Community for Creative Non-Violence v.

Reid
490 U.S. 730 (1989)

Facts:
The Plaintiff, the Community for Creative Non-Violence, was a nonprofit organization dedicated to advocacy
for the cause of the homeless in the US. It negotiated with the Defendant James Earl Reid, a sculptor, to
make a statue based on the classic nativity scene but depicting homeless people for a Christmas pageant
called “Third World America” in Washington, DC. Defendant worked in his Baltimore studio with little direction
from the Plaintiff, merely suggestions on the appearance of the statue from members of CCNV visiting his
studio.
After the sculpture was unveiled in the Christmas pageant, Defendant registered a copyright on the work. This
gave rise to a disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendant who had taken custody of the sculpture for
future exhibitions. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking to obtain possession of the work. The district court
held the Plaintiff to have the right to exhibit the statue. The federal circuit of the court of appeals reversed,
and the United States Supreme Court granted review.

Issue:
Whether or not an artist who creates an artwork at the directive of another retains copyright upon said
artwork.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that pursuant to common-law agency principles, one who creates an artwork at the
directive of another retains copyright upon it, unless that other had employed the artist. 17 U.S.C., Sec.
201(a) provides that copyright ownership vests initially in the work’s author, something the Defendant in this
case obviously was. Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act creates an exception to this in the case of works
created for hire.
Section 101(2) mandates copyright to apply in the case, where the author is an independent contractor of
another, in specific instances not applicable in this case. Section 101(1) defines a work for hire to be work
created by an employee within the scope of his employment. According to the Court, this subsection is the
only one that can divest the Defendant of copyright therein. Since the term “employee” is not defined in the
section, what applies is the rule that words used in a statute will be presumed to possess their normal
meanings. Contrary the Plaintiff assertions, “employee” is a narrower term than one over whom another
exercises a measure of control.
Under common-law agency principles, “employee” is defined as one party who performs labor for another
under circumstances in which that other exerts substantial control over the work environment on the laborer,
as well as the manner of performance. There are many other considerations in relation to this, such as the
level of skill required, tax treatment of the putative employee, the singleness of the assignment, and the
source of the instrumentalities of the labor. In this case, the work was highly skilled. The Defendant was
retained only for a single assignment, he was not treated as an employee for tax purposes, and he provided
his own work area and tools. This being the case, pursuant to agency principles, Defendant was not an
employee of the Plaintiff. Hence, the Sec. 101(1) exception to Sec. 201(a) does not apply, and thus the
copyright belongs to the Defendant.
Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus
210 U.S. 339 (1908)

Facts:
The Plaintiff, Bobbs-Merill Company, was a book publisher that owned the rights to a book entitled The
Castaway by Hailey Erminie Rives. Inside the book cover, a notice was printed saying that the minimum retail
sale price of the book was $1, and if a retailer sells it for less than that they would be held infringing the
copyright. The Defendants, Isidor and Nathan Straus, represented R.H. Macy & Co. and were retailers who
bought copies of the book from a wholesaler and started selling them for 89 cents. The Plaintiff thus sued
them for copyright infringement.
The Plaintiff argued that their ownership of the copyright gave them the exclusive right to distribute, and
that meant that they could revoke the Defendant’s right to sell the books at any time.
The Defendant’s, on the other hand, countered that they didn't buy the book from the Plaintiff, they bought
it from a wholesaler. As such, whatever deal the Plaintiff might have made with the wholesaler didn't affect
them because they were not privy to any contract between the Plaintiff and the wholesaler.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to sell gives the owner of the copyright, after the sale of the book to a purchaser,
the right to restrict future sales of the said book at retail.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled in favor of the Defendants. The court held that the copyright statutes protect an owner's
right to "multiply and sell" the work on their own terms. The statutory right to sell, however, did not also
create a right to limit resale.
The court did not hold that a contract or license imposed on the first sale could not create an obligation. In
this case, there was no contract between the owner and the original purchaser, and there was not privity of
contract between the owner and any third party.
The Court stressed that the while copyright law gives the copyright owner the right to restrict others from
making their own copies of a work, this does not however give them any rights to control what happened to
books after they sold them.
This case describes what is now known as the first sale doctrine, sometimes known as the doctrine
of exhaustion, and is codified in 17 U.S.C. Sec. 109(a). This doctrine basically states that once someone buys
a legitimate copy of a work, they can do whatever they want with it, including selling it to other people, or
lending it out, etc. They are however prohibited from making extra copies of it. This doctrine is what prevents
used bookstores and libraries from being sued for copyright infringement.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
510 U.S. 569 (1994)

Facts:
The Petitioner, members of the rap music group 2 Live Crew, recorded a rap parody of the hit song by Roy
Orbison entitled, “Oh, Pretty Woman.” The Respondent, Acuff-Rose, the copyright holder of the original song,
brought a suit against the Petitioner for copyright infringement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Petitioner, ruling that its song made fair use of
Orbison’s original. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that (1) the commercial
nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair under the first of four factors relevant under Section
107, (2) that by taking the "heart" of the original and making it the "heart" of a new work, the Petitioners had,
qualitatively, taken too much under the third factor Section 107 factor, and (3) that market harm for purposes
of the fourth factor under the Sec. 107 had been established by a presumption attaching to commercial uses.

Issue:
Whether or not the parody work of the Petitioner falls under fair use.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court firstly ruled that in determining whether a work qualifies as fair use, the consideration of its
commercial purpose is only but one element, which comes under (1) the inquiry into the work’s purpose and
character. The other elements to be considered are (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.
Secondly, the Court held that the appellate court also committed an error in ruling that the Petitioner had
copied excessively from the original, considering the satiric purpose of their version. “Parody” is defined as a
work of art or literature that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for ridicule or comic
effect. Copyright law recognizes that a parodist must use some elements of a prior author’s composition in
order to make a new one that comments on that author’s work. Essentially, for a work to be considered a
parody, it needs to imitate an original to make its point. However, it may or may not be constituted as fair
use depending on whether it could be seen as commenting on, or criticizing, the original.
Lastly, the Court ruled that the appellate court erred in holding that the commercial nature of the Petitioner’s
parody squarely rendered it presumptively unfair. No such evidentiary presumption exists for either the first
factor, which is the character and purpose of the use of the work, or the fourth factor, potential market harm.