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1. G.R. No.

148279 May 27, 2004

JENNEVIE H. LIZO, respondent.

FACTS: 21 days after Respondent Jennevie Lizo’s employment as a probationary account executive (tasked to
deal with clients, entertain customers, and promote patronage of the hotel), Petitioner and its officers terminated
her services due to the complaints received from its clients few weeks after her employment. Aggrieved, respondent
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against petitioners.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.


 LABOR ARBITER: Decided that respondent was illegally dismissed. Then petitioner filed for Motion
for Reconsideration.
 NLRC: Denied the Motion in a Resolution. Then petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
 CA: Affirmed in toto the NLRC Resolution. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 with the SC.
 SC: Denied the petition affirming the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
(1) Yes. Respondent was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter decided in this wise:

“All told, it is the finding of this Arbitration Branch that the imputation against the complainant are but the product
of afterthoughts, if not surmises, and guessworks. The inevitable conclusion is that complainant was dismissed
without just and valid cause and absent due process. Accordingly, she is entitled to her backwages from February
15, 1999 up to the date of this decision and to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary. xxx”

(2) NO. Petitioners is not allowed to disregard the mandatory 10-Day period of perfecting an appeal from
the decision of Labor Arbiter.

"Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, a decision of a Labor Arbiter is final and executory unless appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from notice
of the said Decision. Thus, the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period for the same is
jurisdictional in character."

In the instant case, petitioner Corporate Inn’s appeal to the NLRC was filed out of time and petitioner
realized this lapse from start but it pleaded for leniency with the NLRC.

While we may have sidestepped the rule on the statutory or reglementary period for filing an appeal, yet,
we emphasized this caveat: "we cannot respond with alacrity to every clamor of injustice and bend the
rules to placate a vociferous protestor crying and claiming to be a victim of a wrong. It is only in highly
meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice
from being done."7 However this exception does not obtain here. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

1. The Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule shall be
under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
2. Shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof: and
3. The relief prayed for and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order
or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
‘A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.’
4. G.R. No. 140853 February 27, 2003
ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner,

Respondent had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver since October 1995. On September 27, 1997, petitioner
and seven of his co-employee passengers met an accident when he noticed a ten-wheeler truck coming his way at
full speed despite the fact that the latter’s lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to avoid collision,
but nonetheless the van was driving struck the truck which they sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were
damaged. The management of Maxim's required petitioner to submit, within forty-eight hours, a written explanation
as to what happened. He complied but his employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was
preventively suspended for thirty (30) days, Maxim's terminated petitioner for cause.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision petitioner filed
a "Motion for Partial Reconsideration" with the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that there was no negligence on petitioner's part. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision, but said motion was denied by the Commission Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court decided in favor of the employer and its manager.

Whether or not the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an appeal to the NLRC considering
that the motion contained no statement when petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision to determine
the timeliness of the motion cum appeal, petitioner’s failure to pay the necessary filling fees and for want and
verification and absence of proof that it was filed within the reglementary period.

Yes, the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an appeal to the NLRC.

In one of the Court decided cases that in labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict
application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be
avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand... in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.

In this case, it would have readily seen that the said pleading had complied with the technical requirements
of an appeal. The records also clearly show the basis for the finding of the Commission that the appeal fees were
paid. That petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on September
28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI and likewise find
that the motion in question was filed with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date
of receipt by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, the Court are constrained to conclude
that the appellate court had no basis for concluding that the NLRC had gravely abuse its discretion when NLRC gave
due course to the motion and treated it as an appeal when in fact the petitioner complied the requisites for substantial
requirements for an appeal.
5. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC

G.R. No. G.R. No. 130866| |16 Sep 1998


Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of Petitioner on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included
in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but
only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the
mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business.

Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer
allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and therefore his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.


 Bienvenido Aricayos alleged that he started working as operations manager in St. Martin Funeral Home on
6 Feb 1995.
 There was no contract of employment nor was his name included in the in the semimonthly payroll.
 [1996] He was dismissed from employment for misappropriating ₱38K which was intended for payment of
VAT to the BIR.
 St. Martin claims that Aricayos is not an employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, owner of St.
 Aricayos was allegedly voluntarily helping, as an indication of gratitude, because Amelita’s mother gave him
financial assistance when he was still working overseas.
 When Amelita’s mother passed away, Amelita took over the management of the business. She then
discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records
purported to show that the same were already paid.
 Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
 Aricayas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA: No employer-employee relationship. Hence, no jurisdiction over the case.

