PFR Cases Finals

G.R. No.
122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers
that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab
initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the
other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51,
and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper
recording in the registry of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions
on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null
and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed
by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for
the liquidation of the absolute community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases;6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household."8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code;
in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of
their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of
Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA
S. REY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.1
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,2 but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father.4 Their cohabitation was not blessed with any
children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers."5 Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship
with Jacinto’s relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioner’s
relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.6
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her
salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of
their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that
she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied
Development Bank.7 Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.8 She further
stated that she had a total of P35,465.009 share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained
with the same bank.10 Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials,
appliances and other personal properties.11
In his answer12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondent’s meager
income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a
mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips.
Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month
duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did
not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her
parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of
which was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent
in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on
June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte.15 Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision16 was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey
against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiff’s Exhibit C and D and directing the defendant to
return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter
actually contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to return
and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages was deleted for lack of basis.18 The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the
petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendant’s non-compliance therewith
entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition based on
the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING

RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING
THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE
PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO
MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial court’s decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex
parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.20 The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration21 showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because
his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented
by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without
the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer,24 the required answer
stating therein the special and affirmative defenses,25 and several other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did
not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired
from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14
days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his
failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.27
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due
process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in
the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated.28
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically,
Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on
February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the
failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.29
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 14830 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "…only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."31 Proof of actual contribution is required.32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date
of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.33 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article
148 governs.34
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez,36 which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of
Appeals,37 we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.38 This
applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection
as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.39 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts41 in her name for
the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of
P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly
from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed
in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at
P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by
private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondent’s co-ownership over
the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof.
Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial court’s award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same
for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto
Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50.
Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy private respondent’s claim.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and
PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
Juan Jacito for petitioner.
Alipio V. Flores for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana1 against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when
it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have
alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same
failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not
file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at
the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted
by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis
thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the
parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained
should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge
considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by
affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero
likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor
assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be
deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended
within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge
dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice.
Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these legal issues: (a)
whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art.
222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b) whether the absence
of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a
ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social
institution.2 This is also embodied in Art. 149,3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is mandatory4 that the
complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for
motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the
requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course —
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers . .
. A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers . . . 5
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon6 that the enumeration
of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then
Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art.
217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially
the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent
Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it remains a
truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real property, the
spouses' interest and participation in the land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit between half-
sisters . . ."7
Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no actual interest and
participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he
married his wife."8 This factual controversy however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it resumes
hearing the case.
As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit,9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability
to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such
allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action.
It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have waived the
aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain
the proposition of private respondent that the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the
Rules of Court 11 for failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to amend his complaint.
A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly defied. The Order of 7
December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion and amended complaint with a reminder that
the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of 22 December
1992, which denied Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis supplied) . . ." The Order of 29
January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order "admonishing" counsel
for Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous with "order". Moreover, since the
assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based on an erroneous
interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not be bound to comply with them. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil
Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Orfila vs. Arellano
A.M. No. P-06-2110. February 13, 2006.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1377-P.)
CRISTETA D. ORFILA, complainant, vs. ESTIFANA S. ARELLANO, H.R.M.O. II, respondent.

A.M. No. P-03-1692. February 13, 2006.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1424-P.)
SPS. ROMULO and ESTIFANA ARELLANO, complainants, vs. Clerk of Court JESUS P. MANINGAS, Assistant
Clerk of Court JENNIFER C. BUENDIA and Process Server CRIS-TETA D. ORFILA, Regional Trial Court,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Manila, respondents.
Courts; Court Personnel; Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper and ethical
behavior and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with
rudeness and insolence. —Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper and ethical
behavior
_______________
* EN BANC.
281
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and are expected to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. Arellano utterly failed in this regard. The records reveal that Arellano indeed slapped Orfila in the
presence of Atty. Maningas after starting a heated argument regarding an unpaid loan. Orfila categorically
and unwaiveringly testified that Arellano slapped her in the presence of Atty. Maningas. The medical
certificate issued to her by Dr. Pingol confirms that she sustained injury as a result thereof. Her testimony was
further corroborated by three eyewitnesses to whom Arellano failed to impute evil motive. In the absence of
evil motive, their testimonies should be given full weight and credence.
Same; Same; Evidence; Denials; If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, denial is self-serving
and cannot overturn positive eyewitness accounts.—If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
denial is self-serving and cannot overturn positive eyewitness accounts. Meanwhile, the tenability of the
defense of frame-up depends largely on the court’s assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of
the offender. Arellano failed to substantiate her allegations. Justice Atienza reported that when Arellano
testified in both cases, she was restless and did not even look directly at Atty. Maningas, while Orfila and her
witnesses did not waiver in their testimony.
Same; Same; The act of a court employee of slapping a fellow employee without proof of sufficient provocation
and in the presence of her superior in the latter’s office during working hours falls short of the standard of
conduct required of court employees.—Arellano lays emphasis on her clean record and long faithful service in
the judiciary. However, her act of slapping Orfila without proof of sufficient provocation and in the presence
of her superior in the latter’s office during working hours falls short of the standard of conduct required of
court employees. We ruled in Baloloy v. Flores, 364 SCRA 317 (2001), to wit: The conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with the office charged with the administration of justice must at all times be characterized
by propriety and decorum. The court will not tolerate misconduct committed by court personnel, particularly
during office hours within the premises of the court. Such misconduct shows lack of respect for the court, and
erodes the good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Same; Same; Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance
of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times
the good name and standing of the courts in the community.—Although the slapping may not be work-related,
the brazenness of her act is totally unacceptable and should not be countenanced. As enunciated by this Court
in Zenaida C. Gutierrez, et al. v. Rodolfo Quitalig, 400 SCRA 391 (2003), to wit: Employees of the judiciary . .
. should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their
personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of
the courts in the community. The image of a court, as being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest
of its personnel.
Same; Same; Loans; Usury; Under the Civil Service Law, lending of money at usurious rates of interest is
prohibited, so is the lending by subordinates to superior officers.—Arellano’s behavior in the office can be
characterized as anything but exemplary. Arellano admitted that she lent money to her officemates including
Atty. Maningas, who was her direct superior, at a monthly interest rate of 10%. It was because of the unpaid
interest on Orfila’s loan that Arellano had an altercation with Orfila that resulted to the slapping incident.
Under the Civil Service Law, lending money at usurious rates of interest is prohibited. So is the lending of
money by subordinates to superior officers. The same is punishable as a light offense under Section 22, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law, as amended, and for which Arellano must
likewise be penalized.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered
aggravating circumstances.—Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that
if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances.
283
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Same; Same; Evidence; Birth Certificates; While it has been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of
a person’s date of birth and that late registration by the mother of her child’s birth does not affect its evidentiary
value, the same cannot be said for respondent employee’s birth certificate in the face of contradictory
evidence.—All three (3) documents mentioned, namely Orfila’s birth certificate, her marriage contract, and
William Orfila’s birth certificate, are official records that are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
While it has been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of a person’s date of birth and that late
registration by the mother of her child’s birth does not affect its evidentiary value, we cannot say the same for
Orfila’s birth certificate in the face of contradictory evidence. There is no record of Orfila’s birth on 8 October
1942 in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Carigara, Leyte nor in the National Statistics Office so that she
applied for late registration of her birth in 2002. However, Orfila’s birth certificate is merely equivalent to a
bare declaration on her part as to her age because it was she who furnished the data contained therein.
Furthermore, the timing in which the late registration of the said birth certificate was effected, which was on
29 July 2002 when Orfila was already accused of falsification, casts doubt on the veracity of the fact it purports
to prove.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage Contracts; A marriage contract is a public document that needs no
authentication—it cannot be overcome by the testimony of one of the contracting parties.—Orfila did not tell
the truth when she testified that she had just enrolled in Grade II at the time she was married in 1956. Her
Personal Data Sheet that she personally accomplished and submitted to the Supreme Court on 6 June 1983
shows that she studied at the Holy Cross Academy High School from 1954 to 1958. Her signature in the
marriage contract was legible and neatly written, a sign that she did not have difficulty writing then as she
alleged, and that she very well knew what she signed. Her marriage contract is a public document that needs
no authentication. As such, it cannot be overcome by the testimony of one of the contracting parties.
Same; Same; Loans; Borrowing money from a subordinate is punishable as a light offense under Civil Service
Law.—As opposed to the Arellanos’s self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies, there is ample evidence on
record to show that Atty. Maningas had paid
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Orfila vs. Arellano
her loan. However, borrowing money from a subordinate is punishable as a light offense under Civil Service
Law. Being the Clerk of Court of the RTC Manila, she was expected to know the Civil Service Law by heart as
she had the duty to implement the same among her subordinates. For failing to measure up to the exacting
standards of conduct required of her, she must be correspondingly penalized.
Same; Same; Birthday Celebrations; There is nothing wrong with celebrating one’s birthday in the office
especially if it has been a tradition therein.—The Arellanos failed to present substantial evidence to prove their
charges against Atty. Buendia. There is also nothing wrong with celebrating one’s birthday in the office
especially if it has been a tradition therein. Furthermore, the anonymous complaint addressed to Executive
Judge Salvador against Atty. Buendia regarding the anomalous re-raffle of the Ang Sy case deserves scant
consideration considering that they were handwritten and were not even endorsed by Judge Salvador to the
OCC for proper disposition. This kind of letter can easily be manufactured and does not inspire belief.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee, Graft and
Corrupt Practices and Falsification of Public Documents.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
TINGA, J.:
Jesus drove away the moneylenders from the temple for good reason.
These consolidated administrative matters involve employees of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The first, docketed as OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1377-P was filed on 20 April 2002 by
Cristeta D. Orfila (Orfila), a Process Server, charging Estifana S. Arellano (Arellano), a Human Rights
Resource Management Officer II, with conduct unbecoming of a court employee. The second, docketed as
Administrative Matter No. P-03-1692,1 concerns a
_______________
1 Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1424-P before consolidation.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
countercharge filed on 26 June 2002 by Arellano and her husband, retired Judge Romulo Arellano,2 charging
in turn Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas3 and Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court,
respectively, of the RTC Manila with graft and corrupt practices, etc.,4 as well as Orfila for falsification of
public document, etc.5
_______________
2 Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 5.
3 Now Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch. 24.
4 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 12; The letter-complaint filed by complainant-spouses Arellano charges Attys.
Jesus P. Maningas and Jennifer C. Buendia as follows:
“1.Against Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas—for Graft and Corrupt Practices, Illegal and Immoral Abuse of Official
Position, Gross Misconduct, Immoral Solicitation and Non-payment of Loans with Abuse of Official Position
and Influence, Betrayal of Public Trust, Illegal Solicitation of money amounting to Attempted Extortion,
Oppression, Coercion, Maliciously and deliberately trying to delay, block or otherwise deprive my wife,
Estifana S. Arellano, of her retirement benefits by filing midnight and trumped-up charges against her, in
connivance with Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia and Cristeta D. Orfila, and Dishonesty.
“2.Against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia—for Graft and Corrupt Practices, Illegal and Immoral Solicitation of
money amounting to extortion, Grave Misconduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
Oppression, Abuse of Official Position and Influence, Maliciously and deliberately trying to delay, block or
otherwise deprive my wife, Estifana S. Arellano, of her retirement gratuity and other benefits by filing or
causing to be filed against her, midnight, fabricated and trumpedup charges, in collusion with Atty. Jesusa P.
Maningas and Cristeta D. Orfila, Betrayal of Public Trust, and Dishonesty.”
5 Ibid. The letter-complaint filed by complainant-spouses Arellano charges Process Server Cristeta D. Orfila
as follows: “3. Against Cristeta D. Orfila—for Falsification of Official or Public Document, Threats, Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Illegally remaining in the service of the judiciary and unlawfully and fraudulently
drawing her salary and other
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Orfila vs. Arellano

The cases were filed separately. On 2 April 2003, the Second Division of the Court resolved to consolidate both
cases and referred them to Justice Narciso T. Atienza6 for investigation.7
Since the parties have conflicting versions, the facts for each case as culled from the records, shall be presented
and discussed separately.
Cristeta D. Orfila v. Estifana S. Arellano

