Aggravating Circumstance

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ARTICLE 62-64
G.R. Nos. 136164-65 April 20, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO, accused-appellant
In the case at bar, we held that due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant
from reclusion perpetua to death. Parenthetically, the above rule is inapplicable for the crime of robbery committed by accused-
appellant, the same not involving the imposition of the death penalty. For said crime, what remains applicable is the old rule that
generic aggravating circumstances if duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in
determining the proper imposable penalty, even if such circumstances were not alleged in the Information. Thus, for the crime of
robbery, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.
G.R. No. 129299 November 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, accused-appellant.
As heretofore discussed, the appellant pleaded upon a charge of simple rape. The penalty for simple rape under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty. It appears that said counsel is also not aware that under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed (except where there
is a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused under Art. 68, and when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable under Art. 69 – neither of which is the case here. the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds the accused-
appellant Rodolfo Oling Madraga guilty of the crime of rape, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua,
1. CLASSES OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
A. GENERIC B. QUALIFYING C. SPECIFIC D. INHERENT
E. SPECIAL:
i. Advantage be taken by the offender of his public position (ARTICLE 14 AND 62)
ii. Organized or syndicated crime group (ARTICLE 62)
G.R. No. 199735 October 24, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ASIA MUSA y PINASALO, ARA MONONGAN y PAPAO, FAISAH ABAS y MAMA, and MIKE SOLALO y MILOK, Accused-Appellants.
We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his companions constituted a syndicated or an organized
crime group within the meaning of Article 62, as amended. While it is true they confederated and mutually helped one another for
the purpose of gain, there is no proof that they were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which
is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group. While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was
duly established, there was no proof that appellants were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain,
which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code
iii. Exploitation of children (PAR 20 RA 10630)
iv. Complex crime (Article 48)
v. Error in personae – Variance (ART 49); And
vi. Quasi-recidivism (ART 160)
2. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC OFFICE
G.R. No. L-38297 October 23, 1982

vs.
MARIO CAPALAC, defendant-appellant.
The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself justify that the aggravating
circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public position be considered as present. He acted like a brother,
instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one. It would be an
affront to reason to state that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit the
act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy and he acted accordingly. 16 That he was a
policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.
3. IN CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
G.R. Nos. L-35123-24 July 25, 1984

vs.
RUDY TIONGSON, defendant-appellant.
The aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities cannot also be
appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the very ones against whom the crime were committed. Besides, Pat.
Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority.
COMPARE WITH:
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar. The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in
authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and
to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and
who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957.
G.R. No. L-68699 September 22, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
HERMOGENES MAGDUEÑO, accused-appellant.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does not seem to be borne by the
records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that the crime was not committed in the
presence of the public authority but also that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself. (U.S. v. Rodriguez,
19 Phil. 150; People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282). In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim.
Hence, the lower court, erred in including commission of the crime with insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance.
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr.
Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil
act, The accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to Francis and the
entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the
court, this act of the accused was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of other's feelings and safety
and completely reprehensible.
4. DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING;
SEE: PEOPLE VS RODIL
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim. Identified himself as a
PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to
the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public
authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority.
G.R. No. 130708 October 22, 1999

vs.
CARLITO ARIZALA y VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
For the generic aggravating circumstance of "with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank"
to aggravate a penalty in the commission of a crime there must be proof which would clearly demonstrate that the accused
deliberately intended to act with insult or in disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his rank, which is the essence of
said aggravating circumstance. The fact that herein accused-appellant could not credibly feign ignorance of the rank of the deceased
or that he articulated his hatred against all policemen in general does not by itself suffice to prove that indeed accused-appellant
deliberately intended to act with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party by reason of his rank as a police officer.
The circumstances aggravating the penalty of a crime must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or
presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence. 28 Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 96765 July 5, 1993

vs.
SERGIO CURARATON y MONINIO, accused-appellant.
The killing, however, was not attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and disregard of age as erroneously found by the
trial court. The evidence in the case at bar shows that, when accused-appellant continued hacking Cabagte, the latter was already
dead or at least totally unconscious and could no longer feel or experience additional pain that would prolong his physical suffering.
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of age be appreciated because the same is absorbed by treachery. The crime committed is
murder qualified by treachery, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and with no aggravating circumstance.
G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968

vs.
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants,
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant.
The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, 14 like the offense at bar. The
rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the
sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another,
such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. 15 This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled that the
"circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with
violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without
the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's
dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm.
G.R. No. L-18988 December 29, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAULO ALCALA, defendant-appellant.
We find, however, the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of the crime having been committed in the
dwelling of the offended party. As to whether the crime must be held to have been committed in the dwelling of the offended party,
we take it that, although the accused were found with the deceased at the foot of the staircase of the house, that place must be
regarded as an integral part of the dwelling of that family. The porch of a house, not common to different neighbors, is a part of the
dwelling.
G.R. No. 214757
PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

