtech was not an excuse.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent be

found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year.[4]

In Resolution No. XVII-2006-583[5] passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification by suspending respondent from the practice
of law for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[6]

In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that respondents motion for
reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a rehash of his previous arguments.However, the IBP Board of
Governors First Division recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only one year.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors First Division. The IBP Board of Governors denied respondents
motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension from two years to one year.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[7] of
the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court

We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Violation of the Confidentiality

of Lawyer-Client Relationship

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained the information about the
need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings
through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer.

79
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders meeting. Respondent attended
the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders meeting
because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.[8] Hence,
there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their
proxies to the meeting.
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been given to
respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws
may be effected by the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of
the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation.[9] It means the stockholders
are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be delegated to the board of directors or
trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any
amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.[10] The
documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.

It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. [11] The client
must intend the communication to be confidential.[12] Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least
a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information
could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders
meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Representing Interest in Conflict

With the Interest of a Former Client

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client, in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,[13] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[14] The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes
his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[15]

We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where
respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer.There was nothing in the
80
records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he
was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer
agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond
the lawyers employment with the client.[16] The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.[17]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

81
ANGELITA C. ORCINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with this Court a letter-complaint dated December
10, 1991 against respondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel. Complainant prayed that this Court
impose disciplinary sanctions on respondent for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees
she fully paid for his services.
The complaint arose from the following facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In
consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay respondent legal fees of P20,000.00 -- P10,000.00
to be paid upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or before the conclusion of the
case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court and fiscal. This
agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22, 1991.[1]
In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25,
1991,[2] another P5,000.00 on March 31, 1991,[3] and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991,[4] for a total
of P20,000.00.
Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build
a case against the suspects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully attended the
preliminary investigation. The case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Baloc, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.[5]
As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused although these
hearings were postponed on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to attend the
hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this hearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted
bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and
confronted him with his absence.[6] Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the
hearing.[7] Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his
absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her
relatives.[8] Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the
case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the
records.[9]
Complainant never returned the records nor did she see respondent. On September 18, 1991,
respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."[10] The motion did not bear the
consent of complainant.
On October 23, 1991, the court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to
the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent."[11]
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal.[12] Meanwhile, the hearings in
the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact
complainant.Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, the letter-
complaint.
We referred the letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation
at any time with or without cause.[13] The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than
for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.[14] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.[15] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[16] A lawyer's right to withdraw from
a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause. [17]
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

82
 "Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding,
by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney
newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of
the change shall be given to the adverse party.
x x x."
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his
client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his
consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse
party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based
on a good cause.[18]
In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court
thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant
had become hostile and refused to sign his motion.[19] He, however, did not file an application with the court
for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.
Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with
the court, we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's
withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and
that there had been "serious diffferences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution."[20]
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases."

A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists
upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and
the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the
lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the
attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar
cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered
analogous to the grounds enumerated. As found by the Commission on Bar Discipline, this case arose from
a simple misunderstanding between complainant and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's
absence at the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected killers of her husband. She vehemently
opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront respondent with
83
his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's words and
actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words
were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate
respondent's services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot
just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition
for withdrawal will be granted by the court.[21] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer
remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his
client require.[22] He must still appear on the date of hearing[23] for the attorney-client relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.[24]
Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal case to its termination. He
was in fact paid in full for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair
that he return to complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have
rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to continue their relation under the contract.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing
with his clients. He is also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a
warning that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.

84
G.R. No. L-24163 April 28, 1969

REGINO B. ARO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ARSENIO NAÑAWA, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
LUIS MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY, AURELLO MARTINEZ, GREGORIO LONTOK, MARIA
MENDOZA, MAXIMO PORTO and ROSARlO ANDAYA, respondents.

Regino B. Aro in his own behalf as petitioner.

Enrique C. Villanueva for respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Original petition: (1) for certiorari to annul the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, dated
November 21, 1964, dismissing its Civil Case No. SC-525 "without prejudice to the right of Atty. Regino B.
Aro (petitioner herein) to file a separate action against both the plaintiffs and defendants (private
respondents herein) with respect to his alleged attorney's fees", as well as its order dated January 9, 1965,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof for lack of merit and (2) for mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to take cognizance of petitioner's opposition and countermotion or petition dated
November 3, 1964 and to resolve the same on the merits.

