University of the Philippines College of Law

3D

Topic Disputable presumption

Case No. G.R. No. 142039/ MAY 27, 2004
Case Name Mabunga v People
Ponente Carpio Morales

On October 2, 1994, Employees of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Villaruel, found that the hasp of the door of BFP
office was destroyed and the only typewriter there was missing. From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, tricycle driver
Bernardo, Diana, Villaruel, Sylvia, and SPO2 Madali, the facts are presented as follows:

On October 15, 1994, around 3pm, Diana was in front of her store in Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon, waiting for a tricycle, saw
accused, dealer of marble slabs, carrying a box that bore the marking HOPE and tied with gray straws, board a pedicab driven
by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband who works at BFP that accused was prime suspect for robbery in BFP, she
followed the accused. She noticed the pedicab head for the pier and so she went to Villaruel’s place to inform him about it.
Villaruel then proceeded to the pier. By that time accused had reached the pier and unloaded the HOPE box. Diana also
contacted Police Major Madali at his house.

Not long, accused reboarded that same tricycle of Bernardo without the box and headed for his house at Capaclan. Diana saw
him board the tricycle on his way home. Villaruel confirmed that the box was brought by accused. Major Madrona instructed
SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero to watch the box of HOPE brand cigarettes placed under the bench inside the PPA terminal and
wait for someone to get it and load it aboard vessel M/V Penafrancia.

Villaruel, entering the terminal, was told by Sylvia, cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that a man identified as accused
thru a photo shown to her, entrusted the box to her telling her it contained a damaged electric fan. When the vessel left for
Batangas at 8pm, with accused on board the same, PPA officers an hour later arrived at the terminal. They turned over the box
to the police. When it was opened, it contained the stolen typewriter.

Appellant was charged with robbery in RTC Romblon, Romblon. He pleaded not guilty and interposed an alibi. While he admitted
bringing to the pier a box, he said that it bore a marking CHAMPION not HOPE. He said he left Romblon on September 24,
1994, and arrived Manila. He then took the bus bound for Sorsogon, stayed there overnight then proceeded to Northern Samar
thru a jeep. He traveled to several different places because of purchasing materials for the marbles. He returned to Cebu when
the project was done and the next day boarded the ferrt for Romblon and reached the same on October 9 1994. He presented
bus tickets and purchase receipts to support his claim. He further claimed that he, with his son, boarded the pedicab of Bernardo,
carrying the box containing marble materials. At the pier, he laid it down at the gate of PPA and stood beside it as he waited for
the ship to dock; he placed it at the back of his cot upon boarding.

CA, affirming RTC, found him quilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery. CA relied on Section 3 (j) Rule 131 ROC (notes).

Issue Ratio
Petition is impressed with merit.
w/n appellant is
guilty beyond The presumption in Section 3 (j) Rule 131 ROC is misapplied [RELEVANT]
reasonable doubt
of robbery - no Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. Robbery was discovered when it was
noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing. On the sole basis
of presumption under Section 3 (j) Rule 131, CA wrongly affirmed the conviction.

A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established in the action.21 It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not
actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known. A presumption has the
effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the
presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is proof to the
contrary.

In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious
concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Because of
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions
against an accused.

Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery
is not in itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain innocent, such possession may
 University of the Philippines College of Law
3D

be sufficient for an inference that the possessor is the thief unless evidence shows it was obtained
legally.

In understanding the presumption in Section 3 (j) Rule 131, US v Catimbang is controlling:

If as a matter of probability and reasoning based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken
in connection with other evidence, it may fairly be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty of the theft.

The inference of guilt is one of fact and an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witness on the stand to explain
his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty
connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt

Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, there is a
need to prove: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed recently; (3) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable
to explain his possession satisfactorily.

For purposes moreover of conclusively proving possession, the following considerations have to be
emphasized: (1) the possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession must
be fairly recent; and (3) the possession must be exclusive.

In this case, the People failed to prove sufficiently that it accused was caught in exclusive possession
of the stolen good. While possession need not mean actual physical control but may include contructive
possession, it’s still necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive the accused
knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over
a thing, either directly or through another person. CA relied on US v Simbahan but that case does
not apply here. In said case, accused disclosed for a price, the precise location of the missing carabao.
It was held that one who puts or deposits the stolen property in a place of concealment may be deemed
to have it in his possession. Clearly, the facts are different from this case. Accused in Simbahan had
exclusive dominion and control over the thing. Appellant in this case did not.

The HOPE box was not concealed. It was left at the PPA terminal where anyone had access to it, being
placed below the bench 3 meters from the cashier of Sylvia. To assume that in a busy place, the HOPE
box opened by authorties is the same one allegedly entrusted by accused to the cashier is to form an
inference whish is doubtful. More than 6 hrs elapsed from time the box was left at 3pm until it was
opened by police at around 9pm after accused had boarded the ship. A presumption cannot be
founded on another presumption. It cannot thus be concluded appellant was still in constructive
possession thereof, the exercise of exclusive dominion or control being absent.

There were flaws in the prosecution’s theory [RELEVANT]

Why appellant was a suspect by police, no explanation was proferred. Although records show he was
previously indicted for theft, on this basis alone it is non sequitur (it doesn’t follow) to point him as a
suspect. Apart from appellants supposed possession of the HOPE, no other evidence was adduced by
the prosecution linking him to the robbery. It has been held that a presumption being not conclusive
but disputable, its force and value will depend on several considerations. Hence, if the fact of
possession stands alone, wholly unconnected with any other circumstances, its value or
persuasive power is very slight for the real criminal may have artfully placed the article in the
possession of an innocent person. It is necessary to add the proof of other facts indicative of quilt.

CA held that it was established that accused was in possession of the typewriter, he had the burdcen of
proving he was not responsible for the heist. SC held however that the burden of producing evidence of
guilt does not extend to the burden of proving the accuseds innocence of the crime as the burden of
persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial upon the prosecution.

There were material inconsistencies and flaws in the testimonies the add doubt to his guilt

Witnesses differed in versions on how and where the box was opened, a fact necessarily important in
determining whether its content was indeed the stolen typewriter. SPO2 Eleazar Madali, testified during
the direct examination by Prosecutor Sy that the box was opened at the police station. However, Sylvia
remained adamant in saying that the box was opened in her small room inside the terminal.
 University of the Philippines College of Law
3D

Without doubt, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses firsthand and
observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude. The judge’s following comments on prosecution witness
Villaruel’s answers to the questions posed to him during his direct examination, the prosecution
evidence leaves much to be desired. The lower court said that said witness failed to focus on the
questions being asked on him. Quoting what the court said: “concentrate on the question. You listen to
the question. You are like a tape recorder. You just switch on and then you continue, no you wait for the
question.” It added thus, “you are like a fish in outer space, you are a police science graduate, an officer
of the law, you should then feel comfortable in a court of law like a fish in the water you should be
comfortable in a court of law…”

Finally, logic teaches us that it is unlikely that a robber would represent himself to be the owner of a stuff
which he knows contains stolen property and seek the help of a third person to look after it. Moreover,
his alibi has not been discredited.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the decision on review is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDEand appellant, Modesto Moody Mabunga, is hereby
ACQUITTEDof the crime of robbery.

NOTES

1) Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;