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British Documents on the

Origins o f the War
i 8 9 8 - 1 9 1 4

Edited by G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., F.B .A ., and

H A R O L D T E M P E R L E Y , Litt.D., F.B.A.

Vol. X
PAR T II

THE LAST YEARS OF PEACE

LO N DO N :

19 3 ^

( Crown Copyright Reserved)

Reprinted with the permission o f

the Controller o f Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationery O ffice

JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION JOH NSON REPRINT C O M PAN Y LTD.

111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003 Berkeley Square House, London, W .l
 Reprinted from a copy in the collections o f
The N e w Y ork Public Library
Astor, L enox and T ild en Foundations

First reprinting, 1967, Johnson Reprint Corporation

Printed in the United States o f America

I, Y
Jb ld G I U , ' '■ s
r
 V o lu m e X
P A R T II

THE LAST YEARS OF PEACE

Edited by
P. GOOCH, D.Litt., and H A R O L D T E M P E R L E Y , Litt.D.
with the assistance of
L IL L IA N M . PENSON, Ph.D.
 Table of Contents.
Page
Final Foreword by the Editors ............................................................................... vi

Note on the Arrangement of Docum ents ... ... ... ... ... ... ix

Plan of Volume X (Part I I ) ............................................................................................ xi

A Brief Summary of the more Important Bevelations in British Docum ents

on the Origins of the War ............................................................................... xiii

List of Editorial Notes ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xix

List of Abbreviations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xxii

Minutes and Letters by King George V ... ... ... ... ... ... xxiii

Names of Writers of Minutes ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xxiv

List of Docum ents ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xxvii

Foreign Office and other Documents ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1-838

Chapter X C I.— The Bagdad Bailway, 1910-12 ... ... ... ... 1

Chapter X C II.— The Bagdad Bailway. Negotiations with Hakki Pasha,

February-July 29, 1913 ... ... ... ... ... ... 90

Chapter X C III.— The Bagdad Bailway, August-Decem ber, 1913 ... ... 199

Chapter X C IV .— The Bagdad Baihvay, January-August 1914 ... ... 312

Chapter XC V .— The Portuguese Colonies, December 1911-July 1914 ... 421

Chapter X C V I.— Mediterranean Agreements

I.— The Grey-Cam bon Letters of November 1912 ... ... ... 580
II.— Negotiations for an Anglo-Italian Pact, 1 91 2 -1 4... ... ... 620

Chapter X C V II.— Great Britain, France and Germany, 1 9 1 2 -1 4 ................ 655

Chapter X C V III.— Bussian Belations with Germany and Great Britain,

M arch-July 1914
I.— Busso-German Tension, March 1914 ... ... ... ... 754
II.— Anglo-Bussian Negotiations, M arch-July 1914 ... ... ... 774

Appendix I.— M. Sazonov’s Plan in 1914 for an Anglo-Bussian-Japanese

Guarantee of Asiatic Possessions ... ... ... ... ... 821

Appendix II.— Japan and the Opening of the W ar in 1914 ... ... ... 823

Appendix I II.— Lord Kitchener and the Arab National Movement ... 824
Index of persons showing the writers of despatches and the principal persons
mentioned in the text ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 839

Subject Index ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 868
 Final Foreword.
A fter nearly fourteen years the Editors have completed the task which the
British Government invited them to undertake. Volume X I , dealing with the month
before the war, was published in 192 6 ; and Volume X II remains to be published.
This, however, will contain m erely a general index, a chronological table, and some
documents omitted in or unavailable for earlier volumes, for instance some of the
private pape. s of Lord Lansdowne. The Editors have placed its preparation in the
charge of their valued colleague, Professor Lillian Penson. They will assume a
general responsibility for it, but they feel that their own task substantially ends
with the present volume.

The Foreword to Volumes I and II of British Docum ents on the Origins of the
1Var contained this passage: “ The decision to publish a selection from the British
Documents dealing with the origins of the W ar was taken by Mr. Ram say MacDonald,
Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the summer of 1924.
It was confirmed and announced by M r., now Sir, Austen Chamberlain in a letter
of the 28th November, 1924 (published in The Times on the 3rd December),
addressed to Dr. R . W . Seton-W atson. Some extracts from this letter were published
by us in the Foreword to Volume X I , and it need only be said here that the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to ‘ impartiality and accuracy ’ as
being the necessary qualifications for any work which the Editors were to publish.”

In Volume I I I , p. viii, the following passage occurs : “ They (the Editors) think
it well to state what was already implied in their preface to Volume I, p. viii,
that they would feel compelled to resign if any attempt were made to insist on the
omission of any document which is in their view vital or essential.” This declaration
was repeated or referred to in subsequent volumes. The Editors are not Government
Officials but private individuals em ployed by the Government to edit and publish
docum ents, and in that capacity they declared that they would not acquiesce in
the omission of essential material. In a few instances, owing to personal, official
or national susceptibilities, they have allowed passages to be excised or documents
to be withheld. But in every such case either a sufficient indication of what has
been omitted has been given or another docum ent, providing substantially the same
impression or indication of policy, lias been published. Their pledge to the public
has thus been com pletely upheld.

The Editors are glad to record their debt to the late Dir. Ram say MacDonald,
who authorized the publication, and to the late Sir Austen Chamberlain, who carried
the project into effect. They would draw attention to the fact that no other British
Foreign Secretary has ever consented to so extensive a publication of documents.
Without his sympathy and support, their work would have been impossible and their
efforts vain. They venture to think that he has laid historians under a debt the full
measure of which is only beginning to be realized, and which will constitute one
o f his most enduring achievements.

Elsewhere a brief summary is given of the more important revelations of British

diplom acy in the period as a whole. The new items in the present volume may
be briefly alluded to here. Sir Edward G rey’ s attempt to settle all outstanding
differences with Germany is the chief theme. The negotiations dealing with the
Bagdad railway are given in full and these, though tedious, will repay study.
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F a csim ile of final passage o f letter fro m Sir A u s te n C h a m b erla in ,

S ecretary o f State fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, to P ro fe s s o r R . W . S e to n -W a ts o n ,
d ea lin g w ith the d e cis io n to p u b lish a selection o f B ritish D o c u m e n ts ,
d a ted ’ N ovem ber 28 , 1924, and p u b lish e d in T he Tim es on
D e c e m b e r 3, 1 9 2 4 .
[T o face p. vi
 v ii

Summaries of progress are given on pp. 2 6-8 , 5 7-8 , 98-9, 242 -7 , 275 -9 , mainly
in the mifiutes of distinguished officials such as Sir E yre Crowe, Sir A. Ilirtzel,
and Mr. Alwyn Parker. It was unfortunate that work so highly skilled, so intensive,
and so prolonged should have failed of success. The last minutes of August
1914 (p. 420) have a pathetic interest. Chapter XCV dealing with the Portuguese
Colonies, clearing up the old blunder about ‘ The Treaty of W indsor ’ and showing
that English Statesmen must share the blame for the misunderstanding, is much
more interesting. Perhaps the most important part of the whole negotiation is
the exchange of views between Sir Edward Grey, Mr. W inston Churchill and
Colonel Seely in reference to what we should offer Germany in 1912 (pp. 4 80 -8 ).
It is interesting, in this connexion, to note (pp. 4 80-1) that General Botha also
recorded his opinions.

In Chapter XC V I is to be found the most important and original contribution

to knowledge in this volume. It reveals, for the first time, the British side of
the celebrated Mediterranean Agreem ents, with private letters of Sir Edward Grey,
Sir r . Bertie, Sir Rennell B odd, Lord Kitchener, and minutes by Sir E yre Crowe,
Sir Arthur Nicolson, and Air. W inston Churchill. The whole material thus revealed
affords, in conjunction with the French evidence, a complete account of the
strategical dispositions in the Mediterranean, and the meaning and importance
attached to them by the British Governm ent. The chapter, as a whole, is of
fundamental importance to the understanding of British policy.

In Chapter X C V II will be found a very interesting interview between

Sir Rennell Rodd and Herr von Jagow in January 1913, just before he took up
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in Berlin (pp. 659-662), with the com m ents of
King George and Sir Edward Grey (pp. 6 6 3 -4 ); and two statements of opinion
on naval matters by Mr. Churchill (pp. 721, 746—49), the last with a com m ent by
Sir Edward Grey (pp. 7 48-9). One last interview, among the many already
published, between the Em peror W illiam II and a British representative, given
under date of May 12, 1913 (pp. 699-702), is highly characteristic of the former.
The serious crisis caused by bellicose articles in the Russian press in March 1914
and the Royal visit to France, and the Anglo-Russian naval discussions, will be found
discussed at length in Chapter X C V III (pp. 754-820). Finally a letter o f great
importance written by King George V to the Emperor Nicholas II in June 1914
(pp. 801-2) should be studied in connexion with the question of Anglo-Rnssian
relations in Asia. M. Sazonov’ s plan for an Anglo-Russian-Japanese guarantee of
Asiatic possessions is the subject of Appendix I. Japan’ s attitude at the beginning of
the war is revealed in three important documents in Appendix II. In Appendix I II the
long disputed question of Kitchener’ s connexion with the Em ir Abdulla and the Grand
Sheriff in 1914 is cleared up by the publication of a number of relevant documents
including a private letter of Lord Kitchener to Sir W illiam Tyrrell (p. 831), and
statements by the E m ir himself (pp. 831-2), by Sir George Arthur and
Sir Ronald Storrs (p. 831). Finally one o f the most important of recent documents,
the letter of King George V to Sir Edward Grey of December 8 , 1912 (p. 658)
may be taken as an authoritative pronouncem ent to Prince H enry of Prussia on
the probable attitude of England in the event of a war between Germany and
Austria-Hungary on the one side and France and Russia upon the other. This,
with Sir Edward G rey’ s reply (pp. 6 58 -9 ), has an important bearing on the events
of 1914.

In regard to the present volume no objection has been raised by His M ajesty’ s
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the publication o f official despatches or
telegrams, or of memoranda or minutes. Nor have objections been raised by other
departments of the Governm ent, or by Foreign Powers, to the publication of similar
documents.
 v iii

Once again the private papers of Sir Edward Grey and of Lord Carnock have
proved of invaluable assistance, not only in interpreting the attitude o f the Secretary
of State and o f his principal adviser, but in revealing the inmost thoughts of the
British representatives abroad as expressed in their confidential correspondence.
Perhaps the Editors can, for the last tim e, repeat the statement of Lord Grey
(quoted first in Vol. V I, p. ix). “ I did not, however, regard anything except my
own letters and official papers as deciding p olicy.”

The two letters and minutes of His late Majesty King George V (pp. 658, 801-2)
are published by gracious permission of His Majesty. The Editors wish to acknow­
ledge the help given them by Lord W igram , the Keeper of the K ings’ Archives. They
also cannot let this opportunity pass without acknowledging their debt to the kindness
and advice of the Librarian of the Foreign Office, Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.C.M.G., who
has been of the utmost assistance to them throughout. They wish to pay their tribute
to the help given them by other officials of the Foreign Office, particularly
Mr. A. F . Orchard and his predecessor the late Mr. A. Field. They wish also to
thank the officials of the Public Kecord Office in London and Mr. W right, who is
in charge of the Diplomatic and Embassy Archives form erly at Cambridge and now
at Canterbury. Miss E . M. Keate, M .B .E . has assisted in the preparation of this
volume as of several others. Finally we wish to record our great obligations to
Mr. H . R . Mallett M .A ., of the Cambridge University Library, who has so ably
and conscientiously compiled this Index, and all the other Indices of the series.

G. P. GOOCH.
H A RO LD T E M P E R L E V .

D ecem ber 1937.

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M in u te by M r . J. R a m sa y M a c D o n a ld , as P rim e M in is te r , a u th o riz in g
the p u b lica tio n of B ritish D ocum ents on the O rigin of the IV ar,
d ated M a y i, 1924.

[ T o face p. viii
 Note on the Arrangem ent of Documents, & c.
T h e technical arrangement and details of this volume are very similar to those of
Volumes I I I , IV , V I, V II, IX and X (I). The material deals with two main themes,
the Anglo-German negotiations referring to the Bagdad Railway and the question of
the Portuguese Colonies, both reaching their climax in 1914, and the relations of
the Great Powers on naval and other matters.

W ithin the chapters the papers are placed in chronological order, as in previous
volumes, and, as before, chronological order means the date of despatch, whether to
or from London, not the date of receipt. The latter date is added wherever possible,
and readers should be careful to note it.

None of the documents in this volume date from the period before 1906, and
it is therefore unnecessary to repeat the note on the classification o f the papers
before that date, for which reference may be made to Volume I (p. ix).

The note prefaced to Volume II I (pp. ix-x) described further the arrangement
inaugurated at the beginning of 1 9 0 6 :—

“ A new system was inaugurated at the beginning of the year 1906. From that
date all papers, irrespective of country, are first divided into certain general
categories, ‘ P olitica l’ (the form er ‘ dip lom a tic’ ), Commercial, Consular, T reaty, &e.
The papers are, however, not rem oved from their original files, the contents of each
file being treated as one document. The files o f papers are classified within the
general categories according to the country to which their subject most properly
belongs. The volumes containing papers relating to any country are therefore in a
sub-section of the main series, and these sub-sections are arranged in alphabetical
order (e .g ., Political, Abyssinia, &c.). Previously the correspondence with, say, the
British Ambassador at Paris was kept distinct from the com m unications o f the French
Ambassador in L ondon, the latter being termed ‘ D om estic.’ This distinction is now-
abolished, and all papers relating to a subject are placed together in one file or in a
series o f files. The historian finds m any difficulties in this arrangement, as the files
are not arranged in the volumes in chronological order or alphabetical sequence.
The Foreign Office overcomes these difficulties by com piling a manuscript register
of the contents, but this method cannot be used so satisfactorily by the historian. It
is to be feared that the new arrangement makes it more difficult for the historian to
be sure he has found all the papers relating to a given incident.”

For the period 1913-14 many of the documents are still at the Foreign Office,
in the original loose jackets. A com bination of three methods has again been used
in the survey of the available m aterial:—
( 1 ) A comprehensive study has been made of the Confidential Print, which
contains, as the period develops, an increasingly large proportion of the papers.
Documents traced in this way have, as before, been checked by the originals in the
Foreign Office files, and notes and minutes added. In a few cases in this, as in
previous volum es, a note at the foot of a docum ent has been inserted to show that
no original can be traced. In the m ajority of these instances, however, this does not
mean that there is no registered jacket for the paper, but that the jacket contains a
printed copy as the official record.
(2) Application has been made to the Foreign Office library staff for papers and
files of papers to which reference has been found.
 X

(3) The Foreign Office registers of despatches and telegrams sent to or received
from British Embassies or Legations have been searched. In a few cases this
examination has revealed documents which were not included in the Confidential
Print, either because they were not considered at the time of sufficient importance or
because they were regarded as especially confidential.

The Editors have recorded in previous volumes their regret that the Embassy
archives for the period after 1905 are not generally available. W ith the exception of
Japan (to 1910) and Russia, the Embassies and Legations have not yet sent their
later papers to England. The Editors can, however, confirm the judgm ent previously
expressed that the records are more exact and complete after 190(5. There are a
few cases in the present volume in which the original texts of documents occurring
in the Confidential Print have proved impossible to trace. In the large number of
cases where opportunities for com parison exist such copies have been found to be
verbally exact, though the punctuation and capitalisation are standardised.

The private collections available at the Foreign Office continue to be of great

value. Many letters have been printed from the private correspondence of Sir Edward
(Lord) Grey, and Sir Arthur Nicolson (Lord Carnock). The papers of Lord
Lansdowne are also now available for use. Some of these became available too late to
be published in the earlier volumes of this series, but selections will be published in a
later volume. The value of such material is evident, butit is. generally speaking,
m ore complete in respect of in-letters than out-letters.
L IL L IA N M. PENSON.
 Plan of V olum e X (Part II).
Chapter XC I resumes the complicated story of the Bagdad Railway negotiations
where it was left in Volume V I, and carries it from the latter half of 1910 to the
close of 191*2. Unlike the disappointing discussions of 190*2-3 and 1907-8, no serious
hitch occurred in the prolonged exchange of views which culminated in a
comprehensive agreement on the eve of the world war. A brief Turkish M emorandum
of March 1 . 1911, was answered in a British M emorandum o f July 29, 1911, dealing
with the question o f the railway, the respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey
in the region of the Persian Gulf, and the proposed increase in the Turkish customs
from 11 to 15 per cent. An Aide-M em oire of April 15, 1912, explaining the views
o f the Turkish Government with greater precision, was followed by an equally
detailed reply from the British Government on July 18, 191*2. This last document
emphasised the importance of an agreement to the future of Anglo-Turkish relations
in general.
The mission of Hakki Pasha, an ex-Grand Vizier, to London in February 1913
opens Chapter X C II. The discussions, which were based on the British M emorandum
of July 18, 191*2, were of a highly technical character, and were carried on with
the aid of many experts. France and Russia were naturally kept inform ed of the
proceedings, though their assent to any arrangements that might be made was not
required, since the object was merely to prevent the alteration of the status quo in
the Persian Gulf to the disadvantage of Great Britain. Germany made no trouble,
for her control over the railway as far as Basra remained unimpaired. An Anglo-
Turkish agreem ent, signed by the British Foreign Secretary and Hakki Pasha on
July 29, 1913, brought the first stage o f a toilsome journey to a satisfactory close.
A Commission to improve the navigation o f the Chatt-el-Arab was to be set up,
the Turco-Persian frontier was defined, a concession for the navigation o f the Tigris
and Euphrates was outlined, the status of Koweit was carefully explained, the
policing o f the Persian G ulf by British vessels was approved, and conditional assent
was given to the increase of the tariff so long and so eagerly desired by the Turks.

Chapter XC I1I, concerning the last five months of 1913. describes the
negotiations, both with Turkey and other Powers, rendered necessary by the
agreement of July 29, 1913: for the construction o f railways in the Sultan’ s Asiatic
dominions raised political and economic issues o f the highest importance. The
discussions with Germany, the possessor o f the Bagdad Railway concession, were
inevitably the most difficult and prolonged. The chief burden in the preparation
of draft and counter-draft rested on Herr von Kuhlmann, Councillor of the German
Embassy, and Mr. Alwyn Parker of the Foreign Office. L ong before agreement
with Germany was in sight, the discussion o f the right to navigate the Tigris and
Euphrates, granted by Turkey on July 29, 1913, was concluded. The concession,
accompanied by elaborate provisions, was signed on December 12 , 1913, by Hakki
Pasha and by Lord Inchcape as the representative of British com m ercial interests.
The latter undertook to create a com pany to work the concession without undue delay.
The story o f the Anglo-Germ an discussions from the opening of 1914 to the
outbreak o f the world war is related in Chapter X C IV . A preliminary agreement
relating to the transport of material for the line by Lord Inchcape’ s future com pany
was signed on February 23, 1914. The Anglo-German Convention, initialled by
Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky on June 15, 1914, provided for two British
members on the Board of the Bagdad Railway C om p any; the termination o f the
Com pany’ s line at B asra; equal treatment o f the goods o f all countries; the
construction and exploitation of ports at Basra and Bagdad by a separate Ottoman
Company, in which 40 per cent, o f the capital should be B ritish; the building o f a
 x ii

line from Basra to the Gulf only after agreement between the Turkish, German and
British Governm ents; and equal treatment on the Chatt-el-Arab for the vessels of
all nations. The two main objects of British policy in this great transaction were
thus attained— the security of the western approach to India and fair treatment for
British com m erce.

Chapter XC V tells the story of the making of a new Anglo-German agreement

regarding spheres of influence in the Portuguese Colonies, to take the place of the
secret treaty of 1898. W hen the impracticability of a naval agreement and a
neutrality formula had been reluctantly but finally recognised in the spring of 1912,
the rapprochement equally desired by both Governments was sought along the line
of regional pacts. The parallel discussions of the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese
Colonies were regarded as related parts of a comprehensive policy, and were carried
on in the friendliest spirit. The new Convention, described by Sir Edward Grey
as a very slight revision, was somewhat more favourable to Germany than the
old. Though initialled by Sir Edward Grey and Herr von Kuhlmann on
October 20, 1913, it was carried no further, since insuperable difficulties as to
publication arose. The German Government consented to the publication of the
new agreement since Sir Edward Grey refused to sign another secret treaty. But
the British Government argued that, in fairness to Portugal, it should be
accompanied by publication of the so-called W indsor Treaty of October 1899, in which
the old British obligation to defend Portuguese territory was acknowledged as valid,
not by a new treaty but by a declaration referring to the old pledge. This condition
was declined on the ground that it would irritate German opinion and compromise
the position of the Chancellor.
The significant redistribution of British and French naval forces in the
Mediterranean and the Channel during the summer of 1912, and the consequential
exchange of the Grey-Cam bon letters in the following November, are the subject of
C hapter X C V I. These documents authoritatively defined the implications of the
naval and military conversations inaugurated in 1906. The second section of the
chapter reveals the little-known negotiations for an Anglo-Italian pact which were
carried on, without much spirit and without result, between 1912 and 1914.
Chapter XC V 11 illustrates Anglo-Germ an relations during the last two years of
peace in so far as they were not concerned with regional issues. Its most important
docum ent is the letter of King George V inform ing Sir Edward Grey o f the question
b y Prince H enry in December 1912 as to E ngland’ s attitude in the event of a
European war, and of his impromptu reply. Though the limitation of the fleets
was no longer officially discussed, and Mr. Churchill’ s suggestion o f a Naval Holiday
found little favour at Berlin, the growth of German armaments was the subject of
m any discussions and reports. A meeting between Mr. Churchill and Admiral von
Tirpitz, planned for the early summer o f 1914, though desired by both, could not
be arranged.
The shadow of war hangs over Chapter XCVI11, the first section of which
describes the alarming Russo-German press feud in the spring of 1914. The second
section throws light on the Russian suggestion of a naval agreement which was
made to Sir Edward Grey, with the backing of the French Governm ent, on the
occasion of the official visit of K ing George to Paris in April 1914. Despite the
intimate contact indicated by Great Britain’ s ready acceptance of the plan, a good
deal of friction between London and St. Petersburg persisted in regard to Persia.
Though M. Sazonov was never wholly satisfied with British policy, the marked
friendliness of the Emperor Nicholas II remained to the end. Of the three
Appendices, two deal respectively with M. Sazonov’ s plan for an Anglo-Russian-
Japanese guarantee of their Asiatic possessions in 1914 and with the attitude of Japan
at the opening of the War. The third provides material relating to the Arab National
Movement and Lord K itchener’ s relations with the Grand Sheriff.
 x iii

A Brief Summary of the more Important Revelations in

British Documents on the Origins of the W ar.
T h e Editors of British Docum ents on the Origins of the W ar began their
publication in 1897 and not in 1871 as did the Editors of D ocum ents Diplomatiques
Français and of the Grosse Politik. But the problem of a starting-point was very
different for continental and British Editors. One weighty reason for beginning at the
year selected (1897) was that England had had no very active and continuous
connexion with the continent before that date ; care has also been taken to report
transactions before 1897 which touch on the important phases of E ngland’ s policy in
relation to the continent and where they were likely to produce war.

Another reason for beginning in the year 1897 was the opinion of the officials
themselves (and notably of Sir Eyre Crowo) that the records of the Foreign Office
during the period of Lord Salisbury did not show the course of British policy at
all adequately. Thus Sir E yre Crowe w rites: “ For the whole of Lord Salisbury’ s
two Administrations our official records are sadly incom plete, all the most important
business having been transacted under cover of “ private ” correspondence..............
A methodical study of our relations with Germ any during that interesting period is
likely to remain for ever im possible.” (January 1 , 1907.)(1) Lord Fitzm aurice refers
to the Anglo-G erm an overture of 1879 and sa y s: ‘ ‘ I ascertain there was no trace
of the negotiation in the Foreign Office.” (2) In the same way Sir Charles Hardinge
points out that the 1887 agreements were made privately, ‘ ‘ the text having fallen
into m y hands by m istak e” (I I I , 422). Crowe also states the fact that the papers
of 1901, though “ private,” “ were not placed in the archives ” (III, 423). It was, in
fact, only by accident that they were in the Foreign Office or that we found them
and published them in Vol. II. lie also points out that over Samoa Salisbury kept
transactions ‘ ‘ private. ’ ’

The Editors found and published (V III, Chap. L X I) the Mediterranean agree­
ments, which deal with the year 1887. They also found and published memoranda
relating to British guarantees, such as that of 1872 (V III, pp. 371—4) relating particu­
larly to Belgium , and the Law Officers’ opinion of 1870 on the same subject (p. 378).
In regard to Lord Salisbury’ s very obscure attitude to the Belgian guarantee during
1887 they published further documents of which even Lady Gwendolen Cecil was
ignorant.(3) In regard to Portugal they published the interpretation of the guarantee
made by L ord Granville in 1873, which has been continued in that form to the present
d a y .(4)

Thus as regards the essential obligations— Portugal, Belgium and the

Mediterranean Agreements— they have published in fact all that really matters
between 1871 and 1897. Apart from that, during this period the connexion o f England
with the continent was slight and obscure. From 1882 onwards the Triple Alliance
existed, and E ngland, being attracted to its orbit, was able to keep France in awe.
W hen England drew away from the Triple Alliance and Europe became divided into
two groups her situation was still c o m m a n d i n g . For it was dangerous for either
group to attack her or to attack each other. As long as England was in isolation,

O [u. G ooch db T em p erley, V ol. I l l , p. 409, note.']

( 2) [v . ibid., V ol. I l l , p. 422.]
(3) [u. ibid., V ol. V I I I , pp. 374-5, Ed. N o t e .]
0) [u. ibid., V ol. I, pp. 5 1 -2 .]
 x iv

splendid or otherwise, the danger of her being involved in a war in Europe was
not great, and the danger of any great European war was much lessened. In 1901
Lord Salisbury even declared that England had never been practically in danger since
the days of Napoleon. His colleagues thought otherwise, and negotiated first the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance and then the Anglo-French E nten te. By thus abandoning isolation
they made war more possible. Lord Salisbury had himself perceived the danger of
isolation and taken upon him self to end it in 1898. It was then that he offered a
regional arrangement to Russia. On its failure he allowed Mr. Chamberlain to
approach Germany. It is clear that the period of isolation was com ing to an end, and
the course of events was precipitated: by the German seizure of Kiao-Chao at the end
of 1897. It was that incident which prompted Lord Salisbury to reverse the policy of
Disraeli and to make overtures to Russia, and with that event the British
Documents begin.

Volum e I contains almost in its first pages (pp. 5 -7) a detailed account of
Lord Salisbury’ s overture to Russia in January 1898, which is the first full study of
the matter. Chapter II contains the British side of the Anglo-German and Portuguese
Agreem ents, and reveals the truth about “ the Treaty of W in d sor.” Chapter I I I , § ii,
reduces to its right proportions the German-Am erican incident at Manila in 1898.
Chapter IV , § ii, gives a full account o f the Faslioda incident. Chapter V I details the
British attitude and view of the first Hague Peace Conference.

Volume II, Chapter IX , gives the British comment on the German attitude towards
the Anglo-Germ an Agreement of .1909; and in Chapter X, gives Lord Lansdowne’ s
account of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1901, which differs considerably from
the German version. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement is revealed in Chapter X I
and the fact made clear that Count H ayashi’ s Memoirs are. substantially accurate.
In Vol. II, Chapter X I I , § 1 , the high feeling against Germany over the evacuation
of Shanghai is revealed, and details are given of how the Blue Book was mutilated to
conceal it. Section ii of the same chapter in Vol. II gives a good deal of new material
on the Venezuela incident of 190*2, in which concerted Anglo-German action was
attempted, but stopped owing to American opposition. Volume II, Chapters X IV and
XV, give the full British story of the E n ten te and show how Lord Crom er’ s opinions
were of great importance in shaping it. Both Volumes I and II give important
extracts from the private papers o f Sir Ernest Satow on the Far East, on which he
spoke with unrivalled authority (e .g ., I, pp. 41, 219, 241 ; II, pp. 55, 5 8 -9 , 1*26,
228 -9 ).

‘ ‘ The testing of the E n te n te ” in Volume I I I contains new material of vital

importance. The British attitude towards the fall of Delcasse, and the story of the
‘ ‘ offensive and defensive a llia n ce” is related in full, with important letters from
L ord Sanderson and Lord Lansdowne and pungent comments from King Edward,
together with a contem porary account by M. Delcasse of his reasons for resignation
(III, Chap. X V III). The Anglo-French and Anglo-Belgian conversations of January to
April 1906 (III, Chap. X X ) give new materials of great importance, including the
correspondence of Colonel Barnardiston, the British Military Attache in Belgium ,
the existence of which was, by a m isapprehension, denied by Sir Edward Grey in
1915. In addition this volume contains many new details about the Algeciras
Conference (III, Chap. X X I). The Appendices to this volume are of great significance.
The first is the famous memorandum of Sir E yre Crowe o f January 1 , 1907
(III, App. A) dealing with Anglo-Germ an policy, with a criticism by Lord Sanderson
(III, App. B). Sir Frank Lascelles in App. C draws a full length portrait of
the Em peror W illiam II, whom he knew well and liked.
 XV

In Volume IV the Anglo-Russian E n ten te is the theme, and the British account
here published is, as yet, the only authority upon it. There is much important
private material, e .g ., the views respectively of K ing Edward (IV , pp. 5 95-6),
Sir Edward Grey (IV , pp. 6 16 -7 ), and Sir Charles Hardinge (IV , p. 580) on the
scope of the Agreement, while Sir Arthur N icolson’ s private letters from
St. Petersburgh are also valuable. To com plete the picture, a despatch from
Lord Curzon (much mutilated in its Blue Book form) is quoted at m uch greater
length on British policy in India and towards Russia (IV , pp. 356-63).

The Near East is the subject of Volum e V. In Chapter X X X extracts from the
Annual Reports of Turkey for 1906-7 give a com plete picture of the Turkish M onarchy
on the eve of its fall. Chapter X X X IV gives a full account of the rupture with
Servia after the assassination of 1903 and new details about the decision of
K ing Edward to resume diplomatic relations. Much new material is given in
relation to the visit of K ing Edward to the Czar at Reval in June 1908
(Chap. X X X V II) and to the Em peror Francis Joseph at Ischl in August (App. IV ).
In Chapter X X X V III the Young Turkish Revolution is described with important
private letters from Mr. G. II. Fitzm aurice, the chief Dragoman (V , pp. 2 4 7 -8 ,
268-72). The volume also includes the Bosnian Crisis and the quarrel with Count von
Aehrenthal, with piquant com m ents by K ing Edward and Sir Edward Goschen
(pp. 527-30, 536-8).

Volume V I is mainly concerned with Anglo-Germ an tension (1907-12). There

are over a dozen valuable conversations of the Em peror W illiam reported, three
important ones with Admiral von Tirpitz (V I, pp. 1-3, 255-6, 515-7), and one of the
rare conversations with the Em peror Nicholas II (V I, pp. 4 65 -6 ). The British
version of the m uch disputed conversation between Sir H enry Campbell-Bannerman
and M. Clemenceau is given (V I, pp. 2 2 -7 ), as well as two other conversations
with French statesmen (V I, pp. 157-8, 168-9). Sir E yre Crowe has some important
minutes (V I, pp. 11, 13, 109-10, 533-6). Sir Charles H ardinge’ s private papers,
which are for the first time extensively used in this volum e, include an important
memorandum given by Sir Edward Grey to King Edward (V I, p. 779) and a letter
of Lord Salisbury on Foreign Policy (V I, p. 780). Sir Charles H ardinge’ s official
reports of K ing E dw ard’ s royal visits are of great value (V I, pp. 4 3 -6 , 230-2).
Sir Charles Hardinge gives his version of the conversation with the Em peror W illiam
(VI, pp. 184-200) about reduction of armaments, which ultimately became the
subject of discussion by the Times (V I, pp. 197-200) and the press generally.
Part o f L ord H aldane’ s Diary of his mission to Berlin in 1912 is printed (V I,
pp. 676-84), and the full text is published for the first time of Sir Edward G rey’ s
speech to the Im perial Conference of 1911 (V I, App. V ), with annotations by the
speaker.

“ A g a d ir” (Vol. V IP contains a mass of new material. A conversation with

General Joffre (V II, pp. 632-41, the strange incident in which H err von Kiderlen-
W aechter invoked British aid to avoid an Im perial indiscretion (V II, pp. 622 -6 ), and
the dubious attitude of Russia during the crisis (V II, Chap. LVIJ.) are all new.
Sir Edward G rey’ s private letters, particularly that to Mr. Asquith at the moment
of decision (V II, pp. 377-8), and those to Sir F. Bertie (V II, pp. 382, 4 16 -7 , 503-4,
521, 542), are indispensable to an understanding of the crisis. To these should
be added the extract from the m eeting of the Committee of Im perial D efence of
August 24, 1911 (v. V III, pp. 381-2) describing the British fear that Belgium
might not resist invasion.

Volume V I II is a miscellaneous collection, dealing with Arbitration, Neutrality,

and Security. It discloses, among other things, the process by which
Lord Palmerston and his colleagues framed the Declaration of Paris in 1856 (V III,
 xvi
pp. 204-6). It gives two hitherto unpublished memoranda on Belgium in the seventies
(V III, pp. 3 71 -4 , 378-9). There is additional material on the strange attitude of
L ord Salisbury towards Belgium in 1887 (V III, pp. 374-5), and important pronounce­
ments on that subject by Sir Eyre Crowe (V III, pp. 375-7, 392-6), and
Mr. (Sir C. J.) Hurst (V III, pp. 391-2), Sir Edward Grey (V III, p. 403) and Sir Charles
H ardinge (V III, pp. 377-8) The publication of the last minute produced a letter
from Sir Edward Grey, which is reprinted in Vol. IX (I), App. V III. Probably the
newest material in Volume V III is that in Chapter L X I, where the Mediterranean
Agreements of 1887 negotiated by Lord Salisbury are for the first time fully disclosed.
There are some revelations in Chapter L X II as to Portugal and the British Alliance.
More important is the British attitude at the Second Hague Peace Conference in
Chapter L X V , with private com m ents from Sir E yre Crowe (V III, p. 351), Sir Ernest
Satow (V III, p. 305) and Professor Westlake (V III, pp. 369-70). Chapter L X IX
dealing with the renewed alliance with Japan, and Chapter L X X , devoted to Anglo-
American Arbitration, 1910-4, throw much light on two problems hitherto imperfectly
known.

The Balkan W ars and their outcom e form the subject of Vols. IX (I—II). Part I
gives a full report of the Em peror N icholas’ s visit to King Edward at Cowes in
August 1909 (IX (I), pp. 3 3-5 , 37-8) and another interview with the Emperor
Nicholas II (IX (I), pp. 546-9), which combine with the earlier one in Vol. VI
(pp. 465-6), and a later one (IX (II), pp. 688-90) to throw light on his character. There
is also a valuable conversation with M. Sazonov (IX (I), pp. 408 -9 , 749-72). The
Servian statesman M. M ilovanovic (IX (I), pp. 195-7) and Mahmud Shevket (IX (I),
pp. 392-4) also give interviews of m uch value. For the first time the full corres­
pondence between Count Karolvi and Mr. Gladstone after the election of 1880 is
printed, and a long-disputed controversy is thus laid to rest (IX (I), App. I). Perhaps
the most revealing item in the volume is a private correspondence between Sir Charles
H ardinge and Sir Arthur Nicolson on Russia’ s Asiatic policy (IX (I), pp. 101-2, 105-6,
120-2), with comments from Count von Aehrenthal in the role of umpire (IX (H,
pp. 166-8). Vol. IX (I), App. IV , prints a hitherto unknown overture by Turkey for
alliance in 1911.

Volume IX (I), furnishes some interesting views o f Lord Salisbury on the

Straits question (App. II). Volume IX (II), supplements this by an important
private letter of Sir Edward Grey (pp. 660-1). In general, conversations are the
main feature o f this volume. That with the German Emperor (IX (II), pp. 503-5) is
most characteristic, and others with Herren Kiderlen-W aechter (IX (II), pp. 261-2),
Bethmann Hollweg (IX (II), pp. 3 6 -8 ,, von Jagow (IX (II), pp. 7 56-7) are noteworthy.
A m ong those with Balkan statesmen of real value are those with K ing Charles of
Rum ania (IX (II), pp. 254, 998-9), and with M. Venizelos (IX (II), pp. 496-7,
7 76 -7 ), and the references to the early and unofficial diplomatic activities of
Professor Masaryk (IX (II), pp. 194, 317). There is an important interview with
Mahmud Shevket (IX (II), pp. 4 57 -8 ), a valuable memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice
(IX (II), pp. 210-3), and a private letter of Lord Kitchener on E gypt (IX (II), p. 88).
One of the most important features in the work are the valuable reports of
Sir H . Bax-Ironside (v. especially IX (II), pp. 3 60 -8 ), which show that E ngland’ s
acquaintance with the formation o f the Balkan League was much more accurate
and close than had been previously supposed. Thus the denials of its existence
(IX (I), pp. 612, 644) were not believed. The revelation of Sir Edward Grey as a
statesman of a European mind when President of the Conference at St. Jam es’ s, is
o f m uch interest (v. especially, IX (II), pp. vi-xii, 117-8, 167, 506, 573 -4 , 660-1, 680).

The principal interest of Volum e X (I), is the large amount of new material
published on the Potsdam m eeting of the Russian and German Emperors in 1910;
on the little known subject o f the proposed Armenian Reform s in 1913—4 ; and a
 x v ii

revelation of the whole Anglo-Russo-Persian problem , which resulted in the dismissal

o f the American, Mr. Shuster. A letter from the latter is printed (X (I), pp. 7 88-9),
and Sir Edward G rey’ s pronouncem ents on this “ sin gle-m in ded” man have a sad
interest (X (I), pp. 795, 815-6, 888 -9 , 862-8). Sir Edward G rey’ s letter to
Ur. H odgkin on his Persian policy possesses great value (X (I), pp. 898-9).

In Volume X (II), the whole story of the Anglo-German negotiations concerning

the Bagdad railway and the Portuguese colonies is given for the first time from the
British side. Even more important is Chapter XCV, giving a full exposition of the
ideas underlying the transfer of the British fleet from the Mediterranean in 1912
and the famous exchange of letters between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey.
Chapter X C V II gives much new inform ation as to Anglo-Russian relations during
1914. The Japanese attitude at the beginning o f the war is also revealed in
Appendix II, and the long-disputed problem of Lord K itchener’ s relations with the
Grand Sheriff in 1914 is solved in Appendix III. Two letters of K ing George V
(pp. 658, 801-2) are of much interest and value.

Volume X I was “ collected and arranged by ” the late Sir James Headlam -M orley,
under the supervision of the Editors. It fills up the gaps in the W hite Paper published
at the time of the crisis of July-A ugust 1914, and corrects certain errors. The
celebrated memorandum of July 31, 1914, of Sir E yre Crowe on the obligation to
France was here first published (X I, pp. 228-9). There are a number of minutes by
him , by Sir Edward Grey, and by Sir Arthur Nicolson, together with private letters
which reveal E ngland’ s point of view at that supreme crisis, and her relations with
Russia were fully displayed.

The Editors took the view that British documents ought to be presented in a
British way, which did not necessarily coincide with the most scientific approach,
regarded purely from a technical standpoint. The aim was to show that men were
at work and that their methods were not always scientific. Thus it was explained
(III, p. x) that “ The spelling of proper names, capitalisation, and punctuation . . . .
have been made identical with those of the original docum ent. . . . The original
texts have many inconsistencies in these matters, but it has not been thought
desirable to correct th em .” The Editors thought it more illuminating to show that
the Foreign Office allowed such inconsistencies to prevail among its diplomats, than
to insist on a mechanically correct spelling, which did not exist in the documents
themselves. Similarly, in the arrangement o f the documents, they have explained at
length that “ the British w a y ” dictated a certain method of arrangement. “ The
Editors think that they may here state their reasons for adopting the topical, instead
of the chronological method. . . . The topical method was used in the Grosse
Politik. It grouped material into chapters . . . dealing with particular issues and
subjects. The chronological method, adopted in the French Docum ents Diplomatiques,
displays the documents as they appear from day to day and week to week, without any
attempt to sift them out under headings. It adds, however, a classified list by
which the main subjects can be found. The Editors do not presume to decide on the
advantage o f either method as applied to other countries, where the practice may
be different from their own. They believe, however, that the topical m ethod is
essential for displaying the workings of British policy. For when a crisis arises in
England, or when a particular question comes before the Cabinet, the previous papers
relating to the topic are printed and circulated to the Cabinet in special sections.
Indeed, the normal arrangement of the Foreign Office Confidential Print is in printed
sections devoted to topics o f special interest as they arise, e.g ., Congo, China, Spanish
American W ar, Algeciras Conference, &c. The same treatment is shown when
summaries of special questions are made to facilitate decision by the Foreign
[lo^oo]
 x v iii

Secretary or the Cabinet. They are influenced in their decisions by following the
development o f the problem or o f the crisis from documents or summaries extending
backwards for six months or longer. Consequently, the Editors feel that, in adopting
the topical method, they are presenting the problems and decisions to their readers
in much the same way as they appeared to the Cabinet and Foreign Secretary
at the time. These reasons seemed to them to make the topical m ethod of treatment
the preferable one, so far as British policy is concerned.” (Vol. V II, pp. viii-ix.)

The Editors would like to draw attention to
published the actual, and not the paraphrased,
not to be found either in the Blue Book of 1914 or
This is only one instance of the way in which the
been adopted by them.
the fact that they have throughout
versions of telegrams. These are
in the Memoirs of Sir Edward Grey.
most correct texts and versions have

Lastly, they would wish to emphasize the value to the reader of the technical
prefaces or notes on the arrangement of Docum ents, &c., prefixed to each Volume.
These generally contain a considerable amount of new inform ation, not only as
to the records themselves and their arrangement, but as to the working of the
Foreign Office machine and its connexion with other departments of State. The
most valuable of these contributions has been made by Professor Lillian M. Penson
and is signed by her name in V ol. IX (II), pp. x -x ii. This contains “ an analysis
of the character of the Confidential Print and a summary of the evidence available
with regard to the submission of documents to the Secretary o f State and their
circulation to the Cabinet.” It was made in response to suggestions from a num ber
of distinguished historians. It is supplemented by another interesting discovery
(V ol. X (I) p. ix) with regard to the formation and working of a Cabinet Committee
for the discussion of Anglo-Germ an negotiations from 1911 onwards. All this
inform ation is not only new but is the only evidence at present available on the
subject. It is hoped that the light thus thrown on the mechanism of government
in regard to diplom acy may stimulate further investigation of a question the
importance of which it is not easy to exaggerate.

G. P. GOOCH.
■ HAROLD TEM PE RLE Y .

D ecem ber 1937.

 List of Principal Editorial Notes.
P age
Bagdad B a ilw a y N e g o tia tio n s o f 1905-10.
[C itin g G ooch d T em p erley, Vols. V , V I , X (I ), G .P., X X X I ] ................ . 1

B agdad R a ilw a y Q uestion, 1911.

[E x p la in in g orig in o f m em orandum com m u n ica ted to Tew fik P asha on J u ly 29, 1911] 45

P o sitio n o f K o w eit.
[R e co rd in g m odus v iv en d i o f Septem b er 1901] ... ... ... ... ... ... 49

B a g d a d -K h a n ik in L ine.
[C itin g d ocu m en t from S ieb ev t re co rd in g S ir G. L o w th e r’ s protest o f D ecem b er
' 1911] 54
[G iv in g S ir E d w a rd G rey 's view s in S eptem b er 1912] 87

R ussia and th e B agdad R ailw ay.

[C itin g telegram s from S ieb er t o f J u n e 1912] ... 74

V isit o f H a k k i P ash a to L on d on , 1913.

[C itin g Gooch d T em p erley, V ol. I X 0 1 ), G .P., X X X V I I ( I ) ] .................' 90
[R e co rd in g h istory o f n eg otia tion s ] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 114-7

N a v ig a tion of T igris and E u p h ra tes.

[G iv in g te x t o f m em oranda o f 1 8 4 6 ] ........................................................... 9
[R e c o r d in g in itia llin g o f d r a ft concession b y H a k k i P ash a and L o rd In ch ca p e,
A u gu st 12, 1913]

N a v ig a tio n o f S h a tt-el-A ra b .
[R e co rd in g con feren ce of ex p erts a t F oreig n Office, Septem b er 9, 1913, an d cit in g
G .P., X X X V I I ( D ] ................................................................................................................................ 229

S h a tt-el-A ra b R iv era in Com m ission.

[G iv in g t e x t o f D ecla ra tion o f O ctob er 21, 1913, sa feg u a rd in g rig h ts u n d er e x istin g
trea ties ] ............................................................................................................................................. 242

F ra n co-T u rk ish A g r eem e n ts re R a ilw ay and P o r t C oncessions.

[G iv in g t e x t o f despatch from S ir F . B ertie o f A p ril 10, 1914, and ex tra ct from th e
' T em ps of A p ril 11, 1 9 1 4 ] .............................................................................................................. 3 67-8

An g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion re Ba gda d R ailw ay.

[R e c o r d in g revised d r a ft o f A p ril 21, 1914, and in itia llin g o f the A n n ex on
' M arch 28, 1914] ............................................................................................................................ 370-1
[R e c o r d in g fu rth er revised d r a ft o f M a y 29, 1914, and g iv in g te x t of “ N otes to be
ex ch a n g ed on D a te o f S ig n a t u r e ’ ’ ] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 392-4
[R e c o r d in g fu rth er revised d rafts of J u n e 2 a n d J u n e 5, 1914].......................................... 395
[P rop osed om ission o f term “ pecu n ia ry c la im s ” ] ......................................................... 415

A n g lo-T u rkish C on v en tion re M on op olies.

[S u m m a risin g clauses of con v en tion in itia lled on J u n e 10, 1914] ... ... ... 396

E ffec t o f O u tb rea k of W a r on Bagdad R a ilw a y and o th e r N e g o tia tio n s.

[G iv in g m inu tes by M r. P a rk er, S ir E y re Crow e, S ir A. N icolson and S ir E d w a rd
G rey ] ....................................................................................................................................................... 420

The P o rtu g u e se Colonies.

[C itin g G ooch d T em p erley, V ols. I, V I and V I I I , G .P ., X X X I and X X X V I I ( I )] ... 421

A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion o f A u g u st 30, 1898.

[G iv in g m em orandum b y S ir E d w a rd G rey re co rd in g in form a tion from M a rq u is
de Sovera l re a ttitu d e o f L ord S alisbu ry a n d circu m stan ces o f con clu sion ] ... 427
[10900] b 2
 XX

P ag e
The A n g lo -P o rtu g u es e A lliance.
[R e c o r d in g en q u iry by H e r r v on K iihlm a nn on J u ly 10, 1912, and m inu tes by
M r. T yrrell, M r. J. T illey, M r. W . L an g ley an d S ir A. N ieolson ] ................ 483-4

A n g lo-G erm a n N e g o tia tio n s re P o rtu g u e se C olonies, 1912-13.

[C itin g G .P., X X X I an d X X X V I I ( I )] ................................................................................... 488
[G iv in g m inu tes by S ir E y re Crowe, S ir E d w a rd G rey and M r. L ew is H a rc o u rt
r ecord in g orig in o f m em orandum o f J a n u a ry 13, 1913] ... ... ... ... 507-8
[R e co rd in g in itia llin g of C on v en tion on O ctober 20, 1913] ... ... ... ... 544

T he G rey-C a m b on L e tte r s o f N o v e m b e r 22 and 23, 1912.

[C itin g G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I X (I I ), D .D .F ., 3"*' S ir., Vols. I l l and I V ] ... 580

A n g lo -F ren c h N a val C onversa tion s, 1912-3.

[G iv in g M r. C h u rch ill’ s a ccou n t o f a con v ersation w ith the C om te de Sa in t-S ein e
on M ay 14, 1912] ........................................................................................................................... 591-2
[C itin g D .D .F ., 3me S cr., V ol. I l l , fo r conversation of J u ly 10, 1912] ... ................ 599
[G iv in g t e x t o f d r a ft a greem ent of J u ly 23, 1912, from A d m ira lt
c it in g D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. I l l ] ...................................................................................... 602
[R e fe r r in g to S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s speech o f A u gu st 3, 1914, and c it in g P ari. D eb.,
T w e n ty -F iv e Y ears, and C ollected D ip lom a tic D ocu m en ts] ........................................... 615
[P rob a b le con ten ts o f file o f papers sent to S ir E d w a rd G rey on A p ril 10,1913;
cit in g D .D .F ., 3 me S er., V ol. V I , an d A d m ira lty A rch iv es]........... ............................... 694

A n g lo -F ren c h C on v ersa tion s o f 1905.

[C itin g G ooch dc T em p erley, V ol. I l l , D .D .F ., 2me S er., V ol. V I , a n d 3me S er.,
V ol. X ] ...................................................................................................................................................... 612

A n g lo -Ita lia n N e g o tia tio n s, 1912-4.

[A bsen ce of record ed con v ersation s b efore O ctob er 1912] ... ... ... ... 621
[C on versa tion s o f O ctob er 1913; c it in g G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I), D .D .F .,
3me S er., Vol. V I ] ........................................................................................................................... 639

V isit o f P rin c e H e n r y o f P ru ssia to E n gla n d , 1914.

[C itin g K a u ts k y D ocum ents'] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 658

M r. C hurchill’ s N a val P rop osals, 1914.

[C itin g S ieb er t, S ie b e r t-B e n c k e n d o r ff, Im peria lism u s, 1st S er., V ol. I ] ................ 739

B u sso-G erm a n T ension, M arch 1914.

[C itin g S ir G. B u ch a n a n : M y M ission to R ussia, G .P., X X X I X , A n ton J u x :
D e r K r ieg ss ch r eck en des F rü h ja h rs 191k in d er eu ropä isch en P resse,
Im peria lism u s, 1st S er., Vols. I —11] ................................................................................... 754
[C itin g S ieb er t] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 774

M. S a zon ov ’ s P rop osa l fo r A n g lo-F ra n co-R u ssia n C onsu lta tion , F eb ru a ry 1914.
[C itin g S ieb ert, D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. I X , G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X ( I ) ] ... ... 774-5

B u sso-T u rk ish R ela tion s, 1913-14.

[C itin g S t ie v e : D e r D ip lom a tisch e S ch riftw ech sel Isw olskis, and I sw olski und d er
W e lt k r i e g ; G ooch de T em p erley, V ol. X ( I ) ] ...................................................................... 779

V isit o f K in g G eorge V to P a ris, A p ril 1914.

[C it in g S ieb ert, Im peria lism u s, 1st S er., V ol. I I ] ...................................................................... 783
[C itin g S ieb ert, D .D .F ., 3m‘ S er., V ol. X ] ................................................................................... 788

A n g lo-B u ssia n N a val C on versa tion s, M a y -J u ly 1914.

[C itin g S ieb er t, D .D .F ., 3™ S er., V ol. X , Im peria lism u s, 1st S er., V ol. I l l ] ................ 790
[M e e tin g a t R ussian A d m ira lty , M a y 1914] ...................................................................... 797
[S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s S ta tem en t in the H ouse o f Com m ons, J u n e 11, 1 9 1 4 ] ................ 800-1
[R u m ou red con clu sion o f A n g lo-R u ssia n N a v al C onvention, J u n e 1914] ... ... 809
[S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s desire fo r d e la y ; v isit o f fleet to K ie l ; c itin g S ieb ert, S ir G.
B u c h a n a n : M y M ission to R u ssia ] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 812-3
K in g G eorge V ’ s L e t t e r to th e E m p ero r N ich olas 11, J u n e 16, 1914.
[G iv in g sou rce o f te x t and referen ce to Im peria lism u s, 1st S er., V ol. I l l ] 801

A n g lo -P ers ia n Oil A g r eem e n t.

[G iv in g te x t o f teleg ram to S ir G. B u ch an a n o f J u n e 25, 1914].......... .............................. 810

M. S a zon ov ’ s P la n fo r an A n g lo-B u ssia n -J a p a n cse G u a ra n tee, 1914.

[G iv in g e x tra ct from p riv a te letter from S ir A. N icolson to S ir G. B uchanan o f
J u ly 14, 1914] ............................................................................................................................ 821

J a pan and th e O utb rea k o f th e W ar.

[C itin g G ooch <£ T em p erley, V ol. X I ] .................................................................................... 823
[R e fe r r in g to m eetin g o f C abin et C ou n cil a t T ok io, A u g u st 8, 1 9 1 4 ] ................. ... 823

The A rab N a tio n a l M ov em en t.

[C itin g T e m p e rle y : E n g la n d and th e N e a r E a st. The C rim ea] ... ... ... 824
[R e fe r r in g to A rab Secret S ocietie s ] .................................................................................... 824-5
[R e fe r r in g to A ra b -S y ria n C ongress in P a ris, J u n e 1913] ............................................ 825

L ord K it c h e n e r and th e E m ir Abdullah.

[C itin g C a pta in L id d ell H a r t : “ T. E . L a w ren ce ” ] ... ... ... ... ... 826
[C itin g S ir G. A r t h u r : L ife o f K itc h e n e r , M r. G. A n ton iu s and S ir R on a ld S to rr s] 831
[A ck n ow led g in g help o f M r. G. A n to n iu s] ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 831

A z iz B e y and th e A ra b M ov em en t.
[R e fe r r in g to the tria l o f C olonel A ziz-el-M a sri in M a rch 1914] 8 32-3
 List of Abbreviations.
A. de P .................................... B ritish P a rlia m en ta ry P ap ers, A c cou n ts and P a p ers.

A itch iso n ... ... ... C. U. A itch is o n : T rea ties, E n g a g em en ts and Sanads (5th Ed., D elhi,
1933).

B .F .S . P ................................... B ritish and F o r e ig n S ta te P ap ers.

C ecil .............................. L ad y G w endolen Cecil : L ife o f P o b e r t, M a rquis o f S alisbury (4 vols.,

1921-32).

C ollected D ip lom a tie C ollected D ip lom a tic D ocu m en ts rela tin g to th e O utb rea k o f the
D ocu m en ts E u rop ea n W a r (1914).

D .D .F ....................................... D ocu m en ts D ip lom a tiq u es F ra n çais, 1871-1914.

G ooch & T em p erley ... B ritish D ocu m en ts on th e O rigins o f th e W ar, 1898-1914-

G .P ............................................ D ie G rosse P o litik d er E u rop ä isch en K a b in e tte , 1871-1914■

H e r t s le t : M a p o f A frica E. H e r ts le t: M a p of A fric a by T rea ty (3rd ed., 1909).

by T rea ty

Im p eria lism u s ................ D ie I n ter n a tio n a len B e zie h u n g en im Z e ita lte r des Im peria lism u s
(B erlin , 1931).

K a u ts k y D ocu m en ts ... O utb rea k o f th e W orld IFar. G erm an D ocu m en ts collected by

K . K a u ts k y (1924).

Ö .-U .A ...................................... Ö sterreich -U n ga rn s A u ssen p olitik , 1908-14■

P ari. D eb . ................. P a r lia m e n ta ry D eb a te s (H ou se o f Lords or H ou se o f Com m ons).

P oin ca re ... ... ... R . P o in c a r e : A u S erv ice de la F ra n ce (P a ris, 1926).

P rib ra m ... ... ... A. F . P r ib r a m : S ecr et T rea ties o f A u s tria -H u n g a ry (H a rv a rd F n i-

v crsity Press, 1920-1).

S ieb er t .............................. B. de S ie b e r t: E n te n te D ip lom a cy and th e W orld , edited, a rranged

and a n n ota ted by G. A. S ch rein er (N ew Y ork and L on don , 1921).
[T his is an E nglish tra n sla tion w ith the a d d ition o f a ch ron o­
logica l list o f docum ents by the A m erica n E d ito r o f D ip lo ­
m atisch e A k te n s tü c k e zu r G esch ich te d er E n te n te p o litik d er
V ork rieg sja h re (B erlin and L eip zig , 1921).]

S ieb ei t-B e n c h e n d o r ff ... This refers t o a new G erm an ed ition o f the above by H err von
S ieb ert, co n ta in in g a num ber o f addition s. It is en titled G raf
B cn ck en d orffs D ip lom a tisch er S ch riftw ech sel (B erlin and L eip zig ,
1928).

S t ie v e : D e r D ip lom a ­ F. S tie v e : D e r D ip lom a tisch e S ch riftw ech sel Isw olskis 1911-4
tisch e S ch riftw ech sel (B erlin , 1924).
Isw olskis

S tiev e : Isw olski und d er F. S tie v e : Isw olski und d er W e ltk r ie g (B erlin , 1924).
W e ltk rieg

T w e n ty -F iv e Y ea rs ... L ord G rey : T w e n ty -F iv e Y ears, 1892-1916 (2 vols., 1925).

 Minutes and Letters by King G eorge V.

LETTERS.

L e tte r to S ir E d w a rd G rey, D ecem b er 8, 1912, p. 658, N o. 452.

L e tte r to the E m p eror N ich ola s I I , J u n e 16, 1914, pp. 801-2, N o. 549.

M IN U T E S .

(A tta ch ed to the follow in g docum ents.)

No. 324. S ir E d w ard G rey to P rin ce L ichnow sky, J a n u a ry 11, 1913,p. 504.

N o. 333. S ir E d w a rd G rey to P rin ce L ich n ow sky, M a y 13, 1913, pp . 528, 530.

No. 454. S ir R . R o d d to S ir E d w a rd G rey, P riv a te , J a n u a ry 6, 1913, p. 663.

No. 455. S ir E d w a rd G rey to S ir R . R od d , P riv a te , J a n u a ry 13, 1913, p. 664.

N o. 480. S ir E. G oschen to S ir E d w a rd G rey, P riv a te , J u ly 3, 1913, p. 706
 x x iv

Names of W riters of Minutes.

B. A. = M r. (later S ir )B e ilb y F. A lston S en ior Clerk in F o re ig n Office, 1907-18; A c t in g

C ounsellor of Em bassy a t P ek in g , 1912, 1913,
1916-7; M in is te r at P e k in g , 1920-2; at Buenos
Aires, 1922-5; A m bassador at R io de J a n eiro,
1925-9.

F . D. A. M r. (later Sir) F ra n cis D. P arlia m en ta ry U n der-S ecre ta ry o f S ta te for

A cla nd F o re ig n A ffairs, 1911-5 ; F in a n cia l S ecretary to
the T reasury, 1915 ; S e creta ry to the B oa rd of
T ra de, 1915-6.

F . E. F. A M r. F . E. F. A dam .............. Clerk in F o re ig n Office, 1910-7; A c t in g 3rd

Secreta ry a t A thens, 1917-8; 1st S ecretary in
F oreig n Office, 1920-9; C ounsellor o f Em bassy at
L isb on , 1929-34; M in is ter and C onsul-G eneral at
P anam a, 1934— .

H . H . A. M r. H . H . A sq u ith (la ter 1st P rim e M in is te r and F ir s t L ord o f the T rea su ry,
E a rl o f O x ford and A squ ith ) 1908-16.

J . A. M r. (la ter Sir) J o h n A n d erson P erm a n en t U n d er-S ecreta ry of S ta te fo r the

C olonies, 1911-8.

E. A. C. M r. (later Sir) E y re Crow e ... S en ior Clerk in F o re ig n Offic *, 1906-12; A ssistant

U n der-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs,
191 2-20 ; P erm a n en t U n d e r-S ecreta ry , 1920-5.

G. R . C. = M r. (later Sir) G eorge R . C lerk C lerk in F oreig n Office, 1907-10; 1912-3; A c t in g

F irst S ecretary at C on stan tin op le, 1910-2;
S en ior C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1913-9; P riv a te
S ecreta ry to L o rd C urzon, 1919; M in ister at
P ra gu e, 1919-26; A m bassador a t A n g ora , 1926-33;
a t Brussels, 1933-4; a t P a ris, 1934-7.

W . S. C. = M r. W in ston S. C h u rch ill P a rlia m en ta ry U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r

C olonies, 1906-8; P re sid e n t o f B oa rd of T rade,
1908-10; S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r H om e A ffairs,
1910-1; F ir st L ord o f the A d m ira lty , 1 9 1 1 -5 ;
C h a n cellor o f the D u ch y o f L an caster, 1915-8 ;
S ecretary o f S ta te fo r W a r and fo r A ir, 1918-21 ;
Secreta ry of S ta te fo r th e C olonies, 1921-2 ;
C ha n cellor o f the E x ch eq u er, 1924-9.

D. T he 10th E a rl o f D rogh eda ... Clerk in F oreig n Office, 1907-14.

W . E. D. M r. (later Sir) W illia m E. L eg a l A d v iser to F o re ig n Office, 1886-1918.

D av id son , K .C .

E. G. S ir E d w a rd (later 1st V is ­ Secreta ry o f S ta te for F o re ig n A ffairs, D ecem ­

cou n t) G rey (of F allod on ) ber 1 1 ,1905-D ecem ber 11,1916.

A. H. = M r. (later Sir) A r th u r H ir t z e l S ecreta ry , P olitica l D ep a rtm en t, In d ia Office,

1909-17; A ssista n t U n d er-S ecreta ry of S ta te fo r
I n d ia , 1917-21; D e p u ty U n d er-S ecreta ry , 1921-4;
P erm a n en t U n d er-S ecreta ry , 1924-30.
 XXV

L. H. M r. L ew is (later 1st V iscou n t) S e creta ry o f S ta te fo r C olon ies, 1910-5.

H arcou rt

E. G. L. M r. E. G. L is t e r ............................ C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1899-1903; A c t in g 3rd

S e creta ry a t C on sta n tin op le and Sofia, 1903-5;
a t P aris, 1905-6; A ssista n t C lerk in F o re ig n
O ffice, 1907-13; tem p o r a r ily e m p loy ed in F o re ig n
O ffice, 1915-9.

W . L. M r. (la ter Sir) W a lte r L an g ley S en ior C lerk in F o re ig n O ffice, 1902-7; A ssista n t
U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F o re ig n A ffairs,
1907-18.

M. M r. (later 1st V isco u n t) M orley S e creta ry o f S ta te fo r In d ia , 1905-10, a n d M a r c h -

(o f B lack b u rn ) M a y , 1911; L o rd P re sid e n t o f th e C ou n cil,
1910-4; in ch a rg e o f F o re ig n Office, J u ly 1911,
A p r il 1913.

H . W . M. M r. (la ter Sir) H erbert W. E m p lo y e d in F o re ig n Office, 1 911-4; A c t in g 2nd

M a lk in , K .C . S e cr e ta r y in D ip lo m a tic S e rv ice , 1914; A ssista n t
L e g a l A d v ise r to F o re ig n O ffice, 1914-29; L ega l
A d v ise r to F o re ig n O ffice, 1929- .

L. M. M r. (la ter Sir) L ou is M a llet ... A s sis ta n t Clerk in F o re ig n Office, 1902-5; P riv a te
S ecreta ry to S ir E. G rey, 1905-6; S en ior C lerk,
1906-7; A ssista n t U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r
F o r e ig n A ffairs. 1907-13,1918-20; A m bassador a t
C on s ta n tin op le, 1913-4.

R . P. M. M r. R . P. M a x w ell ................ S en ior C lerk in F o re ig n O ffice, 1902-13.

W . M. M r. (later Sir) W illou g h b y C lerk in F o r e ig n Office, 1872-96; E d ito r o f B r itis h

R . D. M a y cock and F oreign , S ta te P a p ers, 1897-1903; S u p e r in ­
t e n d e n t o f th e T re a ty D e p a rtm e n t, 1903-13.

A. N. S ir A r th u r N icolson (later A m bassador a t M a d rid , 1905-6; A m b assa dor a t

1st B a ron C a rn ock of S t. P eterb u rg h , 1906-10; B r itish R e p re se n ta tiv e
C a rnock) a t C on feren ce of A lg ecira s , 1906; P e rm a n e n t
U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F o re ig n A ffairs.
1910-6.

H . N. M r. H. C. N orm an 2nd S ecreta ry a t St. P eterb u rg h , 1903-6; em p loy ed

in F o re ig n O ffice ,'1906-14 ; 1st S ecr e ta r y , 1907;
C ou n sellor o f Em bassy a t T o k io , 1914, 1915-8;
a t B u en os A ires, 1914-5 (som etim es C h a rg e
d ’ A ffa ire s); M in is te r a t T eh ra n a n d C onsul-
G en era l in P ersia, 1920-2.

0. T h e 5th E a rl o f Onslow A s sis ta n t P riv a te S e creta ry to S ir E. G rey ,

1909-10; C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1910-3; P riv a te
S e cr e ta r y to S ir A. N icolson , 1911-3; A ssista n t
C lerk, 1913-4.

L. 0 . M r. (la ter S ir) L a n c e lo t C lerk in F o re ig n O ffice, 1903-5; A c t in g 3rd S ecre­

O lip h a n t ta ry in D ip lo m a tic S e rv ice , 1905-16; A ssista n t
C lerk in F o re ig n O ffice, 1916-20; C ou n sellor,
192.1-8; A c t in g A ssista n t U n d er-S ecreta ry o f
S ta te fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1928-9; A ssista n t
U n d e r-S e cre ta ry , 1929-36; D e p u ty U n d er-S ecre-
t a r y , 1936- .
 xxvi

C. W .O . : M r. C. W . O rde ... . C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1909-20; 1st S ecretary,

1920-9; C ou n sellor, 1929- .

A. P. : M r. A. P a r k e r ... C lerk in F oreig n Office, 1906-12; A ssista n t C lerk,

191 2-7 ; L ib ra ria n , 1918-9.

E. P. : Mr. E. P arkes ............................. In L ib ra ria n ’s D ep a rtm en t, F o re ig n O ffice, 19f 5 -1 4 ;

A ssista n t, 1914-8 ; A c t in g L ib ra ria n a n d K e e p e r
o f th e P ap ers, 1918-9.

F. W . P. : M r. F. W . P em b er ... ... T em p ora ry A ssista n t L eg a l A d v iser to F o re ig n

Office, 1912-3.

C. R . = M r. (la ter S ir) C laud F . W . 1st S ecreta ry at B u en os A yres, 1908-11 ; a t M a d rid ,

R ussell 1910-3; em p loy ed in F o re ig n Office, 1913-4;
C ou n sellor a t A th en s, 1918-20; M in is te r in
A b yssinia , 1920-5; a t B ern e, 1928-31; Am bassa­
d or a t L isbon, 1931-5.

H . J. s. = M r. H . J . S ev m ou r ... ... Clerk in F o re ig n Office, 1908-14; A c t in g 3rd S e c r e ­

ta ry a t W a sh in gton , 1914-9; in F o re ig n Office,
1 91 9-23 ; 1st S ecreta ry a t th e H a g u e, 1923-5;
a t R om e, 1925-7; C ou n sellor in F o re ig n Office,
1929-32 ; P riv a te S ecreta ry to S ecreta ry o f
S ta te, 1932-5.

R . S. = M r. (la ter Sir) R ow la n d A ssista n t C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1907-13; S en ior

S p e r lin g C lerk, 1913-9; A ssista n t S ecreta ry , 1919-24 ;
M in is te r a t B erne, 1924-7; a t Sofia, 1928-9; at
H elsin g fors, 1930-5.

J . A. C. T. = M r. (la ter Sir) J oh n T illey S en ior C lerk in F o re ig n O ffice, 1910-3 ; C h ief

C lerk, 1913-9 ; A c t in g A ssista n t U n d er-S ecre­
ta ry o f S ta te, 1919; A s sis ta n t S ecreta ry , 1919-21;
A m bassador a t R io de J a n e iro , 1921-6; a t T o k io ,
1926-31.

W . T. = M r. (later S ir W illia m , la te r S e n io r C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1907-18; P riv a te

1st B a ron ) T y r re ll (of A v on ) S ecreta ry to S ir E. G rey, 1907-15; A ssista n t
U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F o re ig n A ffairs,
1918-25; P erm a n en t U n d er-S ecreta ry , 1925-8;
A m bassador a t P a ris, 1928-34.

G. H . V . = M r. G. H . V illie r s C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1903-7; A c t in g 3rd S e cr e

ta ry in D ip lo m a tic S e rv ice , 1907-13; A ssista n t
C lerk in F oreig n Office, 1913-21; C ou n sellor in
F o re ig n Office, 1921-9.

R . G . V. = M r. (later S ir) R ob ert G. C lerk in F o re ig n Office, 1911-3; J u n io r C lerk,

V a n s itta r t 1913-4; A ssista n t Clerk, 1914-20; C ounsellor o f
Em bassy, 1920; A ssista n t S ecreta ry, 1920-8;
A ssista n t U n der-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n
Affairs, 1928-30; P erm a n en t U n der-S ecreta ry ,
1930-7 ; C h ief D ip lo m a tic A d v ise r to the F oreig n
Office, 1938- .
 LIST OF DOCU M EN TS.

Chapter XCI.

The Bagdad Railway, 1 9 1 0 -1 2 .

No. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

1910
1 From, S ir G. L ow th er 22 Aug. C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P asha : T u rk ish I
(Iiecd. 29 A u g .) claim to Zakh n u n iyeh . Y ou n g T u rk
p olicy in M esop ota m ia and the P ersia n '
G u lf; B ritish in terests in th a t reg ion ... I

2 F rom S ir F. B ertie (T el ) 6 Oct. M . P ic h o n ’ s in form a tion of G erm an

(R eed . 7 O ct.) w a rn in g to T u rk ey on B a g d a d R a ilw a y
question. ( M i n . ) ............................................ 7

3 F rom M r. M a rlin g . 23 N ov. S ir W . W illco ck s’ s proposal fo r co n s tru c­

(R eed . 28 N ov .) tio n o f B a g d a d -B a s r a ra ilw ay ... ... 7

4 20 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P ash a : B a g d a d

( R c cd . 28 D ec.) R a ilw a y ; G erm an a ttitu d e ................. 8

5 29 D ec. F u r th e r c o n v e rs a tio n : a rm s-sm u g glin g in

(R eed . 3 Jan., R e d Sea. (31 i n . ) .............................. ... 9
1911.)

1911.
4 Jan. C on v ersa tion b etw een S ir H . B a b in g to n
(R eed . 9 J an.) S m ith and H a k k i P a s h a : N a tion a l
B a n k o f T u r k e y ; B a g d a d R a il w a y ;
qu estion of K ow eit. E nclosin g m em o­
ra n d u m by S ir H . B a b in g to n Sm ith.
(M in .) .........................................................

To In d ia Office ... 21 J an . F orw a rd in g N o. 6 ; S ir E. G rey ’ s p o lic y ...

F rom S ir G. L ow th er 23 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P a s h a : A n g lo -

(R eed. 30 J an.) T u rk ish r e la tio n s ; B a g d a d R a ilw ay .
(.M in .) ,

To S ir G. L ow th er 24 J an . C o n v e rsa tio n b etw een Tew fik P asha and

S ir A. N ic o ls o n : p roposed n e g otia tion s
ab ou t B a g d a d R a i l w a y ..............................

To S ir F. B ertie 6 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l C a m b o n :

B a g d a d and oth er ra ilw a y s ; p osition
j o f R u ssia ... ... ... ... ...

11 F rom S ir G. L o w th er (T el.) 7 Feb.

m ent an d B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany.
(3Iin.) ......................................................... 21
12 (T el.) 14 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P asha : sam e
” ’’ subject. (31 in.) ........................................... 22
13 To S ir G. Buchanan 15 F eb. C o n v e rsa tio n w ith C ou n t B en ck en d orff :
sam e su b ject ... ... ... ... 23
14 F rom S ir G. L ow th er (T el.) 1 M ar. R ifa a t P a sh a ’ s proposals : form a tion of
(R eed . 2 31ar.) new B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y ... 24
15 » ,, 1 M ar. E n closin g m em orandum from R ifa a t
(R eed . 6 M a r.) P a s h a : T urkish proposals. T ex t. (31 in.) 25
 x x v iii

No Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

| *
! 1911.
16 To S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 3 M ar. Sam e s u b je ct: en q u iry re G erm an a tti­
tu de ... ... ... ... ... ... 28

17 F rom S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 5 M ar. R e p ly to N o. 16. ( M i n . ) .............................. 28

IB To S ir G. L ow ther (Tel.) 9 M ar. B ritish a ttitu d e to proposals o f O ttom an

G overn m en t ... ... ... ... 29

19 F rom S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 10 M ar. E n q u iry as to form o f B ritish com m u n i­

ca tion to T urkey. (M in .) ................ 30

20 F rom S ir E. G oschen 10 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H err von B ethm ann
(R eed . IS M ar.) H ollw eg : S ir E . G rey ’ s speech in H ouse
of Com m ons on Bagdad R a ilw ay ;
1 fa v ou ra ble reception in G erm any ... 31

21 To S ir G. L ow ther (Tel.) 11 M ar. In str u ctio n to m ake w ritten com m u n ica ­

tion to the P o rte re B a g d a d R a ilw a y ... 32

22 F ro m S ir G. L ow th er ... 13 M ar. E nclosin g n ote com m u n ica ted to the

(R eed . 20 M ar.) P orte. (M in .) ........................................... 32

23 22 M ar. F orw a rd in g cop ies o f con v en tion s between

(R eed . 27 M a r.) O ttom an G overnm ent and B agdad
! R a ilw a y C om pany re (i) H e lif B agdad
sections (ii) A lexa n d retta -O sm a n ie
bra n ch (iii) A lex a n d retta port. (M in.) 34

24 To S ir F . B e r tie ... 28 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l Cam bon and

S ir A. N icolson : R u sso-F ren ch G roup
and railw ay con cession s; B ritish tra d e 37

25 F rom L ord H a rd in g e to 29 M ar. B a g d a d R a ilw a y ; K o w e it and the P ersian

S ir A. N icolson (P riv a te ) G u lf; m a in ten a n ce o f B ritish p re­
dom in a n ce ... ... ... ... ... 38

26 To S ir G. L ow th er 2 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith Tewfik P asha : Turkish

p rop os a ls; delay in B ritish rep ly ... 38

27 F rom S ir F . B ertie (Tel.) 13 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M . C ru p p i : B a g da d

(R eed . 14 M a y) R a ilw a y question. (M in .) ................ 39

28 14 M a y S am e c o n v e rs a tio n : affa irs o f T u r k e y ;

(R eed . 16 M a y) G erm an in fluen ce at th e P orte. (M in.) 40

29 To S ir F. B ertie (Tel.) 16 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :

affairs o f T u r k e y ; den ia l o f n eg otia ­
tion s w ith B erlin ... ... ... ... 41

30 To Sir E. G osch en... 18 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M ettern ich :

Bagdad R a ilw a y C oncession ; equal
trea tm en t fo r all tra d e ... ... ... 42

31 To S ir F . B ertie ... 25 M ay In str u ctio n to in form M. C ru p p i o f desire

fo r F ra n co-B ritish u n d ersta n d in g re
T urkish a ffairs ........................................... 42

32 F rom S ir F . B ertie 28 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M . C ru p p i : same

(R eed . SO M a y) sub ject ........................................... _ ... 43

33 17 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M . d e Selves : same

” ” sub ject : ob stru ctiv e m ethods o f O tto­
(R eed . 21 J u ly)
m an B a n k ........................................................ 43

E d. N o t e ................ 26 J u ly M in u te by M r. P a r k e r : d r a ftin g o f
N o. 34 ........................................................ 45

34 C om m u n ication to Tewfik 29 J u ly R ep ly to proposals o f M a rch 1 from

P asha O ttom an G overn m en t (v. No. 15). T ex t 45
 xxix

No. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

Ed. N o t e .............................. Sept. 1901 A n g lo-T u rk ish arra n gem en t o f S eptem ­

ber 1901 re K o w e it .............................. 49

1911.
35 To S ir R . R o d d ................ 18 A u g . C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :
T u rk ish Custom s dues ; b orrow in g
pow ers o f E g y p t ... ... ... ... 49

36 F rom S ir G. L ow th er ... 18 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha : B ritish

(D eed . 28 A u g .) cou n ter-p rop osals o f J u ly 29 (v. N o. 34) 50

37 To S ir G. L o w th e r................ 28 A u g . C on v ersa tion b etw een Ism ail H a k k i B ey

an d M r. M a llet : new rég im e in
T u r k e y ; q u estion o f P ersia n G u lf ... 51

38 F rom S ir G. L ow th er ... 26 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith Assim B ey : B ritish

( D eed . 4 D ec.) cou n ter-p rop osa ls o f J u ly 29 (v. N o. 34) 52

39 M em oran dum by S ir H. 11 D ec. C on v ersa tion s w ith S a ïd P asha, Assim

B a b in g ton Sm ith B ey, D ja v id B ey ; questions un d er dis­
cussion w ith B ritish G overnm ent.
(M in .) ......................................................... 53
1912.
40 To S ir G. L o w th e r ................ 23 Jan. C on v ersa tion betw een Tewfik P asha and
S ir A. N icolson : delay in T urkish rep ly
t o B ritish cou n ter-p rop osals (v. N o. 34) 55

41 F rom S ir G. L ow th er ... 12 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith Assim B ey : sam e

(D eed . 19 F eb .) s u b je c t; T urkish reasons fo r delay ... 55

42 To S ir G. L o w th e r................ 14 F eb. C on v ersa tion b etw een Tew fik P asha and
S ir A. N ico ls o n : L o rd H a ld a n e ’ s v isit
t o B erlin ; G u lf sections o f B a g d a d
R a ilw a y ......................................................... 56

43 To S ir G. B uch an a n (Tel.) 26 M ar. In s tr u c tio n to ask M . S a zon ov unofficially

a bou t R u ssia n in terest in B a g d a d -G u lf
section ... ... ... ... ... 56

44 F rom S ir G. B uchanan 27 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M . S a zon ov : sam e

(Tel.) su b ject ; p osition o f G erm any an d tra n s-
P ersia n line. (M in .) ... ... ... 57

45 To S ir G. B uch an a n ... 4 A p r. In s tr u c tio n to in form M . Sa zon ov unoffi­

cia lly : sam e su b ject ... ... ... 58

46 F rom S ir G. B uchanan 13 A pr. R eq u est to aw a it official com m u n ica tion

(Tel.) fo r M . S azonov r e n eg otia tion s w ith
T u rk ey ......................................................... 59

47 C om m u n ication from T ew - 15 A p r. T urkish rep ly to B ritish cou n ter-p rop osals

fik P asha o f J u ly 29, 1911 (v. N o. 34). T ex t.
(M in .) ......................................................... 59

48 M r. P a r k e r to D jev a d B ey 18 A p r. Sam e s u b j e c t ......................................................... 66

(P riv a te )

49 D jev a d B ey to M r. P a rk er 20 A p r. Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 66

(P riv a te )

50 M in u te by S ir A. H irtz e l 24 A p r. C om m en tin g on T u rk ish rep ly ... ... 67

and M r. P a rk er

51 C om m u n ication to Tew - 10 M a y S am e s u b je ct; q uestions a risin g ... ... 73

fik P asha

52 M em oran d u m by M r. 11 M a y Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 74

P a rk er

53 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 25 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron von M arschall :

B a g d a d R a ilw a y ; T u rk ish claim s for
con cession s; G erm an o p in ion ... ... 75
 XXX

N o. Name M a in Sub ject.

1912.
54 To L o rd G ra n v ille... 4 Ju ly F u r th e r co n v e rs a tio n : term inus of
B a g d a d R a ilw ay at B asra ... ... 76

55 To Tewfik Pasha ... 18 J u ly E nclosing B ritish rep ly to proposals by

O ttom an G overn m en t' on A p ril 15
(v . N o. 47). D ra fts o f C on v en tion s re
A sia tic R a ilw ays, N a v ig a tio n o f S lia tt-
el-A ra b ; K o w eit ; M ohainm erah F ron -
l tier. T e x t s ......................................................... 76

56 To M r. M a rlin g ... 18 J u ly I C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A . N icolson and I

Tewfik P asha : sam e su b ject ................ 87

To S ir F. B ertie ... 20 Sept. C on v ersa tion be'tween M . P a u l Cam bon

a nd S ir A. N icolson : F ren ch p a rtici-
p a tio n in B a g d a d R a ilw a y

58 F rom S ir G. L ow th er 23 D ec. C on versa tion w ith Assim B e y : unofficial

(R eed . 28 D ec .) request to hasten rep ly to B ritish
m em orandum o f J u ly 18 (v. N o. 55).
(M in .) .........................................................

Chapter XCII.

The Bagdad Railway. Negotiations with Hakki Pasha,

February-July 29, 1913.

1913.
59 F rom S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 10 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith M a hm ud Shevket
P asha : H a k k i P a sh a ’ s visit to L on d on 90

S ir L. M a llet to H akki 26 F eb. N a v ig a tio n of rivers o f M esopota m ia ... 90

Pasha

1846. . . . .
Ed. N o te ... 5 F e b .-2 A p r. C om m u n ica tion s betw een S ir S tra tfo r d
C a n n in g and the P o r t e .............................. 92

1913.
To B oa rd of T ra de 3 M ar. N eg otia tion s w ith H a k k i P asha : T urkish
Custom s ta riff ........................................... 93

C om m u n ication from 9 A p r. C ou n ter-d ra ft o f A r tic le 1 of A sia tic

H a k k i Pasha R a ilw a y s C on v en tion ... ... ... 94

1 M ay P rop osed am endm ents o f te x ts o f D ecla ra ­

tion on M oham m erah fr o n t ie r ; S h a tt-
el-A ra b and A s ia tic R a ilw a y s con v en ­
tion s ... ... ... ... ... ... 95

1 M ay T urkish Custom s dues ... 96

To S ir E. G osch en... 3 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith P r in c e L ichnow sky :

B ritish p a rticip a tio n in B a g d a d R a il­
way from B a g d a d to B asra and beyond
B asra ... ... ... ... ...

M in u te by M r. P a rk er ... 7 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith H err v on K ü h lm a n n :

B agdad R a ilw a y ; T u rk ish finance ;
riv er n a v ig a tion in M esopotam ia.
1 (M in .) ........................................................

C om m u n ication from H err 7 M ay A g reem ents re financial con trol of the

v on K ü h lm a n n B a g d a d R a ilw a y m ade on M a rch 7 and
21, 1911 ........................................................
 xxxi

No. I Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1913.
To S ir G. L ow ther. 8 M ay E nclosing d r a ft con v en tion s and d ecla ra ­
tions re la tin g to (1) th e T u rco-P ersia n
fr o n tie r , (2) R a ilw ay s in A sia M in or,
(3) P ersian G ulf, (4) N a v ig a tio n o f
S h a tt-el-A ra b , in itia lled on M a y 6, 1913 10O
Ed. N o t e ................ 3 M ay M em oran d u m by S ir L. M a llet and S ir A.
H i r t z e l: sam e subject. ( M i n . )................. 114

M in u te by M r. P a rk er 9 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n :

in fo rm a tio n from S a id R u ete. E n clos­
ing m em orandum re riv er n a v ig a tio n ...
118
70 C om m u n ication from M. 13 M ay T urkish fin a n ce; con d ition s p u t forw a rd
de F leu ria u ... ... by F ra n ce fo r im p osition o f ce r ta in
taxes. (M in .) ........................................... 119

71 M in u te by M r. P a r k e r ... 13 M a y C on v ersa tion betw een H akki P asha,

S ir H . L lew ellyn Sm ith, S ir A. H i r t z e l:
n a v ig a tion q u e s t io n ; E g y p tia n b orrow ­
in g p ow ers; T u rco-P ersia n fron tier.
E nclosing d r a ft d ecla ra tion . (M in .) 121

F rom S ir E. Goschen ... 15 M a y A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s : G erm an

(R eed . 17 M a y) press com m ents ... ... 122

F rom S ir F. B e r tie ... 16 M a y Sam e s u b je ct: F ren ch press com m ents 123
(R eed . 17 M a y)

F rom M r. O ’ B eirn e (Tel.) 17 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith M. S azonov: sam e

su b ject ... ... ... ... .., 123

To M r. O ’ B eirn e (Tel.) 20 M a y S am e s u b je c t : no qu estion o f British

finan cial a dv an ce to T u rk ey a p a rt from
other P ow ers ... ... ... .., 124

F rom S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 21 M ay O il concessions. (M in .) .............................. 125

To S ir F . B ertie ................ 21 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M . P au l C am bon and

C ou n t B e n c k e n d o r ff: sta tu s quo in
P ersian G u lf .............................. ... 125

M in u te by M r. P a rk er ... 21 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n :

deta ils o f B a g d a d R a ilw a y q u e s tio n ;
G erm an proposals. (M in .) ................ 126

To S ir E. G osch en ................. 23 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith H err v on K iih lm a n n :

agreem en t w ith H a k k i P a s h a ; G erm an
proposals ........................................... ... 128

C om m u n ication from 24 M a y S u g gested form o f rep ly to p oin ts 4 and 5

H a k k i P asha o f T u rk ish M em orand um o f M a y 1
(v. N o. 6 4 ) ......................................................... 130

To S ir F . B ertie ... 28 M a y C o n v e rsa tio n w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :

S ir E. G rey ’ s con v ersation w ith H err
von K iih lm a n n on M a y 23 (v. N o. 7 9 );
F ra n co-G erm a n con v ersation s in P a ris 130

To S ir E . G osch en... 29 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n :

discussions w ith F ra n ce and R u ssia re
B a g d a d R a i l w a y ........................................... 131

F rom M r. O ’ B eirne 29 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith M. S a z o n o v : A n g lo-

(R eed . 2 J u n e) T u rk ish n eg otia tion s. ( M i n . ) ................. 131

F rom S ir E. G oschen 31 M a y Sam e s u b je c t : qu estion in R e ic h s t a g ;

(R eed . 2 J u n e) rep ly by H e r r v on J a g ow ... ... 132
 x x x ii

No. Name. M ain S ubject. Page

1913.
85 To S ir F . B ertie ... 2 June C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :
F in a n cia l C om m ission in P a r is ; F ren ch
desire fo r a greem ent w ith G erm any re
B a g d a d R a i l w a y ........................................... 133

86 To S ir E. G osch en... 2 June C on versa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky :

A n g lo-T u rk ish n e g o tia tio n s ; finan cial
questions. E nclosing w ord in g proposed
fo r A nglo-G erm a n a greem en t re B a g da d
R a ilw a y ... ... ... ... ... 133

87 |C om m u n ication from M. 2 Ju n e F rench con d ition s fo r finan cial a id to

P a u l Cam bon T urkey. (M in.) ........................................... 134

88 To S ir G. L ow th er (Tel.) 6 Ju n e Sam e s u b j e c t ........................................................ 135

89 To In d ia Office and B oard 6 June E nclosing com m u n ication from H err von
1 o f Trade K iihlm a nn on J u n e 4 r e B a g d a d R a il­
way n eg otia tion s ; d r a ft A n glo-G erm an
d ecla ra tion on same subject and o f
cov erin g m em orandum ... ... ... 136

90 To In d ia Office ................ 6 June P rop osed a d d ition a l clause fo r P ersian

G u lf C on ven tion (v. N o. 92). (M in.) ... 140
91 M in u te by M r. P a rk er ... 7 June C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce Lichnow sky,
H e r r von K iihlm a nn, H err G w inner :
T urco-G erm a n n eg otia tion s. (M in .) ... 142

92 C om m unication from 10 J u n e D ra ft a d d ition a l a rticle re ex tra d ition

H a k k i P asha fo r P ersian G u lf con v en tion (v. N o. 90).
(M in .) ........................................................ 144

93 N ote by C a pta in (S ir 10 J u n e Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 146
1 A rn old ) W ilson

94 C om m u n ication from 10 June. P rop osed B ritish N ote in pla ce o f d ra ft

H a k k i P asha o f J u n e 5. E n closin g te x t ... 148

95 M in u te by M r. P a r k e r ... 11 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i Pasha : m od i­

fications in tex ts o f A n g lo-T u rk ish
agreem ents. (M in .) ... ... 151

96 C om m u n ication to H akki 13 Ju n e I rrig a tio n in M e s o p o t a m ia ................ 153

Pasha
■
97 M in u te by M r. P a r k e r ... 13 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L. M allet and
H a k k i P asha : in itia llin g o f d r a ft note
! (v. N o. 9 5 ) ......................................................... 154

To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 14 J u n e E nclosing d r a ft annex to A nglo-G erm an

agreem en t re B a g d a d R a i l w a y ................ 155

C om m u n ication from 14 J u n e R ussian suggestion s fo r a d d ition to

C ou n t B en ck en dorff decla ra tion re T u rco-P ersia n fr o n tie r
(v. N o. 6 8 ) ........................................................ 155

100 To S ir G. B u chanan (Tel.) 17 J u n e Sam e subject. C om m u n ica tion o f d r a ft

o f S lia tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion to C ount
B en ck en dorff ... ... ... ... 156

101 To In d ia Office .... 17 J u n e P rop osal to in form Sheik o f K o w e it of

d r a ft a greem ent w ith T u rk ey and to
con fer hon ou r on Sheik o f M oham m erah 157

102 To M. Paul Cam bon ; 18 J u n e C om m u n ication o f C on v en tion and D ecla ­

C ou n t B en ck en d orff ; ra tion s r e R a ilw ay s in A sia M in or and
P rin ce L ichnow sky N a v ig a tion o f T ig ris and E u p h ra tes
(v. N o. 6 8 ) ........................................................ 157

103 ! To C ount B en ck en dorff ... ! 19 J u n e R ep ly to com m u n ica tion o f J u n e 14

(v .' N o. 9 9 ) ........................................................ 159
 x x x iii

No. Name. D ate. M a in Subject.

1913.
104 F rom S ir G. L ow th er (T el.) 25 J u n e F orw a rd in g teleg ram from B a g d a d : im ­
p orta n ce o f preserv in g B ritish postal
offices in M e s o p o t a m i a ..............................

105 To M . P a u l Cam bon and 25 J u n e B ritish readiness to g iv e u n d erta k in g

i C ou n t B en ck en d orff sim ilar to th a t g iv en b y R u ssia in
A rt. 3 o f P otsda m A g reem en t ... ... 161

106 E x tra ct from The T im es... 2 J u ly H err von Jagow ’s co n tr a d ic tio n of

rum oured G erm an ren u n cia tion of
na vig a tion rights in th e river T ig ris.
(M in .) ............................................................. 161

107 M in u te b y M r. P a rk er ... 2 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von K iih lm a n n :

q uestions arisin g on A n g lo-T u rk ish
D ra ft C on v en tion re A s ia tic R a ilw a y s.,
(M in .) ............................................................. 162

108 To S ir E. G osch en... 3 J u ly ( Conversation w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky :

im p ossib ility o f d ela yin g sign a tu re of
A n g lo-T u rk ish C onven tion s p en d in g
A n g lo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s ... ... 164

109 (Comm unication 3 J u ly C o u n te r-d ra ft o f e x tra d itio n clause for

H a k k i Pasha K o w e it (v. Nos. 9 2 -3 ) .............................. 164

110 C om m unication from M. 3 J u ly P re cis o f telegram from M . P ic h o n re

P a u l Cam bon con versation s w ith H e r r H elfferich ;
F ren ch and G erm an econ om ic in terests
in A s ia tic T u rk ey ... ... ... ... 164

To M r. M a rlin g 4 J u ly E nclosin g com m u n ica tion from P rin ce

L ichnow sky : G erm an desire fo r tele­
g ra p h ic com m u n ica tion s viâ P ersian
G u lf or P ersia across T u rk ey ... ...

112 To S ir W . T ow n ley ... 4 J u ly S am e su b ject : la n d -lin e across P ersian

t e rr ito ry ... ... ... ... ... 166

113 S ir A . N icolson to M . P a u l 4 J u ly A n g lo-G erm a n and F ra n co-G erm an n eg o­

Cam bon t ia tion s re B a g d a d R a ilw a y ... ... 167

114 M em oran d u m by M r. 5 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n ;

P a rk er n a v ig a tion o f T ig r is ; co n d itio n s on
w hich H e r r B a llin w ou ld not opp ose
m on opoly ... ... ... ... . . . ' 167

115 To M . P a u l Cam bon 7 J u ly C on d ition s o f F ren ch fiscal and finan cial

a ssistance to T u rkey ... ... ... 168

116 M . P a u l C am bon to S ir A. 9 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M r. P a r k e r : F ra n co ­

N icolson (P riv a te) (B red . 11 J u ly) G erm an n eg otia tion s re econ om ic
in terests in T urkey. E nclosin g n ote on
con feren ces b etw een M . de L a m orn a ix
and H e r r H elfferich . (M in .) ................. 169

117 M em oran d u m by M r. 16 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n :

Parker G erm an co u n te r -d ra ft o f A n g lo-G erm a n
D eclaration . (M in .) ...............................172
118 F rom P rin ce L ichnow sky. 16 J u ly E nclosing new d r a ft o f A nglo-G erm a n
(R eed . 21 J u ly) D ecla ra tion and o f ex p la n a tory n ote ... 174

119 M in u te by M r. P a rk er . 17 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha and L o rd

ln ch ca p e : n a v ig a tion concession ; oil
q uestion ... ... ... ... ... 179
120 F rom S ir G. B u chanan 26 J u ly Sum m ary o f a id e-m ém oire from M. Sazo-
(T el.) (R eed . 27 J u ly) nov : T u rco-I’ ersian fr o n tie r ; proposed
com m ission fo r n a vig a tion o f S h a tt-
e l-A r a b ; in d ica tion of am endm ents
desired ............................................................. 180
[10900]
 xxxiv

No. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

1913.
121 To S ir G. B uchanan (T el.) 28 J u ly Sam e s u b je c t : com m ents on proposed
am endm ents ... ... ... ... 181

122 To L ord G ra n v ille... ... 28 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ic h n o w s k y :

p oin ts a t issue in F ra n co-G erm an neg o­
tia tion s ... ... ... ... ... 182

123 To M r. M a rlin g ................ 29 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha a fter

sign atu re of a g r e e m e n ts: T urkish
a ction in T h r a c e ........................................... 183

124 A n glo-T urkish A g reem en t 29 J u ly C ollection of D ocu m en ts sign ed on

J u ly 29. 1913, by S ir E d w a rd G rey and
H a k k i P asha. T ex ts .............................. 183

Chapter XCIII.
The Bagdad Railway, August to December, 1913.

1913.
125 To M r. M a rlin g (T el.) 1 Aug. Sh a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion : A nglo-G erm a n
n e g o tia tio n s ; R u ssia n ob jection s ... 199

126 To S ir G. B u chanan (T el.) 1 A ug. Sam e su b je ct: suggested represen ta tions

to M . S a zon ov ... ... ... ... 199

127 To M r. M a rlin g (T el.) 2 A ug. R iv e r a in C om m ission : en q u iry as to

v io la tio n o f ca p itu la to ry rig h ts ... 200
128 F rom S ir G. B u chanan 3 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith M . S a zon ov : same
(T el.) su b je ct; answ er to follow ... ... 200
129 F ro m M r. M a rlin g (T el.) 6 A ug. C on v ersa tion s w ith M . de G iers and
M . M in orski : same su b ject ... ... 201
130 F rom S ir G. B uchanan 7 A ug. Sam e su b ject : a id e-m ém oire com m u n i­
(T el.) ca ted by R ussian M in is try fo r F oreig n
A ffairs ......................................................... 201
131 To S ir G. B uch an a n (T el.) 8 A ug. Sam e su b ject : com m ents on R ussian
ob jection s ... ... ... ... ... 202

132 „ „ (T el.) 9 A ug. Sam e su b ject : com m ents on R ussian

aid e-m ém oire o f A u g u st 7 (v. No. 130) 203

133 A n g lo-T u rkish C on v en tion 12 A u g . T ex t in itia lled in L on d on , A u g u st 12,

con cern in g A sia tic R a il­ 1 9 1 3 .......................................................... ... 203
ways
134 M in u te by M r. P a r k e r ... 13 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von- K ü h lm a n n
and H a k k i P asha : p roposed m eetin g
w ith H err von G w in n e r ; F ra n co ­
G erm an n eg otia tion s ... ... ... 206

135 C om m u n ication to M . de 14 Aug. M em oran dum on F ra n co-G erm an nego­

F leu ria u t ia tion s (v. N o. 116) ... ... ... 207

136 M in u te b y M r. P a r k e r ... 15 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha : F ra n co ­

G erm an, F ra n co-T u rk ish , R usso-T urk ish
neg otia tion s ... ... ... ... 209

137 |M in u te by M r. P a rk er ... 18 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith M. de F leu ria u : same

subject. (M in .) ........................................... 210

138 C om m u n ication from M. 19 A ug. ; F ran co-G erm an n eg otia tion s (v. N o. 116) 211
de F leu ria u
 XXXV

No. Name. D ate. M a in Subject. j P age

1913.
139 M in u te b y M r. P a rk er 19 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith I la k k i Pasha : T urkish
position at A d ria n op le ; n eg otia tion s re
B a gda d R a ilw a y ; o il concession in
A lesopotam ia. E nclosin g te x t o f su p ple­
m en ta ry d ecla ra tion rc concession fo r
n a v ig a tion o f T ig ris and E u p h ra tes ...

140 „ ■■■ 20 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith H err von K ü h lm a n n :

M esopota m ia n oil co n cession ; rights
u n d er B a g d a d R a ilw a y C on v en tion of
1903 ... ^............. ‘ .................................. 214

141 F rom S ir G. B uchanan 24 Aug. Substance. . o f R ussian a id e-m ém oire

(Tel.) resp ectin g the S h a tt-el-A ra b .................

142 To S ir G. B uchanan (Tel.) 26 A ug. Sam e subject : com m ents on R ussian

a id e-m em oire ... ... ... ...

143 From, S ir F . B ertie ... 27 A ug. S ta tem en t published in the T em ps:

(1 feed. 20 A u g .) F ra n co-G ern ja n n e g o tia tio n s ; T u rk ish
loa n to he raised in P a ris ... ... 217

144 M in u te b y M r. P a rk er ... 27 A u g . C on v ersa tion w ith AE de F le u r ia u :

F ra n co-G erm an n eg otia tion s. (M in .)... 218

145 M. de F leu ria u to M r. 29 A ug. E n closin g m em orandum on sam e su b ject 219

P arker (P riv a te)

146 M in u te b y M r. P a rk er . 29 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith H err von K iih lm a n n :

B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft o f A n g lo-G erm a n

147 H err v on K ü h lm a n n to 30 Aug. P erson a l view s on th e S h a tt-el-A ra b

M r. P a rk er ( Ttccd. 1 S ep t.) C onven tion . E n closin g sta tem ent from
. H a m b u rg -A m e rica lin e ... ... ... 223

148 M in u te by M r. P a rk er 2 Sept. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iih lm a n n :

B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft o f A n g lo-G erm a n
C o n v e n tio n ; F ra n co-G erm an n e g o tia ­
tions. E n closin g t e x t o f A r ticle 6 of
B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft ... ... ...

149 F rom M r. M a rlin g (Tel.) 3 Sept. T urkish ju risd ictio n over for e ig n e rs com ­
m ittin g breaches o f p o r t reg u la tion s ... 226

150 C om m u n ication from M. 3 Sept. F ra n co-G erm an n e g otia tion s (v. N o. 135) 228
de F leu ria u

151 To M r. M a rlin g (Tel.) ’ 5 Sept. C on v ersation w ith H a k k i P a s h a : form ula

fo r n ote to he ex ch a n g ed betw een G reat
B rita in and T u rk ey re S h a tt-el-A ra b
N a v ig a tio n ... ... ... ... ... 229

152 C om m u n ication to M . de 17 Sept. F ra n co-G erm an n e g o t ia t io n s : com m ents

F leu ria u on F ren ch com m u n ica tion s (i>. Nos. 145
a nd 150) ............................................... 230

153 C om m u n ication from M. 18 Sept. F ra n co-T u rk ish a greem en t re railw ays in 1

de F leu ria u A s ia tic T u rk ey , sign ed in P aris, S ep­
tem ber 11, 19i3. T ext. (M in .) ... 231

154 C om m u n ication to H err 18 Sept. R ev ised B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft o f A n g lo-

von K ü h lm a n n G erm an C onven tion . T ex t. (v. N o.
I ’ 1 1 8 ) ................................................................. 234

155 A n g lo-T u rkish C on v en tion 21 Oct. S u p p lem en ta ry con v en tion e x te n d in g

re P ersian G u lf da te o f ra tifica tion ... 241

Ed. n o te 21 Oct. S u p p lem en ta ry d ecla ra tion to S h a tt-el-

A ra b R iv e r a in C on v en tion sa feg u a rd ­
in g righ ts o f n a tion a ls o f certa in
P ow ers und er ex istin g T r e a t ie s ... ... 242
[10900] c 2
 xxxvi

N o. Nam e. D ate. M ain Subject. Page

1913.
156 From, H e r r von K ühlm ann 3 N ov. G erm an co u n te r-d ra ft o f A nglo-G erm an
(R eed . 7 N ov.) C onvention. T ext. ( v. N o. 1541 ... 242

157 To M r. D e rin g .. 4 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :

Italia n interests in A s ia tic T u rkey ... 249

158 F rom H e r r von K ü h lm a n n 4 Nov. S h ip p in g dues at Basra ... ... ... 250
(Ilecd . 5 N ov.)

159 « » 4 N ov. R a tes of fr e ig h t and con d ition s o f tra n s­

(R eed. 7 N ov.) p ort on B a g da d R a ilw a y ... ... 251

160 To H e r r von K ühlm ann ... 7 N ov. P rop osed d r a ft o f decla ra tion s to be
signed by the O ttom an G overnm ent and
the B agdad R a ilw a y C om p any re
term inus o f line ... ... ... ... 251

161 M r. Parker to H a kki 7 N ov. Sam e sub ject : B ritish d ra ft o f proposed

Pasha a greem ent w ith A nnex, and o f Turkish
and G erm an drafts. T ex ts ... ... 252

162 To S ir L. M allet (Tel.) 18 N ov. G erm an request fo r p a rticip a tio n in

S h a tt-el-A ra b N a v ig a tio n C om p a n y ;
S ir E. G rey ’ s a n noyance at fa ilu re of
T u rkey to reply ; com m u n ica tion to be
m ade to S aid H a lim P asha ... ... 258

163 M in u te by M r. H u rst ... 18 Nov. R ev ised d r a ft o f A rticle 6 of A n g lo-

G erm an C on ven tion ... ... ... 259

164 F rom S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 19 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith M. de Giers.: Sh a tt-
el-A ra b Su pp lem en ta ry D eclaration o f
O ctober 21 ... ... ... ... ... 260

165 (Tel.) 20 N ov. C om m u n ica tion to Said H a lim P asha in

„ ”
sense o f N o. 162 ... ... ... ... 261

166 To S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 21 Nov. Sam e subject ... ... ... ... ... 261

167 (Tel.) 22 N ov. C on versa tion w ith M a rq u is I m p e ria li:

” ”
Italia n schem e fo r A d a lia R a ilw ay ... 261

168 F rom S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 22 N ov. S aid H a lim P a sh a ’ s op p osition to Germ an

p a rticip a tio n in N a v ig a tion C om p an y ... 262

169 To H err von K ühlm ann ... 22 N ov. P rop osal to postpon e sign atu re o f agree­
m ents re A sia tic R a ilw ay s p en d in g con ­
clusion o f A nglo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s ... 262

170 F rom S ir L. M allet (Tel.) 24 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith S a id H a lim P a s h a :

den ial o f n eg otia tion s w ith Ita ly re
A d alia ... ... ... ... ... 263

171 (Tel.) 24 N ov. S am e con versation : G erm an p a rticip a tio n

in T ig ris and E u p h ra tes N a v ig a tion
C om pany (r. No. 162) .............................. 264

172 M r. P a r k e r to H e r r von 24 N ov. S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y : im p orta n ce of

K ü h lm a a n (P riv a te ) m eetin g B ritish view s ... ... ... 264

173 To S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 25 Nov. Germ an p a rticip a tio n in T ig ris and

E u p h ra tes N a v ig a tion C om p any ... 265

174 To H e r r von K ü hlm a nn ... 25 Nov. E nclosing B ritish d r a ft of proposed

agreem ent betw een B a g d a d R a ilw ay
C om pany and T urkey .............................. , 266
1
175 F rom M r. O ’ B eirne (Tel.) 29 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith M. S azonov : Sha tt-el-
A rab R iv era in Com m ission ... ... 269

176 To M r. O ’ B eirne (Tel.) 29 N ov. Sam e su b ject ... ... ... ... ... 270
 xxxvii

No. Name. D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

1913.
177 F rom M r. O ’ B eirne (Tel.) 1 D ec. S am e s u b je ct: a id e-m ém oire from
M . Sa zon ov ... ... ... ... ... 271

178 » » (Tel.) 1 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith M. Sa zon ov : same

s u b je ct; suggested B ritish com m u n i­
ca tion ... ... ... ... ... 271

179 „ „ ... 1 D ec. Sam e s u b je ct: T ex t o f R ussian a id e-

(R eed . 4 D ec.) m ém oire ... ... ... ... ... 272

180 To M r. O ’ B eirne (T el.) 2 D ec. Sam e su b ject : p roposed ex ch a n g e o f

notes w ith R u s s ia ; n ote to be addressed
t o H a k k i P asha ........................................... 273

181 F rom S ir L. M a llet ... 2 D ec. S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y C om pany : en­

(R eed . S D ec.) closing B ritish a id e-m ém oire com m u n i­
ca ted to T u rk ey ........................................... 274

182 M in u te b y M r. P a r k e r ... 2 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P a s h a : same

su b je ct; Ita lia n in terests in A d a lia and
R h od es ... ... ... ... ... 275

183 » » - 3 D ec. E u p h ra tes and T ig ris N a v ig a tion C on­

cession : m eetin g a t F oreig n Office ;
proposals by H a k k i P asha, L o rd In ch ­
ca pe and others. (M in.) ... ... 276

184 F rom M r. O ’ B eirn e (Tel.) 4 D ec. S h a tt-el-A ra b R iv e r a in C om m ission : p r o ­

(R eed . 5 D ec.) posed ex ch a n g e o f notes w ith R ussia.
T ex ts ... ... ... ... ... ... 279

185 To S ir L . M a l l e t ................ 5 D ec. Sam e sub ject : result o f A n g lo-R u ssia n

discussions ... ... ... ... ... 280

186 D ecla ra tion s a tta ch ed to 10 D ec. A rticles 3 and 6 o f E u p h ra tes and T ig ris
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g ree­ N a v ig a tio n D e c l a r a t i o n .............................. 281
m ent

187 S u p p lem e n ta r y C on v en tion 10 D ec. A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention re P ersian

G u lf; ex ten sion o f date of ra tific a tio n ... 282

188 C on cession fo r the N a v ig a ­ 12 D ec. T ex t ...................................................................... 283

tion o f the T ig ris and
the E u p h ra tes

189 C om m u n ication to H err 15 D ec. B ritish rep ly to G erm an co u n te r -d ra ft o f

von K ü h lm a n n A nglo-G erm a n con v en tion (v. N o. 156).
(M in .) ......................................................... 298

190 B ritish C o u n ter-d ra ft of 15 D ec. T ex t ...................................................................... 304

A nglo-G erm a n C onven­
tion

191 R evised B ritish D r a ft o f 15 D ec. T ext ...................................................................... 308

p roposed A g reem en t
b etw een B a g d a d R a ilw ay
C om p an y and T u rkey

192 C om m u n ication from H e r r 23 D ec. Sam e su b ject : com m ents on B ritish

von K ü h lm a n n d r a f t ; ob jection s to A r ticle 8 ... ... 310
 x x x v iii

Chapter XCIV.

The Bagdad Railway Question, January-August, 1914.

No. Nam e. M ain Subjeet. Page

1914.
193 f'om m u n ica tion to F rinee 15 J an . B ritish rep ly to N o. 192 ... J 312
' L ichnow sky
!
194 C om m unication from 19 Jan. in crease o f T urkish custom s dues 313
C ount B enek endorff (.ltc e d .
20 Jan.)

195 To S ir F. B ertie 20 Jan. C on versa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :

F ren ch desire th a t all agreem ents be
sign ed sim ultaneously ... ... ... 313

19G C om m unication to II. P aul 29 J an . Sam e su b ject : B ritish rep ly re date for
Cauibon sign atu re o f agreem ents ... ... ... 314

197 To C ount B enek endorff 29 J an . P rop osed in crease o f T urkish custom s ;

en q u iry as to Itusso-Turkish n eg otia ­
t ion s ... ... ... ... ... ... 315

198 F rom P rin ee L ichnow skv 1 F eb. E nclosing m em orandum on B ritish

(R eed . 2 F eb .) e ou n ter-d ra ft fo r A n g lo-G erm a n con ­
ven tion and G erm an eou n ter-d raft.
T e x t ...................................................................... 315

199 i F rom S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 10 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith D jem al B e y : Italia n
(R eed. 11 F eb .) railw ay concession ; suggested A n g lo-
Italia n com b in a tion . (M in .) ................ 323

200 C om m u n ication to H err 12 F eb. A nglo-G erm a n C onvention : B ritish

von K ühlm ann eou n ter-d ra ft o f A rticle 6 ( b ) ................ 325

201 C om m u n ication from H e r r 19 F eb. In itia lled d r a ft o f agreem ent between

1 von K ü h lm a iln Im p eria l O ttom an B ank and D eutsche
Bank ... ... ... ... ... ... 325

202 Bagdad R a ilw a y A g ree 23 Feb. A g r eem e n t betw een the B a g d a d R a ilw ay
m ent Com pany and L o rd Ineheape. T ext ... 329

203 M in u te by M r. P a r k e r .. 24 F eb. S m y rn a -A id in and A n a tolia n R a ilw ay

system s : m eetin g of G erm an and
B ritish represen ta tives at F oreign
Office, F eb ru a ry 19 .............................. 333

204 F rom P rin ce Liehnow sky 24 F eb. E nclosing G erm an cou n ter-p rop osa l for
A r ticle 6 ( b) o f A nglo-G erm a n C onven­
tion ... ... ... ... ... ... 334
I
205 F rom S ir G. B u chanan ... 2 M ar. Sh a tt-el-A ra b R iv e r a in C onvention :
(R eed , j M ar.] A n g lo-R u ssia n exch a n g e o f notes. T exts 335

206 ' To S ir E. G osehen (Tel.) 3 M ar. B ritish a n x iety fo r conclusion o f n eg otia ­

tion s in progress ... ... ... ... 336

207 C om m unication to P rin ce 3 M ar. A nglo-G erm a n C onvention : m odifica tion

Lichnow skv of A rticle 3 (c) ; enclosing d r a ft of
p roposed stip u lation s ... ... ... 337

208 C om m u n ication to H err 3 M ar. P rop osed am endm ents to G erm an cou n ter­
von Ivühlm ann proposal fo r A rticle 6 (b) ... ... 338

209 F rom S ir E. Gosehen (Tel.) 5 M ar. Suspension o f G erm an n eg otia tion s w ith
T u rkey (v . N o. 206). (M in .) ................ 339

210 To P rin ce L ichnow skv ... 6 M ar. Sam e subjeet : B ritish a n xiety fo r re­
sum ption o f n eg otia tion s ... ... 339
 xxxix

No Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1914.
211 A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion 9 M ar. T ext .. .............................. ... 340
re bounda ries o f A den,
&c.

212 To S ir F. B e r t i e ................ 13 M ar. C on v ersa tion betw een M . P au l Cam bon

and S ir A. N icolson : M. D o u m e rg u e ’ s
in stru ction s to M P a léolog u c in view
o f R u ssia n a ction re adm ission o f
Russian delegate to C ouncil o f O ttom an
P u b lic D eb t ........................................... 342

213 To B oa rd o f T rade ... 19 M ar. C on v ersa tion betw een M r. P a rk er, H e r r

v on K ü h lm a n n and H e r r B ergm a n n :
proposed am endm ents o f d r a ft A n g lo-
G erm an agreem en t ... ... .. 342

214 A g r eem e n t re T urkish 19 M ar. A rra n gem en ts fo r fu sion o f in terests in

P etroleu m Conecssions Concessions of D ’ A r cy g rou p and
Turkish P etroleu m C om pany. T ext.
(M in .) .............................. * ................. 345

215 To S ir E. Gosehen (Tel.) 21 M ar. N eg otia tion s fo r A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en ­

tio n ; B ritish stip u la tion s in retu rn fo r
m odifica tion o f A r ticle 3 (c) ... ... 346

216 C om m u n ication to H err 21 M ar. M em oran d u m o f poin ts to be discussed

von K ü h lm a n n and H err betw een the rep resen ta tives o f the
Bergm ann A n a tolia n , B a g d a d , and S m y rn a -A id in
R a ilw a y C om panies .............................. 348

217 C om m u n ication to H err 21 M ar. R ev ised d r a ft o f A rticles 5 (a) and 6 o f

von K ü h lm a n n A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion ... ... 349

218 F rom S ir E. Gosehen (T el.) 23 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von J a g o w :

B ritish stip u la tion s in retu rn fo r m o d i­
fications o f A r ticle 3 (c) ... ... ... 351

219 M in u te b y M r. P a r k e r ... 23 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von K tihlm ann

and H e r r B e r g m a n n : sam e sub ject ... 351

220 F rom P rin ce L iehnow sky 23 M ar. Sam e s u b j e c t ......................................................... 352

(F ee d . 24 M ar.)

221 F rom S ir E. Gosehen (Tel.) 24 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H err v on J a g o w :

H e r r H e lffc rich ’ s view s on same su b ject 352

222 To S ir E. Gosehen (Tel.) 26 M ar. Sam e su b ject : possib ility o f com p rom ise 353

223 F rom ■ S ir E. G osehen ... 27 M ar. C on v ersa tion s w ith H e r r v on J a g o w and

(F eed . 30 M ar.) H e r r v on Stum m : sam e subject. (M in .) 354

224 M r. P a r k e r to H e r r von 31 M ar. A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion : o b jection s to

K ü h lm a n n (P riv a te ) a d d ition a l a rticle proposed by P rin ce
L ie h n o w sk y ; suggested a ltern a tive form 355

225 M r. P a r k e r to H e r r von 1 A p r. R ev ised d r a ft o f A nglo-G erm a n C on v en ­

K tihlm ann tion as a greed by I le r r von K ü h lm a n n ,
H e r r B ergm a n n and M r. P a rk er. T ex t 358

226 H e r r von K ü h lm a n n to 1 A pr. P rop osa l to d rop A rticle 7 : qu estion of

M r. P a r k e r (P riv a te ) B ritish assent to la n d in g o f G erm an
te leg ra p h ic cable on coast o f P ersian
G ulf. (M in .) ........................................... 364

227 To P rin ce L iehnow sky ... 4 A pr. B ritish in a b ility to assent to la n d in g of

cable ... ... ... ... ... ... 365

228 To S ir G. B uch an a n ... 4 A p r. F orw a rd in g cop ies o f A rticles 6 and 7 of

G erm an C on v en tion fo r com m u n ica tion
to R ussia ... ... ... ... ... 366
No. Name. D ate. M ain Subject.

1914.
To S ir G. B u chanan ... 4 A pr. Sam e subject : e x p la n a tory n ote to be
in clu ded in C on v en tion ... ... ...

Ed N o t e .............................. 10 A p r. D espatch from S ir F. B e r tie en closing

(F eed . 11 A p r.) ex tra ct from the T em ps a n n ou n cin g
in itia llin g o f F ra n co-T u rk ish a gree­
m ents ............................................................. 367

230 F rom P rin ce L ichnow sky 16 A p r. A nglo-G erm a n C on ven tion : proposals fo r
m odifica tion s o f form . (M in .) ... ... 368

231 ! F rom S ir G. B uchanan 19 A p r. T ext o f revised n ote to be addressed to

i (Tel.) R ussian G overnm ent ... ... ... 370

M in u te by M r. P a r k e r ... 22 A pr. (Conversation w ith H err v on K u h lm a n n

and S ir E. C r o w e : ir rig a tio n w orks In
M esopota m ia : proposed article. (M in ) 371

233 22 Apr. A m ended d r a ft o f A rticle 3 (c) o f A n g lo-

G erm an C on v en tion and o f S ection I I I j
o f E x p la n a tory N ote ..............................372

234 F rom P rin ce L ichnow sky 24 A pr. P rop osed rew ord in g o f new A r ticle 9 of
A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion ... ... 374

235 To H a k k i P a s h a ................ 25 A p r. D elay in A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s re

M esopota m ia n ir rig a tio n w orks and
S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y ; im p orta n ce of
sa feg u a rd in g in terests o f R a ilw a y Com ­
pany ......................................................................

236 F rom S ir G. B u chanan ... 29 A p r. E nclosing cop ies o f A rticles 6 and 7 of

(F ee d . 4 M a y) ' A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion and of
' E x p la n a to ry N o t e ; and o f notes e x ­
ch a n g ed on this sub ject w ith M. Sazo-
. nov. (M in .) .....................................

237 To P rin ce L ichnow skv ... 1 M av B ritish reply re proposed m odifica tion of
* I form o f d ra ft A n g lo-G erm a n C on ven tion 381

238 „ „ ... 1 M ay E nclosing te x t o f d r a ft a greem ent b e­

tw een O ttom an R a ilw a y C om p any and
A n a tolia n and B a g d a d R a ilw a y Com ­
I panies ............................................................. 382

239 To H a k k i P asha ................ 4 M av C om m u n ica tion o f A rticle 3 (c) o f A n g lo-

G erm an C on v en tion and Section I I I of
E x p la n a tory N ote : B ritish desire for
certa in assurances re possible railw ay
concessions in fu tu re ... ... ... 385

240 F rom S ir L. M a llet (T el.) 5 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith H a lil B e y : in stru c­

tion s to H a k k i P asha r e A d alia R a il­
way, ir rig a tio n works, pecu n ia ry claim s
and m ission ary in stitu tion s ... ...

241 To S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 7 M av Sam e subject : a greem ent to be in itia lled

by H a k k i P asha and L o rd R a th m ore ... 387

242 i F rom P rin ce L ichnow sky 9 M ay W o rd in g and p roced u re proposed for

a greem ent re ir rig a tio n w orks in M eso­
I p ota m ia ; offer to w ith d ra w A r ticle 7 o f
A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion . (M in .) ...

243 To M. P au l Cainbon ... 18 M ay C om m u n ica tion o f A rticles 6 and 7 o f

A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion and o f Sec­
tion s I V and V o f E x p la n a to ry N o t e ;
A n g lo-R u ssia n ex ch a n g e o f notes ; offer
o f sim ilar ex ch a n g e w ith F ra n ce ...
 xli

N o. N am e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1914.
244 To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 29 M ay P rop osed ex ch a n g e o f notes re ir rig a tio n
w orks in M e s o p o ta m ia ; w ith d ra w a l of
A rticle 7 o f A nglo-G erm a n C o n v e n t io n ;
B ritish desire to com p lete n eg otia tion s 392

Ed. N o t e .. Juno Sam e s u b je c t : notes to he ex ch a n g ed on

da te o f sign a tu re o f A n glo-G erm an
C onven tion . T ex ts ... ... ... 392

245 To S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 31 M ay B ritish desire to com p lete agreem ents

w ith T u r k e y ; o u tsta n d in g p oin ts ... 394

246 F rom S ir L. M a llet (T el.) 1 June C on v ersa tion w ith S aid H a lim P a s h a :
(B ecd . 2 J u n e) sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... 395

247 To S ir L . M a llet (Tel.) 6 June C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P a s h a : T urkish

1 refusal o f B ritish requests ... ... 395

Ed. N o t e .............................. 10 J u n e Sum m ary o f A n g lo-T u rk ish M on op olies

I A g reem en t ... ... ... ... ... 396

To S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) |Sam e s u b je c t : o u tsta n d in g p oin ts in

A n g lo-T u rk ish n e g o t ia t io n s ; desira b ility
o f com p letin g n eg otia tion s ... ... 397

249 To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 16 J u n e E nclosing A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion in i­

tia lled, J u n e 15, 1914. T ex t ................. 397

250 F rom S ir L. M a llet (T el.) 16 J u n e A d d ition a l a rticle of M on op olies A g re e ­

m ent ... ... ... ... ... ... 409

251 ... 23 J u n e E n closin g cop y of n ote a ddressed to

(B ecd 29 J u n e) T urkey. C on v ersa tion w ith S a id H a lim
P a s h a : custom s su rtax and oth er ques­
tion s u n d er discussion. ( M i n . ) ................ 409

252 (T el.) 24 J u n e C on v ersa tion s w ith S a id H a lim P ash a and

D ja v id B e y : ou tsta n d in g p oin ts in
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s ... ... 411

253 (T el.) 25 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith S aid H a lim P a s h a ;

sam e s u b je c t ; pa rtial m eetin g o f B ritish
dem ands by T u rk ey ... ... ... 412

254 „ I (Tel.) ¡ 25 J u n e Sam e c o n v e rs a tio n : alleged use o f th rea t

by B rita in ... ... ... ... ... 413

255 „ ,, (Tel.) 25 J u n e Sam e co n v e rs a tio n : request o f T u rk ey fo r

com m ercia l trea ty ... ... ... 413

256 To S ir L. M a llet (T el.) 26 J u n e In stru ction s to in fo rm S aid H a lim P asha

of B ritish a greem ent to con tin u ed levy
of 3 % su b ject to consent o f other
P o w e r s ; rep ly to request fo r com m er-
I cia l tre a ty ... ... ... ... ... 414

257 (Tel.) 2 J u ly P rop osed new a rticle in M on op olies

A g reem en t ... ... ... ... 415

Ed. N o te 3 J u ly C it in g note to P rin ce L ichnow sky o f

J u ly 3, 1914 : suggested am endm ent to
d r a ft A n g lo-G crm a n C onvention 415

F rom S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 5 J u ly P rop osa l fo r com m ercia l tre a ty ... 415
(Itecd . 0 J u ly)

259 To S ir L . M allet (T el.) 14 J u ly C oncession g ra n ted to D a in a scu s-H om s

R a ilw ay C o m p a n y ; B ritish in terest in
R a ilw a y projects betw een M ed ite r ra ­
nean and P ersian G u lf ... ... 416
 x lii

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. 1 Page

1914.
To M r. B eaum ont (Tel.) 19 J u ly G erm an reply to B ritish represen ta tion s
re ea rly con clu sion o f T urco-G erm a n
n eg otia tion s ; B ritish desire fo r con clu ­
sion o f A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s ... 417

261 F rom M r. B eaum ont (Tel.) 21 J u ly T urkish proposal fo r com m ercia l t r e a t y ... 417

262 „ (T el.) 21 J u ly B ritish in terest in ra ilw ay p rojects be­

tw een M ed iterra n ean and P ersian Gulf.
{M in .) ......................................................... 418

„ „ (T el.) 24 J u ly Turkish proposal fo r new A rticle in

M on op olies A greem ent. (M in .) ... 419

264 To M r. B ea um ont (Tel.) 27 J u ly Sam e subject ... ... ... ... ... 419

Ed. N o te ... . 20 Aug. M inutes by M r. P ark er, S ir E. Crowe,

Sir A. N icolson and S ir E. G rey : effect
o f ou tb rea k of w ar on A n g lo-T u rk ish
A greem ents ... ... ... ... ... 420

Chapter XCV.

The Portuguese Colonies, December 1911-July 1914.

1911.
F rom S ir F . B ertie 21 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron von S t u m m :
(P riv a te ) l A n g lo-G erm a n r e la t io n s ; naval and
colon ia l questions. (M in .) ... ... 421

To S ir E. Goschen 29 D ec. G erm an desire fo r d iv ision o f ^Portuguese

(P riv a te ) colonies .................................* 424

1912.
To S ir F. B ertie (P riv a te ) 2 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M ettern ich :
same su b ject ................................................424
I
268 F rom S ir F. B ertie 12 Jan. Sam e su b ject : A n g lo-G erm a n S ecret
(P riv a te ) A g reem en t o f 1898 and B ritish o b lig a ­
tion s to P o r t u g a l ................................................425

1911.
Ed. N o te 25 Jan. S ir E. G rey ’ s m em orandum on L o rd '
S a lisb u ry ’ s a ttitu d e in 1898 . . . j 427

1912.
F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e ... 24 Jan. V isit o f “ P a n th er ” to L isbon. E nclos-
(R ecd . 29 J an.) ing discussion in P ortu g u ese P a r lia ­
m ent on colonies qu estion ... ... , 427

M em oran dum by S ir E yre 26 J an . C on v ersa tion w ith M r. G ilm o u r : sug­

Crowe g ested developm en t of P ortu g u ese
T im o r ; D u tch and G erm an cla im s;
question of p u b lica tion of A n g lo-
G erm an agreem ents. (M in .) ... ... 429

271 F rom S ir A . N icolson 30 J an . C on v ersa tion w ith S enhor V illa u r ru ttia :

(P riv a te ) A n g lo-G erm a n tre a ty o f 1898. (M in .)...

272 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e ... 6 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor V a sc o n ce llo s:

(R eed . 12 F eb .) affairs o f M oza m b iq u e ; question o f
p u b lica tion o f A n g lo-G erm a n a greem ent
o f 1898 and A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se D ecla ra ­
t ion o f 1899. (M in .) ..............................
 x liii

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in S u b ject. Page

1912.
273 To S ir A . H a rd in g e 29 Feb. C om m u n ica tion s m ade to P o rtu g a l in
1898; question o f p u b lica tion o f A n g lo -
P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion ... ... ... 437

274 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e 8 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor V a s c o n c e llo s :

(Tel.) (R eed . 9 M ar.) proposed sta tem ent in P ortu g u ese P a r ­
lia m en t (v. N o. 277). (M in .) ...................... 438

8 M ar. Sam e co n v e rs a tio n : com m u n ica tion s m ade

(R eed . Id M a r.) to P o rtu g a l in 1898; p roposed sta te­
m ent in P ortu g u ese P a rlia m en t ... 439

276 M em oran d u m by M r. H a r- 9 M ar. C on v ersa tion betw een S ir E. G rey,

eou rt M r. H a rc o u rt and C ou n t M ettern ich :
possible te rr ito ria l ex ch a n g es b etw een
B rita in and G erm any. (M in .) ... ... 440

277 F rom S ir E. Goschen (T el.) 11 M ar. 1C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von K id e rle n -
W a e c h t e r : G erm an consent to P o r t u ­
guese sta tem ent (v. N o. 274) ... ... 444

278 To S ir A . H a rd in g e (Tel.) 12 M ar. P ortu g u ese G overn m en t to be in form ed

o f G erm an consent to proposed sta te­
m ent ...................................................................... 414

279 F rom S ir E. Goschen 15 M ar. E n closin g G erm an aid e-m em oire re sta te­
(R eed . 18 M a r.) m ent to b e m ade in P ortu g u ese P a r lia ­
m e n t ........................................................................! 444

280 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e ... 15 M ar. S ta tem en t in P ortu g u ese P a rlia m en t on

(R eed . 20 M ar.) M a rch 15 .............................................. 445

281 16 M ar. P ress rum ours o f for e ig n loan to be

(R eed . 22 M ar.) raised by P o rtu g a l on C olon ia l secu rity.
(M in .) ...................................................446

16 M ar. E n closin g sum m ary o f S enhor V a sc o n ­

(R eed. 25 M ar.) cellos’ speech on for e ig n p olicy o f
P o rtu g a l and A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se A n cien t
T reaties. ( M i n . ) ..................................................... 447

To S ir E . Goschen 18 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M ettern ich :

sam e subject

284 To C olonial Office . P ortu g u ese fo r e ig n lo a n : suggested

pu b lica tion o f A n g lo-G erm a n A g ree­
m ent o f 1898 ............................................

285 F ro m C olon ia l Office Sam e subject. (M in .) ... ... ... 453

1 Apr.

To S ir A. H a rd in g e A n g lo-P ortu g u ese A llia n c e : v a lid ity of

9 A pr.
A n cien t T rea ties ... ... ... ... 454

287 To S ir E. G osch en... 10 A p r. 1C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M e t t e r n ic h :

discussion of P ortu g u ese C olonies and
oth er questions 454

288 I To S ir A . H a rd in g e .. 20 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M r. F rew cn : proposals

fo r loan to P o rtu g a l ; d ev elop m en t of
A n g ola ..............................................................156

289 F rom S ir A. J oh n ston e .. 25 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M yn h eer v an Sw in-

(R eed . 1 M a y) deren : b ou n d a ry a rb itra tio n b etw een
D u tch and P ortu g u ese T im or ; D u tch
I in terests in P ortu g u ese T im or ... ... 457

290 I F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e .. 27 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M r. F rew en : p roposed

(R eed . 6 M a y) P ortu g u ese loan on secu rity o f con ­
cession in A n g ola. (M in .) ... ... 458
 xliv

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in S u b ject. Page

1912.
291 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e ... 16 M ay F u rth e r co n v e rs a tio n : sam e subject.
{R eed . 20 M a y) {M in.) 460

292 To M r. H a rc o u rt (P riv a te) 20 M ay Com m ent on No. 291 461

293 To S ir E. G osch en................ 21 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M e t t e r n ic h :

con d ition s o f P ortu g u ese loan ... ... 462

294 „ „ (Tel.) 23 M ay Messrs. S ch ro d e r’ s a rrangem ents fo r loan

by A n g lo-F ra n co-G erm a n sy n d ic a t e ;
question of A n g ola c o n c e ssio n ; a ttitu d e
of B rita in and G erm any ... ... ... 462

295 M em oran d u m by S ir E y re 23 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M r. T ia r k s : sam e sub­

Crowe je c t ; B ritish and G erm an in terests ... 463

296 24 M ay S econ d con v ersa tion w ith M r. T ia rk s :

sam e subject. {M in.) ... ... ... 466

297 F rom M r. H a rc o u rt 24 M ay G erm an p rep on d era n ce in proposed Com ­

p a n y ; in consistency w ith the A n g lo-
G erm an A greem ent. {M in .) ... ... 468

298 To M r. H a rc o u rt ... 26 M ay F orw a rd in g m em orandum ex p la in in g

A n g ola concession (v. Nos. 295-6) ... 468

299 F rom M r. H a rco u rt 26 M ay E nclosing d r a ft o f C on ven tion show ing

altera tion s proposed by H err von
K iihlm ann in A nglo-G erm a n A g reem en t
o f 1898. T ext. {M in .) ............................... j 469
I
300 F rom S ir E. G oschen (T el.) i 28 M a y Germ an a ttitu d e to proposals fo r P o rtu ­
guese loan. {M in.) ... ... ... 473

301 M r. H a rc o u rt to L o rd ' [2 8 ? ] M ay P rop osed revision o f S ecret T rea ty o f

G ladstone (Tel.) 1898; G eneral B o th a ’ s en q u iry as to
views. {M in .) ... ... ... ... 474

302 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 29 M ay |E nclosing m em orandum from G erm an

{R eed . 3 J u n e) G overnm ent re P ortu g u ese loan. {M in.) 474

303 F rom M r. H a rc o u rt ... 30 M ay P osition o f proposed C ha rtered C om pany

in A n g ola and revision o f Secret T rea ty 475

304 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e 31 M ay C om m u n ica tion m ade to M r. T ia r k s :

(Tel.) tem p orary brea k-d ow n P ortu g u ese
n eg otia tion s ... ... ... ... 476

305 To S ir E. G osch en... ... 4 June C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a rc o u rt and

C ou n t M ettern ich : p roposed revision of
S ecret T rea ty ........................................... 476

306 From S ir F. B e rtie ... 5 June C on v ersa tion w ith M. P o in c a r e : A n g lo-

{R eed . 7 Ju n e) G erm an discussions re exchanges of
terr ito ry in A frica . {M in .) ... ... 478

307 To S ir A. H a rd in g e (Tel.) 7 June I n stru ction s re a ttitu d e t o be m a in ta in ed

d u rin g A n g lo-G erm a n discussions ... 479
To S ir E. G osch en................ 10 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a rc o u rt and
C ount M e tte r n ic h : revision o f secret
t re a ty ... ... ... ... .. 479

L ord G ladstone to M r. 13 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith G eneral B o t h a : same

H a rc o u rt (Tel.) s u b je ct; a ttitu d e o f U n ion o f South
A fric a ... ... ... ... ... 430

310 . . . 1
To M r. W in ston Churchill 18 J u n e D etails o f proposed revision o f Secret
(P riv a te ) T rea ty ......................................................... 481

311 , To Colonel Seely (P riv a te ) 18 J u n e Sam e su b ject ... ... ... ... ... I 481
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No Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1912.
312 To S ir E . G osch en................ 4 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron v on M a rscha ll :
sam e s u b je ct; desira b ility o f com m u n i­
ca tion to P o rtu g a l on p roposed revision 482

313 F rom Colonel Seely 4 J u ly S am e su b ject : possible o b jection s from

(P riv a te) m ilita ry p o in t o f view ... ... ... 483

Ed. X o t e ... ... ... 10 J u ly M in u tes re A n g lo-P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion
o f 1899 ......................................................... 483

314 To L o rd G ra n v ille... ... 17 J u ly C o n v e rsa tio n w ith M r. H a r c o u r t and

B a ron v on M arschall : rev ision of
S ecret T rea ty ; value o f concessions
p roposed ... ... ... ... ... 484

315 17 J u ly Sam e co n v e rs a tio n : effect of A n g lo -

” ............................... P ortu g u ese A llian ce on colon ia l ques­
tion . {M in .) ... ... ... ... 485

316 F rom M r. W in ston 17 J u ly E n closin g m em orandum re effect o f p ro ­

C h urchill (P riv a te ) posed new trea ty on naval policy .
{M in .) ......................................................... 486

317 To L ord G ra n v ille... ... 1 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a r c o u r t and

B a ron v on M arschall : A n g lo -P o r t u ­
guese A llia n ce and Secret A g reem en t
re P ortu g u ese colon ies ... ... ... 488

318 j To S ir E . G osch en................. 21 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a r c o u r t and

P rin ce L ic h n o w sk y : revision o f S ecret
T rea ty ......................................................... 488

319 D r a ft o f R ev ised A n g lo- 9 D ec. T ex t. {M in .) ... ... ... ... ... 489
G erm an C on vention

320 F rom S ir E y re Crow e ... 18 D ec. E n closin g rev ised d r a ft and notes th ereon.
T ex t. {M in .) ............................................ 492

321 S ir J. A nd erson to S ir 24 D ec. Q uestion of F ren ch a ttitu d e to A n g lo-

E y re Crow e (P riv a te ) G erm an a greem ent. {M in .) ... ... 497

322 M in u te by S ir E y re Crowe 26 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith S ir J. A n d erson : re­

vised d r a ft o f A nglo-G erm a n A g reem en t 498
1913.
323 To S ir E. G osch en................. 11 J a n . C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n ow sk y :
sam e su b ject ; q u estion o f p u b lica tion .
{M in.) ......................................................... 500

324 To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 11 J a n . E n closin g revised d r a ft o f A n g lo-G erm a n

con v en tion , and d r a ft note fo r D u tch
G overnm ent. T exts. {M in u te by K in g
G eorge V) ......................................................... 502

Ed. N o t e .............................. 1 3-18 J an . M in u tes show ing o rig in o f N o. 325 ... 507

325 D r a ft M em orand um on 13 J an . T ext ...................................................................... 508

A nglo-G erm a n C onven­
tion

326 To S ir F. B ertie ... ... 10 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l Cam bon :
ru m ou r o f In tern a tion a l C on feren ce re
A frica n questions, and of A n g lo-G erm a n
n e g otia tion s ... ... ... ... 509

327 F rom S ir A . H a rd in g e 18 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor C osta : P o r t u ­

(P riv a te ) guese desire fo r p u b lica tion of A n g lo -
P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion ; o b jection s to
a lien ation o f colon ia l t e rr ito ry . {M in .) 510

328 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 21 Feb F orw a rd in g N o. 3 2 9 ; in form a tion g iven

to H e r r von K iih lm a n n ... ... ... 510
 x lv i

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in S u b ject. Page

1913.
329 To S ir A. H a rd in g e 21 F eb. C on v ersa tion b etw een S ir E yre C row e and
S enhor T e ix e ir a -G o m e s: rep orts in
L isbon P re ss ; alarm re A nglo-G erm a n
n e g o tia tio n s ; q uestion o f p u b lica tion ... 511

330 F rom S ir A. H a rd in g e . 25 F eb. Sam e su b je ct: S enhor M a cie ir a ’ s sta te­

(R eed . 3 M ar.) m ent in Cham ber o f D epu ties. (M in.) 513

331 F rom P rin ce L ichnow sky 18 M ar. E nclosing am ended d r a ft of A n g lo-

G erm an C on v en tion w ith fu rth er p ro ­
posals. T ext. (M in .) ... ... ... 514

332 To S ir E. G osch en................ - 20 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a rc o u rt and

P rin ce L ich n o w sk y : sam e subjet ... 525

333 To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 13 M ay E nclosing revised dra ft. B ritish rep ly to
G erm an proposals. T ex t. (M in u te s by
K in g C eorg e F ) ... ... ... ... 526

334 N o te by S ir E d w a rd G rey 2 Ju n e E nclosing letter o f M a y 30 from P rin ce

L ic h n o w s k y : fu rth er am endm ents.
(M in .) ........................................................ 530

335 To S ir A. H a rd in g e 11 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is de S o v e r a l:

(P riv a te ) M r. C h a m berla in ’ s proposals before
A g reem en t o f 1898; presen t position ... 533

336 To S ir E. G oschen ... 13 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith M r. H a rc o u rt and

P rin ce L ichnow sky : pream ble o f A g ree­
m ent o f 1898 ........................................... 533

337 13 J u n e Sam e co n v e rs a tio n : S ir E. G rey ’ s con v er­

„ „ -
sation w ith M arquis de Soveral. (M in.) 534

338 7 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n ow sk y :

„ „ -
q uestion in pream ble. ( M i n . ) ................ 535

339 17 J u ly Sam e subject ... ... ... ... ... 536

» » •••

340 To P rin ce L ichnow sky ... 26 J u ly A m endm ents in d r a ft A nglo-G erm a n

C on v en tion ... ... ... ... ... 537

341 31 J u ly E nclosin g d r a ft C on v en tion w ith v erbal

„ „ -
a ltera tion s in E nglish tex t. T ex t ... 537

342 To L ord G ra n v ille................ 13 A ug. In itia llin g o f E nglish t e x t .............................. 540

F rom H e r r von K iihlm ann 1 Sept. E nclosing am ended G erm an tex t. T ex t ... 541
343

1 Sept. D efin ition o f riv er b ou n d a ries ... ... 544

344 „ „ ...

To S ir F . B e r t i e ................ 29 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :

345
q uestion o f Z a n zib a r, San Thorne and
P rin cip é ......................................................... 544

F rom M r. O ’ B eirn e ... 3 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith M . S a z o n o v : R ussian

346
(R eed . 17 N ov .) apprehensions. (M in.) ... ... ... 545

„ „ .(Tel.) 6 N ov. Sam e s u b j e c t ......................................................... 546

347
(P riv a te )

348 To M r. O ’ B eirne (Tel.) 7 N ov. Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 546
(P riv a te )

25 Nov. Sam e s u b je c t : prosp ects o f p u blica tion of

349 „ „ -
A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion ................ 547

350 To L ord G ra n v ille ................ 28 N ov. C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E y re C row e and
M.
J I. xP a
¡ lu lí Cyaam
V iu ybuoiin .: exAp^la
C ia n
uaaution
iu ii ofi
u
A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion ... ... 547
 x lv ii

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1913.
351 F rom M r. C arn egie (Tel.) 13 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith S en h or M a cieira : his
(F ee d . 14 D ec.) request fo r v isit o f B ritish s h ip s :
A n g lo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s ................. 548

352 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 15 D ec. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n ow sk y :

G erm an a n x iety re proposed p u b lica tion
o f A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se D eclaration ... 549

353 To M r. C a rn eg ie (T el.) 19 D ec. E x p la n a tio n m ade to P o rtu g a l o f A n g lo-

G erm an A g reem en t o f 1898 ... ... 550

354 F rom M r. C arnegie ... 22 D ec. C on v ersa tion s w ith S en h or M a cie ir a and
(Ttccd. 29 D ec.) D r. R osen : sam e subject. {M in .) ... 550

355 To M r. C a rnegie 22 D ec. C on v ersa tion betw een S ir E y re C row e and i

S enhor T eix eira-G om es : sam e s u b je c t ;
P ortu g u ese req uest fo r p u b lica tio n o f I
T rea ty o f 1898.................................................... 551
1914.
5 J an . C on v ersa tion betw een S ir E y re C row e and
Senhor T eix eira -G om es ; sam e s u b je c t;
d ecla ra tion to be m ade in P ortu g u ese
P a r l i a m e n t ......................................................... 552

357 To S ir F . B ertie ... 6 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l C a m b o n :

F ra n co-G erm a n A g reem en t o f 1911;
q uestion o f C ongo B asin. (M in .) ... 553

358 To S ir E. G osch en... 7 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n o w sk y :

suggested com m u n ica tion to G erm any
o f ob liga tion s u n d er A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se
treaties. {M in .) ........................................... 554

359 M in u tes b v S ir A. N icol- 8 Jail. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :

son an d S ir E. G rey F ren ch a ttitu d e to p u b lica tion of
A n g lo-G erm a n con v en tion . {M in .) ... 554

360 To S ir E. G osch en... 29 J an . C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n ow sk y :

B ritish ob liga tion s to P o r t u g a l; p r o ­
posed p u blica tion o f A n g lo-G erm a n
A g reem en t o f 1898 and A n g lo -P o r t u ­
guese D ecla ra tion o f 1899 ... ... 555

From S ir F . B ertie 11 F eb. C on v ersa tion s w ith M . P o in c a r e and

(F ee d . 13 F eb .) M . D o u m e rg u e : F ren ch a ttitu d e to
A ng lo-G erm a n C on v en tion . {M in .) ... 556
362 „ „ (P riv a te ) 12 F eb. S am e su b ject ... ... ... ... ... 559
363 To S ir F . B e r tie (P riv a te ) 13 F eb. Sam e su b ject ... ... ... 560
364 18 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :
M . D o u m e rg u e ’ s d e s p a tch ; sam e su b ject 560
365 F rom S ir F . B ertie 25 Feb. A r ticle 16 o f F ra n co-G erm a n C on v en tion
{F ee d . 27 F e b ) o f N ov em b er 4, 1911 .............................. 561
To S ir E. G osch en... 3 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ich n ow sk y :
G erm an a n x iety re p u b lica tion of
A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se D ecla ra tion , and
proposal to abandon A n g lo-G erm a n
n e g o tia tio n s ; e x p la n a tion o f B ritish
p olicy in revision o f A n g lo-G erm a n
C on v en tion ... ... ... ... ... 562
367 F rom M r. C a rnegie 3 M ar. S ta tem en t o f Sen h or M a ch a d o in P o r t u ­
{F ee d . 9 M a r.) guese P a r lia m e n t ... ... ... ... 563
368 To S ir F . B ertie ... 4 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l C a m b o n :
suspension o f A n g lo-G erm a n n e g o tia ­
tion s ... ... ... 564
 x lv iii

No. Nam e D ate. M ain Sub ject. Page

1914.
369 N o te by S ir E d w ard G rey 16 M ar. C ircu la tion o f papers to C a bin et show ing
course o f A nglo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s ... 565

From, S ir E. G oschen 28 M ar. E nclosing letter from H e r r von J a g o w :

(P riv a te) ex p la n a tion o f G erm an a ttitu d e ... 565

371 29 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H err von J a g o w : same

(P riv a te ) su b ject ... ... ... ... ... 566

372 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 1 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ic h n o w s k y :

G erm an proposal to com p lete n eg otia ­
tions, p os tp on in g q u estion o f p u b lica ­
t io n ; B ritish ob jection s ... ... ... 567

373 „ ,, (P riv a te) 7 A p r. S ir E. G rey ’ s ex p la n a tion o f his a ttitu d e 568

374 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 21 A pr. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on J a g o w :

[F eed . 27 A p r.) apprehension o f effect o f p u blica tion in
G e rm a n y ; e x p la n a tion o f S ir E. G rey ’ s
views. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 569

375 To S ir E. G osch en................ 2 M ay A p p ro v in g No. 374 ... ... ... ... 571

376 F rom M r. C a rnegie ... 23 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith S enhor F reire

(P ee d . 29 J u n e) d ’ A n d ra d e: G erm an a spira tion s in
A n g o la : concessions for ra ilw a y s ;
P ortu g u ese difficulties. (M in .) ... ... 572

377 2 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor F reire

” ” - (P ee d . 9 J u ly) d ’ A n d r a d e : same s u b je c t; P ortu g u ese
request fo r adv ice ... ... ... 576

378 To C olonia l O ffi c e ................ 10 J u ly Sam e s u b j e c t ......................................................... 577

379 F rom C olon ia l Office ... 13 J u ly Sam e su b ject ... ... ... ... ... 578

389 To M r. C a r n e g i e ................ 15 J u ly V erb a l com m u n ica tion to be m ade to

P o r t u g a l; B ritish a ttitu d e to foreig n
concessions ... ... ... ... ... 579

Chapter XCVI.
Mediterranean Agreements.

I.— T H E G R E Y -C A M B O N L E T T E R S O F N O V E M B E R 1912.

1912.
381 F rom C a pta in M . H a n k ey 30 A p r. E n closin g P rim e M in is te r’ s direction s to
C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D efen ce to
con sid er new naval disp osition s in
M ed iterra n ean and elsew here, and
a gend a fo r m eetin g at M a l t a ................ 5E0

382 M in u tes b y S ir E. Crowe, 30 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith A d m ira l T rou b rid g e,

S ir A. N icolson and S ir G eneral W ilson and C a p ta in H a n k e y :
E d w a rd G rey effect on B ritish p olicy o f ev a cu atin g
M ed iterra n ea n ... ... ... ... 581

383 F rom S ir A. N icolson 4 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l Cam bon :

(P riv a te) F ren ch proposal to renew naval con ­
versations ; F ra n co-R u ssia n naval neg o­
t ia t io n s ; B ritish relation s w ith F ra n ce
and R ussia. (M in .) .............................. 582
 x lix

N o. M a in Sub ject.

1912.
384 S ir A. N icolson to S ir F. 6 M ay C on versa tion s w ith M . P a u l Cam bon on
B ertie (P riv a te ) A p ril 15 and on M a y 4 : A n g lo -F re n ch
relations.; F ra n eo-R u ssia n naval n eg o­
t ia tion s ; possib ility o f in v ita tio n to
B ritain to p a rticip a te ...................................583

F rom S ir A. N icolson 6 M ay F orw a rd in g N o. 386, and com m en tin g

(P riv a te ) thereon ... ... ... ... ... 585

386 M em oran dum by S ir Eyre 8 M ay Effect o f a B ritish eva cu a tion o f M ed i­

Crowe t e rr a n e a n : on questions o f F o re ig n
P olicy .........................................................

To L ord K itch en er 8 M ay M eetin g of C om m ittee of Im p eria l

(P riv a te ) D efen ce in M a lta : im p o rta n ce of
M ed iterra n ea n from E g y p tia n sta n d ­
p oin t ... ... ... ... ... ...

S ir F. B e r tie to S ir A. 9 M ay F ren ch desire fo r clearer u n d ersta n d in g

N icolson (P riv a te )

To M r. C hurchill (P riv a te ) 11 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C am bon:

n aval con v ersation s w ith F ra n ce ...

Ed. N o t e .............................. 14 M a y N ote by M r. C hurchill on con v ersa tion

w ith C om te de S a in t-S ein e. (M in .) ...

F rom L o rd K itc h e n e r ... 19 M a y P rop osed re d u ctio n of naval forces in

(P riv a te ) M e d ite r r a n e a n ; its effect on p os ition in
E g y p t............. .........................................................

391 To S ir F. B ertie 24 M a y C on v ersa tion b etw een S ir A. N icolson and

M. P aul C am bon: M. P o in c a r e ’ s
a n xiety a bou t p os ition in M e d ite r ra ­
nean ; possib ility o f an A n g lo -F ra n co -
Ita lia n arra n g em en t ... ... ...

392 F rom L ord K itc h e n e r 2 June M eetin g a t M a lt a : enclosin g m em o­

(P riv a te) randum on ou tcom e of discussions o f
M ed iterra n ea n naval p olicy ..................... 594

S ir M . d e B unsen t o S ir A. 8 June M ed iterra n ea n p o lic y ; Spanish aspect ... 595

N icolson (P riv a te )
I
S ir E. G oschen t o S ir A. 11 J u n e G erm an press com m ents on B ritish p olicy
N icolson (P riv a te ) i in M ed iterra n ean ... ... ... ... 596

395 To S ir F . B ertie 21 J u n e C on v ersa tion betw een S ir A . N icolson and

M. P a u l C am bon : A n g lo-F ren ch naval
co n v e r sa tio n s; possib ility o f in v itin g
S p a in t o p a rticip a te ... ... ...

F rom S ir R . R o d d ... 24 J u n e F ra n co -Ita lia n re la tio n s; in flu en ce of

(R eed . 1 J u ly) M ed iterra n ean p o lic y ; Ita ly and T rip le
A llian ce. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 598

397 To S ir E. G oschen. 5 J u ly C on versa tion w ith B a ron v on M a rsch a ll :

deb a te in H ou se o f L ord s on M e d i­
t e rr a n e a n ; A nglo-G erm a n relation s ...

To M r. C a rn eg ie .. 11 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C am bon :

reten tion o f squadron at M a lta ...

M em oran d u m by M r. 17 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith C om te d e S a in t-S ein e

C hurchill (P riv a te ) and A d m ira l S ir F ra n cis B rid gem a n :
A n g lo-F ren ch naval con v ersation s ;
p olicy in M ed iterra n ean ; b u ild in g o f
F ren ch w a r - s h i p s ...........................................
[10900] d
 I

No. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject. ?««<*

1912.
400 To Mr. C a rn eg ie ... ... 22 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l C am bon :
sam e subject ; non -com m itta l ch a ra cter
o f naval con versation s ... ... ... 601

Ed. N o t e .............................. 23 J u ly D ra ft plan fo r N a v al co-op era tion in

event o f w ar ... ... ... ... 602

401 M in u te by S ir A. N icolson 24 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C am bon :

(P riv a te ) F ren ch and B ritish na va l dispositions.
(M in .) ......................................................... 603

402 To M r. C a rn eg ie ... ... 26 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :

d r a ft plan of n a va l co-op era tion ;
A n g lo -F re n ch con v ersation s o f 1907;
p roposal fo r ex ch a n g e o f p riv a te notes 604

403 N o te by M r. C hurchill 29 J u ly Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 605
(P riv a te )

404 F rom S ir F . B ertie ... 30 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M . P o in c a r e : same

(B ecd . SI J u ly) sub ject ; F ren ch com m en t on n on ­
com m itta l p rov iso ... ... ... ... 605

405 „ „ (P riv a te) 30 J u ly Sam e con v ersa tion : sam e su b ject ... ... 606

406 F rom M r. C hurchill 2 A ug. Sam e su b ject : proposed a ltera tion in

(P riv a te ) w ord in g ... ... ... ... ... 607

407 F ro m S ir A . N icolson 4 Aug. F ra n co-R u ssian N a v al C on v en tion ; posi­

(P riv a te ) tion o f G reat B rita in .............................. 607

408 F rom S ir E. Goschen ... 8 Aug. G erm an press com m ent on F ra n co-
(B ecd . 12 A ug.) Russian N a v al C on v en tion ... ... 608

409 F ro m S ir F . B ertie 13 A ug. D ra ft plan o f A n g lo -F re n ch naval co ­

(P riv a te ) op era tion ; M r. C h u rch ill’ s suggested
am endm ent ; question o f ex ch a n g e of
d ip lom a tic notes ... ... ... ... 609

410 To S ir F . B e r t i e ................. 19 Sept. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l Cam bon :

suggested F ren ch form u la fo r A n g lo-
F ren ch u n d ersta n d in g ... ... ... 611

411 21 S ept. C on v ersa tion betw een S ir A . N icolson and

” ” ................ M. P a u l C a m b o n : press com m ents re
F ren ch na va l forces in M ed iterra n ean 611

412 F rom M r. A squith 11 O ct M. C a m bon ’ s proposed fo r m u la ; A n g lo-

(P riv a te ) F ren ch con versation s in 1905 ... ... 612

413 To S ir F . B e r t i e ................ 30 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l Cam bon :

d r a ft letter re A n g lo-F ren ch co-op era ­
tion ... ... ... ... ... ... 612

414 7 Nov. F u r th e r c o n v e rs a tio n : M. P o in c a r e ’ s

” ’ ............................... readiness to a ccep t d r a ft le t t e r ; su g ­
g ested a d d ition ........................................... 613

415 21 N ov. F u r th e r co n v e rs a tio n : sam e s u b je ct; re­

” ” .................
w ord in g o f suggested a d d i t i o n ................ 614

416 To M . P a u l Cam bon ... 22 N ov. B ritish note r e A n g lo-F ren ch co-op era ­
tion . T e x t ......................................................... 614

417 F rom M . P a u l Cam bon ... 23 N ov. F ren ch note. T ex t ... ... ... ... 615

1913.
418 F rom S ir F. B ertie ... 1 A ug. E x tra ct from A n n u a l R e p o r t fo r F ra n ce
(B ecd . S A u g .) fo r the y ea r 1912 : F ren ch foreig n
p o lic y ; A n g lo-F ren ch rela tion s ... ... 616
 li

I L — N E G O T I A T IO N S FOR AN A N G L O -1 T A L I A N P A C T , 1912-14.

No. Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject.

1912.
419 From. S ir R R od d 13 A p r. P ossib ility o f A n g lo -Ita lia n a greem ent 620
(P riv a te) (R eed . SO A p r.)

420 20 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is di San

(F ee d . 24 O ct.) G iu lia n o : sam e subject. (M in .) ...

421 (Tel.) 25 Oct. C on v ersa tion betw een S ig n or G iolitti and

M. B a rrère : Ita lia n a ttitu d e to
arra n g em en ts w ith G rea t B rita in and
F ra n ce fo r sa feg u a rd in g N orth A fric a n
in terests ... ... ... ... ... 622

422 To S ir F. B ertie 30 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :

d esira b ility o f arra n g em en t w ith Ita ly 622

423 To S ir R . R od d 30 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :

m a in ten a n ce o f statu s quo in N orth
A fr ic a ... ... ... ... ...

424 F rom S ir R . R o d d (Tel.) 3 N ov. C on v ersa tion betw een M a rq u is di San

G iu lia n o and M. B a r r è r e : F ra n co -
I Ita lia n A g reem en t o f 1902 ; effect of
proposed renew al o f T rip le A lliance.
(M in .)...................................................................... 623

425 10 N ov. P rop osed ex ten sion o f a g reem en t o f 1902.

(F eed . 10 N ov.) (M in .) ......................................................... 624

426 (Tel.) 20 N ov. C on v ersa tion s betw een M a rq u is di San

G iu lia n o and M . B a rrère : sam e sub­
ject. F irst d r a ft o f proposed a rra n g e­
m ent p rep a red b y M . B a rrère. (M in .) 625

23 Nov. C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is di San

(F ee d . SO N ov.) G iu lia n o : proposed A n g lo -Ita lia n
a greem en t as to N orth A fric a ; I t a ly ’ s
ob liga tion s u n d er T rip le A llia n c e .1
(M in.) ...........................................................i 626

42ft 6 D ec. F u r th e r co n v e rs a tio n : sam e subject.

(F ee d . H D ec.) (M in.) 630

429 To S ir R . R o d d .. 20 D ec. Sam e subject. E n closin g prelim in a ry

d r a ft o f form u la fo r con sid era tion . T ex t 632
1913.
430 F rom S ir R . R o d d .. 4 J an . Sam e s u b je c t : com m ent on term s of
(F eed . 11 J an.) d r a ft fo r m u la ; F ren ch a ttitu d e. (M in .) 634

431 To S ir R . R o d d .. Sam e sub ject ... ... 635

432 F rom S ir R . R o d d .. 21 Jan. Sam e subject. (M in .) 635

(F ee d . 25 Jan.)

To S ir II. R o d d .. 30 Jan. i D esira b ility o f w a itin g fo r fa v ou ra b le

o p p o rtu n ity fo r com m u n ica tion to Ita ly
I re d r a ft f o r m u l a ................................................ 636

434 F rom S ir R . R o d d .. 2 Feb. : C on v ersa tion w ith M . B a rrère : en q u iry

(R eed . 8 F eb .) as to progress o f n eg otia tion s. Ques­
tion o f com m u n ica tion o f form ula .
(M in .) ............................................................. 636

To S ir R . R o d d . 13 Feb. Q uestion o f com m u n ica tion o f form u la ... 637

F rom S ir R . R o d d . 15 Feb. C on v ersa tion w ith M . B a rrère : same

(R eed . 22 F eb .) subject. (M in .) ................................................ 637

To S ir R . R o d d . 4 M ar. Sam e s u b j e c t ............................................................. 638

[10900] d 2
 Name. D ate. M ain Subject. I ag e

1913.
438 I To S ir F. B ei tie 3 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :
reasons fo r not pressing Italia n n eg o­
tia tion s ... ... ... ... ... 639

439 From, S ir R . R od d . 16 D ec. E nclosing despatch from C a pta in Boyle,

{P ee d . 29 D ec.) re p o rtin g on naval position o f Ita ly at
j end o f 1913. {M in.) .............................. 639

1914- 1 . . .
13 J an . C on v ersa tion betw een M a rq u is di San
( llecd . 16 Jan.) G iu lia n o and M. K r u p e n s k i: term s o f
| renew al of T rip le A llian ce ... ... 642

30 M ar. P rop osed v isit of M a rq u is di San

{B ecd . 4 A p r.) G iu lia n o to C ount B erch told ; foreig n
policy o f I t a ly ; press com m ents ... 643
22 A pr.
{B ecd . 27 A p r.) C on v ersa tion w ith S ig n or M a rtin i :
F ra n co -Ita lia n re la tio n s; rep u d ia tion
o f alleged docum ent rec o rd in g m odifi­
ca tion o f term s o f T rip le A llian ce ... 644

23 A p r. Sam e c o n v e rs a tio n : F ra n co-Ita lia n rela-

(B ecd . 27 A p r.) t i o n s ...................................................................... 645

27 A p r. |C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is di San

{B ecd . 2 M a y ) G iu lia n o : sam e subject ; ju risd iction in
T rip oli and T u n is ; ca p itu la tion s in
M o rocco ... ... ... ... .. 646

445 To S ir R . R od d 6 M ay 1C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :

proposed rev iva l o f p rojected N orth
A fric a a greem ent ... ... ... 648

6 M ay Sam e c o n v e rs a tio n : Ita lia n difficulties

w ith F ra n ce ... ... ... ... 649

11 M ay C a p itu la tion s in M o rocco and E g y p t ;

possib ility of revival o f p rojected A n g lo-
Ita lia n arra n gem en t ... ... 650

12 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is I m p e ria li:

d esirab ility o f form u la re N orth A fr ic a ;
position o f F r a n c e ... ... ... ... 651

449 M in u te by S ir E. Crowe .. 17 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :

Ita lia n assurances to F r a n c e ; proposed
A n g lo -Ita lia n u n d ersta n din g . {M in.) ... 652

450 To S ir R . R o d d ... 4 June C on v ersa tion w ith M a rq u is Im p eria li :

Ita lia n desire fo r a form u la fo r com ­
m u n ica tion at B erlin ; S ir E. G rey on
necessity for con su ltin g F ra n ce ... 653
 Chapter XCVII.
Great Britain, France and Germany, 1 9 1 2 -1 4 .

Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject.

1912.
451 To S ir E. G oschen. 8 A ug. C on v ersa tion b etw een S ir A . N icolson and
B a ron von M arscliall : M r. W in ston
C h u rch ill's speeches on naval arm a ­
m ents ; gen era l A nglo-G erm a n rela­
tion s ; press com m ents ; F ra n co-G erm an
relation s ; q uestion of P ortu g u ese
colonies ... ... ... ... ... 655

8 D ec. V is it o f P rin ce H e n r y o f P ru ssia : B ritish '

G rey (P riv a te ) a ction in ev en t o f w ar ................

1914.
Ed. X a t e .............................. 26 J u ly T elegra m from G erm an N a val A tta ch e at
L on don ... ... ... ... ... 658

1912.
453 S ir E. G rey to K in g 9 D ec. B ritish p osition in ev en t o f w ar 658
G eorge V (P riv a te )
1913.
454 F rom S ir R . Ilod d 6 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von J a g o w :
(P riv a te ) G erm an relation s w ith A u stria -
H u n g a ry ; survey of A nglo-G erm a n
r e la tio n s ; naval q u estion s ; a ttitu d e o f
E m p eror W illia m II. (M in u te by K in g
G eorge I 7.) (M in .) ..............................

455 To S ir R . R od d (P riv a te) 13 Jan. A n g lo-G erm a n r e la t io n s ; naval questions.

(M in u te by K in g G eorge F ) ... ... 663

456 C a p ta in H . W a tson to Sir 20 Jan. R e v ie w o f p olicy and position o f G erm an

E. G oschen N a val E x p a n sion ist P a r ty ... ...

457 F rom S ir E. Goschen ... 10 Feb. S ta tem en ts by A d m ira l von T ir p it z b efore

(I tec d . 17 F eb .) B u d g et C om m ittee o f R eich sta g . (M in .)

458 M em orand um ... ... 10 Feb. A n g lo-F ren ch co-op era tion in M e d ite r ra ­
nean ... ... ... ... ... ... 671

459 To S ir E. G oschen (P riv a te) 15 Feb. S ta tem en ts by A d m ira l von T ir p it z and

H e r r von J a g ow ... ... ... ... 673

460 F rom S ir A. N icolson 18 Feb. A u d ien c e w ith K in g G eorge V : letter

(P riv a te ) from P rin ce H en ry o f P r u s s ia ; B ritish
position in ev en t o f w ar ... ... ... 673

461 ' From S ir F. B ertie ... 19 Feb. F ren ch press statem ents on in crease o f
(R eed . 21 F eb .) F ren ch arm y. (M in .) ... ... ... 674

462 From, S ir E. G oschen ... 21 Feb. Sta tem en ts by A d m ira l von T ir p it z and
(R eed . 21t F eb .) H e r r von J a g ow to B u d g e t C om m ittee
of R e ic h s ta g : enclosing record o f p ro ­
1 ceedings. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 675
463 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 22 Feb. Com m ents on A d m ira l von T ir p it z ’ s
N icolson (P riv a te ) statem ents ... ... ... ... ... 683
464 Froni S ir E. Goschen ... 2 M ar. E n closin g re p o rt from C a p ta in W a tson on
(R eed . S M a r. ) 1 statem ents o f A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ... 684
465 To S ir E. G oschen (P riv a te ) 5 M ar. S ir E. G re y ’ s a ttitu d e to statem ents o f
A d m ira l von T ir p it z ... ... ...

466 To S ir F . B ertie (P riv a te ) 11 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l C a m b o n :

Mr. A s q u ith ’ s sta tem ent in H ou se o f
C om m ons d en yin g o b lig a tion to send
m ilita ry force to the co n tin e n t ... ...
 liv

No. N am e D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

1913.
467 Q uestions in H ouse of 24 M ar. S ta tem en t by M r. A squith re B ritish
C om m ons ob liga tion s in ev en t o f w ar ... ... 689

468 From, S ir E. Goschen ... 28 M ar. S ta tem en t by M r. C h urchill on N a v y

(llec d . 31 M ar.) E s tim a tes ; G erm an press com m ents ... 690

469 „ „ - 29 M ar. S ir E. G rey ’ s speech in H ou se of

(H eed. 31 M ar.) Com m ons. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von
J a g o w :» M r . C h u rch ill’ s speech ... ... 692

470 To S ir F. B ertie (P riv a te) 10 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C a m b o n :

v isit of P rin ce H c n rv of P r u s s ia ; his
ea rlier a ttem p t to ob tain an assurance
of B ritish n eu tra lity ... ... ... 694
471 F rom M r. C hurchill 10 Apr. P rov ision a l in stru ction s to Com m ander-
(P riv a te) in -C h ief ... ... ... ... ... 695
472 To M r. C hurchill (P riv a te) 11 A pr. Sam e s u b je c t : n eu tra lity of B elgium and
N orw ay ... ... ... ... ... 695
473 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 20 Apr. F ra n co-G crm a n r e la t io n s : L u n ev ille
N icolson (P riv a te ) in cid en t ... ... ... ... ... 696
474 F rom S ir A. N icolson 30 A pr. E n closin g com m u n ica tion s from M. P au l
(P riv a te ) C am bon : proposals r e form o f A n g lo-
F ren ch com m u n ica tion s in event of w ar,
a nd re ex perim en ts in direct F ra n co-
R ussian teleg ra p h ic com m unications.
(J /tn .) ........................... 697
475 C a p ta in W a tson to S ir E. 12 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith E m p eror W illia m I I :
G oschen (P riv a te) B alkan a ffa ir s; B ritish fo r e ig n p olicy 699
476 F rom S ir E. Goschen 28 M a y V isit o f K in g G eorge V and Queen M ary
(P riv a te) to B erlin ... ... ... ... ... 702
477 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 28 M a y Sam e s u b je ct: con v ersa tion w ith M . Jules
N icolson (P riv a te) Cam bon ... ... ... ... ... 703
478 S ir A. N icolson to S ir E. 2 June Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 704
G oschen (P riv a te )

479 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. • 5 [7 ] J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von B ethm ann

N icolson (P riv a te ) H ollw eg and H err von Jagow :
M r. C h u rch ill’ s sta tem ent in H ouse of
C om m ons on J u n e 5 ; a rticle in D a ily
N e w s ...................................................................... 704
480 F rom S ir E. Goschen (Tel.) 3 J u ly C on v ersa tion betw een E m p eror W illia m II
(P riv a te) a nd C aptain W a t s o n : “ N a val con ­
s tru ction h olid a y .” (M in u te by K in g
G eorg e V ) ... ... ... ... ... 705

481 M in u te by M r. C hurchill 8 J u ly G erm an a ttitu d e to “ naval h olid a y .”

(P riv a te ) (M in.) ......................................................... 706
482 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 11 Oct. E nclosing letter from C a pta in W a tson
N icolson (P riv a te ) ' d escrib in g in terv iew w ith E m p eror
W illia m I I : A n g lo-G erm a n relations.
(M in .) ........................................................ 707
483 F rom S ir E. Goschen ... 15 Oct. E n closin g re p o rt b y C a p ta in W a tson on
(H eed. 20 O ct.) G erm an naval affairs. (M in .) ... ... 710
484 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 20 Oct. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K iihlm a nn :
A n g lo-G erm a n co-op era tion in B alkan
cr is is; q uestion o f re-assem bling of
A m b assa dors’ C on feren ce ... ... 718

485 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 22 Oct. M r. C h u rch ill’ s M a n ch ester s p e e ch ;

(H eed. 27 O ct.) G erm an press com m ents ... ... ... 718
486 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 24 Oct. Sam e subject. (J /in .) .............................. 720
N icolson (P riv a te)
N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1913.
487 F rom M r. C hurchill 24 Oct. “ N a v al h o l id a y ” proposals ... ... 721
(P riv a te )

488 To S ir E. G oschen (P riv a te ) 28 Oct. S am e s u b j e c t .............................. . . 722

489 F rom S ir E. Goschen 8 N ov. Sam e sub ject ... ... ... ... ... 723
(P riv a te )

490 L ord G ra n v ille to S ir A. 4 D ec. F ra n co-G erm a n relations. C on v ersa tion

N icolson (P riv a te ) w ith M . P a leolog u e ... ... ... 723

491 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 4 D ec. F ra n co-G erm a n re la tio n s ; Zah ern in ci­

N icolson (P riv a te ) d e n t; resolu tion in R eich sta g ... ... 724

492 S ir A. N icolson to S ir E. 8 D ec. Sam e subjects ... ... ... ... ... 726
G oschen (P riv a te )

493 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 13 D ec. E n closin g re p o rt from L ieu t.-C olon el
(R eed . 15 B e e.) Russell re a rticle by G eneral von
B ern h ard i ... ... ... ... ... 727

494 S ir M . de B unsen to Sir 19 D ec. C on v ersa tion s w ith H e r r v on T sch irsch k y :

A. N icolson (P riv a te ) tre n d o f feelin g in G erm any ... ... 728

1914.
495 F rom S ir V . C orb ett ... 13 Jan. S ta tem en t b y M r. L loy d G e o r g e : G erm an
(R eed . 15 Jan.) com m ent. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 729

496 F rom M r. H ow a rd ... 27 Jan. C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t E h r e n s w a r d :

(R eed . 9 F eb .) Sw edish p olicy o f n eu tra lity ... ... 731

497 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 31 Jan. E n closin g r e p o rt from C a p ta in H en d erson

(R eed . 2 F eb .) on in terv iew w ith P rin ce H en ry o f
P r u s s ia : A n g lo-G erm a n r e la t io n s ;
naval policy . (M in .) ... ... ... 732

498 To S ir E . G oschen (T el.) 5 Feb. S ta tem en t b y A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ;

en q u iry as to m e a n in g ; B ritish re a d i­
ness to m ake naval proposals if w elcom e 734

499 F rom S ir E. G oschen (Tel.) 6 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von J a g o w :

sta tem en t b y A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ;
op p o sitio n to proposals fo r n a va l h oli­
day. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 735

500 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 6 Feb. S am e c o n v e rs a tio n : sam e su b ject ... ... 736

N icolson (P riv a te )

501 F rom S ir E. G oschen (T el.) 10 Feb. F u r th e r co n v e rs a tio n : G erm an a ttitu d e

(R eed . 11 F eb .) to n a va l proposals. (M in .) ................ 736

502 „ „ - 11 F eb. E n closin g H e r r v on J a g o w ’ s m em orandum

(R eed . 12 F eb .) re speech b y A d m ira l v on T ir p it z and
revised t e x t o f la tter ... ... ... 737

503 „ „ ... 21 M ar. E n closin g re p o rt from C a p ta in H e n d e r­

(R eed . 23 M a r ) son on in terv iew w ith A d m ira l v on
T ir p it z : B ritish naval estim ates ... 740

504 To S ir F B e r t i e ................. 25 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M. D o u m e rg u e : v isit

o f K in g G eorg e V and Q ueen M a ry to
P a r is ; suggested com m u n ica tion to
press ... ... ... ... ... ... 741

505 To S ir E. G osch en ................ 27 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ic h n o w s k y :

v isit o f K in g and Q ueen to P a r is ... 742

506 To M r. W i n g f i e l d ................. 6 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M e n s d o r ff:

C ou n t B e r ch to ld ’ s sta tem en t re B ritish
policy ......................................................... 742
N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject. Page

1914.
507 To M r. K id ston ... 11 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M. de S c a v e n iu s :
n eu tra lity o f D e n m a r k .............................. 743

508 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 15 M ay H e r r L im a n ’ s book on G erm an Crow n

N icolson (P riv a te) P rin ce ... ... ... ... ... 743

509 F rom S ir E. G oschen (Tel.) 18 M ay C on v ersa tion betw een C a p ta in H en d erson

(P riv a te ) and P rin ce H en ry o f P r u s s ia : in v ita ­
tio n o f M r. C hurchill and P rin ce L ouis
o f B a tten b erg to K iel. (M in .) ... ... 744

510 S ir A. N icolson to S ir E. 18 M ay R usso-G erm an and A n g lo-R u ssia n rela ­

Goschen (P riv a te) tions ; v isit to K i e l ; P ersia n questions 745

511 M em oran d u m by Mr. 20 M ay Suggested v isit to K ie l ; desirab ility o f

C hurchill (P riv a te) discussion w ith A d m ira l v on T ir p itz ... 746

512 M em oran dum by S ir E. 25 M ay Q uestion o f discussion o f naval question

G rey (P riv a te ) w ith A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ; suggested
reply to in v ita tio n to K ie l ... ... 748

513 M in u te by M r. C hurchill 26 M ay Sam e subject ... ... ... ... ... 749
(P riv a te )

514 P rin ce L ichnow sky to M r. 30 M ay V isit o f A d m ira l v on T ir p it z to K o n o -

T yrrell (P riv a te ) pischt ... ... ... ... ... 750

515 F rom S ir E. G oschen (Tel.) 3 June C on versa tion w ith E m p e ror W illia m I I :
(P riv a te ) in v ita tio n to K ie l ... ... ... 750

516 6 June E nclosin g rep ort b y C a p ta in H end erson

(R eed . 8 J une) on m eetin g o f G erm an F lo tte n v e r e in .
(M in .) ......................................................... 751

517 S ir E. Goschen to S ir A. 13 J une V isit of E m p eror W illia m I I to K o n o - 753

N icolson (P riv a te ) pischt ...„ ... ... ... ...

Chapter XCVIII.
Russian Relations with Germany and Great Britain,
March-July 1914.
I .— R U S S O -G E R M A N T E N S IO N , M 4 R C H 1914.

1914.
518 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 6 M ar. A rticle in K öln isch e Z e it u n g : R ussian
(R eed . 9 M a r.) a rm a m en ts; G erm an press com m ents.
(M in.) ............................................................. 754
J I
519 F rom S ir M. de B u n sen ... 6 M ar. A rticles in A u stria n and G erm an press :
(R eed . 9 M ar.) same subject. (M in .) ... ... ... 756

520 F rom S ir G. B uchanan 8 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M. S azonov : a rticle in ^

(T el.) K öln isch e Z eitu n g . (M in .) ... ... 757

521 To S ir E. G osch en... ... 10 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky :
R usso-G erm an relation s ; G erm an press
a rticles ... ... ... ... ... 758

522 To S ir G. B uchanan ... 10 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t B en ck en dorff :

same subject ................................................ 759

523 F rom S ir E. G oschen ... 10 M ar. A rticle in K öln isch e Z e it u n g : fu r th e r , ^

(R eed . 12 M ar.) press articles ... ... ... ... 759
 lv ii

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Subject. Page

1914.
524 F rom S ir E. Gosclxen 11 M ar. T elegra m in F r a n k fu r te r Z e it u n g ;
(R eed . 14 M a r.) fu rth er press c o m m e n t s ..............................

525 13 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H err v on J a g ow :

(R eed . 16 M a r . ) > com m uniqué in N ord d eu tsch e A llg e-
! m eine Z eitu n g . (M in .) ... ... ... 762

526 F rom S ir M . de B unsen ... 13 M ar. A t t itu d e in V ie n n a to press ca m p a ig n .

(R eed . 16 M ar.) C on v ersa tion s w ith H e r r von T schirsch-
ky : position o f G erm any in E u rop e ...

527 F rom S ir G. Buchanan 15 M ar. I A rticles in B ou rse G a ze tte , R ossia and

(Tel.) N ov oe V rem ya . C on v ersa tion s w ith
I M . Sazonov. R e p o rte d m eetin g o f
C ouncil o f M in isters on M a rch 12 ;
con feren ce w ith m em bers o f D u m a on
M arch 14 ... ... ... ... ... 765

528 18 M ar. Sam e subject. R ussian in tern a l position

(R eed . 25 M ar.) and e x tern a l policy. (M in .) ................. 766

529 S ir G. B uchanan to S ir A. 18 M ar. G erm an press ca m p a ig n ; possible effects

N icolson (P riv a te )

530 F rom S ir G. B u chanan ... 19 M ar. A rticles in N o v o e V r e m y a : press cam -

(R ecd. 23 M a r.) p a ign , arm am ents, E u rop ea n alliances

531 19 M ar. E nclosin g letter from C om m ander G ren -

(R ecd . 2-1 M a r.) fe ll: R ussian naval situ ation ... ...

S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 27 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith H err v on Jagow :

N icolson (P riv a te ) ! position o f D u a l M on a rch y ... ... 772

533 S ir A. N icolson to S ir E. 30 M ar. R usso-G erm an relation s ... 773

I Goschen (P riv a te ) j
I !

I I .— A N G L O -R U S S I \ N N E G O T I A T IO N S , M A R C H - J U L Y 1914.

1914.
S ir G. B uch an a n to S ir A. 5 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith M . S a z o n o v : A n g lo-
N icolson (P riv a te) R ussian relation s in C en tral A s ia ;
en q u iry re discussions in L on d on w ith
M . P a u l Cam bon an d C ou n t B en ck en -
dorff. (M in .) ................................................ 775

To S ir G. B uchanan ... 18 M ar. A n g lo-R u ssia n relation s in C en tral A sia 776

(P riv a te)

F rom S ir G. B u chanan 31 M ar. A rticles in N o v o e V r e m y a ; view s o f C ou n t

(R eed. 6 A p r.) W it te on R ussian foreig n policy . C on­
v ersa tion w ith M. S a z o n o v : A n g lo-
R ussian relations. V iew s o f E m p eror
N icholas ... ... ... ... . . ., 777

3 A p r. A u d ien c e w ith E m p eror N ich o la s: A n g lo -

(R ecd . 7 A p r.) R ussian re la tio n s ; a rticle in N o v o e \
V r e m y a ; question o f S t r a it s ; P ersian
problem s. ( M i n . ) ........................................... 780

S ir G. B uchanan to Sir A. 16 A p r. A n g lo-R u ssia n relation s ; p ossib ility o f

N icolson (P riv a te ) naval a greem ent or o f revision o f 1907
agreem ent 784

539 M in u te b y S ir A. N icolson 17 A p r. C on v ersa tion w ith M. de F leu ria u : possi­

b ility o f discussion o f A n g lo-R u ssia n
u n d ersta n d in g d u rin g v isit to P a r is ... 785

540 , S ir A. N icolson to S ir M. 27 A p r. V is it to P a r is ; possib ility o f e x te n d in g

de B unsen (P riv a te ) | A n g lo-R u ssia n u n d ersta n d in g ... ... 786
 lviii

No. Nam e. M a in Sub ject.

1914.
To S ir F . B ertie 1 M ay C on v ersa tion w ith M. D ou m ergu e,
S ir W . T yrrell, M . P a u l Cam bon and
M. M a rg erie : q uestion o f stren gth en ­
in g relation s w ith Iiu ssia ; p ossibility
o f A n g lo-R u ssia n naval conversations.
C on v ersa tion w ith M. P o in ca re and
M. D ou m erg u e : B ritish p u b lic op in ion
and A n g lo-R u ssia n relation s ... ...

542 21 M a y C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon :

p roposed com m u n ica tion to R ussia ...

543 21 M a v C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l Cam bon and

C ou n t B e n c k e n d o r ff: com m u n ica tion
to R ussia of A n g lo-F ren ch notes of
N ovem ber 22 and 23, 1912; p ossibility
of A ng lo-R u ssia n naval con v ersation s ... 789

F ro m S ir E. Goschen 23 M a y A r ticle in B e rlin er T a g e b la tt: alleged

(R eed . 27 M a y) proposal fo r A n g lo-R u ssia n naval
e n ten te . (M in .) ... ... ... ... 791

545 S ir E. G osclien to S ir A. 23 M a y V iew s o f H e r r von J a g ow on B alkan

N icolson (P riv a te ) • q u estion s ; a rticle in B e rlin er T ag eb latt.
(M in .) ............................................................. 792

546 F ro m S ir G. B uchanan 24 M a y E nclosin g speech by M. Sa zon ov in D um a

(R c cd. 27 M a y ) on M ay 2 3 : R ussian foreig n p olicy ... 794

547 To S ir G. B u chanan 10 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t B e n c k e n d o r ff:

P ersian questions. E n closin g m em o­
randum g iv en to C ou n t B en ck en dorff
on B ritish and R u ssia n p olicy in
P ersia ; possib ility o f rev ision o f 1907
a greem en t ... ... ... ... ...

S ir E. G rey ’ s S ta tem en t in 11 Ju n e A lleg ed A ng lo-R u ssia n naval a greem en t... 801

H ouse o f Com m ons

549 K in g G eorge V to E m p eror 16 J u n e A ng lo-R u ssia n re la tio n s ; a ffairs o f P ersia 801

N ich ola s I I

F rom S ir E. G oschen 16 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on J a g o w :

(R eed . 23 J u n e) S ir E. G rey ’ s sta te m e n t; position of
G erm a n y ; press a rticles ... ... ... 802

551 S ir E. G oschen to S ir A. 20 J u n e Sam e sub ject ... 803

N icolson (P riv a te )

552 F rom S ir G. B u chanan 21 J u n e C on v ersa tion w ith M. S a z o n o v : Russian

(T el.) p olicy in P e r s ia ; B ritish in terests in
P ersia and P ersian G u lf; possib ility of
rev ision of 1907 agreem en t ... ... 804

25 J u n e A u d ien c e w ith E m p eror N ich o la s: letter

(R eed . 29 J u n e) from K in g G eorge V . A n g lo-R u ssia n
relation s in P ersia. C on v ersa tion s w ith
M . S a z o n o v : sam e subject. (M in .) ... 805

554 To S ir G. B u chanan 25 J une C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t B e n c k e n d o r ff:

a lleged A nglo-R.ussian naval a gree­
m e n t ; q uestion o f S tra its ... ... 809

Ed. N o te T eleg ra m to S ir G. B uch an a n record in g

con v ersa tion w ith C ou n t B en ck en d orff
re A n g lo-P ersia n oil a greem ent ... ... 810

555 F rom S ir G. B uch an a n ... 25 J u n e V isit o f F irst B a ttle C ruiser S q u ad ron ... 810
(R eed . 29 Ju n e)
 lix

No Nam e. D ate. M a in S ubject.

1914.
556 F rom S ir G. Buchanan 25 J u n e A u d ien c e w ith E m p eror N ich o la s: A n g lo-
(P riv a te ) R ussian naval con v ersation s and dis­
cussions re C entral Asia. (M in .) ... 811
557 To S ir G. B uchanan 2 J u ly S ir E. G rey ’ s sta tem ent in P a r lia m e n t re
(P riv a te ) P ersian o il concession ... ... ... 813

558 „ » (T el.) 3 J u ly Sam e s u b j e c t ......................................................... 813

F rom M r. C hurchill 7 J u ly A n g lo-R u ssia n naval con v ersation s ... 814

(P riv a te)

F rom S ir G. B uchanan 11 J u ly C on v ersa tion w ith M. S azonov : R ussian

(Tel.) rep ly to No. 547 .. 814

561 11 J u ly E n closin g a id e-m ém oire by M. S a zon ov

(R eed . 14 Juu ly) in rep ly t o N o. 5 4 7 : P ersian questions.
(M in .) ......................................................... 815

Appendix I.
M. S A Z O N O V ’ S P L A N IN 1914 F O R A N A N G L O -R l S S IA N -.T A P A N E S E G U A R A N T E E
O F A S I A T I C P O S S E S S IO N S .

1914.
Ed. N o te ... 14 J u ly E x t r a c t from le tte r from S ir A. N icolson
t o S ir G. B uch an a n : A n g lo-R u ssia n
relation s ... ... ... ... ... 821

— From. S ir G. B uchanan 8 A ug. C on v ersa tion w ith M. S a z o n o v : proposal

(Tel.) | fo r trip le gu a ra n tee o f A s ia tic posses-
( sioiis. (M in .) ... ... ... ... 821

C om m u n ication from 9 Aug. F orw a rd in g teleg ram from M. S a z o n o v 'o f

C ou n t B en ck en d orff A u g u st 7. (M in .) ... .............................. 822

Appendix II.
J A P A N A N D T H E O P E N IN G O F T H E W A R IN 1914.

1914.
To S ir C. G reene (T el.) 6 Aug. P rop osed J ap an ese a ction in Chinese
w aters ............................................................. 823

! F rom S ir C. G reene (T el.) 7 Aug. Sam e subject

(R eed . 8 A u g .)

Appendix III.
L O R D K IT C H E N E R A N D T H E A R A B N A T IO N A L M O V E M E N T.

1913.
F rom S ir G. L ow th er 7 June E n closin g despatch from C onsul-G eneral
(R eed . 11 J u n e) C u m berbatch a t B e iru t g iv in g nam es o f
sp ecial d elegates a p p oin ted t o A ra b -
Sy rian C ongress in P a ris ... ... 825

— F rom M r. C arn egie E n closin g cop y o f resolutions v oted at

A ra b -S y ria n C ongress on J u n e 21 ... 826
1914.
— F rom L ord K itch en er 6 F eb. C on v ersa tion w ith th e E m ir A bdullah at
(R eed . I', F eb .) C a ir o : difficulties betw een T urkish
G overn m en t and the Sheriff o f M ecca ... 827

(T el.) 14 F eb. Sam e s u b je c t : difficulties a m icably settled 827

 Ix

N o. Nam e. D ate. M a in Sub ject.

1914.
F rom S ir L. M a llet 18 M ar. Sam e subject. E nclosing m em orandum on
(F ee d . SO M or.) < position o f G rand Sheriff o f M ecca.
(M in .) ..........................................................827
F rom L o rd K itc h e n e r 21 M ar. H ed ja z R a ilw ay : fu r th e r difficulties be­
(T el.) tw een A rab s and T u rk s at M ecca
(M in.)................. ..........................................................830
4 Apr. Re v isit o f Abdullah B ey to C a iro ;
( H eed. 11 A y r .) necessity for ca re in d ea lin g w ith Arab
q u e stio n ; case o f A ziz B ey ... ... 830
L ord K itc h e n e r to S ir W. 26 Apr. Sam e s u b je ct: did n ot sec S h eriff
T yrrell (P riv a te ) A b d u lla h ; la tte r’ s in terv iew w ith
S ir R . Storrs ................................................831
1936.
N o te by Mr. G. A n ton iu s 1 M ay E nclosing sum m ary o f a ccou n t au th orized
by E m ir A bdullah o f his con versation s
w ith L o rd K itch en er in 1912-14 . . .! 831
1914.
F rom S ir L. M a llet (Tel.) 21 Feb. A rrest o f A z iz A li Bey in C onstantinople.
(M in .) ......................................................... 833

24 Feb. Sam e sub ject : his a ttitu d e to the G overn­

(R eed . 2 M ar.) m e n t; possib ility o f his org a n izin g
in su rrection ... ... ... ... ... t 833
To S ir L. M a llet ... .. 16 M ar. Sam e su b je ct: no B ritish in terv en tion ... 834
F rom M erch a n ts of C airo 8 M ar.
(Tel.) (R eed . 9 M ar.) v en tion in fa v ou r o f fa ir tria l o f A ziz
B ey ...................................................................... 834

From S ir L. M a llet (T el.) 9 M ar. C on v ersa tion w ith G rand V i z i e r : tria l to

(llec d . 10 M ar.) ta k e place, b u t A ziz B ey to be pa rd on ed
and lib era ted i f fou n d g u ilty ... ... 834

„ (T el.) 26 M ar. A ziz A li B ey rep orted cond em ned to

death b u t to be p a r d o n e d : L ord
K itch en er in form ed . (M in .) ... ... 835

(T el.) 27 M ar. S am e s u b je c t : G rand V iz ie r ’ s a ttitu d e,

” ” no gu a ra n tee th a t A ziz Bey m ig h t not
in tr ig u e w ith A rabs ... ... ... 835

» (T el.) 1 A p r. P a rd on o f A ziz B ey to ta k e p lace ... 836

(T el.) 7 A p r. N o con firm ation of A ziz A li’ s condem ­

(R eed . 8 A p r.) n a tion ... ... ... ... ... 836

12 A p r. Sam e s u b je c t : represen ta tion s o f in ­

" ”
(R eed . 17 A p r.) trig u es a ga in st A ziz A l i : E n ver Pasha
opp osed to his lib era tion ... ... 836

(Tel.) 14 Apr. R e p o r t from T alaa t B ey th a t sentence

had been com m uted to penal servitude 837

„ „ (T el.) 17 Apr. F u rth er efforts on b ehalf o f A ziz A li ... 837

(Tel.) 18 A pr. E n v er P asha to ask S u lta n fo r free

pa rd on fo r A ziz A li ... ... ... 837

„ (T el.) 20 A pr. A ziz A li to be lib era ted and sent to

Egypt ......................................................... 837

F rom Ahm ed A li and 16 A p r. P lea from in h ab ita n ts o f E l-M eh a lla on

others (R eed , 25 A p r.) beh alf o f A ziz B ey .............................. 837

F rom S ir R . R o d d (T el.) 26 A pr. R e p o rt of return of A ziz A li to C yrena ica 838

F rom S ir L. M allet 12 M ay E nclosing cop ies o f a rtic le in jou rn a l

(R eed . 18 M a y) Jiha n-i-Isla m , on case o f A ziz Ali,
c o n tr a d ic tin g ru m ou r o f in terv en tion
by B ritish Am bassador ... ... ... 838
 C H A P TE R XCI.

TH E BAGDAD R A IL W A Y , 1910- 12.

[277). X O T E .— T he B a g d a d R a ilw a y n e g otia tion s o f 1905-10 are trea ted in G ooch &
T em perley, V ol. V I , pp. 325-576, C hapters X L V I - X L V 1 I , passim , rp. also V ol. X (I), pp. 982-5,
S u b j e c t I n d e x , suh P o t s d a m M e e t i n g , S u b jects d iscu ssed : B agdad B a ilw ay. cp. also G.P.,
X X X I , pp. 309-377, C ha pter C C X L V . F o r th e in tern a l con d ition o f T u rk ey and th e changes
o f 1908 and 1909 v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V , pa ssim .]

No. 1.

Sir G. L ow ther to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O . 371/1004.
3 1 3 8 6 /5 6 07 /1 0 /4 4 .
(No. 603.) Thcrapia, D. August 22, 1910.
Sir, R. August 29, 1910.
On the 5th July I received a telegram from His M ajesty’ s Consul at Basra to
the effect that, according to inform ation from the Resident at Bushire, Turkish soldiers
had again returned to the island o f Zakhnuniveh and that the Turkish flag was hoisted
there on Fridays, and later received the despatch from Mr. Crow copy of which is
enclosed herew ith. 0 )
I imm ediately brought the matter to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and renewed m y representations of the spring of last year on the lines of the
instructions conveyed in your telegram of May 30th 1909,(2) pointing out that the
island is situated some ten miles to the south-east of Ojair, the point recognized by H is
M ajesty’ s Government as the furthest limit of Ottoman jurisdiction in El Hassa, and
that this violation of the status quo would only needlessly create a fresh incident. His
Excellency promised to study the question and let me know the result later on, but
from the evasive nature of his replies to m y repeated representations of last summer I
have some doubt about obtaining a definite settlement as desired by H is M ajesty’ s
Government and suspect that the withdrawal of the military post reported by me on
September 27th 1909(3) was m erely owing to the termination o f the fishing season
during which the Turks pretended the presence o f their gendarmes to be necessary to
maintain order among the Dowasir fishermen from Bahrein who frequent the island.
In a report received by the Porte from the Mutessarif of El Hassa the latter, after
giving the dimensions &c. of Zakhnuniyeh, maintained that it was practically part of
the mainland, thus revealing the pretensions of the Turks not only to the island but
to the coast south-east of Ojair.
Mr. Crow in his telegram o f August 6th 1910(4) reported that the Yali of
Basra has now appointed a Mudir, or sub-Governor, at Odeid. All this seems to
point to a determination to assert and extend Ottoman sovereignty in the neighbour­
hood o f El Katr and it seems to me only prudent that His M ajesty’ s Government
should make up its mind as to the attitude to be adopted towards Young Turkey’ s

0 ) [M r. C row ’ s despatch to S ir G. L ow th er (N o. 41) o f J u ly 1, 1910, is n ot re p rod u ced as

its con ten ts a re sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F.O . 371/1004. 3 1 3 8 6 /5 6 0 7 /1 0 /4 4 .)]
(2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 328) o f M ay 30, 1909, D . 6 p .m ., is n ot rep rod u ced .
I t stated th a t H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t did n ot recogn ise T urkish ju risd ictio n south o f O jair
and requested S ir G. L ow th er to call th e a tten tion o f th e P o rte to this p oin t. (F .O . 371 /77 6.
1 9 9 4 4 /1 9 9 4 4 /0 9 /4 4 .)]
(3) [S ir G. L ow th er’ s teleg ram (N o. 334) o f Septem b er 27, 1909, D . 9-20 p .m ., R . 9-45 p .m .,
is not rep rod u ced , as its con ten ts are sufficiently in d ic a te d above. (F.O . 371 /77 6. 36008/
1 9 9 4 4 /0 9 /4 4 .)]
(4) [M r. C row ’ s teleg ram to S ir G. L ow th er o f A u g u st 6, 1910, is n ot rep rod u ced , as it
can n ot be tra ce d .]
[10900] B
general forward policy in the regions of the Gulf. Under the old régime we
temporized, but it seems that now a more definite and direct attitude may become
expedient, if not necessary. The vigorous action of the Vali of Basra in dealing with
the Sheikh of Mohammerah and in the bombardment of Zein showed a determination
to assert Turkish sovereign rights, while Mr. Lorim er in his telegram of August 16th,
records his conviction that the high-handed methods employed by the authorities of
Bagdad in the matter of the demolition of Messrs. L y n ch ’ s premises and the
threatened encroachments on the Residency were intended to demonstrate that
foreign subjects and interests are at their mercy. This policy, if not checked, may
be extended to the sepoy guard of the Residency and to the “ Com et,” the presence
of both of which is highly distasteful to Turkish national sentiment, while it is not
impossible that we may eventually find a boycott, as in the case of the Greeks and
Austrians, started against L yn ch ’ s steamers with the object of driving this foreign
com pany with its foreign flag off Turkish internal waters. The old régime was
econom ically old-fashioned and negative as regards the assertion of its sovereign
rights. After the change in July 1908 and while the Cabinet was composed of the
Elder Liberal statesmen who had preserved the traditions of the A ’ ali Pashas and
Fuad Pashas of the time of the Crimean war and after, we had pro-British dem on­
strations reflecting the views of the men in power and it was felt that Young Turkey,
under their guidance, would shrink from raising awkward questions as to our position
at Koweit, Bagdad, Cyprus, Egypt, &c. But it was noticed at the time that prominent
Committee men took no part in these demonstrations and seemed rather to
discountenance them, and, when in 1909 the Committee took over the machinery of
Government, the Elder Liberal statesmen and pro-British demonstrators were put in
the background and their voices and sentiments silenced by the State of Siege, though
the present rulers have to reckon with them to a certain extent. The Committee,
composed of younger men, is more modern and businesslike, while it is also more
positive and self-assertive as regards the vindication of its “ n a tion a l” rights. It is
not swayed hv sentiment but has adopted the doctrine of real-politik and not
unnaturally believes that Young Turkey has to play a prominent, if not the principal,
part in the Asiatic revival and work in sympathy with cognate forces in Persia, Egypt
and India.
In its internal form the Committee appears to be a Judæo-Turkish dual alliance,
the Turks supplying a splendid military material and the Jews the brain, enterprise,
m oney (e.g., Djavid B ey’ s recent loan in Paris) and a strong press influence in Europe,
while, as shown by Sionist literature since the revolution, the Jewish world seems to
have now turned its eyes towards Mesopotamia as the land best suited to Jewish
colonization and the ultimate form ation of a Jewish autonomous State. The Jews who
now seem to inspire and control the inside machinery of the State and are bent on the
economic and industrial capture of Young Turkey, appear determined that no
important enterprise shall be started in Mesopotamia without their participation, if
not control, and it is perhaps significant that the attacks on Sir W illiam W illcocks
have been led by a Jew in a Jewish organ here and the opposition to the Lynch scheme
in Turkish circles wTas mainly the work of Sassoon Effendi, the Jewish deputy for
Bagdad. The Jews, in order to maintain their position of influence in Young Turkey
circles, have to play up to, if not encourage, Turkish “ n a tionalist” tendencies and
the two elements make a distinctly strong combination which has to be reckoned with,
especially by those interested in Mesopotamia. It must, m oreover, not be forgotten
that the present form of Constitutionalism in Turkey is not one which the masses have
risen up and demanded, but is rather a form which a free-thinking oligarchy have
imposed on the masses at the point of the bayonet. This minority, who are also in a
sense anti-clerical, have felt the necessity of replacing the old theocratic conception
of the deeply religious Mussulman by a new Panislamic and Panasiatic creed. Again
the purely Turkish element, inspired by its past traditions of conquest and its martial
superiority, naturally arrogates to itself the role of protector of other Asiatic and
Islamic peoples. The result is a strong anti-Russian current, as, in their phraseology,
 Russia “ lias usurped and oppresses g Asiatic Mussulmans, and a similar, if less strong
anti-British current owing to our position in India. Aden. E gypt, the Persian Gulf and
especially owing to the Anglo-Russian entente regarding Persia and Afghanistan.
Thus the natural corollary of this perfervid Asiatic-cum -Islam ic sentiment is a
com m unity o f interest between Puissia and England more particularly in Persia while
France owing to her position in Tunis Algiers and M orocco also, though in a lesser
degree, comes in for a share of Young Turkey’ s resentment.
Had Turkey’ s “ Constitutionalism ” been an approximation to real liberal and
popular institutions, allowing a certain amount of free play to the difft rent elements,
she would like Austria have formed internally a natural equipoise of races and would
have felt no necessity to adopt a chauvinistic attitude in her foreign politics, an
attitude which is, so to speak, potentially aggressive.
The Turkish masses put up with thirty odd years of the despotism of Yildiz and
especially the severer form which obtained during the second half, i.e. since the
Armenian massacres, practically without a murmur, and there is 110 reason why they
should not similarly endure for a considerable period the more go-a-head despotism of
the Committee. But should the position of the latter be shaken owing to an explosion
of internal disaffection or an external shock, or a com bination of both, we should almost
certainly see a repetition of the pro-British demonstrations of 1908, somewhat
embarrassing as they were.
W e must however take facts as they are and, as far as Mesopotamia is concerned,
Young Turkey’ s policy is to spare neither energy nor m oney to create a strong military
force in those regions, to disarm the refractory tribes and bring them under effective
control and, in a word, to impress the Arabs and show them that the Turk is master
against all comers, native or foreign. It must too be remembered that the present
military Governor General of Bagdad’ s semi-Viceregal powers run from Hekkiari in
the North to Mohannnerah and to El Ivatr in the Arabian Peninsula and the Turks
have a natural desire and pretension to pose as the protectors of the weaker Asiatic
Mussulman state of Persia.
The Committee has been compared to a steamroller, which in a semi-republican
manner, is determined to level all privileges, starting with those of the Palace. It has
done so in Albania and Boum elia and is now busy in Syria. It also somewhat logically
feels a desire to apply the same levelling process to the privileged or predominant
position of foreigners, e.g. of the British, in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Had
they proceeded slowly and gradually their policy would have been more successful and
encountered less objection and resistance. But what appears to natives and foreigners
as undue haste and abruptness of method seem to be the prevailing characteristics of
the new régime and the recent action of the authorities at Bagdad in the matter of the
arbitrary dem olition of L y n ch ’ s premises and their intention of unnecessarily running
a road through the grounds of H is M ajesty’ s Consulate General are only instances in
point. One cannot help sym pathizing with the desire of a regained consciousness of
national independence to assert itself but the present mental attitude of the Young
Turks is rather destructive and devoid of a feeling of give and take. Given this frame
of mind, it would seem only prudent of us not to rem ind them either in the public
press or privately, of our commercial or political predominance in Irak or the Gulf, as
such assertions only nerve them to further attempts to diminish our prestige and
undermine our predominance.
The external manifestations of our special position in those regions which wound
their susceptibilities are, apart from the general situation in the adjoining districts of
South Persia, the size of our Residency buildings and grounds at Bagdad, the Sepoy
Guard, the B .I .M .S . “ C o m e t , ” the British flag flown by two o f L y n ch ’ s steamers
on Turkey’ s internal waters, the status of the Sheikh of Koweït and his influence and
position as regards the Mumtefik, Ibn Saoud, &c. ; Bahrein and El Katr, if not indeed
the Trucial Coast and Muscat.
The Sepoy guard and the “ C o m e t ” which are the survival of a state of things
which is passing away in proportion as Bagdad becomes accessible to the outside
[10900] B 2
 4

world are in a way incompatible with an effective assertion of Turkey’ s territorial

sovereignty and give a certain legitimate ground for umbrage to the Turkish
authorities, but until the new régime is able to stand alone without the prop of martial
law in the capital if not indeed until the time comes to do away with the Capitulations
it would seem premature to consider any suggestion towards abolishing them, except,
perhaps, as part of a general bargain or liquidation of our position vis-à-vis of Turkey
in the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf.
After the revival of the Constitution an attempt was made to settle the question
o f the British flag on L yn ch ’ s steamers by fusing the latter with the “ Mehrieh ”
Ottoman Company and, had Kiam il Pasha or H ilmi Pasha retained power, the scheme
would doubtless have been sanctioned, but, as will be remembered, a section o f the
Committee took up an uncom promising attitude, the project fell through and it only
remains for the present to endeavour to protect L yn ch ’ s acquired rights, but the
possibility of friction ending in an anti-Lynch boycott cannot be excluded.
As regards KoweitC) and Sheikh M ubarek’ s sphere of influence, His M ajesty’ s
Government in 1902 contended that he had always been independent and that his
father had specially stipulated such independence when he allowed Turkish troops to
cross his territory during Midhat Pasha’ s expeditions to El Hasa (called Nejd by the
Turks). The Turks maintained that Koweit was an integral portion of the Ottoman
E m pire and pointed to the Turkish flag flown there and the grade of Pasha accepted
by the Sheikh. To this latter argument my predecessor replied that these were merely
emblems of the Sheikh’ s spiritual dependence on the Caliph, and the status quo basis
was agreed to, but the Turks interpreted it as m eaning that Koweit was an integral
part of their territory. In their mind E ngland’ s interference there was due to our
rivalry with Germany over the terminal section of and point of the Bagdad Railway
and they expect to get the question settled favourably to their contention when final
arrangements are made for the com pletion of that enterprise.
As regards Zaknuniyeh, El Katr and Bahrein which in a way form one group,
the active forward policy o f the Young Turk Yali o f Basra and the Mutessarif of
E l Hasa (Nejd) have already brought us into sharp conflict and there seems no doubt
that we should insist on Turkish exclusion from the district South o f Ojair. I f the
M inister for Foreign Affairs after studying the question of Zaknunieh and Odeid
and consulting his colleagues does not give categorical instructions for the non-inter­
ference of the Turkish local authorities, it would seem necessary subject to the views
o f His M ajesty’ s Government to take a strong line. F or, to the Turkish mind,
/Zaknunieh is a sort o f stepping stone to El Katr and perhaps even to the Trucial
Coast. The Turks do not put forward any valid claims to justify their territorial
acquisitions in those parts, but it is not difficult to glean that they base their claims
on the fact that in the beginning o f the sixteenth century a Turkish flotilla under
Pialé Pasha annexed Gwadur in South Baluchistan and sailed up the Gulf com pelling
the Arab chiefs to acknowledge the sovereignty o f the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph.
They further feel that as the dominant Islam ic power they have undefined right to
bring under their allegiance and to protect the small Arab Moslem tribes &c. in the
Arabian Peninsula.
This second claim is of course untenable from an international law point of view
and is a strange derogation from the much vaunted principle o f ‘ ‘ Ottomanism ’ ’ as
opposed to Islamism supposed to be the keystone of the new régime. ' The first claim
is barred b y the absence of effective occupation for close on three centuries and is
consequently inadmissible as shown by the arrangements with Germany by which
H is M ajesty’ s Government acknowledge the latter’ s rights in the Cameroons, South
W est Africa &c.
Should the present Turkish Government prove obdurate in the matters of
Zaknunieh and the Mudir of Odeid, it would be well, I think, to remember that in
applying the methods of coercion employed under the old régim e, it was a question

(s) [cp . G ooch db T em p erley, V ol. T, pp. 333-4, A p p .]

 of bringing pressure to bear on a Sultan who did not allow such incidents to be
discussed in the native press, whereas the present rulers, who owing to youthful
inexperience have perhaps less sense o f caution and responsibility, may through the
native press which is not allowed to criticize their acts rouse public opinion by appeals
to the fanaticism and ultra-national feelings of the ignorant masses and by depicting
England as aggressively hostile to Islam. I do not, however, think that we should
be deterred by such methods. Young Turkey is now on fairly friendly terms with
Austria despite the amputation of Bosnia and H erzegovina while, though the Russian
Embassy have been extremely complacent and apparently in relations o f most intimate
friendship with the leading members of the Committee, the latter’ s organs have not
refrained from fierce attacks on Russia and her policy. Again during the last nine
months the blandishments showered by the French Embassy and Government on
the Young Turks have not deterred them from taking up a line of sharp antagonism
to French semi-official finance in the matter of a recent loan and courting the
displeasure o f French Government circles by rather violent criticisms in the
“ Tanin ” &c.
On page 22 of the Confidential M emorandum of February 1908(6) respecting
British interests in the Persian Gulf, the Trucial Coast is said to extend to E l Odeid
and the Abu Dthabi are reckoned among the Trucial Chiefs, while on page 42
Colonel Pelly is quoted as having in 1872 regarded El Odeid as properly belonging to
Aber [sic] Dthabi. In 1904 after the appointment by the Turks of a mudir at Wakra
had been cancelled, the Government o f India expressed forcibly their view that a
treaty should be negotiated with Sheikh Ahm ed, but this course was deprecated by
m y predecessor, Sir N. R . O ’ Conor, who regarded the conclusion of the proposed
Treaty as then inopportune. Should His M ajesty’ s Government and the Governm ent
o f India now decide on the expediency of making such a treaty, there would seem
to me no objection from the Constantinople point of view, and the time m ay not be
far distant when, as advocated by Lord Lansdowne in February 1905,f7) a com prehen­
sive, as opposed to piecemeal treatment of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf,
including the withdrawal, absolute or against some quid pro quo, of the Turkish post
at E l Bidaia may become imperative, if indeed it is not forced upon us. In their
despatch of February 21 1907 the Governm ent of India expressed the view that the
chances of Turkey re-establishing her authority in Eastern Arabia to be remote and
even contemplated the prospect of the Turks disappearing altogether from the whole
of Arabia south o f Zobehr. The revival of the Turkish Constitution in 1908 and the
events of the last two years have considerably if not profoundly modified the situation
in the Near East. The Turkish revolution was not m erely a change of régime and
reign, as it appeared to some, but meant the awakening o f new and powerful forces
on the lines o f an Asiatic or Turkish revival. In 1903 our position in the Gulf seemed

( 6) [T h is M em orand um , d a ted F eb ru a ry 12, 1908, is e n titled “ M em orand um resp ectin g

B ritish In terests in the P ersian G u lf ” (C on fid en tia l P r in t 9161). I t con ta in s an ex h au stiv e
survey o f the su b ject.] :
( 7) [I n a le tte r to the In d ia Office, da ted F eb ru a ry 18, 1905, L o rd L an sd ow n e’ s o p in ion was
expressed “ th a t th e m a tter [then und er discussion, i.e., th e renew al o f the A g reem en t o f 1868]
should be deferred t ill the w hole q uestion o f th e p olicy to he pu rsued in the P ersia n G u lf has
been fu lly ex am in ed by th e C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D e fe n c e .” (F .O . 78/5 45 5.) T he F o re ig n
Office m em orandum o f F ebru ary 12, 1908, cited in th e im m ed ia tely p reced in g note, refers to
the n e g otia tion s on the proposal to con clu d e a tre a ty w ith the Sheikh o f El Ivatr on th e lines
o f the A g reem en t o f 1868, and adds the follow in g sta te m e n t: —
“ I t was decid ed th a t th e q uestion should b e subm itted to the C om m ittee o f Im p eria l
D efen ce, w ho do n ot a p p ea r to have record ed any definite o p in io n .”