There appears to be no dispute as to the following facts alleged in the petition:

2. That the services of herein petitioner, as practising attorney, was engaged by respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their
deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, consisting of properties which were in the possession of the
respondents Aurelia Martinez,1spouses Gregorio Lontok and Maria Mendoza and spouses Maximo
Porto and Rosario Andaya.

3. That being without means to prosecute their claim against the persons concerned, respondents
Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with herein petitioner to avail of his services and entrust
the prosecution of their claim on a contingent basis as shown in the agreement, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex 'A' and is made an integral part hereof.2

4. That by virtue of said agreement, herein petitioner took the necessary steps to gather the needed
papers and documents for the filing of a petition to litigate as pauper and a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, in which respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the
plaintiffs and the other respondents, excepting the respondent Judge, were the defendants, ....

5. That said petition to litigate as pauper filed by herein petitioner for respondents Luis Magtibay and
Pablo Magtibay was granted by the respondent Judge as per the order dated September 10, 1964,
.....

6. That to plaintiffs' complaint in Civil Case No. SC-525, the defendants in said case interposed a
motion to dismiss dated September 29, 1964....3

7. That to the said motion to dismiss herein petitioner, as attorney for the plaintiffs (now respondents
Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) filed an opposition dated October 5, 1964.....4

8. That after the hearing of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants and the opposition thereto
by the plaintiffs, which finally took place on October 24, 1964, the respondent Judge issued its
resolution or order dated October 24, 1964, denying the motion to dismiss, ....5

9. That on the very day of and after the hearing of the motion to dismiss, or on October 24, 1964,
before receipt of a copy of the said order (Annex 'G'), there was a conversation which took place
85
between herein petitioner and the attorney of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., in the
civil case and one who was then acting as a sort of spokesman for the defendants (Ex-Mayor
Cordova of Sta. Maria, Laguna) for the amicable settlement of the case between the plaintiffs and
the defendants to the effect that a certain property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased) and
respondent Aurelia Martinez, worth P3,000.00, would be given to the plaintiffs in full settlement of
their claim, as share in the properties left by their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, it having been
agreed by herein petitioner and Atty. de los Reyes and the spokesman of the defendants that for the
purpose of said amicable settlement, the plaintiffs or one of them and herein petitioner would go to
Sta. Maria, Laguna, on October 23, 1964.

10. That having given notice to the plaintiffs (now respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay)
at their given address in Calauag, Quezon to come to Candelaria for the purpose of going to Sta.
Maria, Laguna on October 23, 1964, petitioner had waited for said plaintiffs to go to his office on or
before said date for the engagement mentioned, but due to their (plaintiffs') failure to come to
Candelaria, petitioner had to send a telegram to Ex-Mayor Cordova notifying him of his (petitioner's)
and plaintiffs' not being able to go to Sta. Maria because of the failure of any of the plaintiffs to come
to Candelria, ....

11. That it was only on October 28, 1964, when herein petitioner received a copy of the order dated
October 24, 1964 (Annex "G") and to his surprise he also received on the said day a second motion
to dismiss dated October 26, 1964; together with Annex "A" of said motion, which is entitled
KASULATAN NG PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, dated October
23, 1964 at Sta. Cruz, Laguna and signed by the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez (the three
being now respondents in this case), it having been made to appear in said Annex "A" of the second
motion to dismiss, among others, that the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez had made an
extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Lucio Magtibay and the said Aurelia Martinez
adjudicating to the plaintiffs one-fourth (¼) share in the properties of the spouses and three-fourth
(3/4) share of the defendant Aurelia Martinez, but making it appear also that said plaintiffs waived
their share in favor of Aurelia Martinez, ..., thru which fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was
deprived of his contingent fees, agreed upon, as evidenced by Annex "A" of this petition.6

xxx xxx xxx

14. That petitioner filed by registered mail, on November 4, 1964, his "OPPOSITION TO THE
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND COUNTER-MOTION OR PETITION TO SET ASIDE DEED
OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND WAIVER DATED OCTOBER 23, 1964 AND TO RECORD
ATTORNEY'S LIEN", dated November 3, 1964, wherein he (petitioner) prayed, among others,
invoking the provisions of Section 5(d) and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, for
the protection of the rights of herein petitioner as an officer of the Court, to wit:

