LEUNG BEN VS. P. J. O’BRIEN, JAMES A. OSTRAND and GEO. R.

HARVEY, Judges of First Instance of the City of

Manila

April 6, 1918
FACTS: On December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by P.J. O’Brien to
recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, all alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of
gambling, banking, and percentage games conducted during the two or three months prior to the institution of the
suit. The plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was
about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued. The provision
of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be a cause of action arising upon contract,
express or implied. The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is
not such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he insists that the original complaint shows on its face
that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by
appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for this relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming is an obligation arising from
contract, express or implied.

RULING: Yes. In permitting the recovery money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced modifications in the
application of Articles 1798, 1801, and 1305 of the Civil Code.

The first two of these articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of the nullity of contracts
proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these provisions together, it must be apparent that the
obligation to return money lost at play has a decided affinity to contractual obligation; and the Court believes that
it could, without violence to the doctrines of the civil law, be held that such obligations is an innominate quasi-
contract.

It is however, unnecessary to place the decision on this ground. In the opinion of the Court, the cause of action
stated in the complaint in the court below is based on a contract, express or implied, and is therefore of such nature
that the court had authority to issue the writ of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore
be denied and the proceedings dismissed.
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

F ACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the daughter-in-
law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants
refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his
favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs. RTC absolved the defendant. CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance rendered to
their daughter-in-law.

HELD:
No. According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by contracts,
by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations
arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only
demandable ones.

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which
the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation
to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the defendant’s daughter-in-law must be couched on the
husband.

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a
physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.
Bautista vs. Federico O. Borromeo, Inc.
Petitioners: Abelardo Bautista and Roberto Tan Ting
Respondent: Federico O. Borromeo, Inc.
Ponente: Sanchez

Respondents seek to overturn the decision of CFI of Rizal on Jan 6, 1966 granting petitioners petition for relief from
judgment of Municipal Court on July 23, 1965.

FACTS:
 On SEPTEMBER 15, 1964, Ford truck of Petitioner (Tan Ting) driven by Abelardo Bautista and Volkswagen
delivery panel truck owned by Respondent (Borromeo) were involved in a traffic accident along EDSA which
caused the death of Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s Delivery truck.
 Borromeo had to pay Delgado’s widow P 4,444.00 representing compensation (death benefit) and funeral
expenses due under Workmen’s Compensation Act (source of the obligation).
 On JUNE 17, 1965, upon the confirmation that the said vehicular accident was caused by the Petitioners’
negligence, Respondent started a suit in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong to recover from petitioners
the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow.
 At the scheduled hearing of the case on JULY 23, 1965 neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared.
Borromeo was then allowed to present its evidence ex parte1. On the same day, the municipal court
rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the petitioners in the principal sum of P 4,444.00 and
P 500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs.
 On AUGUST 6, 1965, petitioners received a copy of the municipal court’s decision
 On AUGUST 13, 1965, petitioners moved to set aside the decision. On AUGUST 14, 1965, this motion was
denied.
 On AUGUST 16, 1965, copy of this order of denial was sent by registered mail to counsel of petitioners. Said
counsel did not receive this registered mail and the mail matter was returned to the court unclaimed.
However, said counsel learned of this denial on SEPTEMBER 2, 1965 allegedly "in the course of his
investigation."
 Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal on SEPT. 2, 1965, but they only paid the docket fee only on
SEPTEMBER 28, 1965which was after the lapse of the reglementary period
 The Petitioners did nothing until OCTOBER 26, 1965 when they lodged a petition for relief. They claimed
excusable negligencefor their failure to appear in July 23rd’s hearing that they had a good and substantial
defense that they were not in contractual relationshiop with the respondents. They also sought for
preliminary injunction which was later on denied to them.

ISSUE(S):
WHETHER OR NOT the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 can be invoked by the petitioners
WHETHER OR NOTthe petitioners can be excused for their negligence to appear on July 23 rd hearing
WHETHER OR NOTthe respondents have an obligation to pay their employee’s widow death benefits.

HELD:
1) It is a basic precept that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot sue out a petition for
releif under Rule 382. A petition for relief is not a substitute for appeal. The petitioners somehow waived
their right to appeal because when they were informed that their motion to set aside, they could have
appealed but they did not. They also did not pay the docket fees on time it was eleven days late(it must
have been within 15 days of receipt of the denial of their motion to set aside).Also when they filed a petition
for relief, it was way beyond the 60-day period from August 6, 1965, the time when they first learned of the
judgment to be set aside. Thus the petitioners’ petition for relief must fail.

1
by one only one party
2
relief from judgments, orders or other proceedings
 2) Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo Repotente, Jr., explained that he failed to attend the hearing on July 23
because he had another case before the City Court of Quezon City and that he gave permission to his
associate, Atty. Lucenito Tagle, to attend for him. In Tagle’s sworn statement he said that he just transferred
to his new office so the record of this case was misplaced or lost by his helpers. He then only found it after
a few days of the said hearing in his former office.
Their negligence is INEXCUSABLE, there was no plausible reason for Repotente to entrust the hearing to
another lawyer. When Repotente agreed in open court to set the trial of the case on July 23, it may be very
well be presumed that his other case in QC was not yet calendared for hearing otherwise he could have
disagreed on the said date. He also failed to notify his clients about the hearing set on July 23 so they also
failed to appear.

3) The obligation of Borromeo to pay the widow of its employee compensation and funeral expenses arose
from law – Sec. 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The same law also provides that it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer or sue another person for
damages; “and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the
right of recovering from such person what he paid”.
There is no need to establish any contractual relationship between Delgado and the petitioners because in this
case there is none. The cause of action of the respondent corporation is one which does not spring from a creditor-
debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its subrogation4 to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party.
Such subrogation is sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law aforesaid.

3
SEC. 2.Grounds for compensation. - When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment,
or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the
sums and to the person hereinafter specified…
4
The substitution of one thing for another, or of one person into the place of another with respect to rights, claims, or
securities.