A.M. No. P-06-2110
According to Orfila, at about 8:15 in the morning of 16 April 2002, she went to the office of Atty. Jesusa P.
Maningas, who was then Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, to give the latter suman for breakfast. While they were
conversing, Arellano barged in and said, “Magbayad ka ng iyong utang.”8 She had previously borrowed
P10,000.00 from Arellano and the latter was demanding payment for the unpaid interest due thereon in the
amount of P2,000.00. A heated argument ensued between them. Atty. Maningas advised the two women to
settle the matter outside her office and urged them to respect her position. Then Orfila asked Arellano, “Bakit
naman Panyeng ganyan ka binabastos mo ako, wag kang bastos. Pormalin mo ako Panyeng. Meron naman
akong table sa kabila, doon mo ako puntahan at singilin. Huwag kung saan-saan pati doon
_______________
benefits after she reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 on October 8, 1999 in connivance with and
protection of Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia, and Maliciously and deliberately trying to deprive my wife,
Estifana S. Arrellano, of her retirement gratuity and other benefits by filing against her midnight, false and
trumped-up charges in conspiracy with Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas and Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia.”
6 Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator.
7 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 106.
8 Id., at p. 128.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
sa table ni Boy,” to which Arellano retorted, “Sinungaling ka talaga, Tita, hindi ’yan totoo, sinungaling ka.”9
At this point, Arellano suddenly slapped Orfila on her left cheek prompting Atty. Maningas to call for the help
of the other employees who were seated by their table right outside the door of her office. There were only two
other employees present, Glenda Homeres and Ernesto Lacaba. They later testified that they had heard the
altercation, and through the glass panels of Atty. Maningas’s cubicle, witnessed the slapping incident. Homeres
helped Orfila to sit down as she seemed about to fall while Lacaba tried to pacify Arellano who then had taken
off one of her shoes and was attempting to hit Orfila with it.
Thereafter, Orfila had herself examined in the Ospital ng Maynila and was attended to by Dr. Jose Pingol. Dr.
Pingol issued to her a medical certificate10 diagnosing her with swelling of the left and right cheeks that could
have been caused by slapping.
Atty. Buendia, the Assistant Clerk of Court, was not present when the incident took place but learned of the
same through a text message she received while she was on her way to the office.11 When she arrived, Atty.
Maningas relayed to her what she had witnessed and instructed her verbally, and through a subsequent
memorandum,12 to conduct an investigation on the matter. Atty. Maningas inhibited herself therefrom as
Arellano was her kumadre, she being a principal sponsor in the wedding of one of the latter’s children. She also
feared being accused of bias should she find for Orfila because the latter gave her suman.13
_______________
9 A.M. No. P-06-2110, p. 87.
10 Exhibit “B”; Id., at p. 5.
11 As stated in the Rebuttal Affidavit of Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia marked as Exhibit “F,” A.M. No. P-06-2110,
Rollo, p. 83.
12 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 83.
13 TSN, 18 June 2003, p. 36.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
On the same day of the incident, Atty. Buendia called a meeting of all section chiefs and officers as well as
Arellano, wherein they were reminded to be vigilant in preventing a repetition of the same untoward incident
in the office. After the meeting, Atty. Buendia spoke to her about the shameful incident. Arellano just replied,
“Agi, nabigla ako. Buligi na la ako.”14
Later that afternoon, Judge Arellano came to their office. He told both Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia that
he gave his wife money out of his retirement pay “para may mapaglibangan” and that refusal to pay a debt
was actionable under the Civil Service Law.15 Atty. Buendia expressed her hopes that the matter between
Orfila and his wife will be settled, to which he replied, “Ah oo, pepersonalin ko ito.”16 Orfila then arrived and
Judge Arellano apologized to her. He asked that she forgive his wife and not to push through with filing a
complaint but Orfila refused.
The Investigating Committee headed by Atty. Buendia interviewed Orfila, Arellano, Homeres, Lacaba and
Atty. Maningas. They also tried to reconcile Orfila and Arellano several times but to no avail. According to
Atty. Buendia, the parties were not represented by counsel nor were stenographic notes taken during the
investigation since it was only an inter-office matter that they hoped would be settled between the parties.
On 29 April 2002, the Investigating Committee rendered a report17 to Atty. Maningas that documented the
slapping incident but stopped short of making any recommendation. Atty. Maningas endorsed the same for
administrative action to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) through the Hon. Enrico A. Lanzanas,
Acting Executive Judge of RTC
_______________
14 When translated to English means, “Alas, I was carried away! Just help me.” A.M. No. P-06-2110, Rollo, p.
83.
15 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, pp. 141-142.
16 Ibid.
17 Exhibit “H”; A.M. No. P-06-2110, Rollo, pp. 11-12.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Manila.18 At the same time, Orfila filed the instant administrative complaint as well as a criminal complaint
against Arellano for slight physical injuries, slander by deed and oral defamation with the Office of the Manila
City Prosecutor.
Defending herself, Arellano decried complainant’s version of the facts as fabricated, trumped-up, malicious
and intentionally filed by Orfila out of vindictiveness and for the purpose of harassment.19 She claimed that
the complainant obtained a P10,000.00 loan from her at 10% interest every month to be paid in three (3)
months. When complainant defaulted, she tried to collect from her every pay day. It took Orfila years to pay a
part of the principal amount and would burst into anger every time she was reminded of the unpaid balance
of her loan. Arellano testified that she did not file any formal complaint against Orfila regarding her debt but
only asked her husband to send her a demand letter.20
At 8:00 o’clock in the morning of 16 April 2002, per Arellano’s testimony, Orfila came to her office in the RTC
Library, informing her that Atty. Maningas has the money for the balance of Orfila’s loan. She was glad
because at long last Orfila was going to pay her so she went to see Atty. Maningas. But as soon as she entered
the said office, Orfila began lambasting her saying, “Bastos ka, ayaw kong magbayad sa iyo, kung
magbabayad ako dito rin kay Atty. Maningas ibibigay ko. Ayaw kong magbigay sa iyo, bastos ka.”21 She did
not say a word but just crossed her arms. Atty. Maningas said, “Magpasensyahan na kayo.”22 Orfila stood up
and pointed her finger near Arellano’s face and said, “Ikaw bastos ka hindi ako magbabayad sa iyo.”23
Arellano pushed her and parried Orfila’s fingers with her hand. She denies slapping her, claim-
_______________
18 Id., at p. 14.
19 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 187.
20 TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 11-13.

21 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 135.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
ing that Orfila could have been hit by her own hand when she pushed it towards her.24 Arellano also tried to
remove one of her shoes for self-defense, or to scare Orfila because the latter was charging towards her.
Arellano further claimed that the instant case was filed by Orfila in connivance with Atty. Maningas and Atty.
Buendia. Atty. Maningas is also indebted to her in the total amount of P15,000.00 at 10% monthly interest
which she refused to pay. Atty. Maningas allegedly tried to convince her several times to condone her loan
obligations as well as that of Orfila in exchange for Orfila’s desistance from filing a complaint against her but
she flatly refused. They then conspired with Atty. Buendia to silence her by carefully planning a set-up wherein
she was called to Atty. Maningas’s office under the pretext that Orfila would settle her indebtedness through
her. They then made it appear that she had provoked the incident and Atty. Maningas could be the sole witness
while Atty. Buendia would conduct the investigation. Arellano charged that Glenda Homeres and Ernesto
Lacaba were only instructed by Atty. Maningas to testify in favor of Orfila. Arellano testified that she did not
file any complaint against Orfila, Maningas and Buendia nor report the matter to her superior or with the
Executive Judge of RTC Manila. Nobody prevented her from doing so but she simply did not want to have any
enemies for she was then retiring soon.25
Arellano further testified that she was interviewed by the Investigating Committee regarding the incident but
she was not allowed to submit a written explanation. Thereafter, Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia suggested
that she settle the case amicably with Orfila by giving the latter P30,000.00, which amount was later reduced
to P20,000.00. However, she did not assert that she was the aggrieved party because she wanted the case to
be settled before she retired.
_______________
24 TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 15-17.
25 Id., at pp. 25-27.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Arellano further averred that after the slapping incident, Atty. Maningas, Atty. Buendia and Orfila started
harassing her by threatening to block her retirement benefits if she did not give in to their demands. However,
she filed an administrative complaint against them only after she received a copy of Orfila’s complaint.26
Arellano’s husband also testified in his wife’s behalf, essentially corroborating her tale. According to him, after
his wife called him in the afternoon of 16 April 2002, he went to see Atty. Maningas to verify the facts. Atty.
Maningas allegedly told him that no one saw Arellano slap Orfila’s face. Orfila even apologized to him,
assuring him that it was just a simple misunderstanding between her and his wife.27
Sps. Romulo and Estifana Arellano v. Jesusa P. Maningas, Jennifer C. Buendia and Cristeta D. Orfila A.M. No.
P-03-1692
The spouses Arellano, this time as complainants, filed a joint complaint-affidavit28 against Orfila, Atty.
Maningas and Atty. Buendia.
Charges Against Cristeta D. Orfila

The Arellanos accused Orfila of falsification of public documents by making it appear in her Service Record29
and in her Personal Data Sheet,30 which she personally accomplished when she was appointed janitor in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on 1 November 1982, that she was born on 8 October 1942 in Carigara, Leyte
when in fact she was not.
_______________
26 Id., at p. 39.
27 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, pp. 137-138.
28 Exhibit “A,” “A-2”; Id., at pp. 1-20.
29 Exhibit “C”; Id., at p. 25.
30 Exhibit “D”; Id.
292
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Her marriage contract31 showed that when she was married on 29 November 1956, she was already 22 years
old. Thus, she must have been born in 1934 and should have compulsorily retired in 1999 at the age of 65.
Similarly, the birth certificate32 of her son William indicated that she was married on 29 November 1956 and
she was 21 years old at the time of William’s birth in 1957.
The Arellanos further charged Orfila with the nonpayment of her loan and of conniving with Atty. Maningas
and Atty. Buendia in harassing Arellano in order to evade payment of her obligation. She allegedly acted as a
willing tool considering that she was extraordinarily close to them and that she owed Atty. Maningas favors,
among which was the employment of her three children in RTC Manila.
Orfila denied the charges, insisting that she was born on 8 October 1942. Said date was what her parents had
inculcated in her mind as her birthdate which she had been using in good faith ever since she can remember.
She cannot produce her birth certificate because records of birth from 1942 to 1944 in Carigara, Leyte were
destroyed during the Japanese occupation. She submitted her Certificate of Live Birth33 which was issued only
on 29 July 2002 after she applied for late registration of her birth in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carigara, Leyte. The information appearing therein were all furnished by respondent herself and her
daughter, Maria Teresa Castel. It indicated 1942 as the year of her birth.
Orfila further claimed that her marriage with her husband was arranged by her parents. When she signed the
marriage contract, she did not know that her age as stated therein was 22 years old. She was only asked by
her father to sign the document and she did not know what she was signing then.
_______________
31 Exhibit “B”; A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 26.
32 Exhibit “F”; Id.
33 Exhibit “3,” A.M. No. P-03-1692.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Neither could she remember how old she was because she was still very young then. She had just enrolled in
Grade II and she cannot read but can only write her name.
According to Orfila, she has nothing but a simple superiorsubordinate relationship with Atty. Maningas and
Atty. Buendia. She denied that they framed up Arellano. She filed a case against Arellano of her own volition
because the latter had slapped her.
Charges Against Atty. (now Judge) Jesusa P. Maningas