(a) to deny the second motion to dismiss and get aside and annul the deed of extrajudicial
partition and waiver dated October 23, 1964;

(b) to fix the compensation of herein counsel in the proportion of one-third (1/3) of the shares
of plaintiffs, if in land, or in the amount of P1,000.00, if in cash, and to record the same and
expenses advanced by him for the plaintiffs in the sum of P22.15 as lien in favor of herein
claimant-petitioner over the properties in litigation, particularly over the one-fourth (1/4) share
of the plaintiffs in all the properties of the spouses;

xxx xxx xxx

(d) as an alternative to prayer (a) above, to grant the second motion to dismiss, subjecting,
however, the properties in litigation and subject-matters of the extrajudicial partition and
waiver to the lien for attorney's fees and expenses in favor of herein claimant-petitioner, after
fixing said attorney's fees as prayed for in (b) above.

xxx xxx xxx

86
 15. That on the day f finally set for the hearing of the second motion to dismiss, as well as of the
counter-motion or petition, or on November 21, 1964, because of the inquiries or interpellation made
by respondent Judge to herein petitioner as to whether there is a Philippine precedent which allows
or directs the protection by the Court of the rights of any of its officers (lawyer) against any collusion
perpetrated by the parties in a case to defraud or cheat an attorney of his compensation agreed
upon by him and his clients, and his answer that insofar as his researches were concerned, he
could not find any, although there are a number of cases to that effect in American jurisdiction, the
respondent Judge had opined in open court that the claim for and the fixing of the attorney's fees
should better be done in a separate action and, in spite of petitioner's memorandum citing American
authorities to the effect that,

Though a party may without the consent of his attorney money make a bona fide adjustment
with the adverse party and dismiss an action or suit before a judgment or a decree has been
rendered thereon, if it appears, however, that such settlement was collosive and
consummated pursuant to the intent of both parties to defraud the attorney, the court in
which the action was pending may interfere to protect him as one of its officers, by setting
aside the order of dismissal, .... (Jackson vs. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798).

... the respondent Judge, instead of denying the second motion to dismiss and fixing his attorney's
fees in the said case and recording the same as lien, ... dismissed the case and refused to give
herein petitioner any kind of immediate protection to safeguard his rights ... in said Civil Case No.
SC-525 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

16. That by the express terms of the agreement, Annex "A" of this petition, plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. SC-525 had expressly ceded to herein petitioner one-half (½) [later verbally reduced to one-
third (1/3) or P1,000.00] or whatever share they would get from the estate of their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay, and the defendants in said Civil Case had full knowledge of said right of herein
petitioner in the properties in controversy from and after the time they were served with summons
and copies of the complaint in said civil case — because of the allegations contained in par. 10
thereof. 7 [Emphasis by the Court]

18. That on December 5, 1964, herein petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration dated
December 4, 1664 asking for the reconsideration of the order dated November 21, 1964, ....

19. That the motion for reconsideration was denied by the court, thru the respondent Judge, as per
the order dated January 9, 1965, ....

Upon these facts, petitioner tries to make out before this Court a case of certiorari for grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in dismissing the case on the basis of the compromise
agreement of the parties, entered into at the back of petitioner notwithstanding the reservation made in his
favor to file an action against both parties "with respect to his alleged attorney's fees", as well as a case of
mandamus "to order and command the said respondent judge" to take cognizance of and resolve his
opposition and counter-motion for the court to fix the compensation he should be paid. Unable to find any
local precedent to support his position, he cites American authorities thus:

In the American jurisdiction, it would seem that, even without the specific provisions of the rules of
court cited above, courts had always intervened, in the mere exercise of their inherent powers, to
protect attorneys against collusive agreements or fraudulent settlements entered into by the parties
in a case to cheat attorneys out of their costs or of their fees. Thus, it was held or had been stated
in:

(a) Coughlin vs. N.Y. Cont. & H.R.R. Co., 71 N.Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75.