In a M in u te da ted the 5th F eb ru a ry, 1905, L o rd L ansdow ne w rote as fo llo w s : —

“ I feel stron gly th a t th e tim e has com e w hen all these questions should be con sid ered,
not as we have been in the h a b it o f con s id erin g them — piecem eal and as they arise— b u t
as pa rts o f a P ersian G u lf p olicy , the p rin cip les o f w hich should b e ca refu lly la id dow n
fo r ou r g u id a n ce.” ]
 0

threatened by Eussia and Lord Lansdow ne’ s declaration in the House of L ord s(8)
had in view the possible aggressive expansion of other Powers than Turkey, but the
latter is now bent on an active and forward policy there and after the recent
acquisition of m oney in Paris and additions to her fleet from Germ any, we may soon
see one or more Turkish naval units cruising in the Gulf. A ship flying the Turkish
flag will certainly produce a greater effect on the Arabs than did the “ Variag ” while
the meddlesome tactlessness of Turkish naval officers and their desire to have coaling
stations &c. may give rise to troublesome incidents.
I was recently confidentially inform ed of the drift of a report on the Persian
Gulf and E ngland’ s position there compiled by Mahmoud B ey, the Ottoman Consul-
General at Bom bay and his subordinate Jelal B ey, both of whom seem to be keen
and active officials. The report sketches the way in which Great Britain has built
up her influence by generous pecuniary treatment of the Arab chiefs at Muscat and
elsewdiere and urges that the Ottoman Government should em ploy similar methods
which, it says, ought to be more successful than those of England owdng to the
Islam ic tie between the Arabs and the Turks.
Some remarks in this despatch may sound like severe criticism of the policy
of the present rulers of Turkey and I may perhaps point out that m y official and
private relations vdth those in power are quite cordial, while their professions of
friendship for Great Britain are frequent and, I have no doubt, genuine, but I feel
that this should not blind us to the main trend of Young Turkey aspirations and to
the likelihood that the prosecution of their national programme will bring British
and Ottoman real or fancied interests into conflict in several parts of the Arab world
and perhaps especially in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Hussein Jahid B ey,
deputy for Constantinople, the fidus Achates o f Djavid B ey the Minister of Finance
and the spokesman of the Committee in the “ Tanin ” has recently told us in a
couple of signed articles that Y oung Turkey must strain every nerve to increase her
land and naval forces and that wdien the Minister of W ar can dispose of 1.500,000
bayonets and the Minister of Marine o f a considerable Naval force Turkey’ s Minister
for Foreign Affairs will be considered as one of the greatest of European Statesmen
and Turkey will then “ wrreak vengeance on those who do not now treat her with
proper regard .” Some officers in high positions have been heard indulging in
similar outbursts and an aide-de-camp of the Minister of W ar recently declared to
an Englishm an here that Turkey w^ould, if put to it, light the Islam ic torch from
Calcutta to Marocco. These and other such expressions of a Crescentade spirit need
not be taken too literally, but they cannot be entirely ignored as they are indicative
of strong undercurrents.
In this connexion, I have the honour to enclose copies of three articles(9) which
have recently appeared in the “ Jeune T u rc,” a Committee inspired paper which,
like the ‘ ‘ Neue Freie Presse ” of Vienna is financed and directed by Jews. The
latter’ s detestation of Eussia which is one of the features of Young Turkey is
frequently reflected in its columns and in one of theenclosed articles A. A.
(i.e. Ahmed Agaief, a Musulman from the Crimea') represents English statesmen
as having of recent years adopted a policy inconsistent with British traditions by
concluding certain “ ententes,” alluding to the Anglo-Eussian Entente. The Articles
inveigh against what they erroneously call the Triple Entente and try to make Young
Turkey incline towards the Triple Alliance.
I have. Ac.
GEBARD LOW TH EB.

( 8) [r . Purl. D eb ., 4th S er., V ol. 121, p. 1348. T he d ecla ra tion was m ade on M a y 5, 1903.
cp. Coach (£ T em perleu, V ol. I V , p. 371, No. 3 21 ; p. 454, No. 4 10 ; p. 478, N o. 429.]
( 9) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 7

No. 2 .

Sir F . Bertie to Sir Edward, G rey.

[B y Bag.'J
F.O . 371/992.
3 03 1 4 /1 0 0/10 44. Paris, D. October 6 , 1910.
Tel. (No. 76.) Secret. En clair. B . October 7, 1910.
M. Pichon has information from Constantinople that «the German Ambassador
has warned the Turkish Government that any arrangement that they may make with
France and England on the subject of the Bagdad Railway will be regarded by
Germany as null and void.

M IN U T E .

T he p u rp o r t o f the w a rn in g is not q u ite c le a r ; it w ould be alm ost im possible fo r T u rk ey

t o m ake any a greem ent w ith ou t G erm a n y ’ s con sen t— as T u rkey is tied hand an d fo o t by the
C onvention o f 1 903.(')
A. P.
O c t fo b e r ] 7, 1910.
R . P . M.
A. N.
E. G.

(A j|. Gooch cfc T em pertey, V ol. II, p. 174. Ed. N o te, where a b rie f sum m ary o f this
a greem ent is given. It was sign ed on M arch 5, 1903, and is published in full in B E S T .
V ol. 102, pp. S33-48.]

No. 3.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward G rey.

F .O . 371/992.
4 3 0 7 1 /1 0 0 /1 0 /4 4 .
(No. 852.) Constantinople, D. N ovem ber 23, 1910.
Sir, R . N ovem ber 28, 1910.
I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch/1! from Ilis M ajesty’ s
Consul General at Bagdad reporting that Sir W . W illcocks now advocates the
construction of a railway from Bagdad to Basra to afford an outlet for the produce
of the districts comprised in the Mesopotamian irrigation works, instead o f the
railway direct to the Mediterranean of which he was form erly an ardent cham pion.
Sir W . W illcocks has submitted his plans to the Yali of Bagdad.
It is more than probable that such a line would be a paying concern, but there
is one obvious objection to it from the point o f view of the Turkish Treasury, viz.
that it must by its com] etition reduce the receipts on the Bagdad--Basra section of
the German Bagdad Railway, and pro tanto increase the liability of the Turkish
Government under the heading o f Kilom etric guarantees, which as you will rem em ber
are calculated over the whole o f the line, and not over the individual sections.
From our own point o f view it occurs to me that it is to he apprehended that
if Sir W . W illcocks’ s proposal were carried into effect by the Turkish Government
or on its account by a syndicate, some arrangement might he come to between the
Germans and the Porte, hv which, when the German ra-'lway reached Bagdad from
the W est, the W illcocks railway would be taken over by them and incorporated in

0 ) [N o t re p rod u ced .]
 8

the German line. The Germans would thus avoid competition, the Ottoman Treasury
would escape from increased liability in respect of kilometric guarantees and the
Bagdad Railway would be carried to the shores of the Persian Gulf at an earlier
date than if built continuously from the W est.
I have, &c.
C H A R LE S M. M A R LIN G .

No. 4.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward G r e y .i1)

P .O . 371/992.
4 6 5 6 9 /1 0 0 /1 0 /4 4 .
(No. 920.) Confidential. Constantinople, D. D ecem ber 20, 1910.
Sir, R. D ecem ber 28, 1910.
As I had the honour to report in m y despatch No. 918 of to-day’ s d a te./2) Rifaat
Pasha at the end of our conversation of this m orning introduced the topic of the
Bagdad Railway. His Excellency said that, as he understood it, the desire of His
M ajesty’ s Government was to protect their commercial interests which they conceived
to be threatened if the Railway were entirely controlled by Germany and that they
therefore wished that the Bagdad-“ to the terminus ’ ’ section should not be constructed
and worked by Germans and he suggested that adequate protection would be assured
if that section were built and exploited by an Ottoman Company or by the Ottoman
Governm ent. I pointed out to H is E xcellency that, as the two lines would be
presumably worked on the same system, the Administrative Board of the German Line
would naturally have a considerable voice in the joint management, wdiereas unless
the Turkish Government was ready to admit an adequate British element on the Board
of the Turkish line, we should have none at all ; and I further asked H is E xcellency
how the Germans would view the loss of what promised to be the most paying portion
of their concession : from a financial point of view it would of course affect the
Turkish Treasury more than the Germans as the loss of the receipts on this section
would tend to raise the amount for which Turkey is liable in respect of the kilometric
guarantees. Rifaat Pasha said that the Germans wrere ready to make concessions—
though he would not specify of what nature they wTould be— and went on to say that
of course British trade would be guaranteed a fair share in the orders for matériel &c
for the Turkish line. He believed that if there was a sincere desire on both sides to
com e to an agreement, a solution of the question satisfactory to H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent could be found, and suggested that as the direct negotiations between the
Germans and ourselves had failed, we might address ourselves to Turkey to act as
interm ediary. I told His E xcellency that I was sure that H is M ajesty’ s Government
would welcome any suggestion that promised a satisfactory solution of this thorny
question, and recomm ended that if the Sublime Porte had any definite proposal to
make, they should instruct Tewfik Pasha to communicate it to you in London.
You will note that Rifaat Pasha’ s suggestions do not go beyond those made to
Sir G. Lowther by H is Excellency and Hakki Pasha in May last (see Sir G. Lowdher’ s
No. 276 Secret of May 3rd)(3) and that no reply has been given, as then promised by
His Highness, to your despatch No. 107 Secret o f the 20th A p ril,/4) of which a copy
was handed in by Sir Gerard on your instructions.

(*) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r;

to L o rd C rew e.]
(2) [M r. M a rlin g ’ s despatch (N o. 918), D . D ecem b er 20, It. D ecem b er 28, 1910, is not
rep rod u ced . The con v ersation there re p o rte d referred chiefly to the cha nge in A n g lo-T u rk ish
relation s and the im pression e x istin g in T u rkey th a t G reat B r ita in was losin g her in terest in
th a t cou n try . (F .O . 371/1017. H Ü I /4 6 5 6 7 /1 0 /4 4 .) ]
(3) [r . d ooch <fc T em perley, V ol. V I , pp. 475-7, No. 359.]
P ) [v. ibid., pp. 468-72, No. 352 ]
 9

Although Rifaat Pasha put marked emphasis on his wish to see a solu tion ,
satisfactory to ourselves of this question, I am rather sceptical of any real sincerity on
the part o f the Ottoman Government. You will remember that prior to the approaches
made to Mr. W hittall by Dr. Gwinner a year ago, H ilm i Pasha who was then Grand
Vizier hinted to me once or twice that Turkey could or would promote an arrange­
m ent; the pourparlers between Sir E . Cassel and Dr. Gwinner however only resulted
in inadmissible proposals being put forward by the Germans with the object of
saddling us with the onus of refusing to continue the negotiations which, if successful,
carried with them an assent to the increase o f the 4 % .( 5) Very possibly similar tactics
are now being pursued, the difference being that the unacceptable basis for an under­
standing would be put forward by Turkey instead of Germany, and that possibly more
plausible terms will be submitted to us. At any rate I feel convinced that the real
object of the Turks is to endeavour to force our hand with regard to the 4 % .
At the same time it is I think safe to affirm from these overtures that the Turks
are more than a little uneasy both at the silent disapprobation we have shown of their
general policy, and also at the unexpected support which we gave to France in the
question of the loan. The Grand Vizier was very careful in his Declarations in
Parliament to disclaim any resentment over the latter question against the French or
ourselves, and once or twice similar statements have appeared in the Committee
Press. This does not in m y opinion in any way im ply a permanent alteration in the
Comm ittee’ s policy as expounded in the secret resolutions of the Congress at Salonica
last month, but m erely that Javid B ey recognizes that the financial requirements of
the country make it temporarily necessary to show a conciliatory attitude towards us
in the hope of opening the London market for a future loan, and also that the
Committee are aware that a considerable section of its party in the Chamber and the
great mass o f public opinion views with mistrust the departure from the traditional
policy of friendship towards England and France.
I have, &c.
C H A R L E S M. M A R L IN G .

(5) [F o r the G w in n er-C a ssel n e g otia tion s of 1909-10, v. G ooch <i T em p erley, V ol. V I,
pp. 380-433, passim .]

No. 5.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.

F .O . 371/268.
251/Case 6 2 2 /1 0 /4 5 0 .
(No. 942.) Vera, D. D ecem ber 29, 1910.
Sir, R. January 3, 1911.
In speaking yesterday of the recent Italian incident at Hodeidah, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs expatiated to me at some length on the prevalence o f arms
smuggling in the Red Sea, and asked if it would not be possible for some arrangement
to be reached between Italy, Turkey, France and Great Britain to check it. H e was
aware that France had raised difficulties at the Brussels Conference which had
practically resulted in the break-down of the negotiations, but he hoped that some
arrangement affecting the Red Sea only m ight be concluded, and he was instructing
Tewfik Pasha to sound you on the subject. I said that I was very imperfectly
acquainted with what had occurred at Brussels, but if I rem em bered rightly one point
to which France had raised objections was the inclusion of her North African
possessions in the scope of the C onference; I was sure that whatever proposals the
Porte might now put forward would be considered in a friendly spirit by His M ajesty’ s
Government who held strong views on the necessity of suppressing the illicit trade
in arms.
In this connection I may m ention that a few days ago the j ‘ Tanine ” published
an extract from the reports of Ismail ITakki Bey Babanzade, the deputy who was
sent to furnish the Government with information of the condition of affairs in the
Mesopotamian Vilayets, dwelling on the necessity of suppressing the illicit trade in
arms in the Persian Gulf, and when Bifaat Pasha m entioned to me the wish of his
Governm ent to obtain our co-operation in putting down the traffic in the Bed Sea it
occurred to me that the opportunity might be utilised to invite the Porte to come to
an understanding with us on the same question in the Gulf. Becollecting, however,
the anti-English tone of Ismail lla k k i’ s report (enclosed in m y despatch No. 939 of
the 28th Instant)/1) which will have great weight with the Governm ent, and which
will m oreover indubitably confirm the Committee of Union and Progress in its anti­
British policy, I thought it better to say nothing to Bifaat Pasha, and a further
instalment of Ismail Ilak k i’ s report, translation of which, taken from the “ Jeune
Turc ” of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith,(2) confirms me in
the belief that it would be inopportune to bring up the question as regards the Persian
Gulf for the present.
I have, &c.
C H A B L E S M. M A B LIN G .

M IN U T E .

[ I f ] we do rom e to talk to the T urkish G o v [e r m n e n ]t a bou t the G u lf we m ust b ear in

m in d th a t they are an xiou s a bout the con trab a n d tra d e in arm s and th ou g h jo in t action writh
them w ould be em barrassing we should do w hat we can to con v in ce them th a t we w ant it
stop ped.
E. G.

0 ) [M r. M a rlin g ’ s despatch (N o. 939), I). D ecem ber 28. 1910, 11. J a n u a ry 2, 1911, is not
rep rod u ced as it m erely enclosed the re p o rt m en tion ed above. (F .O . 371 /12 36 . 2 9 /2 9 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(2) [N o t rep rod u ced .]

No. 6 .

Mr. Marling to Sir Edumrd G rey.P)

F .O . 371/1232.
8 4 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 1 .
(No. 14.) Secret. Pera, D. January 4, 1911.
Sir, B. January 9, 1911.
Sir H enry Babington Smith has been so good as to give me a memorandum (copy
enclosed) o f an interview which he had with the Grand Vizier on the 29th Ultimo,
with the object of enquiring what prospects the Government could hold out of putting

(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g . C opies w ere sent to the
In d ia O ffice; to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e ra tio n s; to the C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D efence.
I t was sent to P a r is ; to B e r lin ; to St. P e t e r s b u r g h ; to C on stan tin op le.]
 11

business in the way of the National Bank so as to warrant it in continuing to operate

in Turkey. Sir H enry has forwarded to Sir Arthur Nicolson a copy of this
m emorandum and will no doubt have com m ented on the Grand V izier’ s reply on
which I need not therefore dwell, but the point to which I venture now to invite your
attention is His H ighness’ reference to Koweit.
What brought the matter to Hakki Pasha’ s mind was no doubt Sir H en ry’s
allusion to Ismail Hakki B abanzade’ s recently published reports on Mesopotamia
and the neighbouring regions, and more particularly the violent article from his pen
which appeared in the “ Tanine ” of the 28th o f December and which was specially
devoted to British action in Koweit and British relations with the Sheikh of
Mohammerah (see m y despatch No. 15 o f to-day). (2) Hakki Pasha had however just
previously spoken of the Bagdad Railway, and, after his mention o f Koweit, again
reverted to it, so that it may be inferred that the Grand Vizier for the m oment had,
as was suggested in Sir Gerard L ow ther’ s despatch No. 603 of the 29th August
last,(3) like the Young Turks, conceived the idea of making the solution of the two
questions interdependent.(J)
Be that as it m ay, it seems probable that the question of Koweit will be raised
at no distant date, if indeed it is not, as Ism ail Hakki counsels, forced upon us.
This latter contingency is, I think, un likely; but I venture to suggest that it might
be well for H is M ajesty’ s Government to consider whether in the event of the Porte
inviting us to discuss the Koweit question it will be more expedient to enter into
pourparlers or to postpone negotiations for some little time. Looking at the present
aggressive attitude of the Committee of Union and Progress, which as you are aware,
is the real power guiding the affairs o f Turkey, postponement would seem the wiser
course. The defections from the Com m ittee’ s ranks and its dwindling majorities in
the Chamber show that its position is less secure now than a few months a g o ; there
are also signs that Mahmoud Shevket Pasha and the senior officers by no means
approve the direction given by it to Turkish policy. The lesson learnt by the refusal
of the French Government to allow the late loan to be quoted in Paris has had its
effect and that there is a tendency in the Committee to m odify its chauvinism at
least temporarily is shown by the substitution in the Secretaryship of the moderate
Haji Adil B ey, lately Vali of Adrianople for the violent Dr. Nazim. Time will
therefore to all appearances bring about a change for the better in our favour, but
on the other hand the causes that are at work may operate slowly, and in the m ean­
while articles such as those o f Ismail H akki,— not to mention hints which have
already appeared in the local press that English intrigues are responsible for the
troubles in Kerek— may do us some harm even in the eyes o f those sections of the
people who have now no doubts as to the sincerity of our friendship.
Another danger from delay lies in the fact that the Turks desire the Bagdad
Railway to be built. It is true that the financial arrangements have only been
completed for the construction as far as E l H elif, but, as the Grand Vizier implied
to Sir H enry Babington Smith, there can be no question but that the m oney will be
found for the annuities for the sections as far as Bagdad. There is even reason to
believe that negotiations for the purpose are already on foot, and it is thus probable
that although the line cannot actually be built for some years, the Germans may
potentially reach Bagdad within a few m onths, and will be free to turn all their
attention and influence to asserting their existing rights under the concession to the
B agdad-B asra-G ulf sections. It is not perhaps out of place to remark here that

( 2I [M r. M a rlin g ’ s despatch (N o. 15), D . J a n u a ry 4, R . J a n u a ry 9, 1911, is not rep rod u ced .

I t dealt w ith th e v iolen t m ethods of the C om m ittee of U n ion and P rog ress in M esopota m ia .
A cop y of th e a rticle referred to above was enclosed. (F .O . 371/1236. 8 4 9 /2 9 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(3) [v. sup ra , pp. 1 -6 , No. 1. I t was da ted A u g u st 22, 1910.]
(4) [M a r g in a l com m ent b y M r. P a r k e r : “ M r. M a rlin g m ust be aw are from th e p rin ted
corresp on d en ce th a t this idea was pu t b efore D ja v id B ey when in L on d on in J u ly last. A. P .”
cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 503-5, Ed. N o te , and N o. 388.]
 12

by her recent pourparlers with Germany Russia appears inclined to disinterest herself
in the Southern sections of the railway.
In m y despatch No. 94*2 o f the 29th U ltim o(5) I expressed the opinion that too
m uch importance need not be attached to the advances made by Rifaat Pasha to us
for a renewal of negotiations for a solution of the railway question, but it is quite
possible that if that question and that of Koweit were treated together, (6) we should
find a genuine and effective desire on the part of the Turks to come to an agreement.
The prospect o f gaining something at Koweit would be a powerful inducement to
them to obtain from the Germans the latitude requisite for them to satisfy our
requirements in the railway question. It should be remembered that the main
object in view when eleven years a go(7) we entered into relations with Sheikh Mubarak
was to prevent the Bagdad Railway from reaching the shores of the Gulf except under
conditions consonant with our interests and I venture to suggest that it is worth while
considering whether the moment is not now approaching when we should endeavour
to turn our acquired position at Koweit to account, and whether if we do not now
seize the opportunity, we may not eventually find that we have saddled ourselves
with responsibilities towards the Sheikh involving us in particularly thorny questions
vis-a-vis of the Turks, without having reaped any commensurate advantage. Our
position as regards the actual terminus of the railway at Koweit m ay still be secure
owing to the agreement of October 1 907,(8) but we might now use the leverage offered
to us by the Turkish anxiety to settle the Koweit question to secure our interests on
the Bagdad-Basra sections; whereas if we do not, and if we allow the line to reach
Basra under purely German control, it appears to me that a very awkward situation
might arise.
A great difficulty in seeking a solution o f the Koweit question at present will be
to find a basis of negotiation. Turkish aspirations will o f course be satisfied with
nothing short of an acknowledgment of Ottoman sovereignty over the Sheikh and
his dependencies, but we have, unfortunately, if I may say so, been led into such
intimate relations with him that it would be impossible for us, with the examples
of Albania and Macedonia before us, to abandon him to the tender mercies of the
Turks.
The loss o f reputation to us both in Arabia and Persia would be imm ense, nor
would the native mind be capable o f appreciating the importance o f the advantages
we should have gained in connection with the railway, hut would readily credit the
Turkish version that we had been compelled to yield to the superior power of the
present Governm ent of Turkey. But on the importance of this in relation to our
position in the Persian Gulf His M ajesty’ s Government will no doubt take the opinion
of the Government o f India.
I have. &c.
C H A R L E S M. M A R L IN G .

(5) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

( 6) [M a rg in a l com m en t by M r. P a r k e r : “ M r. M a rlin g m ust have ov erlook ed th e suggestions
m ade to D ja v id B ey last J u ly, and his a tten tion should he called to them . A. P .” ]
( 7) [M a rg in a l com m en t b y M r. P a r k e r : “ W e have had relation s w ith K ow eit, th o [u g h ]
n ot an agreem ent, fo r over 200 years. A. P . (See S ir Lew is P e lly ’ s rep ort.) ” C olonel [S ir ]
L ew is P elly was P o litica l R esid en t in th e P ersian G u lf and C onsul-G eneral at Bushire. T he
r e p o rt cited was d a ted 1863. F o r the a rrangem ents o f 1899 and 1900 w ith Sheikh M u barak
v. in fra , pp. 107-8, No. 68, en d . 3, A n n e x e s I - I L ]
( 8) [T he S ecret A g reem en t o f O ctob er 15, 1907, was forw a rd ed b y th e P o litica l A g en t at
K o w e it to the R esid en t in the P ersian G u lf on O ctob er 16. I t was in th e form o f a lease
ex ecu ted by Sheikh M u barak. Clause 5 pledged the Sheikh th a t n eith er he n or his heirs “ w ill
g ra n t, sell or lease to a for e ig n G overnm ent, and in this is in clu d ed the O ttom an G overnm ent,
n or to the subjects o f any fo r e ig n G overnm ent, any o f ou r land w ith in K o w e it b oundaries, or
arou n d it, w ith ou t the perm ission o f th e precious Im p eria l E nglish G overn m en t.” (F.O . 371/532.
3 6 0 /2 2 5 /0 8 /4 4 .) M a teria l rela tin g to th e n eg otia tion o f this agreem en t is con ta in ed in
F.O. 3 7 1 /3 5 1 .]
 IB

Enclosure in No. 6 .

M emorandum by Sir H . Babington Sm ith. ( 9;

Interview with Hakki Pasha, D ecem ber 29, 1910.

I inform ed Hakki Pasha that I was leaving for London in a few days, and it
would be necessary to arrive at a decision regarding the future of the National Bank.
As he was aware, recent events had raised grave doubts as to whether the Bank
could, with advantage, continue its operations. The decision of this question would
depend, in great measure, upon the prospect o f obtaining active and practical support
from the Governm ent. The Bank would never have been started, unless the
invitation o f the Ottoman Government and the attitude o f the British Government
had given it expectations o f support from both.
Hakki Pasha said that in England there appeared to be a mistaken idea that,
because a concession had been given for the Bagdad Railway, the ground wTas entirely
occupied, and there was no room for any other enterprize in T u rk ey.(10) This, he said,
was a com plete mistake. The Bagdad Railway was an existing concession. If it
were to be given again it would very likely be arranged in a different m an ner; but
anyhow, there it was, and it could not be revoked. But The Turkish E m pire was
large, and there was room for very m any other enterprises, which were open not
only to German capital, but to British capital; and British capital would be heartily
welcomed.
I said that I did not think that this erroneous view was held by anyone who
was well inform ed. It was undoubtedly true that the Bagdad question had assumed
great importance in the relations between E ngland, Turkey and Germ any, both in
itself and in relation to the position in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf generally.
If the Bagdad question could be settled in a satisfactory manner, I was convinced
that it would have an admirable effect on the relations o f the three countries.
Hakki Pasha said that the question of Koweit was at the root of the Turkish
feelin g(n ) about the British action in that part o f the world. On this subject he spoke
strongly. H e said that he regarded as beyond doubt that British action in relation
to Koweit had been unjust. Under British protection, although there was not a
protectorate in the technical sense o f the tvord, Koweit was the cen tre(12) o f the
contraband arms traffic, and a source of continual conflict with its neighbours. So
long as this anomalous state o f affairs existed, it was impossible to restore peace
and order in that part o f the world. Koweit was like a thorn stuck in the side of
T u rk e y; and it was British action there, more than anywhere else, that had created
suspicions o f British aims in Mesopotamia.
I said I was not acquainted with the details o f the question; but whatever the
rights or wrongs of the matter His H ighness knew perfectly well that British action
regarding Koweit was not directed against Turkey, but against the possibility of

( 9) [T h e te x t is ta ken from th e co p y en closed in M r. M a rlin g ’ s despatch. A cop y was also

sent b y S ir H . B a b in g ton Sm ith to S ir A. N icolson , and the m a rg in a l notes g iv en below are
en tered on th a t cop y. (F.O . 371/12.32. 6 3 7 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
( 10) [M a r g in a l n ote b y S ir L . M a lle t: “ N o w o n d e r : since th e T u rks have refu sed our
a p p lica tion fo r th e T ig ris R a ilw ay . I t was we w ho p o in te d ou t to them,, th a t th e y w ere not
preclu d ed from g iv in g oth er concessions hu t t o no pu rpose. L . M .” F o r the B ritish a p p li­
ca tion and th e refusal o f T u rk ey , v. G ooch & T em p crley, V ol. V I , pp. 374-5, N o. 2 7 2 ; pp. 376-7,
Nos. 2 7 4 -5 ; p. 405, N o. 3 0 4 ; p. 433, N o. 3 2 4 ; pp . 471-2, N o. 352 U p. 474, N o. 3 5 7 ; pp. 492-3,
Nos. 3 77 -8 .]
( n ) [M a r g in a l n ote b y S ir L . M a lle t : “ This, then, is a m ost valu a ble asset in a b a rg a in
and w e should he m ost ca u tiou s in w hat w e say to the T urks. L. M .” ]
( 12) [M a r g in a l n ote by S ir L. M a lle t : “ N o t true. M u sca t is th e cen tre. T h ere ha ve been
a ttem p ts la tely t o d iv e rt it to K o w e it h u t w e h a ve lectu red the Sheikh and are now en g ag ed
in p a tro llin g th e G u lf (as we have in th e past) in ord er to stop it. [L . M . ] ” ]
 14
Koweit falling into other ha n d s.(13) The Grand Vizier said he quite realized this, but
that, practically the action taken by way o f defence against another Power operated
as against Turkey. It was not in any way Turkey’ s interest or desire to permit
any other Power to establish itself there. Even under the old Regim e Abd-U l-H amid
had not allowed the Germans to acquire a coaling station in the Red Sea. The new
Regim e would be even more strongly opposed to any such acquisition. If there were
any doubt as to this, Turkey would be willing to take formal engagements as to the
use of Koweit as a N [a ]v a l station. He said that, in his opinion the matter was
one which ought to be capable of settlement, if there was goodwill on both sides;
but he complained that he had been unable to obtain a frank and full discussion
of the question, which was the first condition o f an understanding.
I said that the matter was not one in which I was entitled to express an opinion,
hut that I saw with great regret the extreme sensitiveness of Turkish opinion as
regards the most innocent and legitimate activities o f Rritish shipping and com m erce
in the gulf. I referred to a recent article by Ismail Ilakki Babanzade, in which the
presence of British shipping at Basra and the extent of British trade were treated
as matters o f offence, and indications of sinister intentions; whereas it was clearly
essential to the prosperity o f the country to welcome all the shipping and trade that
would com e, whatever the nationality. Ilakki Pasha replied that the articles in the
Press must not be taken too seriously. Isiuail Ilakki Babanzade had just returned from
Bagdad and B asra; and what had produced more impression on him than anything
else was the question of Koweit.
The Grand Vizier then returned to the question o f the Bagdad Railway. He
said that the Germans must be allowed to complete the line to Bagdad, but that
he quite recognized that beyond Bagdad it was necessary to find some arrangement
which would satisfy England. W hat precise solution was to be preferred he could
not say. The Germans had certainly “ Droits acquiis,’ ’ and clearly any arrangement
must be a matter for n eg otiation; and it was for the interests concerned to formulate
proposals. The Turkish Governm ent would be very anxious to arrive at a settlement
and would be prepared to bring pressure on the Germans for this object. One
solution would be to make the line south o f Bagdad an international o n e ; another
solution would he that it should be a Turkish Government lin e ,(14) a suitable arrange­
ment being made with the interests concerned for providing the capital.
As regards the position o f Turkey generally, he said that, in his view it was
most undesirable to give any one Power an exclusive or preponderant influence in
Turkish affairs. He wished to rem ain on good terms with all the w orld; and the
interests of Turkey lay in securing the assistance o f all the Powers equally for her
developm ent.
I then spoke again of the position of the Bank. I said that so far the Bank
had received no practical evidence o f the Governm ent’ s desire to support it. No­
Governm ent accounts had been given to us, and the only semi-official account we
had was that o f the Commission de la Flotte. The Constantinople loan had only
been arranged after competition with other banks, and after a struggle lasting over
several m onths. I asked whether he could give me any assurances o f practical support
in the future which I could lay before our friends in London. Hakki Pasha said
that, as regards Government accounts, their hands were tied to a very considerable
extent by the terms o f the concession to the Ottoman Bank. The Constantinople
loan had produced profit sufficient to cover the expenses of the Bank for one year at
any rate. If the Bank had been able to conclude the loan recently under discussion,
the profits would have provided [fo r ] the Bank for two or three years at least.

( 13) [M a r g in a l n ote by S ir A. N ioolson : “ F rom papers I saw th ere has been a con sid erable
con tra b a n d tra d e th rou g h K o w e it— an d w e w in k ed at it d u rin g the discussions and fig h tin g
a t N ijd . A. N .” ]
( 14) [M a rg in a l n ote by S ir L. M a lle t : “ T his w ou ld be best. I f it w ere G erm an, th e effect
on th e n a tiv e m in d w ou ld be a blow to ou r prestige. [L . M . ] ” ]
 15

Unfortunately this had been prevented by the action of the British Governm ent,
which he said speaking quite unofficially, he could only describe as a blunder. If
the British Governm ent did not interpose any bar in future, the National Bank
would be able to take part in Governm ent loans, either in co-operation with the
Ottoman Bank or in competition with ' it. Apart from that he repeated that the
whole of Turkey was open to foreign enterprize, and that foreign capital would be
welcomed. I f British capital would come to take part in the developm ent of the
country, there would be a profitable field for the B ank’ s energies. He regretted that
British capital had taken iso little interest in Turkey of late years, and thought that
both the Press and Commercial circles were not well in form ed .(I3) He referred in this
connection to the mining law, in the amendment of which the British G ov [ern m en ]t
had taken a great interest. The law had been amended but in the two years which
had elapsed since then there had not, so far as he was aware been a single British
application for a m ining concession.
I replied that British capital had had very good reasons for avoiding the country
under the old regim e: and in order to persuade it to come here now, it was necessary
to offer adequate inducements, and to create the conditions necessary for success. In
the case of mines for instance the absence of roads and railways made all mines,
except the richest, unrenumerative. This accounted for the absence o f applicants.
As regards works of public utility, we found, unfortunately, a certain want of practical
sense in the Public W orks Department. W ith the objects of securing advantages
to the State, concessions were hedged round with impossible conditions. It would
be to the real interest of the Government to grant the first concessions on terms
which would make them thoroughly rem unerative: whereas the conditions now laid
down were such that there could not be a large profit and there might very likely
be no profit at all. '
ITakki Pasha admitted that there was truth in what I said but added that in
his own opinion this difficulty would disappear in time. At the outset of a
Parliamentary regime there was a tendency to criticize everything. In the endeavour
to avert such criticism , the conditions had perhaps been drawn too tightly.
Experience would rem edy these defects.
I asked the Grand Vizier whether they proposed to approve the Bagdad
Municipal L oan. He said he had been somewhat disappointed as regards the
administrative capacities of- Nazim Pasha and that they had doubted whether the
m oney would be satisfactorily spent, if it were granted. He thought, however, that
they would come to the decision to support Nazim Pasha still, and in that case they
would approve the loan. I represented that it was very desirable to decide the matter
as soon as possible, since m y letter to Nazim Pasha, resum ing our liberty of action
in the matter, had probably reached him or would reach him in a day or two. I
added that it might have some influence as regards the future of the Bank, if I
could point to one business at any rate though not a large one. winch had hecn
concluded. Hakki Pasha said he would endeavour to hasten the decision.

M IN U T E S .

-Mr. M a r lin g ’ s view is that wo should b a rg a in w ith K o w oit in ord er to in duee the T urks
t o use th eir in fluen ce in secu rin g B ritish p a rticip a tio n in the B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y : he suggests
that we should eonsult the I fn d ia ] 0 [ffie e ] on th is proposal.
I t seems t o me that there is the strongest ob je c tio n to M r. M a rlin g ’ s view . H e says we
have had rela tion s w ith the Sheikh o f K o w e it fo r e le v e n . y e a r s : we have had in tim a te
relation s w ith K o w e it fo r tw o eenturies, and in 1863 S ir Lew is P cllv w rote a g low in g a ccoun t
o f the beneficent rule o f the Sheikhs o f K o w e it, o f th e effect o f th a t rule on tra d e iu the
G ulf, and o f the im p orta n ce o f m a in ta in in g w ith th e Sheikhs am icable relations, w hich have
been stea dily con solid a ted ever sinee. T o a bandon the Sheikh to T u rk ey w ou ld be disastrous

( ls) [M a r g in a l note by S ir L. M a lle t : “ The reason is that it has been d iscou ra ged by the
new R eg im e w ho have p u t in n othing. L. M .” ]
 1G
in its effect upon our p osition in the G u lf— all the C hiefs w ould ju stly re g a rd us as “ P erfide
A lb io n .”
On the oth er hand, I do believe th a t a settlem ent o f th e K o w e it q u estion ca n only be
effected by in clu d in g th a t question in an a rra n g em en t a bou t th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l[ w a ] y , and
in J u ly last, w ith S ir C. H a rd in g e ’ s a u th ority , I m ade proposals to this effect to the T urkish
M in is ter o f F in a n ce, w ho was then in L on don .
The difficulty is the deta il o f such an a rra n g e m e n t: we m ig h t recogn ise T urkish suzerainty,
w hile stip u la tin g fo r hom e-rule in a d m in istration , especially as reg a rd s custom s, as to w hich
the Sheikh is p a rticu la rly jealous o f fo r e ig n in terferen ce. W e m ig h t also con sid er the pa ym en t
of a fixed trib u te by th e Sheikh to T u rk ey , fo r w hich he cou ld recou p him self by certa in p ort
dues on th rou g h traffic. As the Sheikh has a lready v irtu a lly a dm itted T urkish suzerainty
by a cce p tin g the office o f K aim ak am , I do not th in k we should have difficulty in in d u cin g
him to agree to the arra n gem en t described, esp ecially as he is m ost a n xiou s th a t the railw ay
term in u s should be a t K ow eit.
I w ould a ccord in gly suggest th a t we should send a cop y o f M r. M a r lin g ’ s despatch to
the I [n d ia ] 0 [ff ic e ] , and w rite to them a t the same tim e as to the a rra n g em en t S ir E. G rey
w ould suggest, a sking fo r th eir ob serv a tion s on the subject.
W e m ig h t add th a t, even if it is deem ed in op p ortu n e to a p p roach th e T urks, it is
e x p e d ie n t to form a clear co n cep tion as to w hat shape a settlem ent of the K o w e it q uestion
should take, in ord er th a t w e m ay be ready if the q uestion is suddenly fo r ce d upon us.
As to a p p roa ch in g T urkey, there is no need to take a decision u n til we receive the
I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ] r e p ly : doubtless they w ill con su lt th e G o v [e rn m e n ]t of In d ia , and b y then
the situ a tion a t C on stan tin ople m ay have changed.
A. P .
J a n [u a r y ] 10, 1911.
Q [u e r ]y w rite to I [n d ia ] 0 [ff ic e ] as proposed.
R . P . M.

I t w ould be useful to m ake up ou r m inds as soon as possible as to w hat concessions be

m ade resp ectin g K ow eit, if proposals in reg a rd to the G u lf section are m ade to u s ; w ith ou t
a clear idea o f w hat we can give, we ca n n ot estim ate how m uch leverage the K o w e it question
g ives us. C onsult I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ].

a '. N.’

I am n ot sure th a t M r. M a rlin g m eans a n yth in g v ery d ifferen t from w hat M r. P a rk er

suggests. In any case M r. P a r k e r suggests w hat I th in k is the rig h t lin e and a reasonable
solu tion o f th e K o w e it question. I t is in fa c t a recog n ition o f th e sta tu s q uo o f K ow eit. It
w ill have to be settled w ith the q uestion of the B a g d a d to G ulf section o f the R [ a ilw a ]y
a nd the lever as reg a rd s b oth w ill be the 4% in crease o f C ustom s.(16) W r it e to the I [n d ia ]
O ffficel as p r o p o s e d .(17)
E. G.

( 16) [M a rg in a l com m ent by M r. A. P a r k e r : “ and the 3 % in 1914.” [A . P .] ]

( 17) [u. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 7.

Foreign Office to India Office.C)

F .O . 371/1232.
8 4 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
Sir, Foreign Office, January 21, 1911.
I am directed by the S e c r e t a r y ] of State for F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] to transmit to
you for submission to the Earl of Crewe copy of a desp[atch] from H [is ] M [a je sty’ s]
Charge d ’ A ff[aires] at Constantinople enclosing a memorandum of a conversation
which has taken place between Sir H . Babington Smith and the Turkish Grand
Vizier. (2) Mr. Marling discusses especially the parts of the conversation relative to

t1) [T h is letter was sent to P a r i s ; to B e r lin ; to St. P e t e r s b u r g h ; to C on stantinople.

C op ies w ere sent to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e ra tio n s; to the C om m ittee o f Im p eria l
D e fe n c e .]
( 2) [u. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t, and encl.]
 17

the Bagdad Railway and Koweit, and raises the question whether the time has not
arrived when it might be possible for H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] to avail
themselves o f their acquired position at Koweit with a view to securing British
participation in the Bagdad Railway.
Sir E. Grey concurs in the view that having regard to the long standing relations
of H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s] G [overnm ent] with Koweit, and to their close nature during the
last few years, it would be impossible now to abandon the Sheikh to the Turkish
G ov [ern m en ]t without incurring a disastrous loss of prestige. On the other hand he
recognizes that a settlement of the question o f Koweit can only be effected by including
it in an arrangement concerning the Bagdad Railway. An indication to this effect
was tentatively placed before the Turkish M in [ister] o f Finance on the occasion o f his
visit to England in last July, and for convenience of reference, I am to transmit to
you a copy o f a memorandum which was handed to Javid B ey at that tim e.(3)
Even if it be deemed inopportune now to approach the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t,
it appears expedient to form a conception of what shape a settlement o f the Koweit
question should take so that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] m ight be ready if the
question were suddenly forced upon them.
Sir E . Grey would suggest that with a view to such a settlement (which would
only be acceptable as part o f an arrangement for British participation in the
Bagdad R [ a i] l[ w a ] v ) , H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overn m en t] might recognize the Turkish
suzerainty while stipulating for a full measure of hom e rule in the administration
especially as regards customs matters, as to which the Sheikh is particularly jealous
of foreign interference. The question m ight also be considered whether provision
should be made for the paym ent of a fixed tribute by the Sheikh to Turkey, for which
he might possibly recoup him self by certain port dues on through tra ffic; the
continuance of the tribute to be subject to the equitable treatment of the Sheikh in
regard to his date groves in the Bussorah vilayet. As the Sheikh has already virtually
admitted Turkish suzerainty by accepting the title of Kaimakam, Sir E. G rey does
not anticipate that there would be serious difficulty in inducing him to assent to such
an arrangement, especially as he is most anxious that the terminus o f the Railway
should be at Koweit. A settlement of the question under discussion would probably
only be satisfactory if it involved the control o f the port by H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] and the Sheikh, thus excluding Turkish or German interference at
Koweit in internal matters.
It is not possible to estimate what leverage, if any, the situation of Koweit gives
Great Britain on the Bagdad Railway question until it is decided whether some such
concessions as are above indicated can safely be made, but the main lever for the
settlement of these questions will consist in the power of H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G [overnm ent] to refuse their consent to the proposed increase of 4 % in the Turkish
Customs and to the continuation o f the 3 % increase beyond the month of April 1914
when the consent already given to that increase will expire.
Sir E . Grey will be obliged if the E arl of Crewe will favour him with his
observations on the points raised in this letter.
[ I am, &c.]
L [O U I S ] ■ A L L E T ] .

( 3) [ v . G ooch <k T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 5 03-5, N o. 388.]

[10900]
 18

No. 8 .
Sir G. Loicther to Sir Edu-ard G r e y .( ')
F.O. 371/1232.
3 4 3 3 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 62.') Pera, D. January 23. 1911.
Sir, R. January 30, 1911.
Rifaat Pasha said to me to-day that he and the Governm ent were anxious to
do what was possible with a view to bringing about a disappearance of the policy of
“ bouderie ” between Great Britain and Turkey. His language was similar to that
used by him to Mr. Marling, as recorded in his despatch No. 918, Confidential, of the
20th U ltim o./2)
I said I was entirely with him in the matter but I should like to have
some definition of what he meant. There had been no sulking on our part. It was true
that we had had to make some' serious complaints of the way our subjects had been
treated at Bagdad and elsewhere by the officials of the new regime, but I had always
endeavoured to make the settlement of these cases as easy as possible for the Turkish
Governm ent. W e had also had to com plain of certain acts of aggression and breaches
of the status quo in the Persian Gulf and it yet seemed doubtful whether the promises
of the Porte had been carried out in this direction. It was the Turkish press, and in
some cases Turkish members of Parliament, who had used language far from friendly
to Great Britain, and this had doubtless left an unpleasant impression in England.
But I could not see of what the Turkish Governm ent had to complain. Did His
E xcellency allude to the loan which, in circumstances to whichAt was unnecessary now
to return, had not been concluded in E ngland? I could not imagine where Turkey
could find a grievance against us. If he alluded to the paucity of British financiers,
concessionnaires and competitors for orders who now came to Turkey, I must admit
that there had been some disappointment felt by such. Many had been called but few
had been chosen. They had found business habits here somewhat cumbersome,
infinite delays, and in the end the margin of profit so small that they were hardly
compensated for the expense and trouble even if successful in obtaining some small
orders.
Rifaat Pasha was unable or unwilling to be more precise, but he said that the
friendship of the mass of the people of this Empire had always been very marked in
favour of Great Britain and any Minister who wished to initiate an anti-British policy
could not live a day. I replied that I had always believed that this was the case, and
therefore it struck me as especially extraordinary that the Government had shown so
little energy in settling matters in which our right was unquestioned. After some
severe criticism of General Nazim, who, he said, imagined that the clock had been set
back fifty years and had been responsible for all the trouble at Bagdad, Ilis Excellency
said that he thought the time had com e for the conclusion of some arrangement
regarding the Bagdad Railway. I replied that I was convinced you would be glad to
hear this as we had been awaiting H is E xcellency’ s proposals since last summer, when
on two occasions he led me to believe that he was on the point of submitting them.
A fter this arrangement was concluded H is Excellency said he thought the Persian Gulf
questions, to which we seemed to attach importance, would be easy of settlement. I
asked His E xcellency whether I could give you any indication of the lines of the
-proposals he intended to make regarding the Bagdad Railway, but he replied that
further consultation with the Grand Vizier was necessary, and he hoped to be ready
with them very soon. In regard to this matter he said he was quite sure that we had
no intention of discussing matters with Germany without the knowledge of the
Ottoman Government. I said that this was so, and in proof of this I reminded him
that I had more than once last summer told him that we were expecting the proposals
he had promised us.
( !) [T his despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g ; to the C a bin et C om m ittee
F o r the form a tion o f th e C abinet C om m ittee, v. G ooch <i• Tem .perley, V ol. X (I), p. ix .]
( 2) [N o t rep rod u ced , b u t v. supra, p. 8, No. 4, n o te ( 2).]
 19

Though Rifaat Pasha has been speaking to Mr. Marling in a similar strain, there
can be little doubt that the recent publication of the Potsdam negotiations/3) has had
the tendency to induce the Turkish Governm ent to desire to negotiate directly with
us, and to show the people of the country that arrangements of this nature cannot
always be concluded behind their backs.
His E xcellency observed that the Potsdam publication had produced a very
painful impression and, although Baron Marschall had stated positively that there
was no truth whatever in § 3 of the published version ,(3) the Turkish representatives
abroad had led Ilis Excellency to believe that in the main the published version
represented what had taken place.
His Excellency made no reference to any absence of a Russian denial here.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW THER.

M IN U T E .

In a p riv a te letter to m e (‘ ) S ir G. L ow ther ex p ects th a t the T urkish p rop osals w ill be

u naccepta ble. It alm ost am ounts to effron tery to ch a ra cterize ou r a ttitu d e as on e o f
“ b ou d erie ” — and if the T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t rea lly d isa p p rov e o f N a zim P a sh a ’ s a ttitu d e
w hy d o thev not recall h im ? A p p ro v e S ir G. L o w th e r’ s la n g u a g e.(5)
A. N.
E. G.

(3) [T he pu blished version o f this agreem en t giv en in the E v e n in g T im es o f J a n u a ry 6,

1911, is p rin ted in Gooch ct T em perley, V ol. X (1), pp. 601-3, N o. 638.]
( ') [T h is letter ca n n ot be tra ce d .]
(5) [T h is w as d on e in S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 40) o f F eb ru a ry 7, 1911. N o t
rep rod u ced . (F .O . 371/1232. 3 4 3 3 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]

No. 9.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. L ow th erJ 1)

F .O . 371 1232.
2 8 8 3 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 25.) Secret.
Sir, F oreign Office, January 24, 1911.
The Turkish Ambassador enquired on the 20th in s t[a n t], o f Sir A. N icolson(2)
whether you had been furnished with instructions to negotiate with the Turkish
G ov [ern m en ]t about the Bagdad Railway.
Sir A. Nicolson told Tevfik Pasha that H is M ajesty’ s Embassy at Constantinople
had been inform ed that if Rifaat Pasha returned to that question H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] would be happy to hear his views and to examine any project which

( ') [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sen t to the P rim e M in is t e r ; to L o rd C rew e;
to th e C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D e fe n c e ; to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita ry O perations. I t was
rep eated to P a ris (N o. 2 3).]
(2) [T h is lesp a tch is based on Sir A. N ico lso n ’ s record of his con v ersation w ith Tew’fik
Pasha. T h e record is m in u ted by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : —
“ T ew nk P a sh a ’ s phrase a bout Ivow eit is w orth n oth in g ( ? n o tin g ) and I am g la d
you reer.ved the m ention o f Ivow eit sy m pa th etically .
E . G.

M. Cam bon asked me this w eek w hether a n y n e g otia tion s w ere in p rog ress w ith
Tu* key abou t the B a g d a d R [ a ilw a ]y and I told him o f th e in stru ction sent t o S ir G.
Low ther, w hich is describ ed in his con v ersa tion w ith Tewfik Pasha.
E. G.
2 1 .1 . 1 1 .” ]
[10900] C 2
 20

he might communicate to them .(3) Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] had been supplied with no

special instructions and there was no intention at present of form ally negotiating, as
nothing on w'hich to negotiate had been laid before H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] by Rifaat Pasha.
Sir A. Nicolson repeated, however, that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] would
be very glad to hear what Rifaat Pasha had to say, as they quite appreciated that the
Turkish Government took a keen interest in a railway running through their
territory.
Tevfik Pasha said that in the contract with the Germans the port and terminus
of the railway on the Persian Gulf had been left open, owing to the quasi independent
position of the Sheikh of Koweit and Sir A. Nicolson observed that perhaps therefore
Rifaat Pasha contemplated discoursing in regard to Koweit, and that the ears of H [is ]
M [a je sty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] were always open to what he might say.
[ I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]
(3) [ cp . S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram to M r. M a rlin g (N o. 14) of J a n u a ry 17, 1911,
D . 2-30 p .m ., w hich is n ot rep rod u ced . In it S ir E. G rey also sta ted th a t he w ished to “ a void
a ny im p u ta tion th a t w ant o f p rog ress is due t o unw illingness on ou r p a rt t o discuss the
q u estion .” (F.O . 371/1232. 1 9 5 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]

No. 10.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B e r tie .i1)

F .O . 371/1232.
4 4 4 6 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 53.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, February 6, 1911.
M. Cambon told me to-day that Rifaat Pasha had spoken to the French
Ambassador at Constantinople about the Bagdad Railway, and had said that the
Turkish Governm ent would be quite willing to give the construction of railways to the
French, provided that they were railways which suited Turkey. He had suggested
railways in the region of the Black Sea, and a railway in Albania.
A railway in Albania, M. Cambon said, would be somewhat difficult. W ith
regard to railways in the region of the Black Sea, Russia had a preference, and France
would have to consult Russia. But, as Germany might at any time get these railways
under cover of Turkey, it was desirable that the French Governm ent should give a
favourable reply to the Turkish proposal.
M. Cambon then told me that he thought it would be well that his Government
and ourselves should speak very clearly at St. Petersburgh, and come to a definite
understanding with M. Sazonow as to what our position was with regard to the
Bagdad Railway.
I said that, if M.Pichon would settle what he desired to say at St. Petersburgh,
we would consider it, with a view to saying the same thing.
I inform ed M. Cambon how strongly Sir George Buchanan had pressed
M. Sazonow, and I added that, with regard to Count Benckendorff, I had not the least
doubt that he had been writing to St. Petersburgh every thing that we could wish.
I also told M. Cambon that Rifaat Pasha had talked of m aking proposals to us
about the Bagdad Railway. W e had said that we should be ready to receive and
consider them. H e had answered that he must consult the Grand Vizier, and as a
matter of fact no proposals had yet been made to us, and nothing was being done.
[ I am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].
(!) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; t o th e C abin et Com m ittee.
I t was rep ea ted to C on stan tin op le (N o. 3 4).]
 21

N o. 11.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r e y .(*)

F.O . 371/1232. Constantinople, February 7, 1911.

4 6 4 4 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . D. 6 -55 p . m .
Tel. (No. 29.) R . 7 -1 0 p . m .
Mr. M arling’ s telegram No. 9 .(z)
Negotiations are proceeding apparently rapidly and successfully between Turkish
Government and Bagdad Railway Company for com pletion of line to Bagdad.
Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I questioned to-day, replied evasively.
After consultation with French Ambassador we have decided to submit to our
respective Governments necessity for some prompt and energetic action to avoid
a surprise of the nature o f the Potsdam A greem ent.(3) This might take the form of
jointly inform ing Porte that all negotiations regarding com pletion o f line to Bagdad
must be taken conjointly with us, and that it is quite insufficient to submit to us
agreement arrived at. W e should add that failing preliminary agreement we cannot
hold out to Porte any hope o f obtaining the 4 per cent customs increase.

M IN U T E S .
E v en if n e g otia tion s d o p roceed ra p id ly b etw een th e P o r te and th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y
Com pany “ fo r the com p letion o f the B a g d a d lin e to B a g d a d ” we have no lega l rig h t
w hatsoever to in terv en e or to p r o t e s t : th ere seems to be som e con fu sion o f th o u g h t in th e
id ea th a t we cou ld a ct in the m a nner su ggested in the second pa ra g ra p h o f this te le g r a m :
the B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y w ill be b u ilt in p u rsu a n ce o f an in tern a tion a l a greem en t sign ed in
1903(4)— an a greem en t w hich was preceded, b y oth er m ore or less sim ilar a greem ents d a tin g
from 1898— and we ca n n ot p rotest a ga in st the fulfilm ent o f such an agreem en t e ig h t years
after its sign ature.
The presen t case is in no w ay a n alogous to th e P otsda m a greem ent.
B u t p ersonally I do n ot th in k the first p a ra g ra p h o f this teleg ram is precisely e x p r e s s e d :
w hat proba b ly is or m ay be p r o ce e d in g “ ra p id ly a n d successfully ” is n ot an a rra n g em en t fo r
“ th e com p letion o f th e lin e to B a g d a d ,” b u t a v ery d ifferen t th in g, the a lloca tion o f specific
revenues to serve as k ilom etric g u aran tees fo r th e sections o f the lin e as fa r as B a g da d.
E ven w hen such revenues are a llocated, dal d e tto al fa tto c ’ e un gran, tr a tto , and the
guarantees ha ve to b e ca pitalised and then p la ced u p on th e m arket. J u d g in g b y th e fa ilu re
o f th e last issue o f B a g d a d R a ilw a y B onds (o f w hich 55% h a d to be ta k en u p b y th e
u n d erw riters a n d then to be reta in ed in the coffers o f th e D eutsch e B a n k ) fo r th e sections
o f the line up to El H e lif, .1 do n ot thin k, in th e absence o f an agreem en t as to th e B a g d a d
R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y betw een the P ow ers, th a t we need b e u n d uly a larm ed as to the p rob a b le success
o f the n ex t issue. In this con n ection it m ay be recalled th a t th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y B onds
y ield only a bou t 5 % , a sum w hich an in v es tor can g et from the S [o u t h ] M a n ch u ria n
R [ a i ] l[ w a ] y , u n con d ition a lly g u a ra n teed b y th e J ap an ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t, or oth er sim ilar
b o n d s: so the a ttr a c tio n o f the B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y to th e in vestor, as d istin ct from th e
C om pany prom oter, is n ot very in v itin g .
A. P.
F eb ru a ry 8th, 1911.
I a gree w ith M r. P ark er.
W e ca n n ot p rev en t the ra ilw ay b ein g m ade to B a g da d. O ur m ain in terest lies in the
G ulf section.
R . P . M.

I agree and th in k th a t we should rep ea t th is teleg ram to P a ris and in stru ct S ir F. B ertie
to in form M. P ic h o n o f its con ten ts and say th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] feel th a t

0 ) [T his teleg ram is en d orsed as h a vin g b een sent to the K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;

to L ord Crewe. I t was sent to P a ris (as N o. 7).]
(2) [M r. M a rlin g ’ s teleg ram (N o. 9) o f J a n u a ry 14, 1911, D. 2 p .m ., R . 4-30 p .m ., is not
rep rod uced . I t sta ted th a t discussion on th e su b ject o f th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y had ta k en p lace
and th a t the C om p an y w ere b ein g u rg ed by the G overn m en t to sta rt w ork in several places
so th a t the lin e cou ld be com p leted to B a g d a d w ith in five or five and a h a lf years. [F .O . 3 7 1 /
1232. 1 6 2 7 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(3) [v. G ooch & T em p erlev . V ol. X (I), pp. 549-723, C h a pter L X X X I X . ]
(4) [p. ibid., V ol. I I , p. 174, Ed. N o te, w here a b r ie f sum m ary o f this agreem en t is g iv e n .]
 22

th ey have no legal g rou n d w hatever fo r p r otestin g to the P o rte a g a in st th e conclusion of

arra n g em en ts fo r the co n tin u a tion o f the L in e to B a g da d, th a t a protest w ou ld be d isrega rd ed
and th a t in these circum stan ces, it w ou ld be im p olitic to lod g e it, b u t th a t we shall n ot rep ly
in these term s w ith ou t k n ow in g the view s o f th e F ren ch G o v [e rn m e n ]t.
R e p e a t C [o n sta n tin o ]p le .
L. M.

W e cou ld t e l[e g r a p h ] to P a ris as p roposed by M r. M a llet,(5) and on re c e ip t o f a rep ly we

cou ld I th in k a scertain som e m ore p a rticu la rs from S ir G. L ow ther. P erh a p s M . B om p ard
has been fu ller and m ore e x p lic it to M . P ich on .
A. N.
M.

(5) [A teleg ram was sent a cco rd in g ly to P a r is (N o. 8) o f F eb ru a ry 9, 1911, 1). 1-30 P.M
I t w as rep eated to C on stan tin op le (N o. 24). (F .O . 371/1232. 4 6 4 4 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]

No. 12.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r ey.(*)

F .O . 371/1232. Pera, February 14, 1911.

5 5 7 4 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . D. 3 -3 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 38.) R. 6 p .m .
Minister for Foreign Affairs volunteered to me to say following were lines on
which they were negotiating with Bagdad Railway Company :—
Company to demand as guarantees no revenues such as 4 per cent., surplus
o f ceded revenues, future temettu, or future monopolies beyond those already
conceded. Company would probably be granted an outlet at Alexandretta, and
Turkish Government would require that com pany should abandon its right to build
B agdad-Persian Gulf section.
This arrangement once concluded— and it was in a fair way o f being so— Turkish
Governm ent would propose to us, and parties interested, that Persian Gulf section
should, while being an Ottoman railway, be internationalised, Great Britain,
Germ any, France, and perhaps Turkey being joint shareholders. Ottoman Govern­
ment would prefer Koweit as an outlet, although Bussorah could easily be rendered
serviceable, but that wrould entail an arrangement with us as to its political position.
To preserve present status quo would of course be impossible from the Turkish
standpoint. It was obvious that the terminus of an Ottoman railway should be in
Ottoman territory. The port should also be built by the international syndicate.
His E xcellency said he would eventually commit proposals to paper, but he
wished us to know general ideas o f the Porte.
He told me that he would speak in a similar sense to m y French colleague,
but he begged that matter might be kept secret.

M IN U T E S .

I t w ill be n oticed th a t the proposal foreshadow ed is th a t the P ow ers nam ed should be

jo in t shareholders, b u t this does not necessarily m ean equal shareholders.
In the pa st we have alw ays stip u la ted fo r 55% on the G u lf section fo r ourselves if
in tern a tion a lisa tion takes place. I th in k it possible th a t we m ig h t m o d ify this a ttitu d e,
b ut on ly if the 1903 a greem ent is ca n celled in so fa r as the B a g d a d G u lf section is concerned,
and another a rra n g em en t is su b stitu ted. T his new a greem ent w ould have to be an in te r­
na tion a l in stru m en t, to which H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] w ould be parties, and it w ould
h a ve to prov id e, in te r alia, fo r the fo llo w in g : —
a) In no circu m stan ces shall differen tia l rates be established on any p a rt o f th e railw ay,
and traffic g o in g east or w est shall b e subject to th e sam e tariff.

(•) [T h is teleg ram is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g .]

 23
b) Sin ce the a rra n g em en t con clu d ed w ould be p a rtly p olitica l (in so fa r as con cern ed
K ow eit) we should have to insist on its b ein g a perm an en t and la stin g settlem ent, and not
m erely fo r a specified num ber of years.
c) T he e x istin g system o f k ilo m e tric g u aran tees should be m odified. (H [is ] M [a je s t v ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ] cou ld not m od ify th e ir a ttitu d e 011 th is p oin t, and D ja v id B ey g a v e m e to
u nderstand th a t the T u rks w ould ea gerly a ccep t a m odifica tion .)
T hen conies the q uestion o f the p o r t : I th in k we cou ld only m od ify ou r a ttitu d e w ith
regard to a 55% share p rov id ed a sa tis fa ctory a rra n g em en t w ere con clu d ed a bou t K ow eit,
and in this qu estion I do not th in k we can g o fu r th e r than is described in our le tte r (a n n ex ed )
o f J a n [u a r y ] 20th, 1911,(2) see esp ecially the last sentence of p a ra g ra p h 4. W e m igh t perhaps
say th a t K o w e it should be an in tern a tion a l free p ort, u n d er the S u lta n ’ s su zerain ty , b u t
subject to the S h eik h ’ s ju risd ictio n in in tern a l m atters, and w e m ig h t stip u la te th a t the p ort
should b e a dm in istered in the in terests of th e ra ilw ay and tra d e in g eneral, and n o t o f any
p a rticu la r cou n try . .
I th in k th a t the T urkish proposals do co n ta in the elem ents o f a possible agreem en
at any ra te the basis fo r n eg otia tion , and th a t we should 011 no a ccou n t slam the d oor to.
I v en tu re to suggest tha t, in the first in stance, we should w rite to th e I [n d ia ] 0 [ff ic e ]
in the sense o f this m inu te, sen d in g them th e teleg ram fo r observa tions, and a skin g th a t we
m ay have an ea rly rep ly to ou r letter o f J a n u a ry 20th, 1911. U n til we hear from th e I [n d ia ]
0 [ffic e ] I w ou ld suggest that we should not rep ly to this teleg ram , or in d ic a te th a t th e
proposals foreshadow ed w ou ld in du ce us to assent to the 4% custom s increase.
A. P .
F eb ru a ry 15th, 1911.

I f it is th ou g h t necessary to send some rep ly we m igh t in stru ct S ir G. L ow th er to say

that the a rra n g em en t ou tlin ed w ould, as fa r as H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] can at presen t
ju dg e, serve as a basis fo r discussion, b u t th a t in the absence o f details, we ca n n ot say m ore
at present.
W e m ust be ca refu l a bout K ow e it, as the P o r te a ttach es grea t im p orta n ce to th a t q uestion
and it w ill be a useful lever.
L. M.

I th in k th a t if we a gree to the in tern a tion a lisa tion of the lin e to K o w e it w e should

m aintain th a t th e con s tru ction and con trol of the p ort should be in ou r hands— a d m ittin g
T urkish su zerain ty and S h eik h 's a utonom y. I f we do less th a n th is w e shall have aba n don ed
to a g rea t e x te n t ou r form er position . B u t w e should first ascertain view s of th e In d ia
Office b efore rep ly in g to S ir G. L ow th er.(3)
A. N.

Y e s : and we need n ot com m it ourselves to T u rk ey till w e g et th e ir proposals on paper,

bevond sa v in g th a t we are w illin g to receive them fo r con sid era tion .
E. G.
T e l[e g r a p h ] to S ir G. L ow th er.(4)
“ Y [ o u ] r t e l[e g r a m ] N o. 38. B a g d a d R a ilw ay .
Y ou m ay in form M [in is te r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A [ffa ir s ] th a t we are w illin g to receiv e th e
Turkish proposals fo r con s id era tion .”
L. M.

(2) [ 0 . sup ra , pp. 16-7, N o. 7. T he letter was d a ted J a n u a ry 21.]

(3) [M a r g in a l com m ent by M r. P a r k e r : “ S usp end a ction . A. P . F e b [r u a r y ] 16, 1911.” ]
(J) [T eleg ram (N o. 40) to S ir G. L ow th er of F eb ru a ry 16, 1911, D. 1-30 p .m . (F .O . 371/1232.
5 5 7 4 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]

No. 13.

Sir E duard G rey to Sir G. B uchanan.(')

■ F.O . 371/1232.
I 4 2 1 6 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 47.) Secret.
Sir, F oreign Office, February 15, 1911.
I took an opportunity o f telling the Russian Ambassador today that the Turkish
, Minister for F oreign Affairs had spoken m ore than once to Sir Gerard Low ther on

( ') [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e C a bin et C om m ittee.]

 24

the subject of the Bagdad Railway, and had said that he expected soon to be able
to submit proposals in writing. But we had not so far received any written proposals,
and we were therefore not yet negotiating. W e had, however, expressed our
willingness to receive such proposals, and to consider them carefully.
Count Benckendorff observed that the Turks had presumably made an arrange­
ment with Germany which would empower them to negotiate with us.
I said that I assumed that they were discussing the matter with G erm any; but
they had not yet told us definitely that Germany had given them a free hand to
negotiate with us as they pleased about the section from Bagdad to the Gulf, which
was the important question.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 14.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F .O . 871/1232.
7 6 6 2 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . Pera, D. March 1, 1911, 11-55 p . m .
Tel. (No. 52.) R . March 2 , 1911, 8 a . m .
Bagdad Railway.
M [inister for] F [oreig n ]' A [ffa ir ]s ’ written proposals were sent by messenger
to-night.
They are on the lines of his verbal com m unication as reported in m y despatch
No. 100.‘(2)
Porte proposes form ation of a new joint stock com pany whose capital would be
provided by Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and British, French and German capitalists
distributed as follows : 4 0% for Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t and 2 0 % for each o f the
others.(3)
Cost o f construction to be provided by State bonds to be issued in London, Paris,
Berlin and Constantinople.
Koweit is mentioned as most suitable terminus but as the political status of
Kowreit presents certain particularities and as terminus must be under the direct
administration o f Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, the relations of Koweit to the Ottoman
Em pire must be regularized.
Attention is also called to utility o f arriving at an understanding as to the
respective rights o f the two Powers in the Persian Gulf.
I confined m yself to saying that I would forward m em o r a n d u m ] to you.

0 ) [T h is teleg ram is end orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g . I t w as sent to St. P eters-
b u rg h (as N o. 75).]
(2) [S ir G. L o w th e r’ s despatch (N o. 100), D . F eb ru a ry 14, R . F e b ru a ry 20, 1911, is not
rep rod u ced , as th e teleg ram g iv en above sum m arizes th e con ten ts o f the despatch. (F.O . 3 71 /
1232. 6 1 6 4 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(3) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ 60% t o G erm any and T u rk ey an d on ly 40% to F ra n ce and
E n g la n d .” ]
 25

N o. 15.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F .O . 371/1232.
8 1 0 9 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 139.) Confidential. Pera, D. March 1 , 1911.
Sir, E. March 6 , 1911.
Eifaat Pasha handed to me to-day the enclosed m emorandum which he had
promised me, setting forth on general lines the proposals which the Ottoman Govern­
ment desire to lay before you with a view to arriving at an understanding regarding
the construction of the section of the line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf.
I told H is E xcellency that I abstained from making any com m ent on the proposals
and that I would forward the memorandum to you by the messenger who is leaving
to-day.
Subsequently I asked H is E xcellency whether the issue of the negotiations with
the Company could be expected at an early date. H e replied that the Ottoman
Government had every reason to look forward to a prom pt settlement. E eferring to
the advantages to be gained by the Company he said that strictly speaking there were
no conditions. The fact that the Company would be able to com plete the line sooner
than was anticipated would constitute a sufficient advantage.
I have, &c.
GEEAED LOW TH EE.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Mémorandum com m unicated to Sir G. Low ther hy Rifaat Pasha.

L ’ intérêt qui s’ attache à l ’ achèvement du Chemin de fer de B agdad-G olfe

Persique, la nécessité latente d ’ assurer l ’ application de la majoration douanière de
4 % , amènent le Gouvernement Im périal à envisager, pratiquement, l ’ examen de ces
deux affaires avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, en tant que lesdites
affaires intéressent, sous certains de leurs aspects, le Gouvernement Eoyal.
Le Gouvernement du E oi a posé une condition à son assentiment à la majoration
projetée : savoir que le supplément de recettes qu ’ elle produirait, ne fût pas affecté aux
garanties kilométriques du Chemin de fer de Bagdad. Si donc le Gouvernement
Impérial Ottoman amenait la Compagnie dudit Chemin de fer à ne pas élever de
prétentions sur ce supplément de recettes, la condition exigée serait remplie. Tel est
l ’ un des aspects de la question./2)
D ’ autre part, à raison des inconvénients qui em pêchent la Compagnie du Chemin
de fer de Bagdad de construire et d ’ exploiter dans les mêmes conditions que le reste
de son réseau, le tronçon B agdad-G olfe Persique, qui est com pris dans sa concession
et dont la construction est d ’ ailleurs, absolument nécessaire pour assurer à cette voie
ferrée son débouché naturel, il s’ agirait d ’ obtenir que la Compagnie renonçât au droit
qui lui fut concédé de construire et d ’ exploiter également le tronçon B agdad-G olfe
Persique. Tel est l ’ autre aspect de la question.
OE, le Gouvernement Ottoman a déjà engagé, au sujet de ces deux points, des
pourparlers avec la Compagnie de Bagdad ; et il a tout lieu d ’ espérer que cette
dernière acquiescera bientôt aux desiderata de la Sublime Porte et renoncera, en ce
qui concerne les garanties kilométriques, non seulement aux recettes appelées à se
produire du chef de la majoration de 4 % , mais aussi à toutes autres nouvelles recettes
qui viendront s’ ajouter aux fonds actuellement consacrés à la Dette Publique
Ottomane. L a Sublime Porte est d ’ autant plus fondée à com pter sur cette renoncia-

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g .]

(2) [M a r g in a l com m ent b y M r. P a r k e r : “ T his is a ltog eth er m islea din g and the T u rks
know , from th e con v ersation s in L on d on o f last J u ly , th a t it is so. A. P .” ]
 26
tion, que des calculs de statistique établissent la progression constante des revenus
dont la Compagnie de Bagdad dispose actuellement et qui, partant, lui assurent, dans
un avenir prochain, des ressources suffisantes pour l ’ achèvement de la voie jusqu’ à
Bagdad, sans qu’ il faille lui affecter de recettes nouvelles.
Le Gouvernement Ottoman avait, naguère, conçu l ’ idée de construire lui-même
la partie finale de la voie ferrée. Il aperçoit des difficultés dans l ’ exécution d ’ un tel
projet. Aussi estime-t-il utile et expédient de recourir, pour ledit tronçon à la création
d ’ une nouvelle société anonyme Ottomane dont le capital serait fourni tant par le
Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman lui-même que par des groupes de capitalistes
anglais, français et allemands. Ce capital est à départager de la façon suivante :
Quarante pour cent pour le Gouvernement Impérial ; vingt pour cent à chacun des
groupes de capitalistes étrangers.
Les frais de construction pourront, d ’ après le système actuel de la ligne K on ia-
Bagdad, être couverts par une émission d ’ obligations d ’ Etat Ottomanes garanties par
le Gouvernement Impérial et émises à Londres, Paris, Berlin et Constantinople. Les
frais de construction, ainsi que le capital actions de la société nouvelle et toute autre
modalité de form ation de la société et de l ’ émission, seront naturellement réglées après
entente entre le Gouvernement Im périal et les groupes intéressés.
En tant que point terminus de la voie ferrée, sur le Golfe Persique, on ne saurait
naturellement envisager que Koveit d ’ abord, Bassorah ensuite. L e Gouvernement
Ottoman pense que Ivoveit est, par sa situation, tout indiqué pour servir de débouché
au Chemin de fer. Comme cependant la situation politique de Koveit présente
certaines particularités, et que. d ’autre part, il importe logiquement, que le point
terminus du Chemin de fer de Bagdad soit sous l ’ administration directe du Gouverne­
ment Ottoman, il serait désirable de régulariser, en premier lieu, les rapports de
Koveit vis-à-vis de l ’ Empire, ce qui pourra rendre possible l ’ exploitation du port à
créer dans cette localité par la société anonyme nouvelle.
Par la même occasion, apparaît l ’ utilité essentielle d ’ une entente entre le
Gouvernement Ottoman et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, à l ’ effet de
préciser la situation du Golfe Persique, respectivement par rapport aux droits
politiques et aux intérêts com m erciaux des deux pays, en établissant, sans équivoque,
la position de chacun d ’ eux.
S ’ il est exacte que les intérêts de la Grande Bretagne s’ opposent à la pénétration
de tierces influences étrangères dans le Golfe Persique, il est non moins certain que,
sur ce point, les intérêts essentiels du Gouvernement Ottoman se rencontrent avec ceux
du Boyaume-TTni, l ’ Empire Ottoman n ’ étant, lni-m ême, nullement disposé à
encourager les Puissances, encore moins à les autoriser à établir une base d ’ influence
dans ces contrées. De sorte qu’ une parité d ’ intérêts entre le Gouvernement Ottoman,
et le Gouvernement Britannique, jointe à leur égal désir d ’ arriver à une entente sur
tous les points qui ont pu jusqu’ ici diviser leurs vues, semble les convier aujourd’ hui
à aborder, dans un même esprit d ’ amitié et de conciliation, le règlement définitif des
questions ci-dessus énumérées.

M IN U T E S .

In the first place I w ould call a tten tion to the serious m is-statem ent (whieh to my m ind
should, to avoid .all fu tu r e em barrassm ent, be forth w ith corrected in an official note from
S ir G. L ow th er) th a t I I [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G fo v e rn m e n t] have m ade one con d ition to th eir assent
to an in crease o f 4% in the T urkish eustom s, viz., th a t the y ield of th a t in crease shall not be
dev oted to the B a g da d R [ a i ] l[ w a ] y .
I th in k it w ould be very im p ru d en t to leave this statem ent u n challenged. T he form u ­
la tion o f the alleged con d ition was orig in a lly a ttr ib u te d by Tewfik Pasha to S ir C. H a rd in g e,
who den ied ea tegoriea lly, in a m inu te, th a t he had ever m ade it.(3) I in form ed M. O strorog,
who aeeom panied D ja v id Bey to L on d on last J u ly , th a t S ir C. H a rd in g e had been com p letely
m isu n derstood on this p oin t, and th a t it w ould be a m ere evasion o f ou r co n d itio n if the
B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y C om pany ren ou n ced the yield o f the eustom s in crease and g o t other

(3) [r . G ooch c£- T em p erley, V ol. V I , p. 445, N o. 339, and n o te (2).]

 •27
revenues in stead, w hich the custom s in crease w ou ld set free. F u rth er, in a m em orandum
com m u n ica ted to D ja v id B ey on J u ly 29th, 1910,(4) th e follow in g passage o cc u rs : —
“ H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] are satisfied th a t any in crease in th e Turkish
custom s d u ties un d er present con d ition s m ust, if not d ir ec tly th en in d ire ctly b y th e m ere
fa c t o f s e ttin g o th e r re v en u e s fr e e , hasten th e com p letion o f the B a g d a d R a ilw a y with
its consequen t effects p reju d icia l to the in terests o f this co u n tr y .”

The m e m o r a n d u m ] w ent on to in d ica te tha t, in view o f this con clu sion , H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]

G fo v e rn m e n t] cou ld only a gree to the custom s in crease p rov id ed a sa tisfa ctory a g reem en t had
been reached w ith reg a rd to ra ilw ay con stru ction in M esopota m ia , in clu d in g the a rra n g em en t
a bout K o w e it as a term inus, and p rov id ed the restriction s on the b orrow in g pow ers of E g y p t
w ere rem oved.
W ith reg a rd to the gen era l su b ject raised in th is despatch, I m in u ted so fu lly the le tte r
from the In d ia Office o f M arch 3rd, 1911 (N o. 7880),(5) en closin g L o rd H a r d in g e ’ s telegram ,
th a t there is little to a dd here. I w ould only rep ea t tha t, if a s a tis fa ctory p relim in a ry a gree­
m ent can be rea ch ed in reg a rd to K o w e it and to the exclu sion of d ifferen tia l ta riffs and other
financial points, then I can see no v a lid o b jection to ou r p a rticip a tio n b e in g lim ited to 2 0 o/>.
It was only so lon g as the 1903 C oncession rem a in ed in force th a t such p a rt ic ip a t io n w ou ld
be in ad equa te. If, how ever, as the T urks a p p ea r to foreshadow , the 1903 concession is to be
ca n celled in so fa r as the G u lf sections o f the ra ilw ay a re con cern ed , then the w hole situ a tion
is altered.
The im p o rta n t p o in t is, how ever, w hether th e G erm ans a p p rov e the proposals con ta in ed
in this m em orandum , a p oin t on w hich I have w ritten a sep arate m in u te on S ir G. L o w th e r’ s
telegram (N o. 8029), No. 56 o f M arch 5 th ,(6) ju st received.
It is sa tisfa ctory th a t the T u rks propose a g eneral settlem ent o f questions p e n d in g in
reg a rd to the P ersian G ulf, as this is in a ccord a n ce w ith the view s o f the In d ia Office, as
expressed in th e ir letter o f M arch 3rd (7880).( 7)

Query:—

Send cop y o f this despatch to the I [n d ia ] O fffice] p rop os in g th a t it should be con sid ered
w ith a view to an answ er b ein g s e n t ; in d ica te th a t, p r o v id e d a sa tis fa ctory a rra n g em en t is
m ade, on the lines of th eir le tte r o f M a rch 3rd, as to K ow eit, it does n ot seem im p era tiv e to
insist on B ritish p a rticip a tio n b ein g 6 0 % , as a new situ ation w ill arise if, as seem s probable,
the T urks have in view th e ca n cellin g o f th e 1903 concession in reg a rd to the B a g d a d -G u lf
sections, and i f they a gree to a prelim in a ry a greem en t w ith us e x clu d in g p referen tia l rates,
and to a settlem ent o f oth er ou tsta n d in g qu estion s on the litto ra l o f the P ersian G ulf.
M eanw hile we can see, b y the course o f events, w hat w ill be the a ttitu d e o f the G erm ans
tow ards the n eg otia tion s which the T u rks have in itia ted .
A. P .
M a rch 6th, 1911.

T here can b e no question o f 60% in any case. I have n oth in g to add to the M in u te w hich
I w rote on the I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ] letter o f M arch 3 .(7)
W e have n o t y et settled in p r in cip le w hether we should be w illin g to fo r e g o C on trol and
w hether it is w orth our w hile to help to b u ild this ra ilw ay w ith ou t con trol and to a gree to
the increase of th e custom s in to the b arga in ! I f w e com e to 110 agreem en t w ith T u rk ey a bout
P ersian G u lf q uestion the status qu o w ill be m a in ta in ed in the G ulf. An agreem en t w ill
probably not im p rov e ou r position , as it is w e w ho w ill be ex p e c te d to m ake concessions. W e
had b etter w rite to the B oa rd o f T ra de and I [n d ia ] 0 [ff ic e ] a full e x p osition o f the present
situ ation and ask fo r th e ir observations.
I t m ust be rem em bered th a t ou r co-op era tion is o f im m ense im p orta n ce to T u rk ey and
Germ any.
L . M.

(4) [r . G ooch dc T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 503-5, No. 388.]

(5) [T he letter from the In d ia Office o f M a rch 3, 1911, is n ot rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s
of space. I t was a rep ly to the F oreig n Office le tte r o f J a n u a ry 21 (u. supra, pp. 1 6-7, N o. 7).
Mr. P a rk er w rote a lon g m in u te on it, q u o tin g a t len gth the m em orandum com m u n ica ted to
D ja v id Bey on J u ly 29, 1910. (F .O . 371/1232. 7 8 8 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(6) [v. in fra , pp. 28-9, No. 17.]
( 7) [In this m inute, which is n ot re p rod u ced from con sid era tion s of space, M r. M a llet
suggested th a t H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t should g iv e th eir su p p ort to a B ritish sy n d ica te,
who w ould assist the com p an y finan cially, p r o v id e d th a t B ritish tra d e an d in terests w ould
definitely b enefit from the ex ten sion of the line to the P ersian G ulf. I f this was n o t clear,
H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t should sta te th e ir term s— “ nam ely, 55% and the co n s tru c tio n and
control o f the h a rb ou r.” I f these term s w ere not a ccep ted no fu rth e r a ction should be taken in
the m atter. (F .O . 371/1232. 7 8 8 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
 28
T he In d ia Office and B oa rd o f T ra d e m ust be con su lted on these proposals. W e should,
in th e m eanw hile, at on ce correct, as su ggested b y M r. P a rk er, th e m isstatem ent as to the
4% in crea se in R ifa a t P a sh a ’ s note. A te l[e g r a m ] should be sent to S ir G. L ow th er saying
th a t the proposals have been received and w ill be con sid ered b u t th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ] desire at on ce to co r re c t a m isap prehension as to the con d ition s to th eir assent
t o th e 4% in crease and rep ea t w hat our con d ition s a re .(8) B efore a rep ly, an d som e tim e w ill
necessarily elapse, is sent, w e m ust be q u ite clear as to th e ex a c t position o f all the in terested
pa rties in this question. T here is a g o o d deal o f ob scu rity on th is poin t.
A . N.

C orrect the m isapprehension abou t th e 4% ; w rite to I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ] and B oa rd o f T ra de

as p rop os ed .(9)
E. G.

I w ill discuss the w hole question also w ith S ir A. N icolson and M r. M a llet a fter W ed nesday.
E. G.
7.3.11.

( 8) [v. in fra , p. 29, N o. 18.]

( 9) [T hese letters w ere despa tched on M arch 16, 1911. (F.O . 371/1232. 7 8 8 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 )]

No. 16.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. L ow th er.( 1)

F .O . 871/1232.
7 6 6 2 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 56.) Foreign Office, March 3, 1911, 1-15 p . m .
Your tel[egram ]' No. 5 2 .(2)
Are the Turkish proposals made with the cognisance and approval o f the German
G o v [e rn m en ]t. Precise inform ation on this point is essential.

C1) [T h is teleg ram was rep ea ted to St. P etersb u rg h (N o. 7 6).]

(2) [v . supra, p. 24, N o. 14.]

No. 17.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F .O . 371/1232. Constantinople, March 5, 1911.

8 0 2 9 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . D. 1-45 p . m .
Tel. (No. 56.) R . 4 p .m .
Your telegram No. 5 6 .(2)
Minister for Foreign Affairs states that, although document containing proposals
o f Turkish Government has not been shown to German Ambassador, German Govern­
m ent are generally cognisant of the conditions proposed. He added that German
Ambassador had intimated that his Governm ent could not agree to any foreign group
having a larger share than the Germans in the Bagdad to Gulf section.

M IN U T E S .
T h is is n ot a full answ er to th e qu estion con ta in ed in our teleg ram un d er rep ly, viz.,
“ A r e the T urkish proposals m ade w ith the cog n isa n ce and a p p rov a l o f th e G erm an G o v [e rn -
m e n ]t ? P recise in form a tion on this p o in t is essential.”

(U [T h is teleg ram is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g .]

(2) [ v . im m ed iately preced in g docu m en t.]
 29
F rom th e enclosed c u ttin g from t o d a y ’ s Timesl?) th e G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t's a ttitu d e
tow ards th e proposals is a p p a ren tly not one o f u n m itig a ted sa tisfa ction . H ow ev er, th e pressing
financial needs o f T u rk ey are all in ou r fa v ou r, and th e T u rk s m ay in d u ce the G erm ans to
m od ify th eir a ttitu d e. In th e m eantim e it seem s desirable to draw up a rep ly in con su lta tion
w ith the In d ia Office.
A. P .
M a rch 6th, 1911.
R . P . M.

I t is clear th a t the P o r te have n ot y e t com e to an agreem en t w ith th e C om p an y and if

we a ccep ted present T urkish proposals, w e should still have to n e g otia te w ith G erm a ny w ho
w ould im pose other con d ition s. T he “ N ord D e u t s [c ]h e ” com m u n iqu e is v ery sign ificant.
N evertheless I th in k th a t we should m ake u p our m inds as to w hat w e w ou ld a ccep t and
tell the T urks.
L . M.

W e will ex am in e the proposals w hen we h a ve them in w ritin g . I suppose th ey a rriv ed

b y th e m essenger o f y esterd a y .(4)
A. N .
E. G.

(3) [N o t rep rod u ced , v. The T im es o f M a rch 6, 1911, p. 5 .]

(4) \y. supra, pp. 25-6, N o. 15, a n d en cl.]

No. 18.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. L ow th er.(*)

F.O . 371/1232.
8 1 0 9 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 61.) Secret. Foreign Office, March 9, 1911, 6*15 p . m .
Your despatch No. 139 of March l s t .( 2)
Proposals of Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t will be carefully considered and reply sent
in due course, but Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should at once address an official note to
the Ottoman M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs] pointing out that paragraph 2 of
memorandum respecting conditions of our assent to 4 % customs increase gives an
altogether misleading statement o f our attitude on this point. That statement is in
direct conflict with m y telegram No. 61 o f April 1910,(3) and with my despatches
155,(4) 215(s) and 222 (6) of 1910.
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] could only agree for a fixed period to the
desired increase o f the customs duty subject to a satisfactory solution of the railway
question in Mesopotamia, such as would not disturb the status quo in those regions
to British detriment, and subject to the rem oval of the existing restrictions on the
borrowing powers of E gypt. Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should make this quite clear in
writing.

0 ) [T h is telegram is end orsed as h a vin g b een sent to th e K in g .]

( 2) \y. supra, pp. 2 5-6, N o. 15, and en cl.]
( 3) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. Y I , pp. 446 -7 , N o. 340.]
(4) [v. ibid., pp. 492-3, N o. 377.]
(5) [v. ibid., pp. 498-9, N o. 384.]
( 6) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch to S ir G. L ow th er (N o. 222) o f A u g u st 3, 1910, is not
rep rod uced . I t enclosed docu m en ts record in g M r. P a r k e r ’ s con v ersation s w ith D ja v id B ey
d u rin g his v isit to L on don in J u ly 1910 and a co p y o f the m em orandum com m u n ica ted to him
on J u ly 29. v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 5 03-5, N o. 388. (F .O . 3 71 /99 2. 27275/
1 0 0 /1 0 /4 4 .)]
 80
N o. 19.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r e y .O

F.O. 371/1232. Pera, March 10, 1911.

8 9 3 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . D. 4 -3 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 58.) E . 5-15 p . m .
Your telegram No. G l.(2)
Ottoman Government official standpoint is that Bagdad line is an internal
Ottoman railway, andtheir com m unication opening negotiations is in form of
“ n o t ic e ” ; and if we address Minister for Foreign Affairs in an official signed note,
especially one containing conditions regarding E gypt, I fear it may be so misconstrued
as perhaps to prejudice future negotiations in the matter.
I venture to submit that our object might be equally well attained by the
“ n o tic e ” form .

M IN U T E S .
There has been so m uch evasion on th e p a rt o f the O ttom an G o v [e rn m e n ]t in reg a rd to
this q uestion d u rin g the past tw elve m onths th a t it seems m ost im p o rta n t to define our
a ttitu d e and rem ove all a m b igu ity in th e m ost form al m anner. W e have already at
to m ake clear our a ttitu d e in “ in form a l ” ways. S ir G. L ow th er was recom m ended to record
our a ttitu d e in w ritin g last A p ril, b u t it docs n ot a p p ea r clear that he did so.(3) Tewfik Pasha
m isu n derstood or was rep orted to have m isu n derstood. S ir C. H a rd in g e ’ s v ery ex p lic it verbal
sta tem en t on the su b ject last s p rin g (4) ; our a ttitu d e was ex p lain ed verb ally to C ou n t O strorog
last J u ly ; and in w ritin g , th ou g h in an in form a l m anner, t o D ja v id B ey last J u ly. Y et the
P o r t e persists in ig n o r in g th e real sta te of affairs. The con d ition a bou t E g y p tia n b orrow in g
pow ers is n ot new, as it was specifically m en tion ed in th e m em orandum handed to D ja v id Bev
on J u ly 29th, 1910.(5)
I t w ou ld scein th a t th e da n g er o f our n eg otia tion s w ith T u rkey b e in g preju d iced is of
v ery m in or im p orta n ce by com p arison w ith the persistent m iscon stru ction o f ou r a ttitu d e in
reg a rd to the custom s. I ca n n ot feel th a t th e sam e ob ject w ould be a chieved by a “ notice ”
as b y an official and sign ed note. Our position in reg a rd to the n e g otia tion s is really, so far
as T u rk ey is con cern ed , a stron g one.

Q u ery te le g r a p h to S ir G. L o w th e r: —
“ Y ou r teleg ram N o. 58 o f M a rch 10th, Custom s increase.
“ The Sublim e P o rte has so p ersisten tly m iscon ceived our a ttitu d e in reg a rd to this
q u estion , in sp ite of the m any in form a l com m u n ica tion s we have m ade both here and at
C on stan tin op le, th a t I desire to define th a t a ttitu d e precisely in an official and sign ed note
to th e O ttom an M [in is te r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A fffa ir s ].
“ T he con d ition a bout E g y p tia n b o rro w in g pow ers is n ot a new one : see m em orandum
ha n ded to O ttom an M in ister of F in a n ce on J u lv 29th.”
A. P.
M a rch 11th, 1911.
R . P . M.

I a gree w ith M r. P a rk er and I do n ot see w hy a clear restatem ent o f ou r con d ition s should
p reju d ice the n eg otia tion s. A t any rate, it w ill ob via te the possib ility of m isunderstan din gs
la ter on.
L. M.

I hesitate to differ from the a bov e m inu tes, b u t I am in clin ed to a gree w ith S ir G.
L ow th er. W e shall by a “ n otice ” p lace on official w ritten record our co rrection o f a m isap p re­
hension or m isu n d erstan d in g — and in n eg otia tion s it is wrell to follow ex a c tly the form o f
w ritten com m u n ica tion s a d op ted by th e other side.
I w ould propose to t e l[e g r a p h ] to S ir G. L o w th e r : —
“ Y ou r te l[e g r a m ] N o. 58 o f M a rch 10. Custom s increase.

( ') [T h is telegram is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g .]

(2) \_v. im m ed iately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
(3) [ v . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 446-7, No. 340.]
(4) [ v . ibid., p. 445, N o. 339, and n o te (2).]
(s) \_v. ibid., pp. 503-5, N o. 388.]
 31
Y ou m ay em body in a n otice a c o m m [u n ic a t io ]n in the term s o f m y te l[e g r a m ] N o. 61
of M arch 9 .(6) T he co n d itio n a b ou t E g y p tia n b orrow in g pow ers is n ot a new o n e ; see m em o-
[ra n d u m ] handed to O ttom an M in [is t e r ] o f F in a n ce on J u ly 29.”
A. N.

I f the th in g is p u t in w ritin g there ca n n ot be any m iscon cep tion a bou t it. The im p orta n t
p oin t seems to me th a t it should be in w r itin g .(7)
[E . G .]

( 6) [v. sup ra , p. 29, N o. 18.]

( 7) [S ir E d w a rd G rey here d ra fte d the teleg ram w hich is prin ted in fra , p. 32, N o. 21.]

No. 20 .

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F.O . 371/1232.
9 0 9 5 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 65.) B erlin, D. March 10, 1911.
Sir, R . March 13, 1911.
I have the honour to report that your speech in the House o f Commons on the
subject o f the Bagdad Railway and Koweit questions(2) has, according to the “ Nord-
deiitsche Allgemeine Z eitu n g ,” made a very favourable impression in official circles.
Your statesmanlike speech, that paper says, clearly shows the lines on which an
understanding can be discussed and arrived at both as regards the raising o f the
Turkish Customs Dues and the building of the railway from Bagdad to the Gulf.
The Imperial Chancellor told me this evening that it was he him self who had
caused this paragraph to be inserted, and he asked me to tell you how much he
appreciated your clear and conciliatory language on these two questions. His
Excellency also said that he was glad to be able to say that he noted a general
improvement in the relations between the two countries. This opinion was, he told
me, shared by Count Metternich, whom no one could ever accuse of exaggerated
optimism.
The Chancellor did not m ention the question of Koweit, but the press this
evening has m uch to say on the subject............... (3)
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCH EN.
0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the C a bin et C om m ittee.]
(2) [T his speech was m ade on M a rch 8, 1911 ( v. P ari. D eb ., 5th S er. (H ou se o f Com m ons),
V ol. 22, pp. 1281-6). In answ er to a speech b y M r. B a lfo u r in w hich he asked w hat H is
M a jesty 's G overn m en t proposed to d o abou t the suggested extension s o f the B a g d a d R a ilw ay ,
in view o f th e fa ct th a t they w ou ld be p r e ju d ic ia l to B ritish tra de, S ir E d w a rd G rey sta ted
that the G overnm ent cou ld not prev en t the ex ten sion o f the railw ay w ith in T urkish t e rr ito ry
as the concession m ade to the G erm an G overn m en t still held g ood. B u t he a d ded th a t the
ex tension of the railw ay w ould cost m oney, and, m uch as he desired to see the establishm ent
o f a g ood and efficient G overnm ent w ith in the T urkish E m p ire, he was not p rep a red to agree
to the p roposed in creased custom s dues, if this a d d ition a l revenue was to be dev oted to the
b u ildin g o f a railw ay o f d ou b tfu l a d v a n ta g e to G rea t B rita in .
T u rn in g to the q uestion o f K o w e it S ir E d w a rd G rey said th a t, if the B a g d a d R a ilw a y
were ex ten d ed to the P ersian G ulf, th a t is, b eyon d T urkish t e rr ito ry , the B ritish d ip lom a tic
position w ou ld be affected. H e w ent on t o say th a t H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t w ere not
a nxious to a lter the sta tu s quo in the G ulf, b u t they ha d en tered in to tre a ty o b lig a tion s w ith
the Sheikh o f K o w eit and they w ould have to see th a t his position was m a in ta in ed .]
( 3) [T he rem a in in g p a ra g ra p h s o f this despatch are om itted as they m erely sum m arize
G erm an pr-ess o p in ion s.]
 32
N o. 21.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Low ther.

P .O . 871/1232.
8 9 3 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 63.) Secret. Foreign Office, March 1 1 , 1911, 10 p . m .
Your telegram No. 58 (Bagdad Railway). (x)
The Porte hasso persistently misconceived our attitude in regard to thisquestion
that it isessential to make the com m unication in writing and in a way which will
put it on record at the Porte, but you may choose the exact form . The condition
about E gyptian borrowing Powers is not a new o n e ; see memorandum handed to
Ottoman Minister of Finance on 29th J u ly.(2)
(!) [v. supra, p. 30, N o. 19.]
( 2) [v. G ooch T em p erley, V o l. V I , pp. 503-5, N o. 388.]

No. 22 .

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward Grey.

F .O . 371/1232.
1 0 0 0 7 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 160.) Pera, D. March 13, 1911.
Sir, R. March 20, 1911.
W ith reference to your telegram No. 63 of the 1 1 th Instant(x) and previous
correspondence on the subject of the Bagdad Railway negotiations, I have the honour
to transmit to you herewith copy o f the “ notice ” which I have com m unicated to the
Sublime Porte relative to the attitude of H is M ajesty’ s Government with regard to the
4 % increase of the Customs duties.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW TH ER.

Enclosure in No. 22 .

N ote com m unicated to Sublime Porte by Sir G. Low ther.

H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Embassy lost no time in forwarding to H is M ajesty’ s

Governm ent the memorandum handed to H is M ajesty’ s Ambassador by His Excellency
the Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 1st, 1911,(2) containing certain proposals
regarding the com pletion o f the B agdad-Persian Gulf Railway. These proposals will
receive the careful consideration of H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent and a reply will be sent
in due course.
In the meantime H is M ajesty’ s Embassy desires, under instructions from its
Governm ent, to call attention to the fact that paragraph 2 of the memorandum
referred to, which deals with one of the conditions of the assent of H is M ajesty’ s
G overnm ent to the increase of the Customs duties by four per cent., gives a statement
o f the conditions laid down by His M ajesty’ s Government which does not correspond
with those which have at various times been explained to the Sublime Porte.
The point of view always maintained by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent has been that
they would be unable to consent to the proposed increase for a fixed period if such
increase were to be devoted, by setting free other affected revenues, to facilitating the
prolongation o f a railway which could not but have a prejudicial effect upon long-
established British com m ercial interests in Mesopotamia.

0 ) [v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

(2) [v . supra, pp. 2 5-6, N o. 15, en cl.]
 33
These views were clearly set forth in a conversation which H is E xcellency the
Minister for Foreign Affairs had with His M ajesty’ s Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs in London on the 19th May last,(3) and on the 20th of J u ly(4) they
were again explained at the Foreign Office to His Highness the Ottoman Ambassador
in London, who was on that occasion accom panied by His Excellency the Minister of
Finance.
Subsequently these views were set forth at greater length in a memorandum
which was placed in the hands of His E xcellency the Minister of Finance when His
Excellency was in London.
The Sublime Porte will doubtless also rem em ber that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent,
in the course of the pourparlers regarding the question of consenting to the additional
imposition o f the four per cent., expressed the desire, in the interests of the internal
development of E gypt, that the Ottoman Governm ent should arrange to rem ove the
restrictions on the borrowing powrers of the Governm ent of His H ighness the Khedive
imposed by the Imperial Firm an o f 7 August 1879/19 Chaban 1296(5) and thus
revert to the financial status quo ante of E gypt as indicated by the Im perial Firm an
of 25 September 1872/R edjeb 22 1289(6) and that of June 8 1873/R abi-A kher 13
1290.(r)

M IN U T E S .

T he n otice has been sent in so it is to o la te to say a n y th in g b u t I th in k the p a rt a bout

the rem oval o f the re s triction on th e b o rro w in g pow ers o f E g y p t m ig h t h a ve b een p itch ed a
little stron ger.
H . N.
M a r [ c h ] 20, 1911.
M r. P ark er.
See M e m o r a n d u m ] com m u n ica ted to th e T u rk ish M in [is t e ]r o f F in a n ce J u ly 29, 1910.(8)
S ir G. L ow th er has used sim ilar w ord in g , b u t he m ig h t p erh a ps have a d ded a rem in der
th a t w e should req u ire th e p o in t to be in clu d ed in the n ote w hich we p roposed the P o r te
should a ddress to us con v e y in g sa tis fa cto ry assurances.
R. P. M.

R e p ly th a t it is presum ed th a t the P o rte w ill fu lly rea lize th a t an a rra n g em en t as to the

b orrow in g pow ers of E g y p t is a con d ition o f ou r consent.
L. M.
I th in k en ou g h has been said fo r the m om ent.
E. G.

I v en tu re to th in k th a t th e w ord “ com m ercia l ” in th e 3 rd p a ra g ra p h is m ost u n fo r tu n a te

and q u ite in accu ra te.
A. P.
M a rch 25, 1911.

I f he had said a n y th in g else T u rk ish su spicion w ou ld h a ve been aroused. A t any ra te I

don ’ t th in k it is w orth ta k in g up.
L. M.
( 3) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 4 92-3, N o. 377.]
(4) [■». ibid., pp. 498-9, N o. 384. T h e d a te should be J u ly 26.]
(s) [t>. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 70, pp. 2 9 7 -8 .]
( 6) [t>. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 65, pp. 1212-3. cp . also A . & P ., (1878 -9 ), L X X V I I I , [C . 2395],
pp. 573-628, w here th e te x ts o f the F irm a n s issued in the p eriod 1841-73 are g iv en , tog eth er
w ith corresp on den ce re la tin g to th em .]
(») [v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 63, pp. 3 1 -4 .]
( 8) [r . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 503 -5 , N o. 388.]

[10900] I)
 34

N o. 23.
Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G r e y .i1)
F .O . 371/1233.
1 10 8 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 1830 Confidential. Constantinople, D. March 22, 1911.
Sir, R. March 27, 1911.
W ith reference to m y telegrams nos. 62 and 63 o f March 1 8th ,(2) and yesterday,
T have the honour to enclose translations o f the conventions signed yesterday(3)
between the Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Railway Company respecting
1 ). the H elif-B agdad sections,
2 ). the Alexandretta-Osm anie branch, and
3). the Alexandretta port.
These were accompanied by a declaration of the Company renouncing its right
conditionally to the B agdad-G ulf section and the ports at Basra and the terminus,
of which the Minister for F oreign Affairs promises to give me details to-morrow. The
sum required for the kilometric guarantee and working expenses amounts roughly to
£ T . 400,000, while the surplus receipts assigned in virtue of paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Article II of the convention of yesterday yield about £ T . 405,000 according to the
latest returns i.e. ÆT. 290,000 from the surplus tithes earmarked for the Haidar
P a sh a-E skish eh ir-A n gora -K on ia -E regli sections and some ¿£T. 115,000 from the
ceded revenues surplus for the B ulgu rlu-H elif sections, as shown in the annexed
table. (4)
A ccording to articles (3) and (4) the Company undertakes to com plete the sections
from H elif to Bagdad within five years from the date of approval of the plans and
surveys, which are to be prepared and approved within 14 m onths from yesterday.
To accom plish this there is a natural desire to set to work as soon as possible from both
ends and consequently a corresponding anxiety to lose no time in com ing to a final
settlement with England and France regarding the B agdad-G ulf sections.
As regards the branch from Alexandretta to Osmanie, it is to be constructed
without kilometric guarantees and within two years from the date of approval of the
surveys which are to be presented to the Ministry within nine m onths from the present
date.
Like the port of Alexandretta, the termination of the concession is made to
synchronise with that of the section ending 200 kilometres east o f H elif i.e. in the
vicinity of Mosul.
The plans for the port at Alexandretta are to be ready within fifteen months from
yesterday and the works are to be com pleted within four years of the date of their
approval. This port is in a way a set-off against the Gulf port and that of Basra
granted to the Company by the original firman but now relinquished together with
their exclusive right to the B agdad-G ulf sections of the Railway.
I am inform ed that the German Company also reserves to itself the right to come
to terms with the new Company as to the indem nity to be paid by the latter to
compensate it for the loss suffered in not constructing that section.
Hussein Djahid B ey in the “ Tanin,” which is practically the organ of the
Minister of Finance, and other Governm ent organs express great pleasure at the
conclusion of these conventions and the hope that they will lead to a similar settle-

f 1) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K i n g ; to the C abin et C om m ittee;

to M r. B u x to n .]
(2) [S ir G. L ow th er’ s teleg ram (N o. 62), D . M a rch 18, 1911, 9-50 p .m ., R . M a rch 19, 9 a .m .,
sta ted th a t th e P o r te had com e to term s w ith th e B a g d a d R a ilw ay C om p an y fo r the com p letion
o f th e H a lif to B a g d a d section o f th e railw ay. H is teleg ram (N o. 63) o f M a rch 21 confirm ed
th is and sta ted th a t the three con v en tion s m en tion ed above had been sign ed on th a t day.
(F .O . 371/1232. 9 9 9 9 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 ; F.O. 371/1233. 1 0 4 6 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .)]
(3) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
(4) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 35

ment with Great Britain in the matter of the G ulf sections, Koweit and ‘ ‘ other parts
o f Ottoman territory in the Persian G ulf,” (the latter phrase m ay refer to Bahrein,
Katar &c.) but the fact that the Governm ent refuses to submit these conventions to
the Chamber indicates that it anticipates considerable opposition to their conclusion.
According to the Concession Law, which was the outcom e o f the “ affaire L yn ch ”
all concessions involving a financial liability on the part o f the Treasury must be
submitted to the Chamber and it is certainly straining the interpretation o f the
preamble o f the 1908 Convention^) to maintain that the re-allocation o f the revenues
assigned to the Haidar P ash a-K onia-E regli sections do not involve such liability. The
opposition in the Chamber would doubtless be based on the contention that while the
State is contracting debts to meet its ordinary expenditure there can be no justification
for assigning revenues to a railway which, even on military considerations, is not an
imperatively immediate necessity.
The condition attached to the German Com pany’ s relinquishment o f its rights
over the B agdad-G ulf section, viz. that its share in the new Ottoman Company should
not be inferior to that of other Non-Ottomans, coupled with the proposal made to H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent and forwarded in m y despatch No. 139 o f March l s t ,(6) that the
Ottoman G overnm ent’ s share should be 4 0 % , does not seem to afford m uch scope for
obtaining such control of the B agdad-G ulf line as would compensate for the consent
of a Free-Trade country like England to the 4 % Customs increase and the surrender
o f our position in Koweit. A com bination by which the Ottoman G overnm ent’ s share
should be reduced to 10% and that o f Germany, France and England increased to
3 0 % — the A nglo-French share being thus greater than that of Turkey and Germany
com bined— might afford a more satisfactory basis, especially if Turkey consented to
recognise our position in Bahrein and Katar. Prom inent Germans here have recently
been hinting that the Turks will have to accept any arrangement come to between
Berlin and L ondon, following the analogy o f the Potsdam interview ,!7) and that we
perhaps could secure a more satisfactory arrangement by unofficial pourparlers with
Germany. I understand that m y German colleague, Baron Marschall, is proceeding
to Berlin in a few days and that he intends impressing on H err Kiderlen-W aechter
the desirability o f Germ any’ s unofficially approaching England with a view to a
friendly solution. On the other hand the present Turkish Cabinet feel that the
Potsdam interview, where matters Turkish were discussed without previously
consulting the Ottoman Governm ent, was a severe blow to the latter, and they are
anxious at least to appear to com e to a settlement of Persian Gulf matters with
England direct. At the same time, the proviso that, in the event o f the failure to form
the new ‘ ‘ international ’ ’ B agdad-G ulf Company, the German Company should be
reinstated in her rights under the original concession would seem to point to
G erm any’ s desire to be prepared for all eventualities, e.g. the breakdown o f the A nglo-
Turkish negotiations on the subject. It is said that one of G erm any’ s main objectives
in all these negotiations is to obtain free access to the Paris m oney market.
On general grounds it would seem that the removal o f the main causes o f rivalry
and friction between Germany and England and France here, if not in a wider sphere,
would be to the benefit o f all parties concerned. Turkey has always traded on the
dissensions between internal Ottoman elements and on the discords and jealousies of
the Great Powers. E ven Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians have lately showrn signs
of a desire to lay aside their mutual dissensions, and it might be to the general interest
that the same tendency should, if possible, be manifested in the international sphere
in matters concerning Turkey.
It is to be anticipated that the German Company will now lose no time in
negotiating with Turkey for the construction of the Khanikin branch.
I have, &c.
GERABD LOW THER.
( 5) [r . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 76 -7 .]
( 6) [ v . supra, pp. 2 5-6, N o. 15, and en cl.]
C ) [r . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 549-723, C h a pter L X X X I X .J

[10900]
 36
M IN U T E S .

T he in terestin g com m u n ica tion will be th e one w hich R ifa a t P asha was to g iv e S ir G.
L ow th er on M a rch 23rd (see the first p a g e o f this despa tch) abou t th e G u lf sections.
T he passages a bout B a hrein and El K a t r are im p o r t a n t : if w e co u ld g et a fa v ou ra ble
settlem en t o f these questions it w ould be a d istin ct a ccom p lishm ent and we cou ld hard ly assent
to the custom s in crease w ith ou t such a settlem ent. T he a ttitu d e of G erm any d u rin g these
n e g otia tion s will be cu riou s to w atch. She a p p a ren tly has som ething to g ain b y a settlem ent,
and th e re fo re m ay u rg e m oderation on th e T urks. On th e oth er hand it m ig h t he unw ise to
confide in h er until she conies ou t in to the open , as it is a lw a y s' possible she is up to dou ble
d ealing.
M r. M a llet to see.
A. P.
M a rch 27, 1911.

I t seems to me im p orta n t steadily to keep in m in d th e m ain o b ject w e have in v ie w :

nam ely the sa feg u a rd in g o f B ritish in terests in th e P ersian G u lf and, sub sidiarily, in
M esopota m ia . I t was because w c con sid ered those interests th rea ten ed by the G erm an
m on op olistic ra ilw ay scheme, th a t w e h a ve declin ed to assist T u rk ey , o r G erm an financiers,
in ca rr y in g ou t th a t scheme. O u r a ttitu d e has resu lted in im p ressing T u rkey w ith the
necessity of ob ta in in g from G erm any a fr e e r hand in reg a rd to th e B a g d a d -G u lf section of
th e ra ilw ay, so th a t T u rkey now has som eth in g to offer to us, in retu rn fo r w hich we are
ex p e c te d to con sen t to in crease of custom s and to allow B ritish m oney to be m ade a vailable
fo r the railw ay. I t is th e custom s, an d ou r hold ov er K ow eit, w hich have been th e lev er by
w hich we are b egin n in g to secure som e success. This lev er is a vailable as a ga in st T u rk ey , and
it is from T u rk ey th a t we w an t a sa tis fa ctory a rra n g em en t res p ectin g th e position a t K o w eit
and gen era lly on the littora l of the G ulf. T h erefore w e should d o well to con tin u e n e g o tia tin g
w ith T u rk ey.
I t is tru e th a t w e are also desirous o f com in g to an u n d ersta n d in g w ith G erm any, b u t
this seems to me, at this stage, n ot th e prim a ry , b u t the secondary, con sid era tion . I t is
proba b ly m ore im p orta n t to us to g et a fa v ou ra b le settlem en t o f the G u lf-q u estion in general,
than to agree a bou t th e ex a ct p r o p o r tio n o f B ritish p a rticip a tio n in the railw ay.
I t is m oreov er only to o likely, because in a ccord a n ce w ith ou r lon g ex p erien ce of . G erm an
d iplom acy, th a t if we w ere t o a gree to n e g o tia te w ith G erm any d irect, she w ould a fte r d r iv in g
the h a rd est possible b a rga in w ith us, finally tu rn rou n d to the T u rks and, by som e system atic
m isrep resen ta tion such as th eir in sp ired organs are m asters of, g et T u rk ey to believe th a t it
was E n g lan d th a t was con tem p tu ou s o f T urkish interests.
I f w e do not g et sa tisfa ction ou t o f the T urks as regard s ou r position in th e G ulf, w e shall
g a in p ra ctica lly n oth in g by any a g reem en t w ith G erm any. On th e o th e r hand, a direct
n eg o tia tio n w ith G erm any m igh t bear no d irect fr u it, and y et we m ig h t still com e to a
sa tisfa ctory a rra n g em en t w ith T urkey. E v e ry th in g th erefore p oin ts to th e w isdom of neg o­
tia t in g direct w ith T u rkey in th e first in stan ce and as th e m ost im p orta n t p a rt o f any a ttem p t
to ca rry ou t ou r policy.
A n y n eg otia tion w hich we m ay ca rry on sim ultaneously w ith G erm any, ou g h t to be clearly
ex p la in ed to be sub ject to th e reserv ation th a t it can lead to no agreem en t unless w e a t the
sam e tim e obtain sa tisfa ctory term s from T u rk ey . B y m a k in g this q u ite pla in , we m ay hope
to en list G erm an su p p ort in in d u cin g T u rkey to com e to term s and I see no reason w hy we
should not ask G erm any definitely to use h er in fluen ce in th a t d irection .
T his presupposes th a t, as a p relim in a ry , we have macle it q u ite clea r to o u r ow n m inds
w hat B ritish req uirem ents are, and I w ould stron gly d ep recate en terin g in to any fu r th e r
discussion w ith G erm any, unless we have reached th a t sta te o f clearness.
E . A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 27.
R . P . M.
a . n :
E. G.
 87
N o. 24 .
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B ertie. (')
P.O . 371/1233.
1 2 2 8 2 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 114.)
Sir, F oreign Office, March 28, 1911.
I saw M. Cambon with Sir Arthur Nicolson to-day.
M. Cambon inform ed us that the French Government wished to secure certain
railway concessions in the north o f Asia M inor, which were being applied for by a
Russo-French group. They wished to com plete the system of Syrian railw ays; and,
as for a part o f its length the H ejaz Railway com peted with one of the French
railways, they wished this length o f the H ejaz Railway to be conceded to the French.
Further, there was the Danube-Adriatic Railway project, in which they were
interested.
I said that I assumed that, if they were satisfied on these points, they would
then be prepared to give their consent to the 4 % increase o f the Turkish Customs
Dues, and to consider that an agreement had been com e to about the Bagdad Railway
generally.
M. Cambon assented, but said that the consent o f the French to the increase
would be dependent upon an accord having been com e to with us.
I told him that our situation .was a corresponding one. W e wished to have a
satisfactory arrangement about the B agdad-G ulf section of the Bagdad Railway that
would secure for us two things. The first thing was that British trade should be sure,
o f perfectly fair treatment on the whole o f the Bagdad Railway system. W e could
secure this if we had control o f the B agdad-G ulf section, for the arrangement of
through-rates would then be a matter in which we should have our say. The second
thing we wished to make sure was that the strategic position in the Persian Gulf
should not be altered to our disadvantage. W e did not wish to press that the Bagdad
Railway should be continued to the Persian G ulf, but we wished to secure that, if it
did reach the G ulf, it should do so at a place and under conditions such that the
present strategic position would not be prejudiced. I should discuss these two points
with the India Office, which was specially interested in the strategic conditions, and
with the Board o f Trade, which was interested in the com m ercial conditions. I
should then make a counter-proposal in reply to the Turkish proposals, which would
certainly not do as they stood. But, as the Germans could upset any arrangement
which was com e to with the Turks, I thought we should probably tell the Germans
frankly what were the things which we wished to secure,, and find out whether they
were willing to agree to conditions by which they could be secured. I f we found
that an agreement could be reached, I should tell M. Cambon what the agreem ent
was to b e ; and I should say to the Turks that we would not conclude it and give
our assent to the Customs increase until the French Governm ent also were satisfied
on the conditions which he had indicated to m e.
M. Cambon entirely accepted this statement o f our position.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

( ') [T h is despatch is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to the C a bin et C o m m itte e ; to

M r. B u x to n .]
 3b
N o. 25.
Lord Hardinge to Sir A . Nicolson.

P rivate.(*) V iceroy’ s Camp, India,

M y dear Nico, March 29, 1911.
I am very much obliged to you for your very interesting letter o f the 2nd M arch(2)
containing a great deal of inform ation on foreign politics which continue to be,
naturally, of very great interest to m e. I will not touch upon them any further
than to say that I always shall have great doubts as to the value o f any agreement
with Germany. Such agreement, if concluded, would be, in m y opinion, only of a
temporary nature so as to tie on e’ s hands pending G erm any’ s convenience. I fully
believe in the theory o f G erm any’ s intention, if possible, to dominate Europe to
which we are the only stumbling-block.
You will have seen m y telegrams on the subject o f the Bagdad Bailway, Koweit
and the Persian Gulf. Bad enough as it is that wre should have been placed in such
an inferior position in connection with the Gulf section, it is not your fault
or m y fault that this is s o ; but there it is. All that we can now do is to
strengthen our position in the Persian Gulf as much as possible, and I think
that we should be very firm in declaring “ hands o f f ’ ’ to anybody, whether
Turk or German, who tries to get a foothold there. W e ought, in particular,
to be very sensitive on the subject o f Koweit. I maintain that if w7e give the smallest
concession there it will sim ply be an encouragement to Turkey to push on and to
make further encroachments in E l Katr, Bahrein, and possibly Muskat. The claim
o f the W ali of Basrah to imprison the four Bahreinis, of which we had telegraphic
inform ation yesterday, is indicative of the temper o f the Turks in those regions. I
think we must seriously contemplate resistance, possibly by force, to the Turks on
the very first opportunity of any encroachm ent on the seaboard of the Gulf where
we can utilise our naval forces. M y belief is that if wTe bring them up with a round
turn they will realise that in the Persian Gulf they are helpless at sea, and wTe shall
find that they are more ready to listen to reason and to abstain from further
encroachm ents. The Sheikh of Kowreit should be protected at any cost. W ere he
not protected, we should at the same time lose the confidence o f the Sheikh of
M ohammerah. Strongly as I felt when in London on the question of the Persian
Gulf, I feel infinitely more strongly out here and realise the intense importance of
our predominance being maintained in those waters................(3)
Y [o u ]r s ever,
' H A B D IN G E OF P [E N S H U B S T ].

(1) [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. I I o f 1911.]

(2) [d. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 590-1, N o. 440.]
(3) [T h e rest o f this le tte r refers b riefly to the T ra n s-P ersia n R a ilw a y an d to v a riou s
p r iv a te m a tters n ot relev an t to th e p resen t ch a p ter.]

No. 26.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Low ther.

P .O . 371/1234.
1 6 9 3 1 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 123.)
Sir, F oreign Office, May 2, 1911.
I told the Turkish Ambassador to-day that I had expected, on m y return to
London after the Easter holiday, to find our reply to the Turkish proposals about
the Bagdad Bailway ready to be given to him . The Governm ent o f India had,
however, some inform ation on certain details connected with the Persian Gulf which
 30
they were sending to us, and they had asked that we should wait until this
information reached us. W e were, therefore, waiting.
. I explained to the Ambassador that we could not accept the Turkish proposals
as they stood, but I did not wish the Turkish Governm ent to suppose that we were
going to meet them with a simple negative, without suggesting some other solution.
As our reply had been delayed longer than I expected, I wished him to understand
that it would be forthcom ing as soon as possible.
The Ambassador said that he would let his Governm ent know what I had
told him.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 27.

Sir F . B ertie to Sir Edward G rey.C )

(B y Post.)
F .O . 371/1234.
1 82 2 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . Paris, D. May 13, 1911.
Tel. (No. 57.) B . May 14, 1911.
French Minister for Foreign Affairs hears that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are
negotiating in regard to the Bagdad Railway question. He earnestly hopes you will
not commit yourself to consenting to the continuation of the additional 3 per cent.
Turkish customs duties or to Turkey’ s demand for further 4 per cent, customs duties
without consulting the French Governm ent. H e undertakes to act sim ilarly towards
his M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and he is anxious to co-operate with you in join t defence
o f British and French interests involved whether the negotiations are at B erlin or
at Constantinople. H e is very much perturbed at the increasing influence of Germany
in Turkey.
Above is confidential.

M IN U T E .

M . C am bon spoke to m e this a ft [e r n o o n ] on th is subject. H e ha d r e c [e iv e ] d a t e lfe g r a m ]

from M. C ru p p i. T he la tter said to S ir F . B e r tie th a t he had h ea rd th a t w e w ere n e g o tia tin g
a t B erlin in reg a rd to th e B a g d a d R [ a ilw a ]y and P ersian G ulf. M. Cam bon had fu lly
in f[o r m e ]d his G o v [e rn m e n ]t as to th e p resen t sta te o f n e g otia tion s w ith T u rk ey an d as to
our a ttitu d e in reg a rd to th e 4 % . I to ld M . C a m bon th a t w e w ere n ot a t p resen t n e g o tia tin g
at B erlin eith er as to B a g d a d lt [ a ilw a ]y or as to P ersia n G u lf— th ou g h it was possible th a t
some day w e m ig h t do so— and in th a t case we s h [o u l]d let him know . O ur a ttitu d e as to th e
4% in crease o f custom s dues rem a in ed ex a ctly w hat it was and w e should n ot fo r g e t the
assurance w e ha d g iv en as to n ot con sen tin g w ith ou t F ra n ce con cu rrin g . P erh a p s substance
o f above cou ld be teleg ra p h ed to S ir F . B ertie ? (2)
A. N.
E. G.

0 ) [T h is teleg ra m is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g .]

( 2) [A n a ltera tion and a d d itio n w ere m ade in the pen u ltim a te sentence o f this m in u te by
S ir E d w a rd G rey. T he w ords “ w e should n ot f o r g e t ” w ere erased, and “ w ill ce r ta in ly hold
g o o d ” w ere in serted a t th e end o f se n te n c e ; S ir E d w a rd G rey a dded th e fo llo w in g n o t e : —
“ I t m a y b e p u t as stron gly as th is in th e telegram . [E . G .] ”
T he telegram t o S ir F. B e r tie is rep rod u ced in fra , p. 41, N o. 29.]
 40

N o. 28.
Sir F . Bertie to Sir Edward G r e y .( l)
F .O . 371/1240.
1 85 2 9 /6 8 6 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 214.) Paris, D . M ay 14, 1911.
S ir :— R . May 16, 1911.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs is very much perturbed at the state o f affairs
in Turkey and the predominance o f German counsels at the Porte. There is every
chance of disturbances in the Balkans before long. The revolt in the Yem en
continues. The mortality amongst the Turkish troops sent thither to suppress it is
very great and the Grand Shereef o f Mecca shows signs o f shaking off the Turkish
yoke. The Governm ent o f the Ottoman Empire by the Committee of Union and
Progress is a failure. The Y oung Turk Party has not shown the qualities which
were hoped and expected o f it. The recent changes in the Turkish cabinet are
om inous of an increase in the already dominant influence of Germany which had
enabled her to make arrangements most favourable to her own interests in regard
to the Bagdad Railway regardless o f those o f France and E ngland. Matters cannot
continue as they now are at Constantinople and there may be a crisis at any moment
and a seizure o f power by a m ilitary dictator. All this was said to me by M. Cruppi
yesterday. The only way in which France and England can hope to combat the
predominance o f Germ any at Constantinople would in His E xcellency’ s opinion be
an understanding between the British and French Governments for joint action in
Turkish affairs. This gave me an opportunity to say that at Constantinople joint
action to be efficacious should be financial as well as political and that unfortunately
the Ottoman Bank had invariably stood in the way when attempts had been made
to bring about A nglo-French financial co-operation. The policy of that Institution
apparently having been to oppose any undertakings where such co-operation would
be useful unless and until the Bank itself was prepared to promote them and have
the controlling share in them. I then gave to M. Cruppi instances in which the
Ottoman Bank had so acted and I went on to say that negotiations were now going
on in London between representatives of the Turkish National Bank, the Salonica
Bank and other French financiers which were likely to fail owing to the obstructive
attitude o f the Ottoman Bank. H is E xcellency interposed to observe that inform ation
which had just reached him showed that Sir Ernest Cassel did not care to continue
the business o f the National Bank and the pourparlers had consequently come to an
e n d .(2) I replied that I knew that in the interest o f the Ottoman Bank it had been
represented that such was the attitude o f Sir Ernest Cassel and that His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent were indifferent in the m atter; but unless M . Cruppi’ s inform ation
which he had just m entioned was o f the day and positive I thought that the position
had been misrepresented. His E xcellency said that he would make further enquiries
as to the circumstances and result o f the negotiations in L ondon, and that he was all
in favour o f an arrangement for a fusion o f interests. W hat however was essential
for the defence of French and British interests against German opposition was an
immediate understanding for joint action at Constantinople. M. Cruppi did not say
what the nature of that action should be or how it should be exercised generally;
but in regard to the Bagdad Railway question respecting which he had learnt that
you were now negotiating he requested me to beg you most earnestly not to commit
yourself in any way to consenting to a continuation of the 3% additional customs
duties or to a further increase of 4 % to them without consultation with the French
Governm ent who would give an undertaking to withhold any such consent by them
without consultation with His M ajesty’ s Governm ent. W hat he desired would be
that the British and French Governm ents should support each other in any
0 ) [T h is despa tch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent t o th e K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;
t o L o rd M o r le y ; to L ord H a ld a n e.]
(2) [cp . G ooch & T em p erley, V o l. I X (I ), p. 230, No. 198.]
 41

negotiations, whether at Constantinople or at Berlin on the subject of the Bagdad

Railway so that they might assist each other in protecting British and French
interests.
I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.
M IN U T E S .

S ir F. B e r tie used his o p p o rtu n ity to m ake som e sa lu ta ry rem ark s a bou t the a ttitu d e o f
the O ttom an B a n k in the m a tter o f A n g lo -F re n ch finan cial co -o p e ra tio n in T u rk ey an d his
la n g u a ge m ig h t b e a p p rov ed .
The m isu n d ersta n d in g w hich has arisen abou t ou r n e g otia tion s w ith reg a rd t o th e B a g d a d
R a ilw a y qu estion w ill have been cleared u p b y ou r teleg ra m o f th is m orn in g r e c o rd in g S ir A.
N icolson ’ s con v ersation w ith M . Cam bon.
E x ce p t fo r co-op era tion in finan cial en terp rises (fo r w hich the O ttom an B a n k ha ve h ith erto
shown no enthusiasm ) and in the B a g d a d R a ilw a y question , I d o n ot see how jo in t a ction at
C on stan tin ople w ou ld be useful a t presen t a n d M . C ru p p i does n ot en lig h ten us.
F ra n ce m ig h t (a n d dou btless w ould, if asked), g iv e us som e k in d o f su p p ort as reg a rd s
our m any differen ces w ith T u rk ey in the G u lf a n d in M esopota m ia b u t th is w ou ld n ot lea d
T u rk ey to p r e fe r A n g lo-F ren ch to G erm an a d v ice— q u ite th e co n tr a r y — nor, so fa r as I can see,
w ould A n g lo -F re n ch coop era tion in the p o litica l sphere save T u rk ey from th e fa te w hich
M. C ru p p i fea rs fo r her.
I th in k w e m ig h t en cou ra ge M . C ru p p i t o form u la te his wishes a little m ore definitely,
recip ro ca tin g his op in io n o f the wish fo r a finan cia l a n d gen era l u n d ersta n d in g res p ectin g
T urkish affairs.
H . N.
M a y 16, 1911.
E. A. C.
M a y 25.
R . P . M.
A. N.
E. G.

No. 29.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O . 371/1234.
1 8 2 2 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 114.) Foreign Office, May 16, 1911.
Your tel[eg ra m ] No. 57 (of M ay 13).f 1)
M. Cambon said yesterday that he had fully inform ed French G ov [ern m e n ]t as
to present state o f our negotiations with Turkey and our attitude in regard to 4 %
customs duties (see m y D esp [atch ] No. 114)(2) but French M [inister for] F [o re ig n ]
A [flairs] had heard that we were negotiating at Berlin in regard to Bagdad railway
and Persian Gulf questions.
M. Cambon was inform ed that we were not at present negotiating at Berlin on
either of these questions though it was possible that some day we might do so. In that
case we should inform him. Our attitude as to the 4 % Customs duties remained
exactly where it was and the assurance we had given as to not consenting without the
concurrence of France would certainly hold good.

(U [ v . supra, p. 39, N o. 27.]

(2) [u. supra, p. 37, N o. 24.]
 42

N o. 30.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en ff1)
F .O . 371/1234.
1 9 1 3 8 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 114.)
Sir, Foreign Office, M ay 18, 1911.
I told Count Metternich to-d ay (2) that we had not yet replied to the Turkish
proposal about the Bagdad Railway. W e could not accept it as it sto o d ; but we should
put forward another proposal, and we were now waiting for inform ation from the
Governm ent of India about the Persian Gulf. Our objects were two-fold : (1) to
secure that in practical working, and not only on paper, there would be no differential
treatment of British tra d e; and (2) to make sure that the strategical position in the
Persian Gulf would not be altered to our disadvantage.
Count Metternich observed that, in the Bagdad Railway Concession, equal
treatment was promised for all trade.
I pointed out how treatment which was equal in theory might be differential in
practice : by the placing of high rates on goods in which we were specially interested
and low rates on goods in which Germany was specially interested. I f we were to
concede to Turkey an increase of Customs Duties which directly or indirectly would
facilitate the making of the Bagdad Railway, we must by means of our participation
in the southern end get some position which would be a guarantee to public opinion
here that there would be no differentiation in raihvay rates. I said that, in conversa­
tion with m y Colleagues, I had always stated that it was not the intention of Germany
to differentiate, and that when as sooner or later must be the case, her assent was
asked to a final settlement of the Bagdad Railway question she would be willing to
m eet us on this point.
Count Metternich assented and confirmed the view that the German Government
had no desire to secure differentiation as regards trade.
[ I am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

0 ) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g ; to the C a bin et C om m itte e ;

to L o rd H a ld a n e.]
(2) [F o r fu rth er record s o f S ir E d w a rd G re y ’ s con v ersa tion on th is da te w ith C ount
M ettern ich , v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , p. 630, N o. 4 6 6 ; V ol. V I I , p. 256, N o. 278.]

No. 31.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.

F .O . 371/1240.
1 8 5 2 9 /6 3 6 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 176.)
Sir, F oreign Office, M ay 25, 1911.
I have received Y [o u r ] E x c e lle n c y ’ s] desp[atch] No. 214 of the
14th in s t[a n t],(1) reporting a conversation with the French Minister for F [o re ig n ]
A [ffa irs ], in which he expressed his apprehension at the state o f affairs in Turkey
and the growing influence of Germany at the Sublime Porte and his conviction that
the latter tendency can be combated only by an understanding between Great Britain
and France for joint action in Turkish affairs.
I approve the language held by Y [o u r] E [x cellen cy ] to M. Cruppi on this
occasion.

0 ) [r . sup ra , pp. 4 0-1, N o. 28.]

 48

Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should take an opportunity of inform ing M. Cruppi that

H [is ] M [a je sty’ s] G [overnm ent] share his wish for a financial and general under­
standing between the two Powers respecting Turkish affairs and you should invite
him to formulate more precisely the lines on which he would propose that such an
agreement should be based.
[I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 32.

Sir F . B ertie to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)

F.O . 371/1240.
2 0 7 4 5 /6 3 6 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 236.) Paris, D. May 28, 1911.
Sir R. M ay 30, 1911.
I had the honour to receive on the m orning of the 26th instant your despatch
No. 176 of the previous d a y ,(2) and I had an interview with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs yesterday. I reminded H is E xcellency of the conversation which I had had
with him on the 13th instant, as reported to you in m y despatch No. 214 of the
following d a v .(3) I told him that you had approved the language which I had held to
him on that occasion and that you had instructed me to inform His E xcellency that
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent share his wish for a financial and general understanding
between England and France respecting Turkish affairs and you had directed me to
ask him to form ulate more precisely than he had done the lines on which he would
propose that such an agreement should be based.
M. Cruppi took note of your suggestion on which he said that he would act, and
he requested me to express to you the satisfaction with which he had received your
message and his great desire to arrive at an understanding with His M ajesty’ s
Government for joint action in questions regarding Turkey.
I have, &c.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .

0 ) [T his despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r ;

t o L o rd M o r le y ; to L o rd H a ld a n e .]
( 2) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m e n t.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 4 0-1, N o. 28.]

No. 33.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/1240.
2 85 4 8 /6 3 6/11 /4 4 .
(No. 829.) Paris, D. July 17, 1911.
Sir, R . July 21, 1911.
I spoke to M. de Selves in the course of m y first interview with His E xcellency
on the 9th instant of the desirability o f A nglo-French co-operation at Constantinople
in financial matters. In this he concurred. I told him that several attempts had been
made to bring about a com bination or a fusion of interests but they had failed owing
chiefly to the obstructive methods of the Ottoman Bank which though nom inally an
Anglo-French establishment was in reality a French one. The London Board had
 44

been quite as obstructive and even more so than the Administration o f the Bank at
Paris. The result of the excessive pretensions of the Bank in the matter of the
Turkish Loan had driven the Porte to seek m oney in Germany. It had obtained it
there at a higher price it was true than it would have paid for a loan in Paris, but
without the political conditions and concessions to the Ottoman Bank which the
French Government at the instance of M. Laurent a French financial expert whose
services had been lent to the Turkish Governm ent as their financial adviser, had been
led to insist on. M. Laurent’ s proceedings had furnished the curious spectacle of an
adviser acting in opposition to the wishes of the Governm ent by which he was
em ployed. There had been a divergence of views between the M inistry for Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. A quotation for a loan by a French group other
than the Ottoman Bank was refused by the Ministry of Finance except on conditions
which the Porte would not accept. The Ottoman Bank declined to forego demands
which the Porte regarded as excessive and a loan from France not being negotiable
the m oney was provided by German Banks under the auspices of the German
Governm ent. German interests had benefited thereby politically and com m ercially.
Germ any had posed as the friend in need and with success.
I further expressed to M. de Selves the opinion that the French Government
rather overrated the effect of the power which the Minister of Finance has to withhold
his consent to a quotation in the Paris market of loans or undertakings to which he
sees political objections or to the bringing out o f undertakings to which lie desires to
attach political conditions or promises of expenditure of part of the funds in France.
The French Government had been for a long time under the impression that by
refusing a quotation for a loan for the construction of the Bagdad Railway they would
be able to exact from the Company terms for French and British participation in the
construction and administration of the Railway. This refusal of a quotation though it
delayed the construction and was inconvenient to the Company did not prevent
F rench m oney being invested in the undertaking. The Ottoman Bank, though it was
for a long time denied on its part, but was now admitted, had an agreement which
still existed by which there was a mutual understanding between it and the Deutsche
Bank (alias also the Bagdad Railway Company) to give to one another a 30% option
o f all enterprises undertaken in Turkey. The Ottoman Bank therefore had an option
o f 3 0% in the Bagdad Railway. As the shares were not quoted on the Bourse they
passed in Paris from Bank to Bank and from hand to hand for there were French
investors who were ready to put their m oney into the concern notwithstanding the
prohibition of the French Governm ent o f a quotation. Shares were also purchased
through Swiss and Belgian Banks. There was also another and a roundabout way in
which French m oney assisted the construction o f the Railway viz. through the
purchase by French investors of shares in German enterprises which the German
holders sold in order to invest in the Bagdad R ailw a y ./1)
M. de Selves said that he quite appreciated how shortsighted had been the attitude
of giving unlimited support to the Ottoman Bank and, so far as he was concerned he
would be very glad to see A nglo-French cooperation at Constantinople in financial as
well as political questions.
I have, &c.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .

0 ) [S ir F . B e r tie ’ s la n g u a ge was a p p rov ed by S ir E d w a rd G rey in his despatch (N o. 303)

o f J u ly 26, 1911. (F.O . 371/1240. 2 8 5 4 8 /6 3 6 /1 1 /4 4 )]
 45
[E D . N O T E .— T he m em orandum p rin ted below was d r a fte d in th e first in stan ce in th e
F o re ig n Office and a p p rov ed b y S ir E d w a rd G rey w ith som e am endm ents. I t was th en sent
to the In d ia Office fo r com m ent. Som e discussion took pla ce re g a rd in g th e proposal in p a ra ­
g ra ph 4 o f section (i) to a ccep t a 20% p a r tic ip a tio n o f G rea t B r ita in on the co n d itio n th a t
no oth er P ow er had any m ore. T he ea rlier su g g estion had been “ at least 5 0 % .” T he final
decision on this p oin t was record ed b y M r. P a r k e r in a m in u te as fo llo w s : —
“ A m eetin g o f S ir E. G rey, M r. S. B u x to n , S ir A . N icolson , S ir H . L l[e w e lly n ] Sm ith,
M r. M c K in n o n -W o o d and M r. P a r k e r was h eld to d a y when it was d ecid ed to adh ere to
th e 20% prop osa l fo r p o litica l reasons.
A. P .
J u ly 26, 1911.” ]
No. 34.

Memorandum com m unicated to Tewfik P asha.(*)

F .O . 371/1234.
2 83 0 0 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(Confidential.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1911.
H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent have not failed to give their careful attention to the
important proposals contained in the m emorandum o f the 1st March last from the
Ottoman G overnm ent.(2)
These proposals, though they affect interests so closely interwoven that they
cannot be settled independently the one o f the other, have, for the purpose of
convenience, been set forth under three distinct headings :—
(i) The Bagdad Railway question.
(ii) The respective interests o f Great Britain and Turkey in the region o f the
Persian Gulf.
(iii) An increase from 11 per cent, to 15 per cent, ad valorem in the Turkish
customs duties.

(i.) The Bagdad Railway Question.

On various occasions His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have indicated the conditions
under which they would favour the participation o f British capital in this enterprise;
and, while it is not now proposed to recapitulate the earlier stages of this question,
it may be recalled that in July 1910, as a result of prolonged discussions with the
Ottoman Minister of Finance who was then in L ondon, it was intimated that an
arrangement securing to British interests a representation of 55 per cent, o f the
whole in regard to the Gulf sections of the line might be regarded as a satisfactory
solution,(3)— and, having regard to the great preponderance o f certain interests in other
sections o f the line, such a proportion cannot well be looked upon as excessive,(4)
especially if the great extent o f British trade in those regions and the vast tonnage
of British shipping are borne in m in d .(5)
Since the arrangement laid before Djavid B ey represented a large measure
of concession on the part o f H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent, they have received the
suggestions now made by the Ottoman Governm ent with some surprise.
The Turkish proposals for the final portions o f the railway are that a new
company should be form ed, and that the capital should be divided between the
Ottoman Governm ent, who would receive 40 per cent, o f the whole, and British,
0 ) [T h is m em orandum is end orsed as h a v in g been sent “ fo r c o n c u r r e n c e ” to L o rd C rew e;
to L ord M o r le y ; to M r. B u x t o n ; to M r. M cK en n a . T he en d orsem ent is in itia lle d by S ir E d w a rd
Grey. A sum m arv was com m u n ica ted to M . P a u l C am bon, C ount M ettern ich an d C ount
B en cken dorff on J u ly 31, 1911. (F .O . 371/1234. 3 0 3 5 6 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .) cp. G .P., X X X I, pp . 3 1 5 -8 ;
S ieb ert, pp. 5 7 5 -6 .]
(2) [v. supra, pp. 25-6, N o. 15, en cl.]
(3) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 503-5, N o. 388.]
(4) [M a r g in a l n ote b y L o rd M o r le y : “ I suppose th e R e p o r t o f m y su b -corn [m ittee] o f
C [om m ittee o f ] I [m p e r ia l] D [e fe n c e ] has been con sid ered in rela tion to th is ? M .” ]
(*) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ C h iro l’ s letters on the G u lf now com in g out in T he Tim es
should be look ed in to, I th in k .” v. The Tim es, J u n e 2 9 ; J u ly 6, 8, 12, 14, 20, 22, 2 5 ; A u g u st 1,
4, 1911.1
 46
French, and German groups, who would each receive 20 per cent. The details of
the financial arrangements are left for subsequent settlement between the parties
interested.
His M ajesty’ s Government regret that they are unable to accept these proposals.
If a new com pany is form ed for the construction and working of the railway south
of Bagdad, and if it is to be constituted upon an international basis, His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent can only accede to such an arrangement provided that British interests
are represented in a degree at least equal to that o f any other Power including
Turkey, and, in order to eSect this and with a view to emphasising the international
and com m ercial character o f the undertaking, they would suggest that Russia should
be admitted to participation and that the percentage allotted to each country should
be 20 per cent.
Assuming that this distribution is adopted, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent consider
that a Convention should be concluded by the Powers concerned providing for the
exclusion of differential rates on any railways in Asiatic Turkey, and for equality
of treatment in regard to transport facilities and cognate m atters; for the alignment
of the railway south of Bagdad and the conditions under which it is to be con structed;
for the introduction of approved financial arrangements tending to foster the develop­
ment o f traffic; and for guaranteeing that the interest in the enterprise of the several
parties concerned shall be o f lasting duration and not subject to termination on the
expiry of the Bagdad Railway concession.
It would furthermore be necessary for the Ottoman Governm ent to undertake
form ally not to impose river dues on British shipping or cargoes without the assent
of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
There remains the question o f the terminal p o r t : having regard to the fact that
important com m ercial interests are already established at Bussorah, H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent cannot but feel that substantial advantages would accrue from the
establishment o f the terminus at that p o in t; and they consider that the port should
be constructed and controlled by the proposed new com pany in the interests of the
unrestricted com m erce of all nations. But if such an arrangement is adopted, they
must stipulate that, in the event o f the railway ever being prolonged to the Persian
G ulf, it must be brought to Kowreit under conditions to be settled by agreement
between Great Britain and Turkey alone, and a clause to this effect must be embodied
in a convention dealing with these matters.

(ii.) The respective Interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the R egion o f the
Persian Gulf.
His M ajesty’ s Government are willing to meet the wish expressed in the
concluding paragraphs of the Turkish memorandum that a precise definition may be
reached as to the respective position of the two countries, com m ercially and politically,
in the Persian G u lf; and they see no reason why a lasting settlement of the questions
involved should not be reached. H is M ajesty’ s Government are in no sense opposed
to the legitimate claims of the Turkish Governm ent. The most southerly point to
which they have ever recognised such claims on the littoral o f the Persian Gulf is
Ojeir, in the district of E l K atif. South o f this point there is no trace of Turkish
power ever having been param ount; in 1870 the Ottoman Minister for Foreign
Affairs conveyed to H er M ajesty’ s Ambassador formal assurances that the Sublime
Porte did not entertain any intention of obtaining supremacy over Bahrein, Muscat,
or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian G u lf(6) ; and it is only since that

( 6) [T hese assurances w ere occasion ed b y B ritish a n x iety a risin g from the p r ep a ra tion fo
M id h a t P a sh a ’ s ex p e d itio n t o N ejd o f 1871-2. T hey w ere rep ea ted m ore th a n once,--bu t the
m ost im p o rta n t occasions on w hich th ey w ere g iv en w ere A p ril 23, 1871 (v . en closure in S ir H .
E llio t ’ s despa tch (N o. 172), D . A p ril 26, It. M a y 9, 1871. F.O. 7 8 /2 3 7 4 ), and D ecem b er 10,
1871 ( v . enclosure in S ir H . E llio t ’ s despa tch (N o. 422), D. D ecem b er 10, R . D ecem ber 28, 1871.
F .O . 7 8 /2 4 4 4 ).]
 47

date that certain attempts have been made by the Ottoman Governm ent to establish
mudirates and other emblems o f Turkish authority at points to the south o f Ojeir.
The position o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent in regard to these tribes has been
entirely different. W ith Bahrein they have had direct relations since 1805; these
relations have found concrete expression in a series of treaties dating from 1820,( 7) and
having as their objects the suppression o f piracy and the slave tra d e; the regularity
of the succession to the th ron e; the protection of the island against foreign a ggression ;
and the safety o f the pearl industry, o f which Bahrein is the centre. In Muscat
and the territories o f the Trucial Chiefs His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have, in virtue
of various treaties and agreements, conferred similar benefits for m any yea rs; and
their policy in each case has been inspired by the importance o f upholding the
maritime peace, o f securing open markets to the com m erce o f all countries, and of
protecting the long-established interests of British-Indian subjects.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent cannot acquiesce in any arrangement which might
restrict or undermine the authority which they have exercised uninterruptedly
with such beneficent resu lts; they conceive that any extension o f Turkish jurisdiction
along the littoral o f the Persian Gulf to the south o f Ojeir would be prejudicial to
those results and unsupported by any legitimate claims o f Turkish sovereignty; and
they have accordingly resisted any attempts which have been made to encroach upon
these regions. They are therefore o f opinion that any lasting settlement between
the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by the Ottoman Govern­
ment o f Bahrein and adjacent islands and o f the whole o f the Peninsula o f E l Katr
(including E l Bidaa), where the Sheikh of Bahrein has important righ ts; and they
consider that such a settlement would finally rem ove a perennial source o f local
friction.
The Ottoman Governm ent express a wish to regularise the relations o f Koweit
towards the Ottoman E m pire, and His M ajesty’ s Governm ent will gladly contribute
to such a solution, on the understanding that their rights and claims are not to be
regarded as prejudiced by any proposals which may now be put forward, should such
proposals prove abortive.
As the Ottoman Governm ent are aware, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have never
admitted that Koweit is under Turkish protection, and, inasmuch as some divergence
of opinion was manifested between the two Governm ents as to the position there,
a modus vivendi was reached in Septem ber 1901 by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
consenting to give an assurance that, provided the Turkish Governm ent abstained
from sending troops to Koweit and respected the status quo there, they would not
occupy that place or establish a British protectorate over it .(8)
British trade relations with the Sheikhs of Koweit have existed for upwards of
two centuries and, inasmuch as the place has attracted merchants from all quarters
by the equity o f its rule and the freedom o f its trade, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
could not consent to any interference with the succession or with the internal
administration, or to any infringem ent o f the com plete autonom y of the Sheikh. On
the other hand, they are prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Kow eit, and
to recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish Kaim akam , provided in other respects the
status quo is guaranteed, and the validity o f certain agreements which the Sheikh
has concluded with the British Governm ent is recognised(9) ; provided the islands of
Warba and Bubian are admitted by Turkey to be within the confines o f Kow eit, and
Turkish m ilitary posts are w ithdraw n; and provided finally the Sheikh is admitted
to the full and undisturbed enjoym ent o f any properties he may own or hereafter
purchase on Turkish territory. Koweit would thus form a sort o f enclave within,

( 7) [cp. C. TT. A it c h is o n : Treaties, Engagements and Sannds (5th ed.), V ol. X I (D elh i, 1933),
pp. 233-4.]
(8) [u. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g Ed. N o te.]
( 9) [i.e., the en gagem en t o f J a n u a ry 23, 1899, & c., p rin ted infra, pp. 107-8, N o. 68 , encl. 3 ,
Annexes. F o r the en gagem en t o f O ctob er 15, 1907, cp. supra, p. 12, N o. 6, and note ( 8).]
 48
and form ing part o f, the Ottoman E m pire, but enjoying complete self-government
under Turkish suzerainty.
Certain difficulties have recently arisen in regard to the buoyage of the Shat-
el-Arab. For a great number o f years British shipping has, owing to its volum e,
been predom inantly, and until recently almost exclusively, interested in these aids
to navigation. For over fifty years the work o f surveying, buoying, and lighting
the river has been carried out by British agency to the general satisfaction o f all
concerned.
In these circumstances, His M ajesty’ s Government have some difficulty in
appreciating why the Ottoman Governm ent have thought fit to disturb existing and
long-standing arrangem ents; but, being desirous of dealing with the difficulty in a
spirit o f conciliation, they would propose to the Ottoman Governm ent the appointment
o f a small riverain com m ission, com posed of a British and a Turkish representative,
with an engineer to be mutually agreed upon. This commission would superintend
all matters pertaining to improvem ent of navigation, and it would likewise superintend
the requisite periodical surveys.(10)
As regards the rest o f the G ulf, on the other hand, the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t,
so far as they are concerned, will recognise the right of Great Britain (1) to control
surveying, lighting, buoying, and p ilota ge; (2) to police its w aters; and (3) to conduct
all quarantine arrangements.

(iii.) The Increase from 11 per cent, to 15 p er cent, ad valorem in the Turkish
Customs Duties.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have consistently maintained that they could in no
circumstances assent to the increase in the Turkish customs duties unless a previous
and satisfactory settlement had been reached in regard to the Bagdad Railway
question.
To this attitude they a d h ere; and while they consider that such a settlement
m ight be promoted on the lines of an agreement such as has already been indicated,
they could not regard a settlement confined to the railway as either satisfactory or
com plete, since it would leave in a state o f uncertainty a number o f questions closely
affecting British interests in the regions o f Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent are in principle favourable to railway construction in T urkey;
but they cannot directly contribute to the com pletion of the Bagdad Railway if it
is to introduce a further element o f possible disturbance into an area where British
rights and interests have, especially of late, been wantonly assailed; nor do they
feel that they could justify to British public opinion the imposition of a tax which
will affect British trade,— amounting in Mesopotamia to some 60 per cent, o f the
w hole,— unless they have provided for a general settlement o f political issues in the
Persian Gulf, such as the Ottoman Governm ent themselves desire to bring about, and
unless they have obtained some compensation for and a guarantee against the
continuance o f arbitrary acts such as the dem olition, on no adequate pretext, of
British property in Bagdad.
If the Ottoman Governm ent are prepared to enter upon a negotiation on these
lines, and to concur, as already stipulated, in a removal o f the existing veto on the
borrowing powers of E gypt,— a measure which is called for in the interests of financial
reform in E gypt,— His M ajesty’ s Governm ent will make it their first aim to contribute
to an agreement likely to rem ove all causes o f friction between the two Pow ers;
and they will not only consent, subject to the concurrence o f other Powers and to
the due observance o f such agreem ent, to the further increase of the Turkish customs
for a fixed period, but they will likewise agree to the continued levy o f the 3 per cent,
customs increase, which had only been sanctioned provisionally till the year 1914.

( 10) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. M c K e n n a : “ fo r w hich the In d ia n G overn m en t w ou ld be

p rep a red to lend th e services o f a su rvey in g ship as occasion req u ires.” ]
 49
[ED . N O TE.— R e fe re n ce is m ade in the above m em ora ndum to th e modus vivendi reached
between G rea t B r ita in and T u rk ey in S eptem b er 1901 re g a rd in g th e p osition of K o w e it
[v. supra, p. 47, N o. 34). F u rth e r m en tion o f th is a rra n g em en t occu rs in the A n g lo-T u rk ish
A greem en t o f J u ly 29, 1913, con cern in g th e P ersian G u lf (v. infra, p. 191, N o. 124). cp. also
infra, p. 64, N o. 47. T he t e x t of these assurances is g iv en in the follow in g d o c u m e n ts: —

(a)

Communication from Anthopoulo Pasha of September 9, 1901.

Télégramme de la Sublime Porte au Rep[résenta~\nt Ottoman à Londres.

F.O . 78/5174. C on st^n tin olp le, le 6 Sept[em bre] 1901.

D ans n otre en tretien a u jo u r d ’ hui a vec S ir N . O ’ C on or il m ’ a décla ré que le G o u v [e rn e -
m e ]n t B r it [a n n iq u e ] n ’ a va it pas l ’ in ten tion d ’ occu p er K o w e it ni d ’ y éta b lir son P r o te c to r a t,
à la co n d itio n que le G o u v [e rn e m e ]n t Im p éria l de son cô té n ’y en v oie pas de trou p es et q u ’ il
respecte le “ sta tu q uo ” de cette localité.
J e lu i ai rép on d u que le G o u v [e rn e m e ]n t Im p éria l aussi é ta it décid é à ne pas y en voyer
des trou p es en ce m om ent et y m a in ten ir le sta tu q u o à la co n d itio n que le G o u v [e rn e m e ]n t
A ng lais de son cô té ne v euille l ’ occu p er ni y éta b lir son P ro te cto r a t.
Cette d écla ra tion de l ’ am bassadeur d ’ A n g leterre éta n t de natu re à term in er la con troverse
actuelle co n cern a n t K o w eit, je prie V o tr e E x cellen ce d ’ en o b ten ir la con firm a tion du
F o re ig n Office, et de m ’ in form er du résu lta t de l ’ e n tretien q u ’ E lle aura eu à ce su jet avec
L ord L ansdow ne.
(S ign é) T E W F IK .

(b)
Lord Lansdowne to Anthopoulo Pasha.
F.O. 78/5174.
Y ou r E x cellen cy, Foreign Office, Septem ber 11, 1901.
I have ta k en n ote w ith sa tisfa ction o f the teleg ram from the T u rk ish M in is te r fo r F oreig n
A ffairs co m m u [n ic a te ]d by you on the 9th in s t [a n t ], in w hich H is E x cellen cy states th a t the
T urkish G o v [e r n m e n ]t w ill n ot send troop s t o K o w e it and w ill m a in ta in the status quo th ere
on con d ition th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] w ill a bstain from occ u p y in g th a t pla ce or
establishing a B ritish p r o te cto ra te there.
I have pleasure in con firm in g the assurance w hich has been g iv en t o H is E x [c e lle n ]c y by
H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] A m bassador a t C o n s t[a n tin o ]p ie th a t, p ro v id e d th e T urkish G o v [e r n m e n ]t
abstain from sen d in g tro o p s t o K o w e it an d resp ect the status quo there, H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n jt w ill n ot occu p y th a t p lace or establish a B ritish p ro te cto ra te ov er it.
L [A N S D O W N E ].

S ir N. O ’ C o n o r’ s rep ort o f the con v ersation w ith Tew fik P asha on Septem b er 6, 1901, is giv en
in his teleg ram (N o. 110) o f th a t date, D . 6 p . m ., R . 10 p . m . (F.O . 78/5 17 4.)
The ten ou r o f this exch a n g e o f view s should be com p a red w ith th e alm ost con tem p ora ry
statem ent p r in te d in Gooch & Temperley, V ol. I I , p. 94, N o. 104, encl. 1.]

No. 35.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd.

F.O . 371/1234.
3 27 1 6 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 130.)
Sir, Foreign Office, August 18, 1911.
The Italian Ambassador told me to-day that he was instructed to enquire as to
our consent to the 4 per cent, increase in the Turkish Customs Dues.
I told him that we had stipulated for terms about the Bagdad Railway to the
south of Bagdad, and for a general understanding about the Persian Gulf that would
be satisfactory to British interests.
The Ambassador pressed me very strongly as to whether there were not some
other conditions.
I said that I remembered only one o t h e r : it was connected with the borrowing
powers of E gypt.
The Ambassador said that he was quite familiar with this question.
[10900] E
 50
Eventually, I found that what he had in mind was the ordering of ships by
Turkey. It was thought that the visit of the Turkish Minister of Marine was connected
with this, and that we had stipulated for the placing of orders in this country in return
for our consent to the 4 per cent, increase.
I assured him that we had made no condition of any sort on this point. The
order for a ship had been given before we sent in our conditions as to the increase of
customs dues, and the two questions were not connected in any way.
[ I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 36.

Sir G. L ow ther to Sir Edward G r e y .{1)

F .O . 371/1234.
3 3 7 1 3 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 583.) Constantinople, D. A vgust 18, 1911.
Sir, R. August 28, 1911.
The Grand Vizier spoke to me yesterday on the subject of the reply of His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent to the proposals regarding the Bagdad Railway and the Persian
Gulf questions, which reply was com m unicated to the Turkish Ambassador in London
on the 29th of J u ly .(2) His H ighness, while stating that there were m any points
which would require very careful examination which he had not yet had time to give
to them, said that on one or two of these he was prepared to offer some observations.
H e did not understand why Russia “ had been dragged in ” to participate in the new
Company which it was proposed to form . Russia did not as a rule furnish capital for
Railway enterprize and he saw no necessity for her having a share in the new
Company. I observed that she had a com m ercial interest through the Persian trade
and that her being allotted a share would further mark the international character of
the Company. His Highness said he resented very much the fashion of linking
Turkey with Germany in the Bagdad Railway and of its being taken for granted that
Turkey would follow German dictation. H e declared with some vigour that Turkey
was neither German, French nor English in this question and he hoped that one day
when this country through the developm ent of its resources had becom e rich, all the
shares would be held by Turkish subjects.
It would be easy to readjust the proportions to be allotted to the different Powers
but he did not suggest what they should be.
Turning to the question of the necessity of providing against the differential rates
H is H ighness said he had never been able to understand the anxiety of H is M ajesty’ s
G overnm ent on that score. H e had not heard that there had been any complaints and
he had called for Monsieur H uguenin the Managing Director of the Line who had
declared to him that such differential rates could not be imposed. His Highness said
that to show how sure he was of this he was prepared to take the opinion of the British
Chamber of Commerce. Moreover the line being an Ottoman one, and it being
obviously to the interest of this country to see it carrying as many passengers and as
m uch m erchandize as possible the Turkish controllers would be careful not to allow
anything of the kind. I said that it was not what had occurred but what might occur
in the future that appealed to H is M ajesty’ s Government.
I understand that were the British Chamber of Commerce to be appealed to in
the manner H is Highness suggested they would not endorse his view.
H is Highness then proceeded to speak of the question of our interests in the
Persian Gulf and said he would be quite prepared that the present position should be

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ;

to L o rd C rew e.]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o 34.]
 51

placed upon a clearer basis. H e did not anticipate any difficulty regarding Bahrein,
E l Katr, &c., but Koweit was in a somewhat different position. The form er were as it
were detached from the main possessions o f the E m pire, while Koweit eat [sic : ate]l
right into it. R eference was made in the M emorandum to certain arrangements
between the Sheikh o f Koweit and His M ajesty’ s G overnm ent.(3) These were unknown
to the Ottoman Governm ent and he presumed they would be duly com m unicated to
it for it was obviously impossible for this Governm ent to negotiate in ignorance of the
contents of the arrangements. The memorandum seemed to provide for an enlarge­
ment o f the dom inions of the Sheikh of Koweit. This could not be viewed favourably
by this Governm ent. Presum ably the arrangements made with the Sheikh were
arrived at with a view to obstructing the acquisition of that place by any other Power.
H is H ighness hoped that we would be assured that Turkey would never alienate any
place on the Persian Gulf to any other Power. They did not desire to see any other
Power but England in those waters. W hat was most important for this Governm ent
(and for this, provision must be made in any arrangements regarding Koweit), was
that it should not becom e a “ foyer de sedition ” or that it should continue to be as
it was now a dépôt for the distribution of arms to the rebels against the Sultan.
These were the only points in the memorandum on which H is Highness touched
and as he said the Cabinet had not yet had an opportunity of exam ining it, I did not
conceive it necessary to argue any of the points with him.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW TH ER.

(3) [r . supra, p. 47, N o. 34, an d n o te ( 9).]

No. 37.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Low ther.

P .O . 371/1261.
3 39 5 8 /3 3 95 8 /1 1 /4 4.
(No. 236.)
Sir, Foreign Office, August 28, 1911.
I have to inform Y [ou r] E [x cellen cy ] that Ism ail H akki B ey Babanzade, Deputy
for Bagdad and ex-Minister for Public Instruction called at this Office on the
21st instant and in m y absence was received b y Mr. M allet.^)
H e expressed his regret at the change of feeling noticeable in E ngland towards
Turkey, which he was at a loss to explain, and he said that the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t
were animated by the friendliest sentiments towards this country and that they
intended to lean more towards us in the future than they had done hitherto.
Mr. Mallet explained that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t were sincere in their
appreciation'of the good work which the Constitutional G ov [ern m en ]t in Turkey had
accomplished, and in their desire for the continuance of the new régim e; they had,
however, experienced some disappointment at the want of confidence in them shewn
by the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t, at the attitude adopted by the latter towards British
subjects and British enterprise at Bagdad, at the failure of the Turkish G ov [e rn m e n ]t
to accord to British enterprise a fair share in the development o f the country, and
latterly at the reports of the cruelties perpetrated against the Melissor tribes in
Albania. H is own articles in the ‘ ‘ Tanin ’ ’ had caused much surprise here as they
shewed a com plete misapprehension in regard to British aims and ambitions in
Mesopotamia.

0 ) [T h is d espa tch is based on M r. M a lle t’ s re co rd o f the con v ersation . T h e record sta ted
th a t th e sign ifica n ce o f th e v isit was th a t Ism a il H a k k i B e y ’ s ■“ a n x iety t o sta n d w ell w ith us
is a sign o f th e tim es.” ]
[10900] E 2
 52
Ismail Hakki B ey disclaimed any unfriendly intention and said that his object
had been to call attention to Persian Gulf questions. Mr. Mallet said that these
questions were now under discussion with the Porte and he could not go into them
with him, but that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] were very anxious to arrive at an
understanding with Turkey. They had no territorial ambitions, but they meant to
maintain the position which they had held in the Gulf for so m any years.
Ismail Hakki B ey then proceeded to talk at some length about Albania, and
he denied the stories of cruelties alleged to have been committed there by the Turkish
Troops, but Mr. Mallet observed that these reports were too well founded and had
reached H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overnm ent] from too m any separate and independent
sources to make it possible to doubt their accuracy.
[ I am, &c.
E. G R E Y .]

No. 38.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward Grey.

F .O . 371/1234.
4 8 3 2 2 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .
(No. 867.) Constantinople, D. N ovem ber 26, 1911.
Sir, R. D ecem ber 4, 1911.
Assim B ey spoke to me yesterday about the counter-proposals regarding the
Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf questions which H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent had
com m unicated to the Turkish Ambassador in a memorandum on the 29th of July
l a s t j 1)
It would not appear that the Cabinet has as yet devoted much study to the
question, for the memorandum has not yet been translated into Turkish nor was Assim
B ey in possession o f the Agreem ents and Treaties respecting Koweit which you had
sent to Tewfik Pasha on the 2nd instant at his request.
H is E xcellency said that he would like to talk over some of the points with me,
but I suggested that as Tewfik Pasha had authority to discuss the general question it
would be better that the Turkish Governm ent should decide on the amendments to
our proposals which they desired to suggest and send them to H is Excellency. H e ,
said however, before doing so he would prefer to discuss some o f the points
academically and proceeded to say that the Ottoman Governm ent were very much
opposed to the participation of Russia in the final portions of the Railway and would
like to suggest that the Russian share should be divided up between the other four |
participants thus giving to each 2 5% and he was of opinion that Turkey should also
provide the President of the Board. I observed that in the Bagdad Railway Turkey
only had 10% and in view of the fact that the line was an Ottoman one and in Ottoman
territory there did not appear to be any necessity for her to require a share equal to
the others. The Minister did not relish the reference to the Bagdad Railway which
he said was an unfortunate legacy o f Sultan Abdul H am id’ s and should not be taken
as providing a precedent.
I understand from another quarter that the suggestion that the Ottoman
Governm ent are likely to put forward is the elimination of Russia and the retention
o f 2 0 % for Turkey the rem aining 8 0 % to be divided between the three other Powers.
H is E xcellency then observed that he did not quite see the object of any group of
capitalists having the m ajority vote on the Board of such a railway. I f the interested
Powers were represented in any form it was clear that preferential rates could not be
established. Moreover though he declared he had refrained from showing the

( 0 [v. supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34.]

 58

German Ambassador the text of our proposals he had asked him whether it would be
possible to apply preferential rates and whether this ever occurred on the Anatolian
Line. The Ambassador had obviously replied in the negative and Assim B ey asked
me whether I could produce specific cases of such preferential rates being given. I
said that at present I could not, but there were undoubtedly ways in which advantages
could be given which were not apparent and that it was the general view that this did
occur.
Assim B ey then went on to say that he did not understand why the idea of
Koweit as a terminus had been abandoned in favour of Basra. I said I im agined that
as both places would require considerable works to transform them into a suitable
harbour and that Basra was already a town of considerable importance with merchants
and their warehouses established there it would seem to have certain advantages over
Koweit. M oreover the long stretch of railway line over the desert would add somewhat
to the cost of transport. To m y enquiry why the Turkish Governm ent appeared to
prefer Koweit the Minister furnished no very definite reply, but m erely said that such
a line as that to Koweit might be the beginning of a railway system which would be
of use to Turkey in quelling disorders among the Arab tribes of those regions.
W ith the other proposals contained in the Mem orandum Assim B ey did not deal
but I understand that other members of the Cabinet consider that it would be very
difficult to obtain the acceptance of [ s i c : b y ] the Chamber of a measure for rem oving
the existing veto on the borrowing powers of E gypt if presented by itself although it
might perhaps be possible to do so if it form ed part of a general proposal for the
settlement of all outstanding difficulties with Great Britain, a settlement which the
present Cabinet express themselves as most anxious to bring about.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW TH ER.

No. 39.

Memorandum com m unicated by Sir H . Babington Smith.

F.O . 371/1234.
4 9 6 5 6 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 . D ecem ber 11, 1911.
There is at present a strong desire on the part of the Turkish Governm ent to
settle outstanding questions, and to place their relations with the British Governm ent
on a more satisfactory footing.
This has been stated to me recently b y the Grand V izir, by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and by the Minister o f Finance. The Minister of Finance inform ed
me that there had been a form al decision o f the Council of Ministers in favour o f a
settlement of the questions under discussion with the British Governm ent.
As regards the Bagdad Railway I gather that the point to which they take most
objection is the assignment to Russian capital of a share in the B agdad-G ulf section
c f the railway.
Supposing Russia to be excluded, the capital m ight be divided between E nglish,
German, French and Turkish interests in such a manner as to give a m ajority to
England and France together, if Turkey would be content with a smaller share than
the other three :—
e.g. England
France 28J% each.
Germany
Turkey 15%
or E ngland
France 2 6 f % each.
Germany
Turkey 20%
 54
Assim B ey inform ed me, in the course o f conversation on N ov[em b er] 25th, that
the least the Ottoman Government could accept would be 20% and the Presidency.
I suggest that it would be possible to arrange so that the Presidency should be
honorary, and should not carry a casting vote.
It appears to be very desirable to take advantage o f the present favourable
disposition of the Porte to arrive at a settlement.
There are some indications that the Germans may cease to be content with the
settlement apparently contem plated in their recent arrangement with the Turkish
G ov [ern m en ]t. In this connexion I refer to a conversation with M . Gunther, which
I reported to Sir G. Lowther on N ov[em ber] 26th.
In the meantime preparations are being actively pursued for the construction of
the line from Bagdad northwards. Negotiations are also being carried on for the
erection o f a Custom House and Bonded W arehouse at Bagdad by the agency of the
Bagdad Bailwav.
H . B AB IN GTON SM ITH .

M IN U T E S .
T he first pa ra g ra p h is b orn e ou t b y th e la st sentence o f 48322 (a n n ex ed ).(*)
I t is n o t q u ite clear w hy th e T u rk s w a n t to ex clu d e R u ssia n finan cia l p a rticip a tio n .
W e h a ve receiv ed no a ccou n t from S ir G. L ow th er o f M r. G u n th er’ s rem arks.
Q [u e r ]y . Ask H [ i s ] E [x c e lle n c y ] t o fu rn ish one.
W e m ig h t express ou r w illingness t o discuss a solu tion w ith T u rk ey — b u t I am n ot sure
th a t w e should n o t ev en tu ally press fo r a w ritten rep ly to the d eta iled proposals in ou r
m e m o [r a n d u ]m o f J u ly 1911,(2) w hich a p p a ren tly has h a rd ly been con sid ered y et. U n til this
has been d on e discussion seems fu tile.
A. P .
D e c [em b er] 12, 1911.

I th in k w e o u g h t to have a w ritte n rep ly b u t in the m eanw hile S ir G. L ow th er m ig h t be

to ld to say som eth in g pleasan t to Assim B ey to th e effect th a t w e w ill listen sy m pa th etically
t o a n y th in g th e T u rk s h a ve to say on th e su b ject and th a t w e h op e th ey w ill say it soon.
H . N.

I t is fo r th e T u rk s to answ er ou r p r o p o s a ls: an d it is n ot fo r us to su ggest le a v in g ou t

R u ssia b u t to keep her in if the T u rk s o b ject to her in clu sion.
S ir G. L o w th e r’ s despa tch N o. 867 is n ot v ery h o p e fu l.0 ) P erh a p s th e b est w ay o f stirrin g
u p th e qu estion w ill be to ask T ew fik P ash a w hen w e m ay e x p e c t a rep ly to ou r proposals. I t
w ill n o t do to in tim a te a t th is stage ev en to S ir H . B. S m ith th a t w e are rea d y to g iv e w ay
to T u rk ish ob jection s, even if th ere are p o in ts on w hich w e cou ld m eet them , and I th in k th a t
it w ou ld be sa fer to tell S ir H . B. S m ith th a t y ou p ropose to ask T ew fik P asha w hen w e m ay
e x p e c t th e T u rk ish reply.
L . M.

S ir H . B a b in g to n S m ith m erely le ft his m e m o fr a n d u m ] w ith m e as ex p la in in g certain

view s. I t does n ot req u ire an answ er. I gave him to u n d ersta n d th a t we p r e fe rr e d th e
q u in tu p le p a rticip a tio n .
A . N.

E a stern D e p [a r tin e n ]t say (D e c [e m b e r ] 29) “ No a ction to be ta k en re stirrin g up

Tew fik ” &c.

(!) [i>. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]

(2) [u. supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34.]

[E D . N O T E .— A c co rd in g to a teleg ram from the R u ssia n A m b assa dor a t C on stan tin ople
d a te d D ecem b er 29, 1911, S ir G. L ow th er in form ed him on D ecem b er 28 th a t he had
“ protested v ig orou sly , alth ou gh n o t officially, a ga in st th e in ten tion a scribed to the G erm an
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y to a lter th e d ire c tio n o f the lin e betw een M ossul [sic] and B a g d a d
in such w ise as to a p p roach K h a n ek in [ s ic ] .” v. S ieb er t, p. 656.]
 55
N o. 4 0 .
Sir Edward G rey to Sir G . Lowther.
F.O. 371/1484.
3 0 7 7 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 25.)
Sir, Foreign Office, January 23, 1912.
On the 20th in s t[a n t], Sir A. Nicolson took the opportunity of a visit from
Tewfik Pasha to enquire when Djevad B ey was expected back from Constantinople,
as H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] were desirous o f com m encing negotiations in
respect o f the Bagdad railway and the Persian Gulf.
H [is ] Ii[ig h n e s s ] replied that he had been continually urging his G ov [e rn m e n ]t
to give us their counter proposals, and they had always replied that their time was
entirely occupied by Parliam entary duties. Now that the Chambers were dissolved,
he expected that Djevad B ey would very shortly return with full instructions.
Sir A. Nicolson said that he hoped that this would be the case, as we were anxious
that no further delay should ensue.
[ I am, &c.]f
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 41.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G rey.ff)

F.O. 371/1484.
7 0 5 4 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 129.) Constantinople, D. February 12, 1912.
Sir, R . February 19, 1912.
Assim B ey asked me today to express to you his very sincere regrets that the
promises he had recently made to me to the effect that the reply of the Turkish
Government to our counter proposals regarding the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf
questions would by now be in your hands (sic : ? had not been fulfilled). But the
combination o f circumstances had made it impossible to fulfil his engagem ent. The
Grand Vizier had not been able to preside over the Council o f Ministers for many
weeks and although the rem aining Ministers had devoted m any Councils to the
discussion o f this subject a final decision had not been reached. Unfortunately,
until the present Government came into power the matter had been left aside,
' Hakki Pasha retaining the papers in his own hands, and Ministers had now been
compelled to make a serious study of all the questions involved and to examine very
| carefully whether any of the proposals made by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent did not
| clash with existing engagements of the Porte in connection for instance with the
lighting and buoying.
It had, however, now been decided very shortly to send Reshid B ey, the
conseiller légiste of the Porte, to assist Tewfik Pasha in the negotiations which will
take place in London.
As his E xcellency said that on several points a decision had been reached, I
1 suggested that it would make a good impression if these negotiations could be begun
j at once leaving matters of detail to be decided when the further examination of which
r he spoke had been made here. But His E xcellency said that they were all so much
I bound up together that this would be im possible, but he finally begged to assure m e,
j and to convey this assurance to you [s ic ], that the delay would be very short.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW THER.

(*) [C op ies o f th is despatch w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice; to the

D irector o f M ilita r y O p era tion s.]
 56
N o. 4 2 .

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G . L o w th er .i1)

F.O. 371/1530.
6 5 5 3 /6 5 5 3 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 57.)
Sir :— Foreign Office, February 14, 1912.
The Turkish Ambassador called on the 13th instant and said that, though he did
not wish to question Sir A. Nicolson as to Lord Haldane’ s visit to B e rlin ,(2) there was
one point that he must mention : H is Highness had seen an allusion to the Bagdad
Railway having been touched upon in conversations at B e r lin : his Government
sincerely hoped that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t were not going to discuss this
question with Germany. The Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t had succeeded in obtaining the
renunciation by Germany o f the agreement o f 1903(3) in so far as it affected the line
between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, only one condition having been imposed, viz,
that no third Power should participate to a greater degree in the capital required
than Germany. As the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t were now engaged in discussions with
us as to the B agdad-G ulf sections, they did not desire German intervention in these
discussions, and they trusted we should not open the question with Germany, as the
latter Power would only be too glad to re-enter into the enterprise, or demand from
Turkey some fresh concessions in return for her abstention.
Sir A. Nicolson said that we were awaiting the Turkish reply to our memorandum
o f July 1911,(4) and that he was not aware o f any intention to admit Germany into
the discussions between H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] and the Turkish
G o v [e rn m en ]t.
The Ambassador reiterated the view that, beyond contributing perhaps a certain
share o f the capital, Germany had no further interest in the Gulf sections.
[ I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]

0) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and t o th e C a bin et.]
( 2) [u. G ooch ¿a T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 666-761, passim .]
( 3) [v. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 33 -4 8.]
( 4) [i>. supra, pp. 45-8, N o. 34.]

No. 43.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.

F.O . 371/1484.
1 2 9 4 4 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 281.) Confidential. Foreign Office, March 26, 1912, 12-21 p . m .
Could you sound M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] very discreetly as to whether
he is really keen on Russian financial co-operation in the B agdad-G ulf railway
section ?0 )
t1) [M a r g in a l n ote b y S ir A. N ic o ls o n : “ M r. P a r k e r ex p la in ed to m e th a t th e T urkish
d eleg ates are a n xiou s to keep ou t R u ssia — th ou g h if w e insisted on her in clu sion th ey m igh t
g iv e w ay, p r o v id e d a 6th P ow er w ere a dded. I t m ig h t, th erefore, b e desirable to a scertain if
R u ssia is rea lly keen. H en ce th is d [ r a ] f t t e l[e g r a m ] fo r y ou r approval. A. N .” T he note
is in itia lled by S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
 57

N o. 4 4 .

Sir G . Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e y .( l)

F.O. 371/1484. St. Petershurgh, March 27, 1912.

1 31 1 9 /2 6 4/12 /4 4 . D. 8 -5 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 1 2 1 . ) Confidential. R . 1 0-54 p . m .
Your telegram No. 281, Confidential. (2)
'At interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day I turned conversation on
to Bagdad Railway, and asked whether he had seen a telegram from Constantinople
published in the press to the effect that Ottoman Governm ent were proposing to
eliminate Russia and to give E ngland, France, Germany and Turkey 25 per cent,
each in Gulf section. H is E xcellency replied in the negative, and enquired whether
I had any official confirmation.
I said that I knew nothing whatever with regard to Turkish counter-proposals,
and was only curious to know what his E xcellency thought o f the above idea.
M. Sazonof replied that such a proposal would require very careful consideration.
He was inclined to think that it would be a mistake to accept it, as it would deprive
Triple E n ten te o f the predominant control o f the Gulf section. It would therefore,
in his opinion, be preferable that Russia should participate. The only argument
in its favour was that if Russia were excluded from Gulf section Germany m ight be
excluded from Trans-Persian Railway.
I am afraid that I cannot extract a clearer statement o f his views without putting
questions to him officially. You will rem em ber that last April Russian Governm ent
strongly advocated Russian participation (see m y despatch No. 110).(3)

M IN U T E S .

O f course th e ob jection t o th e T urkish cou n ter proposals is th a t T u rk ey an d G erm any

betw een them w ou ld have 50% o f the w hole, and E n g la n d and F ra n ce th e oth er 5 0% b etw een
them , in stead o f, as p roposed in ou r n ote o f last J u ly ,(4) E n g la n d , F ra n ce, R ussia , G erm any,
and T u rk ey ea ch h a v in g 2 0 % , w hich w ou ld h a ve g iv en th e E n te n te P ow ers 60% o f th e w hole.
T o this e x te n t th erefore M . S a son off’ s o b jection is w ell-fou n ded.
On the oth er hand the arg u m en t in th e last sentence o f th e pen u ltim a te p a ra g ra p h seems
to a fford som e h op e th a t R u ssia m ig h t fo r g o p a rticip a tio n in the B a g d a d G u lf se c tio n .(s)
T u rk ey m ay, I ra th er gath er, prov e v ery ob d u ra te on this p oin t, and if w e in sist on h a vin g
in R ussia she m ay e ith er propose a 6th P ow er, o r she m ay say th a t she herself m u st have a
la rg er p ercen ta g e than any o f th e oth er P ow ers.
I m yself ha ve n ever b elieved th a t the question o f w hat p ercen ta g e we g et in th e fa g en d
o f th e ra ilw ay — i.e., from B a g d a d to the G ulf, is nea rly so im p o rta n t as it w ou ld be to secure
a sa tis fa ctory prelim in a ry C on v en tion rela tin g to all railw ays in A s ia tic T u rk ey and definitely
ex clu d in g p referen tia l trea tm en t.
B u t ou r p ou rp a rlers w ith th e T urks are n ot y et sufficiently a dv an ced to en ter fu lly in to
these details, w hich m ust b e reserved fo r con sid era tion by the B oa rd o f T ra de, &c., w hen we
g et the T u rk ish rep ly officially, w hich, I hope, w ill be very soon a fte r E aster.
In the m ea n tim e it seems th a t no a ction h a d b etter b e ta ken on th is telegram .
A. P.
M a rch 28, 1912.
R . P . M.

S ir A. H irtz e l is very a n xiou s t o reta in R ussian p a rticip a tio n an d th in k s th a t th e T u rk s

w ill g iv e w ay i f w e hold o u t— esp ecially if we are able to m eet th e ir view s a b ou t E l K a tr . I
am of op in ion th a t we should m a in ta in ou r proposal. W e shall nev er have a b e tte r o p p o rtu n ity
o f ob ta in in g th e term s w hich w e d ecid ed w ere th e m ost fa v ou ra b le fo r w hich we cou ld hope.
As to M . S a zo n o v ’ s arg u m en t it shows his usual con fu sion o f thought.
Germany is m a k in g no concession to R ussia b y a d m ittin g her to th e G u lf section. She has
ren ou nced h er righ ts over th a t section in retu rn fo r a heavy com p en sa tion . I t is fo r T u rk ey

( ') [A cop y o f this d espa tch was sent t o th e In d ia O ffice.]

( 2) [ v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
(3) \y. Gooch cfc Temperley, V ol. X (I ), p. 695, N o. 718.]
(4) [ v . su pra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34 .]
(s) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ th ere is v ery little in this arg u m en t ” ]
 58
to g iv e or w ith h old R u ssia n adm ission. She cou ld m ake no claim to h a ve a share in the
T ra n s-P ersia n L in e on a ccou n t o f R u ssia p a rticip a tin g in the G u lf section.
In any case it has been decid ed th a t no one is to share in the co n s tru c tio n and con trol o f
th e p o r tio n o f the T ra n s-P ersia n L in e ru n n in g th rou g h our sphere.
I f w e w an ted to find som ething t o g iv e G erm any, she m ig h t possibly su p ply som e of th e
m a teria l, b u t th ere is no need to con sid er th is now . I th in k th a t S ir G. B uch an a n should be
to ld to p o in t out to M . Sa zon ov the m istak e u n d er w hich he is la b ou rin g. S ir A. H irtz e l
w hom I have con su lted q u ite agrees.
L. M.

M . S a zon ov does n ot seem to be v ery keen as to R ussian p a r t ic ip a t io n — b u t we can defer

co n s id e rin g the qu estion u n til ou r discussions w ith T u rk ey have fu r th e r dev eloped. P erson a lly
I should lik e to see R u ssia n p a rticip a tio n .
A. N.
E . G.
M r. P a r k e r to see.
B agdad R ailw ay.

M r. P a r k e r should con tin u e to m a in ta in our desire fo r R u ssia n p a rticip a tio n in the G u lf

S ection . I f the T u rk s resist stron gly the m a tter can be discussed la te r— b u t we should n ot
g iv e w ay a t present.
A . N.
M a rch 3 0 /1 2 .

No. 45.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.

F .O . 371/1484.
1 3 1 1 9 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 107.)
Sir, Foreign Office, April 4, 1912.
I have received Y [o u r]' E x c e lle n c y 's ] tel[eg ra m ] No. 121 of the 27th
m t L im o j,n reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for F [o re ig n ] A [fia irs]
relative to the Bagdad Railway.
W ith r e fe r e n c e ] to M. Sazonoff’ s remark that the only argument in favour o f the
exclusion of Russia from participation in the B agdad-G ulf section o f the line, which
has been proposed by the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t is that in that case Germany might
be excluded from participation in the Trans-Pensian Railway, I have to point out the
admission of Russia to a share in that section would not constitute a concession on
the part o f Germany since that Power has renounced its rights over the section in
return for ample com pensation, neither could Germ any, for the same reason, claim
to receive a share in the Trans-Persian Railway on account of Russian participation
in the Gulf section o f the Bagdad line.
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should take an opportunity o f pointing this out to
M . Sazonoff.
[ I am, &e.
E . G R E Y ].
t1) [v . im m ed ia tely preced in g d ocu m en t.]
 59

No. 46.

Sir G . Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 371/1484. St. Petersburgh, April 13, 1912.

1 5 5 5 2 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 . D. 5 p . m .
Tel. (No. 144.) R. 6 p .m .
Your despatch No. 107 o f A p r [il]: 4 . 0
In the conversation reported in m y telegram No. 121 o f M a r[ch ] 2 7 (2) I gave
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to understand that I was speaking entirely on
m y own account and not under instructions.
I would prefer, therefore, not to revert to it, and to postpone replying to his
argument till I am instructed to make an official com m unication to him on the subject
of our negotiations with Turkey. M y doing so at present would not, I think, serve
any useful purpose, and I should be somewhat embarrassed were he to put questions
to me as to the admission or non-adm ission o f Russia to a share in the G ulf section.
0 ) [v. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
(2) [v. supra, p. 57, N o. 44.]

No. 47.

Aide-M ém oire com m unicated by Tewfik Pasha, April 15, 1912.f 1)

F.O. 371/1484.
160 0 0 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
Partition des Capitaux.
En vue de faciliter un accord, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman est disposé
à se rendre aux vues exprimées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et
à confier la construction et l ’ exploitation du chem in-de-fer projeté entre Bagdad et
Bassorah à un syndicat international com posé de capitaux ottom ans, anglais, français
et allemands à raison de 2 5% à chaque groupe du montant du capital global. La
Présidence du Conseil d ’ Administration de la Compagnie à être constituée sur ces
bases, devra cependant être réservée à l ’ un des membres du Conseil d ’ Administration
représentant le groupe ottoman et en cas de partage égal de voix la décision à
prendre devra être de préférence conform e à l ’ avis exprimé par le parti qui s’ est rangé
à l ’opinion exprimée par le Président du Conseil d ’ Administration.

Tarifs différentiels.
Les réserves faites par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique au sujet de
tarifs différentiels sur la ligne de Bagdad, semblent dériver de la nécessité d ’ em pêcher
l ’ application d ’ un tarif spécial au détriment des marchandises anglaises et au profit
de celles d ’ un autre pays. Certes on ne pourrait soulever d ’objection à ce légitime
souci; cependant com m e il est inadmissible, ainsi que cela se pratique d ’ ailleurs
pour le transport des marchandises sur les réseaux ferrés de tous les pays, que toute
marchandise, quelles qu’ en soient la nature et la qualité, soit soumise à un tarif
uniforme nonobstant la distance à parcourir, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
Britannique voudra bien reconnaître que ce principe d ’ uniformité de tarif ne saurait
être reconnu. Néanmoins, et en vue d ’ aller au devant des légitimes soucis du
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, le Gouvernement Im périal est disposé à
assurer au com m erce anglais toutes les facilités compatibles avec les dispositions des
Conventions passées entre le Gouvernement Im périal et la Compagnie des chemins-
de-fer de Bagdad, pour le transport des marchandises.

0 ) [A co p y o f th is A id e-M ém o ir e was sent to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p era tion s.]

 60

Le Gouvernement Im périal accepte en outré en principe, sauf à régler ultérieure­

ment les questions de détail et de pratique, tous les autres points énumérés dans le
Mémorandum du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et se rapportant :
1° Au traitement égal pour le transport, aux facilités et autres matières
analogues.
2° A la prolongation de la ligne Bagdad-Bassorah avec les conditions et modes
de construction au point de vue technique et économ ique.(2)
Quant à la conclusion d ’ arrangements financiers garantissant que les intérêts des
diverses parties intéressées dans l ’ entreprise devront être d ’ une durée permanente
et non-sujets à limitation à l ’ expiration de la Concession du chem in-de-fer de Bagdad,
étant donné que le réseau B agdad-Bassorah formera la portion finale de la ligne
principale de Bagdad, on ne pourrait soumettre une partie d ’ un réseau ferré à des
conditions d ’ une durée illim itée' alors que la ligne principale elle-même est subor­
donnée à une concession limitée. _ .
La Convention à passer entre le Gouvernement Im périal et la nouvelle Compagnie
devra, à l ’ instar de la Convention si-gnée par la Compagnie du chem in-de-fer de
Bagdad, prévoir aussi le droit de rachat pour le Gouvernement Ottoman de la ligne
B agdad-B assorah.

Indem nité financière à la Compagnie du chem in-de-fer de Bagdad.

L ors des négociations qui ont amené la renonciation de la Compagnie allemande
à son droit de concession sur la partie terminus du réseau, il avait été entendu
qu ’ une indemnité devra lui être payée par la nouvelle Compagnie concessionnaire
com m e prix de sa renonciation. Le montant de cette compensation pécuniaire devra,
dans ces conditions, être fixé sur la base des avantages auxquels la susdite Compagnie
allemande a dû renoncer, et le payem ent incombera naturellement à la nouvelle
Compagnie à form er.
Droits fluviaux.
Dans le M émorandum contenant les contre-propositions anglaises(3) il est dit qu’il
serait nécessaire que le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman prit l ’ engagement de ne
pas imposer des droits fluviaux sur les navires ou marchandises anglaises sans le
consentement du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.
Les droits susmentionnés seront éventuellement prélevés en vue de faire face
aux dépenses nécessaires pour le bon entretien du Chatt-el-arab. L a construction du
chem in-de-fer en question rendra ce fleuve beaucoup plus important qu’ il ne l ’ est
à présent. Sa parfaite navigabilité sur tout son parcours devra être assurée d ’ une
façon permanente. Des travaux seront entrepris dans le but de faciliter le transport,
le débarquement et l ’ embarquement des marchandises qui prendront cette voie. Dès
lors le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique voudra bien reconnaître que le
Gouvernement Ottoman, Puissance territoriale, ne pourra se passer de percevoir les
susdits droits ni prendre d ’ores et déjà un engagement quelconque de nature à
l ’ em pêcher plus ou moins dans l ’ avenir d ’ exercer ses droits souverains en cette
matière.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique peut d ’ ailleurs être persuadé
qu’ aucun traitement différentiel ne sera appliqué aux marchandises et navires anglais.

Prolongation du réseau Bagdad-Bassorah.

Le Gouvernement Im périal a décidé de faire construire pour le moment la ligne
Bagdad-Bassorah jusqu’ à cette dernière ville seulem ent; il n ’y a donc pas lieu

( 2) [M a r g in a l com m ent b y M r. A lw y n P a r k e r : “ T his refers to the section from B a g da d

to B ussorah— n ot to the co n tin u a tio n from Bussorah to K ow eït. A. P .” ]
(3) [ v . supra, pp. 45- 8 , N o. 34 .]
 G1
d ’ envisager dès à présent sa prolongation jusqu’ au Golfe Persique. Le Gouvernement
Impérial est cependant tout disposé à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
Britannique toutes les assurances de nature à écarter les soucis et appréhensions qu’ il
pourrait nourrir au sujet de la portion Bassorah au Golfe qui viendrait à être
construite ultérieurement.

Questions politiques et territoriales.

L a souveraineté territoriale effective de l ’ Em pire Ottoman a existé de tout temps
sur la Presqu’ île d ’ Elkatr, tandis que les objections soulevées par le Gouvernement
de Sa Majesté Britannique contre l ’ exercice de cette souveraineté sur certains points
de cette P resqu’ île ne peuvent se concilier ni avec le principe de l ’ intégrité de
l ’ Empire Ottoman, ni se baser sur des arguments de fait et de droit (Voir Annexe
page 1). Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman espère donc que le Gouvernement de
Sa Majesté Britannique voudra bien ne pas insister sur ce point.
E n ce qui concerne les îles Bahréïn, le Gouvernement Im périal serait toutefois
disposé à renoncer à toute réclamation sur ces territoires à la condition que les Consuls
de Sa Majesté Britannique ne réclament point dans l ’ avenir des privilèges capitulaires
en faveur des indigènes de Bahréïn se trouvant dans les territoires de l ’ Em pire
Ottom an; que les droits perçus par les Cheikhs de Bahréïn sur les pêcheries perlières
soient si possible réduits, ou sinon, que les droits actuels du moins ne soient pas
augmentés, avec des assurances à cet effet; enfin que l ’ îlot de “ Zahnounié ” situé
près du port d ’ Ojéir et faisant incontestablement partie intégrante du Sandjak de
Nedjd, soit en vue de prévenir tout malentendu, form ellement reconnu par le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique com m e tel, c ’ est-à-dire com m e faisant
partie dudit Sandjak de Nedjd.

Kow eit.

L a Sublime Porte prie le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique de vouloir

bien se rapporter aux développements et conclusions exposés dans la page 7 de
l ’ A nnexe(4) au présent Aide-M émoire.

Commission fluviale pour la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab.

L a Sublime Porte accède au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
Britannique au sujet d ’ une Commission à instituer pour les besoins de la navigation
dans le Chatt-el Arab, à la condition toutefois que cette Commission n ’ ait pas un
caractère international. Dans l ’ intérêt m ême des deux Gouvernements il serait
préférable de ne pas créer une institution internationale; aussi le Gouvernement
Impérial Ottoman suggère-t-il au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique la
formation d ’ une Commission purement ottom ane dans laquelle siégera un technicien
anglais engagé au service du Gouvernement Ottoman. Une Commission sous cette
forme ne différera en rien dans la pratique de celle proposée par le Gouvernement de
Sa Majesté Britannique. Les attributions de cette Commission seront ultérieurement
définies dans tous leurs détails.
E n ce qui concerne les inspections techniques, telles que l ’ éclairage, la pose de
bouées, le pilotage et l ’ application des dispositions quarantenaires, le Gouvernement
Impérial se chargera lui-m ême exclusivement de ces différents services, en tant qu ’ ils
seront établis et dirigés sur son propre territoire et dans les eaux intérieures et
territoriales de l ’ Em pire. Les deux Gouvernements pourront toutefois s ’ entendre
pour charger la Commission précitée de s ’ occuper aussi desdites inspections, de la
pose de bouées à Fao et du pilotage à travers ce détroit et le long du Chatt-el-Arab
jusqu’ à Bassorah.

(*) [v. in fr a , pp . 64^-5.]

 02

Quant à la police des eaux dans le Golfe Persique, le Gouvernement Im périal en

sa qualité de principale Puissance riveraine du Golfe et étant aussi intéressée que le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique au maintien de l ’ ordre et la sécurité dans
ces parages, désire exercer la police des eaux conjointem ent avec la Grande-Bretagne.
Les deux Gouvernements pourraient conclure une entente à cet effet, prenant pour
exemple la Convention qu ’ ils avaient conclu pour la répression de la traite.

Annexes.

E l-Katr.

Il est dit dans le M ém orandum du 29 Juillet(5) que le Gouvernement de Sa

M ajesté Britannique n ’ ayant jamais reconnu la souveraineté de l ’ E m pire Ottoman sur
les territoires s’ étendant au delà d ’ Ojéir, le Gouvernement Im périal devrait renoncer
à toute réclamation touchant ces territoires. L e Mém orandum cite à cet effet les
assurances qui auraient été données en 1870 par le Ministre Ottoman des Affaires
Etrangères à l ’ Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople, portant que
“ la Sublime Porte n ’ entretenait aucune intention d ’ établir sa suprématie sur Babréïn,
Mascat ou les tribus indépendantes sur les côtes du Golfe Persique. ” ( 6)
Tout d ’ abord la Sublime Porte s ’ empresse de faire savoir au Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté Britannique que toutes les recherches minutieusement effectuées dans les
archives ont abouti à un résultat négatif. E lle pense donc qu ’ il existe un malentendu
au sujet de ces assurances qui ne pouvaient raisonnablement être données, puisque le
Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman avait nullem ent l ’ intention de faire abandon, en
faveur de qui que ce soit, de ses droits souverains au Sud d ’ Ojéir, y com pris la
Presqu’ île d ’ El-K atr. Au contraire le Gouvernement Ottoman entendait conserver
ses droits et les exercer exclusivement. La preuve en est que lorsqu’ en 1871, un navire
Anglais vint à E l-K atr et que son Commandant adressa, au nom du Cheikh de
Babréïn, quelques réclamations aux Cheikhs d ’ El-K atr, ceux-ci s’ appuyant sur leur
nationalité Ottomane, repoussèrent énergiquem ent les prétentions du Cheikh de
Bahréïn. Cet incident conduisit M idhat Pacha, alors Gouverneur-Général de Bagdad,
à dem ander officiellement et par écrit au Consul de Sa Majesté Britannique en cette
ville des explications au sujet de l ’ intervention des Officiers de Marine Britannique
dans les affaires d ’ El-K atr. L e Consul dans sa lettre responsive, nia cette intervention.
Midhat Pacha envoya aussi, la m êm e année, un bataillon sous le Commandement du
Lieutenant-Colonel Eum er B ey, embarqué sur la corvette “ Skendéryé ” et le vapeur
“ A ssour,” avec la mission de protéger les habitants d ’ E l-K atr contre les agressions
probables des Bahréïnis. E n 1875, la Sublime Porte adressa des représentations au
Cabinet de S [a in ]t. James contre l ’ ingérence répétée des Autorités maritimes
Anglaises dans les affaires d ’ E l-K atr. Ces Autorités, appuyant les Cheikhs de Bahréïn,
avaient en effet bombardé Zobara et tiré sur les “ B eni-H adjer ” qui, placés sous le
Comm andem ent de l ’ E m ir Nassir, étaient envoyés à E l-K atr avec mission de percevoir
les impôts dûs au Fisc ottoman par la tribu “ Naïm ” d ’ E l-K a tr.(7)
L es Cheikhs d ’ E l-K atr n ’ ont reconnu jusqu’ ici d ’ autre autorité que celle du
Gouvernement Ottoman. E n effet Djassim -bin-Saani repoussa les ouvertures du
Cheikh Ahm ed de Bahréïn qui voulait s’ emparer de Zobara pour y établir une colonie
de Bahréïnis. Djassim -bin-Saani lui fit dire qu’ E l-K atr faisait partie de l ’ Empire
Ottoman et que lui, fonctionnaire ottom an soumis à l ’ autorité de la Sublime Porte, ne
pouvait rien faire de sa propre initiative.
( 5) [v . su p ra , pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34.]
( 8) [c p . supra, p. 46, N o. 34, and n o te (®). T he q u o ta tio n g iv en a bov e is p roba b ly from
th e docu m en t o f A p r il 25, 1871.]
( 7) [F o r m a teria l rela tin g to these com p la in ts v. F.O . 7 8 /2 4 4 3 -5 .]
 63

Les événements de 1875 furent probablem ent représentés par Son Excellence
Sir H . Elliot, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople, sous une
forme bien différente de la réalité ; sans émettre en cette occurrence aucune prétention
au nom de Son Gouvernement, il déclara au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que le
navire Anglais qui avait attaqué Zobara et tiré sur la tribu Beni Hadjer, se serait
probablement livré à des exercices de tir dans le but d ’ intimider et de disperser les
Arabes. De même, Lord Derby, dans Sa réponse adressée le 24 Novem bre 1874 à
Musurus Pacha au sujet du bombardem ent de Zobara, ne souleva aucune question
quant à la souveraineté de l ’ E m pire Ottoman sur la Presqu’ île d ’ E l-K a tr.(8) Dans sa
Note Verbale du 11 Juillet 1891 la Sublime Porte fit savoir en réponse à l ’ Ambassade
britannique, que Zobara et Odeïd se trouvent dans les limites du Villayet de Bassorah
et qu’ ils sont depuis longtem ps administrés par des “ Kaïmakams ” et des “ M udirs.”
Cette Note ne provoqua aucune protestation de la part de l ’ Ambassade de Sa Majesté
B ritannique,(9) et la Note Verbale du Ministère Im périal des Affaires Étrangères en
date du 26 Janvier 1892 (également demeurée sans réponse) faisant allusion au Traité
signé par le Cheikh d ’ Abuthabi, contenait textuellement ce qui su it: “ Comm e le
Résident Anglais ne pouvait ignorer que la Souveraineté de Sa Majesté Im périale le
Sultan s’ étend sur les contrées en question (E l-K atr : Zobara et Odéïd), il aurait dû
s’ abstenir d ’ exercer le rôle de médiateur entre les Cheikhs Arabes sans l ’ assentiment
préalable de la Sublime Porte. Quoiqu’ il en soit, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman
ayant été laissé dans l ’ ignorance com plète de cet acte, ce dernier ne peut avoir
aucune influence sur ses droits de souveraineté. Du reste l ’ arrangement en question
ne contenait qu’ un armistice entre quelques Cheikhs dont le m aintien est confié à les
surveillance des Autorités Anglaises, et ne saurait être invoqué en aucun cas en faveur
de l ’ établissement de postes militaires à Zobara et Odéïd.’ ’ ( 10)
E n 1895 l ’ Ambassade Impériale Ottomane à Londres s’ adressa au Foreign Office
pour se plaindre de l ’ attitude observée par le Commandant des navires Anglais, qui
avait pressé et menacé les quelques centaines de Bahréïnis soumis au Cheikh Djassim
et établis en émigrés à Zobara où ils avaient arboré le drapeau Ottoman.
Saïd Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, écrivit à la date du 22 A vril 1893 à
Son Excellence Sir Clare Ford, la lettre suivante : “ E n me référant à la conversation
que j ’ ai eu l ’ honneur d ’ avoir aujourd’hui avec Votre Excellence, je m ’ empresse de
lui transmettre, ci-près, copie d ’ un télégramme signé par Djassim, Kaïm akam
d ’ El-K atr, et les habitants. Ainsi que Votre Excellence le relevera de la lecture de
ces pièces, les signataires, en leur qualité de fidèles sujets de Sa Majesté Im périale le
Sultan, s’ adressent à leur Auguste Souverain pour demander Sa haute sollicitude en
leur faveur. Il'^ st hors de doute qu ’ il sera procédé en cette circonstance d ’ après la
justice et l ’ équité. P.S. Je n ’ ai pas besoin de répéter que la présence à Katr d ’ un
Résident Anglais avec un bâtiment d ’ État de Sa Majesté Britannique, n ’ a pas sa raison
d ’ être. Votre Excellence en conviendra, j ’ en suis persuadé, lorsqu’ Elle aura pris
connaissance du télégramme précité.” ( n )
Le Commandant du navire Anglais, “ S p h y n x ’ ’ arrivé le 30 Juin 1890 dans le
port d ’ El-K atr, malgré le conseil amical qui lui avait été donné par le Commandant
du Stationnaire Ottoman ‘ ‘ Sayad-i-Déria ’ ’ débarqua et rendit visite au Cheikh
Ahmed qu ’ il interrogea sur l ’ autorité ottom ane exercée à E l-K atr. Cette conversation
fut rapportée par le Cheikh à la Sublime Porte qui, par le canal de l ’ Ambassade
Ottomane à Londres, se plaignit encore une fois auprès du Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté Britannique de l ’ attitude des Officiers de Marine Anglais.

( 8) [E n closu re in L o rd D e rb y ’ s despatch (N o. 226) to S ir H . E llio t o f N ov em b er 24, 1874.

F.O. 7 8 /2 4 4 5 .]
( 9) [T h e te x t o f th is n o te v erb a le, d a ted J u ly 4, 1891, is in the Em bassy archives,
F.O. 195/1733. I t is end orsed “ C op y to F [o r e ig n ] 0 [ff ic e ] fo r in s t r u [c t io ]n s . J u ly 7, 1891.” ]
( 10) [T h e t e x t o f th is n o te v erba le is in the E m bassy archives, F.O . 195/1771. I t is end orsed
“ J a n [u a r y ] 28. C op y to F [o r e ig n ] 0 [ff ic e ] .” ]
( n ) [T h e t e x t o f th is letter is in the Em bassy archives, F.O . 195/1809. I t is en d orsed “ C op y
hom e A p ril 2 3 /9 3 .” ]
 64
L ’ année dernière Djassim Saani se refusa à donner à l ’ Agent Britannique à
Bahreïn l ’ autorisation demandée par ce dernier d ’ établir des Bahréïnis à Zobara, et
ce contre payement d ’ une somme annuelle de 10,000 roupies. Djassim en sa qualité
de fonctionnaire ottoman ne pouvait agir autrement. Les démarches analogues faites
par Zaïd, fils du Cheikh d ’ Abuthabi, échouèrent également.
Si le Gouvernement Im périal s’ est abstenu à différentes époques d ’ envoyer à leur
poste les Mudirs de Zobara, d ’ E l-W akra et Odéïd, cela n ’ a été que provisoirement et
en vue de prévenir une friction entre les deux Gouvernements amis. Mais la Sublime
Porte a toujours réservé ses droits sur ces localités en attendant le règlement définitif
et satisfaisant de la situation vraiment anormale d ’ El-K atr, en ce qui concerne
certains points du littoral.
A côté des fonctionnaires civils que la Sublime Porte a désignés depuis longtemps
à E l-K atr (les noms et qualités de ces fonctionnaires sont mentionnés dans les
Annuaires officiels, Budgets et Registres du Gouvernement Im périal), il y existe aussi
un fort détachement militaire, ce qui constitue aussi la plus importante affirmation de
la souveraineté effective de la Turquie dans ces parages.

Koweït.

Dans son Mémorandum du 29 Juillet dernier, (1Z) le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté

Britannique appuie ses réclamations sur les deux principaux faits suivants :

1° La non-reconnaissance par la Grande-Bretagne de la protection ottomane sur

Koweit ;
2 ° L ’ Accord de 1901(13) ;

L e Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman ne s’ est engagé en 1901 vis-à-vis de celui de Sa

Majesté Britannique qu ’ à ne pas envoyer de troupes à Koweit. Il a reçu du
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique l ’ assurance par écrit qu ’ il respecterait
également le statu-quo. Or la Sublime Porte, lors de la conclusion de cette entente,
ignorait la Convention, qui lui a été com m uniquée plus tard, que le Gouvernement de
Sa Majesté Britannique avait fait signer en 1889(14) au Cheikh Mubarek. Aux yeux
de la Sublime Porte, le statu-quo n ’ était donc pas la nouvelle situation créée par ladite
Convention, et le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman de son côté n ’ a jamais reconnu et
admis cette situation politique créée en faveur du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
Britannique par la Convention susmentionnée.
L es ‘ ‘ Sabbab ’ ’ ont été de tous temps des sujets Ottomans et simplement
“ Kaïmakams ” de Koweit. Abdullah-bin-Sabbah, son frère Mubarek ainsi que les
habitants de Koweit ont servi en 1870 dans les rangs de l ’ armée ottomane comme
sujets de l ’ Em pire. C ’ est le drapeau ottoman qui flotte à Koweit, fait que le
G ouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a reconnu. Le Cheikh actuel Mubarek,
dans toutes ses correspondances avec les Autorités supérieures de Bassorah donc il
relève, se qualifie à chaque occasion de sujet fidèle de Sa Majesté Im périale le Sultan
et les sig n e: “ Kaïmakam de K ow eit.” Tout dernièrement encore il s ’ est adressé
au Villavet de Bassorah pour obtenir des actes de nationalité ottomane destinés à ses
fils. Les habitants, notables ou non, se sont maintes fois adressés aux Autorités
supérieures ottomanes en qualité de sujets de l ’ Empire.
Quant aux limites de Koweit, telles qu ’ elles sont représentées et réclamées par le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et formant un territoire d ’ une étendue de
160 miles de largeur sur 190 miles de longueur, ces limites sont d ’ autant moins
admissibles que la sphère d ’ influence du Cheikh ne s ’ étend pas au Nord, Nord-Ouest
et au Sud au delà de “ K iazim eh,” “ Jabra ” et “ Sina.” Surtout au Sud l ’ influence

( 12) [u. supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34.]

( 13) [u. supra, p. 49, E d. N o t e .]
( 14) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l co r re c tio n : “ 1899.” cp. in jra , p. 107, N o. 68, encl. 3, A n n ex e I.]
 G5

du Cheikh ne se fait pas sentir au-delà d ’ une distance de 20 kilomètres, c ’ est-à-dire aux
confins du territoire de parcours de la grande tribu “ A jm an.”
Dès lors, Koweit ne pourrait être considéré autrement que comme une ville
ottomane dont l ’ administration est confiée au Cheikh Mubarek nom m é par Ordre
Impérial “ Kaïmakam ” de cette localité.
Toutefois la Sublime Porte animée d ’un sincère désir d ’ entente sur ce point avec
le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, consent à conclure un Arrangement
définitif avec la Grande-Bretagne, sur les bases suivantes :
Maintien de la souveraineté effective du Gouvernement Ottoman sur Bubian,
Wadia et autres îles voisines;
Remplacem ent des Conventions (sans valeur juridique internationale) signées par
le Cheikh Mubarek, par une Convention à conclure entre les deux Gouvernements
Britannique et Ottoman, protégeant les intérêts économiques de la Grande-Bretagne à
Koweit, mais compatible dans ses termes et effets avec les droits souverains de
l ’ Empire sur K ow eit;
Soumission à la Législation ottomane des propriétés appartenant au Cheikh et
sises dans le Yillayet de Bassorah avec la jouissance tranquille et com plète de celles-ci
d ’ après les dispositions des Lois ottomanes régissant la matière.