Meanwhile, complainants-spouses charged Atty. Maningas with graft and corrupt practices, illegal and
immoral abuse of official position, gross misconduct, immoral solicitation and nonpayment of loans, betrayal
of public trust, illegal solicitation of money, oppression, coercion, maliciously and deliberately trying to delay,
block or otherwise deprive Mrs. Arellano of her retirement benefits by filing midnight and trumped-up charges
against her, in connivance with Atty. Buendia and Orfila, and dishonesty.34
Arellano admitted that after her husband got his retirement gratuity, she extended loans to people in the office
who requested for one. Atty. Maningas allegedly pleaded with Arellano to allow her a loan of P30,000.00.
Arellano was then a subordinate employee of Atty. Maningas in the OCC. At first, Arellano refused but after
consulting her husband, Arellano agreed to lend her P10,000.00. Atty. Maningas accepted the same for which
she signed a receipt dated January 21, 1999.35 To avoid further disturbance, Arellano lent Atty. Maningas
another P5,000.00 in February 1999.36 They agreed that the loans were payable in three (3) months.
Yet despite several demands by Arellano, Atty. Maningas never paid the loans. Instead, the latter tried to sweet
talk
_______________
34 Supra note 4.
35 Exhibit “H”; Id., at p. 22.
36 Exhibit “H-1”; Id., at p. 23.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
her that she would recommend her for promotion if she would condone her loans. When Arellano was
eventually promoted as Human Resource Management Officer II, Atty. Maningas claimed that she facilitated
her promotion by following it up personally and even treating the members of the Selection and Promotion
Board of the Supreme Court to snacks.
Arellano testified that she did not file any action against Atty. Maningas out of respect and she just hoped that
she would be paid. Neither did she send her any demand letter. It was only when she was about to retire in
May 2002 that she informed her husband of Atty. Maningas’s refusal to pay.
The Arellanos further alleged that it was “usap-usapan” in the RTC Manila that Atty. Maningas and Atty.
Buendia were involved in the anomalous re-raffle of certain criminal cases. They also allegedly created their
own screening committee for accepting employment in the OCC.
Rebutting these charges, Atty. Maningas claimed that in January 1999, she learned from a fellow employee
that Arellano was granting loans at a very low interest rate. She approached Arellano who offered her a loan.
Atty. Maningas admitted procuring two (2) loans totaling P15,000.00 at P500.00 monthly interest per
P10,000.00 increment of the principal amount, payable in six (6) installments. The installments, interest and
period covered were stated in Arellano’s notebook which Atty. Maningas signs every time she pays. At the
beginning, she kept a list37 of her own but she discontinued the same because she trusted Arellano. No oral or
written demand was ever made to her by Arellano. On the day of the slapping incident, she even reminded
Judge Arellano of the fact that she had paid her debt and the latter did not correct her.38
_______________
37 Exhibit “1-a”; Id., at p. 77.
38 Id., at pp. 163-164. Atty. Maningas and Judge Arellano admitted having the following conversation on 16
April 2002:
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Atty. Maningas further testified that in 2002 she requested for a moratorium from paying the loan which
Arellano granted. Upon approval of her SCSLA loan in February 2002,39 she paid Arellano the balance of her
loan which was more or less P4,000.00 in the presence of some female employees in the library, namely: Editha
Gochingco and Lenida Cariño.40 After Arellano received the same, she said, “Naku
_______________
“Judge Arellano:
Oh, Atty. Buendia, I’ve heard that you had a bongga birthday party.
Atty. Buendia:
Wala po ‘yon judge. Sila lang dito ang nag-kasundo mag-birthday party. Pot luck lang po.
Judge Arellano (to Atty. Maningas): I came here because my wife told me about the incident this morning.
Atty. Maningas:
Oo nga judge, magbabayad na sana si Aling Tita, nauwi pa sa sampalan. Sayang.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Arellano:
Hindi ba alam ni Mrs. Orfila na sa Civil Service Law bawal mangutang na ayaw magbayad.
Atty. Maningas:
Eh ako nga po judge, meron din akong utang sa inyo. Buti na lang tapos na akong magbayad, di ba?
Judge Arellano:
(He did not say anything at all, he just smiled.)”
39 At the hearing, Atty. Maningas presented a certification from the SCSLA that she was indeed granted a
salary loan of P101,000.00 on 14 February 2002 and had an outstanding balance of P87,333.00 as of 12 August
2002; Exhibit “1-c”; Id., at p. 79.
40 Respondent also presented the joint affidavit and testimonies of Editha Gochingco and Lenida Cariño who
were in the library when Atty. Maningas allegedly paid Arellano. They both testified that they saw Atty.
Maningas and Arellano talking in the library on 14 February 2002. They did not actually hear what they were
talking about but when Atty. Maningas left the library, Arellano approached them and said, “Nagbayad si
Atty. Maningas,” so they kidded her, “Magblow out ka naman diyan Ate Fanny,” to which
296
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Orfila vs. Arellano
matutuwa si Judge nito,” to which Atty. Maningas replied, “Wala ba akong diploma comadre?”41 But Mrs.
Arellano answered, “Wala na ma’am, ok na ito.” She no longer insisted on getting a receipt because it would
be a sign of mistrust. Furthermore, Arellano had the habit of not issuing any receipt upon full payment of loans
by borrowers. She admitted lending money to Laniel Jornada, a co-employee, and not issuing a receipt when
he paid her. She simply recorded his payments in her notebook.
Atty. Maningas also denied having any knowledge of Orfila’s age. According to her, there were more than 100
personnel in their office and they cannot be expected to go over each of their biodata. Neither did she have
anything to do with Orfila’s employment with the RTC Manila nor with her children’s. Orfila was
recommended by then Executive Judge Salvador and her children were recommended by their respective
judges. Atty. Maningas likewise denied having a hand in Arellano’s promotion. Arellano was promoted in 2001
to the position of Human Resource Management Officer II because she was the lone applicant and she was
recommended by then Executive Judge Guarina.
As regards the alleged anomaly in the re-raffle of cases, Atty. Maningas explained that the case of “People v.
Jose Sy y Ang,” on which the disturbing rumors had centered, was added to the cases calendared for raffle on
28 February 2000. She had no participation in the preparation of the calendar. She tendered her resignation
from the raffle committee out of delicadeza.42 Her resignation was not accepted.
_______________
Arellano replied, “Principal lang ang binayad hindi ko na pinainteresan.”
41 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 63.
42 Id., at p. 82.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Charges Against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia

Complainants-spouses hurled similar charges of conspiracy, corruption and abuse of position against Atty.
Buendia. In addition, Atty. Buendia is popularly known to have the habit of throwing sumptuous birthday
parties in the Office of the Clerk of Court. During her birthday party on 12 April 2002, an abundant supply of
food was on the table. One of the several litsons had a tag on which was written, “To Atty. Buendia, happy
birthday” from a certain bonding company.43
Atty. Buendia denied framing up Arellano as earlier mentioned. She did not even know that Atty. Maningas
borrowed money from Arellano. She found out about it only when Atty. Maningas excused herself one day and
informed her that she was going to the library to pay Arellano the balance of her loan. When she came back,
she happily announced, “Graduate na ako, la na ako utang kay Estifania.”44 Atty. Maningas had bought fried
chicken for their lunch that day because she was finally able to encash her loan check from the SCSLA.
Atty. Buendia denied harassing or threatening Mrs. Arellano into paying Mrs. Orfila P30,000.00. She
admitted exerting efforts to reconcile the two but Orfila’s children objected to their mother acceding to any
settlement. According to them, the only acceptable settlement was for their mother to also slap Mrs. Arellano.
Atty. Buendia also denied throwing a birthday bash on 12 April 2002, claiming that the lunch in question was
a potluck organized by the April birthday celebrants in the OCC, herself included. Atty. Buendia likewise
disavowed having knowledge of Orfila’s age and the circumstances of her employment as well as that of her
children. She opined that she has no power to appoint people to government position. She also denied blocking
Arellano’s retirement benefits and ar-
_______________
43 TSN, 12 September 2003, pp. 22-24.
44 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 71.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
gued that she and Atty. Maningas would gain nothing by doing so.
As regards the alleged rigging of the raffle of the Ang Sy case, Atty. Buendia claimed that she was not forced
to resign from the raffle committee. She tendered her resignation out of delicadeza and no charges were filed
against her regarding the same.45
Judge Arellano also testified to support his wife’s charges. He asserted that he did not apologize to Orfila. He
also testified that he did not respond when Atty. Maningas told him that she had already paid her debt because
he felt amused by her remark knowing that she had not yet settled her loan obligations with his wife. He did
not take any legal action to demand payment from Atty. Maningas because he did not want his wife to
encounter any problem when she retires. He likewise stated that he and his wife talked to Gochingco in the RTC
library sometime in September 2002. She allegedly told them that she was pressured by Atty. Maningas to
execute a joint-affidavit with Cariño and that she promised them a promotion if they would testify in favor of
Atty. Maningas. But he no longer confronted her on the matter when she testified at the hearing because it was
enough that it was put on record that Atty. Maningas went to her and requested that she execute a joint
affidavit with Cariño in her favor. He also submitted a photocopy of a letter addressed to Hon. Presbitero J.
Velasco, Court Administrator, purportedly written by Atty. Rolando Alejandro Q. Agustin of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas charging Atty. Buendia, et al. with alleged gross violation of laws and conduct prejudicial
to the interest of the government.46
During the course of the investigation, Mrs. Orfila passed away. In a letter dated 09 January 2004, Mrs.
Orfila’s daughter, Mrs. Winefreda O. Paas informed the OCA of her
_______________
45 Id., at p. 82.
46 Exhibits “L” to “L-12,” A.M. No. P-03-1692.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
mother’s death on 12 December 2003, together with corroborating documents.
After the investigation, Justice Atienza submitted his consolidated report47 to the OCA on 7 June 2004. Said
report was noted by this Court on 9 August 2004.48
The OCA through Justice Atienza made the following recommendations:
IPI No. 1377-P [A.M. No. P-06-2110]
Respondent Estifana S. Arellano be penalized to:
(a)pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for misconduct for having slapped Cristeta D. Orfila in the Office of
the Clerk of Court and in her presence; and
(b)pay a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for engaging in the business of lending money in the Office of the
Clerk of Court at usurious rates of interest.
Administrative Matter No. 03-1692
(1)In view of the death of Cristeta D. Orfila during the pendency of the investigation as shown in the Death
Certificate submitted by Ms. Winefreda O. Paas was marked as Annex “1,” the penalty of suspension or
dismissal from the service is no longer possible, the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except the
accrued leaves, be imposed for falsification of public documents.
(2)Then Clerk of Court, (now) Judge Jesusa P. Maningas be penalized to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for
borrowing money from a subordinate employee. The other charges be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
(3)The charges against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.”49
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 125-217.
48 Per Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated 09 August 2004; Id., at p. 124.
49 Id., at p. 217.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
Both administrative matters are now before us to consider Justice Atienza’s findings and recommendations.
The issue in these twin administrative matters is whether or not the respective conduct of the parties warrant
the imposition of administrative sanction. We agree with the findings of Justice Atienza and adopt the penalties
he recommended except with respect to Arellano.
Charges against Estifana S. Arellano

Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee
Employees in the government service are bound by the rules of proper and ethical behavior and are expected
to act with self-restraint and civility at all times, even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.50
Arellano utterly failed in this regard.
The records reveal that Arellano indeed slapped Orfila in the presence of Atty. Maningas after starting a heated
argument regarding an unpaid loan. Orfila categorically and unwaiveringly testified that Arellano slapped
her in the presence of Atty. Maningas. The medical certificate issued to her by Dr. Pingol confirms that she
sustained injury as a result thereof. Her testimony was further corroborated by three eyewitnesses to whom
Arellano failed to impute evil motive. In the absence of evil motive, their testimonies should be given full weight
and credence.51 In People v. Villagracia,52 this Court held:
“On the other hand, accused-appellants were unable to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to falsely implicate them for the crime. In the absence of ill-will, it is
_______________
50 Rona Quiroz v. Cristeta Orfila, 338 Phil. 51; 272 SCRA 324 (1997).
51 People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, citing People v. Nicholas, 370 SCRA
473 (2001).
52 G.R. No. 94471, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 212, 217.

301
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Orfila vs. Arellano
hardly credible that these witnesses would prevaricate and cause damnation to the one who brought them no
harm or injury.”
Meanwhile, Arellano interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up. Justice Atienza reported that it is
physically impossible for Orfila to have sustained injury on her left cheek if her right hand, which she was
allegedly thrusting at Arellano’s face was merely pushed by the latter considering the fact that they were facing
each other when the incident occurred.
As to the defense of frame-up, the same is farfetched and flimsy. Aside from her own self-serving testimony
and that of her husband, she failed to present a scintilla of evidence that the slapping incident was a mere
fabrication. Neither could have Atty. Buendia rendered a distorted report on the investigation as there were
two other employees designated as members of the Investigating Committee who participated actively during
the entire investigation. Arellano did not take legal action against either of them. To say that the investigation
was staged would be stretching it too far.
The testimony of her husband, Judge Arellano, is bereft of evidentiary value being mere hearsay.53 His
knowledge of the incident came from his alleged conversations with Atty. Maningas, Orfila and his wife. At
best, his testimony may be admitted only as proof that there was such a conversation but without reference to
the truth or falsity of the words uttered.
If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, denial is self-serving and cannot overturn positive
eyewitness accounts.54 Meanwhile, the tenability of the defense of frame-up depends largely on the court’s
assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the offender.55 Arellano failed to
_______________
53 People v. Masinag Vda. de Ramos, 451 Phil. 215; 403 SCRA 167 (2003).
54 People v. Santiago Padao y Elcamel, 334 Phil. 726; 267 SCRA 64 (1997).
55 Ibid.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
substantiate her allegations. Justice Atienza reported that when Arellano testified in both cases, she was
restless and did not even look directly at Atty. Maningas,56 while Orfila and her witnesses did not waiver in
their testimony.
It is highly probable that Arellano, after consultation with her husband, panicked for fear of losing her
retirement benefits because of her own mischief. Believing that offense is the best defense, they turned the tables
on the complainant and even implicated her superiors.57 If there was anyone who manufactured a tall tale, it
was she. Arellano then filed an administrative case against the three with her husband, a retired RTC judge,
as co-complainant in order to lend credence to her story.
Arellano lays emphasis on her clean record and long faithful service in the judiciary. However, her act of
slapping Orfila without proof of sufficient provocation and in the presence of her superior in the latter’s office
during working hours falls short of the standard of conduct required of court employees. We ruled in Baloloy
v. Flores,58 to wit:
“The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the office charged with the administration of justice
must at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum. The court will not tolerate misconduct committed
by court personnel, particularly during office hours within the premises of the court. Such misconduct shows
lack of respect for the court, and erodes the good image of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.”
Although the slapping may not be work-related, the brazenness of her act is totally unacceptable and should
not be countenanced. As enunciated by this Court in Zenaida C. Gutierrez, et al. v. Rodolfo Quitalig,59 to wit:
_______________
56 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 206.