vs
TIRSO SIBBU, Accused-Appellant
In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was
outside the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against
Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the
house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered
the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the
assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without.
People v Hilot
prosecution’s evidence shows is that the house where the killing took place was not owned by the victim, but rather by his parents.
However, it is not necessary under the law that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. It is settled that for dwelling to
be appreciated, the victim need not be the owner of the dwelling.37 Regardless of whether the victim was a lessee, a boarder, a
bedspacer,38 or even an invited guest,39 the place is his home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold. In People
v. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206 (1985), where the victim was killed in her mother’s house where she was temporarily staying, this Court
held dwelling to be aggravating. Here, the victim was killed in his parents’ house, which for all intents and purposes was his home.
We agree with the court a quo that dwelling aggravated the offense. Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the prosecution has more
than overcome his presumed innocence. Nonetheless, as earlier elucidated, he can only be found guilty of homicide aggravated by
the circumstance of dwelling.
Compare with People v. Ramolete dwelling is not aggravating in the killing of Refuerzo since he was a mere visitor in Mariano
Ramolete's house (Cf. People vs. Basa,
US V. Ibanez
the aggravating circumstances of the crime having been committed in the house of the aggrieved person in spite of the fact that the
conjugal home was the common domicile of Felix Alviola and his wife, Carmen Ibañ ez; the latter, false to the duty she owed her
husband of being faithful to him, failed, as did the other defendant, to respect the sacredness of this home, and both the defendants
injured and committed a grave offense against the said Felix Alviola, the master of that home. In a similar case the supreme court of
Spanish laid down the same rule in its decision of July 6, 1885, saying: As the person offended by the crime of adultery is the
husband, the aggravating circumstances of committing it in his dwelling cannot be excused by the fact that the dwelling was also the
home of the adultress; because, aside from the consideration that the stranger to the marriage who violates the law in that domicile
is not a member of the community residing there, the adultress' liability is morally and legally accentuated by her lack of respect for
the domicile of the domicile of the offended party, as is implied by her brazen and outrageous consummation of the crime therein.
Compare with Us v Destrito
The trial court found and applied the aggravating circumstance of morada and also, with reference to Ocampo, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence. It is true that the crime was committed in the house of the offended husband, but it is likewise
true that this same house was the home of both the appellants. Genoveva and Ocampo had a right to be in the house, the former
because she was the wife of Ysla, and the latter because that was then his place of residence, he having gone to live on the joint
invitation of Ysla and his wife. Under these facts it was error to apply the aggravating circumstance of Morada. (Decision supreme
court of Spain, November 16, 1871, published in Official Gazette, January 9, 1872.) The trial court committed no error in applying the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence in imposing the penalty upon Ocampo, inasmuch as the record clearly shows that
the offended husband took Ocampo into his home, furnished him with food and lodging without charge, and treated him like a son.
People v Punzalan
Upon the other hand, disregard of age, rank, or sex was incorrectly appreciated by the trial court. This circumstance was absorbed in
abuse of superior strength. Moreover, disregard of age, rank, or sex is relevant only in crimes against persons; the instant case
involves robbery with homicide, a felony classified as a crime against property, the homicide being regarded as incidental to the
robbery. 20 Dwelling should also have been disregarded because the accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided in the servants'
quarter of Mrs. Fule's residence. The servants' quarter may be assimilated to the victim's house, the former being an appendage of,
or attachment to, the latter
People v. Daniel
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance of
having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding
house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is
not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the
place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
1Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
G.R. Nos. 135051-52 December 14, 2000

vs.
CLARITO ARIZOBAL (at large), ERLY LIGNES and TWO (2) JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to
dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime
without transgressing the sanctity of the victim's domicile.17 In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent disregard of
the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in, looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants
into submission, disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.
5. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS
G.R. No. L-51304-05 June 28, 1983

vs.
MARTIN MANDOLADO and JULIAN ORTILLANO, defendants-appellants.
There is also merit in appellants' contention that there could be no abuse of confidence as the evidence on record showed the lack
of confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated the
commission of the crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that "there exists a relation of
trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a
relationship to commit the crime." (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172). It is also essential that the confidence between the
parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the
crime; that such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended
party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence (People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534). In the instant case, there is
absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the
assailants who had just met each other then. Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the crimes.
Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for the simple reason that the requisite
trust of the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated under Article 14, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non- existent. In all likelihood, the accused Army men in their uniforms and holding
their high-powered firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source
of gratefulness or appreciation. The finding of the trial court that: "There is no doubt about Martin Mandolado's state of
intoxication. He was so drunk that even his three (3) companions armed with M-16 armalite feared him. The same thing was true
with the MPs," should credit said accused with the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness but which the trial court decision failed
to appreciate in his favor. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellant Mandolado shall be reduced in the
computation thereof.
G.R. No. L-34497 January 30, 1975

vs.
BENJAMIN ONG y KHO and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS Y SUMALJAG, defendants-appellants.
In order for this circumstance to obtain, it is necessary that there be a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and the
one against whom the crime was committed, and that the accused made use of such relation to commit the crime. 60 It is essential
too that the confidence be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's
belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. 61 Nowhere in the records does it appear that Henry Chua reposed
confidence upon the person of Benjamin Ong. If any, Henry Chua was simply not afraid of Benjamin Ong, having told and bragged to
the latter about his violent exploits in the past and threatened him with bodily harm in case of failure to pay. 62 He knew that he
was far stronger than Benjamin Ong in terms of influence and money. He thought that Benjamin Ong would fear him. The fact that
Henry Chua invited Ong for nightclubbing that fatal evening and accommodated him in his car on their way home from the nightclub
does not mean that Henry Chua had confidence in him. There was no special relation of confidence between them. He knew that
Benjamin owed him a substantial amount and that its settlement had long been overdue which fact irritated him very much.
Benjamin Ong and Henry Chua were together that night in the nightclub as well as in the car not because of said confidence. It was
simply because Benjamin Ong had some accounts to settle with him. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Cruz, et al., 63 it was held that: . ...
The fact of Cabaya having simulated friendship and desire for work, together with the companions who went with him, and the fact
that he received food and work immediately upon being accepted by the Americans to work in the mines, is not, as stated in the
judgment, a degree of treachery, according to law, sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence. It
may however, be argued as unworthy conduct and ingratitude, but not as abuse of confidence. It is necessary first to show what has
been the confidence granted or given in order to determine whether there was or was not an abuse of it, and in the present case
there is nothing to show what the confidence given or conceded to Cabaya was, that could facilitate the commission of the crime.
Likewise, in the case of People vs. Brocal, 64 it was held that: There is no abuse of confidence in attempted rape where on the day of
the crime the accused was in the company of the offended girl, not because
There is no abuse of confidence in attempted rape where on the day of the crime the accused was in the company of the offended
girl, not because of her confidence in him, but because they were partners in a certain business.
6. Crime committed in the palace of Chief Exec., in his presence, where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties or place dedicated for religious worship;
G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Navarro v. Court of Appeals aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged
in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the
police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.43 The crime committed as found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were
two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.
People vs jaurigue
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946
SEE:

vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant
with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as
there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal
night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman,
typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost
the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
7. NIGHTTIME, UNINHABITED PLACE, OR BY A BAND;
G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979