NLRC: set aside the LA’s decision. Remanded to LA. Petitioner filed MR, denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

W/N the CA may exercise judicial review over decisions rendered NLRC.

Ruling: YES.

In San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor , it was held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that
the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
In this case, the petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should
have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

Additional Notes:
[1972] The NLRC was first established in the Department of Labor by Pres. Decree No. 21. Decisions of the NLRC
were expressly appealable to the Secretary of Labor → President.

[1974] Pres. Decree No. 442 was enacted. LABOR CODE, art. 302 later 223. It granted the aggrieved party of the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor. Pres. Decree No. 1391, however abolished
such appeals. No appellate review has since been provided for.

As stated above, in San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor, the court ruled that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by statute; and that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction
and protect the substantial rights of the parties.
Remedy of the aggrieved party:
1. Timely file a motion for reconsideration (precondition for subsequent remedy)
2. Seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
a. Even if the 10 day period for finality of the NLRC decision has lapsed the Supreme Court may still
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari if filed within the 60 day reglementary period under
Rule 65.

Furthermore, in BP Blg. 129, sec. 9, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7902: Cases under the LABOR CODE are
now part of the exclusionary clause. This would mean that appeals from the NLRC cannot be brought before the
CA, but to the Supreme Court.

This is illogical and impracticable since there are no cases in the LABOR CODE wherein the decisions,
resolutions, order or awards are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that

1. There was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. The purpose of Batas Blg. 129 is to
ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court
of Appeals. The court held, therefore, that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated,
the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of the decisions of the NLRC.

2. Appeal on certiorari (RULES OF COURT, Rule 45): SC only. Special civil action of Certiorari (RULES OF COURT,
Rule 65): SC and CA, concurrently.

3. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted
and declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Now, Labor Code, art. 229, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 (1989) and renumbered in 2015.


Petitioner Rubberworld, Inc filed with the DOLE a notice of temporary shutdown of operation; but even
before the effectivity of such, was forced to prematurely shutdown its operation. Private Respondents filed with the
NLRC a petition for illegal dismissal and non- payment of separation pay. Rubberworld then filed the SEC a petition
for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. SEC then ordered an order, stating
that “all action for claims against Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board,
body, Commission or sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.’’ Petitioner submitted to the labor arbiter a motion
to suspend the proceedings invoking the SEC order. The Labor arbiter ignored the motion and thereafter rendered
a decision finding Rubberworld quality of illegal shutdown ordering it to pay separation pay; and moral and
exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision with modification deleting the award for moral and
exemplary damages.


On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of footwear, bags and
garments, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of temporary shutdown of operations
to take effect on September 26, 1994. However, before the effectivity date, Rubberworld was forced to
prematurely shutdown its operations.

As a result, private respondents as employees filed with the NLRC a complaint against petitioner for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay on November 11, 1994.

On November 22, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a petition for declaration of suspension of
payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. The SEC granted the petition and issued the order stating, “all
actions for claims against Rubberworld. . .pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body, Commission
or sheriff are hereby deemed suspended.”

Consequently, on January 24, 1995, Rubberworld submitted to the labor arbiter a motion to suspend
the proceedings invoking the SEC order. The labor arbiter did not act on the motion and ordered the parties
to submit their respective position papers.

The labor arbiter declared Rubberworld guilty of illegal shutdown and ordered the payment of
separation pay with moral and exemplary damages to the private respondents.

Rubberworld appealed to the NLRC alleging abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of
facts of the labor arbiter. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter but deleted the award for

Rubberworld now files to the SC a petition to annul the resolution of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Department of Labor and Employment, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC may legally act
on the claims of respondents despite the order of the SEC suspending all actions against a company under


No, the DOLE, Labor Arbiter and NLRC may not legally act on said claims.
PD No. 902-A is clear that “all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations
under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended
accordingly.” The law did not make any exception in favor of labor claims.1

Thus, when NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the NLRC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. As a consequence, any resolution, decision or
order that it rendered or issued is a nullity.