57 Id., at p. 192.
58 416 Phil. 703; 364 SCRA 317 (2001).
59 448 Phil. 469; 400 SCRA 391 (2003).
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Orfila vs. Arellano
“Employees of the judiciary…should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official
duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the good
name and standing of the courts in the community. The image of a court, as being a true temple of justice, is
aptly mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge
to the least and lowest of its personnel.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Lending Money at Usurious Rates of Interest

and Lending Money to Superior Officer
Moreover, Arellano’s behavior in the office can be characterized as anything but exemplary. Arellano admitted
that she lent money to her officemates including Atty. Maningas, who was her direct superior, at a monthly
interest rate of 10%. It was because of the unpaid interest on Orfila’s loan that Arellano had an altercation with
Orfila that resulted to the slapping incident. Under the Civil Service Law, lending money at usurious rates of
interest is prohibited.60 So is the lending of money by subordinates to superior officers.61 The same is
punishable as a light offense under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service
Law, as amended, and for which Arellano must likewise be penalized.
However, Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if the respondent is
found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances.
For slapping Orfila and worse, in the presence of her superior, Arellano is guilty of misconduct which is
punishable by
_______________
60 Pres. Dec. No. 807, Art. XI, Sec. 36(b) (21). See also Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Rule IV, Sec. 52(c) (9).
61 Pres. Dec. No. 807, Art. XI, Sec. 36(b) (20).
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Orfila vs. Arellano
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal for the second
offense.62 Such penalty should be imposed in its maximum considering that Arellano is also guilty of lending
money at usurious rates of interest and of lending money to a superior officer. Since she has already retired,
she should be held liable to pay a fine equivalent to six (6) months’ salary at the time she committed the offense
in 2002.
Charges against Cristeta D. Orfila

Falsification of Official Documents
Justice Atienza found substantial evidence to show that Orfila falsified her Service Record and Personal Data
Sheet indicating thereon a false birthdate. She stated therein that she was born on 08 October 1942. Orfila
claims to have believed in good faith that she was indeed born on that date as she had learned it from her
parents. As evidence of her birthdate, Orfila presented her birth certificate that was issued only in 2002 after
she applied for late registration of her birth. This indicates that she was 59 years old at the time this case was
filed in June 2002.
However, her marriage contract readily reveals that she was 22 years old at the time she was married in 1956.
The birth certificate of her son, William, where she was the informant, shows that she was married on 29
November 1956 and was 21 years old when William was born in 1957. Evidently, Orfila must have been born
between 1934 and 1936 but not in 1942.
All three (3) documents mentioned above, namely Orfila’s birth certificate, her marriage contract, and William
Orfila’s
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62 Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Civil Service Laws, Rule XIV,
Sec. 22. See also Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Sec. 52.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
birth certificate, are official records that are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.63 While it has
been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of a person’s date of birth and that late registration by the
mother of her child’s birth does not affect its evidentiary value,64 we cannot say the same for Orfila’s birth
certificate in the face of contradictory evidence.
There is no record of Orfila’s birth on 8 October 1942 in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Carigara,
Leyte65 nor in the National Statistics Office66 so that she applied for late registration of her birth in 2002.
However, Orfila’s birth certificate is merely equivalent to a bare declaration on her part as to her age because
it was she who furnished the data contained therein.67 Furthermore, the timing in which the late registration
of the said birth certificate was effected, which was on 29 July 2002 when Orfila was already accused of
falsification, casts doubt on the veracity of the fact it purports to prove.
Moreover, Orfila did not tell the truth when she testified that she had just enrolled in Grade II at the time she
was married in 1956. Her Personal Data Sheet that she personally accomplished and submitted to the Supreme
Court on 6 June 1983 shows that she studied at the Holy Cross Academy High School from 1954 to 1958. Her
signature in the marriage contract was legible and neatly written, a sign that she did not have difficulty
writing then as she alleged, and that she
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63 Section 44 of Rule 130 states:
“Sec. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially rejoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.”
64 People v. Apostol, 378 Phil. 61; 320 SCRA 327 (1999).
65 Exhibit “C,” A.M. No. P-06-2110.
66 Exhibit “D,” Id.
67 People v. Romeo Geron, 435 Phil. 276; 385 SCRA 86 (2002).
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Orfila vs. Arellano
very well knew what she signed. Her marriage contract is a public document that needs no authentication.68
As such, it cannot be overcome by the testimony of one of the contracting parties.
The same is true for William’s birth certificate. In addition, Orfila herself was the informant therein and she is
estopped from denying that she was 21 years old when she gave birth to William. Whether Orfila was 22 years
old at the time she got married or 21 years old when William was born, she must have falsified her Personal
Data Sheet and Service Record in the judiciary in either case.
Under the Civil Service Law, falsification of official document is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for
the first offense.69 Since the penalty of dismissal is no longer feasible in view of Orfila’s death, the penalty of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leaves, should be imposed on her.
Charges against Atty. (now Judge) Jesusa P. Maningas
Illegal Solicitation and Nonpayment of Loans

Atty. Maningas’s version that she was offered a loan by Arellano and that she had already paid the same should
be given more credence than that of the Arellanos’s. It was impossible that Atty. Maningas pestered Arellano
into lending her money considering that Arellano admitted to being a moneylender in the OCC. It is likewise
impossible that Atty. Maningas had not paid Arellano at all considering that both loans were secured in 1999
and both were payable in three (3) months but not a single demand letter was sent to Atty. Maningas even
after Arellano retired from service on 29 May 2002. Neither did Arellano file an administrative complaint
against her before the slapping incident. Her husband, being
_______________
68 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 22.
69 People v. Apostol, supra note 64.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
a retired Judge, could have advised her on the legal implications of Atty. Maningas’s acts but he remained
silent.
As opposed to the Arellanos’s self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies, there is ample evidence on record
to show that Atty. Maningas had paid her loan. However, borrowing money from a subordinate is punishable
as a light offense under Civil Service Law.70 Being the Clerk of Court of the RTC Manila, she was expected to
know the Civil Service Law by heart as she had the duty to implement the same among her subordinates. For
failing to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct required of her, she must be correspondingly
penalized.
Graft and Corrupt Practices, Oppression,

Abuse of Office, etc.
As to the other charges against Atty. Maningas, the Arellanos failed to substantiate their accusations. They
presented mere hearsay evidence as well as their self-serving testimonies totally devoid of factual basis. It is
the complainants’ duty to prove what they allege. Hence, Atty. Maningas is hereby exonerated from the said
charges.
Charges against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia

The Arellanos likewise failed to present substantial evidence to prove their charges against Atty. Buendia.
There is also nothing wrong with celebrating one’s birthday in the office especially if it has been a tradition
therein. Furthermore, the anonymous complaint addressed to Executive Judge Salvador against Atty. Buendia
regarding the anomalous reraffle of the Ang Sy case deserves scant consideration considering that they were
handwritten and were not even endorsed by Judge Salvador to the OCC for proper disposition. This
_______________
70 Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Civil Service Laws, Article XIV,
Sec. 22.
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Orfila vs. Arellano
kind of letter can easily be manufactured and does not inspire belief.
Common Charges against Cristeta D. Orfila, Atty.

(now Judge) Jesusa P. Maningas and Atty.
Jennifer Dela Cruz-Buendia
As earlier discussed, the Arellanos have not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy among
Orfila, Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia to frame her up and to delay and/or deprive her of her retirement
benefits. They failed to prove that Atty. Maningas and Atty. Buendia performed overt acts in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy. Again, we believe that such accusations were concocted by complainants as a desperate
but futile attempt to shield Arellano from the consequences of her misconduct. This Court shall not be an
instrument to the furtherance of such duplicity.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1.Estifana S. Arellano is found GUILTY of misconduct, lending money at usurious interest rates and lending
money to a superior, and meted a FINE in the amount equivalent to six (6) months’ salary deducted from
whatever leave and retirement benefits/privileges she may be entitled to;
2.Cristeta D. Orfila is found GUILTY of falsification of official documents and meted the penalty of forfeiture
of retirement benefits, except accrued leaves. The other charges against her are DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence;
3.Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas is found GUILTY of borrowing money from a subordinate and meted a FINE of
P20,000.00. The other charges against her are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence;
4.As to Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia, all charges against her are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
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309
Orfila vs. Arellano
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,

Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Sick Leave.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Estifana S. Arellano meted with fine equivalent to her six (6) months’ salary for lending money at usurious
interest rates and lending money to a superior; Cristeta D. Orfila meted with penalty of forfeiture of retirement
benefits for falsification of official documents, other charges against her dismissed; Atty. Jesusa P. Maningas
meted with P20,000.00 fine for borrowing money from a subordinate, other charges dismissed; and all
charges against Atty. Jennifer C. Buendia dismissed.
Notes.—Court employees shouting at each other at their workplace, and during working hours, shows
discourtesy and disrespect not only towards one’s co-workers but to the Court of Appeals and exhibits as well
failure to refrain from acts contrary to good morals and good customs as demanded by R.A. 6713. (Tablate vs.
Tanjutco-Seechung, 234 SCRA 161 [1994])
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients
unless the latter’s interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. A lawyer is bound
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. (Junio vs. Grupo,
372 SCRA 525 [2001])
A clerk of court is expected to foster harmony and cooperation in the workplace, a role she can only perform if
she has good personal relations with her staff. (Uy vs. Edilo, 411 SCRA 424 [2003])
——o0o——
310
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Orfila vs. Arellano, 482 SCRA 280, A.M. No.
P-06-2110, A.M. No. P-03-1692 February 13, 2006
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against
the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by
Judge Antonio P. Solano,1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to
compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there
was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another action for recognition and
support against the private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two
petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco
Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship
six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984,
and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they
were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license
which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth,
identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of
respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria,3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and Fr.
Liberato Fernandez.6 The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different
times,7 introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that
Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only
served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of
Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his
baptism. The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant.
He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair.
Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father
after he was sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein)
are entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private respondent) is
hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul
Fernandez, now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a supervisory job
at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to
be delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears reckoned
as of the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals8 in
its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate
to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res
judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving full faith and credit to the
testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3)
not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal
ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth certificates of
petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito
Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under
exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial
court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of
whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated
by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the respondent court rejected as
insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the
presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I").
These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the
private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was
corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to Claro fall
short of the evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held
in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show
unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him paternity.
The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their
physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less
would prove violation of complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held
in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural
child describes her as a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record
cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical
records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the
legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence,
like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the
record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require
separate and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates
so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father
are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited,
not only the naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances
by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate
of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence
of fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no signed by the alleged father
therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners and we are satisfied that the
respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the father and
the mother of the child, that both father and mother were present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother who were present at that
time?
A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you remember having
asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his works?
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again. I want to
be sure if he is the person who appeared before you on that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of the private
respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture by Violeta
Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here?
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a
baptismal certificate and then the second time was I asked you for what is this? And
you said it is for the court.
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you were
already informed that you will testify here before this Honorable Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man wearing the blue
T-shirt is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent
which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In
the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal
ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is
highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court applying the doctrine of res
judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary
considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39537 March 19, 1985
IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and GENOVEVA
RAMERO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA DELGADO and MAXIMINA
DELGADO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in
CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas Branch I, dated December
26, 1969 in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance.
On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying
that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Ramero or Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of
reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four parcels of land
located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of
reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.
It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
other falsifications succeed in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a
document of self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of
the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a
result thereof Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva
Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and
brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula,
Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco
Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P 7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and
to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of
paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed
from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of land (pp. 1-14,
Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer to the complaint
and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the
deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva
Ramero had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was
born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law husband and wife, and
since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child,
maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of P 23,000.00
from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set
up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her
father to the inheritance left by her grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that the defendant Irene
Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has no right to claim from the estate of
Francisco's mother, Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the defendant Irene Delgado no longer
formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had previously disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46,
Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.
On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the counterclaim posed by
defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the defendant, in so far as it would have the effect
of being an indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim over the objections of the
defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).
After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969 dismissing the action for
reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the eight parcels of land. The
counterclaim of Irene Delgado was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to their complaint and the
defendants with respect to their counterclaim.
The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on October 7, 1974, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed. The deed of self-adjudication
executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set aside. The transfer certificates
of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348,
14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby cancelled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and
13489 are reinstated in the name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration
executed by Irene Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag,
Batangas, with Tax Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs (pp.
58-59, rec.).
The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter
of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because
she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53, rec.).
The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs; because in so doing it will be in
effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other
possible heirs or creditors of the deceased.
As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could have demanded a receipt for such a big
amount.
The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado's mother,
and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by
the plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-
58, rec.).
On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
(pp. 2237, rec.).
On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the petition for review filed by
the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).
On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution by the First Division of the
Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).
On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).
On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners (pp. 130-
134, rec.).
On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents' comment (pp. 118-125, rec.).
On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration (p.
142, rec.).
In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the following arguments:
1. There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and even enhance
the doctrine in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the reasoning of the
currently prevailing doctrine, so that as arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene was not duly
recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is nevertheless entitled to successional rights
as sole heir of the late Francisco Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Delgado is undisputed and beyond question (p. 12, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.).
2. Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the Civil Code
recognition of an 'other illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of rights, Irene Delgado was
legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado, specially by his consent or advice to her
marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals (P.
39, Petitioner's Brief, p. 164, rec.).
The petition is without merit.
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court
action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72
SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemeña vs. Clemeña, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic
vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles
vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]).
There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the case of Zuzuarregui vs.
Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein petitioners in their first assignment of errors.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of illegitimate children
other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only
meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from his or her alleged parent (p. 13,
Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code
which reads: "Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children
by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this, code." The term "other
illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous but also
includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other
words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so
long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate children need only to prove his filiation to inherit
and such does not place him in a more advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same
situation.
WE do not find these arguments persuasive.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in applying the
rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared in Clemeña vs. Clemeña,
supra, that:
The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil
Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not
more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural.
The motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition
of natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:
... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where certain
illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates left by deceased
persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of such persons in order to get
part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it is nothing but just and right that alleged
parents should have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally
as well founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724).
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock.
They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children
are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious
children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to
classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the
phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New
Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory
recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fag within the scope of the
definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982
ed.). Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this
Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child
has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil.
396 [1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Candles vs. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81
Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1 [1905]).
As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no sufficient legal recognition of
petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed
by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of
Alitagtag Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1 "). Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the
municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name
of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of
these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition,
must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be
penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of
said child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050
[1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as
record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a
public instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167[1954]).
Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra; People
vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492
[1952]; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this
Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.
Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written consent given by
Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing
does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be
signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo vs. De Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of
the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95
Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her
father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic writing
to prove her recognition by her alleged father.
The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco
Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as
recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado It
cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164
[1975]) wherein the Court said.
According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, Public documents 'are those authenticated by a
notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.' Thus, 'there are two
classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.' "The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs
to the first class.
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity
prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by
him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said witnesses,
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the
requisites of a public document of recognition...
The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado,
cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation.
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is
not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of birth, will statement before a court of
record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless
possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper
prescriptive period (Clemeña vs. Clemeña, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for
the. recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when
the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of
majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shag be brought within four years from the
finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had
not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel
recognition is already barred (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).
WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes alias Irene Delgado is not an heir of the late
Francisco Delgado.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A.
TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M.
Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and
natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F.
Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for
an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his
children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different
paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of
paternal care and affection as above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose
Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose
Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive
Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This
motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out
of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners
before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on
August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute
resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS

BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE
ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON
THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE
THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY
THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR PROHIBITION

AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY
HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of
the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children
may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the
trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering
that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an
action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any
exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the
child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged
sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March
30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners,
further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must
be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the
Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be
given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The Committee did not
define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each
particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise
in the future."5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance"
but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor
child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication
in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it
will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child
she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial
court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding
that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for
compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family
Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this,
the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when
the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired
jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of
E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once
attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its
Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have
likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to
"Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she
averred —
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his
surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died,
and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was
prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin
M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with
his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx xxx xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend
to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and
would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent
in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support
from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some
material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship
between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's
only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and
her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner,
thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which
reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."
(emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No.
8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of
the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers
jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption
earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code
should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of
respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been
discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on
December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of
Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following
questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the
Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort
to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7 It was only much later when
adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.8 Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept
of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their
own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
consideration.9 In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption,
later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption
decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process15 that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February
1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending
on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.
Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the
petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21 spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the
action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from
adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the
argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under
the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year
bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no
vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away
at anytime before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the
law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and
EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special Proceeding No. 0001,
dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted are also the
parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a
legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity not
neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was presented that
the order setting the case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition
registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They were
married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood.
Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal
fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years
old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola
Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development
enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession,
with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since
birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up
for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound
love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the
adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that
they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the Office of the Solicitor General
who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another.
The only objection raised is the alleged "incongruity" that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the
adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her son by
adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who are related by nature should not be
allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result, reliance being made upon the views expressed by this
Court in McGee vs. Republic. L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820. 1aw phîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married to a Filipina by whom he had one child, instituted a
proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife had by her first husband. The lower court granted the
petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none existed before.
Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the
case of illegitimate and step-children, it would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and super
impose another relationship of parent and child through adoption. Consequently, an express authorization of
law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any and all doubt on
the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been
the reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption, authority to
adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the general authorization in
section 765 extended to any inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of
surplusage could plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766 was
unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child anyway.
However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely without reason. It seems to be an established
principle in American jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is
unnecessary to establish a relationship where such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our
codal provisions on adoption). So some states have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such
as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would reveal that there is a variance in
the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding, the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated
as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of
the Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although laws of other
jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a certain degree of relationship
(1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood
relationship between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a
valid adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary
according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given case is considered. It would seem that
in those states originally influenced by the civil law countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally
construed, while in other states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied
because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-
appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who
cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the
law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is,
of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already
exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when
the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be,
which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and
education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person
who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship between the
parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent
the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is
limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain
impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants
of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-
11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Muñoz P. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which
are in pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting
relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law on marriage
when persons who are already related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is
not within the degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship.
And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to
be prevented.
For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the
subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-

REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR.,
EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents
and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno
died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of
the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate
dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right
of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated
February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that
Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on
the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence
when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already
been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those
who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by
legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her
natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same
breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years
after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties,
what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this
earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the
Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL
and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation
or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of
the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the
same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for
granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be
made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where
the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven
[Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof
is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may
be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not
make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined
upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error
cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status
of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the
same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while
another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent
court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming
as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that
purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before
it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the
person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only
Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. L-23828 February 28, 1966
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.

Eulogio Rafael for the respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949.1 Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8
years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin,
particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by
their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners'
care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad
litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise
gave her written consent thereto.2
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a decision, hereunder
quoted in full:
This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes by the
spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos. After due publication in the "National Weekly", a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case
was then set for trial. The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing
did not offer any objection.1äwphï1.ñët
From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past
twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos
Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and
custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up
to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos
Reyes is now seventeen years old and has given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature at
the foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of the minors have long been
unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The
consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The petitioners are
both proprietors and have substantial income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The
Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and welfare of the minors.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos
to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the
Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations to their natural
parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the petitioners.
NOW, ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.
Subsequently — eight years later — on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila, without testament. On
November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.3 In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the
deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In
the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2, 1958 an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late
Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was
likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned
them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on March 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a
reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is
the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to
be named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria
Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity of the
adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the
order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding
instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of
the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos appealed
to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was given. Five months
after submission of this case for decision — or on October 14, 1965 — petitioners herein filed a petition for
preliminary injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial court from
allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita
Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate.
It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that on September 22, 1965 the
probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement
proceedings of Juliana Reyes' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order
allowing, on previous motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all the
parties, including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura; that on October 7, 1965 two strangers to the
proceedings — the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — filed a motion, stating that they are also first
cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each
under bond; that on October 13, 1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings
praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene; that on October 18, 1965 the probate
court issued an order allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them to
withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the funds of the estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion — who thereby submitted
themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and stated that they, "for purposes of expediency, are also denominated
respondents" — filed their "Comment", as required by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary
injunction. On November 15, 1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was issued
upon posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for reconsideration or
modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they would now be precluded from taking part in
the scheduled hearing for settlement of the accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November
26, 1965 we ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29, the writ was modified so as
to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1) from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special
administratrix's accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the estate except when
essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura, or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise, from the funds
of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could
assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their
right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise
that failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab
initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only because the evidence adduced in the
adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also
since the adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on American jurisprudence and
authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of
Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that
under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed
by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is
not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the
general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or
society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its
father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad
litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review
the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of
Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of the fact of abandonment.
As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption court, that:
From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past
twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y]
Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and
custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up
to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y]
Reyes is now seventeen years old. . . . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite
of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has
been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any conduct on the part of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment
approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and
circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of abandonment made by the
adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence — relied upon, as stated, by said Court — the
settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to
be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack
upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac.
736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922,
thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking
it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure.
While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it
essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination
must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the
status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be
held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment
depends upon the ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly
adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its
decision in this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a
presumption arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . . (Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard, said in Parsons vs. Parsons,
101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as follows: "No such adoption shall
be made without the written consent of the living parents of such child unless the court shall find that one of
the parents has abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being
established that the living parent has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to have thereby
relinquished all parental right to be consulted in respect to the child's welfare, and his consent to the
adoption is therefore dispensed with. The term "abandon" obviously means no more than neglect or refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children. The fact
of abandonment, judicially determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it should be
determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in accordance with the truth, because mere error in that
regard does not affect jurisdicition. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or
on insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial oh the question of legal right to proceed judicially to the
next step. That is deemed to be elementary... A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive
evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van
Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That rule applies to all judicial proceedings. . . . .
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of
abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which we need not — and do not — rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed the adoption
proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void or being
secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47
Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice it to mark that adoption is
a proceeding in rem5 and that constructive notice, such as the publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough where
the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not
required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make any difference as far as
the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be
deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would
then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in
this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition.6 It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the
subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right of
Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.
It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child.
Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik vs. Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.
From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:
Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of
the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, wherever possible without doing violence to the
terms of the statute, such a construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat,
this purpose.
Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in accordance with the
statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts, however, where the adoption has been fully
consummated, to construe the statute with a reasonable degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed
relationship and the intention of the parties be upheld, particularly as against strangers to the proceedings
collaterally attacking them . . . .
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and those who, like them
(Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such,
in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude
first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be — as in
the instant case — considered valid.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the probate court a
quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as it
enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria
Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs.
So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision 1 and
March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship,
two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he
evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s] prayer for recognition and the
same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the
other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio]
as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their
minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor children Andre Lewis
Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday
until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the country, without
the written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard
Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for
[Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court in its
Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling
contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to
enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates
of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their
mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of
these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the children out upon the
written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s recognition of his children, the mother
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since
respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of
the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent
Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-
child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did Antonio express
his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor
children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially
in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion
was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family
Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked
by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally
phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his
or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children
with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to
establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal
mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo
to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art.
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not
the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it
says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can
order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its
words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured is their
best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of
the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court
allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father
as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned,
even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule
regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best
possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the
surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity, his status in
relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should
not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of
or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his
name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change
of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way
of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which
states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father, either
at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father,
provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father upon the
submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father upon
submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule
7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the age of majority.
The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The
Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public
document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall not be
changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF shall be
recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and
the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname)
on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial
Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus,
if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly
cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is
clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and
declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes
and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides
the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years
old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters
were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this
Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice
of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their
mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of
these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children out upon the
written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of
determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are
DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent victims are two
children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of
who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local
hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant
status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they
were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United
States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed
Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to
household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone
calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy
against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually
rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-
222, Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority
over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of
visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring,
reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of Appeals
disregarded the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and
conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children should be given to respondent
Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind
application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child
below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a father
cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that
a child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her
husband. This is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action.
(Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant
facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be
awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child.
Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the
basis of that consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the
minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose
sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (do). This
is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due to the influence
of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig
Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a
child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the
court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit
under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh
birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent
with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if
the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children
and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions
and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically
treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and
welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave greater attention to
the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to
determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests
were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were
very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and
worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally
emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the
United States to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety
arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8
recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and
that her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel clearance
required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child
Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for.
Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering
from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel clearance was recommended for
denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the date when the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given
custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and
adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the
good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present
time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial court, with the children crying,
grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to believe
the father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by
Teresita in her pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals
Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What
the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on
the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or with more understanding,
especially as her conduct and demeanor in the courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or
elsewhere (but in the presence of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent
temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical punishment of the children
(even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her failure (or
refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC
Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in
turn, states that the trial court should have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner
Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court which stated
that the allegations of bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not
substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the
interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also
note that the examinations made by the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by
Teresita of the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to
support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an impending possibility of one. That they
were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were
first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have been presented not to
sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it. The
persons who effected such examinations were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters
within their respective knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain contested documents, at the
request, not of a public officer or agency of the Government, but of a private litigant, does not
necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly the issues relative to
said documents. Even a non-expert private individual may examine the same, if there are facts
within his knowledge which may help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not, certainly become
null and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185
SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight
they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which reserve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).
The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of
that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the witnesses' character and to
observe their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial
court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about
to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her
office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker
Lopez in her job appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The
interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation.
On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was
based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise
her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely
testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and an M.A. degree holder
also in Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the
interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were
secured because Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not because of
any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and to render a finding based on her examination, but
she was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not
even petitioner Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a
professional of her potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting
marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow
NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and conveniences commensurate to
their social standing because she does not even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the law which would justify
depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not been
proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of age not to be separated
from the mother, without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or relevant
considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no
difficulty in not awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the
obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might create in the moral and
social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the
difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better
served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is
nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he
has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to
extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the records. The findings of the trial
court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13,
Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already driven
across the continental United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The
two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further
that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo.
Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given
credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious
crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a very convincing indication
that the potential victim is averse to the act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the
prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is
unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to the
house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with
him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo,
Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo
and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in
Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the
daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and
kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the
children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him
and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant is
that letters and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling
reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their
clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-
222, Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole parent and substitute mother
because his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is
misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the
purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the
Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated
January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent
return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a
fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.
Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of
seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody
to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside,
and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding
custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them.1 Indeed,
parenthood is a riddle of no mean proportions except for its mission. Thus, a mother's concern for her child's
custody is undying — such is a mother's love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue in the case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision2 dated March
25, 1994, which affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the
custody of her minor daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo
Eslao were married;3 after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the
husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of their marriage, two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who was born on
April 20,
1987;4 in the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother in Sta. Ana,
Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent's house; on August 6, 1990, petitioner's
husband Reynaldo Eslao died;5 petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her
son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate
for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's house in Pampanga
where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American,
who is an orthodontist practicing in the United States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful
relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to get married; less than
ten months thereafter, or on January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to
join her new husband. At present, the petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her
husband is a progressive practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic and earns
US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the United States; the petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to
take informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present
husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their
support and education; however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Because of the adamant attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer,
Atty. Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of
Angelica to her natural mother6 and when the demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action.7
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the Court grants the same and let the corresponding
writ issue. As a corollary, respondent Teresita Sagala-Eslao or anyone acting under her behalf is hereby
directed to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the minor Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her natural
mother, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minor's paternal grandmother, contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, DID NOT ABANDON MINOR,
ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO SEPARATE MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO,
FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER TERESITA
SAGALA-ESLAO.
III
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS FIT TO BE GIVEN THE CUSTODY
OF MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO.
The petition is without merit.
Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of
her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she maintains a store
which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband,
she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her
gross income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her house.
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioner's "genuine desire to remain with said child, that would qualify her to
have custody of Angelica," the trial court's disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the child's welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody8 convinced this Court to
decide in favor of private respondent, thus:
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner must also be presented here. In this case, we see a picture of a
real and natural mother who is —
. . . legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in order to fill the void
in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed to do for her boy
during the period when she was financially unable to help him and when she could not have
him in her house because of the objection of the father. Now that she has her own home and
is in a better financial condition, she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not
and has never given him up definitely or with any idea of permanence.9
The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has lucrative practice of his profession in San
Francisco, California, USA. The petitioner and her present husband have a home of their own and they have
three cars. The petitioner's husband is willing to adopt the petitioner's children. If the children will be with
their mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright future. Contrast this situation with the one
prevailing in the respondent's [grandmother's] house. As admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms in
her house are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 and 5 persons. Added to these
persons are the respondent's 2 sons, Samuel and Alfredo, and their respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one
can just visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the house has
only 2 toilets and 3 faucets. Finally, considering that in all controversies involving the custody of minors, the
foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties (Union III vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA 183),
the Court is left with no other recourse but to grant the writ prayed for.10
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court erred in finding that there was no abandonment committed by
the private respondent; that while judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose is
not her obtaining as mandated in Art. 229 of the Family Code because petitioner failed to resort to such judicial
action, it does not ipso facto follow that there was in fact no abandonment committed by the private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply demonstrated during the trial that private respondent had indeed
abandoned Angelica to the care and custody of the petitioner; that during all the time that Angelica stayed with
petitioner, there were only three instances or occasions wherein the private respondent saw Angelica; that private
respondent never visited Angelica on important occasions, such as her birthday, and neither did the former give her
cards or gifts, "not even a single candy;"11 that while private respondent claims otherwise and that she visited
Angelica "many times" and insists that she visited Angelica as often as four times a month and gave her
remembrances such as candies and clothes, she would not even remember when the fourth birthday of Angelica
was.
We are not persuaded by such averments.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407,12 we stated, viz:
. . . [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of
the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses.13 As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."14
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law.15 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution.16 When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority.17 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.18
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled
to keep them in their custody and company.19
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature
of the parental relationship.20
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25, 1994 being in accordance with law and the
evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144767 March 21, 2002
DILY DANY NACPIL, petitioner,