M IN U T E S .
S ir A. H irtz e l and I have w ritten a jo in t m in u te on this rep ly , and it is a n n e x e d .(15)
As th e rep ly does n ot g o so fa r tow ard s m eetin g ou r view s, n ota bly in reg a rd t o K ow eit,
as D jév a d Bey, in th e in form a l discussions a t the In d ia Office, had a p p ea red to in d ica te, I sent
him , w ith S ir A . N ico ls o n ’ s a p p rov a l, the a tta ch ed p riv a te le tte r .(16) I have receiv ed his reply,
w hich is also a n n e x e d ,(17) and he cam e to see m e, and said th a t the T urkish rep ly m ust not
be reg a rd ed as th eir final w ord , th ou g h I w as n ot successful in fin d in g ou t w here he th o u g h t
his G o v [e r n m e n ]t m ost likely to yield.
A . P.
A p ril 23, 1912.
See m in u tes inside.
„ R . P. M.

I a gree w ith th e rest o f th e m in u te— and th in k th a t w e can a fford to be stiff, because

T urkey m ust b e an xiou s co com e to term s w ith H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] a t this
c ritica l ju n ctu r e in her fo r e ig n relation s and th a t w e shall n ever have a b etter o p p o rtu n ity
fo r n eg otia tion . P a ra g ra p h g is p a rticu la rly w orth n o tin g .(18)
S ir A. H irtz e l and M r. P a r k e r have ta k en g re a t trou b le over this and had m a n y in terv iew s
w ith the T u rk ish d elegates who, if th ey have not a t on ce a d op ted ou r view s, w ill I feel sure
u ltim a tely su rren d er to th e pow erfu l a rgum ents o f ou r R ep resen ta tiv es.
L. M.
A p [ r i ] l 25th.
P r iv [a t e ] S e c [r e t a r ]y .
(S ir E . G rey w ished to see this paper.)
Tewfik P [a s h ]a has occasion a lly in tim a ted t o m e th a t he is rea dy to open th e serious
n e g o tia tio n s : b u t I und ersta n d th a t it is desired first to com e to an a r r a n g [e m e n ]t as to
K ow eit. I th in k this should be d on e in w ritin g , eith er to th e A m bassador h ere or th rou g h
Sir G. L ow th er to the P orte. I t w ou ld be o f no use discussing th e q uestion w ith D jé v a d B ey —
I m ay m ention th a t Tewfik P [a s h ]a to ld m e he w as a n n oyed w ith th e la tter h a v in g w ritten
p riv a te letters to M r. P a r k e r on these m a tters an d ha d reb u k ed him fo r h a vin g d on e so.
A . N.

I th in k we should w rite an official n ote to th e Em bassy here, w ho have fu ll pow ers to

discuss this q uestion, a deleg ate h a v in g been sp ecially a tta ch ed to them fo r the pu rpose.
L. M.
S ir A . N icolson agrees, bu t, b e fo re a ctin g , le t S ir E . G rey see.
L. M.
P roceed as proposed.
E. G.
6.5.12.
( 15) [v. in fra , pp. 67-73, N o. 50.]
( 1S) [v . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]
( 17) [r . in fra , pp . 66-7, N o. 49.]
( 18) [r . in fra , pp . 72-3, N o. 50.]

[10900] V
 66
N o. 48 .

Mr. Parker to Djevad B e y A 1)

F.O. 371/1484.
12347/2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(Private.)
M y dear Djevad B ey, F oreign Office, April 18, 1912.
You asked me to let you know privately, as soon as possible after we had received
your reply, whether I thought the proposals of your Government were likely to prove
acceptable.
As you only com m unicated the reply on the 15th A pril,(2) there has not been
time to submit it to Sir E . G rey; but I may tell you now, though purely as my
own personal view, that I am greatly disappointed and, after what passed at our
inform al discussions, not a little surprised at the terms of your official reply.
W hen contrasted with the terms o f the British memorandum of last July, the
Ottoman reply seems to show, on almost all the principal points, marked divergency,
and I cannot conceal from you that I apprehend grave and insuperable objection to
some o f your proposals.
I think that a very bad impression will be produced by the attempt which is
made to whittle away the form al assurances which were given by the Ottoman
Minister for Foreign Affairs to our Ambassador in 1870(3) ; those assurances, though
verbal, were repeatedly given, and were referred to in subsequent correspondence.
I can show you the original signed despatches from our Ambassador at Constantinople.
Then as to K o w e it: I had been led to expect that, while the Ottoman Govern­
ment might feel some reluctance to withdraw the military post from Bubiyan Island,
the remaining proposals included in our memorandum of last July respecting Koweit
furnished the basis of an agreement between the two countries. I must confess that
a great stretch o f the imagination appears necessary to reconcile the basis of agree­
ment proposed in your reply with the determination of His M ajesty’ s Government
not to consent ‘ ‘ to any interference with the succession or with the internal
administration, or any infringem ent of the com plete autonomy o f the Sheikh.”
It may be that there are om issions from your reply. I am almost led to think
so from your language about Koweit to me.
You know how desirous I am that the negotiations should su cceed ; yet I fail
to discover the elements o f conciliation, whether in regard to accepting our last
proposals as to participation in the railway, or in regard to several other points.
I am, &c.
ALW YN PARKER.
O ’) [T h e te x t giv en above is ta k en from th e C onfidential P r in t, as no oth er co p y can bo
tra ce d .]
(2) [v. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]
(3) [cp . supra, p. 46, N o. 34, and n o te (®).]

No. 49.
Djevad D ey to Mr. Parker.
E.O. 371/1484.
1 60 0 0 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
Private. Im périal Ottoman Em bassy, London,
M on cher Mr. Parker, April 20, 1912.
Dès la réception de votre lettre j ’ ai fait tout mon possible pour vous voir, soit
au Foreign Office soit chez vous, mais on m ’ a fait dire que vous étiez à la campagne.
Je tenais surtout à vous voir pour tâcher de dissiper les alarmes exagérées que vous
avez à la lecture de notre aide-mémoire. J ’ espère toujours que dans la discussion
verbale entre l ’ Ambassadeur et Sir A. Nicolson on arrivera à s’ entendre.
 67
Cependant je tiens à vous dire aussi que m oi-m êm e je viens d ’ être très surpris
d ’ entendre que le Foreign Office songerait maintenant à réduire notre quote-part
dans la partition des capitaux à 10% ! Vous savez parfaitement que le sacrifice qu ’on
a fait chez nous de renoncer à une part plus élevée et de se contenter d ’ une part
égale à celle des autres Puissances, est l ’ extrême concession que nous soyons en état
de faire ; j ’ ai donc bien peur que si la proposition est soulevée maintenant de la
réduire encore, cela ne mette sérieusement en danger la solution favorable d ’ une
question à laquelle j ’ attache personnellem ent, com m e vous le savez, la plus grande
importance et dont je suis un partisan convaincu.
Bien sincèrement à vous.
L e 20 Avril 1912. D JE V A D .

No. 50.

Joint M inute by Sir A . H irtzel and Mr. Parker on the Turkish G overnm en t’ s
Memorandum com m unicated on April 15, 1912. (*)
F.O. 371/1484.
16000/2G 4/12/44. Foreign Office, April 24, 1912.
1. B agdad B a il w a y .

(a.) Division of Share-capital in the Bagdad-Bussorah Section.

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent originally proposed, in July 1910,(2) that British
interests should be represented by 55 per cent, o f the total share-capital.
Turkey replied that she would prefer a distribution of 40 per cent, for herself,
of 20 per cent, to Germ any, 20 per cent, to France, and 20 per cent, to E ngland.
To this, in July 1911,(3) H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent made a counter-proposal
that the distribution should be 20 per cent, each to Turkey, France, Germany,
E ngland, and R ussia; the idea being to secure 60 per cen t., or a m ajority, to the
3 E n ten te Powers : E ngland, France, and Russia.
Turkey now professes to fall in with the British view, by distributing the capital
equally between herself, France, Germ any, and E ngland, in the proportion o f 25 per
cent, each, the Chairmanship and casting vote being reserved to T u rk e y ! No m ention
is made of R u ssia; but, in our inform al discussions, the Turks intimated that they
would not willingly admit Russia, and that, if His M ajesty’ s Governm ent persisted,
they would have to introduce another country, say Switzerland, to counterbalance her.
The effect o f giving 25 per cent, to each o f four Powrers, and allotting to Turkey
a casting vote, would be to place control in the hands o f the Turco-Germ an group,
in so far as control does actually depend on the percentage o f capital held. Control
probably does depend upon the voting rights of the various sections o f shareholders
in so far as the appointment of a m anager(4) and other high officials and similar
matters are concerned. But though the control to be exercised by the Board of
Directors will not be absolute (since it is proposed to fix by Convention the maximum
and m inimum scales o f tariff rates and m any details regarding transport facilities),
and it is therefore possible to attach too great importance to the distribution o f the
share-capital as a means o f control, we cannot recomm end acceptance of the Turkish
proposal, which we believe would be generally regarded as politically a defeat o f His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent, while financially the small amount o f British capital that
would find em ploym ent would cause great disappointment.
Sir H . Babington-Sm ith has expressed his belief that Turkey, on the analogy
of her holding in the Bagdad Railway, which is only 10 per cent., would be satisfied
0) [T h e t e x t giv en above is ta ken from th e C on fid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l ca n n ot be
traced. F o r th e Turkish m em orandum v. su p ra , pp . 59-65, N o. 47.]
(2) \v. G ooch T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 503 -5 , N o. 3S8.]
(3) [i\ supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34.]
(4) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ W e m igh t stip u la te th a t the M a n a ger should be B r itis h .” ]
[10900] F 2
 68

with a share of 10 per cent, or 15 per cent, in the B agdad-B ussorah section, and he
appears to have discussed the subject with the Turkish Ambassador in L ondon. But
we are led to think that his impression is erroneous ; since the Turkish delegates
represented to us that Turkey, as the territorial Pow7er, was already making a great
concession in limiting her share to the same amount as that o f the other Powers
participating and Djévad B ey has since forcibly expressed the same view in writing.
Unless some via media can be found between the proposal of His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent for five Powers, and the Turkish proposal for four Powers, a deadlock
m ay be reached.
If, for political reasons, it is desired to retain Russian participation, His
M ajesty’ s Government might perhaps reply that they cannot agree to the distribution
suggested by Turkey (four Powers at 25 per cent, each) and that they therefore revert
to the proposal made last July o f 20 per cent, to each Power (Turkey, France,
Germ any, E ngland, and Russia), but that they would be willing to agree to the
President of the Company being a Turk. B y this arrangement of a Turkish President,
Turkey would be in a position nom inally superior to the foreign countries, and this
would make the agreement more acceptable to the Ottoman Parliament. But we
anticipate great reluctance on the part o f Turkey to any arrangement admitting
Russian participation.
W e have already expressed the view that the control to be exercised by the
Board -would be unusually circum scribed; but, such as it is, it will, in so far as it
is to serve British interests, be dependent upon the continued solidarity of the
E nten te Powers. The proposal made by His M ajesty’ s Government last July is based
upon the assumption that, during the whole period o f the concession— that is, for
99 years at least— the general policy of His M ajesty’ s Government and the Govern­
ments of France and Russia will be such as to insure concerted action on the railway
B oard, and it presupposes that the Governments concerned will be able to control
the policy o f their financiers, which in the case of France at least is more than
doubtful. W e venture to suggest that it may in future prove inconvenient that our
interests should depend upon the co-operation of France and Russia on the Board,
since 'the necessity of insuring concerted action by the three Powers in Mesopotamia
m ay handicap British policy in other quarters.
Moreover, it must be remembered that Russian commercial interests are here
contrary to our own, since the value of this section to us— at all events for many
years to come— lies in the fact that it will enable us more easily to pour our goods
into W estern and Northern Persia where at present Russia is our only rival.
W e are accordingly far from being persuaded that it is in the interests of this
country to insist upon Russian participation in the Bagdad-Bussorah section; and
we venture to think that it would be better to provide for the Russian Government
by participation in the Khanikin branch, to which, on terms, the German Govern­
m ent might assent, though the last-mentioned consideration applies to this course
also.
It must not be overlooked that Turkey is not altogether a free agent in regard
to the distribution o f capital, since the Bagdad Railwray Company has reserved the
right to a share equal to that obtained by any foreign country in the B agd ad -
Bussorah sections.
(b.) Proposed international convention providing for the exclusion o f differential rates
on any railways in Asiatic T u rk ey; for the alignment o f the railway south
of Bagdad, and the conditions under which it is to be con stru cted ; and for
guaranteeing that the interest in the enterprise o f the several parties
concerned shall be o f lasting duration and not subject to termination on the
expiry of the Bagdad Railway Com pany's concession.
No specific mention is made in the Turkish reply of the “ international conven­
t io n ’ ’ which His M ajesty’ s Governm ent desire, but we understood from the Turkish
delegates that no objection would be raised to it.
 69
With regard to the exclusion o f differential treatment, the Turkish Government
declare themselves ready to assure to British com m erce all facilities compatible with
the agreements already concluded by Turkey with the Bagdad Railway Company.
This limitation no doubt principally refers to the “ Cahier des C h a rges” or specifica­
tion attached to the Bagdad Railway Convention of 1903, and there is some force
in the contention o f the Turkish Governm ent that their hands are tied so far as
concerns rates on the Bagdad Railway. The specification is composed o f technical
details, and it would be well to ask the Board o f Trade and Government of India to
cause an expert examination of the schedule o f rates to be m ade, so as to ascertain
whether they are of a nature to serve or to militate against British-Indian trade.
At first sight the Turkish reply on this point, the exclusion o f differential rates,
seems satisfactory.
Sir H . Babington-Sm ith has suggested that it is of great importance to provide
that the facilities and rates on the Khanikin branch shall be the same for goods
arriving from the Gulf as for those arriving from the Mediterranean. In this view
we entirely agree.
The Turkish Government are ready to meet His M ajesty’ s Governm ent in regard
to the alignment and the financial arrangements, subject to the arrangement o f details.
On the other hand, they say that they are not prepared to agree to the arrange­
ment to be arrived at for the B agdad-B ussorah sections being o f lasting duration,
instead o f subject to termination on the expiry of the Bagdad Railway concession.
This is a point o f some im portance; and we d o not think His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
would be well advised to m odify the attitude they have taken up on this question.
In any case, if the principle of re-purchase b y the Turkish Government is admitted,
the exercise o f such a right should be made subject to an undertaking that the present
agreement in regard to the exclusion o f differential treatment should not be departed
from .(s)

(c.) Pecuniary indem nity to be paid to the Bagdad Railway Company in respect of
its renunciation of the right to construct the section of the railway betw een
Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.

The Turkish Governm ent say that this charge must be borne by the proposed
new com pany for the railway south o f Bagdad. It was always supposed that this
would be s o ; and we cannot well object. Indeed, Sir H . B abington-Sm ith has
pointed out that this is really Turkey’ s a ffa ir: Germany claims 2,0001, for each
kilometre abandoned by h e r ; and Sir H . Babington-Sm ith has suggested that Turkey
would do well to offer bonds o f the face value o f 2,000Z. in place of cash, especially
since the value of these bonds has fallen about 10 per cent, during the present war.

(d.) R iver D ues.

It seems equitable that Turkey should impose such dues for services rendered
in dredging and such like operations in the S hatt-el-A rab; but we propose to discuss
this point further in relation to the proposed riverain commission.

(e.) Prolongation of the Railway from Bussorah to the Persian Gulf.

H is M ajesty’ s Government proposed, and Turkey agrees, that the best terminus
for the moment would be Bussorah.
But His M ajesty’ s Government further proposed that, in the event o f the railway
ever being prolonged to the Persian Gulf, it must be brought to Koweit under
conditions to be settled by agreement between Great Britain and Turkey alone, and

(5) [Notes by Sir A. Hirtzel and Mr. Alwyn P ark er: “ I understood them to say that if
the Bagdad Railway Concession were extended, the other should be extended also. Could we
not compromise on th a t?— A. H . I agree.— A. P .” ]
 70

that a clause to this effect must be inserted now in a convention dealing with these
matters.
Turkey replies that there is no present cause for contem plating a continuation of
the railway beyond Bussorah, but that, nevertheless, the Turkish Government are
prepared to give to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent all assurances necessary to disperse any
anxieties which may be felt concerning the continuation in question.
H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent have every reason to insist upon a settlement of this
question now, when they are negotiating for a general settlement, and possess the
powerful lever of the customs increase.
The Turkish delegates have represented that Turkey could not agree to the
terminus of this Turkish line being under the control of either an Arab Sheikh or a
foreign Power.
The Turkish point of view is in telligib le; and it was partly owing to the difficulty
o f finding a satisfactory solution otherwise that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent suggested
that the railway should stop at Bussorah. W e think therefore that H is M ajesty’ s
Government should maintain the view, in which the Turkish Governm ent acquiesce,
that the principal terminus should be at Bussorah, and that the prolongation to the
G ulf should m erely be regarded as a branch. But there is some danger that the
Turkish Government might, if they could not secure arrangements satisfactory to
them at Koweit, bring the Gulf branch to Um Kasr or elsewhere, and that the
Sheikh of Koweit m ight deplore such a development. The Sheikh seemed gratified
in 1907 when His M ajesty’ s Governm ent concluded the lease of the foreshore,(6) as he
interpreted the transaction as a clear indication that the terminus of the Bagdad
Piailway would be at Koweit, and consequently that the com m ercial wealth of the port
would be increased. But we would not attach too great weight to this consideration
provided that the Sheikh’ s position is secured.
W e accordingly think it important that the Turkish Governm ent should be
induced to bind themselves to bring the branch from Bussorah to the Gulf, if and
when constructed, to Koweit under conditions to be settled at the time between
Turkey and Great B rita in ; but that the position of Bussorah, as the real terminus,
should he emphasised, and that the continuation to Koweit should be characterised as
a branch line in the further negotiations with Turkey.

(f.) Proposed construction and control of the port at Bussorah by the new railway
com pany in the interests o f the unrestricted com m erce of all nations.

Turkey ignores, in her reply, the question of the construction and control o f the
term inal port at Bussorah.
The Turkish delegates did, however, intimate to us verbally that Turkey would
agree to the construction of the port at Bussorah by the new com pany. They did not
m ention con trol; and probably such measures as police control would have to remain,
as at present, in Turkish hands. But it is desirable that control of the port should be
entrusted to the proposed riverain commission.

2 .— P o l i t i c a l an d T e r r it o r ia l Q u e s t io n s .

(See map annexed. O )

(a.) E l Katr.
Here there is com plete divergency between the Turkish and the British point
of view.
The Turkish Governm ent have maintained a post at E l Bidaa for 40 y e a rs ; and
the Turkish Delegates have emphasised the difficulty there would be in reconciling
parliamentary opinion to the abandonment of territory which Turkey has never

(6) [cp. sup ra , p. 12, No. 6, n o te (8).]

( 7) [Not reproduced.]
 71

form ally ren ou n ced ; and they represented that such a surrender would be particularly
difficult to justify at a time when public opinion is smarting under the loss of Tripoli.
They therefore urged that British interests m ight be reconciled with a consolidation
of Turkish dom inion in El K a tr; but from this view the British Resident in the
Persian Gulf and the Governm ent of India em phatically dissent.
It appears to us that there is nothing in the Turkish agreement that would justify
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent in abandoning one iota o f the claims advanced in the
memorandum of July 1911, seeing that an important object, in embarking on a
settlement of Gulf questions was to eliminate the Turks from the peninsula.
W e consider that H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent should protest energetically against
the Turkish attempt to whittle away the assurances (see Annexe I) given by the
Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to H er M ajesty’ s Ambassador at Constantinople,
and repeatedly given, to the effect that Turkey did not entertain any intention of
obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein, Muscat, and the independent tribes on the
coast of the Persian G u lf; though Turkey did (in the person of Midhat Pasha) argue
that there were no independent tribes in Nedjd.

(b.) Bahrein.

The Turkish reply on this point is, we think, fairly satisfactory. W e understood
from the Turkish delegates that Turkey is prepared to agree to Bahreinis having
British Consular protection in Turkey, but not rights under the Capitulations, and
this appears a reasonable attitude.

(c.) Zakhnuniyeh Island.

According to the Turkish delegates this isle is connected at low tide with the
mainland. It is however opposite a portion of the mainland which is south o f Ojeir,
the most southerly limit to which His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have ever recognised
Turkish influence, and this attempt to establish themselves on the island seems to
date only from 1909.

(d.) K oweit.

The Turkish reply evades a direct answer to much that was written in the British
memorandum of July 1911.
W e consider that no useful purpose would be served by entering into a controversy
as to past history, and that it would be expedient to reply to the Turkish Governm ent
that, while H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent cannot accept or admit the justice of the
Turkish contentions, they would be glad to learn whether the Turkish Governm ent are
prepared to accept the settlement suggested by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent last July,
in the following paragraph :—
British trade relations with the Sheikhs of Koweit have existed for upwards of
two centuries and, inasmuch as the place has attracted merchants from all quarters
by the equity o f its rule and the freedom of its trade, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent could
not consent to any interference with the succession or with the internal administra­
tion, or to any infringem ent of the complete autonom y o f the Sheikh. On the other
hand, they are prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Koweit, and to
recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish Kaimakam, provided in other respects the status
quo is guaranteed, and the validity of certain agreements which the Sheikh has
concluded with the British Governm ent is recognised; provided the islands of Warba
and Bubian are admitted by Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, and Turkish
military posts are withdrawn; and provided finally the Sheikh is admitted to the full
and undisturbed enjoym ent of any properties he may own or hereafter purchase on
Turkish territory. Koweit would thus form a sort o f enclave within, and form ing part
of, the Ottoman Em pire, but enjoying com plete self-governm ent under Turkish
suzerainty.
 72

As regards the limits of Koweit it m ay be mentioned that in 1908 and again in

1910 the British agents toured over the whole of the country claimed by H is
M ajesty’ s Government without finding traces of any influence there except that of
the Sheikh. But for the m oment it is perhaps unnecessary to make any further
reference to this subject, though unless the limits are eventually defined misunder­
standing is certain to arise. Meanwhile we consider that the Turkish Government
should be inform ed that H is M ajesty’ s Government could not agree to conclude an
arrangement with Turkey if the m ilitary post is maintained at Bubiyan Island ; and
we consider that it would be impracticable to transfer our agreements with the Sheikh
in the manner suggested in the Turkish reply.

(e.) Riverain Commission for the Shatt-el-Arab.

Instead of the joint Commission proposed by His M ajesty’ s Government, the

Turkish Governm ent suggest an Ottoman Commission, with a British engineer on it
in the service of the Turkish Governm ent, in order to avoid the appearance of inter­
nationalisation which it is their interest (and ours) to avoid. W e understood from the
delegates that the Commission would consist of two members only, and that the
British representative would be in every respect equal to his Turkish colleague, and
further that he would be free to correspond with the British Governm ent as he
pleased. Provided that his rights are secured by the Convention, and that it is also
arranged that the two Governm ents shall agree as to the individual to be appointed,
we think this may be accepted. But His M ajesty’ s Governm ent’ s further proposal
that the executive engineer should be British should be insisted on.
As soon as this Commission does any real work, the question of dues must come
up, though so long as the expenditure is small, it m ay be possible to avoid it. But if
the ownership of the Shatt is on other grounds adjudged to Turkey, the Turkish right
to levy dues is undeniable, and if the dues are fixed by a Commission, constituted as
proposed, its exercise seems harmless. The Turkish Government would undertake
that there shall be no differential treatment of British shipping, and this should be
embodied in the Convention. The Board o f Trade might be asked to advise as to any
other conditions that may be necessary.
The Turkish delegates were anxious that it should be understood that all
pilotage in the Shatt-el-Arab would be controlled by the Commission, and this may
be agreed to.
(f.) Pilotage, &c., in the Gulf.

This is not mentioned in the Turkish reply, and H is M ajesty’ s Government

should repeat their claim to control it themselves. At the same time, it seems
desirable to define the limits of territorial waters, on the basis of the Government of
In d ia ’ s telegram o f the 18th April, and a chart, on which they are clearly shown
m ight form an annex to the Convention. It would be agreed that any of the existing
British buoys, &c., or o f those about to be laid down by us, which m ight be found to
be in Turkish waters, would pass with the control of the Biverain Commission.

(g.) Policing of the Gulf.

Turkey desires to carry this out join tly with Great Britain. It is evident from
this proposal, and from the proposal that they should consolidate themselves on
E l Katr, as well as from the general attitude of the Turkish delegates, that what the
Turks are aiming at is, under the proposed settlement, not only to secure what they
already possess on sufferance, but also to obtain a footing which they have never had
before. Now whatever m ay be said from the point of view of law, history, or policy,
for the former aim, there is clearly no justification for the latter, and H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent, whose whole object is to get the Turks, as far as possible, out of the Gulf,
can clearly, in no circumstances, acquiesce in it. W e submit that this should be made
quite plain, and it might be well to rem ind the Turks of Lord Lansdowne’ s statement
 78

in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1908, that “ we should regard the establish­
ment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf, by any other Power
as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all
the means at our disposal. ” ( 8)
The next step would seem to act as suggested under (d) on p. 3 8.(9)

A. H I R T Z E L .
A LW Y N P A R K E R .
April 24, 1912.

(8) [v. P a ri. D eb ., 4th S er., Vol. 121, p. 1348. cp. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. IV , p. 371,
No. 32 1; p. 454, No. 41 0; p. 478, No. 429. cp. also supra, pp. 5 -6 , No. 1.]
(9) [v. supra, pp. 71-2, section headed “ Kow eit.” ]

No. 51.

Communication to Tewfik Pasha.(l)

F.O. 371/1484.
1 6 0 0 0 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 . Foreign Office, M ay 10, 1912.
H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] are giving their careful attention to the
important proposals contained in the m emorandum com m unicated by His Highness
the Turkish Ambassador on the 15th A p ril,(2) and they trust to be in a position to
continue the negotiations with the Turkish Governm ent when detailed investigations
have been com pleted by the Departments concerned.
In the m eantim e, how ever, they are somewhat doubtful, from the terms o f the
Turkish m emorandum , whether, leaving on one side for the moment the territorial
questions involved, the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t are prepared to accept the basis of
settlement proposed by H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t] in the following
paragraph:—

“ British trade relations with the Sheikhs of Koweit have existed for upwards
o f two centuries and, inasmuch as the place has attracted merchants from all
quarters by the equity o f its rule and the freedom o f its trade, (i) H[is]|
M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] could not consent to any interference with the
succession or with the internal administration, or any infringem ent o f the
complete autonom y o f the Sheikh, (ii) On the other hand, they are prepared
to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Kow eit, and to recognise the Sheikh as a
Turkish kaimakam, (iii) provided in other respects the status quo is guaranteed,
(iv) and the validity o f certain agreements which the Sheikh has concluded with
the British G ov [ern m en ]t is recognised; . . . . (v) and provided finally the
Sheikh is admitted to the full and undisturbed enjoym ent o f any properties he
may own or hereafter purchase on Turkish territory, (vi) Koweit would thus
form a sort of enclave within, and form ing part of, the Ottoman E m pire, but
enjoying complete self-Governm ent under Turkish suzerainty.”
H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] would be glad to have an explicit reply with
regard to each o f the propositions enumerated above.
There is another question which has recently caused some concern to H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t], viz ., that o f the frontier between Turkey and Persia in
the region o f M oham m erah. W hen H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overnm ent] addressed their

0 ) /C opies of this communication were sent to the India Office; to the Director of Military
Operations; to the Committee of Imperial Defence. It is minuted by Mr. Parker: —
“ I have drawn up this memorandum with Sir A. Hirtzel. A. P .” ]
(2) [v . supra, pp. 59-65, No. 47.]
 74
memorandum of last July to the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t that question had been dormant
for 60 years, and H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] had no desire to raise it. But
from the attitude o f the Turkish frontier Commissioners at Constantinople they are
led to apprehend that the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t may contemplate advancing claims
which would inevitably re-act unfavourably upon the adjustment of the respective
interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region o f the Persian G ulf, in view of
the close relations existing between H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] and the Sheikh
of M ohammerah.
E . G [B E Y .]

No. 52.

Memorandum by Mr. Parker on the Bagdad Railway.

F.O. 371/1484. '
2 07 1 5 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 . Foreign Office, May 11, 1912.
In our m emorandum o f last J u ly /1) to the Turkish Ambassador we stipulated
that if the railway was ever prolonged from Bussorah to the Persian Gulf “ it must
be brought to Koweit under conditions to be settled by agreement between Great
Britain and Turkey alone, and a clause to this effect must be embodied in a convention
dealing with these m atters.”
Germany has, in her agreement renouncing her right to build the line between
Bagdad and the Gulf, stipulated that the Bagdad R [a i]l[w a ] y C o[m p any] shall have
a share in the surrendered portion of the line (Bagdad to the Gulf) equal to that
of any other foreign country.
As matters stand, therefore, there are only two ways of keeping Germany out
of the Bussorah Koweit line, if it is built.
The first way is that Turkey should build the line entirely herself, which would
be unacceptable to u s ; the second is that Turkey should buy Germany out of the
Koweit branch.
The second alternative is preferable, and when we reply to Turkey it will
probably be necessary to say that wre cannot agree to any arrangement which does
not provide for this. Germany m ay, as a keen bargainer, suggest that we should
buy her out in return for some concession elsew here; our answer might be that this
is a matter for Turkey to arrange with Germany, as the concession would be to her
and not to us.
A. P [A R K E R .]
May 11, 1912.
(>) [i>. supra, pp. 45-8, No. 34.]

[E D . N O T E .— A series of telegrams between Count Benokendorff and M. Isvolski and

M. Sazonov dated June 14-26 record the attitude of the Russian Government regarding
participation in the Bagdad railway in response to an enquiry “ in strictest confidence ” from
Sir A. Nicolson. v. S ieb er t, pp. 657-9. cp. supra, p. 56, No. 43, and n o te ( l).]
 75

N o. 53.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en J 1)
F.O. 371/1485.
2 7 4 8 6 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 154.)
Sir, F oreign Office, June 25, 1912.
In the course of conversation with the German Ambassador to-d a y ,(2) I said
that I was sure he knew more about the Bagdad Railway than I d id ; but I should
like to tell him how matters stood, so that I might be certain that m y version of
some points was correct.
The Turkish Governm ent claimed that, as the concession beyond Bagdad had
been given back to them by Germ any in return for the Alexandretta concession, they
were entitled to negotiate about it ; and they desired that, while we negotiated with
them, we should not negotiate with anyone else. On this footing we were negotia tin g;
but I understood that Germany, though relinquishing to Turkey the concession beyond
Bagdad, had reserved the right to an equal participation with any other individual
foreign capital.
The Ambassador said that the correct way o f expressing the situation was that
the Bagdad Railway Company had agreed to transfer the concession beyond Bagdad
to another Company, but German participation must be as great as that o f any
other capital except Turkish, and some indem nity was to be allowed to the Bagdad
R [a ilw a ]y C o[m p a n y] for more difficult portions o f the lin e ; but he did not disagree
that, in substance, the Turkish Governm ent wrere entitled to negotiate as they were
doing. He added that he understood the Turks now proposed that the Railway
should stop at Basra.
I said that, as far as that point was concerned, we would acquiesce.
The Ambassador then dwelt upon the Turkish objections toRussian capital,and
said that they were natural, as Turkey suspected a political motive in everything
which Russia did.
I replied that we were aware o f these objections, and the question o f participation
was not arranged. I proposed to continue negotiating with the Turks alone, as they
desired; but, if participation was arranged for the Railway, the matter would then
of course have to be discussed with Germ any, and in any case I would tell him if
the negotiations broke down and came to nothing, or what the final result was.
The Ambassador expressed satisfaction at this.
For the rest, I said that what we desired was to be sure o f a “ status q u o ” in
the Gulf that would not be disturbed.
He observed that we already had an agreement with Turkey as to the preservation
of the “ status q u o ” in Koweit, but no doubt there was always discussion as to what
the “ status q u o ” was. He dwelt upon the impossibility o f there being any
differential duties without requiring certificates o f origin.
I said that it was feared that rates might be high on goods in which we were
specially interested, and low on goods in which Germany was interested.
The Ambassador replied that this would be impossible under any ‘ ‘ cahier des
charges.”
Finally, I said that the “ crux ” o f the whole matter was the 4 per cent, increase
of Turkish Customs Dues. W e could not agree to this -without being able to satisfy
Parliament that the “ status q u o ” in the Persian Gulf was secure; that it -was
settled where the Bagdad Railway was to end, and on what conditions; and that
there would be no differential rates.

0 ) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the K ing and to the Cabinet.]
(2) [A further account of this conversation is given in Sir Edward Grev’s despatch to
Sir E. Goschen (No. 158) of June 25, 1912. v. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. V I, pp. 757-8, No. 591.
For Baron von Marschall’ s report, v. G .P., X X X I , pp. 340-1.]
 76

The Ambassador took no exception to any o f the points raised. In the course
o f the conversation he observed that he had always said that the Bagdad Railway
could not be carried to the Gulf without agreement with us, and that this view had
been more readily accepted at Constantinople than in Berlin.
[ I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 54.

Sir Edward G rey to Lord Granville.

F.O. 371/1485.
2 9 1 8 3 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 168.)
Sir, Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.
The German Ambassador inform ed me to-d ay /1) that he had reported to his
Governm ent what I had said about the Bagdad R ailw a y ./2) H e felt sure that, if
we were prepared to acquiesce in the Railway stopping at Busrah, an agreement could
be come to. W ith regard to participation o f course the German stipulation would
have to be considered.
I said that we were now drawing up our reply to the Turkish Governm ent, and
we hoped to send it to them early next week. I could not say how the question of
participation might be arranged, we recognized that if we were to participate the
question would have to be discussed with Germany, but acquiescence in the ending
o f the Railway at Busrah would be included in our reply to Turkey.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
Z1) [A further account of this conversation is given in Sir Edward Grey’ s private letter to
Sir E. Goschen of July 4, 1912. v. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. V I, pp. 759-60, No. 593.]
(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 55.

Sir Edward G rey to Tewfik PashaJ1)

F.O. 371/1485.
2 83 2 2 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(Confidential.)
Y our H ighness :— Foreign Office, July 18, 1912.
I have the honour to transmit to Your Highness herewith a Memorandum
em bodying the reply o f His M ajesty’ s Government to the M emorandum communicated
b y the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent on the 15th o f April la st/2) relating to questions
connected with the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf.
In com m unicating this docum ent to Your Highness I desire to call your attention
to two additional points which are not dealt with in the M emorandum or its annexes.
In the first place His M ajesty’ s Government consider it highly desirable in order
to secure the smooth working of the arrangements proposed in regard to the Bagdad
Railway, that at least one British Director, approved by His M ajesty’ s Government, <
should be admitted to the Board of the Bagdad Railway Company. Such an ■'
arrangement would of course require the consent of the German Governm ent.

Z1) [This document is endorsed as having been sent to the K ing and to the Cabinet on
July 27. It was sent to Constantinople (as No. 324) for communication to the Russian .
Ambassador. Copies were sent to the Director of Military Operations; to the India Office.]
(2) [ v . supra, pp. 59-65, No. 47.]
 77

Secondly, as the Turkish Governm ent are aware, certain rights are secured to
Persia under the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), (3) and the geographical position of
Mohammera is such that the Sheikh cannot fail to be brought into contact with the
Riverain Com m ission; and unless provision is made for these facts there is a risk of
the friction arising which it is the object of the two Governments to avoid. There
would have been m uch to be said for an international Riverain Commission on which
Persia, equally with Great Britain and Turkey, should be represented. But as H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent, appreciating the objections entertained by the Porte, have not
pressed for this, it is necessary to provide in some other way for the representation
of Persia in such matters as m ay touch her rights whether under the treaty of
Erzeroum or under this new agreement. His M ajesty’ s Government therefore propose
that the Commissioner who is a British subject should be charged with the duty of
making to the Commission such representations as may at any time be necessary upon
any question affecting those rights, and they will be willing to use their good offices
with the Persian Governm ent and the Sheikh of Mohammera to induce them to agree
to this arrangement.
These two points com e perhaps outside the scope o f the matters dealt with in the
Memorandum which are confined to subjects o f negotiation between Great Britain and
Turkey alone— but H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent attach great importance to them and
trust that they will receive the favourable consideration of the Im perial Ottoman
Government.
[ I have, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]

Enclosure in No. 55.

M em orandum .(*)

1. H is M ajesty’ s Government have not failed to examine with much care and
attention the important proposals which are em bodied in the memorandum com m uni­
cated by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent on the 15th April last.
2. Throughout their deliberations, H is M ajesty’ s Government have been
animated by the conviction that a com plete agreement on outstanding questions is
eminently to he desired in the larger interests of both countries. They are persuaded
that such an agreement, to be justly appreciated, should be viewed not only in the
measure of sacrifice or advantage which each individual clause m ay im ply, but also in
its cumulative and future effects upon A nglo-Turkish relations in general. H is
Majesty’ s Governm ent therefore desire to lay before the Ottoman Governm ent the
following proposals and considerations:—

3. F or convenience of reference the several proposals under consideration m ay

be dealt with under three distinct h ea d in gs:—
(i.) The Bagdad Railway question.
(ii.) The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the
Persian Gulf.
(iii.) A n increase in the Turkish customs duties.

(i.) The Bagdad Railway Question.

4. The interest which Great Britain must take in a railway which is to traverse
a region where British-Indian trade amounts to some 60 per cent, of the total exports
and imports is indeed so obvious as to call for little comment. H is M ajesty’ s

(3) [ v B .F .S .P ., Vol. 45, pp. 8 7 4 -6 ; C. U. A itchison: T rea ties, E n g a g e m e n ts an d Sanads

(5th ed.), Vol. X I I (Calcutta, 1933), A p p . X , pp xlvi-vii.]
(4) [The draft of this memorandum was sent to the India Office and to the Board of Trade
for approval on July 4, 1912.]
 78
Governm ent have on repeated occasions dwelt upon the importance of that trade and
the manner in which it has been steadily consolidated since the foundation, upwards
of two and a-half centuries ago, of the first English factory at B ussorah; they have
recalled that no less than 96 per cent, of the steam tonnage entered at the port of
Bussorah was B ritish; and they have consistently maintained that a satisfactory
settlement of the Bagdad Railway question was a necessary condition of their assent
to an increase in the Turkish customs duties.
5. The magnitude of Great Britain’ s m anifold interests clearly renders it
desirable that some satisfactory agreement as to British participation in the southern
section of the Bagdad Railway should, if possible, be reached. His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent find, however, that the question of participation on terms acceptable to
them is likely to cause the Ottoman Government some embarrassment, and that the
views held on this point by the two contracting parties are difficult to reconcile. In
these circumstances His M ajesty’ s Government, anxious to prove to the Ottoman
Governm ent the sincerity of their desire to reach a comprehensive understanding
without delay or controversy, are prepared to withdraw their request for British
participation in the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah, if a satisfactory agreement is
arrived at on the other points enumerated in this memorandum.
6. It would he impossible to reconcile British public opinion to such a step
unless H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent were at the same time able to show that British
interests of whatever character were fully safeguarded. H is M ajesty’ s Government
consequently feel bound, apart from the territorial arrangements proposed, to lay down
the following conditions as essential to that end :—
Draft C on ven ­ (a.) An arrangement, as set forth in the accom panying draft convention, for the
tion (Annex 2).
exclusion of differential treatment on all railways in Asiatic Turkey.
( b.) The admission of two British representatives, approved by His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent, to the board of whatever com pany may undertake the construction or
working of the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah.
(c.) The terminus of the railway to be at Bussorah.
(d.) No railway to be continued beyond Bussorah in the direction of the Persian
Gulf without prior agreement with H is M ajesty’ s Government, and on conditions
acceptable to them.
D raft C on ven ­ (e.) A convention to be signed, on the basis of the accom panying draft, for the
tio n (Annex 3).
future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Ar&b. This convention must be read in conjunction
with the accom panying m emorandum (Annex No. 5) on the subject of the frontier of
Mohammerah.
(/.) Permission to be given for three British steamers to navigate between
Bagdad and Bussorah in addition to the number already allowed.

(ii.) The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the
Persian Gulf.

7. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent note with satisfaction that the Turkish Govern­
m ent renounce their claims to Bahrein on conditions which there should be no
difficulty in accepting, but they have learnt with disappointment the attitude of the
Im perial Ottoman Government in regard to El Katr and Kowre i t ; nevertheless they
do not doubt that the Ottoman Governm ent will appreciate the important sacrifice
made by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent in the matter of British participation in the
Bagdad Railway, and that they will meet that sacrifice by a corresponding modification
o f the views set forth in the Turkish memorandum of the 15th April.
8. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent must in the first instance protest against the
contention that there is a misunderstanding with regard to the assurance given, and
repeatedly given, to Her M ajesty’ s Ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that
Turkey did not entertain any intention of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein,
Muscat, or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.
 79

9. The original despatches, duly signed and dated, in which these assurances
were reported, have been carefully preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, and
they can readily be produced for the inspection of the Turkish Embassy.
10. His M ajesty’ s Government maintain that prior to Midhat Pasha’ s expedition Annex 4
there were on the Arabian coast no sym bols of Turkish authority, no Turkish
jurisdiction or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared
to recognise Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits o f Koweit (as
hereinafter defined) and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments»
adduced in the Turkish memorandum in any way invalidates the statement that south
of Ojeir, in the district of E l Katif, there is no trace of Turkish power ever having
been param ou nt; and they are fully persuaded that El Katr has never been locally
regarded as form ing part of, or indeed as being subject to the influence of, the
Ottoman Empire.
For themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish
assurances mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly
informed the Sublime Porte accordingly.
11. His M ajesty’ s Government can only reiterate their opinion that any lasting
settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by the
Ottoman E m pire of the whole of the peninsula of E l Katr, including El Bidaa. They
have consistently opposed any consolidation of Turkish authority, which first attempted
to assert itself so recently as 1870, and they are bound to continue that opposition.
12. The Turkish memorandum o f the 15th April does not afford H is M ajesty’ s
Government all the inform ation which they consider essential to a due appreciation
of the attitude of the Turkish Governm ent respecting Koweit. His M ajesty’ s
Government are concerned to ensure the continuance o f the local governm ent of the
Sheikh of Koweit, as defined in their m emorandum of the 29th July, 1911. Further,
His M ajesty’ s Government would be fully prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty
over Koweit and indeed to recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish kaimakam, but they
attach cardinal importance to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan being admitted by
Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, to the withdrawal of the Turkish military
post from Bubiyan, and to a recognition of the limits of Koweit in accordance with
the indications contained in the accom panying memorandum. ^Annex"?“™
13. H is M ajesty’ s Government regret that they would consider the introduction
of divided responsibility for maritime police measures altogether incom patible with
the principles and successful accom plishm ent of their policy in the Persian Gulf.
This policy consists in the maintenance of the maritime peace, and has been
successfully pursued, to the advantage of all concerned, for a century. To m odify the
system in these circumstances would be alike unnecessary and unjustifiable.
14. Indeed His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would go further. They consider that
they have acquired by prescription not m erely the right but the duty to maintain
peace in the Persian G u lf; they have always been opposed to any proposal to trench
upon their prerogative; and it was this attitude which led to the declaration made by
the Marquess o f Lansdowne in the House o f Lords on the 5th May, 1903, that “ His
M ajesty’ s Government would regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified
port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave m enace to British
interests, and they should certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal.” (5)
H is M ajesty’ s Government must therefore ask the Turkish Governm ent to
recognise in the Persian Gulf the right of Great Britain— (a.) To control surveying,
lighting, buoying, and pilotage; (b.) To police its waters; and (c.) To conduct all
quarantine arrangements.
15. In submitting these final proposals for the acceptance o f the Turkish
Government, H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent are not seeking territorial aggrandisement,
nor are they embarking upon any new developments of policy. Their desire is simply
to secure the recognition and to ensure the continuance of an order of things which,

(5) [v. supra, pp. 72-3, No. 50, and n o te ( 7).]

 80
in fact, grew up under their auspices and before the appearance of Turkish authority
in the Persian Gulf, and which has been proved by experience to favour the develop­
ment of trade and the maintenance of peace in a region which, but for long-sustained
British intervention, would have remained the scene of continual piracy and bloodshed.
16. They feel persuaded that the Ottoman Government will not oppose the
continuance o f the political status quo of a hundred years, and they look forward
confidently to a complete adjustment o f the questions enumerated, and to the
improved relations which cannot fail to ensue.
17. As the Ottoman Governm ent are aware, there is a question which has
caused some concern to His M ajesty’ s Government in recent m onths, that of the
frontier between Turkey and Persia in the region of Moham m erah. W hen His
M ajesty’ s Government addressed their memorandum of July 1911 to the Ottoman
Government that question had been dormant for sixty years, and H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent had no desire to raise it. Now however that it has been raised, by
circumstances beyond their control, they feel that no settlement in the Persian Gulf
could be complete which did not provide for this question, and they regard a satis
factory adjustment of it as an essential part of the present negotiations. They have
M em oran du m the honour to submit a separate memorandum on the subject for the consideration
(A n n ex 5).
of the Ottoman Governm ent.

(iii.) An increase in the Turkish customs duties.

18. If the Ottoman Governm ent are prepared to conclude an agreement in the
sense of this memorandum , and to concur in the removal o f the existing veto on the
borrowing powers o f E gypt, then, subject to the assent of the other Powers, His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent will consent to the maintenance for a period of seven years,
counting from six months after the date of such agreement, of the increase in the
general rate o f customs duty leviable on British goods on importation into the
Ottoman Empire from 8 per cent, to 11 per cent, ad valorem which was agreed to
in 1907, and also to the further increase of this general rate of customs duty from
11 per cent, to 15 per cent, ad valorem for the same period.
Foreign Office, July 18, 1912.

A nnex 1.

His M ajesty’ s Government wish to m ention a question to which they attach

great importance, but to which they have not referred in this memorandum.
His M ajesty’ s Government desire to secure that the duties leviable upon certain
classes of cotton yarns and manufactures shall in no case exceed certain rates to be
agreed upon. _
His M ajesty’s Government will furnish the Ottoman Governm ent, with the least
possible delay, with a schedule specifying these classes of goods and the duties to be
applied to them.
Foreign Office.

A nnex 2.

Draft Articles for a Convention betw een the British and Ottoman Governm ents in
respect of Railways in Asiatic Turkey.

A r t ic l e 1.

No discrimination of any kind shall be exercised on any portion of the railways

connecting Bagdad with other places in Asiatic Turkey, or on any o f the branches
thereof, in respect of traffic passing over the said railways, whatever may be its
origin or destination.
 81

The word ‘ ‘ traffic ’ ’ in this and the follow ing articles shall apply to passengers
and their luggage, goods, animals, and things conveyed on the railways, and carriages,
waggons, and other vehicles adapted for running on the railways.

A r t ic l e 2.

Equal expedition shall in all cases be afforded on the said railways to

consignments o f traffic o f the same description and quantity.

A r t ic l e 3.

All reasonable facilities shall be provided by the said railways for the inter­
change of traffic; and each railway shall afford all due and reasonable facilities and
accom m odation for exchanging, receiving, forwarding, and delivering such traffic
without any unreasonable delay.

A r t ic l e 4.

No special rates or facilities shall be accorded b y any o f the said railways in

respect o f any goods carried from or to any o f the ports o f Asiatic Turkey which shall
not be accorded equally to all goods of a like character and carried in similar quantities
on the same route, irrespective of the nationality or ownership o f the vessels by which
they are conveyed, or to be conveyed, to or from such ports; and no special arrange­
ment in respect o f rates or facilities for traffic shall be made by any of the said
railways with any shipping undertaking trading to or from any port o f Asiatic Turkey
which shall not equally, and under like conditions, extend to all other shipping
undertakings so trading.

A r t ic l e 5.

Any complaints which m ay be brought to the notice o f the Im perial Ottoman

Government by His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, in respect o f the treatment
of traffic o f any kind under the provisions o f the foregoing articles, shall im m ediately
be com m unicated by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent to the railway administration
or administrations concerned, and, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two
Governments within three m onths, be forthwith referred to the International Court
of Arbitration at The H ague, which shall have power to determine the matter finally
and to award damages. A ny determination or award o f the International Court of
Arbitration shall be im m ediately enforced by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent,
and any damages awarded shall be paid by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent to His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government to be dealt with at their discretion.

A r t ic l e 6.

Any difference as to the interpretation or carrying out o f this convention shall,

unless settled to the satisfaction o f the two Governments within three m onths, be
referred for determination to the International Court o f Arbitration at The H ague.

A nnex 3.

Draft Convention for the Establishm ent of a Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Comm ission.

The Government o f His Britannic M ajesty and the Government of His Im perial
Majesty the Sultan o f Turkey, being desirous on account o f the magnitude of their
interests in the trade on the Shatt-el-Arab to im prove the navigation of that river,
[10900] G
 82
and to diminish the risks to which com m erce thereon is exposed, have agreed as
fo llo w s :—
1. The navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab shall remain open to the ships of all
nations.
2. The Im perial Ottoman Governm ent will establish a Commission in which
shall be vested the control of the Shatt-el-Arab from Kurna to the sea.
8. The Commission shall consist of two members only, to be appointed by the
Im perial Ottoman Governm ent. One of these two members shall be of British
n a t i o n a l i t y , and shall be selected from candidates suggested by the Government of
His Britannic Majesty.
4. Each of the Commissioners shall receive annually a salary of ¿£T. 2,000 free
of all deductions. These salaries shall be paid by the Commission.
5. The Commission shall appoint such officers and em ployes as may be
necessary, but the Chief E ngineer and the Surveyor shall be of British nationality.
The salaries of such officers and em ployes shall be fixed and paid b y the Commission.
6. The Commission shall be charged with the following duties :—
(a.) The execution of such works as may be necessary for the improvement of
the channel o f the river and of the approaches thereto on the seaward
side.
( b.) The maintenance of the channel of the river free from obstructions of all
sorts, so as to keep it in the best possible state for navigation.
(c.) The preparation, issue, and enforcement of regulations for the navigation
of the river and for the policing of the river and the land and buildings
held by the Commission.
(d.) The control of pilotage.
(e.) The buoying and lighting of the channel, and the maintenance and control
of the lights and buoys in the approaches to the river specified in the
Schedule to this Convention.
(/.) The supervision, so far as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes
of this convention, and subject to the treaty rights of foreign Powers, of
the wharves, quays, docks, and jetties belonging to private persons in
or on the hanks o f the river, and the provision of such additional
accommodation and facilities as the Commission may deem necessary.
7. The Imperial Ottoman Government undertakes to facilitate the acquisition
b;y the Commission of such land as the Commission shall consider necessary to enable
it to carry out effectually the duties assigned to it. The cost of such land shall be
paid by the Commission.
In cases where land to which fishing rights are attached is required by the
Commission, no unnecessary interference with such fishing rights shall take place.
8. No dues, taxes, or charges shall be levied either by the Porte or by the
Commission on ships or goods on the Shatt-el-Arab based on the mere fact of
navigation.
9. The Commission shall have the sole right to levy any dues or charges that
m ay be found necessary to cover the expenses o f works undertaken and services
maintained by it. In the event o f such dues being found necessary they shall not
exceed the amount reasonably required for the above purposes, including the
administration o f the Commission, and their produce shall be exclusively applied
thereto, any surplus being devoted to the reduction o f dues. In no case shall the
rate of dues exceed 1 fr. per net registered ton of shipping.
10. A ny dues or charges levied by the Commission shall be levied impartially
and equitably in respect of all vessels, whatever be the places from or to which they
arrive or depart, or the nations or persons to which the vessels or their cargoes
belong. Similarly there shall be no differentiation in the matter o f facilities between
vessels or goods of different nations or persons, or between vessels arriving from
or departing to different places.
 88

11. A ny sums which it m ay becom e necessary for the Commission to borrow

for the purpose o f carrying out the duties imposed upon it shall be advanced by the
high contracting parties at a rate of interest not exceeding 5 per cent, per annum,
in such proportions and upon such terms as to repayment as they may arrange.
12. The control of all funds raised and expended by the Commission shall be
vested exclusively in the Commission.
13. The Commission shall publish annually com plete and accurate accounts,
showing the amounts received and expended by it.
14. I f the receipts of the Commission are insufficient to cover its ordinary
expenditure the deficit shall be made good by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent.
15. In the event of the members o f the Commission being unable to agree as
to whether any particular works are or are not necessary for the improvem ent o f the
Shatt-el-Arab, or as to the way in which particular works should be carried out,
the question shall be referred by them to an engineer o f repute, to be agreed upon
by the com m issioners, or, failing agreement, to be nom inated by the president of
the Institute o f Civil Engineers in L ondon, and the decision o f such engineer shall
be adopted by the Commission.
16. The Commission shall correspond upon all matters connected with the duties
entrusted to it with the Sublime Porte direct, and not through the local authorities.
17. The local authorities shall not interfere in any way with the houses,
buildings, land, or other property of the Comm ission, or with its funds, or with the
discharge o f their duties by the officers of the police, pilotage, or other services
maintained b y the Commission, or with wharves, jetties, docks, or quays in or on the
banks of the river belonging to private persons.
18. The transfer to the Commission of any buoys or lights in the approaches
to the Shatt-el-Arab shall not be deem ed to affect the territorial jurisdiction in the
waters where such buoys or lights are placed, or be made a ground on the part of
the Imperial Ottoman Governm ent for claim ing that such waters are within its
territorial jurisdiction, nor shall anything in this Convention be deem ed to give the
Commission power to exercise jurisdiction or to carry out duties or to hold land
outside the limits o f the Ottoman Empire without the consent of the territorial Power,
or to affect the operation or the interpretation o f the provisions o f any treaty or
arrangement prescribing or defining the limits of the said Em pire.
19. This agreement shall be binding during twenty-one years from the day
of its signature. In case neither of the contracting parties shall have given notice
to the other, twelve months before the expiration o f the said period of twenty-one
years, of the intention to terminate the agreement, it shall remain in force until the
expiration of one year from the day on which either o f the contracting parties shall
have denounced it.
A nnex 4.

K ow eit.
His M ajesty’ s Government consider the frontier on the north to be a line
running from Khor-as-Sabiyah so as to pass im m ediately south of Umm Qasr and
Safwam to Jabal Sanan and thence to the Batin. On the south his [s ic ] boundary is
considered to run eastwards from Jabal Manifah on the coast to the Na’ airiyah hill
at the north-western corner of Radaif. On the west the Shaikhdom is bounded
between Jabal Sanam and H afar by the B atin, and south of H afar the border is the
line dividing Summan from Dahanah as far south as the point where that line is
intersected by the route from W abrah to R iyadh.
Districts and Islands.— The Shaikhdom, considered from the physical point of
view, falls naturally into two parts, one to the north and the other to the south o f
a line joining Koweit town and R iq a ’ i. In the northern block lie the districts or
tracts of Batin, Shiqqaq, Batih, U m m -al-Khilan, Yah, Qira-al-Marru, Zaqlah, and
Zor. The southern block comprises the three great divisions of Summan, Dibdibah,
[10900] G 2
 84

and (Jmin Janaib; and the last, which lies along the coast to the 60uth o f Koweit
B ay, is further subdivided into districts named Shaqq, Qra’ ab Adan, Salu, Hazaim ,
and Sudah.
The maritime possessions of Koweit consist o f the islands o f Bubiyan, W arba,
and Failakah, which, with its northern and southern outliers o f Mashjan and ’ Auhah,
is situated at the mouth of Koweit B ay, and o f the islets o f Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-
al-M aradim.
A map is enclosed showing the limits of Kow eit.(6)

A nnex 5.

M oham m erah Frontier.

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have already inform ed the Im perial Ottoman Govern­
m ent o f the great importance which they attach to the maintenance o f the frontier
status quo, as locally observed, in the neighbourhood of M ohammerah.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent now have the honour to explain their views in greater
detail, and they would preface their statement by observing that they have not only
re-examined all the evidence, both oral and documentary, which was laid before the
conference o f Erzeroum , but they have also had recourse to the great store of
inform ation collected by the well-known savant Major (afterwards Sir Henry)
Bawlinson. who was well acquainted with the country, and made a profound study
o f the territorial position in the Mohammerah region, based upon historical facts and
the deeds of title relating to each particular plot of land. Moreover, much information,
which was not at the disposal of the Commissioners at Erzeroum , has been traced in
the voluminous records of the East India Company, who carried on direct trade with
Bussorah from the year 1635. These records are especially illuminating in regard to
the conditions which actually prevailed on the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab during the
17th and 18th centuries.
The accom panying maps indicate the line of the frontier as it has been locally
observed for a century or more. F or facility of reference, the line m ay be followed,
firstly, from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where it strikes the Shatt-el-
Arab, and, secondly, along the course o f that river until it reaches the sea.
B y reference to the accom panying map No. 1, the village of S hu’ aib will be
observed at a point 1 5f miles on a bearing of 8 degrees north of west from H a w iz e h :
it is a settled village of the Beni Salih, containing some 500 inhabitants living in
perm anent dwellings. The whole country, comprised approximately in a triangle
form ed by lines joining Hawizeh, Shu’ aib, and Kuskh-i-Basri, is regularly occupied
and cultivated by the tribes of Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, who are not nomadic, in
the ordinary sense of the term, but are settled inhabitants.
These tribes, who exclusively inhabit, and where possible cultivate, the triangular
tract above referred to, have belonged from time imm em orial to Hawizeh, which has
been a recognised district of the Persian province of Khuzistan or Arabistan for, at any
rate, four centuries. They pay revenue to their tribal sheikhs, who form erly passed
it on in tribute to the “ Maula ” ruler of Hawizeh, who in turn paid it to the Persian
Governm ent, but, since 1902, this tribute has been collected through the agency of
the Sheikh of Mohammerah.
To the eastward of the marsh on which the village of Shu’ aib is situated, and
southwards, as far as human occupation prevails or is possible, there is not the
slightest sign of Turkish influence or jurisdiction, nor of Turkish status.
The British Resident in the Persian Gulf has recently visited the Hawizeh
district, and his investigations have served to confirm the inform ation which His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent already possessed. Apart from the sheikhs and tribesmen of
the Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, Sir Percy Cox came in contact with m any old

(®) [N ot reproduced]
 85
inhabitants who could speak with long experience in regard to the territorial status
quo. The view universally expressed as to the frontier was as follows :—

1. That whatever is the western boundary o f the Hawizeh is, ipso facto, the
frontier of P ersia; in other words, that the Hawizeh district is included within the
confines of Persia.
2. That the “ Hawizeh d istrict” comprises those lands which are regularly
occupied and cultivated by tribes belonging to it, and paying revenue to Persia.
3. That, on the above premises, the boundary locally recognised is that shown
by a green line on map No. 1. It will be noticed that the line (which is form ed by
the edge of the marsh, and is thus a natural frontier), after crossing the G hor-el-Azem ,
eventually cuts the main channel of the marsh just west of S hu’ aib, continues in a
southerly direction until it reaches a point due west of Kuskh-i-Basri, whence it breaks
back to that place, and then proceeds direct to the Shatt-el-Arab at D i’ aiji. The
reason why Kuskh-i-Basri is recognised as an angle of the boundary is referable to
the existence o f a winter lake of rain water at Y afair; the limit of cultivation and
occupation by tribesmen under Hawizeh in this direction is regulated by the distance
from their water supply (Yafair), at which they can safely dwell and keep their flocks,
and this limit is considered to be reached at Kuskh-i-Basri, where the ruins o f an
extensive building of great age form a convenient landmark.

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, being in possession of precise and trustworthy

inform ation regarding the frontier of Hawizeh, have no occasion to appeal to more
uncertain authorities, but they think it is not without interest to recall to the Im perial
Ottoman Governm ent that Dervish Pasha, whose estimates of Turkish claims were
not usually marked by excessive m oderation, admits in Chapter X I I I of his book
(printed in Constantinople in 1868), “ that it would be hardly right ” for the Ottoman
Government to lay claim to the country of Hawizeh, though, in the subsequent
chapter, his E xcellency expresses the view that it “ m ight be useful ” for Turkey to
claim it as a pretext for proposing something else, viz., that the Kerkha should be
adopted as the boundary above Sheria.
Coming now to the neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab, the frontier as locally
observed enters the K haiyin Canal (which is the name of the channel running from
the Turkish Customs Post at D i’ aiji, between the islands of Kharnubiyah, Bowarin,
and Aqawat, to the junction of the Nahr Nazaileh with the main stream) at a point
between the Nahr D i’ aiji and the Nahr Abul A rabid; it follows the m iddle of the
Nahr K haiyin until it reaches the point where the Nahr Khaiyin and the Nahr
Nazaileh meet the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab. (See map No. 2.)
It then proceeds, as shown by the broken black line (see accom panying maps
Nos. 3 and 4), along the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, in mid-stream, until that
river reaches the Persian Gulf.
The claim made by Persia rests on continued and undisturbed possession for over
a century, and on the recognition of Persian sovereignty by local representatives of
the Turkish Governm ent in m any ways and on m any different occasions. Thus there
is unanimity o f evidence amongst the local tribesm en that the boundary as locally
observed has not been questioned by the Turkish authorities, who, on the contrary,
many years ago had actually buried some coal in a pit as a permanent boundary m ark ;
and it further appears that the periodical cleaning of the Nahr K haiyin has always
been undertaken by Persian subjects under the orders of the Sheikh of Mohammerah,
whilst the cleaning of the D i’ aiji Canal has been carried out exclusively under the
orders of the Turkish mudirs.
The local inhabitants m oreover draw a very clear line of distinction between the
position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in, for instance, the islands of Akawat, Barin
or Bowarin, Shamshamiyah, and Umm -ut-Tuwaileh, o f the greater part of which he
is merely proprietor, and his position on the Persian side of the locally recognised
boundary.
 86

From the point where the locally observed frontier leaves the Khaiyin Canal
and, opposite the Nahr Nazaileh, enters the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, it
follows the medium filum aquae of the Shatt-el-Arab down to the Persian Gulf. (See
maps Nos. 8 and 4.)
This line of demarcation is in accordance with the general presumption that,
where a navigable river forms the boundary of conterminous States, the middle of
the channel or ‘ ‘ thalweg ’ ’ is the actual line o f separation between those two States.
Such a presumption may, however, be swept away, either b y proof of prior
occupancy and long undisturbed possession on the part of one of the two States, or
by express treaty stipulation.
The records of the past 800 years, as contained in the official archives of the East
India Company and of H is M ajesty’ s Government, are far from supporting any claim
on the part o f Turkey to “ prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession ” of the
S hatt-el-Arab; while no express stipulation is contained in the Treaty of Erzeroum
(1847) as to the ownership of the river.
If, therefore, H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent had strict regard either to purely local
considerations or to the letter of the treaties, they would not hesitate to press for the
frontier as locally recognised along its whole length from Hawizeh to the Persian
Gulf. But they prefer to look at the negotiations in which they are now engaged as a
whole, and are sincerely anxious to arrive at an arrangement which both parties can
accept ex animo, and which, by rem oving all points of grievance and friction not only
between themselves, but also between the Sublime Porte and the Sheikh of
Mohammerah, will place the relations of all concerned on a thoroughly satisfactory
footing. Provided, therefore, the Turkish Governm ent will accept the frontier status
quo as already indicated from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where the
K haiyin Canal and the Nahr Nazaileh enter the Shatt-el-Arab, then H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent are prepared to use their influence with the Persian Government and
the Sheikh of Mohammerah to induce them to recognise Turkish sovereignty over the
whole waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, subject to the following conditions :—
(i.) The following islands to be recognised as within the territorial limits of
Persia :—
(a.) Muhalleh and its adjunct Bahriyeh, the four islands situated between Shatait
and M a’ awiyeh, and the two islands off Manquhi. These islands are in fact parts of
the island of Abadan, and must be so regarded.
(b.) A ny islands now in existence, or which m ay hereafter be form ed, and which
m ay be connected at low water either with Abadan Island or with the Persian bank
below the Nahr Nazaileh.
(ii.) The arrangements proposed by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent for maintaining
full freedom of navigation on the river, and for its conservancy, to be accepted by the
Ottoman Government.
(iii.) The m odern port and anchorage of Mohammerah, which is in the main
stream of the Shatt-el-Arab above and below its junction with the Karun, to be
recognised as within Persian jurisdiction. (See Map No. 2.)
(iv.) No interference to take place with existing fishing rights and usages on or
from the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, that phrase being understood to comprise
all land on the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab or on the Persian islands therein which
is uncovered at normal low tide.
(v.) Turkish jurisdiction not to extend to land on the Persian bank, defined as
above, which is only temporarily covered with water in time of flood or from any
accidental cause, and Persian jurisdiction not to extend to land which is temporarily
or accidentally uncovered below norm al low-water mark.
(vi.) The Sheikh of Mohammerah to continue in full enjoym ent of his existing
proprietary rights in lands situated in Turkish territory.
 87

No. 56.

Sir Edward G rey to M r. M arling .( ’ )

F.O. 371/1485.
312 5 3 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 333.1
Sir, F oreign Office, July 18, 1912.
In an interview which Sir Arthur Nicolson and I had with the Turkish
Ambassador to-day, we handed to him our reply about the Bagdad Railway and Persian
Gulf negotiations, and the annexed m em oranda,(2) with certain maps. W e especially
drew Tevfik Pasha’ s attention to the m emorandum asking for specific rates on cotton
goods when the Turkish Customs Dues were increased. W e said that we attached
great importance to this. W e had not put it into the reply about the Bagdad Railway
and Persian Gulf, because it introduced entirely new matter which was not germane
to this subject; but as, in our reply, we proposed to abandon all participation in the
Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to Busra, we felt it essential to have something which
would be a security for British trade. To give what we asked about cotton goods
would not entail any sacrifice upon the Turkish Government, it would not diminish
their revenue, and it would be no burden to them, though it would give security to an
important branch of British trade that the duties on it would be adjusted so as not to
press unfairly on particular articles.
The Turkish Ambassador seemed quite satisfied with what we told him, and made
no objection. W ith regard to participation in the Bagdad Railway, he said that if we
did not participate, as his country was free to give the concession for making the
R ailway to anyone it liked, a British Company might be employed.
W e said that this would be very satisfactory to us, but we had o f course not
thought it fair to stipulate for it as a condition.
[ I am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].
0 ) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to Mr. Buxton.]
(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

[E D . N O T E .— On September 13, 1912, the Russian cha rgé d ’ a ffaires at London telegraphed
to M. Sazonov that Sir Edward Grey considered the construction of the branch line B agd ad-
I Khanekin “ opposed to Germany’ s interests and would be of advantage only to England, as
| this country would then gain control of the entire trade over the Persian Gulf. Grey,
therefore, doubts that the Southern branch line will be finished by 1916, unless Khanekin be
connected with the main line already constructed.” v. S ieb er t, p. 661.]

No. 57.

Sir Edward G rey to S a 1 . B ertie .(-)

F.O. 371/1485.
394 9 9 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .
(No. 463.)
Sir, Foreign Office, S eptem ber 20, 1912.
The French A m b[assad o]r reminded Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th in s t[a n t ](2)
that some time ago he had enquired privately of H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] whether the
French G ov [e rn m en ]t still desired to participate in the B agdad-B asra section o f the
Bagdad Railway, as the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t were, he had said, likely to be averse
from agreeing to the mode o f participation which H [is ] M [a jesty’g] G o v e rn m e n t]
0 ) [A copy of this despatch was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [A further account of this conversation is given in G ooch d T em p erley, Vol. I X (I),
pp. 421-2, No. 441. cp. D .D .F ., 3” ' S tr., Vol. I l l , pp. 504-5, No. 417.]
had originally proposed, and perhaps H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] might be
inclined to abstain from insisting on participating themselves.
The French M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs ], said M. Cambon, had been
considering the question, and had com e to the conclusion that it would be desirable
that France should participate in the section above named, in order that Anglo-
French co-operation should be maintained, and the section not be handed over to
the Germans.
Sir A. Nicolson told H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] that this intimation had arrived too late.
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s ]: G o v e rn m e n t] had waited for some time to ascertain the views
of the French and Eussian G ov [ern m en ]ts, while the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t were
continually pressing for a reply to their proposals. So long as the terminus of the
section was at Basra the question as to who should construct the line was not of
such importance to Great Britain as was the settlement of the Persian Gulf and other
questions. In view of the difficulty of ever inducing the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t to
consent to a participation in the sense desired by H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ],
and also in face of the possibility of indisposing them, were H [is ] M [a je sty’ s]
G [overn m en t] to continue to insist, towards a satisfactory settlement of other very
important questions, it had been decided to abstain from demanding a participation,
if certain conditions, which would safeguard British com m ercial interests, were
conceded.
M. Cambon asked what were those conditions, and Sir A. Nicolson replied that
he was not at liberty to m ention them , but if they were granted they would, so H [is ]
M [a je s ty ’s ] G o v e rn m e n t] thought, adequately and com pletely safeguard Great
Britain from any unfair differential treatment. This of course was on the assumption
that the line ended at Basra, were it to be prolonged further H [is ] M [a je sty’ s]
G [overn m en t] would have to consider other conditions.
M. Cambon asked whether Great Britain would admit the Turks handing over
the concession to the Germans, and Sir A. Nicolson said that if the conditions for
which H [iis] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] had stipulated were accorded and if a
settlement could be reached on all the questions they should probably raise no
difficulties on the point he had m entioned. The British proposals had been before
the Turks for some weeks but they had probably been too fully occupied with other
matters to examine them thoroughly.
I am, &c.
E . G [K E Y ].

No. 58.

Sir G. L ow ther to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F.O. 871/1494.
5 5 3 7 4 /1 6 79 9 /1 2 /4 4.
(N o. 1100.) Constantinople, D. D ecem ber 23, 1912.
Sir, E . D ecem ber 28, 1912.
Before replying to your despatch No. 558 of the 16th Instant/2) calling for m y
observations on the suggestion of the Secretary o f State for India that the time had
perhaps come to press the Turkish Governm ent for a reply to the British Memorandum
of July 18th(3) regarding the Bagdad Eailway and the Persian Gulf questions, I

(*) [Copies of this despatch were sent to the A d m iralty; to the Director of Military
Operations; to the Board of Trade.]
(2) [Sir Edward Grey’s despatch (No. 558) to Sir G. Lowther of December 10, 1912, is not
reproduced. It forwarded a copy of a letter from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated
November 23, 1912, suggesting that the time had come to press for a reply to the Memorandum
handed to Tewfik Pasha on July 18, 1912. (F.O. 371/1494. 5 0 1 8 9/16 79 9/12 /4 4.)]
(3) [v . s-upra, pp. 77-86, No. 55, en cl.]
 89

thought it as well to approach the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a private and
unofficial manner.
I asked H is E xcellency whether he could tell me whether the present Governm ent
had considered the matter and whether an answer could be expected shortly. His
E xcellency replied that he him self had examined the memorandum in a general
manner, though not in great detail, but that the Cabinet had not had time to do so.
He and the other members of the Cabinet were sincerely desirous of settling all
outstanding points of difference that existed with His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and once
the serious questions, like the Balkan war, &c., which preoccupied the Governm ent,
were disposed o f, he would be prepared to examine the matter and reply to H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
It does not appear to me that we can further press the Governm ent at this
m oment, but if the present Government remains in power after the conclusion of
peace or if it should be followed by one of moderate views, the Turkish Governm ent
should be pressed for a reply.
I have, &c.
GEBABD LOW TH EE.
M IN U T E .

Q [uer]y copy to I[n d ia] 0[ffice], saying that Sir E. Grey thinks that no action can usefully
be taken until the Turkish Gov[ernm en]t renew their demand for the customs increase, which,
he is given to understand, is likely to occur at no distant date.(4)
A. P.
Dec [ember] 30, 1912.
It. P . M .
L . M.
A . N.
E. G.

(4) [This was done in Sir Edward Grey’ s letter to the India Office, of January 3, 1913.
(F.O. 371/1494. 55 37 4/1 6 7 9 9 /1 2 /4 4 .)]
 C H A P TE R XCII.

TH E B A G D A D R A IL W A Y . N EG O TIA TIO N S W IT H
HAKKI P A SH A , F E B R U A R Y T O JULY 2 9, 1913.

[E D . N O T E .— Some further material relating to the visit of Hakki Pasha is given in

G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. I X (II), p. 512, Ed. N o t e ; p. 515, No. 63 6; pp. 516-7, No. 639. The
subject is treated in G.P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 141-470, Chapter C C L X X X V .]

No. 59.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G rey.C )

Constantinople, February 10, 1918.

F.O . 6 46 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . D. 8-15 p . m .
Tel. (No. 79.) E. 4 p . m .
The Grand Vizier tells me that Hakki Pasha is being sent by the G ov [ern m en ]t
to L ondon to-morrow to discuss unofficially Bagdad railway and Persian Gulf questions
and reply to be given to your note o f July 18th.(2)
0 ) [A copy of this telegram was sent to the India Office.]
(2) [v . supra, pp. 76-86, No. 55, and en cl.]

No. 60.

Sir L. Mallet to H akki Pasha.

F.O . 9 4 3 2 /4 9 3 0 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.

Sir Louis Mallet, en présentant ses com plim ents à Son Altesse Hakki Pacha, a
l ’ honneur de lui faire parvenir ci-joint un aide-m ém oire relatif à la navigation fluviale
en Mésopotamie.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Comm unication to Hakki Pasha.

The British claim to exceptional rights of navigation on the rivers o f Mesopotamia,
such as are not enjoyed by any other nation, is based on the following, among other,
considerations, which are clearly borne out by the records in the possession of His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent :—
1. That British vessels have traded with Turkish Arabia from the 17th century;
that a British factory was established at Bussorah in 1689-40 with the sanction of the
Turkish Pasha; and that from this date British trade has been carried on by British
vessels and boats, under their national flag, on the Eivers Tigris and Euphrates.
2. That British vessels have from very early times (1761, Ac.), and at the express
and reiterated requests of successive Pashas of Bagdad, repeatedly assisted the Turkish
local authorities in their warlike operations against internal and external enemies, and
have rendered the navigation of the rivers more secure.
8. That Government vessels (under the British flag) have been attached to the
British residency at Bagdad from 1820, or earlier.
4. That at that period, and for m any years before, British subjects were em ploying
their own boats in the trade between Bussorah and Bagdad under the British flag, as
is shown by the terms of the letter addressed by the Pasha of Bagdad to the British
 91

Resident at that place in 1823. In this letter he stated, inter alia, that “ no tax
except one previously well defined and arranged should be levied on boats the property
of British subjects and protégés, such, for instance, as pass betw een Bussorah and
Bagdad he also stated that their boats should not be seized for the public service.
5. That in 1816 an agreement was concluded between the British Ambassador
(Sir Stratford Canning) and the Porte whereby the tim e-honoured right o f British
vessels to navigate the Mesopotamian rivers was explicitly and form ally recogn ised ^ 1)
It is quite evident, and, indeed, altogether beyond dispute, from the precise and
categorical reports furnished by Sir Stratford Canning on the conclusion o f this
agreement, that both his E xcellency and the Sublime Porte regarded at the time the
f agreement o f 1816 as a definite and perm anent settlement of the conditions under
which British merchant-ships, without limitation as to numbers, m ight navigate the
Tigris and Euphrates as far as they could find water.
It is equally evident that the agreement was the recognition of a right which
British ships, in distinction to ships of any other nation, had in practice enjoyed, with
short intermission, for well nigh two centuries ; that, moreover, they had acquired this
. right partly in consequence of the great and necessary services rendered during a long
series of years by British agency in the m aintenance of security in those regions.
Sir Stratford Canning gave the purport of the agreement of 1846 as follows :—
“ That, whereas British-owned boats had for m any years carried on the internal
! trade on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates under the British flag and without paym ent
of dues, they should in future pay the same dues as the native-owned boats engaged
in the same trade.”
The agreement was based upon a memorandum com m unicated by Sir S. Canning
\ to the Porte, which clearly laid down the terms on which he claimed that British
vessels should navigate the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, whether engaged in the
I external or internal trade.
The memorandum was submitted by the Turkish Governm ent to the Grand
Douanier who, in a report which was com m unicated by the Grand V izier to
I Sir S. Canning, recapitulated and explained the m emorandum in terms agreeing with
' the views expressed by Sir S. Canning in his despatch. These two docum ents were
. embodied in the vizierial letter which received the sanction of His Im perial M ajesty
' the Sidtan, and was accepted by Sir S. Canning, thus constituting an agreem ent of a
binding and form al nature.
These three documents are included in an appendix, which is annexed hereto for
convenience o f reference.
There can be no doubt as to the interpretation of these documents, for they were
subsequently twice submitted to expert legal investigation of a most searching
character, with the result that the conclusions arrived at by Sir Stratford Canning in
1846 were unreservedly confirmed.
The foregoing summary clearly shows that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would be
justified, both on historical and legal grounds, in claiming for British vessels unlim ited
rights of navigation on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. They feel confident,
therefore, that the Turkish Governm ent will not fail to recognise the extreme
I moderation which characterised their recent proposal that the number o f British
merchant-vessels navigating those rivers should be perm anently limited to six, a
proposal which was put forward without prejudice, but with the desire to effect a final
settlement based on a com prom ise.
Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.

0 ) [Sir Stratford Canning’ s reports on this subject are contained in his despatches (No. 45),
D. March 18, R. April 1, 1846 (F.O. 78 /638), and (No. 53), D. April 4, R April 24, 1846
(F.O. 78/639). The latter enclosed the text of the Vizierial letter printed as No. 3 in the
immediately succeeding Ed. N o t e .]
 92
[E D . N O T E .— The following documents form the appendix to the communication printed
as an enclosure to the immediately preceding document (F.O. 9 4 3 2 /4 9 3 0 /1 3 /4 4 ): —

No. 1.

M em oran d u m ab ou t th e N a v ig a tio n o f V essels and C aiques on th e R iv e r o f T igris and th e

R iv e r o f E u p h ra tes, F eb ru a ry 5, 1846.*

1. British vessels coming from sea and passing the Straits to go back to sea shall navigate
under their own flag; they shall pay 5 per cent, of custom duty for the goods they shall have
imported and 12 per cent, on goods they shall export from Turkey, and nothing else.
2. English vessels built in places under the British dominion, and having to stay in order
to navigate the two aforesaid rivers, shall navigate under their own flag, and, when busy in
carrying from one place to another goods, the produce of Turkey, for their consumption in
the country, they shall pay the same duties as the vessels of the country.
3. Vessels and caiques built in the country and become the property of British merchants
shall navigate under the Ottoman flag, and pay the same duties which are paid by other
vessels and caiques of the country.
No. 2.

(Traduction.)
R a p p o r t du G rand D o u a n ier sur la N a v ig a tio n su r le T ig re e t l’ E u p h ra te, ad ressé à son
A ltes se le G rand V izir, e t com m u n iqu é p a r R éch id P a ch a à son E x c ellen ce S ir S tra tfo r d
C a nning, le 24 fé v r ie r , 1846.

J ’ai respectueusement reçu la lettre que votre Altesse m ’ a fait l ’honneur de m ’ adresser
pour me transmettre une dépêche du Pacha de Bagdad, ainsi qu’ un mémorandum qui a été
présenté par son Excellence l’ Ambassadeur d ’Angleterre, relativement aux droits que payent
les bâtiments et les bateaux qui naviguent sur le Tigre et l’Euphrate et pour m ’ ordonner de
faire un rapport là-dessus.
J ’ ai parfaitement saisi le sens de vos ordres et dûment considéré les pièces y incluses.
Il est exposé dans le mémorandum de l’ Ambassade britannique, que les bâtiments marchands
anglais qui arriveront, sous leur propre pavillon, de leurs pays ou des autres pays de l’ Europe,
pour retourner à la mer, payeront 5 pour cent de droits de douane sur les marchandises de
production étrangère qu’ils apporteront et 12 pour cent sur les marchandises de production de
Turquie qu’ ils exporteront pour leurs pays ou pour d ’autres pays; que les bâtiments venant
des États anglais, qui feront habituellement le commerce sur les fleuves susdits et dans d’ autres
endroits aux environs, en transportant des marchandises, navigueront sous leur propre pavillon
en payant les mêmes droits que les bâtiments indigènes; que les bâtiments construits dans ces
pays-là et qui, comme propriété des négociants anglais, voudront faire des voyages sur les deux
fleuves, navigueront sous pavillon ottoman et payeront les mêmes droits nécessaires que les
bâtiments indigènes; voilà ce que dit le mémorandum.
Ainsi, les bâtiments marchands anglais qui, sans sortir des fleuves susdits, seront occupés
à faire habituellement le commerce sur ces fleuves, en transportant des marchandises, soit sous
leur propre pavillon, soit sous le pavillon ottoman, doivent, comme il est dit dans le mémo­
randum, payer entièrement tous les droits payés par les navires indigènes.
Les bâtiments payeront 5 pour cent de droit de douane sur les marchandises étrangères
qu’ ils apporteront dans ces pays-là, de leurs pays ou d’ autres pays de l’Europe, et 12 pour cent
pour droits de douane d’ entrée et de sortie sur les marchandises de production de Turquie
qu’ ils exportent pour leurs pays ou pour d’ autres pays.
Voici encore ce qui se présente à l ’esprit: comme les bâtiments anglais ainsi que tous les
bâtiments des autres nations amies qui, arrivant dans les ports de Turquie, débarquent leurs
cargaisons et s’y arrêtent jusqu’ à ce que le temps du départ arrive ou qui font le commerce
intérieur, payent un droit d’ ancrage appelé “ palamar aktzessi,” le même droit doit être perçu
des navires qui naviguent dans les deux fleuves et dans les environs.
L ’exécution, ou la non-exécution, des points ci-dessus énoncés dépend de la volonté de votre
Altesse, qui donnera dans le cas présent, comme en chaque occasion, tels ordres qu’elle jugera à
propos.
No. 3.
V izie ria l L e t t e r to th e P asha o f B a gd a d o f A p ril 2, 1846 (6 R eb iu l-a k h ir, 1262).
(Traduction.)
J ’ ai pris connaissance du contenu de la dépêche arrivée il y a quelque temps, de la part
de votre Excellence, relativement aux droits que payent les bâtiments et les barques qui
naviguent sur le Tigre et l ’Euphrate.

* This memorandum was translated from English into Turkish and given to the Porte,
and, as no trace of the English is to be found, the present translation is made from the Turkish
sketch, this 2nd day of September 1852.— (Note signed by F. Pisani.)
 98
En même temps, son Excellence l’ Ambassadeur d’Angleterre résidant à Constantinople a
représenté dans un “ tacrir ” que les bâtiments anglais peuvent faire le commerce dans les
deux fleuves susmentionnés, en payant les droits établis par le traité, et il a demandé qu’une
dépêche, conçue dans ce sens, fût écrite à votre Excellence.
Cette question ayant été référée au surintendant de l ’Hotel des Monnaies, son Excellence
a fait là-dessus un rapport dont la teneur su it: —
“ Le transport de marchandises d’ une place à une autre sur les deux fleuves susdits,
et sans sortir à la mer, est un commerce intérieur ; ainsi, sous quelque pavillon que les
navires et les barques fassent ce genre de commerce, il faut qu’ ils payent dans ce cas les
mêmes droits que l’on perçoit des patrons des barques, sujets de la Sublime Porte. On
percevra des bâtiments marchands qui, venant sous pavillon anglais des pays étrangers,
entrent dans l’un des deux fleuves avec un chargement de produits de la Turquie pour
exporter et retournent à la mer, les droits fixés par le traité et par le tarif, après quoi on
prendra des bâtiments marchands anglais aussi qui fréquentent le Tigre et l’ Euphrate, de
même qu’on le prend des bâtiments marchands des Puissances étrangères qui viennent dans
les ports de l’ Empire ottoman et d’ après l’exemple existant, un droit d ’ ancrage qui, comme
nous apprenons, consiste en 5 piastres par bâtim ent.”

Sur le rapport ci-dessus, auquel l’ Ambassade britannique a donné son adhésion, l'affaire a
été soumise au Sultan pour consulter le bon plaisir de Sa Majesté Impériale, qui a ordonné de
vous faire savoir par une dépêche qu’il faut mettre à exécution tout ce qui est nécessaire à cet
égard. En conséquence je vous écris et vous envoie cette dépêche afin que votre Excellence
mette ses soins à ce que l’on prenne des barques de commerce anglaises, qui, comme il a été
dit plus haut, seront désormais occupées à faire le commerce intérieur sur les deux fleuves
susdits, des droits conformes à ceux que l’ on prend des barques des sujets ottom ans; et à ce
que l’ on ne prenne sur les chargements des bâtiments anglais qui viennent du dehors et qui
vont dans un pays étranger, que les droits de douane établis, et qu’un droit d ’ancrage consistant
en 5 piastres : votre Excellence aura soin de ne rien faire prendre de plus.
L e 6 B eb iu l-a k h ir, 1262.
R A O Ü F .]

No. 61.

F oreign Office to Board of Trade.

F.O. 9 4 2 2 /9 4 2 2 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.
I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to advert to your
letter of July 2 6 (1) last covering a m emorandum for com m unication to the Turkish
Ambassador respecting the desire of H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t, in connection
with the pending general increase in the Turkish Customs tariff to 15% ad valorem,
to secure that the duty on certain classes of cotton yarns and m anufactures should
be limited to 13% ad valorem.
In this connection I am to inform you that Hakki Pasha, who has now arrived
in this country to resume the negotiations for the settlements of various outstanding
questions, between H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t and the Sublime Porte, has
emphasized the difficulty with which the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t would be faced if
they deferred to the wishes of I I [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t in this matter. Other
Powers, His H ighness contends, would not fail to demand similar special tariffs for
other classes of goods in which they are predom inantly interested, and it would be
impossible to refuse them similar treatment.
In these circumstances Sir F j . Grey considers that the matter is one which should
not be allowed to prejudice the course of the present negotiations which involve several
questions o f paramount political importance, and even the future financial stability
of Turkey.

0 ) [N ot reproduced. A memorandum giving the views of the Board of Trade on the

question of the increase of customs was enclosed. The Board suggested that a copy of the note
should be sent to Tewfik Pasha, “ subject to Sir E. Grey’ s approval.” This was done on
July 27, 1912. (F.O. 371/1485. 3 1 7 1 4 /2 6 4 /1 2 /4 4 .)]
 94
H e consequently feels constrained to hold this point over for the present and he
fears that it may even eventually becom e necessary to give way on it. The question
will not, however, be lost sight o f and every effort will be made to attain the desired
object should it be possible to do so at a later stage, when the Ottoman G ov[ernm en]t
will not improbably be desirous of negotiating a specific tariff.
I am, Ac.
L [O U I S ] M [A L L E T ].

No. 62.
Communication from Hakki Pasha.C)
F.O. 1 6 3 3 5 /1 6 33 5 /1 3 /4 4. London, April 9, 1913.
Turkish Counter-draft of Article 1 of Draft C onvention in respect of Railways in
Asiatic T u rkey.(2)
Parag [ra p h e] I er.
Le Gouvernement Im périal garantit que :
Si la Société du Chem in-de-fer de Bagdad établit, pour certains parcours et pour
certaines catégories de transports, des tarifs abaissant les taxes au dessous des limites
fixées par le Cahier des Charges, elle sera— tant que ces tarifs n ’ auront pas été
abrogés ou modifiés avec l ’ autorisation du Gouvernement Ottoman— tenue de faire
bénéficier des m êm es réductions les transports se présentant dans les m êm es
conditions, c ’ est-à-dire les transports identiques au point de vue : de la nature des
marchandises, des stations de départ et d ’ arrivée, du parcours effectué entre ces
stations, des conditions de tonnage, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande vitesse, petite
vitesse, et éventuellem ent, délais supérieurs à ceux de la petite vitesse).
Étant bien entendu que la disposition ci-dessus ne s’ applique qu ’ aux transports
com m erciaux, et que les taxes dont bénéficient ou bénéficieront :
a.) les transports militaires et civils du Gouvernement Ottoman,
b.) les transports afférents aux services publics de l ’ État Ottoman,
c.) les transports afférents aux émigrants ou aux indigents,
d.) les transports afférents au matériel et aux matériaux destinés à la construction
des travaux publics ou à l ’ exploitation des services y afférents,
ne seront pas applicables aux transports commerciaux.

Parag [ra p h e] II.

Le Gouvernement Im périal aura le droit d ’ établir une distinction entre les taxes
à appliquer au trafic local d ’ une part, et au trafic d ’ importation, d ’ exportation ou de
transit, d ’ autre part.
Mais, pourvu que les conditions resten t identiques au point de vue de la nature
des marchandises, des stations expéditrices (en Turquie) des stations extrêmes (en
Turquie), du parcours effectué entre ces stations, des conditions de tonnage, d ’ emballage
et de vitesse, le régime à appliquer restera le même, quelque soit :
a.) le lieu d ’ origine des marchandises importées en Turquie,
b.) le lieu de destination des marchandises exportées hors de Turquie,
c.) le lieu d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises transitant par la Turquie.
i 1) [Copies of this communication were sent to the India Office and to the Board of Trade
on April 12. In his covering letter Sir Edward Grey asked for “ any obseivations which the

T ^ o a r ^ o L T r a d ^ 6 ma^ ^ave to ° ^ er on th*s draft.” (F.O. 16 33 5/16 33 5/13 /4 4.) A reply from
the Board of Trade was sent on April 25 (F.O. 1 9 2 4 2 /64 63 /1 3/44 ) enclosing a revised draft
which was discussed with Hakki Pasha on the same day. This was the basis of the text
initialled on May 6. v. infra, pp. 101-3, No. 68, encl. 2. For the discussions with Hakki Pasha
cp. in fra , pp. 115-6, Ed. N o t e .]
 95

P a r a g r a p h e ] I I I.

L e Gouvernement Im périal garantit que :

La Société du Chem in-de-fer de Bagdad ne pourra conclure avec une Société de
navigation fréquentant un ou plusieurs ports maritimes desservis par son réseau, des
arrangements particuliers relatifs à certaines catégories de marchandises importées
ou exportées par ces ports, sans que ces arrangements ne soient de plein droit
applicables à toutes les autres Sociétés de navigation important ou exportant les m êm es
catégories de marchandises, par les m êm es ports et dans les m êm es conditions, les
mots de “ m êm es conditions ” ayant la m êm e signification qu’ au P a r a g r a p h e ] I er.

No. 63.

Communication from H akki Pasha^1)

F.O. 2 01 0 8 /2 0 10 8 /1 8 /4 4. London, May 1, 1913.

Déclaration relative à la fron tière de Moham m erah.

1. L a form e bilatérale me semble préférable.

2. Je désire voir l ’ addition au paragraphe 2 que vous aviez promis de m ’ envoyer.
3. Quant au paragraphe 3, je me permets de vous faire observer que ma
proposition était de donner la faculté d ’ appréciation aux commissaires anglais de
délim itation; je ne pense pas accorder la m êm e confiance d ’ impartialité aux com m is­
saires persans; nous devrions arranger ce point vendredi avant d ’ arrêter le texte
définitif.
C onvention de Shatt-el-Arab.

Préam bule :
. . . . désireux d ’ améliorer les conditions de navigation du Shatt-el-Arab et de
diminuer les risques auxquels pourrait y être exposé le com m erce . . . .”

C onvention des Chem ins de Fer.

Préambule :
. . . . désireux d ’ écarter toute condition pouvant donner lieu à l ’ avenir à des
différends entre eux en ce qui concerne les intérêts com m erciaux dans leurs rapports
avec le trafic des chemins de fer . . . .”
Article 3 4 (2) (qui aura le No. 2). Il faut m entionner l ’ exception en ce qui concerne
le droit découlant pour la Société de Bagdad de sa convention pour l ’ importation des
matériaux et de munitions destinés à la construction du chem in de fer.
Article 40 (qui devient 8). Il me semble que ce sont les clauses de garantie
d ’ égalité de traitement qui doivent s ’ étendre à ceux-ci :
Article 41— Nous devions en faire l ’objet d ’ une note. Pour les deux anglais il
vaut mieux dire : Ayant l ’ agrément de la Chambre de Commerce de Londres. On ne
peut pas changer l ’ élection par l ’ assemblée des actionnaires.
Article 42— C’ est au G [ou vern em en ]t 0 [tt o m a ]n d ’ obtenir la renonciation.
L ’ article est superflu.

O [A copy of this communication was sent to the Board of Trade.]

(2) [No draft has been traced with the Articles numbered as shown here. The Board of
Trade draft of April 25 was numbered separately for each of the texts concerned. The Articles
cited here as 34 and 40 appear in the final text as 2 and 8 ; Article 41 appears as 9, and
Article 42 as an attached Declaration, cp. in fra , pp. 102-3, No. 68, encl. 2.]
 96
N o. 64.
Communication from H akki Pasha.G)

F.O . 2 0 1 0 7 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 . London, M ay 1, 1913.

L e Gouvernement de S [a ] M [a jesté] Britannique voudra bien donner son
consentem ent
1. A l ’ élévation des droits d ’ importation en Turquie à 15% ad valorem. La
nouvelle augmentation de 4 % ne pourra être appliquée aux marchandises anglaises
que si elle est appliquée à celles de tout les autres États.
2. Au rem placement ultérieur de 15% ad valorem par un tarif à droits spécifiques
à fixer d ’ un com m un accord.
(Au m oment de la confection de ce tarif, il sera possible d ’ avantager certains
classes de produits et de charger certaines autres de façon à rester dans la m oyenne
de 1 5% ) *
3. A l ’ application aux sujets britanniques de l ’ impôt de temettu, à la condition
d ’ une application générale à tous les étrangers.
4. A l ’ abolition, en principe, des bureaux de poste étrangers.
(en attendant et pour éviter la criante injustice des revenus publics d ’ un État
perçus pour le com pte des autres, on peut suggérer l ’ idée de l ’ emploi de timbres
ottomans par les bureaux étrangers.)
5. A étudier la question de la suppression des capitulations.

( L ’ Angleterre, en consentant et en participant à cette étude, rendra un vrai

service, pas seulement à la Turquie et à la nation ottomane, mais aussi à l ’ humanité.
L ’ état actuel de la justice en Turquie, avec les lois et les tribunaux d ’une douzaine
d ’ États, équivaut à la négation de toute justice. Si tous les États ayant des droits
capitulaires découlant de leurs propres traités (non par la clause de la nation la plus
favorisée) nom m aient une com m ission purement de juristes pour étudier les
inconvénients du système actuel et recomm ander les m oyens d ’y obvier, on pourrait
arriver, par étages, à de grandes améliorations.)

(!) [A copy of this communication was sent to the Board of Trade.]

No. 65.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen .(l)

F.O . 2 1 0 4 0 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 152.)
Sir, F oreign Office, M ay 3, 1913.
The German Ambassador inform ed me to-day(2) that the Deutsche Bank wished
to have the building o f the Bagdad Railway beyond Bagdad, even if it was a Turkish
con cession; but in the circumstances they would agree to two British Directors for
this part of the work. Their agreement to this would be facilitated if British capital
would com e in. They would also be willing to give up any idea of construction beyond
B asra ; but they would want some indem nity for giving up this part of the concession.
I said that I thought that all the concession beyond Bagdad had already been

(!) [Copies of this despatch were sent to Board of T rad e; to the Director of Military
Operations.]
(2) [H err von Bethmann Hollweg’s instructions for this conversation, dated April 26, 1913
are given in G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 161-3. There had been an earlier conversation between
Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey shortly before April 3 (ibid., pp. 159-60), and Prince
Lichnowsky’s report of this conversation led to the instructions from Berlin.]
 97

given up in return for concessions made by Turkey elsewhere, especially in the

neighbourhood of Alexandretta ; and that Turkey was now entitled to build the
railway beyond Bagdad as she liked, provided that, if she asked for any foreign
participation, she gave Germany as large a share as any other country. I did not,
therefore, see how Turkey could again have to pay an indem nity for the giving up of
any part of a concession as regards which she had already purchased her freedom of
action, subject to the condition of participation of German capital which I had stated.
I had, however, been unable to attend to any details of this subject lately, and I would
ask the Ambassador either to discuss them with Sir Louis Mallet or to'a u th o rise
Herr von Kühlm ann to discuss them.
The Ambassador also said that the Deutsche Bank hoped that we would give
support on the Commission in Paris(3) as to the replacement of securities lost during
the war, which were pledged to the Bagdad Bailway.
[I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
(3) [For the Paris Financial Commission cp. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. I X (II), p. 559,
No. 686; p. 587, No. 718; p. 604, No. 737; p. 803, No. 985; pp. 823-4, No. 1016.]

No. 66.
M inute by Mr. Parker. A

F .O . 2 1 1 9 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.

I called at the German Embassy to-day and H err von Kühlmann explained to
me the views of the German G ov[ern m en ]t in regard to certain matters touching the
Bagdad Railway, Turkish finance, and river navigation in M esopotam ia.(2)
I asked him to allow me to make notes, as the subjects are involved, and I pointed
out that I had come to listen to his remarks and had of course no proposals to make.
The substance of his remarks was as follows :—
1. The Bagdad R [a i]l[w a ] y C o[m p a n y] would prefer to build and manage the
section from Bagdad to Bussorah themselves rather than abandon that section to
another Company. The Company did not, under the arrangement of 1911,(3) definitely
abandon their rights to do this; they at that tim e m erely made a declaration of their
readiness to do so subject to two conditions, viz that the Bagdad Railway C om pany’ s
interest in the new Company should be equal to that of any nation other than Turkey,
and that the Bagdad R [ a i] l[w a ] y C o[m p a n y] should receive com pensation for the
renunciation o f rights secured to them under the original concession.
2. I f H is M ajesty’ s Government agree to point (1), then the Société would be
prepared to agree that :—
a.) The sections from Bussorah to the Gulf should be indefinitely postponed.
b.) If those sections ever should be built the Société would like to share in the
building of them, but would not ask to share in the subsequent management of the
sections, but there must be adequate guarantees as regards through traffic.
c.) That Bussorah should be the terminus of the line.
d.) That the construction and control of the port at Bussorah should be the
subject of an agreement with His M ajesty’ s G ov [ern m en ]t.
e.) That two British directors should be admitted to the Board of the Railway
from Konia to B ussorah.(4)
C) [This minute is endorsed as having been sent to Sir P. Harvey with previous minutes.]
(2) [cp. G .P., X X X Y I I (I), pp. 17L-5.]
(3) [cp. supra, pp. 34-5, No. 23.]
(4) [On May 9, Count Benckendorff sent a telegram to M. Sazonov as follows : “ Nicolson
informs me, that the former standpoint of the British Government has changed, and that the
London Cabinet would no longer raise an objection to the construction of the Bagdad-Basra
Railway, but upon the condition that two of the directors must be Englishmen.” v. S ieb ert,
p 661. cp. G .P ., X X X Y I I (I), pp. 170-1, noie.]
[10900] H
 98
3. The German G ov [ern m en ]t would confirm these proposals of the Société.
T hey would also agree that German subjects should make no claim to participate in
navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris. I f a reasonable and fair arrangement can be
made for the conveyance of materials for the railway while building, then the Germans
would forthwith abandon any claim to navigation on those rivers. If, however, for
some technical reason, such an arrangement cannot be made as regards building
material Ac., then the German G ov [ern m en ]t would undertake that German subjects
shall not participate in any navigation com pany on the two rivers after, say, five years
from 1913.
4. If the German G ov [ern m en ]t and the Société agree that the terminus shall
be Bussorah, they will expect an undertaking from H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t]
and the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t that the Shatt-el-Arab shall be kept in a satisfactory
state of conservancy, so that sea-going vessels without discrimination of flag shall
always be assured of easy access to Bussorah on equal conditions.
5. The German G ov [ern m en ]t would appreciate a confidential intimation as to
the attitude o f I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t towards the Bagdad B [a i]l[w a y ]
enterprise on the conclusion of such an arrangement as that in question.
6. The German G ov [ern m en ]t wishes co-operation between the German and
British delegates on the F in [a n cia ]l C om m [issio]n at Paris, so. as to secure:
a.) That the Bagdad Railway C o[m p a n y] shall receive fresh and equally good
security for any revenues now pledged to the Company and which Turkey m ay forfeit
as the result of the war (e.g. the Salonica Customs duties surplus).
b). That, in the arrangements about to be made for Turkish financial re-organi­
sation, adequate revenues shall now be earmarked for the securities of the
Bagdad-Bussorah section.

I said I would submit these remarks to Sir E . Grey.

A. P [A R K E R ].
M ay 7, 1913.

M IN U T E S .

Herr von Kuhlmann read this record, which I made before I left the German Embassy,
and said it was accurate.
I think the proposals here made contain the elements of a bargain.
He told me Herr von Gwinner -was coming here after Whitsuntide. He also said the
Germans would be quite glad if we abandoned the Mohammerah Khorremmabad line, as that
line, if built, would divert a part of the traffic of the Bagdad Khanikin line. W
pursue the subject.
I also had some conversation with Herr von Kuhlmann about kilometric guarantees, and
he said to me that no railway could be built in Turkey without such a guarantee, and what
was our objection. I said we had no objection to kilometric guarantees because they were
kilometric ; but the opposition to them in this country had arisen from the fact that' the
particular form of kilometric guarantees for the Bagdad Railway were understood to militate
against development of traffic. I could not say if this view was sound, but I recollected a letter,
signed “ Probitas,” which had appeared in the “ T im es” in 1911,(5) and, while I did not
profess to know if the views in that letter were sound or not, it did seem to put the case
against the Bagdad form of guarantee clearly, though of course there might be some answer.
H err von Kuhlmann said he would show the letter to Herr Gwinner as he was anxious to
remove every possible obstacle to English capital engaging in the line.
A. P.
May 8, 1913.
R. P. M.

The most satisfactory feature to my mind in this couvers[atio]n is that the Germans are
willing to give us a free hand in the navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris and to stand out
themselves. W e need raise no objection, provided the Turks agree, to the Bagdad R[ailw a]y
Co[mpany] building the Bagdad-Bussorah section, provided we have 2 Directors on the
Board— and it is distinctly understood that the line is net to be prolonged beyond Bussorah

(5) [v. T he Tim es, March 14, 1911, p. 5.]

 99
■without our consent and on conditions satisfactory to us— I daresay the Germans w [oul]d be
quite glad if we abandoned the Mohammerah Khurmabad line— but I earnestly trust that we
shall do nothing of the kind.
A. N.

W e might come to an agreement on these lines without bringing in anything about the
Khanikin branch. That is a matter that involves other considerations and must be dealt with
quite separately, if at all.
E. G.

No. 67.

Communication from H err von K ühlm ann.(x)

F.O. 2 1 3 4 7 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidentiel. London, M ay 7, 1913.
L e groupe allemand qui a le contrôle financier de la Société du chem in de fer
de Bagdad, est prêt à céder à une Société A nonym e Ottomane à form er la concession
conférée à la Société du chem in de fer de Bagdad par la convention du 20 F évrier/
2 Mars 1903 pour une section de 400 à 500 kilomètres calculés à partir du Golfe
Persique, ainsi que pour les ports à établir à Basra et au Golfe, et ce à des conditions
dont les détails seront fixés d ’ un com m un accord entre le Gouvernement Impérial
Ottoman et la Société du chemin de fer de Bagdad. L e susdit groupe Allemand
déclare d ’ores et déjà qu’ il est d ’ accord à ce q u ’ une large part dans la nouvelle Société
Anonym e Ottomane soit réservée à la Turquie et qu’ il ne réclamera pour l ’ ancienne
Société du Chemin de fer de Bagdad qu’ un intérêt de minorité qui, pourtant, ne serait
pas inférieure à la part de n ’ importe quelle nationalité non-ottom ane. D ’ autre part,
il serait réservé à la nouvelle convention de fixer les compensations qui reviendraient
à la Société du chem in de fer de Bagdad pour l ’ abandon des avantages pécuniaires et
autres qui lui assurait la convention actuellement en vigueur.
Berlin, le 7 Mars 1911.
A. v o n G W IN N ER .
H E L F F E R IC H .

Messieurs A. von Gwinner et H elfferich, signataires au nom du groupe allemand

qui a le contrôle financier de la Société du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, de la déclaration
du 7 Mars 1911 ci-annexée m ’ autorisent à déclarer qu’ ils acceptent que les mots :
‘ ‘ pour une Section de 400 à 500 kilomètres calculés à partir du Golfe Persique ’ ’
s’ interprètent dans le sens de :
‘ ‘ la Section comprise entre Bagdad et le Golfe Persique, soit en totalité, soit en
partie.”
Constantinople, le 21 Mars, 1911.
H U GU EN IN .

0 ) [This communication was made unofficially by Herr von Kühlmann ou May 7. An

official copy was sent by Prince Lichnowsky on May 9. A copy was sent to the Board of Trade.]

[10900]
 100

N o. 68.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Low ther.(l)

F.O. 2 06 6 2 /9 2 41 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 139.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.
I transmit herewith, for Y [o u r ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s con f[id en tia ]l inform ation,
copies of draft conventions and declarations relating to certain o f the negotiations
recently carried on with Hakki P ash a.(2)
These drafts have been initialled ad referen dum .(3)
Copies of the maps referred to will be sent to you in due course. Other drafts
are still under discussion.
[ I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

Draft Declaration.(4)

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an, ayant examiné la question de la frontière

qui sépare les territoires ottoman et persan depuis la région de H aouizé jusqu’ à la
mer, déclare que la ligne frontière doit être fixée comme suit :
La ligne frontière part de l ’ endroit nommé Oumm-Chir, où le Khor-el-Douvel se
sépare du Khor-el-Azem . Oumm-Chir est situé à l'est de la jonction du Khor-el-
Muhaisin avec le Khor-el-Azem à 9 milles au nord-ouest de Bisaitin, endroit qui se
trouve à la latitude 31° 43' 2 9". A partir d ’ Oumm-Chir la ligne se dirige vers le
sud-ouest et atteint la longitude 45° à l ’ extrémité méridionale d ’ un petit lac, connu
aussi par le nom d ’ Azem et situé dans le K hor-el-Azem à quelque distance au
nord-ouest de Chouaïb. De ce point la ligne continue vers le sud le long du marécage
jusqu’ à la latitude 31°, qu’ elle suit directement vers l ’ est jusqu’ à un point au
nord-est de Kouchk-i-Basra, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire ottoman.
De ce point la ligne va au sud jusqu’ au Chatt-el-Arab, qu’ elle rejoint à son confluent
avec le canal de Khaïyin à un point qui se trouve entre le Nahr-Diaidji et le Nahr
A bou -’ l-Arabid. De ce point la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu’ à la mer
en laissant sous la souveraineté ottomane le fleuve et toutes les îles qui s’y trouvent
aux conditions et avec les exceptions suivantes :

(a.) Appartiennent à la Perse : (1) l ’ île de Mouhalla et les deux îles qui se
trouvent entre celle-ci et la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab (rive persane d ’Abadan) ;
(2) les quatre îles entre Chetaït et Maaouiyé et les deux îles devant Mankouhi qui
sont toutes des dépendances de l ’ île d ’ A badan; (3) tout îlot actuellement existant ou
inexistant qui pourrait se form er et qui serait relié par les eaux basses à l ’ île
d ’ Abadan ou à la terre ferme persane en aval du Nahr-Nazaïlé,

0 ) [Copies of this despatch, with enclosures, were sent to the Committee of Imperial
Defence ; to the Director of M ilitary Operations ; to the Board of Trade.]
(2) [cp. Baron von Wangenheim’ s report from Constantinople on May 1, 1913, G.P.,
X X X V I 1 (I), pp. 165-6, and n o te .]
(3) [They were initialled by Hakki Pasha and Sir A. Hirtzel, and in some cases by Sir H.
Llewellyn Smith. For the part taken by Sir A. Hirtzel in the negotiations cp. in fra , pp. 114-6,
Ed. N o te .]
(4) [The texts here given are those preserved in the Foreign Office series of Original
Treaties (Turkey No. 94). They are there headed “ Various Treaty Instruments initialled
ad re fer en d u m during the progress of Mr. Alwyn Parker’ s negotiations with Hakki Pasha,
M ay-August 1913.” Copies of the declaration were sent to St. Petersburgh for confidential
communication to the Russian Government on May 8, 1913, and it was communicated with
the document printed below as encl. 2 to the French, Russian 'and German Ambassadors on.
June 18, 1913. (F.O. 2646 6/25 53 3/13 /4 4.) cp. in fra , p. 157, No. 102, and n o te (2).]
 101

(b.) Le port m oderne et l ’ ancrage de Mouhammera, en amont et en aval de la

jonction du fleuve Karoun avec le Chatt-el-Arab, continueront à se trouver sous la
juridiction persane en conform ité du traité d ’ Erzeroum , sans que cela puisse infirmer
le droit d ’ usage ottoman de cette partie du fleuve et sans que la juridiction persane
puisse s’ étendre aux parties du fleuve restant en dehors de l ’ ancrage.
(c.) Aucune atteinte ne sera portée aux droits, us(ages) et coutumes existants
en ce qui concerne la pêche sur le rivage persan du Chatt-el-Arab, le mot “ r iv a g e ”
comprenant aussi les terres réunies à la côte par les eaux basses.
(d.) iLa juridiction ottomane ne pourra pas s’ étendre sur les parties de la côte
persane qui pourront être temporairement couvertes d ’ eau par la marée ou par
d ’ autres causes accidentelles. La juridiction persane de son côté ne pourra pas
s’ exercer sur des terres qui seront temporairem ent et accidentellement découvertes en
excédant le niveau normal des eaux basses.
(e.) L e cheikh de Mouhammera continuera à jouir en conform ité des lois
ottomanes de ses droits de propriété existant en territoire ottoman.
La ligne frontière établie dans cette déclaration est indiquée en rouge sur la carte
ci-annexée.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s’ engage à inviter le Gouvernement
Impérial persan à agréer, com m e tracé définitif de ses frontières méridionales avec
le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman la ligne indiquée ci-dessus et sur la carte annexée.
Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se charge également d ’ inviter le
Gouvernement Impérial persan à se mettre d ’ accord avec le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman pour nom m er dans le plus bref délai des commissaires qui auront à appliquer
sur le terrain les limites établies par cette déclaration. Si au cours de la délimitation
il est constaté par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et par le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman que les territoires sur le canal de Khaïyin ci-dessus indiqués étaient
effectivement occupés et administrés par les autorités ottomanes à la date du 1er janvier
écoulé (nouveau style), le tracé pourra être rectifié.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le , 1913.
Parafée ad référendum
le 6 mai, 1913.
I. H.
A. H.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

C onvention concernant les Chemins de fer en Asie M ineure.

Sa Majesté le Eoi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’Irlande et des

territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre part ;
Désireux tous deux d ’ écarter toute condition pouvant donner lieu à l ’ avenir à des
différends entre eux en ce qui concerne le transport des marchandises par les chemins
de fer de l ’ Asie M ineure;
Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires savoir :
Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, Em pereur des Indes :

Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur de Turquie :

Lesquels, s’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

A r t ic l e 1.

Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du

chemin de fer de Bagdad applique à toutes les marchandises d ’ une catégorie identique
 102

qui pourront lui être présentées en vue d ’ être transportées par chem in de fer, entre les
mêmes stations et dans les mêmes conditions, précisément le m ême régime, tant pour
le tarif qui leur sera imposé que pour les facilités dont elles jouiront, quels que
soient :
(a.) L e pays d ’ origine des marchandises importées dans l ’ Em pire ottom an;
(b.) Le pays de destination des marchandises exportées de l ’ E m pire ottom an;
(c.) Les pays d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises en transit par l ’ Empire
ottom an; et
(d.) Le pavillon et l ’ armateur des bâtiments sur lesquels les marchandises seront
importées ou exportées par les ports ottomans.

A r t ic l e 2.

Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du

chem in de fer de Bagdad ne conclue avec une société de navigation ou avec un
armateur dont les bâtiments desservent un ou plusieurs ports, soit maritimes, soit
fluviaux, de son réseau, d ’ arrangement particulier relatif à certaines catégories de
marchandises importées ou exportées par ces ports sans que cet arrangement soit de
plein droit applicable, dans les mêmes conditions, à toute autre société de navigation
ou à tout autre armateur dont les bâtiments importent ou exportent des marchandises
de la même catégorie par les mêmes ports. Il est toutefois entendu que cet article ne
porte nullement atteinte aux droits concédés par l ’article 9 de la convention du 5 mars,
1903, relative à l ’importation de matériaux destinés à la construction du chemin de
fer de Bagdad.
A r t ic l e 3.

Aux fins de la présente convention la phrase “ les mêmes conditions ” signifie les
mêmes conditions de poids, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande, petite ou autre).

A r t ic l e 4.

Dans le cas où le com m erce britannique serait soumis, sur quelqu’ un des chemins
de fer auxquels s ’ applique la présente convention, à un régime d ’ exception en quelque
relation non spécifiée par les articles précédents, telle, par exemple, que l'insuffisance
des facilités accordées en matière de transport com m un ou la pose de conditions
spéciales au transport effectué par une voie déterminée, le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique se réserve le droit de faire à ce sujet des représentations auprès
du Gouvernement Im périal ottom an, qui prendra les dispositions nécessaires pour
remédier au grief.
A r t ic l e 5.

Les provisions de la présente convention ne s ’ appliquent ni au transport des

militaires, des marins ou des civils, ni à celui des munitions militaires, navales ou
civiles pour le com pte du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman, ni à celui des matériaux
destinés aux services publics de l ’ État ottoman.

A r t ic l e 6.

Aucune provision de la présente convention ne sera interprétée com m e une

défense de l ’ établissement d ’ une distinction entre les tarifs à appliquer :
(a.) Au transport intérieur, d ’ une part; et
(b.) Au com m erce d ’ importation, d ’ exportation et de transit, d ’ autre part.

A r t ic l e 7.

Les provisions de la présente convention s ’ étendront, dans la mesure où elles y

sont applicables, au régime appliqué par la société du chemin de fer au transport des
voyageurs entrant dans l ’ Em pire ottoman, le quittant ou traversant son territoire, et
 103

de leur bagage. Toutefois, elles ne s’ appliqueront pas au transport des émigrés et des
indigents et de leur bagage.
Aux fins du présent article, le terme ‘ ‘ ém igrés ’ ’ se rapporte aux personnes venues
s’ établir dans les limites de l ’ Em pire ottom an qui sont transportées par les soins de
la com m ission des émigrés.
A r t ic l e 8.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s ’ engage à veiller à ce que les provisions des

articles précédents soient appliquées à tout chem in de fer (soit actuellement existant,
soit à construire à l ’ avenir) en Asie Mineure qui se raccorderait avec le chem in de fer
de Bagdad, com m e s ’ il faisait partie intégrante de celui-ci.

A r t ic l e 9.

L e Gouvernement Impérial ottom an s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du

chemin de fer de Bagdad admette à son conseil d ’ administration deux m embres de
nationalité britannique. Avant la nom ination de ces membres, le Gouvernement
Im périal ottom an prendra les dispositions nécessaires pour s’ assurer qu’ elle a
l ’ agrément du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Dans le cas où, en vertu
d ’ un arrangement quelconque, le tronçon B agdad-B asra serait construit par une autre
société, les provisions du présent article s’ appliqueront également à celle-ci.

A r t ic l e 10.
Aucun prolongement de voie ferrée au delà de Basra vers la mer ne pourra avoir
lieu qu’après accord préalable entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et dans les conditions agréées par eux.

A r t ic l e 11.

E n cas de contestation au sujet de l ’ interprétation ou de la mise à exécution de

la présente convention, la question en litige, à moins d ’ être réglée dans un délai de
trois mois à la satisfaction des deux Gouvernements, sera déférée, sur la demande de
l ’ un ou de l ’ autre Gouvernement, au jugem ent du tribunal international d ’ arbitrage
de La Haye.
A r t ic l e 12.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront échangées aussitôt

que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans un délai de trois mois.
En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Parafée ad référendum
le 6 mai, 1913.
I. H.
II. Ll. S.
A. H.
Déclaration.
L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman déclare que la Société du Chemin de fer de
Bagdad a renoncé à tous les droits qui découlent pour elle des conventions existantes
en ce qui concerne le prolongement de la ligne de Bagdad au delà de Basra, ainsi
qu’ au droit d ’ établir un terminus maritime.
Fait à Londres, le 1913.

Parafée ad référendum
le 6 mai 1913.
I. H.
H . Ll. S.
A. II.
 ]0 4
E n clo s u re 3 in N o. 68.
Draft Convention respecting the Persian Gulf, de.

Sa Majesté le Eoi du Royaum e-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des

territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, et Sa Majesté
l ’ Empereur des Ottomans, animés par le sincère désir de régler, par un accord
com plet, certaines questions touchant leurs intérêts respectifs dans le Golfe Persique
et dans les territoires environnants, ont résolu de conclure une convention spéciale en
vue de prévenir toute cause éventuelle de malentendu entre leurs Gouvernements en
ce qui concerne ces questions.
E n conséquence, ils ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :
Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, Empereur des Indes :
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans :
Lesquels, s’ étant communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

I.— Koueit.

A r t ic l e 1 er.

Le territoire de Koueit, tel qu ’ il est délimité par les articles 5 et 7 de cette

convention, form e un kaza autonome de l ’ Empire ottoman.

A r t ic l e 2.

L e cheikh de Koueit arborera comme par le passé le drapeau ottoman, avec, s’ il

le désire, le mot “ Koueit ’ ’ inscrit au coin, et il jouira d ’une autonomie administra­
tive com plète dans la zone territoriale définie à l ’ article 5 de cette convention. Le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ abstiendra de toute imm ixtion dans les affaires
de Koueit, y compris la question de la succession, et de tout acte d ’ administration
ainsi que de toute occupation et tout acte militaire, dans les territoires qui en font
partie. En cas de vacance, le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman nommera kaïmakam,
par firman Impérial, le successeur du cheikh défunt. Il aura aussi la faculté de
nom m er auprès du cheikh un commissaire pour protéger les intérêts et les indigènes
des autres parties de l ’ Empire.

A r t ic l e 3.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman reconnaît la validité des conventions que le

cheikh de Koueit a conclues précédemment avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique en date des 23 janvier 1899, 24 mai 1900 et 28 février 1904, et dont les
textes sont annexés (annexes I, II, III) à la présente convention. Il reconnaît aussi
la validité des concessions de terrains faites par ledit cheikh au Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique et aux sujets britanniques, ainsi que celle des engagements
consignés dans la note adressée à la date du 24 octobre 1911 par le principal secrétaire
d ’ État de Sa Majesté britannique pour les affaires étrangères à l ’ ambassadeur de Sa
Majesté Impériale le Sultan à Londres, dont le texte est annexé (annexe IV ).

A r t ic l e 4.

E n vue de confirmer l ’ entente déjà établie entre les deux Gouvernements par les
assurances échangées le 6 septembre 1901, entre l ’ ambassade de Sa Majesté
britannique à Constantinople et le Ministère Impérial des affaires étrangères, le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu ’ en tant qu ’ aucun changement
ne sera apporté par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman au statu quo de Koueit, tel
qu ’ il se trouve défini par la présente convention, il ne changera en rien la nature de
ses relations avpc le Gouvernement de Koueit et n ’ établira pas de protectorat sur le
 105

territoire qui lui est attribué. L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman prend acte de
cette déclaration.
A r t ic l e 5.

L ’ autonomie du cheikh de Koueit est exercée par lui dans les territoires dont la
limite forme un demi-cercle avec la ville de Koueit au centre, le K hor-Zoubair à
l ’ extrémité septentrionale et Kraïne à l ’ extrémité méridionale. Cette ligne est
indiquée en rouge sur la carte annexée à la présente convention (annexe V). Les îles
de Ouarba, Boubiane, Machiane, Faïlaka, Anha, Koubbar, Karou, Makta et
Oumm-el-Maradine, avec les îlots et les eaux adjacents, sont compris dans cette zone.

A r t ic l e 6.

Les tribus qui se trouvent dans les limites indiquées à l ’ article suivant sont
reconnues com m e dépendant du cheikh de Koueit, qui percevra leurs dîmes com m e par
le passé et exercera à leur égard les attributions administratives qui lui reviennent en
sa qualité de kaïmakam ottoman. L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman n ’ exercera
dans cette zone aucun acte d ’ administration indépendamment du cheikh de Koueit
et s’ abstiendra d ’y établir des garnisons ou d ’ y exercer une action militaire
quelconque sans s’ être préalablement entendu avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique.

A r t ic l e 7.

Les limites du territoire dont il est parlé à l ’ article précédent sont fixées comme
suit :
La ligne de démarcation part de la côte à l ’ embouchure du K hor-Zoubair vers le
nord-ouest et passe immédiatement au sud d ’ Oumm-Kasr, de Safouan et de Djebel-
Sanam, de façon à laisser ces endroits et leurs puits au vilayet de B asra; arrivée au
Batine, elle le suit vers le sud-ouest jusqu’ à Hafr-el-Batine qu’ elle laisse de côté de
K oueit; de ce point ladite ligne va au sud-est en laissant à Koueit les puits d ’ Es-Safa
et d ’ El-Garaa, Ouabra et Antaa pour aboutir à la mer près de Djebel-M ounifa. Cette
ligne est marquée en vert sur la carte annexée à la présente convention (annexe V).

A r t ic l e 8.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ entendrait avec le Gouverne­

ment de Sa Majesté britannique pour faire aboutir la ligne ferrée de Bagdad-B asra à
la mer au terminus de Koueit ou à tout autre terminus dans le territoire autonome,
les deux Gouvernements s’ entendront sur les dispositions à prendre touchant la garde
de la ligne et des stations ainsi que l ’ établissement de bureaux douaniers, dépôts de
marchandises et toute autre installation accessoire au service de la voie ferrée.

A r t ic l e 9.

L e cheikh de Koueit jouira en pleine sécurité des droits de propriété privée qu’ il
possède dans le territoire du vilayet de Basra. Ces droits de propriété privée devront
s’exercer en conform ité de la loi ottomane et les biens immobiliers qu’ ils concernent
seront soumis aux impôts et charges, au m ode de conservation et de transmission et
à la juridiction établis par les lois ottomanes.

II .- E l -K a t r .

A r t ic l e 10.

Le sandjak ottoman de Nedjd, dont la limite septentrionale est indiquée par la

ligne de démarcation définie à l ’ article 7 de cette convention, se termine vers le sud
au golfe faisant face à l ’ île de Zahnounié, qui appartient audit sandjak. Une ligne
 106
partant du fond extrême dudit golfe ira directement au sud jusqu’ au R uba’ -al-Khali
et séparera le Nedjd de la presqu’ île d ’ E l-K atr. Les limites du Nedjd sont indiquées
par une ligne bleue sur la carte annexée à la présente convention (annexe V). Le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman ayant renoncé à toutes ses réclam ations concernant
la presqu’ île d ’ El-K atr, il est entendu entre les deux Gouvernements que ladite
presqu’ île sera, com m e par le passé, gouvernée par le cheikh Djassim -bin-Sani et par
ses successeurs. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu’ il ne
permettra pas au cheikh de Bahreine de s’ imm iscer dans les affaires intérieures
d ’ E l-K atr, de porter atteinte à l ’ autonomie de ce pays ou de l ’ annexer.

A r t ic l e 11.

Il sera permis aux habitants de Bahreine de visiter l ’ île de Zahnounié pour la

pêche et d ’y demeurer en pleine liberté pendant l ’ hiver com m e par le passé, sans
q u’ aucun nouvel impôt leur soit imposé.

I I I .— Bahreine.

A r t ic l e 12.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an renonce à toutes ses réclamations concernant

les îles Bahreine, y com pris les deux îlots Lubainat-el-Aliya et Lubainat-es-Safliya, et
reconnaît l ’ indépendance de ce pays. De son côté, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique déclare qu’il n ’ a aucune intention d ’ annexer à ses territoires les îles
Bahreine.
A r t ic l e 13.

L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s’ engage vis-à-vis du Gouvernement

Im périal ottoman à veiller à ce que le cheikh de Bahreine ne perçoive pas des sujets
ottom ans de droits sur la pêche des huîtres perlières d ’ un taux plus élevé que celui
qui sera imposé aux autres intéressés les plus favorisés.

A r t ic l e 14.

Les sujets du cheikh de Bahreine seront considérés com m e étrangers dans les
territoires ottomans et pourront être protégés par les consuls de Sa Majesté
britannique. Toutefois, cette protection devra s ’ exercer en conform ité des règles
générales du droit international européen, les sujets de Bahreine n ’ ayant pas le droit
de jouir des privilèges accordés par les capitulations aux sujets de certaines
Puissances.

IV .— Golfe Persique.

A r t ic l e 15.

L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ayant, aussi bien pour la sauvegarde

de ses intérêts spéciaux que dans un but élevé d ’ humanité, entrepris de tout temps
des mesures de police maritime dans les eaux libres du Golfe Persique aussi bien que
sur le littoral appartenant aux cheikhs indépendants de la côté au sud d ’ El-K atr
jusqu’ à l ’ Océan Indien, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman apprécie l ’ importance de
ces efforts déjà séculaires et déclare ne pas s ’opposer à ce que le Gouvernement de
Sa Majesté britannique exerce com m e par le passé dans le Golfe Persique les mesures
suivantes :
(a.) Sondages, allumage des phares, mise des bouées, pilotage.
(h.) Police maritime.
(c.) Mesures quarantenaires.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an réserve à cette occasion tous les droits qui
lui reviennent com m e Puissance territoriale sur les côtes ainsi que sur les eaux,
territoriales ottomanes.
 107

V.— Commission de Délimitation.

A r t ic l e 16.

L es deux Gouvernements sont d ’ accord pour nom m er, dans le plus bref délai, des
commissaires qui auront à appliquer sur le terrain les limites établies par les
articles 5, 7 et 10 de cette convention en en dressant un plan détaillé et un procès-
verbal explicatif. Le plan et le procès-verbal susénoncés, une fois dûment dressés et
signés par les commissaires respectifs, seront considérés com m e partie intégrante de
la présente convention.
A r t ic l e 17.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification en seront

échangés à Londres aussitôt que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans un délai de
trois mois.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le , 1913.
Parafée ad referendum
le 6 mai, 1913.
I. H.
A. H.
A nnexe I.
A greem en t of January 23, 1899, with Sheikh of K ow eit.(5)
(Translation.)
P ra ise be to G od alon e (lit. in th e nam e o f G od A lm ig h ty ) ( “ B issim Illah T a ’ alah S h anuho ” ).
The object of writing this lawful and -honourable bond is, that it is hereby
covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel M alcolm John Meade, I.S.C.,
Her Britannic M ajesty’ s Political Besident, on behalf of the British Governm ent, on
the one part, and Sheikh M ubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other
part; that the said Sheikh M ubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, of his own free will and
desire, does hereby pledge and bind him self, his heirs and successors, not to receive
the agent or representative of any Power or Governm ent at Koweit, or at any other
place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British
| Governm ent ; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors, not to cede, sell,
lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose, any portion of his
territory to the Governm ent or subjects of any other Power without the previous
consent of H er M ajesty’ s Governm ent for these purposes. This engagem ent also to
extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak which m ay now be
in possession of the subjects of any other Governm ent.
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel
Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., H er Britannic M ajesty’ s Political Besident in the
Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the form er on behalf of the
British Governm ent, and the latter on behalf of him self, his heirs and successors, do
each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures, on this the 10th day of
Bamazan, 1316, corresponding with the 23rd day of January, 1899.
M. J. M E A D E ,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.
M U B A B A K -E L -S U B A H .
Witnesses :
E. W i c k h a m H ore, Captain, I.M.S.
J. C a l c o t t G a s k in .
M uham m ad B a h im -b in -A b d u l N ebi S affer.

(5) [T h e t e x t o f this agreem en t and corresp on d en ce rela tin g to it is g iven in F.O . 7 8/5 11 3 ]
 108
A n nexe II.

Agreem ent by Sheikh M ubarek-bin-Subah, C hief of K ow eit.(6)

(Translation.)
I agree to absolutely prohibit the importation o f arms into Koweit or exportation
therefrom , and to enforce this I have issued a notification and proclam ation to all
concerned.
Dated this 24th day o f Moharrum, 1318 (24th day of May, 1900).
(Seal of Sheikh M ubarek-el-Subah.)

A nnexe III.

Postal A greem en t of February 28, 1904, with the Sheikh o f K ow eit.( 7)

(Translation.)
As the British Government has agreed, in accordance with m y desire and for the
benefit of traders, to establish a post-office at Koweit, I, on my part, agree not to allow
the establishment here of a post-office by any other Government. I accordingly write
this undertaking on behalf of m yself and m y successors.
(Seal o f Sheikh Mubarek-el-Subah.)
K ow eit, the 11th Zil Haj, 1321
(February 28, 1904).

A nnexe IV .

Sir Edward G rey to Tewfik Pasha.(8)

Your H igh ness;— Foreign Office, October 24, 1911.

In compliance with the request which, under instructions from your Government,
you were good enough to make to me on the 16th ultim o,(*) I have the honour to
transmit to you herewith copies of the agreements as marked in the margin concluded
by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent with the Trucial Chiefs of Oman and the Sheikhs of
Bahrein and Koweit, to which reference is made in the memorandum communicated
to Your Highness on July 29th last.(10)
W ith respect to these agreements, His M ajesty’ s Government have the following
observations to make.

As regards No. 1, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have inform ed the Sheikh of Koweit
that so long as he and his heirs and successors act up to their obligations under the
Agreem ent, H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent undertake to support them and accord them
their good offices. H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] reserve to themselves the right
to interpret that term at their discretion.

(•) [cp. M em oran d u m on K ow eit, d a ted J a n u a ry 111 1901. F.O. 7 8 /5 1 7 3 .]

( 7) [T h ere is som e corresp on d en ce on this su b ject in F.O . 7 8 /5 3 8 5 .]
( 8) [T h is le tte r has been checked w ith the sign ed d r a ft in F.O. 3 71/1234. 4 2 1 3 5 /2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .]
( 9) [N o t rep rod u ced . On S eptem b er 16, 1911, Tewfik P asha sta ted th a t he had been
in stru cted by his G overn m en t t o ask if “ w e w ould com m u n ica te to th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t
cop ies o f th e con v en tion s w hich we ha d w ith th e Sheikh of K o w e it.” (F .O . 371/1234. 42135/
2 1 /1 1 /4 4 .) cp. supra, p. 51, N o. 36.]
( 10) [v. supra, pp. 4 5-8, N o. 34. T he enclosures w ere th e fo llo w in g : —
N o. 1. A g reem en t o f J an u a rj- 23, 1899, v. supra, p. 107, A n n e x e I.
N o. 2. A g reem en t o f M a y 24, 1900, v. supra, p. 108, A n n ex e II.
N o. 3. P osta l A g reem en t o f F eb ru a ry 28, 1904, v. supra, p. 108, A n n e x e III .
No. 4. T rea ties and E n g a gem en ts rela tin g to B a h rein and the T ru cia l Chiefs, F eb ru a ry 5,
1 82 0-M a rch 6, 1892. T his is n ot rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s of space.
cp. C. U. A it c h is o n : T rea ties, E n g a g e m e n ts and S anads (5th ed.), V ol. X I
(D elhi, 1933).]
 109

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent hold m oreover a lease of land from the Sheikh of
Koweit.
As regards No. 4, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent take occasion to rem ind the Sublime
Porte that British rights in the Persian Gulf and on the coast rest not m erely on the
agreements concluded, and transmitted herewith to the Ottoman Governm ent, but on
the custom, consent and long-established relations between the local chiefs and the
Government of India.
H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent hope that in the com m unication of these agreements,
together with the supplementary declarations which are hereby brought to the notice
of the Ottoman Governm ent, the Sublime Porte will see proof o f H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent’ s goodwill and desire to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations set
forth in their above-m entioned m emorandum.
I have, &c.
E. GREY.

Déclaration secrete.
L e Gouvernement Im perial ottoman declare reconnaître que la phrase ‘ ‘ affaires i- h .
de Koueit ” com prend aussi bien les questions intérieures qu ’ extérieures, mais qu’ en A- H
aucun cas le cheikh ne pourra conclure de traité contraire à la présente convention.
L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman déclare qu’ à l ’ occasion de la signature d ’ une
convention turco-britannique sur le Golfe Persique et les territoires environnants,
fixant les limites du kaza autonome de Koueit et du territoire indépendant d ’ El-Katr,
il a donné à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour que les fonctionnaires civils et
militaires ainsi que les troupes d ’ armée régulière ou de gendarmerie se trouvant dans
les limites assignées à ces deux territoires aient à les quitter dans le plus bref délai.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique prend acte de la décision du
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman de donner une somme de £ st. 1,000 au cheikh de
Bahreine en com pensation de sa renonciation à toute réclam ation sur l ’ île de
Zahnounié, située à proximité du littoral ottom an du Nedjd et appartenant audit
sandjak, et offre ses bons offices pour remettre cette somme au cheikh contre une
renonciation écrite qu’il fera parvenir au Gouvernem ent Im périal ottoman.
Fait en double exemplaire à Londres, le , 1913.
Parafée ad referendum
le 6 mai, 1913.
I. H. *
A. H.

E nclosure 4 in No. 68.

Convention concernant l’ établissem ent d ’ une Commission pour am éliorer les

Conditions de la Navigation du C hatt-el-A rab.{11)
Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre part;
Désireux tous deux d ’ améliorer les conditions de la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab
et de diminuer les risques auxquels le com m erce de leurs sujets pourrait y être exposé,
par suite de l ’ importance de leurs intérêts dans le com m erce sur le fleuve ;

( u ) ""he la ter t e x t o f this con v en tion , in itia lle d “ I. H .; A. P . ” on J u n e 11, is also

preserved in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rig in a l T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 94). T he v a ria tion s
inserted in this d r a ft are record ed below in n o te s ( 12), ( 13), ( 14). T his con v en tion and th e
a nnexed d ecla ra tion w ere com m u n ica ted to the F ren ch , R ussian an d G erm an A m bassadors on
J u n e 18, fo r con fid en tia l com m u n ica tion t o th e ir G overnm ents C opies w ere also sent to the
In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; t o P a r is ; to B e r lin ; to St. P etersb u rg h (F 0 26931/
1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)] H
 110

Ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Eoi de la Grande-Bretagne, Empereur des Indes :

Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur de Turquie :

Lesquels, s ’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

A r t ic l e 1 er.

La navigation du Chatt-el-Arab demeurera ouverte aux navires de toutes les

nationalités.

A r t ic l e 2.

Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman établira une com m ission chargée de remplir

les fonctions relatives à la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab depuis Kourna jusqu’ à la mer,
telles qu’ elles sont définies à l ’ article 6.

A r t ic l e 3.

Cette com m ission sera composée de deux membres seulement, à être désignés par
le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an. L e Gouvernement Im périal, désirant que l ’ un
des membres soit de nationalité britannique, invitera le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique à lui proposer des candidats parmi lesquels il choisira l ’ un des
commissaires.
A r t ic l e 4.

Chacun de ces commissaires recevra un traitement annuel de £ T . 2,000, net de

toute réduction. Les traitements seront versés par la commission.

A r t ic le
La com m ission aura qualité pour nom m er
nécessaires, mais le Gouvernement Im périal,
l ’ inspecteur des services fluviaux soient de
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à lui
il choisira ces fonctionnaires. La com m ission
inspecteur-adjoint de nationalité ottom ane. L e
sera fixé et versé par la commission.
5.
tels agents et em ployés qu’ elle jugera
désirant que l ’ ingénieur en chef et
nationalité britannique, invitera le
proposer des candidats parmi lesquels
nom m era un ingénieur-adjoint et un
traitement de ces agents et employés

A r t ic l e 6.

La com m ission sera chargée des fonctions suivantes :—

(a.) L ’ exécution de tous les travaux qui seront jugés nécessaires à l ’ amélioration
du chenal du fleuve et de ceux qui y donnent accès du côté de la mer.
(b.) L e maintien du chenal du fleuve libre de toute espèce d ’ obstruction de façon
à assurer à la navigation les conditions les plus propices en tout temps.
(c.) La préparation, prom ulgation et mise à exécution de règlements touchant la
navigation et la police du fleuve ainsi que les terrains et constructions détenus pat
la com m ission.
(d.) L e contrôle du pilotage.
(e.) La mise de bouées et l ’ éclairage du chenal, ainsi que le maintien et la
surveillance des phares et des bouées placés dans les chenaux donnant accès au fleuve,
tels qu’ ils sont spécifiés dans l ’ annexe à cette convention.
(/.) L a surveillance, dans la mesure où cela est nécessaire pour assurer l ’ applica­
tion des dispositions contenues dans la présente convention et sous réserve des droits
contractuels des Puissances étrangères, des débarcadères, quais, docks et jetées
appartenant à des particuliers et sis dans ou sur les bords du fleuve, ainsi que la
 111

faculté de pourvoir à toutes accom m odations et facilités que la com m ission pourra
juger nécessaires.
(g.) Dans le cas où un port serait établi à Basra en conform ité de quelque
convention que ce soit liant la Turquie à la date présente, les droits qui seront assurés
dans ce port au Gouvernement Im périal ottom an par cette convention et par le cahier
des charges seront, en tant que ces droits concernent les matières traitées dans les
paragraphes précédents, exclusivement exercés par la commission.

A r t i c l e *7 .

La com m ission aura qualité pour fixer, par les règlements édictés par elle en
vertu de l ’article 6 (c) de cette convention, les amendes qui seront imposées en cas de
leur contravention. Telles contraventions seront justiciables exclusivement par la
commission qui sera revêtue pour des cas semblables de l ’ autorité, analogue à celle
dont jouissent les municipalités, d ’infliger aux délinquants des amendes et, à défaut
de payem ent de telles amendes, le terme de réclusion équivalent prescrit par la loi
ottomane.
A r t ic l e 8.

Pour toute autre affaire pénale du ressort de la com m ission, la police de celle-ci
aura seule le droit d ’ opérer des arrestations. Les prévenus seront ensuite remis aux
autorités com pétentes; la com m ission se réservante1*) le droit de se faire représenter
au procès en qualité de plaignant.

A r t ic l e 9.

Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s ’ engage à faciliter l ’ acquisition par la com ­

mission de tout terrain que celle-ci jugera nécessaire en vue d ’ accom plir d ’ une manière
efficace les fonctions qui lui seront dévolues. Ces acquisitions se feront en conform ité
de la loi ottomane d ’ expropriation pour cause d ’ utilité publique et le prix en sera
acquitté par la commission.
Dans le cas où la com m ission jugerait nécessaire l ’ acquisition de terrains auxquels
des servitudes de pêche sont attachées, il ne sera imposé à ces droits de servitude de
pêche aucune restriction vexatoire.

A r t ic l e 10.
_ Aucun droit, taxe ou charge basé sur le fait seul de la navigation ne sera prélevé,
soit par la Sublime Porte, soit par la com m ission, sur les bâtiments ou marchandises
dans le Chatt-el-Arab à moins d ’ être perçu en rémunération de services rendus.

A r t ic l e 11.

_ La com m ission aura seule le droit de prélever les droits ou charges qui seront
jugés nécessaires pour couvrir les dépenses des travaux et services administrés par
elle. L e produit de tels droits ne dépassera pas la somme nécessaire pour atteindre
le but ci-haut mentionné, y com pris les frais généraux d ’ administration de la
commission, et le produit y sera exclusivement affecté. Tout excédent devra être
utilisé à la réduction des droits. L e taux de ces droits ne dépassera dans aucun cas
1 fr. par tonne nette de navigation.

A r t ic l e 12.

^ Tout droit ou charge imposé par la com m ission sera prélevé impartialement et
équitablement de tout bâtim ent,(13) quels que soient le port d ’origine, de destination et

( 12) [ “ A u r a ” w as su b stitu ted fo r “ se r é s e r v a n t ” on J u n e 1 1 ; th e a ltéra tion w as entered

on the te x t o f M a y 6 and in itia lled “ I. H . ; A. H . ” ]
( 13) [T h e w ord s “ ex cep tion fa ite de ceu x q ui son t ex clu siv em en t affectés à la n a vig ation
“ IV H - \ WH “ ] ° n JUne 11 ’ th ey W0re e n te re d on the te x t o f M a y 6> and in itia lled
 111

de départ, le pavillon et l ’ armateur, et la nationalité et le propriétaire du chargement.

De même, il ne sera fait aucune distinction, en matière des facilités à accorder, ni
entre les bâtiments par rapport à leur pavillon, à leur armateur ou à leur port de
départ ou de destination, ni entre les marchandises par rapport à leur nationalité ou
à leur propriétaire.

A r t ic l e 13.

Toute somme que la com m ission jugera nécessaire d ’ emprunter pour le compte-
capital en vue d ’ accom plir les fonctions qui lui seront dévolues sera avancée par le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, après entente avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique, à un taux d’ intérêt qui ne dépassera pas 5 pour cent.

A r t ic l e 14.

L e contrôle de tons les fonds perçus et déboursés par la commission relèvera

exclusivement de celle-ci.

A r t ic l e 15.

La commission publiera tous les ans un relevé complet et exact de ses comptes,
qui montrera les sommes perçues et déboursées par elle. Ce relevé sera soumis à
l ’ examen de la cour des comptes.

A r t ic l e 16.

Si, la limite mentionnée à l ’ article 11 étant atteinte, les recettes de la commission

ne suffisent pas à ses dépenses ordinaires, le déficit sera com blé par le Gouvernement
Im périal ottoman en attendant qu’ une entente intervienne entre les deux Gouverne­
ments sur les m oyens de rétablir l ’ équilibre financier.

A r t ic l e 17.

Dans le cas où un désaccord s ’ élèverait entre les membres de la commission sur

la question de savoir si tels ou tels travaux particuliers sont ou ne sont pas nécessaires
à l ’ amélioration du Chatt-el-Arab, ou bien sur la façon dont ces travaux devront être
exécutés, la question en litige sera déférée par elle à un ingénieur de compétence
reconnue, désigné d ’ un commun accord par les commissaires ou, faute d ’ un tel accord,
par les deux Gouvernements. La décision rendue par cet ingénieur sera adoptée par
la commission.

A r t ic l e 18.

La commission s’ adressera, pour toutes les questions se rapportant aux fonctions

qui lui seront confiées, à la Sublime Porte directement, et non pas par le canal des
autorités locales.

A r t ic l e 19.

Les autorités locales ne s’ immisceront en aucune façon dans des questions ayant
trait ni aux immeubles, constructions, terrains ou autre propriété de la commission,
ni à ses fonds, ni à l ’ exercice de leurs fonctions par les agents chargés de la police, du
pilotage ou des autres services établis par elle, ni aux débarcadères, jetées, docks ou
quais situés dans ou sur les bords du fleuve et appartenant à des particuliers.
L e personnel de la police qui sera employée par la commission sera choisi parmi
les sujets ottomans et de préférence parmi ceux qui ont déjà été au service du
Gouvernement Impérial. La commission aura qualité pour engager des officiers
supérieurs de nationalité étrangère pour exercer des fonctions d ’ organisation et de
commandement.
 113
A r t ic l e 20.
La remise à la commission de bouées ou de phares placés dans les chenaux
donnant accès au Chatt-el-Arab ne sera pas considérée comme portant atteinte à la
juridiction territoriale exercée dans les eaux où ces bouées ou phares sont situés.
Aucune provision non plus de cette convention ne sera interprétée comme revêtant
la com m ission de l ’ autorité d ’ exercer une juridiction ou des fonctions ou de prélever
des droits ou d ’ acquérir des terres en dehors des limites de l ’ Empire ottom an sans
le consentem ent de la Puissance territoriale, ni comme modifiant l ’ application ou
l ’ interprétation des dispositions d ’ aucun traité ou arrangement définissant les
frontières de l ’ Empire.
A r t i c l e 21.

Cet arrangement restera en vigueur pour une période de vingt et u n (14) ans à
partir du jour de sa signature. Dans le cas où aucune des deux Hautes Parties
Contractantes n ’ aurait fait connaître à l ’ autre douze mois avant l ’ expiration de ladite
période de soixante ans son intention de mettre fin à l ’ arrangement, il restera en
vigueur jusqu’ à l ’ expiration d ’ un an à partir du jour où l ’ une des deux Hautes Parties
Contractantes l ’ aura dénoncé.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et
y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le , 1913.
Parafée ad referendum
le 6 mai 1913
I. H .
A. H.
A n n exe.

Liste des B ouées et Phares du Chatt-el-Arab.

1
D e scr ip tio n
No. |N a tu re des P hares, &c. P ro p rié ta i re a ctu e l. P o sitio n .
sur C arte.*

I
1 1 V a issea u -ph a re ... G ou v ern em en t ottom a n ... B a rre e x t é r i e u r e , L t. F il ev. 5 sec.
56 f e e t , vis.
10 m.
2 B ou ée à gaz a céty lèn e b r ita n n iq u e ... L t. F .
3 , B ou ée non é cla irée ... „ „
ottom a n
...
...
„ „ Old bar buoy.
N o. 1.
4 » » ••• *» ,,
5 ”, » ••• ,, b rita n n iq u e ...
„ ...
7 ” ” ■" ” Chenal ...
8 „ „ ••• » o tto m a n ... „ ...
it
y
10 ", ••• ;; b rita n n iq u e ...
11 ottom a n ... „ ...
12 „ ... B a rre in térieu re
13 n b r ita n n iq u e ... » » I n n e r bar buoy.
14 P h are ... ... ottom a n ... F ao ... L t. F . red 25
»
f e e t , vis. 6 m.

* A d m ira lty C hart N o. 1235 “ M ou th o f the E up hra tes, S h a tt-el-A ra b, and B a rm ish ir
R iv e r ” (c orrected to F eb ru a ry 1913).
Déclaration.
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman déclare que, dans le cas où le cheikh de
Mouhammera voudrait prier un des commissaires de s’ occuper des intérêts du
commerce et de la navigation persans, la Sublime Porte autorisera ledit commissaire
( 14) [ “ S o ix a n t e ” was sub stitu ted fo r “ v in g t e t u n ” on J u n e 1 1 ; it was in itia lle d on the
te x t o f J u n e 11, “ I. H . ; A. P .” ]
[10900] I
 114

a s’ occuper de ces intérêts sans que cela puisse préjudicier en quoi que ce soit à sa
qualité de commissaire ottoman et à ses attributions telles qu ’ elles sont définies par
cette convention.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le ,1 9 1 3 .
Parafée ad référendum
le 6 mai 1913
I. H.
A. H.

[E D . N O T E . T he follow in g m em ora ndum b y S ir L. M a llet and S ir A. H irtz e l com m ents

on th e tex ts enclosed in th e fo r e g o in g d o c u m e n t ^ ): —

BAGDAD R A IL W A Y AND P E R S IA N GFLF.

T he N e g o t ia t io n s w it h H akki P asha.
F.O . 2 0 6 6 2 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 .
S ecret.
R e p o rt.
F o r e ig n Office, M a y 3, 1913.
F o r th e last m onth or so th e u n d ersign ed have m et H a k k i P asha tw ice a w eek at the
F o re ig n Office to discuss th e va riou s q uestions a risin g ou t o f the B ritish m em ora ndum o f
18th J u ly, 1912.(2)
I. T he S h a t-el-A ra b a rra n g em en t presen ted no g rea t difficulties e x ce p t in m a tters o f
form . In A r tic le 5 H a k k i P asha la id stress on th e a p p oin tm en t o f T urkish “ a d jo in t s ” ; as
they will have no special a u th ority th ey w ill be u n ob jection a ble. W e h a ve secured th a t the
tw o ch ie f officials shall be n o t only B ritish b u t selected from ca n d id a tes recom m ended by
H is M a je sty ’ s G overnm ent.
A r tic le 6g was in serted by H a k k i P ash a in ord er to cov er th e rig h ts o f th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y
C om p an y to con s tru ct a p o r t at Basra. '
A r tic le s 7 and 8 are th e up shot o f m uch discussion. W e w an ted th e ju d icia l pow ers o f the
Com m ission to be w id er— in fa c t w e w a n ted it to be con s titu ted a co u r t o f first in stan ce fo r
all pu rposes. B u t H a k k i P asha cou ld n ot a gree to this, and as it a ppea rs th a t the D an u be
C om m ission now has no la rg er pow ers th a n those g iv en by A rticles 7 and 8, it d id not seem
p o litic to insist. T he g rea t o b ject is th a t th e local a u th orities should have as little op p o rtu n ity
as possible fo r th w a rtin g the C om m ission, and th a t seem s to be sufficiently assured.
A r tic le 11.— H a k k i P asha was m ost u n w illin g to a ccep t the m axim um due, b u t w e insisted
to som e e x ten t m eetin g him b y A r ticle 16, w hich, in effect, p rov id es fo r a recon sid era tion o f
the lim it in certa in circum stan ces.
A r tic le 13.— W e had p roposed th a t th e a dv an ce should b e m ade by th e tw o G overnm ents,
in o rd e r to be sure th a t som e oth er P ow er d id not step in. B u t H a k k i P asha was a nxious
th a t it should be th e T u rk ish G overn m en t only, and th e w ord s “ a près en ten te avec le
G ou v ern em en t de Sa M a jesté B rita n n iq u e ” sufficiently serve ou r pu rpose.
A r tic le lit presented con sid era ble difficulty to H a k k i P asha, w ho w an ted the C om m ission’ s
b u d g et to be v oted an n u ally by the T u rk ish P a rlia m en t. T his had to b e stron gly resisted.
A r tic le 19 w as m uch discussed as reg a rd s p olice, w hom H a k k i P asha w ished to be len t by
th e T u rk ish G overnm ent. T his w ou ld n o t secure them sufficient in depen den ce, and had to be
resisted.
A sep arate d ecla ra tion p rov id es th a t th e Sheikh o f M oham m era m ay en tru st his in terests
to on e o f the Com m issioners, m ea n in g , o f course, th e B ritish Com m issioner. I t w ill be necessary
to su p p lem en t this b y an agreem en t w ith th e Sheikh b in d in g him , his heirs and successors, to
select the B ritish Com m issioner fo r th e purpose.
I I. A s reg a rd s K o w e it an d th e P ersian G ulf, H a k k i P asha p rod u ced a c o u n te r d r a ft to
ours, w hich, th ou g h it con ta in ed o b jection a b le features, w e a ccep ted as a basis fo r discussion.
A r tic le 1 .— T urkish and B ritish view s w ere irrecon cila b le on the question o f “ su zerain ty ”
a n d “ so v e re ig n ty ,” b u t as the im p o rta n t th in g is th e rig h ts a ctu a lly secured fo r K o w e it and
ren ou n ced by T u rk ey in the rest o f the con v en tion , and as “ suzerainty ” is itself n ot a w holly
una m bigu ou s term , w e agreed, in retu rn fo r sa tisfa ctory defin ition s in th e subsequent articles,
to om it eith er term , and to say th a t K o w e it “ est un Caza auton om e de l ’ E m p ire O ttom a n .”
In A r tic le 2 H a k k i P asha la id stress on th e O ttom an flag, and we a ccep ted it, su b ject to
the S h eik h ’ s rig h t to m ark it w ith a sp ecial d evice. T his has been w an ted loca lly fo r m any
y ears past, b u t th e Sheikh was a fra id o f T u rk ish displeasure.

( ! ) [O n M ay 28, 1913, S ir E d w a rd G rey circu la ted to th e C a bin et cop ies o f th e R e p o r t of

M a y 3, w ith the S u p p lem en ta ry R e p o r t o f M a y 28, tog eth er w ith the te x ts g iv en supra,
pp. 100-14, N o. 68, encl., and in fra , pp. 158-9, N o. 102, en cl.]
(2) \y. supra, pp. 77-86, N o. 55, en cl.]
 115
T he form u la “ L e G ou v ern em en t O ttom an s ’ a bstien d ra de tou te im m ix tion dans les affaires
de K ow eit, y com p ris la qu estion de la succession ” was the resu lt o f m uch discussion. H a k k i
P asha desired t o say “ les a ffaires in té r ie u r e s ,” to w hich we in sisted on a d d in g “ et ex té rie u re s,”
w ith ou t w hich n eith er th e om ission o f referen ce to su zerain ty or sov ereig n ty n or th e rig h t to
locate a T u rk ish a g e n t a t K o w e it w ould be safe. R a th e r th a n a ccep t this, H a k k i P ash a w ould
om it “ in térieu res e t extérieu res ” a ltog eth er, an d we agreed t o this su b ject to th e sign a tu re
o f a separate secret note defin in g “ a ffa ir e s ” as “ in térieu res e t ex té rie u re s.” T o th is note
H a k k i desired to add th a t the Sheikh had n ot th e rig h t to con clu d e trea ties {tr a ité ). In his
c o u n te r d r a ft he had ha d a clause to the effect t h a t the Sheikh cou ld n ot in fu tu r e con clu d e
p o litica l agreem ents w ith fo r e ig n pow ers, and t h a t econ om ic agreem en ts w ou ld req u ire the
sa n ction o f the T urkish G o v e r n m e n t; b u t we h a d stru ck th is out. W e a greed to th e a d d ition
to the note, w ith the in sertion of the w ord s “ con tra ire à la présen te co n v e n tio n .” I t is
im p rob ab le th a t w e shall ev er a ga in w an t to m ake a p o litica l tre a ty w ith K o w e it w h ich w ould
con flict w ith th e con v en tion so lon g as the T u rk s observe it. T he w ord “ t r a i t é ” w ou ld not,
presum ably, cov er a lease o f la n d ; b u t even th a t w e are u n lik ely to w ant. H a k k i P ash a fu rth e r
claim ed to reg u la te the succession in the S h eik h ’ s fa m ily . T his we ob jected to, p a rtly because
it a d m itted T u rk ish in terferen ce, p a rtly because it is co n tr a r y to B ritish p olicy t o recogn ise
any b u t th e d e fa c to ruler. T he form u la w hich H a k k i was in d u ced to a ccep t— th a t th e T urks
w ill nam e the successor a k aim m akam — is in nocuous.
In respect o f A r tic le 3 we w ere in som e d o u b t as to w hether the B ritish rig h t o f p re ­
em p tion ov er certa in lands (in clu d in g W a rb a I s la n d ),'g iv e n by th e lea se-ag reem en t o f 1907,
should be sp ecifically m en tion ed in th e C on v en tion . W e w ere b oth a greed th a t it w ould be
very im p o litic to in trod u ce it at the eleven th h ou r unless it was absolutely necessary. It
seem ed to be u nnecessary fo r th ree reasons, (a) I t w as ca refu lly con sid ered last sum m er w hat
should be com m u n ica ted to the T urks, an d n eith er S ir P . C ox n or the G overn m en t o f In d ia ,
nor the I n d ia Office, n or the F o re ig n Office, th en suggested m e n tion in g the rig h t o f p re ­
em ption . (?;) T he w ord in g o f the C on v en tion is v ery v a g u e ; “ la v a lid ité des concession s de
terra in s.” I f th e area o f the g rou n d leased had been defined, th e T u rk s m ig h t h a ve accused
us o f bad fa ith i f it w ere a fterw a rd s to a p p ea r th a t w e had rig h ts ov er oth er g r o u n d ; as it is,
we m ig h t have leased th e w hole o f K ow eit. (c) N ow th a t W a rb a an d th e a d ja cen t te r r ito r y
is form ally secu red to K o w eit, w hile the ra ilw ay is only to be con tin u ed to K o w e it on con d ition s
to be a greed t o b y us, th e rig h t o f pre-em p tion loses m uch o f its im p orta n ce, its o b je c t h a v in g
been to p rev en t th e term in u s o f th e ra ilw ay from fa llin g in to fo r e ig n hands. W e finally
decid ed n ot t o raise the question.
A r tic le 4.— H a k k i P asha was v ery a n xiou s t o ha ve a re-assertion o f L o rd L a n sd ow n e’ s
assurances o f 1901,( 3) and th ere seem ed no su b sta n tia l ob je c tio n to m a k in g it.
A r tic les 5 and 7.— I t seem ed advisable to m ake the concession recog n isin g tw o k in ds o f
K o w e it te rr ito ry , an d in retu rn fo r it w e g ot a rectifica tion o f ou r orig in a l sou th ern b ord er,
so as to in clu d e A n t a ’ a. W a rb a an d B u b iy a n , o f course, w ere difficult fo r him to surren d er,
b u t we in sisted. A r ticle 6 secures fo r all p ra ctica l pu rposes the same a u ton om y fo r th e Sheikh
in the la rg er as in th e sm aller area. W e refu sed to allow a rig h t o f w ay fo r T u rk ish troop s.
In A r tic le 8 H a k k i P asha t rie d to com m it us to T u rk ish p r o te ctio n fo r the lin e and
T urkish custom s. T he w ord in g a d op ted leaves a ll such q u estion s open , w hile m a k in g th eir
u ltim a te solu tion su b ject to B ritish a pprov al.
A r tic le s 1 0 -1 3 ev ic t the T u rk s com p letely fr o m B a h rein and E l K a t r . I n ex ch a n g e w e g iv e
them the island o f Z a k h n u n iy a (fo r w hich, how ever, th ey w ill p a y th e S heikh o f B a h rein
£1,000) and a sm all strip o f coast. T h e sa feg u a rd s req u ired b y the G overn m en t o f I n d ia have
bee'n secured. W e u n d erta k e n ot to annex B a h rein (b u t not, as H a k k i P ash a desired, to abstain
from a lterin g th e n a tu re o f ou r relation s w ith it), and we u n d erta k e th a t the Sheikh o f
B a hrein shall n o t a n n ex E l K a tr .
I I I . In th e d ecla ra tion reg a rd in g th e fr o n tie r nea r M oh a m m era a slig h t concession was
m ade (a fte r con su lta tion w ith S ir P . C ox ) in th e n orth ern p a rt o f the line, w hich w ill sta rt at
Um C hir and lea v e K u sk h -i-B a s ri to T u rk ey . On the S hat itself th ere w as a d ire c t co n flict of
op in ion b etw een H a k k i P asha an d ourselves as to w h at the sta tu s quo is, he m a in ta in in g th a t
the te r r ito r y b etw een D ia iji and th e N a h r N a za ileh is in effectiv e T u rk ish occ u p a tio n , w hile
we m a in ta in ed th e con tra ry . F in a lly he a cce p te d ou r lin e w ith the p rov iso t h a t if, on
d elim itation , it is fou n d th a t the t e r r it o r y in q u estion was in effectiv e T urkish o cc u p a tio n on
1st J a n u a ry la st, the lin e shall be rectified a ccord in g ly . T here is v ery little lik elih ood th a t
this w ill prov e to be th e case, b u t it m a y b e n oted th a t, even if it does, w e g e t a ra th er b etter
line th a n t h a t -g iv e n by th e M e d ia tin g C om m issioners in 1850, w hich le ft th e Sheikhs o f
M oha m m era ’ s pa lace a t F a iliy e h in T u rk ish te rr ito ry .
H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t have, o f course, to secure P ersia n a ccep ta n ce o f the line.
I V . T he B ritish M em oran d u m o f 18th J u ly , 1912, enclosed a d r a ft con v en tion on ra ilw ay
m atters b u t H a k k i P asha p ro p o u n d e d a co u n te r d r a ft. T h is was q u ite u n a ccep ta b le, and the
B oa rd o f T ra d e prep a red an a ltern a tiv e, w hich H a k k i P ash a ev en tu a lly a ccep ted w ith som e
a lteration s (also prep a red b y B oa rd o f T ra d e) d esig n ed t o a v oid fre q u e n t disp u tes in v olv in g
a rb itra tion . S ir H . L lew ellyn S m ith to o k p a rt in th e discussion on th is subject, an d it is
(3) [cp . sup ra , p. 49, E d. V o i e .]
[10900J 1 2
 110

u n d erstood th a t he consid ers th e resu lt as sa tis fa ctory as any d ocu m en t is lik ely to be. Som e
a d d itio n a l sa feg u a rd a ga in st u n fa ir d ifferen tia tion in rates w ill he a fford ed b y th e presence
o f B ritish d irectors on th e B oa rd . A ltera tion s in rates, a cco r d in g to H a k k i P asha, req u ire
the sa n ction o f th e T urkish G overnm ent, an d it should be possible fo r th e B ritish d irectors to
w arn H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t if any a ltera tion a d versely a ffectin g B ritish tra d e is p roposed ;
hut to o m u ch stress m ust n ot he la id on this, since it has been im possible t o p r ov id e th a t the
d irectors shall actu a lly be nom in ees of H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t.(4)
L O U IS M A L L E T .
A R T H U R H IR T Z E L .
3 rd M a y, 1913.
M IN U T E S .
F.O . 2 0 6 6 2 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 .
S ir L . M a llet asked m e to send in th is rep ort, a tta ch in g th e a greem en ts (4) w hich H a k k i
P ash a has a ccep ted, su b ject to con firm ation by th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t. W e should a t once
com m u n ica te to th e R u ssia n G o v [e rn m e n ]t, and to M . de G iers a t C on stan tin op le, the d r a ft
a greem en t abou t th e M oham m erah fr o n tie r ; and a com m u n ica tion to th e R u ssia n and F ren ch
G o v [e rn m e n ]ts , defin in g ou r presen t a ttitu d e on th e B a g d a d ra ilw a y qu estion , (as in d ic a te d
in on e o f the a n n exed d r a ft con v en tion s) is now b e in g prepa red . (S ir A. N icolson m ade this
co m m u n [ic a t io n ] verb ally on M a y 8).
O ne o f th e a greem ents w e desire w ith T u rk ey , th a t re la tin g to n a v ig a tio n rig h ts on the
T ig ris and E u p h ra tes,(5) is n ot a n n exed , because H a k k i P asha has p rod u ced a cou n ter-d ra ft.
H e is com in g a ga in on T u esda y (M a y 6) to discuss this w ith S ir A. H irtze l, S ir H . L l[e w e lly n ]
S m ith , and m e ; and S ir L. M a llet ex p la in e d his view s to m e b efore he w en t on leave.
S ir L. M a lle t’ s id ea was th a t the d r a ft agreem ents m ig h t possibly be in itia lle d on M a y 6,
b u t I p ropose to tell H a k k i P ash a th a t S ir E. G rey has n ot y e t had tim e t o read them .
I t w ill b e necessary to draw up a fu r th e r agreem en t p r o v id in g fo r th e rem oval o f the
T u rk ish v eto on the b o rro w in g pow ers o f E g y p t.
H a k k i P asha has also p rod u ced a list o f th e desid era ta o f th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t, who
w an t u s(6) : —
1) T o a gree to an in crea se o f th e custom s from 11% to 15% ad v a lorem fo r an in defin ite
p eriod , and not m erely fo r seven years. (T his S ir L. M a llet th ou g h t w e should concede, subject
o f cou rse to the assent o f all the P ow ers b ein g likew ise g iv en ).
2) T o a gree to th e su b stitu tion , in du e course, o f a specific ta riff for an ad valorem one.
This, I thin k, we can a gree to in p r in c ip le , if oth er P ow ers do so, b u t w e should o f course
stip u la te th a t the deta ils m ust be the su b ject o f n eg otia tion . T he p o in t is, how ever, p rim a rily
one fo r the C o m in [e rc ia ]l D e p [a r tm e n ]t an d th e B [ o a r d ] o f T [r a d e ] , to w hom it is b e in g
referred .
3) T o a gree t o the tem ettu ta x. T his we ca n do su b ject to the assent o f the oth er P ow ers.
4) T o a gree t o the a bolition o f th e fo r e ig n P o st Offices, w hich en ta il a serious loss o f
rev en u e on T urkey.
T h e P ost Office w ere recen tly op p osed to this, an d so was S ir G. L ow th er. I thin k, how ever,
w e m ig h t refer th e p o in t afresh to b oth th e P [o s t ] 0 [ffic e ] and S ir G. L o w th e r ,(7) and th a t
w e m ig h t in th e m eanw hile rep ly t o H a k k i P ash a th a t we w ill re-exa m in e the question, b u t
th a t w e ca n n ot com m it ourselves t o a fa v ou ra b le decision.
5) T h a t H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] should “ a gree to s t u d y ” the p ossib ility of
a bolish in g the C a p itu la tion s— a step w hich w ould im m easurably g r a t ify T urkey.
I know th a t the gen era l fe e lin g a t th e Em bassies a t C o n s [t a n tin o ]p le is a ga in st any
a tte m p t a t abolish in g the C a pitu la tion s.
T he T u rk s have, how ever, been so a ccom m od a tin g in these n e g otia tion s th a t it w ould be
sa tis fa cto ry i f we cou ld g ra tify th eir am ou r p ro p re b y n ot re tu rn in g a flat refusal to th eir
request, w hich a fte r all is m erely one th a t we should n ot “ refuse to stud y ” th e question.
I th in k w e m ig h t say th a t we do n ot th in k th e m a jority o f the P ow ers w ou ld a gree to th e
a b olition o f the ca p itu la tion s in p resen t con d ition s, b u t th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ]
a re nevertheless p repa red , w hile reserv in g th eir final decision, to en ter up on a stud y o f th e
w hole question , w ith a view to d e c id in g if, un d er certa in con d ition s, (ju d icia l and oth er) they
cou ld , in con cert w ith th e oth er P ow ers, a gree to a m odifica tion o f the ca p itu la to ry regim e.
I th in k S ir L. M a llet, w ith w hom I discussed the p oin t, was o f this op in ion .

(4) [I n the sign ed co p y o f this re p o rt th ere was an a d d ition a l p a ra g ra p h Y re fe rrin g to the

N a v ig a tio n o f the E u p h ra tes and T ig ris. T h is was, how ever, deleted, and th ere is a m a rgin a l
note by M r. A. P a r k e r : “ (See su p plem en tary rep ort.) ” T he S u p p lem en ta ry R e p o r t has th ere­
fo r e been added at th e end o f these m in u tes.]
(5) [cp . in fra , p. 159, N o. 102, encl.]
( 6) [M a r g in a l n ote b y M r. P a r k e r : “ See 20107. [A . P . ] ” v. supra, p. 96, No. 64.]
I7) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. P a r k e r : “ See 20107. [A . P . ] ” T he letters t o S ir G. L ow th er
an d to th e P o st Office w ere sent on M a y 9. T hey are n ot rep rod u ced .]
 117
I propose, how ever, m erely to tell H a k k i P ash a th a t w e w ill send him a w ritten rep ly
reg a rd in g th e T urkish desid era ta. ^ p
M a y 5, 1913.
R . P. M.
S ir A . N icolson spoke in g en era l term s to th e S e c [ r e t a r ]y o f S ta te on the above, w ho says
the agreem ents m ay be in itia lle d ad r e fer en d u m , b u t th a t th ey m ust be su b m itted to the
C a bin et b e fo re final a p p rov al. ^ p
M ay 7.
I have now read these docu m en ts— w hich I u n d ersta n d w ere in itia lled y esterd ay . So fa r
as I can ju d g e they are on the w hole q u ite sa tis fa cto ry in respect to th e m a in ten a n ce and
sa feg u a rd in g o f ou r rig h ts and in terests— and e v id en tly ou r n e g o tia to rs have g iven v ery ca refu l
con sid era tion a n d have dev oted g rea t pa in s and a tte n tio n to the m a tter— and I w ou ld subm it
they should be cord ia lly thanked. T he n a v ig a tion o f the T ig ris and E u p h ra tes has been held
ov er— as th ere are several p oin ts still u n settled — and H a k k i P [a s h ] a ’ s desid era ta can be
exam ined and discussed la ter. I w ou ld su g g est th e R e p o r t and th e D r a ft C on v en tion be now
su b m itted to the C a bin et.( 8) ^

P ro ceed as proposed. I am m uch im pressed b y th e a m ou n t o f w ork d on e and co n g r a tu la te

those en g a g ed in it on th e s a tis fa cto ry con clu sion to w hich they h a ve b ro u g h t it.
' E. G.

S u p p lem e n ta r y R e p o rt.
F.O. 2 4 5 2 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
V .— N a v ig a tio n o f th e R iv e rs T ig ris and E u p h ra tes.
A D r a ft D ecla ra tion by the T urkish G overn m en t on th is su b ject has now been in itia lle d
ad re fer en d u m by H a k k i P asha and S ir H . L lew ellyn Sm ith. The d r a ft was p rep a red by the
la tter, and is th e result o f m uch a n xiou s con sid era tion by the B ritish rep resen ta tives, w ho have
had the benefit o f the adv ice o f L o rd In ch ca p e and M r. H u th J ack son , and w ho have also
rep eated ly discussed w ith M r. H . F. B. L yn ch the p osition and am bition s o f his C om p an y, w hich,
at present, alon e represen ts B ritish in terests on these rivers.
The m ain ob ject o f H is M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t is to secure effectiv e com p etition betw een
riv er-b orn e traffic and the R a ilw ay , i f and w hen th e la tte r is ex ten d ed from B a g d a d to Basra,
this b ein g a necessary corolla ry o f the w ith d ra w a l o f ou r ob jection s to the ex ten sion . In the
first in stance, th e B ritish M em oran d u m o f th e 18th J u ly , 1912,( 9) had asked fo r th ree a d d ition a l
ships, w hich it was th ou g h t w ould , w ith M essrs. L y n c h ’ s e x istin g fleet, suffice fo r th a t pu rpose.
B u t dou bts su ggested them selves, and the B oa rd o f T ra de and I n d ia Office h a vin g in d ep en d en tly
com e to the con clu sion th a t it w ou ld be b etter served by som e am alga m ation o f e x istin g T urkish
and B ritish in terests, w hich w ould secure con trol fo r the la tter, it w as d ecid ed to p u t forw a rd
a proposal to this effect to H a k k i P asha, w ho had a lrea d y in tim a ted th a t a m alga m ation was
fa v ou red by th e T urkish G overnm ent, w hile the G erm an G overn m en t had in d ica te d th e ir
w illingness to w ith d ra w from th e n a v ig a tion on certa in con d ition s. I t w as th ou g h t sim pler to
p roceed by w ay o f a D ecla ra tion em b od y in g the m ain p rin cip les in a form as sa tis fa ctory as
possible to T u rk ish am ou r-p rop re, and to lea ve th e deta ils— up on w hich the effectiveness of
B ritish co n tr o l w ill la rg ely d ep en d— to be settled by a C on v en tion b etw een the O ttom an
G overnm ent and the B ritish concessionna ire. I t w ill be necessary th a t th is C on v en tion should
be sign ed b efore the custom s in crease is finally a p p rov ed . I t is prop osed th a t the con cession ­
naire should be L o rd In ch cap e, b u t th a t M r. L y n ch should be a d m itted to a share (n ot, how ever,
a m ou n tin g to co n tr o l) in the new C om p any and should h a ve a seat on th e B oard .
The D ecla r a tio n also prov id es (clause 7) th a t the L yn ch C om p any should co n tin u e as a
separate b od y on the basis o f w h at H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t are prep a red to reg a rd as its
actual rights. T he B ritish flag w ill thus rem a in on the river, and a B ritish u n d e rta k in g w hich
has been in ex isten ce fo r ov er h a lf a cen tu ry need n ot lose its id e n tity . T his is m uch less than
M r. L ynch claim s, b u t it is con sid ered in ad visa ble th a t he should con trol b oth his ow n ex istin g
Com pany and the new one. A t the sam e tim e, his C om p an y has been the p ion eer in the riv er
n a vig ation , and is th erefore ju stified in e x p e c tin g som e p r io r ity o f rights. I t has th erefore
been a rra n g ed w ith L o rd In ch cap e th a t M r. L y n ch should receive, ov er and above th e shares
he m ay choose to ta k e up in the new C om pany, a certain n u m ber o f fu lly p a id -u p shares as a
solatium .
I t is in ten d ed th a t g u aran tees shall b e g iv en th a t b oth th e B ritish p a rt o f the new
Com pany and M essrs. L yn ch shall rem ain p erm an en tly un d er effectiv e B ritish con trol.
H . L L E W E L L Y N S M IT H .
A R T H U R H IR T Z E L .
M a y 28, 1913. A L W Y N P A R K E R .]

(*) [M a r g in a l n ote b y M r. P a r k e r : “ T h is is b e in g don e. A. P . M a y 27, 1913.” ]

(9) [cp. sup ra , p. 78, N o. 55, encl.]
 118
N o. G9.

M inute by M r. Parker.(*)

ICO. 2 1 6 1 1 /6 4 0 8 /1 8 /4 4 . F oreign Office, May 9, 1918.

In accordance with Sir A. N icolson’ s instructions I saw H err von Kuehlmann
again to-day. (2)
I said that we had to-day com m unicated a statement (of which, for facility of
reference I attach a copy) to Hakki Pasha about the navigation of the Euphrates and
Tigris. I explained to H err von Kuehlm ann the substance of the paragraphs marked
in b lu e,(3) and I said that we had worded these paragraphs in such a manner because
we did not wish at this stage to divulge to Hakki Pasha that the Germans had told us
that they would disinterest themselves in the river [s ] ; though we should of course count
on their doing so if the proposals H err von Kuehlmann had com m unicated to me on
May 7 were accepted.(4)
H e said he fully appreciated the course we had adopted; and he understood the
true inwardness of the wording used in the com m unication to Hakki Pasha.
After some general conversation, I said to him that a rumour had reached us,
both from Bagdad and through a certain H err Euthe in London (th o [u g h ] I asked
him not to m ention Herr R uthe’ s name) that the Bagdad Railway Company were
contem plating a change o f tracé for the main line from Mosul to Bagdad, so as to
pass via Khanikine. I said that we did not wish to be inquisitive, but the alteration
if made would of course be important, and we should be glad if the Germans could
give us any inform ation on the point. H e said he did not know, but that he would
telegraph to Berlin to enquire : I asked him not to telegraph, as the matter did not
press.
H e then said that he would like to warn me about H err Ruthe : he was a
perfectly honest, though somewhat garrulous individual; he had no direct connection
with the Deutsche Bank, but was anxious ‘ "d e se faire valoir,” and he was a great
friend of Mr. Lynch. He was, m oreover, always preaching in the German press on
the theme that the Bagdad Railway should stop at Bagdad and not go on to
Bussorah— ideas which Herr von Kuehlmann thought m ight be traced to the
financial interests of Mr. Lynch. As a matter of fact, the Bagdad Railway Company,
and the Deutsche Bank, and the German G ov [ern m en ]t, attached the greatest
importance to the construction of the Bagdad-Bussorah section : he thought it well
to make it plain that H err Ruthe had no sort of mandate from either the German
G ov [ern m en ]t or the Deutsche Bank to negotiate on railway questions. I replied to
H err von Kuehlmann that this applied equally, mutatis mutandis, to Mr. Lynch. He
had no authority to enter into any negotiations about the railway on the part of II [is]
M [a je s ty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ], and anything he might say should be treated with great
circum spection.
H err Kuehlm ann then told me that some years ago he had noticed that a
great deal of the opposition to the Bagdad Railway in the English press emanated
from Mr. L y n ch ; and Herr K uehlm ann had accordingly recomm ended the Company
to give Mr. L ynch a job : consequently the arrangement had been made for
Mr. L y n ch ’ s steamers to convey material for constructing the Railway, and since then
M rr L ynch had becom e strongly in favour o f Anglo-German co-operation, and the press
agitation had diminished.
A. R.
May 9, 1918.
A. N.

( 1) [A cop y o f th is m in u te was sent to th e C om m ittee of Im p eria l D e fe n c e .]

( 2) [cp. P rin ce L ich n ow sk y 's re p o rt o f this date, G.P., X X X V I [ (I), p. 173. T he nam e of
S a id R u e te is not m en tion ed in this re p o rt, b u t cp. ibid., p. 224, n otes.]
(•■’) (Show n here in ita lics.]
C ) [ v. supra, pp. 97-8, N o. 66.]
 119

E n clo s u re in N o. 69.
Statem ent com m unicated to H akki Pasha, May 9, 1913.
Confidential.
W e have been asked by Hakki Pasha to consider whether His M ajesty’ s
Government would prefer a solution o f the E iver navigation question on the lines of
(1) the draft Convention already discussed,(5j or
(2) the abortive L yn ch Convention of 1909, or
(3) the maintenance of the existing British Company as a separate enterprise
and subj’ect to the maintenance of its rights the grant of a Concession to a new
Ottoman Company join tly controlled and financed, of exclusive rights to steam
navigation on the Bivers.
It is obvious that so m uch must depend on the details of any scheme that only a
provisional indication of views can be given at the present stage. Subject, however,
to the satisfactory adjustment of the detailed arrangements, we are at present disposed
towards a solution on the lines of the third alternative, which will have the advantage
of avoiding the difficulty of the Elag.
4 s regards the com position of the new Ottoman Company, Hakki Pasha suggested
a tripartite arrangem ent under which one-third o f the capital would be Turkish,
one-third British and one-third would be supplied by the Belgian Company fo r the
transport o f materials for the Bagdad Railway. 4 s the capital of the last named
Company is half British and half German, the effect of this would be that half the
capital would be British, one-third Turkish and one-sixth German.
4 s regards this proposed division of capital, we m ust be free to arrange with the
Germans as to the allocation betw een the two countries of the Anglo-G erm an share.
In the even t o f the Germans forgoing their share we should be willing that this should
be divided equally betw een Great Britain and Turkey.
The limits and period of the Concession should be generally on the lines already
discussed between us. It would no doubt be necessary to provide some means whereby
a fair share o f the future expansion of the trade of the Bivers would be earned by the
British Company, which otherwise m ight find itself driven out by the com petition of
the new Company.
If an arrangement on the above lines com m ends itself to the Im perial Ottoman
Government, it will probably be sufficient to make it the subject of a declaration,
leaving the details of the Concession to be worked out between the Imperial Ottoman
Government and the Concessionnaire.
It would be useful if some indication could be given of the paym ent which the
Imperial Ottoman Governm ent would expect in return for transferring to the new
Company its interests in the navigation of the Bivers.
H. L L . S.
A. H .
May 9, 1913. A. P.
(5) [A rou g h d r a ft was receiv ed from H a k k i P ash a on A p ril 17, 1913. A cop y w as sent to
the B oa rd o f T ra d e on th e same date. T he rep ly from th e B oa rd o f T ra de, o f A p r il 25, 1913,
enclosed a revised d ra ft. T h eir com m u n ica tion is m in u ted : “ These tw o d r a fts w ere discussed
by S ir L. M a llet and S ir A . H irtz e l w ith H a k k i P ash a on A p [ r i l] 25. H . N. A p [ r i l] 26, 1913.”
(F.O. 1 9 2 4 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .) T he te x t, in itia lled on M a y 20, is g iv en in fra , pp. 158-9, N o. 102, encl.]

No. 70.
Communication from M. de Fleuriau.C)
F.O. 2 2 1 9 6 /2 2 1 9 6 /13 4 4 . London, M ay 13, 1913.
L ’ Ambassade de France à Constantinople a récemm ent remis à la Sublime Porte
deux notes verbales indiquant les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement de la
G ) [T h is com m u n ica tion is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to S ir P . H a rv e y .]
 120

République serait disposé à autoriser la perception sur ses ressortissants de l ’ impôt

des revenus mobiliers, conform ém ent au projet élaboré par la Commission des réformes
financières. La première de ces notes, conform e à un teste identique rédigé de concert
par les diverses Ambassades, est relative à des conditions qui sont com m unes à toutes
les Puissances; la seconde est relative à des conditions qui sont particulières au
Gouvernement Français.(2) _ (
Mais, en dehors de ces deux ordres de conditions, le Gouvernement Français s’ est
demandé s’ il n ’y aurait pas lieu, avant de consentir définitivement à la perception de
l ’ impot sur les revenus mobiliers, de spécifier que le produit de cet impôt ne saurait
être affecté au service des emprunts du chem in de fer de Bagdad. Il se pourrait en
effet que, s ’ appuyant sur une disposition du décret du 28 Mouharrem 1299, relative à
l ’ impot des patentes, l ’ Administration de la Dette Publique prétendit faire verser
dans ses caisses l ’ excédent de l ’ impot sur les revenus mobiliers, qui doit comprendre
les patentes. Dans ce cas, 75% de la part encaissée par la Dette Publique devraient,
en vertu des Conventions du chem in de fer de Bagdad, en date des 2 Juin 1908(3)
et 21 Mars 1911,(4) être affectés au service des séries 2 à 6 des emprunts de cette
entreprise. Or le Gouvernement Français ne saurait consentir à soumettre ses
ressortissants à l ’ impôt sur les revenus mobiliers qu ’ afin de fournir des ressources au
Gouvernement Ottoman ; il ne pourrait imposer cette charge aux Français dans le but
de faciliter l ’ achèvement d ’ une entreprise particulière, com m e celle du chemin de fer
de B agdad; il lui semblerait donc opportun de ne donner son assentiment à l ’ applica­
tion de l ’ impôt sur les revenus mobiliers qu’ en spécifiant des réserves semblables à
celles déjà faites pour l ’ augmentation des droits de douane ottomans. _
Si telle était également l ’ opinion du Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat pour les Affaires
Etrangères, il y aurait lieu d ’ exercer à Constantinople une action commune de la
France, de l ’ Angleterre et de la Russie en vue de soustraire le produit de l ’ impôt sur
les valeurs mobilières à la garantie du chemin de fer de Bagdad.
M. de Fleuriau saisit, Ac.
M IN U T E S .
T his is a difficult position : we ca n h a rd ly a d op t th e F ren ch su g g estion w ith ou t offen din g
the G erm ans— I th in k , how ever, th a t w e should rep ly th a t, in the view o f H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ] th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y C o [m p a n y ] should b e e n titled to receive, in the
a rra n g em en ts m ade fo r fin an cia l rea dju stm en t in T u rk ey , a deq u ate g u aran tees fo r th e com ­
p letion of th e r [ a i ] l [ w a ] y and ce r ta in ly com p en sa tion (in th e shape o f fresh secu rity) fo r any
revenues th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t m a y lose as th e resu lt o f th e w ar— b u t w hich a t present
are p ledg ed to th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y C o [m p a n y ] ; T h at if this is don e th e im p orta n ce of
these p a rticu la r revenues (i.e., th e ta x on personal p rop erty ) to th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y Co.,
w ould be d im in ish ed ; b u t th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] m ust con su lt the Em bassy at
Cons [t a n t in o ] pie in th e first instance.
C o m m [e r cia ]l D e p [a r tin e n ]t.
Q [u e r ]y , a ct a ccord in gly , and send co p y to Cons [t a n t in o ] ple.(s) (I m m [e d ia t]e .)
A . P.
M a v 15th, 1913.
R . P . M.
T he a rgum ents used by th e F re n ch Em bassy are n ot easy to answ er— and one h a rd ly likes
ta x in g ou r peop le fo r the sake o f th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y C o [m p a n y ], In ou r rep ly to the
F ren ch Em bassy and in any a ction w e m ay ta k e at Cons [ta n tin o ] pie I s h [o u l]d n ot allude to
th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y C o [m p a n y ],— th ey can look a fte r them selves— b u t we should I subm it
a gree w ith the gen era l p rin cip le th a t th e p rod u ce o f the “ tem ettu ” s h [o u l]d be d ev oted to
the gen era l pu rposes of th e E m p ire— b u t first consult Cons [t a n t in o ] pie.
A . N.
T he g rou n d we should ta k e is as S ir A. N icolson suggests th a t in crea sed ta x a tio n to which
ou r consent is necessary should g o t o g en era l im p rov em en t of the a d m in istration . P erh a p s a
suitab le schem e of reform s fo r A sia M in o r should be a co n d itio n and th e cost o f it d efra yed as
fa r as possible out o f the in crea sed t a x a tio n a greed to by the P ow ers.

G ) [cp . D .D .F ., Zmt S ér., V ol. V I , pp . 580-2, N o. 518, and n o te (*).]

(3) [>. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 76 -8 4.]
(4) [cp. supra, pp. 3 4-5, N o. 23.]
(5) [A teleg ram based on these m in u tes was sent to S ir G. L ow th er (N o. 224) on M a y 26,
1913, D. 5 .2 0 p . m . (F .O . 2 2 1 9 6 /2 2 1 9 6 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
 121

I t is in v id iou s to sin gle o u t th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y fo r sp ecial ob jection .

B u t we m u st also discuss w ith M . Cam bon w hat ou r a ttitu d e should be to secu rities for
the B a g d a d R [ a i lw a ]y — and I w ou ld su g g est to him th a t th e G erm ans should be fa ir ly m et in
the discussions a t P a r is as reg a rd s p la cin g th e B a g d a d R [ a i lw a ]y in a p osition as reg a rd s
secu rities n ot less fa v ou ra b le than th e p os ition th a t it occu p ied b efore th e w a r : t h a t in return
the G erm ans should agree th a t th e in creased rev en u e, w hich T u rk ey w ill req u ire to p u t herself
on h er feet, should g o to th is pu rp ose (w hich in clu d es restora tion o f ord er in A sia M in o r) and
should n ot be fu r th e r b u rd en ed fo r th e B a g d a d R [a ilw a ]y . T he m a tter can b e discussed
v erbally in th e first in stan ce on these lines w hen M. C am bon returns.
E. G.

No. 71.

M inute by Mr. P a rk er.(l)

F .O . 2 20 7 8 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, May 13, 1913.

An interview took place to-day between Hakki Pasha, Sir H . L l[e w e lly n ] Smith,
and Sir A. H irtzel and m yself regarding the Mesopotamian navigation question : the
discussion on this subject was only tentative, and I need make no record o f it, as it
was arranged that a further interview should take place on Friday afternoon.
(I m ay, however, m ention parenthetically that we subsequently ascertained from
Lord Inchcape that he is prepared to put up ¿6100,000 to buy L yn ch out from the
navigation, or to co-operate with L yn ch if he c a n [n o ]t be bought out.)
The question o f the Turkish veto on E gyptian borrowing powers then came up
for discussion; and Sir H . L l[ew elly n ] Smith and Sir A. H irtzel then left.
I showed Hakki Pasha the draft declaration providing for the renunciation of the
veto by Turkey,— the draft being based on a telegram just received from Lord
K itchen er.(2) Hakki Pasha said that this was the most difficult question o f all, as
Turkey could not abandon her right of veto without parliam entary consent, and that
Tewfik Pasha would speak to Sir A. Nicolson on the subject. I asked him if he could
suggest any change of wording as he seemed specially to object to the proposed form
of Declaration (annexed). H e said he would think it ov er; but he repeated that it
was a very difficult point to settle. I replied that this was very unfortunate, as H [is ]
M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] had from the first made the removal of the veto a principal
condition of their assent to the customs increase. H e then suggested that a possible
way of m eeting the case would be for Turkey to agree now to one very large loan to
be raised in instalments over a number of years. I said that I was convinced that
nothing short of an absolute renunciation of the right of veto would be satisfactory.
Hakki Pasha then said that the Porte had been much disturbed by the join t note
sent in by the British and Russian G ov [ern m en ]ts on M ay 3rd(3) about the Turco-
Persian frontier, as Turkey had expected far more com pensation in Zohab for her
conciliatory attitude elsewhere. I replied that I had seen the note (of which he had
a copy), and, looking on the question historically, I was m uch struck by the
advantageous concessions made to Turkey. H e said that, as his name was m entioned
in the joint note, the note had been referred to him, and could I help him , by going
over the proposed line on the map, to advise the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t as to the
reasons for accepting the joint note. I said that I was not authorised to discuss this
question, and that I must first ask for perm ission to do so. H e said that as his only
( /) [T h is docu m en t is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to M r. V a n sitta r t. A c o p y was sent
to C a iro.]
( 2) [L o rd K it c h e n e r ’ s teleg ram (N o. 53) o f M a y 10, 1913, D . 3 1 0 p . m ., R . 10 p . m ., is not
rep rod u ced . (F .O . 2 1 6 9 2 /2 1 2 4 9 /1 3 /4 4 .) F o r his p rop osed form u la v. th e d ecla ra tion at th e end
o f the p resen t d ocu m en t.]
(3) [S ir G. L o w th e r’ s despa tch (N o. 360), D . A p ril 29, R . M a y 3, 1913, is n ot rep rod u ced .
A cop y o f th e n ote to the O ttom an M in is te r fo r F o re ig n A ffairs was enclosed in it.
(F .O . 2 0 3 3 1 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .) In his teleg ram (N o. 219) o f M a y 5, 1913, D . 10 a . m ., R . 11-55 a . m .
he sta ted th a t th e note was sent on M a y 3, t h a t the R u ssia n A m b assa dor ha d presen ted his
n ote on th e sam e day and ha d u rg ed the G ra n d V iz ie r to a ccep t it. (F .O . 2 0 5 8 9 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .)
cp. in fra , p. 151, N o. 95.]
 122

object was to reach a settlement, surely there could be no objection to unofficial

conversation. I said I would let him know after speaking to Sir Arthur Nicolson.
He then said the Russian attitude was most unreasonable : they even claimed
that Vazné was Persian,— a place which had been incontestably Turkish for centuries.
I said that as it was in the “ disputed z o n e ” the ownership was clearly contested;
but as a matter of fact Sir H enry Rawlinson, an impartial witness, described it in
1844 as Persian.
A. P.
M ay 13, 1913.

Déclaration.
L e Gouvernement Im perial Ottoman declare que le Gouvernement Khédivial a la
disposition complète et entière des affaires financières de l ’ E gypte, ainsi que pleine
faculté de contracter, à tout m oment et sans l ’ autorisation du Gouvernement Impérial
Ottoman, tels emprunts, soit intérieurs soit à l ’ étranger, qu’ il jugera nécessaires.
Parafée ad referendum.

M IN U T E .
I h a v e to ld M r . P a r k e r h e c a n d isc u ss t h e fr o n t ie r q u e s tio n w ith H a k k i P [a s h ]a .
A. N.
E. G.

No. 72.

Sir E. G oschen to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 2 2 5 9 0 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 185.) Berlin, D. May 15, 1913.
Sir, R. May 17, 1913.
The German Press has been somewffiat exercised in its mind as to the negotiations
being carried on in London between H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Porte on the
subject of Koweit and the Bagdad Railw-av, especially as to the manner in which
German interests will be affected. According to some Press reports Germany has
given her consent to the arrangement, while other papers maintain that the agreement
bears an Anglo-Russian character and was concluded over Germ any’ s head.
Conspicuous among these latter papers is the “ Vossische Zeitung,” which publishes
a telegram from its Paris correspondent to the effect that a new treaty has been
concluded between His M ajesty’ s Governm ent and Turkey giving to the former
paramount influence over the Bassorah-Ivoweit section of the Bagdad Railway. “ In
return for this,” the telegram continues, “ England undertakes to build up the harbour
of Bassorah, which is of great importance to the Bagdad Railway. On the Turco-
Persian frontier, Turkey cedes the territory of Urmia, a concession obtained by
England in the interests of Russia, in return for Russian support.” The telegram
concludes by outlining the other provisions of the agreement, including the reforms
in Anatolia and Syria promised by Turkey.
In com m enting on its correspondent’ s telegram the “ Vossische Zeitung,” after
expressing the hope that E ngland’ s role of honest broker during the Balkan crisis was
not prompted by self interest, and after admitting that the above mentioned terms
contained in themselves nothing objectionable to Germany, says that it will be
impossible to judge whether England has been playing fair in the Koweit question till
the badly-needed German official statement on the subject appears.
This official statement has now appeared in the form of the following telegram
to the ‘ ‘ Kölnische Zeitung ’ ’ :—
“ The press has been busy discussing the negotiations now in progress between
England and Turkey about the Bagdad Railway. The two Governm ents have hitherto
made nothing known as to the trend of these negotiations, though it m ay even now be
stated that the view is incorrect that the A nglo-Turkish negotiations will prejudicially
affect German interests. It can be confidently asserted that there is in no quarter any
intention of ignoring the rights of the Bagdad B ailway.”
I have, Ac.
W . E. GOSCH EN.

No. 73.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F.O. 2 25 6 2 /2 2 50 2 /1 3 /4 4.
(No. 247.) Paris, D. M ay 16, 1913.
Sir, R. M ay 17, 1913.
Considerable discussion is proceeding in the French Press as to the meaning
and probable result of the reported negotiations between His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
and the Porte concerning British interests in Asiatic Turkey. (2) There is a tendency to
criticize severely French diplom acy for a too negative policy in the Near East, and for
thus allowing France to be outstripped by other nations there.
Monsieur Becouly, Foreign Editor of the “ F igaro,” in an article on the subject,
declares that a long list of demands on the part of France is before the Porte
(concessions for ports and railways, schools, Ac.). This is, however, not sufficient in
view of the new circumstances brought about by the war. A new policy and programme
ought to be adopted and French efforts and action ought to be concentrated in one
direction and in one region. This region is clearly indicated : nam ely Syria.
Monsieur Poincare during the autumn of last year turned his attention to Syrian
affairs. An important exchange of views took place on the subject between the
Cabinets of London and Paris. (a) Monsieur Jonnart also paid particular attention to
this important question; and certainly Monsieur Pichon will not neglect it.
The article ends as follows : ‘ ‘ Au m om ent même où d ’ autres nous donnent
l’ exemple et nous montrent la voie à suivre, allons-nous demeurer inertes, im m obiles?
Ne chercherons-nous pas à ‘ réaliser ’ nous a u s s i? ”
I have, Ac.
FR AN C IS B E B T IE .
( J) [A cop y o f this despa tch was sent to the D ir e cto r of M ilita r y O p era tion s.]
(2) [cp. th e rep orts m ade b y th e R ussian A m bassador to M S a zon ov on M ay 26 and 30,
S iebert, pp. 6 64 -5 .]
(3) [cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X I (I I ), p. 435, N o. 542, and n o te ( 3) : p. 444, N o. 555.]

No. 74.
Mr. O 'B eirne to Sir Edward G r ey .(v)
St. Petersburgh, M ay 17, 1913.
F.O. 2 2 7 3 2 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 . ‘ D. 2 -4 5 p . m .
Tel. (No. 194.) t R. 3 -1 5 p . m .
Russian M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] referred in conversation yesterday to
Anglo-Turkish negotiations respecting the Persian Gulf region. (2) H e seemed inclined
to complain o f H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] taking present opportunity to obtain
concessions from Turkey. I explained that the negotiations in question form ed a
natural com plement of those respecting Turco-Persian frontier. H [is ] E [x ce lle n cy ]
0 ) [C o p ie s o f t h is t e le g r a m w e r e s e n t t o t h e D ir e c t o r o f M ilit a r y O p e r a t io n s ; t o t h e I n d ia
O ff ic e .]
( 2) [ i ’ p . t e l e g r a m s f r o m t h e R u s s i a n charge d'affaires a n d t h e R u s s i a n A m b a s s a d o r at
L o n d o n t c M . S a z o n o v o n M a y 1 9 a n d M a y 2 1 r e s p e c t i v e l y , Siebert, p p . 6 6 2 - 4 . ]
 124

laid particular stress on press reports to the effect that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] have agreed to make a m oney advance to Turkey. H e said that it had
been understood between the three Powers that no m oney should be given to Turkey
pending the conclusion of peace. I remarked that there seemed now little danger of
Turkey resuming fighting.
It might, I think, be desirable to make some com m unication to H [is ]
E [x ce llen cy ] about these negotiations^) as he seems decidedly sensitive on the
subject.

(3) [v . im m e d ia t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t .]

No. 75.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. O’ Beirne.

F.O. 2 2 7 3 2 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 413.) Foreign Office, M ay 20 , 1913, 12-45 p . m .
Your telegram No. 194 of May 1 7 0 : Persian G ulf-A nglo-Turkish Negotiations.
You should explain to M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A[£fairs] that, so far as I am
aware, there is no question of a British advance to Turkey under consideration, and
certainly H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] have not undertaken any obligation to
make a separate advance to Turkey, apart from the other Powers. I trust, that all
the Powers will, on the conclusion of peace, be prepared to use their good offices to
facilitate Turkey’ s efforts to secure that financial assistance which will be essential
for her w-elfare, but thi's has form ed no part of our own negotiations with Turkey.
You should add that our negotiations with Turkey respecting the Persian Gulf involve
no attempt to press her in her present condition, since they have been in progress for
over two years, and that from the outset the successful issue of those negotiations has
been made an important condition of British assent to the Turkish customs increase.
I could not possibly defend our assent to that increase (which will principally
affect British trade which amounts to 60% of the total imports in Mesopotamia) unless
I had concluded our negotiations first.
Apart from the Turco-Persian frontier, our political negotiations merely involve
the recognition by Turkey of the status quo in the Gulf, as it has existed for acentury,
and the other negotiations are directed to safeguarding British com m ercial interests
in view of the steady progress and undoubted ultimate com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway.
But British assent to the customs increase will continue to be dependent on the
assent of all the Powers concerned to that measure.
I have kept the Russian Ambassador inform ed of the progress of the Bagdad
Railway negotiations, and as long ago as last summer I com m unicated to the Russian
G o v [e rn m en ]t the draft of a convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab,(2)— a convention
which has since so far only been modified in unimportant details.
W e are in no way endeavouring to turn the misfortunes of Turkey to our own
advantage, but m erely to safeguard our important existing interests in view of altering
local conditions.
( !) [v . im m e d ia t e ly p r e c e d i n g d o c u m e n t .]
( ? ) [ v . supra, p p . 8 1 - 3 , N o . 5 5 , encl., Annex 3 . ]
 125

N o. 76 .

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G rey.I1)

Pera, May 21, 1913.

P.O. 2 3 3 4 7 /1 6 /1 3 /4 4 . D. 1 -4 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 238.) R. 2 -2 0 p . m .
My telegram No. 236 of yesterday,(2) and m y tel[eg ra m ] No. 117 of M a r[ch ] l . ( 3)
I understand that representations made b y you on the subject of oil-concessions
for Bagdad and Basrah have had a certain effect here in official circles.
It would seem (group o m itte d : ? best) (to) keep up pressure on Hakki Pasha.

M IN U T E .
I c a n m e n t io n t h is s u b je c t t o H a k k i P a s h a o n F r i d a y , if d e s ir e d . I p r o p o s e t o in s e r t , fo r
c o n s id e r a tio n , a c la u s e in o u r d r a ft r e p ly t o H a k k i t o th e fo llo w in g e f f e c t : —
“ H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] d o n o t d e sir e to in tr o d u c e a n a d d itio n a l p o in t o f
th is n a tu r e in to th e ir e x p r e s s c o n d itio n s fo r a s s e n tin g to th e c u s to m s in c r e a s e , b u t th e y
re ly u p o n t h e O t t o m a n G o v [ e r n m e n ] t t o m a k e w it h o u t d e la y a r r a n g e m e n t s in r e g a r d t o
th e o il w e lls o f M e s o p o t a m ia w h ic h w ill e n s u r e B r it is h c o n t r o l a n d m e e t w ith t h e ir a p p r o v a l
in m a t t e r s o f d e t a il.” ( 4)
A. P.
M a y 21, 1913.
R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.
( !) [C o p ie s o f th is te le g r a m w e r e s e n t to t h e I n d ia O ffic e ; to t h e D ir e c t o r o f M ilit a r y
O p e r a t i o n s ; t o t h e D i r e c t o r o f N a v a l I n t e l l i g e n c e ; t o t h e A d m i r a l t y ; t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e .]
( 2) [ S i r G . L o w t h e r ’ s t e l e g r a m ( N o . 2 3 6 ) o f M a y 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 , D . 1 - 1 0 p . m ., R . 3 - 1 5 p . m ., i s n o t
r e p r o d u c e d . S ir G . L o w t h e r s t a t e d t h a t h e h a d b e e n a s s u r e d t h a t n o p r o m is e s h a d b e e n g iv e n
t o “ M e s s r s . W a g g , R u s s e l l , ( s i c ) . ” ( F .O . 2 3 1 8 8 / 1 6 / 1 3 / 4 4 . ) ]
(3) [ S i r G . L o w t h e r ’ s t e le g r a m ( N o . 1 1 7 ) o f M a r c h 1 , 1 9 1 3 , c a n n o t b e t r a c e d .]
( 4) [ T h is c la u s e w a s c o m m u n ic a t e d t o H a k k i P a s h a o n M a y 2 3 , 1 9 1 3 . ( F .O . 2 3 9 4 5 / 1 6 / 1 3 / 4 4 . ) ]

No. 77.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(*)

F.O. 2 3 5 4 5 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 322.)
Sir, Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.
I explained to the French and Russian Ambassadors to-d ay(2) the position about
the Bagdad Railway. W e had made up our minds that nothing could prevent the
Railway from going to Busra, and we had decided that the point for us to safeguard
was that the “ status quo ” in the Persian Gulf should not be disturbed. An
agreement ‘ ‘ ad referendum ’ ’ had therefore been drawn up with a Representative of
the Turkish Governm ent, under which there were provisions about Koweit, Bahrein,
El Katr, and so forth, for securing the “ status quo ” in the Persian Gulf, provisions
about the navigation of the Shat-el-Arab, and a stipulation that the Bagdad Railway
should not go beyond Busra without our consent. (3) W e had not claimed participation
in the Bagdad Railway, but were to have two Directors on the Board of the Railway
from Konieh to Busra. These Directors would, of course, not be able to exercise
control, but they would be able to see that, in practice as well as in theory, there was
0 ) [T h is d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v in g b e e n s e n t to th e K in g ; to th e C a b in e t; to S ir P .
H a r v e y . I t w a s re p e a te d to S t. P e te r sb u r g h (N o . 2 0 5 ) . I t s s u b s t a n c e w a s c o n t a i n e d in
S ir E d w a r d G r e y ’ s t e le g r a m s (N o s . 2 1 1 a n d 4 1 9 ) t o P a ris a n d S t. P e te rsb u rg h o f M a y 21 ,
D . 7 - 3 0 p . m ., w h i c h a r e n o t r e p r o d u c e d . ]
( 2 ) [cp. Siebert, p p . 6 6 3 - 4 ; D .D .F ., 3me Ser., V o l . V I , p p . 6 8 6 -9 , N o . 5 9 2 . cp. a l s o Gooch &
Temperley, V o l . X ( I ) , p . 4 3 4 , N o . 4 8 5 , note ( 2 ) . ]
( 3 ) [v. supra, p p . 1 0 0 - 1 4 , N o . 6 8 , e n d s . ]
 126

no differentiation of rates on British goods. They would be able to let us know if any
such differentiation did take place, in which case we should make diplomatic
representations.
Since we had made this arrangement with Hakki Pasha, the German Govern­
m ent had begun to speak to us on the subject. Apparently, they were entitled to
claim from Turkey that the Bagdad Railway should, in one way or another, be
continued to the Persian G u lf; and they said that, therefore, Turkey could not forgo
without their consent the right to make the railway from Busra to the Gulf. But this
consent they were willing to give if there was no opposition to the Railway being made
to Busra, and if they could be assured that the financial guarantees for making the
line up to Bagdad, which would be lost by the cession of Turkish territory in Europe
to the Allies, would be replaced, and if further guarantees were secured to carry the
line on to Busra. This was a matter that would come before the Financial Commission
in Paris, and I could not com m it m yself to the German Governm ent without first
discussing the matter with the French and Russian Governments. W e were now
satisfied that, if the Railway did not go beyond Busra, we need not regard it as being
prejudicial to British interests, and we need not oppose it.
The French Ambassador was under the impression that we had secured the right
to build the section from Busra to the Gulf, and had been offered the B agdad-K anikin
branch.
I assured him that this was not so. W e had not acquired any right to build any
section, and we had no participation. It was true that something had been said by an
unauthorised German to Mr. L yn ch, who was also an unauthorised person, as far as
these negotiations were concerned, about giving us the branch from Bagdad to
K anikin.(4) But I had discouraged any idea of such a proposal being brought into the
discussion, as it seemed to me to affect the arrangement that Russia had made at
P o tsd a m : an arrangement that was connected with the Kanikin branch.
[ I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
( 4 ) [ v . supra, p . 1 1 8 , N o . 6 9 . ]

No. 78.
M inute by Mr. Parker.(*)
F.O. 2 3 5 0 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Sir A. Nicolson, Foreign Office, M ay 21, 1913.
H err K uehlm ann came to see me yesterday(2) and, after saying he had ascertained
that there was no intention, as we had heard, to deflect the main line of the Bagdad
Railway at Mosul, he proceeded to m ention what he described as “ one or two points
of detail ” regarding our original conversation of May 7 .(3)
As Sir E . Grey had warned me before that I was not to discuss any
proposals, I told H err Kuehlmann that I would m erely listen to wThat he had to say
and report it.
Since some of his “ points of detail ” are to the advantage of Germany, I thin
is very desirable that Sir E . Grey should have this minute, and my original rec
of H err K uehlm ann’ s proposals, before him when he sees Herr Kuehlm ann to-morrow.
It will be recollected that H err K uehlm ann has accepted that record as an
accurate version o f his proposals, and a copy o f it is annexed. The important point
to bear in mind is that paragraph 6 does not enter as a condition of the proposed
written agreement with Germany : I was particularly careful to keep it out o f the
wording o f m y minute. The suggested conditions of the bargain with Germany are
to be found only in paragraphs 1 to 4 of m y record.
( J) [ C o p i e s o f t h i s m i n u t e w e r e s e n t t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o S i r A . H i r t z e l ; t o M r . P e r c y
A s h le y .]
0 ) [ c p . G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 1 7 9 - 8 1 . ]
( 3 ) [ v . supra, p p . 9 7 - 8 , N o . 6 6 . ]
 127

W hen lie came on M ay 20 Herr Kuehlm ann said he understood the German
Company would prefer to build the port of Bussorah alone. (This is intelligible from
the German standpoint, but we should prefer to participate owing to our special
interest in the river and for other reasons.)
The Germans, he said, would like the conditions for controlling the port at
Bussorah to be the same as those which exist at Haidar Pasha (opposite
Constantinople). He would explain those conditions later. If we did exercise any
share of control, he said he would prefer that it should be done through the proposed
Shatt-el-Arab Commission. (Prim a facie, there seems no objection to this, but it must
be fully looked into.)
The German G ov [ern m en ]t could not absolutely prohibit any German subject
from buying shares in the new navigation Company, or even from engaging in
navigation, but they would undertake not to “ encourage or support ” any German
subject in taking part in the navigation. The German G ov [ern m en ]t hoped, however,
for the sake of public opinion, that the w7ord “ m o n o p o ly ” might be avoided in the
agreement with Turkey. I said I would report his remarks, but that the m onopoly
was the essence of the whole thing, just as in effect the Germans had a m onopoly on
the railway, and I said it seemed to me impossible to secure our object if the word
were omitted.
H e said the German G ov [ern m en ]t hoped we would agree to give an undertaking
that there should be no discrimination between the different nations in regard to river
traffic rates. (This is quite reasonable.)
Then he said that if the Company agreed to the “ indefinite postponem ent ” of
the line from Bussorah to the Gulf it would require financial com pensation from the
Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t for that section (100 miles or so). (The Germans seem to
intend to squeeze the poor Turks, but this is not our business.)
Lastly he said that the Company wished not m erely to secure the allocation of
specific revenues for the main line up to Bussorah, but also for the branches (which
include the Khanikin branch). H e said this was a detail which need not be specially
brought to Sir E. G rey’ s attention, but it is, owing to the introduction of the Khanikin
branch, a very important detail, and however important the construction of the
Khanikin branch m ay be as an artery of British trade, there seems little doubt that
Russia will oppose any attempt on G erm any’ s part to secure the im mediate allocation
of revenues for this branch, as the date of com pletion of that branch has an important
effect on Russia’ s obligations under the Potsdam agreement. The Bagdad
R [a i]l[w a ]y Company is of course already entitled, under the original concession of
1903,(4) to secure the allocation of revenues for that branch eventually, but I think we
should stipulate with H err Kuehlm ann that, having regard to the exhausted financial
condition of Turkey at the m oment, the Com pany should be content if they secure the
allocation of revenues for the main line up to Bussorah, leaving the branches till a
later date. Otherwise there will be a sharp divergence of opinion in the Financial
Commission at Paris.
Meanwhile it seems important to maintain the position that the question of
securing the allocation of revenues for the railway does not enter as a condition
i expressis verbis into our bargain with Germany. All that H err Kuehlm ann asked on
. May 7 was a sort of collateral assurance that we would help them to get security for
the m a i n line to Bussorah.
It seems very desirable to tie the Germans down as soon as possible to their
undertaking about the river navigation, lest they should whittle it away, and I venture
to suggest that a draft agreement should be prepared ad referendum .
A . P.
M ay 21, 1913.
R . P. M.
A. N.