vs.
ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias “TONY MANOK” and REYNALDO ARVISO V REBELLEZA alias “RENE BISUGO,” defendants-
appellants.
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because
it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely
sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative. In this case, the subjective test is not passed because
there is no showing that the accused purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to
determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of
which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover,
which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to
determine their Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. There circumstances combine to
pass the objective test, and e find that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity
enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily
Identified.
gr 175881 2007
G.R. No. 175881 August 28, 2007

vs.
ARMANDO RODAS1 and JOSE RODAS, SR.,2 Accused-Appellants.
People v Rodas The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be considered against appellants. This circumstance is considered
aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for
the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender’s immunity from identification or capture.50 In
the instant case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought or
taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to
the identification of all the accused.
G.R. No. 127748 July 25, 2002

vs.
JOLITO ORANZA Y LOYOLA, accused-appellant.
People v Oranza trial court erred in considering nighttime as aggravating circumstance inasmuch as prosecution evidence failed to
establish that appellant and his co-accused purposely sought nighttime to perpetrate the crime. Their act of purposely showing their
faces to the victims through the flashlight negates the conclusion that accused chose nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense. The mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime with nothing more than that does not make nocturnity an
aggravating circumstance.
G.R. No. L-30116 November 20, 1978

vs.
FAUSTO DAMASO, VICTORIANO EUGENIO, alias TURING, ESTANISLAO GREGORIO alias ISLAO, LORENZO ALVIAR alias ORING AND
BONIFACIO ESPEJO alias MARCIA, defendants, FAUSTO DAMASO, LORENZO ALVIAR, BONIFACIO ESPEJO AND VICTORIANO
EUGENIO, defendants-appellants
The trial court considered separately the three circumstances of armed band, treachery and uninhabited place where under other
situations one may be considered absorbed or inherent in the other. There is ample justification for this. The elements of each
circumstance subsist independently and can be distinctly perceived thereby revealing a greater degree of perversity on the part of
the accused. The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act together in the
commission of an offense. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code. The 9ninhibitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house
to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving
some help. That the accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims
to the sugarcane field although they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were found.
G.R. No. 128074 July 13, 1999

vs.
ISA ABDUL, MINYA ABDUL, MALDIS ABDUL, INGGAT DOE, and JOWEN APPANG, accused, MINYA ABDUL, accused-appellant.
People v. Abdul An offense is deemed committed by a band when more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission thereof.47 This presupposes that from the onset four of the malefactors were already armed in order to facilitate
the commission of the crime. In the present case, only two of the five malefactors were armed at the start of the commission of the
offense. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstance of band was attendant in the commission of the crime, it is
absorbed by treachery. Attendant in the commission of the crime, it is absorbed by treachery.
8. OCCASION OF CONFLAGRATION, SHIPWRECK, EARTHQUAKE EPIDEMIC OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE
G.R. No. L-26789 April 25, 1969

vs.
DICTO ARPA and MAALUM ARPA defendants-appellants.
The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the context of the phrase "other calamity or
misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, which refer to other conditions of distress similar to those
precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic conditions resulting
from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance
"is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted
adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them." 10 Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or
misfortune existed when the motor banca developed engine trouble. It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever
to indicate that the engine trouble developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on the part of the
passengers as perceived by the trial court, and that the same was not easily repaired; if at all, the indications are to the contrary, for
as alleged in the information, the accused succeeded in stealing the motor banca at sea.
9. AID OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO AFFORD IMPUNITY;
G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y
ARI, Appellants.
People v Enojas In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of
unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held
liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
10. RECIDIVISM
G.R. No. L-2390 April 24, 1950

vs.
PEDRO BALDERA, MIGUEL BLAY, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, and FOUR OTHERS, defendants.
PEDRO BALDERA, appellant.
The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of recidivism by reason of his previous
conviction for theft, it appearing that crime was committed on or about December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the offense now
charged took place seven days before that date. In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
serious and less serious physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient vote to impose the
extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.
G.R. No. 65833 May 6, 1991