“Please note that this doctrine was abandoned already by the Supreme Court as it easily demonstrates how a
favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee.” (Garcia v. PAL, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164856, 20 January 2009)

10. Genuino vs. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342, December 04, 2007


Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank. She then filed a complaint before a Labor Arbiter for
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages. The Labor Arbiter finds the dismissal without just cause and
ordered to reinstate complainant immediately to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits, with backwages. On appeal, NLRC reversed the judgment by Labor Arbiter and declared that the dismissal
is for just cause, however, it reiterated the award to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated
complainant in the payroll. Genuino and Citibank both filed petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
however, the decision is REITERATED and AFFIRMED in all other respects except with modification ordering
Citibank to pay Genuino P5,000.00 as indemnity for non-observance of due process.


dismissal is valid and for just cause.



The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule 1, Sec. 7 provides that, “If the decision of the labor
arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the
right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case
was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to
receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company

Here, considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her
dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the
September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision. Hence, she should refund the salaries she received based upon the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC’s decision.

10. Genuino vs. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342, December 04, 2007


This is a consolidated case anchored from the dismissal of Petitioner MARILOU GENUINO by the other
Petitioner CITBIBANK, both assailing the decision of the NLRC. GENUINO, on her part contends that her dismissal
is not valid and illegal. CITIBANK on its part questioned the NLRC's order to pay Genuino's salaries from the date
of reinstatement until the date of the NLRC's decision.

Facts show that, Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with "knowledge and/or involvement" in
transactions "which were irregular or even fraudulent." Genuino wrote Citibank back to substantiate the charge of
fraudulent transactions. Also, the counsel of Genuino demands for the bill of particulars regarding the charges. But
the Citibank’s counsel replied that the bank has no intention of converting the administrative investigation of the
case to a full blown trial but instead, give Genuino an opportunity to explain her side on the issue of whether she
violated the conflict of interest rule—either in writing or in person. Genuino’s lawyers wrote a letter to Citibank's
counsel asking "what bank clients' funds were diverted from the bank and invested in other companies, the specific
amounts involved, the manner by which and the date when such diversions were purportedly affected." Genuino
did not appear in the administrative investigation nor submit a written explanation. Citibank did not reply to the
letter of Genuino’s lawyer but noted the non-appearance of Genuino in the administrative investigation. Thereafter,
Citibank informed Genuino of the result of their investigation. It found that Genuino with Santos used "facilities of
Genuino's family corporation, namely, Global Pacific, personally and actively participated in the diversion of bank
clients' funds to products of other companies that yielded interests higher than what Citibank products offered, and
that Genuino and Santos realized substantial financial gains, all in violation of existing company policy and the
Corporation Code. Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct, (2)
willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.


Whether or not the dismissal of Genuino is FOR JUST CAUSE and in accordance with due process.



In Tabacalera Insurance Co. v. NLRC, No. L-72555, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 667, 674-675., it was held that,
“Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach
by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or duly authorized representative. In order to
constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer.”

In Equitable Banking Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102467, June 13, 1997, 273 SCRA 352, 378, it was held
that, “the act complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employee's duties.

In Labor v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183, 200, Supreme Court held that, “For
loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary,
and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.”
In Reyes v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 47805, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 134, 140, it was held that, “[L]oss
of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's
misconduct is not required. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such loss of confidence or if the employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for
the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position.”

In this case, As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury Department, Genuino was tasked to solicit
investments, and peso and dollar deposits for, and keep them in Citibank; and to sell and/or push for the sale of
Citibank's financial products, such as the MBS, for the account and benefit of Citibank. She held a position of trust
and confidence. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's policies nor her understanding of these
policies as reflected in the survey done by the bank. She could not likewise feign ignorance of the businesses of
Citibank, and of Global and Torrance. it is to the interests of Citibank to retain its clients and continue investing in
Citibank. Curiously, Genuino did not even dissuade the depositors from withdrawing their monies from Citibank,
and was even instrumental in the transfers of monies from Citibank to a competing bank through Global and
Torrance, the corporations under Genuino's control.


The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (Book V, Rule XIV, Sec. 2.), provide that any
employer seeking to dismiss a worker shall furnish the latter a written notice stating the particular acts or omissions
constituting the grounds for dismissal.

In this case, the letters sent by Citibank did not identify the particular acts or omissions allegedly committed
by Genuino. The extent of Genuino's alleged knowledge and participation in the diversion of bank's clients' funds,
manner of diversion, and amounts involved; the acts attributed to Genuino that conflicted with the bank's interests;
and the circumstances surrounding the alleged irregular transactions, were not specified in the notices/letters.