(4) [ u . B .F.S.P., V o l . 1 0 2 , p p . 8 3 3 - 4 8 ; cp. Gooch & Temperley, V o l . V I , p p . 3 2 5 - 7 , Ed. Note.]

 128

I have spoken to H err von Kuehlm ann and dictated a record which I will give to
the D ep [a rtm en ]t on M onday.(s)
E. G.
23.5.13.
(5) [v . im m e d ia t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t .]

No. 79.
Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E. G oschen.( *)
F.O. 24323/6463/13/4-1.
(No. 165.)
Sir, Foreign Office, M ay 23, 1913.
I told Herr von Kiihlmann to-d ay(2) that for some time past, I had been unable to
give close attention to the details of the Bagdad Railway question, owing to the
amount of time that I had had to give to other things, but I had now looked into the
matter and I would tell him how we stood.
F ive or six years ago, on the occasion o f the German E m peror’ s visit, when he
had said that it wTas natural for us to have a gate on the Persian Gulf, we had suggested
negotiation “ d quatre, ” so that an agreement might be come to by Germany, France,
Russia, and ourselves, all together.(3) But this had not found favour with the German
Governm ent. Finding that this was so, France, Russia, and ourselves had agreed that
each m ight negotiate separately with Germany and conclude our own agreements, but
on the condition that any agreement by one of us for participation in the Bagdad
Railway should not becom e effective till the other two countries had also reached an
agreem ent with Germany. In addition, we had agreed that none of the three of us
would give consent to the 4 per cent, increase of the Turkish Customs Dues till the
other two were ready also.
The agreement now made with Ilakki Pasha had not yet been before the Cabinet,
and it must still be subject to confirmation there, though I had little doubt that, if the
Foreign Office and India Office were both in favour of the agreement, as I believed
they were, the Cabinet would sanction it. W e did not regard this agreement as being
dependent upon the consent of France and Russia, because it did not involve
participation in the Bagdad Railway. As far as this Railway was concerned, except i
for the small point of having two British Directors on the Board as a guarantee
against differentiation of rates, the agreement was really self-denial. W e did not even ,
acquire the right to make the section from Basra to the G u lf: we secured only the i
negative guarantee that this section should not be made without our consent.
I was prepared to defend this agreement in Parliament, and to say that, if it was : ■
confirmed, we should have no interest in opposing the com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway to Basra. Hitherto, there had been apprehension that the Bagdad Railway, I
com pleted to the Persian G ulf, m ight upset the “ status q u o " there, might displace !
the navigation, now in British hands, by which British trade entered Asia Minor, and !
transfer into other hands the whole of the trade-route from the Gulf to Asia Minor. I
The agreement that we had now made with Turkey would safeguard us against this.
I understood that Germany had an agreement with Turkey, under which Turkey
was bound to continue the Railway to the Persian Gulf, either by entrusting it to the :
German Company, or in some other way. I also understood that Germany was
prepared not to press her claim for the continuation of the Railway beyond Basra, but
wished to be sure that there would be no opposition to, and indeed that every facility
would be given for, its continuation to Basra. To make sure of this, Germany wished
that we should instruct our Delegates at the Financial Commission in Paris to
C ) [ T h i s d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e K i n g a n d t o t h e C a b in e t . A
c o p y w a s s e n t t o S i r P . H a r v e y .]
(2 ) [ c p . G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 1 8 1 - 5 . ]
( 3) [ c p . Gooch & Temperley, V o l . V I , p p . 96-8, N o . 63.]
 m
co-operate in securing by financial arrangements the necessary guarantees. In effect,
this would mean that we should actively participate in supporting the Bagdad
Railway. B ut, as I had just explained, we were not entitled to promise support of
this sort without first consulting France and Russia, and I must therefore consult
them. It was also the case that we could not well promise the support of our
Delegates in Paris without knowing exactly what proposals were to be made for
securing the necessary guarantees for the Railway. 1 suggested that the German
Delegate in Paris should discuss the matter with his French and Russian Colleagues,
as well as with the British delegate.
Herr von Kuhlmann said that the matter really turned upon the question of an
indemnity rather than upon the question o f an increase of the Turkish Customs Dues.
If Turkey had to pay an indem nity, or if, instead of Turkey’ s paying an indem nity,
the Allies were to be relieved of all share in the Turkish Debt, Turkey would be unable
to find m oney for the Bagdad Raibvay or for any thing else that was necessary to
develop Asia Minor.
I said that we had originally expressed opposition to the idea of an indemnity
because we thought that it was not to the advantage of any Power who had any
interests in Turkey that Turkey should be left, after the war, in such a crippled state
as to be unable to make a newT start with the possessions that were left to h e r ; but I
had not lately discussed the matter. I thought that all the Powers had originally been
of this opinion, but that some of them, including Austria, had since rather changed
their opinion.
Herr von Kuhlmann thought that it would be a pity that all agreement should be
postponed till the financial question had been settled in Paris. H e suggested that,
instead of our prom ising to give support and to co-operate in securing guarantees for
the Bagdad Railway, a form ula might be found saying that the agreement about the
Railway should not com e into force unless the results of the financial arrangements
in Paris were satisfactory.
I said that I would think this over. I thought that there was something to be
said for such a formula. It would make our agreement with Germany conditional.
Germany, I understood, did not wish the agreem ent to be definitive till she was sure
that the outcom e of it would be that she would get facilities for constructing the
Railway as far as Basra. W e, on the other hand, wished the agreem ent to be
conditional, because we could not make a promise of actual support for the Railway
till a settlement was come to with France and Russia. The change made by the
agreement would be that we should henceforth be willing to give reasonable support
if France and Russia were satisfied; whereas without the agreement with Germany
we should have said to France and Russia that, even if they were satisfied, their
support must be conditional upon the making of an arrangement by Germany with us.
I observed that wTiat I had said applied to the Bagdad Railway itself as far as
Basra. I could not enter into any discussion about the B agdad-K hanikin branch,
because I understood that the arrangement com e to between Germany and Russia at
Potsdam involved the continuation of that branch into Persia, and, from that moment
the branch became a matter that specially concerned Russia, and was therefore one
with which I could not deal separately at all.
Herr von Kuhlmann said that he would endeavour to frame a conditional form
of words.
I said that I also would think the matter over.
11 am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

[10900]
 130
N o. 80.
Communication from Haklri Pasha.C1)
F .O . 2 4 0 5 6 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 . London, May 24, 1913.
Mémorandum suggesting form of reply to points 4 and 5 of His H igh ness’ s
Mémorandum o f May 1, 1913.(2)
4. Le Gouvernement de S [a ] M [a jesté] Britannique admet, en principe,
l ’ abolition des bureaux de poste anglais existants en Turquie. En fait, cette abolition
ne peut avoir lieu que si les autres bureaux étrangers sont en m ême temps abolis et
si les postes ottomanes offrent au com m erce anglais les garanties de sûreté et de
régularité désirables. Le Gouvernement anglais est prêt à entrer en négociations avec
la Sublime Porte pour les améliorations à apporter au régime postal ottoman afin de j
rendre possible l ’ abolition des bureaux étrangers, pourvu que les autres Etats
intéressés aussi y prennent part.
Toutefois, le Gouvernement anglais, appréciant que dans l ’ état des choses actuel,
des revenus postaux, devant revenir au trésor ottoman, se trouvent être perçus par des .
bureaux étrangers, déclare n ’ avoir pas d ’objection à prescrire à ses bureaux de poste
en Turquie l ’ usage de timbres ottomans si tout les Etats intéressés se trouvent d ’ accord
pour les conditions d ’ un tel usage.
5. E n ce qui concerne les capitulations, le Gouvernement de S [a ] M [ajesté]
Britannique fait d ’ abord remarquer que les parties commerciales et financières de ces
anciens traités ayant fait l ’ objet d ’ autres accords, il ne peut s’ agir en l ’ espèce que de 1
leurs parties jurisdictionnelles. Comme le Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même ne
demande qu’ une étude de la question, le G [ou vern em en ]t de S [a ] M [ajesté]
B rita n n iq u e ] se déclare prêt à nom m er des délégués à une com m ission purement de
juristes où tous les Etats ayant des capitulations à eux propres devront être
représentées et qui sera chargée d ’ étudier soit les mesures propres à assurer l ’ abolition
des parties susénoncées, soit les améliorations successives qu’ on peut apporter à la
situation actuelle.
t 1) [ C o p i e s o f t h i s m é m o r a n d u m w e r e s e n t t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e G e n e r a l P o s t
O f f i c e .]
( 2) [ r . supra, p . 9 6 , N o . 6 4 . ]

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 2 4 8 4 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 338.)
Sir, Foreign Office, May 28, 1913.
I gave M. Cambon to-d a y ,(x) very confidentially, a copy of my conversation with
H err von Kuhlmann of the 23rd instant./2)
M. Cambon asked me very particularly as to the date of this conversation. On
noticing that it took place a few days ago, he said that he had heard quite lately that
Germ any had begun to talk in Paris about the Bagdad Railway. He hoped that, in
this wav, a solution might be arrived at, and the question be entirely settled.
[1 am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ],
(1 ) [ c p . D D F . , 3 me Sir., V o l . V I , p p . 7 5 2 - 6 , N o . 6 4 6 . ]
( 2 ) [ r . supra, p p 1 2 8 - 9 , N o . 7 9 . ]
 131

* N o. 8 2 .

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen J1)

F.O. 2 4 8 4 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 167.)
Sir, Foreign Office, May 29, 1913.
I showed H err von Kiihlm ann to-d ay (2) the record that I had made of m y
conversation with him about the Bagdad Railway on the 23rd instant.(3)
H aving read it, he said that it represented exactly what he had reported.
I said that I showed it to him because I had now begun to discuss the matter with
the French and Russian Governm ents, and what I had said to him represented the
light in which I would put the matter to them. I agreed, therefore, to his keeping
the copy that I had shown him. I told him that I should be prepared to go as far as
Russia had gone at Potsdam, and say that we would not obstruct the Bagdad Railway.
But we could not becom e active partners in prom oting it unless an arrangement was
come to with France and Russia. The arrangement between Germ any and Russia
was one that concerned themselves, and I could only suggest that the German
Government should discuss the question with the French Governm ent.
[I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
(* ) [ T h is d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e K i n g ; t o t h e C a b i n e t ; t o t h e
B o a r d o f T r a d e .]
( 2 ) [cp. G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 1 8 5 - 7 , w h e r e t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i s d a t e d M a y 2 8 ; cp. a l s o
D .D .F . , 3 me Ser., V o l . V I I , p p . 2 6 - 7 , N o . 2 5 . I t s e e m s c le a r t h a t M a y 2 8 is in f a c t c o r r e c t ,
s in c e t h e B r it is h d r a f t is d o c k e te d “ D [ r a ] f t t o B e r li n 1 6 7 . M a y 2 8 / 1 3 ” ]
( 3 ) [ v . supra, p p . 1 2 8 - 9 , N o . 7 9 . ]

No. 83.

Mr. O 'B eirne to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 2 52 1 3 /9 2 4 1 /1 3 /4 4 .
I (No. 173.) St. Petersburgh, D. M ay 29, 1913.
Sir, R. June 2, 1913.
As I had the honour to report to you by m y telegram No. 194 of the
17th instant,(*) the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs when I spoke to him on the
I previous day showed, though in a good-hum oured way, a good deal of curiosity and
some sensitiveness with regard to the pending negotiations between His M ajesty’ s
Government and the Turkish Governm ent touching the Bagdad Railway and the
Persian Gulf region. His E xcellency hinted that H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent seemed
to be taking advantage of Turkey’ s present situation to extract concessions from her
and asked what was to prevent other Powers from doing the same. H e laid some stress
on reports which he had seen in the Press to the effect that the negotiations concerned
| an advance o f m oney to Turkey and remarked that the understanding between the
three Powers was that no m oney should be given to Turkey until the conclusion of
! peace.
Since however His E xcellency has been furnished with the explanations
I contained in your telegram to me No. 413 of the 20th instant(2) and those which you
gave to the Russian Ambassador (your telegram to me No. 419 of the 21st instant)/3)
he appears to be quite satisfied. At any rate he has not offered any further criticisms
regarding the course followed by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, although he has
questioned me with great interest about the details of the arrangement contem plated
( ! ) [ v . supra, p p . 1 2 3 - 4 , N o . 7 4 . ]
<2 ) [ v . supra, p . 1 2 4 , N o . 7 5 . ]
( 3 ) [ v . supra, p p . 1 2 5 - 6 , N o . 7 7 , a n d note 0 ) . ]
[10900]
 132

by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent concerning tbe Bagdad Railway and more particularly
about the abandonment of any British claim to participation in the construction of
the Bailway as far South as Basrah, which came as a com plete surprise to him.
I have, &c.
H U G H O ’ B E IE N E .
M IN U T E S .
S h o u ld w e n o t in fo r m C o u n t B e n c k e n d o r ff o f t h e c o u r s e o f o u r n e g o tia t io n s w ith G e r m a n y ?
L. M .
Y e s a n d M . C a m b o n t o o . S ir L . M a lle t s h o u ld d o it v e r b a lly o r b y g iv in g a m e m o fr a n d u m ],
I h a v e so m u c h B a lk a n m a t t e r t o d is c u s s e a c h t im e I se e t h e m a n d h a v e n o t t h e d e t a ils o f
t h is s u ffic ie n tly in m in d t o d o i t v e r b a lly .
E. G.

No. 84.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

I'.O. 2 51 5 9 /9 2 41 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 203.) Berlin, D. May 31, 1913.
Sir, B. June 2, 1913.
The following question was addressed to the Im perial Chancellor in the Beichstag
yesterday by Dr. Müller (of Meiningen) the prom inent Liberal m ember :—
“ Is the Im perial Chancellor prepared to furnish inform ation in regard to an
agreement concluded between Turkey, England and Germany under which
Germany can construct the Bagdad Bailway as far as Basra on condition of the
admission of two English m embers to the Administrative Council, whilst the
construction of the harbour at Basra and the line from Basra to Koweit would
fall to England with an English protectorate over K ow eit? ”

Herr von Jagow, Imperial Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, replied as
follows :—
‘ ‘ As the House is no doubt aware from the statement made yesterday by
the English Secretary of State for Foreign A ffairs^1) England and Turkey have
agreed on the draft of a Treaty whereby the Bagdad Bailway shall not go further
than Basra without the concurrence of E ngland; and England, in view of her
interests in the section from Bagdad to Basra, is to be represented on the
Administrative Council of the Bagdad Bailway by two votes. As Sir Edward
Grey pointed out in his statement, the agreement has been com e to between
E ngland and Turkey. W e have however been kept inform ed of the progress of
the negotiations, and, so far as our interests and rights under the earlier Bagdad
Agreem ents and our present Bagdad agreements are affected by the Anglo-
Turkish Treaty, our concurrence is necessary, as the two contracting parties do
not fail to recognize. An exchange o f views on the subject has been begun.
Pending its termination I must, I regret to say, abstain from making a further
statement in regard to details. I desire however to state that the provisions of
the Anglo-Turkish agreement, whereby the Bagdad Bailway is to terminate at
Basra, is based on the assumption that the Shatt-el-Arab will be made navigable
from Basra to the Persian Gulf, and must be maintained permanently in this
condition.”
I have, &c.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

( ! ) [ v . Pari. Deb., 6 t h S e r . ( H o u s e o f C o m m o n s ) , V o l . 5 3 , p p . 3 9 2 - 6 . ]
 133
N o. 8 5 .
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . Bertie.(f)

F.O. 2 5 8 4 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 351.)
Sir, Foreign Office, June 2, 1913.
M. Cambon spoke to me to-day(2) about the Bagdad Railway, urging that as
regards the Financial Commission in Paris it would be very desirable that we should
not make to Germany promises with which France could not be associated. The
French Governm ent were quite ready to com e to an agreement with Germ any about
the Bagdad Railway, and would like the whole matter cleared up and got out of the
way. He asked whether I could not suggest this to the Germans.
I said that I had already suggested to H err von Kiihlm ann that the Germans
should talk to the French about the Railway. W e had said that we would not oppose
the Railway if the Germans made with us the proposed agreement. It would now be
for the French to get what guarantees they wanted for the region in which they were
interested in railways; and then I hoped that the French and ourselves m ight come
to an agreement with Germ any as to the financial arrangements to be made by the
Financial Commission in Paris(3) in support o f the Railway.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
0 ) [ A c o p y o f t h is d e s p a t c h w a s s e n t t o S i r P . H a r v e y .]
( 2 ) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 ™ Ser., V o l . V I I , p p . 26-7, N o . 25.]
( 3) [cp. supra, p . 9 7 , N o . 6 5 , a n d note ( 3 ) . ]

No. 86.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G osch en J 1)

F.O. 2 5 8 4 5 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 177.)
Sir, Foreign Office, June 2, 1913.
The German Ambassador gave me to-d ay (2) the following letter in connection with
the Bagdad Railway :—
(See paper herewith.)
He said that there were one or two other points that his Governm ent thought
should be considered. If we were to have two Directors on the Bagdad Railway,
German public opinion would expect one German Director on the Navigation
Company, and one on the Company that had charge of the dredging of the
Shat-el-Arab.
I said that we should be prepared to guarantee that the navigation would be
kept open, and the Navigation Company would of course require a port. The Bagdad
Railway had, I understood, the right to construct a port at Bagdad and Busra, but not
necessarily the only port. It seemed to me, therefore, that the best plan would be for
the Bagdad Railway Company to discuss with the British element of the Navigation
Company how the ports should be made.
The Ambassador suggested that this and other details of the Bagdad R [a ilw a ]y
question should be discussed between H err von Kiihlm ann and Mr. Parker or someone
in the D ep [a rtm en ]t.
I agreed to this.
0 ) [C o p ie s o f th is d e s p a tc h w e r e s e n t to S ir P . H a r v e y ; to t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; to th e
In d ia O ffic e ; t o th e C o m m it te e o f I m p e r ia l D e f e n c e ; to t h e D ir e c t o r o f M ilit a r y O p e r a tio n s .
I t w a s s e n t t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , f o r i n f o r m a t i o n , ( N o . 1 8 2 ) o n J u n e 1 5 , 1 9 1 3 .]
(2) [cp. H e r r v o n J a g o w ’ s i n s t r u c t i o n s o f M a y 2 8 , G.F., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 1 8 7 - 8 ; a n d
P r i n c e L i c h n o w s k y ’ s r e p o r t , ibid., p p . 1 9 1 - 2 , a n d note.]
 134

I urged that the Germans should discuss the question of the Bagdad Bailway with
the French, if a satisfactory agreement was to be come to at the Financial Commission
in Paris for providing guarantees for the Bailway.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [B E Y ].

Enclosure in No. 86.

Dear Sir Edward, L ondon, May 31, 1913.
A ccording to your desire, expressed in a previous conversation, I beg to give
you the wording which we propose for the clauses intended to be put at the end of
our contemplated agreement concerning the Bagdad Bailway. The text would run
as follows :—
“ Die vorstehenden Abm achungen über die endgiltige B egelung der Bagdad­
bahnfrage sollen nur unter der ausdrücklichen Bedingung in Kraft treten,
1. dass das Ergebnis der in Paris tagenden Finanzkom mission gewähr- j
leistet, dass jeder Ausfall, den die Bagdadbahn durch die Neuregelung der Dinge 1
auf dem Balkan erleiden könnte, durch Verpfändung entsprechender anderer ,
Einkünfte von gleichem W erte und mindestens gleicher Sicherheit wettgemacht
wird,
2. dass ausreichende E innahm en für den Bau und Betrieb der ganzen Bahn
von Konia bis Bassora einschliesslich der nach der Konzession mit Garantie
ausgestatteten Zweiglinien von der türkischen B egierung als Garantie I
überwiesen w erden.” * •
I may explain that the question of providing adequate means for the Bagdad I
railway does not seem bound up in principle with any increase in the customs. I
Experts point out that provided Turkey is not burdened with a war indem nity of
any sort she will he able to find the necessary guarantees. Sources o f such revenues I
seem to he the “ Excédent des revenus diverses ” administered by the Dette Publique I
and perhaps the old 8°/, ad valorem duties of places where traffic is likely, to increase I
after the com pletion of the Bagdad line.
Believe me, &c.
LICIIN OW SKY.

* A n E n g lis h v e r s io n is g iv e n h e r e a ft e r a s a m a t t e r o f c o n v e n ie n c e . [ N o t r e p r o d u c e d .]

No. 87.

Communication from M. Paul Cambon.C)

F.O. 2 55 3 3 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . London, June 2, 1913.
Conditions mises par la France à son Concours financier et fiscal à la Turquie.

1°) Affaires religieuses et scolaires:— délivrance d ’office et sans frais des firmans
réglementaires, statut des écoles, impôts, &c. .
2°) Observation en toutes circonstances du principe que les ressortissants français
ne peuvent être détenus dans les prisons ottomanes.
3°) Beconnaissance de la qualité de ressortissants français aux Tunisiens et aux
Marocains.
4°) Signature et mise en vigueur par Iradé Impérial du com prom is d ’ arbitrage
dont le texte a été soumis à la Porte Ottomane, le 16 mars 1910.

F ) [cp . D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., V o l . V I , p p . 5 8 0 - 2 , N o . 5 1 8 , w h e r e a n o t e b y t h e F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r
a t C o n s t a n t i n o p l e i s g i v e n u n d e r d a t e M a y 8 , 1 9 1 3 . cp. a l s o D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., V o l . V I I , p . 2 7 ,
N o . 2 5 , w h e r e M . P a u l C a m b o n r e p o r t s t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a d e t o S i r E d w a r d G r e y . The
r e f e r e n c e g i v e n t h e r e i n note ( » ) i s o b s c u r e .]
 135
5 °) Octroi au groupe recomm andé par le gouvernem ent français de la concession
garantie on de la construction et de l ’ exploitation, sur la base déjà envisagée, des
lignes de chemin de fer suivantes :
Samsoun à Sivas et Karpout avec privilège, dans le cas où le projet Chester ne
recevrait pas de suite, pour le prolongem ent jusqu’ à D iarbekir; Tourkhal à Tokat
Zihlé à \osgat Tchalts à Erzinghian, Pékiridj et Erzeroum , et éventuellement
Trébizonde à Pékiridj, étant entendu en ce qui concerne ces deux dernières lignes,
que le concessionnaire sera tenu d ’ accepter les délais de construction qui lui seront
fixés par le Ministère Impérial des travaux publics après entente entre les gouverne­
ments Ottoman et Russe.
6°) Concession à la com pagnie D aras-H am ah [s ic ] et prolongem ent de la ligne du
chem in de fer de Rayak à Lydda et du privilège de son prolongement éventuel
jusqu’ à E l-A risch, avec assignation pour la garantie de cette ligne des excédents des
dîmes affectées à la garantie de celle de Rayak à Alep.
7°) Etablissement entre la Compagnie D am as-H am ah et prolongem ent de
1 administration du chemin de fer du H edjaz d ’ un arrangement laissant à la ligne
de Beyrouth à Damas la totalité du trafic entre Damas et la mer.
8°) Concession aux groupes, qui seront recommandés par le gouvernement
français^ dans des conditions en permettant la construction et l ’ exploitation, des ports
d ’ Inéboli, d ’ Héraclée, de Tripoli, de Caiffa et de Jaffa, et en outre de ceux de
Trébizonde et de Samsoun dans le cas où le contrat d ’ études intervenu pour ces deux
derniers avec la Banque nationale de Turquie ne reçevrait pas de suite.
M IN U T E .
T h i s is a v e r y i m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t , a n d a s M . C a m b o n p r e s s e s f o r a n e a r l y r e p l y ( 2) I d o n o t
t h in k w e s h o u ld w a it t ill w e c a n h a v e S ir G . L o w t h e r ’s o b s e r v a t io n s b y p o s t.
I t h in k w e s h o u ld t e le g r a p h a s u m m a r y t o H [ i s ] E [ x c e ll e n c y ] a n d a sk fo r h is o b s e r v a t io n s ;
t h a t w e s h o u ld t a k e t h is c o n v e n ie n t o p p o r t u n it y o f le t t in g t h e F r e n c h k n o w in g e n e r a l o u tlin e
w h a t o u r d e m a n d s o n T u r k e y a r e , m o r e e s p e c ia lly a s t o t h e T ig r is n a v ig a tio n m o n o p o ly a n d t h e
S h a t t -e l -A r a b C o m m is s io n , a n d t h e r e m i g h t b e a d v a n t a g e in g e t t i n g F r a n c e t o s a y s h e w i ll n o t
o p p o se th e m .
I t h in k w e s h o u ld a t o n c e e n t e r in t o c o n fid e n t ia l c o m m u n ic a t io n w ith t h e N a t io n a l B a n k
a b o u t p o i n t 8 , in s o f a r a s i t c o n c e r n s T r e b iz o n d a n d S a m s u n . B e f o r e w e a r e c o m m i t t e d t o
a n y d e fin it e a t t it u d e o n s o m e o f t h e o th e r p o in t s , m o r e e s p e c ia lly r a ilw a y s , I t h in k w e s h o u ld
b e c l e a r a s t o h o w f a r t h e y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o t h e r e x i s t i n g r i g h t s , e.g., t h e B l a c k S e a B a s i n
a g r e e m e n t . A s t o p o i n t 3 w e m i g h t ju s t p o i n t o u t t o t h e F r e n c h G o v [ e r n m e n ] t t h a t in t h e
a n a lo g o u s c a s e o f B a h r e in e s e w e a r e n o t in s is t in g o n m o r e t h a n B r it is h c o n s u la r p r o te c t io n ,
a n d n o t c la i m i n g t h e s p e c ia l p r o t e c t io n o f t h e c a p i t u la t i o n s , a s in t h e c a s e o f E u r o p e a n s .
Q u e r y c o m m u n ic a te w ith th e N a tio n a l B a n k a s p r o p o s e d (3) a n d te le g r a p h to S ir G .
L o w t h e r : — . . . ,( 4) ^ p
J u n e 5, 1913.
R. P. M .
( 2 ) [ S i r E d w a r d G r e y ’ s r e p l y i s g i v e n infra, p p . 1 6 8 - 9 , N o . 1 1 5 . ]
(3) [A le tte r w a s s e n t to th e N a tio n a l B a n k o f T u r k e y on J u n e 9 , 1 9 1 3 . (F O 2 5 5 3 3 /
2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)] ' '
( 4) [T h e d r a f t fo llo w s o f S ir E d w a r d G r e y ’s te le g r a m to S ir G . L o w t h e r ( N o .2 4 5 ) of June6
1 9 1 3 , D . 1 2 - 2 0 p . m . v. i m m e d i a t e l y s u c c e e d i n g d o c u m e n t . ]

No. 88.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. L ow th er.( J)
F.O. 2 55 3 3 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 245.) Foreign Office, June 6 , 1913, 1 2-20 p . m .
French G ov [ern m en ]t have com m unicated to us, and invited any observations
we may desire to make on, the following conditions of their “ financial and fiscal
assistance ’ ’ to Turkey ;—
1). Settlement of religious and scholastic questions, including the status and
taxation of schools Ac.
( 0 [T h is te le g r a m w a s r e p e a te d to P a r is (N o . 2 2 1 ). C o p ie s w e re a ls o s e n t to th e I n d ia
O f f i c e ; t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e D i r e c t o r o f M i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s .]
 136
2). No French citizen to be detained in a Turkish prison.
3). Natives of Tunis and M orocco to be treated in every respect as French
citizens.
4). Enforcem ent of the arbitration compromise submitted to the Porte on
March 16, 1910. W hat is this?
5). Grant of the following railway concessions, on the basis already contemplated,
to the group approved by the French G o v [e r n m e n ]t:—
a) Samsun to Sivas, with option of continuation to Diarbekir if the Chester
project falls through.
b) Tourkhal to Tokat.
c) Zihle to Yosgat.
d) Tchalts to Erzinghian, Pekiridj and Erzeroum , and eventually Trebizond to
Pekiridj, provided that, in regard to the two last named lines the
concessionnaire must agree to the delay fixed by the Ottoman
G ov[ern m en ]t after agreement with the Russian G ov[ern m en ]t.
6). Concession to the Dam ascus-Ham ah Company of an extension from Rayak
to Lydda, with the right of eventual extension to El Arish. (To this last extension we
have objected and M. Cambon said it would be dropped.) This line is to have a
guarantee of the surplus tithes now assigned to the line from Rayak to Aleppo. Are
there any prior claims on that surplus?
7). Traffic arrangements for the Damascus Company to have all the traffic between
Damascus and the sea.
8). Concessions to French groups, under conditions favourable to the construction
and administration of ports at Ineboli, Heraclea, Tripoli, Haiffa, and Jaffa, and at
Samsun and Trebizond, if the contract between the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and the
National Bank lapses.
Please telegraph your observations on these points in so far as you think it
necessary for us to make any reservations. Do any of the conditions conflict with
existing concessions or financial obligations of Turkey?

No. 89.

Foreign Office to India Office and Board of T rade.O

F.O. 21191/6463/13/4-4.
Urgent and Secret.
Sir :— Foreign Office, June 6, 1913.
W ith reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by S ec[reta r]v
Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the S ec[reta r]y of State for India/
the Board of Trade, the accom panying copy of a semi-official com m unication made by
the German Embassy on the 4th instant respecting the Bagdad Railway negotiations. ;
I am also to enclose the drafts of a memorandum and a declaration which, subject ,
to the concurrence of the S ec[reta r]y of State for India/the Board o f Trade, Sir E.
Grey proposes to communicate to the German Ambassador on the 10th instant.
Sir E. Grey considers that there is advantage in securing an undertaking from }
the German G ov [ern m en ]t with regard to the exclusion of differential treatment on j
the Bagdad Railway system, corresponding to the undertaking which that
G ov [ern m en ]t desire from H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] in regard to the river. 1
H e understands, from informal com m unication with the German Embassy, that i
the German G ov[ern m en ]t would be satisfied if, in the event of the Chairman of the ;
proposed Ottoman Navigation C o[m p any] being called upon to exercise his casting
vote, the suggested German director were excluded by the statutes of the Company k
0 ) [O n J u n e 9 b o th t h e I n d i a O ffic e a n d t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e c o n c u r r e d in t h e p r o p o s e d
m e m o r a n d u m a n d d r a f t a g r e e m e n t . ( F .O . 2 6 5 5 3 / 6 4 6 3 /1 3 / 4 4 ; 2 6 4 6 3 / 6 4 6 3 /1 3 / 4 4 . ) ]
 137
from voting at all. This, it is suggested, would overcom e the risk of British control,
which is to be exercised by means of the chairm an’ s casting vote, being endangered.

(t h e f o l l o w in g to bo ar d o f t r a d e o n l y .)

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn if, provided such a stipulation is embodied in
the statutes of the Company, it would be necessary to limit the powers of the German
representative on the Board to a “ voix consultative.”

(t h e f o l l o w in g to b o t h i [ n d ia ] o [ f f ic e ] a n d b [oard] o f t [ r a d e ] .)

As regards the suggested advisory commission, to make recomm endations to the

Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Commission, Sir E . Grey is not disposed to agree to such
an institution, but he considers that it might be well to provide that the Conservancy
Commission should have powers of direct correspondence with the foreign Consuls at
Bussorah, and that the latter should, in a purely advisory capacity, have the right
of making recommendations.
Sir E. Grey understands that the Bagdad Bailway Company would be prepared
to allot at least 4 0% in the construction of Bussorah harbour to British firms.
Sir E. Grey had, some time ago, given the National Bank of Turkey an assurance
that if British participation in the Bagdad Bailway were arranged, the Bank should
be the concessionnaire for the British share. He feels, therefore, that inasmuch as the
construction of the port of Bussorah is provided for under the Bagdad Bailway
Convention, the National Bank might consider that they had a prior claim to any
British share in this work, making the necessary financial arrangements with British
contractors to carry it out.
Sir E. Grey would, however, be glad to have the views of the I[n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ]
and B [o a rd ] of T [ra d e] as to the necessity for the intervention of a Bank in such an
enterprize.
(T H E F O L L O W IN G TO BOARD OF TRADE O N L Y .)

Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Board of Trade would suggest the wording of
annex No. 1 to the draft declaration^2) laying down the conditions for the control of
the port of Bussorah. The conditions should, if possible, approximate to those
obtaining at Haidar Pasha.
[ I am, A c.]
L [O U IS ] M [A L L E T ].
Enclosure 1 in No. 89.

Communication from H err von Kiihlmann.

Notice.
London, June 4, 1913.
From previous conversations concerning details of the negotiations about the
. Bagdad Bailway it appears that there is a desire for British representation in the port
at Basra.
The directors of the Bagdad Bailwray Company have no objection in principle to
1 this. They intend to organise the Basra Harbour Company on lines practically
analogous to those of the Haidar Pasha H arbour Company, the details of which have
I been communicated to the Foreign Office. The directors of the Bagdad Bailway
| Company are inclined to give British Capital 30% of the total capital of the Basra
’ Harbour Company, and to elect on the Board of this Company, which would build
1 and run the Basra Harbour, the two English members sitting on the Bagdad Baihvay
I Company Board. These concessions are conditional upon German interests getting
a representation in the bodies superintending the water-ways from the Persian Gulf
1 to Bagdad. I f a representative of the Bagdad Bailway Company could sit in the
(*) [r. infra, p. 155, No. 98, encl.]
 138
Turkish Commission, to which the conservancy of the Shat el Arab is going to be
entrusted, the German interests and the Im perial Government would prefer such a
solution. If, however, this should not be possible, it may be found feasible to create
a purely advisory Commission which might recomm end to the Ottoman conservancy
board alterations and improvements of the Shat-el-Arab waterway.
In the Board of the E u p h r a t e s ] and Tigris River Steamship Company, to which
practically a m onopoly shall be given, important German Shipping interests demand
one German representative to watch over the strict enforcement of our arrangements
for the exclusion of any differential treatment by the River Navigation Company.
The Imperial Government believes that in German shipping circles and public
opinion in general the idea of a m onopoly will not be popular, and that they could not
see their way to agree to a m onopoly unless the appointment of one representative of
the German interests to the Board provided a moral guarantee against possible
discrimination. Germany would claim no share in the capitalisation of the River
com pany.

Enclosure 2 in No. 89.

Memorandum for the German Ambassador.(3)

Foreign Office, June , 1913.

Sir E. Grey has had under careful consideration the record of the conversation
which took place at the German Em bassy on May 7th (4) between H err von Kiihlmann
and Mr. Parker respecting the Bagdad Railway.
Sir E. Grey understands that a copy of this record is in possession of the German
Embassy, and he now has the honour to state that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would
be prepared to conclude an arrangement on the basis of the paragraphs numbered 1,
2, and 3.
W ith regard to paragraph 4, His M ajesty’ s Government have negotiated a
convention (which has been initialled ad referendum ), with the Ottoman Government
for the establishment o f an Ottoman Commission, which is to be entrusted with the
improvement o f conditions o f navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab.(s) One o f the two
Commissioners will be a British subject, and the draft convention provides that the
Shatt-el-Arab shall be open to the ships of all nations. It further provides that any
dues shall be levied on a basis o f absolute equality without regard to the nationality
of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.
W ith regard to paragraph 2, point (d), His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would suggest
that any control at Bussorah secured to the Ottoman Government should be exercised
through the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Commission.
As regards paragraph 5, His M ajesty’ s Government would, on the conclusion of
the proposed arrangement and on receiving an assurance that there would be no
discrimination against British merchandise either in railway rates or in traffic
facilities, be prepared to give an undertaking similar to that contained in Article 3 of
the Russo-German agreement of August 19th, 1911, viz. :— (6)

“ Reconnaissant l ’ importance générale qu’ aurait pour le com m erce inter­

national la réalisation du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, le Gouvernement russe
s’ engage à ne pas prendre de mesures visant à en entraver la construction ou à

( 3) [T h is m e m o r a n d u m , w ith t h e a n n e x e d d e c la r a t io n , w a s c o m m u n ic a t e d to t h e G e r m a n
A m b a s s a d o r o n J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 1 3 . ( F .O . 2 6 4 6 3 / 6 4 6 3 / 1 3 / 4 4 . ) F o r P r i n c e L i c h n o w s k y ’ s r e p o r t o f
J u n e 2 1 , e n c lo s in g t h e d r a ft A n g lo -G e r m a n D e c l a r a t i o n , t h e G e r m a n c o u n t e r - d r a f t (cp. infra,
p p . 1 7 4 - 9 , N o . 1 1 8 , a n d ends.) a n d t h e d r a f t A n n e x c o m m u n i c a t e d t o h i m o n J u n e 1 4 ( v . infra,
p . 1 5 5 , N o . 9 8 , a n d end.), v. O.P., X X X Y 1 I ( I ) , p p . 1 9 6 - 2 0 5 . ]
( 4 ) [y. supra, p p . 9 7 - 8 , N o . 6 6 . ]
( s ) [ v . supra, p p . 1 0 9 - 1 4 , N o . 6 8 , end. 4 . ]
( 6) [ v . Gooch & Temperley, V o l . X ( I ) , p . 7 2 0 , N o . 7 4 1 . ]
 139

em pêcher la participation de capitaux étrangers à cette entreprise, à condition,

bien entendu, que cela n ’ entraîne pour la Russie aucun sacrifice de nature
pécuniaire ou économ ique.”

The draft of an agreement on the lines referred to above has been prepared, and
is submitted herewith for the consideration of the German Government.
L [O U IS ] M [A L L E T ].

Enclosure 8 in No. 89.

Draft Anglo-G erm an Declaration.

1. H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not oppose the
construction and management by the Bagdad Railway Company of the proposed
railway between Bagdad and Bussorah.
2. The Bagdad Railway Company, having agreed, in so far as they are concerned,
on the following arrangements with the Imperial Ottoman Governm ent, the Im perial
German Governm ent, so far as concerns themselves, hereby adhere to the said
arrangements and confirm them and guarantee their due execution :—

(a) The construction of a branch from Basra (Zubeir) to the Persian Gulf, referred
to in Article 1 of the Bagdad Railway Convention o f the 5th March, 1903,( 7) shall be
indefinitely postponed, and shall in no case be undertaken unless and until there is
complete agreement on the subject between H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, the
Imperial German Governm ent, and the Im perial Ottoman Government.
( b) In the event of the construction of the said branch being eventually under­
taken, the Bagdad Railway Company, while desiring to participate in the construction,
forgoes all claim to participate in the m anagem ent; though adequate arrangements
shall be made to secure facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway
Company’ s system.
(c) The terminus of the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra ; and
the Bagdad Railway Company shall renounce all claims, whether under Article 23 of
the Bagdad Railway Convention o f the 5th M arch, 1903, or in any other way derived,
to build a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf.
(d) The construction of the proposed port at Bussorah shallbe executed in a
manner to be mutually agreed upon, and so that British participation in the
undertaking shall amount to 5 0% of the whole.
The control of the port of Bussorah shall be exercised as provided in annex No. 1
attached to the present declaration. (8)
(e) Two British directors, selected from a list of candidates to be submitted by
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government, shall be admitted to the Board of the Bagdad
Railway Company ; and no discrimination direct or indirect shall be permitted on the
Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s system either as regards facilities or rates of charge for
j the conveyance of like articles between the same points on account of the ownership,
; origin, or destination of goods presented for transport, or in any other manner
‘ whatsoever.

3. The Imperial German Government declare that they will in no case them-
I selves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations whatsoever to
| establish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, without the prior assent of
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
4. The Imperial German Government undertake that they will in no wise
I encourage or support claims on the part of German subjects to participate in any
enterprise of navigation on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates.

(7) iv B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 833-4.]

(8) [ v . infra, p. 155, N o. 98, encl.]
 140

It is nevertheless understood that this article in no wise affects the rights

conceded by Article 9 of the Bagdad Bailway Convention o f March 5th, 1903, relative
to the importation of materials exclusively destined for the construction o f the Bagdad
Railway, except in so far that it is hereby expressly agreed that the said rights shall
not continue to be exercised for m ore than five years from the date of signature of the
present Declaration.
It is further agreed that if an arrangement, to the satisfaction of the parties
concerned, can be made for the conveyance by river of the said materials through
British or Ottoman agency, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Imperial
German Government will lend their best endeavours to the conclusion of such an
arrangement.
5. His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent will use their best endeavours to secure
that the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab shall be carried on on terms of absolute
equality for the vessels of all nations without regard either to the nationality of the
vessels or of their cargoes.
6. (Article corresponding to Article 3 of the Russo-German Agreement of
August 19th. 1911.)( 9)
7. No discrimination shall be made by the concessionnaires for river navigation
on the Tigris and Euphrates as regards facilities or rates of charge for the conveyance
of like articles between the same points on account of the ownership, origin, or
destination of goods presented for transport.
8. A representative o f German interests to be selected from a list of candidates
to be submitted by the Imperial German Government, shall be admitted, a voix
consultative, to the Board of the proposed Ottoman Company for navigation on the
Rivers Euphrates and Tigris. ( 10)

( 9) [ v . Gooch & Temperley, V o l . X ( I ) , p . 7 2 0 , N o . 7 4 1 , e n c L ]

( 10) [ I n a le t t e r o f J u n e 9 t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e s t a t e d t h a t “ it w o u ld b e d e s ir a b le to
d e fin e t h e p u r p o s e fo r w h ic h t h e G e r m a n r e p r e s e n t a t iv e w ill a tt e n d t h e m e e t in g s o f t h e
B o a r d .” I t w a s t h e r e fo r e s u g g e s te d t h a t t h e fo llo w in g w o r d s s h o u ld b e a d d e d a t t h e e n d o f
p a r a g r a p h 8 : “ fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f s a fe g u a r d in g t h e in t e r e s ts o f G e r m a n t r a d e a g a in s t
d i s c r im in a t io n o f a n y k i n d .” ( F .O . 2 6 4 6 3 / 6 4 6 3 /1 3 / 4 4 . ) T h i s a d d i t i o n w a s m a d e t o t h e d r a f t
a g r e e m e n t w h e n i t w a s s e n t t o t h e G e r m a n A m b a s s a d o r o n J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 1 3 .]

No. 90.

Foreign Office to India Office.

F.O. 2 59 4 2 /9 2 16 /1 3 /4 4 .
S ir :— Foreign Office, June 6, 1913.
W ith reference to previous correspondence I am directed by S ec[reta r]y
Sir E . Grey to state, for the inform ation of the S ec[reta r]y of State for India, that
Hakki Pasha intimated today that he had received authority from his G ov[ernm en]t
to sign the convention regarding the Persian Gulf, subject to the addition of a clause,
o f which he will submit a draft, (*) providing for the extradition o f criminals from
Koweit, which otherwise m ight becom e a haven of refuge for bad characters.
Hakki Pasha was inform ed that there would probably be no objection to such a
clause on the part o f H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n ]t; and I am to request that
Sir E . Grey may be furnished with the views of the S ec[reta r]y of State for India on
the subject as soon as possible.
I am, &c.
LO U IS M A L L E T .

0 ) [v. in fra , p . 1 4 4 , N o . 9 2 . ]
 141
M IN U T E S .
T h i s E x t r a d i t i o n Q u e s t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e much c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
W e h a v e n o E x t r a d it io n T r e a t y w ith T u r k e y o r w ith a n y C o u n tr y w h e r e w e e x e r c is e
E x t r a -t e r r it o r i a l ju r is d ic t io n . W e g e t B r it is h s u b je c ts fr o m th e r e a n d v ic e v e r s a u n d e r t h e
fu g it iv e o ffe n d e r s A c t .
W e h a v e a lw a y s , so f a r , r e fu s e d t o m a k e a n y E x t r a d it io n T r e a t y w ith T u r k e y , t h o [ u g h ]
th e y h a v e s u g g e s te d it m o r e th a n o n ce.
W . M.
7 June.
M r. M ay cock : —
.M a n y t h a n k s f o r t h is m in u t e . B u t is n o t t h is a n e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e . K o w e i t is a n
“ a u t o n o m o u s c a z a ” o f t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e i f o u r d r a f t C o n v e n t io n is r a ti fie d . I t is u n d e r
th e s u z e r a in ty o f t h e S u lt a n o f T u r k e y , b u t e n jo y s a b s o lu t e s e lf-g o v e r n m e n t. S u r e ly , t h e r e fo r e ,
t h e q u e s tio n o f w h e th e r o r n o t H [ i s ] M [ a je s t y ’s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] a r e p r e p a r e d t o c o n c lu d e a n
e x t r a d itio n t r e a t y w ith T u r k e y h a s n o d ir e c t b e a r in g o n t h e q u e s tio n .
A. P.
J u n e 9, 1913.

P e r s o n a lly I t h in k it h a s a c o n s id e r a b le b e a r in g o n t h e q u e s tio n . U n d e r t h e C o n v e n tio n

t h e S h e ik h o f K o w e i t is t o fly t h e O t t o m a n fla g , a n d in c a s e o f h is d e a t h t h e S u lt a n n o m in a t e s
h is s u c c e s s o r . I t is t r u e h e is g iv e n c o n s id e r a b l e p o w e r s u n d e r t h e C o n v e n t io n , b u t a s I
u n d e r s ta n d it h e is a v a s s a l o f w h o m t h e S u lt a n is S u z e r a in . I c a n ’ t ju d g e o f w h a t t h e
e x t r a d itio n p r o p o s a ls a r e t ill I se e t h e m , o r w h e th e r s o m e th in g c o r r e s p o n d in g t o t h e C y p r u s
0 [ r d e r ] in C [o u n c il] w h ic h r e g u la t e s C y p r u s e x t r a d it io n w ill b e n e e d e d . T h e q u e s t io n t o m y
m in d p r e s e n t s s e r io u s le g a l d iffic u ltie s o r a t a n y r a t e m a y d o so.
S ir E . D a v id s o n .
W . M.
J u n e 9.
E . A. C.
J u n e 9.

I e n tir e ly a g r e e , a s a t p r e s e n t a d v is e d a n d in t h e a b s e n c e o f fu r th e r e x p la n a tio n s a s t o
t h e s t a t u s o f K o w e i t , w ith M r . M a y c o c k . W e h a v e a lw a y s r e fu s e d t o c o n c lu d e E x t r a d it io n
T r e a tie s ( t h a t is t o s a y t o a p p ly t h e p r o v is io n s o f t h e E x t r a d it io n A c t s ) b e t w e e n t h is c o u n t r y
a n d p la c e s w h e r e t h e K i n g e x e r c is e s e x t r a t e r r it o r ia l ju r is d ic t io n o v e r B r it is h s u b je c ts — o f
w h ic h p la c e s T u r k e y is o n e . T h e r e a r e v e r y g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h is , w h ic h a r e w e ll k n o w n . H o w
a r e w e to c o n c lu d e a n E x t r a d itio n T r e a ty w ith th e S h e ik h o f K o w e it w h e n w e r e fu s e (q u ite
p r o p e r ly ) t o d o so w ith t h e S u z e r a in o f w h o m h e is t h e v a s s a l? W h y s h o u ld w e c o n c lu d e , a n d
h o w c a n w e ju s t ify c o n c lu d in g , a n E x t r a d itio n T r e a ty w ith th e S h e ik h o f K o w e it w h e n w e
h a v e n o n e w ith t h e K h e d iv e o f E g y p t , o r t h e S u lt a n o f M u s c a t — fo r e x a m p le . I p r e s u m e w e
a r e n o t g o in g t o g iv e u p ju r is d ic t io n o v e r B [ r i t i s h ] S [ u b je c t ] s in t h e S h e ik h d o m o f K o w e it
w h ile r e t a in in g s u c h ju r is d ic t io n w ith in t h e S u lt a n a t e o f T u r k e y ? I f w e a r e p r o p o s in g t o d o
a n y t h in g o f t h e s o r t I t h in k t h a t w e s h o u ld c a r e fu lly c o n s id e r — o r r e -c o n s id e r — t h e m a t t e r
fu r th e r b e fo r e w e c o m m it o u r s e lv e s t o a c o u r s e w h ic h a s a p r e c e d e n t m a y h a v e su c h im p o r t a n t
a n d fa r -r e a c h in g c o n s e q u e n c e s .
W . E. D.

M r . M a lk in .
M r. P em ber. .
M r . M a l k i n r e fe r r e d t h i s t o m e a g a in . S o f a r a s I a m a w a r e t h e r e is n o q u e s t io n o f a n
e x t r a d it io n t r e a t y a ffe c t in g B r it is h s u b je c ts . A ll t h a t is c o n t e m p la t e d is a n a r r a n g e m e n t ,
I p r e s u m a b ly r e c ip r o c a l, b y w h ic h K o w e it , in p r o p e r c a s e s , w o u ld s u r r e n d e r O t to m a n s u b je c ts
i (a s d is t in c t fr o m K o w e i t is ) w h o w e n t t h e r e .
I t is n o t t h e c a s e t h a t t h e S u l t a n o f T u r k e y n o m i n a t e s t h e s u c c e s s o r t o t h e S h e i k h o f
K o w e i t u n d e r o u r d r a f t c o n v e n t io n w i t h T u r k e y . H e is t o b e d e b a r r e d e x p r e s s is v e r b is fr o m
■ d o in g s o , a s a ls o fr o m a ll i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e a ffa ir s , e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l, o f K o w e i t .
A. P.
J u n e 10, 1913.

I s e n t th is p a p e r b a c k to M r . P a r k e r b e c a u s e I h a d n o t h e a r d o f th is p o in t b e fo r e a n d
* w a s n o t q u i t e s u r e w h a t w a s c o n t e m p l a t e d . I t n o w a p p e a r s f r o m h i s m i n u t e t h a t t h e r e is n o
| q u e s tio n o f H [ i s ] M [ a je s t y ’ s ] G [o v e r n m e n t] c o n c lu d in g a n e x t r a d it io n t r e a t y , e ith e r w ith
K o w e it o r T u r k e y , o r s u b m it tin g B r it is h s u b je c ts t o t h e p r o v is io n s o f a n e x t r a d it io n a r r a n g e ­
m e n t ; a ll t h a t is p r o p o s e d is a n a r r a n g e m e n t b e t w e e n K o w e i t a n d T u r k e y b y w h ic h t h e y w i ll
I m u tu a lly s u r r e n d e r s u b je c ts o f t h e o th e r . T h i s g o e s a lo n g w a y in t h e d ir e c t io n o f t h e r e c o g ­
n it io n b y T u r k e y o f t h e p r a c t ic a l in d e p e n d e n c e o f K o w e i t , w h ic h is I im a g in e w e ll p le a s in g t o
H [is ] M [a je s ty ’s] G o v e r n m e n t].
 142
I d o n o t t h in k H [ i s ] M f a j e s t y ’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] n e e d o b je c t t o s u c h a n a r r a n g e m e n t b e in g
m a d e b e t w e e n K o w e i t a n d T u r k e y , b u t it m ig h t b e w e ll t o e x p la in t h e p o s itio n a lit t l e m o r e
f u l ly t o t h e I [ n d i a l O F ffic e ],
H. W . M.
1 0 .6 .1 3 .
I a g re e a n d h a v e n o th in g to a d d .
F. W . P.
1 0 /6 /1 3 .
M y o p in io n w a s g iv e n o n t h e p o in t r a is e d b y t h e m in u t e (M r . M a y c o c k ’ s) im m e d ia t e ly
p r e c e d i n g i t , a n d o n t h e f a c t s a s g i v e n i n t h a t m i n u t e . I f t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n i n v o l v e d is a n
a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n K o w e it o n th e o n e h a n d a n d T u r k e y o n th e o th e r fo r th e h a n d in g o v e r o f
c r im in a l K o w e itis a n d T u r k s r e s p e c tiv e ly e n tir e ly d iffe r e n t c o n s id e r a tio n s a p p ly . I m a y p o in t
o u t h o w e v e r t h a t t h e u s e o f t h e t e r m “ e x t r a d i t i o n ” in th e d r a f t w h ic h a p p a r e n t ly h a s n o w
b e e n s e n t o ff w a s in m y o p in io n u n f o r t u n a t e a n d lia b le t o m is le a d p e r s o n s w h o w e r e
a c c u s t o m e d t o e m p l o y t h a t w o r d i n t h e s t r i c t l y t e c h n i c a l s e n s e i n w h i c h i t is k n o w n a t a n y
r a t e to t h e T r e a ty D e p a r t m e n t a n d t o la w y e r s .
“ M u t u a l s u r r e n d e r ” o r “ r e n d it io n ” w o u ld b e a p t e r e x p r e s s io n s .
W . E. D.
1 1 .6 .1 3 .

No. 91.
M inute by Mr. Parker.(*)

F.O. 2 6 2 6 6 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 7, 1913.

W ith Sir L. M allet’ s approval I went to the German Embassy to-day to meet
Herr von Gwinner.
There were present Prince Lichnowsky, Herr von Kuehlmann, and Herr Gwinner.
Herr Gwinner said that he had made a few notes respecting the negotiations with
Germany, and he would like to read them, making comments on each point.
As regards the Bagdad Railway, he was, he said, quite satisfied with the proposed
settlement. I said I was glad to hear this, which I could well understand, since in
effect the suggested settlement left him in sole possession of all in the concession
which was com m ercially valuable, while at the same time opening to him the London
m oney market.
H e then said that the Grand Vizier had communicated to him a copy of our
draft Convention with Turkey about railways(2); that he had read the document with
interest, especially article 9, which laid down that the Ottoman Government would
‘ ‘ veiller ” as to the appointment of two British directors on the Board of the Bagdad
Railway. He said he was perfectly ready that this article should remain “ pour les
beaux yeux du public ” ; but he thought it well to point out that in point of law it
would be ultra vires for the Ottoman Government to enforce their obligation lo
“ veiller,” as nobody but the shareholders of the Bagdad Railway Company could
elect directors. H e was, however, prepared to overcom e this difficulty if there was a
single English shareholder with only a small holding in the Company, as he
(H err Gwinner) could control sufficient votes to ensure the election of the British
directors. He then entered on a long technical argument on the point, and I asked
him for a statement in writing, for the information of the Board of Trade. This, I
believe, Herr Kuehlmann will send.
He then said that if a line ever were made from Basra to the Persian Gulf, the
Germans would like, while leaving the management to us, to have one director on the
Board, so as to guard against unfair rates, and they would like to have a guarantee
that such rates would not be enforced.
I said I would report this desire. (Personally I can see no objection to it.)

( !) [C o p ie s o f th is M in u t e w e re s e n t to th e D ir e c to r o f M ilit a r y O p e r a t io n s : to th e
A d m ir a lty ; to th e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e I n d i a O f f ic e . T h e t e x t g i v e n a b o v e i s t a k e n f r o m
a p r in te d c o p y , a s t h e o r ig in a l d r a f t c a n n o t b e t r a c e d .]
( 2) [ v . supra, p p . 1 0 1 - 3 , N o . 6 8 , encl. 2.]
 143

He then passed to the river, and he said that he had yesterday received a visit
from Mr. L yn ch, who had inform ed him that this was a most critical m oment in the
matter o f navigation, and that German interests and those of Mr. L yn ch called for
close co-operation and mutual confidence. Mr. Lynch had then referred to the existing
agreement with the Bagdad Railway Company for the conveyance of building material,
and H err Gwinner said it would be impossible for him to escape from his obligations
with Mr. L ynch under that contract, which was a very advantageous one for
Mr. L ynch who, besides the emoluments o f management, received a net profit of
12 per ce n t.(3)
I said that the contract in question only related to the conveyance of material
for the Bagdad Railway while in progress of construction, and that when construction
was com pleted both the need for conveying materials, and the navigation rights of the
Bagdad Railway Company under article 9 of their Convention, would cease to exist.
Herr Gwinner and Prince Lichnowsky then said that this brought them to a
further point : they understood that we and the Turks secured a virtual m onopoly
in regard to navigation on the Tigris, and that this would give rise to m uch criticism
in Germany, for it contrasted unfavourably with the German position respecting the
Bagdad Railway, where foreign participation was welcomed. They hoped we would
not object to the H am burg-A m eriea Line having, say, 5 per cent, or 10 per cent,
participation in the navigation com pany if they could arrange for holding part of the
Turkish share.
(As a matter of fact I understand that the Board of Trade are not altogether
opposed to this, but I thought it well to be reserved.)
I said that the navigation concession was in reality a fleeting possession; the
future of Mesopotamia depended on irrigation, and when irrigation came the rivers
would cease to be navigable. I therefore thought the Ilam burg-A m erica line would
find the enterprise a poor investment. But, apart from this, we had been intimately
connected with navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers since the reign o f Queen
Elizabeth, we had rendered great services on the rivers to Turkey in past centuries,
and we had a special and sentimental interest in this enterprize. Our arrangement
with Turkey really was a compromise, and if there was to be foreign participation it
would lose much of its value to us. W e had abandoned, or rather were prepared to
abandon, all claim to participate in and effectually control the B agdad-B asra section
of the Bagdad Railway, and therefore it was important for us to have the river
navigation in our hands.
Herr Gwinner said that all they wanted was a minor participation in the river
navigation, so as to prevent opposition from an influential quarter, the H am burg-
Ameriea line. I said that the settlement should surely be viewed as a whole, and the
Germans, so it appeared, gained far more than they gave.
The point was d rop p ed ; and then Prince Lichnowsky and H err Gwinner referred
to the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy C om m ission ." They said that as Germany
had such a large shipping interest that it was only fair that she should be represented
on the Commission.
I said that the Commission was an Ottoman one, and that we were asked to
appoint someone to act under the Ottoman Governm ent, just as the Ottoman Govern­
ment asked other foreign Powers to appoint advisers to improve their institutions—
a German for instance to reform the army. The Shatt-el-Arab, although open to the
ships of all nations, was, as regards the whole waterway, a Turkish river. W e,
however, had long been associated with the river, both in regard to Buoying and
surveying, and putting down piracy, and we were closely concerned with the de facto
interests of the Sheikh of Mohammerah on the river. It was absolutely necessary for

( 3) [M a r g in a l co m m e n t b y M r . P a r k e r : “ I a m w r itin g a s e p a r a te m in u te o n th e d o in g s
o f M r . L y n c h , a s e lic ite d fr o m M r . G w in n e r . A . P .” T h is s e p a r a te m in u t e is n o t r e p r o d u c e d
a s it d e a ls o n ly w ith t h e c la im s o f M r . L y n c h f o r a s h a r e in t h e n a v i g a t i o n o f M e s o p o t a m i a n
r i v e :- s . I t w a s s e n t t o S i r E d w a r d G r e y o n J u n e 1 2 . ( F .O . 2 7 0 9 6 / 6 4 6 3 / 1 3 / 4 4 . ) ]
 144

us to be connected with the Commission, as otherwise it would be next to impossible

to ensure peace on the river, or to secure that the bar would be properly watched, and
impediments to navigation removed. If the Germans claimed representation every
other nation would do likewise, and the Commission would cease to be Ottoman and
becom e international. But our arrangements with Turkey provided for absolute
equality of treatment for the ships of all nations, and annual accounts would be
published to show that there would be no discrimination. E very real German shipping
interest would be secured by the Commission, but the conditions were such that it
would be impossible locally to institute an international Commission without great
and probably insuperable difficulty.
I told Prince Lichnowsky that we should very shortly be sending him the draft
o f an agreement, based on m y conversation of the 7th M ay(4) with H err von
Kuehlmann.
A. P.
M IN U T E .
I t is v e r y n a t u r a l t h a t t h e G e r m a n G o v [ e r n m e n ] t s h o u ld o p e n t h e ir m o u th s — b u t t h is d o e s
n o t m e a n t h a t t h e y w i l l n o t b e c o n t e n t e d w i t h m u c h l e s s t h a n t h e y now a s k . T h e n e x t m o v e
in t h e g a m e is t h e c o m m u n ic a t io n o f o u r d r a f t M e m o r a n d u m o f a n a g r e e m e n t w h ic h is n e a r ly
r e a d y . T o t h is t h e G e r m a n E m b a s s y w ill r e p ly a s k in g p r e s u m a b ly fo r t h e p o in t s r a is e d in
th is m e m o r a n d u m ] . W e c a n th e n e x a m in e th e m w ith th e B o a r d o f T r a d e a n d m a k e su ch
c o n c e s s io n s a s m a y s e e m n e c e s s a r y .
L. M .
E. G.
(4) [ v . supra, p p . 9 7 - 8 , N o . 6 6 . T h e A n g l o - G e r m a n D r a f t A g r e e m e n t w a s c o m m u n i c a t e d t o
P r i n c e L i c h n o w s k y o n J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 1 3 ( F . O . 2 6 4 6 3 / 6 4 6 3 / 1 3 / 4 4 ) . T h e t e x t i s p r i n t e d supra,
p p . 1 3 9 - 4 0 , N o . 8 9 , encl. 3 . ]

No. 92.

Communication from Haliki Pasha.C)

F .O . 2 6 6 1 7 /9 2 1 6 /1 3 /4 4 . London, June 10, 1913.
D raft A r t ic l e .

Le Cheikh de Koveit et ses dépendants sont obligés de remettre aux autorités

des provinces limitrophes, sur leurs demandes et sans retard aucun, les personnes
poursuivies par les tribunaux ottomans et qui se seraient réfugiées sur le territoire de
Koveit.
M IN U T E S .
K o w e ït .

Proposed “ extradition ” clause.

C a p t [ a i n ] W i l s o n c a m e t o s e e m e , a s h a d b e e n a r r a n g e d b y M r . P a r k e r , a b o u t t h i s t o d a ,y ,
a n d g a v e m e t h e a n n e x e d n o te w h ic h h e h a d w r i t t e n ./2) H e w o u ld lik e t o h a v e a c o p y o f it,
a n d I s h o u ld b e g la d if o n e c o u ld b e s e n t h im .
C a p t [ a i n ] W i l s o n is s t r o n g ly o p p o s e d t o t h e p r o p o s e d a r r a n g e m e n t . H i s a r g u m e n t s a r e
s e t o u t in h is n o te , a n d in c o n v e r s a t io n h e d e v e lo p e d t h e m e v e n m o r e fo r c ib ly . I f so m e
a r r a n g e m e n t h a s t o b e m a d e , h e w o u l d p r e f e r t h e t h i r d c o u r s e s u g g e s t e d b y h i m , w h i c h is
b a s e d o n t h e T u r c o -P e r s i a n t r e a t y o f 1 8 2 3 .( 3)
T h i s is p u r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f p o l i c y , b u t i t s e e m s t o m e t h a t t h e p o i n t s h o u l d b e c a r e f u l l y
r e c o n s id e r e d in t h e lig h t o f C a p t [ a i n ] W i ls o n ’ s o b s e r v a t io n s . H e w ill b e g la d t o a t t e n d h e r e
to d is c u s s t h e m a t t e r fu r t h e r i f d e s ir e d .
H. W . M.
1 1 .6 .1 3 .

( D [ C o p i e s o f t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n w e r e s e n t t o t h e I n d i a O f f i c e .]
( 2) [u . im m e d ia t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t .]
( 3 ) [ u . B.F.S.P., V o l . 1 1 , p p . 8 3 6 - 9 ; C . U . A i t c h i s o n : Treaties, Engagements and Sanads
( 5 t h e d . ) , V o l . X I I I ( C a l c u t t a , 1 9 3 3 ) , p p . x i x - x x i i , App. V I . ]
 115

I q u it e a g r e e . H a k k i P a s h a ’s p r o p o s e d d r a f t is o f c o u r s e q u i t e im p o s s ib le a s i t s t a n d s ,
fo r th e re a so n s (a m o n g s t o th e r s) a d d u c e d b y C a p ta in W ils o n . T h e m a t t e r se e m s to b e n o w
r ip e fo r fin a l d is c u s s io n .
W . E. D.
1 2 .6 .1 3 .
M r . P a r k e r a sk e d m e to ta k e C a p t [a in ] W ils o n ’s n o te o v e r to S ir A . H ir t z e l o f th e
I [ n d i a ] 0 [ f f i c e ] a n d d is c u s s t h e s it u a t io n w it h h im , a n d S ir E . D a v id s o n a g r e e d t h a t t h is
w o u ld b e a g o o d t h in g t o d o . W h i le I w a s t h e r e C a p t [ a i n ] W ils o n h a p p e n e d t o a r r iv e , so w e
a ll t h r e e d is c u s s e d t h e p o in t . S i r A . H i r t z e l c o n s id e r e d t h a t C a p t [ a i n ] W i l s o n h a d m a d e o u t
a v e r y s t r o n g c a s e , a n d t h a t t h e I [ n d i a ] 0 [ f f i c e ] c o u ld n o t a g r e e t o t h e in s e r tio n o f a n y c la u s e
p r o v id in g fo r th e s u r r e n d e r o f c r im in a ls w ith o u t c o n s u ltin g th e G o v [ e r n m e n ]t o f I n d ia a n d
S ir P . C o x . I s a id t h a t I u n d e r s to o d M r . P a r k e r ’s v ie w t o b e t h a t i f a fo r m u la c o u ld b e
d e v is e d w h ic h w a s h a r m le s s i t w o u ld b e w e ll t o a g r e e t o it s in c lu s io n in o r d e r t o g e t t h e
A g re e m e n t th ro u g h .
A f t e r d is c u s s io n it w a s s u g g e s te d t h a t s o m e su c h fo r m u la a s t h e fo llo w in g m ig h t m e e t th e
case : —
“ H [ i s ] M [ a j e s t y ’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] w i ll u s e t h e i r g o o d o ffic e s t o p r e v e n t K o w e i t
b e c o m in g a p la c e o f r e fu g e fo r c r im in a ls o f T u r k is h n a t i o n a lit y .”
C a p t [ a in ] W ils o n t h o u g h t t h a t t h is w o u ld b e u n o b je c tio n a b le .
I f t h i s is c o n s id e r e d s a t i s f a c t o r y w e m i g h t p r o p o s e i t t o t h e I [ n d i a ] 0 [ f f i c e ] , w h o w i ll t h e n
p r e s u m a b ly o b ta in t h e v ie w s o f t h e G o v [ e r n m e n ]t o f I n d ia a n d S ir P . C o x b y t e le g r a p h .
H. W . M.
1 3 .6 .1 3 .
I a g r e e t o t h e fo r m u la s u g g e s te d b u t u n f o r t u n a t e ly H a k k i w o u ld n o t.
A. P.
J u n e 13, 1913.
S ir E . D a v id s o n .
S ir L . M a lle t.
A. P.
I b e lie v e t h e r e is s o m e p r e c e d e n t , fo r w h a t H a k k i w a n t s , in r e g a r d t o t h e L e b a n o n .
A. P.
L e t u s fin d o u t w h a t t h e p r e c e d e n t o f t h e L e b a n o n is a n d h o w i t is w o r k e d in p r a c t ic e .
I a m a fr a id t h a t a ll I k n o w a b o u t t h e L e b a n o n a t p r e s e n t is t h a t t h e r e a r e c e d a r s a n d D r u s e »
th ere.
W . E. D.
T h e L e b a n o n i s a sandjak o r mutessariflik d e p e n d e n t d i r e c t l y o n t h e P o r t e , a c t i n g i n
c o n s u lt a tio n w ith t h e s ix g r e a t P o w e r s .
T h r e e C o u r t s o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e , s u p e r i o r t o t h e p e t t y c o u r t s o f mudirs a n d v i l l a g e sheikhs
a d m in is t e r ju s t ic e .
A r t i c l e X I I I o f t h e R è g l e m e n t O r g a l i i q u e o f S e p t e m b e r 6 , 1 8 6 4 ,(*) w h i c h g o v e r n s t h e
a d m in is t r [a tio ]n o f th e L e b a n o n , la y s d o w n —
“ A r t [ ic le ] X I I I . L e s h a b ita n ts d u L ib a n q u i a u r a ie n t c o m m is u n c r im e o u d é lit
d a n s u n a u t r e s a n d ja k s e r o n t ju s t ic i a b le s d e s a u t o r i t é s d e c e s a n d ja k , d e m ê m e q u e le s
h a b it a n t s d e s a u tr e s a r r o n d is s e m e n ts q u i a u r a ie n t c o m m is u n c r im e o u d é lit d a n s la
c ir c o n s c r ip tio n d u L i b a n , s e r o n t ju s t ic ia b le s d e s t r ib u n a u x d e la M o n t a g n e .
“ E n c o n s é q u e n c e , le s in d iv id u s in d ig è n e s o u n o n in d ig è n e s q u i se s e r a ie n t r e n d u s
c o u p a b le s d ’ u n c r im e o u d é lit s u r le L ib a n , e t q u i se s e r a ie n t é v a d é s d a n s u n a u t r e s a n d ja k ,
s e r o n t , s u r la d e m a n d e d e l ’ a u t o r it é d e la M o n t a g n e , a r r ê t é s p a r c e lle d u s a n d ja k o ù ils
se t r o u v e n t e t r e m is à l ’ a d m in is t r a t io n d u L i b a n . D e m ê m e le s in d ig è n e s d e la M o n t a g n e
o u le s h a b it a n t s d ’ a u tr e s d é p a r t e m e n t s q u i a u r o n t c o m m is u n c r im e o u d é lit d a n s u n
s a n d ja k q u e lc o n q u e e t a u t r e q u e le L ib a n , e t q u i s ’y s e r o n t r é fu g ié s , s e r o n t , s a n s r e t a r d ,
a r r ê t é s p a r l ’ a u t o r it é d e la M o n t a g n e s u r la d e m a n d e d e c e lle d u s a n d ja k in t é r e s s é , e t
s e r o n t r e m is à c e tte d e r n iè r e a u to r ité . L e s a g e n ts d e l ’ a u to r ité q u i a u r a ie n t a p p o r té u n e
n é g lig e n c e o u d e s r e ta r d s n o n ju s tifié s d a n s l ’e x é c u t io n d e s o r d r e s r e la t ifs a u r e n v o i d e s
c o u p a b l e s d e v a n t le s t r i b u n a u x c o m p é t e n t s , s e r o n t , c o m m e c e u x q u i c h e r c h e r a i e n t à
d é r o b e r c e s c o u p a b le s a u x p o u r s u it e s d e la p o lic e , p u n is c o n fo r m é m e n t a u x lo is .
“ E n fin , le s r a p p o r t s d e l ’ a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d u L i b a n a v e c l ’ a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e s p e c t iv e
d e s a u t r e s s a n d ja k s , s e r o n t e x a c t e m e n t le s m ê m e s q u e le s r e la t io n s q u i e x i s t e n t e t q u i
s e r o n t e n t r e t e n u e s e n t r e t o u s le s s a n d ja k s d e l ’ E m p i r e .”
T h e r e is n o in f o r m a t io n in t h e L i b r a r y t o s h o w h o w t h e p r o v is io n s o f t h is A r t ic le w o r k
in p r a c t ic e .
E. P.
J u n e 16, 1913.
H [v. B .F.S.P., V o l . 6 1 , p . 1 0 2 7 .]
[10900] L
 146

M r . P a r k e r h a s a s k e d m e to p r e p a r e a n a lte r n a tiv e d r a ft fo r m u la , b a se d o n C a p t fa in ]
W ils o n ’s t h ir d a lte r n a tiv e (2 7 2 7 4 )(5) fo r s u b m is s io n to t h e I [ n d i a ] 0 [ f f ic e ] , a n d p r o v id in g fo r
r e c ip r o c ity .
P e r h a p s s o m e th in g lik e t h is w o u ld m e e t t h e s it u a tio n .
“ H [ i s ] M f a j e s t y ’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] w i ll u s e t h e i r g o o d o ffic e s t o e n s u r e t h a t T u r k is h
c r im in a ls a n d b a d c h a r a c t e r s s h a ll n o t b e r e c e iv e d in t h e t e r r it o r y o f K o w e i t , a n d if
fo u n d s h a ll b e e x p e lle d t h e r e fr o m .
S im ila r ly K o w e i t i c r im in a ls a n d b a d c h a r a c t e r s s h a ll n o t b e r e c e iv e d in T u r k is h
t e r r it o r y , a n d i f f o u n d s h a ll b e e x p e lle d t h e r e f r o m .”
I h a ve u sed th e w o rd “ e x p e lle d ” b e c a u s e t h e r e m a y b e o b je c tio n s t o s a y in g “ h a n d e d
, ,, T u r k is h , . . . ,,
o v e r t o t h e - - - - - - - - - - - - a u t h o r it ie s .”
K o w e iti
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i t is p r o p o s e d t o a s k t h e I [ n d i a ] 0 [ f f i c e ] w h e t h e r a s im ila r r e c ip r o c a l
a r r a n g e m e n t w o u ld b e a d v is a b le in t h e c a s e s o f B a h r e in a n d M u s c a t .
H. W . M.
1 6 .6 .1 3 .
( 5) [ v . im m e d i a t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t .]

No. 93.
N ote by Captain [S ir Arnold'] Wilson regarding the proposed provision for the
extradition from K oiceit of persons wanted by the Turks.
P .O . 2 7 2 7 4 /9 2 1 6 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 10, 1913.
N.B. The word “ extra d ition ” is used for convenience o n ly ; it is scarcely
applicable in its strict sense.

The following notes represent, I believe, generally speaking, the view of the
question that would be taken by Sir P. C ox; I have written without reference to
records however and subject to correction on all points.
I. Extradition has been refused by the Shaikh in the past to the Turkish
authorities, and cases are on record at Bushire where the demand has been made by
the authorities of Basrah, not com plied with by the Shaikh, and not pressed by the
Turks. The existing status quo certainly does not provide for it, and on this ground
I think we should resist any formal demand for it.
II. The Shaikh of Koweit could not possibly enforce extradition on his dependants
on the drastic scale provided for in Hakki Pasha’ s draft, and his personal prerogatives
in such a matter are strictly limited by immemorial Arab custom and local observance.
III. The indiscriminate extradition o f accused persons is contrary to well-known
and almost universally recognized Arab (and Mohamedan) cu stom : whether provided
for in our agreement or not, it cannot in practice be observed locally and can only
lead to friction and give local Turkish authorities occasion to pick quarrels with the
Shaikh.
A useful case to quote in support o f the above contention might be the murder
by Arabs in 1904 of a Bahrain notable whilst hunting on Turkish territory in Hasa.
M y recollection is that when we demanded the surrender of the guilty parties the
Turks pleaded that the malefactors had taken refuge with an Arab tribe who refused
to give them up, and that the Turkish authorities were not in a position to insist on
their surrender.
IV . Hakki Pasha’ s draft provides for extradition of any persons wanted by the
Turkish provincial authorities whether Turkish subjects or not, and whether accused
o f serious crim e or of petty civil misdemeanour : nor does it provide for any reciprocal
obligation on the part of the Turks. In all these respects it will certainly be
unacceptable and unworkable.
Turkey has refused “ extra d ition ” (the Capitulations notwithstanding) to Great
B rita in : she has also (vide Basrah case, 1910, and corre sp o n d e n ce ] with
 147
Constantinople) generally in practice refused it to Persia, in spite of the specific
provisions of the Treaties of 1 7 4 6 H and 1823.(2) The fact is, the principle of
extradition is repugnant to Eastern ideas.
Y. M y impression is that Hakki Pasha’ s draft goes far beyond the provisions
of Ottoman law on the subject. No Arab chief in Turkish Arabia or Mesopotamia is
expected to hand over without question any person against whom proceedings are
pending in the Ottoman “ tribunals ” (by which the judicial tribunals are presumably
intended). In this connection I am under the impression that the papers regarding
the Glanville murder at Basrah in 1904 or 5 will show that the local authorities at
Basrah admitted their inability to obtain the surrender of accused persons who had
taken refuge with certain Arab tribes such as the Muntafik and A1 bu Mahammad.
V I. In support of the contention (para[graph] I I I supra) regarding Arab and
Mohamedan custom it may be m entioned that no arrangements for extradition
inter se exist between any Mohamedan principalities as far as m y own knowledge
go e s : e.g.
Muskat and Zanzibar,
Muskat and Bahrain,
Bahrain and Koweit,
and Persia and Turkey (in practice).
Each case is dealt wdth on its merits as it arises, the laws of hospitality and
sanctuary being jealously guarded. See Moirs Comm entary on the Koran, and
Doughty. The Koranic law has I believe explicit provisions on the subject.
W e ourselves, if I rem em ber right, do not extradite (see case of Bint Barghash
1902) Muskat subjects from India on principle, but I am not clear about this.
V II. There are some thousands of Persians, Bahrainis, and Trucial Coast Arabs
in Koweit and every year Arabs from Najd and elsewhere visit Kow eit. The
extradition of persons com ing under these categories, and of persons wrho are only
colourably Turkish subjects would raise very awkward questions.

H aving regard to the above, I venture with great deference to suggest

(1) that any provision for extradition is unnecessary, Koweit being a Qaza and
the Shaikh a Qaimmagam, (or W ali?).
(2) Alternatively that any provision inserted should be
(a) reciprocal and mutual.
(b) that extradition from Koweit should apply only to bona-fide Turkish
subjects and vice versa,
(c) who are accused of grave crim inal offences justiciable by the highest
Ottoman judicial tribunals.
(d) that the demand for extradition should come in every case direct from
the porte and not from irresponsible local officials.
(e) that the obligation be qualified b y the words, “ so far as in him lies
the Shaikh . . . . ”

(3) A lternatively “ that a clause be drafted providing that deserters and

malcontents from Turkey shall not be received and shall be expelled if found in
Koweit territory.”
A. T. W .
10
6 1913.
0 ) \v. C . U . A i t c h i s o n : Treaties, Engagements and Sanads ( 5 t h e d . ) , V o l . X I I I ( C a l c u t t a ,
1 9 3 3 ), .4 p p . I l l , p . x .]
( 2 ) [v. ibid., App. V I , p . x x i . ]

[109001
 148

N o. 94.

Communication from Hakki Pasha.

F.O. 2 66 1 6 /2 0 10 7 /1 3 /4 4. London, June 10, 1913.
P rojet de Note anglaise (suggestcd on June 10 by H akki Pasha in place of
'the British Draft).
L e Gouvernement de S [a ] M [a jesté] B [ritann iqu e] n ’ a pas manqué d ’ examiner
avec attention les différentes demandes formulées par la Sublime Porte à certaines
époques et en dernier lieu au cours des négociations qui eurent lieu à Londres pour
le règlement des questions pendantes entre les deux pays. L e soussigné, principal
secrétaire d ’ Ëtat de S [a ] M fa jesté] le E oi pour les Affaires Étrangères, vient, par
laprésente, communiquer à l ’ Ambassade I[m p éria ]le de Turquie les décisions
auxquelles son Gouvernement s’ est arrêté sur les cinq points formant l ’ objet de ces
demandes.
I. Le Gouvernement Britannique donne son consentem ent à la nouvelle m ajora­
tion proposée de 4 % des droits d ’ entrée en Turquie, qui seront ainsi portée à
15% ad valorem sans limitation de temps. La nouvelle majoration ne pourra être
appliquée aux marchandises anglaises que si elle l ’ est également à tous les produits
étrangers et après qu ’ un délai m inimum de six mois ait été laissé avant sa mise en
vigueur.
II. Le G [ou vern em en ]t de S [a ] M [a jesté] B rita n n iq u e ] déclare consentir à la
conversion éventuelle des 15% ad valorem en un tarif de droits spécifiques aux
conditions suivantes :
a. Ledit tarif sera élaboré de com m un accord.
b. Il n ’ entrera en vigueur qu ’ après un délai raisonnable, pas moins qu’ un an
après sa promulgation.
c. Il ne pourra, non plus que les 15% ad valorem être changé ou modifié sans
qu’ un accord intervienne à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements.

III.f1)
IV . Le G [ou vern em en ]t de S [a ] M [a jesté] Britannique déclare qu ’ il n ’ a pas
d ’ objection de principe à l ’ abolition de ses bureaux postaux en Turquie à la condition
que cette mesure s’ étende à tous les bureaux étrangers et que l ’ administration postale
ottomane offre pour la transmission des correspondances les garanties requises de la
sécurité et de la célérité. Le G [ou vern em en ]t R [o y a ]l n ’ a pas, non plus, d ’ objection
à la vente, dans ses bureaux en Turquie, de timbres-postes ottomans. Ceci exigeant
l ’ établissement d ’ une surcharge et certaines mesures d ’ ordre technique, il est prêt à
entamer des négociations à ce sujet si les autres États ayant des bureaux de poste en
Turquie, conviennent d ’ étudier ce changem ent de système.
V. Le G [ou vern em en ]t R [o y a ]l espère que le G [ou vern em en ]t I[m p é ria ]l
créera sous peu, avec les réformes sérieuses de sa législation et de son organisation
judiciaire, un état de choses susceptible de faire envisager la possibilité de l ’ abolition
des capitulations. E n attendant, et com m e le système actuel pourra être amélioré
dans beaucoup de ses détails, il se déclare prêt à nom m er ses délégués si tous les
G [ou vern em en ]ts int[ernationau]x se mettent d ’ accord pour l ’ institution d ’ une
com m ission d ’ études.
A n n e x .

Mémorandum sent in Draft to H akki Pasha, June 5, 1913.( 2)

His Majesty’s Government have had under careful considération the various
draft conventions and déclarations which have been drawn up, and initialled
0 ) [cp. infra, p. 154, N o. 97.]
( 2) [T h e t e x t o f th is m é m o r a n d u m i s t a k e n f r o m t h e Confidential Print, a s t h e o r i g i n a
c a n n o t b e t r a c e d .]
 149

ad referendum , in the course of the recent negotiations with Hakki P a sh a ; they have
also examined, writh close attention, the memorandum com m unicated by his H ighness
on the 1st M a y,(3) com prising a list of various concessions to which the Im perial
Ottoman Governm ent desire that His M a jesty’ s Governm ent should give their assent.
These documents m ay be dealt with under their several headings as follows :—

1. A convention relating to the establishment o f a Commission to improve the

conditions of navigation of the Shatt-el-A rab; and a declaration, annexed to the
convention, providing for the representation on the Commission of neighbouring, but
non-Turkish, de facto interests in the river.
H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent are prepared to adhere to both these instruments,
subject to a modification in article 21 of the convention, increasing its minimum
duration to a period of sixty years, as in the case of Declaration No. 5 (vide infra).
Since the assent of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to the increased customs duties is
requested for an unlimited period, and not m erely for seven years, H is M ajesty’ s
Government trust that the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent will raise no objection to
such a m odification of article 21.
2. A convention, with a secret declaration annexed, providing for the settlement
of the respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the Persian
Gulf.
To these documents His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are prepared to adhere.
3. A declaration, with the necessary maps, indicating the line of the Turco-
Persian frontier from the region of Hawizeh to the sea.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are willing to join in this declaration; they under­
stand, however, that an agreement providing for the settlement of the rem aining part
of the Turco-Persian frontier will likewise be concluded forthwith. As the Ottoman
Government are aware, H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent attach the greatest importance to
the conclusion of this arrangement.
4. A convention relating to conditions of railway transport, and adeclaration
providing for the terminus of the Bagdad Railway to be at Basra.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are satisfied with the terms of this convention,
provided the words “ Turquie d ’ Asie ” are substituted for “ Asie Mineure ” where
they occu r; the proposed declaration as to the terminus being at Basra is cardinal
importance.
5. A declaration respecting river navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris.
His M ajesty’ s Government are prepared to accept this declaration as a satisfactory
settlement of the question, subject of course to the adjustment of details between the
Imperial Ottoman Government and the concessionnaire.
6. A declaration regarding the borrowing powers o f E gypt.

[A ddition to com e h e r e .](4)

The points to which the assent of Plis M ajesty’ s Governm ent isdesired by the
Imperial Ottoman Governm ent are five :—

1. An increase to 15 per cent, ad valorem of the Turkish im port duties.

It will be recalled that in 1907 H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent, in concert with the
other Powers concerned, agreed to the increase of the Turkish import duties from
8 per cent, to 11 per cent, ad valorem for a specified purpose and for a limited period
of seven years, which expires in 1914.(5)

( 3 ) [V. Supra, p. 96, N o . 64.]

( 4 ) [v . im m e d ia t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t .]
( 5) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V o l . V , pp . 198-9, N o . 155, a n d encl.]
 150

In their note of July 1912 His M ajesty’ s Governm ent expressed their readiness,
on stated conditions to agree—
‘ ‘ to the m aintenance, for a period of seven years, . . . . of the increase in the
general rate o f cnstoms duty leviable on British goods on importation into the
Ottoman Em pire from 8 per cent, to 11 per cent, ad valorem which was agreed to
in 1907, and also to the further increase of this general rate of customs duty
from 11 per cent, to 15 per cent, ad valorem for the same period.” ( 6)

The present request of the Ottoman Governm ent goes considerably beyond this
concession : nevertheless, on the successful conclusion of the negotiations which have
been proceeding with His Highness Hakki Pasha in London, H is M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment are prepared to agree to the levy on British imports of 15 per cent, ad valorem
without stipulating for a limitation of the period during which such a rate shall be
enforced.
It must, however, be distinctly understood that this assent of H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent is subject to twro further conditions, firstly that the assent of other Powers
concerned is obtained to the levy o f a similar rate on their respective imports, and
secondly that a period o f notice, of not less than six months, is given before the
increased duties are levied.

2. The eventual substitution of a specific tariff, to be fixed by mutual agreem ent, for
the proposed 15 per cent, ad valorem rate.
Provided that such a change meets wTith the approval of other Powers, His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent would be prepared to agree to it in principle, subject to the
following conditions :—
(a) The details of the scheme o f conversion must be previously agreed between
Great Britain and Turkey.
( b) No such tariff, even when it has been agreed upon shall be put into operation
without a reasonable period of notice, which in any case shall not be less than twelve
months.
(c) The Im perial Ottoman Governm ent shall previously make a declaration that
the rights at present enjoyed by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent, whether under or by
virtue of capitulations, treaties, notes, declarations, or otherwise, to veto any increase
in the duties leviable on British im ports into Turkey shall be fully reserved.

3. The im position of the “ tem ettu ” tax on British subjects on condition of its
im position on all foreigners in Turkey.
This question is the subject of active negotiation at the present time between the
Im perial Ottoman Governm ent and the Embassies at Constantinople, and H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent would hesitate to institute collateral negotiations in London,
since to do so might lead to misunderstanding and misconstruction.

4. The abolition, in principle, of foreign post offices in T u rk ey; and, pending their
abolition, the sale of Ottoman stamps.
Though certain Powers have, H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent are well aware, given
a conditional assent to the abolition of their respective post offices in Turkey, the
question is one in which it is impossible for His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to dissociate
them selves from the collective action of the Powers. They are, however, prepared,
subject to the assent of other Powers to a similar step, to agree to the abolition of
British post offices in principle, on the understanding that no such abolition shall be
effected until they are satisfied that the Ottoman postal administration affords
adequate guarantees of security and promptitude in transmission of correspondence.

( 6) [r . supra, p. 80, No. 55, encl.]

 151

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have no primâ facie objection to the sale o f Turkish
instead o f British stamps ; but it would be necessary to surcharge the stamps used in
the British post offices, or otherwise differentiate them from the stamps sold at
Ottoman Post Offices or the postal agencies o f other Powers, and the technical details
would have to be submitted to careful expert examination so as to avoid difficulties
of accountancy and interference with the British local administration. I f the other
Powers concerned agreed to a similar change in principle, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
would be prepared to appoint a delegate to enquire whether the change is practicable.

5. To study the question of the abolition of th e Capitulations.

As the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent are aware, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have
consistently maintained that, inter alia, their right to veto the increase of taxation on
British subjects and merchandise is derived from the capitulations, and this right
they are not prepared to abandon.
Pending the introduction of drastic reform s in the Turkish judicial administra­
tion, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent feel that it would be somewhat premature even to
study the possibility of abolishing the capitulations. None the less, they are prepared,
if the other Powers agree to such a course, to appoint representatives to examine how
far the existing conditions under the capitulations are capable of im provem ent.

No. 95.

M inute by Mr. Parker, (*)

P.O . 2 6 9 0 8 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 11, 1913.

I had an interview wdth Hakki Pasha to-day.
1. H e stated that his Governm ent were m uch disappointed by the abstention
of Sir E. Cassel from the small joint advance being made by France and Germ any to
Turkey, and he hoped this did not indicate an intention to abstain from larger loan
operations, as if so it would create a very regrettable impression in Turkey. I said
that Sir L. Mallet would be seeing Sir H. B abington-Sm ith on the 12th June, and,
though we had no control over the Bank, would m ention the point to him . Hakki
Pasha said he felt sure a word from the Foreign Office would have the desired effect.
2. He pressed very strongly that Sir E . Grey would oppose an indem nity. He
stated that the French would be most grateful if we took the lead in this m atter./2)
I said that we had been opposed in principle to an indem nity, though we could not
refuse to listen to arguments in favour of one. H e said the reports from Paris on the
subject were disquieting, and that now was the opportune m oment for a démarche on
our part.
3. H e said a difficulty had arisen about the Turco-Persian frontier owing to
Sir G. Lowther and his Russian colleague putting forward claims of an impossible
nature in regard to the frontier south of Z oh ab .(3) I said that our inform ation was
that the outstanding difficulties were small ones relating to the northern part of the
frontier, but that we would telegraph again to Constantinople to find out exactly what
was delaying matters. This has been done in a telegram dated the 11th J u n e./4)
4. H e said his Governm ent accepted the formula about E gyptian borrowing
powers, already initialled ad referendum . They wanted, however, to have the option

t1) [C op ies o f this m in u te w ere sent to th e In d ia Office ; to the B oa rd o f T ra d e ; t o the

A d m ira lty .]
( 2) [M a r g in a l com m en t by S ir E d w a rd G rey : “ T his has been don e to-d a y . 12.6.13. E . G .” ]
(3) [ cp . supra, pp. 121-2, No. 71, and n o te (3).]
(4) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 254) o f J u n e 11, 1913, D. 5-45 p .m ., is n ot rep rod u ced .
(F.O . 2 6 1 6 9 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
 152
of making the change by firman or by declaration, as they might deem most
convenient. I said we would enquire Lord Kitchener’ s views on the subject by
telegraph.(5) Primâ facie there does not seem much objection to leaving them this
option.
5. The Turkish Government were prepared to meet us by agreeing, as we had
asked, to the minimum duration of the Shatt-el-Arab Commission being for sixty years
instead of for tw enty-one(6) : they hoped, however, that as they were so conciliatory on
all points we would show a corresponding disposition in regard to any little requests
they might make to us.
W e initialled the Convention as modified.
6. Mesopotam ian Oil.— Hakki Paslia said that the two groups, viz., the National
Bank and Mr. D ’ Arcy (Greenwav) must be brought to terms. Otherwise the Turkish
G overnm ent would simply keep the concession in suspense, as otherwise in gratifying
one party they would make enemies of the other. The National Bank had inherited,
inter alia, the rights of the Bagdad Bailway Company under their Convention of
1903(7) in regard to mines and oil for a distance o f 20 kilom. on either side of the
railway, and that group (viz., the National Bank one) had acquired such other rights
as the Germans claimed for what they were worth. The National Bank group included
German interests, and if the Turkish Government gave the whole concession to D ’ Arcy
they would be bullied by the Germans.
W hat Hakki suggested was such a com bination as would secure British control
by a slight predom inance of British interests over German. I said I thought, in view
of the past history of this question, that our predominance would have to be more
than slight ; but that efforts were being made to bring the two groups together, though
not with much success so far.
Hakki said that it was clearly their interest to come together.
7. Hakki said that he hoped we would make no difficulty about the rendition of
crim inals by the Sheikh of Koweit. I said the matter had been referred to the
Governm ent of India for their observations.
8. H e asked if we had any objection to a m onopoly for matches and cigarette
papers in Turkey. I said that I would make enquiries from the Commercial
Department and let him know.
9. W e then entered on a discussion o f the “ projet de note anglaise ” which he
had suggested as our reply and as more likely to meet with a good reception in Turkey.
A fter a good deal of discussion 1 said I would submit the following draft to Sir E. Grey,
and Hakki Pasha said he hoped it could be initialled ad referendum on Friday, the
13th June :—

L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n ’ a pas manqué d ’ examiner avec

attention les différentes demandes form ulées par la Sublime Porte à certaines époques
et, en dernier lieu, au cours des négociations qui eurent lieu à Londres, pour le règle­
m ent des questions pendantes entre les deux pays. Le soussigné, Principal Secrétaire
d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères vient, par la présente,
com m uniquer à l ’ Ambassade Im périale de Turquie les décisions auxquelles son
Gouvernement s’ est arrêté sur les cinq points formant l ’objet de ces demandes :—

(i) Le Gouvernement britannique donne son consentement à la nouvelle majora-

tion proposée des droits d ’ entrée en Turquie, qui seront ainsi portés à 15 pour cent
ad valorem sans limitation de temps. La nouvelle majoration ne pourra être appliquée t
aux marchandises anglaises que si elle l ’ est également à tous les produits étrangers,
et elle n ’ entrera en vigueur que six mois après sa notification officielle.

( 5) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 66) to C airo o f J u n e 12, 1913, D. 7 p .m ., is not

rep rod u ced , as the con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F.O . 2 6 9 0 8 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
( 6) [r . supra, p. 113, No. 68, encl. 4, and n o te ( 14).]
( 7) [r . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, p. 8 4 0 ; cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. II, p. 174, Ed. Note.~\
 153

(ii) L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare consentir à la conversion

éventuelle des 15 pour cent ad valorem en un tarif de droits spécifiques aux conditions
suivantes :—

(a) Ledit tarif sera élaboré de com m un accord.

( b) Il n ’ entrera en vigueur qu ’ après un délai raisonnable, pas moins d ’ un an
après sa promulgation.
(c) Il ne pourra, non plus que les 15 pour cent ad valorem, être changé ou
modifié sans qu ’ un accord intervienne à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements.

(iii) (Addition to com e here about “ tem ettu.” ) ( 8)

(iv) Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu ’ iln ’ a pasd ’ objection

de principe à l ’ abolition de ses bureaux postaux en Turquie à la condition que cette
mesure s ’ étende à tous les bureaux étrangers, et qu’ il ait l ’ assurance que l ’ adm inis­
tration postale ottomane offre pour la transmission des correspondances les garanties
requises de sécurité et de célérité. E n attendant que l ’ abolition desdits bureaux
puisse se réaliser, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n ’ a pas d ’objection à
l ’ emploi, dans ses bureaux en Turquie, de timbres-poste ottomans. Cette mesure
exigerait, cependant, l ’ établissement d ’ une surcharge et certaines réglementations
d ordre technique. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique est donc prêt à
entamer des négociations à ce sujet, si les autres Etats ayant des bureaux de poste
en Turquie conviennent d ’ étudier ce changem ent de système.
(v) E n attendant l ’ introduction de réform es dans l ’ administration judiciaire
ottomane, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique estime que le m oment n ’ est pas
venu d ’ envisager la suppression des capitulations. Toutefois, dans le cas où les autres
Puissances se mettraient d ’ accord sur une telle procédure, le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique serait prêt à désigner des représentants en vue de déterminer
jusqu’ à quel point le régime actuel des capitulations est susceptible d ’ am élioration.(9)

10. ITakki Pasha then told me that the Bagdad Railway Company were
negotiating for a modification of the kilometric guarantees in so far as they are at
present, under article 35 of the Convention of 1903, opposed to the developm ent of
traffic.
A. P.

M IN U T E .

T his is v ery sa tisfa ctory . In fo rm B [ o a r d ] o f T [r a d e ] , I [n d ia ] 0 [ff ic e ] an d A d m [ir a lt ]y .

L. M.
E. G.
( 8) [ cp . in fra , p. 154, No. 97.]
( 9) [T he t e x t here g iv en is th a t o f the d r a ft p reserv ed in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rig in a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey No. 94). It was in itia lled “ ad referen d u m ” in L on d on , on J u n e 13, 1913
by H a k k i P ash a and S ir L. M a llet.]

No. 96.

Communication to H akki Pasha.(*)

r .O . 2 7 1 4 8 /2 7 1 0 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 13, 1913.

As the Im perial Ottoman Government are aware, British firms have manifested
considerable interest in the question of irrigation in Mesopotamia.

0 ) [A cop y o f th is com m u n ica tion w as sent t o the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

 154
In these circumstances, and in view o f the abstention of His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment from pressing for British control over any portion of the Bagdad Bailway as far
as Bussorah, it would afford much satisfaction to His M ajesty’ s Government if the
Ottoman Government would grant to British firms concessions and contracts for more
extensive works of irrigation, which could not fail to react favourably on the prosperity
of the country.

No. 97.

M inute by Mr. Parker, (*)

F .O . 2 7 4 6 4 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 13, 1913.

Sir L. Mallet and I saw Hakki Pasha today.
The accom panying “ projet de note ” to be signed by Sir E . Grey, was initialled
ad referendum .( 2) At H akki’ s request the blank space was left, as he said he might
wish to include something about the “ temettu ” tax, though it was pointed out to
him that it would be very inconvenient to carry on collateral negotiations here.
The accom panying note about irrigation was handed to him, and he said he would
refer the matter to Constantinople for instructions.
As to oil, he pointed out that the National Bank group had a double claim : they
had inherited the indisputable rights of the Bagdad Bailway Company under the
Convention of 1903Í'3') to mines and oil for a distance of 20 kilometres on either side
of the line : if say 100 kilometres o f the line passed through petroliferous districts,
then it meant that the National Bank had a good claim to oil in 40,000 square
kilometres.
Then they had inherited the claims, which were he knew disputed, to oil in virtue
of the Agreem ent of 1904 made by the Anatolian B [a i]l[ w a ]y Company.
As against this, he contended, there was nothing but an oral undertaking, which
should never have been given as it was ultra vires, incurred by Kiamil Pasha who
was an old man. That, he contended, was all that Messrs. D ’ A rcy and Greenway had
to go on. W e did not assent to th is; though it is clear that the Turks consider the
National Bank group have the best claim of the two, and that that part of their claim
which rests on the convention of March 1903 is of course indisputable.
It seems absolutely necessary that the two groups should com e to terms if there
is to be a settlement.
Hakki Pasha said that Dr. Gwinner had asked him if there would be any objection
to the Germans taking up 10% o f the Turkish share of the new navigation C om p a n y:
Hakki had said that he would consider the point after consulting us. W e told him
that the Germans had proposed to us that they should stand out of the navigation
on the Euphrates and Tigris. It seems important not to let the Germans into the
Turkish part of the undertaking, at all events until we know precisely whether the
National Bank, as a Turkish institution, intends to continue operations in Turkey and
if it would like to come into the Turkish side of the Navigation Company.
W e told Hakki Pasha that the E gyptian G ov [ern m en ]t, who had been consulted,
had no objection to the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t retaining the option to alter the veto
on E gyptian borrowing powers by firman or declaration as they might deem most
e xp ed ien t: the E gyptian G ov [ern m en ]t considered however that it would be more in
accordance with precedent if it were done by firman.
A. P [A B K E B ].
June 13, 1913.

t 1) [T h is docu m en t is in itia lled as h a v in g been seen by S ir L . M a llet and S ir E d w a rd Grey.1

(2) [r . supra, pp. 152-3, No. 95.1
( 3) [v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, p. 840.J
 155

N o. 98.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince Licknowsky.

F.O. 2 6 9 8 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, June 14, 1913.

Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the German Ambassador and has the
honour to transmit to H is H ighness herewith the draft annex referred to in the draft
agreement about the Bagdad Railway and cognate m atters^1)

Enclosure in No. 98.

A nnex.

(i) In the event of the Bagdad Railway Company desiring to exercise their rights
under Article 23 of the Bagdad Railway Convention o f 1903(2) in respect of the
establishment o f a port at Bussorah, they shall form for the purpose a special
Ottoman Company, to which all the said rights of the Bagdad Railway Company shall
be transferred.
The capital of the Port Company so form ed shall be held in equal proportions
by the Bagdad Railway Company and its nom inees and a group to be nom inated by
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.
(ii) Contracts in respect of the construction, equipment and maintenance of the
port shall be allotted to British and German contractors as nearly as possible in equal
proportions.
(iii) No duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denom ination
shall be levied by the Port Company on any vessels or goods which shall not equally,
under the same conditions, be imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever
be the nationality o f the vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country of
origin or destination o f the goods, and whatever be the places from which the vessels
or goods arrive or to which they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading of vessels in the port
no privileges or facilities shall be granted to any vessel or vessels which shall not
equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.

0 ) \v. su pra , p. 139, N o. 89, encl. 3. T his a nnex was d r a fte d b y th e B oa rd o f T ra de, at
Sir E d w a rd G re y ’ s request ( v . his le tte r o f J u n e 6, 1913, su pra, p. 137, N o. 89), an d forw a rd ed
to the F o re ig n Office on J u n e 12, 1913. (F .O . 2 6 9 8 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
(2) [v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 40 -1 .]

No. 99.

Communication from Count Benckendorff.

F.O . 2 7 3 0 2 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .
Confidentielle. London, June 14, 1913.
Le Ministère Im périal des Affaires Etrangères a reçu copie du projet de
déclaration ad référendum , signé à Londres, le 6 Mai a [n n é e ] c [o u ra n te ].(1) D ’ après
ce projet la ligne frontière Turco-Persane à partir de Hafiz jusqu’ au golfe Persique
passerait en amont de l ’ embouchure du fleuve Karoun par le chenal qui divise le
Chatt-el-Arab en deux parties égales.
Cette ligne suivrait ensuite la rive Persane même de manière à laisser à la
: Turquie toute la surface fluviale.

0 ) [v. sup ra , pp. 100-1, N o. 68, encl. 1, and n ote (4).]

I
 156

Tout le cours du Chatt-el-Arab se trouverait ainsi cédé à la Turquie et "le Karoun

n ’ aurait de débouché sur le golfe Persique que le bras difficilement navigable de
B echm eter; il semblerait que la valeur du Karoun, en tant que fleuve ouvert à la
navigation internationale, en serait sensiblement diminuée.
L e Gouvernement Im périal pense qu ’ il serait désirable d ’ éclaircir comment
pourrait être garantie la navigation internationale du Chatt-el-Arab ; il désirerait de
m ême être inform é sur l ’ état de la question de l ’ établissement d ’ une commission
internationale de navigation sur ce fleuve.
Le Gouvernement Britannique a bien voulu nous com m uniquer confidentiellement
copie de ce projet le 29 juillet 1912(2) et nous com ptons form uler à son sujet, par
l ’ entremise de l ’ Ambassadeur d ’ Angleterre, certaines remarques et exprimer quelques
désirs.
D ’ après le projet de déclaration sur cette frontière, le Gouvernem ent Britannique
“ s’ engage à inviter le Gouvernem ent Persan à accepter le tracé susmentionné de
cette frontière com m e tracé définitif.” Le Gouvernement Im périal n ’ est pas sans
appréhender que pareille rédaction n ’ occasionne quelque froissem ent de l ’ amour-
propre du Gouvernement Persan.

(2) [v. su pra, pp . 8 1-3, N o. 55, encl., A n n e x 3 .]

No. 100.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. B uchanan.(*)

F .O . 2 7 3 0 2 /2 6 1 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (N o. 458.) Foreign Office June 17, 1913, 5-45 p . m .
I have received a com m unication from the Russian E m bassy respecting the
Turco-Persian frontier from Hawizeh to the sea : following is an ex tra ct: . . . .(z)
I have been somewhat surprised by the receipt o f this com m unication, as, in
the absence o f any criticism b y the Russian Governm ent of the docum ent, com m uni­
cated to them last July, and suggesting a definite line o f frontier along the Shatt-
el-Arab, I had assumed that Russian Governm ent did not dissent from that line. It
is true that the line allots the whole waterway o f the Shatt-el-Arab to Turkey, but
this was also so allotted by the M ediating Comm issioners’ line o f 1851, to which
Persia then acceded; and it would, I consider, be impossible to uphold any Persian
claim to the m id-channel boundary having regard to the terms o f the treaty of
Erzeroum . But -the present declaration in no way invalidates o r supersedes the
clause o f the Treaty o f Erzeroum , (3) which secures the right o f navigation to the
K arun via the Shatt-el-Arab.
I have com m unicated to the Russian Ambassador the draft o f our convention
with Turkey respecting the Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Comm ission, and I think the
Russian Governm ent will be satisfied that it contains adequate safeguards for inter­
national navigation, and that those safeguards are in excess o f any which have
hitherto existed.
As to the declaration referred to in the last paragraph of the Russian com m uni­
cation, as the line now provisionally agreed to by Turkey is m ore favourable to
Persia than that awarded by the M ediating Commissioners, which Persia was ready
to accept, I cannot understand how she could possibly object to it.

O [T h is teleg ram w as rep ea ted to C on stan tin op le (N o. 2 6 5 ); to T eh ra n (N o. 275).]

( 2) [T h e e x tra ct w hich is g iv en here is ta k en from the com m u n ica tion p rin ted as the
im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docum ent. I t b egin s “ C ette lig n e su iv ra it ” and ends at “ 1’ am our-
p ro p re du G ou v ern em en t P e rsa n .: ’ ]
(*) [i>. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 45, pp. 8 7 4 -6 .]
 157

In Mr. O ’ B eirne’ s telegram No. 232 of June 3 0(4) I was led to believe that
Russia would support H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] in regard to the Moham m erah
line, in which they were particularly interested, and I undertook to support Russia
in regard to the northern part o f frontier. I earnestly trust that M in is te r for]
F [oreig n ]' A [flairs] will not now raise any difficulty in regard to the arrangements
for the Shatt-el-Arab.

(4) [M r. O ’ B e irn e ’ s teleg ram (N o. 232) o f J u n e 30, 1912, is n o t rep rod u ced , as th e con ten ts
are sufficiently in d ic a te d above. (F .O . 2 7 6 5 4 /5 2 /1 2 /3 4 .)]

No. 101.

Foreign Office to India Office.

F.O . 2 66 1 9 /9 2 1 6 /1 3 /4 4 .
Sir, Foreign Office, June 17, 1913.
W ith r e fe r e n c e ] to your letter P .2283 o f the 10th instant,^ ) I am directed by
S ec[reta r]y Sir E . Grey to state that he considers it desirable that Sir P. Cox should
now inform the Sheikh o f Koweit of the details of the draft agreement with Turkey
respecting Koweit.
He also considers it desirable that he should proceed as proposed with regard
to Moham m erah, and that some further honour should be bestowed on the Sheikh
of Moham m erah when the negotiations with Turkey are finally brought to a close.
[ I am, A c.]
LO U IS M A L L E T .

(!) [N o t rep ro d u ced . A teleg ram from S ir P . C ox, the P o litica l R es id en t at B u sh ire in
the P ersian G u lf, was enclosed, in w hich he asked fo r in fo rm a tio n on th e subjects referred to
above. T he S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r In d ia w a s 'a n x io u s to k now w h at answ er “ S ir E d w a rd G rey
w ould wish re tu r n e d to S ir P . C o x .” (F .O . 2 6 6 1 9 /9 2 1 6 /1 3 /4 4 .)]

No. 102.

Sir Edward G rey to M. Paul Cambon, Count B enckendorff and Prince L ich now sky.(')
F .O . 2 6 4 6 6 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidential. Foreign Office, June 18, 1913.
Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the F ren ch/G erm an/R ussian Ambassador
and has the honour to communicate to H [ i s ] E [x cellen cy ] certain conventions and
declarations which have been initialled, ad referendum , by Hakki Pasha and
representatives of H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t].(2)
Sir E . Grey will be obliged if the F ren ch/R ussian/G erm an G ov [ern m e n ]t will
treat these docum ents as confidential for the present.
He hopes to communicate shortly to the French G ov [ern m en ]t a reply to the
com m unication made by the French Ambassador on the 2nd June(3) respecting the
conditions of F rench fiscal and financial assistance to Turkey.(4)

( 1) [C op ies o f th is le tte r and the enclosures w ere sent to P a r is ; to B e r lin ; to St. P e te rs-
b u r g h ; and t o th e B o a rd o f T ra d e.]
( 2) [T h e oth er enclosures w ere the “ C on v en tion con cern a n t les C hem ins de fe r en Asie
M in eu re,” and the “ D e cla r a tio n ,’ ’ b oth in itia lle d on M a y 6. T hey are p r in te d s v p ra , pp . 100-3,
N o. 68, encls. 1 and 2. F o r th e sim ilar com m u n ica tion o f the S h a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion ,
v. supra, pp. 109-14, N o. 68, e n d . 4, and n ote ( 41) ; p. 156, N o. 100.]
(3) [v. su pra, pp. 134-5, N o 87.]
(4) [T h e final pa ra g ra p h w as sent to M . P a u l C am bon on ly .]
 158
Enclosure in No. 102
D éclaration.( 5)
1. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an se déclare prêt à accorder une concession
pour la navigation à vapeur sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate. Les bâtiments
em ployés en vertu de cette concession auront, sauf les réserves ci-dessous spécifiées,
le droit exclusif de la navigation à vapeur sur lesdits fleuves pendant la durée de la
concession et la faculté de naviguer sans restriction de nombre sur eux jusqu’ à des
points à fixer ultérieurement— pourvu toutefois que les points désignés ne se trouvent
pas en aval de Mosoul sur le Tigre et de Meskéné sur l ’ Euphrate— et sur tous leurs
affluents et canaux navigables.
2. E n conform ité du droit général de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, lesdits
bâtiments auront la faculté de naviguer entre Kourna et la mer ou entre tous points
intermédiaires.
8. L a concession restera en vigueur pour une période de soixante ans au moins,
avec faculté de prolongement pour des périodes successives de dix ans, et elle sera
accordée à un concessionnaire qui s’ engagera à constituer, en vue de l ’opérer, une
société ottom ane. Le Gouvernem ent Im périal ottom an invite le Gouvernement de
Sa Majesté britannique à soumettre à son agrément un concessionnaire possédant
les qualités requises. L e capital de la société sera partagé à proportions approxi­
m ativem ent égales entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne.
4. Le président de la société sera de nationalité ottomane et présidera l ’ assemblée
générale des actionnaires. Le président du conseil d ’ administration sera de nationalité
britannique. Les présidents de la société et du conseil d ’ administration auront tous
les deux la voix prépondérante en dehors de leur vote ordinaire. L a proportion des
directeurs ottomans et britanniques sera égale. Les statuts de la société ainsi que
tous les détails concernant la concession et le service à maintenir seront arrêtés avec
le m oins de retard possible par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an d ’ accord avec le
concessionnaire. ^^
5. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an est prêt à transférer à la nouvelle société
dans des conditions équitables tous ses intérêts à l ’ égard de la navigation à vapeur
dans les limites spécifiées par l ’ alinéa 1er de la présente déclaration.
6. Sont réservés les droits de la société du chemin de fer de Bagdad à l ’ égard
du transport de matériaux destinés à la construction de la ligne.
7. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an déclare en outre qu’ aucune clause de la
concession ne portera atteinte de quelque manière que ce soit au droit dont jouissent
actuellement les bâtiments britanniques à l ’ égard de la navigation à vapeur sur les
fleuves Tigre et Euphrate, lesquels droits sont pleinement réservés et resteront comme
par le passé tels qu ’ ils sont définis par le docum ent annexé. _ _ .
8. Après l ’ expiration de la concession, la société continuera à jouir du droit de
la navigation à vapeur dans les limites spécifiées mais sans posséder aucun m onopole.
9. Il est entendu que la présente déclaration et le docum ent annexé n ’ont trait
q u ’ à la seule navigation com m erciale. ,
10. A ux'fins de la présente déclaration et du document annexé la phrase “ navi­
gation à v a p e u r” com prend la navigation à électricité ou à toute autre force motrice.
11. L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an se déclare en outre prêt à admettre
que, en cas de contestation au sujet de l ’ interprétation ou de la mise à exécution
de la concession ou de la présente déclaration, la question en litige soit déférée,
sur la demande de l ’ une ou de l ’ autre des parties intéressées, au jugem ent du
tribunal international d ’ arbitrage de L a H aye.
Parafée ad référendum
le 20 mai, 1918.
I. H .
A. P.
(5) [T h e te x t here giv en is th a t p reserv ed in the F o re ig n Office sériés o f O rigin a l T reatie
(T u rk ey N o. 94).] •
 159

A n n exe.
A. Deux bateaux à vapeur battant pavillon britannique continueront à naviguer
sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate et à profiter du droit général de la navigation sur le
Chatt-el-Arab.
B. Un bateau à vapeur battant pavillon britannique sera tenu en réserve en
vue de rem placer l ’ un ou l ’ autre des bateaux ci-dessus mentionnés pour le cas où
il serait hors de service.
C. Les deux bateaux faisant actuellement le service auront, comme par le passé,
la faculté de rem orquer chacun deux allèges.
D. Un bateau à vapeur placé sous la direction de MM . L yn ch ou d ’ autres
personnes désignées par eux, mais qui, une fois hors du port, bat pavillon ottom an,
aura la faculté de naviguer en m ême temps que les deux bateaux ci-dessus spécifiés
et, comme ces derniers, de rem orquer des allèges.

Parafée ad référendum,
le 20 mai, 1913.
I. H .
A. P.

No. 103.

Sir Edward G rey to Count B enckendorff.

F .O . 2 7 3 0 2 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 . Foreign Office, June 19, 1913.

Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the Russian Ambassador and has the
honour to acknowledge the receipt of H [ is ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s com m unication o f the
14th J u n e,^ ) respecting the Turco-Persian frontier between Hawizeh and the Persian
Gulf.
Sir E . Grey has, in view of the com m unications which took place between H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] and the Russian Governm ent in April and July 1912,(2)
read Count B enckendorff’ s m emorandum with considerable surprise.
On the 11th April 1912(3) Sir E . Grey telegraphed to H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
Ambassador at St. Petersburg as follows :—

“ H aving regard to the wording o f article 2 o f the Treaty o f Erzeroum ,

His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are inclined to think that nothing m ore can be
claimed on the Shatt-el-Arab for Persia than freedom o f navigation, Turkey
having taken great pains to assert her right o f ownership over the entire waters
of that river, while conceding such freedom .
“ F rom the sea to where the m ediating com m issioners’ line strikes off from
the Shatt-el-Arab, I do not think, therefore, that a frontier more advantageous
to Persia than the mediating com m issioners’ line could be successfully claimed
against T u rk ey.”

0 ) [v. su pra, pp. 155-6, N o. 99.]

(2) [T h is corresp on d en ce is not rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s o f space. T he m ost im p orta n t
com m u n ica tion s in A p ril are those cited above. F o r J u ly , referen ce m ay be m ade to S ir E d w a rd
G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 545) to M r. O ’ B eirn e o f J u ly 1, 1912, in stru c tin g him t o in fo rm M . S a zon ov
th a t a com m u n ica tion had been m a de to the P o r t e on th e lines suggested in h is teleg ram
(N o. 335) o f A p ril 11. (F .O . 3 71/1429. 1 4 6 3 8 /5 2 /1 2 /3 4 .) M r. O ’ B e irn e ’ s teleg ram (N o. 239) o f
J u ly 4, 1912, rep o rte d th a t he had receiv ed a le tte r from M . S a zon ov ex pressin g his th a n k s fo r
B ritish su p port. (F .O . 371/1430. 2 8 4 0 1 /5 2 /1 2 /3 4 .)]
(3)'[ S ir E. G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 335) o f A p ril 11, 1912, D . 3-25 p m ., is n o t rep rod u ced , as
the relevant p o r tio n is p r in te d above. (F .O . 3 71/1429. 1 4 6 3 8 /5 2 /1 2 /3 4 .)]
 160

On April 16th 1912(4) Sir G. Buchanan reported that he had seen the Russian
M inister for Foreign Affairs, that H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] concurred in the views of
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t, and that he would instruct the Russian
Ambassador at Constantinople to support Sir G. Lowther in regard to the frontier
H [ is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overnm ent] had indicated to the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t from
Hawizeh to the sea.
As H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] were careful to obtain the concurrence of
the Russian Government in the line suggested at an early stage o f the negotiations,
and as that line is more advantageous to Persia than the one allotted by the
m ediating commissioners in 1851, to which Persia then acceded, H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]'
G o v e r n m e n t] are at a loss to understand why any exception on the part of any
party should be raised to it at this late period, when it has been placed before the
Turkish Government for nearly ten months. The present declaration to be made
by Turkey in no way invalidates or supersedes that clause o f the Treaty o f Erzeroum
which secures the right o f navigation to the Karun via the Shatt-el-Arab, and
Sir E . Grey feels confident that the draft convention, already com m unicated to the
Russian Ambassador in its latest form , contains adequate guarantees, certainly in 1
excess of any which have hitherto existed, for international navigation on the Shatt-
el-Arab.
Sir E . Grey hopes that the Russian Government will not now raise any difficulty
in regard to the proposed arrangements for the Shatt-el-Arab. Those arrangements •
were communicated to the Russian Government several months a g o ; and Sir E . Grey
was under the distinct impression that the Russian Government would support H [is ]
M [a je s ty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] in regard to the southern frontier, in which, by reason
o f long-standing association, of services rendered to navigation in general, and of
the magnitude o f their com m ercial interests, they are particularly interested, and
he similarly undertook to afford the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t the full diplomatic
support of H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overnm ent] in regard to the northern part of the
frontier, which appears now to be on the eve o f settlement in accordance with
Russian views.
E . G [R E Y ].

(4) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s telegram (N o. 150) of A p ril 16, 1912, D. R-36 p .m ., R . 10 p .m ., is no

rep rod u ced , as th e con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F.O . 371/1429. 1 6 0 2 8 /5 2 /1 2 /3 4 .)]

No. 104.

Sir G. Low ther to Sir Edward G rey.C )

Constantinople, June 25, 1913.

F .O . 2 9 1 8 4 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 . D. 3 p . m .
Tel. (No. 301.) R- 4 -55 p . m .
Following from Bagdad, No. 41 o f June 2 3 r d :—
“ F [o re ig n ] 0 [ffic e ] Confidential Print No. 22638 dated May 17th.(2)
“ May I represent that Bagdad and Basra post-offices under G ov[ernm en]t
of India stand on a different footing from those in Turkey under H [is ]
M [a jesty ’s ] G o v e r n m e n t ]? In view of possible ultimate dissolution o f Turkey

(*) [C op ies o f this teleg ram w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice; to the G eneral P ost Office.]
( 2) [T h e referen ce is to th e letter from the G eneral P ost Office to th e F oreign Office, of
M a y 16, 1913, w hich is not rep rod u ced . I t expressed agreem en t in p r in c ip le to the suggested
a b olition o f the B ritish P osta l A g en cies in T u rk ey p rov id ed th a t an adeq u ate altern a tive
system cou ld be established and th a t, in the in terests o f B ritish Com m erce, agencies established
by F o re ig n P ow ers should be abolished con cu rren tly . (F .O . 2 2 6 3 8 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
 161

and form ation meanwhile o f foreign spheres of interest it seems desirable to

maintain and even increase our establishments in Mesopotamia which is region
where our stake is most large and our claims greatest. For this reason I 6ubmit
that no modification should be made in Bagdad and Basra post-offices and that
all other institutions which mark our premier position here should be most
jealously maintained such as military detachment and stationnaire. These are
ocular proofs of antiquity of our connection with Mesopotamia where steam
navigation and post and telegraph and nearly all such civilization as exists are
due to British enterprize.”

No. 105.

Sir Edward G rey to M. Paul Cambon and Count B en ck en d orffJ 1)

F.O . 2 64 6 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, June 25, 1913.
Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the F ren ch/R ussian A m b [a ssa d o ]r(2)
and has the honour to state, for the confidential inform ation o f the Fren ch/R ussian
G ov [ern m en ]t, that he has intimated to the German G ov [ern m en ]t that, on the
conclusion of a satisfactory arrangement about the terminus of the Bagdad
R [a i]l[w a ]y and equality of treatment on the railway, H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n ­
m ent] would be prepared to give an undertaking similar to that contained in
article 3 of the Russo-German agreement of the 19th August 1911, v iz .(3) :—
“ Reconnaissant l ’ importance générale qu’ aurait pour le com m erce inter­
national la réalisation du Chemin de F er de Bagdad, le Gouvernement russe
s ’ engage à ne pas prendre de mesures visant à en entraver la construction ou à
empêcher la participation de capitaux étrangers à cette entreprise, à condition,
bien entendu, que cela n ’ entraîne pour la Russie aucun sacrifice de nature
pécuniaire ou économ ique.”

O [A co p y o f this n ote was sent to th e B o a rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 me S ér ., V ol. V I I , pp . 284-5, N o. 265. M . P ic h o n had a lread y seen th e te x t
d u rin g his v is it to L on don , v . ibid., p. 268, N o. 247. F o r M . P ic h o n ’ s v is it v. G ooch &
T e m p e rle y , V o l. I X (I I ), p. 871, N o. 1090, and n o te (i ) .]
(3) [v. G ooch & T em p e rle y , V ol. X (I), p. 720, N o. 741, encl. cp. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 105, p. 658.]

No. 106.

E xtract from The Times of July 2, 1913.

F.O . 3 0 3 4 5 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
The Bagdad Railway Negotiations.

(From our own Correspondent.)

Berlin, July 1, 1913.
The German Foreign Secretary has given the following written answer to a
National Liberal question concerning the Baghdad Railway negotiations :—
The report is untrue that in the negotiations between Germany, E ngland,
and Turkey in regard to Koweit and the last section o f the Baghdad Railway
the German Government has perm anently renounced all German claims to
participate in the navigation on the Tigris. The negotiations with England
and Turkey in regard to the last section o f the Baghdad Railway have not yet
reached their conclusion. The navigation questions affected by these negotia­
tions will be settled in agreement with the German shipping circles which are
interested in them.
[10900] M
 1G2

M IN U T E S .

It is clear the G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t m ean to ta k e b ack w liat they offered us on M ay 7 ./1)

A. P.
J u ly 2, 1913.
R P . M.
L. M
A. N.

W e m ust w a it fo r th eir re p ly .(2)

E. G.

0 ) [ V. su pra, p. 99, N o. 67.]

(2) \y. in fra, pp. 174-9, N o. 118, and encl.]

No. 107.

M inute by Mr. P a rk er.O

F.O . 3 0 4 4 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, July 2, 1913.

H err von Kuehlm ann asked to see me today, and said he was not sure that
Prince Lichnowsky had explained him self quite clearly yesterday,(2) as His Excellency
is not fully acquainted with the Bagdad Railway negotiations. The point the German
Governm ent wished to make was one which arose out of articles 9 and 10 of the
Anglo-Turkish Draft Convention respecting railways (annexed)./3) This draft has
been com m unicated by H [is ] M [a jes ty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] to the German G ov[ern-
m e n ]t, and with regard to article 9 the Bagdad Railway Company had said that it
was “ ultra v ir e s ’ ’ for the Turkish G [ov ern m en ]t to “ s ’ engager a veiller ” as to
directors of British nationality, and the German G ov [ern m en ]t wanted to suggest
quite unofficially that the words “ will use their best endeavou rs’ ’ m ight be better.
W ith regard to article 10, the German Government thought it would create a
bad impression in Germany if the Turkish Governm ent were to abandon a German
existing right before com ing to terms with the Germans first.
I said that here was a misunderstanding. I drew his attention to the Declaration
annexed to the draft con vention,/4) and said it was our idea that the two documents
should be signed sim ultaneously; but it was obviously impossible for the Turks to
sign the Declaration until they had first come to an agreement with the Bagdad
Railway Company, as otherwise the Declaration would be untrue. H e agreed, and
said he had already explained this at Berlin, but he just wished to confirm his own
impression. He added that the Bagdad Railway Company were quite ready to agree
with the Turks on the point in question.
He then said that he hoped the suggested agreement between England and
Germany would soon be com p leted ; the whole matter was being examined in Berlin
“ with sym p ath y” ; H err von Gwinner had promised H err von Kuehlmann that
he would do his best to further it ; and H err von Kuehlmann had been commanded
to go on a cruise with the E m peror on July 8, when H err Baffin of the H amburg
America Line would* also be present, and he hoped a satisfactory arrangement about
shipping dues &c on the Shatt-el-Arab would be the result, and that our proposals

Z1) [C op ies o f this M in u te w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e A d m ir a lty ; to the

D ir e c to r o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to th e C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D e fe n c e .]
(2) [P r in c e L ich n ow sk y ’ s a ccou n t o f his con v ersation s on J u ly 1 w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey and
M r. P a r k e r is g iv en in G .P ., X X X V I I (I ), p. 209. N o B ritish re p o rt o f th is con v ersation can
be tra ced . F o r the con v ersation o f J u n e 27 v. G ooch & T e m p e rle y , V ol. X (I), pp. 465-6,
N o. 526. I t referred am on g oth er m a tters to H e r r v on G w in n er’ s v isit to L on don . P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y record s a fu rth er con v ersa tion w ith M r. P a r k e r on J u ly 2, G .P ., X X X V I I (I),
pp. 209-10. T here is no re p o rt in G .P . o f H e r r v on K u h lm a n n ’ s con v ersation o f th is d a y .]
(3) [v. su pra , p. 103, N o 68, encl. 2 .]
(4) [v . supra, p. 103, N o. 68, encl. 2 .]
 163

about the Shatt-el-Arab would be accepted so far as Germany was concerned, 6ubject
only to one or two points of detail.
I then said that I had noticed in the Tim es o f July 2 (s) a telegram from Berlin
giving an answer of H err von Jagow to a parliam entary question about G erm any’ s
reported renunciation o f shipping rights o n the B iver Tigris. He said the answer
was a purely “ technical ” one intended to keep public opinion quiet while negotiations
were in progress. That the question was no doubt due to a mischievous article by
Herr Said Ruete, which had appeared in the “ Berliner Zeitung am M ittag,” and
which made out that Germ any was surrendering her birthright of navigation on the
Tigris. H e said the article bore a close resem blance to views which Mr. L yn ch
had often proclaim ed, and he asked me if I suspected it might have been inspired
from that quarter. I replied that I did not know, but that it was important to bear
in mind that Mr. L yn ch was a private individual, and that no statement he made in
regard to the Bagdad Railway negotiations represented any official view.
Herr von Kuehlm ann then said that he was very anxious to be able to furnish
replies which m ight be useful in Berlin in case o f criticism about the navigation of
the Tigris, and G erm any’ s attitude. He understood that we claimed special rights
by reason o f ancient firmans and long-established usage, and he said he would be
glad if I could give him any inform ation on the subject. I said we certainly had very
definite claims and rights, but he agreed that it would be better for him to speak
on the subject to Sir L . Mallet first. I f it would serve any useful purpose (which
I think perhaps it might) I could draw up a wide statement o f our claim s, showing
what they are based upon, and how the proposed new concession is really a com pro­
mise, and the least we could accept.
He next referred to the oil question,(6) and said that the German G ov [e rn m e n ]t
were very anxious to reach a settlement o n this point as well as others; they had
induced H err Gwinner to moderate the German claims last year and to negotiate
with an English group, and now they found that they had got let in with the group
which did not enjoy support from H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ]. I said that
this was because the group he referred to was, as regards the Oil Company partici­
pating in it, Dutch and not British in control. H [is ] M [a je s tv ’ s] G [ov ern m en t]
were com m itted to support the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which had received
definite promises from the Turkish Governm ent) and unless the National Bank
arranged for adequate representation of that Company in the proposed amalgamation
no settlement seemed possible. The best thing H err von Gwinner could do would
be to urge conciliation upon the National Bank o f Turkey. Herr Kuehlm ann said
a hint to this effect would be given to H err von Gwinner, as the German Governm ent
were determ ined to get this difficulty out o f the way.
A. P [A R K E R ],

M IN U T E S .

T his seems t o be sa tis fa ctory on th e w hole.

It. P . M.
L. M.

M. Cam bon to ld m e y esterd ay (J u ly 2) th a t th e F ren ch w ere discu ssin g w ith G erm any
questions o f m u tu a l in terest in A s ia tic T u rk ey — an d th a t his G o v [e r n m e n ]t h op ed we should
not con clu d e w ith G erm any b efore th e F re n ch w ere rea dy t o d o likew ise. H e w ill send a
m em o[ra n d u m ] on th e su h ject.(7)
' A . N.

W e ca n n o t delay in defin itely. O ur prom ise t o F ra n ce rela ted only t o B a g d a d B [ a i lw a jy

not t o oth er qu estion s o f m u tu a l in terest t o F ra n ce and G erm any in A s ia tic T u rk ey .
E. G.

(3) [ v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]

( 6) [cp. P r in c e L ich n ow sk y ’ s rep ort on this d a te, G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 2 11 -2 .]
( 7) jy . in jra , pp. 164-5, N o. 110.]

[10900] M 2
 104

N o. 108.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en .(l)

F .O . 3 1 2 3 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 220.)
Sir, Foreign Office, July 3, 1913.
I told the German Ambassador to-d ay(2) that there was no question of our signing
the Conventions with Turkey this week or next week, but that we could not promise
to delay signing them till an arrangement with Germany was com pleted. W e must
take the opportunity o f signing when the Turks were ready. B ut, in any case, we
would not publish them, and would keep them secret, till an arrangement with
Germ any had been concluded. This, it seemed to m e, would avoid German
susceptibilities about the navigation in the region of the Persian Gulf being aroused,
as far as German public opinion was concerned, before the German Governm ent could
announce that they had made an arrangement with us. As a matter of fact, the
Turks could not carry out the arrangement about the Bagdad Railway with us until
they had come to an agreement with Germany.
The Ambassador said that he would let me have, as soon as possible, the
observations of the German Governm ent about the proposed arrangement with us.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a b in et.]

( 2) [cp. G.P., X X X V I I (I), p. 211.]

No. 109.

Communication from Hakki Pashaff1)

F .O . 3 0 5 6 9 /9 2 1 6 /1 3 /4 4 . London, July 3, 1913.

C ontre-projet.
Les Autorités provinciales Ottomanes aussi bien que le Cheikh de Koweit ne
recevront pas et repousseront les individus qui ayant commis un crime ou un délit
de l ’ autre côté de la ligne de dém arcation, échapperaient dans les territoires soumis
à leur juridiction.
(*) [cp. su p ra , pp. 144-7, Nos. 9 2 -3 .]

No. 110.

Comm unication from M. Paul Cam bon.(l)

F.O. 3 05 7 1 /2 5 53 3 /1 3 /4 4. J u ly 3, 1913.
R ésum é d ’ un télégram m e de M. Pichon.

Il résulte d ’ un télégramme de M. Pichon à l ’ Ambassadeur de France que le

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a engagé avec M. H ellferich, délégué allemand à
la Conférence financière internationale de Paris, une conversation portant sur les
intérêts économiques et financiers de la France et de l ’ Allemagne en Turquie d ’ Asie.
E n vue du succès de ces pourparlers M. Pichon attache une grande importance
à ce que le Gouvernement britannique ne conclue rien de définitif, tant en ce qui

(1) [cp. D .D .F ., 3me S ir ., V ol. V I I , p. 268, N o. 247 ; p. 305, N o. 285.]

 165

concerne le chemin de fer de Bagdad q u ’ en ce qui concerne la constitution de

nouvelles ressources en faveur de la Turquie, avant que le Gouvernement français
ait pu jeter avec le Gouvernement allemand les bases d ’ un accord particulier. Il
est apparu à M. Pichon que M. H ellferich, dans ses conversations avec lui, fait déjà
volontiers état de l ’ accord en cours de négociations entre l ’ Angleterre et l ’ Allem agne.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères craint donc que la conclusion définitive de ces
accords n ’ ait une fâcheuse influence sur les pourparlers franco-allem ands, si elle
vient à se produire avant que lui-m êm e se soit entendu avec le Cabinet de Berlin.
M. Pichon insiste particulièrement sur l ’ intérêt qu ’ il y a à ce que le Gouverne­
ment allemand ne puisse conserver aucun doute sur les dispositions du Cabinet de
Londres à seconder celui de Paris dans la négociation que ce dernier vient d ’ engager.

No. 111.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. Marling.

F.O . 2 5 7 6 3 /2 5 7 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 211.) V ery Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.
W ith r e f e r e n c e ] to Sir G. Low ther’ s d esp [a tch ] No. 595 o f S ep t[em b er]: 21,
1908,0 relative to the reported desire of the German G ov [ern m en ]t to obtain the
right to land a cable at Basra, I tr[a n sm it] to you herewith copy of a m emorandum
handed to me by the German A m b [a ssa d o]r at this Court, expressing the wish of
his Governm ent to establish direct telegraphic com m unication between Germ any,
German East Africa, and China, by means o f a land-line across Turkey and a cable
which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian G ulf. The
German Governm ent ask for a declaration from His M ajesty’s Government that they
will not oppose in principle the landing o f a cable at such a point, and for a confiden­
tial intimation whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish
or in Persian territory.
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should endeavour to ascertain by confidential enquiry
whether the German G ov [ern m en ]t have obtained from the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t
any concession conferring such a right since the date of Sir G. Low ther’ s despatch
above referred to, reporting that they had not then done so.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [B E Y ].

Enclosure in No. 111.

Communication from Prince Lichnow sky.

London, D. May 29, 1913.

(Confidential.) R . June 2, 1913.
The necessity might arise in the future o f establishing a direct telegraphic
com m unication between Germ any, German East Africa and China. The shortest
and best route for such a com m unication is in the opinion of experts through a land­
line across Turkey and through a cable which would be linked to the landline at
some point on the shores o f the Persian Gulf. Should this point be in Turkish
territory, a special agreement would have to be made with the Eastern Telegraph
C o[m pany] to get the consent of this com pany to the landing o f the cable as this

t 1) [S ir G. L o w th e r’ s d espa tch (N o. 595), D . S eptem b er 21, R . S ep tem b er 26, 1908, is not

rep rod u ced as its ten ou r is s u ffic ie n tly 'in d ic a te d above. (F .O . 3 71 /50 6. 3 3 2 3 5 /2 6 3 6 0 /0 8 /3 4 .)]
 166
com pany enjoys a special position ow ing to arrangements with the Turkish Govern­
m ent. Another possibility would be a landing o f the cable in Persian territory and
a continuation o f the landline across Persia into Turkey. The Im perial Government
would before taking any steps in this question welcome a declaration from His
M ajesty’s Governm ent that there is no opposition in principle to the landing of a
cable on a point on the shores of the Persian G ulf to be determined by agreement
and would appreciate a confidential expression o f opinion, which o f the two possible
s ch e m es: landing the cable in Turkish or Persian territory would be considered
favorably by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent.

No. 112.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir W . Tow nley.

F .O . 2 5 7 6 3 /2 5 7 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(N o. 96.) V ery Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.
I tr[ansm it] to you herewith for your inform ation copies o f correspondence
relative to the desire o f the German G ov [ern m en ]t to establish direct telegraphic
com m unication between Germ any, German East Africa and the Far East by means
o f a land line across Turkey or across Turkey and Persia to be linked to a cable
landed at some point on the Persian G u lf./1)
As regards the proposal to carry a land line across Persian territory, I have
to call your attention to the explanatory note, dated May 20, 1910 annexed to the
joint Anglo-Eussian note to the Persian G ov [ern m en ]t o f April 7, 1910, in which
the following words occur :—
“ Vu la difficulté de specifier les concessions qui pourraient porter atteinte
à leurs intérêts politiques ou stratégiques, les deux Puissances s ’ attendent à ce
qu ’ avant de délivrer des concessions quelconques de voies de com m unication,
de télégraphes et de ports à un sujet étranger, le Gouvernement persan entre
dans un échange de vues avec elles afin que les intérêts politiques et stratégiques
des deux Puissances puissent être dûment sauvegardés.’ ’ / 2)
The Persian G ov [ern m en ]t would, in consequence o f this note, be expected to
consult H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] and the Russian G ov [ern m en ]ts before acceding to any
application which they m ight receive from the German G ov [ern m e n ]t for the right
to carry a telegraph line across Persian territory and the fact is one which should not
be lost sight o f in connection with the question raised in the German E m bassy’ s
m emorandum .
[ I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]
0 ) [N o t rep rod u ced . T hey w ere letters addressed from the F o re ig n Office to the I n d ia
Office, th e A d m ira lty , the G eneral P o st Office, and the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O peration s, da ted
J u ly 4, 1913, g iv in g a b rie f sum m ary o f the n eg otia tion s and a sking w heth er the ob jection s
raised b y the va riou s d ep artm en ts in 1909 still held g o o d ; they enclosed cop ies o f th e note
com m u n ica ted bv P rin ce L ich n ow sk y on J u n e 2, 1913 (v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docum ent,
encl.). (F .O . 2 5 7 6 3 /25763/ 1 3 /4 4 .)] ' '
(2) [ c p . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , p. 452, N o. 343, n o te ( 2).]
 1(>7
N o. 113.

Sir A . Nicolson to M . Paul Cam bon.(l)

F .O . 3 0 5 7 1 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
My dear A m bassad or:— Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.
I have submitted the memorandum you left yesterday(2) about French and
German econom ic interests in Turkey to Sir E . Grey.
He asks me to say that negotiations respecting the Bagdad Bailway &c are in
progress between us and Germany on the lines already explained to you, and that
we have submitted the draft o f an agreem ent to the German Governm ent, but that
nothing definite has been signed as yet, and is not likely to be before July 15 at
the earliest. Sir E . Grey hopes b y that time that M onsieur Pichon will be able to
inform him o f the suggested basis of the Franco-G erm an agreem ent, and, subject
o f course to the examination o f details when the proposals are submitted to him ,
he will be prepared to support the French G ov [ern m en ]t.
W e are anxious to conclude our agreem ent with Germ any without undue delay,
and Sir E . G rey would suggest that M r. Parker, who has been dealing with these
questions, should discuss the subject with you in order to facilitate m atters.(3) Perhaps
you will say what time would be convenient for him to call at the Em bassy.
[I have, &c.
A. N ICO LSO N .]

( 1) [r . D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. V I I , pp. 3 05-6, N o. 285, A n n e x e .]

(2) [i\ supra, pp . 1 64-5, N o. 110.]
(3) [rp. in fra, p. 169, N o. 116.]

No. 114.

M emorandum by Mr. Parker, (f)

F .O . 3 0 9 6 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, July 5, 1913.

H err von Kuehlmann called on July 3 to say that he had had a letter from
H err Ballin, o f the Ham burg America L ine, to the effect that though he did not like
the idea o f a m onopoly on the Tigris he personally would not oppose it in Germ any
if one o f the following alternatives were conceded :—

A .) No through rates to be quoted by the British India Company, or any other

Company, from Europe to Bagdad by water.
B .) I f such rates are quoted the H am burg America Line must have the right
to quote on terms as favourable as any other Company, British or foreign.

I said that if importance were attached to this it m ight be well for the German
G ov [e rn m e n ]t to say so in their reply to us, and then they would get a written
answer. H err von Kuehlmann said that he was going to meet H err Ballin in a
day or two on the E m peror’ s yacht, and as H err Ballin would be able to say a good
deal to influence the E m peror it was very desirable that H err Kuehlm ann should
be in a position now to state definitely what was proposed. I said the Convention
with, or rather the Declaration to be made b y , Turkey(2) did not contain any express
stipulation on this point, but under our draft agreement with Germ any, article 7 ,( 3)

( 1) [C opies o f this m em orandum w ere sent to L o rd I n c h c a p e ; to th e In d ia O ffice; to the

B oard o f T ra d e .]
( 2) [ v . sup ra , pp. 158-9, N o. 102, en cl.]
(3) [r . sup ra , p. 140, N o. 89, encl. 3 .]
 1G8
unfair discrimination on the river was ruled out, and I felt sure he might be at
rest, and that the wishes o f Herr Ballin would be met.
A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Lord Inchcape and to the Board of
Trade.
A. P.
July 5, 1913.
L . M.
A. N.
E . G.

No. 115.

Sir Edward, G rey to M. Paul C a m bonJ1)

F.O. 2 92 5 0 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, July 7, 1913.

Sir E . Grey presents his compliments to the French Ambassador and has the
honour to inform I i [ i s ] E xcellency that H [ is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t have now
examined the conditions o f French fiscal and financial* assistance to Turkey, as set
forth in the memorandum com m unicated on June 2 .(2)
Sir E. Grey understands from M. Gambon’ s com m unication o f July 3 (3) that a
further m emorandum 'm a y be expected shortly dealing with these and cognate
subjects, and he accordingly reserves his observations on some of the points
enu m erated; but he ventures to recall to M . Cambon the hope already expressed on
behalf o f H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] that the concession for a railway to E l
Arish, on the Egyptian frontier, would not be pressed fo r ; and he has the honour
to furnish the following explanations in regard to point 8, so far as it concerns the
ports o f Trebizond and Samsun :—
_ The National Bank of Turkey undertook, under the preliminary contract
with the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, to have surveys and studies made and plans
prepared for harbours at the two places named. These plans were to be
presented to the Government within eighteen months from the signature of this
con tract; and when the plans have been approved by the Ottoman G ov[ern-
m en ]t the National Bank has, for a certain period and on the conditions defined
in the final contract, the option o f taking the concession for the construction
and working o f the two ports. The National Bank o f Turkey arranged with the
British firm, Sir John Jackson L [ i m i ] t [ e ]d , to carry out the surveys; and the
complete studies, plans &c prepared by that firm were handed to the Ministry
o f Public W orks on February 11th, 1913. On April 2 1/M a y 4 1913 a letter was
received from the Ministry o f Public W orks stating that the plans had been found
acceptable as a whole, but suggesting certain modifications o f detail. These
suggestions are now under consideration, and it has been agreed by the Ministry
of Public W orks that the time allowed for the settlement of the plans shall be
extended.
The contracts which have been signed are more than a “ contrat d ’ etudes ” ;
they give to the National Bank an option o f taking the concession on defined
conditions.
In these circumstances, Sir E . Grey ventures to hope that, if the French
G ov [ern m en ]t support a reversionary claim for a concession for these ports to a
F rench group, and if H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] do not oppose such a
reversionary claim, the French G ov [ern m en ]t will give an assurance that no attempt

0 ) [C op ies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to S ir P . H a r v e y ; to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) [r . supra, pp. 134-5, N o. 87.]
( 3) [r . supra, pp. 164-5, N o. 110.]
 169

will be made on behalf o f French interests to prevent the final confirmation o f the
existing concession, with or without m odifications, in the event o f the option granted
being exercised.

No. 116.

M . Paul Cambon to Sir A .N icolson.(*)

F.O . 3 1 9 4 8 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Ambassade de F rance, à L ondres.

(Privée.) D. le 9 juillet, 1913.
Cher Sir Arthur, R . le 11 juillet, 1913.
M. Parker, dont votre lettre privée en date d ’hier m ’ annonçait la v isite,(2) est
venu me voir ce matin. Je l ’ ai mis au courant de l ’ état des négociations engagées
à Paris entre MM . Helfferich et de Lam ornaix sur les intérêts économiques respectifs
de la France et de l ’ Allemagne en Turquie d ’ Asie. Pour plus de clarté, j ’ ai résumé
ces négociations dans une note que je vous envoie ci-joint.
L ’ un des m otifs de l ’ intransigeance dont fait preuve M . Helfferich consiste dans
cette idée que, depuis l ’ arrangement russo-allemand de Potsdam et l ’ouverture de
pourparlers anglo-allemands en vue d ’ un accord, la France est aujourd’ hui isolée
dans la question de Bagdad et qu ’ abandonnée par ses alliés et ses amis, elle devra
accepter sans les discuter les volontés allemandes. C’ est la raison pour laquelle
M. Pichon attache tant d ’intérêt à ce que le Gouvernement britannique fasse tout
ce qui dépendra de lui pour dissiper cette illusion.
Depuis 1905, l ’ entente a été complète entre les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris,
sur le principe de ne pas traiter l ’ un sans l ’ autre cette affaire de B agdad.(3) Aucun
des deux n ’ a jamais négligé de mettre l ’autre au courant de ses vues ou de ses
intentions à l ’ égard de cette entreprise. Mais renouvelant une tactique qui lui est
familière le Cabinet de Berlin cherche à profiter de la situation actuelle pour semer
entre les deux pays amis, le désaccord et la suspicion. E n hâtant la conclusion d ’ un
accord avec l ’ Angleterre, il espère non seulement venir plus facilement à bout des
résistances de la France, mais encore éveiller parmi les Français la crainte d ’ avoir
été abandonnés par les Anglais.
E n me référant aux entretiens que nous avons déjà eus ensemble à ce sujet,
j ’ appelle donc votre attention sur l ’ intérêt q u ’ il y a à manifester clairem ent à Berlin
l ’ union qui n ’ a pas cessé d ’ exister entre les deux cabinets de Paris et de Londres en
ce qui concerne leurs intérêts respectifs en Turquie d ’ A sie.(4)
Croyez, &c.
P A U L CAM BON.

E nclosure in No. 116.

N ote com m unicated by M. Paul Cambon.

Les Conférences qui ont eu lieu entre M M . de Lamornaix et Helfferich ne font pas
apparaître com m e satisfaisant l ’ état des négociations franco-allem andes sur la
question des intérêts respectifs de la France et de l ’ Allem agne en Turquie d ’ Asie.
M. de Lamornaix a fait valoir les services que la France pouvait rendre à
l ’ Allemagne en favorisant, à la Commission financière de Paris, la reconstitution, dans
une mesure aussi large que possible, des excédents de la dette publique ottomane

t1) [A co p y o f this com m u n ica tion was sent to the B oa rd of T rade. I t is n ot p rin ted in
D .D .F .]
(2) [>. D .D .F ., 3me S ér., V ol. V I I , p. 351, N o. 316, A n n e x e .]
( 3) [c p . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , p. 329, N o. 2 1 2 ; p. 336, N o. 222.]
(4) [T h is le tte r is end orsed by S ir E. G r e y : “ I have ta lk ed th is ov er w ith M r. P a r k e r
and wish to see him a ga in w ith S ir A. N icolson and Sir L. M a llet tom orrow . E. G. 10.7.13.” ]
 170
nécessaires à la garantie des emprunts de Bagdad. M. Helfferich a purement ei
simplement nié ce service. Il a soutenu que, si le groupe allemand est en effet
intéressé à la reconstitution intégrale des ressources de la Dette, à cause de la
garantie des emprunts Bagdad, les porteurs français n ’ y sont pas moins intéressés,
puisque les revenus de la Dette assurent le service des lots, de la rente unifiée et de
l ’ emprunt 1904, qui sont en majorité ou en totalité placés en France. Il s ’ est donc
refusé à voir un des éléments de la négociation dans la reconstitution des excédents
de là dette par la mise à la charge des Etats balkaniques d ’ une quote-part de cette
dette.
Or il n ’ est pas possible, et M . de Lamornaix l ’ a fait observer à M. Helfferich,
de prétendre qu’ en travaillant à reconstituer les revenus actuels de la dette ottomane
la France servirait l ’ intérêt français dans la même mesure que l ’ intérêt allemand.
En effet, d ’ après les comptes de l ’ exercice 1911-12, l ’ excédent des recettes nettes
de la dette atteint ¿9T. 1,969,000, dans lesquels la surtaxe douanière figure pour
¿9T. 950,000 et les revenus de Boum élie pour ¿0T. 970,000. La surtaxe douanière
n ’ étant pas applicable à la garantie des emprunts* Bagdad, les excédents qui pourront
être affectés à cette entreprise allemande seront nuls, si les revenus de Boum élie ne
sont pas reconstitués. Au contraire les recettes, même sans tenir compte de la
surtaxe douanière seraient encore suffisantes pour assurer le service intégral des lots
et de l ’ unifiée. Quant à l ’ emprunt 1904 ; le produit de la surtaxe douanière lui serait
applicable d ’ après la thèse soutenue dans le Conseil de la dette et par les représen­
tants allemands et autrichiens.
Il suit de là que la France est justifiée à présenter com m e un service rendu à
l ’ entreprise de Bagdad la reconstitution des revenus de la B oum élie. M . H elfferich
à prétendu qu ’ elle avait déjà “ pris p o sitio n ” dans cette question en se prononçant
en faveur de la prise en charge par les Etats balkaniques d ’ une cote [quote] part
de dette ottomane. Il appartiendra aux délégués français dans la Commission de
Paris de lui prouver le contraire et ils n ’ y manqueront pas ; car, à défaut d ’ une entente
entre les groupes français et allemand, la France ne se prêtera pas aux mesures qui
tendraient à com bler, au delà des intérêts stricts de ses porteurs les déficits causés
dans la caisse de la dette par la perte de la B oum élie.
En supposant admis définitivement le principe de mettre une quote part de
dette ottom ane à la charge des Etats balkaniques, le montant de cette quote part
est susceptible d ’ évaluations très diverses. Certains calculs tendent à la fixer à 4 ou
500 millions. Bien n ’ empêcherait de la fixer à un chiffre inférieur, voire même à
un chiffre m inimum, uniquem ent pour en maintenir le principe. Dans cette
hypothèse la solution serait infiniment plus préjudiciable aux intérêts du chemin de
fer de Bagdad qu ’ à ceux des porteurs de rente ou de lots turcs, dont le service serait,
à strictement parler, suffisamment garanti par les ressources que la Dette ottomane
tire des vilayets d ’ Asie et qui, en outre, bénéficient d ’ une première hypothèque.
L e but de M. Helfferich, en contestant le point de vue français sur ce point, est
d ’ amener la France à prêter à l ’ entreprise de Bagdad, une assistance financière
directe. Il a indiqué qu ’ à son avis le règlement de la question de Bagdad devait
s ’ effectuer “ sur la base d ’ une co-opération complète et définitive du capital français,
que ce soit par l ’ admission des obligations à la cote de la Bourse de Paris ou par un
autre m oyen .”
Le Gouvernement français ne croit pas possible de consentir à l ’ admission à la
cote de la Bourse de Paris des titres de Bagdad. Dans l ’ état actuel des relations
entre les deux pays, ni l ’opinion publique ni l ’opinion parlementaire en France
n ’ accepteraient l ’ ouverture du marché français aux valeurs d ’ une entreprise allemande.
Elle ne comprendraient pas qu’on fît appel à l ’ épargne française pour alléger les
charges de la finance allemande dans une affaire dont l ’ Allemagne retirera le profit
matériel et moral.
C ’ est la raison qui a porté le Gouvernement français à chercher au contraire le
règlement de la question dans la liquidation des intérêts com m uns et dans la
renonciation du groupe français à sa participation de 3 0 % . Il estime qu’il rendrait
 ni

à l ’ Allem agne un service effectif en lui prêtant son concours pour assurer à la Société
du Bagdad en dehors du marché français les ressources financières nécessaires au
service de ses emprunts et à la poursuite de son entreprise. C’ est précisément en
retour de ce service éventuel qu’ il demande à l ’ Allemagne de reconnaître, elle aussi,
à la France le droit de construire en Turquie d 'A sie certaines lignes de chem in de
fer et de s’ assurer également des ressources financières correspondantes.
M . Helfferich ne s ’ est pas refusé à exam iner, de concert avec M. de Lam ornaix,
le programm e des voies ferrées que désirent exécuter les deux groupes français et
allemand et l ’ évaluation approximative des ressources financières nécessaire [ s ] à ces
travaux. Il a déterminé le programme allemand de la manière suivante :—

Lignes. Kilom ètres.

A ngora-C ésarée-Sivas Césarée Dukichla ... 600
M ardine-D iarbékir-K harpout ... ... 220
S adidjé-K hanikin-B agdad-B assorah ... ... 700
Sivas-Kharpout ... ... ... ... 250
M ousm ieb-H il ... ... ... ... 180

Soit environ ... ... ... 1,950 k ilo m è t r e s ]

nécessitant un ensemble de garanties s ’ élevant à environ ¿£T. 1,400,000.

Dans ce programme ne figure pas le tronçon B oulgourlou-Bagdad de
1,400 kilomètres, qui tient évidem m ent la première place dans les projets allemands
et d ’ ou résulte une annuité de plus de £ T . 500,000. A l ’ observation que lui en a
faite M. de Lam ornaix, M. Helfferich a répondu que la ligne de B oulgourlou-B agdad
était depuis longtem ps con cédée; que les garanties nécessaires y étaient affectées
(excédent des dîmes d ’ Anatolie et excédents de la d ette); que par suite il n ’ avait
aucune négociation à ouvrir à ce sujet. Comme M . de Lam ornaix lui faisait observer
que, amplement suffisante avant la dernière guerre, les garanties en question
pouvaient être affectées par la perte de la R oum élie et que, pour les reconstituer,
l ’ appui de la France pouvait ne pas être inutile, M. Helfferich a répliqué que “ la
reconstitution des excédents de la dette était la première des obligations de la Turquie,
et que, tant que la totalité des ressources affectées aux emprunts Bagdad n ’ aurait
pas été reconstitués d ’ une manière ou d ’ une autre, l ’ Allemagne ne permettrait pas
qu’ il soit affecté la plus petite garantie à d ’ autres entreprises.’ ’
M. de Lam ornaix n ’ en a pas moins produit le programme français de voies
ferrées qu’ il a divisé pour tenir compte des ressources financières de la Turquie et
du recrutement de la main d ’ œuvre en travaux de 1èr®, 2èm8 et 3ème urgence.

urgence KilTomètres]
Samsoun, Sivas, Erzignian, Kharpout ... 945
Yerkein-Ermelik ... ... ... ... 165
Rayat-Ramleh ... ... ... ... 308

Total ... ... ... ... 1 ,4 1 8

urgence
Hanza, Kastamouni Démeiji ... ... 440
Erzinian Erzeroum ... ... ... 213
Kharpout Diarbékir ... ... ... 180
Ramleh El Arish ... ... ... ... 100

933
urgence
Alep Meskené ... ... ... ... 100

L ’ exécution de ces travaux nécessiterait pour le service du capital d ’ établisse­

ment et les frais d ’ exploitations un ensemble de ressources pouvant être évaluées à
 172

ÜT. 900,000 pour le premier groupe, 700,000 pour le deuxième et 27,000 pour le
troisième.
De la comparaison des programmes allemand et français il résulte d ’ abord que
deux lignes sont revendiquées des deux côtés; ce sont les lignes Diarbékir-Kharpout
et Sivas-Kharpout. Monsieur H elfferich a déclaré vouloir les réserver l ’ une et
l ’ autre à la Compagnie de Bagdad. Il a soutenu que le groupe Français ne saurait
posséder sur aucune ligne de droits qui fussent en opposition avec les droits antérieurs
de sociétés allemandes. Il a invoqué, notamment pour la ligne Sivas-Kharpout des
droits établis par la Convention d ’ Anglora [s ic ] Césaré en 1893 et consacrés par
l ’ accord Russo-Turc de 1900. D ’ une manière générale, il n ’ admet la construction de
voies ferrées par le groupe français qu’ à l ’ intérieur seulement de la zone délimitée par
l ’ accord russo-turc de 1900. Les prétentions des Allemands sur la ligne Sivas
Kharpout sont particulièrement exorbitantes. Les droits qu’ ils prétendent tenir des
dipositions de la concessions [sic] Angora Césaré sont périmés et le groupe allemand
ne saurait raisonnablement réclamer à la fois l ’ ancien et le nouveau tracé Bagdad. 11
n ’ a d ’ ailleurs pas ignoré les négociations suivies depuis trois ans à Constantinople
par l ’ Ambassade de France au sujet de la concession du réseau d ’ Arménie et jamais,
à aucun m oment, il n ’ a soulevé la moindre objection au sujet de la ligne Sivas
Kharpout.
E n ce qui concerne la ligne Ierkein-E rm elic, M. Helfferich a déclaré que la
Compagnie d ’ Anatolie s’opposerait de toutes ses forces à ce qu’ elle fût concédée au
groupe français, parce que cette com pagnie, dont le terminus actuel est Angora,
possède une Agence à Yosgad et draine actuellement le trafic de la contrée. Se
considérant comme en possession d ’ état, elle ne tolérera pas qu’ un concurrent vienne
lui enlever ce trafic.
E n ce qui concerne la ligne Alep M eskené, M. Helfferich a déclaré qu’ il
s’opposerait de la façon la plus formelle à ce qu’ elle fût concédée à la Compagnie
française de Dam as-IIam ah. Il a revendiqué pour la Société de Bagdad le droit de
construire tous les embranchements pouvant, d ’ un point quelconque de la ligne
principale aboutir à la côte entre Mersine et Tripoli. Or, le tronçon Alep Meskené
étant le passage forcé de tout em branchem ent sur le Golfe d ’ Alexandrette, vouloir
le réclam er pour une Compagnie française serait, d ’ après lui, faire revivre l ’ ancien
projet H om s-B agdad.
L es prétentions émises par M. Helfferich et l ’ accueil qu’ il a fait aux propositions
de M. de Lam ornaix attestent une intransigeance qui fait mal augurer de l ’issue des
négociations, à moins qu’ une pression exercée sur le Gouvernement Allemand ne
ramène le représentant de la Deutsche Bank à une plus saine appréciation des
intérêts de la France en Turquie.

M IN U T E .

I have told th e F ren ch Em bassv w e w ill aw a it a m ap, show ing th e lines desired b y F rance,
b e fo re w e reply.
A. P
July 9, 1913.

No. 117.

Memorandum by Mr. Parker. 0 )

F.O. 3 2 7 8 8 /1 6 /1 3 /4 4 .
Secret. Foreign Office, July 16, 1913.
H err Von Kuehlmann came to see me today in order to give a few explanations
respecting the German counter draft for a settlement of the Bagdad Railway and

t 1) [C opies o f this m em orandum w ere sent to the A d m ira lty , to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
 173
cognate questions.(2) As the counter-draft is to be sent officially to-m orrow, I will
defer reporting his remarks on those points until it is received.
He said that the German Ambassador had received our memorandum about the
Mesopotamian oil concession, and had referred the matter to Berlin for instructions.(3)
He asked me if I could give him any indication of the views of H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G ov[ern m en ]t. I replied that I was not in a position to do this, but that what was
of great importance was that the Deutsche Bank should not commit themselves any
further to the Anglo-Saxon and National Bank group until further com m unication had
taken place between the British and German Governments. H e said he would at once
report in this sense to Berlin, asking that a hint might be given to H err von Gwinner
in confidence.
He then said that last year the German G ov [ern m en ]t, wishing to rem ove a
possible source of friction between the British and German Governm ents, had
suggested to H err von Gwinner that he should come to terms with the E n glish ; that
Herr von Gwinner, wishing to deal with a representative Englishm an, had approached
Sir E. Cassel, whose Bank at Constantinople was then looked upon as being in close
touch with H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G o v [e rn m e n ]t; and that now, to his great annoyance,
Herr von Gwinner found him self in the wrong boat. It was Sir E. Cassel, so far as
Herr von Kuehlmann was aware, and not the Deutsche Bank, who had entered into
negotiation with the Anglo-Saxon Company. The German Governm ent, he thought,
did not wish to establish or favour m onopolies in oil where it was possible to avoid
them, and he thought, though he was of course only expressing his own personal view,
that, provided adequate arrangements were made for supplying the German Govern­
ment with a fair share of oil-fuel, and for the sale on favourable terms of other oil
products to Germans, that the German Governm ent would have no objection to the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company being the technical Company in connection with the
Mesopotamian Oil Concession, though he could not be certain how far H err von
Gwinner was actually bound to the A nglo-Saxon Company. He then asked me why
Sir E. Cassel had entered into an agreement with a Company which did not enjoy the
support of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ], and I replied that he had better ask
Sir E. Cassel; that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] had consistently supported the
Anglo-Persian Oil C om pany’ s application for the concession for years. He said that
if the National Bank went out then perhaps the Anglo-Persian Company could have
50% of the whole : I said that I could not say anything definite on this point, but I
asked him if the Germans had any particular affection for the A nglo-Saxon Company,
to which he replied in the negative. H e said H err von Gwinner was most anxious to
be accom m odating in the matter.
A copy o f this has been sent to the Admiralty and to the Board of Trade.
A. P.
July 16, 1913.

M IN U T E .
S a tisfactory .
A. N.
L. M.
E. G.

(2) [ v . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t, and e n d s .1

(3) [ cp . G .P., X X X V I I (I ), p. 221.]
 174

N o. 118.

Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward G r e y .( l)

F.O. 3 3 6 0 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidential. London, D. July 16. 1913.
Dear Sir Edward, R . July 21, 1913.
Concerning the new draft of an Anglo-G erm an Declaration ( 2) respecting the
Bagdad Eailways and other cognate questions I would like to explain shortly the
proposed alterations.
The undertaking similar to that contained in Article 3 of the Russo-German
Agreem ent of the 19th of August 1911 (3) which was Article 6 of the British draft has,
considering its general character, been made Article 1. I f the last sentence beginning
with ‘ ‘ under ’ ’ and ending with ‘ ‘ nature ’ ’ could be omitted we would propose to
strike it out, as having no practical importance. If however His M ajesty’ s Government
prefers to have it inserted we would agree.
The second clause of Article 1 corresponds to Article 1 of the English draft. W e
would prefer our wording which does not materially alter the obligations of the British
Governm ent. _
Clause 3 of the same Article is new and intended to give to the Bagdad Railway a
reasonable security against com peting lines. Schemes for such com peting lines which
would considerably reduce, if not entirely annihilate, the econom ic value of the Bagdad
Railway have been publicly discussed in the past, and it seems desirable to have some
form al undertaking that such com peting lines will not enjoy the support of His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent in the future.
Article 2 covers the same ground as Article 2 of the English draft but takes into
account the fact that the proposed agreements with the Turkish Governm ent are not
yet concluded. Section a of Article 2 corresponds to Section c of the British draft.
Section b reproduces verbatim the second part of Section e o f the British draft.
Section c is analogous to Section b of the British draft. It provides for
through-traffic and protection against discrimination. The Bagdad Railway
C o[m p a n y ] would after careful consideration not lay great stress on the right to
participate in the construction of that line, but an undertaking ^of H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent would seem desirable that, in case the line should be built, German capital
would participate in it and be represented on the board of this line under exactly the
same conditions and in the same proportion as British capital shall be represented on
the board of the Bagdad Railway. These questions would be dealt with in a draft-note
which is here annexed. <
Section d corresponds to Section d of the English draft. At first it was only
contem plated to give British capital a participation in the port of Basra but the Bagdad
Railway C o[m p a n y] have been induced to grant the same participation for the port
at Bagdad, this being considered an important concession which it is hoped will
facilitate an agreement about the share of the Bagdad Railway interests in the River
Navigation C o[m p a n y ]. The draft fixes the amount of British participation to not
less than 2 0% of the whole share capital in order to establish a parallel with
Section 4b of our draft. The Bagdad Railway interests are however prepared to let
British capital have 4 0% in the Basra and Bagdad Port C o[m p a n y ].
Article 3 corresponds to Section a of Article 2 of the British draft. As it is not
an obligation of the Bagdad Railway C o[m p a n y ], but of the Im perial Governm ent, it
seemed better to put it in a separate Article.

( 0 [cp . H e r r v on J a g o w ’ s in stru ction s o f J u ly 11, G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp . 213-21, and

P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s rep ort o f his con v ersation w ith M r. P a r k e r on this subject, ibid., pp. 222-3.]
(2) [F o r th e orig in a l d r a ft, v. supra, pp. 139-40, N o. 89, encl. 3 .]
(3)[V G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), p. 720, N o. 741, encl. cp. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 105, p. 658.]
 175

Article 4a deals with the proposed concession for river-navigation on the Tigris
and Euphrates. In the declaration initialled 20th o f M ay 1913(4) two changes would
seem desirable from the German point of view. The word ‘ ‘ exclusif ” in : “ le droit
exclusif de la navigation à vapeur ” may perhaps be omitted and replaced by a
stipulation that in the lifetim e of this concession no further shipping concessions on
the Mesopotamian rivers should be granted without a previous agreement o f the
Ottoman with H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
The same the words “ Mais sans posséder aucun monopole ” in Article 8 might
perhaps be left out.
Article 4b deals with the interest to be allotted to the Bagdad Railway in the
new Shipping C o[m p a n y ]. It has been found that the share o f 2 0% o f the whole is
the m inimum which would make it possible for the Im perial Governm ent to agree to
the present understanding. The idea of a m onopoly for river transport is extrem ely
unpopular with the shipping interests in Germany, and it is only with the greatest
difficulty that the opposition of this large and powerful interest can be overcom e, if
they get a more than nominal share in the new River Navigation C o[m p a n y ]. This
point is very essential, as the question has been already raised in Germany, both in
the Press and Parliament and signs are not wanting that German public opinion looks
very unfavourably upon the contem plated transport m onopoly. It must, however, be
understood that the Im perial Governm ent, by asking for 2 0% o f the share capital, is
not aiming at any com bination, which could endanger the effective British Control
of the Navigation C o[m p a n y ], W e would, therefore, be prepared to receive favourably
any proposals about voting agreements which would seem to the British Governm ent
desirable in order to assure the effective British Control of the River Navigation
C o[m p a n y].
Section 4c corresponds to Article 7 of the British draft. W e added the
prohibition o f rebates as a special case of discrimination and also a stipulation against
through-rates if they were not permitted for all lines regularly trading with Basra. In
case His M ajesty’ s Governm ent does not sign the declaration for concession of river
navigation, this declaration being signed by Turkey only, the words “ as signatory of
the aforesaid declaration ” m ay be left out.
Section d corresponds to Section 2 Article 4 of the British draft. Provisions
concerning a ferry service between the railway terminus at Bagdad and the town have
been added as well as provisions concerning small craft to be used by the Railway and
Port C o[m p an ie]s. W e would not oppose a reasonable limitation in tonnage of such
craft or a stipulation that their service should be limited to strictly local purposes.
The last part of 4d is similar to the last part of Article 4 of the original English
draft. I f instead of the words “ through British or Ottoman a g e n c y ’ ’ it would be
said: “ by the aforesaid river navigation C o[m p a n y ] ” this would not be opposed.
Article 5 corresponds to Article 5 o f the British draft.
Article 6 deals with a “ Comité de surveillance ” for the interests of the nations
not represented in the Shat-el-Arab Commission.
Article 7 defines conditions under which this declaration shall becom e operative.
Clause a would disappear after conclusion of arrangements with the Ottoman Govern­
ment in case the declaration was initialled in its present form , and definitely signed
after the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements between the Im perial and the
Ottoman Governments.
The clauses b and c relate to financial arrangements and have been previously
discussed with His Majesty’s Government.
Clause d tries to establish some guarantee for the carrying out of the necessary
works in the Shat-el-Arab. In the opinion of our experts an average depth of 20 feet
for the navigable channel up to the port of Basra ought to be attained by the time the
railway between Basra and Bagdad is completed. Some stipulation of that sort seems
to be quite as much in the interest of British as of German Shipping. In giving up all
(4) [ v . supra, p. 158, N o. lOli, encl.]
 176

right to an outlet on the Persian Gulf the Im perial Government must be able to point
to some reasonably definite undertaking concerning the navigable channel between the
Persian Gulf and Basra.
Article 8 gives an arbitration clause which in the opinion of the Imperial
Governm ent, is highly desirable.
The question of British directors dealt with in Section c Article 2 of the British
Draft is dealt with in the draft of the explanatory note.
Believe me, Ac.
LICHNOWSKY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Prince Lichnow sky to Sir Edward G rey.

(Draft o f an explanatory note.)

Kaiserlich D eutsche Botschaft, London, den 16. Juli 1913.
E uer Exzellenz,
Im Anschluss an das M emorandum vom heutigen Tage, mit welchem ich die
Ehre hatte, Euer Exzellenz neue Vorschläge der Kaiserlichen Regierung bezüglich
einer Deklaration über die Bagdadbahn und verwandte Fragen zu übermitteln, möchte
ich auf einzelne in unserem Entwurf berührte Punkte näher eingehen :
W as die Zweigbahn von Basra (Zobeir) nach dem Persischen Golf betrifft, so
dürfte die Absicht der K öniglich Grossbritannischen Regierung den Bau dieser
Zweigstrecke praktisch für unabsehbare Zeit aufzuschieben, durch den deutscherseits
vorgeschlagenen Text genügend R echnung getragen sein. _
Die Kaiserliche Regierung würde W ert darauf legen, von Euerer Exzellenz in
einer Note bestätigt zu erhalten, dass im Falle des Baus der Strecke Basra (Z o b e ir)-
G olf die britische Regierung dafür eintretep. wird, dass die Bagdadeisenbahn­
Gesellschaft in dem Verwaltungsrat der für den Bau und Betrieb der Eisenbahn
B asra-G olf zu gründenden Gesellschaft unter genau denselben Bedingungen
vertreten sein wird, wie das britische Kapital in dem Verwaltungsrat der Bagdadeisen­
bahn-Gesellschaft. '
W as die Aufnahm e von 2 englischen Delegierten in den Verwaltungsrat der
Bagdadbahn-Gesellschaft betrifft, so schlagen wir v o r :
1) ein Schreiben der Deutschen Bank an die zu bildende englische Gruppe, dass
die Deutsche Bank jederzeit mit den ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln
in der Generalversammlung der Bagdadbahn-Gesellschaft dafür eintreten
wird, dass zwei von der englischen Gruppe zu präsentierende britische
Staatsangehörige in den Verwaltungsrat der Bagdadbahn gewählt werden.
(Entwurf des Schreibens beifolgend.) _ _
2) eine Note dieser Botschaft an E uer Exzellenz mit der M itteilung, dass die
Deutsche Bank das Auswärtige Amt von dem an die englische Gruppe zu
richtenden Schreiben in Kenntnis gesetzt und sich verpflichtet hat, das
Schreiben jederzeit auf W unsch des Auswärtigen Amts an die von der
Königlich Grosäbritannischen Regierung zu bezeichnende Gruppe abzu­
senden. Der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung kann es überlassen
bleiben, sich ihrerseits von der von ihr zu bezeichnenden englischen
Gruppe die Zusicherung geben zu lassen, dass diese _ nur ihr, der
Regierung, genehme britische Staatsangehörige zur W ahl in den Verwal­
tungsrat der Bagdadeisenbahn-Gesellschaft präsentieren wird.

Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein

E uer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
[L IC H N O W S K Y ].
 177

E n clos u re 2 in N o. 118.
Draft N ote.
B erlin,
As shareholders o f the Bagdad Railway Company and head o f a syndicate
owning a m ajority o f the shares of said Company, we hereby undertake to vote from
time to time in favour o f and elect two candidates which you as shareholders o f the
Bagdad Railway Company will from time to time name us to occupy two seats on the
Board of Directors (Conseil d ’ Administration) of the Bagdad Railway Company.
Respectfully yours,
D E U TSC H E B AN K .
Enclosure 3 in No. 118.
Memorandum .
Die Kaiserliche Regierung hat das M em orandum Sir Edward Greys vom 10. Juni
1913(5) sowie den diesem M emorandum beigegebenen Entwurf zu einer deutsch­
englischen Deklaration eingehend geprüft und ist damit einverstanden, dass über
die in dem M emorandum bezeichneten Gegenstände ein Ü bereinkom men zwischen der
Kaiserlichen Regierung und der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung abgeschlos­
sen werde. E in neuer E ntwurf für die geplante Deklaration ist beigefügt.
London, den 16. Juli 1913.
A n n ex to Memorandum.
1.) R ecognizing the general importance o f the com pletion of the Bagdad Railway
for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent undertake not to
encourage any measures likely to impede the construction o f the Bagdad Railway, or
to prevent the participation o f capital in this railway under the express condition that
this should not cause for Great Britain any prejudice o f a financial or economical
nature.
Regarding the proposed railway between Bagdad and Basra, His Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare that they will use their best endeavours to support
the construction and management o f the said line by the Bagdad Railway Company.
H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government undertake not to encourage or support
the construction o f railways in or to Mesopotamia fit to create a com petition to the
Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, unless and until there is complete agreement on
the subject between H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Imperial German
Government.
2.) The Bagdad Railway Company being in négociation with the Im perial
Ottoman Governm ent for an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German
Government and H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare, so far as concerns
themselves, to adhere hereby to the said arrangem ent[s] and confirm them :
a.) The terminus o f the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra and
the Bagdad Railway Company shall renounce all claims to construct a
branch line from Basra (Zubiir) to the Persian Gulf, referred to in
article 1 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1903,(6)
and to build a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, whether
under article 23 o f the said Bagdad Railway Convention or in any other
way derived.
b.) No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the Bagdad
Railway Company’s system, either as regards facilities or rates of charge
for the conveyance of like articles between the same points on account
of the ownership, origin, or destination of goods presented by transport,
or in any other manner whatever.
( 5 ) [ u . supra, pp. 138-40, No. 89, encls. 2 and 3, and note ( 3 ) . ]
( 6) [v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 3 3 -4 .]
[10900] N
 178

c.) In the event of the construction o f the said branch line from Basra (Zubiir)
to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be
made to secure facilities for through-traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway
Com pany’is system , and there shall be com plete protection against
discrimination, direct or indirect.
d .) The construction o f the proposed ports at Basra and Bagdad shall be executed
by a separate Ottoman com pany wherein British participation shall
amount to not less than 2 0 % of the whole. The statutes and cahiers
des charges of the ports of Basra and Bagdad com pany and concession
shall be form ed on the model o f the Haidar-Pascha Port Company.

3.) The Im perial German Governm ent and H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
declare that they will in no case support the construction of the branch from Basra
(Zubiir) or any other point of the main line to the Persian G ulf, unless and until
there is complete agreement on the subject between His Britannic M ajesty’ s Govern­
m ent, the Im perial German Governm ent and the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent.
4.) a.) The Im perial German Governm ent having cognizance of the declaration
initialled on the 20th May 1913(7) between the representatives of H is Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent, concerning the
navigation on the Tigris and E u p h ra te[s], declare that they will not oppose the
execution nor support any action directed against the execution of this declaration.
No further concession for river navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates except
that now existing shall he encouraged or supported by either of the two Governments
unless and until a prior agreement has been established on the subject between
the Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
b .) His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent will not oppose the Bagdad Railway
interests acquiring not less than 2 0 % of the whole share capital out o f the shares
allotted to Turkish interests in the Ottoman Company for river navigation and
becom ing represented by one director in the board of the aforesaid Company.
c.) His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial German Government
agree that no discrimination shall be permitted by the concessionnaires for navigation
o n the aforesaid rivers either as regards facilities or rates of charge for the conveyance
o f like articles between the same points on account of the ownership, origin or
destination o f goods presented for transport or in any other manner whatsoever.
The granting o f rebates in any form whatsoever by the river navigation company
shall expressly be forbidden. The granting of through-bills of lading is equally
forbidden unless there is a previous agreement about this matter between the River
Navigation C o[m p a n y] and the steamship lines of the countries represented in the
com ité de surveillance mentioned in article 6. H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
as signatory o f the aforesaid declaration will use their best endeavours to secure
the strict execution o f these stipulations.
d .) It is nevertheless understood that this article in no wise affects the rights
conceded by article 9 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1903,(8)
relative to the importation of materials exclusively destined for the construction of
the Bagdad Railway, except in so far that it is hereby expressly agreed that the said
rights shall not continue to be exercised after the com pletion o f the construction
o f the Bagdad Railway to Basra and o f its branches to Khanikin and H it.
The right of establishing a ferry service between the railway station, port and
town of Bagdad and o f using small craft for the local requirements of the Bagdad
Railway or Basra (and Bagdad) port Companies will at all times he free.
It is further agreed that if an arrangement, to the satisfaction of the parties
concerned, can be made for the conveyance by river o f the said materials through
British or Ottoman agency, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Imperial

( 7) [r . sup ra , pp. 158-9, No. 102, encl.~\

0 ) [r . B.F.S.r., V ol. 102, p. 837.]
 179

German Governm ent will lend their best endeavours to the conclusion o f such an
arrangement.
5.) His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial German Governm ent
agree that the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall perm anently be kept open for
seagoing vessels and be carried on on terms of absolute equality for the vessels of all
nations without regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
6.) A Comité de surveillance shall be established com posed of those foreign
consuls resident at Basra whose flag is represented by steamship lines regularly
trading with that port. The Comité shall correspond directly with the river com m is­
sion to be established by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent on all matters affecting
the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab and the dues to be levied on that river, it is
however understood that the functions of the Comité shall be advisory and not
executive. The Comité will see that the Shatt-el-Arab shall be perm anently kept
In a satisfactory state of conservancy in order that sea-going vessels m ay always
be assured o f free and easy access to the port o f Basra, and that dues shall be
imposed not for the mere fact of navigation, but only for repaying sums actually
spent on improvem ents in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and harbour facilities.
They shall in no case exceed 1 fr [a n ]c per r e g is t e r e d ] ton (the dues to cover the
com ing in and going out o f the same vessel) ; any dues shall he levied on a basis
of absolute equality without regard to the nationality o f sea-going vessels or their
cargoes.
7.) The preceding arrangements for the final settlement of all questions connected
with the Bagdad Bailway shall becom e operative only under the express condition,
a.) that the arrangement referred to in article 2 between the Bagdad Bailway
Company and the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent has been concluded and
entered into force,
b.) that all losses which the Bagdad Bailway Company and holders o f Bagdad
Bailway loans may suffer through the loss to Turkey o f her European
provinces shall be duly com pensated by assigning other sources o f revenue
of equal value,
c.) that the Turkish Governm ent shall assign as guarantees sufficient sources
o f revenue for the building and working of the whole line from Konia
to Bassorah including such branch lines as under the concession are
entitled to guarantees, and
d.) that the Shatt-el-Arab has been brought into a satisfactory state o f conser­
vancy in order that sea-going vessels may always be assured o f free and
easy access to the port of Basra.

8.) Any difference of opinion arising out o f this declaration shall be submitted
to arbitration. I f the two Governm ents fail to agree about a special court or arbiter,
the case shall be submitted to the Hague Tribunal.

No. 119.

Minute by Mr. Parker.

\ F.O . 3 29 9 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, July 17, 1913.
I met Iiakki Pasha again at Lord Inch cape’ s house to-day and we made great
progress with the navigation concession. Hakki Pasha agreed to the two groups of
the Board voting by units if the Chairman so desires, and this would effectively secure
control by the British Chairman.
The concession, with the modifications shown in italics, is being re-printed.
Hakki Pasha told us that Mr. L yn ch, when in Paris, had visited Djavid B ey, to
whom he had stated that it only required a hint from Hakki Pasha for the F oreign
[10900] N 2
 180
Office to designate Mr. L yn ch as the concessionnaire for the new Company. Hakki
Pasha had explained the position to Djavid Bey. H e remarked that the last letter
from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, of which he had sent a
copy to Sir L. Mallet, contained a threat against him, and he had not replied to it, and
did not intend to do so.
After the m eeting was over I asked Hakki Pasha if he had heard anything about
the oil question, and he replied that he had not. I said that the British and German
Governm ents were discussing the question in order to see if the groups concerned
could not be brought to terms, and it was obviously very important that the Ottoman
Governm ent should not further com m it itself in the meantime. Hakki Pasha said he
realised this, but there was a question of a small advance, say £ T . 500,000 by the
National Bank to Turkey, and Turkey was badly in need of funds, and if the National
B ank made any condition about the oil concession the Ottoman Governm ent would
be much embarrassed, for they 'h a d seldom had such urgent need of m oney. He
further said, as I already knew, that Sir IT. B abington-Sm ith was in Paris this week.
I feel a little anxious about this, and it is matter for consideration whether the
Anglo-Persian Company should not now make some advance to Turkey in order to
confirm their position, or at all events to get an assurance that their interests would
not be left out of account.
Hakki Pasha asked me if we had news about the Turco-Persian frontier, as he
had heard that the Ottoman Governm ent had practically accepted the Anglo-Russian
proposals, and he said that this attitude of conciliation was solely due to a strong desire
to please the British Governm ent. I said that our news corresponded with his own,
and that we certainly attached very great importance to a final settlement which
seemed at last to be in sight.
A. P [A R K E R ].

P.S.— Hakki Pasha told me that he had asked Sir H. B abington-Sm ith for a
statement showing the m inimum acceptable (a) to Mr. D ’ Arcy, and (b) to the National
Bank group respecting oil, but he had not been able to secure it, though it would have
been useful as a basis for discussion and possible agreement.— A. P.

No. 120.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r ey .{1)

F.O. 3 45 4 4 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4. St. Petersburgh, D . July 26, 1913, 11-55 p . m .

Tel. (No. 280.) R. July 27, 1913, 11 a . m .
M y telegram No. 274.( 2)
Following is summary of aide-m ém oire just received from Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
Imperial Government have no objection to conclusion of arrangement with regard
to Turco-Persian frontier from Hawizeh to Persian Gulf on lines of declaration signed
in London on 6th M ay.(3)
T hey equally approve constitution of a mixed commission for navigation of
Shatt-el-Arab which would guarantee full and entire liberty of navigation and occupy
itself with introducing improvem ents calculated to prom ote passage of merchant

t 1) [T h is telegrain w as sent to C on sta n tin op le (as N o. 357) ; to T ehran (as N o. 328). Copies
w ere sent to the In d ia Office ; to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e ; to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O peration s.]
( 2) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s telegram (N o. 274) o f J u ly 23, 1913, D . 7-1 p . m ., R . 10-30 p . m ., is
n ot rep rod u ced . In it he sta ted th a t he had “ pressed M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs for
im m ed ia te answ er ” to S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s m em orandum o f J u n e 19, 1913 ( v . supra, pp. 159-60,
N o. 103). (F.O . 3 3 9 9 1 /2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
( 3) [v. supra, pp. 100-1, N o. 68, encl. 1.]
 181

vessels. As Russian maritime trade in those regions is very considerable Imperial

Government would like, more especially if that trade continues to develope in near
future, to take part in labours of that com m ission. Im perial Governm ent would like
to see some Russian subjects invited to occupy some responsible posts in administra­
tion of com m ission, especially if subjects of other Powers should be so em ployed.
As com m ission has not yet been appointed, it is too early to discuss details of its
competence and attributions, but Im perial Government would indicate certain
amendments which it would like introduced into draft scheme, nam ely, right o f consuls
to have direct relations with com m ission; com m unication to consuls and authorities
of vilayets o f reports of its proceedings and expenditure ; in the event of direct
relations between com m ission and captains of ships or landed proprietors on either
bank, coercive measures to be applied to foreign subjects only through m edium of their
respective consuls; regulations affecting foreign ships, more especially with regard to
tariffs and (?) taxes, to be enforced exclusively after preliminary agreem ent with
consuls ; ships of light tonnage that are not now stopped by bar and that consequently
do not benefit by works of deepening to be free from all dues.

No. 121.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.(l)

F.O. 3 45 4 4 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /4 4.
Tel. (No. 558.) F oreign Office, July 28, 1913, 7 -3 0 p . m .
Please express to Russian G ov [ern m en ]t m y thanks for com m unication reported
in your telegram No. 280.(2)
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] should point out, however, that we have only been able to
induce Turkey to agree to the Commission on the understanding that it should be
Ottoman and not international, and that the only reason we are asked to participate,
without in any way detracting from the Ottoman character of the Commission, is that
we have rendered services to navigation for centuries in the river. But full provision
would be made for consuls to have direct relations with Commission on all matters
affecting their shipping, and the draft convention contains full guarantees for equality
of treatment o f ships of all nations and for no dues to be imposed by the mere fact of
navigation, but merely for services rendered; reports of the proceedings and expendi­
ture of com m ission will be regularly com m unicated to foreign consuls and to Ottoman
G overnm ent; and it is only proposed to impose dues on ocean-going steamers, but
if the suggestion as to freedom from dues made in last paragraph of your telegram
were carried out practically no ships would be subject to dues which can now pass the
bar. As British ships represent about 7 5% of the steam tonnage entered at present
at Bussorah I trust Russian Government will not press this objection, which would
render nugatory and impossible the work of the commission.
I propose to sign the draft convention about the Shatt-el-Arab on July 29 ;(3) you
should inform M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] of this and ask him to treat the
matter as confidential for the p resen t; you should add that I shall do m y best to meet
him as far as practicable in regard to the last paragraph of your telegram, but explain
that the admission of Russian subjects to serve on the com m ission would, I fear, alter
the entire character of that body, and make it international. I earnestly trust,
therefore, that he will not press it.

t1) [T h is teleg ram was rep ea ted to C on sta n tin op le (N o. 3 5 8 ); to T ehra n (N o. 329).]
(2) [ v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [v. in fra , pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]
 182
N o. 122.
Sir Edward G rey to Lord Granville.0 )

F.O. 3 53 3 5 /6 4 63 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 240.)
M y Lord, F oreign Office, July 28, 1913.
The German Ambassador said to-day that it had been understood, he thought
perhaps from an interview between Herr von Iviihlmann and some one in the Foreign
Office, that I had offered to do what I could, if the German Governm ent desired it, to
help an agreement between them and France about railways in Asiatic Turkey. Such
mediation was not necessary at present, but the German Governm ent were grateful
for the offer, and he gave me the following Memorandum of the points at issue :—

(See paper herewith.)

I said that I had not considered m yself in a position to go so far as to offer

mediation. I was anxious that an agreement should be com e to between France and
Germany, and had expressed this hope to the French G overn m en t: because, till an
agreement was come to with France, I could do no more than promise not to obstruct
the Bagdad Railway, and could not give that active co-operation in getting securities
for the Bagdad Railway which could only be given when France was in a position to
do the same. [ I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

Enclosure in No. 122.

The Imperial Government is very anxious to bring about, together with the
Anglo-Germ an agreement, a settlement between the German and the French interests
in Turkish railway questions.
The French aims are, as far as it is known in Berlin, directed towards the
following railway concessions :—
(a) In Eastern A n a tolia :
1. Sam sun-Siwas
2. Siw as-Karput-D iarbekir
3. B itlis-V an
4. from a point of the line Siwas-Karput to E rzindjan and later to
Erzerum
( b) In S yria :
1. Aleppo-M eskene
2. R ayak-R am le and later to the Egyptian frontier.
The French Governm ent furthermore wishes to secure for the French capital
a decisive influence in the Hedjas railway, which until now was a State-railway, and,
if circumstances permit, to take over the management of a part of the Hedjas railway
line.
These far-reaching wishes collide with German rights and interests, as far as the
lines A leppo-M eskene and Siw as-K arput-D iarbekir are concerned. A line A leppo-
Meskene must be regarded as a direct rival line to the section of the Bagdad railway
Company from Aleppo to the Euphrates and it is therefore unacceptable from the
German standpoint. As to the line Siwas-Karput on which the Bagdad railway
possesses a conventional prior claim, the interested German group is ready to make
large concessions, provided that the position of the French group concerned in the
Bagdad railway com pany to the extent o f 30% will be regulated so as to enable this
group to take an active part corresponding to their share in the com pany in the work
of financing the Bagdad railway. That has been rendered extrem ely difficult by the
0 ) [C op ies o f this despatch w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
 183
attitude taken by the French Governm ent with regard to the Bagdad railway loans.
The French Governm ent hold that, while fully recognising the expediency of the
Bagdad enterprise, they are prevented from admitting Bagdad loans to the Paris Stock
Exchange by the necessity o f considering public opinion. There are actually
negotiations going on between the German group and the French party concerned
about a com bination tending to set aside these difficulties. Other wishes which could
be contrary to French rights and interests are not entertained by the German group.
German Embassy, London, July 28th, 1913.

No. 1*23.
Sir Edu-ard G rey to Mr. Marling.C)
F.O. 3 5 5 9 4 /3 2 30 4 /1 3 /4 4.
(No. 232.)
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1913.
After signing various agreements with Hakki Pasha to-d ay,(2) 1 observed that I
had not liked to postpone the signature of these agreements and thereby throw away
all the good work that had been done, and I was still anxious that France and Germ any
should come to an agreement about the Bagdad Railway, in order that the Powers,
having rem oved the difficulties between themselves, m ight be in a position to support
Turkey in her Asiatic provinces. In this way I had hoped that the agreements that
we were now making would be the beginning of a policy by which we could give
support to Turkey. But the action that the Turks had taken in upsetting the
boundary fixed by the Treaty o f London had made me very apprehensive as to the
effect on other Powers. Though I had proceeded with the signature of these agree­
ments, I could not help pointing out that the action of Turkey might com plicate
matters with other Powers, and thereby upset the policy of which I had hoped that
these agreements were a beginning.
Hakki Pasha expatiated on the unfairness of the Powrers resenting the action of
Turkey in taking advantage of the situation in Thrace, when they had not resented
the action of Roumania in taking advantage of the situation in Bulgaria after her
agreement in St. Petersburg. H e expressed great distrust of Russian policy towards
Turkey in Asia.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
(!) [A c o p y o f this despa tch was sent to th e D ir e c to r o f M ilita r y O p era tion s.]
(2) [v. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t.]

No. 124.
A n g l o - T u r k is h A greem en t.

Collection of Docum ents signed on July 29, 1913.

( 1 .)
Convention concernant l'établissem ent d'une Commission pour am éliorer les
Conditions de la Navigation du C halt-el-A rabJ1)
Sa Majesté le R oi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre part ;
( ') [T he te x ts o f this con v en tion and o f th e d e cla ra tion follow in g it ha ve been ta k en from
the originals w h ich a re preserved in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey
No. 86).]
 184

Désireux tous deux d ’ améliorer les conditions de la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab

et de diminuer les risques auxquels le commerce de leurs sujets pourrait y être exposé,
par suite de l ’ importance de leurs intérêts dans le commerce sur le fleuve ;

Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le E oi du Eoyaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes : L e Très Honorable
Sir Edward Grey, Baronnet du Eoyaum e-U ni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la
Jarretière, Membre du Parlement, Principal Secrétaire d ’ État de Sa Majesté au
Département des Affaires E trangères;
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans : Son Altesse Ibrahim Hakki Pacha, ancien
Grand Yézir, décoré des Grands Cordons des Ordres Impériaux de l ’ Osmanié et du
Medjidié en brillants;

Lesquels, s’ étant communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due

form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

A r t ic le 1er.
La navigation du Chatt-el-Arab demeurera ouverte aux navires de toutes les
nationalités.

A r t ic l e 2.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an établira une commission chargée de remplir

les fonctions relatives à la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab depuis Kourna jusqu’ à la
m er, telles qu’ elles sont définies à l ’ article 6.

A r t ic l e 3.

Cette commission sera composée de deux membres seulement, à être désignés

par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an. Le Gouvernement Im périal, désirant que
l ’ un des membres soit de nationalité britannique, invitera le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique à lui proposer des candidats parmi lesquels il choisira l ’ un des
commissaires.

A r t ic l e 4.

Chacun de ces commissaires recevra un traitement annuel de ¿£T. 2,000, net de

toute réduction. Les traitements seront versés par la commission.

A r t ic l e 5.

La com m ission aura qualité pour nom m er tels agents qt em ployés qu’ elle jugera
nécessaires, mais le Gouvernement Im périal, désirant que l ’ ingénieur en chef et
l ’ inspecteur des services fluviaux soient de nationalité britannique invitera le Gouverne­
m ent de Sa Majesté britannique à lui proposer des candidats.parm i lesquels il choisira
ces fonctionnaires. La com m ission nommera un ingénieur-adjoint et un inspecteur-
adjoint de nationalité ottom ane. L e traitement de ces agents et employés sera fixé
et versé par la commission.

A r t ic l e 6.

La com m ission sera chargée dès fonctions suivantes :—

(a.) L ’ exécution de tous les travaux qui seront jugés nécessaires à l ’amélioration
du chenal du fleuve et de ceux qui y donnent accès du côté de la mer.
( b.) Le maintien du chenal du fleuve libre de toute espèce d ’obstruction de façon
à assurer à la navigation les conditions les plus propices en tout temps.
 185
(c.) La préparation, prom ulgation et mise à exécution de règlements touchant
la navigation et la police du fleuve ainsi que les terrains et constructions
détenus par la commission.
(d.) Le contrôle du pilotage.
(e .) La mise de bouées et l ’ éclairage du chenal, ainsi que le maintien et la
surveillance des phares et des bouées placés dans les chenaux donnant
accès au fleuve, tels qu ’ ils sont spécifiés dans l ’ annexe à cette convention.
(/.) La surveillance, dans la mesure où cela est nécessaire pour assurer l ’appli­
cation des dispositions contenues dans la présente convention et sous
réserve des droits contractuels des Puissances étrangères, des débarcadères,
quais, docks et jetées appartenant à des particuliers et sis dans ou sur
les bords du fleuve, ainsi que la faculté de pourvoir à toutes accom m oda­
tions et facilités que la com m ission pourra juger nécessaires.
(g.) Dans le cas où un port serait établi à Basra en conform ité de quelque
convention que ce soit liant la Turquie à la date présente, les droits qui
seront assurés dans ce port au Gouvernement Im périal ottom an par cette
convention et par le cahier des charges seront, en tant que ces droits
concernent les matières traitées dans les paragraphes précédents,
exclusivement exercés par la com m ission.

A r t ic l e 7.

La com m ission aura qualité pour fixer, par les règlements édictés par elle en
vertu de l ’ article 6 (c) de cette convention, les amendes qui seront imposées en cas
de leur contravention. Telles contraventions seront justiciables exclusivement par la
commission qui sera revêtue pour des cas semblables de l ’ autorité, analogue à celle
dont jouissent les m unicipalités, d ’ infliger aux délinquants des amendes et, à défaut
de payement de telles amendes, le terme de réclusion équivalent prescrit par la loi
ottomane.

A r t ic l e 8.

Pour toute autre affaire pénale du ressort de la com m ission, la police de celle-ci
aura seule le droit d ’opérer des arrestations. Les prévenus seront ensuite remis aux
autorités com pétentes; la commission aura le droit de se faire représenter au procès
en qualité de plaignant.
A r t ic l e 9.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an s’ engage à faciliter l ’ acquisition par la

commission de tout terrain que celle-ci jugera nécessaire en vue d ’ accom plir d ’ une
manière efficace les fonctions qui lui seront dévolues. Ces acquisitions se feront en
conformité de la loi ottomane d ’ expropriation pour cause d ’ utilité publique et le prix
en sera acquitté par la com m ission.
Dans le cas où la com m ission jugerait nécessaire l ’ acquisition de terrains auxquels
des servitudes de pêche sont attachées, il ne sera imposé à ces droits de servitude
de pêche aucune restriction vexatoire.

A r t ic l e 10.

_ Aucun droit, taxe ou charge basé sur le fait seul de la navigation ne sera prélevé,
soit par la Sublime Porte, soit par la com m ission, sur les bâtiments ou marchandises
dans le Chatt-el-Arab à moins d ’ être perçu en rém unération de services rendus.

A r t ic l e 11.

La com m ission aura seule le droit de prélever les droits ou charges qui seront
jugés nécessaires pour couvrir les dépenses des travaux et services administrés par
elle. L e produit de tels droits ne dépassera pas la somme nécessaire pour atteindre
 186

le but ci-haut mentionné, y compris les frais généraux d’administration de la

commission, et le produit y sera exclusivement affecté. Tout excédent devra être
utilisé à la réduction des droits. Le taux de ces droits ne dépassera dans aucun cas
1 fr. par tonne nette de navigation.

A r t ic l e 12.

Tout droit ou charge imposé par la commission sera prélevé impartialement et

équitablement de tout bâtiment (exception faite de ceux qui sont exclusivement
affectés à la navigation fluviale), quels que soient le port d’origine, de destination et
de départ, le pavillon et l’armateur, la nationalité ou le propriétaire du chargement.
De même, il ne sera fait aucune distinction, en matière des facilités à accorder, ni
entre les bâtiments par rapport à leur pavillon, à leur armateur ou à leur port de
départ ou de destination, ni entre les marchandises par rapport à leur nationalité ou
à leur propriétaire.

A r t ic l e 13.

Toute somme que la commission jugera nécessaire d’emprunter pour le compte-

capital en vue d’accomplir les fonctions qui lui seront dévolues sera avancée par le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, après entente avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique, à un taux d’intérêt qui ne dépassera pas 5 pour cent.

A r t ic l e 14.

Le contrôle de tous les fonds perçus et déboursés par la commission relèvera

exclusivement de celle-ci.

A r tic le 15.
La commission publiera tous les ans un relevé complet et exact de ses comptes,
qui montrera les sommes perçues et déboursées par elle. Ce relevé sera soumis a
l’examen de la cour des comptes.

A r t ic l e 16.

Si, la limite mentionnée à l’article 11 étant atteinte, les recettes de la commission

ne suffisent pas à ses dépenses ordinaires, le déficit sera comblé par le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman en attendant qu’une entente intervienne entre les deux Gouverne­
ments sur les moyens de rétablir l’équilibre financier.

A r t ic l e 17.

Dans le cas où un désaccord s’élèverait entre les membres de la commission sur

la question de savoir si tels ou tels travaux particuliers sont ou ne sont pas nécessaires
à l’amélioration du Chatt-el-Arab, ou bien sur la façon dont ces travaux devront être
exécutés, la question en litige sera déférée par elle à un ingénieur de compétence
reconnue, désigné d’un commun accord par les commissaires ou, faute d’un tel accord,
par les deux Gouvernements. La décision rendue par cet ingénieur sera adoptée par
la commission.
A r t ic l e 18.

La commission s’adressera, pour toutes les questions se rapportant aux fonctions

qui lui seront confiées, à la Sublime Porte directement, et non pas par le canal des
autorités locales.
A r t ic l e 19.

Les autorités locales ne s’immisceront en aucune façon dans des questions ayant
trait ni aux immeubles, constructions, terrains ou autre propriété de la commission,
 187

ni à ses fonds, ni à l'exercice de leurs fonctions par les agents chargés de la police,
du pilotage ou des autres services établis par elle, ni aux débarcadères, jetées, docks
ou quais situés dans ou sur les bords du fleuve et appartenant à des particuliers.
Le personnel de la police qui sera employée par la commission sera choisi parmi
les sujets ottomans et de préférence parmi ceux qui ont déjà été au service du
Gouvernement Impérial. La commission aura qualité pour engager des officiers
supérieurs de nationalité étrangère pour exercer des fonctions d’organisation et de
commandement.
A r t ic l e 20.

La remise à la commission de bouées ou de phares placés dans les chenaux

donnant accès au Chatt-el-Arab ne sera pas considérée comme portant atteinte à la
juridiction territoriale exercée dans les eaux où ces bouées ou phares sont situés.
Aucune provision non plus de cette convention ne sera interprétée comme revêtant
la coihmission de l’ autorité d’exercer une juridiction ou des fonctions ou de prélever
des droits ou d’acquérir des terres en dehors des limites de l’Empire ottoman sans
le consentement de la Puissance territoriale, ni comme modifiant l’application ou
l’interprétation des dispositions d’aucun traité ou arrangement définissant les
frontières de l’ Empire.
A r t ic l e 21.

Cet arrangement restera en vigueur pour une période de soixante ans à partir
du jour de sa signature. Dans la cas où aucune des deux Hautes Parties Contrac­
tantes n’aurait fait connaître à l’autre douze mois avant l’expiration de ladite période
de soixante ans son intention de mettre fin à l’arrangement, il restera en vigueur
jusqu’à l ’expiration d’un an à partir du jour où l’une des deux Hautes Parties
Contractantes l’aura dénoncé.
En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 29 juillet, 1913.
[L .S .] E. GREY.
[L .S .] I. HAKKY.

A nnexe.

Liste des Bouées et Phares du Chatt-el-Arab.

N ature des Phares, &c. P rop riéta ire actuel. P osition . D escription
No.
sur Carte.*

1 Vaisseau-phare ... G ouvernem ent ottom an ... Barre e x térieu re... Lt. Fl. ev. 5 sec.
56 f e et, vis.
10 m .
2 Bouée à gaz acétylène „ b ritan n iqu e... >) )) '• ' Lt. F.
3 Bouée non éclairée . . . >5 ••• » >) *•• Old bar buoy.
4 » » ■•• ,, ottom an ... » » ••• No. 1.
5 >> v ••• britan niqu e... „ 2.
6 >J ••• î» ♦ » jj „ 3.
i »} ••• ’1 5) .•• Chenal ... ... » fi
8 » ••• „ ottom an ... jj ... . .. » 5.
9
10
•J •••
,, b ritan n iqu e... „ . .. . ..
„ G.
,,
11 ,, ottom an ... „ 5.
12 Barre in térieu re ... „ 9.
13 n »J ••• ,, britan niqu e... >> ••• Inner bar buoy.
14 Phare ... ... ,, ottom an ... Fao ... ... Lt. F. red 25
fe et, vis. 6 m.

* A dm iralty Chart No. 1235 “ M outh of the Euphrates, Shatt-el-A rab, and Barm ishir
R iver ” (corrected to February 1913).
 188
( 2 .)
Déclaration.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an déclare que, dans le cas où le cheikh de

M ouhammera voudrait prier un des commissaires de s ’occuper des intérêts du
com m erce et de la navigation persans, la Sublime Porte autorisera ledit commissaire
à s ’occuper de ces intérêts sans que cela puisse préjudicier en quoi que ce soit à sa
qualité de commissaire ottom an et à ses attributions telles qu’ elles sont définies par
cette convention.
E n foi de quoi le soussigné, dûment autorisé à cet effet, a signé la présente
déclaration.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 29 juillet, 1913.
I. HAKKY.

(3.)
Déclaration. (2)
Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an, ayant examiné la question de la frontière
qui sépare les territoires ottom an et persan depuis la région de H aouizé jusqu’ à la
m er, déclare que la ligne frontière doit être fixée com m e suit :

L a ligne frontière part de l ’ endroit nom m é Oumm-Chir, où le Khor-el-Douvel

se sépare du Khor-el-Azem . Oumm-Chir est situé à l ’ est de la jonction du Khor-el-
Mulîaisin avec le K hor-el-Azem à 9 milles au nord-ouest de Bisaitin, endroit que
se trouve à la latitude 31° 43' 2 9 ". A partir d ’ Oumm-Chir la ligne se dirige vers le
sud-ouest et atteint la longitude 45° à l ’ extrémité méridionale d ’ un petit lac, connu
aussi par le nom d ’ Azem et situé dans le K hor-el-Azem à quelque distance au nord-
ouest de Chouaïb. De ce point la ligne continue vers le sud le lo n g .d u marécage
jusqu’ à la latitude 3 1 °, qu’ elle suit directem ent vers l ’ est jusqu’ à un point au nord-est
de K ouchk-i-B asra, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire ottom an. De ce
point la ligne va au sud jusqu’ au canal de K haïyin à un point qui se trouve entre le
N ahr-Diaidji et le N ahr-A bou-’ l-A rabid ; elle suit le m edium filum aquœ du canal
Khaïyin jusqu’ au point où celui-ci rejoint le Chatt-el-Arab, à l ’ embouchure du Nahr-
Nazaïlé. De ce point la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu’ à la mer en
laissant sous la souveraineté ottom ane le fleuve et toutes les îles qui s ’ y trouvent aux
conditions et avec les exceptions suivantes :
(a.) Appartiennent à la Perse : (1) l ’ île de Mouhalla et les deux îles qui se
trouvent entre celle-ci. et la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab (rive persane
d ’ Abadan) ; (2) les quatre îles entre Chetaït et Maaouiyé et les deux îles
devant Mankouhi qui sont toutes des dépendances de l ’ île d ’ Abadan;
(3) tout îlot actuellement existant ou inexistant qui pourrait se form er et
qui serait relié par les eaux basses à l ’ île d ’ Abadan ou à la terre ferme
persane en aval du Nahr-NaZaïlé.
( b) Le port m oderne et l ’ ancrage de Mouhammera, en amont et en aval de la
jonction du fleuve Karoun avec le Chatt-el-Arab, continueront à se trouver
sous la juridiction persane en conform ité du traité d ’ Erzeroum , sans que
cela puisse infirmer le droit d ’ usage ottoman de cette partie du fleuve et
sans que la juridiction persane puisse s’ étendre aux parties du fleuve
restant en dehors de l ’ ancrage.
(c.) Aucune atteinte ne sera portée aux droits, us et coutumes existants en ce qui
concerne la pêche sur le rivage persan du Chatt-el-Arab, le mot ‘ ‘ rivage ’ ’
comprenant aussi les terres réunies à la côte par les eaux basses.