vs.
EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-appella
he former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment. The phrase
"at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment. We declared in People vs.
Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its general sense, including the
rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include everything that is
done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the
accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein
became final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear
that the accused is a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for
the second offense.
11. REITERACION
People v Real
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished
previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind
from that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight).
Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is
recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no reiteracion because
that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall
in title (Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating
circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the
one for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been punished for the
previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.
12. HABITUAL DELINQUENCY (ART. 62 PAR 5)
People v. Manalo gr L-8586
Examining now the information in question and applying the rule above adverted to, the first two convictions on September 5,
1947, should be considered as one because the second offense was committed two days after the commission of the first and before
the date of conviction for the first crime. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight convictions listed in the information should
also, for the same reason, be considered as equivalent to one for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty under Article 62,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The eleventh conviction should not be counted as the date of commission in said offense is
not stated in the information and it has been held that averment of the commission of the previous crime is essential and habitual
delinquency be taken into account for insufficiency of allegation on this point (People vs. Venus, 435; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Masonson, 63 Phil. 866; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Topel, 68 Phil 464; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Ocbina, 63 Phil., 528). All in all (including the ninth conviction) there are three convictions properly
to be considered in the imposition of the additional penalty. As the case at bar is Appellant’s fourth conviction, pursuant to Article
62, Case No. 5 paragraph (b), Appellant should be sentenced to an additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. In imposing this additional penalty, recidivism should not be taken into account (People vs. De Jesus, supra) the same being
inherent in habitual delinquency (People vs. Bohol, 40 Off. Gaz., 3114). The additional penalty should therefore be imposed in its
medium period or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months of prision mayor.” We, therefore, correct the
additional penalty for habitual delinquency by imposing 8 years of prision mayor. The fountain pen, which was stolen, should be
ordered returned to the offended party, or, in lieu thereof, the accused should be ordered to pay him P30 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency
People v. Macbul gr 48976
The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the consideration by the trial court of recidivism as
an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel contending that
recidivism should not have been taken into account because it is inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct,
as we have decided in the case of People vs. Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point here because the error committed by
the trial court lies not so much in its having considered recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of penalizing
habitual delinquency, as in its having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the information that his
two previous convictions were more than ten years apart. "A person shall be deems to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of
ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any
of said crimes a third time or oftener." (See last paragraph, article 62, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.) Therefore, appellant's first
conviction, which took place in November, 1928, cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August,
1942, or fourteen years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has only one previous conviction
against him, namely, that of 1942.
People v. Morales gr 42924
On this appeal the only question raised relates to the additional penalty imposed for habitual delinquency, counsel de oficio for the
appellant contending that appellant's plea of guilty did not amount to an admission that he was a habitual delinquent. While it is
well settled that a plea of guilt admits all the material allegations in the information, including that of habitual delinquency, in the
case before us the information failed to allege the date of appellant's last conviction or release. It simply averred that the crime
herein complained of was "committed within the period of 10 years from the date of his last conviction". Apart from the fact that
such averment is a mere conclusion of fact, the law specifically provides that a person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent if
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is found guilty of the crime of estafa a third time or
oftener. It is thus clear that what is material is not the date of commission of the subsequent offense, but that of his conviction
thereof, in relation to the date of his release or last conviction. As stated by this court in People vs. Siojo (G.R. No. 36835, 57 Phil.,
1005), "it is true that there is an admission that the appellant had previously been convicted four times of the crime of theft, but
there is no showing that the judgment appealed from was rendered within the period of ten years from appellant's last conviction or
from his last release." Moreover, the record shows that the five previous convictions of the appellant took place on the same day.
Upon the authority of People vs. Kaw Liong and Yu Siong (57 Phil., 839); People vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266); People vs. De la Cruz
(G.R. No. 33786, promulgated February 7, 1931, not reported), and People vs. Ventura (56 Phil., 1), and others the said five
convictions should be considered as only one conviction. It follows that the appellant can not be deemed a habitual delinquent, but
only a recidivist.
People v. Bernal gr 4498
It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when
it is deemed to aggravate the crime in fixing the principal penalty to be imposed, because recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
modifying criminal liability is not an inherent or integral element of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal Code considers as
an extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance. Under the last subsection of paragraph 5 of article 62 of he Revised Penal
Code, a person shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Paragraph 9 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines recidivism by stating that it is committed by a person who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the
Code. Defining reiteration or habituality paragraph 10 of the same article provides that it is committed when the offender has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches at an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty. Reflecting on these definitions it will be seen that recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is
not a factor or element which necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the elements as well as
the basis of each of these circumstances are different. For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title. For the existence of habitual
delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall have been convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction
shall have taken place ten (10) years before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes previously committed
be prior to the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged a third time or oftener.
13. QUASI-RECIDIVISM (ART. 160)
14. PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
People v. Hipolito gr l-31402
The contention of the accused that evident premeditation is inherent in, and cannot be considered separately from the aggravating
circumstance that the crime was committed in consideration of price, reward or promise cannot be sustained: In the case of U.S. v.
Rabor, 16 the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "It has been suggested that the commission of the crime with deliberate
premeditation and ‘for a price or promise of reward’ should not be treated as two distinct aggravating circumstances, because it is
said that the latter necessarily implies the former. This contention, however, can not be sustained in this case and is fully answered
by the language of the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 3, 1885: ‘Considering, it says, ‘that one or the other of the
circumstances (treachery or premeditation) is present, either one of them serves to qualify the crime of assassination, and the other
to determine the penalty according to the constant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and it further appears that the
assassination was committed for a price, without there existing any incompatibility between this circumstance and that of
premeditation, because, if it is certain that by the general rule the first implies the second, it is not less certain that the latter may be
present without the former, and in the present case, after the agreement of the criminals as to the price, they exhibited in their acts
a studied and insistent tenacity in accomplishing the criminal object they had proposed.’ There is, likewise, no merit in the claim of
the accused that the aggravating circumstance of price, reward or promise is not present in view of the non- prosecution of Vicente
Ang, the alleged giver of the price or reward. The record shows that the accused Feliciano Hipolito made arrangements with his co-
accused Cirilo Malagamba relative to the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang and not with Vicente Ang, although Cirilo
Malagamba said that he was acting at the instance of the said Vicente Ang, and it was the accused Cirilo Malagamba who paid him
the amount of P2,800.00. Accordingly, whether or not Vicente Ang was prosecuted in connection with the slaying of Concepcion
Bustamante Ang is of little importance.
15. INUNDIATION, FIRE, POISON ETC.
16. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
People v Bibat
There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met: 1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to
commit the crime; 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and 3. A sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.17 The essence of premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.18 Besides, even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the
presence of the first requisite of evident premeditation appears to have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The
determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward circumstances that happened on the
fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco
saw the accused with some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution
witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing
from a notebook and with the use of such weapon, stab the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant
clung to his resolution to kill the victim. From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident
at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant to reflect on the consequences of his
dastardly act. As held in the case of People v. Dumdum20 "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident premeditation,
because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration." In the case under examination, two hours
had elapsed from the time appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime.
US V. Manalinde gr 5292
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should
be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be
generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused confessed that he
voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the
promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused
undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings,
depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws
in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to
commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in
order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences
of the acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a
weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two
unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to
a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the
killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature
and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same,
and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been
deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent
intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed in
manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes
present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not
necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have
existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime
was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in
his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not
conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
People v. Mangbu-at Gr 25459
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence premeditation and treachery. Even when there is
sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established), yet, it cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance in the present case, because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo, who
was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo. Had evident premeditation been proven, and there being no other qualifying
circumstance of frustrated murder present in this case, the acts should be held to be frustrated homicide and punished with the
maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law. (Question 2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But, the fact is that treachery
was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which
tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said
offended party. The treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was
present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the accused
when he fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in holding a crime to be
murder and not homicide, stated the following: Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in article 10
of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance, it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused
the death of Nazario Iñ igo, he employed means which tended to insure the commission of the crime without any risk to himself
arising from any defense that might be made by the offended party, for neither the wounded party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom
the shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly before, as held by
the trial court, was not in a position to defend himself in any way, nor could Nazario Iñ igo become aware of any attack so unjustified,
rapid and unforeseen; considering, further, that the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than
the one intended was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements constituting the crime of murder qualified by the
treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted, whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario
Iñ igo, for which reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable herein, the culprit not having, in fact, committed a crime different
from that which he intended, taking into consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof, etc. Although the case just
cited refers to the crime of consummated murder, the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the
concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned. The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused
having intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)
People v Guevarra Gr 24371
The crime committed by the appellant is murder qualified by treachery. When he shot the victim, appellant was then well hidden
behind a tree that the victim, who was unarmed and unaware, had no way of defending himself. Thus, appellant employed means,
methods or forms to insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself. As the appellant committed the act with intent to kill
and with treachery, the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shots a person other than the one intended was killed,
does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen his criminal responsibility, and he is responsible for the consequences of his acts.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense
against the attack or become aware of it. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 907; People vs. Tolentino, et al., 82 Phil. 808; People vs.
Mamasalayan, 92 Phil. 639; People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950.) The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated because the deceased was not the intended victim (People vs. Guillen, supra); neither the aggravating
circumstance of night time may be appreciated for the reason that the same is already absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of
treachery; nor the aggravating circumstance of superior strength for the reason that only appellant Guevarra was responsible of the
crime, or that of official position for the reason that there is no proof that the appellant has used the influence, prestige, or
ascendency which his office gives him as the means by which he realized his purpose. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 156.)
G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical manner by which
they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, unless shown to be customary, 45 appellants' act of
arming themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing. That
evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those of the prosecution witnesses is of no
moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to be witnesses against themselves, 48 they waived this right by voluntarily
taking the witness stand. Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence which the trial court correctly
appreciated against them.
17. CRAFT, FRAUD, OR DISGUISE;
G.R. No. 95756 May 14, 1993