... But since the time of Lord Mansfield, it has been the practice of courts to intervene to
protect attorneys against settlement made to cheat them out of their costs. If an attorney has
commenced an action, and his client settles it with the opposite party before judgment,
collusively, to deprive him of his costs, the court will permit the attorney to go on with the suit

87
 for the purpose of collecting his costs. Swain v. Senate, 5 Bos. & Pul. 99; Cole v. Bennett, 6
Price, 15; Moore v. Cook, 13 Id. 473; Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige, 501; Rusquin v. The
Knickerbocker Stage Col., 12 Abb. Pr 324; Ward v. Syme, 9 How. Pr. 16; McDonald v.
Napier, 14 Ga. 89.

There are many cases where this had been allowed to be done. It is impossible to ascertain
precisely when this practice commenced, nor how originated, nor upon what principle it was
based. It was not upon the principle of a lien, because an attorney has no lien upon the
cause of as it upon the action before judgment for his costs; nor was it upon principle that his
services had produced the money paid his client upon the settlement, because that could not
be known, and in fact no money may have been paid upon the settlement. So far as I can
perceive, it was based upon no principle. It was a mere arbitrary exercise of power by the
courts; not arbitrary in the sense that it was unjust or improper, but in the sense that it was
not based upon any right or principle recognized in other cases. The parties being in court,
and a suit commenced and pending, for the purpose of protecting attorneys who were their
officers and subject to their control, the courts invented this practice and assumed this
extraordinary power to defeat attempts to cheat the attorneys out of their costs. The
attorney's fees were fixed in definite sums, easily determined by taxation and this power was
exercised to secure them their fees. (pp. 76-77)

(b) Randall v. Van Wagenan et al., 22 N.E. 361, 362.lawphi1.nêt

... But where such settlement is made collusively for the purpose of defrauding the attorney
out of his costs, courts have been accustomed to intervene, and to protect the attorney by
permitting him to proceed with the suit, and, if he is able to establish a right to recover on the
cause of action as it originally stood, to permit such recovery to the extent of his costs in the
action. Coughlin v. Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 443, and pages cited. And the court will set aside
an order of discontinuance if it stands in the way. This is an adequate remedy, and we think
the exclusive remedy where the suit has been fraudulently settled by the parties before
judgment to cheat the attorney out of his costs. We have found no case of an equitable
action to enforce the inchoate right of an attorney, under such circumstances, and no such
precedent ought, we think, to be established.

(c) Jackson v. Stearns, et al., 43 Ore 25, 84 Pac. 798.

... Though a party may, without the consent of his attorney, make a bona fide adjustment
with the adverse party, and dismiss an action or suit before a judgment or a decree has been
rendered therein, if it appears, however, that such settlement was collusive and
consummated pursuant to the intent of both parties to defraud the attorney, the court in
which the action or suit was pending may interfere to protect him, as one of its officers, by
setting aside the order of dismissal and permitting him to proceed in the cause in the name
of his client to final determination to ascertain what sum of money, or interest in the subject-
matter, if any, is due him for his services when fully performed. Jones v. Morgage 99 Am.
Dec. 458; Randall v. Van Wagenen (N.Y.) 22 N.E. 361, 12 Am. St. Rep. 828. (p. 800)

Before a court will set aside an order dismissing a suit or an action, made upon stipulation of
the parties, without the consent of plaintiff's attorney, and allow the latter to proceed with the
cause in the name of his client, to determine the amount of fees due him, it must appear that
the defendant participated in the fraudulent intent to deprive the attorney of his
compensation. Courtney v. McGavock, 25 Wis. 619. When no adequate consideration is
given by the defendant for the settlement and discharge of an action or a suit, the
insufficiency of the inducement to the contract affords evidence of his bad faith. Young v.
Dearborn, 27 N.E. 324. It will be remembered that the complaint alleges that the value of the
real property in question is $3,000.00, and that Stearns executed to Wilson a deed to the
premises for a nominal consideration. This is a sufficient averment of the defendant's intent
to deprive the plaintiff of his compensation thereby imputing to Wilson bad faith. (p. 800)

(d) Desaman v. Butler Bros., 188 Minn. 198, 136 N.W. 747.
88
 We have recently held that a client has always the right to settle his cause of action and stop
litigation at any stage of the proceeding, subject, however, to the right of the attorney to
receive compensation for services rendered. Burho v. Camichael 135 N.W. 386. It is
therefore contended by defendant that a litigant retains the unrestricted right to determine for
what amount the cause of action may be settled, and, having so done, the lien of his
attorney for services is measured by the amount determined on and actually settled for.
Conceding, without deciding, that this may be true of any time prior to the rendition of a
verdict in the action which the attorney has been employed to bring, we are of opinion that
after verdict fixing the amount of a plaintiff's cause of action a secret and collusive
compromise between parties litigant does not affect the amount of the attorney's lien...; but
therein is also clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Brown that, if there be fraud and collusion to
deprive the attorney of his lien, the settlement will not be permitted to accomplish such
result. (p. 748)