( 2) [T h e te x t o f this décla ra tion has becn ta ken from th e orig in a l w hich is preserved iu
th e F o re ig n Office sériés o f O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 76).]
 189

(d.) La juridiction ottomane ne pourra pas s’ étendre sur les parties de la côte
persane qui pourront être temporairem ent couvertes d ’ eau par la marée
ou par d ’ autres causes accidentelles. L a juridiction persane de son côté
ne pourra pas s’ exercer sur des terres qui seront temporairem ent et
accidentellement découvertes en excédant le niveau normal des eaux
basses.
(e.) L e cheikh de Mouhammera continuera à jouir en conform ité des lois
ottom anes de ses droits de propriété existant en territoire ottom an.
La ligne frontière établie dans cette déclaration est indiquée en rouge sur la carte
ci-annexée.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s ’ engage à inviter le Gouvernement
Impérial persan à agréer, com m e tracé définitif de ses frontières méridionales avec le
Gouvernement Im périal ottom an la ligne indiquée ci-dessus et sur la carte annexée.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se charge également d ’ inviter le
Gouvernement Im périal persan à se mettre d ’ accord avec le Gouvernement Im périal
ottoman pour nom m er dans le plus bref délai des commissaires qui auront à appliquer
sur le terrain les limites établies par cette déclaration. Si au cours de la délim itation
il est constaté par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et par le Gouvernement
Impérial ottom an que les territoires sur le canal de Khaïyin ci-dessus indiqués étaient
effectivement occupés et administrés par les autorités ottomanes à la date du
1er janvier écoulé (nouveau style), le tracé pourra être rectifié.
E n foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé la présente
Déclaration.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 29 juillet, 1913.
[L .S .] E. G E E Y .
[L .S .] I. H A K K Y .

(4.)
Déclaration. (3)

1. L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an se déclare prêt à accorder une concession

pour la navigation à vapeur sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate. Les bâtiments
employés en vertu de cette concession auront, sauf les réserves ci-dessus spécifiées, le
droit exclusif de la navigation à vapeur sur lesdits fleuves pendant la durée de ^
concession et la faculté de naviguer sans restriction de nom bre sur eux jusqu’ à des
points à fixer ultérieurement— pourvu toutefois que les points désignés ne se trouvent
pas en aval de Mosoul sur le Tigre et de Meskéné sur l ’ Euphrate— et sur tous leurs
affluents et canaux navigables.
2. E n conform ité du droit général de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, lesdits
bâtiments auront la faculté de naviguer entre Kourna et la mer ou entre tous points
intermédiaires.
3. La concession restera en vigueur pour une période de soixante ans au moins,
avec faculté de prolongement pour des périodes successives de dix ans, et elle sera
accordée à un concessionnaire qui s ’ engagera à constituer, en vue de l ’ opérer, une
société ottomane. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman invite le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique à soumettre à son agrément un concessionnaire possédant les
qualités requises. Le capital de la société sera partagé à proportions approxim ative­
ment égales entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne.
4. Le président de la société sera de nationalité ottom ane et présidera l ’ assemblée
générale des actionnaires. Le président du conseil d ’ administration sera de nationalité
britannique. Les présidents de la société et du conseil d ’ administration auront tous

(3) [T h e t e x t o f this décla ra tion has beeu taken from th e o rig in a l w hich is p reserv ed in
the F o re ig n Office sériés o f O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 86).]
 190

les deux la voix prépondérante en dehors de leur vote ordinaire. La proportion

des directeurs ottomans et britanniques sera égale. Les statuts de la société ainsi que
tous les détails concernant la concession et le service à maintenir seront arrêtés avec
le moins de retard possible par le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an d ’ accord avec le
concessionnaire.
5. Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman est prêt à transférer à la nouvelle société
dans des conditions équitables tous ses intérêts à l ’ égrrd Je la navigation à vapeur
dans les limites spécifiées par l ’ alinéa 1er de la présente déclaration.
6. Sont réservés les droits de la société du chem in de fer de Bagdad à l ’ égard du
transport de matériaux destinés à la construction de la ligne.
7. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman déclare en outre qu’ aucune clause de la
concession ne portera atteinte de quelque manière que ce soit au droit dont jouissent
actuellement les bâtiments britanniques à l ’ égard de la navigation à vapeur sur les
fleuves Tigre et Euphrate, lesquels droits sont pleinement réservés et resteront comme
par le passé tels qu ’ ils sont définis par le document annexé.
8. Après l ’ expiration de la concession, la société continuera à jouir du droit de la
navigation à vapeur dans les limites spécifiées mais sans posséder aucun monopole.
9. Il est entendu que la présente déclaration et le document annexé n ’ ont trait
qu’ à la seule navigation comm erciale.
10. Aux fins de la présente déclaration et du document annexé la phrase
“ navigation à vapeur ” com prend la navigation à électricité ou à toute autre force
motrice.
11. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman se déclare en outre prêt à admettre que,
en cas de contestation au sujet de l ’ interprétation ou de la mise à exécution de la
concession ou de la présente déclaration, la question en litige soit déférée, sur la
demande de l ’ une ou de l ’ autre des parties intéressées, au jugem ent du tribunal
international d ’ arbitrage de La H aye.
E n foi de quoi le soussigné, dûment autorisé à cet effet par Firm an Im périal, a
signé la présente Déclaration et son annexe.
Fait à Londres, en double expédition, le 29 juillet, 1913.
I. H AK K Y .
A n nexe.
A. Deux bateaux à vapeur battant pavillon britannique continueront à naviguer
sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate et à profiter du droit général de la navigation sur le
Chatt-el-Arab.
B. Un bateau à vapeur battant pavillon britannique sera tenu en réserve en vue
de remplacer l ’ un ou l ’ autre des bateaux ci-dessus m entionnés pour le cas où il serait
hors de service.
C. Les deux bateaux faisant actuellement le service auront, com m e par le passé,
la faculté de remorquer chacun deux allèges.
D. Un bateau à vapeur placé sous la direction de MM. L yn ch ou d ’ autres
personnes désignées par eux, mais qui, une fois hors du port, bat pavillon ottoman,
aura la faculté de naviguer en m ême temps que les deux bateaux ci-dessus spécifiés
et, comme ces derniers, de rem orquer des allèges.
I. H A K K Y .
(5.)
['Convention concernant le Golfe Persique, cf’c . ] ( i)
Sa Majesté le B oi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, et Sa Majesté
l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans, animés par le sincère désir de régler, par un accord
(-1) [T h ere is no h ea d in g to th is docu m en t in th e orig in a l. I t has been a d ded fo r con venience
o f referen ce. The tex ts o f th is con v en tion and of the décla ra tion follow in g it have been taken
from the o rig in a l w hich is preserved in the F o re ig n Office sériés o f O rig in a l T rea ties (T urkey
N o. 8 6).]
 191

complet, certaines questions touchant leurs intérêts respectifs dans le Golfe Persique
et dans les territoires environnants, ont résolu de conclure une convention spéciale en
vue de prévenir toute cause éventuelle de m alentendu entre leurs Gouvernements en
ce qui concerne ces questions.
E n conséquence, ils ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :
Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes : Le Très H onorable
Sir Edward Grev, Baronnet du R oyaum e-U ni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la
Jarretière, Membre du Parlem ent, Principal Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté au
Département des Affaires É trangères;
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans : Son Altesse Hakki Pacha, ancien Grand
Yézir, décoré des Grands Cordons des Ordres Im périaux de l ’ Osmanié et du Medjidié
en brillants;
Lesquels, s’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

I.— K oueii.

A r t ic l e 1 er.

Le territoire de Koueit, tel qu ’ il est délimité par les articles 5 et 7 de cette

convention, form e un kaza autonome de l ’ Em pire ottoman.

A r t ic l e 2.

L e cheikh de Koueit arborera com m e par le passé le drapeau ottom an, avec, s ’ il
le désire, le mot “ Koueit ” inscrit au coin, et il jouira d ’ une autonomie administrative
complète dans la zone territoriale définie à l ’ article 5 de cette convention. Le
Gouvernement Im périal ottom an s ’ abstiendra de toute imm ixtion dans les affaires de
Koueit, y com pris la question de la succession, et de tout acte d ’administration ainsi
que de toute occupation et tout acte militaire, dans les territoires qui en font partie.
E n cas de vacance, le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an nom m era kaïmakam, par
firman Im périal, le successeur du cheikh défunt. Il aura aussi la faculté de nom m er
auprès du cheikh un commissaire pour protéger les intérêts et les indigènes des autres
parties de l ’ Empire.
A r t ic l e 3.

Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman reconnaît la validité des conventions que le

cheikh de Koueit a conclues précédem m ent avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique en date des 2 3 janvier 1 8 9 9 , 2 4 mai 1 9 0 0 et 2 8 février 1 9 0 4 , et dont les
textes sont annexés (annexes I, II, III) à la présente convention. Il reconnaît aussi
la validité des concessions de terrains faites par ledit cheikh au Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique et aux sujets britanniques, ainsi que celle des engagem ents
consignés dans la note adressée à la date du 2 4 octobre 1 9 1 1 par le principal secrétaire
d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté britannique pour les affaires étrangères à l ’ambassadeur de
Sa Majesté Im périale le Sultan à Londres, dont le texte est annexé (annexe IY).

A r t ic l e 4.

E n vue de confirmer l ’ entente déjà établie entre les deux Gouvernements par les
assurances échangées le 6 septembre 1 9 0 1 , (5) entre l ’ ambassade de Sa Majesté
britannique à Constantinople et le Ministère Im périal des affaires étrangères, le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu’ en tant qu’ aucun changem ent ne
sera apporté par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an au statu quo de Koueit, tel q u ’il
se trouve défini par la présente convention, il ne changera en rien la nature de ses
relations avec le Gouvernement de Koueit et n ’ établira pas de protectorat sur le
(5) [cp . su pra, p. 4 9, E d . N o t e .]
 192
territoire qui lui est attribué. Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman prend acte de cette
déclaration.
A r t ic l e 5.

L ’ autonomie du cheikh de Koueit est exercée par lui dans les territoires dont la
limite form e un dem i-cercle avec la ville de Koueit au centre, le Khor-Zoubair à
l ’ extrémité septentrionale et Kraïne à l ’ extrémité méridionale. Cette ligne est indiquée
en rouge sur la carte annexée à la présente convention (annexe V). Les îles de
Ouarba, Boubiane, Machiane, Faïlaka, Anha, Koubbar, Karou, Makta et
Oumm-el-Maradine, avec les îlots et les eaux adjacents, sont com pris dans cette zone

A r t ic l e 6.

Les tribus qui se trouvent dans les limites indiquées à l ’ article suivant sont
reconnues com m e dépendant du cheikh de Koueit, qui percevra leurs dîmes comme par
le passé et exercera à leur égard les attributions administratives qui lui reviennent en
sa qualité de kaïmakam ottoman. L e Gouvernement Impérial ottoman n ’ exercera
dans cette zone aucun acte d ’ administration indépendamment du cheikh de Koueit et
s’ abstiendra d ’y établir des garnisons ou d ’y exercer une action militaire quelconque
sans s ’ être préalablement entendu avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

A r t ic l e 7.

Les limites du territoire dont il est parlé à l ’ article précédent sont fixées comme
suit :
La ligne de démarcation part de la côte à l ’ embouchure du Khor-Zoubair vers le
nord-ouest et passe immédiatement au sud d ’ Oumm-Kasr, de Safouan et de Djebel -
Sanam, de façon à laisser ces endroits et leurs puits au vilavet de B asra; arrivée au
Batine, elle le suit vers le sud-ouest jusqu’ à H afr-el-Batine qu’ elle laisse du côté de
Koueit ; de ce point ladite ligne va au sud-est en laissant à Koueit les puits d ’ Es-Safa
et d ’ El-Garaa, d ’ E l-H aba, Ouabra et Antaa pour aboutir à la mer près de Djebel-
M ounifa. Cette ligne est marquée en vert sur la carte annexée à la présente
convention (annexe Y).

A r t ic l e 8.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s’ entendrait avec le Gouverne­

ment de Sa Majesté britannique pour faire aboutir la ligne ferrée de Bagdad-Basra à
la m er au terminus de Koueit ou à tout autre terminus dans le territoire autonome,
les deux Gouvernements s’ entendront sur les dispositions à prendre touchant la garde
de la ligne et des stations ainsi que l ’ établissement de bureaux douaniers, dépôts de
marchandises et toute autre installation accessoire au service de la voie ferrée.

A r t ic l e 9.

Le cheikh de Koueit jouira en pleine sécurité des droits de propriété privée qu’il
possède dans le territoire du vilayet de Basra. Ces droits de propriété privée devront
s ’exercer en conform ité de la loi ottomane et les biens immobiliers qu’ils concernent
seront soumis aux impôts et charges, au mode de conservation et de transmission et à
la juridiction établis par les lois ottomanes.

A r t ic l e 10.

Les criminels des provinces voisines ne seront pas reçus dans le territoire de
Koueit et seront repoussés si on les y trouve; également les criminels de Koueit ne
seront pas reçus dans les provinces voisines et seront repoussés si on les y trouve.
 193

Il est entendu que cette disposition ne servira pas aux autorités ottomanes de
prétexte d ’ im m ixtion dans les affaires de K ou eit; elle ne servira pas non plus au
cheikh de Koueit de prétexte d ’ immixtion dans les affaires des provinces voisines.

I I .— E l-K atr.

A r t ic l e 11.

Le sandjak ottoman de Nedjd, dont la limite septentrionale est indiquée par la

ligne de démarcation définie à l ’ article 7 de cette convention, se termine vers le sud
au golfe faisant face à l ’ île de Zahnounié, qui appartient audit sandjak. Une ligne
partant du fond extrême dudit golfe ira directement au sud jusqu’ au R uba’ -al-Khali
et séparera le Nedjd de la presqu’ île d ’ E l-K atr. Les limites du Nedjd sont indiquées
par une ligne bleue sur la carte annexée à la présente convention (annexe V a ) . Le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman ayant renoncé à toutes ses réclamations concernant
la presqu’ île d ’ E l-K atr, il est entendu entre les deux Gouvernements que ladite
presqu’ île sera, comme par le passé, gouvernée par le cheikh Djassim -bin-Sani et
par ses successeurs. L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu’ il ne
permettra pas au cheikh de Bahreine de s’ imm iscer dans les affaires intérieures d ’ E l-
Katr, de porter atteinte à l ’autonomie de ce pays ou de l ’ annexer.

A r t ic l e 12.

Il sera permis aux habitants de Bahreine de visiter l ’ île de Zahnounié pour la

pêche et d ’ y demeurer en pleine liberté pendant l ’ hiver com m e par le passé, sans
qu’ aucun nouvel impôt leur soit imposé.

I I I .— B ahreine.

A r t ic l e 13.

L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an renonce à toutes ses réclamations concernant

les îles Bahreine, y compris les deux îlots Lubainat-el-Aliya et Lubainat-es-Safliya,
et reconnaît l ’ indépendance de ce pays. De son côté, le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique déclare qu’il n ’ a aucune intention d ’ annexer à ses territoires les
îles Bahreine.

A r t ic l e 14.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s’ engage vis-à-vis du Gouverne­

ment Im périal ottoman à veiller à ce que le cheikh de Bahreine ne perçoive pas des
sujets ottom ans de droits sur la pêche des huîtres perlières d ’ un taux plus élevé que
celui qui sera imposé aux autres intéressés les plus favorisés.

A r t ic l e 15.

Les sujets du cheikh de Bahreine seront considérés com m e étrangers dans les
territoires ottomans et pourront être protégés par les consuls de Sa Majesté
britannique. Toutefois, cette protection devra s’ exercer en conform ité des règles
générales du droit international européen, les sujets de Bahreine n ’ ayant pas le droit
de jouir des privilèges accordés par les capitulations aux sujets de certaines Puissances.

I V .— Golfe Persique.

A r t ic l e 16.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ayant, aussi bien pour la sauvegarde

de ses intérêts spéciaux que dans un but élevé d ’ humanité, entrepris de tout temps
[10900] 0
 194

des me’s ures de police maritime dans les eaux libres du Golfe Persique aussi bien que
sur le littoral appartenant aux cheikhs indépendants de la côte au sud d ’ E l-K atr
jusqu’ à l ’ Océan Indien, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman apprécie l ’ importance
de ces efforts déjà séculaires et déclare ne pas s’opposer à ce que le Gouvernement
de Sa Majesté britannique exerce com m e par le passé dans le Golfe Persique les
mesures suivantes :
(a.) Sondages, allumage des phares, mise des bouées, pilotage.
( h.) Police maritime.
(c.) Mesures quarantenaires.

L e Gouvernement Impérial ottom an réserve à cette occasion tous les droits qui
lui reviennent comme Puissance territoriale sur les côtes ainsi que sur les eaux,
territoriales ottomanes.

V .— Commission de Délimitation.

A r t ic l e 17.

Les deux Gouvernements sont d ’ accord pour nom m er, dans le plus bref délai,
des commissaires qui auront à appliquer sur le terrain les limites établies par les
articles 5, 7 et 10(6) de cette convention en en dressant un plan détaillé et un procès-
verbal explicatif. Le plan et le procès-verbal susénoncés, une fois dûment dressés
et signés par les commissaires respectifs, seront considérés com m e partie intégrante
de la présente convention.

A r t ic l e 18.

L a présente convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification en seront

échangés à Londres aussitôt que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans un délai de
trois mois.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présent convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 29 juillet, 1913.
[L.S.]| E . GREY.
[ L .S .] I. H A K K Y .

A nnexe I.
A greem ent of January 23, 1899, with Sheikh of K ow eit.( 7)
(Translation.)
P ra ise be to G od alone (lit. in the nam e o f G od A lm ig h ty ) ( “ Bissim Illah T a ’ alah S hanuho ” ).
The object o f writing this lawful and honourable bond is, that it is hereby
covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S .C .,
H er Britannic M ajesty’ s Political Resident, on behalf o f the British Governm ent,
on the one part, and Sheikh M ubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the
other p art; that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, o f his own free will
and desire, does hereby pledge and bind him self, his heirs and successors, not to
receive the agent or representative o f any Power or Government at Koweit, or at
any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of
the British Governm ent; and he further binds him self, his heirs and successors,
not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose,
any portion of his territory to the Governm ent or subjects o f any other Power without
the previous consent o f H er M ajesty’ s Government for these purposes. This engage-

(6) [I n the sign ed cop y o f this a greem ent, 10 has been a ltered to 11. The correction is
in itia lle d “ E. G. I. H .” ]
( 7) [cp. su p ra , p. 107, N o. 68, encl. 3, and n o te (5).]
 195

raent also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak which
may now be in possession of the subjects o f any other Governm ent.
In token o f the conclusion o f this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant­
Colonel M alcolm John Meade, I .S .C ., H er Britannic M ajesty’ s Political Besident in
the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh M ubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the form er on behalf of
the British Governm ent, and the latter on behalf o f him self, his heirs and successors,
do each, in the presence o f witnesses, affix their signatures, on this the 10th day o f
Ramazan, 1316, corresponding with the 23rd day of January, 1899.

(L .S .) M. J. M E A D E ,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.
(L .S .) M U B A R A K -E L -S U B A H .
Witnesses :
(L .S .) E. W ic k h a m H ore, Captain, I.M .S .
(L .S .) J. Calcott G a s k in .
(L .S .) M uham m ad R a h im - b in - A b d u l N e b i Saffer.

A nnexe II.

A greem en t hy Sheikh M ubarek-bin-Subah, C hief of K ow eit.(8)

(Translation.)
I agree to absolutely prohibit the importation o f arms into Koweit or exportation
therefrom, and to enforce this I have issued a notification and proclam ation to all
concerned.
Dated this 24th day of M oharrum , .1318 (24th day of M ay, 1900).
(Seal o f Sheikh M ubarek-el-Subah.)

A nnexe I II.

Postal A greem ent o f February 28, 1904, with the Sheikh of K o w e it.(*)

(Translation.)
As the British Governm ent has agreed, in accordance with m y desire and for
the benefit of traders, to establish a post-office at Koweit, I, on m y part, agree not
to allow the establishment here of a post-office by any other G overnm ent. I
accordingly write this undertaking on behalf o f m yself and m y successors.
(Seal of Sheikh M ubarek-el-Subah.)
K ow eit, the 11th Zil Haj, 1321
(February 28, 1904).

A nnexe IV .

Sir Edward G rey to Tewfik Pasha.(8)

Your H ighness, Foreign Office, October 24, 1911.
In com pliance with the request which, under instructions from your G overnm ent,
you were good enough to make to me on the 16th ultimo, (9) I have the honour to
transmit to you herewith copies o f the agreements concluded by His M ajesty’ s
Government with the Trucial chiefs o f Oman and the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit,
to which reference is made in the m emorandum communicated to your H ighness on
the 29th July la st.(10)

( 8) [cp. supra, p. 108, N o. 68, encl. 3, and n otes ( 6), ( 7) and ( 8).]
( 9) \cp. supra, p. 108, No. 68, e n d . 3, n ote ( 9).]
( 10) [ cp . supra, p. 108, N o. 68, encl. 3, n o te ( 10).]
[10900] O 2
 W ith respect to these agreements His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have the following
observations to make :—
As regards No. 1, His M ajesty’ s Government have inform ed the Sheikh of
Koweit that so long as he and his heirs and successors act up to their obligations
under the agreement, His M ajesty’ s Government undertake to support them and
accord them their good offices. His M ajesty’ s Government reserve to themselves the
right to interpret that term at their discretion.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent hold, m oreover, a lease of land from the Sheikh of
KowTeit.
As regards No. 4, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent take occasion to remind the Sublime
Porte that British rights in the Persian Gulf and on the coast rest not merely on the
agreements concluded, and transmitted herewith to the Ottoman Governm ent, but
on the custom, consent, and long-established relations between the local chiefs and
the Government of India.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent hope that in the communication of these agreements,
together with the supplementary declarations which are hereby brought to the notice
of the Ottoman Governm ent, the Sublime Porte will see proof of His M ajesty’ s
G overnm ent’ s goodwill and desire to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations set
forth in their above-mentioned m emorandum.
I have. &c.
E. GEEY.
Déclaration secrete.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an declare reconnaître que la phrase “ affaires

de Koueit ” comprend aussi bien les questions intérieures qu’ extérieures, mais qu ’ en
aucun cas le cheikh ne pourra conclure de traité contraire à la présente convention.
L e Gouvernement Impérial ottom an déclare qu’ à l ’occasion de la signature d ’ une
convention turco-britannique sur le Golfe Persique et les territoires environnants,
fixant les limites du kaza autonome de Koueit et du territoire indépendant d ’ El-K atr,
il a donné à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour que les fonctionnaires civils
et militaires ainsi que les troupes d ’ armée régulière ou de gendarmerie se trouvant
dans les limites assignées à ces deux territoires aient à les quitter dans le plus bref
délai.
L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique prend acte de la décision du
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman de donner une somme de £ st. 1,000 au cheikh de
Bahreine en compensation de sa renonciation à toute réclamation sur l ’ île de
Zahnounié, située à proximité du littoral ottoman du Nedjd et appartenant audit
sandjak, et offre ses bons offices pour remettre cette somme au cheikh contre une
renonciation écrite qu’ il fera parvenir au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.
En foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé la présente
Déclaration.

Fait en double exemplaire à Londres, le 29 juillet, 1913.

E. G E E Y .
I. H A K K Y .
( 0 .)

Déclaration.f11)

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n ’ a pas manqué d ’ examiner avec

attention les différentes demandes formulées par la Sublime Porte à certaines
époques et, en dernier lieu au cours des négociations qui eurent lieu à Londres, pour
le règlement des questions pendantes entre les deux pays. Le soussigné, Principal
Secrétaire d ’ Etat de Sa Majesté britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, vient, par
( n ) [T he t e x t o f this d ecla ra tion has been taken from the orig in a l w hich is preserved in the
F oreig n Office series of O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey No. 86).]
 197
la présente, com m uniquer à l ’ Ambassade Im périale de Turquie les décisions auxquelles
son Gouvernement s ’ est arrêté sur les cinq points formant l ’objet de ces demandes :—
(i.) Le Gouvernement britannique donne son consentement à la nouvelle
majoration proposée des droits d ’ entrée en Turquie, qui seront ainsi
portés à 15 pour cent ad valorem sans limitation de temps. L a nouvelle
m ajoration ne pourra être appliquée aux marchandises anglaises que si
elle l ’ est également à tous les produits étrangers, et elle n ’ entrera en
vigueur que six mois après sa notification officielle.
(ii.) Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare consentir à la co n v e r­
sion éventuelle des 15 pour cent ad valorem en un tarif de droits spécifiques
aux conditions suivantes :—
(a.) Ledit tarif sera élaboré de com m un accord.
(6.) Il n ’ entrera en vigueur qu’ après un délai raisonnable, pas m oins d ’ un
an après sa promulgation.
(c.) Il ne pourra, non plus que les 15 pour cent ad valorem , être changé
ou modifié sans qu ’ un accord intervienne à ce sujet entre les deux
Gouvernements.

(iii.) L ’ application du “ témettu ” aux sujets britanniques ayant fait l ’ objet d ’ une
correspondance entre la Sublime Porte et l ’ Ambassade de Sa Majesté
britannique à Constantinople, le soussigné déclare que le Gouvernement
de Sa Majesté britannique consent à ladite application, sous réserve des
conditions déjà posées.
(iv.) Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique déclare qu ’ il n ’ a pas d ’objection
de principe à l ’ abolition de ses bureaux postaux en Turquie à la condition
que cette mesure s ’ éte n d e , à tous les bureaux étrangers, et qu’ il ait
l ’ assurance que l ’ administration postale ottomane oifre pour la transmis­
sion des correspondances les garanties requises de sécurité et de célérité.
E n attendant que l ’ abolition desdits bureaux puisse se réaliser, le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n ’ a pas d ’ objection à l ’ emploi,
dans ses bureaux en Turquie, de timbres-poste ottom ans. Cette mesure
exigerait, cependant, l ’ établissement d ’ une surcharge et certaines
réglementations d ’ ordre technique. Le Gouvernement de Sa 'Majesté
britannique est donc prêt à entamer des négociations à ce sujet, si les
autres États ayant des bureaux de poste en Turquie conviennent
d ’ étudier ce changem ent de système.
(v.) E n attendant l ’introduction de réform es dans l ’ administration judiciaire
ottom ane, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique estime que le
moment n ’ est pas venu d ’ envisager la suppression des capitulations.
Toutefois, dans le cas où les autres Puissances se mettraient d ’ accord sur
une telle procédure, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique serait
prêt à désigner des représentants en vue de déterminer jusqu’ à quel point
le régime actuel des capitulations est susceptible d ’ amélioration.

Fait à Londres, le 29 juillet, 1913.

E. GEEY.

(7.)

Sir Edward G rey to Tewfik Pasha.( 12)

Your H ighness :— Foreign Office, July 29, 1913.
As you are aware, I have to-day signed a note respecting the assent, on stated
conditions, o f H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent to the increase of the Turkish customs
duties and certain other concessions.
( 12) [A co p y o f this d ocu m en t is preserved in th e F o re ig n Office series o f O rig in a l T rea ties
(T u rk ey N o. 8 6 ) ; th ere is a d r a ft in F.O . 3 4 7 8 0 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 .]
 198
In order to preclude all misunderstanding, I think it well to recall to Your
Highness that the arrangements indicated in the above note are dependent upon the
issue of the Imperial firman respecting the borrowing powers o f E gypt and the
signature o f the draft convention relating to railways in Asiatic Turkey,— an instru­
ment which cannot be completed pending the conclusion of the necessary negotiations
between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Bailwav Company.
In addition to this matter, His M ajesty’ s Government attach very great
importance, as has already been explained, to a satisfactory arrangement in regard
to the Mesopotamian oil concession ; they feel confident that the ■Ottoman Govern­
ment will use their best endeavours to secure such a settlement.
F inally, I would suggest to Your Highness that for the present the signature of
the various agreements should be treated as confidential.(13)
[ I have, & c.]
E . G [B E Y .]

(8 .)

Teivftk Pasha to Sir Edward G r ey .(li)

Ambassade Im périale ottom ane, Londres,

Excellence, U 29 juillet, 1913.
En réponse à la note que votre Excellence m ’ a fait l ’ honneur de m ’ a.dresser pour
form uler certaines réserves au sujet de la Note qu’ Elle a signée en date d ’ aujourd’ hui
relativement à la majoration douanière et autres concessions, je m ’ empresse de faire
parvenir, ci-inclus, à votre Excellence la déclaration que m ’a remise son Altesse
Hakky Pacha que le Gouvernement Impérial avait spécialement chargé de négocier
avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.
J ’ ai, &c.
T E V F IK .

Déclaration.
Au moment de signer les conventions relatives au Golfe Persique et les Territoires
environnants et au Chatt-el-Arab, et la Déclaration relative à une concession de
navigation fluviale sur le Tigre et l ’ Euphrate, le soussigné constate que ces instru­
ments n ’ entreront pas en vigueur tant que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique
maintiendra les réserves, formulées par Son Excellence .S ir Edward Grey dans sa
note du 29 Juillet 1913, relative à la Déclaration dudit Gouvernement en date de ce
jour.
L ’ exécution des susdits instruments aura lieu du moment que le Gouvernement
de Sa Ylajesté britannique sera en mesure de retirer les réserves spécifiées dans
ladite note.
I. H AK K Y .
Londres, le 29 Juillet, 1913.

( 13) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. P a rk er : “ S ir L. M a llet.— As the R a ilw a y s C on v en tion cannot

be sign ed by H a k k i P asha on J u ly 29th, I th in k a n ote like this should b e handed to him at
th e tim e o f sign atu re fo r the T urkish Am bassador. I f the d r a ft cou ld be a p p rov ed by M onday
m orn in g I w ould then send it back t o H a k k i P asha in d r a ft form . I have a lread y spoken
to him a bout it. A. P a r k e r.” T his n ote is in itia lled “ L. M ., A. N., E. G .” ]
(ll) [T h e signed tex ts of Tewfik P a s h a ’ s letter and o f th e enclosed d ecla ra tion .are preserved
in the F oreig n Office series o f O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 86). T here are cop ies in
F.O . 3 5 0 6 5 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 .]
 199

C H A P TE R XCIII.
THE BAGDAD R A IL W A Y , A U G U ST TO DECEM BER,
1913.

No. 125.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. Marling. O

F.O. 3 5 2 6 6 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 366.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1913, 12-55 p . m .
I am fully aware that we shall have to obtain the consent of the Powers concerned
to articles 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Shatt-el-Arab Convention, and it was precisely with this
object that I com m unicated to Russian, German, and French G ov [ern m en ]ts the text
of the Convention when initialled.(2) I even com m unicated a draft to the Russian
G ov [ern m en ]t a year ago, and they raised no objection then.(3) I am negotiating
with the German G ov [ern m en ]t on this matter, and I do not expect any insuperable
difficulty from either the German or the French s id e ; and, as Russian com m erce is
so small and as the arrangements we propose are designed equally in the interests of
all nations, I trust Russian objections may be met or overcom e. But if they persist
in appointment of Russian subjects to administrative posts on Commission the whole
thing will, owing to Turkish objections, fall to the ground,whereas the proposal
contained in the last paragraph of Sir G. B uchanan’ s telegram No.280(4) would, if
adopted, render the conduct of the necessary works financially impracticable.
You should urge upon your Russian colleague such of the above considerations,
and of those contained in m y telegram No. 558(5) to St. Petersburg, as you properly
can, as it is most important to overcome such objections as we cannot admit, and
Russian Ambassador at Constantinople appears to be the source of Russian objections.

t1) [T h is teleg ra m w as rep eated to St. P etersb u rg h (N o. 563). C op ies w ere sent to
the In d ia O ffice; to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p era tion s.]
( 2) [t>. supra, p. 109, N o. 68, encl. 4, n o te ( l l )-]
(3) [cp. sup ra , p. 76, N o. 55, n o te 0 ) . ]
(4) [t>. supra, pp. 180-1, N o. 120.]
( 5) [ v . supra, p. 181, N o. 121.]

No. 126.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.C)

F.O. 3 5 2 6 6 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 564.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1913, 2 p . m .
My tel[eg ra m ] No. 558(2) : Shatt-el-Arab.
You should make such use as you can of the following arguments in your
representations to Russian M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs].
B y article 1 of convention Turkey admits, as she has never done hitherto, that
the whole Shatt-el-Arab is open to all ships, even up to Kurna.
H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] have supported Russia energetically and
successfully in regard to northern part of Turco-Persian frontier, and they have even
gone so far as to intimate to Hakki Pasha that the acceptance of Russian proposals

i 1) [T h is teleg ram was rep eated to C on sta n tin op le (N o. 367). A co p y w as sent to the
Board o f T ra d e.]
(2) [u. supra, p. 181, N o. 121.]
 200
of last year was virtually a condition of British assent to the Turkish customs increase.
I have reason to believe that this intimation was a decisive factor in bringing about
Turkish acceptance.
In view of these and other considerations already explained I feel confident that
Russian M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A[fEairs] will not oppose our convention respecting
Shatt-el-Arab or insist upon claim for admission of Russians to posts under
commission.

No. 127.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. Marling.(*)

F.O. 35266/1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 372.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1913.
M y telegram No. 366 of 1st A ugust(2) : Riverain Commission.
Articles 7 and 8 were drafted by Hakki Pasha and Mr. Malkin with the intention
that any privileges conferred by the Capitulations should continue to be enjoyed under
them. Under article 7, if a foreigner were fined and did not pay, he would be tried,
as in a municipal court, with a dragoman present, or whatever the ordinary procedure
in municipal courts is.
In what respect do you consider that these articles violate capitulatory rights?

O [T h e t e x t g iven above is ta ken from th e cop y in the C onfid en tial P r in t, as the orig in a l
d r a ft ca n n ot be tra ced . T he teleg ram was rep eated to St. P etersb u rg h (N o. 570).]
(2) [a. supra, p. 199, N o. 125.]

No. 128.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Greyffi)

St. Petersburgh, August 3, 1913.

F.O. 3 58 4 1 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4. O. 2 -5 6 p . m .
Tel. (No. 286.) R. 6 p . m .
Shatt-el-Arab : Riverain Commission.
I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs three days ago aide-m ém oire
em bodying your telegram No, 558 o f July 2 8,( 2) and I yesterday spoke to him in the
sense of your telegram No. 564 of A u g[u st] l . ( 3)
H is E xcellency received m y remarks in a very friendly spirit, but said he must
examine question more closely, as he personally knew very little about it. I pressed
him to give an answer as soon as possible.

0 ) [T his teleg ram was sent to C on stan tin op le (as N o. 381). C opies w ere sent to the
In d ia O ffice; to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O peration s.]
(2) [v. supra, p. 181, N o. 121.]
( 3) [v. supra, pp. 199-200, No. 126.]
 201

N o. 129.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

Constantinople, August 6, 1913.

F.O. 3 63727150 6 3 /1 3 /4 4. IX 9 p . m .
Tel. (No. 393.) Confidential. R. 11 p . m .
Your telegrams Nos. 348 of July 2 4 (2) and 372 of A u g[u st] 2 (3) : Shatt-el-Arab
Convention.
I have had three inconclusive conversations with Russian Ambassador, who
seemed to know little about the observations of his Governm ent, and I suspect that
they were inspired privately by M. Minorsky. Finally his E xcellency sent Minorsky
to me this m orning to explain his views. H e said that Russian Embassy had pointed
out to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that convention would form ally m odify in
favour of Great Britain political status at head of Persian Gulf, while final declaration
concerning Sheikh of Moham m erah was not far short of recognition of sheikh’ s
independence of Persia. Sheikh’ s territory was, m oreover, in neutral zone in Persia.
Embassy had not recomm ended that objections should be raised to convention, but
had m erely pointed out that, if Russia agreed to it, she would be entitled, if the
occasion arose, to claim similar complaisance on our part.
As regards substance of convention, he said that now that it was understood that
convention would be applied without derogation to Capitulations Russian Embassy
had no objections to make, but embassy had insisted, with Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, on desirability of having Russian subject appointed to com m ission in
some technical capacity. I said you could not agree to this, as it would lead to inter­
nationalisation of the commission. M. Minorsky said it could be arranged by an
exchange of secret notes, and agreement need not com e into force imm ediately.
Point raised in last section of your telegram No. 372 being too com plicated to be
dealt with by telegraph, I sent a despatch by post yesterday. It should reach you
on 8th August. (4)

0 ) [T h is teleg ram was sent t o St. P etersb u rg h (as N o. 577).]

( 2) [S ir E. G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 348) o f J u ly 24, 1913, is not rep rod u ced . I t re fe rre d to
his com m u n ica tion of J u n e 19, 1913, to C ou n t B en ck en d orff (v. supra, pp. 159-60, No. 103).
Mr. M a rlin g w as u rg e d t o use such a rgum ents as he cou ld in su p p ort o f the B r itish view as
the R u ssia n o b jection s w ou ld rouse “ g re a t in con v en ien ce and delay the w hole settlem en t.”
The telegram was rep eated to T ehra n (N o. 3 2 4 ); to St. P etersb u rg h (N o. 553). (F .O . 33991/
2 6 1 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
( 3) [u. sup ra , p. 200, N o. 127.]
('*) [M r. M a r lin g ’ s despatch (N o. 701), D . A u g u st 4, R . A u g u st 18, 1913, is not rep rod u ced
as it is tech n ica l in cha ra cter. I t deals v ery fu lly w ith the ca p itu la to ry aspects o f th e proposed
S h a tt-cl-A rab C onven tion . (F .O . 3 8 0 5 3 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]

No. 130.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r cy .(l)

St. Petersburgh, August 7, 1913.
F.O. 3 65 4 1 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4. D. 8 p . m .
Tel. (No. 289.) R. 10 p . m .
My telegram No. 286 of A u g[u st] 3 (2) : Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.
Aide-m ém oire from M inistry for Foreign Affairs states that, in view of explana­
tions given, Imperial Government raise no objection to participation of His M ajesty’ s

0 ) [T h is teleg ram was sent to C on stan tin op le (as N o. 386). C op ies w ere sen t to the
India O ffice; t o the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s ; to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [ v. supra, p. 200, N o. 128 ]
 202

Governm ent on commission, and would only like to have right to recomm end R ussian'
subjects for some of the responsible posts in Administration should subjects of any of
the other Powers be em ployed on it.
Imperial Government note writh satisfaction statement that Anglo-Turkish
Convention guarantees equality of treatment to ships of all nations, but would like to
know what is meant by phrase ‘ ‘ no dues will be imposed by mere fact of navigation,
but m erely for services rendered.”
Imperial Government raise no objection to imposition of dues prescribed by
convention in conform ity with stipulations of the said convention, and will not insist
on freedom from all dues of ships of small tonnage of all nations.

No. 131.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.(')

F.O. 3 63 7 2 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 1.
Tel. (No. 579.) Foreign Office, August 8, 1913, 4 p . m .
You should inform Russian M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] of substance of
Mr. M arling’ s telegram No. 393,(2) om itting first sentence. You should add that I
cannot accept reasoning advanced by M. Minorski, since, so far from situation on
Shatt-el-Arab being modified in our favour, we are actually surrendering to Turkey
participation in conservancy rights which we have hitherto exercised alone for a very
long time. It seems to me that M. Minorski is inclined to overrate the importance of
this matter altog eth er: the duties of the Commission are limited to a small
geographical area and are strictly defined so as to ensure equality of treatment for
ships of all nations, and, as the Sheikh of Mohammerah has certain de facto interests
on the river (of which the whole waterw’ay is Turkish) it seems absolutely necessary
to provide for them in such a way as is done in the declaration annexed to the con ­
vention, but if the Russian Government prefer we need not publish the declaration
about Mohammerah.
I do not think it can be urged that our action would form ally m odify the political
status at the head of the Persian Gulf in our favour, since, far from making any claim
to treat Mesopotamia as a British sphere, we are giving up all claim to control over
any part of the Bagdad Railway. Such being the case, the only wray in which wre can
now safeguard our great interests in Mesopotamia is by making without delay (and
before the com pletion of the Bagdad Railway which is now7 inevitable) a settlement
recognising our de facto position in the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab.
I regard it as quite impracticable to obtain admission of Russian subject in some
technical capacity on the Commission : even Germany, whose shipping is six times as
great as that of Russia, has not made such a claim, and it would be impossible to
overcom e Turkish objections; but I will endeavour to meet Russian wishes by
arranging that consuls shall have right of addressing representations and advice
direct to the Commission on all matters affecting foreign shipping.
Following arguments are for your guidance and for such use as you can
advantageously make of them. As we are not securing any control over the" Bagdad
Railway, which is to traverse a region where British commercial interests have long
been paramount, public opinion will not be satisfied unless we obtain recognition of
the status quo in the Shatt-el-Arab and Persian Gulf, and on latter point please refer

(*) [T h is teleg ram was rep eated to C on stan tin op le (N o. 388). A paraph ra se was sent to
the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
( 2) [-u. supra, p. 201, N o. 129.]
 203
to my published despatch of August 29, 1907,(3) to Sir A. Nicolson. I consider it very
important that it should be seen that Russian G ov [ern m en ]t is at one with us in a
matter so greatly affecting our interests, and I earnestly trust that they will express
their concurrence at an early date. I am anxious to avoid admitting contention of
Russian Embassy at Constantinople that if Russia agrees to this arrangement it will
entitle her to ‘ ‘ similar complaisance on our part ’ ’ in other regions. It would be as
well however to avoid anything which might lead to an argument on this subject and
confine yourself to pointing out the self-denying character of our agreement.

(*) [r . G ooch d T em p erley, V ol. I V , pp. 501-2, N o. 455.]

No. 132.

Sir Edward, G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.^)

F.O. 3 65 4 1 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 583.) Foreign Office, August 9, 1913, 1 p . m .
Your telegram No. 289.( 2)
Please convey m y thanks to M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs ]. In view of
Russian reply I leave it to your discretion how far you act upon m y telegram No. 579
of yesterday.(3) It will perhaps be better to say nothing.
The phrase “ no dues will be imposed by mere fact of navigation but m erely for
services rendered ” is intended to limit amount of dues to actual disbursements of
Commission upon such works as dredging, buoying, lighting, landing facilities, and
administrative expenditure, but to preclude any toll consequent upon mere navigation
of the river and in excess o f expenditure actually incurred by and upon Commission.
Our wish was to guard against any attempt on the part of Turkey to impose dues in
excess of such expenditure, thereby securing a fresh source of revenue to the
detriment of foreign shipping.
W ith regard to first paragraph of your telegram, if by “ other Powers ” is meant
“ Powers other than Great Britain ” there is no objection so far as H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] are con cerned; but you need not m ention this unless M [inister for]
F [o re ig n ] A [flairs] recurs to the point.

O [T h is teleg ram was rep eated t o C on sta n tin op le (N o. 391).]

( 2) [r . supra, pp. 201-2, N o. 130.]
(3) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 133.

Convention concernant les Chem ins de fe r en Turquie d ’ A s ie .i1)

August 12, 1913.

Sa Majesté le R oi du Royaum e-U ni de la Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre p art;
Désireux tous deux d ’ écarter toute condition pouvant donner lieu à l ’ avenir à des
différends entre eux en ce qui concerne le transport des marchandises par les chemins
de fer en Turquie d ’ Asie,

0 ) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is th a t of the d r a ft preserved in th e F oreig n Office series o f

O rigin a l T rea ties (T u rk ey No. 94). T here is a co p y in F.O . 3 7 3 2 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . C op ies w ere
sent to H a k k i P a s h a ; to the In d ia O ffice; to th e B oa rd of T r a d e ; to P a ris (as N o. 504) on
A u gu st 13, 1913. T he ea rlier d ra ft, also in itia lled ad re fer en d u m , is giv en supra, pp . 101-3,
No. 68, encl. 2. A rticles 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, and the D ecla ra tion v a ry in w ord in g in the tw o v ersion s.]
 204

Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Eoi de la Grande-Bretagne, Em pereur des Indes :

Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans :—

Lesquels, s’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

A r t ic le 1.
L e Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du
chemin de fer de Bagdad applique à toutes les marchandises d ’ une catégorie identique
qui pourront lui être présentées en vue d ’ être transportées par chemin de fer, entre
les mêmes stations et dans les mêmes conditions, un régime parfaitement égal, tant
pour le tarif en vigueur qui leur sera imposé que pour les facilités dont elles jouiront,
quels que soient respectivement :

(a) Le pays d ’ origine des marchandises importées dans l ’ Em pire ottoman ;

(b) L e pays de destination des marchandises exportées de l ’ Em pire ottom an;
(c) Les pays d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises en transit par l ’ Empire
ottoman ; et
(d) L e pavillon et l ’ armateur des bâtiments sur lesquels les marchandises seront
importées ou exportées par les ports ottomans.

A r t ic le 2.
L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du
chem in de fer de Bagdad ne conclue avec une société de navigation ou avec un
armateur dont les bâtiments desservent un ou plusieurs ports, soit maritimes, soit
fluviaux, de son réseau, d ’ arrangement particulier relatif à certaines catégories de
marchandises importées ou exportées par ces ports sans que cet arrangement soit de
plein droit applicable, dans les mêmes conditions, à toute autre société de navigation
ou à tout autre armateur dont les bâtiments importent ou exportent des marchandises
de la m ême catégorie par les mêmes ports. Il est toutefois entendu que cet article ne
porte nullement atteinte aux droits concédés par l ’ article 9 de la convention du 5 mars,
1903,( 2) relative à l ’ importation de matériaux destinés à la construction du chemin de
fer de Bagdad.

A r t ic le 3.
Aux fins de la présente convention la phrase “ les mêmes conditions ” signifie les
mêmes conditions de poids, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande, petite ou autre), la
m ême catégorie de marchandises, et les mêmes stations de départ et d ’ arrivée.

A r t ic le 4.
Dans le cas où le com m erce britannique serait soumis, sur quelqu’ un des chemins
de fer auxquels s’ applique la présente convention, à un régime d ’ exception en quelque
relation non spécifiée par les articles précédents, telle, par exemple, que l ’insuffisance
des facilités accordées en matière de transport com m un ou la pose des conditions
spéciales au transport effectué par une voie déterminée, le Gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique se réserve le droit de faire à ce sujet des représentations auprès
du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, qui prendra les dispositions nécessaires pour
rem édier au grief.

( 2) [v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, p. 837.]

 205

A rticle 5.
Les dispositions de la présente convention ne s ’ appliquent ni au transport des
militaires, des marins ou des fonctionnaires ottomans, ni à celui des munitions
militaires, navales ou civiles pour le com pte du Gouvernement Im périal ottom an, ni
aux transports afférents aux services publics de l ’ État ottom an, ni au transport du
matériel et des matériaux destinés à la construction ou à l ’ exploitation des travaux
publics existants ou à créer dans l ’ Em pire ottoman.

A r t ic le 6.
Aucune disposition de la présente convention ne sera interprétée com m e une
défense de l ’ établissement d ’ une distinction entre les tarifs à appliquer
respectivement :
(a) Au trafic local.
(b) Au trafic d ’ importation.
(c) Au trafic d ’ exportation.
(d) Au trafic de transit.
A r t ic le 7.
Les dispositions de la présente convention s’ étendront, dans la mesure où elles
y sont applicables, au régime appliqué par la société du chemin de fer au transport
des voyageurs entrant dans l ’ Em pire ottom an, le quittant ou traversant son territoire,
et de leur bagage. Toutefois, elles ne s ’ appliqueront pas au transport des ém igrés et
des indigents et de leur bagage.
Aux fins du présent article, le terme “ ém igrés ” se rapporte aux personnes venues
s’ établir dans les limites de l ’ Em pire ottom an qui sont transportées par les soins de la
commission des émigrés.
A r t ic le 8.
L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s ’ engage à veiller à ce que les dispositions
des articles précédents soient appliquées à tout chemin de fer (soit actuellement
existant, soit à construire à l ’ avenir) en Turquie d ’ Asie qui se raccorderait avec le
chemin de fer de Bagdad.
A r t ic le 9.
L e Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ engage à veiller à ce que la société du
chemin de fer de Bagdad admette à son conseil d ’ administration deux m embres de
nationalité britannique. Avant la nom ination de ces membres, le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman prendra les dispositions nécessaires pour s ’ assurer qu ’ elle a
l’ agrément du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Dans le cas où, en vertu
d’ un arrangement quelconque, le tronçon B agdad-B asra serait construit par une autre
société, les dispositions du présent article s’ appliqueront égalem ent à celle-ci.

A r t ic le 10 .
Aucun prolongem ent de voie ferrée au delà de Basra vers la mer ne pourra avoir
lieu qu’ après accord préalable entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le
Gouvernement Impérial ottom an et dans les conditions agréées par eux.

A r t ic le 11.
E n cas de contestation au sujet de l ’ interprétation ou de la mise à exécution de
la présente convention, la question en litige, à moins d ’ être réglée dans un délai de
trois m ois à la satisfaction des deux Gouvernements, sera déférée, sur la demande
de l ’ un ou de l ’ autre Gouvernement, au jugem ent du tribunal international d ’ arbitrage
de La H aye.
 206

A r t ic l e 12.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront échangées aussitôt

que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans un délai de trois mois.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le ,1 9 1 3 .
Parafée ad referendum ,
Londres, le 12 août, 1913.
I. H . A. P.

Déclaration.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman déclare que la Société du Chemin de fer de

Bagdad a renoncé à tous les droits qui découlent pour elle des conventions existantes
en ce qui concerne le prolongement de la ligne de Bagdad au delà de Basra, ainsi
qu ’ au droit d ’ établir un terminus maritime sur le littoral du Golfe Persique.
Fait à Londres, le , 1913.
Parafée ad referendum ,
Londres, le 12 août, 1913.
I. II. A. P.

[E D . N O T E .— A d r a ft concession fo r th e n a v ig a tion o f the T ig ris and E u p h ra tes R iv ers

was in itia lled by H a k k i P asha and L o rd In ch cap e on A u g u st 12, 1913. (F.O . 3 7 3 2 2 /6 4 6 3 /
1 3 /4 4 .) The final te x t is g iv en infra, pp. 283-298, N o. 188.]

No. 134.

Minute by Mr. P arker.(*)

F.O. 377 6 6 /6 4 63 /1 3 44. London, August 13, 1913.
In pursuance o f the annexed m in ute/2) I arranged for Herr von Kuehlmann to
meet Hakki Pasha at the F [o re ig n ] 0 [ffic e ] to-day,(3) and Hakki Pasha urged upon
him that Herr von Gwinner should be pressed to com e to London at an early date
in order to come to terms with him about the final section of the Bagdad Bailway
and about the terminus being at Bussorah. Herr von Kuehlmann said that he would
write at once to this effect.
Hakki Pasha then suggested (and I had not been aware previously that he was
going to do so) that it might be very advantageous for him to have a discussion with
Herr Gwinner in order to see if the conflicting French and German claims could not
be reconciled, as none of the agreements could becom e operative until they were.
H err von Kuehlmann agreed, and asked if it was Hakki Pasha’ s wish that someone
on behalf of France should be asked to come to London also. Hakki Pasha said he
thought it would be premature to do this until he had had a discussion with Herr
Gwinner.

( ' ) [C op ies o f this M in u te w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the Jndia O ffice.]

( 2) [N o t rep rod u ced . In this m inu te, da ted A u g u st 12, M r. P a r k e r rep orted H a k k i P ash a ’ s
wish to m eet H err von K iihlm a nn, and ultim a tely H err von G w inner, to discuss the B agdad
R a ilw a y q u estion .]
(3)'[c p . G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 2 2 5 -7 .]
 207

I said 1 knew Sir E . G rey’ s view was that it would be preferable if France and
Germany could com e to a direct understanding, and that we did not wish to offer,
far less to press, our mediation if the two countries could com e to a direct agreement,
but we were anxious that such an agreement should be come to in order that our
agreements should com e into force.
A. P [A R K E R ].
August 13, 1913.

No. 135.

Communication to M. de Fleuriau.( ‘ )

F.O . 3 19 4 8 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 14, 1913.

His M ajesty’ s Government have given their close attention to the note, com m uni­
cated by the French Ambassador on the 9th J u ly,(2) concerning the negotiations which
have recently been proceeding at Paris in regard to the respective interests of France
and Germany in the financial, econom ic, and railway development of Asiatic Turkey :
they have also had under most careful consideration the private letter, addressed
on the same date by M. Cambon to Sir A. N icolson,(2) concerning the agreement
which, it is pointed out, has existed in principle for some years between His M ajesty’ s
Government and the French Governm ent to treat the Bagdad Railway question
together, and accordingly suggesting that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent should now
indicate clearly to the German Governm ent the understanding which has consistently
been maintained between the French Governm ent and His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
regarding their respective interests in Asiatic Turkey.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have welcomed this full expression o f views, as likely
to lead to a better appreciation o f the French standpoint, and therefore to contribute
to a desirable settlem ent; they attach great importance to acting in continued agree­
ment with the French Governm ent, and they therefore wish to place their views
with corresponding frankness before them.
The agreement which is now the subject o f negotiation between Great Britain
and Germ any does not provide for any measure o f British control over, or indeed
of British participation in, the Bagdad Railway as a whole or the B agdad-B asra
sections in particular. Apart, indeed, from stipulations (i) that the terminus of the
line shall be at Basra— the natural port for a com m ercial railway in M esopotamia,
(ii) that differential treatment on the railway shall be excluded, and (iii) that two
British directors shall be admitted to the board of the railway in order to assist
in securing point (ii), the draft agreement represents, on the contrary, the virtual
abandonment o f any British claim either to control or to participate in any portion
of the Bagdad Railway.
W hile, therefore, as has already been explained, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent are
desirous of acting in agreement with the French Governm ent, and while, m oreover,
they feel that no settlement regarding the econom ic development of Turkey could be
complete or satisfactory if it lacked French support, they consider that the self-
denying agreement under negotiation with Germany respecting the Bagdad Railway
hardly runs counter to any previous understanding between Great Britain and France.
Such an understanding, in the view of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, amounted
to an arrangement, firstly, that neither France, Great Britain, or Russia should
participate in the Bagdad Railway without preliminary agreement amongst them selves,
and, secondly, that none o f the three Powers should assent to the Turkish customs

O') [C op ies of this com m u n ica tion w ere sent t o the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office. F or
I b rie f sum m ary, rp. D D . F . . 3me S\er., V ol. VITT, p. 55, N o. 49, n otes 0 ) and (2).]
(2) \v. sup ra , pp. 169-72, N o. 116, and en cl.]
 208
increase without making the enforcement of that increase conditional upon the
assent o f the other Powers to such a measure in regard to their respective imports
into Turkey.
As regards the second point, an explicit reservation has recently been made to
the Ottoman Government in writing.
It will thus be recognised that the practical effect of the present negotiations,
between Turkey and Great Britain as also between Germany and Great Britain, will
so far be principally negative; and, pending a general adjustment in which France
is largely concerned, any positive and operative result is, to some extent at any rate,
suspended.
His M ajesty’ s Government attach very great importance to their agreements being
carried fully into effect without undue delay— a consummation which is, amongst
other cogent reasons, rendered the more urgent in view of the undoubted ultimate
com pletion of the Bagdad Bailway, and o f the far-reaching influence which that
enterprise is likely to exercise upon British interests in M esopotamia, where British
trade has hitherto been paramount.
Apart altogether, however, from this consideration, His M ajesty’ s Government
are anxious to co-operate, so far as is in their power, in reaching a settlement
satisfactory to France.
It would seem that the position has now becom e, as between France and
Germ any, a much wider one than a mere settlement of the Bagdad Bailway q uestion;
but His M ajesty’s Government have already expressed the hope at Berlin that there
m ay be an agreement with France at the same time as with Great B ritain(3) (and
that such a wish is entertained by the German Governm ent themselves has already
been confidentially intimated to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent), and they have pointed
out how desirable it is in the general interest that all railway questions in Turkey,
as well as the necessary financial settlements, should be decided in principle now.
H is M ajesty’ s Government trust that, in these circum stances, complete agree­
ment m ay be reached by direct negotiation between the French and German
G overnm ents; they are willing, so far as the object in view may be furthered by such
a course, to use their further good offices if necessary to promote this agreement.
In consenting to adopt this attitude in the interests of a general settlement,
and if necessary to delay for a little the final conclusion of their own agreement with
Germ any, His M ajesty’s Governm ent feel confident that the French Government
will, on their part, agree to certain points in which British interests are, either
directly or indirectly, vitally concerned.
T hey would ask :—
(i.) That there should be no differential treatment o f British goods on any
railway, present or future, under French management in Turkey, and
that the French Government should signify their assent to the annexed
draft agreement with Turkey excluding such treatment on all railways
in Asiatic Turkey.(4)
(ii.) That the French Governm ent should agree to lend their support, if
necessary, to the agreements between His M ajesty’ s Government and
Turkey, which were com m unicated confidentially to M . Cambon on the
17th and 18th June, 1913.(5)

One of these is a declaration by the Turkish Government Consenting to the

form ation of an Ottoman com pany, under British control, to carry on the navigation
of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. This arrangement is in reality a compromise, for
His M ajesty’ s Government, by reason of various firmans and special agreements,

( 3) [M a rg in a l n ote b y M r. P a r k e r : “ T h is is cov ered by S ir E. G rey ’ s rem arks to P rin ce

L ichnow sky and by w hat I have said t o H e r r v on K uehlm ann. A. P .” ]
(4) [cp. supra, p. 204, No. 133, A r ticle 1.]
( 5) [v. su p ra, p. 100, No. 68, encl. 1, n o te (4), and p. 109, No. 68, encl. 4, n o te ( n ) ; p. 157,
No. 102.]
 20 9

have for over a century claimed that Great Britain is entitled to exceptional rights
of navigation on these two rivers. In view of the exclusion of Great Britain from
important railway enterprises in Turkey, and in view of her special rights and great
commercial interests in the rivers, Ilis M ajesty’ s Government have felt it to be
indispensable that this arrangement concerning the navigation should be con cluded.(6)
They wish, m oreover, to bring two further points to the attention of the French
G overn m en t: the concession will contain a stringent clause prohibiting all
discrimination in rates and traffic facilities; it may also be necessary to admit the
Bagdad Kailway Company to a very m inor participation in the shares o f the new
navigation com pany, in order that the latter, or some other British interest, may
participate to some extent in the concession held by the form er, under article 23 of
the Convention of March 1903,( 7) for ports at Bagdad and B asra.(8)

(iii.) That, so far as is possible, the conclusion of the Franco-Germ an agreem ent
would [sic : ? should] be hastened.
(iv.) That, if necessary, a com prom ise in regard to certain French claims for
railways, and the assignment of prior guarantees, should not be excluded
from consideration, if, on exam ination, H is M ajesty’s Governm ent should
be able to place before the French Governm ent reasons which appear to
render such a course equitable and expedient.(9)

( 6) [M a r g in a l n ote b y M r. P a r k e r : “ I th in k a g la n ce at th e m ap w ill show th a t w e are

claim in g so little res p ectin g railw ays, in com p a rison to F ra n ce and G erm any, th a t we are
en titled to claim th e n a v ig a tio n on this, a p a rt from oth er grou n d s. A . P .” ]
C ) [v. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 8 4 0 -1 .]
( 8)[M a r g in a l n ote b y M r. P a r k e r : “ I th in k this is a v ery g ood ex p la n a tion to g iv e to
F ra n ce in reg a rd to the G erm an p a rticip a tio n in th e n a vig a tion . A. P . ” ]
( 9) [M a r g in a l note by M r. P a r k e r : “ W e are, I th in k , fu lly e n titled to ask this, as ou r own
agreem ents are all necessarily h eld up p en d in g a F ra n co-G erm a n a greem ent. A. P . ” ]

No. 136.

M inute by Mr. Parker.( x)

F.O. 3 8 3 1 4 /2 0 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 15, 1913.
Hakki Pasha told me to-day that he had good news from Paris. The French
were sending an unofficial financial m ission to Berlin this month to try and come
to terms with the Germans about the respective interests o f France and Germany
in A [sia tic] Turkey.
Djavid B ey had made great progress with the French G ov [ern m en ]t in the
Franco-Turkish negotiations about railways &c.
Djavid Bey and M. Isvolski had had some preliminary conversations o f a
satisfactory nature, and each had asked for full powers to settle Turco-Russian
financial and economic interests.
Hakki Pasha said the last item of news was most satisfactory, and he hoped
it would prevent the Russians from com m itting “ des b êtis es ’ ’ respecting Adrianople.
A. P [A R K E R ].
August 15, 1913.

H . N.
L. M.
E . G.

( ') [A cop y o f this m in u te was sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

P
 210

No. 137.

M inute by M r. Parker.

F.O. 3 87 1 0 /3 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 18, 1918.

M. de Fleuriau called to-day ( ‘ ) with reference to the Bagdad Railway negotiations.
He said that he thought there would be no difficulty on the part of the French
G ov [ern m en ]t respecting point i) on page 2 of the annexed p rin t./2) He also thought
there would be no difficulty with regard to point ii) though he had asked for more
precise instructions from Paris as to this.
As to iii) he hoped we would not hasten the conclusion o f our agreement with
Germ any before the beginning o f October, as the French G ov [ern m en ]t had sent
a mission this week to Berlin to try and reach an agreement with the Germans,
which would possibly include some indirect substitute for a quotation on the Paris
bourse o f the Bagdad Railway bonds. I said that we wanted to be as accommodating
to the French G ov [ern m en ]t as possible in this matter, though we did attach great
importance to a speedy settlement. I said that I did not think it very probable that
anything would be signed before the end of September, but that it was hoped very
soon that we should be able to initial something with Germany. M. de Fleuriau
then pressed that we should defer doing even this until it was known what result
the French mission to Berlin had. I said that I thought we might defer initialling
till September 1, but that it would be difficult to do so longer. He seemed pleased.
As a matter of fact we should in no circumstances be ready much before September 1.
He then referred to point iv and asked if we had any specific renunciation to
urge upon France. I said that as yet we had none, but we had on ly wished to reserve
the point in case o f necessity.
He then said that Russia had made rather a strong representation at Paris last
week to the effect that no more m oney should be given to Turkey, but he said Djavid
B ey was parcelling out the possessions o f the old Civil List to various wealthy persons
in Paris, and the French G ov [ern m en ]t could not control the financial operations
o f individual Frenchm en, or even o f some financial institutions. Turkey would
continue to get m oney.
I asked him if his personal impression was that Russia would eject the Turks
from Adrianople, and he rep lied : “ If the Turks do not go beyond the Maritza T
think they will not have to withdraw from i t .’ ’
This is interesting, though only a personal o p in io n ; but I think it is worth
while perhaps hinting to Hakki Pasha that the Turks will serve their own best
interests by not crossing the Maritza. but that “ chi troppo abbraccia, nulla strin ge.’ ’
A. P [A R K E R ],
August 18, 1913.

M IN U T E .

T he T urks have a lread y crossed th e M aritsa.

L. M.
H . N.

( ') [F o r M. de F le u r ia u ’ s re p o rt v. D D F ., 3me S er., V ol. V I I I , pp. 5 5-7, N o. 49.]

I2) [r . supra, p. 208, N o. 135.]
 ‘211

N o. 138.

Mémorandum com m unicated by M. de F leu ria u .(l)

F.O . 3 8 5 4 3 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Ambassade de France à Londres, August 19, 1913.

Le mémorandum communiqué le 9 Juilletf2) à Sir Arthur Nicolson par M . Paul
Cambon indiquait quel était à cette époque l ’ état des négociations franco-allem andes
relatives au chemin de fer de Bagdad ; la principale difficulté consistait dans l ’ouver­
ture de la Bourse de Paris aux titres du Bagdad, ouverture que les négociateurs
allemands réclamaient et que le Gouvernement Français se refusait à accorder.
Depuis lors on a cherché à Paris un m oyen de tourner la difficulté et on croit
l ’ avoir trouvé dans la rétrocession au groupe allemand de la Compagnie du Bagdad
de la part du groupe français dans cette même affaire ; c ’ est en effet sur l ’ existence
de cette participation française que les négociateurs allemands basaient leur demande
de la cote de la Bourse de Paris.
Voici quelle est la com binaison proposée :

Le groupe français de la Banque ottom ane détient une participation de 30%

dans l ’ affaire du Bagdad, participation que le groupe allemand avait offert de lui
reprendre, il y a 18 m ois, en désintéressant le groupe français des frais accessoires
qui auraient pu lui incom ber. Les titres représentant la participation française de
30% ont actuellement une valeur d ’ environ 60,000,000 de francs.
E n échange de ces titres, le groupe de la Banque ottom ane prendrait à sa charge
l ’ avance d ’ environ 65,000,000 de francs faite par la Banque allemande au Gouverne­
ment ottom an sur la deuxième tranche de l ’ emprunt ottoman 1911, du montant
nominal de ¿6T. 4,000,000 ; il serait substitué au groupe allemand dans l ’option que
celui-ci possède sur cet emprunt gagé sur les douanes de Constantinople, et il
demanderait ultérieurement à émettre cet emprunt en France.

Cette opération offrirait pour les Allem ands les avantages suivants :

1° Paiement, d ’ une contre-valeur pour les titres du Bagdad que le groupe

allemand était disposé à reprendre sans com pensation, il y a dix-huit
m ois ;
2° Restitution au groupe allemand des actions de la Société de construction,
titres en hausse et susceptibles d ’ une large plus-value;
3° Allègement évalué à environ 10,000,000 de francs procuré au marché
allemand par la reprise d ’ un emprunt ottom an par le marché français.

La combinaison suggérée ne peut être réalisée que si le Gouvernement français

autorise l ’ admission à la cote de la tranche de d£T. 4,000,000 d ’ emprunt ottom an;
cet emprunt étant d ’ un revenu m oyen en bien garanti, le Gouvernement français
sera disposé à donner l ’autorisation nécessaire, à la condition toutefois de recevoir
officiellement l ’ assurance qu ’ aucun obstacle ne sera opposé par le Gouvernement
allemand aux accords à intervenir entre la France et la Turquie touchant les entre­
prises de chemins de fer et d ’obtenir certaines garanties pour les réseaux de voies
ferrées créés par les capitaux français dans l ’ Em pire ottom an.
Ces dernières garanties, à négocier imm édiatement entre les représentants des
groupes français et allemand, viseraient :

1° Les raccordements à Alep, Diarbekir, Yerkeui (près Yuzgat) et à tous les

points de contact entre les réseaux français et les réseaux allemands du
Bagdad ;
2° Une convention de partage du trafic entre lesdits réseaux.

G ) [T h is m ém orandum is endorsed as h a v in g been seen by S ir E. G rey on A u g u st 29 ; a

cop y was sent to the B oa rd of T ra d e (secret).]
( 2) [t>. supra, pp. 169-72, N o. 116, and encZ.]
[1 0 9 0 0 ] P 2
 212

3° Une convention de transit et de trafic com m uns garantissant l ’ égalité absolue

de traitement pour les marchandises de provenance ou à destination desdits
réseaux et faisant obstacle à l ’ établissement de tarifs privilégiés ou
différentiels.

Enfin les Allemands avaient manifesté l ’ intention de s’ opposer à la concession

à des Français des sections Kharpout-Diarbekir et Zihle-Y uzgat en invoquant les
droits qu ’ ils tiendraient de leur première convention pour la construction du B agdad;
on demandera que les intéressés allemands notifient au Gouvernement ottoman qu’ ils
renoncent à invoquer cette clause.
Les représentants du groupe français, MM. de Neuflize et de Klaptka doivent
arriver à Berlin le 20 Août.

L e 19 août, 1913.

No. 139.

M inute by Mr. P arker.p )

F.O. 3 8 5 4 1 /1 0 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, August 19, 1913.

I had a further interview with Hakki Pasha today to initial the annexed further
declaration about the navigation and to settle finally about the terms o f a guarantee
connected with Lord Inchcape’ s concession.
Hakki Pasha told me that the King of Greece had given orders to the Greek
Comm ander-in-Chief at Dedeagatch only to hand over the place to Turkish troops,
as His Majesty feared to hand over to Bulgarians any territory where there were
Greek residents, as to do so would be to pass sentence of certain death upon them.
M oreover the K ing o f Greece had, though His Majesty wished this treated as
confidential for the present, issued a direct invitation(2) to the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t
to occupy Dedeagatch.
Hakki Pasha then said that the situation was briefly this : the Ottoman forces
had reoccupied Adrianople and there they would remain until they were ejected by
force, which it was becom ing increasingly clear would not take place. They (i.e. the
Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t) would probably agree to a line which would give Kirk Kilisse
to the Bulgarians, and give them access to the sea on the iEgean, provided Europe
gave adequate guarantees that any territory occupied by Bulgaria would be so
governed, under European supervision, that the non-Bulgarian population would not
be exterminated. How was it, he asked, that the Mussulman population received
the Greek forces with open arms, and fled before Bulgarian troops. If any of the
territory now occupied by Turkey were unconditionally handed back to Bulgaria the
administration would simply be handed over to Komitadjis.
But E urope did nothing when Mussulmans were concerned, as witness their
treatment in Crete : in this case, however, Greeks were also involved.
Turkey, he said, must have the Maritza line and she must have Adrianople which
was essential for the protection o f Constantinople, and she must have the railway
which connected Adrianople with Constantinople.
I said I was not authorised to discuss these questions with him , but it seemed to
me that every day the Turks were making their ultimate ejection from Adrianople
m ore certain by acting on the principle of “ grasp all, lose a ll.” I f they went on

0 ) [C opies o f this m in u te and the annex w ere sent to the A d m ir a lty , to the B oa rd of
T ra d e.]
( 2) [I n the p rin ted cop y of this m in u te th e follow in g unsign ed n ote a p p e a rs : “ R eshid
S n fv er B ey told M. de F leu ria u th a t he had seen th e letter con v ey in g this in v ita tio n .” ]
 2 13

penetrating beyond the Maritza questions o f prestige would arise, and very unpleasant
developments might ensue.
We then passed to the Bagdad Bailway. He said Herr von Kuehlm ann had had
a reply from Herr von Gwinner respecting the proposal that he should com e to
London and he said that this would he impossible, but had suggested that Hakki
Pasha should go to Zurich from August 22 to August 25 in order to meet H err von
Gwinner and Herr Helferrich [sic] there : this would help matters forward a good
deal as between the Turks and the Bagdad Bailwav Company, and Hakki Pasha was in
favour of going. I said I thought it would be an excellent thing, only I hoped it
would really get things ahead a bit.
He is therefore going on August 22, and he expects to be hack on September 1,
after visiting the Hague. He then hopes to complete our negotiations very rapidly.
This will give Mr. W eakley and me time to discuss the outstanding questions
fully with the Board of Trade. I told Hakki Pasha that we should probably ask for
petroleum concessions in Syria and Farsan and he said he would ask for instructions.
I also said we should probably ask for an extension of the S m vrna-A idin Bailway
concession and line, and he said he anticipated no difficulty on this account if our
wishes did not run counter to those o f the Germans, which he did not think likely
to prove [to b e ] the case.
I then said that if he spoke to H err von Gwinner as to the oil concession in
Mesopotamia (which he told me he intended to do) it might be well for him (Hakki)
to know that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] did not consider, and knew that the
Ottoman G o v [e rn m e n ]t’ s legal advisers did not consider, the German claims under
the Anatolian Bail way agreement of 1904(3) to be very strong, although the Germans
had certain limited though not exclusive claims under the Bagdad Bailway concession
of 1904. The two original claimants therefore were, in order o f priority, the Anglo-
Persian Company (Mr. d ’ Arcv) and the Bagdad Bailway Company. W h y was it
necessary to introduce fresh elements, like the Shell and the National Bank of
Turkey? H err von Gwinner had already said he was willing to accept a minor
share, and it seemed far simpler not to introduce additional parties. Hakki Pasha
said that he was not sure how far H err von Gwinner was bound to the National
Bank and the Shell (A nglo-Saxon) group, hut as he understood the National Bank
was, if necessary, prepared to go out voluntarily, he thought it might he possible to
arrange for some combination between the Anglo-Persian Company and the Germans.
I said that of course H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] would have to he consulted
about the details of any such arrangement. H e agreed, and said he would discuss
the whole question with Herr von Gwinner.
A. P [A B K E B ].

A n n ex .

Déclaration. (4)
Le soussigné, dûment autorisé à cet effet, déclare que si le concessionnaire soumis
à l’ agrément du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique, en vertu de l ’ article 3 de la déclaration ottomane en date du 29 juillet,
1913, relative à la navigation sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate, serait rendu incapable,
par suite de maladie ou par toute autre cause, de procéder à la constitution d ’ une
société pour exploiter la concession dont il est question, le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman s’ oblige à transférer le bénéfice de la présente concession à un successeur
nommé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et accepté par le Gouverne­
ment Im périal ottom an; et le soussigné déclare que le terme “ con cessionnaire”

(3) [cp . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 325 -7 , Ed. N o te .]

(4) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is th a t o f the d r a ft preserved in th e F o re ig n Office series o f
O riginal T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 94).]
 214

dans le projet de concession parafé le 12 août, 1913, sera interprété comme

comprenant tout successeur auquel le bénéfice de ladite concession pourra être ainsi
transféré.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le août, 1913.
Parafée ad référendum.
L e 19 Août 1913.
I. H. A. P.

No. 140.
M inute by Mr. Parker.(*)
F .O . 3 8 7 3 8 /1 6 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 20, 1913.
Flerr von Kuehlmann called to-d ay (2) to speak to me about the Mesopotamian oil
concession.
H e said that he had heard from Herr von Gwinner, who said he feared it
would be impossible for him to free him self from his contractual obligations to the
Shell Company. Personally H err von Gwinner had no marked preference for the
Shell Company, but what had happened was this :—
H err von Gwinner, in the desire of reaching an agreement with the English,
had approached Sir E . Cassel (the National Bank of Turkey). Someone in the
National Bank o f Turkey had first brought forward the idea of an arrangement with
the Shell Company, and an arrangement had subsequently been form ally concluded,
by which, so it appeared, the National Bank received 50 per cent, in the New
Company, the Shell Company 25 per cent., and the Deutsche Bank 25 per cent.
Under clause 36a of the articles of association it was laid down that, if one of
the three parties withdrew, the shares o f that party should be offered first to the other
two parties : if, therefore, Herr von Gwinner had pointed out, the National Bank
withdrew, the effect would be to increase the holding of the Shell Company. It
was accordingly undesirable that the National Bank should go out.
I said to Ilerr von Kuehlm ann that this was based on the assumption that the
New Company held a valid and undisputed title to what it claimed. He was already
aware that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, just as much as the German Governm ent,
were anxious to avoid dealing with this question in a contentious spirit, and to reach
an acceptable arrangement for the future rather than to waste time on an examination
o f the past. But if it became a question of whether or not the Shell could be ousted,
assuming such a consum m ation, for the sake o f argument, to be desirable, then
there was some advantage in exam ining how far the title of the New Company, or
the trio, was valid and undisputed.
That title consisted in (a) certain rights, limited by the fact that they were
expressly stated not to constitute “ a privilege or a m on op oly,” and by the fact that
they only extended for 20 kilom. on each side o f the Bagdad Railway in so far as
that railway might pass through petroliferous districts, and ( b) certain claims.
The rights were derived under article 22 o f the Bagdad Railway Convention of
March 1903.(3) The claims rested upon the convention concluded by the Anatolian
R ailway Company with the Civil List in 1904. That convention, both in the view
of the legal advisers of the Sublime Porte, and in the opinion o f the legal advisers
o f the Foreign Office, had lapsed, and it appeared clear that no claim under it would
lie in a Court o f Law.
H err von Kuehlmann admitted that the rights o f the New Company rested upon
these two instruments, hut he said that the Company had, he understood, taken
( 0 [C op ies o f th is m in u te w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e A d m ir a lty ; to the
I n d ia Office.]
( 2) [cp. C,.P ., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 2 2 9 -3 0 .]
( 0 [v. B .F .S .P ., V o l. 102, p. 8 4 0 .J
 215

legal advice which tended to support the view that the convention o f 1904 was still
valid.
I said that at any rate the validity was disputed, and the prospects were that,
in the absence o f an agreement acceptable both to Germ any and to Great Britain,
there would be no satisfactory settlement and a good deal of ill-feeling which it was
most desirable to avoid. If, therefore, the presence o f the Shell Company had the
practical effect of blocking the concession, except in so far as any rights o f the
Bagdad Bailway Company under the convention o f 1903 were concerned, it would do
itself no good by adopting a dog-in-the-m anger attitude, and. refusing either to be
easily bought out or to accept reasonable terms.
I made it clear that I was not pressing that the Shell Company should go out,
but the point I did want to make was that the Shell Company did not really dominate
the situation, for it could hardly persist in its claims under any agreem ent made
with H err von Gwinner, if such persistence rendered the New Company paralytic.
Such being the logic o f the situation, H err von Gwinner seemed to be in a position
of vantage for exercising suasion upon the Shell Company.
I then referred to the position o f the A nglo-Persian Oil Company, as representing
Mr. d ’ Arcy. I said that his Company had applied for, and been prom ised, the
diplomatic support o f H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent m any years ago, and long before
the National Bank or the Shell Company had appeared on the scene. This com pany,
in the person o f Mr. d ’ A rcy, had received the most definite promises from two Grand
Viziers that the oil concession for the vilayets o f Mosul and Bagdad would be granted
to them ; it had been encouraged to keep an agent for m any years in Constantinople,
and His M ajesty’ s G overnm ent, while they might perhaps induce the A nglo-Persian
Company to forgo its well-founded claim to the whole concession, if satisfactory terms
were arranged, could not equitably, and did not desire to, abandon those who had
first obtained their support.
Herr von Kuehlm ann asked me what arrangement I thought would be satisfactory
to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent. I said that this depended to some extent upon
whether or not the Shell Company was to remain in the com bination, and if so what
percentage it was to hold. The principal objects o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent were
(a) to maintain the independence of the A nglo-Persian Oil Company, as they were
opposed to the creation of large trusts, (h) to secure satisfactory m arketing arrange­
ments, (c) to secure an abundant supply o f oil at a reasonable price, and (d) to
support the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in what they considered to be a just and
well-established claim to the concession.
It was difficult to discuss percentages, control, and marketing arrangements
without expert knowledge, but I felt confident that anything short o f fiO per cent,
would not be regarded as adequate for the Anglo-Persian Company. I f that were
conceded, I thought that an arrangement which made fair allowance for the interests
of all concerned in the products ought to be p racticable; but I thought it would be
difficult to advance towards agreement until the Shell Company came to a proper
sense o f its own weak position in regard to M esopotamia. I urged that H err von
Gwinner should be asked to put forward, through H err von Kuehlm ann, proposals
which would be acceptable to him , and then a discussion could begin to some purpose.
I gave H err von Kuehlm ann a copy o f this memorandum for his confidential
use, and he said he would com m unicate further with H err von Gwinner. He left
with me the attached papers.(4)
A. P [A B K E R ].

(4) [T h e a tta ch ed papers are cop ies o f the agreem en t m ade b y th e T urkish P etroleu m
Com pany w ith th e D eu tsch e B ank, the M em oran d u m of A ssociation of the sam e co m p a n y and
an e x tra ct from its A rticles of A ssociation , d a ted respectiv ely O ctob er 23, 1912, and J a n u a ry 30,
1911.]
 216

N o. 141.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e y .(*)

St. Petersburgh, August 24, 1913.

F.O. 3 9 0 0 8 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4. D. 3 -24 p . m .
Tel. (No. 312.) E. 6 p . m .
Your despatch No. 230.(2)
Eussian Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me yesterday aide-m ém oire of which
following is substance :—

Paragraph 1. Eussian Ambassador in London has forwarded to Eussian Govern­

m ent text of convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab, and of declaration on subject of
right of Sheikh of Mohammerah to charge one of the members of the commission to
look after Persian trade and navigation interests.
Paragraph 2. Having studied these documents, Eussian Government desire to
point out that text o f the convention differs from the convention previously com m uni­
cated to Eussian Governm ent in that two articles, Nos. 7 and 8. respecting imposition
of fines and rights of police have been inserted.(3)
Paragraph 3. Eussian Governm ent, in referring to aide-m em oire enclosed in m y
despatch No. 233,(4) express hope that provisions of these articles will not infringe in
any way rights reserved to Eussia under treaties in force between her and Turkey as
regards privileges of Eussian subjects in Ottoman territory.
Paragraph 4. As regards declaration, Eussian Governm ent wishes to draw
attention of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to fact that Sheikh of Mohammerah, being a
Persian subject and possessing none of the privileges of autonom y, cannot be
considered as entitled to entrust to anyone protection of Persian com m ercial and
maritime interests, such right belonging exclusively to Persian Governm ent itself.
In reading to me first paragraph of above, Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked
that he did not wish to quarrel with us about the convention, but on com ing to
paragraphs 3 and 4 he adopted a rather serious tone. It seemed, he said, to be our
intention to place Eussian subjects under jurisdiction of a commission, in which we
were represented and in which Eussia was not, and to treat Mohammerah like Koweit.
Independent position we were claim ing for sheikh was hardly consistent with principle
o f Persian integrity.
I said that I must look up the papers before discussing matter with him, and that
meanwhile I would forward aide-m ém oire to you by telegram.

0 ) [T h is telegram was sent to T ehran (as N o. 386) ; to C on stan tin op le (as N o. 428). Copies
w ere sent to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to the In d ia Office.]
(2) [S ir E. G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 230) o f J u n e 18, 1913, enclosed a cop y o f th e d r a ft o f t
S h a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion and the a n n exed D ecla ra tion in itia lled ad re fer en d u m on J u n e 11
1913. (F .O . 2 6 9 3 1 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .) cp. sup ra , p. 109, N o. 68, encl. 4, n o te («»).]
(3) [cp . supra, pp. 81-3, N o. 55, en cl.]
(4) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s despatch (N o. 233), D . J u ly 26, It. J u ly 31, 1913, is not rep rod u ced .
I t enclosed an a id e-m ém oire from th e R ussian G overnm ent, d a ted J u ly 1 3 /2 6 , 1913. T his
re fe rre d to th e S h a tt-el-A ra b D e cla ra tio n in itia lled ad re fer en d u m on M a y 6, 1913 (cp. supra,
pp. 109-14, N o. 68, encl. 4), and sta ted th a t th e R ussian G overn m en t d id not ob ject to the
a rra n g em en t foresh a dow ed th ere re g a rd in g th e T u rco-P ersia n fr o n t ie r ; it fu rth e r signified
a p p rov a l o f th e p roposed C om m ission o f N a v ig a tio n , su g g estin g certain am endm ents in its
con s titu tion . (F .O . 3 5 4 2 2 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
 217
N o. 142.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.i 1)

F.O. 3 90 0 8 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /4 4.
Tel. (No. 628.) Foreign Office, August 26, 1913, 1 2-20 p . m .
Your telegram No. 312.(2)
I will furnish the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t with full explanations respecting first
three paragraphs of Russian aide-m ém oire shortly.
As regards Mohammera, no position of independence is claimed for the Sheikh,
who is m ainly concerned, and is actually m entioned, because he is the m an whose
commerce and shipping, owing to his geographical and territorial position, is chiefly
involved. It was in order to avoid any appearance o f setting him up as independent
that the expression ‘ ‘ persans ’ ’ instead of “ de Mouhammera ’ ’ was used. Moreover,
when the Persian G ov [ern m en ]t wished to introduce the Belgian customs adm inis­
tration into Arabistan they did so by means of an agreement with the Sheikh,
recognising his special position, which includes that of an hereditary ruler.
The Russian G ov [ern m en ]t are aware that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ]1
have for m any years past had very close relations with the Sheikh of M ohammera,
whose interests touch theirs in m any important points : but so far are they from being
conscious that there is anything in their policy “ hardly consistent with principle of
Persian integrity,” that they have always, in writing to the Sheikh, made loyalty to
the Central Governm ent one of the conditions on which their support o f him has
depended.

C1) [T h is telegram w as rep ea ted to T ehra n (N o. 38) ; to C on sta n tin op le (N o. 429).]

(2) [ d . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]

No. 143.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 3 9 8 0 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 442.) Paris, I). August 27, 1913.
Sir, R. August 29, 1913.
I have the honour to inform you that a statement, bearing the appearance of an
official com m unique, is published in the issue o f the “ Temps ” of to-d ay’ s d ate^ 1) to
the following e ffe ct:—
A report in the Gazette de Francfort announces the term ination o f F ranco­
German negotiations in regard to the Anatolian Railway, and the conclusion of a
Turkish L oan in Paris, which is to take place next November.
This inform ation is incorrect as regards the placing of a fresh Turkish loan in
Paris which would, in any circumstances, be dependent on the settlement of the
question o f Adrianople.
It is true, on the other hand, that negotiations are about to terminate between the
French and German financial houses which represent the interests of either country
in the Baghdad Railway.
These negotiations, which are proceeding simultaneously in Paris and Berlin, are
being carried on in com plete accord with Russia and E ngland, who are kept inform ed
from day to day of their various phases. Russia has already at Potsdam decided her
position in regard to the Baghdad Railway. England is on the eve of signing an
agreement by which she disinterests herself in the undertaking as far as Baghdad.
France in her turn is working for a settlement.

0 ) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ T em ps, A u g u st 28th .” R e fe re n ce to in fo rm a tio n a p p ea rin g

in the issue o f th e 27th is m ade in D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., Y ol. V I I I , pp. 104-5, N o. 88, a n d n o te f 1).]
 *218

According to the broad lines o f the negotiations the Ottoman Bank gives back to
the Germans, that is the Deutsche Bank, its financial participation in the Baghdad
Bailway, that is to say the bonds which, in the absence of a quotation on the French
B ourse which would make them negotiable, are a dead weight. The Germans buy
back these bonds and renounce, in favour of the French, other railway concessions on
the Black Sea Coast and in Syria.
The terms of the agreement give Germany freedom of action in the Baghdad
railway without foreign control, even of a mild character, and they free France in
turn from German com petition in the districts where it might be encountered. They
rem ove m oreover a source o f friction and rivalry between the two countries in Asia
M inor.
It is necessary to add that these arrangements will only becom e final if there be
a com plete understanding between Paris, St. Petersburgh and London, and that the
signatures will not be exchanged'until a complete and reciprocal agreem ent has been
reached between the three Powers and Turkey.
I beg leave to enclose herein a leading article, extracted from this evening’ s issue
of the “ Teinps,” com m enting on this statem ent./2) The article briefly reviews the
attitude of France in the matter of the Baghdad Railway from the beginning. It is
pointed out that France at the early stages had excellent cards in her hand for securing
a share in the undertaking. Thirteen years ago Germany stood in greater need of i
French financial support than now, but only sub-participation was offered to France h
which Monsieur Delcasse, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, was com pelled to refuse
in circum stances which were not o f his creation.
France therefore remained inactive and meanwhile the great industrial and
econom ic development in Germ any made her less dependent on outside financial
assistance. The T rip oli-H om s-B agh d ad-P ersian Gulf railway scheme fell through ‘
owing to the adverse attitude of the French Embassy at Constantinople, and that was j
the only weapon with which France and E ngland could have negotiated successfully ]
with Germany.
Russia had settled up with Germany, and Great Britain was on the point of doing
so. France could but do likewise. The terms announced were the best that could be
got in the circumstances.
Germany, the article concludes, will have succeeded in m aking the Baghdad
railway a purely German concern. She will draw therefrom political influence and
econom ic gains, but she cannot make of it an instrument of domination. Germany
could only seize the region traversed by the line if she emerged as victor from a
general war.
France gets a free hand in respect of German com petition on the Syrian and
Arm enian railway systems, from which a more far-seeing policy than in the past may
secure important advantages.
I have, &c.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
( 2) [N o t re p ro d u ce d .]

No. 144.

M inute by Mr. Parker.( x)

F.O. 3 90 8 7 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 27, 1913.

M. de Fleuriau called to-d ay,(2) and told me that the French Mission which had
gone to Berlin (see No. 38543)(3) to arrange about French and German financial and

0 ) [C op ies o f this m in u te w ere sent to th e B oa rd of T r a d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]

(2) [cp . M. de F le u r ia u ’ s rep ort, D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. V I I I , pp. 105-7, N o. 89.]
C ) [v. supra, pp. 211-2, N o. 138.]
 219

railway interests in Turkey had returned, and that they had reached an agreement
with the Germans, which appeared to be com pletely satisfactory on both points.
M. de Fleuriau had been instructed by M. Pichon to convey to H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t] the thanks o f the French Governm ent, as they felt sure that the
adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by the Germans was due to the influence we
had, unofficially, brought to bear upon them. H e is going to send us a statement of
the agreement arrived at, and he says that the French G ov [ern m en ]t will probably
wish to confirm it by an agreement between themselves and the German
G ov [ern m en ]t. H e hopes that the Franco-Germ an agreement may be concluded at
the same time as the Anglo-G erm an one.
This is extrem ely satisfactory, as it means that the ‘ ‘ conditional ’ ’ clauses which
the Germans wanted in their agreem ent with us will probably now be superfluous, as
if there is agreement between France, G [r e a ]t Britain, and Germany, there will
probably be no difficulty about getting adequate guarantees for the Bagdad Railway
at the Financial Commission in Paris. M. de Fleuriau told me that he had inform ed
Count Benckendorff of what had been settled in Berlin. H e said he assumed that
the project for the M eskene-A leppo line would be dropped now.
H e said he was asking for authority to discuss the guarantee question with
Herr von Kuehlm ann in London. M. de Fleuriau then said that the arrangement
come to had entailed a certain financial loss to the Im perial Ottoman B a n k ; and he
hoped in consequence that both the French and British G ov [ern m en ]ts would be able
to give that institution greater support in future.
I said to him that we should be willing to support the Im perial Ottoman Bank
if it took a more active part in the prom otion of British financial and industrial
enterprise in Turkey, and he said that the best way to get it to do this was to
strengthen the British directorate.
A. P A R K E R .
August 27, 1913.
M IN U T E S .
M . de F le u r ia u m ade m e th e sam e com m u n ica tion .
C o l[o n e l] L aw ren ce had been w ith m e ju st b efore his a rriv a l and to ld m e th a t the
I m p [e r ia ]l O ttom an B ank w ere p a rtin g w ith th e ir h o ld in g (1 /3 ) in th e B a g d a d R [ a i ] l [ w a ] y
to the D eu tsch e Bank.
A n a rra n g em en t was b ein g com e to, a cco r d in g to w hich th e B a n k w ou ld g et so m eth in g in
exchange.
T he F ren ch G [o v e r n m e n ]t fa v o u re d th is b u t it m ust n ot he sup posed th a t th e B a n k was
g oin g to m ake a fin an cia l sacrifice tc. please th e F re n ch G [o v e r n m e n ]t. I said th a t w e h a d no
ob jection.
' L . M.
A u g [u s t ] 27.
I am v ery gla d the F ren ch and G erm ans h a ve com e to an a rra n g em en t— now le t us finish
w ith the G erm ans as soon as we can.
E. G.

No. 145.

M. de Fleuriau to Mr. P arker.(*)

F.O. 3 99 1 9 /2 5 53 3 /1 3 /4 4.
Private. Ambassade de France, Londres,
Cher Monsieur Parker, le 29 août, 1913.
Veuillez m ’ excuser si je ne vous ai pas envoyé plus tôt le m em orandum que je
vous avais promis sur le résultat des pourparlers entre les groupes français et
C1) [T h ere is no re p o rt b y M . de F leu ria u o f th is com m u n ica tion in D .D .F . A fu ll a ccou n t
of the F ra n co-G erm a n p ou rp a rlers, sent b y M. P ic h o n to M . J u les C am bon, is p r in te d in D .D .F .,
3me S ér., V ol. V I I I , pp. 101-4, N o. 87. A sim ilar d esp a tch sent to M . de F leu ria u is n ot p rin ted
there, b u t it is sta ted th a t it was nearly id e n tic a l w ith the one sent to M . J u les C am bon,
cp. ibid., p. 105, No. 89, n o te p ) . ]
 22 0
allemand du Bagdad. Vous trouverez, ci-joint, ce document. Je n ’ ai pas inséré dans
le m émorandum les détails des arrangements financiers envisagés par les deux groupes,
arrangements qui doivent encore être étudiés de part et d ’ autre et dont le règlement
définitif peut avoir une répercussion sur la longueur de telle ou telle ligne de chemin
de fer partagée entre les groupes; au moins c ’ est ainsi que je com prends les indica­
tions un peu compliquées qui m ’ ont été données oralement par un représentant du
groupe français venu à Londres pour mettre le com ité anglais de la Banque ottomane
au courant du détail des pourparlers.
En vous communiquant m ercredi le résultat de ces négociations, je vous ai donné
lecture d ’ une lettre que j ’ avais reçue de Paris et je crois bien faire en reproduisant ici
le dernier paragraphe de cette lettre :

“ L ’ entente, m ’ écrit M. Bichon, ne peut encore être considérée comme

définitive. Elle n ’ en constitue pas moins un progrès décisif vers la solution de
nos difficultés avec l ’ Allem agne. A ce point de vue, le Gouvernement Britannique, I
à l ’ attitude duquel nous sommes certainement redevables pour une part de
l ’ amélioration des dispositions du groupe allemand, apprendra, je n ’ en doute pas,
avec satisfaction que nous sommes sur la voie d ’ un arrangement prochain. Cette
situation ne peut que nous confirmer dans notre désir de voir les ententes
anglo-allemandes et franco-allem andes se conclure à la même date.”
Votre très sincèrement dévoué,
A. d e ELEL’ KIAU.

Enclosure in No. 145.

M ém orandum .(")

Ambassade de France, à Londres, le 29 août 1913.

Les négociations annoncées dans le m émorandum de cette ambassade du
19 août(3) ont été engagées entre le groupe français et le groupe allemand de la
Compagnie du Chemin de fer de Bagdad ; après une longue discussion les représen- :
tants des deux groupes ont reconnu que l ’ entente pouvait s’ établir sur les quatre points
suivants :

1°) Rétrocession au groupe allemand de l ’ ensemble des intérêts du groupe

français dans l ’ affaire du Bagdad, le groupe français prenant par contre l ’ avance de
¿£T. 3,000,000 consentie par un consortium allemand au Gouvernement ottoman et
le droit d ’option réservé à ce Consortium sur la deuxième tranche de l ’ emprunt ■
turc 1911 garanti par la douane de Constantinople.
Les modalités de cet échange doivent encore être discutées : les conditions dans
lesquelles les Allemands reprendraient les titres du Bagdad sont considérées comme
très onéreuses par le groupe français. D ’ autre part l ’ emprunt turc de 1911 a été I
établi sur des bases qui rendraient son émission impossible à l ’ heure actuelle et qu ’ il
y aurait lieu de faire modifier par le Gouvernement Ottoman.
2 °) Entente pour poursuivre parallèlement et simultanément l ’ achèvement du
réseau Bagdad, ainsi que la construction par le chemin de fer d ’ Anatolie des lignes
A ngora-C ésarée-Sivas et C ésarée-O ulou-K ichla, d ’ une part; d ’ autre part la création
d ’ un réseau hom ogène dit “ de la mer Noire ” dont le groupe français poursuit
l ’obtention et qui com prend les lignes suivantes :

Sam soun-Sivas avec em branchem ent de Soulou Serai jusqu’ à la crête ouest de la
vallée de Yéchil Irmak.
Sivas-Tchalta, E rzinghian-Pékeridje.

(*) [A cop y o f this m ém orandum w as sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.l

(3) [v. supra, pp. 211-2, N o. 138.]
 221
T chalta-K harpout et 85 k [ilo ]m [êtres] au delà de Kharpout vers A rga n a -
Maden, avec em branchem ent sur le lac de V an-K avza-C astam ouni jusqu’ à
60 k [ilo ]m [ê tre s ] de Bolou.
3°) Fixation des points de raccordement des deux réseaux et arrangements
équitables pour les questions de tarifs, de transit et de partage du trafic dans les
régions limitrophes.
4 °) Collaboration des deux pays, en vue de procurer à la Turquie des ressources
nouvelles, lui permettant de poursuivre son développem ent économique, étant entendu
que la partie de ces revenus qui sera attribuée aux chemins de fer à construire sera
affectée par parts égales aux deux réseaux m entionnés au No. 2 ci-dessus.

Il y aurait évidem m ent lieu de préciser et d ’ amener ces dispositions générales et

les pourparlers ne peuvent être considérés com m e terminés ; mais il semble bien
qu’ on doit espérer les m ener à bonne fin.

No. 146.

M inute by Mr. Parker.(*)

F.O. 4 0 0 9 7 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, August 29, 1913.

I had a m eeting with Herr von Kuehlm ann to-d ay(2) when we discussed, very
cursorily and on the distinct understanding that at this stage anything which passed
should be regarded as non-com m ittal, the attached counter-draft of an Anglo-G erm an
convention./3)
H err von Kuehlm ann admitted that it was desirable that the agreem ent between
the Bagdad Railway Company and the Turkish Governm ent should, if possible, precede
the conclusion of the Anglo-Germ an Convention, and we agreed that the latter might
perhaps be initialled pending the signature of the form er. This would get rid of the
conditional nature of article 2.
W ith regard to a British participation of 50 per cent, in the port of Bagdad, he
seemed to think this might be conceded, though Germ any (and I think justly so)
would insist on the Bagdad Railway Company retaining the casting vote. He said
there might be some difficulty in apportioning the contracts for the construction of
the port equally between the two nationalities, inasmuch as if two firms of contractors
were em ployed great extravagance would ensue. W e agreed that this was a matter
for experts.
Herr von Kuehlmann told me he thought the arrangement now suggested for
article 3 was particularly ingenious. The German Governm ent had disliked the
proposal which is now article 3 (b), as they had felt that there was no reason why
they, any more than any other Power, should give such an undertaking, and they felt
they would be much criticised for making such a stipulation; but he admitted that
a case for reconsideration appeared to have been made out by the drafting we had
proposed, balancing article 3 (b) against article 3 (c), and that he would recom m end
that the German Governm ent should examine the point afresh. He said he was not

(!) [C op ies o f this M in u te and the d r a ft a tta ch ed w ere sent t o the B o a rd o f T r a d e ; t o the
In d ia Office.]
(2) [H e r r v on K iih lm a n n ’ s re p o rt o f th is d a te refers m a in ly t o A r ticle 4 o f th e A n g lo-
G erm an d r a ft con v en tion , v. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 231-2. cp. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g
docu m en t.]
(3) [T h e t e x t a n n exed t o M r. P a r k e r ’ s m in u te con ta in ed b oth th e G erm an com m u n ica tion
o f J u ly 16, 1913 (v . supra, pp. 174-9, N o. 118, an d en d s.), and th e B ritish d r a ft o f S eptem ber
1913 ( v . in fra , pp . 238-41, N o. 154, encl.). A r ticle 6 was o m itted and m a rked “ reserved fo r th e
presen t.” cp. in fra , p. 226, N o. 148, A n n e x .]

I
 2*22

sure if the limitation “ within the provinces of Bagdad and M o s u l” was sufficiently
wide to give the Bagdad Bailway Company adequate protection. I urged that it was
in point of fact a very large concession on our part when it wasrecollected that our
trade in the twro provinces was some 60 per cent, or more of the whole.
Parenthetically I may m ention that M . de Fleuriau told me yesterday that he
thought the French had dropped the A leppo-M eskene project, and that he did not
think the French Governm ent would object to our giving the Germans an assurance
of the nature in question with regard to more westerly provinces as well as Bagdad
and Mosul if we so desired.I do not think, however, that the Germans are likely
to press this extension : but I feel that if they want to get the assurance we offer in
article 3 (c) it will afford us a good lever for getting them to concede article 3 (b),
which is important.
As to article (51 he told me that the Bagdad Bailway wanted to have the right
o f using launches in the ports as well as ferries, and that these would of course be
smaller than the ferries. I said in that case it would be necessary to obtain, by an
additional convention (which will in any case be required) a further modification of
L ord Inchcape’ s concession. The launches he said would be solely for the use of the
port and railway officials.
Article 6. about the Shatt-el-Arab Commission, we agreed to reserve. He read
me some observations, very much to the point, about the desiderata of the Hamburg -
Amerika Line regarding the r iv e r ; but, after some discussion, we decided to postpone
detailed consideration of this point till next Tuesday, and in the interval he is going
to write me a private letter explaining in greater detail his own views as to the
Shatt-el-Arab difficulty, and his suggestions for overcom ing it. H e will also send a
copy o f the observations of the H am burg-A m erika Line.
I asked him if he thought it would not be well to begin the article about this by
some clause such as the following :—

“ The Imperial German Government, having cognisance of the Anglo-

Turkish Convention of , 1913, respecting the Shatt-el-Arab,
undertakes, so far as German subjects and shipping are concerned, to facilitate
the due execution of the said instrum ent.”

H e said he thought this clause might possibly come in if the Bagdad Railway
could- get some reasonable guarantee that access to Bussorah would be improved and
maintained, and that failing such a result the Germans should have some effective
means of -redress. I said I did not wish to suggest the above clause definitely, but
only tentatively.
H e said our Admiralty seemed to have the idea that the Commission was to do
no dredging and to sit down and watch the river pass along assisted by training
works : the idea of the German shipping companies on the other hand was that a
substantial amount of dredging should be done. I asked him about fu n d s ; and I said
that although pessimists— who made no allowance for future expansion of trade— had
pointed out that, on an average of past years, the tonnage dues would only yield about
11,OOOL a-year, it did seem difficult to see how the Commission could spend say
75,OOOL on a dredger straight off. He replied that in his view we should press the
Turks in this matter to provide the funds and to earmark, over and above the shipping
dues, a certain proportion of the customs duties of Basra as security for a loan to be
raised by the Commission, and for other purposes of river con serv a n cy .. It must not
be overlooked that the improvem ent of the port and river would lead to an immense
developm ent of Mesopotamia, and it was only fair that the Turks should contribute
something to this result.
I handed him the annexed memorandum, which he said he would consider.
A. P [A R K E R ].
 223
Annex.

Aid e-m em oire.(*)

It is observed that under article 21 of the “ cahier des charges ” of the Bagdad
Railway one m onth’ s notice must be given o f any increase o f rates (within the
prescribed m axima), but only three days’ notice of any reduction. His M ajesty’ s
Government are o f opinion, however, that these periods are much too short having
regard to the conditions under which European trade with Asiatic Turkey is carried
on, and the fact that contracts in respect of both imports and exports are as a rule
made a considerable time before the goods are actually imported or exported. M ore­
over, in order to afford effective protection against discrimination it seems necessary
to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to prescribe as long a period o f notice for reductions
as for increases o f rates, and also to ensure ample publication of rates and conditions
and proposals to vary them.
H is M ajesty’ s Government Would therefore value an assurance, which might
either be embodied in the convention now under discussion with the Im perial German
Government o r given in such other way as m ay be most convenient (e .g ., by an
exchange o f notes), that there shall be effective publication o f all rates and conditions
on the Bagdad Bailway and o f all intended changes therein, and that the notice to
be given o f such changes shall not be less than two months in the case o f both
increases and decreases.

Foreign Office, August 29, 1913.

(*) [T h e d r a ft o f this m em orandum was enclosed in a le tte r from th e B oa rd o f T ra d e to

the F o re ig n Office, D . A u g u st 28, R . A u g u st 29, 1913. (F.O . 3 9 8 3 2 /2 6 1 0 7 /1 3 /4 4 .)]

No. 147.

H err von Kiihlm ann to Mr. P arker.( l)

F.O . 4 0 2 4 6 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .
Confidential. London, D. A ugust 30, 1913.
My dear Parker, R . Septem ber 1, 1913.
As you asked me to give you a written statement about m y views— they are only
my personal views— concerning the Shat-el-Arab, I will do so with pleasure.
It seems to me, that article 4 of the protocol of May 7th (2/ is a very accurate
summary o f our views particularly if the words ‘ ‘ always ’ ’ and ‘ ‘ easy access ’ ’ are
emphasised. I have been in correspondence with the H am burg-A m erica L ine and
beg to include a short statement from them , showing what is the size o f sea­
going vessels now trading with Basra, and what they consider would be a satisfactory
condition o f the navigable channel. It is quite obvious that from our point o f view
Basra must be made a very good port with very easy access, otherwise we could never
justify the giving up o f direct access to the Gulf at Koweit or K hor-A bdullah. The
questions, which would be the best way to make the navigable channel and which
would be the best way of keeping it open is [s ic ] highly technical. D on ’ t you think,
that an inform al meeting o f a british and german expert could help us materially
in getting nearer to the solution o f the following questions : W hich would be the best
method to do the work, how long is it likely to take, what is going to be the

0) [C op ies o f th is com m u n ica tion w ere sent t o the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; t o th e I n d ia O ffice;

to th e A d m ira lty .]
(2) [u. supra, p. 98, N o. 66.]
 224
approximate cost, how is the work to be protected, what is the permanent cost of
conservancy likely to be.
There seems no doubt, that the initial cost will be a com paratively heavy one,
so a loan seems the right policy for m eeting it. The permanent outlay will no doubt
with the natural increase o f trade at Basra be covered by the dues. Under no
conditions whatsoever must the work on the Shat be delayed by questions of financial
resources. H aving in view the enormous importance o f the scheme for Turkey, it
seems only fair that Turkey should be called upon to assure the financing o f the
works. A sum amply sufficient for interest and redemption of a loan, the size of
which would be determined by the experts in conference should be set aside, say
from the Basra customs, on ly to be paid over to the turkish Exchequer if the dues
have covered all requirements.
Some stipulations seem desirable, by which, in case the turkish commission
failed to achieve what has been stipulated in article 4 of the protocol, international
control o f the com m ission should take place. The best way, perhaps, to establish
the fact that the turkish com m ission has failed would be technical arbitration on the
line o f article 8 of our last proposals. H ere too it seems, that for definitely drafting
our convention the finding of an inform al expert conference would be of great
assistance.
Believe m e, &c.
KU H LM A N N .

E nclosure in No. 147.

Die H am burg-A m erikanische Paketfahrt-Aktiengesellschaft sendet monatlich

zwei Dam pfer nach dem Persischen Golf von durchschnittlich 7000 Tons Tragfähigkeit.
Der durchschnittliche Tiefgang dieser Dampfer bei Eintreffen vor der Basra-Barre
ist 221 F uss-2 3 F u ss; der grösste Tiefgang ist 25 Fuss.
Die Wasserverhältnisse zwischen Basra und dem Meere sind bis auf zwei Stellen
gut zu nennen. Es existieren zwei Barren, die eine an der Mündung des Shat-el-
Arab bei Fao, die andere am Einfluss des Karun in den Shat-el-Arab bei Mohammerah.
Die grössere und gefährlichere ist diejenige bei Fao. Zweimal im Monat, bei Voll-
und Neum ond, ist auf dieser Barre der höchste W asserstand, d.h . Maximum bei
Südwind 21^ Fuss. Eine Überwindung der Barre mit voll ausgenutzten Dampfern
ohne Leichterung, sowohl ausgehend wie heim kehrend, ist ganz ausserordentlich
selten.
Die gewünschte W assertiefe auf der Barre ist 25 Fuss.
Es steht zu erwarten, dass bei den grossen Eisenbahnmaterialtransporten, die
einsetzen werden, sobald das B asra-B agdad-S tück der Bagdadbahn von Basra aus in
Angriff genomm en wird, auch noch grössere Dampfer von der H am burg-A m erika­
Linie aus zur Expedition gelangen werden.
Die H am burg-A m erika-Linie ist der Ansicht, dass die Durchbaggerung der Fao-
und M oham m erah-Barren dringend notwendig ist und dass die E infahrten und die
Fahrrinnen, vor allem die E infahrt bei Fao, durch Leuchtbojen auch bei Nacht
passierbar gemacht werden.
W ährend der Shat-el-Arab von Fao bis Basra mit Ausnahme der beiden oben
erwähnten Barren durchgehends eine, zu allen Jahreszeiten allen Ansprüchen
genügende Tiefe hat, ist dahin zu streben, dass durch die beiden Barren eine
Fahrrinne von 25 Fuss Tiefe bei niedrigster Flut offen gehalten wird.
 225
N o. 148.
M inute by M r. Parker . (*)
F.O. 4 0 6 2 6 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, S eptem ber 2, 1913.
H err von Kuehlmann called to-day(2) and we discussed further the British
counter-draft of the Anglo-German Convention respecting the Bagdad Railway and
cognate matters.
He said he had received a copy from M . de Fleuriau o f the agreement come to
at Berlin between the French and German grou p s; that he had appreciated
M. de Fleuriau’ s action in doing this; and that it would afford him an opportunity
for discussing with him the A leppo-M eskene project, to see if it was not possible to
reach a settlement agreeable to Germany and to France.
He rem inded me that Hakki Pasha had made a suggestion to the effect that the
French might perhaps receive an assurance from the Ottoman Government that the
concession in question would not be given to any concessionnaire who had not the
support o f the French Governm ent, but that it should not be given at any rate until
the Bagdad Railway had become a com m ercial success, say until a specified number
of years had elapsed. I replied that under the existing system o f kilometric
guarantees it was very hard for the Bagdad Railway to becom e a com m ercial su ccess;
but he reminded me that the system o f guarantees was under discussion with a view
to securing a modification.
He said there was very strong feeling against the A leppo-M eskene line in
Berlin : it was felt that if it were worked in conjunction with the navigation conces­
sion on the Euphrates it might damage the Bagdad Railway. I said that this fear
seemed exaggerated : the Aleppo-M eskene line would serve a different district to the
Bagdad Railway, and one altogether to the south o f that railway. It seemed to me
that it would feed the French Syrian system without damaging the Bagdad lin e ;
moreover, navigation up to Meskene would be very long in being brought about.
It was in consequence of M . de Fleuriau’s com m unication made to me orally
on the 1st September that I spoke about this line : a written com m unication from
M. de Fleuriau is promised this week on this and other points.(3)
Herr von Kuehlmann then mentioned that he had received a private letter from
Herr von Jaegow to the effect that Germ any must press for two-fifths, instead of
one-third as proposed, in the Turkish share o f the new river navigation com pany.
If Turkey does not object it is considered unnecessary that we should do so, as it
is only a difference o f about 3 per cent., and will in no way invalidate Lord Inch cap e’ s
control over the whole.
I read to him our draft, as prepared by Mr. Hurst and approved by Sir E . Grey,
of article 6 o f the convention. This is the article referring to the Shatt-el-Arab
commission : he agreed that it would serve as a basis of discussion, and wTe are to
go into the question more fully on the 4th September when he comes again.
A copy o f article 6 of the British counter-draft is annexed for facility of reference.
I impressed upon him the great importance His M ajesty’ s Governm ent attach
to article 3 (b ).(4).
A. P [A R K E R ].
S eptem ber 2, 1913.
I inform ed H err von Kuehlmann of Sir E . G rey’ s views as to an inform al meeting
of experts to discuss the reasonable requirements of mercantile shipping in regard
to the Shatt-el-Arab, and he said he would telegraph to B erlin. I told him we
suggested provisionally some time next week as the date for it to take place.
A. P.
(*) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta ken from th e C on fid en tial P rin t, as the o rig in a l d r a ft
ca n n ot be tra ce d .]
(*) [cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 2 3 2 -3 ; 235 '
(3) [r . in fra , pp. 228-9, N o. 150.]
(4) [ i\ in fra, p. 239, No. 154, en cl.]
[10900] Q
 226

A nnex.

British C ounter-Draft.

A r t ic l e 6.

The Im perial German Governm ent having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913,(5) under which the free navigation of the Shatt-
el-Arab is assured to the shipping of all nations and a com m ission is established
for the execution o f such works as may be necessary for the improvem ent of its
channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes set out therein, and
being of opinion that the provisions of the convention are conducive to the best
interests of international com m erce, will, so long as the duties imposed upon the
com m ission by the said convention are satisfactorily carried out, uphold the conven­
tion, and will undertake that German subjects and German shipping shall com ply
therewith, and with all regulations issued by the com m ission, and . . . . shall duly
discharge all dues, fines, or other pecuniary obligations properly imposed upon them.
If at any time the Imperial German Governm ent are of opinion that the duties
imposed upon the com m ission are not satisfactorily carried out, or that the reasonable
requirements of the com m erce of the river in matters within the competence o f the
com m ission are not adequately m et, and if the com m ission has not seen its way to
give effect to important recomm endations laid before it in the interests o f German
shipping, H is M ajesty’ s Government will use their good offices with the Im perial
Turkish Government to ensure the reference to a commission o f enquiry, appointed
in accordance with article o f the Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes,(6) of the questions whether in any particular respects the
duties o f the commission have not been satisfactorily carried out, and whether there
is good ground for thinking that the com m ission, if maintained, will not be able to
provide for the reasonable requirements of the com m erce o f the river.

(*) [v. supra, pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]

(6) [rp. (loach <f- T em p erley, V ol. V I I I , pp. 303-4, Nos. 261-2. R e fe re n ce is g iv en there
to A . & P ., (1908), C X X I V , [C d. 4174], pp. 766 -7 .]

No. 149.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward G r e y .{1)

Constantinople, S eptem ber 3, 1913.

F .O . 4 0 7 1 7 /1 5 0 6 2 /1 3 /3 4 . D. 3 -15 p . m .
Tel. (No. 451.) R . 6-45 p . m .
Your telegram No. 4 3 5 .(2)
Questions 1 to 4 appear to contemplate offences committed b y individuals, and
question 5 those committed by ships. In latter case little serious attempt is made

( ') [C op ies o f this teleg ram w ere sent t o the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to the In d ia
Office.]
(2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 435) o f A u gu st 28, 1913, D. 2-40 p . m ., is not rep ro
du ced. (F.O . 3 8 0 5 3 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .) In it he stated th a t “ ex a ct in form a tion is req u ired as to
presen t ex ercise o f ju risd ictio n ov er foreig n ers com m ittin g breaches o f p ort reg u la tion s or other
a n alog ou s reg u lation s issued by O ttom an authorities.
1) Is arrest by O ttom an p olice perm issible w ith ou t consular s a n ctio n ?
2) I f not, is consular san ction necessary even in cases o f u rg e n c y ?
3) Can an O ttom an C ou rt exercise ju ris d ictio n ?
4) I f so, un d er w hat co n d itio n s?
5) W h a t, fo r instance, h appens at Sm yrna if a foreig n ship d isrega rd s ord ers o f port
a u th ority as to h er p lace o f a n ch ora g e? ” ]
 227

by Turks to enforce such regulations as exist, and even in form er it is difficult to

make an exact statement, as the principles governing all such matters are subject to
perpetual controversy between the Porte and Powers. Powers, m oreover, do not
all hold the same views. In practice, cases find a more or less arbitrary solution
dependent on special circumstances.
Subject to this general statement and further reservations m entioned below,
answers to your questions are :—

1. Missions claim, and Porte still recognises in practice, that Ottoman authorities
cannot arrest a foreigner except in flagrante delicto. Most Powers claim
that in all cases consular authority alone can detain accused person pending
trial. Even in case o f arrest in flagrante delicto they maintain that accused
should be surrendered. Porte contests this. In practice His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent allows detention in Turkish prison provided that consular
authorities acquiesce in necessity for it.
2. Yes, unless case comes within definition in flagrante delicto.
3. All Powers except United States and one or two m inor Powers wrould admit
Ottoman courts’ jurisdiction subject to capitulatory rights, but prosecutions
o f foreigners under regulations o f the kind referred to are rare. Exercise
o f jurisdiction does not im ply right to execute sentence. Some Powers
claim that this right belongs exclusively to consular authorities. Others,
including Great Britain, admit right o f Ottoman authorities to execute
with consular assistance.
4. See previous answer. Principal requirement o f Capitulations is that consular
delegate should attend proceedings. Powers maintain that his assent is
necessary to validity o f sentence. Porte asserts that his presence alone
is necessary.
5. Turkish authorities would apply to consular authority, which would order ship
to com ply with their requirements if reasonable. I f ship defied consular
authority also, Turkish authorities might take legal proceedings or hamper
s h ip ’ s freedom b y withholding p a p ers; but such a case would hardly ever
arise.

Further reservations mentioned above are as follows :—

1. Questions answered on assumption that regulations themselves are recognised
by the Powers as applicable to foreigners (see m y despatch No. 701 of
4th A ugust).(s)
2. No Power would allow Ottoman authorities to effect arrests on board foreign
ships. It is doubtful whether they would admit jurisdiction o f Turkish
courts in respect o f an infringem ent o f regulations committed on board;
but in absence of actual cases it is difficult to say what their attitude
would be.

His M ajesty’ s consul at Basra, whom I have consulted, agrees with foregoing.
He says, further, with reference to question 5, that in Basra ships anchor where
they ca n ; that Turks, in practice, rarely interfere with foreign ships unless invited ;
that, in case o f difficulty, local authorities would invite consul to arrange it ; and
that he has always settled such cases amicably.

(3) [M r. M a r lin g ’ s despa tch (N o. 701), D . A u g u st 4, R . A u g u st 18, 1913, is n ot rep rod u ced ,
as it is tech n ica l in cha ra cter. I t was a d eta iled answ er to S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ra m
(N o. 372) o f A u g u st 2, 1913, v. supra, p. 200, N o. 127. (F .O . 3 8 0 5 3 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)] '

[10900]
 228
N o. 150.

Communication from M. de Fleuriau. (*)

Ambassade de France, à Londres,

F .O . 4 07 1 4 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . S eptem ber 3, 1913.
Le Gouvernement Français a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt du
m émorandum relatif aux négociations engagées à propos du chemin de fer de Bagdad
que le Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat pour les Affaires Etrangères avait adressé à l ’ Ambassade de
France le 14 août dernier,(2) et il est heureux de constater la complète identité de
ses vues et de celles du Gouvernement Britannique. Il n ’ élève d ’objections sur aucun
des quatre points visés à la fin du mémorandum :—

(1) Le Gouvernement Britannique demande qu’ aucun traitement différentiel ne

soit imposé aux produits britanniques sur aucun chemin de fer, construit ou à
construire par des entreprises françaises en Turquie, et que le Gouvernement Français
donne son adhésion à l ’ arrangement projeté entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie
prohibant tout traitement différentiel sur aucune ligne de chemin de fer en Turquie
d ’ Asie.
L e Chargé d ’ Affaires de France est autorisé à donner au Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat pour
les Affaires Etrangères des assurances formelles à cet égard.
(2) Le Gouvernement Britannique demande que le Gouvernement Français lui
prête, s ’ il est nécessaire, son appui afin de faire aboutir les arrangements négociés
entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie et dont le texte a été communiqué confiden­
tiellement à M. P. Cambon, les 17 et 18 juin d ernier.(3) Cn de ces arrangements
concerne la concession par le Gouvernement Ottoman à une compagnie ottomane
placée sous le contrôle britannique du droit d ’organiser la navigation sur le Tigre et
l ’ Euphrate, et le Gouvernement Britannique attire l ’ attention du Gouvernement
français sur ce fait qu’ il sera probablement nécessaire d ’ accorder <à la compagnie de
Bagdad une participation d ’ importance minime dans la nouvelle compagnie de
navigation afin d ’ assurer à cette dernière ou à d ’ autres intéressées britanniques une
participation dans la concession des ports de Bagdad et Bassorah détenue par la
compagnie du Bagdad.
Le Chargé d ’ affaires de France est autorisé à déclarer au Secrétaire d ’ Etat pour
les Affaires Etrangères que son Gouvernement est tout disposé à donner au Gouverne­
ment Britannique s’ il est nécessaire l ’ appui qui lui est demandé et qu’ il ne voit pas
d ’ inconvénient à l ’octroi à la Compagnie du chemin de fer de Bagdad d ’ une
participation d ’ importance minime dans la compagnie de navigation du Tigre et de
l ’ Euphrate.
Le Gouvernement Français de son côté se préoccupe d ’ assurer dans l ’ avenir la
ligne A lep-M eskené à une entreprise française. Cet embranchem ent, qui doit relier
un jour l ’ Enphrate au réseau syrien, figurait dans les projets d ’ accords franco-
ottomans ^et la Turquie paraît disposée à prendre l ’ engagement de ne pas concéder
le chemin de fer en question sans se mettre d ’ accord avec la Société des chemins
de fer Damas-ITamah et prolongements. Cette stipulation ne vise que l ’ avenir.
La ligne A lep-M eskené ne présentera en effet d ’ intérêt que le jour où la naviga­
tion aura été organisée sur l ’ Euphrate par la nouvelle Compagnie turco-britannique ;
elle sera alors le complément indispensable de l ’ œuvre entreprise par la Grande­
Bretagne ; et le Gouvernement Français espère que, le moment venu, le Gouverne­
ment Britannique lui prêtera son appui en vue de faire accorder la concession A lep -

t 1) [T h is com m u n ica tion is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g . C opies w ere sent
to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]
( 2) [v. supra, pp. 207-9, N o. 135.]
(3) [cp . supra, p. 208, N o. 135, and n o te (*).]
 229

Meskené à une compagnie française. Le Chargé d ’ Affaires de France serait heureux

de recevoir des assurances à cet égard.
(3) Le Gouvernement Britannique demandait que la conclusion de l ’ arrangement
franco-allemand fût hâtée autant que possible.
Le Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat pour les Affaires Étrangères a été tenu au courant des
pourparlers engagés entre les groupes financiers français et allemand du B agdad;
le Gouvernement français ne néglige rien pour presser l ’ examen des combinaisons
financières envisagées à B erlin ; il espère être prochainement en mesure de prendre
à cet égard une décision et d ’obtenir .l’ adhésion du Gouvernement allemand à l ’accord
esquissé entre financiers.
(4) Si cet espoir se réalise le Gouvernement Français n ’ aura pas besoin de recourir
aux bons offices du Gouvernement Britannique afin d ’ arriver à une transaction entre
les points de vue français et allemand en ce qui concerne les concessions des chemins
de fer et les garanties d ’intérêt. Mais il tient à rem ercier le Gouvernement
Britannique de l ’offre aimable que contenait le dernier paragraphe du Mem orandum
du 14 août.
Ce 3 septem bre, 1913.

No. 151.

Sir Echcard G rey to Mr. Marling.

F.O. 4 07 1 7 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .
Tel. (No. 451.) F oreign Office, S eptem ber 5, 1913, 7*40 p . m .
Your telegram No. 451 of S e p te m b e r ] 3 .(')
Following formula for a note to be exchanged between Great Britain and Turkey
was prepared and discussed at a meeting with Hakki Pasha to-day :—
“ Il est bien entendu que les clauses des articles 7 et 8 de la convention
relative à l ’ établissement d ’ une com m ission pour améliorer les conditions de la
navigation du Chatt-el-Arab, conclue le 29 juillet, 1913,(2) ne modifient en rien
les droits dont jouissent actuellement en Turquie les ressortissants de certaines
Puissances en vertu des traités existants.”

Hakki Pasha is telegraphing to Ottoman G ov fern m en ]t for sanction. Do you

see any objections to form u la ?/3) Reference to articles 6 (c) and 11 is omitted because
concurrence of important Powers in establishment of Commission has been invited,
and, unless these provisions are accepted, there can be no Commission.

p i [v. supra, pp. 226-7, N o. 149.]

(2) [V sup ra , p. 186, No. 124 (1 ).]
(3) [M r. M a rlin g ’ s rep ly w as g iv en in his despa tch (N o. 798), D . S eptem b er 17,
R . S eptem b er 22, 1913. H e suggested certa in qu estion s fo r e x p e r t ex a m in a tion , chiefly w ith
reg a rd to m ethods of m eetin g the necessary expenses o f g ra n tin g free n a v ig a tio n in th e
S h a tt-el-A ra b. (F.O . 4 3 2 7 2 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]

[E D . N O T E .— A con feren ce betw een G erm an an d B ritish e x p erts was held a t the F oreig n
Office on S eptem ber 9, 1913, to discuss m easures desirable for the im p rov em en t o f n a v ig a tio n
in the S h a tt-el-A ra b. The rep ort, w hich is v ery d eta iled , is n ot rep rod u ced here (F .O . 41628/
1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 ), b u t th e recom m en da tion s draw n up at the con feren ce are p rin ted in fr a , pp. 253-4
N o. 161, A n n e x N o. 1. cp. also G .E., X X X V I I (I ), pp . 2 37 -9 .]
 23 0

N o. 152.
Communication to M . de Fleuriau.C)

F.O. 4 07 1 4 /2 5 53 3 /1 3 /4 4. Foreign Office, S eptem ber 17, 1913.

H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] have not failed to examine with close attention
the memoranda com m [unicate]d by the French Charge d ’ Affaires on August 2 9 (2)
and Sept [em ber] 3 (3) resp [ectin ]g (a) the progress of the Franco-Germ an negotia­
tions in regard to railway enterprises in A [sia tic] Turkey and ( b) certain agreements
which have recently been the subject of negotiation between H [ is ] M [a je sty’ s]
G [overn m en t] and the Im p [e ria ]l Ottoman G ov[ernm en]t.
II [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] have learnt with m uch pleasure of the marked
progress towards a com plete agreement made on the occasion of the recent visit of
French financiers to Berlin. They observe, however, that the French G ov[ern m en ]t,
while regarding an early agreement as probable, do not consider the understanding
to be as yet definitive, and that importance is still attached by the French
G ov [ern m en ]t to the Anglo-G erm an and Franco-Germ an agreements being concluded
on the same date.
In response to this desire, I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] will not precipitate
the conclusion of their agreement with G erm a n y; but they have reason to believe that
the project for a line from Meskene to Aleppo is regarded with some opposition in
Berlin and, in these circumstances and with a view to rem oving what is apparently
the sole outstanding point of difficulty, they venture to think that, a lth o[u gh ] the
project is not to be carried into imm ediate execution and to that extent concerns the
future rather than the present, there would be distinct advantage in a direct discussion
on the subject between the French and German parties interested, in order that an
early settlement may if possible be reached.
H [ i s ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] take note with satisfaction of the assurances
contained in the memorandum o f 3rd September in regard to the prohibition of
differential treatment on French railways, present or future, in Turkey. They also
desire to express their gratitude to the French G ov [ern m en ]t for their promise of
support in respect of the Anglo-Turkish agreements, the drafts of which were
com m [u n ica te]d to the French A m b [a ssa d o]r on June 17 and 18 last.(4). Sir E. Grey
has the honour to state, for the confidential inform ation of the French
G ov [ern m en ]t, that these arrangements were signed on July 29th last,(5) but that it is
not intended that they should com e into operation pending the conclusion of the
Anglo-G erm an agreement. II [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] will, however,
appreciate the support of the French G ov [ern m en ]t in so far as it may be necessary
in any further negotiations, either with the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t or with other
Powers, in order to carry the arrangements, and especially that concerning the
Shatt-el-Arab convention, into full effect.

0 ) [T h is m em orandum is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g . C opies w ere sent to

the In d ia O ffice; to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e .]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 220-1, N o. 145, en cl.]
( 3) [v. supra, pp. 228-0, N o. 150.]
( 4) [ c p . supra, p. 208, N o. 135, and n o te (4).]
( 5) [t\ supra, pp. 183-98, N o. 124.]
 231

N o. 153.

Communication from M . de Fleu n au .(l)

F.O. 4 2 8 3 7 /2 5 5 3 3 /1 3 /4 4 . London, S eptem ber 18, 1913.

Accord sur les Chemins de F er et E ntreprises de Travaux publics en Turquie d'Asie.
Entre son Excellence Mehmet Djavid B ey, ancien Ministre des Finances et des
Travaux publics, au nom du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman, d ’ une part, et son.
Excellence Monsieur Stéphen Pichon, Sénateur, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, au
nom du Gouvernement de la République française, d ’ autre part, il a été convenu ce
qui suit :
A r t ic l e 1.

Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman déclare que les contrats concernant la

construction immédiate et l ’ exploitation des lignes de chem in de fer S am soun-S ivas-
T chalta-E rzindjan-Pékéridj et Tchalta-K harpout ont été paraphés le 4 septembre.
1913, avec le groupe français.
Ces mêmes contrats visent :
1. la construction d ’ une ligne entre Hawza et Castamouni et au delà, pour se
joindre à la ligne venant de B olou ;
2. la construction éventuelle d ’ un em branchem ent de S oulou-S eraï vers
Yozgad;
3. la construction éventuelle d ’ une ligne de Trébizonde à Pékéridj.

A r t ic l e 2.

Au cas où la com pagnie du chem in de fer d ’ Anatolie renoncerait à la partie de

sa concession A da-B a za r-B olou , comprise entre Duzdjé, à l ’ Ouest de Bolou, et un
point situé à 60 kilomètres à l ’ Est de Bolou, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman
s’ engage à donner la construction et l ’ exploitation de cette ligne au groupe français.

A r t ic l e 3.

Dès que la construction de la ligne K harpout-E rgana-M aden et de son prolonge­

ment éventuel vers Bitlis et Yan sera décidée, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman en
chargera le groupe français à des conditions analogues à celles des contrats déjà
intervenus.
A r t ic l e 4.

L e Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman lorsqu’ il se décidera à relier ce nouveau

réseau au réseau d ’ Anatolie, fera en sorte que leur indépendance réciproque soit
sauvegardée. Notamment en ce qui concerne la construction de l ’ embranchem ent
partant de S oulou-Seraï vers Yozgad, il accordera au groupe français la concession
d’ une partie de cet embranchement partant de S oulou-Seraï et aboutissant à la ligne
de partage des eaux entre le Yéchil Irm ak et le Kizil-Irm ak.

A r t ic l e 5.

L e Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman accepte en principe de confier les études, la

construction et l ’ exploitation des ports d'H éraclée et d ’ Inéboli à un groupe français
avec lequel il est en pourparlers.
L orsqu’ il sera décidé d ’ établir une voie ferrée entre le port d ’ H éraclée et la ligne
H aw za-C astam ouni-B olou-D uzdjé, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman, prenant en
considération que cette voie ferrée sera une dépendance directe du port et de la ligne,

0 ) [C op ies (C on fid en tia l) o f this a greem en t w ere sent to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O péra ­
tio n s ; to the B o a rd o f T r a d e ; to the A d m ira lty .]
 232

en confiera la construction au groupe français, à des conditions analogues à celles des

contrats déjà intervenus.

A r t ic l e 6.

Dans le cas où la Banque Nationale de Turquie renoncerait à son droit et

q u ’ aucune autre Banque ne serait subrogée aux droits et obligations de ladite
banque, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman accepte, en principe, d ’ accorder au groupe
français la construction et l ’ exploitation des ports de Samsoun et de Trébizonde aux
conditions arrêtées entre le Gouvernement Ottoman et ledit groupe.

A r t ic l e 7.

La concession ferme du prolongement du chemin de fer A lep-R ayak jusqu’ à

Ram leh est agréée par le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman et le contrat y relatif a été
paraphé le 27 Août, 1913.

A r t ic l e 8.

L ’ exploitation com binée du réseau de la Compagnie Dam as-IIam ah et Prolonge­

ments et de la ligne Deraa-Caïffa étant de nature à donner lieu à de nouvelles
difficultés à l ’ avenir, le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman qui a le ferme désir de
protéger les capitaux français engagés dans l ’ Empire, accepte la consolidation des
recettes de la ligne D am as-B eyrouth-M zérib, sur la base du contrat paraphé le
27 Août, 1913.
La nom ination à la tête de la ligne Deraa-Caïffa d ’un directeur en chef de
nationalité française relevant directement et exclusivement de Constantinople,
dissipera tout malentendu à ce sujet à l ’ avenir.

A r t ic l e 9.

Le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman déclare au Gouvernement de la République

française qu’ il a paraphé, le 27 Août, 1913, avec la société Dam as-H am ah et
Prolongem ents un contrat aux termes duquel il s’ engage à reporter au 5 Mai, 1943,
la date à partir de laquelle il aura la faculté de racheter les lignes concédées à la
société Dam as-H am ah et Prolongem ents y compris la ligne de Rayak à Ram leh. Il
s ’ engage, en outre, à ne racheter aucune des lignes concédées à ladite société sans
racheter en même temps l ’ ensemble de son réseau.

A r t ic l e 10.

Pour faciliter à la société du chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, sa contribu­

tion à l ’ établissement d ’ un port à Jaffa, le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman est
disposé à prolonger la durée de la concession du chemin de fer et à proroger la date
à partir de laquelle il aura le droit de racheter celui-ci suivant les conditions et dates
fixées dans la convention passée avec le groupe français concernant les ports.
E n vue de protéger les capitaux français engagés dans le chemin de fer de Jaffa
à Jérusalem, contre les difficultés pouvant résulter de l ’ exploitation simultanée de
cette ligne et de la ligne Afouleh-Jérusalem , le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman
s’ engage à provoquer entre ces deux lignes une entente de tarifs.

A r t ic l e 11.

Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman est disposé à confier à un groupe français

les études, la construction et l ’ exploitation des ports de Jaffa, de Tripoli et de Caïffa.
 233
A r t ic l e 12.

Au cas où le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman prendrait une décision au sujet

de l ’ établissement d ’ un port ou d ’ une jetée à Djounié ou à Nébi-Younous, la
construction et l ’ exploitation en seront confiées à la société du port de Beyrouth.

A r t ic l e 13.

Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman fait remarquer qu’ en vertu des conventions

existantes, la société des tramways libanais est tenue d ’ achever la construction des
lignes prévues et que les droits de ladite société se trouvent périmés pour les lignes
non construites.
Cependant, pour faciliter la régularisation de la situation présente de la société,
le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman consent à lui accorder un délai de 5 ans pour la
construction des lignes facultatives qui deviennent par cela même obligatoires et
accepte aussi la prolongation de la durée de la concession des tramways libanais sur
la base du contrat paraphé le 4 Septembre, 1913.

A r t ic l e 14.

Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman, bien que la construction de la ligne Alep

à Meskéné ne lui paraisse pas présenter d ’ utilité déclare qu ’ il s’ est engagé vis-à-vis
de la société des chemins de fer de D am as-H am ah et Prolongem ents à ne pas la
concéder ultérieurement sans se mettre d ’ accord avec ladite Société.
, S. PICH ON .
M. D JA V ID .
Paraphé à Paris, le 11 Septembre, 1913.

M IN U T E S .

In com m u n ica tin g t o m e th is agreem ent, fo r S ir E. G rey ’ s con fid en tia l in fo rm a tio n ,
M. de F leu ria u said it w ould n ot becom e o p e r a tiv e u n til the sign a tu re o f a n other a greem en t
which was* still un d er n eg otia tion at C on sta n tin op le resp ectin g a num ber o f sm all b u t in
p ractice very im p o rta n t reform s in th e a d m in istra tiv e m a ch in ery and oth er details.
Y et a n oth er con v en tion had been sign ed, b u t he ha d n ot y et received a cop y. H e w ou ld
let m e see it as soon as received. This dealt w ith th e custom s in crease, th e ta riff, a p p li­
ca tion o f new taxes, m onopolies, prom ise to stu d y q uestion of ca p itu la tion s, octr o i etc. etc., in
fa ct all the m a tters on w hich we also are n e g o tia tin g w ith th e P o r t e .(2)

T he presen t con v en tion cov ers a la rg e num b er o f concessions fo r the co n s tru c tio n o f
railw ays and ports, p a rtly new, and p a rtly confirm ed afresh.
T he m ost in terestin g item fo r us at th e m om ent is th e u n d e rta k in g g iv en b y T u rk ey in
the last a rtic le (14) n ot to g iv e a concession fo r th e A le p p o -M e s k e n é lin e w ith ou t th e consent
of the F ren ch ra ilw ay com p an y w hich has itself a p p lied fo r th a t concession.
M r. P a r k e r to see.
E. A. C.
S ept [em b er] 20.
E. G.
S ir E. Crowe.
M ig h t we not, in confidence, show a rtic le 6 to S ir H . B a b in g ton -S m ith , w ith referen ce to
previous corresp on d en ce?
A . P.
• S ep t [em b er] 27,1913.
I a gree.(3)
E. A. C.
O c t [o b e r ] 1.

(2) [cp. in fra , pp . 367-8, Ed. N o t e .]

(3) [A co p y was sent a ccord in g ly to S ir H . B a b in g ton Sm ith on O ctob er 6, 1913.]
 234

N o. 154.
Communication to H err von Kühlm ann.(l)

F .O . 4 2 8 3 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . S eptem ber 18, 1913.

His M ajesty’ s Government have examined with close attention the counter-draft,
com m unicated by the German Ambassador on the lGth July, 1913,(2) of the proposed
Anglo-G erm an convention respecting the Bagdad Railway and cognate matters ; they
have also considered the various memoranda which accompanied this docum ent, and
the detailed explanations which His Serene H ighness was good enough to furnish
in a private note of the same date.
Sir E. Grey now has the honour to submit a revised counter-draft, printed, for
the sake of convenience, with the German counter-drafc in parallel colum ns,(3) and to
deal with the several points which have been raised by referring, where necessary,
seriatim to the articles o f the British counter-draft.

Article 1, Clause (a).— The German Government suggest that the words “ under I
the express condition that this should not cause any prejudice of a financial or
economical nature ’ ’ might be om itted. His M ajesty’ s Government consider, however,
that without such words the clause might be interpreted as com m itting them,
unconditionally and indefinitely, to liability not to oppose any increases of the •
Turkish customs duties which might be proposed, or any allocations o f specific I
revenues which might be claimed, if such increases or allocations wTere ever deemed
desirable, either to provide further guarantees for, or in any other interest of, the
Bagdad Railway Company.
Article 1, Clause ( b).— His M ajesty’ s Governm ent note that the German Govern­
ment w’ould prefer the drafting o f this clause to be in a positive rather than a negative ''
form , though such a modification would not materially alter the nature of the obligation
concurred [ s ic : incurred]. His M ajesty’ s Government have given this point careful
consideration, but, on the whole, it appeal’s to them expedient to retain the wording
o f the British counter-draft ; this wording corresponds, m oreover, with the under- I
taking the German Government propose to give in article 4 (a) as regards the ’
navigation of the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates.
Article 1, Clause (c).— His M ajesty’ s Governm ent attach importance to the i
insertion of this provision. The undertaking to be given by the German Government
under the proposed wording is m erely that they will “ use their best endeavou rs’ ’
for the purpose stated ; but H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent appreciate the technical
difficulty that the German Government cannot theoretically ensure the election o f the
directors in question without the co-operation o f the Bagdad Railway Company ; and
they are accordingly prepared to agree that if and when a British group is formed,
the arrangements suggested in Prince Lichnow sky’ s note would be satisfactory to
them. The question, howrever, whether a British group can be successfully formed
must necessarily depend on the financial conditions o f participation. His M ajesty’ s
G overnm ent accordingly rely upon the German Government using their powerful
influence to prevent the imposition of such conditions by the Bagdad Railway
Company as would make participation unattractive to British financiers, and so
frustrate the object o f the clause under discussion, viz., British representation on the
directorate. The)' do not believe that the prospects laid by H err von Gwinner before

0 ) [T h is m em orandum is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g . cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I),

pp. 240-51.]
(2) [i\ supra, pp. 174-9, N o. 118, an d e n d s.]
(3) [T h e B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft is p rin ted here as an enclosure. T he G erm an d r a ft of
J u ly 16, 1913, is given supra, pp. 177-9, N o. 118, en d . 3 .]
 285
Sir H. B abington-Sm ith on the 14th June, 1913,(4) as to the conditions of British
participation are likely to result in a settlement.
Article 2 .— The preamble o f this article has been amended so as to meet the
proposal embodied in clause (a) o f article 7 o f the German counter-draft, and in order
that the conclusion o f the proposed arrangement between the Bagdad Railway
Company and the Ottoman Governm ent m ay be treated as a prelim inary to the
signature of the Anglo-G erm an convention, a point to which His M ajesty’ s G overn­
ment attach prim ary importance.
Article 2, Clause (a), corresponds to the German counter-draft.
Article 2, Clause (b), corresponds to the German counter-draft; but His M ajesty’ s
Government would, as the German Charge d ’ Affaires has already been inform ed, value
an assurance (which might either be added to this clause, or given b y an exchange
of notes, should the German Governm ent deem such a course to be preferable) that
there will be effective publication o f all rates and conditions on the Bagdad Railway
and o f all intended changes therein, and that the notice to be given of such changes
will not be less than two months in the case of both increases and decreases.
Article 2, Clause (c), corresponds to the German counter-draft. His M ajesty’ s
Government have carefully considered the statement o f Prince Lichnowsky that the
German Governm ent would attach importance to receiving a note confirm ing that,
in the event of the construction of the Basra (Zobeir) Gulf branch, His M ajesty’ s
Government would take steps to secure that the Bagdad Railway Company is
represented on the Board o f the Company to be form ed for the construction and
working o f the said line in the same manner as British capital will be represented
on the Board o f the Bagdad Railway Company.
It appears, however, to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent that the British representation
on the Bagdad Railway finds its counterpart in German participation in the river
navigation, and that it is hardly reasonable that Germany should claim to participate
in the latter and in an eventual branch o f the railway to the Persian Gulf as well.
His M ajesty’ s Government trust that this point will not be pressed.
Article 2, Clause (d).— His M ajesty’ s Governm ent understand from Prince
Lichnowrsky’ s note, that while the German Governm ent in their counter-draft suggest
that British participation in the ports of Bagdad and Basra should not be less than
20 per cen t., they are prepared to concede 40 per cent, if so desired. It will be
observed that the British counter-draft om its all reference to British participation in
the port o f Bagdad, while claim ing a British participation of 50 per cen t., as regards
capital, directorate and contracts, in the port of Basra. Having regard to the fact
that no British participation is claimed in the Railway Com pany’ s proposed port at
Bagdad, and to the large proportion which British shipping at the port o f Basra
bears to that of the total shipping (the steam vessels entered and cleared at that port
during the year 1912 having been 217 British, 12 Germ an, 5 Russian, and 1 French),
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent confidently believe that the degree o f participation claimed
will be regarded as very m oderate, and indeed as highly desirable in the genera]
interests of the port. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent further consider it desirable that
the principal conditions as to the form ation and operation o f the port at Basra should
be laid down in the present convention.
Article 3, Clause (a), corresponds to the German counter-draft.
Article 3, Clause ( b), gives effect to article 3 of the original British draft of
10th June, 1913 : this article is ignored in the German counter-draft, but it consti­
tutes, in the view o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, a most important and essential
condition o f the present convention. W ithout it, the provisions o f article 2, clause (a),

(4) [S ir H . B a b in g ton S m ith ’ s le tte r to S ir L . M a llet, D . J u n e 16, R J u n e 17, 1913,

enclosed a m em orandum o f his con v ersation w ith H e r r von C w in n er on J u n e 14. T he la tter
proposed th a t a B ritish g ro u p should ta k e 10% o f th e to ta l ca p ita l o f the C om p an y and
“ a p r o p o r tio n a te share in the sy n d ica te fo r rea lisin g th e G overn m en t bonds ” ; he also
suggested th a t a B ritish g ro u p “ should ta k e a share o f 40% in the com p an y to be form ed fo r
con stru ctin g an d w ork in g the p ort o f B a sra.” (F .O . 2 7 8 0 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
 236

and article 3, clause (a), are illusory, and m ight, if it were so desired, be rendered
nugatory. Inasmuch as a principal object o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent in concluding
the present convention is to guard against such a port or railway terminus on the
Persian G ulf, except on conditions subject to their approval, they trust the German
Governm ent, who by reajson o f the railway interests o f German subjects are specially
concerned,(5) will not take exception to this clause.
It may be said without exaggeration that the attitude o f His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment throughout the present negotiations has been largely determined by the belief
that they were effectively providing against the contingency under discussion.
Article 3, Clause (c).— His M ajesty’ s Government recognise, however, that the
German Government may feel some disinclination to agree to the provisions of
article 3 of the British draft of the 10th June, 1913,( 6) if that article stands alone.
They have accordingly redrafted article 3 in such a manner that clause (a) is a
mutual undertaking, clause ( b) is a German undertaking, and clause (c) is a British
undertaking. Clause (c) m ay, in some measure, be regarded as a set-off against
clause ( b).
Clause (c) is, m oreover, designed to meet the object, under a more precise
definition, o f clause (c) o f article 1 o f the German counter-draft. Clause (c) of
article 3 does not compare unfavourably with clause (b) of the same article, when
it is borne in mind that British trade in Mesopotamia amounts to some 60 per cent,
o f the whole. H aving regard to this com m ercial predom inance, His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent have felt compelled to limit their inaction to “ railway undertakings in
direct com petition with the Bagdad Com pany’ s lin e s ’ ’ (as projected, o f course, under I
the existing concessions), and they wrould have hesitated to agree even to this
stipulation, had they not entertained com plete confidence in the German assurances I
as to equality o f treatment on that railway.
They trust, however, that the concession offered under clause (c), in the interests
of the Bagdad Bailway Company, will induce that Company, and the affiliated
Anatolian Bailway Company, to adopt a conciliatory and favourable attitude towards
certain desiderata o f the Sm yrna-Aidiri Bailway Company. These desiderata, which
have been placed before the Ottoman G overnm ent, include an option for an eventual
junction o f that Com pany’ s line with the Anatolian Com pany’ s system , on conditions
to be mutually agreed between the two companies. Inasm uch as the Anatolian
Bailway Company is already connected with Smyrna by the Smyrna-Cassaba
C om pany’ s line, it would seem that there can be no objection o f principle to such
a junction as that proposed with the Smyrna^-Aidin Com pany’ s system, and to the
establishment o f facilities for through traffic. His M ajesty’ s Government feel that
they can, with the more assurance, claim the co-operation of the German Govern­
ment in bringing about such a settlement, as the S m yrna-A idin line is the only ’
rem aining railway under British management in Turkey. They are further persuaded
that, in considering this very moderate request, the German Governm ent will not
overlook the fact that, in the recent adjustment o f certain railway claims in Turkey,
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have not only refrained for the present from claiming :
fresh railway concessions in favour o f British subjects, but have even furthered, to
the best of their ability, the adjustment in question.
Article 4 .— His M ajesty’ s Governm ent appreciate the German objection to the
idea o f a m onopoly, but it must not be overlooked that the Bagdad Bailway is itself
o f the nature o f a m onopoly, a fact which is emphasised by article 3, clause (c).
Moreover, a m onopoly of navigation exists already, and it appears to His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent that Germany, who now has no rights on the Bivers Tigris and
Euphrates beyond the carriage of railway material during the period o f construction,

(5) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. P a r k e r : “ These w ords are in serted b ecause H e r r von K iihlm an

sa id to m e he and his G o v [e rn m e n ]t d id n ot u n d ersta n d why G erm any any m ore than F ra n ce
should m ake such a d ecla ra tion . A. P .” T he w ords to w hich M r. P a r k e r refers are “ the
G erm an G overnm ent . . . . con cern ed .” ]
( ') [v. supra, p. 139, N o. 89, encl. 3.]
 237
is losing nothing more than the prospect o f participation in the very improbable
event of Turkey throwing the rivers open, for which uncertain prospect she is,
according to article 4, to be compensated by an actual share in a very profitable if
exclusive undertaking. It seems to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, therefore, that the
objection raised in Prince Lichnow sky’ s note can be answered, and they do not feel
able to amend the Anglo-Turkish declaration in the manner suggested.
Article 4, clause (a).— The second sub-clause o f the German counter-draft appears,
in these circum stances, to be superfluous, and it is, in the opinion of H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent, in itself objectionable, as appearing to put German and British interests
on the rivers on an equality, a conclusion to which His M ajesty’ s Governm ent could
on no account assent, having regard to the fact that the rivers have been navigated
by British vessels for well-nigh three centuries, and that such navigation has taken
place by virtue o f special and ancient firmans. An addition has, however, been made
to clause (a) which, it is hoped, will secure to the German Government such further
protection as they consider desirable.
Article 4, clause ( b).— Prince Lichnowsky refers in his note to “ the desire to
establish a p a ra llel” with British participation in the ports of Bagdad and Basra.
The parallel would now be confined to such participation in the latter port ; but even
so there would seem to be little analogy between participation in a single port
com pany, and participation in the lucrative enterprise o f extensive and exclusive
river navigation. .
Notwithstanding the basis of agreement suggested on the 7th M ay, 1913, H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent are, after careful consideration, prepared to agree not to
oppose German interests in acquiring not more than (as distinct from not less than)
one-third of the share-capital allotted to Turkish interests in the Ottoman Company
for river navigation. They are confident that this important concession, over and
above the terms of agreement suggested in the m emorandum of the 7th M ay, 1913,
will be borne in mind by the German Governm ent in considering the points to which
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, on their part, attach weight.
Article 4, Clause (c).— Ilis M ajesty’ s Government attach cardinal importance to
a specific limitation o f five years, and to the reservations embodied in the British
draft. But, in view of the final paragraph of this clause, they trust that an agreement
of the nature indicated may be reached between the parties interested, in which case
the wording o f the clause in question could be revised.
Article 5 o f the British counter-draft calls for no explanations, except that the
preamble has, so far as applicable, been based upon that of article 2.
Article 6 corresponds to articles 5 and 6 of the German counter-draft.
H aving regard to the fact that the whole waterway o f the Shatt-el-Arab is
Turkish, it appears to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent that the wording of article 5 of the
German counter-draft might perhaps somewhat offend Ottoman susceptibilities. The
wording of article 5 of the British draft of the 10th June, 1913,(7) was based upon the
fact that the Ottoman Governm ent, recognising the practical services rendered
through British agency in m aintaining access to the port of Basra in the past, were
prepared to conclude an agreement with His M ajesty’ s Governm ent on the lines
known to the German Governm ent.
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent have considered very carefully the proposal to
establish a ‘ ‘ comité de surveillance” contained in article 6 of the German counter­
draft, but they are persuaded that the inconvenience which would arise from the
co-existence o f two bodies would be detrimental to the interests of navigation.
They confidently believe, however, that the wording o f article 6 of the British
counter-draft will, in effect, meet the points to which the German Governm ent attach
importance.
Article 7 .— H is M ajesty’ s Government trust that this article may be suppressed
i for the reasons explained in the notes printed opposite the several clauses o f the

(7) [M a r g in a l n ote bv M r. P a r k e r : “ T h is is to foresta ll a ‘ tu q u oq u e.’ A. P .” ]

i
 288

German counter-draft. They desire to conclude a definite and operative convention

with the German Governm ent, and not one which is to remain in suspended animation.
Article 8 corresponds to the German counter-draft.
His M ajesty’s Government earnestly trust that the views expressed in this
m emorandum will command the willing assent o f the German Governm ent. They
are persuaded that an Anglo-G erm an understanding on the lines proposed will
contribute to the permanent strength, the independence, and the economic develop­
ment of the Ottoman E m pire,(8) and that this is an object to the attainment of which
Great Britain and Germany can successfully and whole-heartedly co-operate.

Enclosure in No. 154.

Anglo-G erm an Convention.

British Coxinter-draft of S eptem ber , 1913.(9)

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a). B ecognizing the general importance of the com pletion of the Bagdad j
Bailway for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction of the Bagdad
Bailway, or to prevent the participation of capital in this railway, under the express
condition that no prejudice of an econom ic or financial nature is caused to Great
Britain in pursuance of this clause.
Clause ( b). H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not
oppose the construction and management o f the proposed railway from Bagdad to
Basra by the Bagdad Bailway Company.
Clause (c). The Im perial German Governm ent declare that they will use their
best endeavours to secure that two British directors, agreeable to His Britannic
M ajesty’ s G overnm ent, shall be admitted to the board o f the Bagdad Bailway
C om pany.( 10)
A r t ic l e 2.

The Bagdad Bailway Company, having concluded with the Im perial Ottoman
Governm ent an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German Government
and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare, so far as concerns themselves,
that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best endeavours to secure
its due execution :•—
Clause (a). The terminus o f the Bagdad Bailwav Com pany’ s line shall he at
Basra, and the Bagdad Bailway Company has renounced all claims to construct a
branch line from Basra (Zobeir) to the Persian G ulf, referred to in article 1 o f the
Bagdad Bailway Convention of the 5th March, 1903,( n ) and to build a port or railway
terminus on the Persian Gulf, whether under article 2 3 (12i of the said Bagdad Bailway
Convention or in any other way derived.
Clause (b). No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the
Bagdad Bail way Com pany’ s system , either as regards facilities or rates o f charge
for the conveyance of like articles between the same points on account of the owner-
( 8) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e b y M r . P a r k e r : “ I h a v e i n s e r t e d t h i s i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e d e s i r e o f
t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d ia a n d L o r d C r e w e t h a t s o m e d e c la r a t io n o f t h e fu t u r e p o lic y o f H is
M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t t o w a r d s T u r k e y s h o u ld h e m a d e ; a n d t h is p a s s a g e w ill p e r h a p s b e
a p p r o v e d a s a n in d ic a tio n o f t h a t p o lic y . A . P .” ]
( 9) [ I n t h e o r i g i n a l t h e G e r m a n C o u n t e r - d r a f t o f J u l y 1 6 , 1 9 1 3 ( v . supra , p p . 1 7 7 - 9 , N o . 1 1 8 ,
encl. ( 3 ) , A n n e x ) , i s g i v e n i n p a r a l l e l c o l u m n s w i t h t h i s B r i t i s h C o u n t e r - d r a f t . A num ber of
c o m m e n t s in t h e o r i g i n a l m a k i n g r e fe r e n c e s fr o m o n e d r a f t t o t h e o t h e r a r e p r in t e d h e r e a s
notes ( i ° ) , ( 13) , 0 « ) , ( 15) , ( 16) , ( 17) , a n d ( 1 9 ) . ]
( 10) [ A c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e : “ ( S e e a r t i c l e 3 , c l a u s e ( c ) , o f B r i t i s h d r a f t ) ” a p p e a r s i n t h e o r i g i n a l
a s a c o m m e n t o n A r t i c le 1 , c la u s e (c ) o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t .]
(> > ) [v. B.F.S.P., V o l . 1 0 2 , p p . 8 3 3 - 4 . ]
( 1 2 ) [v. ibid., p p . 8 4 0 - 1 . ]
 239
ship, origin, or destination o f goods presented for transport, or in any other manner
whatever.
Clause (c). In the event of the construction of the said branch line from Basra
(Zobeir) to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be made
to secure facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway C om pany’ s
system, and there shall be com plete protection against discrimination, direct or
indirect.
Clause (d). The construction of the proposed port at Basra, authorised by
article 2 3 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1 9 0 3 , shall be
executed by a separate Ottoman com pany, wherein British participation, both in the
capital and directorate of the port com pany and in the contracts for construction and
maintenance, shall amount to 5 0 per cent, o f the whole. No duties or charges of
whatever nature or under whatever denom ination shall be levied by the Port Company
on any vessels or goods which shall not equally, under the same conditions, be
imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever be the nationality of the
vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country of origin or destination of the
goods, and whatever be the places from which the vessels or goods arrive or to which
they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading of vessels in the port,
no privileges or facilities shall be granted to any vessel or vessels which shall not
equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.
A ny control over the port appertaining to the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent shall
be exercised through the proposed Ottoman R iver Conservancy Commission.

A r t ic l e 3.

Clause (a). The Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government declare that they will in no case support the construction o f a branch
from Basra (Zobeir), or from any point of the main line o f the Bagdad Railway, to
the Persian G ulf unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject between
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, the Im perial German G overnm ent, and the
Imperial Ottoman Governm ent.
Clause (6). The Im perial German Governm ent declare that they will in no case
themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations whatsoever
to establish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf unless and until there
is complete agreem ent on the subject between His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent
and the Im perial German Governm ent.
Clause (c). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare that they will in no
case them selves establish or support any claim by any persons or corporations what­
soever to establish, within the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad, railway undertakings
in direct com petition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, unless and until
there is com plete agreement on the subject between the Im perial German Governm ent
and His Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent.(13)

A r t ic l e 4 .

Clause (a). The Im perial German Governm ent, having cognisance o f the
declaration signed on 1 9 1 3 , on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman
G overnm ent, concerning navigation on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, declare that
they will not oppose the execution, nor support any action directed against the
execution, o f such declaration, so long as the navigation on the said rivers is m ain­
tained in substantial accordance with the provisions thereof.
Clause ( b). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Railway interests o f not more than one-third
of the share capital allotted to Turkish interests in the Ottoman Company for river
( 13) [ A c r o s s -r e fe r e n c e : “ (S e e a r tic le 1 , c la u s e (r ), o f G e r m a n d r a ft ) a p p e a r s in t h e o r ig in a l
a s a c o m m e n t o n t h i s c l a u s e .!
 240
navigation and their representation on the board of the aforesaid com pany, by one
director out of the share of the directorate allotted to Turkish interests^11)
Clause (c). It is, nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall be
held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 o f the Bagdad Railway Convention of
the 5th March, 1903, relative to the conveyance of materials exclusively destined
for the construction o f the Bagdad Railway, except in so far that it is hereby expressly
agreed that the said rights shall not continue to be exercised for more than five years
from the date of signature of the present agreement, unless it is shown that no other
satisfactory means are available for the conveyance of the said materials and that in
any case they shall cease on the com pletion of the •construction of the Bagdad
Railway to B asra.(15)
It is further agreed that if an arrangement to the satisfaction of the parties
concerned can he made for the conveyance by river o f the aforesaid materials through
British or Ottoman agency, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Imperial
German Government will use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of such
an arrangement.
A r t ic l e 5.
The concessionnaire, nominated in pursuance of article 3 o f the aforesaid
declaration of 1913, having concluded with the Im perial Ottoman Government
an arrangement on the following basis, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the
Im perial German Government declare, so far as concerns themselves, that they
adhere to the said arrangement and* will use their best endeavours to secure its due
execution :—
Clause (a). No discrimination shall be permitted by the Ottoman Company for
river navigation, either as regards facilities or rates o f charge for the conveyance
of like articles between the same points on account of the ownership, origin, or
destination of goods presented for transport, or in any other manner whatsoever.
The Company shall grant no through bills o f lading, rebates, or other privileges of
any description in respect of goods carried by any ship between any place served by
the com pany’ s vessels and any place oversea, unless the. same privileges are accorded
in respect o f similar goods carried under the same conditions and in the same
direction between the same places by all ships regularly trading between those places,
irrespective of nationalitv.(16) ■
Clause (b). The Bagdad Railway Company shall have the right to use, within
the limits of the ports o f Bagdad and Basra and exclusively fpr the service of the
railway and the said ports, small launches, as well as ferries for the transport of
passengers and goods from one bank to the other. Such launches shall not exceed
tons British m easurem ent^17) •
A r t ic l e 6.
The Im perial German Governm ent having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention o f under which the free navigation of the
Shatt-el-Arab is assured to the shipping of all nations and a com m ission is established
for the execution of such works as may be necessary for the improvement of its
channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes set out therein, and
being o f opinion that the provisions of the Convention are conducive to the best
interests of international com m erce, will, so long as the duties imposed upon the
Commission by the said Convention are satisfactorily carried out, uphold the Conven-
( 14) [ A c r o s s -r e fe r e n c e : “ ( S e e a r t i c le 5 , c la u s e l a ) , o f B r it is h d r a f t ) ” a p p e a r s in t h e o r ig in a l
a s a c o m m e n t o n A r t ic le 4 , c la u s e (c ), o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t .] _
( 1 5 ) [ A c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e : “ ( S e e a r t i c l e 5 , c l a u s e (b), o f B r i t i s h d r a f t ) ” a p p e a r s i n t h e o r ig in a l
a s a c o m m e n t o n t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f A r t i c l e 4 , c la u s e ( d ) , o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t .]
( 16) [ A c r o s s -r e f e r e n c e : “ ( S e e a r t i c le 4 , c la u s e (c ), o f G e r m a n d r a f t ) ” a p p e a r s in t h e o r ig in a l
a s a c o m m e n t o n t h i s c l a u s e .]
( 17) [ A c r o s s -r e f e r e n c e : “ (S e e a r t i c le 4 , c la u s e ( d ) , s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h , o f G e r m a n d r a ft) ”
a p p e a r s i n t h e o r i g i n a l a s a c o m m e n t o n t h i s c l a u s e .]
 241
tion, and will undertake that German subjects and German shipping shall com ply
therewith, and with all regulations issued by the Commission, and shall duly discharge
all obligations properly imposed upon them in pursuance of the provisions o f the said
Convention.
If at any time the Im perial German Governm ent are o f opinion that the duties
imposed upon the Commission are not satisfactorily carried out, or that the reasonable
requirements of the com m erce o f the river in matters within the com petence of the
Commission are not adequately met, and if the Commission in such case has not seen
its way to give effect to important recomm endations laid before it in the interests of
German shipping, with the object o f rem oving the above-m entioned causes of
com plaint, H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent will use their good offices with the
Im perial Ottoman Government to ensure the reference to a Commission of E nquiry,
appointed in accordance with article 12 of the Convention of 1907 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes,(18) of the questions whether in any particular
respects the duties of the Commission have not been satisfactorily carried out, and
whether there is good ground for thinking that the Comm ission, if maintained, will
not be able to provide for the reasonable requirem ents o f the com m erce of the river.

A r t i c l e 7 . ( 19)

A r t ic l e 8 .
A ny difference o f opinion arising out o f this declaration shall be submitted to
arbitration. If the two Governm ents fail to agree about a special Court or arbiter,
the case shall be submitted to The Hague Tribunal.
( 1 8 ) [ cp. Gooch & Temperley, V o l . V I I T , p p . 3 0 3 - 4 , N o s . 2 6 1 - 2 . R e f e r e n c e is g i v e n t h e r e t o
A. & P., (1 9 0 8 ) , C X X I V , [C d . 4 1 7 4 ] , p p . 7 6 6 - 7 .]
( 1 9 ) [ T h e f o l l o w i n g a p p e a r s i n t h e o r i g i n a l a s a c o m m e n t o n A r t i c l e 7, c l a u s e s ( a ) , ( b) a n d ( c ) ,
o f th e G e r m a n d r a ft : —
I t i s h o p e d t h a t t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r c l a u s e (a) o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t w i l l n o l o n g e r e x i s t ,
a s H i s B r i t a n n i c M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d o n l y c o n c l u d e t h e p r e s e n t a g r e e m e n t after
su c h a n a r r a n g e m e n t h a d b e e n m a d e b y th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C o m p a n y .
H i s B r it a n n i c M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t t r u s t t h a t it m a y b e p o s s ib le t o e lim in a t e t h e
c o n d i t i o n a l c l a u s e s ( b) a n d ( c ) o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t , r e s p e c t i n g f r e s h g u a r a n t e e s f o r t h e
B a g d a d R a i lw a y C o m p a n y , b e f o r e t h e p r e s e n t c o n v e n t io n is s ig n e d .
A c r o s s -r e fe r e n c e : “ (S e e a r tic le 6 o f B r it is h d r a ft ) ” a p p e a r s in t h e o r ig in a l a s a c o m m e n t o n
A r t i c l e 7 , c l a u s e ( d) , o f t h e G e r m a n d r a f t . ]

No. 155.
Anglo-Turkish C onvention.^)
C onvention Supplém entaire.

Foreign Office, October 21, 1913.

Sa Majesté le B oi du Pioyaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part ; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans, d'autre part;
Désireux tous deux de modifier les dispositions de l ’ article 18 de la convention
relative au G olfe Persique et aux pays environnants, conclue à Londres le 29 juillet,
1913 :(2)
Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :
Sa Majesté le B oi du Boyaum e-U ni de Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes : L e Très H onorable
( ! ) [ T h e t e x t h e r e g iv e n is t a k e n f r o m t h a t p r e s e r v e d in t h e F o r e i g n O ffic e s e r ie s o f O r ig in a l
T r e a t i e s ( T u r k e y N o . 8 7 ). T h e r e is a c o p y a ls o i n F .O . 4 8 2 3 5 / 2 0 1 0 7 / 1 3 /4 4 . C o p i e s w e r e s e n t o n
O c t o b e r 2 4 t o t h e A d m i r a l t y ; t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e .]
( 2 ) [ v . supra, p . 1 9 4 , N o . 1 2 4 , ( 5 ) V , A r t i c l e 1 8 . ]
[1 0 9 0 0 ] R
 242
Sir Edward Grey, Baronnet du Royaum e-U ni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la
Jarretière, Membre du Parlement, Principal Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté pour les
Affaires É trangères;
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans : Son Altesse Ibrahim H akky Pacha,
ancien Grand Vézir, décoré des Grands Cordons des Ordres Im périaux de l ’ Osmanié
et du Medjidié en brillants;
Lesquels, s’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et duo
form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :
Puisqu’ il n ’ a pas été possible d ’ effectuer l ’ échange des ratifications de la
convention relative au Golfe Persique et aux pays environnants avant la date indiquée
à l ’ article 18, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de prolonger de deux mois,
c ’ est-à-dire, jusqu’ au 29 décembre, 1913,(3) la période prescrite.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
supplémentaire et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 21 octobre, 1913.
E . .GREY.
I. H A K K Y .
( 3) [i>. infra, p . 2 8 2 , N o . 1 8 7 . ]

[ED . N O T E .— T h e f o l l o w i n g d e c l a r a t i o n w a s a l s o s i g n e d o n t h i s d a t e . T h e t e x t i s t a k e n
f r o m t h a t p r e s e r v e d in t h e F o r e i g n O ffic e s e r ie s o f O r i g i n a l T r e a t i e s ( T u r k e y N o . 8 8 ). C o p i e s
w e r e s e n t o n O c t o b e r 2 4 t o t h e A d m i r a l t y ; t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e . T h e r e is a c o p y a ls o in
F . O . 4 8 2 9 9 /15063 /1 3 / 3 4 . ) : —
Shatt-el-Arab Biverain Commission.
Déclaration.
Foreign Office, October 2 1 , 1 9 1 3 .
L e s S o u s s ig n é s , d û m e n t a u to r is é s à c e t e ffe t p a r le u r s G o u v e r n e m e n ts r e s p e c t ifs ,
d é c la r e n t a in s i q u ’ il s u i t : —
I l e s t b ie n e n t e n d u q u e le s c la u s e s d e s a r t i c le s 7 e t 8 d e la C o n v e n t io n r e la t i v e à
l ’ E t a b l i s s e m e n t d ’ u n e C o m m i s s i o n p o u r a m é l i o r e r l e s C o n d i t i o n s d e la N a v i g a t i o n d u
C h a t t -e l -A r a b , c o n c lu e le 2 9 j u i l l e t , 1 9 1 3 , n e m o d i fie n t e n r ie n le s d r o it s d o n t jo u is s e n t
a c t u e lle m e n t e n T u r q u i e le s r e s s o r t is s a n t s d e c e r t a in e s P u is s a n c e s e n v e r t u d e s t r a i t é s
e x is ta n ts .
E n fo i d e q u o i le s S o u s s ig n é s o n t s ig n é la p r é s e n t e D é c la r a t io n .
F a i t à L o n d r e s , e n d o u b le o r ig in a l, le 2 1 o c t o b r e , 1 9 1 3 .
E. GREY.
I. H A K K Y .
F o r t h e t e x t o f t h e S h a t t - e l - A r a b C o n v e n t i o n , v. supra , p p . 1 8 3 - 7 , N o . 1 2 4 ( 1 ) . ]

No. 156.

H err von Kiihlmann to Sir Edward G rey.I1)

F.O. 5 0 6 4 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidential. Germ an Embassy, L ond on, D. N ovem ber 3, 1913.
Dear Sir Edward, R. N ovem ber 7, 1913.
The counter-draft to the British draft of September 18th, 1913,(2) which I had
the honour to submit to-day, might require some confidential explanations which I
shall attempt to give in the following :
0) [T h e t e x t s o f t h is d o c u m e n t a n d it s e n c lo s u r e s a r e t a k e n fr o m t h e o r ig in a l t y p e s c r ip t
c o m m u n ic a te d b y H e r r v o n K iih lm a n n . T h e m a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . P a r k e r a n d S ir E y r e C r o w e
w e re e n te r e d o n a p r in te d c o p y . C o p ie s o f th e c o m m u n ic a tio n w e r e s e n t, o n N o v e m b e r 17 , to
th e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e I n d i a O ffic e . H e r r Z i m m e r m a n n ’ s i n s t r u c t io n s , d a t e d O c t o b e r 2 7 ,
1 9 1 3 , a r e g i v e n i n G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 2 5 2 - 6 1 . F o r H e r r v o n K i i h l m a n n ’ s r e p o r t o f h i s
a c t i o n o n t h e m v. ibid., p p . 2 6 1 - 2 . ]
( 2 ) [v. supra, p p . 2 3 8 - 4 1 , N o . 1 5 4 , encll]
 243
In Article 1 Clause a we would prefer to say in the seventh line “ construction of
the Bagdad Bailway system ” because that would cover the main line and the branch
lines granted by the concession, as they shall be finally settled between the German
and Turkish Governments. The word “ Bail way ” at the beginning of the 9th line
of the English counter-draft to be replaced by “ Undertaking.” (3)
W e would like the last part of Article 1 beginning with “ u n d e r ” and ending
with “ this cla u s e ” to be transferred to the note explicative. Our legal advisers do
not hold the opinion that by accepting this clause E ngland would bind herself to
support any future increase of Turkish customs, because an increase might seem
desirable in the interest of the Bagdad Bailway, but we consider at the same time
that it would, as would the spirit of this convention, prevent E ngland from opposing
existing revenue or increases o f the customs, in principle already accepted by the
Powers, being in part used for the Bagdad Bailway.
In Clause b “ declare that they will not oppose ” might be replaced by “ agree
to.” (4) _ . . . . . .
Clause c. The Im perial Governm ent is quite willing to use its influence to see
that British capital should be admitted to the Bagdad Bailway C o[m p a n y ] under
fair and reasonable terms. The Clause would then read as follows :

“ The Im perial German Governm ent declare that they will use their best
endeavours to secure that two British directors agreeable to His Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent shall be admitted as representatives of a group of British
shareholders to the Board of the Bagdad Bailway C o [m p a n y ].”

The Im perial Government is o f opinion that this clause might be left out
altogether if a group of British shareholders can be form ed before the signature of
this agreement. As for the election of the British directors I am glad to see that the
arrangements suggested in Prince L ichn ow sky’ s note are satisfactory to His M ajesty’ s
Government.
The German Governm ent considers that clause c article 1 in its amended form
should better be left out of the convention and put in the note explicative. If
however H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent could not agree to this but insisted on retaining
this clause in the convention the Im perial Governm ent would agree to this provided
the second section of clause c article 2 which according to Prince Lichn ow sky’ s note

( 3) [ M a r g i n a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ P r o v id e d i t is e x p r e s s ly a g r e e d ,
p e r h a p s i n t h e note explicative r e f e r r e d t o b y H e r r v o n K i i h l m a n n , t h a t t h e d r a f t i n g o f
a r t i c l e 1 , c l a u s e (a), d o e s n o t i n a d v a n c e p r e c l u d e H i s M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t f r o m o p p o s i n g
fu t u r e v a r ia t io n s o f t h e c o n c e s s io n , a n d p r o v id e d H is M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t a r e fu r n is h e d w ith
a u th e n t ic c o p ie s o f a ll e x is t in g a g r e e m e n ts b e t w e e n t h e O t t o m a n G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e G e r m a n s ,
in c lu d in g t h e m o d ific a t io n s n o w u n d e r d is c u s s io n w ith D ja v i d B e y , 1 d o n o t t h in k e x c e p tio n
n e e d b e t a k e n t o t h e w o r d s ‘ s y s te m ’ a n d ‘ u n d e r t a k in g .’ I t is , h o w e v e r , e s s e n t ia l t h a t H i s
M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t s h o u ld k n o w p r e c is e ly w h a t t h e y a r e a s k e d t o a g r e e t o .
T h e r e d o e s n o t se e m t h e s a m e o b je c t io n t o le a v in g o u t th e s e w o r d s fr o m t h e c o n v e n t io n if
t h e y a r e i n s e r t e d i n t h e note explicative, w h i c h m i g h t a d v a n t a g e o u s l y d e f i n e t h e i r s o m e w h a t
a m b i g u o u s m e a n in g . [ A . P .]
I d o n o t lik e t h e id e a o f a n e x p la n a t o r y n o te . T h e c o n v e n t io n it s e lf o u g h t t o b e so c le a r
a n d p r e c is e a s to r e q u ir e n o e x p la n a tio n . S u c h a n o te w [ o u l ] d o n ly h a v e s e n s e i f it w a s in
t h e n a t u r e o f further s t i p u l a t i o n s , n o t t o b e p u b l i s h e d . B u t t h e r e a r e s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n s t o a n y
s e c r e t s t ip u la t io n s . I w o u ld p u t in t h e c o n v e n t io n it s e lf e x a c t ly w h a t w e m e a n (s e e o u r
M e m o r a n d u m ] o f S e p t e m b e r ] 1 8 , a n d A r t [ i c l e ] 1 , c la u s e ( a ) ) . E . A . C .” ]
(4) [M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ I th in k th is is a n im p r o v e d
w o r d in g in w h ic h H i s M a je s t y ’s G o v e r n m e n t m ig h t c e r t a in ly c o n c u r . [ A . P .]
I t h in k o u r o r ig in a l w o r d in g m o r e c o r r e c t ly c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e fa c t s o f t h e s it u a t io n , b u t
t h e p o i n t is n o t p e r h a p s o f s u ff ic ie n t im p o r t a n c e t o j u s t i f y a f o r m a l o b je c t io n . E . A . C .” ]
[1 0 9 0 0 ] R 2
 244
of July 16th, 1913, was to be put in the note explicative would he restored to the text
o f the convention^5)
The prospects laid by Herr von Gwinner before Sir H . Babington-Sm ith on the
14th June 1913 were, to use a financial expression, ground-floor terms as favourable
as could be offered at that period. The Bagdad Bailway C o[m p a n y] will try to obtain
from the Turkish Government m ore favourable terms. A ny concession which they
might be able to secure will be offered as a matter o f course to the British group.(6)
In Article 2 Clause d the words “ fifty per cen t.’ ’ should be replaced by “ not
less than twenty per cen t.’ ’
W hat Prince Lichnowsky said about our willingness to agree to a British
participation of forty per cent, is entirely maintained, but the Imperial Government
attaches the greatest importance to this particular wording and I would strongly
recom m end its acceptance.(7)
The last paragraph beginning with ‘ ‘ any ’ ’ and ending with ‘ ‘ commission ’ ’
could be left out. It is contained in the Anglo-Turkish Convention and will be
confirmed in the agreement between the Bagdad Railway C o[m p any] and the Turkish
Governm ent.(8)
( 5) [ M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ T h e o r ig in a l id e a o f s e c u r in g
t h e a p p o in tm e n t o f tw o B r it is h d ir e c t o r s w a s t o g u a r d a g a in s t d is c r im in a tio n in r a t e s ; s u b s e ­
q u e n t ly t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t p o in t e d o u t t h a t in p r a c t ic e t h is c o u ld o n ly b e a r r a n g e d b y
su c h d ir e c t o r s r e p r e s e n tin g B r it is h s h a r e h o ld e r s , a n d t o t h is H is M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d .
I a m , h o w e v e r , d o u b t f u l a s t o w h e th e r t h is t e x t s h o u ld b e a d o p t e d . T h e w o r d s ‘ a s r e p r e ­
s e n ta tiv e s o f a g r o u p o f B r it is h s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ a p p e a r in g in th e b o d y o f t h e c o n v e n t io n a p p e a r
t o le n d t h e o ffic ia l s u p p o r t o f H i s M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t t o a c t iv e B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e
B a g d a d R a ilw a y — a n d s u c h a n a t t it u d e m ig h t , in v ie w o f t h e p a s t h is t o r y o f t h e q u e s t io n , b e
d iffic u lt t o d e fe n d .
I t is in d e e d m a t t e r fo r c o n s id e r a t io n w h e t h e r , a s t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t s u g g e s t , c la u s e (c )
o f a r t i c l e 1 s h o u l d n o t b e l e f t o u t o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n a n d p u t i n t h e n o te ex p lic a tiv e. A s v e r y
g r e a t im p o r t a n c e is n o t, I b e lie v e , a t t a c h e d b y t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e t o t h e a p p o in t m e n t o f
B r i t i s h d i r e c t o r s a t a l l ( s o f a r a s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t B r i t i s h t r a d e is c o n c e r n e d ) i t m i g h t
b e b e s t t o o m i t a l l m e n t i o n o f s u c h a p p o i n t m e n t s e v e n i n t h e n o te e x p lic a tiv e, t h u s l e a v i n g i t
o p e n t o B r it is h fin a n c ie r s to p a r t ic ip a t e o n t h e ir o w n t e r m s a s r e g a r d s r e p r e s e n ta t io n o n th e
b o a r d . T h i s w o u ld e n a b le u s t o r e s is t t h e G e r m a n c la im a s e m b o d ie d in t h e la s t p a r a g r a p h o f
a r t i c l e 2 , c l a u s e ( c ) , a n d i t s i n s e r t i o n c i t h e r i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n o r i n t h e n o te e x p lic a tiv e ; t h a t
c l a i m is o n e w h i c h t h e I n d i a O f f i c e a r e a n x i o u s s h o u l d b e r e s i s t e d . [ A . P . ]
I n t h e s e c i r c [ u m s t a n c e ] s , I a g r e e 1 (c ) m i g h t b e s t r u c k o u t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s e c o n d
p a r a g r a p h o f 2 (c ). E . A . C .” ]
( 6) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ T h e e x p r e s s i o n ‘ g r o u n d - f l o o r
t e r m s ’ c a n s e ld o m h a v e b e e n so fla g r a n tly m is a p p lie d . H e r r v o n G w in n e r p r o p o s e d to S ir H .
B a b i n g t o n - S m i t h , a s r e g a r d s B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t e r m s f a r le s s f a v o u r a b l e t h a n t h o s e
c o n c e d e d to th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C o m p a n y b y th e ir c o n v e n tio n o f 1 9 0 3 . I t w a s th is w h ic h
p r o m p t e d th e r e m a r k s in t h e B r it is h n o te o f 1 8 th S e p t e m b e r , a n d in t h e r e p ly th e s e c o n s id e r a ­
t io n s s h o u ld b e e m p h a s is e d . A t t h e s a m e t im e i t is t r u e t h a t , o w in g t o t h e w a r a n d o th e r c a u s e s ,
t h e 1 9 0 3 c o n c e s s i o n i s f i n a n c i a l l y l e s s a t t r a c t i v e t h a n i t w a s a t t h e d a t e o f s i g n a t u r e . [ A . P .]
I a g r e e . E . A . C .” ]
( 7) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ I n s t e a d o f 5 0 p e r c e n t , i n t h e
p o r t o f B a s r a , w e a r e o ffe r e d ‘ n o t le s s t h a n 2 0 p e r c e n t .,” w h ic h in c lu d e s p a r t i c ip a t i o n in t h e
c o n s t r u c t io n c o n t r a c ts ‘ if a n y .’ T h e e x p r e s s io n ‘ n o t le s s t h a n 2 0 p e r c e n t .’ is r e t a in e d m e r e ly
t o c o n f u s e t h e G e r m a n p u b l i c i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a p a r a l l e l b e t w e e n a r t i c l e 2 , c l a u s e (d),
a n d a r t i c l e 4 , c l a u s e ( b) , b u t i t is e x p l a i n e d t h a t G e r m a n y i s s t i l l w i l l i n g i n p o i n t o f f a c t t o l e t
u s h a v e 4 0 p e r c e n t. H is M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t g a v e g o o d r e a so n s fo r a s k in g fo r a 5 0 p e r c e n t,
p a r t ic ip a t io n in t h e ir n o te o f th e 1 8 th S e p t e m b e r . I f n o w H is M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t a g r e e
t o 4 0 p e r c e n t, t h e y m ig h t w e ll o n ly d o so o n c o n d it io n o f B r it is h p a r t i c ip a t i o n in t h e p o r t o f
B a g d a d a s w e ll a s in t h a t o f B a s r a . L o r d I n c h c a p e c o n s id e r e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in B a g d a d v a lu e ­
le s s ; b u t t h e p o in t m e r it s fr e s h c o n s id e r a tio n a s o p p o r t u n it y fo r s u c h p a r t i c ip a t i o n n o w a r is e s
a g a in , a n d in a n y c a s e H i s M a je s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t s h o u ld s t ip u la t e a g a in s t d is c r im in a tio n a s
b e t w e e n v e s s e l s o f d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y a t t h e r a i l w a y p o r t o f B a g d a d . [ A . P .]
I a g r e e . E . A . C .” ] _
( 8) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s i s n o t
p r i m a r i ly a m a t t e r f o r a n A n g lo -G e r m a n c o n v e n t io n ; b u t t h e r e is , n e v e r t h e le s s , s o m e a d v a n t a g e
in s e c u r in g th e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t’ s a s s e n t to su c h a s tip u la tio n a n d fo r th is re a so n it see m s
w e ll t o r e t a i n it . [ A . P .]
A t th e b e g in n in g o f a r t[ic le ] 2 , H [ i s ] M fa je s t y ’s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] ‘ a d h e r e ’ to th e T u r c o -
G e r m a n a g r e e m e n t . G e r m a n y m a y w e ll, in r e t u r n , a d h e r e t o t h e a r r a n g e m e n t in t h e la s t
p a r a [ g r a p h ] o f 2 ( d) . E . A . C . ” ]
 245
In Article 3 Clause c the Im perial Governm ent would like to see the words
“ within the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad ” replaced by “ in Ottoman territory East
of A le p p o ’ ’ and after “ Bagdad Railway C o [m p a n y ]’ s lin e s ” interpolated “ or in
contradiction with that Com pany’ s existing rights.”
The first alteration is based on the belief that the wording proposed in the British
counter-draft would not sufficiently protect the Bagdad Railway interests against the
possibility o f a com peting line from some point of the Mediterranean to Lower
Mesopotamia being supported by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent. It is hoped that the
plan of constructing a line from A leppo to Meskene can be successfully dealt with
during the Franco-Germ an negotiations about railways in Asia M inor.(9)
Article 4 Clause b asks for a twenty per cent, participation in the shares o f the
River Navigation C o[m p a n y ]. This is the irreducible m inimum we must ask for, and
nothing less but this participation could in the opinion of the Im perial Government
lead to a successful conclusion of this agreement. The German Governm ent lays
great stress on the wording proposed which establishes some sort of parallelism with
clause d, article 2, but it is at the same tim e understood that tfie wording does not
mean to establish any claim beyond the twenty per cent, share we ask for. This
twenty per cent, share is meant to represent a permanent proportion of the share
capital so th a t. in case of future changes in the capitalisation this proportion shall
always be m aintained.(10)
In Article 4 Clause c we propose to strike out the words beginning with ‘ ‘ not
continue ” till “ case they shall.”
The Bagdad Railway interests are quite willing to let their transport privileges on
the river lapse after the com pletion of the main line to Basra, but do not see their
way to agree to a fixed time limit, as proposed in the British counter-draft. It is
hoped, however, that some arrangement, as contemplated in the last section of
clause c, might be concluded before the signature of this Convention, rendering the
proposed time limit altogether unnecessary.(n )
In Article 5 Clause b it is proposed to insert after ‘ ‘ to use ’ ’ the words ‘ ‘ at their
stations on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates and . . . .” ( 12)

( 9) [M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ I d o n o t t h in k w e c a n sa fe ly
a g r e e t o t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d e f in it io n , e v e n i f t h e A le p p o -M e s k e n e q u e s t io n is s e t t le d . W e c o u ld
h a r d ly m o r t g a g e t h e f u t u r e a s r e g a r d s a n y lin e fr o m t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t o L o w e r M e s o p o t a m i a ;
a n d , a s i t is , 1 t h i n k w e s h o u ld a t t a c h t o t h e c o n v e n t io n a m a p s h o w in g t h e li m i t s o f B a g d a d
a n d M o s u l. A s r e g a r d s t h e w o r d s ‘ o r in c o n t r a d i c t io n w i t h t h a t c o m p a n y ’ s e x i s t i n g r ig h t s ,’
T t h in k w e m ig h t a g r e e t o t h e m s u b je c t t o a s a t is f a c t o r y s e t t le m e n t o f t h e M e s o p o t a m ia n o il
q u e s tio n [ A . P .] , a n d p r o v id e d t h e r e is a fu ll a n d p r e c is e d is c lo s u r e o f w h a t t h e ‘ e x is t in g
r ig h ts ’ a r e . E . A . C .” ]
( l0 ) [M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a i d S ir E . C r o w e : “ A s 2 0 p e r c e n t, is t h e m a x im u m
w e c o u l d a g r e e t o a s r e g a r d s G e r m a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r i v e r n a v i g a t i o n ( a r t i c l e 4 , c l a u s e ( b) )
it s e e m s u n d e s ir a b le a n d in d e e d d e c e itfu l t o a d o p t t h e w o r d in g ‘ n o t le s s t h a n ’ w it h r e g a r d
to s u c h p a r t i c ip a t i o n . I t w o u ld u lt im a t e ly h a v e t o b e e x p la in e d in P a r li a m e n t w h a t t h e r e a l
u n d e r s t a n d in g w a s , a n d i t t h u s s e e m s u s e le s s t o a d o p t a w o r d in g w h ic h is n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d
in t h e c o n v e n t io n . H e r r Z i m m e r m a n n is , I u n d e r s t a n d , t h e d e v o t e d p a r e n t o f t h i s r i d i c u lo u s
‘ p a r a l le lis m .’ [ A . P .]
W e s h o u ld in s i s t o n w o r d s w h ic h c o n v e y p r e c is e ly w h a t is in t e n d e d . E . A . C .” ]
( n ) [M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ I t is o f g r e a t im p o r t a n c e t h a t
w e s h o u ld s e c u r e a t im e l i m i t ; b u t it s e e m s t h a t w e s h o u ld n o w fir s t a im a t a n a r r a n g e m e n t
a s c o n t e m p la te d in t h e la s t p a r a g r a p h o f a r tic le 4 (c ), a n d t h a t n e g o t ia t io n s t o t h is e n d s h o u ld
b e h a s te n e d . [ A . P .]
I a g r e e . E . A . C .” ]
( 12) [M a r g in a l n o te s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S ir E . C r o w e : “ T h is p ro p o se d a d d itio n g oe s
b e y o n d a n y t h in g c o n c e d e d in t h e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C o n v e n tio n o f 1 9 0 3 , a n d , fr o m t h e w o r d in g
(a s r e a d t o m e b y H a k k i P a s h a ) o f a d r a ft a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n t h e C o m p a n y a n d t h e O t to m a n
G o v e r n m e n t , i t is e v id e n t ly t h e a im o f t h e C o m p a n y t o s e c u r e t h e r e b y r a t h e r e x t e n s iv e r ig h t s
o f n a v i g a t i o n . I t h in k t h e lim it s o f su c h n a v i g a t i o n r ig h t s , i f c o n c e d e d , s h o u ld b e c a r e fu lly
r e s tr ic te d , a n d p o s s ib ly t h e s e r v ic e s in q u e s t io n m ig h t b e p e r fo r m e d b y L o r d I n c h c a p e ’ s
C o m p a n y in w h ic h t h e G e r m a n s a r e t o p a r ti c ip a te . [ A . P .] E . A . C .” ]
 246

W e propose to restore the contents of our form er article 5 as article 5a or clause c

of article 5 British counter-draft, in the wording of our counter-proposal. In view of
the paramount importance which the Shatt-el-Arab has for our interests, being the
only access by sea to the terminus o f the great railway in which so much capital has
been sunk, it is necessary for us to have a direct assurance from His M ajesty’ s
Governm ent that the river will be kept in good conservancy and open under terms of
absolute equality.(13)
In Article 6 we agree to the first section, but would like a clause added expressly
stating that the rights, acquired by the capitulations, shall not be im paired^14;
The Im perial Governm ent thinks that the m achinery provided by the second
section of article 6 is open to a good deal of criticism and proposes, if their original
article 6 should be accepted, striking out the words from the ‘ ‘ Shatt-el-Arab shall ’ ’
to “ of Basra and.” Turkey has not ratified the Hague Convention of October 18th,
1907.( 1S) There does not seem, therefore, to be any real guarantee that the British
Governm ent would in every case succeed in making the Turkish Governm ent accept
the reference to a Commission of Inquiry, as proposed in the British counter-draft.
Such a com m ission seems in the opinion of the German Governm ent a rather clumsy
instrument and probably there would be a good deal of delay before any decision could
be arrived at. The decision of the com m ission would in no way have the character
o f an arbitral decision or any binding character whatsoever. The decision leaves, as
stated in article 35 of the Hague Convention, absolute liberty to the parties concerned.
It seems therefore that if after protracted negotiations the Commission of enquiry
should give a decision unfavourable to the commission, there would be under the
scheme as it stands now no guarantee whatever that the Riverain Commission either
changes the objectionable policy or is replaced by a body better adapted for the needs
of com m erce and navigation. (16) The Imperial Governm ent for the same reasons that
have led [th em ] to ask for the retention of article 5 a attaches great importance to
get a direct undertaking from His M ajesty’ s Governm ent concerning dues on the
Shatt-el-Arab. ( 17)
The desire to retain the second part of our article 6 beginning with “ That due3
shall ” has no doubt contributed to the desire to let our article 6 stand as proposed
by us. Therefore it seems advisable in case the retention of our article 6 should not
be agreed to to attach its second part to article 5 a .

( 13) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ H i s M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t
m i g h t p o s s ib ly u n d e r t a k e t o u s e t h e i r b e s t e n d e a v o u r s t o t h i s e n d , b u t i t is c o n s id e r e d
o b je c t io n a b le t o a d m it t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t to a n y s h a r e o f r e s p o n s ib ilit y .
T h e ‘ r e c o m m e n d a tio n s ’ m a d e a t t h e in fo r m a l c o n fe r e n c e o f th e 9 t h S e p te m b e r , 1 9 1 3 ,
m ig h t b e t h e in t e r p r e t a t io n o f t h is a r tic le , a n d m ig h t b e e m b o d ie d in a n a n n e x t o t h is
c o n v e n t io n . [ A . P .] E . A . C .” ]
( 14) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ T h i s m a y , s u b j e c t t o a n y
o b s e r v a t io n s o f t h e L e g a l A d v is e r , b e a g r e e d t o a s i t is c o v e r e d b y t h e a d d it i o n a l c o n v e n t io n
s ig n e d b y H a k k i P a s h a o n th e 2 1 s t O c to b e r .
P o s s i b l y t h e w o r d s ‘ in no other respects ’ s h o u l d b e s u b s t i t u t e d f o r ‘ i n n o w i s e . ’ [ A . P . ]
T h is r e s e r v a t io n is im p o r t a n t . E . A . C .’ ’ ]
( 15) [ F o r t h e S e c o n d H a g u e P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e v. Gooch & Temperley, V o l . V I I I , p p . 1 8 5 - 3 0 5 ,
C h a p t e r L X V . T h e t e x t o f t h e F i n a l A c t i s p r i n t e d i n A . & P., ( 1 9 0 8 ) , C X X I V , ( Cd. 4 1 7 5 ) ,
p p . 7 6 9 -9 2 0 .]
( 16) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ F r o m o r a l e x p la n a t i o n s o f
H e r r v o n K ü h l m a n n i t is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t h e p e r s o n a lly is s t r o n g ly o p p o s e d t o a ‘ c o m it é d e
s u r v e i lla n c e ,’ w h ic h , h e r e c o g n is e s , w o u ld b e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y in p r a c t ic e . I t s e e m s t h e r e fo r e
a d v is a b le to c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e im p r o v e m e n t o f a r tic le 6 o f t h e B r it is h d r a ft so a s to m e e t th e
G e r m a n c r itic is m s a s h e r e e x p r e s s e d . P e r h a p s M r . H u r s t w o u ld s u g g e s t a n a m e n d e d w o r d in g .
[ A . P .] ^
I t h in k w e s h o u ld fir m ly r e s is t a ll r e fe r e n c e t o a ‘ c o m it é d e s u r v e i lla n c e .’ E . A . C .” ]
( 1 7 ) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e b y M r . A . P a r k e r : “ T h i s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t o f a r t i c l e s 11
a n d 1 6 o f th e A n g lo -T u r k is h S h a tt -e l-A r a b C o n v e n tio n o f th e 2 9 th J u ly , 1 9 1 3 . [A . P .] ’’
( v . supra, p p . 1 8 5 - 6 , N o . 1 2 4 ( 1 ) . ) ]
 247
In Article 7 the Im perial Governm ent agree to the proposal o f the British
counter-draft, but would like to see Clause d retained in a form given in our
counter-draft. ( 18)
Article 8 is agreed to .(19)
Believe me, &c.
KÜHLM ANN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 156.

Memorandum.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung hat das vertrauliche M emorandum vom 18. September
1913 über die Bagdadbahn und verwandte Fragen sowie den diesem Schriftstücke
beigegebenen E ntwurf zu einer deutsch-englischen Konvention aufs Genaueste
geprüft. Das Ergebnis dieser Prüfung in Form eines neuen Entwurfes zu dieser
Konvention mit den entsprechenden Abänderungsvorschlägen beehrt sich der
Kaiserliche Geschäftsträger erhaltenem Aufträge gemäss Sir Edward Grey anliegend
ergebenst zu übermitteln.
Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft,
London, am 4. November 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 156.

Anglo-G erm an C onvention.

Germ an C ounter-Draft o f N ovem ber 3, 1913.

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a). R ecognising the general importance o f the com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction o f the
Bagdad Railway System , or to prevent the participation of capital in this undertaking.
Clause ( b). His Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent agree to the construction and
management of the proposed railway from Bagdad to Basra b y the Bagdad Railway
Company.
Clause (c). The Im perial German Governm ent declare that they will use their
best endeavours to secure that two British directors, agreeable to H is Britannic
Majesty’ s Governm ent, shall be admitted as representatives o f a group o f British
shareholders to the board of the Bagdad Railway C om pany.(20)

A r t ic l e 2 .

(Pream ble, Clause (a) and (b) unchanged.)

Clause (c). In the event o f the construction o f the said branch line from Basra
(Zobeir) to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be made

( 18) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e s b y M r . A . P a r k e r a n d S i r E . C r o w e : “ A r t i c l e 7 s e e m s v e r y o b j e c ­
t io n a b le . [ A . P .]
I t g iv e s G e r m a n y t h e r ig h t t o d e c la r e h e r s e lf n o t b o u n d b y t h e C o n v e n t io n b y m e r e ly
d e c la r in g s h e is n o t s a tis fie d . I t is q u it e in a c c e p t a b le . E . A . C .” ]
( 19) [ M a r g i n a l n o t e b y M r . A . P a r k e r : “ ( H e r r v o n K ü h l m a n n s t a t e d t h a t o u r r e q u e s t
(s e e n o t e c o v e r in g o u r d r a f t o f 1 8 t h S e p t e m b e r ) c o n c e r n in g t h e S m y r n a - A i d i n R a i lw a y w a s
u n d e r c o n s id e r a t io n a t B e r li n a n d i t w a s h o p e d a f a v o u r a b le s e t t le m e n t w o u ld b e r e a c h e d .)
I v e n t u r e to s u g g e s t t h a t t h e m o s t e x p e d itio u s w a y o f d e a lin g w ith t h e G e r m a n p r o p o s a ls
w o u ld b e f o r t h e m t o b e s e n t , w i t h t h is m i n u t e , t o t h e I n d i a O ffic e a n d B o a r d o f T r a d e w i t h
t h e s u g g e s t io n t h a t a c o n fe r e n c e s h o u ld m e e t e a r ly n e x t w e e k t o d is c u s s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
r e p l y . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o c o n c l u d e t h e a g r e e m e n t a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e . A . P . Foreign Office,
November 1 1 , 1 9 1 3 . ” ]
( 20) [ U n s i g n e d m a r g in a l n o te o n t h e o r ig in a l t y p e s c r i p t : “ S e e c la u s e C , a r t i c le 2 .” ]
 ‘2 48

to secure facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s
system, and there shall be com plete protection against discrimination, direct or
indirect.
In this event German capital would participate in it and would be represented
on the board o f this line under exactly the same conditions and in the same proportion
as British capital shall be represented on the Board of the Bagdad Railway.( 21)
Clause (d). The construction of the proposed port at Basra, authorised .by
article 23 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th M arch, 1903, shall be
executed by a separate Ottoman com pany, wherein British participation, both in the
capital and directorate of the port com pany and in the contracts, if any, for construc­
tion and maintenance, shall amount to not less than 20 per cent, of the whole. No
duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denomination shall be levied
by the Port Company on any vessels or goods which shall not equally, under the same
conditions, be imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever be the nationality
o f the vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country o f origin or destination
o f the goods, and whatever he the places from which the vessels or goods arrive or
to which they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading o f vessels in the
port, no privileges or facilities shall he granted to any vessel or vessels which shall
not equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.

A r t ic l e 3.

(Clause (a) and (b) unchanged.) (

Clause (c). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to establish, in Ottoman territory east o f Aleppo, railway undertakings
in direct competition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines or in contradiction
with that Com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is complete agreement
on the subject between the Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Governm ent.
A r t ic l e 4 .

(Clause (a) unchanged.)

Clause ( b). His Britannic M ajesty’s Government declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Railway interests of not less than 20 per cent,
o f the whole share capital out of the shares allotted to Turkish interests in the Ottoman
Company for river navigation, and their representation on the board of the aforesaid
com pany, by one director out of the share o f the directorate allotted to Turkish
interests.
Clause (c). It is, nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall be
held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of
the 5th March, 1903, relative to the conveyance of materials exclusively destined for
the construction of the Bagdad Railway, except in so far that it is hereby expressly
agreed that the said rights shall cease on the com pletion of the construction of the
Bagdad Railway to Basra.
(Paragraph 2 unchanged.)

A r t ic l e 5.

(Preamble and Clause (a) unchanged.)

Clause ( b). The Bagdad Railway Company shall have the right to use at their
stations on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates and within the limits of the port of

( 21) [T y p e d m a r g i n a l n o t e o n t h e o r i g i n a l t y p e s c r i p t : “ T h i s c la u s e w o u ld b e in s e r t e d in
t h e n o te e x p lic a t iv e i f H [ i s ] M [ a j e s t y ’s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] a g r e e d t o h a v e c la u s e C , A r t ic le 2 .
e m b o d ie d in t h is n o t e .” ]
 249
Bagdad exclusively for the service of the railway and the said port, small launches,
as well as ferries for the transport o f passengers and goods from one bank to the
other. Such launches shall not exceed tons British measurement.

A r t ic l e 5a .

H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial German Governm ent

will use their best endeavours to secure that the Shatt-el-Arab shall be brought into
and permanently kept in a satisfactory state o f conservancy in order that sea-going
vessels may always be assured o f free and easy access to the port of Basra, and to
secure further that the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall perm anently be kept open
for sea-going vessels, and be carried on on terms o f absolute equality for the vessels
of all nations, without regard either to the nationality o f the vessels or to their
cargoes.
A r t ic l e 6.

(Paragraph 1 unchanged.)
It is, nevertheless, understood that this stipulation in no wise affects the
privileges and immunities granted to the German Em pire by the Capitulations.
A “ comité de surveillance’ ’ shall be established, composed of those foreign
consuls, resident at Basra, whose flag is represented by steamship lines regularly
trading with that port. The “ c o m ité ’ ’ shall correspond directly with the river
commission, to be established by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent, on all matters
affecting the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab and the dues to be levied on that
river; it is. however, understood that the functions o f the “ c o m ité ” ehall be
advisory and not executive. The “ co m ité ” will see that dues shall be im posed,
not for the m ere fact of navigation, but only for repaying sums actually spent on
improvements in the navigation o f the Shatt-el-Arab and harbour facilities. They
shall in no case exceed 1 fr [a n c] per registered ton (the dues to cover the com ing
in and going out of the same vessel) ; any dues shall be levied on a basis of absolute
equality without regard to the nationality of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 7.

The preceding arrangements for the final settlement of all questions connected
with the Bagdad Railway shall cease to be operative if the Shatt-el-Arab after a
reasonable time has not been brought into a satisfactory state of conservancy in
order that sea-going vessels may always be assured of free and easy access to the
port of Basra.

( A r t ic l e 8 a g r e e d t o .)

No. 157.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. D ering.(*)

P.O . 5 06 5 7 /3 9 48 4 /1 3 /4 4.
(No. 269.)
Sir, Foreign Office, N ovem ber 4, 1913.
The Italian Ambassador spoke to me to-day with emphasis of the desire of the
Italian Governm ent to see the integrity of Asiatic Turkey preserved. But he said
that, as F rance, Germany, and Russia had all in one way or another sought for

t 1) [ T h i s d e s p a t c h i s e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e K i n g a n d t o t h e C a b i n e t . I t
is a ls o e n d o r s e d b y S i r E d w a r d G r e y : “ L o r d C r e w e w ill n o d o u b t s e n d a c o p y t o t h e V i c e r o y .” ]
 250
econom ic expansion, or spheres o f economic interest, in Asia M inor, Italy also wished
to have econom ic expansion. She was now asking for a concession for a port at
Adalia, and other things connected therewith. H e could not see that it conflicted
with the concession of the S m yrna-A idin Railway, and he hoped that we would not
oppose it.
I said that, if it did not conflict with the legitimate interests o f the S m yrna-
Aidin Railway, we would certainly not oppose i t ; but this Railway was the only
British Railway in Asia M in o r : it wTas so to say our ewe lam b, and we must see
that its rights were protected.
I went on to say to the Ambassador that we had no other Railway in prospect,
unless the Bagdad Railway wTas continued beyond Basra to the Persian Gulf. It
was there that we especially wished to safeguard our interests, and I took the occasion
to m ention that, if any Power touched Arabia, we should be concerned, because of
the strong feeling in India about Mahom m edan holy places. But neither the Persian
G ulf nor Arabia were relevant to the question o f the present Italian concession.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 158.

H err von K ühlm ann to Sir Edward G r ey .I1)

F.O . 5 05 8 6 /1 5 0 6 8 /1 3 /3 4 . London, D. N ovem ber 4, 1913.
E uer Exzellenz R. N ovem ber 5, 1913.
Von deutschen Interessenten ist die Frage aufgeworfen worden, ob die H afen-
bezw. Fährboote der Bagdadbahn in Basra irgend welcher Schiffahrtsabgabe unter­
liegen würden. Nach der Fassung der englisch-türkischen K onvention über die
Schiffahrt auf dem S chat-el-A rab,(2) insbesondere aber nach den Beschlüssen der am
9. September d. J .(3) im Foreign Office abgehaltenen Sachverständigen-Konferenz
(Section 2 Ziffer 1 “ Dues will be levied equally upon all steamships which cross the
bar at the entrance o f the r iv e r ” ) ist nach Ansicht der Kaiserlichen Regierung kein
Zw eifel, dass Dam pfboote, welche auf dem Schat-el-Arab die Schiffahrt ausüben,
ohne die Barre zu überschreiten, von jeder Abgabe frei zu bleiben haben. Die
Kaiserliche Regierung wäre aber wegen der prinzipiellen W ichtigkeit des Punktes
dankbar für eine gefällige M itteilung, dass die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung
diese Anschauung teilt.(4)
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die E hre zu sein
E uer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
KÜ H LM A N N .

p ) [C o p ie s o f t h is n o t e w e r e s e n t t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e I n d i a O ffic e o n N o v e m b e r 1 0 .
I t w a s s e n t t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e i n S i r E d w a r d G r e y ’ s d e s p a t c h ( N o . 3 7 8 ) o f N o v e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 1 3 .]
( 2 ) [ f . supra, p p . 1 8 3 - 7 , N o . 1 2 4 ( 1 ) . ]
( 3 ) [ r . supra, p . 2 2 9 , Ed. N o te . ]
( 4 ) [ T h e r e p l y s e n t t o H e r r v o n K ü h l m a n n b y S i r E y r e C r o w e is p r i n t e d i n G.l\,
X X X V I I ( I ) , p . 2 7 3 .]
 251

N o. 159.

H err von Kühlmann to Sir Eduard G r e y .{ 1)

F.O. 5 0 5 5 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . London, D. N ovem ber 4, 1913.