vs.
CRISOLOGO EMPACIS, accused-appellant.
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud23 was properly appreciated against Empacis. He and Romualdo pretended to be bona
fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling.
This Court has held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft.
18. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, OR MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE;
G.R. No. 226475
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
CYRUS VILLANUEVA y ISO RENA alias "Tutoy" and AL VIN SA YSON y ESPONCILLA alias "Alvin Talangka", Accused-Appellants
the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Both the lower courts concluded that
the accused-appellants and Valencia, having the intent to kill Enrico, employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution
and success of the crime. The RTC concluded that the facts that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked by the accused-
appellants and Valencia, who were armed by a knife and a stone, are clear indicia of the abuse of superior strength employed by the
accused-appellants and Valencia against Enrico.23 The RTC's conclusion was entirely adopted by the CA.24
The foregoing conclusion is baseless. The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia, armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up
on Enrico does not automatically merit the conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength.
19. TREACHERY;
G.R. No. 169246 January 26, 2007

vs.
NICOLAS GUZMAN y BOCBOSILA, Accused-Appellant.
In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. 37 Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions of
treachery were established and proven during the trial. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. 40 This is even more true if the assailant is
an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. 41As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not
provoking anyone to a fight when he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at
the time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974

vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting
to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his
companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the
victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly
established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was
alleged in the information, was not proven.
G.R. Nos. 122976-77. November 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGANDO VILLONEZ y PASCASIO, RUEL SANTOS y LAPADA, JOHN DOE, PETER
DOE, ELMER DOE, and ROY DOE, accused, v.EDUARDO N. SANTOS @ "EDDIE," REYNALDO N. SANTOS @ "REY," FERNANDO N.
SANTOS @ "DEDE," EMERLITO N. SANTOS @ "ELMER," and RUDY N. SANTOS @ "BUDDA," accused, REGANDO VILLONEZ y
PASCASIO, EMERLITO N. SANTOS, and RUEL SANTOS, Accused-Appellants.
However, we do not share the assessment of the trial court that there was no treachery in this case because the victim had engaged
in a fight previous to the killing and was thus forewarned of an attack against him. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the
victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate.31 The overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and
the fact that the victims hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by the victim.
SEE:
G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995

vs.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted
with alevosia when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery
if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight
or retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207
SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and
the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after
appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to
frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near
appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia where the decision to attack was made
peremptorily and the victim's helpless position was accidental
G.R. No. 140901-02 May 9, 2002

vs.
ANGELO ZETA Y DOLOROSO, accused-appellant.
Treachery cannot be established where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was carried out, or
how it began or developed. Treachery must be based on positive or conclusive proofs, not mere suppositions or speculations.
Moreover, it must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the killing itself. 11
In the case at bar, Jan Ryan did not witness the onset of the attack as he was upstairs. He only testified that prior to hearing the
three (3) gunshots, he heard his father Jose and accused-appellant exchanging invectives and apparently having a heated
discussion.12 Time and again, it has been ruled that there is no treachery where the attack was preceded by a quarrel and a heated
discussion.13
The prosecution, nevertheless, argues that Jan Ryan saw how Jose was fired upon a fourth time even if the latter was already down
on the ground and bleeding from the first three gunshots wounds.
It is a fundamental rule of long standing that for treachery to be appreciated, that circumstance must be present at the inception of
the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, treachery, even if present at a subsequent stage, is not to be
considered.14 That the final fatal blows may have in truth been delivered under conditions exhibiting some features of treachery
does not remedy the fact that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of treachery at the onset of the attack. 15 In the absence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, accused-appellant’s conviction must be modified so that he is found guilty not of murder
but only of homicide.
G.R. No. L-14476 November 6, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from
treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable
to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no treachery in the attack which
results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that,
at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so frequently
the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established. There was present in the offense in question the generic
aggravating circumstance that said offense was committed in a place where public authority was engaged in the discharge of duty.
[ G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILFREDO LAYUG, NOEL BUAN AND REYNALDO LANGIT, ACCUSED,
WILFREDO LAYUG AND NOEL BUAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
Also, treachery was adequately proven by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA. In People v. Baron,[13] this
Court reiterated that treachery is not considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide but as a generic
aggravating circumstance, the presence of which merits the imposition of the higher penalty, thus:
As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr., treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but "a generic aggravating circumstance to
robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime". Corollarily,
"Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating
circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into
account for the purpose of increasing the penalty". In the case at bar, "treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide".
Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide". As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing the
penalty for crime.[14]
20. IGNOMINY;
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias “BOY,” EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO
and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
The Court is convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them. There is no
doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not
indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting,
however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated,
so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature cannot legally be considered as still connected with the abduction
— in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the
former can no longer be complexed with the latter. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy is present, since the appellants in
ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating.
G.R. No. L-50276 January 27, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
MICHAEL J. BUTLER, accused-appellant.
This Court holds that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious
advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4
ft 11 inches tall, but also fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and
pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to
death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since
she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The court further sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating
circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he
mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead.
G.R. No. 102705 July 30, 1993