To be sure, these authorities are quite persuasive, but contrary to petitioner's impression, there is already a
precedent setting decision of this Court handed down way back in 1922 in a case very similar to his, that in
Rustia vs. the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, et al., 44 Phil. 62. As it is very brief, it can
be quoted in full:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner alleging that the respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the
parties but without the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff in the case, the herein petitioner.

It appears from the record that on July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo Porcuna, for himself and on
behalf of his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de Porcuna, by means of a written contract, retained the
petitioner to represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was the plaintiff and one Eulalia
Magsombol was the defendant. The contract fixed the petitioner's fee at P200 in advance with an
additional contingent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should
not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer,
the herein petitioner.

After trial, the petitioner then being plaintiff's attorney of record, the Court of First Instance, under
date of December 24, 1921, rendered judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna and Rosa H. de Porcuna
ordering the defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof
to pay to them the sum of P3,250. On January 14, 1922, Eulalia Magsombol filed her exception to
the judgment and on the following day presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on the
21st of the same month. She thereupon gave notice of appeal and presented a bill of exceptions
which was approved on February 20, 1922. On March 2, 1922, and before the transmission of the
bill of exceptions to this court, the plaintiffs presented the following motion in the Court of First
Instance:

The plaintiffs, without any further intervention of their attorney, now appear before this
Honorable Court and respectfully aver:

That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado they already settled this case with the herein defendant.

That the basis of the compromise is that we, the plaintiffs, finally agree that we should be
paid the amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) in two installments; P300 to be paid on this
same date, and the remaining five hundred pesos (P500) at the end of March, 1922.

That we, the plaintiffs, recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the
aforesaid amount of eight hundred pesos (P800) and that this is the total amount the
defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and we have no right whatever to any other
amount than the aforementioned.

That we have not sold to any other person our rights as plaintiffs in this case.

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 Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request the dismissal of this case, without any
pronouncement as to costs, and that the appeal interposed by the defendant be further
dismissed.

Batangas, Batangas, P.I., March 2, 1922.

(Sgd) ROSA H. PORCUNA

Plaintiff

JUSTO M. PORCUNA
Plaintiff

The defendant, through her attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having signified her assent to the motion,
the Court of First Instance on the same day, March 2, dismissed the action without notice to counsel
for the plaintiffs.

The petitioner alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922. After an
unsuccessful effort to obtain a reconsideration of the order of dismissal from the trial court, he filed
the present petition for a writ of certiorari. By resolution dated October 24, 1922, this court denied
the petition and upon motion of the petitioner we shall now briefly state our reasons for such denial.

The burden of the petitioner's contention is (1) that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice
of his client's motion to dismiss the case, and (2) that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the
lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it. A moment's reflection
should make it clear that neither of these propositions is tenable.

Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure a client may dismiss
his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant
from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.

Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of
the sum recovered in case of success this does not give the attorney such an interest in the
cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit. (4 Cyc. 990, and
authorities cited in Note 6; see also Louque vs. Dejan 129 La. 519; Price vs. Western Loan &
Savings Co., 19 Am. Cas. 589 and Note.)

In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By
appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The petitioner's
contingent interests in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest
nor as and attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.

As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of
exceptions had been approved, it is very true that upon such approval the lower court loses its
jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing
to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said
court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case.
A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the
agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; Compania General de Tabacos vs. Obed, 13 Phil. 391.) The
petitioner might have protected his interests by entering an attorney's lien under section 37 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of certiorari was therefore properly denied. So ordered.