Euer Exzellenz E. N ovem ber 7, 1913.
hatten im Laufe der Verhandlungen über die Bagdadbahn den W unsch
ausgesprochen, (aide m emoire vom 29. August 1913)(2) gewisse Zusagen wegen
Veröffentlichung der Frachtraten auf der Bagdadbahn zu erhalten. Die Kaiserliche
Regierung ist bereit, durch Notenwechsel folgendes zu erklären : Die B agdad-E isen­
bahngesellschaft hat der Kaiserlichen R egierung zugesagt, dass alle Frachtraten und
Transportbedingungen angemessen veröffentlicht werden, ebenso wie jede beabsichtigte
Veränderung hierin ; ferner, dass jede Veränderung dieser Bedingungen und
Frachtsätze, sowohl H erabsetzungen wie E rhöhungen, mindestens 2 Monate vor ihrem
Inkrafttreten veröffentlicht werden sollen. Die Kaiserliche R egierung wird ihr Bestes
tun, damit die Bagdadbahngesellschaft diese Zusage einhalte.
Der Notenwechsel dürfte vielleicht zweckmässiger W eise gleichzeitig mit der
K onvention über die Bagdadbahn gezeichnet werden.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die E hre zu sein
E uer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
K Ü H LM A N N .

t 1) [ C o p i e s o f t h i s n o t e w e r e s e n t o n N o v e m b e r 1 0 t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e I n d i a
O f f i c e .]
( 2) [ v . supra, p . 2 2 3 , N o . 1 4 6 , Annex.]

No. 160.

Communication to H err von K üh lm a nn .^ )

F.O . 5 0 6 3 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Immediate. F oreign Office, N ovem ber 7, 1913.
Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the German Charge d ’ Affaires and
has the honour to state, for the confidential inform ation of the German G ov [ern -
m en ]t, that Hakki Pasha has recently com m unicated to the F oreign Office a telegram
which H [is ] H [igh n ess] had received from Djavid B ey, at present in B erlin, asking
for the full text o f the declarations which, in the opinion o f His H ighness, should
be signed by the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and the Bagdad Railway Company with
reference to the terminus o f the line and cognate matters.
Hakki Pasha, wishing to expedite the negotiation and to preclude all possibility
of misunderstanding, has requested H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t to assist him
in the preparation o f a draft, and Sir E . G rey, with similar objects, has, as H err von
Kuehlmann is aware, authorised his Department to enter into inform al, and mutually
non-com m ittal, com m unication with the German Embassy on the subject.

0 ) [A c o p y o f th is c o m m u n ic a tio n w a s s e n t to th e B o a r d o f T r a d e . I t w a s s e n t to
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ( a s N o . 3 7 6 ) . F o r H e r r v o n K ü h l m a n n ’ s r e p o r t , v. O.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 2 6 3 - 4 . ]
 252
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] now propose to inform Ilakki Pasha forthwith
that the following text appears to meet the case :—

A r t i c l e 1. La Société du Chemin de fer de Bagdad renonce à la concession

de la construction et de l ’ exploitation de l ’ embranchement partant de Basra
(Zobéir) ou de toute autre point de la ligne et aboutissant à un point du Golfe
Persique (article 1 No. 4 de la Convention du 20 Février 5 Mars 1903)(2) ainsi
q u ’ au droit de construire et exploiter un port à un point situé au Golfe Persique
(article 23 de cette même convention).
A r t i c l e 2 . Les droits de la Société concernant la construction et l ’ exploita­
tion des ports à Bagdad et à Basra (article 23 de la Convention précitée) seront
conférés à deux sociétés anonymes ottomanes ad hoc. Les conventions relatives
à ces ports et les statuts des sociétés à constituer contriendront [s ic ] des disposi­
tions sauvegardant expressément les droits de la Commission Fluviale à établir pour
l ’ amélioration des conditions de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab. Les conventions
et statuts sus-mentionnés contiendront également des dispositions assurant aux
marchandises transportées par voie d ’ eau et à celles transportées par chemin
de fer un traitement identique.
A r t i c l e 3 . La Société du chemin de fer de Bagdad, ayant pris connaissance
de la convention Anglo-Ottom ane concernant les chemins de fer en Turquie
d ’ Asie, parafée à Londres le 12 août 1913,(3ï déclare, en tant qu’ elle entre en
cause, adhérer aux stipulations de ladite convention.
A r t i c l e 4 . Le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman s’ engage à exécuter les
travaux nécessaires à l ’ amélioration des conditions de navigation sur le Chatt-
el-Arab. Cet article sera interprété d ’ après les recommandations indiquées à
l ’ annexe No. l . ( 4)

Sir E . Grey would be grateful if he could he inform ed as soon as possible whether

this text com m ends itself to the German G ov [ern m en ]t and, in the contrary case,
if they would formulate their objections at their earliest convenience.
Sir E . Grey has no doubt that the German G ov [ern m en ]t share the views of
H [ is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] as to the great desirability of a rapid conclusion of
these negotiations.

( 2) [ v . B .F.S.P., V o l . 1 0 2 , p . 8 3 4 . ]
( 3) [ r . svpra, p p . 2 0 3 - 6 , N o . 1 3 3 . ]
(■*) [ U n s i g n e d n o t e : “ A n n e x N u m b e r 1 w o u l d c o n t a i n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s d r a w n u p a t
t h e c o n f e r e n c e h e l d a t t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e o n S e p t e m b e r 9 , 1 9 1 3 . ” v. supra , p . 2 2 9 , Ed. Note.
T h e t e x t is g iv e n in t h e im m e d ia t e ly s u c c e e d in g d o c u m e n t , A n n e x N o . 1 .]

No. 161.

Proposed A greem en t betw een Bagdad Railway Company and Ottoman

G overnm en t.^)
F.O. 5 18 1 1 /6 4 63 /1 3 /4 4 .
(No. 1.)

Draft com m unicated by Mr. Parker to Iiakki Pasha, N ovem ber 7, 1913.

A r t ic l e I er.

La Société du Chemin de F er de Bagdad renonce à la concession de la construc­

tion et de l ’ exploitation de l ’em branchem ent partant de Bassora (Zobéir) ou de tout

0 ) [ T h e t e x t g i v e n a b o v e i s t a k e n f r o m t h e Confidential Print, a s t h e o r i g i n a l c a n n o t b e
t r a c e d . C o p i e s w e r e s e n t o n N o v e m b e r 1 4 t o t h e B o a r d o f T r a d e ; t o t h e I n d i a O f f i c e .]
 253
autre point de la ligne et aboutissant à un point du Golfe Persique (article 1er, No. 4,
de la convention du 20 février (5 mars), 1903'«, ainsi qu ’ au droit de construire et
exploiter un port à un point situé au Golfe Persique (article 23 de cette même
convention).
A r t ic l e 2.

Les droits de la Société concernant la construction et l ’ exploitation des ports à

Bagdad et à Bassora (article 23 de la convention précitée) seront conférées à deux
sociétés anonymes ottomanes ad hoc. Les conventions relatives à ces ports et les
statuts des sociétés à constituer contiendront des dispositions sauvegardant expressé­
ment les droits de la Commission fluviale à établir pour l ’ amélioration des conditions
de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab. Les conventions et statuts susmentionnés
contiendront également des dispositions assurant aux marchandises transportées par
voie d ’ eau et à celles transportées par chem in de fer un traitement identique.

A r t ic l e 3.

La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, ayant pris connaissance de la conven­

tion anglo-ottomane concernant les chemins de fer en Turquie d ’ Asie, parafée à
Londres le 12 août, 1913,(■) déclare, en tant qu’ elle entre en cause, adhérer aux
stipulations de ladite convention.

A r t ic l e 4.

L e Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s ’ engage à exécuter les travaux nécessaires

à l ’ amélioration des conditions de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab. Cet article sera
interprété d ’ après les recommandations indiquées à l ’ Annexe No. 1.

Annex No. 1.
Liste de Recom m andations à faire à la Commission fluviale du Chatt-el-Arab.
C h a p it r e I.

1. La Commission se mettrait à l ’ œuvre dans le plus bref délai possible.

2. La Commission entreprendrait une étude préliminaire d ’ au moins un an avant
de recomm ander que des frais considérables soient consacrés à des travaux d ’ art
permanents.
3. La Commission viserait de prime abord une profondeur de 24 pieds au-dessous
du niveau de la pleine mer de la grande marée.
4. L a position d ’ un banc de sable dans le chenal du fleuve en avalde Mohammera
serait indiquée par des bouées, à placer le plus tôt possible.
5. Des bouées d ’ amarre, réservées dans la mesure du possible aux diverses
compagnies de navigation, seraient placées dans le port de Bassora dans un bref délai.
6. La Commission pourrait avoir avantage à prendre comme m odèle, d ’ une
manière générale, les arrangements analogues de la Commission du Danube en tant
que ces derniers seraient applicables au cas présent.

C h a p it r e II.
1. Etant donné que les droits seront perçus à raison du tonnage et sans
distinction sur tout bâtiment à force m otrice qui passerait la barre à l ’ embouchure du
fleuve, il serait à recommander que :
(a) Un droit réduit (inférieur au maximum de 1 fr. par ton à prélever éventuelle­
ment) serait à percevoir afin de satisfaire au service d ’ un emprunt suffisant
à couvrir les dépenses du personnel et de l ’ étude préliminaire susmentionné
ainsi que les autres débours indispensables. Ledit droit suffirait à faire
face au paiement des intérêts et de l ’ amortisation de l ’ emprunt dans un
délai de trente ans.
(2) [v . supra, pp. 2 0 3 -6 , N o. 1 33 .]
 254

(b) Le cas échéant, il serait émis des emprunts ultérieurs, destinés à couvrir les
frais des travaux que la Commission se déciderait à entreprendre.
2. Il est d ’ ailleurs à recomm ander que des revenus spécifiques tels que l
recettes douanières de Bassora, ou leur excédent, soient assignés au service des
emprunts mentionnés sous les catégories (a) et ( b), et que, en tant que les droits de
tonnage à percevoir n ’ v suffiraient pas, tout déficit soit com blé au m oyen des revenus
spécifiques, qui seraient à réserver éventuellement aux fins requises.
(N ote.— The following addition was suggested to Mr. Parker by Hakki Pasha on
November 9 :— )

“ Le droit de tonnage spécifié à l ’ article 1er (a) devra être, en tout cas,
éventuellement porté au m aximum de 1 fr. par tonne en tant que les frais de la
Commission et le service d ’ intérêt et d ’ amortissement des emprunts contractés
le rendront nécessaire à l ’ achèvement des travaux pour lesquels les emprunts
auraient été contractés. La garantie par les recettes douanières ne sera
maintenue que pour parfaire l ’ insuffisance de ce droit maximum et jusqu’ à ce que
l ’ accord ultérieur prévu par l ’ article 16 de la convention signée le 29 juillet, 1913,
soit intervenu.”

(No. 2.)

Draft com m unicated by Hakki Pasha, N ovem ber 11, 1913.(3)

I.
Bassora est fixé com m e point terminus de la ligne du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad renonce à tous ses droits de construire
et d ’ exploiter l ’ embranchement partant de Bassora (Zobéir) et aboutissant au Golfe
Persique, m entionné au chiffre 4 de l ’ article 1er de la Convention du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad, du 5 mars, 1903.
Elle renonce également à la construction et à l ’ exploitation, soit en conformité
de l ’ article 23 de cette même convention, soit en vertu de toute autre stipulation, d ’un
port ou d ’ un terminus maritime du chem in de fer sur le Golfe Persique.

II.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad confirme qu ’aucune tarification
différentielle ne sera appliquée sur son réseau, et que les articles de m ême nature à
transporter entre les mêmes points seront traités sur le même pied d ’une parfaite
égalité, quels qu ’ en soient leur propriétaire, leur origine ou leur destination.
Elle consent en outre à ce que les délais fixés par l ’ article 21 de son cahier des
charges, touchant les avis préalables à donner en cas de modification des conditions
ou des prix des tarifs soient uniform ém ent portés à deux mois.
Ces avis seront insérés dans le Journal officiel du Gouvernement Impérial
ottom an, le Journal de la Chambre de Commerce ottomane et dans un autre journal
publié en langue européenne.

III.

E n cas d ’ un embranchement de Bassora (Zobéir), ou de tout autre point de la

ligne principale au Golfe Persique, des arrangements seront conclus en vue de faciliter
le trafic direct, sans rupture de charge, de et vers le réseau de Chemin de Fer de
Bagdad, et il y aura sur cet embranchem ent une com plète protection contre toute

(3) [H a k k i P ash a had receiv ed th is d r a ft from D ja v id B e y .]

 255
tarification différentielle, soit directe ou indirecte, com m e il est prévu à l ’ article 2,
alinéa 1er, pour le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

IV.
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s’ engage à exécuter les travaux nécessaires
pour l ’ amélioration des conditions de la navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, com m e aussi
de maintenir le chenal du fleuve libre de tout espèces d ’ obstacles, de manière que les
navires de mer d ’ un tirant de pieds puissent passer sans encombre au moins
jusqu’ au port de Bassora.

V.
La construction et l ’ exploitation du port de Bassora, prévues à l ’ article 23 de la
Convention du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars, 1903, seront assurés par une
société anonym e ottomane à form er dans ce but, et dont les actes de concession et les
statuts seront arrêtés d ’ un com m un accord entre le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
et la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman se réserve le droit de conférer ses droits de
contrôle sur le port de Bassora à la com m ission qu’ il se propose de charger de
l’ amélioration et du maintien de la navigabilité du Chatt-el-Arab.

VI.

E n ce qui concerne le port de Bagdad, la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad

conserve son droit de le construire et de l ’ exploiter elle-mêm e.

V IL
Aucuns frais généralement quelconques, n ’ importe sous quel titre, ne seront
imposés dans les ports de Bassora et de Bagdad aux navires et aux marchandises,
quels que soient la nationalité, le propriétaire, le pays d ’origine ou dé destination des
marchandises, et quels que soient les lieux de provenance ou de destination des navires
et des marchandises, en tant qu ’ il ne s’ agira pas d ’ une mesure générale applicable
indistinctement et uniformém ent à tout le m onde, sans exception et sans privilège
spécial d ’ aucune sorte en faveur de qui que ce soit.
Pour tout ce qui concerne le stationnement, l ’ embarquement et le débarquement
des navires dans ces deux ports, aucuns privilèges ou facilités ne sauraient être
accordés à des navires généralement quelconques, en tant qu ’ ils ne seront pas
accordés également et dans les mêmes conditions, à tous les autres navires.

V III.

La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad aura le droit d ’ assurer les com m uni­
cations avec ses stations, partout que de besoin, par l ’ établissement de services de
transbordement entre les deux rives des fleuves, au m oyen de remorqueurs, de
barcasses ou de toutes autres embarcations à vapeur ou à moteur, chalands, &c., de
80 tonnes registrées anglaises au maximum. La Société aura également le droit
d ’ affecter à ces m êmes services des ferry-boats d ’un tonnage supérieur.
Ce matériel fluvial jouira de toutes les exemptions de droits d ’ entrée et autres
. dont jouit le matériel roulant du chem in de fer, et il sera de m ême exonéré de tous
1 impôts, redevances ou taxes généralement quelconques de navigation et autres.
Les combustibles nécessaires pour ces services jouiront de la franchise douanière
au m ême titre que ceux consom m és par le chem in de fer, et celui-ci aura le droit d ’ en
opérer le transport dans les mêmes conditions que ceux destinés à son exploitation.
Les recettes des services susvisés restent acquises à la Société du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad.

I
 256
(N o. 3.)

Official German Draft com m nnicated by H err von Kühlmann, N ovem ber 14, 1913.(')

I.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad renonce à la concession de la construc­
tion et l ’ exploitation de l ’ em branchem ent partant de Bassora (Zobéir) ou de tout
autre point de la ligne et aboutissant à un point du Golfe Persique (article 1er, No. 4,
de la Convention du 20 février (5 mars), 1903), ainsi qu ’ au droit de construire et
exploiter un port à un point situé au Golfe Persique (article 23 de cette même
Convention).

II.

La Société du Chemin de F er de Bagdad confirme qu’ elle continuera comme par

le passé à appliquer à toutes les marchandises d ’ une catégorie identique qui pourront
lui être présentées en vue d ’ être transportées par chemin de fer, entre les mêmes
stations et dans les mêmes conditions, un régime parfaitement égal, tant pour le tarif
en vigueur qui leur sera imposé que pour les facilités dont elles jouiront, quels que
soient respectivement :
(a) Le pays d ’ origine des marchandises importées dans l ’Em pire ottom an;
(b) Le pays de destination des marchandises exportées de l ’ Em pire ottom an;
(c) Les pays d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises en transit par l ’ Empire
ottom an; et
(d) L e pavillon et l ’ armateur des bâtiments sur lesquels les marchandises sont
importées ou exportées par les ports ottomans.

La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad consent, en outre, à ce que les délais

fixés par l ’ article 21 de son Cahier des Charges, touchant les avis préalables à donner
en cas de modifications des conditions ou des prix des tarifs, soient uniformément
portés à deux mois.

( 4) [ c p . H e r r Z im m erm a n n ’ s in stru ction s to H e r r v on K üh lm a n n , d a ted N ovem b er 12, 1913,

G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp . 266-71, and H e r r v on K ü h lm a n n ’ s rep ort, ibid., pp. 271-2. T he follow in g
n ote a ccom p an ied H e r r v on K ü h lm a n n ’ s com m u n ica tion of th e G erm an d r a f t : —

K a iserlich D eu ts ch e B ots ch a ft, L ondon, am 14. N o v e m b e r 1913.

E u er E x zellen z !
Ich habe nich t v erfeh lt, d ie V orsch läg e E uerer E x zellen z w egen der von der
B agda deisen ba h n gesellsch a ft der tü rk isch en R eg ie r u n g gegen ü ber a bzugeb enden E r k lä ­
ru n gen der K a iserlich en R e g ie r u n g um gehend m itzu teilen . E rh alten em A u fträ g e gemäss
h abe ich heu te A b sch rift der G egen vorsch lä ge dem b eteilig ten D ep a rtem en t des F oreig n
Office ü b ergeben, w elche die K a iserlich e R e g ie r u n g fü r diese E rk lä ru n gen fü r zw eckm ässig
hält.
D a die V erh a n d lu n g en über d ie B a g d a d b ah n zw ischen D eutsch land, E n g la n d un d der
T ü rk ei ein G anzes b ild en u n d es in hohem G rade w ünschensw ert ersch ein t, dass die in den
v erschied enen V e r trä g e n un d K o n v e n tio n e n g etroffen en V erein b a ru n g en genau ü b erein­
stim m en, erscheint es zw eckm ässig, die b ezü glich en V era b red u n g en m it der türk ischen
R eg ie r u n g v orläu fig nur zu p a ra p h ieren , da m it g egebenenfalls zur H erstellu n g v ollkom ­
m ener Ü berein stim m u n g n otw en d ige Ä n d eru n g en leich ter vorgen om m en w erd en können.
D ie K a iserlich e R eg ie r u n g w ird aus diesen E rw ä g u n g en die in B erlin m it D ja v id B ey zu
treffen d en A bm ach u n g en zunächst nur paraph ieren .
M it der a u sgezeichnetsten H oc h a c h tu n g habe ich die E h re zu sein
E u erer E xzellen z
g an z g ehorsam er D iener
K ÜH LM ANN.

C op ies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent on N ovem ber 22 w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s rep ly (v. infra,
pp. 262-3, N o. 169) to the In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd o f Trade.
 257

Ces avis seront insérés dans le Journal officiel du Gouvernement Impérial

ottoman et dans le Journal de la Chambre de Commerce ottomane de Constantinople.
Les mots “ les mêmes con d ition s’ ’ em ployés dans le présent article signifient
les mêmes conditions de poids, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande, petite ou autre), la
même catégorie de marchandises et les mêmes stations de départ et d ’ arrivée.
Ces dispositions s ’ étendront dans la mesure où elles y sont applicables au régime
appliqué par la Société du Chemin de Fer au transport des voyageurs entrant dans
l ’ Empire ottoman, le quittant ou traversant son territoire, et de leurs bagages.
Toutefois, elles ne s’ appliqueront pas au transport des émigrés et des indigents et de
leurs bagages. Aux fins du présent alinéa, le terme “ ém ig rés ’ ’ se rapporte aux
personnes venues s’ établir dans les limites de l ’ Empire ottoman qui sont transportées
par les soins de la Commission des Emigrés.

III.

En cas d ’ exécution d ’ un embranchement de Bassora ou de tout autre point de la

ligne principale, au Golfe Persique, des arrangements seront conclus en vue de faciliter
le trafic direct, sans rupture de charge, de et vers le réseau du Chemin de Fer de
Bagdad, et il y aura sur cet embranchement une protection complète contre toute
tarification différentielle, soit directe ou indirecte, comme cela est prévu à l ’ article 2
pour le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

IV.
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s ’ engage à exécuter les travaux nécessaires
pour l ’ amélioration des conditions de la navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, com m e aussi
de maintenir le chenal du fleuve libre de toutes espèces d ’obstacles, de manière que les
navires de m er d ’ un tirant de 24 pieds puissent passer sans encombre, au moins
jusqu’ au port de Bassora.

V.

L a construction et l ’ exploitation du port de Bassora, prévues à l ’ article 23 de la

Convention du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars, 1903, seront assurées par une
Société anonyme ottomane à form er dans ce but et dont les actes de concessions et
les statuts seront arrêtés d ’ un com m un accord entre le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman et la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman se réserve le droit de conférer ses droits de
contrôle sur le port de Bassora à la com m ission qu’ il se propose de charger de
l ’ amélioration et du maintien de la navigabilité du Chatt-el-Arab.

VI.

En ce qui concerne le port de Bagdad, la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad

aura le droit, soit de le construire et de l ’ exploiter elle-m êm e, soit de conférer la
construction et l ’ exploitation à une société à constituer ad hoc, dont la concession et
les statuts seront analogues à ceux de la société à form er pour la construction et
l’ exploitation du port à Bassora.

V II.
Aucuns frais généralement quelconques, n ’ importe sous quel titre, ne seront
imposés dans les ports de Bassora et de Bagdad aux navires et aux marchandises, quels
que soient la nationalité, le propriétaire, le pays d ’ origine ou de destination des
marchandises, et quels que soient les lieux de provenance ou de destination des
navires et des marchandises, en tant qu’ il ne s’ agira pas d ’ une mesure générale
applicable indistinctement et uniformém ent à tout le monde, sans exception et sans
privilège spécial d ’ aucune sorte, en faveur de qui que ce soit.
[10900] S
 258

Pour tout ce qui concerne le stationnement, l ’ embarquement et le débarquement

des navires dans ces deux ports, aucuns privilèges ou facilités ne sauraient être
accordés à des navires généralement quelconques, en tant qu’ ils ne seront pas accordés
également et dans les mêmes conditions, à tous les autres navires,

V III.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad aura le droit d ’ assurer les com m unica­
tions avec ses stations, partout que de besoin, par l ’ établissement de services de
transbordement entre les deux rives des fleuves, au moyen de remorqueurs, de bareasses
ou de toutes autres embarcations à vapeur ou à moteur, chalands, &c., de 80 tonnes
registre anglais au maximum. La Société aura également le droit d ’ affecter à ces
mêmes services des ferrv-boats d ’ un tonnage supérieur.
Ce matériel fluvial jouira de toutes les exemptions de droits d ’entrée et autres,
dont jouit le matériel roulant du chemin de fer, et il sera de même exonéré de tous
impôts, redevances ou taxes généralement quelconques, de navigation et autres.
Les combustibles nécessaires pour ces services jouiront de la franchise douanière
au même titre que ceux consommés par le chemin de fer, et celui-ci aura le droit d ’ en
opérer le transport dans les mêmes conditions que ceux destinés à son exploitation.
Les recettes des services susvisés restent acquises à la Société du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad.

No. 162.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet. (')

F .O . 5 2 0 2 4 /6 1 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 541.) Foreign Office, N ovem ber 18, 1913, 5 -45 p . m .
Your telegrams Nos. 572 and 5 7 3 .(2)
ITakki Pasha was informed in J u ly(3) that the Germans had asked for participa­
tion in the navigation company and consulted as to what participation might be
allotted to them out of the Turkish share, so that there should be no suspicion of

( ') [C op ies of this teleg ram w ere sent to the B oa rd of T r a d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]

( 2) [S ir L. M a lle t’ s telegram (N o. 572) of N ovem ber 15, 1913, is not rep rod u ced . In it he
rep orted th a t the G erm an G overnm ent had not asked fo r any p a rticip a tio n in the T urkish
share in the n a vig a tion com p any. H is teleg ram (N o. 573) o f N ovem b er 16, 1913, stated th a t he
had rem inded the G rand V iz ie r of the in form a tion given to H a k k i P asha in J u ly 1913. H e
asked S ir E d w a rd G rey w hether th ere w ould be any objection to “ sa yin g we have stipulated
th a t G erm an p a rticip a tio n in above share should not ex ceed on e -th ird ? ” (F.O . 520 23 /64 6 3/
1 3/4 4. 5 2 0 2 4 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
(3) [On J u ly 29, 1913, M r. A. P a r k e r w rote a m em orandum com m en tin g on P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y ’ s note of J u ly 16, 1913 (v. su p ra , pp. 174-9, No. 118, and en d s.), in the lig h t of
prev iou s corresp ondence. It is not rep rod u ced as m ost o f the m a terial it con ta in s is given in
docu m en ts prin ted above. The follow in g passage is, how ever, o f in terest, as it is the only record
th a t has been tra ced of th e in form a tion g iven to H a k k i P asha w ith referen ce to the German
desire fo r p a rticip a tio n in th e N a v ig a tio n C o m p a n y : —
“ I have spoken to H a k k i P asha a bout the G erm an desire fo r p a rticip a tio n , as we had
b efore in form ed him of H err von K ü h lm a n n ’ s assurance th a t G erm any w ould abandon all
claim for such p a rticip a tio n . I said we felt b ound to tell him of th e G erm an change of
a ttitu d e b efore the agreem ent w ith L ord In ch ea p e was con clu d ed, as o f course any German
p a rticip a tio n m ust com e o u t of the T urkish share so as not to in va lid a te L ord In ch ca p e’ s
con trol.
H a k k i Pasha said he a p p recia ted this, and th a t he had already lea rn t o f the Germ an
wish to p a rticip a te th rou g h D ja v id B ey from P aris. H e said th a t he th ou g h t T urkey
w ould not ob ject to g iv in g G erm any a certain p a rticip a tio n , b u t he a dded em phatically
th a t she cou ld not agree to g iv e any p a rticip a tio n to F ra n ce or R ussia, neith er o f whom
had any com m ercia l in terest in th a t reg ion .” (F.O . 3 5 4 4 6 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
 2 59
unfair play towards Turkey on our part. It was explained to His Highness that the
German allotment could not come from the British shares as to do so would deprive
Lord Inchcape of control which is both essential and in accordance with the
declaration o f July 2 9 .(*) Ile him self suggested one third of the Turkish share,
which corresponds to about 16|% o f the whole, and the Germans now want 2 0 % ,
to which, subject to Turkish assent and certain other conditions, we should be
prepared to agree as a maximum. But, out of consideration for Turkey, we have
not been willing to sign a convention with Germ any, to the effect that such participa­
tion would not be objected to on our part, until we had been made aware o f Turkish
concurrence. As, however, five months have elapsed and no Turkish objections have
been raised, we assume, and earnestly trust, that they will not be raised at this late
stage.
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] may make a com m unication in the above sense to Grand
Vizier, and inform His Highness that, the matter having been so carefully explained
to Hakki Pasha 4 months ago, I am greatly annoyed by the delay and the consequent
embarrassment I am experiencing in dealing with German negotiations.

(4) [v. supra, pp. 189-90. N o. 124 (4). F o r L o rd In ch c a p e ’ s concession v. in lra, pp . 283-98,
No. 188.]

No. 163.

Revised Draft by Mr. Hurst of Article 6 of Anglo-G erm an C onvention.^)

P.O. 5 2 4 5 8 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, N ovem ber 18, 1913.

A r t ic l e 6.

The Imperial German Government having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish

Convention of under which the free navigation of the
Shatt-el-Arab is assured to the shipping o f all nations and a com m ission is
established for the execution of such works as may be necessary for the im prove­
ment of its channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes set
out therein, and being o f opinion that the provisions o f the Convention are conducive
to the best interests of international com m erce, will, so long as the duties imposed
upon the Commission by the said Convention are satisfactorily carried out, uphold
the Convention, and will undertake that German subjects and German shipping shall
comply therewith, and with all regulations issued by the Commission, and shall duly
discharge all obligations properly imposed upon them in pursuance of the provisions
of the said Convention.
The Imperial German Government take note in this connection o f the declaration,
signed on the and attached to the said Convention, to the
effect that articles 7 and 8 o f the above Convention do not affect the rights enjoyed
in the Ottoman Empire by the nationals of the Treaty Powers.
_ His Britannic M ajesty’s Government on their part undertake that they will not,
without a preliminary agreement with the Im perial German Governm ent, consent
to the imposition of dues exceeding 1 franc per registered ton.
If at any time the Im perial German Governm ent are of opinion that the duties
imposed upon the Commission are not satisfactorily carried out, or that the reasonable
requirements of the com m erce o f the river in matters within the com petence o f the
Commission are not adequately met, and if the Commission in such case has not
seen its way to give effect to important recomm endations laid before it in the interests
of German shipping, with the object o f rem oving the above-m entioned causes of

0 ) [T h e te x t g iv en above is taken from th e C onfidential P r in t as th e o rig in a l d r a ft ca n n ot

be traced. F o r the ea rlier d r a ft, v supra, p. 226, N o. 148, A nn ex.']
[1 0 9 0 0 ] S 2
 260
com plaint, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government will use their good offices with the
Im perial Ottoman Government to ensure the reference o f the questions whether in
any particular respects the duties o f the Commission have not been satisfactorily
carried out, and whether there is good ground for thinking that the Commission, if
maintained, will not be able to provide for the reasonable requirements of the
com m erce of the river to a Commission o f E nquiry.
This Commission shall consist o f three m embers, one o f whom shall be appointed
by the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent, one by His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent,
and one by the Im perial German Governm ent. The member appointed by the
Im perial Ottoman Government shall be the President.

A lternative.
This Commission shall consist o f five members to be drawn from the Powers
most interested by reason o f the magnitude of their shipping in the Shatt-el-Arab ;
the Ottoman m ember of this Commission shall be the President.
The procedure to be followed in the investigation of the questions referred to
the Commission shall he determined by the Commission itself, but, subject thereto,
shall be in general accordance with that followed by Commissions of E nquiry appointed
under the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
The Commission of Enquiry shall, unless the time is extended with the consent
o f all parties, publish its report within six months o f its appointment. The Govern­
ment of His Britannic Majesty will use their good offices with the Imperial Ottoman
Government to ensure that the proposals contained in such Report are carried out.

No. 164.

Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward G r ey .I1)

F .O . 5 26 0 9 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (N o. 580.) Constantinople, N ovem ber 19, 1913.
Your telegram No. 539 of 17th N ovem ber(2) : Shatt-el-Arab Declaration.
I have spoken to m y Russian colleague, who telegraphed his views to his
Governm ent three days ago.
He was reassured on learning that Turkey was a party to declaration of
21st October,(3) which he thought was between us and Russia, as he said that Russian
rights could not be made dependent on declaration from us. But he maintained that
greater precision was necessary. It must be stated in article 7 that foreign consuls,
or dragomans, must be present on occasions when foreigners are brought up, and in
article 8 there must be provision for consular sanction in arrests (except perhaps in
cases of flagrante delicto) and for detention by consular authorities.
I pointed out that declaration amply safeguarded these rights, but he was rather
insistent, saying that these were only his personal views and he was not authorised
to discuss them.
Perhaps some additional declaration might be suggested which would satisfy
Russian Government if they do not accept it as it stands.

( ! ) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta k en from the C onfidential P r in t, as th e o rig in a l d ecypher

ca n n o t be tra ced . T he teleg ram was sent to St. P etersb u rg h (as No. 759).]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 539) of N ovem b er 17, 1913, is n ot rep rod u ced . In it
he in stru cted S ir L. M a llet to discuss w ith th e R ussian Am bassador th e q uestion o f the ju rid ica l
p osition as regard s R ussian trea ty rig h ts w hich w ould result from the S h a tt-el-A ra b conven tion
ta ken tog eth er w ith the a d d ition a l d ecla ra tion , an d to “ tr y to ov ercom e any ob jection s.”
(F .O . 5 2 0 2 7 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
( 3) [a. supra, p. 242, E d. N o te.]
 261
N o. 165.
Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F.O . 5 2 7 7 8 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 584.) Constantinople, N ovem ber 20, 1913.
I com m unicated to Grand Vizier contents o f your telegram No. 541 of
18th N ovem ber(2) : Tigris and Euphrates navigation.
He had not yet had an answer from Djavid B ey.

(*) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t , as th e o rig in a l d ecy ph er

ca n n ot be tra ced . C opies w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice.]
(2) [i>. supra, pp. 258-9, N o. 162.]

No. 166.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet. (*)

F.O . 5 2 7 7 8 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 550.) Foreign Office, N ovem ber 21, 1913, 7 -45 p . m .
Your telegram No. 5 84 .(2)
It is hardly necessary for Grand Vizier to await reply from Berlin before
intimating to us views of Turkish G overnm ent. The Germans ask that we shall not
oppose German interests in acquiring “ not less t h a n ” 2 0% of the whole share
capital to be allotted out o f the Turkish shares. So far as we are concerned we
would agree to 20% of the Turkish shares being held by Germans but wre consider
that the maximum amount and should stipulate accordingly.

( !) [C op ies o f th is teleg ram w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; t o the In d ia O ffice.]

( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 167.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet.(*)

F.O . 5 29 0 7 /3 9 4 8 4 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 551.) F oreign Office, N ovem ber 22, 1913, 4 -3 0 p . m .
Italian scheme for Adalia railway.
W e have failed so far to get precise inform ation as to terms of Italian concession.
Italian Ambassador here professes great optim ism as to prospects of a satisfactory
understanding with H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] concerning British com pany’ s
rights. But when he is pressed for exact inform ation or definite proposals, he becom es
nebulous, whilst constantly reiterating that the Italian concession in no way conflicts
with the Smyrna line.
It has been pointed out to him that any Italian line from Adalia must enter the
regions served either by the Smyrna or the Anatolian systems. In either case the
British railway would be fatally injured, and H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [ov ern m en t] cannot
allow this. The same objection would militate against a substitution of motor services
for railway over the same ground, which appears to have been contemplated by the
Italians as a possible solution of the difficulty.
So far as we can gather, Italy is likely to contend that so long as Italian lines
do not actually form a junction with Smyrna or Anatolian system s, there will be no

t1) [T h is teleg ram was rep eated to R om e (N o. 353). C opies w ere sent, in para ph ra se, to
the B oa rd o f T ra d e and to H a k k i P ash a.]
 262

infraction of the letter o f British com pany’ s right under article two of Convention
o f 1906.(2) H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] are not prepared to admit validity of
such a technical subterfuge. At the lowest, an Italian claim based on such a
technicality would be a most unfriendly proceeding. Nor can it be admitted that the
British com pany’ s preferential option for a line debouching at Adalia would be
compatible with an Italian concession for control of that port.
According to report from H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] Chargé d ’ Affaires at Borne, it seems
probable that Italian embassy at Constantinople is engaged in negotiating some
settlement with the Porte without allowing British interests to be heard. Should
this be the case, it might be well if A’ [ou r] E [xcellen cy ] could find an opportunity
to point out to the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t that an awkward situation would arise if
they were to commit themselves definitely to schemes which H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t] would be constrained vigorously to oppose as inconsistent with British
rights. W e have no political aims in the district in question and therefore no desire
to exclude other parties ; our sole object is to safeguard the property of a British
com pany and if Italians desire concessions which conflict with Sm yrna-A idin Bailway
concessions they ought at least to come to terms with the Company which will protect
its shareholders.
( 2) [A rtic le 2 o f th e C on v en tion o f O ctob er 6, 1906, is as follow s : —
“ L e G ouvernem ent Im p éria l s’ in terd it d ’ accorder, sans le consentem ent de la C om ­
pagnie, à to u te a u tre personne ou S ociété.
L a concession de la con s tru ction de tou tes lignes de chem in de fer, p ou va n t fa ire
con cu rren ce aux lignes concédées à la C om p ag n ie dans 1111 rayon de 40 kilom ètres, c ’ est-à-
dire 25 m illes en tou s sens des d eu x lignes in diquées à l ’ a rticle 1er de la présente con v en tion ,
ainsi que la concession de la con stru ction d ’ une ligne p a rta n t d ’ A d a lia et a boutissant soit
a ux lignes de la C om p ag n ie d ’ A id in , soit à celles d ’ A n a tolie ou de B a g d a d .”
(F.O . 371 /14 5. 2 6 2 9 2 /3 7 0 7 /0 6 /4 4 .)]

No. 168.
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F .O . 5 3 0 5 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 588.) C onstantinople, N ovem ber 22, 1918.
Your telegram No. 550 of 21st N ovem ber./2)
Grand Vizier was strongly opposed to admitting German participation when I
spoke to him on W ednesday, but I did not think it worth while to report this pending
receipt of D javid’ s reply, which I hope will make him say something definite as to
Turkish attitude.
( !) [T h e te x t g iven above is ta ken from th e C onfidential P rin t, as the o rig in a l d ecypher
ca n n o t be tra ce d .]
(2) [v. supra, p. 261, N o. 166.]

No. 169.
Sir Edward G rey to H err von Kiihlma7i7i.( l)
F .O . 5 2 5 4 9 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Confidential.
S ir :—- Foreig7i Office, N ovem ber 22, 1913.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note o f the 14th instant/2'
in which you state that, as the negotiations between Germ any, Great Britain and
Turkey relative to the Bagdad Bailway are to form one whole, and as it appears
0 ) [C opies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to th e In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd o f T rade.
F o r H e r r von K iih lm a n n ’ s rep ort, v. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 2 74-6 ]
( 2) [v. supra, p. 256, N o. 161, n ote ( ') . ]
 2G3
highly desirable that the arrangements incorporated in the different treaties and
conventions should exactly correspond, it seems expedient for the present merely
to initial the agreements with the Turkish Governm ent, in order that it may be
easier to insert any necessary alterations in order to bring about complete conform ity.
You add that, for this reason, the German G ov [ern m en ]t will for the present only
initial the agreements to be concluded with Djavid B ey at Berlin.
In conveying to you the thanks o f H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] for this
com m unication, I have to inform you that the agreement between H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G ov [ern m en ]t and the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t relating to railways in Asiatic
Turkey will not be signed yet ; but the agreements relating to the Euphrates and
Tigris Navigation Concession and to the Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Commission were,
as I have already inform ed His Highness the German Ambassador privately, signed
some months ago.
In accordance, however, with the semi-official statement which I I [is ] II[ig h n e ss]
made some time ago. that the German G ov [ern m en ]t would regard it as very
conciliatory if I I [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t did not publish their agreements
with Turkey pending the conclusion of the Anglo-German agreem ent, I I [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] will defer such publication for some weeks, though they
desire to lay papers before Parliament reassembles, and they therefore trust that all
the agreements may be concluded before December 31, 1913.
I have to state further that I I [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G [overnm ent] are in full agree­
ment with the German G ov [ern m en ]t as to the importance of complete concordance,
and they are also of opinion that any agreements now under discussion with Djavid
Bey or Hakki Pasha in which the three Powers, Germ any, Turkey, and Great Britain,
are interested, should be m erely initialled pending direct discussion between Germany
and Great Britain.
In conclusion, I have to add that I hope to furnish you at an early date with the
observations of H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] on the German counter-draft, which
you were good enough to com m unicate to this Department, of the proposed agreement
between the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and the Bagdad Railway Company.
[ I have, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 170.

Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward, G re y .(')

P .O . 5 33 3 0 /3 9 4 8 4 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 591.) Constantinople, N ovem ber 24, 1913.
Your telegram No. 551 of 22nd Novem ber(2) : Italians at Adalia.
I asked Grand Vizier to-day whether negotiations of any kind with Italian
Charge d ’ Affaires were on foot. He emphatically denied their existence.
I said I was glad to hear this, as it would be a serious matter if the Ottoman
Government committed themselves to any scheme which would in any way affect
British interests without consulting us. I asked his H ighness to let me know if
the Italian Embassy made any proposals, and he promised to do so.
I will endeavour to get this confirmed by enquiry at Ministry of Public W orks.

(*) [T h e te x t given above is ta ken from the C onfidential I ’ r in t, asthe orig in a l deeyp h er
can n ot be tra ced . T his teleg ram was sent to R om e (as N o. 25)3) on N ov em b er ‘26 |
(2) [r . sup ra , pp. 261-2, No. 167.]
 ‘2 64

N o. 171.
Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward G r e y .I 1)

F .O . 5 3 3 3 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 592.) Constantinople, N ovem ber 24, 1913.
My telegram No. 588 of 22nd N ovem ber./2)
Grand Vizier tells me that he has had a telegram from Djavid Bey m erely stating
that Germans have broached question of participation in Turkish share, but have
not specified amount.
In accordance with your instructions, I said I hoped Ottoman Government would
not object, but that participation should not exceed 20 per cent, o f the whole.
Grand Vizier (group om itted : ? said) that he much disliked giving Germans
any share, but that if it was necessary he would do so, but would give as little as he
possibly could.
On leaving his Highness I happened to meet Talaat, to wffiom I repeated what
I had said to the Grand Vizier.
Minister of Interior asked me pointedly whether you really wanted him to give
a share to Germans, and I replied that you saw no objection provided that it did not
exceed 20 per cent, o f the whole.
Both Grand Vizier and Minister o f Interior seem a littlesuspicious of our interest
in the matter in spite of explanations which I made on receiving your telegram
No. 541 of 18th N ovem ber,/3) and now that I have made your views clear it would
seem better to let Germans negotiate for themselves.

( ') [T h e te x t g iv en a bove is ta k en from the C onfidential P r in t, as the o rig in

ca n n ot be tra ced . C opies o f th e teleg ram w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice; t o th e B oa rd o f T ra d e .]
(2) [v. supra, p. 262, N o. 168.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 258-9, No. 162.]

No. 172.

M r. Parker to H err von Kixhlm ann.{1)

F .O . 5 26 2 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .
Private.
My dear Kuhlmann :— F oreign Office, N ovem ber 24, 1913.
You will remember that our official note of September 18th(2) contained a para­
graph about the desiderata of the Sm yrna-A idin Railway, and that we gave reasons
which we felt sure.w’ould enable us to count upon the co-operation o f the German
Governm ent in bringing about a favourable settlement. For the sake of convenience
I enclose a copy of the p aragraph./3)
Your note of November 3 rd /4) to Sir E . Grey contained no reference to this
subject, but you explained privately to me that Herr von Gwinner was discussing
the subject with Djavid B ey at Berlin, and that though nothing definite could be
said for the moment, the German Government hoped that negotiations were tending
towards a favourable conclusion.
This news was particularly gratifying, for the Sm yrna-A idin line being the sole
rem aining line under British management in Turkey, we are particularly desirous

( 1) [T h is letter was sent to C on sta n tin op le (as N o. 401). A cop y was sent to the B oa rd of
T rade, cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), p. 276.]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 234-8, No. 154.]
(3) [T h e referen ce is to A rticle 3, clause ( r ) ; v. supra, p. 236, No. 154.]
(4) [p. su p ra, pp. 242-7, N o. 156.]
 265

that it should not be barred from developm ent in its own region o f natural though
limited expansion, and we felt sure that the arguments advanced in our official note
of September 18th would appeal to the German Governm ent. W e have, notwith­
standing the large proportion o f British trade in relation to that of other countries
in Asiatic Turkey, taken a back seat in regard to the large schemes o f railway
development recently under discussion, and we have done our best to promote a
settlement satisfactory to others.
Such being the case, we do consider that our requests with regard to the S m yrna-
Aidin Railway Company are very m od erate; and it is because a hitch has apparently
occurred at Berlin with regard to the desiderata of that Company that I am writing
this private letter to you. I am most anxious that the difficulty should be overcom e
as I know what an unfavourable impression a breakdown of this Sm yrna-A idin
negotiation would create here.
Hakki Pasha tells me privately that he learns from Djavid B ey that the German
Company is only willing to agree to a junction o f the S m yrna-A idin and Anatolian
systems on terms which would impose a very heavy and even prohibitive financial
sacrifice upon the Ottoman Governm ent and that as regards the other desiderata of
the Sm yrna-A idin Company the attitude o f the German Company, except in m inor
details, is one o f non-possnm us. This attitude, before which the Ottoman Governm ent
may very well be helpless, would if persisted in not only paralyse the extension of
the S m yrna-A idin lines in their legitimate sphere, but it would debar the com pany
from navigating on certain lakes even though this could be done without any
substantial prejudice to German irrigation projects, and it would condem n large tracts
of country to remain without the benefits o f railway com m unication.
What we do feel especially is that at the very moment when we are asked by
the German Governm ent to enter into a form al engagement in no way to oppose the
successful execution of a great trunk railway system by German interests, the modest,
legitimate, and indeed necessary natural developm ent o f our one little rem aining
railway in Turkey should be blocked by those very German interests, and by those
interests alone. I f you could place yourself for a moment in our position, I think
you would see the inequity o f this.
I feel sure that the representation, as here explained, o f how we regard the whole
question has only to be made in the right quarter in Berlin for a speedy settlement
to be reached, and I am also convinced that you will understand how much
importance we attach to the inclusion o f this matter amongst those others in regard
to which we are reaching a complete understanding.
[Yours, A c.]
A LW Y N P A R K E R .

No. 173.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L. M a llet.(l)

KO. 5 33 3 1 /6 1 63 /1 3 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 554.) F oreign Office, N ovem ber 25, 1913, 9 -3 0 p . m .
River Concession.
Your telegram No. 592.(2)
Please refer to Asiatic lu r k e y print May 7 section 1(3) and September 18
section l . ( 3)

( !) [C op ies o f this teleg ram w ere sent to th e B o a rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice.]

(2) [v. sup ra , p. 264, N o. 171.]
(3) [T h e referen ce here is to docu m en ts in clu d ed in th e C onfid en tial P r in t circu la ted to
Embassies, cp. supra, pp. ix - x . T he actua l d ocu m en ts in qu estion are those p r in te d supra,
pp. 97-8, N o. 66, and pp. 238-41, N o. 154, en cl.]
 2GÜ
Hakki Pasha was inform ed of paragraph 3 of first paper, and he was also informed,
several days before the Turkish declaration was signed by him on July 29, that the
Germans had modified their view as to participation, and was consulted as to our
reply. (A His Highness expressed the view that it was natural that the railway
com pany should desire some participation in the river navigation, whereupon it was
carefully explained to him that such participation could not com e out of the British
shares. He said he appreciated this, and himself suggested that we should, in our
agreement with Germany, propose that “ H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would
not oppose ” Germany acquiring one-third of the Turkish shares.
I fully agree with Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cv ] that the Germans should negotiate direct
with Turkey on the subject, but they have communicated to me a counter-draft to the
one I proposed on September 18,(5) and a reply has to be sent.
I had no wish originally to admit Germans, but I am doubtful if they would have
acquiesced in creation of a m onopoly without participating in it. I consider it
impracticable to exclude them at this late stage, but until the Ottoman G ov[ernm en]t
make up their minds as to what they will agree to, all negotiations must remain in
suspense ; this causes serious inconvenience, as the Anglo-Tnrkish agreements cannot
be ratified until the Turco-Germ an negotiations are concluded, and I do not wish to
postpone date of ratifications again. December 31 is the latest possible date without
further postponement.

0 ) [cp. supra, pp. 258-9, No. 162, and n o te (3).]

( 5) [t>. supra, pp. 238-41, N o. 154, en c l.) pp. 247-9, N o. 156, encl. 2 ]

No. 174.

Sir Edward G rey to H err von K iihlm ann.(l)

F.O. 53422/64G 3/13/44.

Im mediate. Foreign Office, N ovem ber 25, 1913.
Sir E. Grey presents his com plim ents to the German Charge d ’ Affaires and, with
reference to the draft, communicated by Herr von Kuehlmann on the
14th N ovem ber,(2) of the proposed agreement between the Bagdad Railway Company
and the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, has the honour to transmit the accompanying
counter-draft which, in so far as British interests are concerned, appears to H [is ]
M [a je stv ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t to meet the requirements of the situation.
A sentence has been added to article 1, so as to bring that article into accord
with the corresponding stipulation in the Anglo-German draft.
No changes are made in articles 2 and 3.
Article IV, as drawn in the German draft, is impossible of being carried into
execution : in the first place, a vessel drawing 24 feet would require a depth of
considerably over 24 feet in the r iv e r ; in the second place, as the depth on the bar of
the Shatt-el-Arab is, as explained in Sir E. G rey’ s memorandum of August 23,(3) only
11 feet at low water springs, a depth of 24 feet over the bar cannot be attained except
at high-water springs, and even so such a depth (24 feet) must be regarded as a
desirable consummation rather than as an assured possibility.
For this reason, H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t consider that it would serve
no useful purpose, and would indeed formulate an impossible condition, if a more

( x) [A co p y o f this com m u n ica tion was sent to the B oa rd of Trade. F o r H e r r von K iih l-
m a n n ’ s rep orts, r. G.P., X X X V I I (I), p. 277, pp. 278-83.]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 256-8, No. ]61 (3 ).]
(3) [N o t rep rod u ced , as the m em orandum ca n n ot be tra ced .]
 267

positive or unqualified wording than that contained in the British counter-draft were
adopted.
A paragraph has been added to article Y in order to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction
which might otherwise arise.
There is no change in article VI.
A paragraph has been added to article Y II so as to render it more complete.
Article V III has been modified so as to be more in accord with the British counter­
draft of September 18 of the Anglo-G erm an agreem en t: (4) the final paragraph has
been added after consultation with Lord Inchcape, the concessionnaire for the Biver
Navigation Company under the Turkish declaration of the *29th July, 1913.C) His
Lordship is fully prepared to provide, on terms to be mutually agreed, all reasonable
facilities to the Bagdad Bailwav C om pany; but I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [ov ern m en t],
having regard especially to section 3 of the proposals made on May 7, 1913,(6) would
be unable to assent to the grant outside Bagdad of such rights as are contem plated in
article V III of the German counter-draft com m unicated on November 14.( 7)

Enclosure in No. 174.

Official British Draft of proposed A greem erit betw een Bagdad Railway Company and
Ottoman G overnm ent, N ovem ber 25, 1913.

I.
Bassora est fixé com m e point terminus de la ligne du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad renonce à la concession de la construc­
tion et l ’ exploitation de l ’ em branchem ent partant de Bassora (Zobéir) ou de tout autre
point de la ligne et aboutissant à un point du Golfe Persique (article 1er, No. 4, de la
Convention du 20 février (5 mars), 1903),(8) ainsi qu’ au droit de construire et exploiter
un port à un point situé au Golfe Persique (article 23 de cette même Convention).(9)

II.
L a Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad confirme qu ’ elle continuera com m e par
le passé à appliquer à toutes les marchandises d ’ une catégorie identique qui pourront
lui être présentées en vue d ’ être transportées par chemin de fer, entre, les mêmes
stations et dans les mêmes conditions, un régime parfaitement égal, tant pour le tarif
en vigueur qui leur sera imposé que pour les facilités dont elles jouiront, quels que
soient respectivement :

(a) Le pays d ’ origine des marchandises importées dans l ’ Em pire ottom an;
(h) L e pays de destination des marchandises exportées de l ’ Em pire ottom an:
(c) Les pays d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises en transit par l ’ Empire
ottom an; et
(d) Le pavillon et l ’ armateur des bâtiments sur lesquels les marchandises sont
importées ou exportées par les ports ottomans.

La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad consent, en outre, à ce que les délais

fixés par l ’ article 21 de son Cahier des Charges, touchant les avis préalables à donner

(4) [ v . supra, pp. 238-41, No. 154, enc?.]

( s) \y. supra, pp. 189-90, No. 124 (4 ).]
(6) [r . supra, p. 98, N o. 66.]
C) [ v . supra, p. 258, N o. 161 (3 ).]
( 8) [ v . B .F .S .r ., V ol. 102, p. 834.]
( 9) [v. ibid., pp. 8 4 0 -1 .]
 268

en cas de modification des conditions ou des prix des tarifs, soient uniformément
portés à deux mois.
Ces avis seront insérés dans le Journal officiel du Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman et dans le Journal de la Chambre de Commerce ottomane de Constantinople.
Les mots “ les mêmes con d ition s’ ’ em ployés dans le présent article signifient
les mêmes conditions de poids, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande, petite ou autre), la
même catégorie de marchandises et les mêmes stations de départ et d ’ arrivée.
Ces dispositions s’ étendront dans la mesure où elles y sont applicables au régime
appliqué par la Société du Chemin de Fer au transport des voyageurs entrant dans
l ’ Em pire ottoman, le quittant ou traversant son territoire, et de leurs bagages.
Toutefois, elles ne s’ appliqueront pas au transport des émigrés et des indigents et
de leurs bagages. Aux fins du présent alinéa, le terme “ ém ig ré s ” se rapporte aux
personnes venues s’ établir dans les limites de l ’ Empire ottom an qui sont transportées
par les soins de la Commission des Emigrés.

III.

E n cas d ’ exécution d ’ un em branchem ent de Bassora ou de tout autre point de

la ligne principale, au Golfe Persique, des arrangements seront conclus en vue de
faciliter le trafic direct, sans rupture de charge, de et vers le réseau du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad, et il y aura sur cet em branchem ent une protection com plète contre toute
tarification différentielle, soit directe ou indirecte, comme cela est prévu à l ’ article 2
pour le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

IV.
Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman s’ engage à faire exécuter, par la commission
mentionnée à l ’ article V des présentes, les travaux nécessaires pour l ’ amélioration
des conditions de la navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, afin de maintenir, dans la mesure
du possible, le chenal du fleuve libre de toutes espèces d ’ obstacles, et ladite com m is­
sion viserait de prime abord, au moins jusqu’ au port de Bassora, une profondeur de
24 pieds au-dessous du niveau de la pleine mer de la grande marée.

V.
La construction et l ’ exploitation du port de Bassora, prévues à l ’ article 23 de la
Convention du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars, 1903, seront assurées par une
Société anonyme ottomane à form er dans ce but et dont les actes de concessions et
les statuts seront arrêtés d ’un com m un accord entre le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman et la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman se réserve le droit de conférer ses droits de
contrôle sur le port de Bassora à la commission qu’ il se propose de charger de
l ’ amélioration et du maintien de la navigabilité du Chatt-el-Arab.
Les conventions relatives à ce port et les statuts de la société à constituer
contiendront des dispositions sauvegardant expressément les droits de la commission
fluviale à établir pour l ’ amélioration des conditions de navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab.

VI.
En ce qui concerne le port de Bagdad, la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad
aura le droit, soit de le construire et de l ’ exploiter elle-même, soit de conférer la
construction et l ’ exploitation à une société à constituer ad hoc, dont la concession et
les statuts seront analogues à ceux de la société à form er pour la construction et
l ’ exploitation du port à Bassora.
VII.
Aucuns frais, n ’ importe sous quel titre, ne seront imposés dans les ports de
Bassora et de Bagdad aux navires et aux marchandises, quels que soient la nationalité,
 26 9

le propriétaire, le pays d ’ origine ou de destination des marchandises, et quels que

soient les lieux de provenance ou de destination des navires et des marchandises, en
tant qu ’ il ne s’ agira pas d ’ une mesure générale applicable indistinctement et
uniformém ent à tout le monde, sans exception et sans privilège spécial d ’ aucune sorte,
en faveur de qui que ce soit.
Pour tout ce qui a rapport aux frais quelconques à imposer dans lesdits ports, et
aux facilités à accorder, un traitement identique sera assurée aux marchandises
transportées ou à transporter par voie d ’ eau et à celles transportées ou à transporter
par chemin de fer.
Pour tout ce qui concerne le stationnement, l ’ embarquement et le débarquement
des navires dans ces deux ports, aucuns privilèges ou facilités ne sauraient être
accordés à des navires quelconques, en tant que lesdits privilèges et facilités ne seront
pas accordés également et dans les mêmes conditions, à tous les autres navires.

VIII.
La Société du Chemin de fer de Bagdad aura la faculté d ’ em ployer à Bagdad,
pour le seul service du chemin de fer, des bateaux à vapeur, ou à toute autre force
motrice, de 80 tonnes registre anglais au m aximum et des bacs ('ferry-boats'i d ’ un
tonnage supérieur.
Ladite société, ou la Société du port de Bagdad si telle société est constituée en
vertu de l ’ article G des présentes, aura la faculté d ’ em ployer à Bagdad des bateaux
à vapeur, ou à toute autre force motrice, de 80 tonnes registre anglais au maximum,
pour le seul transport de son personnel, de ses ouvriers et de son matériel.
Ce matériel fluvial jouira de toutes les exemptions de droits d ’ entrée et autres,
dont jouit le matériel roulant du chemin de fer, et il sera de m ême exonéré de tous
impôts, redevances ou taxes, de navigation et autres.
Les combustibles nécessaires pour ce service jouiront de la franchise douanière
au même titre que ceux consom m és par le chem in de fer, et celui-ci aura le droit d ’ en
opérer le transport dans les mêmes conditions que ceux destinés à son exploitation.
Les recettes du service susvisé restent acquises à la Société du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad.
E n dehors dudit port de Bagdad, et partout où le besoin s’ en ferait sentir sur le
Tigre ou l ’ Euphrate, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman s ’ engage à obtenir de la
Société Ottomane de Navigation Fluviale à constituer qu ’ elle se charge de tout service
de navigation, y compris celui des bacs, à établir pour les fins du chemin de fer, selon
des conditions, et aux endroits, à déterminer de temps en temps par contrat spécial
entre les susdites Sociétés.

No. 175.

Mr. O ’ Bcirne to Sir Edward G r cy .(l)

F.O. 5 40 7 8 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 396.) St. P etersburgh, N ovem ber 29, 1913.
Your telegram No. 764 of 26th N ovember : ( 2) Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.
I pressed the Minister for Foreign Affairs for a reply.

0 ) [T he t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t, as the o rig in a l decy ph er

ca n n ot be tra ced . T he teleg ram was sent to C on sta n tin op le (as N o. 554). C opies w ere sent to
the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; t o th e I n d ia Office.]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 764) o f N ovem b er 26, 1913, D . 7-45 p . m ., is not
rep rod u ced . In it he sta ted th a t it was essential th a t the S h a tt-el-A ra b qu estion should be
settled w ith T u rk ey w ith ou t delay. M r. O ’ B cirn e was in stru cted to ex p la in this to th e M in ister
fo r F o re ig n A ffairs. (F .O . 5 2 6 0 9 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
 270

He said that the Russian Government had not the least desire to make difficulties
for the Commission, but that the provisions of article 7 and article 8 of the Anglo-
Turkish Convention were not consistent with the additional declaration. Russia could
not agree to the diminution of her rights under the Capitulation, which would be
involved by the enforcement of the above-mentioned articles. H e would, however,
gladly accept any suggestion which would enable her to escape this difficulty without
“ loss of face ” as regards treaty rights.
If no such arrangement as suggested by the Russian Ambassador (Constantinople
telegram No. 580){3) can be considered by His M ajesty’ s Government, I might
endeavour to induce the Russian Government to enter into an arrangement with us
by which they would delegate the functions of the Russian consul ad hoc to the British
com m issioner, who would keep Russian consulate fully informed of matters affecting
Russian subjects. I could argue that this involves no diminution of treaty rights.

(a) [u. supra, p. 260, N o 164.]

No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. 0 ’ B eirn e.(l)

F.O. 5 4 0 7 8 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /4 4.
Tel. (No. 769.) Foreign Office, N ovem ber 29, 1913, 6 p . m .
(Your telegram No. 396 of 29th N ovem ber(2) : S hatt-el-A rab: Riverain
Commission.)
It is not necessary to adopt procedure indicated in final paragraph which goes
beyond anything we desire and would be impracticable as both Commissioners are
Turkish officials though one is of British nationality.
I am not sure from your telegram if the Russian G ov [erm en ]t concur in the
views of Russian Ambassador as reported in Sir L. M allet’ s telegram No. 580(3) ; but,
if they do, please explain that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] have never contem ­
plated exclusion of foreign consul or dragoman concerned under article 7 of
convention, and they fail to see how Turkey could possibly oppose the presence of
such officials in the face of the additional declaration of October 21 (4) which Hakki
Pasha has signed.
As to article 8, it is expressly laid down that the persons arrested shall be handed
over to the “ com petent a u thorities” ; these authorities would be those recognised
under the capitulations ; arrests would, it is true, be carried out in the first instance
by the Comm ission’ s police, but only in so far as it otherwise might be in practice
impossible to effect arrests at all, and immediately after such arrests the Consul
concerned would be notified and the prisoner handed over to him. Save in such
entirely exceptional circ[um stance]s, arrests would, in pursuance of the Declaration of
O ct[ob er] 21, be effected in the normal manner through the Consul concerned.
You should discuss the subject fully with Russian M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ]
A [ffairs] and endeavour to induce II [is] E [xcellen cy ] to withdraw his objections,
with the least possible delay basing your arguments on the terms of the additional
declaration of October 21. If, however, you are not successful you should telegraph
the precise wording which would be acceptable to H [is ] E [x cellen cy ].

0) [T h is teleg ram was rep eated to C on stan tin op le (N o. 555). C opies w ere sent to the
B oa rd of T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]
(2) [ v. im m ed iately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
(3) [v. supra, p. 260, No. 164.]
( ') [r . supra, p. 242, Ed. N o te.]
 •271

N o. 177.
Mr. O ’Beirue to Sir Edward G rey.(')
F.O. 54364/15068/18^84.
Tel. (No. 397.) St. Petersburgh, D ecem ber 1. 1913.
Your telegram No.7G9 of 29th N ovember : ( 2) S hatt-el-A rab: Riverain
Commission.
Before I could arrange for discussion with Minister for Foreign Affairs I received
from him an aide-m ém oire to the following effect :—
Additional declaration is in contradiction to articles 7 and 8 of the convention,
because, under the Capitulations, all taxes on Russian subjects require sanction of
em bassy; fines can be inflicted only with knowledge of, and levied through inter­
mediacy of. consul, and detention must be in the consulate.
Russian Government cannot surrender above privileges, but to meet wishes of
His M ajesty’ s Government propose the following compromise
(a) Since British officials are members of the Commission, the latter may be
empowered by “ delega tion s” to enquire into cases affecting Russian
subjects and to impose fines, but only in the presence of Russian dragom an.
(b) L evy of fines imposed and detention to take place in the consulate.
(c) Consul to be entitled to acquaint himself with the case and with the
Commission before the hearing.
(d) Consul to be entitled to ask Commission for explanation regarding amount o f
dues imposed on shipping and necessity o f expenditure incurred by
Commission.
(e) Consul must continue to have right to arrest Russian subjects and maintain
order on Russian ships in Shatt-el-Arab, also on shore, and Commission
will be bound to render consul assistance.

Russian Government ask that changes corresponding to above stipulations be

introduced into the convention. They will then instruct consuls to see that Russian
ships pay dues.
I am to see Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and will report to-night how far
he can be induced to m odify those of his desiderata which are not already fully satisfied
by the declaration of 21st October.(3) Are there any objections to stipulation (b)?
C) [T h e t e x t g iven above is ta ken from the C onfid en tial P r in t, as the orig in a l d ecy p h er
ca n n ot be tra ced . Copies w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]
(2) [u. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [v. supra, p. 242, Ed. N o t e .]

No. 178.

Mr. O ’ Bcirne to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

St. Petersburgh, D ecem ber 1, 1913.

F.O. 543GG/150G3/13/34. D. 8 -2 0 p m
Tel. (No. 399.) ' R. l o p . m .
My telegram No. 397 of D ec[em b er] 1 : ( 2) Shatt-el-A rab: Riverain Commission.
_ As result of discussion with Minister for Foreign Affairs, Russian Governm ent
will not ask for any alteration of convention or any new declaration if I am authorised
to address com m unication to them to the following effect :—
Stipulation (a). His M ajesty’ s Governm ent understand by declaration of
21st October]3) that dragoman of Russian consulate is entitled to be
present at hearing of cases affecting Russian subjects.
0 ) [C op ies o f this teleg ram w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]
( 2) [ v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.!
(3) [u. supra, p. 242, Ed. N o t e .]
 272

( b) His M ajesty’ s Government agree, but amount of fines to be remitted to

Commission.
(c) His M ajesty’ s Governm ent agree.
(d) In addition to accounts published under article 15, Commission will furnish
Russian consul if he so desires with full explanations regarding dues
imposed, and works undertaken which necessitate such dues.
(e) Nothing in article 8 affects right of Russian consul to exercise his usual
functions in relation to Russian subjects on board Russian ships in
Shatt-el-Arab and on shore, and Commission will render consul necessary
assistance.
Russian Government will on their side recognise right of Commission to levy dues
and instruct consuls to see that Russian ships pay dues and observe regulations.

No. 179.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F .O . 5 4 6 9 7 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 . St. Petersburgh, D. D ecem ber 1, 1913.
(No. 369.) R . D ecem ber 4, 1913.
Sir,
W ith reference to m y despatch No. 336 of November 5 th ,(2) I have the honour to
transmit to you herewith copy of the reply of the Russian Government ro the Aide
Mémoire which I addressed to them on October 23/N ovem ber 5th regarding the
Commission for the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab.
I have, &c.
H U G H O ’ B E IR N E .

Enclosure in No. 179.

Aide-M ém oire.
Ayant pris connaissance de l ’ Aide-M emoire de l ’ Ambassade Britannique du
23 Octobre 5 Novembre a [n n ée] c [o u ra n te ](2) le Gouvernement Impérial n ’ a pas
manqué de soumettre à un nouvel examen la question de concéder à la Commission de
Navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arabe des droits exceptionnels en matière de police et de
juridiction à l ’ égard de ceux qui commettraient des infractions à son règlement,
conformém ent aux Articles 7 et 8 du projet de Convention à ce sujet entre la Grande
Bretagne et la Turquie./3)
Le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut s ’ em pêcher de faire observer que le projet de
stipulations complémentaires à ladite Convention mentionné dans l ’ Aide-Memoire
précité se trouverait être en contradiction avec le texte des deux Articles en question.
Conformément aux droits de Capitulations existant en Turquie, ainsi qu’ à l’ usage
établi, tous les impôts et droits ne sauraient être obligatoires pour les sujets russes que
s’ ils sont sanctionnés par l ’ Ambassade Im périale à Constantinople. Ensuite, quoique
les autorités municipales turques se mettent en relations directes avec les sujets russes
en vue d ’ éviter les complications et les retards inutiles, elles n ’ ont néanmoins pas le
droit de leur infliger des peines ou des amendes à l ’ insu des Consulats, ni de mettre à
exécution leurs décisions autrement que par l ’ intermédiaire de ces derniers; un sujet
russe ne saurait aussi être mis aux arrêts autre part que dans le Consulat.

0 ) [A cop y o f this despatch and enclosure was sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) [M r. O ’ B e irn e ’ s despatch (N o. 336), D . N ov em b er 5, R . N ov em b er 17, 1913, is not
rep rod u ced . I t enclosed a cop y o f th e a id e-m ém oire com m u n ica ted to the R ussian G overn­
m ent on N ovem ber 5, 1913, in fo rm in g them o f the a d d ition a l decla ra tion on the S h a tt-el-A ra b
qu estion sign ed betw een H is M a je s ty ’ s G overn m en t and the P o r t e on O ctob er 21, 1913.
(v. sup ra , p. 242, Ed. N o te.) (F .O . 5 2 0 9 1 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .)]
( 3) [r . supra, p. 185, No. 124 (1 ).]
 27 3

Vu cet ordre de choses, les droits qui seraient reconnus à la Commission en vertu
des Articles 7 et 8 de la Convention se trouveraient être de fait sans objet. D ’ autre
part le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait consentir à renoncer aux privilèges
mentionnés plus haut dont jouissent ses ressortissants en Turquie.
Voulant tout de même aller au devant des désirs du Gouvernement Britannique,
le Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à proposer, de son côté le compromis suivant :
considérant que des fonctionnaires anglais participeront à la Commission, celle-ci
pourrait être investie du droit d ’ examiner les affaires dans lesquelles les accusés
appartiendraient à la sujétion russe et d ’ infliger des amendes à ces derniers pour ainsi
dire par délégation, mais seulement en présence du drogman du Consulat de Russie.
La perception des amendes sur les sujets rnsses et la mise à exécution des ordonnances
de la Commission à leur égard ainsi que leur détention préventive ne pourront avoir
lieu que dans le Consulat. E n même temps le Consul doit avoir le droit de prendre
connaissance des affaires et de se mettre en rapports avec la Commission préalablement
au jugem ent de l ’ affaire par le Tribunal de la Commission.
En prenant acte de ce que le montant des droits de navigation sur le Chatt-el-
Arabe sera calculé dans le but exclusif de couvrir les frais effectifs de la Commission,
le Gouvernement Im périal considère néanmoins indispensable de reconnaître aux
Consuls de Russie le droit de demander des explications à la Commission au sujet du
montant de ces droits ainsi que sur la question de savoir à quel point telle ou autre
dépense faite par la Commission se trouvait être effectivement nécessaire.
En outre le Gouvernement Im périal trouve indispensable que le Consul de Rnssie
continue de jouir du droit d ’ arrêter en cas de nécessité tout snjet russe et de maintenir
Tordre tant sur les vaisseaux russes sur le Chatt-el-Arabe que sur le territoire riverain
de la Commission qni sera obligée pour sa part de lui prêter aide et assistance en tant
que cela dépendra d ’ elle.
L e Gouvernement Im périal se flatte de l ’ espoir que le Gouvernement Britannique
voudra bien reconnaître le bien-fondé de ces desiderata et introduire des changements
respectifs dans le texte du projet de sa Convention avec la Turouie. De son côté le
Gouvernement Im périal se déclare prêt à reconnaître à ces conditions le droit de la
Commission de percevoir sur les vaisseaux russes les taxes réglementaires : il est prêt
aussi à charger ses Consuls de veiller à ce que ses vaisseaux ne se soustraient pas au
payement de ces taxes.'
|m P étersb ou rg , ce 17/3 0 N ovem bre, 1913.

No. 180.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. 0 'B e ir n e .(x)

F.O. 5 43 6 6 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 .
Tel. (No. 779.) Foreign Office, D ecem ber 2, 1913, 6 -15 p . m .
Your tel[eg ra m ]s Nos. 397(2) and 399.( 3)
The stipulations of the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t appear to me reasonable, and I
am willing to adopt procedure proposed on the understanding that (d) will give the
Russian consul no right to veto works considered necessary by commission.
You should draw up texts of proposed com m unications to and from Russian
G ov [ern m en ]t in consultation with M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs], and then
submit them to me by telegraph for approval.(4) I will then, before ratifying conven­
tion of July 2 9 (5) and additional declaration of October 2 1,( 6j address anote to Hakki

(!) [C op ies o f th is teleg ram w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e ; to the I n d ia O ffice.]

( 2) [ii m p. 271, N o. 177.]
0) [■„ x, pp 2 71-2, No. 178.]
(0 [ v . ijra , pp. 279-80, N o. 184.]
(5) [v. supra, pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]
( 6) [v. supra, p. 242, Ed. N o t e .] '
[10900] T
 274

Pasha inform ing him of exchange of notes with Russia and stating that H [is ]
M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] consider that proposals of Russian G ov [ern m en ]t must be
regarded as covered by Anglo-Turkish declaration of October 21.

No. 181.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 5 5 1 9 0 /8 9 48 4 /1 8 /4 4.
(No. 969.)
Sir,
W ith reference to your telegram No.
honour to enclose herein copies of an Aide
on the 27th instant, upon his return
infringem ent of the rights of the Sm yrna
Constantinople, D. D ecem ber 2, 1913.
R. D ecem ber 8, 1913.
551 of the 22 o f last m onth,f1) I have the
Mémoire which I left with the Grand Vizier
from Adrianople, protesting against any
Aidin Railway Company.
I have, Ac.
LO U IS M A L L E T .

Enclosure in No. 181.

Aide-M ém oire.
L ’ Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique est chargé par son Gouvernement de
rappeler à l ’ attention de Son Altesse le Grand Vizir que, selon les provisions de
l ’ article 2 de la convention annexe conclue en 1906(2) entre le Gouvernement Impérial
et la Compagnie de Chemin de Fer Aidin, le Gouvernement Im périal s’ interdit
d ’ accorder, sans le consentement de la Compagnie, à toute autre personne ou société,
la concession de la construction de toutes lignes de chemin de fer pouvant faire
concurrence aux lignes concédées à la Compagnie dans un rayon de 40 kilomètres,
c ’ est-à-dire 25 milles, en tous sens des deux lignes indiquées à l ’ article 1 de la
convention, 1. la ligne principale et prolongements, 2. embranchement partant d ’ un
point de la ligne qui sera ainsi prolongée et aboutissant au lac de Bourdour, ainsi que
la construction d ’ une ligne partant d ’ Adalia et aboutissant soit aux lignes de la
Compagnie d ’ Aidin soit à celles d ’ Anatolie ou de Bagdad.
Ainsi toute ligne partant d ’ Adalia dans la direction des deux lignes susmentionnées
ou de l ’ embranchement,— même si elle n ’ aboutisse pas à ces lignes entre, par ce fait,
dans le zone réservé, et par suite ne pourrait que porter préjudice aux droits de la
Compagnie. Les mêmes objections seraient applicables à l ’ institution d ’ un service
d ’ automobiles.
L a Grande Bretagne n ’ a aucune ambition politique dans ces régions ni aucun désir
d ’ entraver leur exploitation économique par d ’ autres. Il est, pourtant de son devoir
de protéger les intérêts de la Compagnie anglaise,— qui est, du reste, la seule Compagnie
de Chemin de Fer Britannique dans l ’ Em pire Ottoman.
Dans ces circonstances l ’ Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique est chargé
d ’ exprimer au Gouvernement Ottoman son vif espoir qu’ il n ’ accordera pas de
concessions dans ces régions sans des consultations préalables avec le Gouvernement
Britannique, ni prendra aucun engagement envers d ’ autres concessionnaires, auquel
le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique serait forcé d ’ offrir une opposition
résolue.

Péra, le 27 N ovem bre 1913.

0 ) [v. supra, pp. 261-2, N o. 167.]

(2) [cp. supra, p. 262, N o. 167, n o te ( 2).]
 275
N o. 182.
M inute by M r. Parker. O

F.O . 5 4 5 1 0 /8 9 4 8 4 /1 3 /4 4 . F oreign Office, D ecem ber 2, 1913.

W hen I saw Hakki Pasha yesterday he said to me “ W hat about A d a lia ? ’ ’
I replied that it was difficult for us to say anything definite on that subject till we
knew what had taken place between Turkey and Ita ly ; whereupon he said that
he had made enquiries at Constantinople and had ascertained that no concession
had been given, m erely a permission to investigate for a line. I asked him for
what kind o f a line, and he said “ a railway line and a port at A d a lia ” and he
added that the permission was restricted to a period of four years.
I said that a permission of this nature was usually held to entitle the persons
who held it to some sort o f prior claim to fulfil the object of the permission.
He then said that it was an impossible attitude for His M ajesty’ s Government
to take up that there should be no railway and no port at Adalia, and he thought
that by so doing we should throw the local population into the hands o f the
Italians, who wished to confer upon them these benefits. I said I was not aware
that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent had taken up any such attitude, but what they did
maintain was that it would be a gross injustice for the Ottoman Governm ent to allow
the Sm yrna-A idin Railway Company to be short circuited and ruined by the granting
of a concession for a port at Adalia to a foreign Company, with the right to make
say short lines from Adalia northwards, and then to connect with Buldur by motor car
services. I f such a concession was in effect desirable it was obviously the Sm yrna-
Aidin Company which would have the first claim to a refusal. M oreover I could
not understand why Turkey should be so eager to establish Italy at A d alia : a port
concession might conceivably, in her hands, becom e a fortified base.
Hakki Pasha then said that whatever happened there must be no Turco-Italian
incident on the subject; if there was to be an incident about Adalia it must be an
Anglo-Italian one. I said I did not see the necessity for any sort of incident :
it was hardly conceivable that a Great Power would create an incident sim ply to
filch away the rightful trade of an old-established British Company, and any port
at Adalia in foreign hands would damage the S m yrna-A idin Company, and would
be utterly inconsistent with the prior obligations, in spirit and indeed almost in the
letter, of the Ottoman Government towards that Company. W e hereupon read the
concession very carefully.
Hakki Pasha stated that he thought of recom m ending to the Ottoman Govern­
ment a solution which he thought would meet the case : the Italians should be given
concessions for everything but railways in the Adalia region, and the concession
for everything, including railways and telegraphs, in the Turkish island o f Rhodes.
I said that it would then be the Italian island o f R h o d e s ; and he replied that the
Italians no doubt thought that sooner or later Russia, without any protest on the
part o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, would annex the two easternmost provinces of
Armenia, and Italy wanted to have a claim ready pegged out on her own behalf if such
annexation should take place. That, he asserted, explained Ita ly ’ s interest in the
islands and in Adalia.
I said that without admitting the premiss about Russia and Arm enia, I could
hardly appreciate the attitude o f His H ighness, who, with the example o f Italian
action in Tripoli before his eyes, seemed to be intent on treating his country like
a plum cake, and to be taking the lead in cutting it into slices, prim arily for the
benefit o f a Power which had hardly had time to digest what she had so recently
swallowed.
The conversation then turned to other matters, which I will explain in a
separate minute.
t1) [T h e t e x t given above is ta ken from th e C on fid en tial P r in t , as the o rig in a l ca n n ot be
traced. C op ies w ere sent to R o m e ; to C on sta n tin op le.]
[10900] T 2
 27G
W hen, as will shortly be the case, we put forward the desiderata of the S m yrna-
Aidin Company, we can refer to the question of a port at Adalia in greater detail. It
will be deplorable if the Sm yrna-A idin Company, owning the one British-controlled
railway in Turkey, is ruined by the action o f Italv.
A. P [A B K E R J .

No. 183.

Minute by Mr. Parker.

F.O. 5 46 8 1 /6 4 63 /1 8 /4 4 . Foreign Office, D ecem ber 3, 1913.

Euphrates and Tigris Navigation C oncession. (*)

A prolonged meeting took place at the Foreign Office to-day to discuss the
alterations desired by Turkey in the draft concession, over and above those agreed
to by Ilakki Pasha and Lord Inchcape ten days a go.(2)
There were present Ilakki Pasha and Sassoon Effendi, Lord Inchcape and his
two solicitors, Sir H enry Johnson and Mr. Ilotblack, and m yself.
L ord Inchcape told me before the m eeting that he was very m uch disgusted
by the whole matter, that he could make more profit by bargaining in regard to
a single ship to be built for the British India than he would out of this concession
in a whole year, and that he had wasted so much time over the draft during the last
six months that he had definitely decided to throw up the whole business if a
settlement was not reached within ten days.
W hen the meeting began Hakki Pasha said that he had been much surprised
by the receipt of a strongly worded letter from Lord Inchcape, and Sassoon Effendi
said that the Turkish Governm ent’ s one desire was to smooth away difficulties which
would greatly embarrass Lord Inchcape in the future. Lord Inchcape retorted that
there were four principal points in dispute, and he could not see how the adoption of
the Turkish contentions regarding them would smooth away difficulties for him.
Those contentions were—
1). That Lord Inchcape should be deprived even of a reasonable assurance that,
after having raised thousands of pounds for the navigation, the navigation should not
be rendered impossible by irrigation works executed without any regard to the
importance of maintaining navigation. In the absence o f such an assurance nobody in
England would invest a farthing in the enterprise.
2). Lord Inchcape was to be deprived, almost entirely, o f the benefit o f customs
exemption for fuel during the exclusive period o f the concession ; yet this arrange­
ment was a compromise he had reached with Ilakki Pasha in July, his Lordship’ s
original demand having been for customs exemption in perpetuity, as regards fuel,
or at all events for 99 years as in the case o f the rest of the property o f the Company.
Now it was proposed that, even during the exclusive period of the concession, freedom
from customs duties should not be accorded on fuel if the dividends on the ordinary
share capital should reach 9 % .
3). Article 14 was to he modified in such a manner that Lord Inchcape would
be deprived of a large measure o f control and placed at the m ercy of the Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t in such a way that he could not be certain of working the concession
as a commercial success.

t1) [C op ies o f this m in u te w ere sent to C on stan tin ople (as N o. 4 2 8 ); to the B oa rd o f T ra de.]
(2) [O n N ov em b er 21, 1913, S ir E d w a rd G rey sent a telegram to S ir L. M a llet (N o. 54
g iv in g the te x t o f a telegram w hich H a k k i P asha w as sending to C on stan tin ople th a t night.
It referred to a m eetin g w ith L ord In ch ca p e and M r. P a r k e r at w hich certa in poin ts had been
agreed, and con ta in ed the follow in g s en ten ce: “ J e me b orne à d ire que la form e que j ’ aurai
à sou m ettre rep résen tera to u t ce q u ’ on peu t fa ir e sans rom p re les n é g ocia tion s.” (F.O . 53504/
6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 .)]
 277
4). The Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t wished the Company to convey the mails free
of cost, and to debar the Company from carrying foreign mails, from which they
might derive a large profit, at all.
As regards point 1) Lord Inchcape absolutely refused to adopt any wording
except a slight modification of that agreed to in the revise o f November 29, 1913
(annexed).(3) After a good deal of discussion Ilakki Pasha and bassoon Effendi
admitted that this attitude was reasonable, and I think they will recom m end the
adoption of the proposed wording at Constantinople, (see article 10.)
2). Sassoon Effendi urged that it was impossible to grant more favourable terms
as regards customs exemption on fuel to the Navigation Company than to the
Bagdad Railway Company, as to do so would at once give rise to a claim for equal
treatment from the railway com pany. I replied that it would be perfectly easy to
decline such a demand from the railway com pany, as there was no analogy whatever
between the two concerns. The Bagdad Railway was an upstart concession dating
from 190 3 ; the British rights of navigation dated from the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
and it was owing to the action and support of British ships that Turkish powTer in
Mesopotamia existed to -d a y ; the vessels o f the Indian Marine had repeatedly
assisted the Pashas o f Bagdad in suppressing disorder at their request, and British
vessels had navigated on those rivers for centuries. In 1846 Sir Stratford Canning
had made an arrangement with the Porte b y which it was solem nly agreed that only
certain restricted dues should be paid on British vessels,(4) but the Turkish G ov[ern-
m en]t had in 1860 sought to restrict the privileges granted in 1846, and they had
even imposed customs duty on the fuel imported by Messrs. L yn ch, a most arbitrary
and illegal proceeding^5) Still we were not now concerned with Messrs. L y n ch ; but
as regards the new Company I must point out that the declaration of July 29,
1913,( 6) was a compromise between the British view of unrestricted British rights
of navigation free of all but certain specified dues, and the Turkish view of restricted
British rights o f navigation which could on ly be exercised subject to the exaction of
dues varying according to the exigencies of the m om ent. W e had, in July and
August, carefully gone over the ground with regard to dues and custom s, and the
concession initialled on August 12,(7) represented what both Hakki Pasha and H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t considered a fair settlement. If, however, the naviga­
tion com pany was to be penalised by the exaction o f customs dues m erely to avoid
requests for exemption from the Bagdad Railway Company it was clear that we
had reached no acceptable com prom ise respecting the navigation question, and I
felt confident that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t would not agree to the increase
of the Turkish customs duties from 11% to 15% in the absence o f such a com prom ise.
Already criticisms were being made in the press in this country that H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t had apparently been too facile in agreeing to the customs
increase, and our agreement could not be defended if this longstanding controversy
of the river navigation were not settled.
Moreover, apart altogether from the historical aspect of the question, the Bagdad
Railway Company had a guarantee; this guarantee was, up to a point, a valuable
asset: wTould the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t give the Navigation Company a guarantee
of 5% on the capital involved, making the guarantee a first charge on the proposed
customs increase? I f so, there might be closer analogy between the two enterprises.
Hakki Pasha said that as soon as the gross receipts of the railway reached 4,500 francs
per kilometre the exemption from customs on the railway would cease, and I retorted
that unless the working expenses guarantee were modified the Railway Company
would take good care that the gross receipts did not exceed 4,500 per kilometre.

(3.) [T h is revise is not. rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s o f space. T he final tex t of
D ecem ber 12, 1913, is g iv en in fra , pp. 283-98, N o. 188.]
(4) [cp. supra, p. 91, N o. 60, encl. and n o te (* ) ; pp . 9 2-3, Ed. ATo fe .]
( 5) [M a te r ia l rela tin g to this sub ject can be fo u n d in F.O . 7 8 /3 9 8 8 .]
(«) [» . sup ra , pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]
( 7) [v. supra, p. 206, E d. Note.~[
 Hakki Pasha and Sassoon Effendi said that the utmost they could do would be,
while granting customs imm unity on everything else for 99 years, to say that it should
be granted for fuel until the Company paid 9 % on its ordinary shares. L ord Inchcape
said that if this was so the negotiations must be regarded as being at an end, and
matters appeared to have reached a deadlock.
I thereupon asked him and his solicitors to come to another room, and I went
back to Hakki Pasha and Sassoon Effendi and pointed out how serious it would be if
negotiations broke down, as not only the navigation agreement, but the whole Anglo-
Turkish settlement would be jeopardised. I asked him if we could not devise some
com prom ise, and after a good deal of discussion he accepted the following arrange­
ment, which I then took to Lord Inchcape and w7hich he agreed to as a great
con cession :—

‘ ‘ The exemption from customs duties on all fuel of every description is granted
for a period of 20 years from the date of the signature of these presents and at the
expiration of such period the Company shall be exempt from all customs duties on
fuel in any year in which the aggregate profits of the Company distributed as dividend
since the date of its incorporation are not more than sufficient to have paid an average
dividend of 9 % per annum on the whole of the ordinary capital of the Company in
each year which has then elapsed since the date of its incorporation.
‘ ‘ But save a6 hereinbefore expressly provided to the contrary all the exemptions
granted in this article are granted in perpetuity.”

3). As regards article 14, it was agreed that the statutes of the new Company
should be subject to the approval of the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t and conform as far
as possible to the model type of statutes for Ottoman joint stock com panies; but it
was provided that the statutes should em body provisions consistent with all the
stipulations of article 14, which, I understand, is exhaustive as regards matters of
real importance.
Lord Inchcape only agreed to this on condition that the concession should be
signed by Thursday December 11 at latest, and that the Ottoman G ov[ernm en]t
would not raise difficulties in regard to the statutes, of which a copy wa6 given to
Sassoon E ffendi, and that the statutes should be approved before Christmas.
4). Lord Inchcape positively declined to convey the Ottoman mails free of c o s t :
he said it meant putting at least ¿£8,000 a year from the pockets of the Company
into those of the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, and it would be quite impracticable to supply
a cabin gratis on every steamer. Ilakki Pasha and Sassoon Effendi were very bitter
about this and said it would create a most unfavourable impression at Constantinople.
L ord Inchcape said he had made such a valuable concession with regard to customs
duties for 40 out of 60 years that he could make no further concession. As it was,
Sassoon Effendi wonld return to Constantinople with not less than £200.000 of customs
dues, and he could net have £8,0 00 a year for mails as well. I rather think, however,
that Lord Inchcape may agree to convey up to one ton a month of mail matter at a
reduction of 50% on the ordinary cargo rates if everything else goes through without
a hitch, including the statutes.
As to the right to convey foreign mails, it was agreed that it should be stipulated
in the concession that such conveyance should not take place without the assent of
the Ottoman Governm ent, hut that Hakki Pasha should address a note to Sir E . Grey
saying that the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t would agree to the British mails heing conveyed
on Lord Inchcape’ s steamers if H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] so desired. This
note would not be published.
The interview, which had lasted nearly five hours, then term inated; and it is
agreed that Hakki Pasha, Sassoon Effendi, Sir H . Johnson, Mr. H otblack and I are
to meet again at noon to-morrow in order to settle the drafting, and that Sassoon
Effendi will leave for Constantinople on Saturday with Hakki Pasha’ s report and
strong recommendation to the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t to accept the draft concession
as it stands. He will request telegraphic instructions.
 279
I really think we have now impressed both Hakki Pasha and Sassoon Effendi with
the seriousness o f the p osition; but I think a copy of this minute should be sent
by post to Sir L . M allet(8) with the amended concession and that he should be asked
to exercise pressure at Constantinople with a view to a signature next week. I am
positive that Lord Inchcape will throw up the whole thing if the concession is not
signed without delay, and I had the greatest difficulty in preventing him from
breaking off negotiations to-day.
A. P [A R K E R ]. D ecem ber 3, 1913.

M IN U T E S .
M r. P a r k e r deserves praise.
A. N.
M r. P a r k e r ’ s w ork in th is and th e k in d red q u estion s is in valuable
E . G.
(8) \v. supra, p. 276, n o te (*).]

No. 184.

Mr. O ’ B eirne to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 5 4 9 5 4 /1 5 0 6 3 /1 3 /3 4 . St. Petersburgh, D. D ecem ber 4, 1913.

Tel. (No. 402.) R. D ecem ber 5, 1913.
Your telegram No. 779 of 2nd December : ( 2) Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.
Follow ing is the text of proposed com m unications :—
A ide-m ém oire to Russian Governm ent :—
“ E n se référant à Paide-m ém oire du Ministère Impérial du 17 (30) novem bre(3)
au sujet des droits de police et de juridiction de la Commission de Navigation sur le
Chatt-el-Arab, le Chargé d ’ Affaires d ’ Angleterre est autorisé à faire les déclarations
suivantes :
“ 1. L e Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique entend bien par la déclaration
signée avec le Gouvernement ottom an le 21 octobre,(4) et dont le texte est cité dans
l ’ aide-mémoire de l ’ ambassade du 23 octobre (5 novembre),!'5) que le dragoman du
consulat de Russie aura le droit d ’ assister à l ’ examen des affaires dans lesquelles les
accusés appartiennent à la sujétion russe.
“ 2. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n ’ a aucune objection à ce que
la perception des amendes sur les sujets russes ainsi que leur détention, le cas échéant,
ait lieu dans le consulat. Celui-ci remettra le montant des sommes ainsi perçu à la
Commission.
“ 3. Le consul aura le droit de prendre connaissance des affaires et de se mettre
en rapport avec la Commission préalablement au jugem ent de celle-ci.
“ 4. Il est bien entendu que les stipulations de l ’ article 8 de la convention anglo-
turque du 11 juin ne touche en rien au droit du consul russe d ’ exercer ses fonctions,
d ’ après les Capitulations et les ordres établis, par rapport aux sujets russes tant à
bord des vaisseaux russes sur le Chatt-el-Arabe que sur le territoire riverain de la
Commission.
“ 5. E n plus des comptes rendus annuels prévus par l ’ article 15 de la convention,
la Commission ne manquera pas, si le consul en exprime le désir, de fournir à celui-ci

G) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C on fid en tial P r in t , as the o rig in a l d ecy ph er

ca n n ot be tra ced . I t was sent to C on stan tin op le (as N o. 432). C op ies w ere sent t o th e B oa rd
o f T ra d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]
( 2) [n. supra, pp. 273-4, N o. 180.]
(3) [n. supra, pp. 2 72-3, N o. 179, encl.]
(4) [n. supra, p. 242, E d. N o te .]
( 5) [u. supra, p. 272, N o. 179, n ote ( 2).]
 28 0

toutes explications utiles quant au montant des droits prélevés par la Commission et
quant aux travaux qui ont nécessité ces droits. Le consul n ’ aura pas, toutefois,
le droit d ’opposer son veto à des travaux jugés nécessaires par la Comm ission.”

Aide-m ém oire from Russian Governm ent :—

„ “ Le Gouvernement Im périal, en prenant acte des com m unications de
l ’ Ambassade britannique du 28 octobre et du novembre de l ’ année courante, se ^
déclare prêt à reconnaître le droit de la Commission, pour améliorer les conditions
de la navigation du Chatt-el-Arabe, de percevoir sur les vaisseaux russes des taxes qui
seront fixées en article 11 de la Convention du de l ’ année courante, 1
conclue entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie. Le Ministère Im périal ne manquera
pas de charger ses consuls de veiller à ce que les vaisseaux russes ne se soustraient i
pas au paiement des taxes et se soumettent aux règlements qui seront établis par la
Commission pour les bâtiments de toutes les nations.
“ Les amendes qui seront imposées à des sujets russes par le tribunal de la
Commission en vertu de l ’ article 7 de la convention ci-dessus m entionnée et de l 'aide-
m émoire du Ministère Impérial du 17 novembre courant seront remises par les consuls
de Russie à la Comm ission.”

No. 185.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L. Mallet.

[B y Post.]
F.O. 5 4 3 6 6 /1 5 06 3 /1 3 /3 4.
(No. 430.)
Sir, ^ Foreign Office, D ecem ber 5, 1913.
As Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] is aware from my tel[eg ra m ] No. 769 to St. Petersburgh
of N ov[em b er] 29 last,(x) I instructed H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] Minister there to discuss
fully with the M finister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] the Russian objections to
A rt[ic le ]s 7 and 8 of the Shatt-el-Arab Convention.
I have now received from Mr. O ’ Beirne a report of the result of that discussion,
to the following effect :—

The Russian G ov[ernm enJt will not ask for any alteration of the Convention or
for any new declaration upon condition :—
(a) that IT [is] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] give an assurance that they under­
stand by the declaration o f O ct[ob er] 21 (2) that the dragoman of the Russian
Consulate is entitled to be present at the hearing of cases affecting Russian subjects.
W ith this proviso, the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t agree to the Commission being
empowered by ‘ ‘ delegations ’ ’ to enquire into such cases and to impose fines, since
British officials are to be members of that body.
(b) that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] agree to the amount of any fines
imposed being levied, and to detention taking place, in the Russian Consulate, provided
that such amount is remitted to the Commission.
_ (c) that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] agree to the Russian Consul being
entitled to acquaint him self with the case and with the Commission (sic) before the
hearing.
(d) that in addition to the accounts which have to be published under
A rt[ic le ] 15 of the Convention, the Commission will furnish the Russian Consul, if

0 ) [v . supra, p. 270, N o. 176.]

(2) [v . supra, p. 242, Ed. N o te.]
 281
he so desires, with full explanations regarding the dues imposed and the works under­
taken which necessitate such dues.
(e) that nothing in A rt[icle] 8 of the Convention affects the right of the Russian
Consul to exercise his usual functions in relation to Russian subjects on board Russian
ships in the Shatt-el-Arab and on shore, and that the Commission will render the
Consul any necessary assistance.
The Russian G ov [ern m en ]t will on their side recognize the right of the Comm is­
sion to levy dues and will instruct their Consuls to see that Russian ships pay these
dues and observe the regulations.
I have inform ed Mr. O ’Beirne that these stipulations appear to me to be
reasonable and that I am prepared to authorize a formal com m [u n ica tio]n to the
Russian G ov [ern m en ]t recording m y assent, provided it is recognized that the
condition laid down in (d) will give the Russian consul no right to veto any works
which the Commission may consider necessary.(3)
As soon as I have received from Mr. O ’ Beirne the draft texts of the com m unica­
tions^) which must a cc[ord in g ]lv be exchanged between the two G ov [ern m en ]ts, I
propose to inform Hakki Pasha of their contents and to state to H [is ] H [ig h n e ss]
that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] consider that the proposals of the Russian
G ov [ern m en ]t must be regarded as covered by the Anglo-Turkish declaration of
October 21.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
(3) [v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]

No. 186.

Declarations attached to the Anglo-Turkish Agreem ent.

( 1)
Déclaration.( x)
D ecem ber 10, 1913.
Les soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements, ayant examiné de
nouveau la portée de l ’ article 6 de la déclaration du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
du 29 juillet, 1913,(2) sont d ’ accord pour déclarer que, cet article ayant pour but de
réserver intacts les droits découlant pour la Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin de
Fer de Bagdad de l ’ article 9 de sa convention, la réserve y contenue s ’ étend aussi aux
matériaux nécessaires à l ’ exploitation de la ligne et de ses embranchements, ainsi
qu’ aux agents et ouvriers que ladite Société aura à transporter, seulement pendant la
durée de la construction.
E n foi de quoi les soussignés ont signé la présente déclaration.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 10 décembre, 1913. g GREY
i . 'h akkÿ .
( 2)
Déclaration. (3)
D ecem ber 10, 1913.
L e soussigné, dûment autorisé à cet effet, déclare que si le concessionnaire,
soumis à l ’ agrément du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman par le Gouvernement de Sa
0 ) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is ta k en from th a t preserved in th e F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 89). T here is a co p y also in F.O . 5 6 6 2 0 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . A co p y w as sent to
H a k k i P asha on D ecem b er 15, 1913.]
(2) [r . sup ra , p. 190, N o. 124 (4 ).]
(3) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is ta k en from th a t preserved in the F oreig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 89). T here is a co p y also in F.O . 5 6 6 2 1 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . A co p y w as sen t to
H a k k i P asha on D ecem b er 15, 1913.]
Majesté britannique, en vertu de l ’ article 3 de la déclaration ottom ane en date du
29 juillet, 1913, relative à la navigation sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate, serait rendu
incapable, par suite de maladie ou par toute autre cause, de procéder à la constitution
d ’ une société pour exploiter la concession dont il est question, le Gouvernement
Im périal ottoman s ’ oblige à transférer le bénéfice de ladite concession à un
successeur désigné par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et accepté par le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman ; et le soussigné déclare que le terme ‘ ‘ con­
cessionnaire,” dans l ’ acte de concession à accorder, sera interprété comme
comprenant tout successeur auquel le bénéfice de ladite concession pourra être ainsi
transféré.
E n foi de quoi le soussigné a signé la présente déclaration.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 10 décembre, 1913.
I. HAKKY.

No. 187.

Convention supplém entaire.(*)

D ecem ber 10, 1913.
Sa Majesté le R oi du Royaum e-U ni de Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre part;
Désireux tous deux de prolonger au delà de la date visée dans la Convention
supplémentaire du 21 octobre, 1913,(2) la période prescrite pour l ’ échange des ratifica­
tions de la convention relative au G olfe Persique et aux pays environnants, conclue à
Londres le 29 juillet, 1913 ;(3)
Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :
Sa Majesté le R oi du Royaum e-U ni de Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes : Le Très Honorable
Sir Edward Grey, Baronnet du R oyaum e-U ni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la
Jarretière, Membre du Parlement, Principal Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté pour les
Affaires Etrangères ;
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans : Son Altesse Ibrahim H akky Pacha, ancien
Grand Vézir, décoré des Grands Cordons des Ordres Im périaux de l ’ Osmanié et du
M edjidié en brillants;
Lesquels, s’ étant com m uniqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :
Puisqu’ il n ’ est pas encore possible d'effectuer l ’ échange des ratifications de la
convention relative .au Golfe Persique et aux pays environnants les Hautes Parties
Contractantes conviennent de prolonger jusqu’ au 15 février, 1914, le terme indiqué
à l ’ article 18 de ladite convention, pour l ’ accomplissement de cette formalité.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention
supplémentaire et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à Londres, en double original, le 10 décembre, 1913.
[L .S .] E. GREY.
[L .S .] I. H A K K Y .
0 ) [T h e te x t here g iven is ta k en fr o m th a t preserved in the F oreig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 87). T here is a co p y also in F.O. 5 6 6 2 2 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . A cop y was sent to
th e B oa rd o f T rade. T here w ere subsequent con v en tion s on F e b ru a ry 11, M a rch 24, and
J u n e 26, 1914, e x te n d in g the lim it fo r th e d a te o f ra tification to M a rch 31, J u n e 30, and
O ctob er 31, 1914, respectiv ely . T he te x ts are preserved in the F oreig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 87).]
(2) [v . supra, pp. 241-2, N o. 155.]
(3) [ v . supra, pp. 190-6, N o. 124 (5 ).]
 288
N o. 188.
Concession pour la Navigation sur le Tigre et VEuphrate ,{ l)
D ecem b er 12, 1913.
Entre son Altesse H akky Pacha, le représentant dûment autorisé du Gouverne­
ment Im périal ottom an, d ’ une part, et le très Honorable James L yle, Baron Inchcape,
G .G .M .G ., K .C .S .I., K .C .I .E . (ci-après dénom m é “ le con cessionnaire’ ’ ), d ’ autre part,
il a été convenu ce qui suit :—
1. Le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an accorde au concessionnaire:
(a) Le droit exclusif de navigation tel qu’ il est défini aux articles 4, 5 et 6 des
présentes.
(b) La liberté de navigation telle qu’ elle est définie aux articles 8, 9 et 12 des
présentes.
(c) L ’ autorité et le droit d ’exécuter la totalité ou toute partie des travaux, et
de prendre la totalité ou l ’ une quelconque des mesures définies aux
articles 10 et 12 des présentes.
(d) L ’ autorité et le droit de faire et d ’ appliquer les règles et règlements définis
aux articles 11 et 12 des présentes.
(e ) L ’ exemption des taxes définie à l ’ article 13 des présentes.
(/) Le droit de transférer le bénéfice de la présente concession ainsi qu’ il est requis
à l ’ article 3.

2. L e concessionnaire s’ oblige à constituer, avec toute la diligence raisonnable et

conformém ent aux dispositions de l ’ article 3, une société ottomane (ci-après dénom m ée
“ la so cié té ” et ce terme comprendra, lorsque le contexte le permettra, ses ayants
droit) à l ’ effet d ’ exercer les droits et facultés accordés par les présentes, et le Gouverne­
ment Impérial ottoman s ’ oblige à accorder toutes les facilités nécessaires à la
constitution de ladite société avec le m inimum de retard possible : dans le cas où le
concessionnaire manquerait de constituer ladite société dans un délai de deux ans à
partir de la date de la signature de la présente concession, il sera passible d ’ une amende
de £ T . 100 pour chaque mois solaire écoulé entre l ’ expiration dudit délai de deux ans
et la date de la constitution de ladite société, à la condition toutefois que telle amende
ne sera pas exigible si la non-constitution de la société est due soit entièrem ent, soit en
partie, soit directement, soit indirectement, à quelque cause que ce soit hors du contrôle
personnel du concessionnaire.
3. Aussitôt que possible, et pas plus tard qu’ un an après la constitution de la
société, le concessionnaire devra, après que la société l ’ aura indem nisé de tous frais,
dépenses et obligations encourus dans et au sujet de l ’ obtention de la présente
concession, en constituant la société ou autrement dans l ’ exercice ou dans la préparation
de l ’ exercice des droits et facultés accordés par les présentes, transférer à la société le
bénéfice de la présente concession, et tous droits et intérêts acquis par le concessionnaire
en vertu de cette concession, à la condition que si le transfert de la concession est remis
à une date plus tard qu ’ un an après la constitution de la société par suite d ’ une cause
quelconque hors du contrôle personnel du concessionnaire, celui-ci n ’ en sera pas tenu
responsable et aucun préjudice ne sera en conséquence porté à ses droits tels qu ’ ils
découlent des présentes.
4. Le droit exclusif accordé en vertu de l ’ article 1er (a) des présentes est le droit
exclusif de naviguer sur les eaux, définies à l ’ article 5, au m oyen de navires ou
embarcations de toute nature entièrement ou partiellément actionnés par la vapeur, par
des moteurs à com bustion interne, par la force motrice électrique ou par toute autre
force motrice mécanique, et avec ou sans autres navires ou embarcations en remorque.
A la condition que rien, dans les présentes, ne soit interprété com m e s’ étendant à
0 ) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is ta k en from th a t p reserv ed in th e F o r e ig n Office sériés o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 85). T here is a co p y also in F.O . 5 6 1 4 5 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . A co p y w as sen t to
C on stan tin op le (N o. 448). C op ies w ere sent t o the In d ia O ffice; to the B o a rd o f T r a d e ; to
H a k k i P ash a on D ecem b er 15, 1 91 3; to P rin ce L ich n ow sk y on J a n u a ry 13, 1914.]
 284
la navigation entreprise seulement pour des usages autres que le trafic ou le commerce,
ou à des navires de plaisance privés non destinés à la location.
A la condition également que rien dans les présentes ne porte atteinte en aucune
manière aux facultés dont jouissent actuellement Messrs. Lynch ou leurs ayants droit
en ce qui concerne la navigation sur les fleuves du Tigre et de l ’ Euphrate, lesquelles
facultés telles qu’ elles sont citées dans la première annexe aux présentes, sont
entièrement réservées.
A la condition également que rien dans ces présentes ne porte atteinte aux droits
existants de la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad en ce qui concerne le transport,
seulement pendant la durée de construction, des matériaux nécessaires pour la
construction et l ’exploitation de sa ligne et de ses embranchements, ainsi que le
transport de ses agents et de ses ouvriers.
A la condition également que la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad aura la
faculté d ’ employer à Bagdad, pour le seul service du chemin de fer, des bateaux à
vapeur, ou à toute autre force motrice, de 80 tonnes registre anglais au maximum et
des bacs (ferry-boats) d ’ un tonnage supérieur; et que ladite Société, ou la Société du
port de Bagdad si telle Société est constituée, aura la faculté d ’ employer à Bagdad des
bateaux à vapeur, ou à toute autre force motrice, de 80 tonnes registre anglais au
maximum pour le seul transport de son personnel, de ses ouvriers et de son matériel.
Partout ailleurs où le besoin s ’ en ferait sentir, soit sur le Tigre, soit sur l ’ Euphrate,
la société s’ engage, sur la demande du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, à se charger
de tout service de bacs, à établir pour les fins du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, selon des
conditions, et aux endroits, à déterminer de temps en temps par contrat spécial avec
la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
5. Les eaux, à l ’ égard desquelles le droit exclusif est accordé, sont les eaux du
Tigre à et entre Mosoul et Kurna, tous deux inclus, et les eaux de l ’ Euphrate à et entre
Meskineh et Kurna, tous deux inclus, et toutes les eaux qui sont ou pourront dans la
suite devenir navigables et qui sont ou pourront dans la suite être reliées, soit avec
le Tigre à ou entre Mosoul et Kurna, tous deux inclus, soit avec l ’ Euphrate à et
entre Meskineh et Kurna, tous deux inclus.
6. Le droit exclusif com m encera à la date à laquelle le transfert de biens prévu
aux articles 16 et 31 aura lieu, et continuera pendant la période de soixante ans à partir
de cette date, et après celle-ci pendant des périodes successives de dix ans, à moins que,
cinq ans au moins avant l ’ expiration de ladite période de soixante ans ou de l ’ une
quelconque desdites périodes de dix ans, avis ne soit donné par écrit à la société de
l ’ intention du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman de mettre fin au droit exclusif à la fin
de la période au cours de laquelle l ’ avis est donné.
7. L e Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s ’ oblige d ’ une façon générale à prendre
toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que les opérations du concessionnaire et de la
Société ne soient pas entravées, à ne pas accorder à des tiers des droits en contradiction
avec ceux accordés par les présentes au concessionnaire, et à em pêcher toute violation
de ceux-ci.
8; La faculté accordée en vertu de l ’ article 1er ( b) des présentes, est la faculté non
restreinte de naviguer sur les eaux définies à l ’ article 9 au m oyen de navires et
embarcations de toute nature de telle manière que la société, à sa libre discrétion, pourra
juger la meilleure, et en particulier sans restriction ou condition en ce qui concerne le
nom bre, genre, mode de propulsion ou de remorquage ou de traction des navires
employés, d ’ entrer et de séjourner dans les ports et endroits auxquels lesdites eaux
donnent accès, de transborder des passagers, des marchandises ou du bétail, d ’ un navire
à un autre, à tout endroit sur lesdites eaux de la manière et aux conditions que la
société pourra fixer de temps à autre, et, en général, de faire tous actes se rapportant
raisonnablement à l ’ entreprise d ’ une société de navigation exerçant sur lesdites eaux.
Il est toutefois entendu que les passagers, les marchandises et le bétail ne peuvent
être embarqués ou débarqués que dans les endroits désignés à cet effet, à la condition
que, au cas où la Société se déciderait à établir un débarcadère à un endroit où il n ’en
existait pas auparavant, un avis préalable de cette intention soit dûment communiqué
 285
au Gouvernement Im périal ottoman, qui fournirait la police et, le cas échéant, le bureau
et les employés de douane y nécessaires.
9. Les eaux à l’ égard desquelles ladite faculté est accordée sont les eaux définies à
l ’ article 5 ainsi que les eaux à et entre Kurna et la mer.
10. L ’ autorité et le droit accordés en vertu de l ’ article 1er (et des présentes sont
l’ autorité et le droit de draguer ou d ’ approfondir et d ’ améliorer de toute autre manière
le lit ou parcours de tous cours d ’ eau qui sont compris ou, s’ ils étaient rendus
navigables, seraient compris dans la description contenue dans l ’ article 5 des présentes
ou d ’ améliorer la navigation de ces eaux, et d ’ éclairer, de munir de bouées ou autre­
ment de prendre des mesures pour la sûreté et la commodité de la navigation sur
lesdites eaux.
A la condition que rien dans les présentes et qu’ aucun acte commis conformém ent
aux présentes ne soit censé imposer aucune obligation ou devoir à la société d ’ exécuter
tous travaux, de prendre toutes mesures de cette nature ou d ’ accom plir toute autre
obligation ou devoir quelconque. Il est toutefois entendu que si le Gouvernement
Impérial ottom an demande à la société d ’ entreprendre des travaux de cette nature et
que celle-ci ne veut pas s’ en charger, ledit Gouvernement aura la faculté de les
exécuter, mais de manière à ne pas entraver la navigation.
A la condition également que rien dans les présentes ne sera censé accorder à la
Société aucun droit d ’ approfondir ou d ’ améliorer les lits de canaux ou de cours d ’ eaux
existant actuellement ou qui pourront être créés dans la suite par le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman aux fins d ’ irrigation sans la permission dudit Gouvernement
préalablement obtenue, et qu’ aucuns travaux entrepris par le concessionnaire ne seront
de nature à entraver les travaux d ’ irrigation entrepris par ledit Gouvernement.
D ’ autre part, le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman exploitera le service d ’ irrigation de
façon à ne pas entraver la navigation sur le Tigre et l ’ Euphrate sauf pendant les
périodes de sécheresse absolue et, m ême pendant ces périodes, ladite exploitation
s’ effectuera de façon à réduire toute entrave à la navigation au minimum strictement
possible ; mais les entraves occasionnelles et inévitables de courte durée ne seront
pas considérées comme comprises dans cette condition ; aux fins de ce paragraphe, les
barrages avec des écluses de dimensions suffisantes à la navigation ne seront pas
considérés comme des entraves à celle-ci.
11. E n vue de jouir de l ’ autorité et du droit accordés en vertu de l ’ article 1er (d)
des présentes, la société pourra établir tout règlement nécessité par les exigences de
son service intérieur; elle aura aussi le droit de faire et d ’ appliquer les règles et
règlements qu’ elle jugera utiles pour la réglementation et la conduite de la navigation
sur les cours d ’ eaux qui sont compris, ou, s ’ ils étaient rendus navigables, seraient
compris, dans la description contenue dans l ’ article 5 des présentes. Ces règles et
règlements ne seront appliqués, en tant q u ’ il ne s’ agit du service intérieur, qu ’ après
avoir reçu la sanction du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman. Cette sanction sera
accordée avec toute la célérité que le cas comporte.
A la condition que ces règles et règlements ne s’ appliquent pas à la navigation
sur lesdites eaux par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman pour l ’ usage naval ou militaire
de l ’ Em pire ottoman.
A la condition également que ces règles et règlements ne portent pas atteinte aux
facultés dont jouissent actuellement Messrs. L yn ch ou leurs ayants droit.
A la condition également que ces règles et règlements ne portent pas atteinte aux
facultés dont jouit la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad conform ém ent à l ’ article 4
des présentes.
12. Les autorités et droits accordés par les présentes et définis par les articles 10
à 11 des présentes, sont accordés pour une période de quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans à
partir de la date de la signature de la présente concession, et à l ’ expiration de cette
période ils pourront être renouvelés pour une période à convenir au choix du
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman.
Dans le cas où ledit Gouvernement ne voudra pas renouveler lesdits autorités et
droits, il incombera à celui-ci de se charger des travaux nécessaires pour le maintien
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de la navigabilité des eaux pour les navires de la société qui seront employés sur
lesdites eaux à la date de la terminaison desdits autorités et droits. '
Les droits, facultés, autorités et exemptions accordés par les présentes (autres que
ledit droit exclusif défini par les articles 4, 5, 6 des présentes, la franchise des droits
de douane accordée par l ’ article 13 des présentes, et les autorités et droits définis par
les articles 10 et 11 des présentes) sont accordés à perpétuité.
13. Le concessionnaire et la société seront libres de toute espèce de taxe, charge
impôt, droit, redevance ou répartition, imposé, prélevé, ou chargé actuellement, ou
devant l ’ être dans la suite à un m oment quelconque, par le Gouvernement Impérial
ottom an, les autorités locales, les municipalités, les commissions fluviales, ou les autres
corps constitués quelconques, tant sur l ’ exercice des droits, facultés et autorités
accordés par les présentes que sur le sol, les édifices, les navires, le matériel, les fonds
et les autres biens et les revenus, à l ’ exception (1) des droits revenant aux vacoufs,
(2) des taxes municipales imposées en rémunération des services rendus, (3) des taxes
établies pour les frais d ’ amélioration du cours du Chatt-el-Arab, en tant que les navires
de la société en profiteraient directement et se trouveraient ainsi dans le cas de les
payer, eu égard, bien entendu, au tarif réduit qui sera appliqué impartialement par la
com m ission ad hoc à tous les navires exclusivement affectés à la navigation fluviale;
(4) les^ impôts afférents à tout imm euble de rapport que la société aura dans sa
possession en dehors des exigences de son service.
Les matériaux, fers, bois, houille, machines, voitures, wagons, et autres appro­
visionnements et munitions, nécessaires au premier établissement, ainsi qu ’ au bon
entretien et à l ’ augmentation éventuelle du service fluvial, que le concessionnaire ou
la société achètera dans l ’ Empire ottoman ou qu ’ il fera venir de l ’ étranger, seront
toujours exempts de tous impôts intérieurs et de tous droits de douane. Les navires
et embarcations de toute nature nécessaires de temps en temps au service fluvial
seront également exempts de tous impôts intérieurs et de tous droits de douane.
L a franchise des droits de douane est expressément limitée à une période de
quatre-vingt dix neuf ans à partir de la date de la signature des présentes, à moins
qu ’ elle ne soit renouvelée par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en considération des
services rendus par la société.
La franchise des droits de douane sur les combustibles est accordée pour une
période de vingt ans à partir de la signature des présentes, et à l ’ expiration de cette
période la Société sera exempte de tout droit de douane sur les combustibles pour
toute année où le bénéfice net de la Société (abstraction faite de tous frais, y compris
ceux d ’ administration, d ’exploitation, de dépréciation, et les dividendes à payer sur
les actions de priorité et sur les obligations) n ’ aura pas dépassé une somme suffisant
à payer un dividende m oyen de 9 pour cent par an sur le montant effectivement versé
des actions ordinaires pour toute année écoulée depuis la date de sa constitution. Il
est toutefois entendu que lesdits droits de douane ne seront prélevés que sous la
réserve que le bénéfice à distribuer n ’ en soit réduit à un taux inférieur à 9 pour cent.
Il ne sera perçu aucun droit de timbre sur le présent contrat ni sur les statuts de
la société ni sur les conventions additionnelles ni sur les actes subséquents. Le
concessionnaire ou la société sera soumis au droit de timbre pour toutes les actions, les
actions de priorité, les obligations, ou sur les autres titres de n ’ importe quelle espèce;
le concessionnaire ou la société sera aussi soumis au droit de timbre pour toutes ses
opérations autres que celles pour lesquelles la franchise lui est accordée par les
présentes.
Il ne sera imposé, prélevé, ou établi, par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman ou
par aucune autorité locale, municipalité, com m ission fluviale, ou autre corps constitué
quelconque, aucune taxe, ou autre charge quelconque, sur les voyageurs, le bétail ou
les marchandises, ou à leur égard, à l ’ occasion de leur transport par les bâtiments, ou
de leur passage par les établissements, de la société, soit à leur entrée, soit à leur sortie,
à moins que lesdites taxes et charges ne soient également perçues sur, ou à l ’ égard
de, tous les voyageurs, marchandises ou bétail transportés par tous autres m oyens de
transport ‘
 287
14. Les statuts de la société seront soumis à l ’ approbation du Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman. Les statuts ainsi que la constitution de la société s’ accorderont,
autant que possible, avec le type modèle prescrit pour les Sociétés anonymes
ottomanes, lequel type modèle sera com biné (sous réserve de tout contrat entre le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman et le concessionnaire ou la société à l ’ effet du
contraire) avec les dispositions spéciales ci-dessous énoncées et numérotées (a)-(fc),
ainsi qu ’ avec les autres dispositions spéciales de ces présentes :—
(a) Il y aura un président de la société, qui devra être un sujet ottom an nom m é
par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.
(b) Le président, ou en son absence le président du conseil d ’ administration,
devra présider toutes les assemblées générales des actionnaires, et en cas d ’ égalité de
voix il aura une voix prépondérante en addition à la voix ou aux voix auxquelles il
pourra avoir droit en qualité d ’ actionnaire.
(c) Tout actionnaire (sous réserve de toutes conditions spéciales, approuvées et
par le président du conseil d ’ administration et par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman,
relativement au vote auxquelles un nouveau capital pourra être émis) aura une voix
en raison de chaque action détenue par lui à toute assemblée générale des actionnaires,
en tant que le président de la société n ’aura pas décidé que les actionnaires voteront
par unités. Dans le sens du présent article, les actionnaires britanniques constitueront
une unité, et les autres actionnaires constitueront l ’ autre unité. Chaque unité ainsi
constituée aura une voix, qui sera donnée conform ém ent au désir de la m ajorité des
membres de cette unité présents à cette assemblée générale ; et, dans le cas où ces
membres seraient également divisés, le président du conseil d ’ administration ou, en
son absence, le vice-président du conseil d ’ administration, dans le cas des actionnaires
britanniques, et le président de la société, dans le cas des autres actionnaires, auront
respectivement droit à une voix prépondérante pour déterminer le sens du vote de
cette unité.
E n cas d ’ égalité de voix à toute assemblée générale des actionnaires à laquelle les
actionnaires votent par unités, le président de la société aura une voix prépondérante
en addition à la voix de son unité.
(d) Le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an nommera la m oitié des premiers
administrateurs de la société. L ’ autre m oitié des premiers administrateurs de la
société seront nommés par le concessionnaire. Après la première nom ination, toute
place vacante qui viendrait à se produire parmi les administrateurs nom m és par le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman sera remplie par un nouveau directeur à nom m er
par ledit Gouvernement, et toute place vacante parmi les autres administrateurs
sera remplie par un nouveau directeur à nom m er par le président du conseil
d ’ administration.
A la condition que rien dans les présentes n ’ empêche le conseil d ’ administration
(ci-après dénom m é “ le co n s e il” ) de fonctionner à un moment quelconque durant
lequel la constitution du conseil ne sera pas conform e à la disposition m entionnée en
dernier lieu.
Chaque administrateur aura une voix à toute assemblée du conseil en tant que le
président du conseil, ou, en son absence, le vice-président du conseil, n ’ aura pas
décidé que les administrateurs voteront par unités. Dans le sens du présent article,
les administrateurs nommés par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an constitueront
une unité, et les autres administrateurs constitueront l ’ autre unité.
Chaque unité ainsi constituée aura une voix, qui sera donnée conform ém ent au
désir de la majorité des membres de cette unité présents à cette assemblée ; et, dans
le cas où ces membres seraient également divisés, le président de la société dans le
cas des administrateurs nommés par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an et le
président du conseil d ’ administration ou, en son absence, le vice-président du conseil
d ’ administration, dans le cas des autres administrateurs, auront respectivement
droit à une voix prépondérante pour déterm iner le sens du vote de cette unité.
E n cas d ’ égalité de voix à toute assemblée du conseil à laquelle les administra­
teurs votent par unités, le président du conseil d ’ administration, ou en son absence,
 288
le vice-président du conseil d ’ administration, aura une voix prépondérante en addition
à la voix de son unité.
Le conseil pourra déterminer le quorum nécessaire pour constituer une
assemblée du conseil, à la condition que la présence de deux des administrateurs
nommés par le concessionnaire ou par le président du conseil d ’ administration soient
toujours requis pour constituer un quorum.
(c) Le président du conseil d ’ administration et le vice-président du conseil
d ’ administration devront toujours être sujets britanniques. A chaque séance du
conseil le président, s’ il est présent, ou, en son absence, le vice-président, présidera;
et aura, en cas d ’ égalité de voix, à toute séance du conseil, une voix prépondérante
en addition à sa voix ordinaire en qualité d ’ administrateur. Le premier président
du conseil d ’ administration sera le concessionnaire, qui conservera cette fonction à
son gré. A la mort ou à la démission de tout président du conseil le vice-président
succédera à sa place, et, dans le cas où il n ’ y aura pas de vice-président, le président
du conseil d ’ administration sera élu par les voix des administrateurs nommés par le
concessionnaire ou le président du conseil. Le premier vice-président sera nommé
par le concessionnaire, qui aura qualité pour le révoquer à sa discrétion, et tout vice-
président ultérieur sera nom m é par le président du conseil d ’ administration, qui aura
qualité pour le révoquer à sa discrétion.
(/) La société adoptera tous contrats ou toutes conventions provisoires pour la
nom ination de directeurs, gérants ou agents faits par le concessionnaire au nom de
la société avant son incorporation.
(g) Sous réserve des dispositions contenues dans les présentes, l ’ entière conduite
et l ’ entière direction des affaires de la société seront confiées au conseil.
(h) Les pouvoirs du conseil ne pourront être contrôlés, limités ou étendus que
par une délibération passée par une majorité non inférieure aux trois quarts des
m embres de la société ayant le droit de voter présents en personne ou par procuration
à une assemblée générale de la société, et les statuts de la société ne pourront être
modifiés que par une telle délibération. Toutefois en tant que les statuts à modifier
seront relatifs aux clauses de ces présentes, ils ne seront pas susceptibles de modifica­
tions qu ’ à la suite d ’ un accord intervenu entre la société, le président du conseil
d ’ administration et le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman.
(?) Le bureau central de la société sera à Constantinople : celle-ci pourra établir
des sièges dans d ’ autres villes de l ’ Empire ottoman ou à l ’ étranger. L e conseil
d ’ administration se réunira, selon sa propre décision, dans un des sièges de la société,
et le lieu de réunion de l ’ assemblée générale des actionnaires devra être déterminé
chaque fois par le conseil d ’ administration.
(j) Aucun transfert d ’ actions de la société ne sera valable avant d ’ avoir été
approuvé par le conseil, et si le cédant est un sujet britannique, également par le
président du conseil. Toute approbation de cette nature pourra être donnée ou
refusée à la discrétion absolue du conseil ou du président du conseil, suivant le cas,
et sans qu’ ils soient tenus de déclarer la raison d ’ un tel refus.
A la condition que, dans le cas où le cédant n ’ est pas un sujet ottom an, aucun
transfert ne puisse être approuvé jusqu’ à ce que les actions en question aient été
d ’ abord offertes à et refusées par un ou plusieurs sujets britanniques approuvés par­
le président du conseil d ’ administration, et dans la suite offertes à un ou plusieurs
sujets ottomans approuvés par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et dans le cas où
le cédant est un sujet ottom an, aucun transfert ne puisse avoir lieu que 6Í l ’ acheteur
est un sujet ottoman approuvé par le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an.
Toute action offerte doit être libre de toute charge ou obligation quelconque ;
la vente ne doit comporter aucune condition ou restriction autre que celles afférentes
aux actions en vertu des statuts de la société ; et l ’ offre doit se faire à un cours
convenable, ou s ’ il n ’ y a pas de cote, au prix que le conseil fixera comme étant la
valeur convenable de ces actions.
Toute offre de cette nature sera censée avoir été refusée si elle n ’ est pas acceptée
dans un délai d ’ un mois à partir de sa communication au Gouvernement Impérial
 289
ottoman ou au concessionnaire ou au président du conseil d ’ administration, suivant
le cas.
Il ne sera pas émis d ’ actions ou de titres d ’ actions déclarant que le porteur de
ceux-ci a droit aux actions y spécifiées, ni de certificats d ’ actions comprenant ou
portant au dos un acte de transfert. Aucune action ne sera transférable autrement
que par un acte de transfert enregistré dans les livres de la société.
(k) Les statuts pourront contenir les dispositions que le concessionnaire jugera
appropriées à l ’ égard des objets suivants, à savoir :—

(1) Pour déterminer les conditions auxquelles (s’ il y en a) toute corporation sera
autorisée à devenir actionnaire de la société.
(2) Pour assurer qu’ aucune action de la société ne sera tenue par le détenteur
de cette action, directement ou indirectem ent, en qualité de dépositaire
au nom, pour le bénéfice, pour le compte ou sous le contrôle de toute
autre personne ou autres personnes ou corporations quelconques non
approuvées expressément par le conseil, et aussi pour permettre au conseil
de prévenir toute infraction à cette disposition en ordonnant le transfert
obligatoire des actions par le détenteur, ou autrement com m e le conseil
le jugera convenable.

15. Les statuts contiendront en outre des dispositions pour assurer que le nombre
d ’ actions émises par la société lors de la première répartition sera partagé en propor­
tions égales, parmi des sujets ottomans et britanniques. Dans le but de fixer le
montant du capital-actions initial à libérer, de manière à suffire aux besoins de la
société, le conseil pourra établir à l ’ égard du montant à payer sur les actions émises
à des sujets britanniques les dispositions qu ’ il jugera appropriées, et pourra dans la
suite établir relativement à des appels de nouveaux payements sur ces actions les
dispositions qu’ il jugera convenables le cas échéant.
Il est bien entendu que tout dividende à payer doit être en proportion des
sommes effectivement versées par' les actionnaires et que toutes actions nouvelles à
émettre doivent être proposées tout d ’ abord pour souscription aux anciens actionnaires
en proportion des actions détenues par eux. La société peut émettre, sur la demande
du conseil d ’ administration et par décision de l ’ assemblée générale, des actions de
priorité à intérêt fixe et sans participation aux bénéfices ou des obligations. Mais
aucune émission de nouvelles actions ordinaires n ’ aura lieu tant que le montant
intégral des actions ordinaires originales n ’ ait été effectivement versé.
16. A une date (ci-après dénommée date du transfert) qui sera fixée dans la
suite par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et le concessionnaire, et qui ne sera
pas, sauf avec le consentement du concessionnaire, postérieure de plus de deux mois
solaires à la date de la constitution de la société, le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
(ou le concessionnaire si le transfert mentionné à l ’ article 31 a déjà eu lieu) trans­
férera à la société, libres de toutes hypothèques, charges, retenues ou autres
obligations :—

(a) Les biens sur lesquels le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman possède tout droit
ou intérêt énuméré dans la première partie de la seconde annexe aux
présentes.
( b) Les autres biens que le concessionnaire choisira conform ém ent à l ’ article 17
des présentes.
(c) Le bénéfice de ceux d ’ entre le6 contrats énumérés dans la seconde partie de la
seconde annexe aux présentes que le concessionnaire choisira pour être
transférés.

Tous les biens devant être transférés par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
à la Société seront aux risques et périls du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman jusqu’ à
ce qu’ ils soient effectivement transférés à la société.
[109001 ü
 290
17. Immédiatement après la signature de la présente concession le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman et le concessionnaire nommeront chacun un agent, et les agents ainsi
nommés prépareront conjointement une liste détaillée (ci-après dénommée Liste (A ))
des biens compris dans la première partie de la seconde annexe, ainsi qu’ une liste
(ci-après dénommée Liste (B) ) des autres biens du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman
employés dans les affaires de navigation sur les eaux définies à l ’ article 9, que le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman est disposé à transférer, mais qui ne sont pas
compris dans la première partie de ladite annexe, et également, autant qu’il sera
possible, considérant le fait que la date du transfert pourra ne pas être déterminée, une
liste (ci-après dénommée Liste (C) ) des contrats com pris dans la deuxième partie de
ladite annexe, avec des indications détaillées en ce qui concerne le6 termes desdits
contrats. Toutes corrections dans la liste mentionnée en dernier lieu seront, le cas
échéant, communiquées à l ’ agent du concessionnaire. Au moins un mois avant la date
fixée comme date du transfert, le concessionnaire communiquera au Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman le détail des biens compris dans la Liste (B) dont il désire le
transfert à la société et des contrats compris dans la Liste (C). dont il désire que le
bénéfice soit transféré à la société.
18. L ’ équivalent qui devra être donné au Gouvernement Im périal ottoman pour
le transfert des biens de la Liste (A) et des biens de la Liste (B), que le concessionnaire
choisira pour être transférés comme il est dit ci-dessus, en sera la valeur convenable,
qui sera payée ainsi qu’ il est prévu dans l ’ article 19. Cette valeur ne comprendra
aucune augmentation de valeur qui pourrait être attribuée à ee6 biens en raison de
l ’ existence de tout achalandage en relation avec les affaires de navigation conduites
actuellement par le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an, ou en raison de tous droits
exclusifs accordés à la société ou de toutes obligations imposées à celle-ci. Dans le
cas où ladite valeur ne pourrait pas être convenue, elle sera déterminée conformém ent
à l ’ article 21.
19. Ledit équivalent sera payé par l ’ attribution à un ou plusieurs ayants droit du
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman d ’ actions de la société émises comme entièrement
libérées, dont la valeur nominale sera égale à la valeur déterminée conformément aux
dispositions de l ’ article 18, et le montant de cet équivalent constituera la moitié
ottomane du capital-actions à laquelle il est fait allusion à l ’ article 15.
20. L ’ équivalent pour le transfert du bénéfice des contrats compris dans la
Liste (C), que le concessionnaire choisira pour être transférés sera l ’ engagement par
la société de remplir les obligations réciproques qui autrement devraient être remplies
à ce sujet par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman, cette obligation étant proportionnée
quand cela sera nécessaire, de sorte que le rapport de l ’ obligation à entreprendre par la
société à l ’obligation totale entreprise à l ’ origine par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman
sera égal au rapport du bénéfice transféré à la société au bénéfice total assuré à
l ’origine au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman conformém ent aux termes du contrat.
21. Au cas où l ’ on ne s ’ entendrait pas en ce qui concerne la répartition de ces
contrats, ou la valeur des biens à être transférés comme il est dit ci-dessus, tout
différend sera tranché par un arbitre qui sera désigné par convention mutuelle entre la
société et le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman, et au cas où une telle convention
n’ aboutirait pas, cet arbitre sera choisi par le président de la Cour de Cassation à Paris.
22. Le fait qu’ un tel différend n ’ ait pas été tranché à la date du transfert ne
2onstituera pas une raison de différer le transfert, et l ’ équivalent pour le transfert sera
assuré par l’ émission d ’ actions ou par l’ émission d ’ actions et le dépôt, dans une banque
qui sera désignée par convention mutuelle, d ’ espèces ou de valeurs représentant le
montant désigné comme représentant la valeur des biens transférés par le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, et le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s’ engagera,
dans le ca6 où la valeur telle qu’elle sera déterminée par l ’ arbitre serait inférieure à la
valeur nominale des actions ainsi émises, à souscrire en espèces pour l ’ excès d ’ actions
attribuées.
23. lia société pourra, autant qu’ elle le jugera nécessaire ou souhaitable pour les
objets de son entreprise, construire et ouvrir sur des terrains dont elle aura besoin,
 291
des docks, quais, jetées, débarcadères, plans inclinée, fanaux, magasins, ateliers, dépôts
et autres, qui pourront être d ’ accès privé ou ouvert au public aux conditions que la
société pourra déterminer.
A la condition que rien dans les présentes ne portera atteinte aux droits conférés
à la Compagnie de Chemins de Fer de Bagdad en vertu de l ’ article 23 de la Convention
du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars, 1903 (20 février, 1318), lesquels droits sont
entièrement réservés.
24. L ’ entreprise étant d ’ utilité publique, le terrain requis le cas échéant par la
société pour la construction de docks, quais, jetées, débarcadères, plans inclinés, fanaux,
magasins, ateliers, dépôts et autres, ou les terrains requis de toute autre manière pour
les objets de l ’ entreprise de la société, appartenant à des particuliers (la nécessité de ces
constructions et objets étant reconnue, en tant qu ’il s ’ agit d ’ expropriations, par le
Gouvernement Impérial sur la demande de la société) seront pris conform ém ent à la loi
concernant l ’ expropriation, dans les cas où il n ’ aura pas été possible d ’arriver à une
entente entre la société et les propriétaires pour l ’ achat de ces terrains.
L e Gouvernement Impérial ottoman expropriera et remettra à la société le terrain
ainsi requis et tout ce qui y appartient. Si dans lesdits terrains il se trouve des
terrains dits Arazii-Em iriei-Halié (terrains domaniaux vacants) ils seront remis
gratuitement à la société.
Le terrain nécessaire pour l ’occupation temporaire au cours des travaux de
construction seront remis à la société par les autorités locales à la condition que la
société indemnisera les propriétaires.
25. Le bois nécessaire pour la construction et l ’ exploitation du service de navigation
pourra être coupé dans les forêts des districts avoisinants appartenant à l ’ Etat,
conformém ent aux règlements relatifs à ce sujet.
26. Sous réserve de toutes dispositions expresses contenues dans les présentes,
la société sera soumise à toutes les lois de l ’ Em pire ottoman auxquelles sont soumis
actuellement et le seront dans la suite le6 personnes et corporations ottomanes en
général, mais aucune loi ne sera passée faisant distinction au détriment de la société.
27. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman accordera à des tiers la
concession de l ’ exploitation des sources pétrolifères, et en tant que les exploitants
desdites sources auront recours au transport fluvial, le concessionnaire s ’ engage à leur
offrir des bateaux-citernes et autres facilités requises pour de tels transports aux
conditions à déterminer par accord mutuel.
28. Aucune distinction quelconque ne sera faite par la société ou requise par le
Gouvernement Im périal ottoman à l ’ égard de marchandises sur la base du domicile,
de l ’ emplacement des affaires, ou de la nationalité du propriétaire, consignateur
ou consignataire de ces marchandises, ou du pays d ’ origine ou de la destination de ces
marchandises ou à l’ égard de la nationalité ou de la propriété du navire dans lequel
les marchandises sont transportés vers ou depuis les ports ottomans.
A la condition que rien de ce qui est contenu aux présentes n ’ empêchera la société
de prendre les mesures qui seront jugées à propos par le Gouvernement Im périal
ottoman à l ’ égard des marchandises dont le propriétaire, expéditeur ou consignataire
est domicilié ou exerce les affaires dans le territoire d ’ un Etat qui sera au temps en
cours en guerre avec la Sublime Porte.
Toute distinction de ce genre à l ’ égard du remorquage de vaisseaux et de
bâtiments est de même prohibée, et sous la m ême réserve.
La société ne conclura avec aucune com pagnie de navigation maritime
d ’ arrangements en vue d ’ appliquer un tarif spécial et de faveur aux marchandises
transportées par telle compagnie d ’ un port étranger jusqu’ à Bassora ou jusqu’ à quelque
autre port desservi par les bâtiments de la société, et transportées de ce point par les
bâtiments de la société jusqu’ à Bagdad ou jusqu’ à quelque autre point desservi par les
bâtiments de la société, sans admettre immédiatement au bénéfice d ’ un tel arrangement
(en tant que cela dépendra de ladite société) toute autre compagnie de navigation
maritime qui transporterait des marchandises analogues dans les mêmes conditions
entre les mêmes points.
[10900] U 2
 292
29. Aussitôt que le transfert prévu aux articles 16 et 31 des présentes aura lieu,
le concessionnaire assurera sur le fleuve un service de navigation au moins égal à celui
existant au moment de ce transfert. Dès qu’ elle aura disposé d ’ une période raisonnable
pour acquérir de l ’ expérience dans l ’ exploitation de cette concession, mais pas
plus de six mois après 6a form ation, la société soumettra à l ’ approbation du Gouverne­
ment Impérial ottoman un tableau indicatif du service m inimum qu’ elle fournira
normalement, ainsi que du tarif maximum normal qu’ elle imposera pour le transport
de6 marchandises et des voyageurs entre les points compris dans ledit service et en
attendant que lesdits tableau et tarif soient soumis par la Société au Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman, le tarif maximum normal à imposer par la Société ne dépassera
pas le maximum existant à la date du transfert desdites propriétés selon les dispositions
de6 articles 16 et 31 des présentes.
Si, dans les trois mois de la soumission de ce tableau, aucune objection n ’ y est
notifiée à la société par le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an, ledit tableau sera alors
censé avoir été approuvé par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman. Si le Gouverne­
ment Impérial ottoman soulève quelque objection contre ledit tableau et que celle-ci
ne soit pas acceptée, la question sera soumise à l ’ arbitrage (de la manière prévue par
l ’ article 21b
A la condition que la société pourra exiger du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
que le service minimum indiqué dans le tableau soit diminué si à une époque quel­
conque les bénéfices de la société ne suffisent pas au payement d ’ un dividende d ’au
moins 5 pour cent (abstraction faite des dépenses de dépréciation) aux actions
ordinaires.
A l ’ expiration de cinq années à partir de sa fixation par accord mutuel ou autre­
ment, tout tableau de ce genre ou toute révision de celui-ci seront, à la requête de
la société, sujets à révision quand il y aura lieu, et toute contestation surgissant à
propos d ’ une requête à cet effet sera tranchée de la même manière et sous la même
réserve.
A la condition que rien de ce qui est contenu aux présentes ni aucun défaut par
la société de se conform er à un tableau par lequel elle sera liée au temps en cours
ne pourra en aucune manière donner lieu à la réduction ni à la limitation d ’ aucun
des droits, libertés, facultés ou avantages accordés par cette concession, si ce n ’ est
au droit pour le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman d ’ exiger l ’ amende prévue à
l ’ article 30.
En ce qui concerne les voyages de service, le transport des agents de l ’ État, et
des militaires des armées de terre et de m er, voyageant en corps ou isolément, tant
en temps de guerre qu’ en temps de paix, sera effectué 6elon le tarif actuellement en
vigueur réduit de 50 pour cent.
Le transport des prisonniers et condamnés sera effectué à une pareille réduction.
L e transport du matériel et des approvisionnements de guerre sera effectué selon
le tarif actuellement en vigueur réduit de 15 pour cent.
En considération de ce tarif réduit, et sans porter préjudice au paragraphe 2 de
l ’ article 11, le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman se servira exclusivement des navires
et des embarcations de la société pour lesdits transports, sauf dans le cas où soit
pour cause d ’ urgence, soit pour tout autre m otif, la société ne sera pas à même de
pourvoir au service qui lui sera demandé d ’ avance par notification des autorités
locales, civiles ou militaires.
30. En cas de défaut par la société de se conform er au tableau (le cas échéant)
fixé aux termes de l ’ article 29 et par lequel elle sera liée au temps en cours, le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aura le droit de donner à la société un avis par écrit
exposant les circonstances détaillées du défaut allégué et requérant la société de se
conform er audit tableau. Si, après la réception de cet avis, la société persiste
volontairement dans ledit défaut pendant une période de non moins de six mois, le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aura le droit d ’ exiger une amende, qui n ’ excédera
pas 10 pour cent des bénéfices nets gagnés par la société pendant toute année dans
laquelle se prolongera le défaut après l ’ expiration desdits six mois. En aucun cas
 293
il ne pourra être exigé plus d ’ une amende à l'égard d ’ une année quelconque. Si le
droit d ’ exiger cette amende est contesté par la société, le point sera tranché par un
arbitre de la manière prévue à l ’ article 21, et cet arbitre déterminera absolument à
son gré le montant de l ’ amende à infliger, sous réserve de la limite prévue au présent
article.
31. Nonobstant toute disposition précédente et à titre de mesure préliminaire à
la formation de la société et au transfert à elle de cette concession, le concessionnaire,
m oyennant la fourniture de la garantie ci-après mentionnée et un préavis d ’ un mois,
aura à toute époque le droit de demander au Gouvernement Im périal ottoman de lui
transférer la totalité ou une partie quelconque des différentes propriétés comprises
dans la première partie de la seconde annexe, ainsi que le bénéfice de ceux des
contrats énumérés dans la deuxième partie de la même annexe que le concessionnaire
élira de se faire transférer, comme aussi tous les intérêts du Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman dans les droits de navigation et autres formant l'objet de cette concession,
et d ’ exercer par lui-même ou par ses agents tous les droits, libertés et facultés concédés
par les présentes, et généralement d'exploiter ladite navigation et de faire tous les
actes s 'y rapportant qu’ il jugera à propos dans son absolue discrétion en conformité
de l ’ article 29 des présentes, sauf les réserves ci-dessus faites pour la protection de
Messrs. L yn ch et de la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, et le Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman sera tenu de transférer au concessionnaire lesdits droits et propriétés
à l ’ expiration dudit avis ou auparavant.
La garantie ci-dessus m entionnée sera celle de l ’ Agence de Londres de la Banque
Impériale ottomane, et sera en la forme du projet de garantie qui forme la troisième
annexe des présentes.
Il est bien entendu qu'au cas où le concessionnaire exercerait le droit de prendre
à son com pte lesdits droits et propriétés avant l ’ incorporation de la société, celle-ci
sera tenue, aussitôt que possible après son incorporation (en outre d ’ avoir à se
conform er aux dispositions de l ’ article 3 des présentes : (a d'adopter et prendre
à son compte tous les contrats, conventions et arrangements faits par le concession­
naire ou par ses agents, et de ratifier et adopter tous les actes faits par lui ou par
eux dans l ’ exercice réel ou présumé des pouvoirs accordés par les présentes; (b de
garantir le concessionnaire et ses agents contre tous aetioos. poursuites, jugem ents,
pertes, réclamations, demandes et frais quelconques que lui ou eux anrcnt pu souffrir,
éprouver ou encourir à toute époque précédente ou pourront souffrir, éprouver ou
encourir à toute époque ultérieure, dans l ’ exercice réel ou présumé par lui ou par
eux des droits, libertés et facultés accordés par h s présentes et généralement dans
l ’ exploitation de la navigation, et le concessionnaire sera alors tenu de rendre compte
à la société de tout bénéfice qui aura pu être réalisé par l'exploitation de ladite
navigation com m e il est dit ci-dessus.
32. Les employés et agents de la société porteront la tenue qui sera fixée et
adoptée par le Gouvernement Im périal ottom an ; sauf les fonctionnaires et les
employés supérieurs, ils st ront, autant que possible, choisis parmi les sujets ottomans.
33. Les objets d'art et d ’ antiquité découverts pendant les travaux de la société
seront soumis aux règlem. r.ts régissant la matière.
34. L e Gouvernement Im périal ottom an pourra faire élever, à ses frais, des
retranchements et travaux de défense sur les bords des fleuves.
35. La société pourra établir, à ses frais, des poteaux et des fils télégraphiques
et téléphoniques; elle pourra de même établir des communications souterraines, soit
télégraphiques, soit téléphoniques. Ces fils suivront le cours des fleuves, ou ils
passeront en ligne directe d ’ une embarcadère à l ’ autre, au gré de la société; ils ne
pourront pas servir aux correspondances privées n ’ ayant pas trait au service fluvial.
Le Gouvernement Im périal se réserve le droit de faire contrôler à tout moment
par des inspecteurs délégués par le Ministre des Postes et Télégraphes, toute la
correspondance télégraphique passant par les fils de la société.
L e Gouvernement pourra faire usage des poteaux de la société pour l ’ établisse­
ment d ’ un et, au besoin, de deux fils télégraphiques, et les poteaux de la société
 294
seront établis de façon à pouvoir supporter ces deux fils supplémentaires, ainsi que
ceux de la société. E n cas de besoin le Gouvernement aura le droit d ’installer, en
cas de rupture et de dérangement de ses lignes, des télégraphistes dans les stations
pour la transmission par les lignes télégraphiques de la société des dépêches officielles
importantes et urgentes, à la condition, toutefois, de n ’ apporter aucune entrave au
service fluvial.
36. A aucun moment de son exploitation la Société ne pourra entreprendre
aucun service postal étranger sans permission préalable du Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman.
37.Nonobstant toute disposition précédente de ces présentes, il est expressé­
ment entendu que, aprèsl ’ expiration de lapériode exclusive définie à l ’ article 6, la
Société ne sera soumise à aucune disposition ou condition restrictive, à moins que
les autres services de navigation commerciale sur les eaux définies à l ’ article 9 des
présentes n ’ y soient également soumis.
38. Toute contestation qui pourra surgir, soit entre le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman et le concessionnaire ou la société, soit entre le concessionnaire et la société,
à propos de l ’ interprétation ou de l ’ exécution de la présente concession sera, sous
réserve des dispositions expresses contenues aux présentes, et à la requête de Tune
ou l ’ autre des parties intéressées, soumise au Tribunal international ¿ ’ Arbitrage de
La Haye.
Fait à Londres le 12 décem bre, 1913.
[L .S .] I. H A K K Y.
[L .S .] IN CH CAPE.

P r e m iè r e A n nexe.

A. Deux bateaux à vapeur battant pavillon britannique continueront à naviguer

sur les fleuves Tigre et Euphrate et à profiter du droit général de la navigation sur le
Chatt-el-Arab.
B. Un bateau à vapeur battant pavillon britannique sera tenu en réserve en vue
de remplacer l ’ un ou l ’ autre des bateaux ci-dessus mentionnés pour le cas où il serait
hors de service.
C. Les deux bateaux faisant actuellement le service auront, comme par le passé,
la faculté de remorquer chacun deux allèges.
D. Un bateau à vapeur placé sous la direction de MM. L yn ch ou d ’ autres
personnes désignées par eux, mais qui, une fois hors du port, bat pavillon ottoman,
aura la faculté de naviguer en même temps que les deux bateaux ci-dessus spécifiés
et, comme ces derniers, de remorquer des allèges.
Aux fins de la présente annexe la phrase “ navigation à v a p e u r” com prend la
navigation à électricité ou à toute autre force motrice.

Fait à Londres le 12 décembre, 1913.

I. H A K K Y .
IN CH CAPE.

D e u x iè m e A nnexe.

Prem ière Partie.

Les six vapeurs dits respectivement “ H am idieh,” “ Burhanieh,” “ F rat,”
“ R esafa,” ‘ M osul,” “ Bagdad,” “ Basra ” et “ Bagdad (n e u f)” avec tous leurs
agrès, apparaux et gréements.
2. Tous autres vaisseaux ou bâtiments (y compris les bateaux, chalands et
allèges) avec tous leurs agrès, apparaux et gréements.
3. Tous les terrains, édifices, jetées, docks, quais, débarcadères, plans inclinés,
balises, magasins, bureaux, matériel, outillage et autres choses semblables utilisés en
 295
ce moment en connection avec la navigation des eaux définies à l ’ article 9 et tous les
agencements et accessoires.
4. Le stock de combustible, lubrifiants, pièces de rechange, matériaux de
réparations et autres choses semblables emmagasinés aux dépôts existants à la date
du transfert.
5. Certaines propriétés des municipalités de Bagdad et de Zor, affectées à la
navigation, à spécifier dans une liste à dresser ultérieurement par accord mutuel.

D euxièm e Partie.
Contrats non expirés à la date du transfert et relatifs :
(a A la location ou à l ’ usage de terrains et d ’ édifices;
(b Aux services d ’ em ployés;
(c) A la fourniture de combustible et d ’ approvisionnements :
(d Au remorquage de chalands et au transfort de voyageurs et de
marchandises ;
(e) A la construction d ’ ouvrages d ’ art ou d ’ édifices.
Fait à Londres le 12 décembre, 1913.
I. H A K K Y .
IN CH CAPE.
T r o is iè m e A nnexe.

Dans l ’ affaire de la concession pour la navigation du Tigre et de l ’ Euphrate, en

date du 12 décembre, 1913, passée entre son Altesse H akky Pacha (représentant
dûment autorisé du Gouvernement Im périal ottoman), d ’ une part, et le Bight
Honourable James L yle, Baron Inchcape, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K .C .I.E . (le con­
cessionnaire), d ’ autre part.

A Son Altesse H akky Pacha,

Si avant la formation de la Société mentionnée dans la concussion le con­
cessionnaire (cette expression sera interprétée com m e comprenant tant Lord Inchcape
que tout successeur de celui-ci) demandera au Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
(ci-après dénom m é “ le Gouvernement ” ), en vertu de l ’ article 31 de la concession, de
lui transférer les biens mentionnés à l ’ article 31, et le Gouvernement lui transférera
lesdits biens en conséquence, puis, à la condition que le Gouvernement effectue ledit
transfert au concessionnaire, nous donnons la garantie et prenons l ’obligation :
(a) Que le concessionnaire procédera dûment à la constitution de la Société
mentionnée à l ’ article 2 de la concession avec toute la diligence raisonnable ; et dès
que la Société aura été ainsi constituée, le concessionnaire fera attribuer ou transférer
au Gouvernement ou à ses ayants droit— ceux-ci étant des sujets ottomans— des
actions entièrement libérées de la Société, représentant un montant nom inal équivalent
à la valeur raisonnable des biens ainsi transférés, déterminés conform ém ent aux
termes de la concession : b que. dans le cas où le concessionnaire manquerait de
faire attribuer ou transférer au Gouvernement ou à ses ayants droit, ainsi qu’ il est
dit ci-dessus, lesdites actions entièrement libérées de la Société, dans un délai de trois
ans à partir de la date de la com plétion du transfert desdits biens en sa faveur, nous
paierons au Gouvernement, à l ’ expiration de ces trois années, une somme égale à la
valeur raisonnable desdits biens déterminés conform ém ent aux termes de la
concession.
A la condition que, si un tel défaut est dû au fait du Gouvernement Im périal
ottoman ou des autorités ottomanes ou à un cas de force majeure ou à toute circon­
stance quelconque en dehors du contrôle du concessionnaire, de ses agents ou de ses
employés, nous soyons dégagés de toute responsabilité sous cette garantie pour le cas
qui aura été soulevé.
Il est bien entendu que ledit cas ou ladite circonstance devra être notifié par le
concessionnaire par écrit au Gouvernement Im périal ottoman et à l ’ Ambassade de
Turquie à Londres.
 296
A la condition également que, dans le cas où nous serions tenus de payer et où
nous paierions au Gouvernement ladite somme, celle-ci nous sera remboursée par le
Gouvernement avec des intérêts ne dépassant pas 5 pour cent par an et ne dépassant
pas les sommes reçues par le Gouvernement provenant des bénéfices acquis relative­
ment à l ’ exploitation de la navigation, ainsi qu’ il est prévu à l ’ article 31 de ladite
concession, immédiatement après que lesdites actions auront été à un moment
quelconque dans la suite émises ou transférées au Gouvernement ou à ses ayants
droit, ou que le concessionnaire aura retransféré au Gouvernement ou à ses ayants
droit lesdits biens tels qu’ ils pourront exister au moment d ’un tel retransfert, et
également rendu compte au Gouvernement ou à ses ayants droit de tous bénéfices
qu’ il pourra avoir acquis par l ’ exploitation de la navigation mentionnée dans ladite
concession ; et jusqu’ à un tel remboursement nous serons substitués dans tous les
droits du Gouvernement tant à l ’ égard desdits biens qu’ à l ’ égard du concessionnaire.
Tout différend qui pourra subvenir entre le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman et
la Banque Impériale ottomane quant à l ’ interprétation et à l ’ exécution de cette
garantie, sera soumis, sur la demande de l ’ une ou l ’ autre des parties intéressées, au
Tribunal international d ’ Arbitrage de La Hâve.
I[N C H C A P E ].

Relativement à la Concession en date du 12 décembre, 1913, à moi accordée par

le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, je soussigné, le Très Honorable James L yle
Baron Inchcape, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E ., conviens par les présentes avec son
Altesse Ilakki Pacha, représentant dûment autorisé dudit Gouvernement, comme suit :
1. Qu’ après la formation de la Société dont il est question dans ladite
Concession, j ’ userai de tous mes efforts et pouvoirs pour décider ladite S ociété:

(a A acheter trois vapeurs appartenant en ce moment à Aga Djaffer et un bateau

automobile appartenant aux Vacoufs (Esterabadee) et en service à présent sur le fleuve
le Tigre, pourvu que lesdits vapeurs soient raisonnablement en état de faire le service
de navigation fluviale entre Kurna et Bagdad d ’ une manière efficace à la date du
transfert.
Le prix desdits vapeurs et bateau automobile sera une valeur équitable à convenir
par accord mutuel et, à défaut d ’ accord, à déterminer par arbitrage sur la base et de
la manière prévues aux articles 18 et 21 de la Concession, de la même manière à tous
égards que pour la détermination du prix des propriétés à transférer par le Gouverne­
ment Impérial ottoman à moi ou à ladite Société aux termes de ladite Concession.
(b) A prendre à sa charge l ’ actif et le passif de la Caisse actuelle des Retraites
des employés du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman occupés exclusivement à la naviga­
tion du Tigre ou de l ’ Euphrate ou en connexion avec cette navigation, pourvu qu’ il en
soit dressé par un actuaire à nom m er par moi un inventaire montrant la valeur des
fonds repris par moi ou par ladite Société d ’ une part, et le montant des engagements
à entreprendre par la Société d ’ autre part. Au cas où le passif excéderait l ’ actif, le
déficit serait remboursé à moi ou à ladite Société par le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman, ou bien, à mon choix, il serait déduit de la valeur des biens à transférer
à m oi ou à ladite Société par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aux termes de la
Concession susvisée.
(c) Ladite Société passera une convention avec le Gouvernement Impérial
ottoman pour le transport des malles postales ottomanes à des conditions équitables.
Cette convention portera que la Société sera tenue de transporter sans frais pour le
Gouvernement Impérial ottoman des lettres (à l ’ exclusion des colis) jusqu’ à
concurrence d ’ une tonne par mois solaire ; mais si ce service nécessite une cabine ou
des facilités spéciales, ces avantages seront fournis à la charge du Gouvernement
Impérial ottoman.

Fait à Londres le 12 décembre, 1913.

IN CH CAPE.
 297
Entre Son Altesse H A K K Y PA CH A , le représentant dûment autorisé du
Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman, d ’ une part, et le “ Right Honourable ” JAM ES
L Y L E , Baron Inchcape, G.C.M.G., K .C.S.I., K.C.I.E ., d ’ autre part, il a été convenu ce
qui suit :

1. La Concession accordée par le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman pour la

navigation sur les fleuves du Tigre et de l ’ Euphrate, en date du douze Décembre
mil neuf cent treize ne sera pas valable pour engager aucune des deux parties
contractantes avant la ratification, par le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman et le
Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, de la Déclaration en date du vingt neuf
Juillet mil neuf cent treize,(2) relative à ladite navigation; mais immédiatement après
cette ratification, ladite Concession acquérera et conservera toute sa validité et sa force
d ’ exécution.
2. Toutes les fois que, dans ladite Concession, un délai quelconque est stipulé
comme devant être calculé à partir de la date de ladite Concession ou à partir de
l’ expiration d ’ une période quelconque calculée à partir de cette date, ledit délai
commencera seulement à courir à partir de la date de la ratification de ladite
Déclaration ou (suivant le cas1» à partir de l ’ expiration de toute telle période calculée
à partir de la date de ladite ratification au lieu de la date de ladite Concession.
3. Si le transfert dt-s biens énumérés dans la seconde liste de ladite Concession
a lieu conform ém ent aux dispositions de l ’ Article 31 de ladite Concession (C ’ est-à-dire
avant l ’ incorporation de la Société qui doit être constituée en vertu de ladite
Concession) il appartiendra à Lord Inchcape d ’ em ployer tous ses efforts personnels
pour effectuer l ’ achat m entionné dans la Section (a de sa Déclaration de la même
date, ci-jointe.
4. Le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman emploiera tous ses efforts et ses pouvoirs
sous la form e de voix pour obtenir que ladite Société assume tous les obligations et
engagements pris par L ord Inchcape, se rapportant, d ’ une manière quelconque, à
l ’ achat m entionné à l ’ article précédent, et l ’ exploitation des biens achetés de ce fait,
et qu’ elle lui rembourse toutes sommes d ’ argent dépensées par lui relativement audit
achat et à ladite exploitation, avec les intérêts sur ces sommes à un taux supérieur de
un pour cent (1 % ) à celui de la Banque d ’ Angleterre au temps en cours, avec un taux
minimum de cinq pour cent (5 % ) par an.

Fait à Londres le 12 Décembre, 1913. HAKKY.

IN CH CAPE.

D eclaration,(3)

To The Im perial Ottoman Government,

I, the undersigned, The Right H onourable James L yle Baron Inchcape, G.C.M.G.,
E .C.S.I., K .C.I.E ., hereby declare and admit that in the event o f m y becom ing
incapacitated by illness or otherwise from proceeding to form the Ottoman Company
as provided by Article 2 of the concession signed by His Highness H akkv Pasha and
myself on the 12th day of December, 1913, and in the event of the Imperial Ottoman
Government granting such concession to a successor nominated by H is Britannic
M ajesty’ s Government neither m y heirs nor m y executors or administrators shall
have any right or claim to the transfer of the said concession to them after being
indemnified in respect of any costs expenses and liabilities incurred by me in and
about obtaining the said concession form ing the said Company or otherwise in the

(2) [v. supra, pp. 1S9-90, X o . 124 (4 ).]

(3) [T h e t e x t h ere g iv en is ta k en from th a t p reserv ed in th e F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T reaties (T u rk ey X o . 89). T here is a cop y also in F.O . 5SS09 &463 13 44.]
 298
exercise of or in preparing for the exercise of the rights and liberties granted or to
be granted by the said concession and undertakings of even date herewith.
It is clearly understood that as soon as I have caused the said Company to be
incorporated this undertaking is absolutely determined and is of no further effect.
Dated this 12th day of December, 1913.
[L .S .] IN CH CAPE.

Déclaration secrete.(*)

Le Gouvernement Imperial ottoman, par l ’ intermédiaire de son Altesse Hakky

Pacha, dûment autorisé à cet effet, déclare au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique :

1. Qu’ il consent à ce que la société à constituer par Lord Inchcape en vertu de

la concession signée le 12 décembre, 1913, pour la navigation du Tigre et de
l ’ Euphrate, se charge, sur la demande du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, du
transport des valises postales britanniques entre Bagdad et Bassora et/ou
Mouhammera et/ou tout autre point intermédiaire où le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
britannique aurait un bureau de poste à la date précitée.
2. Qu’ il donnera son approbation à toutes les dispositions que Lord Inchcapc
voudra insérer dans les statuts de la Société susmentionnée, à la condition qu’ elles
ne soient pas de nature déraisonnable ou en contradiction avec les dispositions de la
concession signée le 12 décembre, 1913.
Fait à Londres, le 12 décembre, 1913.
I. HAKKY.

(4) [T h e te x t h ere g iv en is ta k en from th a t preserved in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin

T rea ties (T u rk ey No. 89). T here is a cop y also in F.O. 5 6 1 9 5 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Copies w ere sent on
D ecem b er 15, 1913, to C on stan tin ople (N o. 4 5 3 ); t o H a k k i P a s h a ; to th e In d ia O ffice; to the
B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

No. 189.

Communication to H err von K uhlm ann.(l)

F .O . 5 0 6 4 3 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . Foreign Office, D ecem ber 15, 1913.
His M ajesty’ s Government have very carefully considered the counter-draft,
com m unicated by the German Charge d ’ Affaires on the 4th November, of the
proposed Anglo-German Convention respecting the Bagdad Railway and allied
questions, and his note of the 3rd November com m enting upon this docum ent.(2)
Sir E . Grey now has the honour to transmit a further draft, which is somewhat
amended both in form and in substance.(3)
The changes of form are primarily due to exigencies of procedure, and are
designed to meet the fact that certain stipulations must necessarily, in the first
instance, be agreed upon between the Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Railway
Company or the proposed River Navigation Company, as the case may be.
The changes o f substance are largely attributable to the desire of His M ajesty’ s
Government to recall the German Government as nearly as possible to the original

0 ) [C opies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office. F o r
th e enclosures v. in fra , pp. 304-10, Nos. 1 9 0 -1 ; supra, p. 242, Ed. N o te. T he te x t is p rin ted in
fu ll in G .F., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 3 08 -1 4.]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 242-9, No. 156, and en d s.]
(s) [17. immediately succeeding document.]
 299
proposals which thev put forward, as a basis of negotiation, on the 7th May, 1913,(4)
and from which each successive counter-draft seems to have constituted a further
departure. So wide indeed has been the departure that even such important conditions
as those contained in section 2 ( b) and the first and third sentences of section 3 of the
memorandum of that date,— which went far to constitute the credit side of the
transaction from the British standpoint,— have now, by the wording of the German
counter-draft of the 3rd November, 1913 (article 2, clause (ci, last paragraph, article 4,
clauses ( b) and (c), and article 5, clause b) ),(s' been substantially whittled away.
His M ajesty’ s Government recognise that the proposals made on the 7th May,
1913,(4) were to some extent tentative and non-com mittal, and they have accordingly
not been unwilling, as the German Government are aware, to concede certain important
points in the course of negotiation in the interests o f a general settlem ent; but they
are persuaded that they cannot go further in this direction without so weakening
the conditions secured in British interests as to expose the whole Convention to
unanswerable criticism and therefore to insuperable objection. This will be the more
apparent when attention is drawn to the following considerations, a course which
Has M ajesty’ s Government adopt in no controversial spirit.
The principal desiderata of His M ajesty’ s Government have from the first been,
and, as indicated in the present British counter-draft, still are, confined to two
p oin ts:—

(a) That there should be no change detrimental to British interests in what His
M ajesty’ s Government regard as the political status quo at the head of
the Persian Gulf.
(b) That there should be n o sort of discrimination against British trade on the
Bagdad Bailway.
These points are largely covered by section 2 of the memorandum of the 7th M ay,
1913,(4) and by the proposal, confidentially explained to Herr von E uhlm ann on the
same date, for the institution of a Riverain Commission on the Shatt-el-Arab.(6)
On the other hand, the desiderata of the German Governm ent, as conceded in
the present counter-draft, are relatively not inconsiderable :—
(a) His M ajesty’ s Government agree to an increase in the Turkish customs
duties, an increase which must be borne largely by British trade, which
represents some 30 per cent, of the total foreign imports into T u rk e y ; this
increase is virtually a si7ie qua. non to the successful com pletion of the
Bagdad Railway.
(b) His M ajesty’ s Government undertake not to oppose the construction and
management o f the proposed railway right down to Basra, the on ly natural
commercial terminus o f such a line, by the Bagdad Railway Company.
T hey thereby abandon all claim to British control in the Bagdad-Basra
section : it will be recollected that the satisfaction of this claim was at one
time a principal condition of British assent to the customs increase.
(c) H is M ajesty’ s Government agree that, in the important provinces o f Bagdad
and Mosul, where British trade has long been predominant, they will
support no railway undertakings either in direct competition with the
Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines or with that Com pany’ s existing rights.
(d) His M ajesty’ s Government agree not to oppose the acquisition b y German
interests of 40 per cent, of the share capital allotted to Turkey in the
proposed Ottoman River Navigation Company.
(e) His M ajesty’ s Government acquiesce in certain facilities being granted to
the Bagdad Railway Company on the R iver Tigris at Bagdad.
W hile His M ajesty’ s Government have no desire to exaggerate the disparity
between these respective desiderata, they are confident that the German Governm ent
( 4) [r. supra, p p . 97-8, N o. 66 ]
(5) [r . supra, pp. 243-9, N o. 156, encl. 2 .]
( 6) [N o record o f th is e x p la n a tio n can be tra ce d .]
 300
will appreciate their attitude in regarding the proposals put forward in the revised
counter-draft now enclosed as representing the utmost limit o f concession to which
they can properly agree.
Sir E . Grey will now proceed to deal seriatim with the points raised by Herr von
Kiihlmann in his covering note of the 3rd November,( 7) and to refer when necessary
to the corresponding clauses of the counter-draft.
His M ajesty’ s Government are in principle opposed to explanatory notes, holding
that a convention itself should be so clear and precise as to require no explanation;
nevertheless, they recognise that, in the present instance, many points of detail are
involved and that their inclusion in the text of the convention might prove somewhat
cumbrous and inconvenient, and they are accordingly prepared to defer to the wish
of the German Government, on the distinct understanding that the explanatory note
is ratified and published at the same time as the convention.
His M ajesty’ s Government agree to the adoption of the words “ s y s te m ” and
“ un dertaking” as proposed in article 1, clause (a), provided they are first furnished
with authentic copies of all agreements between the Ottoman Government and the
Bagdad Bailway Company, and provided they find no occasion for objection in the
final text of the supplementary agreements nowr under discussion at Berlin, as it is
clearly essential that they should know precisely what they are asked to agree to ;
provided also that it is expressly agreed in the explanatory note that their freedom
of action with regard to future variations of the concession is not impaired by this
wording.
His M ajesty’ s Government would also agree to the inclusion in the explanatory
note of the words “ under the express condition that no prejudice of an economic or
financial nature is caused to Great Britain in pursuance of this clause.” They consider
further that the obligations of Great Britain under this clause should be defined in
the same docum ent. In the view of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, Great Britain would
be bound, after the signature of this convention and the conclusion of all pending
negotiations with Turkey, not to oppose the increase of the Turkish customs duties
up to 15 per cent, ad valorem, and not to oppose the allocation of a portion of this
increase or of existing Turkish revenues for the purposes specified in article 35 of
the Bagdad Bailway Convention of March 1 9 0 3 0 : such an obligation would not,
however, commit His M ajesty’ s Government in advance to support the allocation of
any particular revenues, but m erely that of adequate revenues, to such purposes.
H is M ajesty’ s Government prefer the words “ declare that they will not oppose ”
to those suggested in article 1, clause (b ), of the German counter-draft; this under­
taking corresponds, m oreover, to that which the German Government assume in
article 4, clause (a).
The addition suggested bv the German Government of the words “ as represen­
tatives of a group of British shareholders” in article 1, clause (cl. does not commend
itself to His M ajesty’ s Government. It is essential that there should be British
representatives on the board of the Bagdad Bailway, and H is M ajesty’ s Government
attach importance to an assurance from the German Government that they will use
their best endeavours to this e n d ; but it appears to them otiose to enter in the
Convention into the technical formalities which the admission of such representatives
may entail. Herr von Gwinner explained to Mr. Parker at the German Embassy
on the 7th June, 1913,( 9) that their admission could only take place in a manner
such as is suggested in Prince Lichnow skv’ s note of the 16th July, 1913,( 10) and,
subject to the successful formation of a British group. His M ajesty’ s Government
intimated that the arrangements indicated would be satisfactory. W hile they adhere
to this position, they w’ould point out that they have since taken legal advice respecting

( 7) [i\ supra, pp . 242-7, N o. 156.]

( “) [v. B.F.S.P., V ol. 1 0 2 ,-pp- 844 -6 .]
( 9) [r . supra, p. 142, No. 91.]
( 10) [v. supra, pp . 176-7, N o. 118, and en d s. 1 and 2 .]
 Bül

the bearing of the statutes of the Bagdad Railway Company and of the provisions of
Turkish com pany law on the question and they are advised that it would not in fact
be contrary either to the one or to the other for British representatives with a
qualifying holding to be admitted to the Board independently of the votes o f the
shareholders.
In this connexion it must be remarked that the terms outlined by Herr von
Gwinner to Sir H . B abington-Smith on the 14th June. 1913,( n ) are not such as are
likely, in the opinion of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, to encourage British financial
participation in the undertaking. The British subscribers are to be required to pay for
their shares in full at par. whereas the original shareholders paid actually only one-half
of the nominal value of their shares, the remainder being credited to them out of the
profits on the construction of the first section of the railway— a course which seems
open to criticism on purely financial grounds. W hilst as regards participation in the
profits arising from the construction and working of the railway, British shareholders
would thus be in a less favourable position than the original subscribers, they are
to be required to put themselves in the same position as original subscribers as regards
the very onerous obligations of the syndicate for realising the Government b> nds.
If substantial British financial participation in the enterprise is desired. H is M ajesty’ s
Government trust that the German Government will use their influence with the
Bagdad Railway Company to secure an appreciable modification of the terms
suggested.!12)
As regards article 2 certain changes have been made, with a view to greater
clearness, in the lettering and numbering of the several clauses and sub-clauses : it
will be observed that no alteration of wording is made in clause (a), sub-sections i)
and (ii), or in the first paragraph of sub-section 'n il: but His M ajesty’s Government
are unable to concur in the proposal that German capital should be represented by
directors on the board o f any railway which might be built from Basra Zobeir to
the Persian Gulf. S ic h a proposal, as has already been pointed out. is in direct
conflict with section 2 (b'\ of the memorandum of the 7th M ay, 1 9 3 3 ',3>; it also appears
to His M ajesty’ s Government misleading and inequitable to stipulate that German
representation on such a line should be similar as regards conditions and proportion
to any British participation on the board of the Bagdad R ailw ay: the counterpart of
any such British participation as may be arranged is rather to be found in German
participation in the proposed River Navigation Company.
H is M ajesty’ s Government attach great importance to all the stipulations which
now appear in italics in article 2. clause (a i. section (ivl of the British counter-draft
being “ adhered t o ’ ’ by the German Governm ent in the present A nd o-G erm an
Convention, even though they may in the first place be the subject o f agreement
between the Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Railway Company.
Clauses b) and (c) of article 2 provide for a British participation, both in the
capital and directorate of the com pany or com panies of the ports o f Basra and Bagdad,
and in the contracts for construction and maintenance, of 40 per cent, o f the whole.
Such a percentage is, according to Prince Lichnow sky’ s note o f 16th July,C 4) what the
Bagdad Railway Company are prepared to concede to British interests: as British
participation in the port o f Basra up to 50 per cent, is not conceded, as suggested
in the British note o f the 18th September, 1913,( 15) His M ajesty’ s Government now
revert to the proposal for British participation in both ports.
Clause di o f article 2 appears very desirable in order to ensure com plete equality
o f treatment.
Clauses (a) and (b) of article 3 have not been altered.

(u ) [cp.^ supra, p. 235, X o . 154, n ote (4).]

( 12) [T h is pa ra g ra p h has b een a c d e d from th e co p y in the C on fid en tial P rin t. On th e d r a ft
a n ote is in serted to the effect th a t a p a ra g ra p h w ou ld be a d ded by th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
( 13) [i\ supra, p. 97, X o . 66.]
( 14) [r . supra, p. 174, X o . 113.]
( 15) [v . supra, p. 235, X o . 1 54 ; p. 239, X o . 154, en cl.]
 302

The German Government express a wish that two changes should be made in
clause (c) of article 3, viz., that the words “ in Ottoman territory east of Aleppo”
should be substituted for “ in the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad,” and that the
words “ or in contradiction with that Company’s existing rights” should be inserted
after the words “ the Bagdad Railway Company’s lines.”
His Majesty’s Government regret that they cannot possibly agree to an extension
of the geographical area under this clause ; they have had very great hesitation in
agreeing even to the area originally suggested, having regard to the established
position of British trade and influence in the provinces specified, but they certainly
could not agree to mortgage the future as regards any line which might, at some
distant date and under wholly altered conditions, possibly when the Bagdad Railway
system is fully developed, be projected from the Mediterranean to Lower
Mesopotamia.
His Majesty’s Government understand that no project for a competing line with
the Bagdad Railway from any point on the Mediterranean is at present under con­
templation, and that, as regards the Aleppo-Meskene project, nothing beyond a purely
negative obligation has been assumed by the Ottoman Government.
As regards the second alteration of wording suggested in this clause, His Majesty’s
Government are prepared to adopt it subject to the insertion of the word “ either”
after “ railway undertakings,” and provided a satisfactory settlement respecting the
oil concessions in Mosul and Bagdad is reached, as they trust may be the case, before
the signature of this Convention.
His Majesty’s Government do not consider that there is any parallel in fact
between German participation in the River Navigation Company and British participa­
tion in the ports of Bagdad and Basra ; if it is desired to establish a parallel it should
be sought, due regard being had to the relative magnitude of the two concerns, between
German representation in the River Navigation Company and British representation
in the Bagdad Railway Company, which, under the convention of 1903, includes
concessions for the ports of Bagdad and Basra.
His Majesty’s Government could in no case agree to the wording of article 4,
clause (b) of the German counter-draft of the 3rd November, any more than they
could to that of article 2, clause (d) of the same document : they consider it
absolutely indispensable that British participation in the ports should be fixed in
precise terms in the convention itself at 40 per cent, of the whole, and that German
participation in the navigation should be expressly limited in the convention itself lo
a stated maximum; they are further of opinion that the real facts of the agreement
would have to be revealed eventually in Parliament and that no object would therefore
be gained by their temporary obscuration. If, however, the German Government are
anxious to maintain a spectacular parallel, perhaps the wording of article 4, clause (b)
of the counter-draft now enclosed might serve the purpose in view. In agreeing not
to oppose German participation, to the extent indicated, in the River Navigation
Company, His Majesty’s Government take formal note of the assurances contained
in the German Ambassador’s communication of the 16th July, 1913, to theeffect that
the German Government does not aim at any combination which could endanger
effective British control of the navigation, and that the German Government would
therefore be prepared to receive favourably any proposals about voting arrangements
which would seem to His Majesty’s Government desirable in order to assure the
effective British control of the River Navigation Company.
It will be observed that clause (c) (i) of article 4 has been amended in form, and
that the time limit of five years is re-inserted. His Majesty’s Government attach
cardinal importance to a specific limitation in the duration of the rights of the Bagdad
Railway Company under article 9 of the convention of 1903(16); they must in
pursuance of section 3 of the memorandum of the 7th May, 1913, continue to press
for such a limitation, which is not moreover inconsistent with the terms of agreement

(»*) [i>. B.F.S.P., Vol. 102, p. 837.]

 303

between the Bagdad Railway Company and either the *’ Société de Transports
fluviaux ’ ’ or Messrs. Lynch Brothers.
Sir E. Grey would add that he understands that Messrs. Lynch Brothers are
prepared., so far as they are concerned, to conclude an arrangement such as that
contemplated under article 4 clause (c) (ii).
The changes in article 5 ( b ) have already been explained in substance in
Sir E. Grey’s memorandum of the 25th November, 1913(17 : slight verbal changes
have since been made with the object of greater precision.
His Majesty’s Government, after the most careful consideration, are not able to
agree to stipulations such as are contained in articles 5 a and 7 of the German
counter-draft of the 3rd November; but they would be willing to agree that article 6
of the British counter-draft should be interpreted, so far as possible, in the light of
the recommendations of the 9th September, 1913,(18> and that these recommendations
should be embodied in the explanatory note : they understand, however, from Hakki
Pasha that the specific revenues named in section II of those recommendations have,
already been earmarked by anticipation for another purpose— a subject upon which
Djavid Bey may possibly be able to throw more light.
While resolutely opposed, for the practical reasons explained in Sir E. Grey’s
memorandum of the 18th September, 1913,(19) to the system of dual control which a
“ comité de surveillance ” would entail, His Majesty’s Government have made a
considerable modification in the wording of article 6 in order to meet the criticisms
of the German Government, and they earnestly trust that the draft in its present form
will be acceptable. A copy of the Anglo-Turkish declaration, respecting the rights
enjoyed by the nationals of the Treaty Powers in Turkey, is enclosed.(20)
In order that the document which formed the enclosure in Sir E. Grey’s
memorandum of the 25th November, 1913, may exactly correspond with the present
British counter-draft, a revised version is transmitted herewith.(21)
In conclusion, and while expressing the hope that these negotiations may be
completed and the Anglo-German Convention signed in the course of next month, His
Majesty s Government would again draw the attention of the German Government
to the desiderata of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, which, if dealt with on a
svmpathetic and broad basis would, they confidently believe, contribute to the ultimate
benefit both of the Smyrna-Aidin and the Anatolian Railway systems.

M IN U TE .

This is an excellent draft and embodies clearly a piece of excellent w ork.(22) I hare
explained it to Sir E. Grev who shares this view and entirelv approves.
' E. A. C.
D ec[em ber] 12.
A. N

(17) [v. supra, p. 266, No. 174.]

(1S) [ v. supra, p. 229, E d . X o fe .]
(19) [ v. supra, p. 237, No. 154.]
(20) [r. su pra, p. 242. E d . ATife.]
(21) [r. infra, pp. 303-10, No. 191. F or the version of November 25, r. supra, pp. 267-9,
No. 174, e/icl.]
(22) [This memorandum was drawn up by Mr. A Parker.]
 304
N o. 190.

British Counter-draft of Anglo-G erm an C onvention.^)

F.O. 5 0 6 4 3 /6 4 63 /1 3 /4 4 . D ecem ber 15, 1913.

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a). Recognising the general importance of the com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction of the Bagdad
R ailway system or to prevent the participation of capital in this undertaking.
Clause ( b). H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that th ey udll not
oppose the construction and management of the proposed railway from Bagdad to
Basra by the Bagdad Railway Company.
Clause (c). The Im perial German Government declare that they will use their
best endeavours to secure that two British directors, agreeable to H is Britannic
M ajesty’ s Government, shall be admitted to the board of the Bagdad Railway
Company.

A r t ic l e 2.

Clause (a). The Bagdad Railway Company having concluded with the Im perial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German
Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best
endeavours to secure its due execution :—
(i) The terminus of the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra, and
the Bagdad Railway Company has renounced all claims to construct a branch line
from Basra (Zobeir) to the Persian Gulf, referred to in article 1 of the Bagdad
Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1903, and to build a port or railway terminus
on the Persian Gulf, whether under article 23 of the said Bagdad Railway Convention
or in any other way derived.(2)
(ii) No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the Bagdad
Railway Com pany’ s system, either as regards facilities or rates o f charge for the
conveyance of like articles between the same points on account of the ownership,
origin, or destination of goods presented for transport, or in any other manner
whatever.
(in) In the event of the construction of the said branch line from Basra (Zobeir)
to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be made to secure
facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s system, and
there shall be complete protection against discrimination direct or indirect.
(iv) The construction and exploitation of the proposed port at Basra, authorised
by article 23 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1903, shall be
carried out by a separate Ottoman com pany.

No duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denomination shall

be levied by the port com pany on any vessels or goods which shall not equally, under
the same conditions, be imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever be the
nationality of the vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country of origin or
destination of the goods, and whatever be the places from which the vessels or goods
arrive or to which they depart.

( ') [cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 302-7. T he use o f ita lics in th e te x t g iv en above in d icates
v a ria tion s from the G erm an draft, of N ovem b er 3, 1913. cp. supra, pp. 247-9, No. 156, encl. 2 .]
(*) [v. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 833-4 (A rt. 1 ); pp. 840-1 (A rt. 2 3).]
 305
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading of vessels in the
port, no privileges or facilities shall be granted to any vessel or vessels which shall
not equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.
The Imperial Ottoman Governm ent reserves to itself the right to con fer upon
the Commission, which it proposes to entrust with the im provem ent and m aintenance
of the navigability of the Shatt-el-Arab, its rights of control over the port of Basra.
The conventions relating to this port, and the statutes of the com pany to be
form ed, shall contain provisions expressly preserving the rights of the aforesaid
Commission.
Clause fbh The Imperial German G overnm ent and His Britannic M ajesty's
Governm ent agree that they will use th eir best endeavours to secure that in the
separate Ottoman Company for the construction and exploitation of the port o f Basra,
mentioned in sub-clause (iv11 above, British participation, both in the capital and
directorate of the port com pany, and in the contracts for construction and main­
tenance, shall amount to 40 per cent, of the whole.
Clause (c). The Im perial German G overnm ent and His Britannic M ajesty's
G overnm ent agree that th ey will use th eir best ejideavours to secure that in any
Ottoman Company for the construction and exploitation of the port of Bagdad, to be
form ed under article 6 of the agreem ent betw een the Bagdad Railway Company and
the Im perial Ottoman G overnm ent, m entioned in clause (a) of the present article,
British participation, both in the capital and directorate of the port com pany, and
in the contracts fo r construction and m aintenance, shall amount to 4 0 p er cent, of
the whole.
Clause (d . In all that relates to the dues and charges of w hatever nature to
be levied, and to the facilities to be accorded, in the ports of Basra and Bagdad,
goods arriving or to be forwarded by icater shall receive identic treatm ent to those
arriving or to be forwarded by rail.

A r t ic l e 3.

Clause (a). The Imperial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government declare that they will in no case support the construction o f a branch
from Basra (Zobeir), or from any point o f the main line o f the Bagdad Bailway,
to the Persian Gulf unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject
between H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, the Im perial German Governm ent,
and the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent.
Clause (b). The Im perial German Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to estai lish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf unless and
until there is complete agreement on the subject between His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government and the Im perial German Governm ent.
Clause H|i His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to establish, in the provinces o f Mosul and Bagdad, railway undertakings
either in direct com petition with the Bagdad Bailway Com pany’ s lines, or in
contradiction with that com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is complete
agreement on the subject between the Im perial German Governm ent and His
Britannic M ajesty's Governm ent.

A r t ic l e 4.

Clause (a). The Im perial German Governm ent, having cognisance o f the
declaration signed on 29th July, 1913.0) on behalf o f the Im perial Ottoman Govern­
ment, concerning navigation on the Bivers Tigris and Euphrates, declare that they
will not oppose the execution, nor support any action directed against the execution,
(3) [r . supra, pp. 189-90, X o . 124 (4 ).]
[10900] X
 30G
o f such declaration, so long as the navigation on the said rivers is maintained m
substantial accordance with the provisions thereof.
Clause ( b). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Bailway interests o f 40 per cent, of the share
capital to be allotted to Turkish interests at the first allotm ent and the right in respect
th ereof to subscribe for a rateable proportion of further issues of capital of the
Ottoman Company for river navigation, and their representation on the board o f the
aforesaid com pany by one director out of the share o f the directorate allotted to
Turkish interests.
Clause (c) (t). It is, nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall
be held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 o f the Bagdad Railway Convention
of the 5th March, 1903, except in so far that His Britannic M a jesty’ s Governm ent
and the Im perial German G overnm ent hereby agree and declare, so fa r as concerns
them selves, that they adhere to, and will use their best endeavours to secure the due
execution of, the following provisions of the arrangem ent referred to in article 2 of
the present convention :—
The Bagdad Railwray C om pany’ s rights under article 9 of the aforesaid C onven­
tion of the 5th March, 1903, shall not continue to be exercised after the 31st January,
1919, unless it is shown that no other satisfactory means are available fo r the purposes
specified in the said article 9, and in any case they shall cease on the completion of
the construction of the Bagdad Railway to Basra.
(ii) It is further agreed that if an arrangement to the satisfaction of the partie
concerned can be made for the conveyance by river of the aforesaid materials through
British or Ottoman agency, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial
German Government will use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of such
an arrangement.
A r t ic l e 5.

Clause (a). The conoessionnaire, nominated in pursuance o f article 3 of the

aforesaid declaration of the 29th July, 1913, having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Governm ent and the Im perial German Government declare, so far as concerns them ­
selves, that they adhere to the said arrangement and will use their best endeavours
to secure its due execution :—
No discrimination shall be permitted by the Ottoman Company for river
navigation, either as regards facilities on rates o f charge for the conveyance of like
articles between the same points on account o f the ownership, origin, or destination
of goods presented for transport, or in any other manner whatsoever. The Company
shall grant no through bills of lading, rebates, or other privileges of any description
in respect of goods carried by any ship between any place served by the Com pany’ s
vessels and any place oversea, unless the same privileges are accorded in respect
o f similar goods carried under the same conditions and in the same direction between
the same places by all ships regularly trading between those places, irrespective of
nationality.
Clause (b). The Im perial Germ an G overnm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Governm ent declare, so far as concerns th em selves, that th ey adhere to, and will
use their best endeavours to secure the due execution of, the following provisions of
the arrangem ent referred to in article 2 of the present C on ven tion :—
The Bagdad Railway Company shall have the right, solely fo r the service of the
railway, to em ploy at Bagdad vessels propelled by steam or by any other m otive
power, but not exceeding 80 tons British register, and ferry-boats of greater tonnage.
The Port Company referred to in article 2, clause (c), shall have the right to
em ploy at Bagdad vessels propelled by steam or by any other m otive power, but not
exceeding 80 tons British register, solely for the transport of its officials, workm en,
and materials.
 807
.4£ oth er places on the Tigris or E uphrates w h erever the need m ay arise, the
Im perial Ottoman G overnm ent tm dcrtakes that the proposed Ottoman Company of
R iver Navigation shall he responsible fo r any ferry service required fo r the purposes
of the railway, according to conditions, and at points, to he settled from tim e to time
hy special agreem ents between the above com panies.

A r t ic l e 6.

(a) The Im perial German Governm ent haring taken note of the A nglo-Turkish
Convention of under which the free navigation of the Shatt-
el-Arab is assured to the shipping of all nations and a commission is established for
the execution of such works as may be necessary for the improvement of its channel
and for its maintenance and for other like purposes set out therein, and being of
opinion that the provisions o f the Convention are conducive to the best interests of
international com m erce, will, so long as the duties imposed upon the Commission
by the said Convention are satisfactorily carried out, uphold the Convention, and
will undertake that German subjects and German shipping shall com ply therewith,
and with all regulations issued by the Comm ission, and shall duly discharge all
obligations properly imposed upon them in pursuance o f the provisions o f the said
Convention.
The Im perial German Governm ent take note in this connection of the declaration,
signed on the and attached to the said Convention,
to the effect that articles 7 and 8 of the above Convention do not affect the rights
enjoyed in the Ottoman E m pire hy the nationals of the Treaty Powers.
His Britannic M a jesty’ s Governm ent on their part undertake that th ey will not,
without a prelim inary agreem ent with the Imperial Germ an G overnm ent, consent to
the imposition of dues exceeding 1 franc p er registered ton.
(b) If at any tim e any of th e Governm ents m ost interested by reason of the
magnitude o f their shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab are of opinion that the duties itnposed
upon the Commission are not satisfactorily carried out, or that the reasonable require­
ments of the com m erce of the river in m atters tcithin the com petence of the Commission
are not adequately m et, and if the Commission in such case has not seen its way
to give effect to im portant recom m endations laid before it in the interests o f shipping,
with the object of removing the above-m entioned causes of complaint, H is Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent will use their good offices with the Imperial Ottoman Govern­
m ent to ensure the referen ce to a Board of Enquiry o f the questions w h ether in any
particular respects the duties of the Commission have not been satisfactorily carried
out, and w hether there is good ground for thinking that the Commission, if m aintained.
icill not be able to provide for the reasonable requirem ents of the com m erce of the
river.
This Board shall consist of five m em bers to be drawn from the Powers most
interested by reason of the magnitude of their shipping in the S hatt-el-A rab; the
Ottoman m em ber of this Commission shall be the President.
The Board of Enquiry shall, unless the time is extended with the consent of all
parties, publish its report within four months of its appointm ent. The G overnm ent
of His Britannic M ajesty will use their good offices with the Im perial Ottoman G overn­
m ent to ensure that the proposals contained in such R eport are carried out.

A r t ic l e 7.

Any difference of opinion arising out of this declaration shall be submitted to

arbitration. If the two Governments fail to agree about a special Court or arbiter,
the case shall be submitted to The Hague Tribunal.

[10900]
 808
N o. 191.
R evised Official British Draft of proposed A greem ent betw een Bagdad Railuay
Company and Ottoman Governm ent.
F.O. 5 0 6 4 3 /6 4 63 /1 3 /4 4 . D eccm ber 15, 1913.
I.
Baesora est fixé com m e point terminus de la ligne du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad renonce à la concession de la construction
et l ’ exploitation de l ’ embranchement partant de Baesora (Zobéir) ou de tout autre point
de la ligne et aboutissant à un point du Golfe Persique (article 1er, No. 4, de la
Convention du 20 février (5 mars), 1903), ainsi qu’ au droit de construire et exploiter
un port à un point situé au Golfe Persique (article 23 de cette m ême C onvention)^1)

II.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad confirme qu ’ elle continuera comme
par le passé à appliquer à toutes les marchandises d ’ une catégorie identique qui
pourront lui être présentées en vue d ’ être transportées par chem in de fer, entre les
mêmes stations et dans les mêmes conditions, un régime parfaitement égal, tant pour
le tarif en vigueur qui leur sera imposé que pour les facilités dont elles jouiront, quels
que soient respectivement :
(a) Le pays d ’origine des marchandises importées dans l ’ Em pire ottom an:
(b) Le pays de destination des marchandises exportées de l ’ Em pire ottom an;
(c) Les pays d ’ origine et de destination des marchandises en transit par l ’ Empire
ottoman ; et
(d) Le pavillon et l ’ armateur des bâtiments sur lesquels les marchandises sont
importées ou exportées par les ports ottomans.
La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad consent, en outre, à ce que les délais
fixés par l ’ article 21 de son Cahier des Charges, touchant les avis préalables à donner
en cas de modification des conditions on des prix des tarifs, soient uniformément portés
à deux mois.
Ces avis seront insérés dans le Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman
et dans le Journal de la Chambre de Commerce Ottomane de Constantinople.
L es mots “ les mêmes con d ition s’ ’ employés dans le présent article signifient
les mêmes conditions de poids, d ’ emballage et de vitesse (grande, petite ou autre),
la même catégorie de marchandises et les mêmes stations de départ et d ’ arrivée.
Ces dispositions s ’ étendront dans la mesure où elles y sont applicables au régime
appliqué par la Société du Chemin de Fer au transport des voyageurs entrant dans
l’ Em pire ottoman, le quittant ou traversant son territoire, et de leurs bagages.
Toutefois, elles ne s’ appliqueront pas au transport des émigrés et des indigents et de
leurs bagages. Aux fins du présent alinéa, le terme “ é m ig ré s ” se rapporte aux
personnes venues s’ établir dans les limites de l ’ Em pire ottoman qui sont transportées
par les soins de la Commission des Emigrés.

III.
En cas d ’ exécution d ’ un embranchement de Bassora ou de tout autre point de la
ligne principale, au Golfe Persique, des arrangements seront conclus en vue de faciliter
le trafic direct, 6ans rupture de charge, de et vers le réseau du Chemin de Fer de
Bagdad, et il y aura sur cet embranchem ent une protection com plète contre toute
tarification différentielle, soit directe ou indirecte, comme cela est prévu à l ’ article 2
pour le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
IV .
Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s ’ engage à faire exécuter, par la commission
mentionnée à l ’ article V des présentes, les travaux nécessaires pour l ’ amélioration des
C ) [v . B.F.S.P., V ol. 102, p. 834 (A rt. 1, N o. 4) ; pp. 840-1 (A rt. 2 3).]
 309
conditions de la navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab, afin de maintenir, dans la mesure du
possible, le chenal du fleuve libre de toutes espèces d ’obstacles, et ladite commission
viserait de prime abord, au moins jusqu'au port de Bassora, une profondeur de 24 pieds
au-dessous du niveau de la pleine mer de la grande marée.

y.
La construction et l ’ exploitation du port de Bassora, prévues à l ’ article 23 de la
Convention du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars, 1903, seront assurées par une
Société anonyme ottomane à form er dans ce but et dont les actes de concessions et
les statuts seront arrêtés d ’ un com m un accord entre le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman
et la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
Le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman se réserve le droit de conférer ses droits
de contrôle sur le port de Bassora à la com m ission qu ’ il se propose de charger de
l ’ amélioration et du maintien de la navigiibilité du Chatt-el-Arab.
Les conventions relatives à ce port et les statuts de la société à constituer
contiendront des dispositions sauvegardant expressément lts droits de ladite
commission.

V I.
La construction et l ’ exploitation du port de Bagdad, prévues à l ’ article 23 de la
Convention du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad du 5 mars. 1903. seront assurées par ls
Société prévue à l ’ article 5 des présentes ou par une Sc ciété anonyme ottomane à
former dans ce but et dont les actes de concessions et les statuts seront arrêtés d ’ un
commun accord entre le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman et la Société du Chemin de
Fer de Bagdad.

V II.
Aucuns frais, n ’ importe sous quel titre, ne seront imposés dans les ports de
Bassora et de Bagdad aux navires et aux marchandises, quels que soient la nationalité,
le propriétaire, le pays d ’ origine ou de destination des marchandises, et quels que
soient les lieux de provenance ou de destination des navires et des marchandises, en
tant qu’ il ne s’ agira pas d ’ une mesure générale applicable indistinctem ent et
uniformément à tout le monde, sans exception et sans privilège spécial d ’ aucune sorte,
en faveur de qui que ce soit.
Pour tout ce qui a rapport aux frais quelconques à imposer dans lesdits ports, et
aux facilités à accorder, un traitement identique sera assuré aux marchandises
transportées ou à transporter par voie d ’ eau et à celles transportées ou à transporter
par chem in de fer.
Pour tout ce qui concerne le stationnement, l ’ embarquement et le débarquement
des navires dans ces deux ports, aucuns privilèges ou facilités ne sauraient être
accordés à des navires quelconques, en tant que lesdits privilèges et facilités ne
seront pas accordés également et dans les mêmes conditions, à tous les autres navires.

vin.
La Société du Chemin de F er de Bagdad aura la faculté d ’ em ployer à Bagdad,
pour le seul service du chem in de fer, des bateaux à vapeur, ou à toute autre force
motrice, de 80 tonnes registre anglais au maximum et des bacs (ferry-boats) d ’ un
tonnage supérieur.
Les recettes du service susvisé restent acquises à la Société du Chemin de Fer
de Bagdad.
La Société constituée en vertu de l ’ article 6 des présentes, aura la faculté
'd ’ em ployer à Bagdad des £>ateaux à vapeur, ou a toute autre force motrice, de 80 tonnes
registre anglais au maximum, pour le seul transport de son personnel, de ses ouvriers
et de son matériel.
 310
Le matériel fluvial susmentionné jouira de toutes les exemptions de droits
d ’ entrée et autres, dont jouit le matériel roulant du chem in de fer, et il sera de même
exonéré de tous impôts, redevances ou taxes, de navigation et autres.
Les combustibles nécessaires pour ce service jouiront de la franchise douanière
au même titre que ceux consom m és par le chemin de fer, et celui-ci aura le droit d ’ en
opérer le transport dans les m êmes conditions que ceux destinés à son exploitation.
Partout ailleurs où le besoin s’ en ferait sentir, soit sur le Tigre, soit sur
l ’ Euphrate, le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman s’ engage à obtenir de la Société
Ottomane de Navigation Fluviale à constituer qu’ elle se charge de tout service de bacs,
à établir pour les fins du chemin de fer, selon des conditions, et aux endroits, à
déterminer de temps en temps par contrat spécial entre les susdites Sociétés.

IX .
Les droits de la Société du Chemin d-e Fer de Bagdad, découlant de l ’ article 9 de
la Convention du 20 février (5 mars), 1903,(2) ne resteront plus en vigueur à partir du
31 décembre ( n . s .ï , 1918, sauf le cas où il serait démontré qu’ il n ’ existe pas d ’ autre
m oyen satisfaisant aux besoins spécifiés audit article 9, et, en tous les cas, lesdits
droits seront déterminés dès que la construction du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad aura
été complétée jusqu’ à Bassora.
( 2) [ v . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, p. 837.]

No. 192.

Communication from H err von Kühlm ann.(J)

F.O. 5 8 3 8 8 /6 4 6 3 /1 3 /4 4 . London, D ecem ber 23, 1913.(2)

Notiz.
Die Abänderungsvorschläge der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung zu den
beabsichtigten Vereinbarungen der Bagdadbahnge6ellschaft mit der türkischen
R egierun g(3) sind eingehend geprüft worden. Die Vorschläge zu Artikel 1-7 sind zwar
nicht in allen Einzelheiten von Bedenken frei, es ist aber anzunehmen, dass den
zum Ausdruck gekomm enen W ünschen R echnung getragen wird, soweit dies mit der
W ahrung der deutschen Interessen vereinbar ist. Dagegen erklären die Interessenten
die für Artikel 8 vorgeschlagene Fassung nicht annehmen zu können.
Sie führen aus, dass die M öglichkeit, zwischen den wichtigeren Eisenbahnsta­
tionen und den jenseitigen Ufern des Euphrat oder Tigris leistungsfähige Verbindungen
herzustellen, für die Bagdadbahn geradezu eine Lebensfrage ist. Die Bagdadbahn
führt bekanntlich dem rechten Tigrisufer entlang, das kein eigentliches Hinterland
hat. Der Hauptverkehrszufluss wird von dem linken Tigrisufer her erfolgen. Der
Brückenbau ist angesichts der Breite der in Betracht kommenden Flüsse ein
kostspieliges Unternehmen. W ie weit sich ein leistungsfähiger Verkehr von einem
Ufer zum anderen ohne motorische Kraft hersteilen lässt, ist zur Zeit noch nicht
zu überßehen. W enn für die H erstellung eineß Motorverkehrs von Ufer zu Ufer erst
eine Verständigung mit der Gesellschaft des Lord Inchcape notwendig ist, so bedeutet
dies nicht mehr und nicht weniger als eine Auslieferung der Verkehrsinteressen der
Bagdadbahn, soweit diese den Flüssen entlang läuft, an die Monopolgesellschaft, die
ihrerseits als Konkurrentin der Bagdadbahn ein Interesse daran haben kann, die
Zufuhr von W aren und Personen zu deii Stationen der Eisenbahn nicht zu erleichtern,
sondern zu erschweren.
( ') [T h is com m u n ica tion was sent t o the B oa rd o f T ra d e on J a n u a ry 2, 1 91 4; to L o rd In ch ­
ca p e on J a n u a ry 9, 1914. F o r the in stru ction s on w hich this m em ora ndum was based v. G.P.,
X X X V I I (I ), pp. 284 -7 .]
(2) [T h is docu m en t is not dated. I t was reg istered at the F oreig n Office on D ecem b er 29
b u t th e da te a ppears to have been D ecem b er 23, v. im m ed iately su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]
(•■') [v. im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t.]
 311
Die Bagdadbahngesellschaft muss deshalb nach wie vor W ert darauf legen,
wenigstens an den allerwichtigsten Uferplätzen einen Verkehr von Ufer zu U fer, auch
soweit die Zuhilfenahme motorischer Kraft notwendig ist, selbst einzurichten. Dieser
Verkehr muss der Bahnverwaltung die Möglichkeit bieten, auch die Personen und
W aren, die vom jenseitigen Ufer kommend zur Eisenbahn gelangen oder mit der
Eisenbahn ankommend das jenseitige Ufer erreichen wollen, herüber und hinüber
zu befördern. Diese Möglichkeit wird durch die deutsche Redaktion des ersten
Absatzes des Artikels 8 gewahrt, dagegen durch die englische Redaktion der Absätze 1
und 2 des Artikels 8 ausgeschlossen.
Als Punkte, für die die Bagdadbahngesellschaft die Befugnis braucht, einen
eigenen Dienst unter Zuhilfenahm e m otorischer Kraft von Ufer zu Ufer einzurichten,
kommen in erster Linie Bagdad, Samarra und Mossoul in Betracht.
Was die übrigen Stationen anlangt, an denen sich das Bedürfnis eines M otor­
verkehrs herausstellen könnte, so ist die Deutsche Bank im Prinzip bereit, sich mit
der Flussschiffahrtsgesellschaft über die E inrichtung des erforderlichen Dienstes zu
verständigen, wie dies im Schlussabsatz der englischen Fassung des Artikels 8
vorgeschlagen ist. Der englische Vorschlag scheint jedoch insofern unvollständig, als
er nicht besagt, was geschehen soll, wenn eine solche Verständigung zwischen der
Eisenbahngesellschaft und der Flussschiffahrtsgesellschaft daran scheitert, dass die
Flussschiffahrtsgesellschaft Bedingungen stellt, die bei vernünftiger W ürdigung der
Bedürfnisse der Bagdadbahn für die Eisenbahngesellschaft nicht annehmbar sind.
Es müsste also zum mindesten eine unparteiische Instanz vorgesehen werden, welche
bei M einungsverschiedenheiten die Bedingungen für die Herstellung eines solchen
Verkehrs festzusetzen hätte. W enn die Gesellschaft des Lord Inchcape zu diesen
Bedingungen einen solchen Verkehr nicht einrichten will, müsste der Bagdad­
gesellschaft das R echt, ihrerseits den Verkehr einzurichten, belassen werden.
Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten wäre es am natürlichsten, wenn Lord Inchcape
sich mit dem so weitgehenden Monopol der Schiffahrt flussauf- und flussabwärts
begnügen wollte, für die seine Konzession gedacht war, und nicht auch noch den
Ufer-zu-LTfer-Verkehr für sich beanspruchte.
Der Schlussabsatz des Artikels 8 in der englischen Fassung könnte so ausgelegt
werden, als ob die Bagdadbahngesellschaft sich jede E inrichtung eines Verkehres
von Ufer zu Ufer, einerlei ob mit oder ohne motorische K raft, zu Gunsten der Fluss­
schiffahrtsgesellschaft des Lord Inchcape untersage. Auch nach dieser R ichtung hin
ist eine unzweideutige Klarstellung erforderlich, dass die Bagdadbahngesellschaft sich
das Recht wahrt, sich von der türkischen Regierung die Erm ächtigung geben zu
lassen, Drahtseilfähren &c. überall dort anzulegen, wo es ihr nützlich erscheint.
Das Studium der Frage würde es erleichtern, falls die Vereinbarungen (K on­
zessionsentwürfe und Statuten), die Lord Inchcape mit der türkischen Regierung
bezüglich der Flussschiffahrt auf dem Tigris geschlossen hat, der Kaiserlichen
Regierung vertraulich mitgeteilt werden könnten, um dazu eventuell Stellung nehmen
zu können.
 31*2

CHAPTER XCIV.

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY QUESTION,

JANUARY— AUGUST 1914.
No. 193.

Communication to Prince Lichnowsky.C)

F.O. 1 9 8 6 /2 7 7 /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, January 15, 1914.

On the 23rd December a memorandum was communicated by the German Charge
d ’ A ffaires/2) respecting article 8 of the proposed agreement between the Ottoman
Government and the Bagdad Bailway Company. In this memorandum stress was
laid upon three principal points :—
(i) The desire of the Bagdad Railway Company to establish connexion between
the two banks of the River Tigris at Bagdad, Mosul, and Samara, by means of services
under its own control.
(ii) The need for a sure guarantee that satisfactory services will in fact be supplied
by the proposed Ottoman Company of river navigation wherever else they may be
required by the Bagdad Railway Company, on conditions acceptable to the latter
com pany.
(iii) The need of reserving to the Bagdad Railway Company the right of
establishing, by agreement with the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t, ferry services, &c.,
wherever they may be required.

As regards point (i), I I [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would observe that the

right to establish cable ferry services is already conceded at Bagdad under article 8
of the British revise of the agreement in question,/3) and under article 5 of the draft
Anglo-G erm an agreem ent,/4) as enclosed in the British memorandum of December 15,
1913. As regards the proposal o f the Bagdad Railway in so far as concerns the.
institution of such services at Samara and Mosul, I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov[ern m en ]t
have been in consultation with Lord Inchcape, and his Lordship is strongly opposed
to such an arrangement, though he would be prepared to enter into a contract forth­
with with the Bagdad Railway Company for the supply of the necessary services at
those places. H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t would, m oreover, not be prepared to
acquiesce in the proposal of the Bagdad Railway Company, which goes beyond the
terms of the convention of March 1903, is inconsistent with the Anglo-Turkish
Declaration of July 29, 1913,(5) and is still more inconsistent with the basis of agree­
ment suggested to I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] by the German G ov [ern m en ]t on
M ay 7th, 1913, where it is laid down that “ German subjects should make no claim to
participate in the navigation of the Euphrates and the Tigris.” / 6)
As regards point (ii), H [is ] M fa jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t must entirely dissent from
the contention that Lord Inchcape’ s concession was at first intended to Ibe confined to
navigation up and down stream, and did not extend to transport between the two
banks.
They would suggest that, in the event of disagreement between the Bagdad
Railway Company and the Ottoman River Navigation Company as to what constitutes

( !) [A cop y o f this com m u n ica tion was sent to th e B oa rd o f T rade. T he te x t is g iv en in full

in G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 319 -2 0.]
( 2) [ v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
( 3) [>. supra, pp. 309-10, N o. 191.]
( 4) [t>. supra, pp. 3 06-7, No. 190.]
(5) [t>. supra, pp. 189-90, N o. 124 (4 ).]
( 6) [cp . supra, p. 98, N o. 66.]
 313

acceptable conditions, provision should be made for reference to an independent

arbitrator of foreign nationality, and, failing agreement as to the arbitrator, that the
reference should be to the Hague Tribunal.
As regards point (iii), H fis ] M [a jesty ’ sn G o v e rn m e n t] must base their refusal
on the same grounds as are adduced against point (i), as well as upon the additional
reason that such ferries, under foreign control, might seriously hamper the river
navigation and thus render Lord Inch cape’ s concession nugatory.
A copy of the concession has now been com m unicated to the German Embassy,
and H [is ] MTajesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t trust that an early conclusion of the pending
negotiations may now be achieved.

No. 194.

Communication from Count Benckendorfj.

F.O. 2 7 4 2 'S T O /ld/d d . London, D. January 19, 1914.

Confidentielle. R. January 20, 1914.
Si les pourparlers au sujet de la mission militaire Allemande (*) aboutissent à un
résultat satisfaisant, le Gouvernement im périal ne verra plus d ’ obstacles à ce que son
arrangement économique et de chemins de fer avec la Turquie soit signé sans retard.
Il y est fait m ention entre autre du consentement principiel du Gouvernement
Russe d ’ admettre le 4 % de surtaxe douanière lorsque les autres Puissances y auraient
donné leur adhésion.
Mais le Cabinet de St. Petersbourg. s'étant entendu avec ceux de Londres
et de Paris que la surtaxe ne serait admise qu’ après entente entre ces trois Cabinets,—
M. Sazonofi serait reconnaissant de connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement
Anglais à ce sujet.
Il espère que Sir Edward Grey ne verra pas d ’ objections à ce que le consente­
ment en principe du Gouvernement Im périal soit donné sans retard.
L a surtaxe n ’ entrerait d ’ ailleurs en vigueur que du jour de son acceptation par
toutes les Puissances.
le 19 Janvier, 1914.

t1) [op. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 333-423, C h a pter L X X X V I I , passim..]