vs.
DOROTEO MEJORADA y SILLAN, accused-appellant.
The Supreme Court appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and ignominy 35 which, though not
alleged in the information, were duly proven without objection on the part of the accused. At twenty minutes to midnight, the latter
unleashed the fury of his criminal mind on a sleeping victim. He defiled the sanctity of Mrs. Regino’s home by forcibly opening its
door. Wanting to force upon her his evil desires, he hugged her and then pressed a knife to her face without any provocation on her
part. He thereupon had sexual intercourse with her in a “dog-style” position. While such a position has been resorted to by
consenting adults, it adds ignominy when employed in rape cases. 36Such aggravating circumstances would have justified the
imposition of the greater penalty of death pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering, however, that the
Constitution prohibits its imposition, 37 the appropriate imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua, which the trial court
correctly imposed, although it sought to define the same as “imprisonment for life.” The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not, of
course, similar to or synonymous with “life imprisonment.” As this Court has repeatedly ruled in many cases, reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment are not synonymous but distinct in nature, duration and accessory penalties.
21. UNLAWFUL ENTRY
22. BREAKING OF WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR OR WINDOW;
G.R. No. 79089 May 18, 1993

vs.
ROGELIO BONDOY, accused-appellant
The Court is legally and morally convinced that appellant committed the crime of rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, as
defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore appellant broke the wall of Patria's house to effect entry.
The court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua inasmuch as the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and unlawful entry. The qualifying circumstance of breaking down a wall should be deemed absorbed in unlawful entry.
There being two aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, the penalty of death would have been the proper penalty were it not
for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally banned.
23. USE OF MOTOR VEHIC;ES, AIRSHIPS, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS;
G.R. No. 206291

vs.
ZALDY SALAHUDDIN and Three (3) other UNIDENTIFIED COMPANIONS, Appellants.
The use of motor vehicle may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.
The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellant’s
back rider mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt that the motorcycle was used as a means to
commit the crime and to facilitate their escape after they accomplished their mission. The prosecution has proven through the
testimonies of Java and Delos Reyes that appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty.
Segundo who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then
stopped near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene aboard the motorcycle. Clearly,
the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime.
24. CRUELTY
25. USE OF ILLEGAL FIREARMS OR EXPLOSIVES – (SEC. 29 RA 10591)
26. USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS WHILE COMMITING A FELONY (SEC 25 OF RA 9165)
27. USE OF INFO AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN COMMITING A FELONY (SEC 6 OF RA 10175)
G.R. No. 132470 April 27, 2000

vs.
FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO, accused-appellant
The Court held that the additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant
"anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of
gravity. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered
as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous
circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed
providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of
the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
ARTICLE 15: ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. RELATIONSHIPS
G.R. Nos. 124303-05. February 10, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.ALEJANDRO ATOP @ ALI, Accused-Appellant.
On the other hand, relationship as an alternative aggravating circumstance under Art. 15 of the Revised Penal Code encompasses
only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative by affinity in the same
degrees. Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the
accused, no other relationship, kinship or association between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for
the crime committed. The fact, then, that the offended party is the granddaughter or descendant of appellants live-in partner
cannot justify the imposition of death upon the rapist.
Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance. The scope of relationship as defined by law encompasses (1)
the spouse, (2) an ascendant, (3) a descendant, (4) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (5) a relative by affinity in
the same degree.17 Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity
therefore are those commonly referred to as in-laws, or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by
consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth enumeration above. The law cannot be stretched
to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to
his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him.
G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO MOLEJON, Accused-Appellant
Meanwhile, Section 1 of Act No. 4103,53 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is
ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond
what the special law prescribed.54 But as We have clarified in People v. Simon,55 the situation is different where although the offense
is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the
legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.
Here, since the crime was committed by the stepfather of the offended parties, the alternative circumstance of relationship should
be appreciated.56 In crimes against chastity, such as acts of lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating. 57 With the presence of
this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and ten (10) days to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months,58 without eligibility of parole.59 This is in
consonance with Section 31(c)60 of R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is, inter alia, the stepparent of the victim.
Corrolarily, the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated since the crime was committed by the step-father of
the offended party.64 With the presence of this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be
applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole.65 This is in consonance with Section 31(c)66 of
R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is, inter alia,
the stepparent of the victim.
As mentioned earlier, the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as follows: (1) the
accused commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
First, based on the records, accused-appellant repeatedly committed the following acts against AAA: kissing her neck and lips;
inserting his finger into her vagina; and licking and sucking her breasts. These acts clearly falls within the scope of lascivious conduct
under Section 2(h) of the IRR of R.A. No. 7610. 45
Second, the accused-appellant, having moral ascendancy over his step-daughter, forced AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which
is within the contemplation of sexual abuse. Indeed, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. Moral coercion or
ascendancy is, thus, sufficient.46
Third, AAA testified that she was over 12 and below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. This was
corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during trial.
2. INTOXICATION
G. R. No. 143817 : October 27, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALEJANDRO BAJAR, Appellant.
With regard to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, which the trial court treated as aggravating, we find that it has not been
shown to be habitual or intentional as required by Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Lolita testified that her husband would drink
liquor once a week but was not a frequent drinker. She also admitted that on that fateful day, there was a fiesta celebration at
Barangay Mambayaan.41 As Alejandro insists, it was but natural for him to drink liquor during fiesta celebrations. In the absence of
clear and positive proof that Alejandros intoxication was habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime, it is improper to
consider the same as an aggravating circumstance. Neither can intoxication be considered mitigating in the instant case, there being
no proof that the appellant was so drunk that his will-power was impaired or that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his
acts.
3. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981