vs.
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 527551 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2000 denying petitioner Dily
Dany Nacpil's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the decisions promulgated by the Labor
Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which consistently ruled in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner states that he was Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administration and Comptroller of private
respondent Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) from 1996 until April 1997. According to petitioner,
when Emiliano Templo was appointed to replace IBC President Tomas Gomez III sometime in March 1997, the
former told the Board of Directors that as soon as he assumes the IBC presidency, he would terminate the services
of petitioner. Apparently, Templo blamed petitioner, along with a certain Mr. Basilio and Mr. Gomez, for the prior
mismanagement of IBC. Upon his assumption of the IBC presidency, Templo allegedly harassed, insulted,
humiliated and pressured petitioner into resigning until the latter was forced to retire. However, Templo refused to
pay him his retirement benefits, allegedly because he had not yet secured the clearances from the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and the Commission on Audit. Furthermore, Templo allegedly refused to
recognize petitioner's employment, claiming that petitioner was not the Assistant General Manager/Comptroller of
IBC but merely usurped the powers of the Comptroller. Hence, in 1997, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits. 1âwphi1.nêt
Instead of filing its position paper, IBC filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over the case. IBC contended that petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly elected by the Board of Directors
of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). However, the motion was denied by the Labor Arbiter in an Order dated April 22,
1998.2
On August 21, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision stating that petitioner had been illegally dismissed. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and
against all the respondents, jointly and severally, ordering the latter:
1. To reinstate complainant to his former position without diminution of salary or loss of seniority
rights, and with full backwages computed from the time of his illegal dismissal on May 16, 1997 up to
the time of his actual reinstatement which is tentatively computed as of the date of this decision on
August 21, 1998 in the amount of P1,231,750.00 (i.e., P75,000.00 a month x 15.16 months =
P1,137,000.00 plus 13th month pay equivalent to 1/12 of P 1,137,000.00 = P94,750.00 or the total
amount of P 1,231,750.00). Should complainant be not reinstated within ten (10) days from receipt of
this decision, he shall be entitled to additional backwages until actually reinstated.
2. Likewise, to pay complainant the following:
a) P 2 Million as and for moral damages;
b) P500,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; plus and (sic)
c) Ten (10%) percent thereof as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.3
IBC appealed to the NLRC, but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated March 2, 1999, for its failure to file
the required appeal bond in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code.4 IBC then filed a motion for
reconsideration that was likewise denied in a Resolution dated April 26, 1999.5
IBC then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which petition was granted by the
appellate court in its Decision dated November 23, 1999. The dispositive portion of said decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated
August 31, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Nacpil submits that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS APPOINTED BY

RESPONDENT'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS COMPTROLLER. THIS FINDING IS CONTRARY TO THE
COMMON, CONSISTENT POSITION AND ADMISSION OF BOTH PARTIES. FURTHER, RESPONDENT'S
BY-LAWS DOES NOT INCLUDE COMPTROLLER AS ONE OF ITS CORPORATE OFFICERS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE ISSUE OF THE CASE WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION'S DECISION TO APPLY THE APPEAL BOND
REQUIREMENT STRICTLY IN THE INSTANT CASE. THE ONLY ISSUE FOR ITS DETERMINATION IS
WHETHER NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DOING THE SAME.7
The issue to be resolved is whether the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of benefits filed by petitioner. The Court finds that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the same.
Under Presidential Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), the law in force when the complaint for illegal
dismissal was instituted by petitioner in 1997, the following cases fall under the exclusive of the SEC:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the
Commission;
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such

corporations, partnerships or associations;
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships, or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of

payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association possesses property to cover all of its
debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
Management Committee created pursuant to this decree. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has consistently held that there are two elements to be considered in determining whether the SEC has
jurisdiction over the controversy, to wit: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question
that is the subject of their controversy.8
Petitioner argues that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but an employee thereof since he had not been elected
nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by the IBC's Board of Directors. He points out that he had
actually been appointed as such on January 11, 1995 by the IBC's General Manager, Ceferino Basilio. In support of
his argument, petitioner underscores the fact that the IBC's By-Laws does not even include the position of
comptroller in its roster of corporate officers.9 He therefore contends that his dismissal is a controversy falling within
the jurisdiction of the labor courts.10
Petitioner's argument is untenable. Even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General Manager, such
appointment was subsequently approved by the Board of Directors of the IBC.11 That the position of Comptroller is
not expressly mentioned among the officers of the IBC in the By-Laws is of no moment, because the IBC's Board of
Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code12 and under the corporation's By-Laws to appoint
such other officers as it may deem necessary. The By-Laws of the IBC categorically provides:
XII. OFFICERS
The officers of the corporation shall consist of a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary-Treasurer, a

General Manager, and such other officers as the Board of Directors may from time to time does fit to
provide for. Said officers shall be elected by majority vote of the Board of Directors and shall have
such powers and duties as shall hereinafter provide (Emphasis supplied).13
The Court has held that in most cases the "by-laws may and usually do provide for such other officers,"14 and that
where a corporate office is not specifically indicated in the roster of corporate offices in the by-laws of a corporation,
the board of directors may also be empowered under the by-laws to create additional officers as may be
necessary.15
An "office" has been defined as a creation of the charter of a corporation, while an "officer" as a person elected by
the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" occupies no office and is generally employed not by
action of the directors and stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the
compensation to be paid to such employee.16
As petitioner's appointment as comptroller required the approval and formal action of the IBC's Board of Directors to
become valid,17 it is clear therefore holds that petitioner is a corporate officer whose dismissal may be the subject of
a controversy cognizable by the SEC under Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A which includes controversies involving both
election and appointment of corporate directors, trustees, officers, and managers.18 Had petitioner been an
ordinary employee, such board action would not have been required.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Since complainant's appointment was approved unanimously by the Board of Directors of the corporation,
he is therefore considered a corporate officer and his claim of illegal dismissal is a controversy that falls
under the jurisdiction of the SEC as contemplated by Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. The rule is that dismissal or
non-appointment of a corporate officer is clearly an intra-corporate matter and jurisdiction over the case
properly belongs to the SEC, not to the NLRC.19
As to petitioner's argument that the nature of his functions is recommendatory thereby making him a mere
managerial officer, the Court has previously held that the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer
or agent or employee is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but instead by the incidents of the
relationship as they actually exist.20
It is likewise of no consequence that petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal includes money claims, for such
claims are actually part of the perquisites of his position in, and therefore linked with his relations with, the
corporation. The inclusion of such money claims does not convert the issue into a simple labor problem. Clearly, the
issues raised by petitioner against the IBC are matters that come within the area of corporate affairs and
management, and constitute a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.21
Petitioner further argues that the IBC failed to perfect its appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision for its non-
payment of the appeal bond as required under Article 223 of the Labor Code, since compliance with the requirement
of posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from
has been held to be both mandatory and jurisdictional.22 Hence, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter had long become
final and executory and thus, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in giving due course to the IBC's petition for certiorari, and in deciding the case on the merits.
The IBC's failure to post an appeal bond within the period mandated under Article 223 of the Labor Code has been
rendered immaterial by the fact that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since as stated earlier,
the same is in the nature of an intra-corporate controversy. The Court has consistently held that where there is a
finding that any decision was rendered without jurisdiction, the action shall be dismissed. Such defense can be
interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment.23 It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired
through, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties.24
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
case filed before the Labor Arbiter, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in the proper court.
1âw phi 1.nêt
It must be noted that under Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code (Republic Act No. 8799) which was signed
into law by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on July 19, 2000, the SEC's jurisdiction over all cases
enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. 902-A has been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52755 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles
City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher
J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely
Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at
Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his
legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and
against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the
herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject
minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality
of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated.
This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over
their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful
custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at
bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by express
provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a case
singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and
respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas,

petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially
supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of
Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the
issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from
each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case
of Salvaña v. Gaela,1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the
parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art.
176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is
entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner
is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She
augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of
P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works
up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents
and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern
for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made
it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with
him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to
her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any
support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them
on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because
of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the
respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care
and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for
payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the
Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the
court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter
case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at
the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is
over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother
is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition
the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver
the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
CARLITOS E. SILVA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for
their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling
for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an

unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union
saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long
after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when
Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections.
The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact,
had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two
eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of

Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous
understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a
petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who
averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing

respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children
without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs."1 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales
interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds

emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it

held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of the
parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the predicament and/or status of both
petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome
morally and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of
custody of said children. Allowing these children to stay with their mother on
weekdays and then with their father and the latter's live-in partner on
weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of tender
age. There is no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how temporary
and/or remote, would affect the moral and emotional conditions of the minor
children. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having to live
with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not their mother may have
a more damaging effect upon them.
"Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
provides in part:
"`Art. 3. Rights of the Child. - x x x
`(1) x x x
`(2) x x x
`(3) x x x
`(4) x x x
`(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality

and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character.
`(6) x x x
`(7) x x x
`(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to
his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral development.
`x x x'
"With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of the
minor children, to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the
father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his love
for the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little
self-sacrifice and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children. While
petitioner-appellee, as father, may not intentionally prejudice the children by
improper influence, what the children may witness and hear while in their
father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of morality and
rectitude where they should be brought up.
"The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The
molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one
parent is more normal than two separate houses - (one house where one
parent lives and another house where the other parent with another
woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate
children are supposed to use the surname of and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
"The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus
important we be careful in rearing the children especially so if they are
illegitimates, as in this case.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered giving

due course to the appeal. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
dated April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed. Petitioner-appellee's petition for
visitorial rights is hereby denied.
"SO ORDERED."2 chanroblesvi rtu allawlib rary
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case
merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial
court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have visitorial
rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could)
he take out the children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The
visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his
or her child or children.3 chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on

the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of
the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those x x x (2)
(b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to Article 220,
of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and
those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in
their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of
the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the
youth.4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant
to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in
varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of
examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so
explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well.5 Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody
of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is
always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor
General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours
spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed is not
entirely without merit; thus:
"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even

assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an
unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner
shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action
for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the
deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages."6 chanroblesvi rtu allawli bra ry
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-
meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents natural
desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide
this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby
the judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105562 September 27, 1993
LUZ PINEDA, MARILOU MONTENEGRO, VIRGINIA ALARCON, DINA LORENA AYO, CELIA CALUMBAG and
LUCIA LONTOK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, respondents.
Mariano V. Ampil, Jr. for petitioners.
Ramon S. Caguiao for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the Decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 229501 and its Resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2 The challenged decision
modified the decision of the Insurance Commission in IC Case
No. RD-058. 3
The petitioners were the complainants in IC Case No. RD-058, an administrative complaint against private
respondent Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter Insular Life), which was filed with the Insurance
Commission on 20 September 1989. 4 They prayed therein that after due proceedings, Insular Life "be ordered to
pay the claimants their insurance claims" and that "proper sanctions/penalties be imposed on" it "for its deliberate,
feckless violation of its contractual obligations to the complainants, and of the Insurance Code." 5 Insular Life's
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the claims of complainants are all respectively beyond the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commission as provided in Section 416 of the Insurance Code,"6 having been denied in
the Order of 14 November 1989, 7 it filed its answer on 5 December 1989. 8 Thereafter, hearings were conducted on
various dates.
On 20 June 1990, the Commission rendered its decision9 in favor of the complainants, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Commission merely orders the respondent company to:
a) Pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) a day from the receipt of a copy of this Decision
until actual payment thereof;
b) Pay and settle the claims of DINA AYO and LUCIA LONTOK, for P50,000.00 and P40,000.00,
respectively;
c) Notify henceforth it should notify individual beneficiaries designated under any Group Policy, in
the event of the death of insured(s), where the corresponding claims are filed by the Policyholder;
d) Show cause within ten days why its other responsible officers who have handled this case should
not be subjected to disciplinary and other administrative sanctions for deliberately releasing to Capt.
Nuval the check intended for spouses ALARCON, in the absence of any Special Power of Attorney
for that matter, and for negligence with respect to the release of the other five checks.
SO ORDERED. 10
In holding for the petitioners, the Insurance Commission made the following findings and conclusions:
After taking into consideration the evidences [sic], testimonial and documentary for the complainants
and the respondent, the Commission finds that; First: The respondent erred in appreciating that the
powers of attorney executed by five (5) of the several beneficiaries convey absolute authority to
Capt. Nuval, to demand, receive, receipt and take delivery of insurance proceeds from respondent
Insular Life. A cursory reading of the questioned powers of authority would disclosed [sic] that they
do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt
from respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured. On the
contrary, the said powers of attorney are couched in terms which could easily arouse suspicion of an
ordinary
man. . . .
Second: The testimony of the complainants' rebuttal witness,

Mrs. Trinidad Alarcon, who declared in no uncertain terms that neither she nor her husband,
executed a special power of attorney in favor of Captain Rosendo Nuval, authorizing him to claim,
receive, receipt and take delivery of any insurance proceeds from Insular Life arising out of the death
of their insured/seaman son, is not convincingly refuted.
Third: Respondent Insular Life did not observe Section 180 of the Insurance Code, when it issued or
released two checks in the amount of P150,000.00 for the three minor children (P50,000.00 each) of
complainant, Dina Ayo and another check of P40,000.00 for minor beneficiary Marissa Lontok,
daughter of another complainant Lucia Lontok, there being no showing of any court authorization
presented or the requisite bond posted.
Section 180 is quotes [sic] partly as follows:
. . . In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the latter's absence or

incapacity, the mother of any minor, who is an insured or a beneficiary under a
contract of life, health or accident insurance, may exercise, in behalf of said minor,
any right, under the policy, without necessity of court authority or the giving of a
bond where the interest of the minor in the particular act involved does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos . . . . 11
Insular Life appealed the decision to the public respondent which docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 22950. The
appeal urged the appellate court to reverse the decision because the Insurance Commission (a) had no jurisdiction
over the case considering that the claims exceeded P100,000.00,
(b) erred in holding that the powers of attorney relied upon by Insular Life were insufficient to convey absolute
authority to Capt. Nuval to demand, receive and take delivery of the insurance proceeds pertaining to the
petitioners, (c) erred in not giving credit to the version of Insular Life that the power of attorney supposed to have
been executed in favor of the Alarcons was missing, and
(d) erred in holding that Insular Life was liable for violating Section 180 of the Insurance Code for having released to
the surviving mothers the insurance proceeds pertaining to the beneficiaries who were still minors despite the failure
of the former to obtain a court authorization or to post a bond.
On 10 October 1991, the public respondent rendered a decision, 12 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom the award to Dina
Ayo and Lucia Lontok in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. 13
It found the following facts to have been duly established:
It appears that on 23 September 1983, Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI, for brevity), a
crewing/manning outfit, procured Group PoIicy
No. G-004694 from respondent-appellant Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life insurance
coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. On 17 February 1986, during the
effectivity of the policy, six covered employees of the PMSI perished at sea when their vessel, M/V
Nemos, a Greek cargo vessel, sunk somewhere in El Jadida, Morocco. They were survived by
complainants-appellees, the beneficiaries under the policy.
Following the tragic demise of their loved ones, complainants-appellees sought to claim death
benefits due them and, for this purpose, they approached the President and General Manager of
PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval. The latter evinced willingness to assist complainants-appellees to
recover Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) benefits from the POEA and to work for
the increase of their PANDIMAN and other benefits arising from the deaths of their husbands/sons.
They were thus made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon, special powers of
attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among others, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for
their benefit indemnities of sums of money due them relative to the sinking of M/V Nemos. By virtue
of these written powers of attorney, complainants-appellees were able to receive their respective
death benefits. Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder
of the life insurance of its deceased workers, filed with respondent-appellant formal claims for and in
behalf of the beneficiaries, through its President, Capt. Nuval. Among the documents submitted by
the latter for the processing of the claims were five special powers of attorney executed by
complainants-appellees. On the basis of these and other documents duly submitted, respondent-
appellant drew against its account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on 27 May 1986 six (6)
checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and another for P40,00.00, payable to the
order of complainants-appellees. These checks were released to the treasurer of PMSI upon
instructions of
Capt. Nuval over the phone to Mr. Mariano Urbano, Assistant Department Manager for Group
Administration Department of respondent-appellant. Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these checks from
the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-law, endorsed and deposited them in his account with
the Commercial Bank of Manila, now Boston Bank.
On 3 July 1989, after complainants-appellees learned that they were entitled, as beneficiaries, to life
insurance benefits under a group policy with respondent-appellant, they sought to recover these
benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied their claim on the ground that the liability to
complainants-appellees was already extinguished upon delivery to and receipt by PMSI of the six (6)
checks issued in their names.14
On the basis thereof, the public respondent held that the Insurance Commission had jurisdiction over the case on
the ground that although some of the claims exceed P100,000.00, the petitioners had asked for administrative
sanctions against Insular Life which are within the Commission's jurisdiction to grant; hence, "there was merely a
misjoinder of causes of action . . . and, like misjoinder of parties, it is not a ground for the dismissal of the action as it
does not affect the other reliefs prayed for." 15 It also rejected Insular Life's claim that the Alarcons had submitted a
special power of attorney which they (Insular Life) later misplaced.
On the other hand, the public respondent ruled that the powers of attorney, Exhibits "1" to "5," relied upon by Insular
Life were sufficient to authorize Capt. Nuval to receive the proceeds of the insurance pertaining to the beneficiaries.
It stated:
When the officers of respondent-appellant read these written powers, they must have assumed
Capt. Nuval indeed had authority to collect the insurance proceeds in behalf of the beneficiaries who
duly affixed their signatures therein. The written power is specific enough to define the authority of
the agent to collect any sum of money pertaining to the sinking of the fatal vessel. Respondent-
appellant interpreted this power to include the collection of insurance proceeds in behalf of the
beneficiaries concerned. We believe this is a reasonable interpretation even by an officer of
respondent-appellant unschooled in the law. Had respondent appellant, consulted its legal
department it would not have received a contrary view. There is nothing in the law which mandates a
specific or special power of attorney to be executed to collect insurance proceeds. Such authority is
not included in the enumeration of Art. 1878 of the New Civil Code. Neither do we perceive collection
of insurance claims as an act of strict dominion as to require a special power of attorney. Moreover,
respondent-appellant had no reason to doubt Capt. Nuval. Not only was he armed with a seemingly
genuine authorization, he also appeared to be the proper person to deal with respondent-appellant
being the President and General Manager of the PMSI, the policyholder with whom respondent-
appellant always dealt. The fact that there was a verbal agreement between complainants-appellees
and Capt. Nuval limiting the authority of the latter to claiming specified death benefits cannot
prejudice the insurance company which relied on the terms of the powers of attorney which on their
face do not disclose such limitation. Under the circumstances, it appearing that complainants-
appellees have failed to point to a positive provision of law or stipulation in the policy requiring a
specific power of attorney to be presented, respondents-appellant's reliance on the written powers
was in order and it cannot be penalized for such an act. 16
Insofar as the minor children of Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok were concerned, it ruled that the requirement in Section
180 of the Insurance Code which provides in part that:
In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the latter's absence or incapacity, the mother,
of any minor, who is an insured or a beneficiary under a contract of life, health or accident insurance,
may exercise, in behalf of said minor, any right under the policy, without necessity of court authority
or the giving of a bond, where the interest of the minor in the particular act involved does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos. Such a right, may include, but shall not be limited to, obtaining a policy loan,
surrendering the policy, receiving the proceeds of the policy, and giving the minor's consent to any
transaction on the policy.
has been amended by the Family Code 17 which grants the father and mother joint legal guardianship over
the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment; however,
when the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent
concerned shall be required to put up a bond in such amount as the court may determine.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which we gave due course after the private respondent had filed the
required comment thereon and the petitioners their reply to the comment.
We rule for the petitioners.
We have carefully examined the specific powers of attorney, Exhibits "1" to "5," which were executed by petitioners
Luz Pineda, Lucia B. Lontok, Dina Ayo, Celia Calumag, and Marilyn Montenegro, respectively, on 14 May
198618 and uniformly granted to Capt. Rosendo Nuval the following powers:
To follow-up, ask, demand, collect and receipt for my benefit indemnities or sum of money due me
relative to the sinking of M.V. NEMOS in the vicinity of El Jadida, Casablanca, Morocco on the
evening of February 17, 1986; and
To sign receipts, documents, pertinent waivers of indemnities or other writings of whatsoever nature
with any and all third persons, concerns and entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my
said attorney.
We agree with the Insurance Commission that the special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and
clear terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance proceeds arising
from the death of the seaman-insured. On the contrary, the said powers of attorney are couched in terms which
could easily arouse suspicion of an ordinary man." 19 The holding of the public respondent to the contrary is
principally premised on its opinion that:
[t]here is nothing in the law which mandates a specific or special power of attorney to be executed to
collect insurance proceeds. Such authority is not included in the enumeration of art. 1878 of the New
Civil Code. Neither do we perceive collection of insurance claims as an act of strict dominion as to
require a special power of attorney.
If this be so, then they could not have been meant to be a general power of attorney since Exhibits "1" to "5"
are special powers of attorney. The execution by the principals of special powers of attorney, which clearly
appeared to be in prepared forms and only had to be filled up with their names, residences, dates of
execution, dates of acknowledgment and others, excludes any intent to grant a general power of attorney or
to constitute a universal agency. Being special powers of attorney, they must be strictly construed.
Certainly, it would be highly imprudent to read into the special powers of attorney in question the power to collect
and receive the insurance proceeds due the petitioners from Group Policy No. G-004694. Insular Life knew that a
power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its
practice with respect to group policies. Such practice was testified to by Mr. Marciano Urbano, Insular Life's
Assistant Manager of the Group Administrative Department, thus:
ATTY. CAGUIOA:
Can you explain to us why in this case, the claim was filed by a certain Capt. Noval
[sic]?
WITNESS:
a The practice of our company in claim pertaining to group insurance, the

policyholder is the one who files the claim for the beneficiaries of the deceased. At
that time, Capt. Noval [sic] is the President and General Manager of Prime Marine.
q What is the reason why policyholders are the ones who file the claim and not the
designated beneficiaries of the employees of the policyholders?
a Yes because group insurance is normally taken by the employer as an employee-

benefit program and as such, the benefit should be awarded by the policyholder to
make it appear that the benefit really is given by the employer. 20
On cross-examination, Urbano further elaborated that even payments, among other things, are coursed through the
policyholder:
q What is the corporate concept of group insurance insofar as Insular Life is