No. 195.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 3 2 2 3 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .
(No. 33.)
Sir, Foreign Office, January 20, 1914.
M. Cambon said to-d ay f1) that the French discussions with Germ any about railways
in Asia Minor had progressed. There was now only one point unsettled, and it was
not one of the most important points. M. Doumergue was most anxious that we
should not sign our agreement with Germ any before the French signed theirs. As
regards the arrangements with Turkey, France had initialled those, but it was
desirable that the British and Russian and French agreements with Turkey should all
be signed simultaneously.
I told M. Cambon that I had heard nothing of these agreements for some three
weeks. M y impression was that we had actually signed most of our agreements with

P ) [cp. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docum ent. F o r M . P a u l C a m bon ’ s rep ort v. D .D .F ., 3me Ser.,
V ol. I X , pp. 241-3, No'. 194.]
 814

T urkey; but the one about the Bagdad Railway still remained to be signed, because
Turkey must first make an agreement with Germany on that point. I would enquire
in the Department how things stood with regard to this and our pending agreement
with G erm any.(2)
I am, Ac.,
E. G [R E Y ].
( 2) [N o te by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ I should like to see M r. P a rk er a b ou t this. E. G .” ]

No. 196.
Communication to M. Paul Cambon.
F.O. 32*23/2390/14/44. Foreign Office, January 29, 1914.
On January 2 0th (1) the French Ambassador informed Sir E. Grey of the progress
then being made in the French negotiations with Germany respecting railways in
Asia Minor. H [is ] E [xcellen cy ] at the same time expressed the hope that the
agreement between G [rea ]t Britain and Germany would not be signed until the
French agreement with Germany was ready for signature, and that the British,
French, and Russian agreements with Turkey should all be signed simultaneously.
Sir E. Grey replied that the Anglo-Turkish agreements connected with the
proposed customs increase, as distinct from the monopolies, had already been signed
some months previously, with the single exception of that relating to railways in
Asiatic Turkey, which the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t were not in a position to sign
pending the com pletion of negotiations now approaching conclusion between the
Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and the Bagdad Railway Company.
As regards the Anglo-German negotiations, Sir E. Grey would recall to M. Cambon
that as early as July 4th last the desire of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t to
conclude the agreement with Germany as soon as possible was alluded to in a note
from Sir A. N icolson(2) ; and on August 14th, a memorandum was communicated to
the French Embassy in which it wras explained that while H [is ] 'M [a je s ty ’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] were willing, if necessary, to delay for a little the conclusion of their
own agreement with Germany, they felt confident that the French G ov[ern m en ]t
would, so far as possible, hasten the conclusion of their own agreement with the
German G ov [ern m en ]t(3) ; in a letter dated August 29 M. de Fleuriau explained in
outline how matters stood at that time, and again laid emphasis on the desire of the
French G ov [ern m en ]t that the British and French agreements with Germany should
be concluded at the same tim ef4): and on September 17 H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] agreed not to precipitate their agreement with G erm any.(5) Finally, in
December, M. Cambon discussed with Sir A. Nicolson the subject again and
January 15 was suggested as a suitable date, which M. Cambon thought would quite
meet the requirements of the French G o v [ern m en ]t.(6)
In these circumstances PI [is] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t earnestly trust that the
French G ov [ern m en ]t will be satisfied if a date not later than February 14 is now
appointed for the signature of the agreements since that is the latest date fixed for the
ratification of an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey respecting the Persian
Gulf and of other agreements.
The Anglo-German draft agreement has in substance been settled, and it is hoped
that in the course of next week all outstanding points of detail will be arranged.

0 ) [i>. im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t, and n o te R ).]

(2) [*. supra, p. 167, N o. 113.]
(3) [*. supra, pp. 207-9, N o. 135.]
(4) [u. supra, pp. 219-21, N o. 145, and encl.]
(5) [t>. supra, p. 230, N o. 152.]
(o) [cp. D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. V I I I , p. 759, No. 604, w here M. P a u l Cam bon record s
con v ersation w ith S ir A. N icolson on D ecem b er 10, 1913.]
 315
N o. 197.

Sir Edward G rey to Count BenckendorffJ1)

F.O . 2 7 4 2 /3 7 0 /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, January 29, 1914.

Sir E . Grey presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador and, in reply
to H [is ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s enquiry of the 19th January(2) respecting the proposed
increase of the Turkish customs from 1 1% to 15% ad valorem, has the honour to
state that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] see no objection to the immediate assent
of the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t to this measure being given in principle.
Sir E . Grey observes that reference is made, in Count Benckendorff’ s com m unica­
tion, to the Russian draft agreement with Turkey respecting railways and certain
economic questions; H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] would be much interested if
they could be apprised in due course of the railway lines which are contemplated by
this agreement.
H [is ] M a je s t y ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t propose to give their assent to the increase of
the Turkish customs dues as soon as the Turkish G ov[ern m en ]t are in a position to
sign the agreement, which has already been communicated to the Russian
G ov [ern m en ]t, relating to railway rates and cognate matters in Asiatic Turkey.
t1) [A cop y o f this co m m u n ica tion was sent to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [r . supra, p. 313, X o . 194.]

No. 198.

Prince Lichnou'sky to Sir Edward G r ey J 1)

F.O. 4 6 0 1 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 . London, D. February 1, 1914.

Euerer Exzellenz R. February 2, 1914.
beehre ich mich, erhaltenem Aufträge gemäss, eine A ufzeichnung ergebenst zu
übersenden, welche die Gegenvorschläge der Kaiserlichen Regierung auf den mit
dem vertraulichen M emorandum vom 15. Dezem ber 1913(2) mir übermittelten Entwurf
zu einem Abkom m en über die Bagdadbahn enthält.
LIC H N O W SK Y .

Enclosure 1 in No. 198.

M emorandum com m unicated by Prince Lichnotcsky.

The Im perial Government have, with the greatest care, studied the British counter­
draft for an Anglo-German Convention of December 15th 1913 and the confidential
memorandum of the same date.(2) Prince Lichnowsky now has the honour to
communicate a further draft designed to meet as far as possible the views put forward
in the British memorandum of Decem ber 15th.
It must be emphatically stated that the proposals made on May 7th 1913(3) have
always been considered by the Im perial Government as tentative and non-com mittal.
Their aim was to establish, as far as possible with such intricate questions covering a
wide field and deeply affecting important interests, a basis for discussion.
It is inevitable that in such a discussion as the different questions are explained
in fuller detail some modifications have to take place and it must be pointed out that
if the draft as it now stands gives to Germany some advantages not mentioned in the

(*) [H e r r v on J a g o w ’ s in stru ction s fo r this com m u n ica tion are g iv en in G .P., X X X V I I (I),
pp. 3 22 -4 3.]
( 2) \y. supra, pp. 295-307, X os. 189-90.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 9 7-8, X o. 66.]
 816
draft of May 7th 1913, it contains on the other hand important German concessions
not stipulated in this draft, as for instance the very important Article 3 clause b, or
the participation with 4 0% of British capital in the construction and management of
the port at Bagdad. It is not proposed to deal here with the points raised in this
connection in the memorandum (article 2 clause c, article 4 clauses b and c and
article 5 clause b as they have to be examined in detail later on) but it can be stated
that none of these points if agreed to by H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] Government would in
any appreciable or essential way interfere with the objects which H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
Government was aiming at.
The two points put forward in the memorandum as being the most important
desiderata of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] Government have from the beginning o f the
negotiations been in principle accepted by the Imperial Government.
It is open to considerable doubt if a speedy solution of the questions still under
discussion would be advanced by -examining in a sort of historical retrospect at length
every concession made by both sides in the course of the negotiations and by covering a
good deal of ground where agreement has already been practically obtained; the
Im perial Government therefore while entirely reserving their attitude towards the
arguments adduced in the British memorandum prefer to confine their remarks to
the details of the convention actually still under discussion.
The Imperial Government hope that His M ajesty’ s Government will examine the
proposals of the counter-draft here included in a spirit o f fairness and conciliation, so
that a speedy and satisfactory solution o f all outstanding points may be attained.
Prince Lichnowskv will now proceed to discuss seriatim the points raised by the British
counter-draft of December 15th 1913.

A r t ic l e 1.

Article 1 remains materially as proposed in the British counter-draft. The

Imperial Government agree to furnish His M ajesty’ s Government with authentic
copies of all agreements between the Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Railway
Company, and it is also agreed that it should be expressly stated in the explanatory
note that the freedom of action of the British Government with regard to future
variations of the concession is not impaired by this wording. This is accepted on the
distinct understanding that the British Government shall act in exactly the same way
about all agreements concerning river navigation in Mesopotamia and the River
Conservancy Commission.
The inclusion is accepted in the explanatory note of the words “ under the express
condition that no prejudice of an economical or financial nature is caused to Great
Britain in pursuance of this clause.” The German Government agree that the
obligations of Great Britain under this clause should be defined in the same document.
There has been no intention on the 6ide of the Bagdad Railway interests to earmark
any part of the Turkish customs increase to 15% for this undertaking, they think
therefore sufficient if the explanatory note stated that Great Britain would be bound
by this clause not to oppose an allocation of existing Turkish revenues sufficient for
the construction of the Bagdad Railway system.
W e would prefer to leave out clause b of article 1, as the line from Bagdad to
Basra is part of the Bagdad Railway system. If this is done ‘ ‘ or management ” would
have to be inserted in article 1 clause a.
As in article 2 clause a 1 Basra is expressly mentioned as the terminus of the
line. This seems a further reason for leaving out clause b article 1.
Clause c. The modus procedendi for the admission of English members to the
Conseil d ’ Administration of the Bagdad Railway has been explained in Prince
Lichnow sky’ s note of July 16th 1913.( 4) These proposals having been accepted there
seems to be agreement about this point.

C ) [r . supra, p. 176, No. 118, encl. 1.]

 317
If the British Government insists on leaving out “ a6 representatives of a group
of British shareholders ’ ’ this would be agreed to provided that ' ‘ agreeable to His
Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent” shall equally be left out of the convention. Both
clauses could be inserted in the explanatory note. Both give details about the way
to elect two British members which are entirely covered by the exchange of notes
proposed by Prince Lichnowsky. It must be clearly understood that the two British
members cannot enjoy any privileged position but shall be in a position of absolute
equality with all other members of the Conseil d ’ Administration. Should the British
Government propose to drop clause c altogether and arrange for the election of the
two British members by exchange of notes there would be no objection. It seems
desirable to say “ M em b ers” instead of “ D irectors” and instead of the “ Board of
the Bagdad Railway C om p a n y” “ Conseil d ’ A dm inistration” of this Company, as
those are expressions used in the original docum ents. W ithout knowing exactly the
arguments of the legal advisers of His M ajesty’ s Government concerning certain
remarks made by H err von Gwinner in June 1913^1 it would not be possible to discuss
them but probably no useful purpose would be served by such discussion.
The “ Deutsche B a n k ” dors not agree with the views put forward on page 5 of
the British Memorandum concerning the participation of British capital in the Bagdad
Railway, but this question being highly technical might better be left to a special
discussion between the Deutsche Bank representatives and British interests. The
“ Deutsche B a n k ” considers that their offer will put the British shareholders in a
more favourable position than those shareholders who have been in the undertaking
from the beginning. The intention of the “ Deutsche B a n k ” is to offer part of the
shares belonging now to the Ottoman Bank under exactly the same conditions under
which these shares shall be sold by the Ottoman Bank to the German group.

A r t ic l e 2.

Clause a 1.— It is proposed to strike out “ or in any other way d e riv e d ” as the
convention to be concluded between the Turkish Government and the Bagdad Railway
only mentions article 23 of the Bagdad Railway Concession. There seems to be no
necessity to retain those words as there exists absolutely no agreement between Turkey
and the Bagdad Railway from which 6uch a right could be derived.
The Imperial Government cannot accept the statement that the stipulation[s] in
clause c concerning German representatives on the board of the Zobeir Gulf section
are misleading and inequitable, the same reasons which have prompted H is M ajesty’ s
Government to ask for two members on the Conseil d ’ Administration of the Bagdad
Railway, viz. to provide against any possible discrimination on that system has led to
demand a German representative on the board of the Zobeir line to safeguard the
important rights conceded in article 2 clause a III. They nevertheless agree to leave
out the second part of clause c beginning with “ in this event ” to “ Bagdad Railway ”
provided that this is not taken to prejudice in any way the position the Im perial
Government might take up should the line from Zobeir to the Gulf ever be undertaken,
and provided a complete agreement is reached in all other outstanding points o f the
present convention.
IV. A6 British interests now demand a 40°,'> participation both at Basra and
Basdad it is proposed to have only one Company for both harbours. The text is
modified accordingly.
The Imperial Government agree to section 4 of IV but do not see their way to
accept section 5 for which there seems to be no necessity as being entirely covered by
section 4.
Clauses b and c are accepted in principle, but we propose to say at the beginning
of clause b “ The Imperial Government declare that they will not op p ose.” to make
it exactly sim ilar to article 4 clause b. Instead of “ Directorate ” it is proposed to say
|>p. supra, d o . 234-5, N o. 154, and n ote (4) ; p. 301, X o . 1S9, an d n o te R 1). cp. also G.P.,
X X X V I I (I), pp. 196-7.]
 818
“ Conseil d ’ Administration ” to bring it in accordance with the wording of the
agreements with Turkey we would like to see the words “ if a n y ’ ’ maintained for
the reasons given before.
Clause d is agreed to.

A r t i c l e 3.

Clauses a and b are accepted, but it is suggested that at the end of article 3 the
Im perial Ottoman Government being the Sovereign of the country shall be named
first of the three Governments.
In article 3 clause c it is proposed to strike out the words “ in the provinces of
Mosul and B agdad.” It seems an essential condition of an agreement like the one
which is under discussion that one party should not interfere with acquired rights
and important interests of the other. A limitation to the provinces of Mosul and
Bagdad m ight be interpreted as if the Bagdad Bailway interests agreed in all other
provinces to the construction of railway lines either in direct com petition with the
com pany’s lines or in contradiction with that com pany’ s rights.
The Imperial Government would like to have fuller inform ation about plans to
build at some distant date a line from the Mediterranean to Lower Mesopotamia as
m entioned on page 7 of the British Memorandum.

A r t ic l e 4.

Clause a is agreed provided that the Im perial Government are furnished with
authentic copies of all agreements between the British Government and the Ottoman
Governm ent, and provided there i6 no occasion for objection in the final texts of these
agreements. The questions raised by the concession of December 12th(6) for the
navigation on the Mesopotamian rivers are still under examination and are better
reserved for future discussion.
Clause b i6 agreed with slight verbal alterations. W e propose to insert “ i.e .,
2 0 % of the whole 6hare capital,” to make it quite clear that this shall be a permanent
proportion and further they would prefer instead of “ by one director ” “ their rateable
participation in the B oard ,” to make it clear that if any change in the number of
directors occurred the German shares should always be assured of a proportional
representation on the Board.
If His M ajesty’s Government should insist that no alteration takes place in
clause b article 2 it is proposed to say in article 3 clause b “ His M ajesty’ s Government
and Im perial Government agree that they will use their best endeavours to secure & c.”
The same if stress should be laid on retaining in article 1 clause c the words “ agreeable
to H is M ajesty’ s G overnm ent” it would be claimed that the words “ agreeable to
the Im perial Government ’ ’ should be interpolated in this article after the word
“ director.”
Clause c is agreed to except the time limit for the conveyance of the building
material on the rivers till the com pletion of the line to Basra.
The Bagdad Bailway interests are quite willing to come to a friendly agreement
with the Ottoman Company for Biver Navigation to have all the material transported
by them after cancelling their existing agreements with Messrs. L yn ch , but they do
not see their way to give up vis-a-vis of Turkey their right secured on the original
concession of transporting their own materials should the Ottoman Company for Biver
Navigation fail to conclude a satisfactory arrangement for transports or fail to carry
out this contract in a satisfactory way. As a slight verbal alteration we propose to
say instead of “ through British or Ottoman a g e n c y ” “ by the Ottoman Company for
Biver N avigation.”

(•) [v. sup ra , pp. 283-98, N o. 188.]

 319
A r t ic l e 5.
Clause a is accepted.
Clause b cannot be accepted definitely, but it is hoped that a discussion between
the con cession a ires of the River Navigation Company and the Bagdad Railway interests
might lead to an agreement acceptable to both parties.
5 a. The Im perial Government consider the retention of Article 5 a in the conven­
tion, as absolutely vital. In the first tentative sketch of an agreement o f M ay 7th 1913
it was very strongly pointed out that an assurance practically analogous to the article 5
as we proposed should be given not only by the Ottoman Government but also by
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent. The whole agreement is based on the assumption that the
access to the terminus of the railway in Basra shall always be open for sea-going vessels
and this undertaking form s in the opinion of the Im perial Government a vital part of
the whole convention. Both by the wording of the introduction which we propose and
by introducing “ so far as possible ’ ’ we believe to have rem oved any objection which
His M ajesty’ s Government might have against the article 5a. The same general
assurance about the le v y i n g of dues in the same article seems desirable and corresponds
with the last sentence in article 4 of the protocole of May 7th 1913.C

A r t ic l e 6.

In this article we propose to insert after “ assu red ” “ on terms o f absolute

eq u a lity” and later on after “ international com m erce w i l l ” “ so long as the
convention is not materially altered.” It is proposed to finish this article with
“ uphold the con vention.” The follow ing details which in the opinion o f the legal
advisers of the Imperial Government are entirely covered b y this undertaking, would
in the form now proposed raise numerous legal difficulties and occasion protracted
discussion. The recommendations to be made to the Riverain Commission of
September 9 th (3) shall be embodied in the explanatory note, and serve for the definition
o f the duties o f the Riverain Commission.
Section I I is agreed to ; Section H I can, if our proposals for article 5a are
accepted, be left out.
Clause b requires in the opinion o f the Imperial Government com plete recasting.
The Im perial Government propose to conclude with the Im perial Ottoman Govern­
ment an arrangement on the following lines :
The German consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with the Riverain
Commission on matters within the com petence of the Commission. Should the
Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements o f the com m erce o f the river
and refuse to rem ove the causes o f complaint the question would be transmitted to
Constantinople to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. Failing an agreement
between the Ottoman Government and the German Em bassy either party shall have
the right to ask for arbitration. E ach party shall appoint one arbiter and they shall
agree about a third.
It is proposed that in the present convention the British Governm ent should
take note o f this agreement between Germ any and Turkey and undertake to uphold
if. If this was agreed upon, the whole article 6 b might be left out.

A r t ic l e 7.

H aving agreed to the insertion o f “ as far as possible ” in article 5a the Im perial

Government feel that they must have some undertaking for the improbable but
possible case that Basra would cease to be accessible for sea-going vessels and
thereby becom e totally unfit to be the terminus o f a great railway system . W ith
such a change in geographical conditions all the assumptions on which this present
convention is based would have disappeared and the necessity would arise to provide
( 7) [r . supra, p. 98, X o . 66 ]
( 8) [rp . supra, p. 229, E d. jVoie ]
 320
the Bagdad Railway system with a new terminus easily accessible for sea-going
vessels. An examination o f the main bases of this convention will make it clear
that the Imperial Government must insist on some clause giving them a guarantee
against the terminus o f the Bagdad Railway system becom ing through change in
geographical conditions an isolated inland town cut off from communication with
the sea. For the same reasons which have led the British Government to ask for
two members on the Conseil d ’ Administration of the Bagdad Railway, i.e. to have
a guarantee for the fulfilment o f the stipulations about through-traffic and preven­
tion o f discrimination, the Im perial Government think it fair that Germany should
have in this connecting railway, in case the necessity o f building it ever arose, a
share in the capital and directorate similar to that held by England in the Bagdad
Railway.
Article 8 agreed to.

Enclosure 2 in No. 198.

D e lts c h -e n g lis c h e s A bkom men .

D cutschcr Gegenentw urf vom Jamiar 1914.

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a). R ecognising the general importance of the com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction or manage­
ment by the Bagdad Railway Company o f the Bagdad Railway system or to prevent
the participation o f capital in this undertaking.
Clause (b). The Imperial German Government declare that they will use their
best endeavours to secure that two British members shall be admitted to the Conseil
d ’ Administration of the Bagdad Railway Company.

A r t ic l e 2 .

Clause (a). The Bagdad Railway Company having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German
Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best
endeavours to secure its due execution :—
(i) The terminus of the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra, and
the Bagdad Railway Company has renounced all claims to construct a
branch line from Basra (ZobeiC to the Persian Gulf, referred to in
article 1 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1903,
and to build a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, under
article 23 of the said Bagdad Railway Convention.
(ii) No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the Bagdad
Railway Com pany’ s system, either as regards facilities or rates of charge
for the conveyance o f like articles between the same points on account
o f the ownership, origin, or destination of goods presented for transport,
or in any other manner whatever.
(iii) In the event of the construction o f the said branch line from Basra (Zobeir)
to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be
made to secure facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad
Railway Com pany’ s system, and there shall be complete protection against
discrimination direct or indirect.
(iv) The construction and exploitation o f the proposed ports of Basra and Bagdad
authorised bv article 23 o f the Bagdad Railway Convention o f the
5th March, 1903, shall be carried out by a separate Ottoman company.
 321
No duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denomination shall
be levied by the port com pany on any vessels or goods which shall not equally, under
the same conditions, be imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever be
the nationality of the vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country o f origin
or destination of the goods, and whatever be the places from which the vessels or goods
arrive or to which they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading o f vessels in the
ports, no privileges or facilities shall be granted to any vessel or vessels which shall
not equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.
The Im perial Ottoman Government reserves to itself the right to confer upon
the Commission, which it proposes to entrust with the improvement and maintenance
o f the navigability of the Shatt-el-Arab, its rights o f control over the port o f Basra.
Clause ( b . The Im perial German Government declare that they will not oppose
the acquisition by british interests o f 40 per cent, o f the share-capital o f the separate
Ottoman Company for the construction and exploitation o f the ports of Basra and
Bagdad, m entioned in sub-clause (iri> above, and their rateable representation on the
Conseil d ’ Administration o f the port com pany, and in the contracts, if any, for
construction and maintenance.
Clause (c). In all that relates to the dues and charges of whatever nature to be
levied, and to the facilities to be accorded, in the ports of Basra and Bagdad, goods
arriving or to be forwarded by water shall receive identic treatment to those arriving
or to be forwarded b y rail.

A r t ic l e 3 .

Clause (a). The Im perial German Government and H is Britannic M ajesty's

Government declare that they will in no case support the construction o f a branch
from Basra ('Zobeiri, or from any point of the main line o f the Bagdad Bailway, to
the Persian Gulf unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject between
the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the
Im perial German Governm ent.
Clause ( b). The Imperial German Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations what­
soever to establish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf unless and until
there is com plete agreement on the subject between His Britannic M ajesty's
Government and the Im perial German Governm ent.
Clause (c . His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim b y any persons or corporations what­
soever to establish, in Ottoman territory east of A leppo, railway undertakings either
in direct com petition with the Bagdad Bailway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction
with that com pany's existing rights, unless and until there is complete agreement
on the subject between the Imperial German Government and His Britannic
Majesty’ s Governm ent.

A r t ic l e 4 .

Clause (a\ The Im perial German Governm ent, having cognisance o f the
declaration signed on the 29th July, 1913,( 9 on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman Govern­
ment, concerning navigation on the Bivers Tigris and Euphrates, declare that they
will not oppose the execution, nor support any action directed against the execution,
of such declaration, so long as the navigation on the said rivers is maintained in
substantial accordance with the provisions thereof.
Clause (b . His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Bailway interests o f 40 per cent, o f the share
capital to be allotted to Turkish interests at the first allotment (i.e. 20 per cent, of

( 9) [c . sup ra , pp. 159-90, N o. 124 (4 ).]

[1 0 9 0 0 ] Y
 322

the whole share-capital) and the right in respect thereof to subscribe for a rateable
proportion o f further issues o f capital of the Ottoman Company for river navigation,
and their rateable participation in the board of the aforesaid com pany out of the
share of the directorate allotted to Turkish interests.
Clause (c). (i) It is, nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall
be held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 of the Bagdad Railway Convention
of the 5th March, 1903, except in so far that His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
and the Imperial German Government hereby agree and declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to, and will use their best endeavours to secure the due
execution of the following provision of the arrangement referred to in article 2 of
the present convention :—
The Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s rights under article 9 of the aforesaid Convention
of the 5th March, 1903, shall cease on the completion o f the construction of the
Bagdad Railway to Basra.
(ii) It is further agreed that if an arrangement to the satisfaction of the partie
concerned can be made for the conveyance by river of the aforesaid materials through
the Ottoman Company for river navigation, H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and
the Imperial German Government will use their best endeavours to secure the
conclusion o f such an arrangement.

A b t ic l e 5.
Clause (a). The concessionnaire, nominated in pursuance o f article 3 o f the
aforesaid declaration of the 29th July, 1913, having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government and the Imperial German Government declare, so far as concerns them­
selves, that they adhere to the said arrangement and will use their best endeavours
to secure its due execution : —

No discrimination shall be permitted by the Ottoman Company for river naviga­

tion, either as regards facilities or rates of charge for the conveyance of like articles
between the same points on account of the ownership, origin, or destination of goods
presented for transport, or in any other manner whatsoever. The Company shall
grant no through bills o f lading, rebates or other privileges of any description in
respect of goods carried by any ship between any place served by the Com pany’ s
vessels and any place oversea, unless the same privileges are accorded in respect of
similar goods carried under the sam e conditions and in the same direction between
the same places by all ships regularly trading between those places, irrespective of
nationality.
Clause (b). Die Kaiserliche Regierung behält sich ihre Stellungnahme zur
Fassung des englischen Entwurfes vor.

A b t ic l e 5 a.

His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial German Government will
join in using their good offices with the Im perial Ottoman Government to secure
that the Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as possible be brought into and permanently kept
in a satisfactory state of conservancy in order that sea-going vessels may always be
assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab shall permanently be kept open for sea-going vessels,
and be carried on on terms of absolute equality for the vessels of all nations, without
regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact o f navigation, but only for repaying
sums actually spent on improvem ents in the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed 1 fr [a n c] per registered ton (the
dues to cover the com ing in and going out of the same vessel); any dues shall be
 823

levied on a basis of absolute equality without regard to the nationality o f sea-going

vessels or their cargoes.
A r t ic l e 6.

(a) The Im perial German Governm ent having taken note o f the Anglo-Turkish
Convention o f under which the free navigation o f the Shatt-
el-Arab is assured on terms of absolute equality to the shipping o f all nations and
a com m ission is established for the execution of such works as may be necessary
for the improvem ent o f its channel and for its maintenance and for other like
purposes set out therein, and being of opinion that the provisions o f the Convention
are conducive to the best interests o f international com m erce, will, so long as the
Convention is not materially altered and so long as the duties imposed upon the
Commission by the said Convention are satisfactorily carried out, uphold the
Convention.
The Im perial German Government take note in this connection o f the declaration,
signed on the and attached to the said Convention, to the
effect that articles 7 and S of the above Convention do not affect the rights enjoyed
in the Ottoman Empire by the nationals o f the Treaty Powers.
( b) Die Kaiserliche Regierung behält sich ihre Stellungnahme zu dieser
Klausel vor.
A r t ic l e 7.

Should the Shatt-el-Arab, after a reasonable time, not have been brought into
a satisfactory state o f conservancy assuring sea-going vessels o f free and easy access
to the port o f Basra, or should this state of conservancy not be m aintained, His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will agree to the construction of
a branch from Basra (Zobeir) to the next point allowing a free and easy access to
sea-going vessels.
In this case His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government will not oppose German
capital participating in this branch line and its being represented on the board of
this line under exactly the same conditions and in the same proportion as British
capital shall be represented on the board o f the Bagdad Railway.

A r t ic l e S.

A ny difference of opinion arising out o f this declaration shall be submitted to

arbitration. If the two Governments fail to agree about a special Court or arbiter,
the case shall be submitted to the Hague Tribunal.

No. 199.

Sir L. M allet to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 6 2 6 7 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 . Constantinople, D. February 10, 1914, 10 p . m .

Tel. (No. 94.1 R . F ebruary 11, 1914, 8 a . m .
Djem al B ey has been to see me about Italian concession. H e maintains the
view explained in m y despatch No. 104S.(‘ ) but desires strongly that a railway should
be built between Adalia and Buldur and has instructed Hakki Pasha to make proposal
to British com pany with this object.
I explained to him our position in the matter o f arrangement between com pany
and Italian syndicate supposing Turkish Governm ent gave any concession to Italians
and I told him I did not think British Company would be very likely to wish to

(*) [i\ G ooch ¿c T em p erley, V ol. X (1), pp. 16S-71, N o. 1S5.]

[10900] Y 2
 324

build the line. H e said that in this case he might offer it for adjudication— of course
respecting British rights— and that Italians would co-operate and probably obtain it.
H e said that he thought Italian Ambassador would accept this proposal.
He said however that he would much prefer giving concession to an Anglo-
Italian com bination if this could be brought about. I think he is in some difficulty,
and that probably other members of the Government are in favour of granting
Italians some concessions.
He liked the idea of Anglo-Italian com bination because he fears Italians want to
create a sphere of influence.
He said he wanted to accord requests of British com pany for extension and
junction with Anatolian Bailway Company Ac., but he fears that Germans will then
demand to enjoy fulfilment of the kilometric guarantee o f the Eski C hehir-K onieh
line.

M IN U T E S .

Q uery R e p ly to S ir L. M a lle t : —
“ Y ou r teleg ram N o. 94.
“ I und ersta n d th a t n eg otia tion s are p roceed in g sa tis fa ctorily betw een M . N og a ra and
S m y rn a -A id in C om pany, b u t th e Ita lia n s have not m ade any definite p rop osal fo r a lin e u n itin g
A d alia and B uldur, which w ould be v ery costly and cou ld not o f course trespass w ithin 40 k ilo­
m etres o f B u ld u r w ith ou t consent o f B ritish C om pany. T he lines proposed b y M. N og a ra do
n ot com e w ith in 50 kilom etres o f B uldur.
“ T he m a n ag er o f the S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y is com in g over in a week, and m eanw hile
M . N og a ra has asked fo r m ore tim e as he wishes to m o d ify his proposals in m in or respects.
“ As to last p a ra g ra p h o f y o u r telegram , m eetin g was held on F rid a y in L on don w ith
rep resen ta tives o f A n a tolia n R a ilw ay , w ho are w illin g to a gree not to opp ose any o f S m y rn a -
A id in C om p a n y ’ s requests ex cep t th a t fo r n a v ig a tion rig h ts on L ak e B evshehir, w hich, ow in g
to w atershed, they claim is in the A n a tolia n region . I t was then suggested te n ta tiv e ly th a t
perhaps an a rra n g em en t could be m ade fo r a jo in t lin e from B evshehir t o K o n ia , or fo r a line
to b e bu ilt b y G erm ans from B evshehir to K o n ia , m a k in g th e ju n ction b y this rou te in stead of
at Afium K arah issar, and both com p an ies p a rtip a tin g in n a v ig a tio n o f L a k e Beyshehir. T his
is to be ex am in ed and discussed fu r th e r when G erm ans retu rn in ten days.
“ G erm ans con ten d th a t w hether ju n ctio n is m ade at K o n ia or A fium K arah issar they
ca n n o t fa ce risk o f div ersion o f traffic to Sm yrna unless O ttom an G overnm ent release them
fr o m th e cou n ter-g u a ra n tee g iv en b y A n a tolian C om p an y t o O ttom an G o v [e rn m e n ]t th a t
form er w ill m ake up to G o v [e rn m e n ]t any differen ce b etw een a ctu a l g ross receip ts, if th ey are
below 6,000 fran cs per kilom etre, and 6,000 fra n cs.(2)
“ I t is o f course possible th a t ju n ctio n w ith S m y rn a -A id in lin e w ou ld in crease receip ts o f
A n a tolia n R a ilw a y , b u t in ord er th a t position m ay be fu lly con sid ered I should be glad if
Y [ o u r ] E [x e e lle n c y ] w ould send hom e deta iled statem ent show ing a ctu a l results in gross
ea rn in gs per k ilom etre o f E ski-Shelir K o n ia line in past ten y ea rs.”
A. P.
F ebru ary 11, 1914.
I a tta ch a m ap, w hich ex plain s this d r a ft .(3)
G. R . C.
11.2.14.
I agree w ith the teleg ra m .(4)
E. A. C.
F e b [ r u a r y ] 11.
A . N.
E . G.

(2) [M a rg in a l note by M r. P a r k e r : “ (I had in ten ded to d r a ft a teleg ram abou t this before
S ir L. M a lle t’ s telegram cam e in. A . P .) ” ]
(3) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
(4) [T h e telegram (N o. 89) is da ted F ebru ary 12, 1914, 4 p . m .]
 325
N o. 200.
Communication to H err von Kuhlm ann.^i

F.O. 6 5 5 6 '4 6 0 1 '1 4 '4 4 . Foreign Office, February 12, 1914.

British Counter-draft of Article 6 (b).
Article 6, Clause (F . H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government, so far as they are
concerned, agree that the Consuls of the several Powers stationed at Basra shall have
the right to correspond with the Commission on matters within its com petence.
Should the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements of the com m erce of
the river and refuse to remove the causes of complaint, His B r i t a n n ic M ajesty’ s
Government will use their good offices to ensure the reference of the question at issue
to an impartial expert to be nom inated by agreement between the Im perial Ottoman
Government, H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and the Government or Govern­
ments whose consul or consuls m ay have raised the complaint to be enquired into.
Failing agreement, H er Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited to
designate the expert referee.
The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the Governm ents
concerned, proceed to Basra for the purposes o f his enquiry, and shall publish his
report within four months o f his arrival there.
The Government of His Britannic M ajesty will use their good offices with the
Imperial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recom m en­
dations as m ay be made by the expert referee.
The expenses of the enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee, shall be
borne in equal shares by the Governments concerned.
O [T h is com m u n ica tion was sent to C on sta n tin op le (as N o. 7 6'. Copies w ere sent to the
In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd of T ra de. The te x t w ith a co v e rin g despatch by P rin ce L ich n ow sk y is
p rin ted in G .P ., X X X V I I (I ), pp . 357 -6 0.]

No. 201.
Communication from H err von Kühlm ann.( l)

F.O. 7 7 2 1 /6 9 9 0 /1 4 '4 4 .
Confidential. * London, February 19, 1914.

P rojet d'Accord paraphé à Berlin le 15 février, 1914.( 2

Entre la Banque Impériale ottomane, agissant tant en son nom propre que,
dûment autorisée, au nom et pour le com pte de la Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer
de Dam as-H am a et prolongements, et de la Société en form ation pour la construction
et l ’ exploitation du réseau de la Mer Noire, ces divers établissements étant désignés
ci-après sous le nom de “ groupe français,” d ’ une p art; et la Deutsche Bank, agissant
tant en son nom propre que, dûment autorisée, au nom et pour le compte de la Société
du Chemin de Fer ottoman d ’ Anatolie et de la Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin
de Fer de Bagdad, lvS divers établissements étant désignés ci-après sous le nom de
“ groupe allem and,” d ’ autre p a rt; il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :

A r t ic l e 1 er.

Le groupe français expose qu ’ il poursuit actuellement auprès du Gouvernement

Im périal ottoman la concession d ’ un réseau de chem in de fer hom ogène, dit de la Mer
Noire, et comprenant notamment le tracé principal de Sam soun-Sivas-K arpout avec
prolongements vers Arghana Maden, Bitlis et Van à l ’ est, vers Castamouni et Bolou à
(*) [C op ies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e I n d ia O ffice;
to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r v O p éra tion s.]
(2) [cp . D .D .F ., 3™ S ir., V ol. I X , pp . 397-401, No. 313, A n n e x e I I .]
 826

l ’ ouest, ainsi qu’ un em branchem ent partant des environs de Soulou-Seraî et allant
dans la direction de Yozgat jusqu’ à la ligne de partage des eaux entre le Yéchil Irmak
et le Kizil Irmak.
L e groupe allemand prend acte des déclarations du groupe français, et déclare,
de son côté, son intention de poursuivre la concession des lignes destinées à relier les
réseaux des Chemins de Fer d ’ Anatolie et de Bagdad à celui de la Mer Noire à Sivas,
par Césarée, et à Arghana Maden par Diarbékir.
L e groupe français prend acte de ces déclarations.

A r t ic l e 2.

E n conséquence, les réseaux des deux groupes se raccorderont :

A l ’ ouest à Bolou, en gare du Chemin de Fer d ’ A natolie;
Au sud à Sivas, en gare du Chemin de Fer de la Mer N oire;
A l ’ est à Arghana Maden, en gare du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.
L es conditions techniques de ces raccordements en gares communes, ainsi que les
conditions précises auxquelles se fera le raccordement à Bolou, feront ultérieurement
l ’ objet d ’ un accord équitable entre les Sociétés intéressées.
Les deux groupes s’ entremettront pour que la construction et l ’ exploitation tant
du port d ’ Héraclée que du ou des chemins de fer reliant H éraclée avec les réseaux
ferrés de l ’ intérieur se fassent en tenant com pte équitablement des intérêts industriels
français et allemand dans le bassin d ’ Héraclée, ainsi que des intérêts des chemins de
fer des deux groupes.

A r t ic l e 3.

Les deux groupes constatent que la position respective des Sociétés du Chemin de
F er de D am as-IIam a et prolongements et du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad est aujourd’ hui
fixée par la jonction des réseaux de ces Compagnies à Alep, et par leur accès à la
m er à Alexandrette pour le Bagdad, à Tripoli de Syrie pour le D am as-H am a et
prolongements.
E n vue de fortifier leur situation respective et de poursuivre le développement
normal de leurs réseaux à l ’ abri de toute rivalité et concurrence, les deux groupes sont
d ’ accord pour arrêter les dispositions suivantes (articles 4 à 6) :

A r t ic l e 4.

L e groupe allemand déclare son intention de poursuivre éventuellement la

concession d ’ une ligne destinée à relier directement Alexandrette à Alep et Alep par
Meskéné à un point quelconque du réseau déjà concédé au Bagdad en Mésopotamie.
L e groupe français prend acte de cette déclaration du groupe allemand et déclare, de
son côte, son intention de poursuivre éventuellement la concession d ’ une ligne destinée
à relier directement Tripoli de Syrie à l ’ Euphrate par un prolongement de H om s à
D éir-es-Zor, où le réseau du D am as-H àm a et prolongements se raccorderait à celui de
Bagdad. L e grou p [e] allemand prend acte de cette déclaration.

. A r t ic l e 5.

Les deux groupes reconnaissent aux lignes définies à l ’ article précédent une zone
de protection de 60 kilom. au sud de la ligne A lexandrette-A lep-M eskéné et prolonge­
m ent, une zone égale de protection au nord de la ligne T rip oli-H om s-D éir-es-Z or,
ainsi qu’ une zone de protection de 60 kilom. de chaque côté de l ’ axe de la voie de la
ligne existante de Hom s à Alep.
A la jonction des deux réseaux, où elles viennent en contact, ces zones de
protection sont délimitées par une droite tirée du point de jonction des voies ferrées, à
Alep, au point d ’ intersection des limites extérieures des deux zones, suivant les
 327
indications que les parties ont, d ’ un com m un accord, portées sur la carte schématique
annexée aux présentes.
Ces zones de protection étant exclusivement réservées à l ’ action du réseau dont
elles dépendent, chacun des groupes s’ engage à ne construire ni exploiter de voies
ferrées dans la zone de protection des lignes de l ’ autre groupe.

A r t i c l e 6.

Les deux groupes s ’interdisent de construire et d ’ exploiter, sans accord préalable,

tout nouvel embranchement aboutissant à la mer dans la zone libre comprise entre
les lim ites extérieures des zones de protection des lignes A lexandrette-A lep et
Tripoli-H om s.
A r t i c l e 7.

Les raccordements ci-dessus définis entre les réseaux des deux groupes (articles
2, 3 et 4) sont les seuls dès maintenant p révus; les jonctions nouvelles qui seraient
décidées ultérieurement par le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman devront faire l ’ objet
d ’ un accord préalable entre les deux groupes.

A r t i c l e 8.

Pour compléter l ’ effet des stipulations qui précèdent en tant qu’ elles tendent à la
constitution de réseaux homogènes, les deux groupes se donnent mutuellement
l ’ assurance qu’ ils ne rechercheront la construction ou l ’ exploitation d ’ aucune voie
ferrée dans la zone d ’ action d ’ un réseau de l ’ autre groupe, en tenant compte,
notamm ent, des points de jonction indiqués ci-dessus (articles 2, 3 et 4k
Les deux groupes s’ interdisent, au même titre, de soutenir ou favoriser, soit
directement, soit indirectement, tout individu ou Société quelle qu ’en soit la nationabté,
dont l ’ action irait à l ’encontre des stipulations du présent accord.

A r t ic l e 9

Les questions de trafic intéressant les réseaux des deux groupes sont réglées par
deux accords spéciaux intervenus entre les Sociétés intéressées et annexés aux
présentes.
A r t ic l e 10.

L es deux groupes s ’étant com m uniqué le programme de construction de chemins

de fer dont le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an projette l ’ exécution par leurs soins,
reconnaissent la nécessité que ces travaux soient échelonnés de manière à tenir compte
de la situation financière de la Turquie.
A cet effet ils expriment le vœu et, pour leur part, ils feront en sorte que
l ’ exécution des chemins de fer dont la concession leur a été ou leur sera donnée et qui
intéressent au même titre le développem ent économique de l ’ Empire, soit poursuivie,
autant que possible, pari passu, chaque groupe faisant normalement appel dans la
même mesure aux emprunts émis ou garantis par le Trésor ottoman.
Les deux groupes considèrent que l ’ intérêt de la Turquie lui com m ande, pour
assurer son crédit et faciliter ses émissions nouvelles, de replacer les emprunts déjà
créés dans la situation où ils se trouvaient avant la guerre balkanique. Au cas où la
contribution assumée par les États balkaniques n ’y suffirait pas pleinement, des
garanties nouvelles équivalentes aux garanties disparues devraient être affectées à ces
emprunts sous les réserves suivants.
Cette affectation ne serait poursuivie que dans la mesure utile, c ’ est-à-dire à
concurrence seulement des sommes nécessaires au service des emprunts.
La nouvelle affectation n ’ aurait qu’ un caractère tem poraire; elle deviendrait
caduque lorsque, pendant trois années consécutives, les anciens gages auraient assuré,
grâce aux plus-\alues, le service les [s ic ] emprunts.
 328
D ’ une manière générale devraient faire retour au Trésor ottoman pour ses besoins
généraux et demeurer à sa libre disposition tous excédents de gages affectés dont
l ’ entreprise bénéficiaire n ’ aurait plus l ’ emploi.
Les deux groupes estiment enfin que leurs intérêts com m uns recommandent, en
vue du maintien et de la consolidation du crédit de la Turquie, une coopération
effective des différents marchés dans les emprunts de liquidation.

A r t ic l e 11.

Tous accords et conventions quelconques intervenus entre les participants des

deux groupes antérieurement à ce jour au sujet des questions réglées par les présentes
sont expressément déclarés abrogés.

A r t ic l e 12.
Le présent accord étant conclu de bonne foi, les deux groupes déclarent leur
intention de soumettre à l ’ arbitrage le règlement des difficultés qui pourraient naître à
l ’occasion de son application.
Chaque groupe choisira un arbitre. Les arbitres désigneront au besoin un
surarbitre pour les départager ; en cas de désaccord sur le choix du surarbitre, celui-ci
sera désigné à la requête des parties par le Président du Tribunal fédéral de
Lausanne.

A r t ic l e 13.

Le présent accord sera com m uniqué pour approbation aux Gouvernements

français et allemand.

A r t ic l e 14.

La ratification définitive du présent accord est liée :

1. A la conclusion de l ’ accord entre le groupe français et le Gouvernement
Jimpérial ottoman au sujet des chemins de fer dont le groupe français poursuit la
concession ;
2. A la conclusion de l ’ accord entre le groupe allemand et le Gouvernement
Im périal ottoman au sujet des Chemins de Fer de Bagdad et d ’ A natolie;
3. A la conclusion de l ’ accord financier entre les deux groupes relatif à la
liquidation de l ’ intérêt du groupe français dan6 l ’ entreprise du Chemin de Fer de
Bagdad.
Fait en quadruple expédition.
Paraphé ad référendum .

B erlin, le 15 février, 1914.

v. R C. S.
II. H . P.
E. DE K.

Présents :
M. Sergent, Sous-Gouverneur de la M. de Rosenberg, Conseiller-Rapporteur
Banque de France. an Département Im périal des Affaires
M. Ponsot, Consul de France. Etrangères.
M. de Klapka, Secrétaire général de la Al. Helfferich, Directeur de la Deutsche
Banque Impériale ottomane. Bank.
 329
A n n exe à l ’ A rticle 5.
Carte schém atique(2

portant indication des zones de protection des voies ferrées du réseau du D am as-H am a
et prolongements et du réseau du Bagdad dans le voisinage d ’ Alep.
D ’ après la carte de Kiepert au 1 : 4 00 .00 0 : feuille Adana, 1911, 3® édition; feuille
Alep, 1911, 2® édition.
N .B .— La ligne de démarcation des deux zones de protection— telle qu'elle résulte
du tracé existant du Dam as-H am a et prolongements et des lignes conventionnelles
adoptées pour figurer le tracé direct d ’ AJexandrette à Alep et d ’ Alep à Meskéné— est
représentée : à l ’ ouest d ’ Alep, par une droite qui traverse l ’ Oronte à m i-chem in environ
entre Derkush et D jisr-es-Shoyr. le cours de l ’ Oronte se trouvant en amont de ce point
dans la zone de protection du Dam as-H am a et prolongements : à l ’ est d ’ Alep par une
droite établie d ’ après le même principe.
Les indications du présent schéma feront foi entre les parties.

’ : ) [A m ap show ing the effect o f th e proposals con ta in ed in H e r r v on K iih h n a n m s m em o­

randum was prep a red in the F o re ig n Office an d sent to S ir A. X ico lso n on M a rch 26. 1914. I t
is not re p ro d u ce d .]

No. 202.

Bagdad Railway A g reem en t.(*)

F.O. S236 277 14 44. London, February 2 3 , 1 9 1 4 .

Between the Bagdad Bailway Company— hereinafter referred to as B .B .C .—
represented by Geheimer Baurat Dr. Otto Biese of Frankfort-on-the-M ain, duly
authorised for this purpose, on the one side, and the Bight Honourable James L yle,
Baron Inchcape, of London, on the other side, the following arrangement has been
agreed upon :—
A r t ic l e 1.

The B .B .C . is at present under agreements with the Société de Transp rts

Fluviaux en Orient, of Brussels, and with the firm of L yn ch Brothers, of London City,
concerning the transport of material necessary for the construction of the Bagdad
railroad and ite branches, on the Biver Tigris from Basra to Bagdad. It is intended
to cancel the said agreements. Conditionally on this cancellation the B .B .C and
Lord Inchcape enter into the following contract with the object of suitably arranging
such transport of material for the Bagdad Bail way construction on a new basis.

Ar t ic l e 2.

The B .B .C . agrees to entrust to Lord Inchcape, and the latter agrees to undertake,
the transport on the Biver Tigris from Basra to Bagdad, of all material, machines
and articles of any kind (hereinafter collectively called “ g o o d s ” ) necessary for the
construction and for the working o f the Bagdad Bailway and its branches, including
the port' of Bagdad and including further any other construction work to be executed
by the B .B .C . or by the firm of Philipp Holzm ann and Co. Lim ited . of Frankfort-
on-Main, as far as the B .B .C . may decide to transport goods to Bagdad by water.
The total weight of goods to be transported during the construction of the Bagdad
Bailway shall not be less than 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 tons of 1 . 0 1 6 kilog. each, but in this guaranteed
quantity of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 tone shall be included the total weight of all goods already
transported or to be transported to Bagdad before the present agreement becomes

0 ) [C op ies o f this a greem ent w ere sent t o the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice; to

Messrs. W a lt o n s ; t o M essrs. L y n ch .]
 880
operative by the Société de Transports Fluviaux and the firm of L ynch Brothers by
order and for account of the B.R.C., amounting, on the 1st February, 1914, to about
10,000 tons.

A r t ic l e 3.

Lord Inchcape agrees to transport from Basra to Bagdad, on craft provided by

him self, all quantities of goods delivered to him by the B .R .C . up to a maximum of
3,500 tons of 1,016 kilog. each per m onth, and the B .R .C ., on the other hand, agrees
to provide not less than 2,500 tone o f 1,016 kilog. each of goods per month until the
said 100,000 tons has been entrusted to Lord Inchcape for such transport as aforesaid.
The B .R .C . agrees to advise the representative o f Lord Inchcape at Basra or Bagdad
o f the quantity to be shipped during any given m onth, two months in advance. On
special desire of Lord Inchcape such information 6hall be given four months in
advance, but shall then be considered as an estimate only, and not as binding the
B .R .C . Quantities up to 500 tons per month beyond the quantities for the delivery
of which the B .R .C . may have engaged itself, shall be transported without previous
advice, but Lord Inchcape reserves to himself the right to allow or not to allow the
maximum m onthly quantity of 3,500 tons to be exceeded. ,
The B .R .C . undertakes to make the necessary arrangements for the timely
delivery at Basra o f the quantities of goods as advised by it.
Should any of the craft em ployed by Lord Inchcape for the transport of goods
be detained at Basra or at Bagdad for more than four consecutive days by reason \
of goods not being provided by the B .R .C ., or of any delay, neglect, failure, or 1
default in the loading or discharging thereof, the B .R .C . shall pay Lord Inchcape
by way of demurrage 4 1, for the fifth and each following day for each steamer,
and 1L for the fifth and each following day for each barge. Claims for demurrage
must be presented to the representative of the B .R .C . in time to allow an examination
o f the respective claim. I f the representatives of the parties to this contract disagree
about the claim, the final decision thereon shall rest at Basra with the British consul,
at Bagdad with the German consul.
To the extent to which Lord Inchcape may find it convenient to em ploy the
steamers and barges in other work, demurrage shall be reduced or not charged.
The goods loaded into the barges shall, as far as possible, be taken under lead
seal. Lord Inchcape agrees to issue orders to his staff to help and assist as much as
possible the employes of the B .R .C . in stating the losses and filing the claims with
the insurance companies.

A r t ic l e 4.

The goods arriving at Basra by sea steamer and delivered by the latter “ from _
the ship’ s s lin g s ” ( “ sous p a la n ” ) will be directly loaded into and properly stowed
away in the barges by the B .R .C ., but the B .R .C . has the right at any time to take
part of the goods to its magazine at Basra, whence they will be loaded by the B .R .C .
into the barges.
Lord Inchcape undertakes (accidents excepted) to provide not less than five
steamers and eighteen barges for service under this contract and to make every effort
to place barges alongside the sea steamers, so that their discharge may be made into
these barges with a view to avoid the necessity for landing goods at Basra.
The B .R .C . undertakes to arrange that the stevedoring of the goods in the barges
will be properly done, and that the instructions of the skippers of the river craft will
be com plied with. A ny costs which should result from the non-observation of this
engagement will have to be defrayed by the B .R .C . The barges arriving at Bagdad
will be discharged by the B .R .C . alongside the landing place installed for that purpose.
The representative o f the B .R .C . has to decide the order in which the loaded barges
are to be despatched from Basra to Bagdad.
The bills of lading for the river service will have to be issued and handled in a
similar way to that hitherto arranged with Messrs. Lynch Brothers.
 331
Article 5.
The B .E .C . pays to Lord Inchcape for each ton of 1,016 kilog. loaded at Basra
the general rate of 221 (twenty-two and one half shillings. This rate will also apply
upon all goods shipped and to be shipped from Basra to Bagdad under the agreement
referred to in article 1 hereof, by the Société de Transports Fluviaux en Orient and
Messrs. L yn ch B rothers, up to the time the present contract becomes operative.
The freight is to be calculated upon the weight stated in the bill of lading of
sea steamer. Should this method not be applicable— which may happen in a few
instances when goods are taken into the barges from the magazine— the weight shall
be fixed at Basra by a representative of the B .B .C . and a representative of Lord
Inchcape. The representative of Lord Inchcape shall present not later than the
5th o f each month a statement showing the shipments made during the preceding
month. The B .B .C .. after examination of the statement, but not later than the
15th o f each month, shall make payment for the said shipments in London.
Specifications of all the shipments made by the B .B .C . to Basra shall be rendered
regularly by the B .B .C . to Lord Inchcape at his London office.

A r t ic l e 6.

L ord Inchcape will keep a special account for the steamers and barges engaged
in the transport of the goods, crediting to same all receipts and debiting it with all
expenses resulting from them , including a depreciation o f 18J per cent, per annum,
on the original cost o f the craft purchased for the carrying of the goods, the charge
for depreciation to cease when the craft has been written down to 25 per cent, of
its original cost. I f in any calendar year the special account shows a profit o f more
than 10 per cent, on the capital nsed for the purchase o f all the necessary vessels
actually in service, and accessories, the surplus shall be equally divided between
L ord Inchcape and the B .B .C . If Lord Inchcape desires to em ploy the sr?amers
and 'or barges for the transport of goods other than those comprised in this contract,
no objection will be raised, provided that the transport o f the Bagdad Bailway material
will in no way be interfered with. The receipts resulting from such other transports
shall not be credited to the Special A ccount, whilst vice versa any expenses resulting
from those other transports ('over and above those which would have been incurred
had no such other cargo been carried shall not be debited to the Special Account.

A r t ic l e 7.

The B .B .C . heretofore, has been com pelled to enter into agreements with third
parties for auxiliary transports to Bagdad, amounting to 3,000 tons for the year
1913 and 7,200 tons for the current year.
The B .B .C . undertakes not to give any further goods for transport to any
other owners o f sailing vessels or other craft, provided however that, if L ord In ch ­
cape should— in three consecutive months— transport less than his obligation under
article 3 o f this contract, the B .B .C . shall have the right to the extent of such
deficiency to enter into contracts for shipments on sailing vessels, the amount so
shipped to be deducted from the guaranteed m inimum o f 100,000 tons.
Should Lord Inchcape fail to provide transport for 75 per cent, of the goods
tendered for transport according to article 3 hereof, in each of three consecutive
months, then, unless that shall be due to any of the causes specified in articles 9
and 10 hereof, he shall refund to the B .B .C . 3 shillings for each ton so tendered and
not carried during such period.
Should L ord Inchcape fail to provide transport in each of six consecutive months
for 50 per cent, of the goods tendered for shipment according to article 3, then, unless
that shall be due to any of the causes specified in articles 9 and 10 hereof, the B .B .C .
 332

shall have the right to cancel the present contract without any compensation, and
to exercise, in its discretion, in any other manner the right granted to it by article 9
of the Bagdad Convention of the 5th March, 1903.

A r t ic l e 8.

This contract comes into force at the date o f cancelling the agreements mentioned
in article 1 of this contract and expires at the time of com pletion of the Bagdad
B ailway down to Basra. Should it be found at the expiration of this contract, that
the total quantities shipped from Basra to Bagdad— with due consideration of the
terms o f articles 2 and 7— fall below the minimum o f 100,000 tons, the B .B .C .
agrees to pay to Lord Inchcape a compensation of 11 shillings and 3 pence for each
ton less than 100,000 tons.

A r t ic l e 9.

Lord Inchcape shall not be liable for any loss o f or damage whatsoever to goods,
nor for any non-delivery or delay in the delivery thereof, however the same may
be caused, and even though the same may be caused by any act, neglect, or default
o f masters, mariners, or other agents or servants whatsoever o f Lord Inchcape.

A r t ic l e 10.
L ord Inchcape shall not be liable for any failure to carry out any of the terms
o f this contract if the same shall be due directly or indirectly to any o f the following
causes namely :—

The act o f God, perils of the seas and rivers, pirates, assailing thieves, arrest
or restraint of princes rulers or peoples, seizure by authorities or legal process,
enemies, thieves, fire, civil com m otions, strikes or lock-outs, storm, fog, flood,
shortage o f water in the rivers, or any other cause beyond the control of Lord
Inchcape.

The B .B .C . shall not be liable for any failure to carry out any o f the terms of
this contract if the same shall be caused by civil com m otions, strikes, or lock-outs
occurring at Basra.

A r t ic l e 11.

Lord Inchcape has the right to transfer all his privileges and liabilities resulting
from this contract to the Ottoman Navigation Company to be form ed by him , and
upon such transfer, Lord Inchcape shall be discharged from all personal liability
hereunder.

A r t ic l e 12.
If at any time either during or after the currency of this contract any dispute
or difference whatsoever shall arise between the parties, the same shall except as
provided in article 3 hereof be referred to the sole arbitration in London of
H err Bichard von Kiihlm ann, C .V .O ., or failing him of an arbitrator to be appointed
by the Ambassador for the time being of His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor
accredited to the Court of St. Jam es, whose decision shall be final and binding upon
the said parties. And the said Arbitrator shall have power to obtain, call for, receive
and act upon any such oral or docum entary evidence or inform ation as he may
think fit, and the costs of the reference and award shall be in the discretion of the
said arbitrator, who may direct to or by whom and in what manner the same or any
 333
part thereof shall be paid and with power to assess the amount of costs so to be paid
or any part thereof.
This contract shall be construed according to English Law.
L ondon, February 23, 1914.
R IE S E .
W itness :
R . vox K uhlm ann.

IN CH C A P E.
W itness :
E yre A. C r o w e .

No. 203.

M inute by Mr. Parker. (*)

F.O. 8 3 2 3 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, February 24, 1914.
A m eeting took place at the Foreign Office on the 19th February at which the
following wrere p resen t:—
H err von Kuhlmann.
Dr. E iese, (of the Bagdad Hallway).
H err Bergm ann, (of the Deutsche Bank).
L ord Eathm ore, Chairman of the S m yrna-A idin E [a i]l[w a ]y Company.
Mr. Single, Director.
Mr. Barfield, General Manager.
M r. Slaughter, Solicitor.
M r. Corbett, Solicitor.
M r. Parker.
It was explained to the Germans that since our last m eeting Hakki Pasha had
intimated that the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t would be opposed to a junction of the
Sm yrna-A idin and Anatolian systems via Beyshehir town and Konia, though they
would agree to one on conditions at Afium Karahissar. The reason o f this distinction
was understood to be that if the junction took place at the latter place only one third
of the E ski-Shehr Konia section o f the Anatolian Kailway would be affected, and the
risk of diversion of traffic from the rem aining two thirds would not arise.
It was pointed out to the Germans that the Turks disliked the condition which
the Anatolian Company had laid down that if a junction were effected the Anatolian
Company must be freed from the so-called “ counter-guarantee ” for the section
from E ski-Shehr to Konia : it was urged that it was unnecessary for the Germans
to make such a stipulation, or for the Turks to decline to agree to it, since if the
junction took place at Afium Karahissar traffic could only be diverted, if at all, from
the part of the line between Afium Karahissar and E ski-Shehr, which was only one
third of the section in question, viz that from E ski-Shehr to Konia. It m ight be that
the section as a whole would attract much more traffic from the S m yrna-A idin line
than would be diverted to that line from one third o f the section. The Germans
admitted that there was force in this point.
W e then communicated the attached memorandum regarding the S m yrna-A idin
Company’ s claim to a concession to navigate Lake Beyshehir. The German represen­
tatives said that the view of the Anatolian Company had been that Beyshehir was
decidedly within their zone,(2) and they had irrigation works close to the L a k e ; they
i 1) |A cop y o f th is m in u te was sent to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [M a r g in a l note b y S ir E y re C r o w e : “ See N o. 8055, F eb ru a ry 21. E. A . C .” T he
referen ce is to a m em orandum , d a ted F eb ru a ry 21, 1914, show ing the reasons w hy the
A n a tolian R a ilw a y C om p any desired perm ission to n a v ig a te L akes E g h erd ir and B eyshehir
and to con s tru ct a ra ilw ay con n ectin g the lakes. (F .O . 8 0 5 5 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
 334

admitted, however, that the memorandum contained arguments which had not been
before their colleagues in B erlin, and that it put the case of the Sm yrna-A idin
Company, so far as they could judge, prima facie, in a convincing manner. They
said that the headquarters o f the Anatolian Railway were at Constantinople, and
they would therefore like to send the memorandum out there for com m ents, and they
promised to let us hear further in a fortnight.
I laid great stress upon the importance which H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t
attached to getting the right of navigation on Lake Beyshehir for the Sm yrna-A idin
Company, and I shall be much disappointed after the language of the German
delegates if this point is not conceded.
They then said that, without wishing to be indiscreet, and -without pressing us
to say anything should we prefer to be silent, they felt that the question of a junction
with the Anatolian Railway, especially if it took place as they favoured bv a line
from Beyshehir to a point below Konia (which strictly speaking is the Bagdad Railway^
must depend in some degree upon whether or not the Sm yrna-A idin Company was
linked up with Adalia by a line going from Buldur, as such a junction would divert
much o f the traffic o f the Anatolian and Bagdad systems to Adalia. I said that the
Italian projects were somewhat vague and indeterminate, but it -was useful for us to
know the views of the German interests on this question.
A. P [A R K E R ].

No. 204.

Prince Lichnowshy to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 8 4 6 4 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Euer Exzellenz London, February 24, 1914.
beehre ich mich erhaltenem Aufträge zufolge anliegend den deutschen Gegen­
vorschlag für die Fassung des Artikel 6 Klausel b des geplanten Vertrages über die
Bagdadbahn ergebenst zu übersenden. Unser Gegenvorschlag schliesst sich sachlich
fast ganz dem englischen Vorschlag vom Februar d. J. an .(2) Die Kaiserliche Regierung
hält es aus rechtlichen Gründen für unerwünscht, dass eine Fassung gewählt werde,
welche den Fall aller an der Schiffahrt auf dem Schatt-el-Arab beteiligten Völker
deckt. Solche Abm achungen würden den bisher von der Kaiserlichen Regierung
streng festgehaltenen Grundsätzen widersprechen.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung würde es für durchaus zweckmässig halten, wenn
nach Abschluss des vorliegenden Vertrages der Schiedsrichter, der im Artikel 6 .b .
vorgesehen wird, im voraus für einen gewissen Zeitraum bestimmt würde.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten Hochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
Euer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
LIC H N O W SK Y .

Enclosure in No. 204.

German Counter-proposal for Article 6 (b ).

Article 6, clause (b). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, so far as they are
concerned, agree,
1) That the German Consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with
the Commission on matters within its com petence;

(*) [C opies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office.
F o r H e r r von J a g o w ’ s in stru ction s v. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 3 6 2 -3 .]
( 2) [r . sv p ra , p. 325, No. 200.]
 335
2") that, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
of the com m erce of the river and refuse to remove the causes of complaint
raised by the German Consul, the question at issue shall be referred to
an impartial expert to be nominated by agreement between the Imperial
Ottoman Governm ent, His Britannic M ajesty's Governm ent, and the
Imperial German G overnm ent; failing agreement. H er Majesty the Queen
of the Netherlands shall be invited to designate the expert referee.
The Government of His Britannic Majesty will use their good offices with the
Imperial (Ottoman) Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recom ­
mendations as may be made by the expert referee.
To be put in the explanatory note :
The expert referee shall, if so desired by the Governments concerned, proceed
to Basra for the purpose of his enquiry. H e shall publish his report within four
months after having received all the necessary materials from both sides or within
four months of his arrival at Basra.
The expenses o f the enquiry, including the remuneration o f the referee, shall be
borne in equal shares by the Governments concerned.

No. 205.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey.( l)

F.O. 970S 1037/14 44.

(No. 55.i St. Petersburgh, D. March 2, 1914.
Sir, Pi. March 5, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the Notes which have
been exchanged between this Embassy and the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs
respecting the Anglo-Turkish Shatt-el-Arab Piiverain Convention of July 29, 1913.(2)
I have, Ac.
GEOIÎGE W . BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 205.

Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonov.

Monsieur le Ministre, St. Petersburgh. February 13 26, 1914.

En me référant à l ’ Aide-M émoire du Ministère Impérial du 17 30 Novembre,
1913,(3) au sujet des droits de police et de juridiction de la Commission de Navigation
sur le Chat t-el-Arabe je suis autorisé à Vous faire les déclarations suivantes.
1. Le Gouvernement Britannique entend bien par la Déclaration signée avec le
Gouvernement Ottoman le 21 Octobre 1 9 1 3 '1) et dont le texte est cité dans l ’ Aide-
Mémoire de l ’ Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique du 23 Octobre 5 N ovem bre,(â)
que le drogman du Consulat de Piussie aura le droit d ’ assister au sein de la Commis­
sion à l ’ examen des affaires dans lesquelles les accusés appartiennent à la sujétion
Busse.
2. L e Gouvernement Britannique n ’ a aucune objection à ce que la perception
des amendes imposées à des sujets Russes par la Commission ainsi que leur détention
à la suite des jugem ents de ladite Commission ait lieu, le cas échéant, dans le
Consulat.
O ) [C op ies o f this despatch and enclosures w ere sent to H a k k i P a s h a ; to th e B oa rd o f
T rade ; to th e A d m ira lty ]
y | [ r. su pra , pp. 183-7, No. 124 (1 ).]
(3) fr . su pra , pp. 272-3, N o. 179, encl.]
(■’ ) fr . su pra, p. 242, E d . N o fe .]
(5) [r . su pra, p. 272, N o. 179, n ote (2).]
 866

3. Le Consul aura le droit de prendre connaissance des affaires et de se mettre

en rapport avec la Commission préalablement au jugem ent de celles-ci.
4. Il est bien entendu que les stipulations de l ’ Article 8 de la Convention Anglo-
Turque du 11 Juin(6) ne touchent en rien au droit du Consul Eusse d ’ exercer ses
fonctions, d ’ après les Capitulations et usages établis par rapport aux sujets Russes,
tant abord des vaisseaux russes sur le Chatt-el-Arabe que sur le territoire riverain de
la Commission.
5. E n plus des comptes rendus annuels prévus par l ’ Article 15 de la Convention,(7)
la Commission ne manquera pas, si le Consul en exprime le désir, de fournir à
celui-ci toutes explications utiles quant au montant des droits prélevés par la
Commission et quant aux travaux qui ont nécessité ces droits. Le Consul n ’ aura
toutefois pas le droit de poser son véto à des travaux jugés nécessaires par la
Commission.
Je profite de cette occasion, Monsieur le Ministre, pour renouveler à Votre
Excellence l ’ Assurance de ma très haute considération.
G E O R G E W . BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. “205.

31. Sazonov to Sir G. Buchanan.

Monsieur l ’ Ambassadeur, St. Petersburgh, February 16/March 1, 1914.

En prenant acte de la com m unication de l ’ Ambassade Britannique du 28 Octobre
1913 et de Votre Note en date du 13/26 février a.c. j ’ ai l ’ honneur de porter à
Votre connaissance que le Gouvernement Impérial se déclare prêt à reconnaître le
droit de la Commission, pour améliorer les conditions de la navigation du Chatt-el-
Arab, de percevoir sur les vaisseaux russes les taxes qui seront fixés en vertu de
l ’ article II de la Convention conclue à ce sujet entre la Grande Bretagne et la
Turquie. Le Ministère Im périal ne manquera pas de charger ses Consuls de veiller
à ce que les vaisseaux russes ne se soustraient pas au payem ent des taxes et se
soumettent aux règlements qui seront établis par la Commission pour les bâtiments
de toutes les nations.
L es amendes qui seraient imposées à des sujets russes par la Commission en vertu
de l ’ art. 7 de la Convention ci-dessus mentionnée et de l ’ Aide Mémoire du Ministère
Im périal du 17 Novembre 1913 seront remises par les Consuls de Russie à la
Commission.
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l ’ Ambassadeur, l ’ assurance de ma haute considération.
SAZONOW .
( 6) [u. supra, p. I l l , N o. 68, encl. 4, and n o te ( 12). This is the te x t o f M a y 6, b u t the notes
in d ica te any v a ria tion s in th e t e x t of J u n e 11. cp. also p. 185, N o. 124 (1 ).]
( 7) [u. supra, p. 112, N o. 68, encl. 4. cp. also p. 186, No. 124 (1 ).]

No. “206.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G oschen.G)
F.O . 9 5 8 0 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 . _
Tel. (No. 63.) Foreign Office, March 3. 1914. 7 -3 0 r .M .
Please inform German G ov!"ernm en]t(2) that we are on the point of concluding
our agreements with Turkey in so far as they are connected with the proposed
customs increase as distinct from the m onopolies, and that we hope to reach complete
agreement with German Government in regard to proposed Anglo-German Convention
respecting Bagdad railway and cognate matters forthwith, but I am disturbed by the
P ) [T h is telegram was rep eated to C on stan tin op le (N o. 114). A co p y was sent to the
B oa rd o f T ra d e.] _
(2) [S ir E. G oschen com m u n ica ted an a id e-m ém oire on M a rch 4, 1914, in a ccord a n ce w ith
these in stru ction s, cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), p. 367.]
 337
reflection that our agreements with both Germ any and Turkey are largely dependent
upon the conclusion of corresponding agreements between the Bagdad Railway
Company and the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, and the latter and the German Government,
and that progress in this direction does not appear to be very rapid.
March 31 is the latest date fixed for ratification of our agreements with Turkey,(3)
and, both on this account and in view of the urgent necessity of Turkey for m oney,
which cannot be raised until the customs increase hr.s been agreed to, I earnestly trust
that negotiations at Berlin may soon be concluded.
(3) [cp . supra, p. 232, X o . 157, n o te f 1).]

No. 207.

Communication to Prince L ich now sky.f 1)

F.O . 4 6 0 1 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Immediate. Foreign Office, March 3, 1914.
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t have had under further consideration the draft
of Article 3 (c) of the proposed Anglo-German Convention regarding the Bagdad
Railway and cognate matters, in which, in distinction to the limitation proposed by
them, the words “ east of A le p p o ’ ’ have again been inserted by the German
G o v [e rn m e n ]t.(2)
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t are, in deference to the views of the German
G ov[ern m en ]t, and in their desire to reach an early settlement, prepared to m odify
the article so that it m ay be worded as follows :—
“ Article 3 (c . His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporate ns
whatsoever to establish in Ottoman territory railway undertakings either in direct
competition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction with that
com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is complete agreement on the subject
between the Im perial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent.”
provided that the stipulations proposed in the annexed draft are added.
In view of this concession, which in effect protects the whole Bagdad Railway
from direct com petition, H [is ] M [a jesty’ s ] G ov [em m en ]t earnestly trust that the
German G ov [ern m en ]t will use their powerful influence with the German railway
interests concerned in order that the German opposition to the very moderate requests
of the Sm yrna-A idin Railway Company in regard to the navigation of Lake Beyshehir
may be withdrawn. The point, as has already been explained inform ally to H err von
Kuehlmann, is one to which H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t attach great importance.

Enclosure in No. 207.

Draft.
It is agreed that lines in the following regions shall not be held to be in direct
competition with the Bagdad Railway :—
1. In that part of Asiatic Turkey which, west of the 36th meridian of east
longitude, lies south o f the 34th degree o f latitude and that part which, east o f the
said meridian, lies south of the 31st degree of latitude.
2. In that part of Asiatic Turkey lying to the east and north of a line drawn
midway between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates from the 44th meridian o f longitude
to Kurna, provided that such lines fother than one connecting Mendali with the River
Tigris at a point not less than 40 kilom. below Bagdad) are south of the latitude of
0 ) [C op ies o f this com m u n ica tion w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office.
F or P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s re p o rt v. G .P.. X X X V I I (I ), pp. 369-73-1
( 2) [r . sup ra , p. 321, X o . 198, encl. 2. F o r the w ord in g o f th e prev iou s B ritish d ra ft,
cp. supra, p. 305, X o . 190.]
[10900] Z
 838
Bagdad and do not approach within 60 kilom. of any place to be served by the Bagdad
Railway system as defined in the Conventions of
It is further agreed that the question of whether any line in any part o f Asiatic
Turkey not within one or other of the above regions would or would not be in direct
competition with the Bagdad Railway under Article 3 fc) of the present Convention
shall, in the event of failure to reach an agreement, be referred to arbitration in
accordance with Article 8 of the said Convention.
It is further agreed, for the purposes o f this article, that the western terminus
o f the Bagdad Railway shall be held to be at Konia and the eastern terminus at Basra.

No. 208.

Communication to H err von Kuhlm ann.{')

F.O. 9 5 0 8 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 . F oreign Office, March 3, 1914.
Proposed A m endm ents to Germ an Counter-proposal for Article 6 (b).

Article 6, clause (6). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, so far as they are
concerned, agree :—
1. That the German consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with the
Commission on matters within its com p etence;
2. That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
of the commerce of the river and refuse to remove the causes of complaint raised
by the German consul, the question at issue shall be referred to an impartial expert to
be nominated by agreement between the Im perial O ttom an G o vernm ent, -His B rkannie
■Alaje-sty-’s G ov ernment, two m em bers of the Commission, and the -Imperial German
G o v e r nm ent consul, provided that if a similar or analogous complaint is made by any
oth er consul, he shall participate in the said nom ination; failing unanimous agree­
m ent, H er Majesty the Queen o f the Netherlands shall be invited to designate the
expert referee.
The Governm ent o f His Britannic Majesty will use their good offices with the
Im perial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recomm enda­
tions as may be made by the expert referee.

To be put in the explanatory n o t e :

The expert referee shall, i f so ffesiFeff unless it be otherwise agreed by the
G o v ernm ents parties concerned, proceed to Basra for the purpose o f his enquiry. He
shall publish his report within four months after having received all the necessary
materials from both sides, or within four months of hie arrival at Basra.
The expenses of the enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee, shall be
borne in equal shares by the Governments concerned.

(‘ ) [F o r P rin ce L ieh n ow sk y ’ s rep ort v. G.V., X X X V I I (I), pp . 3 67 -9 .]

 339
N o. -209.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .( l)

F .O . 9S63;2390/14 44.
Tel. (No. 3 2.' Berlin, March 5, 1914.
Your telegram No. G3 of 3rd March acted o n i2, : Negotiations with Turkey.
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says some two or three months ago
the German Government submitted certain proposals to Ottoman Government in
connection with increase of Turkish customs dues. These proposals, he said, were
mainly intended to secure advantages which would satisfy German public opinion,
but were not really important. Turkish negotiator, Djavid B ey, had left Berlin at
Christmas, and had not returned. Negotiations between the German and Ottoman
Governments and between the latter and the Bagdad Bailway Company were therefore
suspended for the moment.
Under-Secretary of State said that I could assure you of the earnest wish of the
German Governm ent that both sets of negotiations at Berlin should be concluded as
quickly as possible, and he fully appreciated urgent need of Turkey for m oney.
Absence of Turkish negotiator was. however, a bar to the resumption of negotiations,
and he evidently thought that there was no prospect of their conclusion by 31st March.

M IN U T E S .

I should lik e to be a u th orised to show th is teleg ram , m inu s the last 15 w ords, to H a k k i
P asha.
C opies t o In d ia Office.
B oa rd o f T rade.
A. P .
M a rch 5, 1914.
G. R . C.
5.iii.l4.
I t w ou ld do g ood to show it to H a k k i P ash a as su g g ested .(3)
E. A. C.
M [a r ic h 5.
A. X .
E. G.

f 1) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l d ecy ph er

ca n n ot be tra ced . I t was sent to C on sta n tin op le (as X o . 121'. C opies w ere sent to th e B oa rd
o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]
(2) [i\ sup ra , pp. 336-7, X o . 206, and n o te ( : ).]
(3) [T h is was don e on M a rch 7, 1914.]

No. 210.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich n ow sky.f1)

F .O . 9863 2390/14 44.

Urgent and Confidential. Foreign Office, March 6, 1914.
Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the German Ambassador and has the
honour to inform His Serene Highness that on the 3rd instant(2) H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to inform the German G ov [ern m en ]t that H [isJ
M [a jesty’ s ] G ov [ern m en ]t were on the point of concluding their agreements with

( 1) [C op ies o f th is n ote w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office. F o r P rin ce

L ich n ow sk y ’ s re p o rt v. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 374^6.]
(2) [r . sup ra , pp. 336-7, X o. 206.]
[10900] Z 2
 340
Turkey, so far as they are connected with the proposed customs increase as distinct
from the monopolies, and that they hoped to reach com plete agreement with the
German G ov [ern m en ]t in regard to the proposed Anglo-German Convention respecting
the Bagdad Railway and cognate matters forthwith. Sir E . Goschen was further
to explain that H fis ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t were, however, disturbed by the
reflection that the British agreements both with Germany and with Turkey could not,
to a large extent, becom e operative until the conclusion of corresponding agreements
between the Bagdad Railway Company and the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, and the
Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t and the German G ov [ern m en ]t, and. that progress in this
direction did not appear to be very rapid. H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] was to add that
March 31st was the latest date fixed for the ratification o f the British agreements
with Turkey(3) and, both on this account and in view of the urgent necessity of Turkey
for m oney, which could not be raised until the customs increase had been agreed
to, H [is ] M [a jesty’s ] G ov [ern m en ]t earnestly trusted that the negotiations at Berlin
might soon be concluded.
H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] Ambassador has now been inform ed by the German G ov[ern-
m en ]t that the negotiations in question are in suspense, owing to the prolonged
absence of Djavid B ey at Paris, and, while the German G ov [ern m en ]t are anxious
for their early conclusion, they evidently are far from confident that they will be
resumed at an early date, and they are able to give no indication o f the date when
a conclusion may be anticipated.(4)
H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t have received this news with much disappoint­
m e n t; they are being pressed to lay the British agreements before Parliam ent, or
to disclose their contents, and a prolonged delay will cause serious inconvenience
and even embarrassment. In these circumstances Sir E . Grey would greatly
appreciate the action o f the German G ovrern m en ]t if they could expedite the progress
of negotiations in which H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t are closely concerned,
since their conclusion is a necessary preliminary condition of the Anglo-Germ an and
the Turco-British agreements being brought to a successful issue.
Sir E . Grey therefore trusts that it m ay still be possible for the Turco-Germ an
negotiation to reach a conclusion before March 31st.
(3) [ c p . supra, p. 282, N o. 187, n o te ( ') . ]
(4) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 211.

Anglo-Turkish C onvention respecting the Boundaries of Aden, d c .f 1)

March 9, 1914.
Sa Majesté le R oi du Royaum e-U ni de Grande-Bretagne et d ’ Irlande et des
Territories Britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, d ’ une part; et
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans, d ’ autre part :
Désireux tous deux de com pléter et de ratifier les protocoles signés (Annexe A )(2)
par les Commissaires ottoman et britannique en 1903, 1904 et 1905 pour indiquer
la ligne de démarcation de la frontière arrêtée par eux pour séparer le vilayet du
Yém en du territoire des neuf cantons d ’ Aden telle qu’ elle est indiquée en bleu sur
les quatre cartes annexées (Annexe B) ;(2)

( ') [T h e t e x t g iv en here is ta k en fr o m th a t preserved in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l

T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 77). T here is a co p y also in F.O. 6 6 2 5 /2 7 /1 4 /4 4 . T he d r a ft of the C on ven ­
tion had been sent to C on stan tin op le in S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 77) o f F ebru ary 16,
1914. S ir L. M a llet was in form ed by teleg ram (N o. 132) o f M a rch 11, 1914, D . 5-20 p . m ., th a t
th e C on v en tion ha d been sign ed on M a rch 9. A cop y o f the d r a ft w as sen t to the In d ia Office
on F eb ru a ry 16. C opies o f th e final te x t w ere sent to H e r r v on K iih lm a n n on J u ly 2 ; to B erlin
(N o. 207) ; to C on stan tin op le (N o. 441) on J u ly 4, 1914.]
( 2) [T h ese enclosures are not re p ro d u ce d .]
 841

Ont nom m é pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le E oi du Royaum e-U ni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des
Territoires Britanniques au delà des Mers, Em pereur des Indes : Le Très H onorable
Sir Edward G rey, Baronnet du R oyaum e-U ni, Chevalier du Très Noble Ordre de la
Jarretière, Membre du Parlem ent, Principal Secrétaire d ’ Ëtat de Sa Majesté pour les
Affaires E trangères;
Sa Majesté l ’ Empereur des Ottomans : Son Altesse Ibrahim Hakki Pacha, ancien
Grand Yézir, décoré des Grands Cordons des Ordres Im périaux de l ’ Osmanié et du
Medjidié en brillants;
Lesquels, s ’ étant communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due
form e, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

A r t ic l e I.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes confirment et ratifient les protocoles signés par
les Commissaires ottom an et britannique en 1903, 1904 et 1905, dont le texte se
trouve à l ’ Annexe A de la présente Convention.

A r tic le n.
Pour confirmer l ’ engagement pris à l ’ alinéa 1er du protocole en date du 20 avril,
1905. Sa Majesté l ’ Em pereur des Ottomans déclare qu ’ il n ’ aliénera pas de quelque
manière que ce soit le territoire, d ’ une étendue d ’ environ 550 milles anglais carrés,
contigu à la ligne Djébel N oum an-H usn Mourad et situé dans les limites de 1 ancien
canton des Soubéha. Ledit territoire est indiqué en jaune sur la carte qui forme
l ’ Annexe C de la présente Convention.

A r tic le III.
Le point No. 1 du Ouadi Bana indiqué sur la première des cartes annexées
(Annexe B ï à la présente Convention, étant le dernier point du côté de l ’ est délimité
sur les lieux, il est convenu entre les Hautes Parties contractantes et arrêté, conform é­
ment audit protocole, et sous réserve des conditions et spécifications y contenues, que
la frontière des territoires ottomans suivra une ligne droite qui ira du L ekem et-m -
Choub vers le nord-est au désert de Ruba-al-Ivhali avec une inclinaison de 4 5 °. Cette
ligne rejoindra dans le Ruba-al-Ivhali, sur le parallèle 2 0 °, la ligne droite et directe
vers le sud qui part d ’ un point sur la rive méridionale du golfe d ’ Oudjeïr et qui
sépare le territoire ottoman du sandjak de Nedjd du territoire d ’ E l Katr, en conformité
de l ’ article 11 de la Convention anglo-ottomane du 29 juillet, 1913, relatif au Golfe
Persique et aux territoires environnants.
L a première des deux lignes est indiquée en violet et la seconde en bleu sur la
carte spéciale ci-jointe ^Annexe O .

A r tic le IV.
La présente Convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de ratification en seront
échangés à Londres aussitôt que faire se pourra, et au plus tard dans un délai de
trois mois.
E n foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente Convention
et y ont apposé leurs cachets.
Fait à L ondres, en double original, le 9 mars. 1914.
[L .S .] E. G R E Y.
[L .S .] I. H A K E T .
 342
N o. 212.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(l)

F.O. 9 2 3 4 /1 3 2 /1 4 /4 4 .
(No. 141.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 13, 1914.
, I have to inform Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] that the French Ambassador called at
this Office on the 27th ultimo and showed to Sir A. Nicolson a confidential despatch
from the French M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] to the French Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh explaining the action taken by the Russian M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ]
A [ffairs] in regard to the admission of a Russian delegate to the Council of the
Ottoman Public D ebt.(2)
M. Doumergue pointed out that Turkey had agreed in principle to such admission,
but France, while also agreeing in principle, had warned Russia to be cautious how
she proceeded, and had recomm ended her to strengthen her claim by acquiring some
financial interest in Turkey in the shape of some Turkish bonds.
M. Sazonow of his own initiative had suddenly addressed him self to all the Powers.
The results had been what France had feared. Germany made a condition that a
second German delegate should be appointed and that she should have her turn in
the P resid en cy: Austria-Hungary laid down as a condition that Russia should
recognize the Austro-Italian Bank in Albania and concur in that Bank undertaking
important banking transactions, and Belgium had applied also for a delegate. Italy
would probably also make some demands. The ill-considered action of M. Sazonow
had, therefore, unchained a series of complicated questions; and M. Paleologue in
recounting the consequences to M. Sazonow was to urge him to go no farther, but to
leave the matter alone and be content with the acceptance in principle by France and
Turkey of a Russian delegation, while awaiting a more favourable opportunity to
advance the matter further.
[ I am, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]

0 ) [T h is despatch is based u p on S ir A . N icolson ’ s record o f the in terv iew .]

( 2) [O n this su b ject cp. D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. I X , pp. 270-1, N o. 214, and n ote. cp. als
S tie v e , V ol. I V , pp. 5 8 -9 .]

No. 213.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.(*)

F.O. 1 21 9 9 /4 6 0 1 /14/44.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 19, 1914.
I am directed by S ec[reta r]y Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accom panying
copy of a minute, dated March 18. recording a conversation between Dir. Parker and
H err von Kuhlmann and Herr Bergm ann resp [ectin ]g certain clauses of the draft
Anglo-German agreement.
I am to enquire the views of the S ec[reta r]y of State for In d ia /B [o a rd ] of
T [ra d e] resp [ectin ]g the proposed change in the clause regarding British directors
on the board of the Bagdad R [a i]l[w a ]v , and. if possible, Sir E. Grey would be glad
to have a reply this week so that the matter may be further discussed with
H err Bergmann before his departure.
W ith regard to article 6, clause b, of the draft Convention (which as you are
aware the German G ov [ern m en ]t have now conditionally agreed to), the following

( ') [T h is letter was rep eated to the In d ia Office.]

 343
modification has been proposed to H err von Kiililmann for submission to liis
G o v [e r n m e n ]t:—
“ The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed to by the parties
concerned, proceed to Basra for the purposes of his enquiry. l i e shall publish
his report within four months after having received all the necessary materials
from all the parties, including both Commissioners (instead of ‘ both sides ’ ), or
within four months of his arrival at Basra.” (2)
I am to add that this modification lias been proposed with a view to ensuring
that the British Commissioner shall be effectively heard by the expert referee.
[ I am, &c.
E Y R E A. C R O W E .]

Enclosure in No. ‘213.

M inute by Mr. Parker.

March 18, 1914.
I had a meeting with Herr von Kuehlmann and H err Bergm ann to-day. I
communicated to them copies o f the agreement initialled by the Sm yrna-A idin
Railway Company and Signor Nogara,(3) for their confidential inform ation.
I also com m unicated to them a draft of the agreement which it is suggested
should be signed by them (i.e. the Bagdad Railway) on the one hand and Lord
tnchcape and Mr. Lynch on the other. They said they would consider it, and they
anticipated no difficulty as it was merely an amplification of what had already been
initialled ad referendum .(4)
I then raised the question of British directors on the Bagdad Railway. I said
that in the German draft of November 3, 1913, article 1, the following clause was
suggested :—

“ The Im perial German Governm ent declare that they will use their best
endeavours to secure that two British directors, agreeable to H is Britannic
M ajesty’ s Government, shall be admitted as representatives of a group of British
shareholders to the Board of the Bagdad Railway Com pany.” / 5)

In our counter-draft of December 15( 6) the words underlined had been omitted,
and in the last German counter-draft (that of January 19141 the words “ agreeable
to H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government ’ ’ had been om itted.(7)
The German representatives explained that they did not like retaining the words
“ agreeable to His Britannic M ajesty’ s G ov ern m en t” if it were not stipulated that
they should be “ representatives of a group of British shareholders” as it looked as
if His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government had two watch dogs. I explained our
difficulties, and I suggested that, inasmuch as the two British directors would have to
have a qualifying holding they would themselves be shareholders, and therefore,
speaking tentatively, I did not see why we should not accept the German counter-draft
of November 3 (quoted above) provided the three words “ a group o f ” were deleted.
They said they would recom m end this to Berlin by telegraph. I said m y proposal

(2) [r . su p ra, p. 338, N o. 208.]

(3) [O n M a rch 6 S ig n or N og a ra and M r. F . S in gle in itia lled a d ra ft en titled “ H ea ds o f a
p roposed A g reem en t betw een the O ttom an R a ilw a y from S m yrna to A id in (h e r e in a fte r called
‘ the C om p an y ’ ) and S ig n or N og a ra , rep resen tin g an Ita lia n S y n d ica te called the ‘ S ocieta
C om m erciale, In d u stria le e F in a n zia r /a ’ (h erein a fter ca lled ‘ the S y n d ic a t e ’ ).” (F .O . 10127/
7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
<4) [T h is a greem ent was finally sign ed on M a rch 27, 1914. (F .O . 1 5 2 7 4 /2 7 7 /1 4 /4 4 .) cp. G .P.,
X X X V I I (I ), pp. 4 15 -9 .]
(s) [v. supra, p. 247, N o. 156, encl. 2.]
( 6) [v. supra, p. 304, No. 190.]
( 7) [v. supra, p. 320, N o. 198. encl. 2.]
 344
was non-committal, pending reference to the Board o f Trade and Sir E. G rey’ s
decision. They said the Deutsche Bank group which controls the Bagdad Railway
would give an undertaking to the German Governm ent, who in turn would give an
undertaking to His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government, that the said group would always
vote in favour of two directors agreeable to His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.
They said that they assumed that His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent would not
oppose the investment of British capital in the railway, and I rem inded them that we
had expressly undertaken not to oppose it in article 1. They said they would like to
get some capital in London, and I indicated the distinction between directors and
groups, pointing out that the latter need not necessarily be entrusted with the
presentation of directors.
This point is being referred to Berlin, but it is desirable that we should have an
early expression o f the views of the Board of Trade.
They then said that they would like the words printed in italics added to article 3
of the annexed tentative draft. I consider that they should be added.
A. P [A R K E R ].

A nnex.

Tentative Draft of March 17, 1914.(8)

Article 3 (c). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to establish, in Ottoman territory, railway undertakings either in direct
com petition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction with that
com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject
between the Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.
F or the purposes of this article, the western terminus o f the Bagdad Railway shall be
held to be at Konia and the eastern terminus at Basra.
Tn regard to article 3, clause (c), of the Anglo-Germ an Convention of
it is agreed as follows :—

1. No lines in that part of Asiatic Turkey which, west of the 36th meridian of
east longitude, lies south of the 34th degree of latitude or in that part which, east of
the said meridian, lies south of the 31st degree of latitude, shall be held to be in direct
com petition; but any line north of these limits shall be held to be in direct com peti­
tion if it establishes direct railway com m unication between the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf.
2. There shall be a protective zone extending for 60 kilom. on either side of the
Bagdad Railway, and any line passing within the said zone shall be held to be in
direct com petition, provided that in the region between M useyib and Kurna the
protective zone shall be bounded on the east by a line drawn midway between the
Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, from the latitude of Museyib to Kurna.
3. Local lines serving as feeders for the river navigation and not exceeding
100 kilom. in length shall, provided th ey do not pass within the p rotective zone, not
be held to be in direct competition.
4. The question of whether any other line is or is not in direct com petition shall,
in the event of failure to reach an agreement, be referred to arbitration in accordance
with article 8 of the said C onvention.(9)

( s) [cp. supra, pp. 3 37-8, N o. 207, and en cl.]

(9) [r . supra, p. 323, N o. 198, encl. 2.]
 345
N o. 214.
Turkish Petroleum C oncessions.!1)

Arrangem ents for fusion o f the interests in Turkish Petroleum Concessions o f the
D ’A rcy group and of the Turkish Petroleum Company.

Foreign Office, March 19, 1914.

It is agreed that the interests shall be divided as follows :—
5 0% to the D ’ A rcy group,
2 5% to the Deutsche Bank,
2 5% to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, and that in order to carry out
this division

1) the shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company now held by the National Bank
of Turkey shall be transferred in equal moieties to the Deutsche Bank and the Anglo­
Saxon Company.
2) the capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company shall be increased to F1G0.000
by the creation of SO.000 new shares of ¿ 1 each of the same class as those now
existing.
3) these 80,000 new shares shall be allotted to the D ’ A rcy group on terms to be
agreed upon between the parties.
4 ' The Board of the Company shall consist of 8 members of whom 4 will be
nominated by the D ’ A rcy group, 2 by the Deutsche Bank, and 2 by the Anglo-Saxon
Company.
5 The capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company shall be em ployed only in
exploring, testing, and proving oilfields, a separate public com pany or companies being
formed to work any field or fields the examination of which has proved satisfactory.
6) Such working com pany or companies shall issue to the Turkish Petroleum
Company fully paid ordinary shares as consideration for the acquisition of the rights
of the Company to the properties to be acquired ; such ordinary shares shall carry
full control of the working Company or Companies, which control shall in no
circumstances be parted with by the Turkish Petroleum Company.
7 The working capital required by such working com pany or companies shall be
raised by means of preference shares and tor debentures which shall be offered to the
public to such extent as the members of the Turkish Petroleum Company or any one
of them shall elect not to subscribe for themselves.

0 ) [T h e te x t here g iven is ta k en from th a t p reserv ed in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l

T rea ties (T u rk ey N o. 74). C op ies w ere sent on M a rch 20. 1914, t o all th e s ig n a to rie s; to the
B oa rd o f T r a d e ; t o th e A d m ir a lty ; t o the In d ia Office. A co p y w as sent to C on sta n tin op le
(N o. 144). T he fo llo w in g m in u te a p p ea rs on th e co p v o f th e t e x t filed in F .O . 1 2 d 2 4 '1 0 6 7 /
1 4 /4 4 : —

M IN T T E .

T h is is the agreem en t w hich w e g ot a ccep ted and sign ed b y all the p a rties a fte r a
p rolon g ed discussion y esterd ay a ftern oon .
I t enables us now t o a p p roa ch th e T u rk ish g o v [e r n m e n ]t fo r th e definite g ra n t o f the
M esop ota m ia n o il concession t o th e new A n g lo-G erm a n g rou p .
T he G erm ans h a ve in form a lly a greed, an d th is w ill b e p u t on record , th a t the d ’ A rcy
g ro u p w ill ha ve th e n om in a tion o f th e ch a irm an o f th e am alga m ated com p a n y fo r a
num ber o f years.
H it h e r t o th e m u tu a l o p p o sitio n o f the r iv a l g rou p s, b ack ed b y th e ir resp ectiv e g o v e r n ­
m e n t s has resulted in all concessions b ein g block ed. T his b lock is now defin itely rem oved

E. A C.
M [ a r ] c h 20
F . D . A.
A. N.
E . G .]
 346
8) The alterations in the memorandum and/or articles of association of the
Turkish Petroleum Company necessary to carry out the above conditions shall be made
forthwith.
9) Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian shall be entitled to a beneficiary 5 % interest without
voting rights in the Turkish Petroleum Company, this 5 % being contributed equally
by the D ’ Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company out of their respective holdings.
The shares representing Mr. Gulbenkian’ s interest shall be registered in the names
of nominees of the D ’ A rcy group and of the Anglo-Saxon Company, and shall be held
by them, but undertakings 6hall be exchanged between these parties whereby :—
1) Mr. Gulbenkian undertakes to pay the calls on the shares, and
2) The D ’ Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company undertake that .
Mr. Gulbenkian shall be entitled to all financial benefits of the shares.
If Mr. Gulbenkian shall desire to dispose of his interest, and also in the event of
his death, the D ’ Arcy group and the Anglo-Saxon Company shall have the option of
purchasing the interests standing in their names on the terms defined in article 36 ( b)
of the articles of association of the Turkish Petroleum Company.
10) The three groups participating in the Turkish Petroleum Company shall give
undertakings on their own behalf and on behalf of the companies associated with
them not to be interested directly or indirectly in the production or manufacture of
crude oil in the Ottoman Em pire in Europe and Asia, except in that part which is
under the administration of the Egyptian Government or of the Sheikh of Koweit, or
in the “ transferred territories ” on the Turco-Persian frontier, otherwise than through
the Turkish Petroleum Company.
Foreign Office, London, March 19, 1914.
for the Imperial German G [overn m en ]t,
R . v. K U H LM A N N .
(For H is Britannic M ajestv’ s Government),
E Y R E A. C RO W E .
For the National Bank of Turkev.
II. BABIN GTON SM ITH .
For the Anglo-Saxon P etr[oleu m ] C [o m ]p [a n ]v , L [im ite ]d , ,
W . D E T E R D IN G .
W A L T E R H . SAM U E L.
For the Deutsche Bank.
C. BERGM AN N .
For the D ’ Arcy Group,
C. G R E E N W A Y .
H . S. B A R N E S.

No. 215.

Sir Edward Grexj to Sir E . G oschen .(0

F.O . 1 2 6 5 6 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 79.) Foreign Office, March 21, 1914, 7*30 p . m .
Discussions have been taking place with German representatives regarding
railway interests in Asiatic Turkey, and memoranda and maps go to Y [o u r]
E [x ce llen cv ] by post to-night.(z)

(*) [C op ies o f this telegram w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]

(*) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 847
I regret to 6ay that two serious hitches have arisen.
The Germans have pressed me to give an undertaking that no railways shall be
built which are in direct competition with the Bagdad Bailway at any point between
Konia and Basra.
I have with considerable hesitation expressed m y readiness to accept a formula
which rules out any lines within 60 kilometres of either side of the line, and any line
north of certain limits if it establishes direct railway com m unication between the
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, while rem aining lines, except short ones strving
as feeders for the river navigation, are. failing agreement, to be classed as com peting
or non-com peting in accordance with the award of an arbiter.
This concession on m y part will meet with formidable criticism here when the
agreement is published, and it goes much further than anything I had previously
contemplated.
As a counter-concession, which it must be admitted is out of all proportion to that
we have expressed readiness to make, I have asked
ai that a line from Mendali to Kut-el-Amara on the Tigris should be included
in the short feeders for the river navigation, and
b^ that Lake Beyshehir should be regarded as within the area to be served by
the S m yrna-Aidin Railway.

As regards a) our argument is that when the Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to
Basra is com pleted a great part of the through traffic will be diverted from the river
to the railway, and it is therefore vital that the river service, in which the Germans
will be shareholders, should be fed by local lines and traffic. Mendali will probably
be just inside the 60-kilometre zone measured from the Khanikin branch, and the line
we propose would pass via Bedrai and Jessan which would make it rather longer than
100 kilometres.
As regards b) please refer to arguments in memorandum printed in Turkey
series under date of February 21,(3) and to m emorandum which goes to you by post
to-day.(L
The Sm yrna-A idin Company claim that the junction, or point of m eeting, of
extensions from their system and the Bagdad system should be Lake S eid isheir; the
Bagdad Railway representatives claim that it should be at the north end of Lake
Beyshehir. a solution which would be disastrous to the S m yrna-A idin Company. As
a compromise I can induce the Company to agree to make the meeting point at the
town of Beyshehir, which serves as a market for the whole district.
Y [o u r ] E Txcellency] should represent to the German G o v [e m m e n ]t the difficulties
of the situation and the very considerable concessions which we have shown ourselves
ready to m ak e: the enormous area to which our concessions to Germ any re la te ;. and the
great importance I attach to these two small points being conceded.
Though I am very desirous that the negotiations should be speedily concluded. I
cannot give way on either of these points without taking back the concessions we have
made in favour of the interests of Germany.
The Sm vrna-A idin Railway is the oldest and only rem aining British Railway in
Asia M inor and is entitled to special support from H [is ] M rajesty’ s] G o v [e r n m e n ]t;
and I have only been able to agree to the proposed settlement regarding railways in
Mesopotamia on the understanding that British rights in the river navigation should
be consolidated and put upon a permanent footing, a consummation which is impossible
if local traffic such as would be brought b y a line from Mendali is to be ruled out.
As Mendali is nearly 60 kilometres from the proposed alignment of the Bagdad
Railway no serious com petition can be feared.

(3) [N o t rep rod u ced . T he M em oran d u m is e n titled “ M em oran d u m sh ow in g th e reasons

w hy th e C om p any desires perm ission to n a v ig a te th e L ak es E g h e rd ir and B ey sh eh ir and to
con stru ct a lin e o f ra ilw ay co n n e ctin g th e L ak es.” (F .O . 8055; 7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
(*) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t.]
 848
Throughout the discussions the German negotiators have laid stress on the
necessity of our making concessions on the ground that German public opinion must
be considered. In return I must ask that British public opinion be taken into
account. I shall have to defend our concessions before Parliament, and I must be in
a position to show that important British interests have not been sacrificed.
I shall be glad to receive a telegraphic reply from Y [o u r] E [xce lle n cy ] if possible
by Tuesday afternoon.(5)

(5) [ V. in fra , p. 351, No. 218.]

No. 216.

Communication to H err von Kiihlmann and H err Bergmann.

F.O. 1 2656/756/14 '44. Foreign Office, March 21, 1914.

Memorandum of Points to be discussed between the R epresentatives of the Anatolian,

Bagdad and Sm yrna-A idin Companies.(*)

1. Heads of Proposed A greem ent with the Italian Syndicate.

The Anatolian and Bagdad Companies to take note of this agreement and not to
oppose such agreement being approved by the Ottoman Governm ent.

2. Navigation of Lakes E gherdir and B eyscheir.

The Anatolian and Bagdad Companies not to oppose the granting to the S m yrna-
Aidin Company of a Concession for the navigation of the Lakes, provided that no
m onopoly is asked for.

3. Railway between the Lakes.

The Anatolian and Bagdad Companies not to oppose the granting to the S m yrna-
Aidin Company of a Concession for the construction and working of this railway.

4. Railway from Bagdad Railway to L ake Seidischeir.

The Sm yrna-A idin Company not to oppose the granting to the Bagdad Company
of a Concession for the construction and working of a railway from a point on the
Bagdad Railway, through the Tscharbambe Valley to Lake Seidischier.

5. Junction at Afiun Karahissar.

The S m yrna-A idin Company has applied to the Ottoman Government for a
Concession to construct and work a branch line from Kara Kouyou to Sandukly.
The S m yrna-A idin Company has put forward a tentative proposal to the Ottoman
Government for an option, extending over a long period of years, to make a junction
at Afiun Karahissar, with the Anatolian Railway, if it ultimately desires to do so

0 ) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C on fid en tial P rin t, as th e o rig in a l ca n n ot be

tra ced , cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 3 89 -9 0.]
 849
and can com e to satisfactory terms with the Ottoman Government and the Anatolian
Railway.
Ko demand has. as yet, been made by the Ottoman Government to the S m y m a -
Aidin Company for the immediate construction of a line from Sandukly northwards,
to join the Anatolian Railway at Afiun Karahissar, but the S m yrna-A idin Company
believes that such a demand will be made, as it understands that the Ottoman
Government is desirous of obtaining through railway com m unication between
Constantinople and Adalia. If such a demand is made, and is pressed by the Ottoman
Government, the Company could only agree to such demand if the following conditions
were fulfilled :—
(c) An adequate and properly secured guarantee were given to the S m yrna-A idin
Company on the capital expenditure involved in the consi ruction of the
whole line from Kara Kouyou to Afiun Karahissar.
(b) A similar guarantee were given in respect of the Sm yrna-A idin Com pany’ s
existing line between Beudjeli and Kara Kouyou, to compensate it for
the loss of the traffic diverted to the Anatolian Railway.
(c) A rate agreement were entered into between the Sm yrna-A idin Company and
the Anatolian Company securing equal rates to sea ports, traffic
facilities, &c.

6. Junction with the Bagdad Railway.

The Sm yrna-A idin Company is prepared to examine, with the Bagdad Railway,
the question o f a junction at some point to the south of the town o f B eyscheir. The
proposal has already been put forward tentatively, but the Sm yrna-A idin Company
understands that objections are, or may be, raised by the Ottoman Governm ent.
The Sm yrna-A idin Company is prepared to consider the provision of direct
railway com m unication to the south o f the town o f B eyscheir, if satisfactory terms
can be made with the Ottoman G overnm ent, and the Bagdad Railway will enter
into an agreement for equal rates to sea-ports, traffic facilities, &c.

No. 217.

Communication to H err von K iihlm annJ1)

F .O . 1 2 6 5 1 /4 6 0 1 '1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, March 21, 1914.

R evised Draft o f Articles 5a and 6.

A r t ic l e o a .

His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial German Governm ent will
join in using their good offices with the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent to secure that the
Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as possib le practicable be brought into and perm anently
kept in a satisfactory state o f conservancy in order that sea-going vessels m ay always be
assured o f free and easy access to the port o f Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall perm anently be kept open for sea-going
vessels, and be carried on under conditions o f absolute equality for the vessels o f all
nations, without regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact of navigation, but on ly for

0 ) [C op ies o f this d r a ft w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e : to the A d m ir a lty ; t o th e In d ia

O ffice: to C on stan tin op le (bv post). F o r P rin ce L ich n ow sk v ’ s rep ort r. G .P., X X X V I I (I ),
pp. 3 91 -2 .]
 350
administrative charges of the Commission referred to in Article 6 and for repaying
sums actually spent on improvements in the navigation o f the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed 1 fr[a n c] per registered ton (the
dues to cover the com ing in and going out o f the same vessel) except by agreem ent
betw een the two G ov ern m en ts; any dues shall be levied on a basis o f absolute equality
without regard to the nationality of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 6.

(a) The Imperial German Governm ent having taken note o f the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913,(2) under which the free navigation o f the Shatt-
el-Arab is assured on terms o f absolute equality to the shipping o f all nations and
a com m ission is established for the execution o f such works as m ay be necessary for
the improvem ent o f its channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes
set out therein, and being of opinion that the provisions o f the said Convention are
conducive to the best interests o f international com m erce, will uphold it so long as
it is not materially altered and so .long as the duties imposed upon the Commission
thereunder are satisfactorily carried out.
The Imperial German Government take note in this connection o f the declaration,
signed on the 21st October, 1913,(3) and attached to the said Convention, to the effect
that articles 7 and 8 thereof do not afEect the rights enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire
by the nationals of the Treaty Powers.
(b) H is Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent, so far as they are concerned, agree :—

(i) That the German consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with the
Commission on matters within its com petence;
(ii) That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
o f the com m erce of the river, and refuse to remove the causes o f complaint
raised by the German consul, the question at issue shall be referred to
an impartial expert, to be nominated by agreement between the two
m embers of the Commission and the German consul, provided that if a
similar or analogous complaint is made by any other consul, he shall
participate in the said nom ination; and that, failing unanimous agree­
ment, H er Majesty the Queen o f the Netherlands shall be invited to
designate the expert referee.

The Government of His Britannic Majesty will use their good offices with the
Im perial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recomm enda­
tions as may be made by the expert referee.

To be put in the explanatory note :

The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties concerned,
proceed to Basra for the purpose o f his enquiry. He shall publish his report within
four months after having received all the necessary materials from all the parties,
including both Comm issioners, or within four months o f his arrival at Basra.
The expenses o f the enquiry, including the remuneration o f the referee, shall
be borne in equal shares by the Governm ents concerned.

( 2) [v. sup ra , pp. 183-7, No. 124 (1 ).]

(3) [v. sup ra , p. 242, E d. X o t e .]
 351

N o. 218.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .I1)

Berlin, March 23, 1914.

F.O. 12929 756 14 44. D. 8 -2 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 39.) E . 9 -45 p . m .
Your telegram No. 79 o f March 2 1 .(2)
Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs inform s me that concession respecting
Mendeli has already been agreed to on condition that it should be kept secret for
the present.
As regards S m y m a -A idin concession. Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs
said that Bagdad Company will certainly refuse. After long discussion, in which
I produced your views and explained difficulty o f the situation, he said he would
consult Deutsche Bank and see me again to-m orrow.

0 ) [C op ies o f th is teleg ram w ere sen t to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]

(2) [r . su p ra , pp. 3 46-8, No. 215.]

No. 219.

M inute by Mr. P a rk er.i1)

F.O . 13117 7 5 6 ,1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, March 23, 1914.
H err von Kuehlmann and Herr Bergm ann called to-day. The German G ov[ern -
m en jt, though with great hesitation, were prepared to meet H [is ] M [a je s ty ’s ]
G ov[ern m en ]t with regard to a line from Mendali via Bedrai and Jessan to Kut-el-
Amara on the Tigris, subject to three conditions :—
1) The assurance which would be given to H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t in
a note must not be divulged without the prior assent o f the German
G o v [e m m e n ]t,
2) The line must not be built before railway com m unication was established
between Khanikin and Basra via Bagdad. This would probably not be
very long as the Bagdad Company was entitled to guarantees.
3) The line must not be continued beyond Mendali without an agreement with
the German G ov [ern m en ]t.
I think these conditions are reasonable, and 3 especially so, as we only ask
for the line as a feeder for the river navigation.
H err von Kuehlmann had received no instructions from his Governm ent about
Beyshehir, the other subject dealt with in Sir E . G rey’ s telegram No. 79 o f March 21
to Berlin (2) : but Herr Bergm ann bad received a very perem ptory telegram from his
Bank saying that the Bagdad B [a i]l[w a ] y could not agree to the m eeting point of
their system and the Sm yrna-A idin Railway being at the town of Beyshehir, but
H err Bergm ann would do his best to get it fixed half way up the Lake. I thereupon
read to them Sir E . G rey’ s telegram to Sir E . Goschen, and we agreed to postpone
discussion. (3)
A. P A R K E R .
March 23, 1914.

f 1) [C op ies o f th is m in u te w ere sent to th e B o a rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice.]

(2) [» . supra, pp. 346 -8 , N o. 215.]
(3) [N o te by S ir E y re C r o w e : “ In these circu m stan ces, th e q uestion o f follow in g u p ou r
telegram to B erlin b v a n ote to P rin ce L ich n ow sk v m ight stand ov er fo r a d a v or tw o. E. A. C.
M [a r ]c h 23. A X ' E. G .” ]
 852

N o. 220.
Prince Lichnow sky to Sir Edward G r e y . ( *)

F.O. 1 3 1 3 4 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 . London, D. March 23, 1914.

Euerer Exzellenz E. March 24, 1914.
beehre ich mich in der Anlage erhaltener W eisung zufolge ein streng vertrau­
liches Memorandum ergebenst zu übersenden, in welchem die Anschauungen der
Kaiserlichen Regierung über den Bau einer Bahn nach Mendeli niedergelegt sind.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
Euerer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
LIC H N O W SK Y .

Enclosure in No. 220.

Notiz.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung hat ernste Bedenken gegen Ausdehnung der geplanten
Zubringerbahn zum Tigris bis nach Mendeli. Falls jedoch nach Vollendung der
Bagdadbahn von Khanekin nach Basra die Britische Regierung der Kaiserlichen
R egierung gegenüber den W unsch äussern sollte, eine Bahn von Kut-el-Amara nach
Bedrai bis Mendeli auszudehnen, so würde die Kaiserliche Regierung, um den
W ünschen der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung entgegenzukom m en, einem
solchen Bau durch englische Interessenten nicht entgegentreten, weder wegen des
Umstandes, dass diese Linie länger würe als. 100 km noch wegen des Umstandes,
dass Mendeli innerhalb der 60 km -Schutzzone der Bagdad-K hanekin-Strecke liegen
würde. Zu einer Verlängerung der Bahn über Mendeli müsste jedoch auf jeden Fall
die Zustim m ung der Kaiserlichen Regierung eingeholt w erden./2)
Die Zusage wegen des Bahnbaues nach "Mendeli könnte in einer Note der Kaiser­
lichen Botschaft gegeben w erden; diese Note müsste aber unter allen Umständen
geheim bleiben und dürfte nicht ohne Zustim m ung der Kaiserlichen Regierung
veröffentlicht werden.

London, den 23. März 1914.

0 ) [A co p y o f th is com m u n ica tion was sent to th e B oa rd of T rade. F o r H e r r von J a g o w ’ s
in stru ction s on w hich th is com m u n ica tion was based, v. G .P., X X X V I I (I ), p. 386. P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y ’ s m em orandum is p r in te d ibid., pp. 419 -2 0.]
( 2) [O n A p ril 3, 1914, a rep ly w as sent to P rin ce L ich n ow sky, sta tin g th a t “ H is
M a je sty ’ s G overnm ent agree to th e p roposals o f the G erm an G overn m en t as to the con d ition s
u n d er w hich the ra ilw a y should b e co n s tru cte d .” (F .O . 1 3 1 3 4 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .) cp. G .P ..
X X X V I I (I), p. 420.]

No. 221.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r ey A1)

F .O . 1 31 3 7 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 40.) B erlin, March 24, 1914.
M y immediately preceding telegram of 23rd M a rch ./2)
Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs inform s me that H err H elfferich, of the
Deutsche Bank, wTith whom he had a conference this m orning, states that the company
cannot allow Lake Beyshehir to be regarded as within area to be served by the

Z1) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from the C onfid en tial P rin t, as th e orig in a l decyph er

ca n n ot he tra ced . A cop y was sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e ],
( 2) [v. supra, p. 351, N o. 218.]
 353
Smyrna—Aidin Railway. They consider that it is already a great concession to have
allowed that railway to come as far as the north end of Lake Beyshehir. To allow
it to com e to the town o f Beyshehir would be tantamount to giving it the whole of
the traffic of the plains of Konia. Besides, it would interfere with their irrigation
plans, as the lake drains out to the north o f the town o f Beyshehir. It m ight,
however, be possible to arrange for com m on rights of navigation on the lake.
Secretary o i State inform ed me that he had telegraphed result of his conference to
the German Ambassador for your inform ation.
I again pointed out to his E xcellency the reasons why you attribute such
importance to these concessions, and expressed m y regret that refusal of what,
compared to our concessions, was a very moderate request, threatened to render so
much work already done useless and perhaps to wreck the whole agreem ent. His
Excellency said that no one would be sorrier than he if such were to be the case.
He was extremely anxious that an agreement should be rea ch ed : but there it was—
he had gone through with Herr Helfferieh the whole o f the arguments produced by
the Sm yrna-A idin Company, and had told him also what I had said, but H err
Helfferieh had said that even the com prom ise which you had suggested was too
detrimental to the interests of the Anatolian Railway Company to make it possible
of acceptance.

No. 222.

Sir Eduard G rey to Sir E . G osch en ff1)

F .O . 13137 756,14 44.

Tel. (No. S3 A Foreign Office, March 2b, 1914, 2 -1 5 p . m .
Your telegram No. 4 0 .(2)
You should express to German G ov [ern m en ]t the great regret which their
failure to meet our wishes causes m e. It was originally claimed by Sm yrna-A idin
Company that Lake Beyshehir was within their legitimate area, though they did not
claim a m onopoly of navigation on the Lake, as H err H elferich seems to have
supposed even as late as this week.
I cannot agree to confirm the concessions I have offered to the Bagdad Railway
against direct competition over their entire system if that Company maintains its
present attitude, and I have to request Y [o u r ] E [xeellen cy ] to make a categórica'
statement to this effect to the German G ov [ern m en ]t. You should add that I am
forced to this step with the greatest reluctance, and you should add that when the
Sm yrna-A idin Company originally asked to come as far as Lake Beyshehir and to
have navigation rights on the Lake, they did not anticipate that the Bagdad R [a i]i-
[w a ]y would build a fine as far as Beyshehir Town, but that such a line would not
go beyond Lake Seidisheir.
As a com prom ise, I am prepared to urge upon the Sm yrna-A idin Company
that the meeting point should be half way down the Lake.
I shall be m uch gratified if this point is conceded, it would he the utmost I
could hope to induce the Company to agree t o : it appears an equitable com p rom ise;
and it will afford another opportunity for Anglo-Germ an co-operation in Turkey.

Í1) (A c o p y o f this teleg ram was sent to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) fr . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]

[10900]
 354

N o. 2*23.
Sir E . Goschcn to Sir Edicard G rey.(')

F.O . 1 38 5 4 /7 5 6/14 /4 4 .
(No. 132.) B erlin, D. March 27, 1914.
Sir, R . March 30, 1914.
I did not fail to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 79
o f the 21st instant(2) with regard to the concessions desired by His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment in return for the undertaking that no railways should be built which would
be in direct competition with the Bagdad Railway between Konia and Basrah.
As I had the honour to inform you by telegram ,(3) the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs said that as regards the M endeli-Kut-el-A m ara branch line, the
Bagdad Railway Company were ready to meet the desire of His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment on the condition that the arrangement should for the moment be kept secret;
but that as regards the other concession desired by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, namely
that Lake Beyshehir should be included in the area to be served by the Sm yrna-
Aidin Company, there was no chance o f the Company accepting your proposal, as
they already thought that they had gone quite far enough in meeting the wishes
of the Sm yrna-A idin Railway Company in consenting to their com ing to the North
W estern point of Lake Beyshehir. In discussing the latter point with Herr von
Jagow, I pointed out that what was now asked was a very small matter compared
to the very large and important concession which His M ajesty’ s Government had
shown themselves disposed to make to the Bagdad Railway. Both H err von Jagow,
and H err von Stumm who was present at our conversation, showed a disposition
to minimize the importance o f this concession and to claim that what we regarded
as a great concession was really a right held by them as the original holders o f the
concession o f the Bagdad Railway. I replied that I was of course no expert in the
Bagdad Railway question, but that it would surprise me very much to learn that
the original concession absolutely excluded the building o f any lines which might
possibly compete with the Bagdad Railway in any part o f the country through which
it was to run. I might of course be wrong, but the way in which the company had
been straining every nerve to obtain the undertaking not to build com peting lines
seemed to me to preclude the idea either that it was unimportant or that it was
already theirs by right.
Herr von Stumm then pointed out that even if this undertaking was a great
concession, I must not forget that Germany had made great concessions too, both by
giving up their undoubted right o f carrying the railway right down to the Persian
Gulf, and by allowing two British directors on the Board o f the Bagdad Railway
Company.
After some further discussion as to the size and merits o f the concessions made
on each side, and after I had gone fully into the arguments put forward by the
Sm yrna-A idin Railway in favour o f their claims, with no result, I called Herr von
Jagow ’ s attention to the fact that you attached great importance to these two conces­
sions, and that you felt that you could not give way upon them without taking back
the concessions that you were prepared to make to German interests. Under these
circumstances I hoped that His E xcellency wTould do all in his powTer to persuade
the Company to fall in with your v iew s; for he would, I was sure, agree with me in
thinking that it would be a thousand pities if the chances of com ing to a satisfactory
agreement were to be wrecked upon a point which was o f minor importance compared
to the questions which had been already practically settled. Herr von Jagow said that
he would go into the matter on the following day with Herr Helfierich of the Deutsche
Bank and let me know the result.

0 ) [ c p . G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 3 9 2 -3 .]
(2) [v. supra, pp . 3-16-8, X o. 215.]
(3) [r . supra, p. 351, X o . 2 1 8 ; pp. 352-3, X o . 221.]
 355
His E xcellency saw me again after his conversation with H err H elfferich and told
me that to his great regret the Bagdad Railway Company found it impossible to give
way with regard to the inclusion of Lake Beyshehir in the zone o f the Sm yrna-A idin
Company. After giving me the reasons why the Bagdad Railway Company refused
to entertain the compromise which you had suggested, reasons with which you are
no doubt familiar, Herr von Jagow said that he also would consider it a great
misfortune if this difference of opinion betw een the two Companies should undo the
work that had already been done and endanger the prospects of an agreement. He
attached the greatest possible importance to the agreement, both because of the
good effect it would have on public opinion in both countries and because it would
exclude the danger of a clash of interests between the only two Powers who were
sincere in their desire that the Ottoman Em pire should continue to exist. He
confessed that he had no confidence in the sincerity o f the other Powers in this
respect, certainly not in that of Italy or France and least o f all in that o f Russia.
In any case he did not give Turkey more than twenty years of existence and he feared
that even that period would be curtailed unless Great Britain and Germany
co-operated heartily together.
I did not fail to point out to him that the views he had just expressed would
seem to render it worth while that a strong effort should be made to persuade the
Bagdad Railway Company to give way upon the point which he had been discussing,
and upon which you felt so strongly; but His E xcellency said that he feared that
the Company was not to be moved from their decision.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCH EN.

M IN U T E .

The last tw o p a ra g ra p h s are very im p orta n t.

A. P .
M a rch 30, 1914.
E. A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 30.
A. N.
E. G.

No. 224.

Mr. Parker to H err von K uhlm ann.( J)

F .O . 1 42 5 7 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
(Private.)
My dear K u h lm a n n :— F oreign Office, March 31, 1914.
I have already spoken to you about the difficulties which are raised by the
additional article, proposed in the draft enclosed in Prince Lichnow sky’ s letter of
the 1st F ebruary.(2) I am anxious to avoid a form al official correspondence, as I
think we m ay be able to reach agreement m ore speedily without it, but at the same
time, as the subject is so com plicated, I think it would be convenient to you to
have a written statement from me.
For facility of reference, I enclose a copy o f the additional article in its original
form.

( J) [C op ies o f this le tte r w ere sent t o th e B o a rd of T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice; to the

D irector o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to the A d m ir a lty ; to C on stan tin op le (as N o. 1 8 4 ); to B erlin
as No. 9 2).]
( 2) [v . sup ra , p. 323, N o. 198, encl. 2 .]
[10900] 2 A 2
 356

Tn our view, the basis of the whole Treaty is that we undertake not to oppose
your going as far as Basra, and you agree not to go beyond Basra. Our undertaking
is given in clause (a) o f article I ; whereas in clause (a) of article I II it is agreed
that no railway shall be built “ from Basra to the Persian G u lf ’ ’ unless and until
there is complete agreement between the Ottoman, British, and German Governments.
There has been a difference of opinion between our two Governments as to one
point arising from the last-mentioned clause : we are willing to agree that if the
line is ever built there shall be no discrimination in rates, but you wished us to go
further (which, for political reasons, we were not willing to do) and agree that there
shall be two German directors on the board. ’
In view of the terms of article I II clause (a) (which confers on either Govern­
ment the power of vetoing the line altogether), the settlement of this difference did
not appear to be of immediate importance. Now, however, you have proposed an
additional article which, if adopted as it stands, would hind the British Governm ent,
owing to circumstances wholly beyond their control, to agree to a line being built
from Basra to some point nearer, and possibly on, the Persian Gulf, and, if
the line were built, to agree that there should be German participation in the capital
and German representation on the hoard.
Against this article I perceive a formidable array of objections :—

In the first place, though this is a point which does not concern my Government
and merely arouses m y personal curiosity, I am at a loss to appreciate why the
German Governm ent, who have accepted Basra as the most natural and suitable
com m ercial terminus for the Bagdad Bailway, should, by inserting this article in
the Treaty, indicate to the public that in fact they are not quite confident that the
decision to make Basra the terminus is prudent or wholly d efensible; thus, while the
article would undoubtedly prove a thorn in the flesh for us, I fear that it would be
rather a crumpled leaf in your own bed of roses.
In the second place, it would be argued in Parliament here, and to my mind
could not be successfully controverted, that we had, by agreeing to the additional
article, rendered insecure and therefore nugatory all the advantages conferred upon
us hv article I II clause (a) and by article II clause (a) (copies enclosed); for what
is it we are asked to do?
To agree to the construction of a line, with an inevitable German participation
but without any express stipulation for British control or even participation, to a
point which might conceivably have to he settled by arbitration over our heads, and
result in the sacrifice of those very interests, to protect which we were originally
induced to negotiate this Treaty.
And, if the additional article were adopted, what would be the casus foederis
in which the line would have to he built?
The article provides that if within a reasonable (uncertainty number li time,
the Shatt-el-Arab cannot be brought into and maintained in a satisfactory (uncertainty
number ‘2) state of conservancy, the British Government shall agree (uncertainty
number 3, as, while our assent to the project is secured, no proviso as to British
control is made) to the construction of a line from Basra to a point affording free
and easy access (uncertainty number 4) to ocean-going vessels (uncertainty number 5,
assuch vessels may in future include an “ Imperator ” or a “ Super-Imperator ” ).
I f the article is to he inserted at all.it is absolutely indispensable that British
predominance should be secured expressis verbis therein; if you desire the article
for Parliamentary reasons in Germany, we desire this qualification added for similar
reasons h ere; and no exchange of secret notes respecting the qualification would
serve our purpoise. For we must be able to satisfy Parliament that this extension
will be as indisputably “ British ” as the Bagdad Railway is indisputably “ German.”
W e should of course infinitely prefer to omit the article altogether, but if, on
further consideration, your Government really considers it necessary to provide for
the eventuality of Basra not rem aining, as it has done now for over 2,000 years,
 357
open to ships from the sea, then I should be ready to submit to Sir E . Grey a clause
tothe following effect. I cannot say that I feel confident he would accept i t ; in
any case I am certain that he would not go beyond i t :
“ Should the port of Basra, owing to some unforeseen physical cause, be
rendered inaccessible to ocean-going vessels, or should st rious and insuperable
obstacles arise to the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab up to the said port, His
Britannic M ajesty's Government declare that they would, in accordance with
article 10 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention o f , take steps to promote
the construction of a line from Basra to some point nearer the sea, affording
free and easy access to such vessels, provided that in theCompany controlling
the line, British participation in the capital, and British directors on the board,
clearly and perm anently predominate.
“ In such a contingency, adequate arrangements would be made to ensure
to the Bagdad Railway Company traffic facilities, and to obviate any sort of
discrimination in the transport o f passengers or g o o d s : and His Britannic
M ajesty's Government would not oppose German capital participating in the line,
and its representation on the board thereof. The proportion of German directors
would not exceed the proportion of the British directors specified in article I,
clause (b , of the present C onvention.”
I f an article is really desired. I sincerely hope that you will at least recomm end
this wording to your Governm ent. If they and His M ajesty's Government were to
agree to it. and if the few rem aining points already discussed are settled. I cannot
see why the whole Treaty should not be initialled by us <1 referendum very shortly.
It would be a great advantage if this could be done.
Yours sineerelv.
ALW YN P A R K E R .

Enclosure 1 in No. *224.

Additional A rticled 3)
Should the Shatt-el-Arab, after a reasonable time, not have been brought into
a satisfactory state of conservancy assuring sea-going vessels of free and easy access
to the port o f Basra, or should this state of conservancy not be maintained, His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will agree to the construction of
a branch from Basra (Zobeir) to the next point allowing a free and easy access to
sea-going vessels.
In this case His Britannic M ajesty’s Governm ent will not oppose German capital
participating in this branch line and its being reprt rented on the board o f this line
under exactly the same conditions and in the same proportion as British capital shall
be represented on the board of the Bagdad Railway.

Enclosure 2 in No. 224.

Article 2. Clause (a .(4>

The Bagdad Railway Company having concluded with theIm perial Ottoman
Government anarrangement on the following basis, the Imperial German Govern­
ment and His Britannic M ajesty’s Governm ent declare, so far as concerns themselves,
that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best endeavours to secure
its due execution :—
(i) The terminus o f the Bagdad Railway C om pany's line shall be at Basra, and
the Bagdad Railway Company has renounced all claims to construct a
branch line from Basra (Zobeir to the Persian Gulf, referred to in article 1
(3) [r . supra, p. 323, X o . IP?, encl. 2 .]
(J) [r . supra, p. 320, X o . 19?, encl 2.]
 358
of the Bagdad Railway Convention o f the 5th March, 1903, and to build
a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, under article 23 of the
said Bagdad Railway Convention^5)

Enclosure 3 in No. 224.

A rticle 3. Clause (a ).(6)

The Imperial German Government and H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government

declare that they will in no case support the construction of a branch from Basra
(Zobeir), or from any point o f the main line of the Bagdad Railway, to the Persian
Gulf unless and until there is complete agreement on the subject between the Imperial
Ottoman Governm ent, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and the Imperial
German Governm ent.

Enclosure 4 in No. 224.

A rticle 10 of Draft Anglo-Tnrkish C onvention.(7)

Aucun prolongement de voie ferrée au delà de Basra vers la mer ne pourra avoir
lieu qu’ après accord préalable entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et
le Gouvernement Impérial ottom an et dans les conditions agréées par eux.

(5) [t\ B .F .S .P ., Vol. 1 0 2 , pp. 8 3 3 - 4 (A rt. 1) ; pp. 8 4 0 - 1 (A rt. 2 3 ) . ]

( 6) [r . supra, p. 3 2 1 , No. 1 9 8 , en d . 2 . ]
( 7) [v. supra, p. 2 0 5 , No. 1 3 3 . ]

No. 225.

Mr. Parker to H err von K uhlm ann.(*)

F .O . 1 4 2 7 8 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
M y dear K u eh lm a n n :— Foreign Office, April 1, 1914.
I send you a revise of the Anglo-G erm an C onvention,!2) showing, as far as possible,
the text so far as it has been agreed between you and H err Bergm ann and m yself.
I have left article 8 blank, and have added article 10.
Bergm ann agreed to the last paragraph of article II, clause (a) (iv), and I
explained to you both why we considered it essential to have it in the Anglo-German
Convention. •
You will see that two clauses have been modified to meet a changed situation,
v iz., article 4, clause (c) (ii), and article 5, clause (b).
I presume that the first section of the “ recom m endations” o f last September
about the Shatt-el-Arab should come in the explanatory note regarding articles 6
and 7.
I would draw your special attention to the second marginal note on the first
page. W ould you let me know exactly what is proposed by your Governm ent as to
this point?
Yours sincerelv,
ALW YN PARK ER.

( 1) [T his letter was sent to C on sta n tin op le (as N o. 182). C op ies w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice;
to th e B oa rd o f T rade. F or P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s rep ort cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 408-14.]
( 2) [T h ere was a fu rth e r revised d r a ft o f this C on v en tion da ted A p ril 21, 1914. (F .O . 17856/
4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .) The notes g iven below show any v a ria tion s in the te x t o f th is d ra ft, cp. also
in fra , pp. 370-1, E d. N o te .]
 359

E n closu re in N o. •225.

R evised Draft of Anglo-G erm an C onvention.(3)

March 31, 1914.

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a). Recognising the general importance of the com pletion of the Bagdad
Railway for international com m erce. His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction or manage­
ment by the Bagdad Railway Company of the Bagdad Railway system or to prevent
the participation of capital in this undertaking.^)
Clause (b). The Im perial German Government declare that they will use their
beet endeavours to secure that two British members, agreeable to His Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent, shall be admitted as representatives o f British shareholders
to the Board (Conseil d ’ Administration) of the Bagdad Railway C om pany.(5)

A r t ic l e 2.

Clause (ah The Bagdad Railway Company having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German
Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best
endeavours to secure its due execution :—

ii) The terminus c f the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra, and
the Bagdad Railway Company has renounced all claims to construct a branch line
from Basra CZobeir) to the Persian Gulf, referred to in article 1 o f the Bagdad
Railway Convention of the 5th March, 1 9 0 3 , and to build a port or railway terminus
on the Persian Gulf, under article 2 3 o f the said Bagdad Railway Convention.
(ii. No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the Bagdad
Railway Com pany’ s system, either as regards facilities or rates of charge for the
conveyance o f like articles between the same points on account of the ownership,
origin, or destination of goods presented for transport, or in any other manner
whatever.(6)
ini') In the event o f the construction o f the said branch line from Basra (Zobeiri
to the Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be made to secure

( 3) [F o r th e G erm an co u n te r -d ra ft o f J a n u a ry 1914. v. supra, pp. 320-3. N o. 19S, encl. 2.]

( 4) [U n sig n ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ (N o t e : C op ies o f all agreem ents rela tin g t o the ra ilw ay
system to be com m u n ica ted t o H is B r ita n n ic M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent b efore sig n a tu re o f this
C on v en tion .) ” ]
(5) [U n sig n e d m a rg in a l n o t e : “ (N o t e : In ord er to ensure th e perm an en t presen ce on the
B oa rd o f tw o d irectors agreeab le to H is B r ita n n ic M a je sty ’ s G overnm ent, the G erm an g rou p
w hich con trols th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y w ill g iv e a w ritte n assurance t o th e Im p eria l
G erm an G overn m en t th a t th e said g ro u p w ill alw ays use its best en d eavours and v o t in g pow er
to secure th is ob ject, an d the Im p e ria l ‘G erm an G overnm ent w ill u n d erta k e t o H is B r ita n n ic
M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t th a t th ey w ill m a in ta in an d u p h old th e sa id assurance. P ro v is io n s to
this effect shou ld be in serted in the e x p la n a to ry note.) ” ]
( 6) [I n th e revised d r a ft o f A p r il 21, 1914, th e w ord s “ As h ith e rto .-’ w ere a d d ed a t the
b eg in n in g o f this clause. A m a rg in a l note was also a dded “ ( N o t e : T he Im p e ria l G erm an
G overnm ent are ready, b y m eans o f an e x ch a n g e o f notes, to d ecla re as fo llo w s : T he B a g d a d
R a ilw ay C om p an y have assured th e Im p eria l G erm an G overn m en t that all rates o f fr e ig h t an d
con d ition s o f tra n sp ort shall be du ly p u blished , an d likew ise any ch a n g e p rop osed th e re in ;
fu rth er th a t any change, w heth er an in crease o r a decrease, in the said co n d itio n s or rates o f
fr e ig h t shall be pu blish ed a t least tw o m onths b e fo re th ey com e in to force. T he Im p eria l G erm an
G overn m en t w ill use th eir best end eavours t o keep th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y to these
a s s u r a n c e s .)" (F O. 175.56, 460 1/1 4 44 )]
 8G0
facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s system, and
there shall be complete protection against discrimination, direct or indirect.
(iv) The construction and exploitation of the proposed ports o f Basra and Bagdad
authorised by article 23 of the Bagdad Railway Convention o f the 5th March, 1903,
shall be carried out by a separate Ottoman Company.
No duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denomination shall
be levied by the port com pany on any vessels or goods which shall not equally, under
the same conditions, be imposed in like cases on all vessels or goods, whatever be
the nationality of the vessels or their owners, or the ownership or country o f origin
or destination of the goods, and whatever be the places from which the vessels or
goods arrive or to which they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading, and unloading o f vessels in the
ports, no privileges or facilities shall he granted to any vessel or vessels which shall
not equally and under like conditions be granted to all other vessels.
The Imperial Ottoman Government reserves to itself the right to confer upon
the Commission, which it proposes to entrust with the improvement and maintenance
of the navigability of the Shatt-el-Arab, its rights of control over the port of Basra.
No rights conferred upon the ports com pany shall prejudice o r impair the right
of the aforesaid Commission to perform any o f the duties entrusted to it under the
Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913.( 7)
Clause (b). The Imperial German Government declare that they will not oppœ e
the acquisition by British interests of 40 per cent, of the share-capital of the separate
Ottoman Company for the construction and exploitation of the ports of Basra and
Bagdad, mentioned in sub-clause (iv) above, and their rateable representation on the
Board (Conseil d ’ Administration) o f the port com pany, and in the contracts, if any,
for construction and maintenance.
Clause (c). In all that relates to the dues and charges o f whatever nature to be
levied, and to the facilities to be accorded, in the ports of Basra and Bagdad, goods
arriving or to be forwarded by water shall receive identic treatment to those arriving
or to be forwarded by rail.(8)

A r t ic l e 3.

Clause fa). The Imperial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Governm ent declare that they will in no case support the construction of a branch
from Basra (Zobeir), or from any point of the main line of the Bagdad Railway, to
the Persian Gulf unless and until there is complete agreement on the subject between
the Imperial Ottoman Governm ent, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and the
Imperial German Government.
Clause (b). The Im perial German Government declare that they will in no case
themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations whatsoever
to establish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf unless and until there
is complete agreement on the subject between His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
and the Imperial German Governm ent.
Clause (c). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to establish, in Ottoman territory, railway undertakings either in direct
com petition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction with that
com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is complete agreement on the
subject between the Imperial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Governm ent. For the purposes of this article, the western terminus o f the Bagdad
Railway system, as defined in the explanatory note attached to the present Conven­
tion, shall he held to be at Konia and the eastern terminus at Basra.

( 7) [v. supra, pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]

( 8) [In the revised d r a ft o f A p ril 21, clause (c) was in serted as p a rt o f clause (a), cp. G.P.,
X X X V I I (I), p. 425.]
 861
To be put in the explanatory n o t e :
In regard to article 3, clause (c), o f the Anglo-German Convention of
, it is agreed to as follows :—
1. No lines in that part of Asiatic Turkey which, west o f the 36th meridian of
east longitude, lies south of the 34th degree of latitude and or in that part which,
east o f the said m eridian, lies south o f the 31st degree o f latitude, shall be held to
be in direct com petition; but any line north o f these limits shall be held to be in direct
com petition if it establishes direct railway communication between the Mediterranean
and the Persian Gulf.
2. There shall be a protective zone extending for 60 K ilom . on either side of
the lines o f the Bagdad Railway system, and any line passing within the said zone
shall be held to be in direct com petition, provided that in the region between Museyib
and Kurna the protective zone shall be bounded on the east by a line drawn midway
between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, from the latitude of Museyib to Kurna.
3. L ocal lines serving as feeders for the river navigation and not exceeding
100 kilom. in length shall,, provided they do not pass within the protective zone,
not be held to be in direct com petition.
4. The question of whether any other line is or is not in direct com petition
shall, in the event o f failure to reach an agreement, be referred to arbitration in
accordance with article 9 of the said C onvention.(9

A r t ic l e 4.

Clause (a . The Im perial German Governm ent, having cognisance o f the

declaration signed on the 29th July, 1913, on behalf of the Im perial Ottoman
Governm ent, concerning navigation on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, declare that
they will not oppose the execution, nor support any action directed against the
execution, o f such declaration, so long as the navigation on the said rivers is m ain­
tained in substantial accordance with the provisions thereof.
Clause (bb His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Railway interests o f 40 per cent, o f the share
capital to be allotted to Turkish interests at the first allotment (i.e., 20 per cent,
of the whole share-capitall and the right in respect thereof to subscribe for a rateable
proportion of further issues of capital o f the Ottoman Company for river navigation,
and their rateable participation by directors agreeable to the Im perial German
Government in the board o f the aforesaid Company out o f the share o f the directorate
allotted to Turkish interests (i.e ., not more than 20 per cent, of the whole
directorate .
Clause (c).— (i It is. nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall
be held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 o f the Bagdad Railway Convention
of the 5th March. 1903, except in so far that His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
and the Im perial German Government hereby agree and declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to, and will use their best endeavours to secure the
due execution of the following provision of the arrangement referred to in article 2
of the present Convention :—
The Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s rights under article 9 o f the aforesaid
Convention o f the 5th M arch. 1903. shall cease on the com pletion o f the
construction o f the Bagdad Railway to Basra.
(ii His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Im perial German Governm ent
take note o f the contract, signed on the 23rd February, 1914, and form ing annex X o. I
to the present Convention, respecting the conveyance o f railway em ployes and
materials, and, so far as they are concerned, undertake to uphold it.(10)
( 9) [I n th e revised d r a ft o f A p ril 21, th is form ed S ection I I I o f the e x p la n a tory n ote.]
( 10) [rp . supra, pp. 329—13, X o . 202. T h is section (ii) w as o m itted from the revised d ra ft o f
A p ril 21.]
 362

A r t ic l e 5.
Clause (a). The con cession a ire, nominated in pursuance of article 3 o f the
aforesaid declaration of the 29th July, 1913, having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government and the Imperial German Government declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to the said arrangement and will use their best
endeavours to secure its due execution :—
No discrimination shall be permitted by the Ottoman Company for river naviga­
tion, either as regards facilities or rates of charge for the conveyance of like articles
between the same points on account of the ownership, origin, or destination of goods
presented for transport, or in any other manner whatsoever. The Company shall
grant no through bills of lading, rebates, or other privileges of any description in
respect of goods carried by any ship between any place served by the Com pany’ s
vessels and any place oversea, unless the same privileges are accorded in respect of
similar goods carried under the same conditions and in the same direction between
the same places by all ships regularly trading between those places, irrespective of
nationality.
Clause ( b l j 11) His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial German
Government take note of the agreement, signed on the 27th March, 1914, which forms
annex No. I I to the present Convention, and, so far as they are concerned, undertake
to uphold it.

A r t ic l e 6 .

His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial German Government will
join in using their good offices with the Imperial Ottoman Government to secure that
the Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as practicable be brought into and permanently kept
in a satisfactory state of conservancy in order that sea-going vessels may always be
assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall permanently be kept open for sea-going vessels,
and be carried on under conditions of absolute equality for the vessels of all nations,
without regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact of navigation, but only for
administrative charges of the Commission referred to in Article 7 and for repaying
sums actually spent on improvem ents in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed 1 fr. per registered ton (the dues to
cover the com ing in and going out o f the same vessel) except by agreement between
the two G overnm ents; any dues shall be levied on a basis of absolute equality without
regard to the nationality of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 7.

(a) The Im perial German Government having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913, under which the free navigation of the Shatt-el-
Arab is assured on terms of absolute equality to the shipping of all nations and a
com m ission is established for the execution of such works as may be necessary for the
improvem ent of its channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes set
out therein, and being o f opinion that the provisions of the said Convention are
conducive to the best interests of international comm erce, will uphold it so long as
it is not materially altered and so long as the duties imposed upon the Commission
thereunder are satisfactorily carried out.
The Imperial German Government take note in this connection of the declara­
tion, signed on the 21st October, 1913,( 12) and attached to the said Convention, to the

( n ) [cp. supra, p. 343, N o. 213, encl., and n o te (3). T his clause w as o m itted from the revised
d r a ft o f A p ril 21.]
( 12) [t\ supra, p. 242, Ed. ATo fc .]
 363
effect that article 7 and 8 thereof do not affect the rights enjoyed in the Ottoman
Empire by the nationals o f the Treaty Powers.
( b) H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, so far as they are concerned, agree :—
(i) That the German consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with
the Commission on matters within its com p eten ce;
(ii) That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
of the com m erce of the river, and refuse to rem ove the causes of complaint raised by
the German consul, the question at issue shall be referred to an impartial expert, to
be nom inated by agreement between the two members of the Commission and the
German consul, provided that if a similar or analogous complaint is made by any
other consul, he shall participate in the said nom ination; and that, failing unanimous
agreement, H er Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited to designate
the expert referee.
The Governm ent of H is Britannic Majesty will use their good offices with the
Imperial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recom m en­
dations as m ay be made by the expert referee.
To be put in the explanatory note :
In regard to article 7, clause (bC of the Anglo-German Convention of
, it is agreed as follows :—
The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties concerned,
proceed to Basra for the purpose of his enquiry. He shall publish his report within
four months after having received all the necessaiy materials from all the parties,
including both Commissioners, or within four months of his arrival at Basra.
The expenses of enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee, shall be
borne in equal shares b y the Governments concerned. ( 13)

A b t ic l e S .f14)

A r t ic l e 9.

A ny difference of opinion arising out of this Convention shall be submitted to

arbitration. I f the two Governm ents fail to agree about a special Court or arbiter,
the case shall be submitted to The Hague Tribunal.(15)

A r t ic l e 10 .

The Present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged,
within the period of three months from the date of signature.

( 13) [I n the revised d r a ft o f A p ril 21, th is form ed Section I V o f the e x p la n a tory n ote.]
( 14) [I n the revised d r a ft o f A p r il 21, A r ticle S was also le ft b la n k .]
( 15) [T h e revised d r a ft o f A p ril 21 con ta in ed a new A r ticle 9, as fo llo w s : —
“ H is B r ita n n ic M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent and the Im p eria l G erm an G overn m en t take
n ote o f th e a greem en t b etw een the S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y C om p any on the one p a rt and
th e A n a to lia n an d B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p anies on th e oth er p a rt, sign ed on the A p ril,
1914, and fo r m in g a n n ex N o. 1 to th e p resen t C on v en tion , and, so fa r as th ey are concerned ,
un d erta k e to h old it .”
The presen t A r ticle s 9 and 10, becam e A rticles 10, and 11 resp ectiv ely .]
 864
N o. 226.

H err von Kiihlmann to Mr. Parker.

F.O. 14602 4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Private and confidential. 9, Carlton H ouse Terrace, London, S.TP.,
My dear Parker, April 1, 1914.
After mature consideration I com e to the conclusion that I shall recommend to
drop the A rt[icle] 7, as I cannot find a wording which will be acceptable to both
sides. This recomm endation shall encounter formidable resistance at home but I
would feel more confident of the possibility of ultimate success if I could assure them
that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [ov ern m en ]t will not oppose the landing of a Cable
somewhere on the Gulf Coast. You told me you did not deal with that but the matter
is connected and has been mentioned by us right from the beginning of the negotia-
tions.C) I f you could get me that I would put the little weight these long struggles
have left me in the balance for dropping A rt[icle] 7.
Yours very sincerely,
‘ K C IIL M A N N .

M IN U T E S

A r ticle 7 w ill I th in k be d rop p ed or ren d ered harm less w ith ou t this cou n ter concession.
I w ould suggest th a t th e n ote to th e G erm an A m b [a ssa d o ]r (see 4 S 60 4/1 3)(2) should be sent
off (b e in g slig h tly a ltered as P rin ce L icfrnow sky is in cha rge). I f it w ere possib le I should like
to a dd to th e last pa ra g ra p h a sentence a greein g to cod e and cy p h er m essages fo r G erm an
m erchants. B u t this is a fa cility a ga in st w hich possibly ob jection s m ay exist.
As soon as the official letter is sent off I w ill rep ly to H e r r von K iihlm a nn.
I h op e the official letter can g o th is w eek.
A. P .
A p r il 2, 1914.

I f M r. P a r k e r does n ot fea r th a t th e re c e ip t o f th e n ote w ill m ake th e G erm ans m ore

diffim ilt in oth er m a tters, it m ig h t g o forw a rd . I f any a d d ition is to be m ade to th e d r a ft, we
m ust consult th e D e p [a r tm e n ]t s in terested.
G. R . C.
2 .iv .l4 .

L et the n ote g o forw a rd , b u t H e r r von K iih lm a n n w ill have t o be in form ed th a t w e are

op p osed to th e tw o questions b e in g lin ked . I d ou bt w hether a n y th in g w ou ld be g ain ed by the
a d d itio n to th e n ote suggested b y M r. P ark er. In the p a rt of th e note referred to we in v ite
su ggestion s from th e G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t as to th eir requirem ents. T hey can m ention
fa cilitie s fo r cod e and cy p h er m essages as one o f th e ir desid erata. T am not aw are th a t cod e
and cy p h er m essages need be cov ered b y a special assurance, as no difficulties are usually m ade
in a llow in g them to be sent ex ce p t in case o f war, w hen it m ay b ecom e necessary to stop them .
E. A. C.
A p [ r i l] 3.

T he n ote should go forw a rd in the term s agreed upon.

A. N.

0 ) [cp. supra, pp. 165-6, N o. I l l , en cl.]

( 2) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t, and n o te ( ') . ]
 865

N o. 227.
Sir Edward G rey to Prince Lichnow skyfi1)

F.O. 14602/4601 14/44.

Your E xcellency, Foreign Office, April 4, 1914.
Careful consideration has been given to the enquiries contained in the
m emorandum handed to me by Y [o u r ] E /x c e lle n cy ] on the 2nd of Ju n e(2) to the effect
that, as the need m ight arise of establishing direct telegraphic com m unication between
Germany, German East Africa and China, the German Government would welcome a
declaration from His M ajesty’ s Governm ent that they would not oppose in principle
the landing of a German cable on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and an expression
of opinion whether the landing of the cable in Turkish or in Persian territory would
be more favourably considered by H is M ajesty’ s Government.
His Majesty s Government feel that the German Governm ent, in m oving Your
Excellency to make this enquiry, have given friendly recognition of [ s i c : to ] the very
special interest which Great Britain attaches to all questions connected with the Persian
Gulf, and the question has been thoroughly examined in the same amicable spirit, but
His M ajesty’ s Government find themselves constrained, much to their regret, to
maintain the view that the landing of a foreign cable on the shores of the Gulf would
gravely affect the British position in those regions which it has been a cardinal principle
of the well-known foreign policy of this country for over a hundred years to uphold, by
the sacrifice, at times, of m any valuable British lives, and at the cost of continuous
and heavy national expenditure.
H is M ajesty’ s Government have no reason to attribute, and do not attribute, any
political object to the proposal made by the German Governm ent, but this cannot
prevent them from realizing that political considerations of serious import are in fact
involved. It is therefore with the greatest reluctance that they have to state their
inability to favour the German scheme.
At the same time they are most anxious to do all they can to avoid placing
difficulties in the way of the reasonable requirements of German com m erce, and they
will therefore be happy, upon receipt of m ore detailed inform ation as to such require­
ments, to see in what way G erm any’ s needs in respect to greater facilities for
international telegraph com m unications could suitably be met by other arrangements
not open to the same objection.
[ I have, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]

(O [T h is le tte r w as d ra fte d on N ov em b er 19, 1913. and the orig in a l d r a ft a p p ea rs in

F.O. 4 S604'25763 1 3 /4 4. T he on ly su b sta n tia l ch a n g e is th a t in th e o rig in a l d r a ft th e follow in g
sentence a p p ea red at the end o f p a ra g ra p h 2 : “ F rom the sam e p o in t o f view th e la n d in g o f
a fo r e ig n o r foreig n con trolled cable on th e shores o f th e P ersian G u lf w ou ld in the eyes o f
H [ is ] M [a je s t y 's ] G o v e r n m e n t ] so q u ick ly affect th e g en era l situ ation in these reg ion s as to
giv e rise to g ra v e p o litica l ob je ctio n s.” A m a rg in a l n ote on the d r a ft sta tes: “ Sent forw a rd ,
u n d er date A p ril 4, 1914. See p a p er 1 4 6 0 2 /1 4 .” C op ies w ere sent to the A d m ir a lty ; to the
In dia O ffice; to the G eneral P ost O ffice; to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to the
C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D efen ce.]
(2) [P r in c e L ich n ow sk y ’ s n ote w as d a ted M ay 29, 1913. T he actual co m m u n ica tion w as
m ade on J u n e 2. r. su p ra , pp. 165-6, N o. I l l , encl.]
 366
N o. 228.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.ff)

F.O. 9 70 8 /1 6 3 7/14 /4 4 .
(No. 132.)
Sir :— Foreign Office, April 4, 1914.
W hen the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t first agreed with Mr. Ô ’ Beirne to sign the
documents enclosed in Y [o u r] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s despatch No. 55 o f the 2nd ultim o,/2)
it was intimated to him that, in the event of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t con­
cluding any agreement with any other Power (except Turkey) regarding the
Shatt-el-Arab C om m [issio]n, the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t would like to have the
opportunity of considering whether or not they would wish to make a further
agreement of a similar nature with H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov[ern m en ]t.
I now have to request Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] to com m unicate to the Russian
G ov [ern m en ]t, for their strictly confidential inform ation, the accom panying copies
of two articles which are to be embodied in the Anglo-G erm an Convention respecting
the Shatt-el-Arab, the Bagdad Railway and cognate m atters./3)
If the Russian G ov [ern m en ]t are so disposed, H [is ] M fa jesty’ s] G ov[ern m en ]t
would be fully prepared to conclude with them a convention, in terms similar, mutaiis
mutandis, to the enclosed two articles ; but, if such a Convention is concluded between
Great Britain and Russia, I would particularly request that it m ay be signed on or
before the 20th instant.
[I am, Ac.
(for the Secretary of State)
E Y R E A. C R O W E .]

( x) [T h is despatch w as rep ea ted to C on stan tin ople. C opies w ere sen t to the B oa rd of
T ra de; to the In d ia Office.]
(2) [a. supra, pp. 335-6, N o. 205, an d encls.]
(3) [F o r these enclosures v. in fra , pp. 377-9, N o. 236, en d . 1.]

No. 229.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.ff)

F.O. 9 7 0 8 /1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .
(No. 133.)
g ir; Foreign Office, April 4, 1914.
’ W ith reference to my despatch No. 132 o f to-day’s d a te,(2) respecting the draft
Anglo-German Convention, I have to request Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] to inform the
Russian G ov [ern m en ]t that it is also proposed to include in an explanatory note the
following passage :—
In regard to articles 6 and 7 of the said Convention, it is agreed that the
following recommendations shall serve as a basis for the work o f the Commission
1. The Commission to set to work as soon as possible. _ _
2. The Commission to undertake a preliminary survey, during a period of at least
twelve months, before recom m ending any large expenditure on permanent works.
3. The Commission to aim as a first step at a depth of 24 feet at high-water
springs on the bar.
4. The channel of the river below Mohammerah to be buoyed as soon as possible
so as to indicate the position o f a shoal in the river.

(1) [C opies o f this despatch w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice ]

(2) [v. im m ed iately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 3G7

5. Fixed m ooring buoys., allotted as far as possible to the several companies, to

be provided at an early date at Basra.
6. The Commission might with advantage model its arrangements generally upon
the analogy of the Danube Commission, so far as applicable.
[ I am, tic.
(F or the Secretary of State)
E Y E E A. C R O W E .]

[E D . X O T E .— T he follow in g despatch from S ir F . B ertie enclosed an e x tra ct from the

T em ps a n n ou n cin g the in itia llin g o f the F ra n co-T u rk ish agreem ents to w hich referen ce is m ade
supra, pp. 231-3, No. 153, and mins. S ir F . B e r t ie ’ s despatch (X o . 514) o f O ctob er 16, 1913, is
n ot rep rod u ced . It enclosed an e x tra ct from the Jla tin g iv in g a sum m ary o f th e agreem ents
then in n eg otia tion . (F 0 . 47302/25533 1 3 /4 4 ) : —

S ir F . B e r tie to S ir E d w a rd G rey.
F.O . 1 5S 9 4/15894/14 44.
(X o . 194.) P aris, D. A p ril 10, 1914.
Sir, R . A p ril 11. 1914.
I have the h on ou r to tra n sm it to y ou herew ith e x tra cte d from th is e v e n in g ’ s issue o f the
“ T em ps,” th e te x t o f a com m uniqu é a n n ou n cin g th e in itia llin g yesterd ay by th e F ren ch
P resid en t o f the C ouncil, M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs and D ja v id B ey, o f th e F ra n co-T u rk ish
agreem ents in respect o f ra ilw ay con stru ction and p o r t concessions in A s ia tic T u rk ey , w hich
form ed the sub ject o f m y despatch X o. 514 o f th e 16th O ctob er last.
The ra ilw ay concessions gra n ted to F ra n ce u n d er these agreem ents a re th e sam e as those
enum era ted in my despatch above-m entioned, w ith th e a d d ition o f a lin e from R a y a k to R am leh,
h a lf w ay from Jaffa to Jerusalem .
I t is sta ted th a t D ja v id B ey w ill p roceed to C on stan tin ople to-m orrow in ord er to subm it
these a greem ents to the Sultan, and th a t so soon as an Ira d é is issued con firm in g them , w ork
w ill im m ed ia tely be begu n on th e lines.
I have, &c.
(F o r the A m bassador),
G R A N T IL L E .

E nclosu re.

E x tr a c t from the T em ps o f A p ril 11, 1914.

L es A f f a ir e s d ’ O r ie n t : L a c o n c l u s io n des accords franco- tu rcs.

L es a ccord s fra n co-tu rcs visa n t l ’ ém ission d e l’ e m p ru n t tu r c et certain es fa cilité s données

au gou v ern em en t tu r c au poin t de vue finan cier, ainsi q ue les concessions de n a tu re économ iqu e
accordées pa r le gou v ern em en t ottom an à des g rou p es fran çais, ont été p araph és hier par
M D ou m ergu e, président du conseil, m in istre des affaires étra n gères, et pa r D ja v id hey,
m inistre des finances de l’ em p ire ottom an , en présence de M . de M a rg erie, d irecteu r des affaires
politiqu es et com m erciales, ch e f du ca b in et du m in istre, qui a va it été ch a rg é de su iv re les
n ég ociation s avec l’ assistance de M. P on sot, consul de F ra n ce.
D ja v id bey p a rt dem ain p ou r C on stan tin ople, où il sou m ettra ces a ccords à l ’ ira d é du
Sultan.
Com m e le T em ps l’ a an n on cé le 17 octo b re d ern ier, la F ra n ce ob tien t p a r l ’ a ccord
économ iqu e qui v ien t d ’ être con clu les concessions des chem ins de fe r suivantes :

1. D 'u n e v oie ferrée relia n t Sam soun, Sivas, K h a r p o u t et A rgh a n a ;

2. D ’ nne v oie ferrée relia n t A rgh a n a , B itlis et V a n . L a v oie ferrée fran çaise ren con trera
à A rgh a n a la v oie ferrée allem ande A r g h a n a -D ia r b e k ir ;
3. D ’ u ne voie ferrée relia n t T réb izon d e et E rzerou m ;
4. D ’ u ne v oie ferrée relia n t E rzerou m , E rzin g h ia n et S iv a s;
5. D ’ une voie ferrée p a rta n t d ’ un p oin t sur la lig n e S a m sou n -S iva s et a llant à K a stam ou n i.

Les con tra ts con cern a n t toutes ces lignes son t conclus et on n ’ a tten d p ou r com m encer les
tra v a u x que la sign atu re de l ’ irad é du sultan. Ces lignes d oiv en t être achevées dans un délai
de d ix ans.
 868
Enfin, la P o rte aeeorde la concession en Syrie d ’ une v oie ferrée allan t de R a v a k à R am leh,
à m i-eheinin de Jaffa et de Jérusalem . On espère que le G ouvernem ent b rita n n iq u e consentira
éventuellem ent à un em branchem ent a vec le réseau ég yp tien .
La P o rte aeeorde aussi des concessions p ou r les p orts de J affa, Caïffa et T rip oli d ’ Asie sur
la M éd iterra n ée, et pou r les ports d ’ In éboli e t H éraclée sur la m er N oire.]

No. 230.

Prince Licknow sky to Sir Edward G r ey .f 1)

F .O . 17078 '4601 14 44.

V ertraulich!
Euer E xzellenz! London, April 16, 1914.
Die unter dem 31. März d. J s.(2) mitgeteilten Vorschläge der Königlich Gross­
britannischen Regierung über eine deutsch-englische Konvention haben der Kaiser­
lichen Regierung Vorgelegen, und diese ist mit ihnen sachlich im ganzen
einverstanden, wünscht aber noch einige redaktionelle Abänderungen.
1. In der Note Explicative zum Artikel lb des Entwurfes empfiehlt es sich, den
die Kaiserliche Regierung betreffenden Passus folgendermassen zu fassen :

“ Die Kaiserliche Regierung verpflichtet sich der Königlich Gross­

britannischen Regierung gegenüber, ihren Einfluss dahin geltend zu machen,
dass die Deutsche Bank ihre Zusage aufrecht erhält und erfü llt.” (3)

2. Im Artikel 2, letzter Absatz der Klausel a, wäre wohl— in Übereinstimmung

mit Artikel 4 und 5— declaration statt convention zu setzen. (4)
3. Am Schluss der Klausel b des Artikels 4 wird vorgeschlagen, die in Klam mer
gesetzten W orte (i.e. not more than 20 per cent, of the whole directorate)(5) zu
streichen. Die Einschaltung ist sachlich nicht nötig und auch redaktionell insofern
nicht ganz einwandfrei, als sie von der entsprechenden Bestimm ung unter Nr. 6
der zwischen den Interessenten abgeschlossenen Vereinbarung vom 27. März 1914(6)
abweicht. Die deutschen Interessenten wünschen in der Direktion der Schiffahrtsge­
sellschaft zwar nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger als 20 Prozent Beteiligung zu
erhalten, was bei der Fassung der Einschaltung nicht sichergestellt erscheint.
4. Nr. 2 der Klausel c von Artikel 4 und Klausel b von Artikel 5 wären besser
zu streichen. Die dort erwähnten Vereinbarungen sind kaufmännische Privat­
verträge und enthalten interne Abm achungen technischer und finanzieller Natur,
die für die Öffentlichkeit nicht bestimmt sind.Ö) Die Deutsche Bank legt W ert

(*) [C op ies of th is com m u n ica tion w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In dia Office.

F o r H e r r von Z im m erm a n n ’ s in stru ction s on w hich th is letter" was based v. G .P., X X X V I I (I),
pp. 4 21 -2 .]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 359-63, No. 225, en cl.]
(3) [M a rg in a l note b y M r. A. P a r k e r : “ A greed . A. P .” T his and the subsequent m arginal
notes a p p ea r on th e tra n slated version o f P rin ce L ieh n ow sk y’ s letter.]
( 4) [M a r g in a l note by M r. A. P a r k e r : “ N o : ‘ C o n v e n t io n ’ is rig h t. A . P .’ ’ ]
(5) [M a rg in a l n ote by M r. A. P a r k e r : “ W ord s ‘ not m ore t h a n ’ stru ck ou t, b u t the rest
reta in ed by desire o f B [o a r d ] o f T [r a d e ] , A. P .” ]
( 6) [ c p . supra, p. 343, N o. 213, encl., and n o te (3).]
( 7) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. A. P a r k e r : “ A g reed — on con d ition th a t w e m ay refer in the
cov erin g despatch in g en era l term s to the fa ct th a t such a rra n g em en ts have been m ade.
Q [u e r ]v in form L o rd In cheape and M r. L yn ch o f this in w ritin g A. P .” T his was d on e on
A p ril 28, 1914. B oth L o rd In ch ea p e and M r. L yn ch a greed in w ritin g on A p ril 29 th a t
th e details o f the arra n gem en ts con clu d ed w ith th e B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y should be
“ perm an en tly trea ted as con fid en tia l.” (F .O . 17078 ' 4601 / 14 / 44.)]
 369
darauf, dass die Details dieser Abm achungen geheim bleiben. Sollte die Königlich
Grossbritannische Regierung es für nötig erachten, dass die beiden Regierungen von
dem Inhalt der Verträge Akt nehmen und sich deren Aufrechterhaltung zusiehern, so
kann dies durch einen besonderen, nicht zu veröffentlichenden, Notenwechsel
geschehen, zu dem die Kaiserliche Regierung bereit ist.
Was den Artikel 7 (jetzt 8) des Abkomm ens anlangt, so darf ich mir nach
Eingang der in Aussicht gestellten Instruktion weitere Mitteilung ergebenst
Vorbehalten.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung ist bereit, das Abkomm en nach Vollzug der vorge­
schlagenen redaktionellen Änderungen alsbald zu paraphieren. Die Paraphierung der
Abm achungen kann natürlich nur mit dem Vorbehalt geschehen, dass die definitive
Zeichnung und Ratifikation erst erfolgen wird, wenn die zwischen der Kaiserlich
Deutschen Regierung beziehungsweise der Bagdad-Eisenbahngesellschaft und der
Pforte schwebenden Verhandlungen zu einem den deutschen Interessen Rechnung
tragenden Abschluss gelangt sind. Die Kaiserliche Regierung gibt sich der H offnung
hin. dass die Königlich Grossbritannische R egierung ihr zur Erreichung dieses Zieles
nötigenfalls ihre diplomatische Unterstützung leihen w ird .(8)
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
Euerer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
LIC H N O W S K Y .

M IN U T E .

I con su lted the B oa rd o f T ra d e a bou t this and saw H e r r von K ü h ln ia n n on A p r il 21 and

w ent th rou g h the w hole o f the C on v en tion and th e ex p la n a to ry n ote w ith h im and he w ill now
su b m it them to B erlin in the form a greed (cop y a n n ex ed ).( 9) P lea se see m y m a rg in a l m inu tes
on P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s letter.
Q [u e r ]y A c t a ccord in g ly and send to B o a rd o f T ra d e (w ith r e f[e r e n c e ] to N o. 17311)(10)
and to I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ] cop ies o f C on v en tion as revised w ith H e r r v on K üh lm a n n .
See 1 7 8 5 6 .(")
A. P.
A p ril 22, 1914.
G. R . C.
23.iv.14.
E. A. C.
A p [ r i l] 24.

( 8) [M a r g in a l n ote by M r. P a r k e r : “ Q [u e r ]y a gree to this p r o v id e d the G erm an G o v [e rn -

m e n ]t w ill d o likew ise, if necessary, in g e t t in g I ta ly and A u s tria t o a gree to the S h a tt-el-A ra b
C onven tion . A. P .” ]
( 9) [F o r th e d r a ft o f A p ril 21 v. supra, pp. 359-63, N o. 225, encl., and n otes, cp. also in fra ,
pp. 3 70-1, E d . ATo fe .]
( 10) [N o t rep rod u ced . In a letter of A p r il 17, 1914, th e B oa rd o f T ra de sta ted th a t they
“ have no fu r th e r observa tion s to m ake on th e d r a ft [o f the A n g lo-G erm a n C o n v e n tio n ], w hich
a ppears t o offer a sa tisfa ctory settlem en t o f th e v ariou s A n g lo-G erm a n questions t o w hich it
relates.” (F .O . 1 7 3 1 1 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
( n ) [T h is p a p er con ta in s a cop y of the rev ised d r a ft o f A p r il 21, 1914. cp. supra, pp. 358-63,
N o. 225, and encl., and n otes, cp. also in fra , pp. 370 -1 , E d. N o te. (F .O . 1 7 8 5 6 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]

[10900]
 870
N o. 231.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e y .( x)

F .O . 1 70 9 2 /1 6 37 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 92.) St. Petersburgh, April 19, 1914.
Your telegram No. 179 o f 18th A p ril.(2)
Following is text o f revised note which I propose addressing to the Russian
Government, which embodies the notes exchanged on 7th and lo th A pril(3) :—
“ In m y note of 7th April I had the honour to communicate to your
Excellency copies of two articles, Nos. 6 and 7, which are to be embodied in the
A nglo-German Convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab, Bagdad Railway, and
cognate matters, of which the text is as follows (here follows text). In a further
note of the same date I had the honour of inform ing your Excellency that in
regard to the above-mentioned articles it was proposed to include an explanatory
note of the following passage (here follow last seven paragraphs o f your despatch
No. 133!.(4) '
“ The reply which your E xcellency was good enough to address to me on
15th April was to the effect that the Imperial Governm ent, having examined
articles 6 and 7 o f the proposed Anglo-German Convention as well as the points
to be included in the explanatory note to be attached to these articles, were
prepared to adhere to this arrangement.
“ I am accordingly now authorised to inform your Excellency that ITis
M ajesty’ s Government agree to regard the provisions o f the aforesaid articles
as well as the six points comprised in the explanatory note above referred to as
having binding force between His M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial
G overnm ent.’ ’
The Russian Government in their reply will, I gather, take act of my note, and
state that they regard articles 6 and 7, &c., as having binding force between the two
Governm ents. His M ajesty’ s Government will therefore incur no unilateral
obligations. I f you do not consider this sufficient please telegraph how you wish
the Russian reply worded.(s)
C ) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is taken from the C onfidential P rin t, as th e o rig in a l decypher
c a n n ot b e tra ced . C opies w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office.]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G re y ’ s teleg ram (N o. 179) o f A p ril 18, 1914, D. 4 p . m ., is not reprod uced .
In it he asked fo r th e te x t o f the R u ssia n n ote o f A p ril 15, 1911. (F.O . 1 6 7 5 4 /1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
(3) [S ir G. B u ch an a n ’ s note o f A p ril 7 and M . S a zon ov ’ s note o f A p ril 15 are prin ted infra,
p. 380, N o. 236, en d s. 3 and 4 .]
0 ) [p. supra, pp. 366-7, N o. 229.]
(5) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 190) o f A p ril 22, 1914, D . 2-30 p . m ., in stru cted S ir G
B uch an a n to in sert the w ords “ m u ta tis m uta ndis ” b efore th e w ord s “ b in d in g f o r c e ” in th f
final p a ra g ra ph o f his proposed note. (F .O . 1 7 0 9 2 /1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .) cp. infra, pp. 377-9, No. 236,
a n d en d . 1, which gives the full te x t o f the n ote.]

[E D . N O T E .— T here was a revised d r a ft o f the A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion da ted A p ril 21,
1914. cp. supra, pp. 359-63, N o. 225, encl., and notes. I t was orig in a lly draw n up by M r. P a rk er
on A p ril 8 (F .O . 1 5 5 6 8 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 ) and discussed by him w ith H e r r von K iih lm a n n on A p ril 21
(F .O . 17078 / 4601 / 14 / 44). In th e form w hich was a d op ted on th a t day it was tra n sm itted by
P rin ce L iehnow sky to H e r r von Bethm ann H ollw eg on A p ril 22. v. G .P., X X X V I I (I),
pp. 424-5. F or fu rth er referen ce to this d r a ft v. in fra , pp. 372-4, Nos. 2 3 3 -4 ; p. 382, N o. 238.
T h e te x t was follow ed by an E x p la n a to ry note in five sections. T here was also an A n n ex ,—
“ H ea d s o f proposed A g reem en t betw een the O ttom an R a ilw a y from S m yrna to A id in (h erein ­
a fter called “ the ‘ E n g lis h ’ C o m p a n y ” ) an d the A n a tolia n R a ilw a y C om p any and the B a g da d
R a ilw ay C om pany (h erein a fter tog eth er referred to as “ the ‘ G e r m a n ’ C o m p a n ie s ” ).” A note
was added to this A n n ex to th e effect th a t it was “ proposed to su b stitu te the form al agree­
m ent as soon as sign ed fo r the docu m en t.” T he A nnex, w hich was in itia lle d on M arch 28,
1914, rem ained unch an ged in the final te x t o f th e C on ven tion a n d is p rin ted in fra , pp. 404-6.
N o. 249, en d . F o r the d r a ft o f the form al agreem ent v. infra, pp. 382-5, N o. 238, en d .
 371
A com m u n ica tion from P rin ce L ich n ow sk y d a ted M a y 6, 1914, in form ed S ir E d w a rd G rey
th a t the G erm an G overnm ent agreed to the d r a ft o f A p ril 21 “ in the m a in ,” b u t suggested
m odifica tion s in certa in poin ts (F .O . 20527/4601 1 4 /4 4 ). F o r the la te r d r a fts p. in fra , p. 395,
Ed. *Yo£e.]

No. 232.

M inute by Mr. P a rk er.i1}

F .O . 1 78 9 4 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 . F oreign Office, April 22, 1914.

Herr von Kuehlm ann spoke to Sir E . Crowe and me about irrigation works in
Mesopotamia on Saturday. He said the German Government objected to the British
claim that the sections tendered for by British firms alone in 1912 should now be
reserved to British firms, and considered that the principle of open com petition should
apply to all works of irrigation. It was pointed out to H err von Kuehlmann that the
Germans had acquired exclusive irrigation contracts in certain districts around Konia,
and all we asked now was that British firms should not lose what we regarded
practically as a droit acquis in Mesopotam ia, for the said firms had alone tendered
in 1912, and their tenders had only not been accepted because it was inconvenient
at that time for the Ottoman Governm ent to embark upon such expenditure. He
then urged that if the British firms did not get the definite contracts all they could
claim would be compensation for their out o f pocket expenses in tendering in 1912 :
to this we pointed out that the British firms had expended brains as well as m oney
in 1912, and we saw no reason why outsiders should reap the benefit of either to
their detriment. M oreover, the sections tendered for in 1912 were o f relatively small
extent, and only formed about one-third of the W illcocks scheme, which did not by
any means extend to all the regions capable of irrigation. H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent
regarded the British claims to carry out the sections tendered for in 1912 as strong,
and they must be upheld. As for the rest of the work, His M ajesty’ s Government
had themselves proposed to Turkey, who had agreed, that the principle o f open
com petition should apply.
H err von Kuehlm ann then said that he must get something, for his Government
were rather put out about the German cable question, and he thought if he did get
som ething, even though purely form al, it would strengthen his hands in inducing
the German Government to abandon the article we objected to about a railway to
the south of Basra : we pointed out that in any case that article was of recent birth,
and did not entitle the Germans to any quid pro quo if they gave it up : in fact it
seemed to be objectionable from their own point of view as well as from ours. He
persisted that no harm would be done if we said that German firms might have a
minor participation in any contracts or concessions for irrigation we m ight obtain
in M esopotamia, provided the arrangement were mutual. To this Sir E . Crowe
replied that the matter would be considered in consultation with the Board of Trade,
but it would be necessary in any case to stipulate that such participation would only
be admissible if it were considered com m ercially desirable by the firms concerned,
and that H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent could only undertake “ not to o p p o s e ’ ’ it.
W hen H err von Kuehlmann came to see me on the 21st instant we drew up
the annexed article, which I said I would submit to the Board of Trade, in order that
they m ight consider it in consultation with the British firms principally concerned.
I would draw attention to the reference in clause ( b) to the German works o f irrigation
in Asia M inor, and to the first paragraph o f clause (a) which extends the principle
of open com petition to the whole of Asiatic Turkey.
The Board o f Trade are being consulted.
A. P [A R K E R ].

0 ) [T h e te x t g iv en above is taken from the C on fid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l ca n n ot be

tra ce d .]
[10900] 2 B 2
 372
A n n ex.

A r t ic l e

(a) The Imperial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
declare, so far as concerns themselves, that they will uphold the principle of open
com petition in regard to contracts or concessions for the execution of future works
of irrigation in Asiatic Turkey.
The Imperial German Government declare that they will not oppose a minor
British participation in any contracts or concessions which may be allotted to German
subjects, provided such participation is deemed com m ercially desirable by the parties
holding such contracts or concessions.
His Britannic M ajesty’s Government declare that they will not oppose a minor
German participation in any contracts or concessions which may be allotted to British
subjects, provided such participation is deemed com m ercially desirable by the parties
holding such contracts or concessions.
( b) It is expressly agreed that the foregoing clause shall not be held to apply
to those irrigation works already entrusted to German subjects in Asia M inor, or to
those tendered for in Mesopotamia by British firms in 1912.

M IN U T E S .

T he B oa rd o f T ra de have in form ed M r. P a r k e r th a t th ey agree.

G. R . C.
23.iv.14.
E. A. C.
A p [r i l] 24.

H e r r v on K ueh lm a n n to ld m e t o -d a y th a t he w ou ld subm it to his G overn m en t the a rticle

suggested in annexed m inu te, and, if th ey a p p rov ed as he fe lt sure they w ou ld from in stru ction s
he ha d receiv ed, he w ould sub m it it as a proposal from them officially to us. H e said th a t
then the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t w ou ld d rop the a d d ition a l a rticle abou t th e S h a tt-el-A ra b t o
w hich w e had ob jected , and he said th a t in th a t case P rin ce L ich n ow sk y w ould, he th ou g h t,
be in a p o s itio n to in itia l th e d ra ft C o n v e n tio n and e x p la n a to r y n o te w ith S ir E . G rey n e x t
w ee k .(2)
A. P .
A p ril 23, 1914.
G. R . C.
23.iv.14.
W e are g e ttin g on.
E. A. C.
A p [ r i l] 24.
A. N.
( 2) [T h e con v en tion was finally in itia lle d on J u n e 15, cp. in fra, pp. 397-404, No. 249, and
en cl.]

No. 2 3 3 .

Minute by Mr. Parker. ( J)

F .O . 1 78 5 5 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, April 22, 1914.

The following is Article 3, clause (cl of the draft Anglo-G erm an Convention, and
section I II of the explanatory note attached th ereto:—

A r t ic l e 3 .

Clause (c). His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations what-

0 ) [T he t e x t g iv en above is ta ken from the C onfidential P rin t, as th e o rig in a l ca n n ot be

tra ced . C opies w ere sent to H a k k i P a s h a ; to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to C a iro (N o. 1 2 1 ); t o
C on stan tin ople (N o. 238).]
 373
soever to establish, in Ottoman territory, railway undertakings either in direct
com petition with the Bagdad Railway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction with that
com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is complete agreement on the subject
between the Im perial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
For the purposes of this article, the western terminus o f the Bagdad Railway system,
as defined in the explanatory note attached to the present Convention, shall be held
to be at Konia and the eastern terminus at Basra.

S e c t io n I II.
In regard to article 3, clause (c), o f the Convention, it is agreed as follows :—
1. No lines in that part o f Asiatic Turkey which, west o f the 36th meridian of
east longitude, lies south o f the 34tli degree o f latitude a n d /or in that part which,
east o f the said m eridian, lies south of the 31st degree o f latitude, shall be held to
be in direct com petition; but any line north of these limits shall be held to be in direct
com petition if it establishes direct railway com m unication between the Mediterranean
and the Persian Gulf.
2. There shall be a protective zone extending for 60 kilom. on either side of
the lines o f the Bagdad Railway system, and any line passing within the said zone
shall be held to be in direct com petition, provided that in the region between Musevib
and Ivurna the protective zone shall be bounded on the east by a line drawn midway
between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates from the latitude of Museyib to Kurna.
3. Local lines serving as feeders for the river navigation and not exceeding
100 kilom. in length shall, provided they do not pass within the protective zone, not
be held to be in direct com petition.
4. The question of whether any other line is or is not in direct com petition shall,
in the event o f failure to reach an agreem ent, be referred to arbitration in accordance
with article 9 of the said Convention.
A map is annexed for facility of reference^2)
I venture to suggest that the above provisions should be com m unicated officially
to Hakki Pasha, and that his special attention should be drawn to points 1 and 3 of
section I I I o f the explanatory n o t e ; that he should be inform ed that H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent are at present opposed to any railway connection with E gypt, but that,
in the event of this view being modified at some future date, or o f any concessions
being granted for railways to the Persian Gulf south o f the limits indicated in point I ,
H is M ajesty’ s Government rely upon the Ottoman Government granting them only
to a British group agreeable to His M ajesty’ s Governm ent, and only allowing the
construction under conditions acceptable to them ; and that, in view of the fact that
His M ajesty’ s Government have made no small sacrifices in agreeing to article 3,
clause (c), in the desire principally to facilitate the negotiations between Germany
and Turkey, His M ajesty’ s Government would much appreciate a written assurance
on the subject from the Ottoman Governm ent.
I also think Hakki Pasha should be asked to obtain, in favour o f the Ottoman
R iver Navigation Company, an option for ten years, to date from the com pletion
o f the Bagdad Railway to Basra, for short lines o f railway as feeders for the river
navigation.
H is attention might be drawn to the fact that, after the com pletion o f the Bagdad
Railway, the River Navigation Company, in which the Ottoman Governm ent are
important shareholders, will he deprived o f much o f the lucrative through traffic it
will at first enjoy, and will be dependent upon local traffic to a large extent. W e
might specify a line extending for 100 kilometres on either side o f the Tigris, and
joining the river at Kut-el-Am ara, as one line which will probably be eventually
desirable, especially if irrigation work proceeds as rapidly as anticipated.
A. P [A R K E R ].
( 2) [N o t re p ro d u ce d .]
 374

N o. 234.

Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward G r c y .f1)

F .O . 18189 4601 14/44.

Euer E xzellenz! London, April 24, 1914.
Der Entwurf zu einem deutsch-englischen Vertrage vom 21. April 1914(2) enthält
einen neuen Artikel (Artikel 9 . Die Kaiserliche Regierung ist mit diesem grundsätz­
lich einverstanden. Jedoch möchte sie im Hinblick darauf, dass der Abschluss des
endgiltigen Vertrages zwischen der Sm yrna-A idin-B ahn einerseits und der
anabolischen beziehungsweise Bagdadbahn andererseits sich noch einige Zeit
hinziehen kann, vorschlagen, in dem Artikel zu sagen :

. . . . take note of the heads of proposed agreement initialled on March 28,

1914,(3) agree to these heads form ing the basis of an agreement to be concluded
between the English and German Companies concerned, and, so far as they are
concerned, undertake to uphold this agreement when concluded.

Euerer Exzellenz wäre ich für eine geneigte Mitteilung dankbar, ob diese
Fassung des Artikels 9 von der Königlich Grossbritannischen Regierung angenommen
wird.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die E hre zu sein
Euerer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
LTCHNOW SKY.
0 ) [cp. G P ., X X X V I I (I), pp. 4 2 3 -4 .]
(2) [r . supra, p. 363, N o. 225, encl., and n o te ( 15).]
(3) [r . in fra , pp. 404-6, No. 249. encl., A n n ex, v. also G P ., X X X V I I (I), pp. 4 62 -5 .]

No. 235.

Sir Edward G rey to Hakki P a sh a.p )

F.O. 17871 /7 5 G /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, April 25, 1914.

Sir E. Grey presents his com plim ents to Hakki Pasha and has the honour to
state that His M ajesty’ s G ov [ern m en ]t are much concerned by the great delay and
serious difficulties which have supervened in regard to certain important points under
negotiation with His Highness.
Many months ago Sir E. Grey was given to understand that the text of two
articles, regarding irrigation works in Mesopotamia, had been agreed upon, and that
His Highness did not deem it necessary to refer it to Constantinople in view of the
explicit instructions he had already received ; Sir E. Grey now learns that when, after
a considerable lapse of time, His Highness did at length submit the text to the Ottoman
G ov[ern m en ]t, drastic and far reaching alterations were suggested both in the
substance and the wording. A detailed statement on the subject will be furnished to

(*) [C op ies o f this n ote w ere sent t o C o n s ta n tin o p le ; to R om e by post. T here is a m a rgina l
note by M r. Clerk a t the head o f th e d r a f t : “ The d ra ft had been sen t off before it was
su b m itted to the S e c fr e ta r y ] o f S ta te — see m inu tes on 18025 fo r reasons. [G. It. C .] ” In
the m inu tes referred to S ir E. Crowe e x p la in ed th a t he had sent off the n ote as he was “ a little
a fra id o f H a k k i P ash a and S ig n or N og a ra b ein g en g a g ed in m a kin g arra n g em en ts behind our
backs a fter we have w ith g rea t trou b le b rou g h t them to g e th e r.” (F .O . 1 8 0 2 5 /7 5 6 / 1 4 / 44.) On
A p ril 20, 1914, S ir E d w ard G rey w rote a m in u te to the effect th a t he ha d m ade “ a slig h t
a ltera tion in the m e m o r a n d u m ] to be g iv en to H a k k i. E. G .” F o r this a ltera tion v. n o te ( 2).]
 375
Hakki Pasha forthwith, indicating why several of these alterations, more especially
those regarding the mode of selection of the arbitrator and the liabilities of the
contracting firms, are in the view of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov[ern m en ]t very unsatis­
factory : in view of the great and regrettable delay which has already arisen in regard
to this negotiation, Sir E . Grey trusts that Hakki Pasha will be able to obtain by
telegraph the assent of his Government to the proposals about to be submitted to
him,— proposals which are largely based upon the text of the articles as originally
drawn up with H is Highness, while m eeting the requirements of the Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t so far as is com m ercially practicable.
Another negotiation which is causing His M ajesty’ s G o v [e m m e n ]t much
preoccupation is that relating to the S m yrna-A idin Eailwav. This Company represents
one of the most important British interests, and conducts what is admittedly one of
the most efficient railways, in the Ottoman E m p ire ; and the negotiation in London
respecting certain outstanding questions in which it is concerned will, if successful, go
far to justify, in public opinion in this country, the assent o f H [is ] M [a je sty’ s]
G ov [ern m en ]t to the valuable m onopolies and octroi dues desired by the Ottoman
G ov[ern m en ]t. For this reason H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t made the settle­
ment of the Com pany’ s just claims, and the recognition of their legitimate interests,
a principal condition of British assent to the financial measures referred to.
Since negotiations began, however, the com pany’ s interests have been vitally
threatened from two directions, and Sir E . Grey feels compelled to intimate to Hakki
Pasha that, from recent com m unications from C ons[tantino]ple and from the
difficulties experienced by the Company in negotiation, it appears that the Ottoman
G ov[ern m en ]t are far from appreciating the gravity of the situation.
In the first place, the illegal claim against the Company in respect of their
terminal land at Smyrna has been revived, and Sir E. Grey learns that the Com pany’ s
opponents are very active on the subject at Constantinople. Hakki Pasha is fully
aware of the complicated questions involved, and of the justice o f the Com pany’ s
position; legal decisions have been given in their favour, but, by means which H [is ]
M [a jestv’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t prefer not to scrutinise, those decisions have been nullified,
and the judge who fearlessly pronounced a just decision penalised and degraded. The
Sm yrna-A idin Company have thus been exposed during twenty years to futile legal
expenditure and to continual anxiety and insecurity. It is obvious that no railway
can be run if its terminus is subject to illegal confiscation 01* sequestration, or if, in the
alternative, it is liable to unjust claims of the nature in question.
In the circumstances explained, H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t feel bound to
press that an article should be embodied in the new convention with the Company
indem nifying them against any claims in respect of their terminal property, and
making the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t, who are in equity liable in respect o f such claims,
liable in fact.
In the second place, the negotiation respecting the line from Adalia to Buldour
is in a most unsatisfactory condition. H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t hold— and
their opinion is based upon high legal advice and upon the history of the negotiations
of 1906— that, by the terms of the Convention signed in 1906, the S m yrna-A idin
Company have the right to build any line which may be determined upon from Adalia
or a point adjacent thereto, and especially so if the line is built in a northerly direction ;
they hold that the Company are entitled to terms at least equally advantageous as
those which may be offered to third parties. The Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t have asked
the Company, through his Highness Hakki Pasha, to build the lin e; but as it cannot
be built without a guarantee owing to engineering difficulties— and this is the
dominating factor in the situation— the Company could not accede to the request of
the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t, who have persistently shut their eyes to those difficulties,
and thus rendered any useful negotiations impracticable.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the Sm yrna-A idin Company was in a
strong position, His M ajesty’ s G ov [e m m e n ]t, in deference to the wishes of the
Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t, again expressed through His H ighness Hakki Pasha, have
 376
exercised considerable pressure upon the directors, in order to induce tkem (2) to come
to terms with the Italian parties interested in the railway projects in this part o f Asia
Minor. The Company, in deference to the representations of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t], have entered upon a tedious and very costly negotiation with Signor
Nogara, acting on behalf of the Italian syndicate concerned, only to find that here
again the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t is dissatisfied, and desirous o f adopting a different
solution which would afford no advantage or lasting security to the Company.
The facts are clear and may be summarised as follows :—

His M ajesty’ s G ov [ern m en ]t entered upon a negotiation, in return for their

assent to the introduction of m onopolies and the levy of octroi dues, with a view inter
alia to protect the interests of the Sm yrna-A idin Company : Sir E . Grey cannot now
sign any convention agreeing to those measures unless the Com pany’ s vital interests
are protected in fact in the most explicit terms, and are safeguarded in particular both
against unfair legal claims at Smyrna and against the danger of being short-circuited
near Bgldour. The first point, that of the Smyrna terminus, has already been dealt
with. As to the second point, the requirements of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t]
are as follows :—

1) If a line is built from Adalia, or from an adjacent point, in a northerly

direction, the Smyrna Aidin Company should simultaneously build a junction line of
not less than 50 miles in length in a southerly direction, and receive note an under­
taking that a) adequate guarantees for the construction of the junction line will be
provided, b) adequate guarantees will be furnished so as to protect the Company
against the diversion of traffic from its main line east of Karakouyou to Adalia, the
guarantees to be calculated in such a manner as to assure to the Company an agreed
m inimum percentage of profit on its net earnings upon the said section of the main
line, c) the freight charges, agreed upon between the Company and Signor Nogara in
the document already com m unicated to Hakki Pasha are approved by the Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t, d) the arrangements with Signor Nogara as to port facilities and
directorships are approved by the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t.
2) An undertaking from the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t that, failing the fulfilment
o f the conditions enumerated under (1), no line from Adalia, or from any point on the
coast within 100 miles to the west or 30 miles to the east, will be built in a northerly
direction, either now or at any future time.

H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t have carefully discussed the questions involved

with railway experts, and they are satisfied that it is only by an arrangement upon
these lines that the essential interests of the S m yrna-A idin Railway Company can be
fairly safeguarded. They accordingly are obliged to adopt and to adhere to this
attitude.
In conclusion, Sir E. Grey would express to Hakki Pasha the confident hope that
all outstanding negotiations m ay be speedily concluded, and that the Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t may not further delay such a consum m ation by refusing to meet His
M ajesty’ s G ov [ern m en ]t on the above subjects.
E . G [R E Y ].

( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s a ltera tion w as as fo llo w s : “ . . . . h a ve m ade it clear to the

d irectors, th a t it is desirable to . . . .” ]
 877
N o. 236.

Sir G . Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e y .(x)

F .O . 19570 1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .
(No. 122.) St. Petersburgh, D. April 29, 1914.
Sir, E . May 4, 1914.
W ith reference to your despatches Nos. 132 and 133 o f the 4th instant,(2) I
have the honour to enclose copy o f a Note which I handed to-day to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, com m unicating to His E xcellency the text of articles 6 and 7
which are to be embodied in the Anglo-G erm an Convention respecting the Shatt-el-
Arab, the Bagdad Railway and cognate matters, as well as of the six points to be
recorded in the Note explanatory o f that Convention and inform ing him that His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent agree to regard the provisions o f these articles as well as
the six points comprised in the explanatory Note above referred to as having.
mutatis m utandis, binding force between His M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Imperial
Governm ent.
I had explained to M . Sazonow that, in order to give him the original text of
the Articles and points above referred to, I had written m y Note in E nglish instead
of French, and His E xcellency had yesterday consented to send me his reply in
French and not in Russian. To-day how ever, he told me that, in accordance with
international etiquette his reply must be written in R ussian: but he subsequently
agreed to accom pany it with a French Note described as a translation o f the Russian
which he also signed. The latter, which has been compared at this Em bassy with
the original Russian Note, has been found to be accurate in every respect. I am
forwarding both these documents in original.
I have also the honour to enclose copies o f the Notes which I had previously
exchanged with M . Sazonow, to which reference is made in m y Note of the
23rd instant.(3)
I have. &e.
G E O R G E W . B U CH AN AN .

Enclosure 1 in No. 236.

Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonov.(* .

Monsieur le Ministre, St. Petersburgh, April 10 (23), 1914.

In m y Note o f March 25 'A pril 7 I had the honour to com m unicate to Your
E xcellency copies of two Articles, Nos. 6 and 7, which are to be em bodied in the
Anglo-German Convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab, the Bagdad Railway and
cognate matters, o f which the text is as follows :—

A b t ic l e 6.

H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial German Governm ent will
join in using their good offices with the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent to secure that
the Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as practicable be brought into and perm anently kept
in a satisfactory state o f conservancy in order that sea-going vessels may always be
assured of free and easy access to the port o f Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall perm anently be kept open for sea-going vessels,
and be carried on under conditions o f absolute equality for the vessels o f all nations,
without regard either to the nationality o f the vessels or to their cargoes.

0 ) [C op ies o f th is despatch w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the A d m ira lty .]

(2) [r . sup ra , pp. 3 66-7, Nos. 2 2 3 -9 .]
( 3) [F o r referen ce t o th e d r a ft in g o f th is n ote, v. supra, p. 370, N o. 231, and n otes.]
(4) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is ta k en from th a t p reserv ed in the F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (R u ssia N o. 6 5).]
 378
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact o f navigation, but only for
administrative charges o f the Commission referred to in Article 7 and for repaying
sums actually spent on improvements in the navigation o f the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed one franc per registered ton (the dues
to cover the com ing in and going out of the same vessel) except by agreement between
the two G overnm ents; any dues shall be levied on a basis o f absolute equality
without regard to the nationality o f sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 7.

(a) The Imperial German Government having taken note o f the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913,(5) under which the free navigation o f the Shatt-el-
Arab is assured on terms of absolute equality to the shipping of all nations and a
Commission is established for the execution of such works as may be necessary for
the improvement of its channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes
set out therein, and being o f opinion that the provisions of the said Convention are
conducive to the best interests o f international com m erce, will uphold it so long as
it is not materially altered and so long as the duties imposed upon the Commission
thereunder are satisfactorily carried out.
The Imperial German Government take note in this connection of the declaration,
signed on the 21st of October, 1913,(*) and attached to the said Convention, to the
effect that Articles 7 and 8 thereof do not affect the rights enjoyed in the Ottoman
Empire by the nationals of the treaty Powers.
(b') His Britannic M ajesty’ s G overnm ent, so far as they are concerned, agree :—

(I) That the German Consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with
the Commission on matters within its com p etence;
(II) That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
of clie com m erce of the river, and refuse to remove the causes o f complaint raised
by the German Consul, the question at issue shall be referred to an impartial expert,
to be nominated by agreement between the two members o f the Commission and
the German Consul, provided that if a similar or analogous complaint is made by
any other Consul, he shall participate in the said n om ination; and that failing
unanimous agreem ent, H er M ajesty the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited
to designate the expert referee.

The Government of His Britannic M ajesty will use their good offices with the
Imperial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recom ­
mendations as may be made by the expert referee.

To be put in the explanatory n o t e :

In regard to article 7, clause (b), of the Anglo-G erm an Convention of

, it is agreed as follows :—

The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties concerned,
proceed to Basra for the purpose o f his enquiry. He shall publish his report within
four months after having received all the necessary materials from all the parties,
including both Commissioners, or within four months o f his arrival at Basra.
The expenses o f the enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee, shall
be borne in equal shares by the Governm ents concerned.

(5) [v. sup ra , pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]

(*) [r . supra, p. 242, Ed. N o t e .]
 879
In a further Note of the same date I had the honour of inform ing Your Excellency
that, in regard to the above m entioned Articles, it was proposed to include in an
explanatory note the following passage :—
In regard to Articles 6 and 7 o f the said Convention, it is agreed that the
following recomm endations shall serve as a basis for the work of the Commission :—
1. The Commission to set to work as soon as possible.
*2. The Commission to undertake a preliminary survey during a period of at
least twelve months before recomm ending any large expenditure on permanent works.
3. The Commission to aim as a first step at a depth of twenty-four feet at high-
water springs on the bar.
4. The channel o f the river below M ohammerah to he buoyed as soon as possible
so as to indicate the position of a shoal in the river.
5. Fixed m ooring buoys, allotted as far as possible to the several com panies, to
be provided at an early date at Basra.
6. The Commission m ight with advantage m odel its arrangements generally upon
the analog}' of the Danube Commission so.fa r as applicable.

The reply which Your E xcellency was good enough to address to me on the
2 /1 5 April was to the effect that the Im perial Governm ent, having examined
Articles 6 and 7 of the proposed Anglo-G erm an Convention as well as the points
to be included in the explanatory note to be attached to these articles, were prepared
to adhere to this arrangement.
I am accordingly now authorized to inform Your E xcellency that H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent agree to regard the provisions of the aforesaid Articles as well as the
six points com prised in the explanatory note above referred to as having, mutatis
mutandis, binding force between His M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the Im perial
Government.
I avail, Ac.
G E O R G E W . BUCH AN AN .

Enclosure 2 in No. 236.

M. Sazonov to Sir G. B uchanan.(7)
(Traduction.)
M. l ’ Ambassadeur, S aint-Pétersbourg, le 16 (29) avril, 1914.
Par Sa note en date du avril c[o u ra n ]t, Votre Excellence a bien voulu
me com m uniquer le teneur des a rt[icles] 6 et 7 qui seront incorporés dans la
Convention Anglo-Allem ande au sujet du Chatt-el-Arab, du chemin de fer de Bagdad
et d ’ autres questions qui s ’ y rattachent. Vous m ’ avez également fait tenir un extrait
d ’un projet de note explicative au sujet de l ’ a rt[icle] 7, clause b, de ladite Conven­
tion, comprenant un préambule et six clauses qui com plètent le sens de l ’ article en
question.
E n même temps Vous avez bien voulu m ’ inform er de ce que le Gouvernement
Britannique consent à considérer la teneur des deux articles ci dessus m entionnés
ainsi que des six clauses de la note explicative com m e ayant, mutatis mutandis, force
d ’ un arrangement entre les Gouvernements Britannique et i m p é r i a l .
De mon côté j ’ ai l ’ honneur de Vous faire savoir qu ’ ayant accepté la proposition
du Gouvernement Britannique d ’ adhérer aux deux articles susmentionnés de la
Convention Anglo-Allem ande et aux six clauses de la note explicative ci dessus
mentionnés tels qu’ ils sont exposés dans Votre note du 10 23 avril c [o u ra n ]t, le
Gouvernement i m p é r i a l consent à son tour à considérer com m e obligatoire pour
lui le teneur desdits articles et clauses.
Veuillez. &c.
SAZON OF.
( 7) [T h e t e x t here g iv en is ta k en from th a t preserv ed in th e F o re ig n Office series o f O rigin a l
T rea ties (R u ssia X o . 6 5).]
 380
E n clos u re 3 in N o. 23G.
M. Sazonov to Sir G. Buchanan.

Monsieur l ’ Ambassadeur, Saint-Pétersbourg, le 2 (15) avril, 1914.

En réponse à vos Notes en date du 7 avril/25 Mars a [n n é e ] c[ou ra n te], au '
sujet de la Commission de Navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arabe j ’ ai l ’ honneur de porter à
Votre connaissance qu ’ ayant examiné les articles G et 7 de la Convention Anglo-
Allem ande projetée, ainsi que les points 1-G qui seront inclus dans la note explicative
dont cette convention sera accom pagnée, le Gouvernement Impérial se déclare prêt
à adhérer à cet arrangement.
Un échange de notes supplémentaires pourrait avoir lieu à cet effet entre le
Ministère Im périal et l ’ Ambassade Britannique.
Veuillez, Ac.
SAZONOF.

Enclosure 4 in No. 23G.

Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonov.

Monsieur le Ministre, St. Petersburgh, March 25 (April 7), 1914.
W ith reference to my Note of to-day’ s date, respecting the draft Anglo-German
Convention, I have the honour to inform Your E xcellency that His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment also propose to include in an explanatory note the following passage :—
“ In regard to Articles G and 7 of the said Convention, it is agreed that the
following recommendations shall serve as a basis for the work o f the
Commission :■—
1. The Commission to set to work as soon as possible.
2. The Commission to undertake a preliminary survey during a period
of at least twelve m onths, before recom m ending any large expenditure
on permanent works.
3. The Commission to aim as a first step at a depth o f twenty-four feet at
high-water springs on the bar.
4. The channel of the river below Mohammerah to be buoyed as soon
as possible, so as to indicate the position o f a shoal in the river.
5. Fixed m ooring buoys, allotted as far as possible to the several
companies, to be provided at an early date at Basra.
G. The Commission might with advantage model its arrangements
generally upon the analogy o f the Danube Commission, so far as
applicable.”
[I avail, A c.]
G E O B G E W . BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 5 in No. 23G.

Sir G. Buchanan to M. Sazonov.

Monsieur le Ministre, St. Petersburgh, March 25 (April 7), 1914.
W hen the Bussian Governm ent first agreed to the exchange of Notes respecting
the Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission it was intimated to Mr. O ’ Beirne that, in
the" event of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent concluding any agreement with any other
Power (except Turkey') regarding the Shatt-el-Arab Commission, the Russian Govern­
ment would like to have the opportunity of considering whether or not they would
wish to make a further agreement o f a similar nature with His M ajesty’s Governm ent.
I have now been instructed to communicate to your E xcellency, for the strictly
confidential inform ation of the Im perial Governm ent, the accom panying copies of
 381
two Articles which are to be embodied in the Anglo-G erm an Convention respecting
the Shatt-el-Arab, the Bagdad Bailway and cognate matters.
In com m unicating the above docum ents, I am to state that, if the Russian
Governm ent are so disposed, His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would be fully prepared to
conclude with them a Convention in terms similar, mutatis mutandis, to the enclosed
two Articles. In conclusion, I am to add that, if the Im perial Governm ent are
desirous to conclude such a Convention, Sir Edward Grey is particularly anxious that
it should be signed not later than the 20th instant (n .s.).
I avail. &c.
G E O B G E W . BUCH AN AN .

M IN U T E S .

I th in k w e should now offer the F ren ch G o v [e r n m e n ]t a sim ilar ex ch a n g e o f n o te s : and,

as a m a tter o f form , (as th ere are now no A u stria n ships g o in g to th e P [e r s ia n ] G u lf)
com m u n ica te th e S h a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion betw een G rea t B r it a in and T u rk ey to A u s tria and
express th e h op e th a t, if any A u s tria n ships should go, th ere w ill be no o b jection s raised to
the levy o f dues etc., and th a t A u stria w ill ta k e note o f the C onvention.
I th in k th e m om ent is not o p p o rtu n e fo r a p p roa ch in g Ita ly (see p a p er 24S25)(8) and th a t
we had b e tte r w ait.
A. P .
M a y 15, 1914.

I agree.
E. A . C.
M a y 15.
See d r a fts to P a r is (9) and Y ie n n a (10) herew ith.

( 8) [T h e com m u n ica tion to Ita ly w as finally m ade as th e result o f S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s

despatch (N o. 160) to S ir R . R o d d o f J u n e 2, 1914, w hich in stru cted him to com m u n ica te to the
Ita lia n G overn m en t th e substance o f th e d espa tch o f M a y 18 to V ien n a, cp. in fra , n o te ( i0).
(F .O . 2 4 3 2 5 /1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
( 9) [ V:, in fra , pp . 339-92, N o. 243, and en cl.]
( 10) [N o t rep rod u ced as the substance is g iv e n in th e above m inu te. A letter in these term s
was sent to C ount M en sdorff on M ay 18, en closin g a co p y o f the S h a tt-el-A ra b C onven tion .
A cop v o f th e letter an d en closure was sent to V ien n a (as N o. 73) on the sam e day. (F .O . 19570/
1 6 3 7 /1 4 /4 4 .)]

No. 237.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich n ow sk y.p )

F.O. 1 7 0 7 8 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
Immediate and Confidential.
Your Serene Highness, F oreign Office, M ay 1, 1914.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Y [o u r] S [eren e] H [ig h n e s s ]’ s
note of the 16th ultim o(2) resp [ectin ]g certain clauses o f the draft Anglo-G erm an
Convention concerning the Bagdad R [a i ] l [ w a ]y and cognate matters.
As Y [o u r ] S [eren e] H [igh n ess] is aware, these points have been discussed with
H err von Kuhlmann and a revised draft, dated April 2 1,(3) com m [u n ica te]d to him.
As regards point 1, H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] agree.
As regards point 2, the word “ convention ” in article 2 is correct.
As regards point 3, H [is ] M fa jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] trust that the views of the
German G ov [ern m en ]t will be met by deletion only of the words “ not more than.”
As regards point 4, H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] agree to the procedure

0 ) [C op ies o f th is letter w ere sent in d r a ft to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice; to

L ord I n c h c a p e ; to M r. L y n ch .]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 368-9, N o. 230.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 359-63, N o. 225, encl., and n o te s ; pp . 370-1, Ed. N o te .]
 382
proposed, provided that reference m ay be made in general terms, in the covering
despatch to be published with the Convention and in the course of debate in
Parliament, to the fact that such arrangements have been made with Lord Inchcape
and Mr. Lynch, who have now been inform ed of the wishes of the Deutsche Bank
re sp [e ctin ]g the secrecy to be maintained as to details.
I note that Y [o u r ] S [eren e] H [igh n ess] will make a further comm[unicatio"|n
in respect to the article specified in the penultimate paragraph of your note : Herr von
Kuhlm ann has already been fully apprised of the strong objections entertained by
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] in respect of that Article.
In regard to the last sentence of Y [o u r ] S [eren e] H [ig h n e ss ]'s note, I have to
state that I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] will be happy, if necessary, to afford the
German G ov [ern m en ]t so far as they properly can the support desired. H [is ]
M [a je stv ’ s] G [ov ern m en t], on their part, trust that the German G ov [ern m en ]t will,
if necessary, afford them similar support in securing in due course the grant by the
Ottoman G ov fern m en jt to British interests of short lines to act as feeders for the river
n a vig [a tio]n in Mesopotamia.
[ I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 238.

Sir Edicard G rey to Prince Lichnotcsky.

F. 0 . 1 81 8 9 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
Im mediate.
Your Serene Highness :—• Foreign Office, May 1, 1914.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Serene H ighness’ note of
the 24th A p rilf1) in which you intimate that the German G ov [ern m en ]t agree
in principle to article 9 of the draft, dated April 21,(2) of the proposed Anglo-German
C onven tion; but, in view o f the fact that there may be a little delay in concluding the
definitive agreement between the S m yrna-A idin C o[m p any] and the Anatolian and
Bagdad R [a i]l[w a ]y Companies, you add that the German G ov [ern m en ]t would
prefer a modification in the wording.
In reply, I have the honour to transmit herewith, in triplicate, the draft of the
definitive agreement in question and, as there are few if any points of divergence
likely to arise, H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s] G [overnm ent] trust that it m ay be possible to sign
it forthwith.
It would in any case be desirable, in the opinion of H [is ] M [a je sty’ s]
G [ov ern m en t], to attach either the “ proposed heads of agreem ent,” or the definitive
agreement, to the Convention as an annex, as there are technical objections to laying
before Parliament a Convention in which reference is made to another document not
simultaneously published.
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overnm ent] would accordingly prefer to adhere to the
wording already suggested by them for article 9.
[ I have, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]
Enclosure in No. 238.

Draft A greem ent.

An agreement made the day of 1914 between the
Ottoman Railway Company (hereinafter called “ the English C om p a n y ” ) of the one
part and the Anatolian Railway Company and the Bagdad Railway Company

0 ) [v. supra, p. 374, N o. 234.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 363, N o. 225, encl., and n ote ( 15).]
 383
(hereinafter called “ the German C om p anies” ) of the other part W hereas the
English Company and the German Companies are the Owners of certain railways
within the dom inions of the Ottoman Government And whereas the parties hereto
have agreed to enter into the Agreements and stipulations hereinafter contained Now
these Presents witness that it is hereby m utually agreed between the parties hereto
as fo llo w s:—
A r t ic l e 1.