vs.
SAGLALA MACATANDA, defendant-appellant.
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft
and robbery 5 leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply
being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the
Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle. Incidentally, the
Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to mitigate liability for theft, for even long before it, in U.S. vs.
Pascual, 6 a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of theft or robbery. The Maqui case was decided
in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in reaching its present state since recent years, when
it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semi-uncivilized.
But more than what has just been observed. a legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant invokes
in his appeal. It is that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant,
no evidence having been taken relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment provided by P.D.
533 for the crime charged with a more severe penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply said law with leniency.
G.R. No. L-44274 January 22, 1980

vs.
LUISITO SAN PEDRO, et al., accused, ARTEMIO BANASIHAN, defendant-appellant.
With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, craft and treachery, it would make no difference even if the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction were appreciated in appellant's favor which is even doubtful from the fact alone, as was allegedly
proven by the testimony of appellant that he cannot read and write but can only sign his name (P. 9, t. s. n. Sept. 1, 1975). This, apart
from the fact that as held categorically in the case of People vs. Enot, 6 SCRA 325 (1962) lack of instruction is not applicable to
crimes of theft and robbery, much less to the crime of homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature, wrongful
acts, and are manifestly so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant (People vs. Salip Manla et al., 30 SCRA 389 [1969]).
As recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., the "criteria in determining lack of instruction
is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence." It is significant that neither to the trial court nor to the appellant's
counsel has the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction entered the mind. No attempt was made to prove it, as direct proof,
not mere inference, is required, and must be invoked in the court below (People vs. Mongado, et al., 28 SCRA 642, [1969]), the
reason being that the trial court can best gauge a person's level of intelligence from his manner of answering questions in court
(People v. Manuel, 29 SCRA 337 [1969]). If the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstance invoked for the first time here
on appeal, it must be because from appellant's testimony, and even more so from his given occupation as a merchant (T.S.N., p. 3,
Sept. 1, 1975), his alleged lack of intelligence never suggested itself to the trial court or to his lawyer, as entitling him to the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
VI. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
A. PRINCIPALS – ART. 17
SEE: PEOPLE VS DELIM, PEOPLE VS AGUILOS
DIVISION
[ GR No. 175942, Sep 13, 2007 ]
PEOPLE v. MARLON DELIM
In any event, this Court, in People v. Delim,[35] already ruled as to the existence of conspiracy among appellant's co-accused, Marlon,
Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim. We held therein:
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon and
Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow,
Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00
a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto.
Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy
remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill
Modesto shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Roland. Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty
of the killing of Modesto. Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Roland nevertheless
he is a principal by direct participation. If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each person
concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if
they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all
are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime.
Conspiracy having been established, the act of one, therefore, is the act of all and everyone of the conspirators, appellant included,
is guilty with the others in equal degree.
G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003

vs.
EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, Appellant.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the conspiracy.26 The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to
make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.27Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.
From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.28 As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the
evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end.29
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by
direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying
Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in
bringing about the victim’s death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and
separate overt criminal acts.30 Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the
death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code
G.R. No. 149368 April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case provisionally dismissed), accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, appellant
Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellant’s admission that he participated in its
commission by holding Rosemarie’s legs made him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following
requisites are present:
1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.20
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were
in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.21
The prosecution was able to prove appellant’s participation in the criminal resolve by his own admission that, right after he was told
by Pacot to close the door, he held down Rosemarie’s legs. He was pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He admitted that
they only stopped when they were sure that Rosemarie was already dead. The two men planned how to dispose of the victim’s
body; it was in fact appellant’s idea to pour concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacot’s suggestion to just dump the body into the
sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in cement and made sure that there were no leaks from which foul odor could
emanate. He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or not he himself did the strangling or the stabbing, he was also liable for
the acts of the other accused.
G.R. No. 133527-28 December 13, 1999

vs.
JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, CHARLES DUMANCAS (Acquitted), POL. OFFICER JOSE PAHAYUPAN (Acquitted), VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.
(Acquitted), accused, JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL.
OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ,
EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, accused-appellants
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present: (1) the inducement be made
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the commission
by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the
inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to
justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a chance word spoken without
reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a
resolution to crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In
such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or
performed the act) would not be guilty of the crime committed" (p. 219).
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the crime itself (People
vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for
ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to "take care of the two."
Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer.
The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the
victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused- appellant did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the
attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal
Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either
anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2)
cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
G.R. No. 193854 September 24, 2012

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant
Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by
indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a
conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed
by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant
convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the
crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have
been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped.
Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information,
as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
G.R. Nos. L-67803-04 July 30, 1990

vs.
Pat. RICARTE MADALI and ANNIE MORTEL MADALI, defendants-appellants.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence of conspiracy
between the Madali spouses. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be shown by acts and circumstances
from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the
evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused may
be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. 75 With this and the principle that in criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in
favor of the accused, as guides, the Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the crimes committed herein,
is only that of an accomplice.i•t•c-aüsl
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and warning her husband of the
presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good aim.
However, such assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of
the Madali spouses, "it was not so dark nor too bright 76 that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same
intensity. 77 Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's cooperation and assistance.
B. ACCOMPLICES- ARTICLE 18
G.R. Nos. 102361-62 May 14, 1993