The difference We perceive, however, between petitioner's case, on the one hand, and that of Atty. Rustia,
in the above decision, on the other, is that in the latter's case, neither the court nor the party adverse to his
clients were aware of the exact agreement as to his fees, whereas in the case of petitioner, both the court
90
and the other parties knew the terms of the contract for professional services between petitioner and his
clients, the Magtibay brothers, because the written contract therefor, Annex A, was made part of the
complaint, and none seriously disputes its authenticity. Besides, the court had already dismissed the case
when Atty. Rustia raised the question of his fees before the court; in petitioner's instance, he opposed the
motion to dismiss and pleaded with the court to protect his rights as officer of the court before the first order
in question was issued by respondent judge. Were it not for these differences, We would have inclined
towards denying the herein petition in line with the Rustia ruling that, in any event, certiorari is not the
appropriate remedy, the American authorities cited by petitioner not withstanding.

Withal, there is another Philippine case which Us to sustain petitioner. In the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100
Phil. 440, Atty. Claro M. Recto found himself practically in the same situation as petitioner herein. After Atty.
Recto had rendered services to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden in a protracted suit against her husband for
the purposes of securing an increase of her and her daughter's monthly support, (the spouses were
separated), to P10,000.00 and of protecting and preserving her rights in the properties of the conjugal
partnership, which suit lasted from 1941 to 1949, and after the Court of First Instance of Manila had
rendered a judgment favorable to Mrs. Harden acknowledging, inter alia, her rights to the assets of the
conjugal partnership, which turned out to be P4,000,000, and awarding her a monthly support of P2,500,
practically as prayed for in Atty. Recto's pleadings, while the case was already pending on appeal before
this Court, Mrs. Harden and her husband, Mr. Fred Harden, entered into a compromise of their case,
without the knowledge of Atty. Recto, whereby said spouses "purportedly agreed to settle their differences
in consideration of the sum of P5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of $500 to
be paid by him to her; (2) Mr. Harden created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of
$500 would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each
other from all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in
consideration of the sum of $1." (p. 435)

Whereupon Atty. Recto filed a motion with this Court praying that:

a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be authorized to continue
holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the undersigned's
inchoate lien on them;

b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the plaintiff and the
defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the undersigned, by the
appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception of such evidence;

c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000 as his fees for
services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex "A"
and to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;

d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to which the
latter is found to be entitled.

This motion was objected to by Mr. Hardens counsel, who in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to
which Atty. Recto objected. Under these circumstances, this Court acceded to Atty. Recto's prayer that the
case be not dismissed, that the receivership be maintained except as to certain properties not material to
mention here, and that the case be remanded to the lower court so that his fees may be determined and
ordered paid. Upon the remand of the case to the lower court, a commissioner was appointed to hear the
matter of the amount of the fees in question, and after the commissioner had submitted a report
recommending the payment to Atty. Recto of the 20,70 attorney's fees stipulated in the contract for his
services, equivalent to P369,410.04, the court rendered judgment as follows:

The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or
20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with the
above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE

91
 HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN
CENTAVOS (P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden's share in the conjugal
properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said Esperanza P.
de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount above-stated.

On appeal from this judgment to this Court, the same was affirmed, the decision stating pertinently in part:

The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity
must come with clean hands (Bastida et al. vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil. 195; 30 C.J.S. 475), and
appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction,
that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between
husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein
appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a
judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is
inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the benefits of all orders
and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr.
Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this moat unusual avowed settlement between Mr.
and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the
spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement.
What is more, the records show that the relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed,
not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before,
for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as
evidenced by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground
of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.

On the same considerations of equity, and for the better protection of lawyers, who, trusting in the good
faith of their clients, render professional services on contingent basis, and so that it may not be said that
this Court, sanctions in any way the questionable practice of clients of compromising their cases at the
back of their counsel with the consequence that the stipulated contingent fees of the lawyer are either
unreasonably reduced or even completely rendered without basis, as in this case — wherein the clients
waived the whole of their rights in favor of their opponent after the latter had acknowledged, in effect, the
correctness of said clients' contention — We have decided to grant the herein petition, in so far as the
rights of petitioner have been prejudiced by the questioned compromise agreement. While We here reaffirm
the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer", 8 We hold that when such compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive
him of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees, and that when it is evident
that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer's
contingent interest or such interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the
better practice is to settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after hearing all the
affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise in so far as it does not adversely
affect the rights of the lawyer. Surely, "the client cannot, by setting, compromising or dismissing his suit
during its pendency, deprive the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless the lawyer
consents to such settlement, compromise or dismissal", (Legal and Judicial Ethics by Martin, 1967 Rev. Ed
p. 121) for the, attorney is or "Shall be entitled to have and recover from his client - a reasonable
compensation (not more) for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney", (Sec. 24,
Rule 138, on Attorney and Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
"in fixing fees, it should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and
not a mere money-getting trade."