concerned?
WITNESS:
a Group insurance is a contract where a group of individuals are covered under one
master contract. The individual underwriting characteristics of each individual is not
considered in the determination of whether the individual is insurable or not. The
contract is between the policyholder and the insurance company. In our case, it is
Prime Marine and Insular Life. We do not have contractual obligations with the
individual employees; it is between Prime Marine and Insular Life.
q And so it is part of that concept that all inquiries, follow-up, payment of claims,
premium billings, etc. should always be coursed thru the policyholder?
a Yes that is our practice.
q And when you say claim payments should always be coursed thru the policyholder,
do you require a power of attorney to be presented by the policyholder or not?
a Not necessarily.
q In other words, under a group insurance policy like the one in this case, Insular Life
could pay the claims to the policyholder himself even without the presentation of any
power of attorney from the designated beneficiaries?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
a No. Sir.
ATTY. AMPIL:
q Why? Is this case, the present case different from the cases which you answered
that no power of attorney is necessary in claims payments?
WITNESS:
a We did not pay Prime Marine; we paid the beneficiaries.
q Will you now tell the Honorable Commission why you did not pay Prime Marine and
instead paid the beneficiaries, the designated beneficiaries?
xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. AMPIL:
I will rephrase the question.
q Will you tell the Commission what circumstances led you to pay the designated
beneficiaries, the complainants in this case, instead of the policyholder when as you
answered a while ago, it is your practice in group insurance that claims payments,
etc., are coursed thru the policyholder?
WITNESS:
a It is coursed but, it is not paid to the policyholder.
q And so in this case, you gave the checks to the policyholder only coursing them
thru said policyholder?
a That is right, Sir.
q Not directly to the designated beneficiaries?
a Yes, Sir. 21
This practice is usual in the group insurance business and is consistent with the jurisprudence thereon in the State
of California — from whose laws our Insurance Code has been mainly patterned — which holds that the employer-
policyholder is the agent of the insurer.
Group insurance is a comparatively new form of insurance. In the United States, the first modern group insurance
policies appear to have been issued in 1911 by the Equitable Life Assurance Society. 22 Group insurance is
essentially a single insurance contract that provides coverage for many individuals. In its original and most common
form, group insurance provides life or health insurance coverage for the employees of one employer.
The coverage terms for group insurance are usually stated in a master agreement or policy that is issued by the
insurer to a representative of the group or to an administrator of the insurance program, such as an employer. 23 The
employer acts as a functionary in the collection and payment of premiums and in performing related duties. Likewise
falling within the ambit of administration of a group policy is the disbursement of insurance payments by the
employer to the employees. 24 Most policies, such as the one in this case, require an employee to pay a portion of
the premium, which the employer deducts from wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This is known
as a contributory plan as compared to a non-contributory plan where the premiums are solely paid by the employer.
Although the employer may be the titular or named insured, the insurance is actually related to the life and health of
the employee. Indeed, the employee is in the position of a real party to the master policy, and even in a non-
contributory plan, the payment by the employer of the entire premium is a part of the total compensation paid for the
services of the employee. 25 Put differently, the labor of the employees is the true source of the benefits, which are a
form of additional compensation to them.
It has been stated that every problem concerning group insurance presented to a court should be approached with
the purpose of giving to it every legitimate opportunity of becoming a social agency of real consequence considering
that the primary aim is to provide the employer with a means of procuring insurance protection for his employees
and their families at the lowest possible cost, and in so doing, the employer creates goodwill with his employees,
enables the employees to carry a larger amount of insurance than they could otherwise, and helps to attract and
hold a permanent class of employees. 26
In Elfstrom vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 27 the California Supreme Court explicitly ruled that in group
insurance policies, the employer is the agent of the insurer. Thus:
We are convinced that the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of
administering group insurance policies. It cannot be said that the employer acts entirely for its own
benefit or for the benefit of its employees in undertaking administrative functions. While a reduced
premium may result if the employer relieves the insurer of these tasks, and this, of course, is
advantageous to both the employer and the employees, the insurer also enjoys significant
advantages from the arrangement. The reduction in the premium which results from employer-
administration permits the insurer to realize a larger volume of sales, and at the same time the
insurer's own administrative costs are markedly reduced.
xxx xxx xxx
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the employer acts as the agent of the
insurer, however, is that the employee has no knowledge of or control over the employer's actions in
handling the policy or its administration. An agency relationship is based upon consent by one
person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control. It is clear from the evidence
regarding procedural techniques here that the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency test
with regard to the administration of the policy, whereas that between the employer and its
employees fails to reflect true agency. The insurer directs the performance of the employer's
administrative acts, and if these duties are not undertaken properly the insurer is in a position to
exercise more constricted control over the employer's conduct.
In Neider vs. Continental Assurance Company, 28 which was cited in Elfstrom, it was held that:
[t]he employer owes to the employee the duty of good faith and due care in attending to the policy,
and that the employer should make clear to the employee anything required of him to keep the policy
in effect, and the time that the obligations are due. In its position as administrator of the policy, we
feel also that the employer should be considered as the agent of the insurer, and any omission of
duty to the employee in its administration should be attributable to the insurer.
The ruling in Elfstrom was subsequently reiterated in the cases of Bass vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. 29 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. vs. State Board of Equalization.30
In the light of the above disquisitions and after an examination of the facts of this case, we hold that PMSI, through
its President and General Manager, Capt. Nuval, acted as the agent of Insular Life. The latter is thus bound by the
misconduct of its agent.
Insular Life, however, likewise recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. Unfortunately,
through its official, Mr. Urbano, it acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying without question on
the special power of attorney. In Strong vs. Repide, 31 this Court ruled that it is among the established principles in
the civil law of Europe as well as the common law of American that third persons deal with agents at their peril and
are bound to inquire as to the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract. And in Harry E. Keller
Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez, 32 this Court, quoting Mechem on Agency, 33 stated that:
The person dealing with an agent must also act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence.
Obviously, if he knows or has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he
cannot claim protection. So if the suggestions of probable limitations be of such a clear and
reasonable quality, or if the character assumed by the agent is of such a suspicious or unreasonable
nature, or if the authority which he seeks to exercise is of such an unusual or improbable character,
as would suffice to put an ordinarily prudent man upon his guard, the party dealing with him may not
shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal with the agent at all, or
should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs. (emphasis supplied)
Even granting for the sake of argument that the special powers of attorney were in due form, Insular Life was
grossly negligent in delivering the checks, drawn in favor of the petitioners, to a party who is not the agent
mentioned in the special power of attorney.
Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public respondent that since the shares of the minors in the insurance
proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under Article 225 of the Family Code their mothers could receive such
shares without need of either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a bond. It is of the view that said
Article had repealed the third paragraph of Section 180 of the Insurance Code. 34 The pertinent portion of Article 225
of the Family Code reads as follows:
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of the unemancipated common child's property, the father
and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's property. However, if the market value of the property
or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to
guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.
It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code speaks of the "market value
of the property or the annual income of the child," which means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or
annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a bond is required. There is no evidence that the share of each of the
minors in the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property. Without such evidence, it would
not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only property.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

10 October 1991 and the Resolution of 19 May 1992 of the public respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 22950 are SET
ASIDE and the Decision of the Insurance Commission in IC Case No. RD-058 is REINSTATED.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and
his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III,
of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial,
reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-

ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son,
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent
and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was
the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest -
would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute
to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private
rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)"
And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to
an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence,
the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman
of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it
clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is
already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber
real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time
of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion
with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still
a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage
of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use
of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, and is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI
HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of which is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance
with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but
sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic
Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz
Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in
relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with
Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name
sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names
by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar
v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within
one (1) week from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule
103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the
dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083),
and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground that the petition is
substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of
name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's
maiden name and surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to the instant
case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially one for
change of name, particularly of surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being
her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal
right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result
in the resumption of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is
the substantive requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis supplied).
Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne by individual
and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth
certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See:
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a
petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil
Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35
SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil
Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483 [1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be
changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it
is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his
real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of
persons. A name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her
registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of
the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with
Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows:
Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance
with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the
spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable,
shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration
of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187,
PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after
annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is
permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of
the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which
provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married
woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by
prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first
name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer
exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use
of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art.
373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her
former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance
with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or
rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the
onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial
confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a
specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by
competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of
civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it
is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and averment of concise
statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most liberal
construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on
grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.
The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and would not serve the
public interest. We have consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it
(Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v.
CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10,
1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
assailing the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 28, 1989, which affirmed the decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, dated August 31, 1987. The appealed decision granted private
respondent Cynthia Vicencio's petition for change of surname, from "Vicencio" to "Yu".
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and circumstances of the case:
Petitioner's evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19 January 1971 at the Capitol
Medical Center, Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de
Vega Leabres (Exh. C, also marked Annex A of Petition); that on 10 January 1972, after a
marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan;
that since then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was
Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic) and her children; that on 29
June 1976, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition in the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, Civil Case No. E-02009, which
was granted in a decision rendered by the Hon. Regina C. Ordoñez Benitez on 11 July 1977
(Exhs. D, D-1 to D-3); that sometime in 1983, petitioner's mother filed another petition for
change of name, Sp. Proc No. 83-16346, that is to drop the surname of her husband
therefrom, and after hearing a decision was rendered on 5 July 1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C.
Cui of Branch XXV of this Court approving the petition (Exh. E); that in 1984, petitioner's
mother again filed another petition with this Court, Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the declaration
of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and which petition was granted on 26 April 1984 in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera (Exh. F & F-1); that on 15 April 1986,
petitioner's mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a ceremony solemnized by
Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. G.).
It was also established that even (sic) since her childhood, petitioner had not known mush
less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is
Ernesto Yu; that despite of which she had been using the family name "Vicencio" in her
school and other related activities therein; that in view of such situation, confusion arose as
to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her
family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme
embarrassment; that on two (2) occassions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions
Club affair and in Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that her
step-father had been priorly consulted about this petition and had given his consent thereto;
that in fact Ernesto Yu testified for petitioner and confirmed his consent to the petition as he
had always treated petitioner as his own daughter ever since. 3
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the OSG manifested that it was opposing
the petition. It participated in the proceedings by cross-examining the private respondent Cynthia Vicencio,
(petitioner a quo) and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSG's contention, the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying the petition.
Further, the trial court stated that it could not compel private respondent's step-father to adopt her, as
adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not be a cause for disallowing private
respondent to legally change her name.4 Hence, it granted the change of surname of private respondent
from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court, which held that it is for the best interest
of petitioner that her surname be changed. The appellate court took into account the testimonies of private
respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of surname would "give her an opportunity to
improve her personality and welfare." 5 It likewise noted that the discrepancy between her original surname,
taken from her biological father; and the surname of her step-father, who has been socially recognized as
her father, caused her embarrassment and inferiority complex.6
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision allowing
the change of private respondent's surname to that of her step-father's surname.
In Republic vs. Hernandez 7, we have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a
change name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, (b)
when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was far a
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that
confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father,
assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in society as the daughter of
Ernesto Yu, she claims that she been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different surname,
causing her much humiliation and embarrassment. However, it is not denied that private respondent has
used Vicencio as her surname in her school records and related documents. But she had used the surname
of her step-father, Yu, when she participated in public functions, such as entering beauty contests, namely,
with the Lion's Club and the Manila Red Cross, and when she celebrated her debut at the Manila Hotel. 8
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private
respondent's change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal
complications due to the fact that private respondent's step-father has two (2) children with her mother. In
the event of her step-father's death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights
as a "legitimate" daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor General opines that "Ernesto Yu has no
intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change
of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by
adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy." 9
We find merit in the Solicitor General's contention.
"The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which
the change is sought." 10 The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to
depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames 11, specifically the law which
requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father 12.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As
previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed
that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same
unless weighty reasons are shown. 13
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage because of her surname. But
even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her
step-father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While previous decisions have allowed
children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even without the benefit of adoption, these
instances should be distinguished from the present case. In Calderon vs. Republic, 14 and Llaneta vs.
Agrava, 15 this Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the
situation in the present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were
not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs.
Republic, 16 where the circumstances appears to be similar to the present case before us, the Court upheld
the Republic's position:
We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a
lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should
the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as
to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in
the community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the
feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore
family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush
aside. 17
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, 18 the Court ruled that:
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not
their father, could result in confusion in their paternity It could also create the suspicion that
said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were
in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. 19
Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father's legitimate
children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is
laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a
father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent's
desire to use her stepfather's surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even
more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if
granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18 years old but
still considered a minor because Republic Act 6809, 20 lowering the age of majority, was then in effect.
However, regardless of private respondent's age, our conclusion remains considering the circumstances
before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

PFR Cases Finals

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G.R. No.

122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,

Juan Jacito for petitioner.

Alipio V. Flores for private respondent.

As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

Orfila vs. Arellano

A.M. No. P-06-2110. February 13, 2006.*

CRISTETA D. ORFILA, complainant, vs. ESTIFANA S. ARELLANO, H.R.M.O. II, respondent.

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orfila vs. Arellano

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orfila vs. Arellano

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1424-P before consolidation.

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

2 Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 5.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orfila vs. Arellano

Cristeta D. Orfila v. Estifana S. Arellano

6 Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator.

7 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 106.

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

9 A.M. No. P-06-2110, p. 87.

10 Exhibit “B”; Id., at p. 5.

12 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 83.

13 TSN, 18 June 2003, p. 36.

Orfila vs. Arellano

15 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, pp. 141-142.

17 Exhibit “H”; A.M. No. P-06-2110, Rollo, pp. 11-12.

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

19 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 187.

20 TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 11-13.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orfila vs. Arellano

24 TSN, 28 April 2003, pp. 15-17.

25 Id., at pp. 25-27.

VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 13, 2006

Orfila vs. Arellano

Charges Against Cristeta D. Orfila

27 A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, pp. 137-138.

28 Exhibit “A,” “A-2”; Id., at pp. 1-20.

29 Exhibit “C”; Id., at p. 25.

30 Exhibit “D”; Id.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orfila vs. Arellano

31 Exhibit “B”; A.M. No. P-03-1692, Rollo, p. 26.