vs.
RUDY FRONDA, defendant-appellant.
Under the circumstances, appellant cannot therefore be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The trial court,
therefore, erred when it found appellant guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
However, appellant's act of joining the armed men in going to the mountains, and his failure to object to their unlawful orders, or
show any reluctance in obeying the same, may be considered as circumstances evincing his concurrence with the objectives of the
malefactors and had effectively supplied them with material and moral aid, thereby making him as an accomplice. He cannot with
candor, claim that he was unaware of the evil intentions of the armed men which may have been the case had appellant merely
guided the group to locate the victims' abodes. On the contrary, appellant himself tied the victims' hands and even joined the armed
men in taking the victims to the hills. Appellant's complicity is made more manifest by the fact that without any justifiable reason he
failed to report the incident to the authorities for a period of more than three (3) years.
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, "cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts". Under this provision, a person is considered as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the crime is of a minor character. To be convicted as such, it is necessary that he be aware to the criminal intent of
the principal and thereby cooperates knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of
the crime.
It is well settled that if there is ample of criminal participation but a doubt exist as to the nature of liability, courts should resolve to
favor the milder form of responsibility, that of an accomplice.
G.R. No. 80130 August 19, 1991
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there
must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law
punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance
of the offense intended to be committed.
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary before a judgment of conviction can be
rendered.1âwphi1 Not an iota of doubt must cloud the Court's mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and
positive evidence and not on mere assumptions. 16
In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner Abejuela has not been established beyond
a reasonable doubt for which reason he must be acquitted. The question that must be resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's
acquittal on his civil liability.
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991

vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C.
DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal
design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime
intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. 24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the
commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit
homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer
to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample evidence of their
criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or
responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required
medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished
with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20)
days of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.
G.R. No. 128966 August 18, 1999

vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused,
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
Appellant an Accomplice, Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-
accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at
the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at
most, he was only an accomplice.
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided
upon."18Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be
established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and
community of interest.20
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, 21 cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."22 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the
criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime
would be committed just the same."23 To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the "community"
of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. 24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is
proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all.25 In the case of an accomplice,
the liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however,
know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed;
they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are
merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
G.R. No. 173858 July 17, 2007

ERNESTO GARCES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before complainant was raped. He was present
when Pacursa abducted complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with
the other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he entered the barn and took
complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an accomplice, 32there being insufficient
evidence to prove conspiracy,33 and not merely as an accessory.
G.R. No. L-8528 October 22, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO FLORES (alias Gregorio Albay), FRANCISCO CATAPANG, BENITO HERNANDEZ, RICARDO MARQUEZ and CIRIACO
LIMBO, defendants.
CIRIACO LIMBO, appellant.
In the case at bar these does not appear to have been any community of purpose between Limbo and his codefendants to commit
the theft of which they were convicted, nor was the theft committed in pursuance of any arrangement between them to commit
some other offense of which it was the natural or probable consequence. We are of opinion therefore that the evidence of record
does not sustain his conviction as a complice (accessory before the fact).
It may be convenient, in connection with this discussion as to the nature of the act which will render one guilty of the commission of
a crime as complice, to indicate that the English word "accomplice" and the Spanish term "complice," Although often treated as
equivalents in translation, are not in fact identical, although derived from the same Latin root. The English word "accomplice" is
defined by Bouvier to be "One who is concerned in the commission of a crime," and it is said that the term in its fullness includes in
its meaning all persons who have been concerned in the commission of a crime, all participes criminis, whether they are considered
in strict legal property as principals in the first or second degree, or merely as accessories before or after the fact (Fost. Cr. Cas., 341;
1 Russ. Cr., 21; 4 Bla. Com., 331; 1 Phil. Ev., 28) whereas the word complice as defined in the Spanish Penal Code (art. 14) is
applicable only to one who, not being included in article 13 (i. e., a principal) cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous acts. Under this definition a more accurate legal equivalent of the Spanish word complice in English would appear to
be the technical term "accessory before the fact;" and in general, the English word "accomplice" should be rendered into Spanish by
the use of some such phrase as "participante en el delito" (particeps criminis).
C. ACCESSORIES – ART. 19 AND 20 (RPC); PD 1612; PD 1829
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978

vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue cannot
have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear
that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and
did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or
together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really
includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his
complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact,
the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my
child." The worst he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the
very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she
came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what
she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later,
when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information
given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her
husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him,
after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law
enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery
and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly
known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft."
Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D.
No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. 13 The state
may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter
would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing14and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew
or should have known that the items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence
of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which
was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase
and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 181111, Aug 17, 2015 ]
JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA v. PEOPLE
the facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for
violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not the technical name
that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the
accused is not concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a
crime given in the law with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in
the manner therein set forth."
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were accessories to the
crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name of an accused's criminal participation
under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which
they should stand trial.

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AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

G.R. Nos. 136164-65 April 20, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 129299 November 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

1. CLASSES OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

A. GENERIC B. QUALIFYING C. SPECIFIC D. INHERENT

ii. Organized or syndicated crime group (ARTICLE 62)

G.R. No. 199735 October 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

iii. Exploitation of children (PAR 20 RA 10630)

iv. Complex crime (Article 48)

v. Error in personae – Variance (ART 49); And

vi. Quasi-recidivism (ART 160)

2. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC OFFICE

G.R. No. L-38297 October 23, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

3. IN CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

G.R. Nos. L-35123-24 July 25, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-68699 September 22, 1986

G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

4. DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX AND DWELLING;

SEE: PEOPLE VS RODIL

G.R. No. 130708 October 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 96765 July 5, 1993

G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-18988 December 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 214757

PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee

Compare with Us v Destrito

G.R. Nos. 135051-52 December 14, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

5. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS

G.R. No. L-51304-05 June 28, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-34497 January 30, 1975

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,

C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 175881 August 28, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 127748 July 25, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-30116 November 20, 1978

G.R. No. 128074 July 13, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

8. OCCASION OF CONFLAGRATION, SHIPWRECK, EARTHQUAKE EPIDEMIC OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE

G.R. No. L-26789 April 25, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

9. AID OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO AFFORD IMPUNITY;

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

G.R. No. L-2390 April 24, 1950