True it is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place", (Sec.
26, Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision, which is an incorporation of Republic Act
636 into the Rules of Court, also provides that "if the contract between client and attorney had been
reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client full compensation ..." In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement
92
in question and even inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, (see
footnote 6, ante) petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc., supra.) Such
implied dismissal appears to Us to have been made without justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in
the record, and so, the above-quoted provision of Section 26, Rule 138 applies here. The terms of the
compromise in question, as spelled out in Annex A of Annex I of the petition, indicate clearly that Aurelia
Martinez, the defendant aunt in-law of petitioner's clients, acknowledged that the rights of said clients were
practically as alleged by petitioner in the complaint he filed for them. In other words, through the services of
petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a recognition, which had been previously denied by their aunt-in-
law, that they were entitled to a ¼ share in the estate left by their uncle. We hold that under these
circumstances, and since it appears that said clients have no other means to pay petitioner, since they
instituted their case as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was aware of the terms of their contract of
professional services with petitioner', said clients had no right to waive the portion of their such
acknowledged rights in favor of their opponent to the extent that such waiver would prejudice the stipulated
contingent interest of their lawyer and their aunt-in-law had no right to accept such waiver unqualified. The
Civil Code enjoins that:

ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Under the circumstance extant in the record, it is clear that the compromise agreement in question falls
short of the moral requirements of this quoted article of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it should not
be allowed to prejudice the rights of petitioner. Accordingly, as all of these circumstances were presented to
respondent judge before he issued the challenged order of dismissal and all the parties were heard
thereon, it was incumbent upon His Honor, in equity and to avoid multiplicity of suits, particularly, because
the amount claimed by petitioner is only P1,000.00, to have directly passed upon petitioner's claim, and not
having done so, it would appear that the court a quo abused its discretion gravely enough to warrant the
writ of certiorari herein prayed for in so far as the questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's right to the fees
for the professional services which appear to have been creditably rendered by him. Respondents allege
that the judgment of dismissal in question is already final because no appeal was taken therefrom, but
since We hold that the same was rendered with enough grave abuse of discretion to warrant
the certiorari prayed for, such alleged finality could not have materialized; obviously, petitioner could not
have appealed, not being a party in the case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of the respondent court dated November 21, 1964 and January
9, 1965 in Civil Case No. SC-525 are hereby set aside in so far as they prejudice the payment of
petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the form of either one-third of the ¼ share acknowledged as his
clients in the compromise in question or P1,000.00, which should constitute as a lien on the said share, in
spite of the waiver thereof in favor of respondent Aurelia Martinez. It is unnecessary to consider the petition
for mandamus. Costs against, private respondents.

A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962

93
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical
conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt
with accordingly.

The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained by
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of
the said administration proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate
and, second, a notice for the rendition of final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the
administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead
advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings
that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance as the new
counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be
relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F.
Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.

Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the reason
that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix
and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and
accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration
proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law office and there made
her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several
corporations and establishments where the Estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and
which documents purported to disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the dividends
of the estate from said corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of
attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive being to embarrass
petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer
and no longer trusted by his client — all with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and
his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice
to petitioner.

In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on January 11, 1955
the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, the herein
petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled "Discharge of
Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had filed with the
court.1awphîl.nèt

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on February 7, 1955, the
petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.

After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General recommended the complete
exoneration of respondents.

It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug
entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a pleading discharging the
petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said pleading, it was not

94
the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera
dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one time she found out that
some dividend checks which should have been sent to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel
that she was being cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine
National Bank and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.

We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for the
widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The evidence as
found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the
widow, a written contract having been made as to the amount to be given him for his professional services.

Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug
had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment
of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as
counsel for the widow. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug was unprofessional.

Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he
entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after Mrs. Barrera had
dispensed with petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and after petitioner had voluntarily
withdrawn his appearance on February 5, 1955.

With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as complained
of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or
intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Evidently,
petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a
dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow
for libel and falsification. It was shown, however, that the case was dismissed.

No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed and the
case closed.

Xsc

95