The E nglish Company and the German Companies will in Co-operation use their
best endeavours to procure that the Ottoman Government
1. Shall grant to the English Company a concession to construct a railway from
Karakouyou to Sanduklv with the right for a period of ten years from the date of the
signing of the said concession by the Ottoman Government to construct an extension
of the said railway so as to form a junction with the railways of the German
Companies at Afion Karahissar.
2 . Shall grant to the English Company a concession to construct a railway from
a point on the east shore of Lake Eghirdir to a point on the north or north-west shore
of Lake Beyshehir north of the latitude of Kazak Adassy.
3 . Shall grant to the group which has undertaken the irrigation of the Plain of
K onia a concession to construct a narrow gauge local railway, laid so far as possible
along the irrigation dams, com m encing at Tchoum ra by a junction with the railway
of the Bagdad Railway Company and term inating at Beyshehir which said local
railway shall when constructed be worked b y the Bagdad Railway Company.
4. Shall grant to the English Company the right to navigate Lake Eghirdir.
5. Shall grant to the English Company and to the German Companies upon and
subject to the same terms conditions and stipulations in each case the right to
navigate Lake Beyshehir so as not to impede interfere with or diminish any rights
powers or privileges enjoyed at the date o f the said grant in connection with the
irrigation works deriving a supply of water from Lake Beyshehir.
6. Shall, in the event of the construction of a railway from Sanduklv to a
junction with the railways of the German Companies at Afion Karahissar, give such
guarantees to the English Company and the German Companies or either o f them as
m ay be desired by them for the protection of either or both of them by reason of the
loss of or diversion of traffic from their respective railways by such railway and shall
waive or m odify in such manner and to such extent as may be desired by the German
Companies the counter guarantee given by the German Companies in respect of traffic
passing over the railway of the German Companies between Eskishehir and Konia.

A r t ic l e 2.

The German Companies will not at any time offer any opposition direct or
indirect to the construction by the English Company of a railway from Sanduklv to
a junction with the railways of the German Companies at Afion Karahissar.

A r t ic l e 3.

The German Companies will in the event of the construction of a railway from
Sanduklv to a junction with the railways of the German Companies at Afion
Karahissar by the English Company the Ottoman Government or any other person
or persons whatsoever enter into an Agreem ent with the English Companies which
shall provide
(a) That the rates to be charged and the facilities to be afforded for the
conveyance of traffic to and from all seaports from and to Afion Karahissar
shall be the same under similar conditions and shall be determined by
agreement between the parties hereto
 884
(b) That the English Company and the German Companies shall afford to one
another all due and reasonable facilities for the receipt forwarding
conveyance and delivery of traffic of every description passing or desirous
of passing over such railway from or to places on their respective railways
or beyond.
A r t i c l e 4.

In the event of the English Company not having constructed the extension of
the railway referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 1 hereof within the period of ten years
referred to therein and declining thereafter upon the request of the Ottoman Govern­
ment to construct such extension the Ottoman Government may itself construct such
extension and in such case the English Company and the German Companies will
co-operate to secure that the Ottoman Government shall indem nify the English
Company for any loss or diversion of trafficsustained by the English Company by
reason of the construction of and the working of traffic over such extension.

A r t i c l e 5.

The railway referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 1 hereof will not be constructed

south of the latitude of Kazak Adassy or to any point on the east shore of
Lake Beyshehir and will not be constructed along or parallel to the north shore of
Lake Beyshehir except in so far as it may be necessary in order to provide a convenient
terminus on the said Lake for the purposes of such railway and the traffic to be served
thereby. . .
The railway referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 1 hereof will not be constructed
north of the latitude of the town of Beyshehir or parallel to the south shore of Lake
Beyshehir. .
Provided nevertheless that the English Company and the German Companies
m ay by agreement but not otherwise respectively construct extensions of the railways
referred to herein so as to effect a junction between such railways at Munafer.

A r t ic l e 6.

The rates and charges to be taken, the regulations to be made, and the facilities
to be afforded for the receipt conveyance forwarding storing warehousing and delivery
of traffic on or over Lake Beyshehir by the English Company and the German
Companies respectively will be the same under similar conditions and will be fixed
and determined from "time to time by agreement between the parties hereto.

A r t ic l e 7.

The rates to be charged and the facilities to be afforded for traffic to and from all
seaports from and to the termini on Lake Beyshehir of the English Company and the
German Companies will be the same under similar conditions and will be fixed and
determined from time to tim e by agreement between the parties hereto.

A r t i c l e 8.

A ny dispute or difference which may arise under this agreement or as to the

rights duties and obligations of the English Company or the German Companies in
respect of the matters referred to in this Agreement will be determined by an
impartial referee to be appointed by agreement or failing agreement by H er Majesty
the Queen of the Netherlands or her successor and the decision of such referee shall
notwithstanding any law or custom whatsoever be final and binding upon the parties.

A r t i c l e 9.
This agreement will be laid before the duly appointed representatives of the
British and German Governments who will be invited to take official note thereof.
 8S5

The aforesaid Governments will be invited so far as they are each concerned to
undertake to uphold individually and collectively this agreement and to use their best
endeavours in order that the terms thereof may be punctually and faithfully complied
with.

No. 239.

Sir E duard G rey to H akki Pasha. (*)

F.O . 17855; 4 60 1 /1 4 /4 4 . Foreign Office, May 4, 1914.

Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to Hakki Pasha and has the honour to
communicate to H [is ] H [igh n ess] herewith the text of article 3, clause /c), of the
draft Anglo-German Agreement respecting the Bagdad Railway and cognate matters,
and section III of the explanatory note to be annexed to the convention. 2)
Hakki Pasha is aware that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m eu ]t are at present
opposed to any railway connection with E gypt from the east, but. iu the event of
this view being modified at some future date, or of any concessions being granted
for railways to the Persian Gulf south o f the limits indicated in point 1 of the
explanatory note, section I I I , H [is ] M [a je s ty 's] G ov [ern m en ]t rely upon the
Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t, in view o f the cordial relation existing between the two
Powers, granting them only to a British group agreeable to H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G ov [ern m en ]t, and only allowing the construction under conditions acceptable to
them. H aving regard to the fact that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t have made
no small sacrifices in agreeing to article 3, clause (c , of the above-m entioned
Convention, in the desire principally to facilitate the negotiations between Germany
and Turkey, they would m uch appreciate a written assurance on the subject from
the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t.
Sir E . Grey would also draw the attention o f Hakki Pasha to the fact that,
after the com pletion o f the Bagdad R [a i ] l [ w a ]y , the R iver Navigation Company, in
which the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t are important shareholders, will be deprived of
much o f the lucrative through traffic it will at first enjoy, and will to a large extent
be dependent upon local traffic. In these circumstances. H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s] G ov[ern-
m en]t trust that the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t will grant, in favour of the Navigation
Company, an option for ten years, to date from the com pletion of the Bagdad
R [ a i] l[ w a ] y to Basra, for concessions for short lines of railway as feeders for the
river navigation: such feeders m ay be a large source of income to the Navigation
Company, especially if irrigation work proceeds as rapidly as anticipated in
Mesopotamia, and Sir E . Grey would specify a line extending for 100 kilometres on
either side of the Tigris, and joining the river at Kut-el-Am ara, as one line which
will probably eventually be desirable.

0 ) [T h is letter was d r a fte d b y M r. P a rk er. A cop y w as sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) [T h is enclosure is p rin ted in M r. P a r k e r ’ s m in u te of A p ril 22, 1914, r. sv p ra , pp. 372-3,
N o. 233.]

[10900]
 886
N o. 240.
Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward, G rey.Q )

Constantinople, May 5, 1914.

F.O. 2 0 0 4 9 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 . D .'4 -3 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 278.) K. 5 -45 p . m .
President o f the Council o f State told me last night pnrport o f instructions to
Hakki Pasha :—
1. If the line from Adalia is ever constructed, Government will give a guarantee
to British company provided a maximum is fixed. There is great opposition to
kilometric guarantee, which they had never any intention of giving to Italians, and
which they did not think British com pany would demand, as they had never asked
for one before.
I had much difficulty in persuading President o f the Council o f State to give
way, and I therefore hope that a maximum will be agreed to.
2. As regards site of station, they are anxious to meet your wishes, and fully
realise that it will be impossible for com pany to continue in uncertainty as to tenure
of this part o f their land.
They entirely deny, however, that land in dispute is land which was originally
accorded to this com pany by Governm ent, and Ostrorog, who called to see me, says
there are documents in Ministry o f Public W orks proving that com pany originally
recognised validity o f claim by offering to pay for land. Ostrorog is of course
retained by the other side. I am sending by post a m em orandum (2) of merits of the
case, so far as ascertainable here, but it does not appear to be so clear and indisputable
as com pany maintain.
Government now offer arbitration, the tribunal to consist o f one Ottoman and
one British member and a British umpire. President o f the Council of State said
he hoped that this offer would show desire o f the Government to settle question and
their confidence in British impartiality.
I f you thought it right to recomm end to com pany to accept arbitration they
would, I suppose, make conditions that in case of losing they would not he dispossessed
o f land and that present value of land should not be basis o f compensation.
3. Irrigation. Hakki Pasha is instructed to report what are requirements of
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
4. Pecuniary claims. They cannot place deposit in bank or give debt guarantees,
and declare that a written undertaking to pay should be sufficient as between
Governm ents. It is partly a question o f am our-propre, and I could not induce Djavid
B ey, to whom I have also spoken, to give way. I told him . as Russian claims were
actuallv being paid, I thought it strange that he should refuse us this, hut he said
that they have not got 250.0001. to put in the bank. Tie offers to pay British
claimants on the same terms as Russians. I believe Hakki is told to offer 75,000/.
in full settlement.
I have said, speaking personally, that, even if this method o f settlement were
approved by you, that sum would not be sufficient and that it would be difficult in
any case for His M ajesty’ s Government to apportion the m oney, which ought to be
done by negotiation between Finance Ministry and claimants.
My view is that, unless lump sum offered were equivalent to whole non-conten-
tious claims and to a substantial percentage o f others, proposal would be impracticable.
In view of strong attitude taken up by Minister we might waive question of deposit
and be satisfied with undertaking that sums awarded will be paid to His M ajesty’ s
Government within a fixed period of months with proviso thattotal sum should carry
interest at a certain rate for any time after expiration of thatperiod.
( ‘ ) [T h e tex t g iven above is ta ken from th e C onfid en tial P rin t, as the o rig in a l decypher
ca n n ot be tra ced .]
( 2) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 387

W ith regard to missionary institutions, President o f Council of State said that

Turkish Governm ent could not admit that favoured-nation treatment extended to
institutions. I replied that such a contention was one which His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment could never accept. H e said that in fact Ottoman Government were quite ready
to give to H is M ajesty’ s Government what they had accorded to France, but they
did not want to say in convention that they were according m ost-favoured-nation
treatment. I do not think that they would hold out about this if pressed, but if
you wished to meet them , and provided that our treaty rights were safeguarded, I
see no strong reason for insisting.
I did not discuss these questions at length in view of your telegram No. 216
of 1st M ay,(3) and of difficulty of carrying on negotiations in two places, but I
promised to telegraph to you m y impressions o f proposal, which Grand Vizier specially
wished me to do.
I am convinced that Turkish Governm ent wish to settle everything without delay,
and that if you can meet their wishes on some points they will not make difficulties.

(3) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ra m (X o . 2161 to S ir L. M allet o f M a y 1, 1914, D. 6-20 p . m ., is

not rep rod u ced . In it he sta ted th a t “ H a k k i P asha . . . . has asked, as he is ha m pered and
em barrassed b y con cu rren t discussions o f his G overnm ent at C on stan tin op le th a t, fo r the
present, n e g otia tion s m a y so fa r as possible be con d u cted th rou g h him . H e is now m ost
co n cilia tory a n d I am an xiou s th a t he should be hum oured so fa r as possib le.............. ”
rF.O. 1 9 1 2 4 '7 5 6 .14 4 4 .']

No. 241.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L. Mallet.

F.O. 20049 7 5 6 '1 4 '4 4 .

Tel. (No. 219.1 F oreign Office, M ay 7, 1914, 2 -3 0 p . m .
Your telegram No. 278.f 1)
An agreement will be initialled ad r e fe r e n d u m ] to-morrow by Hakki Pasha and
Lord Rathm ore and taken to C on s[ta n tin o]pie by Mouktar B ey who arrives on
May 12 :
1. The com pany have never pressed for kilometric guarantees and do not now
insist upon formal guarantees as a satisfactory com prom ise has been proposed by
Hakki Pasha and accepted by the C o[m p a n y ].
2. As regards terminal land, com pany have produced for first tim e original
plan, which Hakki Pasha recognises as irrefutable evidence in their favour and covers
all propertv hitherto in dispute : this will now be protected bv draft article accepted
by Hakki. ‘
Company and their legal advisers view with grave suspicion proposal for
arbitration and attribute it to Count Ostrorog’ s influence : it would afford no legal
finality and might even lead to fresh claims.
Copy o f initialled agreement goes to Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] by post.(2)
I will await Hakki Pasha’ s com m [u n ica tio]n as to claims.
f 1) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G re y ’ s despatch (X o . 286) t o S ir L . M a llet o f M a y 8, 1914, enclosed the
tex t o f the a greem en t b etw een H a k k i Pasha an d L ord R a th m ore, C hairm an o f th e S m y rn a -
A id in R a ilw a y C om pany. It was in itia lled at L on d on on M a y 7. (F .O . 20441 756 14 44.) I t
is not rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s o f sp ace.]

[10900] 2 C 2
 388
N o. 242.

Prince Lichnoirsky to Sir Edward G re y.(l)

F.O. 2 1 0 6 9 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
E uer E xzellenz! London, May 9, 1914.
Ueber die Frage der Vergebung von Bewässerungsarbeiten beehre ich mich
Euerer Exzellenz erhaltenem Aufträge zufolge das Nachstehende mitzuteilen :
Die Kaiserliche Regierung legt den grössten W ert darauf, dass zur Vermeidung
von späteren Missverständnissen für die Bewässerungsarbeiten in Mesopotamien der
Grundsatz öffentlicher Ausschreibung festgehalten werde und würde es zugleich
begrüssen, falls durch entsprechende Bestimm ungen ein ällzuscharfer W ettbewerb
verhindert werden könnte, welcher unter Umständen für die allgemeinen Beziehungen
unerwünschte Folgen haben könnte. Die Kaiserliche Regierung schlägt daher für
die Regelung der obenbezeichneten Frage nachstehende Fassung vor :
“ His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Im perial German Government
will join in using their good offices with the Imperial Ottoman Government to secure
that the principle of open com petition in regard to contracts or concessions for the
execution of future works of irrigation in Mesopotamia shall be upheld.
The Imperial German Governm ent declare that they will not oppose a minor
British participation in any contracts or concessions which may be allotted to German
subjects, provided such participation is deemed com m ercially desirable by the parties
holding such contracts or concessions.
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not oppose a minor
German participation in any contracts or concessions which may be allotted to British
subjects, provided such participation is deemed com m ercially desirable by the parties
holding such contracts or concessions.”
An sich hätte es die Kaiserliche Regierung vorgezogen, die Vereinbarung über
die Bewässerungsfrage in einen besonderen Notenwechsel zu verweisen, sie ist jedoch,
falls dies dem W unsche Euerer Exzellenz entspräche, auch bereit zuzustimmen, dass
die vorstehenden Grundsätze in den Bagdadbahnvertrag aufgenomm en werden.
Ferner schlägt die Kaiserliche Regierung nachstehenden Notenwechsel vor :
“ Die Kaiserliche Regierung wird keinen W iderstand dagegen erheben, dass
diejenigen Bewässerungsarbeiten in Mesopotamien, für welche bereits eine öffentliche
Ausschreibung erfolgt und die Frist für Angebote abgelaufen ist, ohne dass andere
als englische Firm en detaillierte und nach den Submissionsbedingungen zuschlags­
berechtigte Offerten eingereicht haben, den englischen Unternehmern von der Pforte
endgültig übertragen werden, auch wird sie konkurrierende Bestrebungen deutscher
Staatsangehöriger nicht unterstützen.”
“ Die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung wird die Kaiserliche Regierung
mit einem authentischen Verzeichnis versehen, in welchem die Zahl und der Umfang
der unter Vorstehendem in Anspruch genom m enen Bewässerungsarbeiten genau
wiedergegeben sind.”
“ Die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung wird keinen Widerstand dagegen
erheben, dass die Bewässerung von Adana, für die auf Grund von Verträgen mit der
Türkischen Regierung deutsche Staatsangehörige bereits bedeutende Vorarbeiten
geleistet haben, den deutschen Unternehmern von der Pforte endgültig übertragen
werden. Auch wird sie konkurrierende Bestrebungen englischer Staatsangehöriger
nicht unterstützen.”
Stimmt die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung den im Vorgehenden
gem achten Vorschlägen zu, so würde die Kaiserliche Regierung als besonderen Beweis
ihres Wunsches Euer Exzellenz entgegenzukom m en auf die Einfügung des
Artikels 7 (8) des Entwurfs für ein Abkommen über die Bagdadbahn verzichten,

i 1) [C opies o f this letter w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia Office.]

 3S9
nachdem die bisherigen Verhandlungen ergeben haben, dass dieser Artikel zu
erheblichen Schwierigkeiten Anlass gegeben hätte.
Die Kaiserliche Eegierung kann sich zu diesem Verzichte nur unter erheblichen
Bedenken entschliessen und tut diesen Schritt nur in der festen Zuversicht, dass,
falls durch unvorhergesehene Naturereignisse die Schiffbarkeit des Schatt-el-Arab
schwer beeinträchtigt oder Basra für Seeschiffe unzugänglich werden sollte, die
Königlich Grossbritannische Eegierung zusammen mit der Deutschen Eegierung für
die dem Geiste des Abkommens und der Lage entsprechenden Massregeln eintreten
wird.
Im Falle der Annahm e der vorstehenden Vorschläge der Kaiserlichen Eegierung
dürfte über alle Punkte des geplanten Abkommens vollkommene Ü bereinstim mung
hergestellt worden sein und ich wäre Euer Exzellenz für eine sehr gefällige Mitteilung
dankbar, zu welchem Zeitpunkt der Paraphierung des Vertrags» ntwurfs entgtgen-
gesehen werden kann.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
E uer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
LICH N OW S IvY.
M IN U T E .

I have ha d a p riv a te le tte r from H e r r v on K ü h lm a n n ex pressin g the earn est h op e th a t we

w ill a gree to this w ord in g and p roced u re as reg a rd s ir rig a tio n .
See a n n exed dra fts to I [n d ia ] O fffice] and B [ o a r d ] o f T [r a d e ] .(2)
A. P .
M a y 13, 1914.

(2) [N o t rep rod u ced . A tra n sla tion o f P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s letter was enclosed. S ir E d w a rd
G rey sta ted th a t he was a n xiou s to have th e op in io n o f the B oa rd o f T ra d e an d o f th e S ecretary
o f S ta te fo r In d ia on th e subject. T he letters w ere sent on M a y 14, 1914. (F .O . 21069/
4601; 14, 4 4.)]

No. 243.

Sir Edicard G rey to M. Paul Cam bon.p)

F.O . 19570/1637 14 44.

Confidential.
Your E xcellency :— Foreign Office, May 18, 1914.
On the 17th September last/2' I had the honour to com m unicate to the French
Chargé d ’ Affaires a memorandum which, as Y~[our] E [xeellen ey] is aware, contained
the following passage :—
“ H [ i s ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] take note with satisfaction o f the
assurances contained in the m emorandum o f the 3rd Septem ber/3) in regard to
the prohibition of differential treatment on French railways, present or future,
in Turkey. They also desire to express their gratitude to the French G ov[ern-
m en ]t for their promise of support in respect o f the Anglo-Turkish agreements,
the drafts o f which were com m unicated to the French Ambassador on the
17th and 18th June la st./4' Sir E . Grey has the honour to state, for the
confidential information o f the French G ov [ern m en ]t, that these arrangements
were signed on the 29th July last,/5) but that it is not intended that they should

0 ) [C op ies o f this le tte r w ere sent t o the B o a rd o f T r a d e ; to th e A d m ira lty .]

(2) [v. sup ra , p. 230, N o. 152.]
Is) [u. supra, pp . 228-9, N o. 150.]
( 4) [ p . supra, pp. 100-14, N o. 6S, encls., an d n o te s (4) a n d ( lx) ; cp. a l s o pp. 157 -9 , N o. 102,
and e n d s .]
( s ) [ p . su p ra , pp. 183-98, N o. 124.]
 390
come into operation pending the conclusion of the Anglo-German agreement.
H [is ] M fa jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t will, however, appreciate the support of the
French G ov[ern m en ]t in so far as may be necessary in any further negotiations
either with the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t or with other Powers, in order to carry
the arrangements, and especially that concerning the Shatt-el-Arab Convention,
into full effect.”
I would now inform Y [o u r ] E [x ce lle n cy ], for the strictly confidential information
o f the French G ov [ern m en ]t, that the negotiations between H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G ov [ern m en ]t and the German G ov [ern m en ]t respecting the Bagdad Bailway and
cognate matters are in an advanced stage, and I have the honour to enclose copies
of articles 6 and 7 of the draft Anglo-G erm an Convention, which relate to the
Shatt-ei-Arab.
A copy of sections IV and V of the Explanatory Note, to be attached to the
Convention, is also enclosed. These sections refer to the two articles in question.
B y an exchange of notes, dated April 1914,(6) H [is ] M [a jesty’ s ] G ov[ernm en]t
have now agreed that the above clauses should, mutatis mutandis, have the validity
of an agreement between Great Britain and Russia, and the Russian G ov[ernm en]t
have agreed to be bound accordingly.
As French shipping is interested in the navigation o f the Shatt-el-Arab, I have
the honour to inform Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov[ern m en ]t
would be happy to proceed to a similar exchange of notes with the French G ov[ern-
m en]t in order to record in a more formal manner the agreement which in substance
has already been reached between France and Great Britain.
[I have, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

Enclosure in No. 243.

Draft Anglo-G erm an C onvention.

Articles 6 and 7 .

A r t ic l e G.
His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government and the Imperial German Government will
join in using their good offices with the Imperial Ottoman Government to secure that
the Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as practicable be brought into and perm anently kept
in a satisfactory state of conservancy in order that sea-going vessels may always be
assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab shall permanently be kept open for sea-going vessels,
and be carried on under conditions of absolute equality for the vessels of all nations,
without regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact of navigation, but only for
administrative charges of the Commission referred to in Article 7 and for repaying
sums actually spent on improvem ents in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed 1 fr. per registered ton (the dues
to cover the com ing in and going out of the same vessel) except by agreement between
the two G overnm ents; any dues shall be levied on a basis of absolute equality
without regard to the nationality of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 7 .

(a) The Imperial German Governm ent having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913, under which the free navigation of the Shatt-

( 6) [u. supra, pp . 377-81, No. 236, e n d s .]

 391
el-Arab is assured on terms of absolute equality to the shipping of all nations and
a com m ission is established for the execution of such works as may be necessary
for the improvement of its channel and for its maintenance and for other like
purposes set out therein, and being of opinion that the provisions o f the said
Convention are conducive to the best interests of international com m erce, will uphold
it so long as it is not materially altered and so long as the duties imposed upon the
Commission thereunder are satisfactorily carried out.
The Im perial German Government take note in this connection of the declaration,
signed on the 21st October, 1913,( 7) and attached to the said Convention, to the
effect that articles 7 and 8 thereof do not affect the rights enjoyed in the Ottoman
Empire by the nationals of the Treaty Powers.
(b) His Britannic M ajesty’s G overnm ent, so far as they are concerned, agree :—

(i) That the German consul at . Basra shall have the right to correspond with
the Commission on matters within its com petence;
(ii) That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
o f the com m erce of the river, and refuse to remove the causes o f complaint
raised by the German consul, the question at issue shall be referred to
an impartial expert, to be nominated by agreement between the two
members of the Commission and the German consul, provided that if a
similar or analogous com plaint is made by any other consul, he shall
participate in the said nom ination; and that, failing unanimous agreement,
H er Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited to designate
the expert referee.

The Governm ent of His Britannic M ajesty will use their good offices with the
Imperial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such recom m en­
dations as m ay be made by the expert referee.

Explanatory Note.

S e c t io n IV .
In regard to articles G and 7 o f the Convention, it is agreed that the following
recomm endations shall serve as a basis for the work of the Commission :—
1. The Commission to set to work as soon as possible.
2. The Commission to undertake a preliminary survey, during a period of at
least twelve months, before recom m ending any large expenditure on
permanent works.
3. The Commission to aim as a first step at a depth of 24 feet at high-water
springs on the bar.
4. The channel of the river below Mohammerah to be buoyed as soon as possible
so as to indicate the position o f a shoal in the river.
5. Fixed m ooring buoys, allotted as far as possible to the several com panies, to
be provided at an early date at Basra.
6. The Commission might with advantage model its arrangements generally upon
the analogy of the Danube Comm ission, so far as applicable.

S e c t io n V.
In regard to article 7, clause ( b), of the Convention, it is agreed as fo llo w s :—
The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties
concerned, proceed to Basra for the purpose of his enquiry. H e shall publish
his report within four months after having received all the necessary materials

( 7) [v. sup ra , p. 242, Ed. N o t e .]

 392

from all the parties, including both Commissioners, or within four months of his
arrival at Basra.
The expenses of the enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee,
shall be borne in equal shares by the Governments concerned.

No. 244.
Sir Edward Grey to Prince lAchnowslaj.i1)
F.O. 23780/4601/14/44. Foreign Office, May 29, 1914.
Sir E. Grey presents his compliments to the German Ambassador and has the
honour to acknowledge the receipt of IT[is] E[xeellency]’s note of the 9th instant(2)
on the subject of irrigation works in Asiatic Turkey, and cognate matters.
II[is] M[ajestv’s] Gov[ernmen]t are prepared, as the German Gov[ernmen]t
desire, to record the agreement about irrigation in an exchange of notes, instead of
in the Anglo-German Convention respecting the Bagdad B[ai]l[wa]y. The text of
two notes, as tentatively drafted with Herr von Kuehlmann, is annexed to the enclosed
draft of the Anglo-German Convention.!3) It will be observed that the stipulation as
to the principle of open competition is extended so as to cover the whole of Asiatic
Turkey as distinct from Mesopotamia; and it is provided that the German
Gov[ernmen]t should furnish to II[is] M[ajesty’s] Gov[ernmen]t an authentic list,
giving the area and scope of German irrigation works on the plain of Adana. H[is]
M[ajesty's] Gov[ernmen]t would be glad if the German Gov[ernmen]t would agree
to these changes.
A saving clause has also been inserted in regard to canals connected with the
Rhatt-el-Arab: in view of the importance of keeping the river open for navigation
IT[is] M[ajesty’s] Gov[ernmen]t must necessarily regard conservancy as taking
precedence over irrigation.
Sir E. Grey has noted with much satisfaction that the German Gov[ernmen]t
renounce their demand for the insertion of the article which was formerly number 7
in the draft Anglo-German Convention; in the unlikely event of Basra becoming
inaccessible to sea-going vessels, II[is] M[ajesty’s] Gov[ernmen]t would be fully
prepared to discuss such a development with the German Gov[ernmen]t with a view
to taking such measures as might be called for.
Sir E. Grey would be glad to know whether Prince Lichnowsky is now prepared
to initial the draft Convention and Explanatory Note, and how soon H[is]
E[xcellenc3r] expects to be in a position to sign these instruments. II [is] M[ajesty’s]
Gov[ernmen]t are particularly desirous that signature should take place before the
end of June, at the latest.
0 ) [Copies of this note were sent to the Board of T ra d e; to the India Office.]
(2) \v. supra, pp. 388-9, No. 242.]
(3) [r. im mediately succeeding E d . Note.']

\ED . N O T E . — The tex t of the draft of the Anglo-Germ an Convention dated M ay 29, 1914,
is not reproduced from considerations of space. The variations from the final tex t ( v . infra,
pp. 398-404, No. 219, encl.) are sufficiently indicated in the intervening documents. Its main
im portance is that it was the first draft to contain the text of the “ Notes to he exchanged on
Date of S ig n a tu r e ” of the Convention. These were as follow s: —

T e x t of N o t e s to be ex cha ng ed on D a t e of Si gn a ture of A n g lo -O er m a n C on ven tion .

F.O. 24079/4601/14/44.
No. 1.
D r a f t of N o t e f r o m Si r E . G r e y to Pr in c e Lic hnowsky .
(Confidential.)
Y our Excellency, F o r e i g n Office, J une , 1914.
On signing the Anglo-German Convention respecting the Bagdad Railw ay, &c., I have the
honour to state, with reference to article 1, clause (a), that H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent will not
 393

oppose the Bagdad Railw ay Com pany in securing the requisite fresh guarantees (i) to com pen­
sate the Com pany for the revenues which had been allocated for the purposes of the Railw ay,
but, ow ing to the Balkan war. may no longer be available for that purpose, and (ii) to enable
the Company to com plete the line.
This assurance is subject to the proviso that H is M ajesty’ s Government retain such freedom
o f action as w ill perm it the British Delegates at the F inancial Commission at Paris to criticise
the details of any scheme which may be put forw ard in regard to the allocation of specific
revenues In default of some such reservation, the German Governm ent will readily appreciate
that the position o f the British Delegates at P aris might be rendered difficult in the com plicated
questions likely to come up for discussion.

No. 2.

D r a f t of X o t e from P r in c e L ichnoicsky to Si r E . G re y.

(Secret.) Ger m an E m b a s s y ,
Y our Excellency. L o n d o n , -June , 1914.
On signing the Anglo-Germ an Convention respecting the Bagdad Railw ay, etc., I have the
honour to state, with reference to article 3. clause (c), and to section IV of the E xplanatory
N ote that if, after the com pletion o f the Bagdad R ailw ay from K hanikin to Basra, the British
Government should express to the Im perial Governm ent a wish that a railway from K ut-el-
Amara, or an adjacent point, to Bedrai should be extended to M endeli. the Im perial Governm ent
would refrain from opposing such an undertaking, either by B ritish interests or by the proposed
Ottoman Com pany of R iver N avigation, on the ground that it exceeds 100 kilom. in length, or
on the ground that M endeli may lie w ithin the 60 kilom. protective zone of the B a g d a d -
K hanikin line.
The Im perial Governm ent expressly desire that this note should remain secret, and should
not be published w ithout their consent.

No. 3.
D r a f t of X o t e from S i r E. G r e y to Pr in c e Lichnoxrsky re specting I rr ig a tio n W o r k s .

Y our Excellency, F o r e i g n Office. J u n e , 1914.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that H is M ajesty's Government will use their
good offices with the Ottom an Governm ent, w ith the view o f securing that the principle of
open com petition shall be upheld in regard to contracts or concessions for future works of
irrigation in A siatic Turkey.
H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent will not oppose a m inor German participation in any contracts
or concessions which may be allotted to British subjects, provided that such p a rticipation is
deemed comm ercially desirable by the parties holding the said contracts or concessions.
In agreeing to this arrangem ent. I desire to brin g to your E xcellency’ s knowledge the
follow ing clause in an agreement concluded between H is M ajesty's Governm ent and the Ottoman
Government, which should in no way be prejudiced by the terms o f this n ote: —
“ En tant qu ’ il s’ agit de travaux d ’ irrigation à exécuter par le moyen de canaux se
raccordant directem ent au Chatt-el-Arabe, il est tou tefois entendu qu'ils ne seront pas
autorisés par le Gouvernement im périal Ottom an sans avoir reçu l'approbation préalable
de la Commission fluviale. Celle-ci aura le droit de surveiller les travaux dont il est
question pour qu ’ ils soient exécutés conform ém ent aux plans et devis autorises. '

I have to add that H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent w ill raise no objection to the irrigation of
the plain of Adana (for which, by virtue o f existing agreements with the Ottoman Government,
German subjects have already carried out considerable prelim inary work) being definitely
conceded to German subjects, and that they will not support any claims which may be advanced
by British subjects to com pete in regard to this enterprise. I understand that the German
G overnm ent w ill furnish to H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent an authentic list, in dicating accurately
the area and scope of the works in question.

No. 4.

D r a f t of simitar X o t e , m utatis mutandis, f rom Prin ce Lic hnoic sky to S i r E . G re y.

Ger m an Em ba s sy ,
Y our Excellency, L ond o n, J u n e , 1914.
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Im perial Governm ent w ill use their
good offices w ith the Ottoman Government, w ith the view of securing that the prin ciple o f open
com petition shall be upheld in regard to contracts or concessions for fu tu re works o f irrigation
in A siatic Turkey.
 394
T he Im p eria l G overn m en t will not opp ose a m inor B ritish p a rticip a tio n in any con tracts
or concessions w hich m ay be a llotted to G erm an subjects, p r o v id e d th a t such p a rticip a tio n is
deem ed com m ercia lly desirable by the p a rties h old in g th e said con tra cts or concessions.
In a greein g to this arra n gem en t, th e Im p eria l G overn m en t ta k e n ote o f the clause q u oted
in y ou r E x ce lle n c y ’s n ote o f this date resp ectin g canals con n ected w ith th e S h a tt-el-A ra b, and
a gree th a t it shall in no w ay be p r e ju d ic e d by the present a rrangem ent.
I have to add th a t the Im p eria l G overn m en t will raise no ob jection to those ir rig a tio n
w orks in M esopota m ia , fo r w hich only B ritish firms ten d ered on the 20th A p ril, 1912, being
defin itely h anded over to B ritish subjects, and th a t they w ill n ot su p p o rt any claim s which
m ay be adv an ced by G erm an subjects t o com p ete in reg a rd to this en terp rise. I u nd erstand
th a t the B ritish G overnm ent w ill fu rn ish to the Im peria l G overnm ent an a u th en tic list,
in d ic a tin g a ccu rately the area and scope o f the w orks in q u estion .]

No. 245.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.(AI

F.O. 2 46 4 0 /2 3 90 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 245.) Foreign Office, May 31. 1914, 12-20 p . m .
I am very desirous of getting all agreements with Turkey signed as soon as
possible, and ratified before the end of June. There are, however, certain outstanding
points in regard to which Hakki Pasha’ s instructions are either indefinite or
unsatisfactory.
1) The Mesopotamian Oil concession. I cannot ultimately agree to customs
increase (see m y note of July 29 1913 to Turkish Ambassador(2) ) or to monopolies
until this question has been settled. W hat is the cause of delay?
2. Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t have declined to agree to addition to article providing
that irrigation works shall be put up to open com petition :— I am telegraphing text of
proposed additional clause in a separate telegram .(3)
It is necessary that a provision of this nature should be made, as there is a close
connection between the irrigation of the date groves and the conservancy of the river,
and if the Commission, which it should not be overlooked will be Ottoman and not
British, is deprived of control of irrigation in so far as it depends upon water from the
Shatt-el-Arab, the river may becom e silted up and the whole basis of the present
agreements w-ith Turkey and Germany endangered. Perhaps the Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t do not fully appreciate the physical conditions, or realise that the mud
and water from the Karun is forced by the tides up to Kurna, fertilising on the one
hand the date groves, but on the other hand form ing islands in the river channel. W e
do not wish the present irrigation to be interfered with, but the requirements of
navigation must take precedence on the river. Y [o u r ] E [x celle n cy ] should urge
Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t to reconsider their decision.
3) Local lines to serve as feeders for river navigation and lines south of
latitude 31. I hope Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t will send a conciliatory reply to my
request to Hakki Pasha.(4) I attach great importance to both points.

0 ) [C opies o f this telegram w ere sent to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice; to the

A d m ira lty .]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 197-8, N o. 124 (7 ).]
( 3) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 246) to S ir L . M a llet o f M a y 31, 1914, is n ot rep ro­
du ced. The te x t o f the a d d ition a l clause was as fo llo w s : “ En ta n t q u ’ il s’ a git de tra v a u x
d ’ ir rig a tio n à ex écu ter pa r le m oyen d e ca n a u x se ra ccord a n t d irectem en t au C hatt-el-A rabe,
il est to u te fo is entendu q u ’ ils ne seront pas autorisés par le G ouv ern em en t Im p éria l O ttom an
sans a voir reçu l ’ a p p rob a tion p réalable de la Com m ission fluviale. Celle-ci aura le d r o it de
su rveiller les tra v a u x don t il est qu estion p ou r q u ’ ils soient exécu tés con form ém en t aux plans
e t devis a u torisés.” (F.O . 2 4 6 4 0 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
( 4) [u. supra, p. 385, N o. 239.]
 395
N o. 216.
Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward G r e y .( *)

F.O. 2 4 4 7 3 '2 3 9 0 /1 4 '4 4 . Constantinople, D. June 1 . 1914.

Tel. (No. 308.' B . June 2, 1914.
M y telegram No. 306 of this m orning.(2)
I discussed subject of your telegram No. 245 of 31st M ay(3) with the Grand Vizier
this afternoon and urged com pliance with your requests. His Highness said that he
recognised that oil concession was an original condition of your consent to 4 per cent.,
but, if the other two demands were intended as further conditions, he could not under­
stand them being put forward at this stage. I gathered from your telegram that they
are not conditions, but I did not take up this point, and confined m yself to pointing
out that clause respecting Shatt-el-Arab irrigation was proposed quite as much in
Ottoman interest as in British, the com m ission being Ottoman.
As for railway line, in view of number of lines which had been given to others,
we were asking for very little. Moreover, construction of “ feeders ” to the river was
as important to Ottoman Government as to ourselves, as they were partners in riverain
concessions. The other request was conditional on lines ever being granted. Your
wish was to clean the slate and remove all possibilities of further friction. His
Highness said that Hakki Pasha had already received instructions, but I appealed to
him to use his influence to obtain these modifications. H e finally said that he would
consider question and see what could be done in the way o f finding a formula.
H is H ighness told me that German negotiations had begun well.

0 ) [T h e te x t g iv en a bove is ta k en from th e C onfidential P r in t , as th e o rig in a l decypher

ca n n ot be tra ce d .]
( 2) [S ir L . M a lle t’ s teleg ram (N o. 306) o f J u n e 1. 1914, D. 3 p . m ., R . 4 1 5 p . m .. is not
reprod uced . It referred to S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram s X os. 245 and 246 o f M a y 31, 1914
(i7. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t, and n ote ( 3) ), and sta ted th a t the m ea n in g o f p a ra g ra p h 2
o f teleg ram (N o. 246) was obscure, as the a d d itio n a l clau se a p p a ren tly referred t o the S h a tt-el-
A rab and not to th e M esopota m ia n oil concession. A t 7 p .m . S ir L. M a llet teleg ra p h ed th a t
pa ra g ra p h 2 had been w ron g ly decv ph ered , and th a t th e m ea n in g was now clear. (F .O . 24313/
2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
(3) [i\ im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t.]

[E D . X O T E .— On J u n e 2, 1914, P rin ce L ich n ow sk y sent to Sir E d w a rd G rey a fu rth er

revised d r a ft o f the A nglo-G erm a n C onven tion . I t is not rep rod u ced from con sid era tion s of
space. (F .O . 24SS7 4601 1 4 /4 4 .) It was follow ed on J u n e 5 by a fu rth er B ritish revised d r a ft
w hich w as com m u n ica ted to P rin ce L ich n ow sky on th a t date, cop ies b ein g sent to C on stan tin op le
(N o. 361) an d to the In d ia Office an d th e B oa rd of T rade. (F .O . 2 5209'4601 14 44.) T h is new
revise em b odied “ a fter discussion w ith H err v on K iih lm a n n ” th e changes m ade in the G erm an
tex t o f J u n e 2 .]

No. 247.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L. M allet.(*)

F.O. 2 54 10'2390 14/44.

Tel. (No. 254.) Foreign Office, June 6, 1914, 3 -15 p . m .
Hakki Pasha has given me unfavourable replies about i) the additional clause
concerning irrigation works which might affect navigation on ¡Shatt-el-Arab, ii short
feeder railways, iii) Arabian fines south of latitude 31, and iv,i he has no satisfactory

0 ) [C op ies of th is teleg ram w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice; t o the B oa rd o f T ra de. A letter
to the sam e effect was sent to H a k k i P asha b y M r. A P ark er on J u n e 6, 1914.]
 396
information about Mesopotamian oil question, though I have impressed upon him my
earnest wish to conclude all negotiations by July 1st at the latest.
As to i) the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t appear to admit that navigation shall not be
interfered with on Shatt-el-Arab by irrigation works, and I have been given no reason
to explain their reluctance to em body this admission in an agreement in the wording
I have proposed to which I attach importance. The clause I have suggested can do no
possible harm to Ottoman interests, as the Commission itself is to be an Ottoman
institution.
As to ii) and iii) I am a little surprised that HXis] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t]
should meet with a refusal in regard to such a moderate request, when Turkey has
given such extensive concessions for railways to French and German groups. The
complaint has frequently been made by Turkey that British capital avoids that country
as a field of investm ent; the present attitude of the Turkish G ov [ern m en ]t, in
refusing even an option for short feeders to an Ottoman Company in which British
subjects are interested, is perhaps the true answer to the above complaint. Our wish
is to facilitate the economic development of Turkey, and to avoid the total exclusion of
British enterprise from the regions where concessions have not yet been given to
others.
Hakki Pasha says that our requests are regarded at Constantinople as fresh
conditions of our assent to the customs increase and m onopolies; this is a misappre­
hension. Point iv) has been a condition from the first. Point i) we regard as
essential to the harmonious and successful working of the Commission, and we have
proposed it in the inte rests of Turkey as much as in those of international commerce.
Point ii'i will be very important to the Navigation Company when irrigation is
developed and the local traffic may becom e some substitute for the diversion of through
traffic to the Bagdad Bailway. I cannot understand why the Ottoman G ov[ern m en ]t
objects to giving the option desired. Point iii) what we desire is a preferential option
for British enterprise, as against foreign, on equal terms.

[E D . N O T E .— A n A nglo-T u rkish C on v en tion (c ite d in the im m ed iately su cceed in g docum ent

as “ th e m onopolies a g r e e m e n t ” ) was in itia lle d on J u n e 10, 1914. The te x t is not reprodirced
from con sid era tion s of space. T he follow in g is a b rie f sum m ary o f its clau ses: —

1. C on d ition s on w hich the B ritish G overn m en t agreed to the establishm ent o f m onopolies
in T u rkey o f sp irits, oil, m atches, cig a r e tte pa per, and p la yin g cards, and to the
con trol o f con su m ption o f sugar and a lcoh olic drinks.
2. Consent o f B ritish G overnm ent to the im p osition o f octro i d u ties on a specified list of
a rticles o f B ritish origin.
3. A ccep ta n ce by B ritish G overn m en t of the p rin cip le o f the reform o f the stam p d u ty in
T urkey.
4. Consent o f the O ttom an G overnm ent t o the form a tion o f an A nglo-T u rkish com m ission
to ex am ine the d u ties on lig h ts and beacons.
5 & 6. Ir r ig a tio n in M esopotam ia.
7. B ritish schools and hospitals.
8. P ro te ctio n o f oil concessions in vilay ets o f Sy ria and Y em en, referred to in A n n ex o f
the C onvention.
9. R eferen ce to a rb itra tion of certa in claim s aga in st the O ttom an G overnm ent.
10. S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay C oncession.
11. P rov ision for ra tification at L on don w ithin fo u r m onths.
A n n ex I. D efin ition of ca teg ories o f oil ex em p t from ta xes on con su m p tion and from
m onopoly.
A n n ex II. S p ecifica tion o f oil concessions in vilav ets o f Sv ria and Y em en. (F.O . 29241/
2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)] ‘
 397
N o. 248.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet . ( ')

F.O . 26369 1067 14, 44.

Tel. (No. 262.) Foreign Office, June 12, 1914. 5 - 45 p . m .
Your telegram No. 3 3 4 .(2)
1 agree to postponement for a few days as you suggest, but it is desirable that
before July 1st final agreement should be signed, and not m erely favourable reply
obtained.
No reply has been received from Hakki Pasha respecting local feeder lines and
Arabian lines, and unfavourable reply has been made about suggested new paragraph
to article 5 of monopolies agreem ent.(3)
The m onopolies agreement has now been initialled ad referendum , but it cannot
be signed until the Mesopotamian oil question is settled, and I should be glad to get
the additional paragraph to article 5 agreed to. If this is done, I am quite prepared
to agree to discussion o f feeder lines and Arabian lines taking place later at
Constantinople if you think there is really no prospect of Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t
authorising Hakki Pasha to give us some assurances now on these points : they need
not form part o f the agreement itself, but might be embodied in a separate note.
I do not quite understand Grand V izier’ s proposal to withdraw Hakki Pasha
before he has signed the agreements which he has negotiated. The position, as
Y [o u r] E x c e lle n c y ] is aware, is that he cannot sign railways agreement until Turkish
negotiations with Bagdad Railway Company are com pleted. You might explain this
to H fis ] H [igh n ess] and ask him when this will be.
The on ly other outstanding points are the m onopolies agreem ent, the S m yrn a -
Aidin agreement, and the pecuniary claims agreement. It is on ly when these
documents are signed that Hakki Pasha could be recalled, unless Turkish GovTern-
m en]t want to break off negotiations altogether. I understand from Germans that
their agreement with Turkey could easily be settled in one day. I f so Y("our1
E [x ce lle n cy ] might suggest that Hakki Pasha could be given authority to sign all
outstanding documents here next week.
O ' [C op ies o f th is telegram w ere sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to the In d ia O ffice; to th e
A d m ira lty .]
(2V 'S i r E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (X o . 25S) t o S ir L. M a llet o f J u n e 10, 1914, D . 5-15 p . m .,
is not rep rod u ced . In it he suggested th a t S ir L. M a llet and his G erm an collea g u e “ should
ca teg orica lly in form the G rand V iz ie r in w ritin g th a t unless the [o il] q uestion is s a tis fa ctorily
settled at a v ery ea rly da te the tw o G o v [e rn m e n ]ts m ust w ithhold th eir consent to the
m on opolies.” (F.O . 25733 1067 14 44.) In his teleg ram (X o . 334), D. J u n e 11. R ; J u n e 12,
1914, S ir L. M a llet stated th a t he w ould p refer to a void th e u ltim a tu m if possible and at any
rate to p ostp on e it fo r a few days. H e aske 1 S ir E d w a rd G rey if a fa v ou ra b le answ er had been
retu rn ed to th e la test dem ands o f H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent, and added that th e G rand V iz ie r
was a n xiou s to recall H a k k i Pasha. (F .O . 26369 1 0 6 7 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
( 3) [r . supra, p. 396, Ed. N o te . T he a d d itio n a l p a ra g ra p h t o A r ticle 5 was as follow s:
“ E n ta n t q u ’ il s’ a g it de tra v a u x d ’ ir rig a tio n à e x écu ter p a r le m oyen de ca n a u x se
ra ccord an t directem en t au C h a tt-el-A ra b e, il est to u te fo is enten d u q u 'ils ne seront pas autorisés
par le G ouvernem ent Im p éria l O ttom an sans a v o ir reçu l ’ a p p rob a tion préala ble de la Com m is­
sion fluviale. Celle-ci aura le d roit de su rveiller les tra v a u x don t il est question p ou r q u ’ ils
soient ex écu tés con form ém en t a u x plans et devis a u torisés.” ]

No. 249.
Sir Edward G rey to Prince Lichnowsky.
F.O. 2 71 3 5 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Immediate. F oreign Office, June 16, 1914.
Sir E . Grey presents his com plim ents to the German Ambassador and has the
honour to transmit to H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] herewith six copies of the Anglo-Germ an
Convention, as initialled on June 15th.
 E n closu re in N o. 249.
Germ an-British C onvention.f1)
His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and H is Majesty the King
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions
beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual
agreement certain questions concerning the respective interests of their States, as
hereinafter set forth, have determined to conclude a Convention destined to prevent
all cause of misunderstanding between Germany and Great Britain in regard to the
questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective
Plenipotentiaries, to w i t :
H is Majesty the German Em peror, King of Prussia, his Serene Highness
Prince Lichnowsky, His Imperial M ajesty’ s Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extra­
ordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majesty at L o n d o n ;
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and
of the British Dom inions beyond the Seas. Emperor of India, the Bight Honourable
Sir Edward Grey, Baronet of the United Kingdom , Knight of the Most Noble Order
of the Garter, Member of Parliament, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs;
W ho, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in
good and due form , have agreed upon the following articles :—

A r t ic l e 1.

Clause (a).— Becognising the general importance of the com pletion of the Bagdad
B ailway for international com m erce, His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government undertake
not to take or encourage any measures likely to impede the construction or m anage­
ment by the Bagdad Bailwav Company of the Bagdad Bailwav system or to prevent
the participation of capital in this undertaking.*
Clause (b).— The Imperial German Governm ent declare that they will use their
best endeavours to secure that two British members, agreeable to His Britannic
M ajesty’ s Governm ent, shall be admitted as representatives of British shareholders
to the Board (Conseil d ’ Administration) of the Bagdad Bailway Company.

A r t ic l e 2.

Clause (a).— The Bagdad Bailway Company having concluded with the Imperial
Ottoman Government an arrangement on the following basis, the Im perial German
Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare, so far as concerns
themselves, that they adhere to the said arrangement, and will use their best
endeavours to secure its due execution :—
(i) The terminus of the Bagdad Bailway Com pany’ s line shall be at Basra, and
the Bagdad Bailway Company has renounced all claims to construct a
branch line from Basra (Zobeir) to the Persian Gulf referred to in article 1
of the Bagdad Bailway Convention of the 5th March, 1903, and to build
a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, under article 23 of the said
Bagdad Bailwav Convention.
(ii) As hitherto, no discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted on the
Bagdad Bailway C om pany’ s system, either as regards facilities or rates of
charge for the conveyance of like articles between the same points on
* C opies o f all agreem ents rela tin g to the ra ilw ay system to be com m u n ica ted to H is
B r ita n n ic M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent b efore sign a tu re o f this C onvention.
( ') [T h e te x t given above is taken from the in itia lled cop y preserved in the F o re ig n Office
series o f O rigin a l T rea ties (G erm any No. 88). T he tex ts o f th e C on v en tion and th e E x p la n a tory
N ote are given both in G erm an and in E nglish. F o r the G erm an version v. G .P., X X X V I I (I),
pp. 454-62. Copies w ere sent on J u n e 16, 1914, to the B oa rd o f T r a d e ; to th e In d ia Office.]
 399
account of the ownership, origin, or destination of goods presented for
transport, or in any other manner whatever.
(iii) The Bagdad Bailway Company agrees that the periods fixed by article 21
of the “ cahier des charges,” relating to the notice to be given in case of
any modification of the conditions of transport or rates of freight, shall
uniform ly be two months. The said notices shall be inserted in the
Official Gazette of the Imperial Ottoman Government and in the Journal
of the Ottoman Chamber of Commerce at Constantinople.
(iv) In the event of the construction of a branch line from Basra (Zobeir) to the
Persian Gulf being undertaken, adequate arrangements shall be made to
secure facilities for through traffic from and to the Bagdad Bailway
Com pany’ s system, and there shall be complete protection against
discrimination, direct or indirect.
(v) The construction and exploitation o f the proposed ports of Basra and Bagdad,
authorised by article 2 3 of the Bagdad Bailway Convention of the
5th March, 1 9 0 3 , shall be carried out by a separate Ottoman Company.
No duties or charges of whatever nature or under whatever denom ina­
tion shall be levied by the port com pany on any vessels or goods which
shall not equally, under the same conditions, be imposed in like cases on
all vessels or goods, whatever be the nationality of the vessels or their
owners, or the ownership or country of origin or destination of the goods,
and whatever be the places from which the vessels or goods arrive or to
■which they depart.
In all that relates to the stationing, loading and unloading of vessels
in these ports, no privileges or facilities shall be granted to any vessel or
vessels which shall not equally and under like conditions be granted to all
other vessels.
In all that relates to the dues and charges of whatever nature to be
levied, and to the facilities to be accorded, in the ports of Basra and
Bagdad, goods arriving or to be forwarded by water shall receive identic
treatment to those arriving or to be forwarded by rail.
The Im perial Ottoman Governm ent reserves to itself the right to
confer upon the Commission, which it proposes to entrust with the
improvement and maintenance of the navigability of the Shatt-el-Arab, its
rights of control over the port o f Basra.
No rights conferred upon the ports com pany shall prejudice or impair
the right of the aforesaid Commission to perform any of the duties
entrusted to it under the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July,
1 9 1 3 .0
Clause (b).— The Imperial German Government declare that they will not oppose
the acquisition by British interests of 40 per cent, of the share-capital of the separate
Ottoman Company for the construction and exploitation of the ports of Basra and
Bagdad, mentioned in sub-clause (v) above, and their rateable representation on the
Board (Conseil d ’ Administration) of the port com pany, and in the contracts, if any,
for construction and maintenance.
A r t ic l e 3.

Clause (a).— The Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s
Government declare that they will in no case support the construction of a branch
from Basra (Zobeir) or from any point of the main line of the Bagdad Bailway, to
the Persian Gulf unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject between
the Im perial Ottoman Governm ent, the Imperial German Government, and His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.

(2) [u. supra, pp. 183-7, N o. 124 (1 ).]

 400

Clause (b).— The Imperial German Government declare that they will in no case
themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations whatsoever
to establish, a port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf unless and until there is
complete agreement on the subject between the Imperial German Government and His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.
Clause (c).— His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will in no
case themselves establish, or support any claim by any persons or corporations
whatsoever to establish, in Ottoman territory, railway undertakings either in direct
com petition with the Bagdad Bailway Com pany’ s lines, or in contradiction with that
com pany’ s existing rights, unless and until there is com plete agreement on the subject
between the Imperial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government.
F or the purposes of this article, the western terminus of the Bagdad Bailway system
shall be held to be at Konia and the eastern terminus at Basra.

A r t ic l e 4.

Clause (a).— The Im perial German Government, having cognisance of the

declaration signed on the 29th July, 1913, on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman Govern­
ment, concerning navigation on the Bivers Tigris and Euphrates,(3) declare that they
will not oppose the execution, nor support any action directed against the execution,
o f such declaration, so long as the navigation on the said rivers is maintained in
substantial accordance with the provisions thereof.
Clause (b).— His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government declare that they will not
oppose the acquisition by the Bagdad Bailway interests of 40 per cent, of the share
capital to be allotted to Turkish interests at the first allotment (i.e., 20 per cent, of
the whole share-capital) and the right in respect thereof to subscribe for a rateable
proportion of further issues of capital of the Ottoman Company for river navigation,
and their rateable participation (by directors agreeable to the Im perial German
Government) in the board of the aforesaid Company out of the share of the directorate
allotted to Turkish interests (i.e., 20 per cent, of the whole directorate).
Clause (c).— It is, nevertheless, understood that nothing in this article shall be
held to affect the rights conceded by article 9 of the Bagdad Bailway Convention of
the 5th March, 1903, except in so far that the Im perial German Governm ent and His
B ritannic M ajesty’ s Government agree, so far as concerns themselves, that the said
rights shall cease on the com pletion of the construction of the Bagdad Bailway to
Basra, in accordance with the arrangement referred to in article 2 of the present
Convention.
A r t ic l e 5.

The con cession a ire, nominated in pursuance of article 3 o f the aforesaid

declaration of the 29th July, 1913, having concluded with the Im perial Ottoman
Government an arrangement^1) on the following basis, the Im perial German Govern­
ment and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent declare, so far as concerns themselves,
that they adhere to the said arrangement and will use their best endeavours to secure
its due execution :—
No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be permitted by the Ottoman
Company for river navigation, either as regards facilities or rates of charge for
the conveyance of like articles between the same points on account of the
ownership, origin, or destination of goods presented for transport, or in any other
manner whatsoever. The Company shall grant no through bills of lading,
rebates, or other privileges of any description in respect of goods carried by any
ship between any place served by the Com pany’ s vessels, and any place oversea,
unless the same privileges are accorded in respect of similar goods carried under
the. same conditions and in the same direction between the same places by all
ships regularly trading between those places, irrespective of nationality.
(3) H . supra, pp. 189-90, No. 124 (4).]
( 4) [ c p . supra, p. 343, N o. 213, encl., n ote (3).]
 401

A r t ic l e 6.
The Im perial German Government and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government will
join in using their good offices with the Im perial Ottoman Government to secure that
the Shatt-el-Arab shall so far as practicable be brought into and perm anently kept in
a satisfactory state of conservancy in order that sea-going vessels m ay always be
assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra, and to secure, further, that the
navigation on the Sbatt-el-Arab shall perm anently be kept open for sea-going vessels,
and be carried on under conditions of absolute equality for the vessels of all nations,
without regard either to the nationality of the vessels or to their cargoes.
Dues shall be imposed, not for the mere fact of navigation, but only for
administrative charges of the Commission referred to in Article 7 and for repaying
sums actually spent on improvements in the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and
harbour facilities. They shall in no case exceed 1 fr. per registered ton (the dues to
cover the com ing in and going out of the same vessel except by agreement between
the two G overnm ents; any dues shall be levied on a basis of absolute equality without
regard to the nationality of sea-going vessels or their cargoes.

A r t ic l e 7.

(a The Im perial German Governm ent having taken note of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of the 29th July, 1913, under which the free navigation of the
Shatt-el-Arab is assured on terms of absolute equality to the shipping of all nations
and a Commission is established for the execution of such works as m ay be necessary
for the improvem ent of its channel and for its maintenance and for other like purposes
set out therein, and being of opinion that the provisions of the said Convention are
conducive to the best interests of international com m erce, will uphold it so long as it
is not materially altered and so long as the duties imposed upon the Commission
thereunder are satisfactorily carried out.
The Im perial German Government take note in this connection of the
declaration, signed on the 21st October, 1913, and attached to the said Convention, to
the effect that articles 7 and 8 thereof do not affect the rights enjoyed in the Ottoman
Empire by the nationals of the Treaty Pow ers.(5)
(b) His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent, so far as they are concerned, agree :—
(!) That the German consul at Basra shall have the right to correspond with the
Commission on matters within its com p eten ce;
(ii) That, if in any case the Commission fail to meet the reasonable requirements
of the com m erce of the river, and refuse to rem ove the causes of complaint
raised by the German consul, the question at issue shall be referred to an
impartial expert, to be nom inated by agreement between the two members
of the Commission and the German consul, provided that if a similar or
analogous complaint is made b y any other consul, he shall participate in
the said nom in a tion ; and that, failing unanimous agreement, H er Majesty
the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited to designate the expert
referee.

The Governm ent of His Britannic M ajesty will use their good offices with the
Im perial Ottoman Government to ensure that effect is duly given to such
recomm endations as m ay be made by the expert referee.

A r t ic l e 8.

The Im perial German Governm ent and His Britannic M ajesty’ s Governm ent take
note of the Heads of Agreem ent between the S m yrna-A idin Bailway Com pany on the
one part and the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies on the other part,
initialled on the 28th March, 1914, and form ing an annex to the present Convention,
(5) [v. supra, p. 242, Ed. A 'o fe .]
flOOOO]
 402

and, so far as they are concerned, undertake to uphold the definitive agreement when
signed.*

A r t ic l e 9.

Any difference of opinion arising out of this Convention or the explanatory note
attached thereto shall be submitted to arbitration. If the two Governm ents fail to
agree about a special Court or arbiter, the case shall be submitted to The Hague
Tribunal.

A r t ic l e 10.

The present Convention, together with the explanatory note attached thereto,
shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, within the period of three
months from the date of signature.
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Convention and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate at London, the day of , 1914.
Initialled at London, June 15th, 1914.
E. G .(6)

Germ an-British C onvention of , 1914.

Explanatory Note.

S e c t io n I.
In regard to article 1, clause (a), of the Convention, it is agreed as follows :—
The Bagdad Bailway system is such as it is defined in the conventions concluded
with the Imperial Ottoman Governm ent on—

March 5, 1903.(7)
March 21, 1911.(8)
June , 1914.

A true copy of each of the said conventions has been com m unicated to His
Britannic M ajesty’ s Government by the Imperial German Government.
It is further agreed in regard to the said clause that no sacrifice of a pecuniary
or econom ic character is to be incurred by Great Britain in consequence th e re o f; and
that it does not involve the assent of His Britannic M ajesty’ s Government to any levy
of import dues, over 15 per cent, ad valorem, in the Ottoman Em pire, or to any other
form of taxation not now in existence.
Nevertheless, Ilis Britannic M ajesty’ s Government will not oppose the Bagdad
Bailway Company in securing, from existing revenues or from proposed new revenues
(to be derived from the increase of the customs duties to 15 per cent, ad valorem or
from the proposed m onopolies or consum ption taxes to be instituted in regard to
alcohol, petroleum, matches, tinder, cigarette paper, playing cards and sugar), the
requisite fresh guarantees to enable the Company to com plete the line. This under­
taking shall in no way prejudice prior rights of H is Britannic M ajesty’ s Government
derived under the Anglo-Turkish Pecuniary Claims Convention of the June,
1914.

* T his a rticle to be m odified if the defin itiv e agreem en t is con clu d ed b e fo re th e C onvention
is signed.
( 6) [T h e G erm an te x t was sim ilarly in itia lled “ L .” 1
C ) [i>. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 102, pp. 833-48.]
( 8) [cp . supra, pp. 3 4-5, No. 23.]
 4U3
S e c t io n I I .

In regard to article 1, clause (b), the German group wliich controls the Bagdad
Railway Company has given a written assurance to the Im perial German Government
that it will always use its best endeavours and voting power to ensure the permanent
presence on the Board of the Railway of two directors agreeable to His Britannic
M ajesty’ s G overnm ent: and the Im perial German Government undertake to His
B ritannic M ajesty’ s Government that they will use their influence with the group
concerned so that the said assurance m ay he always carried out.

S e c t io n III.
In regard to article 3. clause (c), o f the Convention, it is agreed as follows :—
1. No lines in that part of Asiatic Turkey which, west of the 36th m eridian of
east longitude, lies south of the 34th degree of latitude a n d /or in that part which,
east of the said meridian, lies south of the 31st degree of latitude, shall be held to be
in direct com petition; but any line north o f these limits shall be held to be in direct
com petition if it establishes direct railway com m unication between the Mediterranean
and the Persian Gulf.
2. There shall be a protective zone extending for GO kilom. on either side of the
lines of the Bagdad Railway system, and any line passing within the said zone shall
be held to be in direct com petition, pro\ided that in the region between Museyib and
Kurna the protective zone shall be bounded on the east by a line drawn midway
between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, from the latitude of Museyib to Kurna.
3. Local lines serving as feeders for the river navigation and not exceeding
100 kilom. in length shall, provided they do not pass within the protective zone, not
be held to be in direct com petition.
4. The question of whether any other line is or is not in direct com petition shall,
in the event of failure to reach an agreement, be referred to arbitration in accordance
with article 9 of the said Convention.

S e c t io n IV.

In regard to articles G and 7 of the Convention, it is agreed that the following

recommendations shall serve as a basis for the work of the Commission :—
1. The Commission to set to work as soon as possible.
2. The Commission to undertake a prelim inary survey, duiing a period of at
least twelve months, before recom m ending any large expenditure on permanent works.
3. The Commission to aim as a first step at a depth of 24 feet at high-water
springs on the bar.
4. The channel of the river below Moham m erah to be buoyed as soon as possible
so as to indicate the position o f a shoal in the river.
5. Fixed m ooring buoys, allotted as far as possible to the several companies, to
be provided at an early date at Basra.
6. The Commission might with advantage model its arrangements generally upon
the analogy of the Danube Commission, so far as applicable.

S e c t io n Y .

In regard to article 7, clause ( b , of the Convention, it is agreed as follows :—

The expert referee shall, unless it be otherwise agreed by the parties concerned,
proceed to Basra for the purpose of his enquiry. H e shall publish his report within
four months after having received all the necessary materials from all the parties,
including both Commissioners, or within four months of his arrival at Basra.
The expenses of the enquiry, including the remuneration of the referee, shall be
borne in equal shares by the Governments concerned.
[10000] 2 D 2
 404

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this explanatory

note and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at London, the day of , 1914.
Initialled at London, June 15th, 1914.
E. G .(9)

A nnex.

Ottoman Railway from Sm yrna to Aidin.

*Heads of proposed Agreem ent between the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to
Aidin (hereinafter called “ the ‘ English ’ Company ” ) and the Anatolian Railway
Company and the Bagdad Railway Company (hereinafter together referred to as “ the
‘ German ’ Companies ” ).

A r t ic l e 1.

The “ E n g lis h ” Company and the “ G erm a n ” Companies shall co-operate to

procure that the Ottoman Governm ent shall—

1. Grant to the “ English ” Company a Concession—

(a) For the construction of a branch line from Karakouyou to Sandukly.
( b) For the construction of a line from some point on the east shore of Lake
Eghirdir to a point on the north or north-west coast of Lake Beyshehir,
such railway not to extend further in a southerly direction than the
latitude of Kazak Adassy.
2. Grant to the group which has undertaken the irrigation of the Plain of Ivonia
a Concession to construct a nam nv-gauge ‘ ‘ local ’ ’ railway laid, as far as possible,
along the navigation dams, connecting the station of Tchoum ra on the Bagdad Railway
to the shore of Lake Beyshehir at the Town of Beyshehir, such line to be operated by
the Bagdad Railway Company.
3. Grant to the “ English ” Company an authorisation for the navigation of Lake
Eghirdir and of Lake Beyshehir and to the ‘ ‘ German ’ ’ Companies an authorisation
for the navigation of Lake Beyshehir. The terms upon which the “ English ”
Company and the “ G erm a n ” Companies shall be authorised by the Ottoman
Governm ent to navigate Lake Beyshehir shall be in all respects identical.
It is understood that the authority to navigate Lake Beyshehir shall in no wav
interfere with any existing rights in connection with the irrigation works deriving
their supply of water from Lake Beyshehir.

A r t ic l e 2.

It is understood and agreed by and between the “ English ” Company and the
“ German ” Companies as follows :—
1. If and whenever the “ E n g lis h ” Company or the “ G e rm a n ” Companies
shall agree between themselves and with the Ottoman Government that it is desirable
for a junction to be made between the line to be constructed by the “ English ”
Company between the Lakes under Article 1, clause 1 ( b), and the line to be
constructed by the German group under Article 1, clause 2, that such junction shall
be made at Munafer on the eastern shore o f Lake Beyshehir. Failing agreement
between them, neither the “ English ” Company nor the “ German ” Companies
shall extend in any direction their respective lines as defined in Article 1 to any other
point on Lake Beyshehir.

* (N ote. I t is proposed to su b stitu te the form al a greem ent, as soon as sign ed, fo r this
d ocu m en t in the A n n ex.)
( 9) [T h e G erm an te x t was sim ilarly in itia lled “ L .” ]
 405
2. That the “ E n g lis h ” Company and the “ G erm a n ” Companies will enter
into an agreement which shall provide, inter alia :—

(a) That the rates charges regulations and facilities made by the “ English ”
Company and the ‘ ‘ German ’ ’ Companies in respect of the navigation of
Lake Beyshehir shall not be com petitive and shall be fixed from time to
time by agreement between the “ English ” Company and the “ German ”
Companies.
( b) That the rates charged b y the “ English ” Company from its terminus on
the north or north-west of Lake Beyshehir to seaports and the rates
charged by the “ G e rm a n ” Companies from their terminus on Lake
Beyshehir to seaports shall not be competitive and shall be fixed from time
to time by agreement between the ‘ ‘ English ’ ’ Company and the
‘ ‘ German ’ ’ Companies.

A r t ic l e 3.

The “ English ” Company has agreed with the Ottoman Government that the
' ‘ English ’ ’ Company shall have the option for a period of ten years, from the signing
o f the definite Concession for the construction of the branch to Sandukly, to extend
such branch to Afiun Karahissar, so as to effect a junction with the line of the
“ G e rm a n ” Companies. I f the “ E n g lis h ” Company shall not exercise its option
the Ottoman Governm ent shall be at liberty to call upon the ‘ ‘ English ’ ’ Company to
effect a junction at Afiun Karahissar and, if the ‘ 4 English ’ ’ Com pany shall be
unwilling to do so, the Ottoman Governm ent shall be at liberty itself to build the line
and thereby effect a junction between the lines of the “ English ” Company and the
lines of the *4 German ’ ’ Companies. It shall be a term of the construction of such
line by the Ottoman Government that it will indem nify the 44 English ” Company
against any loss or diversion of traffic that m ay be caused to the ‘ 4 English ’ ’ Company
by such junction being made.
The 44 English ” Company agrees that, if a junction is made, and if the
"‘ G e rm a n ” Companies desire it to do so, it will co-operate with the “ G e rm a n ”
Companies in obtaining from the Ottoman Government adequate guarantees for the
protection o f the 44 German ’ ’ Companies against the diversion of traffic and, so far
as m ay be desired, for a m odification or waiver of the “ counter-guarantee ” in respect
of the line o f the 44 German ” Companies between Eskishehir and Konia.
The “ G e rm a n ” Companies agree that they will not, at any time, oppose the
construction of a line b y the 44 English ” Company between Sandukly and Afiun
Karahissar and will, if the 44 English ” Company shall desire them to do so, co-operate
with the 44 English ’ ’ Company in obtaining from the Ottoman Governm ent adequate
guarantees for the protection of the 44 English ” Company against the diversion of
traffic.
If a junction is made at any time at Afiun Karahissar the 44 German ” Companies
will enter into an Agreem ent with the 44 English ’ ’ Company that the rates charged
by the 44 English ” Company and the 44 German ” Companies to seaports shall not be
competitive and shall from time to time be mutually agreed between the 44 English ”
Company and the 44 G erm a n ” Companies, who will mutually give to one another
reasonable traffic and other facilities.

A r t ic l e 4.

In the event of the 44 English ’ ’ Company and the 44 German ’ ’ Companies being
unable at any time to agree as to the rates, Ac., to be charged or made by them or
either of them from time to time under the terms of article 2, clause 2, and article 3
or as to the nature and extent of the traffic and other facilities to be offered under the
terms of article 3 the question in dispute shall be referred to arbitration in manner
hereinafter mentioned.
 406

A r t ic l e 5.

Any dispute or difference which may arise hereafter concerning the interpreta­
tion of these presents or of the formal Agreement to be entered into at an early date
in pursuance of these presents or of the rights, duties, and obligations of the
‘ ‘ English ’ ’ Company and the ‘ ‘ German ’ ’ Companies in connection with the matters
above mentioned shall, failing agreement, be referred to the sole decision of an
Arbitrator, to be appointed by the parties to such difference. Failing agreement, H er
Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands shall be invited to appoint the Arbitrator. The
decision of the Arbitrator shall, notwithstanding any law or custom whatsoever to the
contrary, be final and binding upon such parties.

A r t ic l e 6.

It is understood that the above arrangements will be incorporated in a formal

Agreem ent, of which the British and German Governments will be invited to take
official note. The said Governm ents will be invited, so far as they are concerned, to
undertake to uphold, individually and collectively, the agreement when concluded,
and to use their best endeavours in order that the terms thereof m ay be punctually
and faithfully com plied with.
Initialled, ad referendum .
B gm .
F . S.
London, March 28, 1914.

Text of N otes to be exchanged on Date of Signature of Anglo-G erm an Convention.

No. 1.

Draft of Note from Sir E. G rey to Prince Lichnowsky.

Your Excellency, Foreign Office, June , 1914.

Gn signing the Anglo-G erm an Convention respecting the Bagdad Railway, &c.,
I have the honour to state that the undertaking of His M ajesty’ s Government in
Section I of the Explanatory Note also covers the guarantees necessary to compensate
the Company for the revenues which had been allocated for the purposes of the
Railway, but, owing to the Balkan war, may no longer be available for such purposes.
This assurance is subject to the proviso that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent retain
such freedom of action as will permit the British Delegates at the Financial Commis­
sion at Paris to criticise the details of any scheme wiiicli m ay be put forward in regard
to the allocation of specific revenues. In default of some such reservation, the German
Governm ent will readily appreciate that the position of the British Delegates at Paris
m ight be rendered difficult in the complicated questions likely to come up for
discussion.
E. G.
L.

No. 2.

Draft of N ote from Prince L ichvow sky to Sir E. Grey.

(Geheim.) Kaiserlich D eutsche Botschaft,

Euerer Exzellenz, London, den Juni 1914.
Bei Unterzeichnung des deutsch-englischen Abkomm ens über die Bagdadbahn
und verwandte Fragen beehre ich mich, mit Beziehung auf Artikel 3 (c) des
 40 7

Abkomm ens und Abschnitt II I der ihm beigefügten erklärenden Note, Folgendes zu
erklären.
Falls nach Vollendung der Bagdadbahn von Chanekin bis Basra englische
Unternehmer oder die geplante Ottomanische Flussschiffahrtsgesellschaft durch
Verm ittlung der K öniglich Grossbritannischen Regierung den W unsch äussern
sollten, eine Eisenbahn von Kut-el-Am ara oder einem dieser Stadt benachbarten
Punkt über Bedrai hinaus nach Mendeli zu bauen, wird die Kaiserlich Deutsche.
R egierung Einwendungen gegen den Bau einer solchen Zubringerbahn weder daraus
herleiten, dass die Bahn mehr als 100 km. lang ist, noch daraus, dass Mendeli
m öglicherweise innerhalb der Schutzzone der Bahnlinie Bagdad-Chanekin liegt. Die
Bahn darf jedoch weder über Mendeli hinaus verlängert noch bei Mendeli an die
persische Grenze herangeführt werden, es sei denn, dass hierüber zuvor völlige
Ü bereinstim mung zwischen der Kaiserlich Deutschen und der Königlich
Grossbritannischen R egierungen erzielt ist.
Die Kaiserlich Deutsche Regierung legt W ert darauf, dass diese Note bis auf
W eiteres geheim bleibt und nicht ohne ihre ausdrückliche Zustim m ung
veröffentlicht wird.
L.
E . G.

No. 3.

Draft of N ote from Sir E. G rey to Prince Lichnowsky.

(Secret.)
Your E xcellency, Foreign Office, June , 1914.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your E xcellency’ s note of the
instant respecting a project for a railway from the Tigris to Mendeli, and to
state that H is M ajesty’ s Government agree with the conditions therein proposed.
E. G.
L.

No. 4.

Draft o f N ote from Sir E. G rey to Prince Lichnow sky respecting Irrigation Works.

Your Excellency, Foreign Office, June , 1914.

I have the honour to inform your E xcellency that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
will use their good offices with the Ottoman Governm ent, with the view of securing
that the principle of open com petition shall be upheld in regard to contracts or
concessions for future works of irrigation in Asiatic Turkey.
H is M ajesty’ s Government will not oppose a minor German participation in any
contracts or concessions which m ay be allotted to British subjects, provided that such
participation is deemed com m ercially desirable by the parties holding the said
contracts or concessions.
In agreeing to this arrangement, I desire to bring to your E xcellency’ s knowledge
the following clause in an agreement concluded between H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent
and the Ottoman Governm ent, which should in no way be prejudiced by the terms of
this note :—
“ E n tant qu’ il s’ agit de travaux d ’ irrigation à exécuter par le m oyen de
canaux se raccordant directement au Chatt-el-Arabe, il est toutefois entendu
qu’ ils ne seront pas autorisés par le Gouvernement Im périal Ottoman sans avoir
reçu l ’ approbation préalable de la Commission fluviale. Celle-ci aura le droit de
 408
surveiller les travaux dont il est question pour qu’ ils soient exécutés
conformém ent aux plans et devis autorisés."’ ( 10)

I have to add that His M ajesty’ s Governm ent will raise no objection to the
irrigation of the plain of Adana (for which, by virtue of existing agreements with the
Ottoman Government, German subjects have already carried out considerable
preliminary work) being definitely conceded to German subjects, and that they will
not support any claims which may be advanced by British subjects to compete in
regard to this enterprise. I understand that the German Governm ent will furnish to
His M ajesty’ s Government an authentic list, indicating accurately the area and scope
o f the works in question.

No. 5.

Draft of similar Note, mutatis mutandis, from Prince Lichnow sky to Sir E. Grey.
Kaiserlich D eutsche Botschaft,
London, den Juni 1914.
Euere Exzellenz beehre ich m ich davon in Kenntnis zu setzen, dass die
Kaiserlich Deutsche Regierung ihre guten Dienste bei der Kaiserlich Ottomanischen
Regierung anwenden wird, damit der Grundsatz des freien Wettbewerbs bei
Kontrakten und Konzessionen für künftige Bewässerungsarbeiten in der Asiatischen
Türkei aufrecht erhalten wird.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung wird gegen eine englische Minderheitsbeteiligung bei
Kontrakten oder Konzessionen, die deutschen Reichsangehörigen zugeteilt werden,
keine Einwendungen erheben, vorausgesetzt, dass die Inhaber des Kontrakts oder der
Konzession eine solche Beteiligung vom geschäftlichen Standpunkt für wünschenswert
erachten.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung nimmt ferner Kenntnis von der Vertrags­
bestimmung, ( n ) die in Euerer Exzellenz Note von heute angeführt ist und die mit
dem Schatt-el-Arab zusam m enhängenden Kanäle betrifft. Sie ist damit einverstanden,
dass diese Bestimm ung von der gegenwärtigen Vereinbarung in keiner W eise berührt
werden soll.
E ndlich wird die Kaiserliche Regierung keine Einwendungen dagegen erheben,
dass diejenigen Bewässerungsarbeiten in Mesopotamien, für die am 20. April 1912
nur englische Firm en Angebote gemacht haben, englischen Untertanen endgültig
übertragen werden; auch wird sie Bestrebungen deutscher Reichsangehöriger im
W ettbewerb mit diesen Bewässerungsarbeiten nicht unterstützen. Ich darf hierbei
voraussetzen, dass die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung der Kaiserlich
Deutschen Regierung ein authentisches Verzeichnis mitteilen wird, das die Art und
Lage der in Rede stehenden Arbeiten genau angibt.

( 10) [O n J u ly 2 it was agreed ad re fer en d u m b y M r. P a r k e r and H e r r von K ü h lm a n n

th a t th e fo llo w in g pa ra g ra p h should he su b stitu ted for the tw o p a ra g ra p h s “ In a g reein g . . . .
devis autorisés ” : —
I desire to in form y ou r E x cellen cy th a t the O ttom an G overn m en t have g iv en form al
assurances to H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] (i) th a t w henever ir rig a tio n w orks b y m eans
o f canals d irectly con n ected w ith th e S h a tt-el-A ra b are in co n tem p la tion th e proposed
R iv e r a in C om m ission w ill be con su lted , and (ii) th a t the Com m ission m ay in terv en e to
cause the d iscon tin u a n ce o f any w orks which m ig h t con s titu te an im p edim en t to n a v ig a ­
tion . These assurances should in n o w ay he p r e ju d ic e d b y the presen t N ote.

This a m endm ent and the one g iv en in fra , n o te ( u ), w ere in serted , as a m in u te hv M r. P a rk er

stated, “ so as to corresp on d to the la test proposals o f the T u rk s.” A subsequent m in u te by
M r. P a r k e r sta ted “ H e r r v on S ch u bert in form ed m e on J u ly 17 th a t the G erm an G overnm ent
agree to the a m endm ents.” (F.O . 2 9 9 1 5 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
C11) [T he am endm ent a greed on J u ly 2 su b stitu ted fo r “ der V e r tra g s b e stim m u n g ” the
w ords “ den Zu sa gen der K a iserlich en O ttom anischen R e g ie r u n g ” ; an d “ Zu sa gen ” for
“ B e s tim m u n g ” tw o lines below , an d m a de the necessary a ltera tion s in th e verbs follow in g .]
 409

N o. 250.

Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edicard G r e y J 1)

F .O . 27125 '2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 345.) Constantinople, June 1G, 1914.
Your telegram No. 2G2 o f 12th June(2) : Negotiations with Turkey.
Grand Vizier promises to try and meet your views in regard to additional article
o f Monopolies Agreem ent. Hakki Pasha will be instructed to propose formula which
he hopes will prove acceptable. He would prefer to discuss the other two questions
after conclusion o f present negotiations.
He wishes you to understand that this does not mean that he is opposed to
granting your requests. On the contrary, he is very anxious to meet you and to
encourage British capital to com e to this country.

P ) [T h e t e x t g iv en a bove is ta ken from the C on fid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l d ecy p h er

ca n n ot be tra ced . A co p y was sent to th e In d ia O ffice; and a p a ra ph ra se to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e ]
( 2) [v . supra, p. 397, X o . 243.]

No. 251.

Sir L . Mallet to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)

F.O . 29114 '2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .

(No. 452.) Therapia, D. June 23, 1914.
Sir, R . June 29, 1914.
I enclose a copy of the Note which I addressed to the Sublime Porte on the
21st instant making the consent o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent for the prolongation
of the surtax beyond July 1st dependent upon the settlement of the various questions
now under discussion between the two Governments including that o f the petroleum
wells in Mesopotamia. I saw His Highness yesterday and reinforced the Note by an
urgent appeal to him to save His M ajesty’ s Governm ent the painful necessity of
withholding their consent to this surtax, to which His Highness replied that he was
as anxious as you were to terminate these tedious negotiations and would discuss
the whole matter with the Ministers to-day, exerting all his influence in favour of
the conclusion o f the agreement at once. It was finally arranged that I should
call on H is H ighness at Yenikeuy to-morrow evening to receive m y reply.
I need not point out the extreme inconvenience wrhich would be caused by
definitely withholding our consent to the levy o f the 3 % after the 1st July but in
the event of the Turks proving recalcitrant it will be necessary to carry the matter
through in spite of the financial chaos which our action will entail according to
Sir R . Crawford. The Russian consent, limited to one year pending the settlement
o f the question of a Russian representative on the Council o f the Debt, was given
last week. In this connection I am inform ed that it is now unlikely that the German
Government will insist both on a second delegate and on the alternate presidency,
but that they will be satisfied with the latter. The consent of the United States
Government is likewise limited to one year pending the settlement o f certain out­
standing questions connected with the numerous American Missions and scholastic
establishments in this country.
I reported in m y despatch No. 72 Commercial o f M ay 13th last(2) the arrange­
ment under which Germany agreed to the continuation of the surtax also for one

0 ) [A co p y o f th is despa tch was sent t o th e B o a rd o f T ra d e.]

(2) [S ir L . M a lle t’ s despa tch (X o . 72, C om m ercia l), D . M a y 13, R . M a y IS, 1914, is n ot
rep rod u ced , as th e con ten ts a re sufficiently in d ic a te d above. (F .O . 2 2 0 4 9 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
 410

year. The other Powers having given their consent, that o f His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment is now alone in doubt.
I also enclose copy of a note rem inding the Porte of the necessity of obtaining
the consent o f the minor Powers to the continuation o f the surtax as instructed in
your telegram No. 257 of the 10th instant.(3)
I have, Ac.
LO U IS M A L L E T .

Enclosure 1 in No. 251.

Sir L . M allet to Halim Pasha.

Urgente.
Altesse, Constantinople, le 21 juin, 1914.
D ’ordre de mon gouvernement j ’ ai l ’honneur d ’ attirer votre attention très
sérieuse sur les considérations suivantes relatives aux négociations qui se poursuivent
actuellement à Londres.
(1) Son Altesse Hakki Pacha vient de com m uniquer à Sir E . Grev un projet
modifié de la Convention sur le Règlem ent des Réclamations Pécuniaires britanniques.
L ’ adoption de ce projet comporterait un changement si radical du texte, tel qu’ il a
déjà été paraphé il y a quelque temps, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique
n ’ a pu qu’ être vivement surpris de la com m unication, d ’ autant plus que Son Altesse
Hakki Pacha a eu depuis des mois pleine connaissance de la manière de voir de
Sir E . Grey à ce sujet, ce qui lui aurait permis de proposer antérieurement toute
modification qui pût sembler nécessaire à son Gouvernement.
(2'i Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique remarque en outre qu’après
avoir perdu un mois entier à étudier les détails des listes de réclamations le Gouverne­
ment Ottoman propose maintenant d ’ en ajourner la rédaction jusqu’ à ce que le
Tribunal d ’ Arbitrage prévu par le projet de Convention com m ence se6 séances.
(3) Mon Gouvernement se plaint également des retards réitérés apportés à la
signature définitive des autres accords, y compris ceux relatifs aux gisements
pétrolifères de la Mésopotamie et au Chemin de Fer de S m yrne-A ïdin , ainsi que
l ’ arrangement général au sujet des autres Chemins de Fer, dont la conclusion a
toujours été une condition de son adhésion à la majoration éventuelle des droits de
douane de 4 % .
C’ est en conséquence de ces considérations que Sir E . Grev me charge de faire
part à Votre Altesse, aussi instamment que je le puis, de son vœu que Son Altesse
Hakki Pacha soit autorisé télégraphiquement dès à présent de procéder à la rédaction
immédiate et définitive des listes de réclamations pécuniaires et de signer
définitivement les accords sur le règlement de ces réclamations et sur les
M onopoles, Ac. E n attendant une réponse favorable à cette demande j ’ ai l ’ordre de
déclarer à Votre Altesse que mon Gouvernement n ’ adhère que pour une période d ’ une
semaine à partir du 24 courant à la prolongation de la majoration des droits de
douanes de 3 % demandée par la Note Verbale Circulaire du Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères en date du 20 mai 1914.(4)
Je profite, Ac.
LO U IS M A L L E ’T .

( 3Ï TSir E d w a rd G rey ’ s telegram (N o. 257) o f J u n e 10, 1914, D . 12 noon, is not reprod uced .
It expressed a greem ent w ith the F ren ch A m b assa d or’ s proposal re g a rd in g the assent o f the
P ow ers to the 3 % Custom s in crease, as q u oted in S ir L. M a lle t’ s telegram (N o. 326) o f J u n e 9.
This proposal is em b odied in the n ote g iv en in fra (e n d . 2). (F.O . 2 5 9 1 6 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
(4) [S ir L. M a lle t’ s despatch (N o. 83, C om m ercial), D. M a y 22, R . M a y 26, 1914, is not
rep rod u ced . The N o te V erb ale from th e P o rte , a skin g fo r the con sen t o f H is M a jesty ’ s
G overn m en t to the “ con tin u ed levy o f the 3 % custom s in crease a fte r J u n e 25th, 1914,” was
enclosed in this despatch. (F.O . 2 3 4 7 5 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
 411

E n closu re 2 in N o. 251.

Sir L . Mallet to Halim Pasha.

Altesse, Constantinople, le 21 juin, 1914.
Me référant à la Note urgente que je Vous adresse aujourd’ hui au sujet du cours
des négociations qui se poursuivent à Londres je crois devoir rappeler à Votre Altesse
que, quand même les autres obstacles à l ’ adhésion de m on Gouvernement à la
prolongation indéfinite de la surtaxe douanière de 3°{, disparaîtraient avant le
1er juillet com m e je l ’ espère, la troisième disposition du Protocole du 25 août, 1907,(5)
devrait toujours être appliqué pour ladite prolongation au même titre que lors de
l ’établissement de la surtaxe.
Je profite, &c.
LO U IS M A L L E T .

M IN U T E .

The R u ssia n G o v [e rn m e n ]t have only a greed fo r one y ea r t o th e su rtax , p e n d in g the

settlem en t o f th e q u estion o f R u ssia n rep resen ta tion on th e D ebt.
A. P .
J u lv 2, 1914
G. R . C.
2 .v ii.l4 .
E. A . C.
J u ly 2.
A. N.

(5) [T h e p r o to co l was sig n ed on A p ril 25, 1907. cp. G ooch cù T em p erley , V ol. V , p. 199,
No. 155, encl. It g av e th e consent o f th e P ow ers t o the in crea se o f the custom s from 8 % to 1 1 % ,
on certa in con d ition s, fo r a p eriod o f seven years, v. also B .F S .P ., V ol. 100, pp. 5 7 5 -8 .]

No. 252.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward G rey.I})

F.O. 2 8 5 3 4 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 377.) Constantinople, June 24, 1914.
I have seen both Grand Vizier and Minister of Finance to-day, and am promised
definite answer to-morrow.
Minister of Finance said that he thought Governm ent would accept Pecuniary
Claims Convention, but intimated that they would not give way about Ottoman director
on S m yrna-A idin Railway. Our refusal to accept this had made a most disagreeable
impression. E very other railway in Turkey had some Ottoman directors, including
all the new F rench lines. English com pany was alone in refusing without giving any
reasons. Turkish Government were unable to make a special exception in the case of
this com pany. It was a question of am our-propre upon which they could not give
way. I argued at length, but to no avail. I should have thought that this was a
small point which com pany should be made to yield.
As to oil, he went over all the old ground, but finally said that if we and Germany
would support them in resisting similar demands by France and Russia for Syria and
eastern vilayets it would facilitate solution.
I said that it would be useless to ask you for such an assurance.
He m ay possibly prefer some form of words admitting that the case of
Mesopotamia is exceptional, and recognising that the m ining law is applicable in
other parts o f the Empire.
(D [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P rin t, as the orig in a l d ecy p h er
ca n n ot b e tra ced . P a rap h ra ses w ere sent to the In d ia O ffice; to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
 412

I discussed the whole question of our relations with Turkey, and incidentally
alluded to large concessions given to other countries in comparison with us. He
denied this, and said that France was giving them more than the Porte had any right
to hope for. In addition to the immense loan which had saved their lives, French
capitalists were investing over 25 millions in railways which Turkey wished to see
built. On all these lines there wrere two or three Ottoman directors. The French
Government had treated with them in a most liberal spirit. H is M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment are, on the other hand, asking for feeder lines for riverain navigation, and hold
out no prospect of construction of those lines. If I could give him a list of lines which
English capitalists would put m oney into in the course o f a year or two, he would give
them at once.
H e asked for nothing better than British assistance, which was, however, not
forthcom ing. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent m erely wished to earmark certain districts
in which no one else was to build railways, and of what good was that to Turkey?
As for 3 per cent., he affected to make light of threat to withdraw it, which would
affect the Debt much more than the P orte; but this indifference is in part assumed,
as I know from other sources that the Government are much concerned. The Grand
Vizier said that the fact o f the threat having been made had rendered his position
much more difficult, as he had been working for the conclusion of all the agreements,
but that the Porte could not possibly give way to a threat of this kind.
My German colleague is convinced that we shall certainly obtain what we want
with a little patience. I told him that you must have everything settled before
1st July. H e thinks that answer will be favourable to-morrow, but, if not, he will put
in another note threatening to refuse monopolies, should I wish it.
In view of inclusion o f oil question in 3 per cent, ultimatum, of which he is not
aware, I have not thought it necessary to carry out that part of your instructions. As
an immediate solution of pending questions does not seem to be probable, we must
contemplate refusal of 3 per cent, after 1st July. I suppose that merchants should
pay under protest. I f so I should like early instructions, as consuls must be instructed
as soon as possible. Crawford is in consternation at the prospect.

[E D . N O T E .— S ir E d w a rd G re y ’ s re p ly to this teleg ram is g iv en in his teleg ram (N o. 281)

o f J u n e 26, 1914, D . 6-15 p . m . H e em phasised the necessity t o u rg e up on th e G ra n d V iz ie r the
arg u m en ts alrea d y tra n sm itted to him , chiefly in L o rd R a th m o re ’ s letter o f J u n e 10, 1914,
fo rw a rd e d to S ir L. M a llet in despa tch (N o. 378) on J u n e 12. (F.O . 2 6 3 0 3 /7 5 6 /1 4 /4 4 .) The
teleg ram is n ot rep rod u ced as the G rand V iz ie r ’ s decision was g iv en oil th e follow in g day,
J u n e 25, v. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docum ent. (F .O . 2 8 5 3 4 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]

No. 253.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 2 8 7 0 3 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 380.) Constantinople, June 25, 1914.
My telegram No. 377 of 24th June.(2)
Grand Vizier told me this m orning that Porte agreed to give Turkish Petroleum
Company lease of concession of oil-wells of Mesopotamia subject to details being
settled between com pany and Ministry.
They would also instruct Hakki Pasha to accept Pecuniary Claims Convention,
though they could not understand why we would not accept what was acceptable to
the French Government.

0 ) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta k en from the C onfid en tial P rin t, as th e o rig in a l decyph er

ca n n ot be traced . P arap h ra ses w ere sent to the A d m ir a lty ; to the In d ia O ffice; to th e B oa rd
o f T ra d e .]
( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
 41 3
They must, however, insist on admission o f Turkish directors to board of Smyrna
Railway. E very other foreign railway com pany had accepted this, and it was a subject
upon which they felt very strongly.
Just after leaving his H ighness, whom I fear I shall not be able to see until
Saturday, I received your telegram No. *279 of 24th June./3) I have visited m y
German colleague, who tells me that his negotiations are not yet finished, but are
progressing satisfactorily. They might possibly be finished in about a week’ s time.
He will keep me inform ed. H e has sent to ask for his answer respecting share of oil
concession. W e propose to ask for it in writing.
I have ceaselessly pressed upon Grand Yizier and upon all his colleagues
inconvenience of delay, and they are fully aware o f your wish to have everything
settled by 1st July. I have made every endeavour to persuade Djavid B ey yesterday
to agree to your proposal respecting Shatt-el-Arab Commission, but he flatly refused,
and said that he could not go further than g i v i n g them the right to be consulted. He
said that they had undertaken to keep the river open to navigation, which should be
a sufficient guarantee o f their good faith. I will, however, again urge your wishes
upon the Grand Yizier, if possible, to-morrow.
(3) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (X o . 279) o f J u n e 24, 1914, D. 3-45 p . m ., is n ot rep rod u ced .
S ir L . M a llet was u rg ed t o persu a de th e G ra n d V iz ie r to con clu d e th e T u rco-G erm a n n eg otia ­
tion s b y a g r e e in g to the clause “ g iv in g S h a tt-el-A ra b C o m m [issio ]n co n tr o l ov er ir rig a tio n
w orks b y ca n a ls con n ected w ith S h a tt-el-A ra b .” S ir E d w a rd G rey added th a t “ in v iew o f
g rea t im p orta n ce o f n a v ig a tio n w e m ust press fo r C o m m [issio ]n t o h a ve u ltim a te decision in
reg a rd t o a n y w orks w hich m ay a ffect it .” (F .O . 2 7 9 2 0 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .)]

No. 254.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward G rcy.(')

F.O. 2 8 7 0 4 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 381.) Constantinople, June 25, 1914.
M y im m ediately preceding telegram of to-d av.(2)
The Grand Yizier said that it was not necessary for His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
to menace the Porte, who were very anxious to meet their views, but he begged you
to show some consideration for their difficulties. I asked his Highness to read very
attentively the terms o f m y note respecting 3 per cent., which did not, as a matter of
fact, contain any threat.(3)
H is Highness said that threat was implied.
(! ) T he t e x t g iv en a bove is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l decy ph er
c a n n ot be tra ce d .]
(2) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [t\ supra, p. 411, X o . 251, encl. 2.]

No. 255.

Sir L. M allet to Sir Edward G r ey .{x)

F.O. 2 8 7 0 5 /2 4 7 1 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 382.) Constantinople, June 25, 1914.
M y telegram No. 380 of to-d ay.(2)
After granting lease o f Mesopotamian oilfields this m orning his H ighness said
that in return he hoped that His M ajesty’ s Government would consider favourably

(*) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t, as th e o rig in a l decyph er

ca n n ot he tra ced . C opies w ere sent to th e A d m ir a lty ; to th e In d ia O ffice; an d a p a ra ph ra se
t o th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
( 2) [v. sup ra , pp . 412-3, X o . 253.]
 414

request which Porte were going to put forward to them, the nature of which he but
briefly outlined, stating that he would send me a written note on the subject.
They were going to ask us to negotiate a commercial treaty on the basis of
international law. He said that all other Powers had agreed.
I asked my French colleague if this was the case so far as France was concerned,
and he gave me article in French agreement ; it runs as follows :—

‘ ‘ L e Gouvernement français accepte de négocier avec le Gouvernement

ottoman un accord destiné à régler les échanges com m erciaux entre les deux pays
sur la base du droit international, à la condition que toutes les Puissances
intéressées consentent elles-mêmes à tiaiter sur cette base.”

My German colleague tells me in confidence that he lias not yet signed, but
intends to propose to the Turkish Governm ent wording to the effect that the German
Governm ent accepts on the same terms as the French, but with the insertion after the
word ‘ ‘ international ’ ’ of the words ‘ ‘ in accordance with German treaty of
(? 1890).” (3)
The effect of this reference to treaty is to make the interpretation of the new
article a little doubtful and to leave a loophole.
My French colleague thinks that it is impossible to refuse Turkish request, and
sees no harm in treating the Turkish Governm ent in this respect like any other
Government.
I hope to hear some particulars from Crawford to-day.

(3) [cp . B .F .S .P ., V ol. 82, pp. 128-201.]

No. 256.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L. M allet.(')

F.O. 2 87 0 5 /2 4 71 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 284.) Foreign Office, June 26, 1914, 6 -1 0 p .m .
Your telegram No. 382.(2)
Please inform Grand Vizier that H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s G o v e rn m e n t] agree to
continuance of levy of 3 % if all the other Powers do so. I rely however upon Ottoman
G ov [ern m en ]t not making unreasonable stipulations in the negotiation of details with
Turkish Petroleum Company.
I am not quite clear as to what is intended by negotiation of a com m ercial treaty
“ on basis of international law,” or what is desired beyond the assent we have already
given, subject to certain conditions, to conversion of 15% ad valorem into a specific
tariff; but Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] m ay inform Grand Vizier that we are prepared to
give any proposal he may make on the subject our favourable consideration, though we
cannot agree to its being made a condition of grant of Mesopotamian concession which
is part of the bargain to which our assent to m onopolies constitutes the counterpart.

(M [C op ies o f th is teleg ram w ere sent to th e A d m ir a lty ; to the In d ia O ffice; to the B oa rd

o f T ra d e.]
( 2) [v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
 415

Xo. 257.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet .( ’ )

F.O. 2 9 2 4 1 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 290.) Foreign Office, July 2, 1914, 1 -2 0 p . m .
Hakki Pasha has suggested a new article in m onopolies agreem ent(2) in following
terms :—
“ Le Gouvernement de S ra] M [a jesté] britannique accepte de négocier avec
le Gouvernement Im périal ottoman un accord destiné à régler les échanges
com m erciaux entre les deux pays sur la base du droit international public à la
condition que toutes les Puissances intéressées consentent elles-mêmes à traiter
sur cette base.”
I am consulting the Board of Trade about this proposal, but it seems to render
valueless the three conditions to which I made subject, in the declaration signed on
July 29, 1913,(3) our assent to negotiate a specific tariff with Turkey, and it would, in
the opinion o f Mr. W augh whom I have consulted, be an undertaking of very
far-reaching consequences, involving the abandonment o f certain com m ercial safe­
guards. It is, in any case, a matter which requires most careful and prolonged
consideration, and I think it is unreasonable for Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t to put forward
this fresh stipulation now as a condition of signing the m onopolies agreement, which
has twice been initialled by Hakki Pasha already, and which I am anxious to conclude
at once. I should be glad to receive Y [o u r ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s observations by telegram.
( J) [A c o p y o f this teleg ram was sent to th e B oa rd o f T r a d e ; a co p y o f the d ecla ra tion o f
J u ly 29, 1913, a n d o f the p roposed new a rticle in the “ m on opolies a g r e e m e n t ” w as also sent
to P rin ce L ich n ow sk y .]
( 2) [v. supra, p. 396, Ed. .Vote.]
( 3) [v. sup ra , pp. 196-7, X o . 124 (6 ).]

[E D . N O T E .— On J u ly 3, S ir E d w a rd G rev sent the follow in g note to P rin ce L ich n ow sky

(F .O . 2 7 1 3 5 /4 6 0 1 /1 4 /4 4 ): —
F o r e ig n Office, J u ly 3, 1914.
S ir E. G rey presents his com p lim en ts to th e G erm an A m bassador and has th e hon ou r
to suggest th a t the w ord s “ pecu n ia ry c la im s ” in the E n g lish version , a n d “ ueber
G eld reklam a tion en ” in the G erm an version , o f the 1st section o f th e e x p la n a to ry n ote
a n n exed to th e d r a ft A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion res p ectin g the B a g d a d R a ilw a y a n d cog n a te
m a tters should be om itted . The reason fo r th is a ltera tion is th a t the p rov ision as to
secu rity fo r pa ym en t o f the p ecu n ia ry claim s is n ot to be m ade in the P e cu n ia r y C laim s
C on v en tion , b u t in an oth er C on v en tion , in w h ich the assent o f H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t
to the m onopolies, &c., w ill be g iven.

F o r the t e x t o f S ection I o f the E x p la n a to ry X o t e , v. supra, p. 402, X o . 249, en cl.]

No. 258.

Sir L . M allet to Sir Edward G rey.(')

F.O. 3 0 4 4 7 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 . Constantinople, D. July 5, 1914.

Tel. (No. 408.) R. July 6, 1914.
Your telegram No. 290 of 2nd J u ly(2) : Anglo-Turkish negotiations.
I inform ed Grand Vizier that insertion of article in Monopolies Agreem ent
respecting Commercial Treaty would delay negotiation of that agreement, as His

( x) [T he te x t giv en above is ta k en from the C onfid en tial P r in t, as the o rig in a l d ecy p h er

ca n n ot be tra ced . A co p y was sent to the In d ia Office, and a paraph ra se o f the second p a rt
o f th e teleg ram to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
( 2) [i>. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
 416

M ajesty’ s Government could not be expected to consent so readily as the other Powers,
their position being quite different owing to absence of tariff in England. Turkish
Government must give them time to think over this proposition. I had already told
his Highness that you were ready to consider in friendly spirit any proposal which his
Government might make, and that should be sufficient for the present. His Highness
agreed, but said that he would like you to answer Hakki Pasha’ s proposal to the effect
that you would give it your favourable consideration.
i would recomm end that you should give answer which would satisfy Hakki Pasha
without absolutely com m itting you. German negotiation on this point is not finished.
M y German colleague has gone to Berlin. It would be as well to await result of these
negotiations. They may find formula which would safeguard our interests also. I f
they know that we shall refuse they will be able to accept relying on our refusal.
Italian Treaty of Lausanne (3) explains clearly what Turkish Governm ent wants,
namely, freedom to negotiate commercial treaty like any other European Power
untrammelled by Capitulations.
It is undoubtedly serious and far-reaching demand involving greater risks for us
than for other Powers, and it is a proposal to which the Board of Trade will inevitably
be strongly op p osed ; but, on political grounds, I am of opinion that it is worth our
while to consider in what ways and under what limitations we could agree to consider
it. Crawford will be in England in three weeks’ time and could give you any necessary
explanation.

(3) [cp. G ooch cfc T em p erley, V ol. I X (I), pp. 438-42, N o. 466, encl.']

No. 259.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir L . M allet.(?)

F.O. 3 1 2 9 8 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 308.) Foreign Office, July 14. 1914, noon.
Your tel[egra m ] No. 423.(2)
In view of right acquired by D am ascus-H om s Railway C o[m p a n y ], Y [o u r]
E [x ce llen cy ] should ask Grand Vizier for an assurance that that right will not be
held to debar British interests from acquiring a concession in the future for a through
line from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.
There is no question of such a line at present, but it may some day be desirable
in both British and Turkish interests, and H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] trust
that the Ottoman G ov [ern m en ]t will agree that such an assurance is a reasonable
precaution.

( 0 [T h is teleg ram was rep eated b y post to P a r is (N o. 4 5 9 ); to C a iro (N o. 222).]

( 2) [S ir L. M a llet’ s teleg ram (N o. 423) o f J u ly 10, 1914, D. 12-30 p . m ., R . 1-15 p . m ., is not
rep rod u ced . I t referred to a clause in the F ren ch C on v en tion res p ectin g railw ay concessions
in A ra b ia , reserving to the H e d ja z R a ilw a y the rig h t to b u ild a bra n ch lin e east and west o f
the line betw een D am ascus and M a a n ; if th is w ere n ot b u ilt b y the H e d ja z R a ilw a y it w ould
be b u ilt by the D am a scu s-H om s R a ilw a y C om pany. S ir L. M a llet stated th a t he th ou g h t the
G rand V iz ie r was ig n o r a n t o f this clause, as he had s a id : “ never, u n d er any circum stan ces,
w ould they allow foreig n ers to bu ild a n y bra n ch lines o f H e d ja z lines.” (F .O . 3 1 2 98 /46 0 1/
1 4 /4 4 .)] ‘
 417

N o. 260.

Sir Edu-ard G rey to M r. Beaum ont .( x)

F.O. 33073/2390 14/44.

Tel. (No. 3150 Foreign Office, July 19, 1914, 12-15 p . m .
I had a few days ago represented to German Embassy the importance I attach
to an early conclusion of the Turco-Germ an negotiations,/-) owing to their bearing
upon the Anglo-Turkish negotiations. The following telegram has been received in
reply by the German Embassy from Berlin :—
“ W e too have a great interest in concluding as soon as possible our negotia­
tions with Turkey. These negotiations, however, are not retarded by exorbitant
claims o f the Bagdad Bailway Company but only by Djavid B e y ’ s obstinacy. Last
week long conversations took place between the German Foreign Office, Baron
von W angenheim , who for this purpose only had been asked to come to Berlin,
and the Constantinople Director of the Bagdad Bailway Company. The result of
these conversations was to meet the Turkish wishes as far as possible and to show
the utmost limit of concession we are able to agree to. These are. the conditions
under which the negotiations have been renewed. Should they not prove
successful, a contingency which is hardly to be expected, Turkish obstinacy alone
would be responsible and to be blamed. It would probably be of good service if
Sir E. Grey would use his influence with Djavid B ey by seriously representing
to him how the matter stands.”

You should continue to urge upon the Ottoman G ov rernm en]t the great
importance I attach to conclusion of the British negotiations forthwith. If this is not
practicable I shall have to interrupt all negotiation for two months, during the leave
season. I am anxious to avoid this as it would entail financial loss to Turkey through
the non-imposition of the higher customs duties.
( !) [T h is teleg ra m was rep ea ted to B erlin (N o. 186). C opies w ere sent to the B o a rd o f
T r a d e ; to th e In d ia O ffice.]
(2) [F o r referen ce to these n e g otia tion s cp. sup ra , p. 413, N o. 253, n ote ( 3).]

No. 261.

Mr. Beaum ont to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)

F .O . 33170'2390 14,44.
Tel. (No. 445.) Constantinople, July 21, 1914.
Your telegram No. 309 o f 14th o f J u ly .(2)
To accelerate conclusion o f M onopolies Agreem ent, Minister o f Finance is ready
to forgo insertion of the clause respecting negotiation o f commercial agreement on
basis o f international law, but he attaches utmost importance to acceptance of proposal
in principle, which might be done by separate com m unication either here or in
London. H e says that he will positively refuse to sign anything with Germany

t1) [T he te x t g iv en above is e n d o rse d : “ R ev ised te x t o f M r. B ea u m on t’ s tele g r a m .”

T he orig in a l d ecy p h er ca n n ot b e tra ced . A cop y was sent to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 309) o f J u ly 14, 1914. D . 5 p . m ., is n ot rep rod u ced .
In it he sta ted th a t H a k k i P asha was still pressin g fo r the in clu sion o f th e a rticle q u oted in
his teleg ram (N o. 290) (r . supra, p. 415, N o. 257). in the m on opolies a greem ent. S ir E d w a rd
G rey said fu r th e r that it w ou ld be im p ru d en t to a gree t o it unless it w ere expressly sta ted th a t
it w ould “ in no w ay in v a lid a te the reserv ation s m ade in the decla ra tion w hich I sign ed on
J u ly 29, 1913, . . . . i f new clause is in serted w ith reservation s previou sly m ade its p u rp o r t
w ould be ob scu re or its in sertion w ould be superflu ou s.’ ’ (v. supra, pp. 196-7, N o. 124 (6).)
S ir L. M a llet was u rg ed to ex p lain the situ a tion to the G ra n d V iz ie r and to “ en d eav ou r to
g et clause w ith d ra w n .” H e was also in stru cted to en q u ire as to the progress o f th e T u rco-
G erm an n eg otia tion s. (F .O . 3 1 9 7 8 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
[10900] 2 E
 418

which does not contain unqualified admission of Turkey’ s freedom to negotiate under
the same conditions as any other independent country and that Russia’ s consent
is already assured. Our refusal to make this concession would therefore prevent
commercial negotiations with France and Austria, Italy, Russia, and Germany. He
admits that it is idle to pretend that phrase only means free hand in Customs
administration as Ilakki Pasha and Crawford seemed to im ply. It is economic
independence o f Turkey which he wants to secure. W e would, he declares have
nothing to lose by form ally admitting this, and there would be no need for us to
negotiate at once, his only wish being to clear the way for other negotiations.
Bagdad Railway negotiations are progressing slowly. They (i.e ., Bagdad Railway
Company) want original agreement altered under conditions which will cost Turkey
£100.000 a year more at once, and eventually, as railway is built, at least another
£100,000. ' '
Ile will be in Paris during the first fortnight of August, but, as things are at
present, he thinks it will he useless to go to Berlin.
Our admission of principle at issue might hasten conclusion of the Bagdad
negotiations.

No. 262.

Mr. Beaum ont to Sir Edward G rey .(')

P .O . 3 31 5 8 /4 6 01 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 446.) Constantinople, July 21, 1914.
Railway from Mediterranean to Persian Gulf.
On the receipt of your telegram No. 308 of l lth J u ly ,(2) I left with Grand Vizier
memorandum asking for required assurance. Djavid now states that nothing in the
text o f the Franco-Turkish Agreem ent, which he has promised to com m unicate,
would preclude application by British interests for such a concession. He seemed
to think we wanted guarantee in this connection, and I told him that assurance asked
for contained no reference to this. He evidently does not consider the matter of
much practical importance, and expressed surprise that there should be any idea
o f building what would be a third trunk line in the same direction as two which
would cross desert.

M IN U T E .
I th in k we can d rop the m a tter now.
A . P.
Jillv 23, 1914.
G. R . C.
23.vii.14.
E. A C.
J u ly 23.

(>) [T he te x t g iven above is ta k en from th e C onfidential P r in t as th e o rig in a l decypher

ea n n ot be tra ced .]
( 2) [v. supra, p. 416, No. 259.]
 41 9
N o. *263.

M r. Beaumont to Sir Edward G r e y .( l)

F .O . 33662 '2 3 9 0 /1 4 ,4 4 .
Tel. (No. 453.) Constantinople, July 24, 1914.
Your telegram No. 320 of 23rd J u ly(2) : Anglo-Turkish Convention,
monopolies, &c.
Principle which Turkish Government wish admitted is that of their complete
independence in econom ic matters, including right to fix customs duties and negotiate
commercial treaties like any other nation. Acceptance by all the Powers of formula
inserted in article 10 of Franco-Turkish agreement and which Turkish Government
want to insert in our M onopolies Convention would, they think, secure this.
Grand Vizier stated to me the other day that it was intolerable for Turkey to
continue to go round Europe begging for permission to make alterations in her fiscal
arrangements absolutely necessary to enable her to balance her budget, and that he
personally had been disposed to defy the Powers and impose tariff without their
consent.
Crawford should by now have arrived in London from Paris.
M IN U T E S .
I t is m ost unreason able o f T u rk ey to sp rin g th is up on us a t the eleventh hour, and I am
stron gly o f op in io n th a t we should n ot a gree to it.
A. P.
J u ly 24, 1914.

S in ce w ritin g th e above m in u te I have had a lon g con v ersation w ith S ir R . C raw ford and
subm it a d r a ft t e l[e g r a in ] to M r. B ea u m on t.(3)
A. P .
G. R . C.
24.vii.14.
E. A. C.
J u ly 24.

(*) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta ken from th e C onfidential P r in t, as th e orig in a l d ecypher

ca n n ot be tra ced . A paraph ra se w as sent to the B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [S ir E d w a rd G re y 's teleg ram (N o. 320) o f J u ly 23, 1914, D. 4-50 P.m ., is not rep rod u ced .
I n it he sta ted th a t if M in ister o f F in a n ce w ould com m u n ica te a “ d eta iled sta tem en t o f w hat
he wishes H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v [e r n m e n ]t to a gree t o th e m a tter w ill b e fu lly e x a m in ed .”
(F.O . 3 3 1 7 0 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
(3) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 264.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. B ea um ont.(')

F.O . 3 3 6 6 2 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 .
Tel. (No. 326.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914, 6 -2 0 p . m .
Your telegrams Nos. 445 (2) and 453(3).
I have discussed question fully with Sir P . Crawford. He states that Djavid
B ey and the Grand Vizier are obviously bluffing about additional article, and that
all that is really expected is that H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s ] G o v e rn m e n t] should agree to
greater freedom for dealing with contraband and such matters. If this is so, the
draft proposed is m isleading, and the Ottoman Government had better send a written
statement, either through you or through Hakki Pasha, explaining precisely what
they do want. Meanwhile m uch time is being lost and no progress is made.
(*) [A p a ra ph ra se o f th is teleg ram w as sent to th e B oa rd o f T ra d e.]
(2) [p. supra, pp. 417-8, N o. 261.]
(3) [ •). im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]

[10900] 2 E 2
 42 0
[E D . N O T E .— The follow in g m inu tes (F .O . 4 1 1 2 5 /2 3 9 0 /1 4 /4 4 ) are o f som e in terest in view
o f th e preced in g docum ents : —
Urgent.
T receiv ed a telegram from H a k k i P asha, whom I had not seen fo r a m onth, asking m e to
ca ll on him. I did so this m orning.
H e said he had been th in k in g ov er ou r agreem ents as a ffected by the w ar. H e was m ost
a n xiou s th a t the agreem ents should n ot be suspended, and he saw no reason w hy they should
be, in so fa r as G erm any was not d ire c tly in volved . H e th ou g h t th erefore th a t the agreem ents
rela tin g (1) to the P ersian G ulf, (2) to th e S h a tt-el-A ra b conservan cy, (31 t o n a vig ation on the
T ig ris and E uphrates, (4) to the T urkish custom s increase and other concessions to T u rkey
agreed to on J u ly 29th, 1913, m ig h t be ratified forth w ith . T u rk ey w ould g iv e us an assurance,
fo r w hich a form u la w ould have to be fou n d , th a t she w ould com e to a settlem ent sa tisfa ctory
to us as reg a rd s railw ays in A s ia tic T u rkey. H e said the B a g d a d R a ilw a y settlem ent w ould
proba b ly la rgely be affected b y the issue o f the E u ropea n w a r : w hat H is H ighness w ould
suggest is th a t a d ecla ra tion should be sign ed by G reat B rita in and T urkey th a t an agreem ent
a bou t railw ays had been in itia lled in 1913 and was annexed, but th a t T u rk ey , in retu rn for
ou r assent to the custom s increase, w ou ld u n d erta k e to com e to a settlem ent accep tab le to
H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent on the con clu sion o f peace.
H is H ighness said th a t i f H is M a je sty ’ s G overnm ent agreed, and in d u ced R ussia and
F ra n ce to agree, to the custom s increase, etc., G erm any w ou ld be the on ly P ow er still out­
sta n din g , as A u stria in 1909 and Ita ly in 1912 had a lread y agreed. H e added th a t our assent
w ou ld have a m ost fa v ou ra ble effect, in his view , on the present foreig n p olicy o f T urkey.
H e also said we m igh t agree to th e m on opolies con v en tion b ein g sign ed and ra tified , and
th a t, as regard s the oil concessions in M osul an d B a g d a d , T u rk ey m ig h t g ive H is M a jesty ’ s
G overnm ent an assurance th a t not less than 5 0% , and cha irm an sh ip w ith ca stin g vote, w ould
be g iv en to M r. d ’ A r c y ’ s g roup .
H is H ighness said th a t these w ere his “ p e r s o n a l” view s, and th a t he had only discussed
them w ith Tewfik P asha w ho agreed.
H e said th a t if S ir E. G rey a p p rov ed the idea and w ould discuss it w ith him at an early
date he w ould then telegrap h the p rop osal to C onstantinople.
I told H a k k i Pasha I had no a u th ority to discuss these m atters b u t th a t I w ould subm it
his rem arks to S ir E. Grey.
S o fa r as my relativ ely u n im p orta n t n eg otia tion s are concerned , I th in k the solu tion
su ggested is excellent. P [A R K E R ]
A u g u st 20th, 1914.
P .S .— The firm an rem ov in g th e v eto on E g y p tia n b orrow in g powrers w'ould also be issued
forth w ith .
A. P .
T his suggestion m ay be useful.
Q [u e r ]y . T elegraph a sum m ary t o S ir L. M a llet, fo r his o b s [e r v a tio ]n s , and a u th orize
him, i f he thin ks fit, to use the p rop osal in his con v ersation s w ith th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t.
G. R . C.
20.viii.14.
I thin k we m ust w alk w arily.
T he Turkish ob ject is to g et the in creased custom s revenues. W e m ust be ca refu l not to
g iv e this and ou r consent to the T urkish m onopolies aw ay w ith ou t full secu rity th a t the T urkish
p a rt o f the b arga in is du ly fulfilled.
As regard s all th a t p a rt o f the a greem ents w hich relates to the B a g d a d railw ay, no settle­
m ent is o f course possible at this m om ent, b u t it seeins to me th a t a form al u n d erta k in g by
T u rk ey to agree to a settlem ent sa tisfa ctory to H f is ] M [a je s t y ’s] G [overninent'J, and in no
case less fa v ou ra ble to the la tter than th e one o f w hich the d r a ft has been in itia lled , m ig h t be
a ccep ted, p rov id ed the recen t ob stru ctiv e dem ands m ade by th e T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t in
con n ection w ith the m on opolies a greem ent, &c., are now dropp ed.
W e m ig h t a u th orize S ir L. M a llet to p u t the above before th e G ra n d V iz ie r and to say
th a t p rov id ed the T urkish G o v [e r n m e n ]t definitely and u n eq u iv oca b ly fulfils the d u ties o f
n eu tra lity , releases all B ritish ships a n d cargoes, guaran tees the free use o f th e S tra its, and
sends away the G erm an naval officers and crews, and dism antles G erm an w ireless in stallations,
H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] are p rep a red to p roceed w ith the gen era l a greem ent on th e
lines in d icated and g iv e th eir assent to the 15% custom s ta riff and the m onopolies.
E. A . C.
A ug. 20.
B efore ta k in g any action a t all, I should w ait a short tim e to see how T u rk e y ’ s attitude,
presents itself. A t present it is obscure and u ncertain. ^ ^

I thin k I had b etter see H a k k i P asba. A p p o in t him fo r some tim e tom orrow and m ean­
while I should like to discuss this w ith S ir E. Crowe and M r. P arker.
E . G .]
 421

C H A P TE R XCV.

TH E PO RTU G U E SE COLONIES,
DECEM BER 1911-JU LY 1914.

[E D . N O T E .— T he docum ents o f 1S98-9 on the su b ject o f the A nglo-G erm a n C on v en tion s

o f A u g u st 30, 1898, an d the A n g lo-P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion o f O ctob er 14, 1899, are p rin ted
in G ooch ( i T em p erley, V o l I, pp. 44-99, C h a p ter II, S ection s I I —I I I . T he developm en t o f th e
A n g lo -P ortu g u ese A llian ce in th e period 1904-1911 is trea ted , w ith oth er cog n a te subjects, in
V ol. V I I I , p p . 49-80, C h a p ter L X I I . D iscussions re g a rd in g th e P ortu g u ese colon ies form ed
p a rt o f the A nglo-G erm a n n e g otia tion s in 1911-2, a n d referen ce w ill he fou n d to them in
V ol. V I ( v. p. 823, S u b j e c t I n d e x , sub A f r i c a , P o r t u g u e s e C o l o n i e s ) . T he p a pers p r in te d there
should he rea d in co n ju n ction w ith the ea rlv docu m en ts o f the presen t ch a p ter, cp. also G .P.,
X X X I , C ha pters C C X L I I -C C X L I V , an d X X X V I I (I ), C ha pter C C L X X X I V .]

No. 265.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G r ey .{1)

Private and Confidential.(2)

My dear Grey, . Paris, D ecem ber 21, 1911.
In a letter of June 23rd last to N icolson(3) I gave an account of a conversation
which I had had at Bagnoles de l ’ Orne with Baron Stumm, a German ex-Ambassador,
and now a great Ironfounder.
H e has been in Paris off and on for about six weeks. H e dined at the Embassy
a short time since and he paid me a goodbye visit a few days ago. H e rem inded me
of our conversation at Bagnoles in June just before the appearance at Agadir of the
German Ship of W ar and observed that since then much had happened.
I rem inded Baron Stumm o f the high opinion which he had expressed at
Bagnoles of the qualities of M. de Bethm ann-H ollw eg and M. de K iderlen-W ächter,
and asked him whether his opinion had in any way changed. H e denied that he had
described the latter gentleman as straightforward and veracious; he had, he said,
called him clever, which he undoubtedly was, but his manners were odious and he
had grossly mismanaged the recent M orocco negotiations^4) M. de Bethm ann-H ollw eg
he had described as an honest and straightforward man and he certainly was that
and it was a pity that he had not intervened more so as to keep a check on
M. de K iderlen-W ächter. Baron Stumm then said of the Franco-Germ an Agreement
that it appeared to be full of such vague terms that he feared that it might create
fresh difficulties. H e then told me that he had lately been in Germany and had been

0 ) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in ister, w ith a c o p y of

S ir E d w a rd G rev ’ s reply, r. in fra , pp. 424-5, X o . 267.]
(2) [G rey M SS., V ol. 13.]
( 3) [S ir F . B e r tie ’ s letter to S ir A . N icolson o f J u n e 23, 1911, is n ot re p rod u ced as its
ten ou r is sufficiently in d ica ted above. T he fo llo w in g e x tra ct m ay, how ever, be o f in te r e s t: —
“ N ow th a t P rin ce Biilow has d isa p p eared B a ron Stum m ta kes a m ore h op efu l view
o f the p rosp ects o f his C ou n try. On my a sk in g w hether P rin ce B iilow m ig h t n o t retu rn to
p ow er B a ron Stnm m said ‘ n ever ’ fo r the E m p eror discovered th a t he con cea led from him
th e tru th an d was in tr ig u in g aga in st H [ i s ] M J a jestv ] and th e E m p eror dism issed him as
a t ra ito r . H e had now g o t honest str a ig h tfo rw a r d and tru th fu l an d tru stw orth y a dvisers
in M . B ethm ann H ollw eg as C ha n cellor an d M . K id erlen W ä ch ter as F o re ig n S ecreta ry
w ho can he relied on by F oreig n G overn m en ts th ou g h th e m anners o f the la tte r gen tlem a n
a re ra th er u n cou th .” C a rn ock M SS ., V ol. I I o f 1911.

(4) [F o r th e “ recent M orocco n e g o t ia t io n s ” v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I I .]

 4'22

surprised and shocked at the almost universal feeling of irritation against England
and everything English. Could not something be done to improve the relations
between England and G erm any? I f they remained long as now the slightest cause
might make them so bad as to be dangerous to the peace of Europe.
I said that I thought that the present exaggerated antipathy against England in
Germany was due to the feeling that England had been the obstacle which stood
between Germany and the object of her ambition which was to squeeze and humiliate
France. W e could at the present remain indifferent to the unreasonable feeling
against us for we considered ourselves safe from a German invasion. Baron Stumiu
then went over much o f the ground traversed during our conversation at Bagnoles
and there was on each side a good deal of repetition of what wTas then said. As I
reported to Nicolson that conversation, I need not redescribe it. H e this time stated
that in Germany I was represented as being Germanophobe, which he did not believe
and he had said so in reply to observations to that effect. It was alleged that a visit
which I made to London in July was for the purpose of stirring up the British
Government against Germany. I interrupted the Baron in order to observe that my
personal feelings could not be of any consequence but as a matter of fact I was not
Germanophobe, I was Anglom ane, it was natural that you should wish to knowr from
your observer on the spot what was the feeling in France in regard to the critical
state in which the negotiations between the French and German Governm ents then
were. Baron Stumm remarked that he could not understand how it was,— Carlton
H ouse Terrace and the Foreign Office being so near to each other,— that there had
not been explanations which would have put an end to the extreme tension between
England and Germany. He thought that Metternich must have been somewhat in
fault for not giving explanations wdiich would have satisfied the British Government.
He then spoke of the bellicose reputation which I had and the supposition that I was
of a party which advocated a wrar with Germany before she became navally stronger.
I replied that my bellicosity had been limited to the feeling, which I might have
expressed in private conversation, that Lord Palmerston would have thought it
preferable to bring matters to a head rather than sit still and submit to the ever
increasing expenditure of vast sums to maintain the supremacy of England at sea;
but times had changed. W ars were in his time cheap compared with what the cost
would be nowadays and there was also the question of public opinion which in Lord
Palm erston’ s day it was not absolutely essential, as it was now, to have in favour of
a w’ar. The battle would be one of m oney. If the German Governm ent increased
their shipbuilding programm e the British Government would of necesoity have to
construct in proportion so as to maintain the necessary superiority over any probable
com bination, and the British public would make the requisite monetary sacrifices and
it would be a question of which people, the British or the German," would tire the
first. Baron Stumm thought that the German people, unless something were done
to change their feelings and consequently their attitude, would be ready to bear for
at least ten years whatever taxation the Government might recomm end for the Navy.
Could not some prominent public man visit Berlin and talk with the German
G overnm ent so as to bring about some arrangem ent? The German people would be
satisfied with so little. It must not be a Lloyd George after the speech which he had
m ade.(5) I stopped the Baron in order to say that he and others in Germ any must not
imagine that Mr. Lloyd G eorge’ s speech was his own only. Matters had arrived at
such a pass that it was necessary to make a statement defining the attitude of H i 3
Majesty s Government. No reassuring explanations were forthcom ing from the
German Government and Mr. Lloyd George spoke the words of the Cabinet so that
there should be no doubt as to the position. Baron Stumm did not pursue this
incident^ H e returned to the great desirability of a conversation at Berlin through
the medium of some prominent Englishm an. Germany would require so little to

(5) [F o r M r. L loy d G eorg e’ s speech a t the M ansion H ou se on J u ly 21, 1911, and its results,
v. G ooch T em p erley, V ol. V II, pp. 387-417, C h a pter L V .]
 423

satisfy her and bring about an entire change in her feelings towards England. Could
not England give her som ething? I replied that British Governm ents were not often
in a giving mood when it was not an exchange of territory with profit to British
interests. W e had given Heligoland to Germ any in return for German undertakings
in regard to Zanzibar, but we could not have fortified Heligoland without offence to
Germany and it was therefore not o f the value to us that it became to Germany.
W here did he propose that we should find gifts for G erm any? n e said that the
Portuguese Possessions in Africa were of no advantage to Portugal. I suggested that
England being her ally and bound to defend her and her Colonies against foreign
aggression could hardly give away Portuguese property unless Portugal desired to get
rid of it. He thought that something might be found somewhere for Germ any without
detriment to England. I said that unfortunately for Germany she had arrived
100 years too late in search of dum ping ground for her surplus population. All the
places fit for white man colonization were occupied or possessed by others who were
unwilling to give away or dispose of th e m : even portions o f the French Congo which
was not a white m an’ s country and not fit for German colonization had only been
obtained by the German Government after much pressure on the French Governm ent,
and I m entioned to him an anecdote which I had lately heard attributed to him on
the occasion of a conversation with the German Emperor, who was stated to have
asked him as a much travelled man whether he could account for the unsympathetic
manner with which Germany was regarded by other nations. H e was reported to
have replied to the Em peror that the German was like the traveller who arrived very
late for a train, the bearer of a first-class ticket. He opened the door of a com part­
ment which was full, insisted on his right to a seat, forced his way in notwithstanding
the protests o f the passengers, trod on their toes, talked very loud and blew bad
tobacco smoke into their faces. Baron Stumin laughed, remarking that such like
stories were always exaggerated. H e then returned to the question of the relations
between England and Germany regretting the agitation in Germ any against
everything English and expressing the hope, in which I cordially joined, that the
German Government would not be persuaded to add to their shipbuilding programme,
for it would create a dangerous situation necessitating counter-construction by the
British Governm ent. He said that it seemed so natural that the two countries should
be on good terms for their interests were not divergent, and so unnatural that there
should be discord for no very good reason. I reminded Baron S umm that the policy
of England had always been the maintenance of the Balance of power, and that it
had been prejudiced by the enormous armaments of Germany. She ought to be
satisfied with the possession of the most powerful army in the world and not
endeavour to contest the supremacy of the seas with England, for so long as she
followed such a policy the relations between the two countries must remain
unsatisfactory.
Baron Stumm expatiated a good deal on the pacific views of the German Emperor
and his moderating influence in the M orocco negotiations, and wound up his political
remarks by saying that of course he had spoken only for himself. H e was only a
private individual anxious to promote good relations between his country and England
whose policy in regard to the Balance o f Bower he quite appreciated and for whose
institutions he had the greatest admiration. He was sure that what he had suggested,
viz., that a prominent English public man should go to Berlin to talk would do much
good. He asked why it was that no such persons ever visittd Berlin. I suggested that
it was not on the way to attractive places.
I do not know whether Baron Stumm lias cognizance o f the secret Agree ment
between Germ any and England on the subject of the Portuguese Possessions in Africa
and T im or.(s)
Mv belief is that Baron Stumm was com m issioned by the E m peror to use me as
the channel o f a suggestion to you which, if you adopted it, might be treated by the

( 6) [cp . Gf'orh <t- T em p erley, V ol. I. pp. 71—5. X os. 9 0 -2 , and e n cli.]
 424

German Government as not made by them and be accepted or rejected as might suit
their convenience when made.
I had written this letter to Nicolson, but I hear that he is away so I have
converted it into one to you, and I inclose, for convenience of reference, m y copy of
my letter to him of June 23rd, which please return to me.
Yours sincerely,
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
M IN JJTE.
V ery in teresting.
H. H. A.

No. 2G6.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . Goschen.

P rivate.f 1)
M y dear Goschen, Fallodon, D ecem ber 29, 1911.
. . . . ( 2) As to the future it is clear from what Metternich has already said to
me that the Germans would like the division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place
as soon as possible. So should I. These Colonies are worse than derelict so long
as Portugal has them : . . . .(3) the Union of South Africa will never rest till
it has Delagoa Bay : on every ground material and moral and even Portuguese
it would be better that Portugal should sell her Colonies. B ut how can we of
all people put pressure on Portugal to sell : we who are bound by an Alliance
to protect and preserve her Colonies for Portugal— an Alliance renewed secretly for
value received during the Boer w ar? And Portugal wron ’ t part with her Colonies—
any régime in Portugal that did so would be overturned by a revolution— for when
nations have gone down hill till they are at their last gasp their pride remains
undiminished, if indeed it is not increased. It clings to them as Tacitus says the
love of dissimulation clung to Tiberius at his last gasp.
However I am to meet Harcourt next month and study the map o f Africa with
him in a pro-German spirit : then the Cabinet will review the situation. For a
real bargain about naval expenditure in which Germany gave up the attempt to
challenge our naval superiority we might give something substantial, but the
difficulty is that cession of territory can hardly from the German point of view be
in pari materia wdth a naval arrangement.
Yours sincerely,
E. GREY.
0 ) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 23.]
( 2) [F o r th e op en in g p a ra g ra p h s o f this le tte r v. G ooch <£• T em p erley, V ol. V I I , p. 795
No. 767.]
(3) [A few w ords are om itted h ere fo r reasons o f in tern a tion a l courtesy. T hey add noth in g
to th e substance o f th e le tte r .]

No. 267.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F . B ertie.

Private, f1)
My dear Bertie, Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.
Many thanks for your interesting letter about the conversation with Baron
S tu m m .(2) I return the copy of your previous letter to N icolson.(*)

(1) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 14.]

( 2) [v. supra, pp. 421-4, N o. 265.]
(3) [ep. supra, p. 421, N o. 265, n o te (3).]
 425

I send you the record of a conversation o f mine with Metternich before

Christmas, (*) which confirms the impression that what the Germans want is a division
of the Portuguese Colonies. The Union Government o f South Africa wants it too—
at any rate they are impatient for Delagoa B ay which they would get under the
Secret Agreem ent with Germany, if a division took place.
The Portuguese Colonies will be of no use to Portugal or to any one as long
as they remain Portuguese, and the management of them will continue to be a scandal.
But we are bound by the terms o f our Alliance to protect and preserve them for
Portugal, unless the latter is a willing seller. This Alliance was confirmed by a
British Governm ent, though secretly, as lately as the South African w ar.(5)
The situation is somewhat exasperating, but there it is ; and for us to put
pressure on Portugal to sell or connive at another Power putting pressure upon her
would be an even greater scandal than the retention of the Colonies and their govern­
ment or rather misgovernment by Portugal.
On the general question of a deal with Germany about railways or territory
anywhere m y view is that it isn ’ t worth discussing till after the German elections,
and the Cabinet can’ t discuss it here till after the holidays.
Yours sincerelv,
E.‘ G R E Y .
(*) [r . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V i , pp. 650-1. X o. 480.]
( s) [v. ibid., V ol. I. pp. 90-4. X o . 118.]

No. 2G3.

Sir F . B ertie to Sir Edward, G r e y .(l)

Private and Confidential. (2)

M y dear G rey, Paris, January 12, 1912.
I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 2nd instant(3) and rejoiced
that you are not to be tempted by Ytetternich’ s Satanic invitation to you to look
down on the African possessions of Portugal as a means of satisfying German land
hunger.
I was the Assistant Under Secretary concerned in African Affairs when Arthur
Balfour concluded and signed with Count Hatzfeldt the Anglo-G erm an Secret Agree­
ment o f 1S98.(4) The negotiations had been begun by Lord Salisbury, who later
on told Count Hatzfeldt, so the latter inform ed m e, that he would not have signed
the Agreem ent, to which the Ambassador retorted, so he said to m e, that he (Lord
Salisbury) certainly would have signed it for the Cabinet would have made him do so.
L ord Salisbury had no affection for the Agreem ent, but that was, I think, partly
because he had hoped to stave off the German Governm ent and thought that his
nephew had been too ready to conclude the negotiations. Besides this, in the latter
days of Lord Salisbury’ s time as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he and
Arthur Balfour were not always at one and the uncle was rather jealous of the
nephew in his management o f the Foreign Office during the un cle’ s absences. There
was an example o f it in the question of Port Arthur. The Cabinet— in the absence
of Lord Salisbury— under the inspiration o f Arthur Balfour had determined to say
“ hands o f f ’ ’ to Russia. Lord Salisbury returned and aided by Sir M ichael Hicks
Beach persuaded the Cabinet to reverse its previous decision.

__ 0 ) [T h is letter is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e P rim e M in is ter an d to S ir A.

X icolson .]
( 2) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 14.]
(3) [i\ im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
( ‘ ) [r . G ooch <fe T em p erley, V ol. I, pp. 71-5, X os. 9 0-2, and enr/s.]
 4*26
The “ en cla v e” as Metternich in his conversation with von on the 20th ultimo
(see to Sir E . Goschen No. 304 of that d a yKs) described the territory earmarked
for England in Portuguese Angola nnder the secret agreement in the event o f a
liquidation of the Portuguese Possessions was so reserved partly in order that
Phodesia might have continuous territorial access to the Atlantic and thus have the
means in the future of establishing its own railway connection with that ocean as
a shorter route to England from some of the British South African Possessions than
by the Indian Ocean.
The intentions of the British and German negotiators were not the same. The
German object was to bring about as soon as possible the partition o f the African
possessions o f Portugal between Germany and England to the exclusion of other
states and meanwhile to use England as their defender with the aid o f Germany.
The object of the British Governm ent was to stay [sic ; stave] off any German
annexation of Portuguese territory and hind Germany in a written engagement to
restrain her appetite bv a promise to her of an eventual assignment of territory to the
exclusion of other Powers whenever Portugal borrowed and defaulted on a loan to be
advanced only by England and Germany on the security of her African Possessions.
Meanwhile England and Germany were to say “ hands o f f ’ ’ to all others. The
Portuguese Government having obtained knowledge of these terms have avoided
defaulting by not borrowing on the security in question and the German Government
being deceived in their expectations say that we have deceived them.
By ancient treaties we are hound to defend Portugal and her possessions against
all comers and she is under obligation to he with us in any war in which we may
he engaged and we have the right to use all Portuguese ports. In the Boer war we
preferred to exempt Portugal from that obligation and to forego our right to use
Delagoa Bay and Lorenço Marquez through which wTe m ight have attacked the
Transvaal, because Germany might have persuaded France in such case to join with
her against us. The Portuguese Governm ent however undertook to prohibit the
passage through Lorenço Marquez to the Transvaal of arms and munitions of war.
if we were engaged in a European war the use of the ports o f Portugal would, I
imagine, be of great advantage to our Fleets. W ould any Portuguese Government
willingly accord us their use if we had been instrumental in depriving Portugal of
her African possessions. W e still hold Bombay one o f the considerations from
Portugal for which we undertook to defend her and her possessions.
As to the designs of Germanv on the Belgian Congo what would he the feeling
in Belgium as regards England if it could with any plausibility he misrepresented
to the Belgian Government by the German Government that we had given encourage­
ment to an absorption of the Belgian Congo by Germany with a few choice morsels
reserved for ourselves? W ould not the Belgian Government come to the conclusion
that they must hasten to make friends with the German mammon of unrighteousness
and with that evil result in Europe to our relations with Belgium which are so
important to us in the event o f a European W ar?
France has undertaken by the Franco-Germ an Agreement of November 4th
Article HP6)
“ Dans le cas où le statut territorial du bassin conventionnel du Congo, tel que
celui-ci est défini par l ’ Acte de Berlin du 20 février, 1885.(7) viendrait à être modifié
du fait de l'une ou de l ’ autre des Puissances contractantes, celles-ci devraient en
conférer entre elles, comme aussi avec les antres Puissances signataires de l ’ Acte de
B erlin .’ ’ W hat would he the feeling in France if it could be made to appear that
we were encouraging Germanv to regard the Belgian Congo as proper food for her
land hunger in disregard of the pre-emptive claims of France, and what would be the
(5) p\ Enoch if: T entp erley. V ol. YT. pp. 650-1, No. 480.]
( 6) |>. ibid.. Vol. V I I , p. 597, No. 612. The clause given there in d r a ft becam e A rticle X V I
of the C onvention between F rance and G erm anv rela tin g to th eir P ossessions In E q u a toria l
A frica, of N ovem ber 4. 1911. r. Ji.F.S.]\. V ol. 104, p. 960.]
( 7) [>. ITertslet : M a p o f E u rop e by T rea ty, Vol. IV , pp. 0 260-4.]
 427
strategical effect as regards both France and England of the substitution o f a powerful
Germany for a weak Belgium and the establishment o f Germany right across the
African continent from sea to sea with connecting railways. How long would it be
before the portions of the Congo territory now French and Spanish Guinea would
be absorbed by Germany. In such a climate the surplus population o f Germany
could not live to stay and breed so as not to be l^st to the Arm y o f the Em pire.
They would still go to America. Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Ac.
I do not believe that we should conciliate Germany by facilitating her acquisition
o f territories not our property. She would attribute our good offices to fear o f her
and desire to keep her away from our own possessions. Exchange o f territory between
England and Germany to the advantage of both is all that can be reasonably expected
o f us.
Yours sineerelv.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .

[E D . X O T E .— T he follow in g m em orandum b y S ir E d w a rd G rey is of in terest in view o f

the referen ce to L ord S a lisb u ry ’ s a ttitu d e in the im m ed ia tely p reced in g docum ent. It is d a ted
J a n u a ry 25, 1911. G rey M SS ., V ol. 5 4 : —

Secret.
The M a rq u is de S everal to ld me to d a y not only th a t he knew o f the secret T rea ty betw een
G reat B r ita in and G erm any, resp ectin g th e P o rtu g u e se C olonies, b u t th a t he ha d know n o f
it from the b e g in n in g and had d on e his best to prev en t its b ein g signed.
It was, he said, settled at M r. A lfre d R o th s ch ild ’s house betw een M r. C ham berlain and
E ck ard stein o f the G erm an Em bassy.
S overal u rg ed L ord S alisbu ry not to sign it and L ord S alisbu ry w as d isin clin ed to d o so.
B u t L ord Salisbu ry w ent a broad and for e ig n affairs w ere handed ov er tem p ora rily to
M r. B a lfou r. Sovera l a rg u ed a ga in st the T rea ty w ith M r. B a lfou r, but th e view s o f
M r. Cham berlain , w ho th ou g h t only o f the T ransvaal and D ela goa B ay. p revailed .
On L o rd S a lisb u ry ’ s retu rn Sovera l rep roa ch ed him a bout the T rea ty. L o rd S alisbu ry
rep lied th a t he had not sign ed any T rea ty , to w hich Sovera l rep lied that M r. B a lfo u r had
sign ed it. T his L o rd S a lisbu ry adm itted .
S overal th en p oin ted out th a t som e day a ra ilw ay w ou ld be m ade from L o b ito B a y th rou g h
A n g ola and th a t this, on the direct rou te to the C ape, w ould supersede as the m eans o f com m u n i­
ca tion to R h od esia any rou te w hatever on the East Coast. T he T rea ty had th erefore handed
ov er to the G erm ans the fu tu re con trol of th e d irect rou te to R h od esia. L ord Sa lisbu ry had
said th a t these con sid era tion s had not been b rou g h t b efore him but that the T rea ty w ould not
com e in to ex ecu tion . T his was tru e so lon g as P o rtu g a l held tog eth er, but now th a t P ortu g a l
was fa llin g in to chaos the G erm ans m igh t press fo r the ex ecu tion o f the T rea ty. T he only
sa feg u a rd fo r us was the m a in ten a n ce b y P o rtu g a l o f the possession of her colonies.
I ob served th a t we cou ld not by in te r v e n tio n im p rov e the sta te o f G overnm ent at L isbon
and Sovera l a d m itted that any in te r v e n tio n to restore th e M on a rch y w ou ld be h a rm fu l, th ou g h
he con sid ered it certa in th a t K in g M anoel w ou ld be b ack in L isbon sooner or later. E. G .]

No. 269.

Sir A . Ilardinge to Sir Edward G rey.A

F.O. 371 1462.

39S6 39S6 12 36.
(No. 7. Confidential. Lisbon, D. -January 24, 1912.
S ir :— R . January 29, 1912.
The newspapers will have inform ed you o f the demonstrations o f sym pathy with
Germany occasioned by the visit to this port on her homeward journey of the German
man o f war “ Panther ” o f Agadir fa m e.(2) and of the courtesies shown to her officers

C ) [T his despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the C a bin et.]
( 2) LThis subject is fu lly dealt w ith in Gooch & T em p e rle y , V ol. V I I .]
 42S

by the Portuguese Governm ent, the President o f the Republic him self returning the
Captain’ s visit on board the latter’ s ship.
It may, however, perhaps interest you to learn that Senhor Vasconcellos thought
it advisable to explain privately to the French Minister that these courtesies had no
political significance o f a nature to give umbrage to France. The “ P a n th e r” was,
His Excellency said, the first foreign man of war to visit Lisbon since the recognition
of the Portuguese Republic by the great powers, and her presence was thus in itself
a mark of German goodwill towards Portugal. It had moreover coincided with what
Senhor Vasconcellos described as a “ German flirtation with this cou ntry,” and
proceeded to explain as a very friendly settlement of several outstanding frontier and
other colonial questions in Angola. The Portuguese ¡Premier appeared indeed
convinced that a material improvement had taken place in the relations o f the two
countries, which might react in a sense favourable to Portugal on the attitude adopted
up to the present by Germany on the vexed question o f the religious properties. It
seems indeed probable, from what he said to my French colleague, that the German
Government has availed itself of this opportunity to strengthen its influence here
by dispelling for the nonce the alarm as to its designs on the Portuguese Em pire in
Africa due to the clum sy and brutal utterances of Pangermanist papers and professors.
Ilis Excellency referred to-day in conversation with me to the visit and cordial
reception here of the “ Panther,” to the effect which he hoped it would produce upon
his Governm ent’ s dealings with that o f Germany and to a speech which he had
him self made in Congress, and of which I enclose a summary, about the friendship
and joint civilizing mission o f the two powers in tropical Africa. I said that I was
very glad to hear all this, as I felt convinced that the Government o f Portugal’ s
traditional ally would he the first to applaud the consolidation of friendly relations
between Lisbon and Berlin, more especially in Africa, where the two countries were
in such close contact as neighbours, both with one another and with ourselves.
I have, Ac.
A R T H U R II. IIA R D IN G E .

Enclosure in No. 269.

Question in Portuguese Parliament respecting Division of Portuguese Colonies in

Africa, and attitude of Foreign Press in regard to those Colonics.
Senhor Goulart de Medeiros began by alluding to a variety o f articles recently
published in the foreign press— inspired by different motives— but all of them
suggesting reconstruction o f the map o f Africa. Amongst others he made special
allusion to an Article by Admiral Fremantle in the United Service Magazine.
Although this article repudiates the idea that Portugal should make any cession of
her colonies still the situation created by such articles in the press is an unpleasant
one, and attention should at once be directed towards clearing it up. He therefore
urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to issue instructions to diplomatic and consular
representatives of Portugal abroad, to use every endeavour to dissipate the had
impression caused, and to fill up the existing vacancies in the diplomatic and consular
services, especially the post o f Minister in Berlin.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that too much weight must not be given
to the utterances of such a paper as the “ P ost.” It was the organ o f a small and
extreme party and had lost the influence which it had once possessed. H e would
m oreover declare that the most open and cordial relations existed between Germany
and Portugal, of which he had received many and recent proofs. In support of this
affirmation, the Minister proceeded to give an account of the incident which had
recently taken place on the S fou th ern ] frontier of Angola owing to the construction
by the Portuguese of a fort on what turned out to be German territory. The
Portuguese had often expressed to the German Government its desire for an official
delimitation o f that frontier and although the attainment of this object involved
 42 9

considerable difficulties, the excellent relations between the two countries would, he
felt sure, render it attainable.
The English alliance continued and would continue to be the basis o f Portuguese
foreign policy, based as it is on the most ancient as well as on m odern treaties,
embracing under their provisions not only the mainland and the adjacent islands but
also the Portuguese colonies. This would not however in any way prevent the
Government of the Republic from endeavouring to strengthen the bonds which unite
it to other Powers and especially to those which are its neigld ours either on the
continent or in the colonies. The Governm ent has the strongest d< sire to develop
the excellent relations of good neighbourliness and loyal friendship with its powerful
neighbour on the S [ou th ] o f Angola and the X [o r th ] of Mozambique. It has a great
work of civilisation and peace to undertake which will becom e easier with the help
of intelligent collaboration. Malicious and ill-judged observations of journalists should
have no effect on the good relations and on the policy of different countries.

No. 270.

Memorandum by Sir E yre Croice.

Timor and the Anglo-G erm an secret conventions of 1898.

F.O. 367 2S4.
37S5 391 12 436. Foreign Ojjice, January 26. 1912.
Mr. Gilmour, director of the (Portuguese' Mozambique Company, called at the
F oreign Office yesterday, in order to tell me that Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade had
sounded him as to his readiness to form a com pany for the administration and
development of the Portuguese half of the island of Timor. Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade
admitted that this Portuguesf possession was in a state of absolute stagnation and
chaos, as neither the Portuguese governm ent nor private enterprize did anything
whatever for it. He thought the island was rich in natural resources, suitable for the
production of rubber, among other things, and would certainly repay m oney and
trouble spent in a judicious soberne of development. The Portuguese g o v [e m m e n ]t
were afraid of German designs becom ing dangerous, unless something was done to
establish an efficient administration. H ence Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade’ s suggestion.
Mr. Gilmour said the scheme might tempt him . He would prefer to form a British
com pany which should then be granted a charter or lease of the island, but no doubt
the Portuguese gov [ern m en ]t would insist on the com pany being a Portuguese one,
though financed by British capital. Mr. Gilmour asked whether there was any
objection on the part of H is] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] to his taking up the matter.
H e was going to see Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade in Paris on Sunday (J a n [u a ryj 2S'
and should be glad of an answer to this question before he started for Paris.
I was somewhat taken aback, and found it difficult at the moment to decide what
I could say, in view of the stipulations respecting Timor in the agreements o f 1898.M
M erely in order to show that the question was not quite so simple as it looked, I asked
Mr. Gilmour whether he was aware that under a treaty concluded in 1904 between
Portugal and Holland, each of the two countries tnjoyed. reciprocally, a right of
pre-em ption over the territory of the other in the island of Timor ? ( 2) I suggested that
the existence of the Dutch right o f pre-em ption over Tortugutse Tim or m ight
conceivably make it undesirable for H ris] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] to encourage
the creation of important m onopoly rights there by British subjects. Mr. Gilm our
said he had had no knowledge of the existence of the treaty. I explained that I was
still new to this particular branch of F [o re ig n ] 0 [ffic e ] business, and would like to

0 ) [i\ G ooch d T em p erley, V o l. I, p. 73, X o . 91, cn ci.]

( 2 p. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 1 0 1 , p p . 4 9 7 - 5 0 0 . ]
 43 0

go into the matter more carefully, and, after discussing the question this m orning
with Sir A. Xicolson and Mr. Langley, informed Mr. Gilmour verbally that the matter
was not free from complication and required reference to the Secretary of State, who
was out of town at present, so that I could not possibly let him have an answer to his
question before Sunday.
Mr. Gilmour seemed quite satisfied on this point, and said he would put off
Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade for the present and not move further in the matter until he
had heard from me again.
Mr. Gilm our’ s enquiry raises the whole question of the secrecy of the 1898
conventions in an acute and embarrassing form , and this at the very moment when
attention is pointedly drawn to the subject in a number of statements appearing in the
press, most of which originate from an article in the Saturday Beview of January *20.
(See papers No. 3076; 3256; 3589.)(3)
It is to be expected that these newspaper “ revelations” will lead to further
questions in Parliament and public controversy, and the position of H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] will soon be a very awkward one. I propose to discuss briefly the
considerations arising out of this situation which invite attention.
Dealing, first, with Mr. G ilm our’s enquiry, there are, I think, four different
courses open to the Secretary o f State. I will proceed to enumerate them, with a
statement of the advantages and disadvantages attaching to each :

1. We might shelter ourselves behind the difficulties to which I have alread

alluded in talking to Mr. Gilm our, as to the Dutch right of pre-em ption. However
flimsy he might consider such an objection to be, we could probably insist on m ain­
taining that on the strength of it, we felt debarred from favouring the employment
of British capital in territory which might possibly before long pass to H olland. The
advantage o f this course is its extreme sim plicity. The disadvantages, however, are
o b v io u s : Our subterfuge would certainly lack straightforwardness. It is quite
conceivable that circumstances might arise in which we should be compelled to refuse
to recognize the Dutch rights of pre-em ption, seeing that our convention with Germany
hinds us to oppose the claim of anyone but Germany to Portuguese Tim or. Should
this contingency ever arise, we should appear to have put forward deliberately a
contention which, it could well be argued, we knew to be unfounded, and which we
all along intended to resist ourselves.
•2. We might speak in rather vague and mysterious tones to Mr. Gilm our of the
existence o f reasons, which we are not in a position further to specify, that not merely
preclude H [is ] M [a jestv ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] from giving any support to the proposed
exploitation of Portuguese Tim or hy British capital, but make it in fact undesirable,
in the opinion of H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G [ov ern m en t], that British capital should be
so em ployed. I have ascertained at the Colonial Office that it was by a statement
made to him there more or less to this effect, that Mr. Gilmour was quite recently
led to agree to an alteration of the line of railway which the B [ritish ] C fentral]
A [frica n ] Company wishes to construct from Port Herald on the Shire to the
Zam bezi. Air. Gilm our, who like everyone who has been in South Africa and kept
his ears open, knows of the existence of the 1898 conventions, seems readily to have
understood the hint, and thereupon agreed to trace the course of the line so as to
avoid its touching any portion of Portuguese territory within what may be called
tbe German zone under the secret conventions.
I f a similar hint were now given as regards Tim or, it is quite probable that,
without asking further questions, he would conclude that Tim or also came within
the scope o f the 1898 arrangement and was thereunder allotted to Germany.

(3) [T hese papers con ta in e x tra cts from the S a tu rd a y llev ie w o f J a n u a ry 20, 1912; the
P all M ull (ia z e tte o f the sam e d a t e ; th e O bserver o f J a n u a ry 21, 1912; the D a ily M ail o f
J a n u a ry 22, 1912 (P .O . 3 71/281. 3 0 7 6 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 ); The T im es o f J a n u a ry 23, 1912 (F.O . 3 71 /
284. 3256/391 12/436. 3 5 8 9 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 ); and the D a ily .Yetvs o f J a n u a ry 25, 1912 (F.O . 3 71 /
284. 3 5 8 9 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 ).]
 431
This course has the advantage of involving us in no subterfuges. There is
however a possible difficulty : Mr. Gilm our might not take the hint, or might not
wish to take it. He might say that unless we can give him a good and intelligible
reason, he did not see why he should not go into Timor if he wished and if the
Portuguese invited him. To this we should have no answer. And in fact, I do not
think that under the terms of the convention l l [ i s ] M [a jes ty 's] G o v e rn m e n t] are
called upon to prevent British subjects from taking up enterprizes or concessions
in those Portuguese territories which have been earmarked for Germ any. But if,
as would inevitably be the case, the German Government got wind o f the affair, they
would be quite capable of taking steps at Lisbon to com pel the Portuguese govern­
ment to drop the schem e, a contingency which would create the m aximum of
disagreeableness to all parties concerned.
Apart from this, Mr. Gilmour would be free to indulge in whatever speculations
he liked as to the grounds on which H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] opposed his
plan. I f he connected Tim or in hiis mind with the German secret conventions of
1898 relating to M ozambique, of which he seems clearly aware, there would be
nothing to prevent his talking about his suspicions. Fresh series of rumours might
be set about, which would then come to the ears o f our Australian Dom inions and
induce them to ask awkward questions.
3. These several dilemmas which, if not very probable, are yet quite possible,
would be avoided by the more decided step o f telling Mr. Gilm our the exact truth,
under the seal o f secrecy. Personally, I believe Mr. Gilmour would honour such
confidence by keeping strict silence. On the other hand, if Air. Gilmour abandoned
the interp rize, others might come forward. It would in any case he impossible to
go on confiding such a secret successively to a number of private individuals, even
if they were all of the same standing as Mr. Gilm our. And, it must be admitted,
that even to tell him alone, would be to break deliberately onr pledge of secrecy
given to the German governm ent.
4. There remains the alternative of obtaining G erm any's consent to publishing
the conventions outright. This wonld be the most heroic, and also the most straight­
forward course. It would undoubtedly give rise to a number of difficulties all of
which would have to be seriously weighed :
(A) A preliminary difficulty which might frustrate the plan from the outset,
would be a refusal on G erm any's part to agree to publication. There is nothing in
the text of the three documents signed on August 30th 1898, binding the parties to
keep their provisions secret either perm anently or temporarily. But on
Dec [em ber] 21 o f that year, Lord Salisbury in conversation with Count Ilatzfeldt,
agreed to the view expressed by the latter, “ with some em phasis,’ ’ that the conven­
tions “ should not at present be made public, but that, at all events, if either Power
should desire to publish them, it should not do so without previously ascertaining
that the other Power was an assenting party. ” (4)
On the whole, it appears to me unlikely that Germany would seriously object
to publication now. She would from such publication derive the advantage of
satisfying to some extent the territorial appetite of German public opinion, at least
in anticipation. W e might put forward strong arguments in favour o f publication,
chiefly based on the impossibility o f our preventing British subjects from obtaining
concessions and starting enterprizes, m onopolistic or other, in the Portuguese
possessions earmarked for Germ any, unless we are in a position to give a reason for
such an attitude. W e could also urge that an unfair advantage was being taken of
our being pledged to secrecy, by allowing German public opinion to remain under the
impression that England was standing in the way o f German expansion, whilst these
conventions proved the contrary.
Germany might perhaps snggest publishing the first convention only, and
continuing to maintain secrecy concerning the second one and the Note, which deals

(4) [u. Gooch <6 Temperley, V ol. I, p. 81, N o. 103.]

 43 2
with the possible contingency of Portugal being forced to part with her colonies.
This might at first sight appear a most tempting proposal. For the first convention
expressly recites the object of the Signatories as being to preserve Portuguese integrity
and independence. It would facilitate our task in making the publication palatable
t-o Portugal, a subject to which I shall refer more fully later on ; and it would,
generally, place the action o f Great Britain in a less unfavourable light. In other
respects however the same objections which may be raised against the whole plan
of publication, would still remain, and thereto would be added this other difficulty :
In view of recent events and discussions on the subject of secret treaties, it is almost
inevitable that if the first convention is alone published, questions will be asked in
Parliament as to the existence of any additional and secret stipulations, and the mere
raising of such a suspicion would make the situation even more embarrassing for
IT [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] than if nothing had been published. I therefore
doubt whether incom plete publication would be, ultimately, of real benefit to this
country.
If in the end Germany maintained a refusal to allow any publication, we should
at least be able with a good conscience to let British capitalists come to terms with
the Portuguese gov [ern m en ]t on their own account, if they want to^ without its
being open to Germany to reproach us.
(B) Supposing the German opposition to publication overcom e, we still have
to face, in the first instance, almost certainly, a good deal of ill feeling in Portugal.
It is however to be remembered that this must in all likelihood happen anyhow,
sooner or later. The Portuguese gov [ern m en ]t know already, from the com m unica­
tions made by us and Germany to them at the time, the main outline o f the scheme
embodied in the conventions (see Mr. B alfour’ s note to M. de Soveral of A u g[u st] 31
1898,(5) the tel[eg ra m ] to II[is]] M [a jestv ’ s] Charge d ’ Affaires at Lisbon No. 20
Africa of Sept [em ber] 2 1898,(6) Mr. Thornton’ s tel[eg ra m ] No. 25 Africa of
September 12 1898(7) and his d esp [atche]s Nos. 82 and 83 of Sept [em ber] 10 and 11
1898).( s) It would clearly be advisable to communicate the text of the 3 instruments to
the Portuguese G ov[ern m en ]t confidentially, say a day before publication, with further
explanations. Stress would again be laid on the express desire o f the Signatories
to see the integrity and independence o f Portugal maintained (preamble of first
convention). The assurance given in 1898, that Great Britain continues to stand
by her obligation to defend the Portuguese colonies against unprovoked aggression,
would be renewed ; the advantages to Portugal o f the arrangements contemplated
under the convention of 1898 as to the security for Anglo-Germ an loans, as compared
with a possible European financial control, would again be em phasized: and finally
Portugal warned that, Great Britain being now bound by the conventions o f 1898,
it behoves the Portuguese government with, if necessary, the financial assistance of
the two Powers, or their subjects, so to reorganize and develop their colonies that
every danger o f foreign interference would thereby be obviated.— I think that in this
way the blow which the publication of the conventions would cause to Portugal would
be softened. Germany could not complain of our attitude in emphasizing our desire
that the situation contemplated in the second secret convention, and note, should not
arise, and in renewing our assurances as to the continued validity o f the old treaties
of alliance. For Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour, more than once in the course of
the negotiations with Count TIatzfeldt in 1898. reminded him of these very things

(5) [r . G ooch (£• T em p er]ey, V ol. T, p. 7.5, N o. 93.]

(6) [ v. ibid., V ol. T, p. 76, No. 9.5.]
( 7) [M r. T h orn ton ’ s teleg ram (N o. 25, A fric a ) o f Septem b er 12, 1898, is not reprod uced .
H e rep orted th a t he had im pressed u p on the M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs the a dvantages to
P o rtu g a l o f the p roposed jo in t loan from E n g lan d and G erm any. (F .C j G erm any (A frica ) 1467.)]
(®) [M r. T h o rn to n ’ s despatches (N o. 82), D . Septem b er 10, R Septem b er 16, 1898, and
(N o. 83), D . Septem b er 11, R . Septem b er 16, 1898, are not rep rod u ced H e rep orted that he
and his G erm an collea g u e had oom m unieated to the M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs the substance
o f the A n glo-G erm an A greem en t, w hich ha d been fa v ou ra bly received (F .O . G erm any (A frica )
1467.)] '
 43 3
(see particularly the d e s p a t c h ] to Sir F . Lascelles No. 141 Africa of August ‘22
1S9S .(•)
(C) The Dutch governm ent will be sure to be terribly annoyed at the arrange­
ment respecting Tim or, which runs counter to their treaty o f pre-em ption with
Portugal of 1904.( I0) They will look with the greatest apprehension on the danger of
seeing Germany establish herself in Tim or, and with good reason. But we shall
not be creating a new situation, but only revealing it, and H olland would have to
make up her mind to accept it.
Di Equal, if not greater, consternation will arise in Australia, and the indigna­
tion in that quarter will undoubtedly be exceedingly vociferous. Indeed I think this
may appear to be perhaps the principal objection to publication. But here again it
may be said that in all probability the facts will becom e known sooner or later. It
is o f course just possible that this will not happen, either because a war with Germany
might automatically put an end to the treaties before they becom e operative, or
because the Portuguese g ev [e m m e n ]t might succeed in introducing efficient govern­
ment in her colonies and so prevent the situation which the conventions contem plate,
from arising. B oth these contingencies are however very problematical. It may be
best, after all, to take the bull by the horns, and settle the matter by plain speaking.
(E ) The enemies o f E ngland will be able, perhaps, to point a reproachful finger
at her and create further ill-feeling against a country which m ight b y them •be
described as sanctim oniously professing solicitude for an ancient ally and proclaim ing
the intention to uphold the alliance whilst at the same time secretly agreeing with
a third Power to divide between them the a lly’ s most valuable colonies. This will
certainly be said, probably most loudly in the German press, and we should have
to face the obloquy and answer it as best we can.
The above are, I think, the principal objections to publication. It remains to
look at the other side of the pieture :

(AA) H R s ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] would be definitely relieved o f the load

of secrecy, and able to deal with all the com plicated issues arising from these conven­
tions, in the most open and straightforward manner. This is always an immense
gain, moral and material. All difficulties as to statements in Parliament would
disappear.
BB'i W e ought to be able to use the revelation in vindication at least of our
friendly attitude towards Germany, and &o disarm a good deal of parliamentary
criticism.
CC W e should almost certainly stimulate the efforts of the Portuguese govern­
ment to set their house in order. F or the sake of the Portuguese alliance, which
retains its value in large European com plications, and which gives us the right to
keep foreign Powers off the strategically important Portuguese islands Azores, Cape
Verde which we are called upon under the terms of the alliance, to defend against
attack, it will be better that Portugal should develop her colonies herself (with British
capital! than that we should be forced to take them over. And if we only revealed
the secret conventions ultimately after so taking over Portuguese colonies, our action
would be open to much hostile criticism , which would be avoided if the whole world
knew and saw beforehand what must happen, and why.
(DDl Our position towards our Dom inions would be clearly defined; we should
be the better able to restrain any possible undue aggressiveness on the part of the
Union of S [o u th ] Africa.
These considerations, which I submit as arising directly out of the simple question
asked by M r. Gilm our, are thus seen to involve wider issues. For the present of
course, all that is imm ediately required, is an answer to that question. But it may
be thought wise to face the larger problem at once, and seek a more com plete and

( 9) [ p . G ooch cfc T em p erley, V ol. I. pp. 69-70. X o . 83.]

(i®) [®. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 101. p p 497-500.]
[10900]
 434

more definite solution o f the difficulty which, failing such a solution, will undoubtedly
continue to present itself in different forms o f increasing embarrassment.
If I may venture to express an opinion, I should say that I should strongly
favour the adoption of the 4th alternative above indicated, if the difficulty as regards
Australian feeling can be overcom e or may be neglected.
Failing the adoption o f what I have called the heroic course, we should, I think,
do best to temporize further by falling back on the 2nd alternative.
E Y R E A. CRO W E.
J an [u a ry] 26, 1912.

M IN U T E S .

I can add n oth in g to th is M e m o r a n d u m ] b eyon d sa y in g th a t it w ould be b etter to publish

the secret agreem en t and also the renew al o f the T re a ty o f A lliance.
A. N.

I am in fa v o u r o f com p lete p u b lica tion . I f we publish the agreem ent w ith G erm any I
th in k the fa ir th in g w ill be also to pu blish the reaffirm ation o f the A llian ce w ith P o rtu g a l m ade
d u rin g the B oer war.
1. T he first step is to g et M r. H a r c o u r t ’ s con cu rren ce as to p u b lic a t io n ; the effect in
A u stra lia is the w orst difficulty. F o r th is pu rpose M r. H a rc o u rt should see these m inutes.
2. I f M r. H a rc o u rt as C olon ia l S ecreta ry consents I m ust then let L o rd L ansdow ne and
M r. B a lfo u r (w ho sign ed the secret A g reem en t w ith G erm a ny) see e x a c tly w hat we propose
to pu blish and ask i f th ey have ob je c tio n s to urge.
3. T he consent o f the G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t resp ectin g the agreem en t w ith them m ust
then be o b ta in ed — a date cou ld be nam ed fo r p u b lica tion th a t w ould g iv e tim e to com m u n ica te
the p a p er to be pu blished con fid en tia lly t o the P rim e M in isters o f the S elf-G ov ern in g D om in ion s
and to the P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t b efore p u b lica tion took place. W e should then also h a ve
to ob ta in the consent o f P o rtu g a l to the p u b lica tion o f the re-affirm ation o f th e A lliance.
P ro ce e d step by step in th is order.
E. G.
29.1.12.

M eanw hile I th in k S ir E. C row e’ s 2nd proposal fo r dea lin g w ith M r. G ilm our can be
a d o p t e d ; if necessary we m ig h t g o a little fu rth e r and tell him in confid ence th a t there are
secret agreem ents betw een ourselves an d G erm any th a t w ould p reclu d e us from g iv in g him
d ip lom a tic su p p ort in secu rin g a concession o f the natu re p roposed in T im or. I assume he
w ill w an t som e rep ly b efore the m a tter o f p u b lica tion can be settled and I u n d ersta n d he is a
man w ho can be trusted.
E . G.

M r. G ilm our ca lled upon me to d a y and I took th e op p o rtu n ity o f te llin g him th a t th ere
w ere reasons, w hich I th ou g h t it unnecessary fu rth er to sp ecify , fo r w hich H f is ] M fa je s t y ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ] could not en cou ra ge any B ritish firms to em bark on d ev elop m en t en terp rizes in
T im or. M r. G ilm our at once said he q u ite u n d erstood , and th a t he person a lly w ould th erefore
abandon the plan. H e th ou g h t h ow ever th a t it m ig h t b e ta ken up by oth er B ritish firms
w ith or w ith ou t co-op era tion w ith finan ciers o f oth er coun tries. H e asked me w hat H [ is ]
M fa je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] w ould say i f a D utch com p an y w ere form ed fo r th e pu rpose, in
w hich B ritish ca p ita l m ig h t be la rgely rep resen ted . I again ex p la in ed ou r a ttitu d e, a d d in g
th a t o f course the g o v [e r n m e n ]t d id not possess or claim to have a n y pow er to p rev en t a
B ritish su b ject from ob ta in in g concessions in T im or. All they w ished to do was to w arn B ritish
subjects th a t such en terp rizes cou ld not cou n t up on the su p p o r t or assistance of H [ is ]
M fa je s t y ’ s] G fo v cr n m e n t] should they h erea fter find them selves in a p osition w hich they had
not foreseen.
M r. G ilm our rep ea ted th a t so fa r as he was con cern ed he w ould certa in ly n ot m ove fu rth er
in the m a tter, and he th a n k ed m e fo r th e w arn in g g iv en , w hich he prom ised to trea t as
confidential.
E. A. C.
F e b fr u a r y ] 1.

M r. H a rc o u rt has seen this p a p er and retu rn ed it to m e toda y. H e w ill com e to discuss

the question w ith me 011 M on d a y.
E. G.
2 1.12 [sic: 1.2.12]
 435
N o. 271.
Sir A . Nicolson to Sir Edward G rey.
F.O. 367/2S4.
5352 '391, 12, 43G.
Private.
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office, January 30, 1912.
M. de Villaurruttia today said that he was about to put to me an indiscreet
question— viz whether we were likely to put into operation the secret treaty which
we had concluded in 1898 with Germany for a partition of the Portuguese Colonies. (*)
1 asked him what grounds he had for assuming that there was a secret Treaty. H e
replied that he knew that the late K ing Edward (Sir E yre Crowe tells me it was
the late Lord Salisbury) had inform ed M. de Soveral that a Treaty had been signed,
and that the latter had been made acquainted with its contents. I said that I did
not mind his asking me indiscreet questions, as I had asked m any in m y time—
but I could not reply to anv conundrums or to hypothetical surmises.
A . N [IC O L S O N ].
M IN U T E .

The p a pers sent m e th e oth er d a y show th a t L o rd Sa lisbu ry did in form M . S o v e r a l: and

M . S ov era l him self on ce to ld m e the w hole history o f the a frair.(2)
E. G.

0 ) [v. Gooch <£• T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, pp. 71-5, Nos. 9 0 -2 .]

(2) [cp . ibid., V ol. I, pp . 75-6, Nos. 9 3-5, and E d . N o t e ; cp. alsosupra, p. 427, E d . V o f e .]

No. 272.

Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)

F.O. 367/284.
6 1 7 5 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .
(No. 9.) Africa. Lisbon, D . F ebruary 6, 1912.
Sir, E . F ebruary 12, 1912.
Senhor Yasconcellos spoke to me again to-day about the representations you had
made to him on the state o f the Province o f M ozambique. He said that before
replying to these representations lie wished to consult Senhor Azevedo da Silva, the
late Higli Commissioner in M ozambique, who was expected at Lisbon in a day or
two, about the working o f the “ prazos ” system and the recruitment o f native labour.
He might however say that his enquiries into the latter question had satisfied him
that the conditions under which native labourers were sent to San Tliome were more
generous and indulgent than those under which they were sent to the Eand mines,
as those destined for San Thom e were allowed, which those for the Eand were not,
to take their wives and families with them.
H e would like, he proceeded, to consult Senhor Azevedo da Silva about the
extension through Portuguese territory of the Shire [ s i c : S hire] Highlands Eailway,
as to which, as directed in your despatch No. 14 Africa o f the 24th instant.(2) I had
pressed him unofficially. I said that I admitted the reasonableness of this, but added

O ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g heen sent to the C a bin et on M a rch 1. 1912.]

( 2) (S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 14 A fr ic a ) o f J a n u a ry 24, 1912, is n ot rep rod u ced .
H e in stru cted S ir A. H a rd in g e to a p p roa ch the P ortu g u ese G overn m en t un officia lly “ w ith an
in tim a tio n th a t H ( i s ] M fa je s t v ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] ta k e a grea t in terest in the success o f the
proposed p ro lo n g a tio n o f the Shire H ig h la n d s R a ilw a y and h op e th a t th e P o rtu g u e se G overn ­
m ent m ay see th eir w ay t o a ccord t o the B f r it is h ] C [e n t r a l] A [ fr io a n ] C o fm p a n y ], w ith ou t
unnecessary delav, the sim ple perm ission w hich thev desire.” (F .O . 3 6 7 '2 8 9 . 3 4 2 1 ’ 3 42 1/
12 '4 3 6 .)] ‘
(10900] 2 F 2
 43G

that you would like an answer on the subject of the railway by the middle of this
month at latest. He replied that ho thought he could promise me this.
His Excellency then adverted to the continued German press campaign about
the Portuguese colonies, and to the alleged Anglo-German secret agreement of
1898,(3) and said that he would wish, in order to reassure Public Opinion in this
country, to publish the text o f the agreement o f the following year by which the
late Marquess of Salisbury had reaffirmed the binding character o f the old treaties
of alliance between the two countries, and he asked if you would entertain any
objection to its publication by him , for the information o f the Lisbon Congress. I
said that I would bring the matter to your notice, and would be prepared to advise
you to agree to publication, if the Government o f the Republic really deemed such
a step desirable, in order to allay any doubts or alarms in this country. I felt sure
in any case that j’ou would give the matter your most careful consideration.
His E xcellency’ s allusion to the Treaty of 1898, and the presence of Senhov
M adeira the Minister o f Justice, who had joined us in order to discuss another
question, afforded me an opportunity o f executing the instructions contained in your
despatch No. 1 Africa (49719/11) of the 4th ultimo.(b) 1 accordingly observed that
after m y conversation of some weeks ago with Senlior M adeira in which the latter
had construed a Parliamentary Statement by Mr. Asquith(5) about secret arrangements
as im plying that no such engagements existed other than those mentioned with
France, I had looked up the Prime M inister’ s statement, as reported in the English
papers, and had found that it only covered secret arrangements involving military
obligations, and would not therefore necessarily exclude an understanding with
Germ any such as that which the papers had referred to, as to the eventual disposal
of the Portuguese Colonies, should Portugal of her oicn free will desire to dispose
of any parts o f her Colonial Em pire to other Powers. I felt however sure that if
any exchange o f views, such as that which the German Press alleged, had taken
place, on the subject o f a hypothetical contingency of this nature, between Great
Britain and other Powers, it could only have been on the presumption that Portugal
were a free and willing party to it. I only mentioned this point in order to correct
any misapprehension into which Senhor Macieira might have been led by m y apparent
acquiescence in an imperfect appreciation on His E xcellency’ s part o f the British
P rem ier’ s declaration.
Both Ministers were I think a little taken aback at these remarks, and Senhor
Vasconcellos observed, with raihcr a forced laugh, that it made little practical
difference, as Portugal would rather perish than alienate any portion of her colonial
Em pire to a foreign Power. In the old corrupt days of the m onarchy such a notion
might have possibly occurred to foreign states, but the sound financial methods
introduced by the*Republican Governm ent had disposed o f the dangers of insolvency
which could alone warrant such a sacrifice. I replied that I was very glad to hear it.
I think personally that it might be advisable to let the Portuguese Government
publish the renewed Treaty of Alliance, and T inferred from a conversation which
1 had the honour of having with you on the 8th of January last that you were inclined
to lay before our own Parliament, not only that Treaty, but the secret Agreements
of 1898. I f this is so it will perhaps be well for me to arrange confidentially for a
simultaneous publication o f both documents at Lisbon and in London. I shail await
your instruction on this point before reverting to the subject in conversation with
the Portuguese Premier.
I have, Ac.
AR TH U R II. IIA R D IN G E .

( 3) p>. Gooch & T em p erley, V ol. I. pp. 71 5, Nos. 9 0-2, ¡ ¡ | Is.]

(4) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 1 A fric a ) o f J a n u a ry 4, 1912, is n ot rep rod u ced . H e
in stru cted S ir A. H a rd in g e to co r re c t the m isapprehension o f the P ortu g u ese C a bin et th a t
G rea t B rita in had now published all h er secret treaties. (P.O . 367 /23 7. 4 9 7 1 9 /2 9 1 1 9 /1 2 /4 3 6 .)!
(5) [i>. P ari. D eb., 5th P er.. (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 32, pp. 106-7. A n e x tra ct is prin ted
in G ooch & T em p e rle y , V ol. VIT, p. 725, N o 720.]
 437
M IN U T E .

W o u ld it n ot b e well to let S ir A . H a rd iu g e p o in t ou t to th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t

th a t when th e secret agreem en t o f 1898 was b e in g con clu d ed, th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e r n m e n ]t
w ere du ly in form ed by H [ e r ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] o f its gen era l ou tlin e and p u rp o r t,
and refer S ir A. H a rd in g e to the several com m u n ica tion s m a de a t th e tim e b oth to M . de
Soveral h ere and to th e P ortu g u ese M in ister fo r F [o r e ig n ] A [fla ir s] a t L isbon.
H e should add th a t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] w ill g iv e th e ir ca re fu l con sid era tion
to th e q u estion o f th e p u b lica tion o f th e a greem en t o f W in d so r o f 1899.(6)
E. A. C.
F e b [r n a r v ] 13.
F . D . A.
A. N.
E. G.

(6) [u. G ooch db T e m p e rle y , V o l. I, pp . 9 3-4, No. 118. On th e m isuse o f th e te rm “ a gree­

m ent o f W i n d s o r -’ v. ibid ., p. 99, E d . X o t e , an d V ol. Y i l l , Ip. 49, E d . X o t e ; cp. also in fra,
pp. 4*3—4, E d . ATote.]

No. 273.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir A . H ardinge.C)

F.O. 367/284.
6 17 5 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .
(No. 30.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, February 29, 1912.
I have received your despatch No. 9, Africa, c o n fid e n tia l], of the
6th in s t[a n t ],(2) and I approve the language held by you to the Portuguese Ministers
for Foreign Affairs and of Justice on that date.
In view of the apprehensions apparently entertained by the present Portuguese
G ov [ern m en ]t as to the scope and effects of the secret Anglo-G erm an Agreement of
1898,(3) it would be well if you called the attention of the M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ]
A [ffairs] to the several co n fid e n tia l] com m unications made on this subject by
H [e r ] M [a je sty ’ s ] G o v e rn m e n t] at the time when that agreement was negotiated,
to the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t o f that day, such as the assurance given on
A u g[u st] 18th, 1898 by Mr. Balfour to the Portuguese Minister in London and
recorded in the despatch No. 90 Africa to M r. Thornton o f the same d ate,(4) “ that
in any arrangement with Germany the sovereign rights o f Portugal would be most
carefully safeguarded and that no cession of territory would be asked of her.”
This was repeated to M. de Soveral in Mr. B alfour’ s note dated the 31st of that
m onth,(5) although M. de Soveral was not explicitly told that the two G ov [ern m en ]ts
had agreed to exclude any third Power from interfering with the Portuguese colonies
(see telegrams to Mr. Thornton, No. 19, A f[r ic a ], o f S e p te m b e r ] l s t ,( 6) and No. 20
of S e p te m b e r ] 2 n d ).(7)
Shortly afterwards Mr. Thornton at an interview with the Portuguese M [inister
for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs ], which he reported in his despatch No. 82 A f[rica ] of the
10th S e p t[e m b e r],(8) briefly sketched the fundamental principles of the Anglo-Germ an
arrangement as set forth in the first clause of the Convention of the 30th A u g [u st],
of the signature of which Senhor Beirâo seemed to be aware already at the time.

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g and to th e C a b in et.]

( 2) [» . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [1§ Goocli <ù T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, pp. 71-5, Nos. 9 0-2, encls.]
C ) [» . ib id., V ol. I, p. 66, N o. 84.]
(5) [u. ib id., V ol. I, p. 75, N o. 93.]
( 6) [M r. B a lfo u r’ s teleg ra m (N o. 19 A fr ic a ) to M r. T h orn ton o f S eptem b er 1, 1898,
D . 6-30 p . m .. g a v e th e t e x t o f M r. B a lfo u r’ s n ote to M. de Sovera l o f A u g u st 31. (F .O . G erm any
(A frica ) 1466.)]
( 7) [v . G ooch & T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, p. 76, N o. 95.]
( 8) [cp . su pra , p. 432, N o. 270, n ote ( 8).]
 438

You should remind the present M [m ister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] of the friendly
character of the conversation which followed, during which Mr. Thornton laid fresh
stress on the fact that Portugal would by such an arrangement gain breathing time
in which to reform her administrations, and be relieved from all apprehension of
attack on her colonial possessions, the primary object o f the two Signatory Powers
being to assist Portugal in her financial difficulties without involving any loss or
diminution of her sovereign rights.
Again on Sept [em ber] 29th of that year Mr. Thornton explained more clearly
to Senhor de Castro (No. 93 A f[rica ] of S e p te m b e r] 30th)(9) the situation contem ­
plated under the Agreement as regards the possible future division of the two
Portuguese colonies into spheres o f influence for Great Britain and Germany (see
his despatch No. 93 A f[rica ] of S e p te m b e r ] 30th 1898). Although therefore the
Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t did not see the actual treaties, they were placed in a
position to form a fairly accurate idea of their main purport.
In calling the attention o f Senhor Yasconcellos to the language held to the
Portuguese G ov[ern m en ]t on these occasions in 1898 you should add that H [is ]
M [a je stv ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] will give their careful consideration to the question of
the publication o f the Treaty signed at W indsor between Great Britain and Portugal
on O ct[ob er] 14th 1899.( 10) Yrou might at the same time remind H [is ] E [xcellen cy ]
of the assurance given to M. de Soveral by the Marquess of Salisbury on June 22nd,
1898,( n ) that H [e r ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] quite recognised the present validity
o f the ancient treaties between England and Portugal, thus indicating the spirit in
which L [o r ]d Salisbury entered on his negotiations with the German G ov[ern m en ]t.
[ I am, A c.]
E. G[EEY].
( 9) [M r. T h o rn to n ’ s despatch (N o. 93 A fric a ), p . S eptem b er 30, It. O ctob er 10, 1898, is not
rep rod u ced , as the con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F .O . G erm any (A frica ) 1467.)]
( 10) [u. Gooch <Sc T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, pp. 9 3-4, N o. 118. F o r the misuse o f the term “ W in d sor
T r e a t y ” v. ibid ., p. 99, E d . N o t e ; V ol. V I I I , p. 49, E d . N o t e ; and in fra, pp. 483-4, E d . A 'ofe.]
( 11) [r . Gooch <£• T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, p. 50, N o. 68.]

No. 274.

Sir A . Hardinge to Sir E duard G r ey .( l)

F.O. 367/284.
1 0 2 6 4 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 . Lisbon, D. March 8, 1912, 11-20 p . m .
Tel. (No. 11.) Secret. Africa. B . March 9, 1912, 8 a . m .
Your despatch No. 30, A frica, Secret, (of F eb [ru a ry ] 2 9 ).(2)
Have made com m unication to Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs who
expressed satisfaction and asked whether he could make statement in Parliament to
reassure wide-spread public anxiety felt here as to Anglo-Germ an agreement o f 1898.
I said that I could authorise no such statement without reference to you, as your
despatch dealt with a secret treaty. W ould you, how ever, let him say something
of this kind?—
“ W e have not seen text of agreement o f 1898, but at the time of its
conclusion confidential explanations as to its principles and general purport were
given by the British to the then Portuguese Governm ent, and have been this
year repeated to ourselves which have satisfied us that it contains nothing of
a nature to menace independence, integrity, and interests o f Portugal, or of
any portion o f her dominions. More than this, as the agreement is a secret
one, we cannot at present say to the H ou se.”

I have telegraphed at his E xcellency’ s request.

0 ) [A cop y o f th is teleg ram was sent to the C olonial O ffice.]
( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 439
M IN U T E S .

T he sta tem en t p rop osed seems u n ob jection a b le in itself, alth ou g h here the S e c [ r e t a r ]y o f
S ta te has sa id th a t to m ake any sta tem en t re g a rd in g a secret tre a ty is in com p a tib le w ith its
secrecy.
I t w ou ld perh a ps be m ore con sisten t if th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t said “ W e are satis­
fied th a t no tre a ty exists b etw een G rea t B r ita in and G erm any w hich con ta in s a n y th in g o f a
natu re to m enace ” etc. W e o u g h t to g e t G erm a n y ’ s consent.
Q [u e r ]y . T e l[e g r a p h ] to S ir E . G oschen.
“ P o rtu g u e se G o v [e r n m e n ]t are a n xiou s t o m ake sta tem en t in P a rlia m en t to reassure
p u b lic a n x ie ty as to A n g lo-G erm a n con v en tion s o f 1898.
W e propose, i f G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t agree, t o say w e should have no ob je c tio n to follow in g
form u la : ‘ W e a re satisfied th a t no tre a ty ex ists betw een G rea t B r ita in an d G erm any w hich
con ta in s a n y th in g o f a n a tu re to m enace in d ep en d en ce, in te g r ity or in terests o f P o rtu g a l, or
o f any p o r tio n o f h er d om in ion s.’
P o rtu g u e se G o v [e rn m e n ]t m ig h t be a u th o rize d to say, i f they wish, th a t this sta tem en t is
m ade w ith th e assent o f B ritish and G erm an G overn m eiits.” ( 3)
J. A . C. T.
9 /3 /1 2 .

I a gree th a t w ith o u t G erm a n y ’ s consent w e ca n n ot a u th orize such a sta tem en t as the

P ortu g u ese G overn m en t propose.
E . A . C.
M [a r c h ] 9.

T eleg ra p h as p roposed to B erlin.

E. G.

A n d rep ea t to L isbon.
[E . A . C .]

(3) [T h is was d on e in S ir E d w a rd G rev ’ s teleg ra m (N o. 42) o f M a rch 9, 1912. I t was

rep ea ted to L isb on (N o. 5). (F .O . 367 /28 4. ‘ 1 0 2 6 4 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .)]

No. 275.

Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Edward G r e y .{x)

F.O. 367/284.
1 0 8 3 2 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
(No. 17.) A frica. Secret. Lisbon, D. March 8, 1912.
Sir, R . March 13, 1912.
I had the honour to receive on the 5th instant, your despatch No. 3 0 (2) Secret
respecting the Anglo-Germ an Agreement o f 1898,(3) and, in accordance with the
instructions contained in it, I to-day called the attention o f Senhor Vasconcellos to
the various communications on this subject made at the time by H er late M ajesty’ s
Government to that of Portugal. I translated to him Mr. B alfour’ s despatch No. 90
of August 18 1898(4) to this Legation, and his note to Monsieur de Soveral of the
30th o f the same m on th ,(5) and gave him a general outline of the main principles
and purport, o f the Agreement as described by Mr. Thornton in his interviews with
Senhor Beirao and Senhor Luciano de Castro. I added that you would give your
careful consideration to the question of the publication of the Treaty signed at
W indsor on 14 October 1899.(6) and reminded His E xcellency of the assurance given
on 22 June 1898(7) by the Marquess of Salisbury to Monsieur de Soveral.

( !) [A co p y o f this despatch w as sent to the C olon ia l Office.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 437-8, N o. 273.]
(3) [u. G ooch & T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, pp. 71-5, Nos. 90-2, cn c/s.]
C) [v. ib id ., V ol. I, p. 66, No. 84.]
(5) [v. ib id ., V ol. I, p. 75, No. 93.]
( 6) [v. ib id .. V ol. I, pp. 93-4, N o. 118.]
(») [v. ib id ., V ol. I, p. 50, No. 68.]
 440
Senhor Vasconcellos expressed great satisfaction at this statem en t: he gave me
to understand that the accounts of all these communications and conversations were
very im perfectly recorded in the archives of the Lisbon Foreign Office and said that
it was a great relief to him to know exactly how Portugal stood with reference to
the Anglo-German Agreem ent, as to which a good deal o f anxiety had o f late been
felt in this country. lie would like to be able to reassure public opinion by some
formal declaration in Parliament.
I said, that the despatch in which I had been instructed by you to make this
com m unication to him was marked secret, that it dealt with an international agree­
ment the text of which, as it was secret, could not be communicated to Portugal
without the consent of both the signatories, although now, as in 1898, it was the
wish o f Ilis M ajesty’ s Governm ent to satisfy that of its ancient ally, by confidentially
indicating its general purport, that it involved nothing prejudicial to the latter’ s
interests. But a public explanation in the Lisbon Parliament was a different matter,
and I must ask him to say nothing o f what had passed between us outside the Cabinet
until I heard further from you. H e asked if I would not telegraph to you, and I
therefore addressed to you m y telegram No. 11 o f to-day’ s d a te.(8)
I have, &c.
A R TH U R H . H A R D IN G E .

( 8) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 276.

M emorandum by Mr. H arcou rt.{1)

F.O. 371/1373.
10785/ 5 5 6 9 /1 2 /1 8 . March 9, 1912.
Today Sir Edward Grey and I met Count Metternich at the Foreign Office/2) and
discussed with him for an hour and a quarter the possible territorial rectifications and
exchanges which might be made bettveen E ngland and Germany. I took separately
— and continued to treat separately—
1. The Secret Treaty of 1898 as to Portuguese C olonies./3)
2. The German request for Penguin and Seal Islands in Angra Pequena Bay.
3. Zanzibar and Pemba.
As to 1. I suggested that if this treaty was revised it might be published, but I
said that it would be necessary also to publish the original treaty in order to make
our position clear to the public here.
I f they had no knowledge of the existing treaty— now fourteen years old— which
was made by Lord Salisbury’ s Governm ent they would ask why we had not obtained
better terms for England.
Count Metternich seemed to demur to the publication of the original treaty, but
Sir E. Grey and I said that this m ight become necessary in any case— even if there
was no revision— as the leakage in Germ any as to the existence, and even the details,
of the treaty had been so extensive that it was no longer possible to conceal the facts
from our own Parliament.
Count Metternich admitted the leakage and his knowledge of the leaker.
I then said that I understood that the German Government would like to obtain
the reversion to themselves of that part of Portuguese Angola which, under the
secret treaty, was secured to England. I pointed out the large extent of this on the

(*) [T h is m em orandum is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g an d to the Cabinet.

I t w as sent to B erlin (as N o. 55, S ecret).]
( 2) [cp. G .P., X X X r , pp. 255-60.]
(3) [r . Gooch, d• T em p erley, V ol. I, pp. 7 2-5, Nos. 91-2, and en d s.]
 441

map, adding that it contained the excellent port of St. Paul de Loanda, the terminus
of the existing Portuguese railway, and that this territory, stretching from the West
Coast of Africa to the north-westernmost com er of Northern Ehodesia (near Katanga),
was regarded by m any people in Africa, especially the Chartered Company, as the
natural and ultimate outlet for their produce to the sea, and I added that the
homeward and outward freights from and to St. Paul de Loanda would be much
lower than those round the Cape to Beira. I said that I did not find any insuperable
obstacle to an exchange so long as we received an equivalent in Africa— not equal in
extent, but sufficient to satisfy public opinion in this country and at the C a p e ; that,
though I had no special desire for territory, but in order to meet German wishes, I
had considered what would be a sufficient quid pro quo, and I suggested to him that
in Portuguese East Africa the future British sphere should be extended from the
mouth of the Zam besi (where it ends under the existing treatyi northwards to the
15th parallel, and that the country between Lake Nyassa and a line drawn from Lake
Chinta to the confluence of the Luehulingo and Bovuma Rivers should eventually be
added to Xyassaland, and that the W estern frontier of Northern Rhodesia should be
continued up the present line of longitude 2 2 -3 0 ° till it reached the projected
K atanga-L obito Railway at the southern frontier of the Belgian Congo.
Count Metternich expressed great surprise at these suggestions, and said that
L ord Haldane in Berlin had “ offered the whole of Angola, and had said we only
required the cession of Tim or in exchange.” (4)
I pointed out that it was impossible that Lord Haldane could have intended or
said th is; that on the day before his departure for Berlin I had a brief conversation
with him, and told him that if the Secret Treaty was m entioned I should be glad to
know what, if any, change in it was suggested by the German G overnm ent; that we
should be glad to drop Tim or out, because it excited Australian sentiment, but we did
not want it for ourselves, and were quite satisfied with the prior rights of Dutch pre­
em ption; that Beira and Delagoa B ay must in any case rem ain in the British sphere,
but that if Germany had views about our share of Angola I should be very willing to
discuss the matter on his return. Count Metternich again repeated that this was not
the impression created by Lord Haldane in Berlin.
2. I then turned to Penguin and Seal Islands, which Count Metternich at once
called barren rocks, but I said were islands essential to turn Angra Pequena
into a good harbour by building a breakwater on and between them.
I said that m any years ago they were transferred to the Cape Colony, that they
had therefore passed to the Government of the Union of South Africa, and that they
could not be ceded without a resolution, and probably an Act, of the Union
Parliament. To produce an atmosphere favourable to this it would be necessary to
offer the Union Government some com pensation in that neighbourhood, and I could
think of nothing but the strip of land known as the “ Caprivi tassel,” which stretches
from the north of German South-W est Africa into Rhodesia to a point on the Zam besi
north of and above the Victoria Falls.
I suggested that the western boundary of Bechuanaland might be extended
northwards along the twentieth degree of longitude up to the point where it meets the
present southern boundary of Portuguese East Africa, and that all country lying east
of that line should becom e part of Bechuanaland. Count Metternich evidently
thought this far too large a price for the two islands and said he regarded it as quite
out of the question.
I alluded to the fact that no m ention had been made at B erlin of W alfisch Bay,
and that we appreciated the discretion of this silence, which was no doubt due to the
knowledge acquired by H err Dernburg in his visit to South Africa of the strength of
feeling there on the subject.
I said that it was impossible to press on, or even suggest to, the Union Govern­
ment any" surrender of W alfisch B ay, but that if the German Governm ent had any
offer they cared to make, such as, e.g. the southern portion of Namaqualand, I would
(4) [ cp. Gooch <b Temperley, V ol. V I , p. 634, N o. 506, App. I I I . ]
 442

willingly be the conduit-pipe of such a suggestion, but that if it was refused I could
press the matter no further.
Count Metternich said that it was not worth while to discuss Walfisch Bay, as it
had ceased to have much value to them. At one time they would have liked it, but
that now they had sunk large sums in developing the harbour at Swakopmund, and
would not care to change their port or railway terminus.
Passing across the map via the Belgian Congo, I m entioned that if in a remote
future this territory were to pass to other hands than those of the French (who had
the right of pre-emption), we should be specially interested in and feel that we had a
strong claim to that part of the Belgian Congo south of parallel 10° which contains
Katanga.
W e then reached Zanzibar and Pemba, o f which I said that, though practically
a possession, they were nom inally a p rotectorate; that they carried with them some
sort of sovereignty over the coast strip of our East African Protectorate, to which
protectorate this coast strip must be transferred if Zanzibar changed hands; that
Zanzibar was the landing place of our East African cables, and that these must be
transferred to British territory— probably M om basa; that Zanzibar was the most
flourishing com m ercial port on the East Coast, a great centre of entrepot trade, and
much valued by traders and shippers. W e pointed out that it was impossible to part
with these islands, which were our sole consideration for the cession of Heligoland
in exchange for mere diplomatic assistance over the last section o f the Bagdad
Railway and a recognition of our position in the Persian Gulf and at K ow eit; that
public opinion would demand territory in exchange for territory, and that again I
had looked round for something which might serve the purpose and, though not of
great value, might be a salve to public pride. For this purpose I suggested the cession
to us o f the north-west corner of German East Africa (called Ruanda), north of a
line drawn from the north end of Lake Tanganyika to the south-west extremity of
Lake Victoria Nyanza.
Count Metternich observed that this would cut German East Africa off from
any possible future connection (through the Congo) with their W est African
possessions, actual or potential.
H e reminded us that Lord Rosebery, in 1894, had failed to obtain facilities for
the Cape to Cairo Railway on the west side of Lake Tanganyika in Belgian territory
owing to a previous Anglo-Germ an understanding which had been overlooked by
Lord R osebery(s) ; but Count Metternich intimated that the German Government would
not be unwilling to give a way-leave for such a line if required through their
territory.
I said that the Cape to Cairo line was a sentimental aspiration and not a
commercial proposition; that the real outlets for Central African trade were Beira
on the east and St. Paul de Loanda or Lobito Bay on the w est; but that if the Cape
to Cairo line were ever built it would probably be through Belgian territory north of
Katanga, and beyond the range of the prohibited area which had upset Lord
R osebery’ s previous plans.
Count Metternich mentioned the interest of the German Governm ent in the
Portuguese Islands of San Thom e and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, which were
not included in the Secret Treaty o f 1898.(6) Seeing the difficulty which had arisen
during the conversation about Tim or, I suggested that these might be included in a
new treaty with remainder to Germ any as a set-off to Tim or which she would lose,
though we should not acquire it.
(s) [cp. G ooch <£ T em p erley, V ol. I l l , p. 424, A p p . B. T he te x t o f th e C ongo T rea ty o f
M a y 12, 1894, is p rin ted in A . & P ., (1894), V ol. X C V I , [C . 7358], pp. 23-9. T he corresp on den ce
as to th e w ith d ra w a l o f A rticle I I I is p r in te d ibid., [C . 7390], pp. 3 1 -4 2 ; and the D ecla ra tion
o f w ithd raw al itself ibid., [C. 7549], pp. 43-5. cp. also H e r t s le t : M a p of A fric a b y T rea ty,
V ol. I l l , pp. 1008-1015, 1017. F or the 1890 n eg otia tion s cp. C ecil, V ol. I V , pp. 283-8, 2 9 5 -6 ;
G .P ., V I I I , pp. 11-25, p a ssim ; C rew e: L o rd R os eb ery , V ol. I I , pp. 359-60. R eferen ce to the
1894 n eg otia tion s is m ade also in Crewe, op. cit., V ol. I I , pp. 4 48 -9 .]
( 6) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I, pp. 72-5, Nos. 9 1-2, and e n d s.]
 44 3

I drew attention to the fact that neither Lord Salisbury nor the German Govern­
ment of that day had included in the Secret Treaty any Portuguese Islands, such as
Madeira and the Azores.
Count Metternich at once added “ and the Cape Verde Islands.’ ’
As these are exactly opposite French Senegal, and the conversation seemed to
be becom ing embarrassing, I switched it off to the other side of the world and
suggested that, if Germany wished to make any further concession in return for
Zanzibar and Pemba, there were the islands of Bougainville and Bourka, which form
part of the Solom on Islands, and are the sole rem aining (and I believe undeveloped)
possession of Germany within that group.
Count Metternich expressed considerable disappointment at m y attitude and
ideas, which he thought more extravagant than those of Lord Haldane.
I replied that I was well known to be an extreme G erm anophile; that Count
Metternich must be aware (which he admitted) of conversations of mine last autumn
suggesting just such exchanges of territory as we had been discussing which conver­
sations I have reason to believe were the m oving factor of the German approaches
to us through H err Ballin and Sir E. Cassel.
Sir E. Grey also said that he had brought me in as the rara avis— a Colonial
Secretary who was a willing seller.
I ought, perhaps, to explain that throughout the conversation I took the
labouring oar because I was specially conversant with the geographical details, but
also (which accounts for the undue use of the personal pronoun in this m emorandum)
because I felt that if a settlement can be arrived at by concession it will be easier
for the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet to say that the views put forward in this
conversation were m y own, but that the concessions made are the considered
judgm ent of the Cabinet, to which I have no doubt that I should be an assenting
partv.
L. H.

M IN U T E S .

C on v ersation b etw een C ou n t M ettern ich , S ir E. G rey and M r. H a rc o u rt, 10 M a rch , 1912,
9 or 1 1?
C op y as m a rked sent to H e r r v on K u h lm a n n O c t [o b e r ] 22, 1913, b y S ir E . C row e.(7)
S ir E. C row e,
T he a n n exed p r in t is the record o f the con v ersa tion to w h ich I th in k H e r r v on K u h lm a n n
referred . I t is how ever the same p a p er th a t we g o t o u t last tim e he enq u ired.
H . J. S.

H e r r v on K iih lm a n n said th a t w hilst h e d istin ctly recollected a ll th a t passed a t th e

in terv iew he referred to, as to ld h im b y C ou n t M ette r n ic h a t th e tim e he cou ld find no p r o p e r
record o f it in his archives. H e was m ost a n x iou s to com p lete those record s and th erefore
asked w hether he cou ld be fu rn ish ed w ith the r e c o rd w hich w as no d ou b t m ade a t the tim e
by S ir E. G rey. H e had orig in a lly su ggested th e 10th o f M a rch as the date o f th e in terv iew
b u t ha d been to ld th a t no re co rd o f a co n v ersa tion on th a t day cou ld be fo u n d a t ou r office.
H e now asks fo r fu rth e r search, co v e rin g th e da ys im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g or fo llo w in g the 10th.
I presum e th e a tta ch ed p r in t con ta in s the in terv iew re ferred to, th ou g h I do n ot, in t h a t case,
und ersta n d how it cam e a bou t th a t it w as p rev iou sly rejected .
Q u [ e r y ] : C om m u n ica te a ty p e d cop y , w ith the om issions I have m arked.
E . A . C.
O c t [o b e r ] 19.
P riv a te S ecretary.
Yes. W . T.

( 7) [T h e m em orandum is endorsed as h a v in g b een sent, w ith certa in om issions, t o H e r r v on

K u h lm a n n on O ctob er 22, 1913.]
 441
No. 277.
Sir E . Goschcn to Sir Edward G r e y .{ 1)

F.O. 367/284. Berlin, March 11. 1912.

106 7 6 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 . D. 9 p . m .
Tel. (No. 31.) R . 9 p . m . [sic]
Your telegram No. 42 (of M a r[ch ] 9 ,(2) Portuguese Colonies).
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sees no objection to declaration you propose
nor to statement that it is made with the consent of British and German Governments.

(!) [T h is telegram was sent to L isb on (as N o. 20). A cop y was sent to the Colonial Office.]
(2) [v. supra, p. 439, N o. 274, m in., a n d n ote (3).]

No. 278.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir A . H ardinge.{ b

F.O. 367/284.
1 0 6 7 6 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
Tel. (No. 21.) Africa. F oreign Office, March 12, 1912.
Sir E . G oschen’ s tel[egram ] No. 31 of yesterday.(2)
You should accordingly inform Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t.

( J) [A co p y o f th is teleg ram was sent to the C olonia l O ffice.]

(2) [v. im m ed iately p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 279.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 367/284.
1 1 4 8 3 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
(No. 126.) Berlin, D. March 15, 1912.
Sir, R . March 18, 1912.
W ith reference to m y telegram No. 31 of the 11th instant,(0 I have the honour
to transmit, herewith, copy and translation of a com m unication which I have received
from the Imperial Foreign Office, confirming what Herr von Kiderlen had already
told me, to the effect that the Im perial Government had no objection to a statement
being made in the Portuguese Parliament respecting the non-existence of a treaty
between Great Britain and Germany containing anything to menace the indepedence,
integrity or interests o f Portugal or her possessions.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 279.

Aide-M em oire com m unicated to Sir E . Goschen.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung ist einverstanden mit dem Vorschlag der Königlich
Grossbritannischen Regierung, der Portugiesischen Regierung mitzuteilen, dass
beide Regierungen der Abgabe folgender Erklärung im Portugiesischen Parlamente
zustimmen :
“ W ir sind überzeugt, dass zwischen Deutschland und England kein Vertrag
besteht, dessen Inhalt irgendwie die Unabhängigkeit, die Integrität oder die
Interessen Portugals oder seiner Besitzungen bedroht.”

0 ) [v. supra, p. 444, N o. 277.]

 445

Auch ist die Kaiserliche Regierung bereit, die Portugiesische Regierung, falls
sie es wünscht, zu der Feststellung zu erm ächtigen, dass diese Erklärung im E inver­
ständnis mit der Kaiserlichen und der Britischen Regierung abgegeben werde.
Der Kaiserliche Geschäftsträger in Lissabon ist angewiesen worden, im E inver­
nehmen mit dem dortigen Vertreter der K öniglich Grossbritannischen Regierung die
Portugiesische Regierung entsprechend zu verständigen.
Berlin, den 14. März 1912.

No. 280.

Sir A. Iiardinge to Sir Edward G r e y .{x)

F.O. 367 284.

11955/391 12 436.
(No. 38. Lisbon, D. March 15, 1912.
Sir, R . March 20, 1912.
I have the honour to report that I communicated to Senhor Yasconcellos on the
13th instant the text (in English of the formula which you authorised him , as stated
in your telegram No. 5 of the 11th instant,(a to make to the Lisbon Parliament on
the subject of the Anglo-German Treaty o f 189S.
His E xcellency reproduced it to-day in a speech on Foreign Policy delivered by
him in the Chamber of Deputies, a translation of which I shall have the honour to
forward in a separate despatch, as soon as I have had time to procure it .(3}
The speech was in reply to three questions by Senhor Ezequiel de Campos :
(1) Have our country’ s international relations suffered owing to the establishment
o f the R epublic? (2^ Have the Treaties in force when the Republic was proclaimed
been in any respect m odified? (3 Has the Ministry for Foreign Affairs official
cognisance of the Secret Treaty concluded in 1S9S between England and Germany,
and if so, does this Treaty in any way threaten the integrity and independence of
our overseas dom inions?
The first two questions afforded His E xcellency an opportunity of dilating on
the British Alliance, and o f citing the various treaties upon which it reposed. To
the third he answered (I translate textually from the Portuguese) “ I can reply with
great satisfaction that the Republic knows ” “ (sabe) ” — I had suggested the equiva­
lent of the English “ is sa tisfied " or of the French “ a acquis la con viction ,” but
neither of these form s, so Mr. Oakley tells m e, would be idiomatic in Portuguese—
“ that there exists no treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and the German Empire which contains anything of a nature to menace
the independence, integrity and interests o f Portugal, or of any portion of her
dom inions. I make this declaration to the Parliament o f m y country with the assent
of the Cabinets o f London and B erlin .’ ’
The speech was loudly applauded in all parts of the house and His E xcellency
tells me that he has telegraphed to Senhor Teixeira de Gomes to thank you for
enabling him to deliver it. The Chamber has ordered it to be “ pu b lish ed ” or
placarded— a compliment known in France as ‘ ‘ affichage ’ ’ which was borrowed by
the Portuguese, like so m any other things, from French Parliam entary practice, but
which he tells me is somewhat rare here— the last instance within his recollection
being a speech delivered at the highest of rsic] his popularity by Senhor Franco.
I hope it may help to keep him in office— for I hear unpleasant rumours that
Senhor Costa’ s return here next week may mean a change of cabinet, in which the

(! ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the C a bin et.]

( 2) [r . supra, p. 439. N o. 274. m in., and n ote (3).]
(*•> [r . in fra, pp. 447-51. N o. 2S2. an d en cl.]
 446

Democrats and the Camacho group of moderates may take a turn at the spoils of
office, Senhor Costa’ s being the dominant influence,— a situation which would render
several matters which I have in hand much more difficult.
I am sending a duplicate o f this despatch to the African Department with which
the correspondence originated.
I have, &c.
A R T H U R H . H A R D IN G E .

No. 281.

Sir A . H ardinge to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 367/284.
1 22 7 7 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
(No. 39.) Confidential. Lisbon, D. March 16, 1912.
Sir, R . March 22, 1912.
T o-day’ s “ Dia ” states that the Portuguese Governm ent is engaged in negotia­
tions, which have made some progress, for a foreign loan o f about 10 million sterling
to be issued at 91 and bearing interest at 4 % with the London River Plate Bank
and with the Paris firm o f Bonardel, the security being the customs o f certain of
the Colonies.
There is I think a foundation for this rumour for I have learnt from Senhor
Vasconcellos that he is actually negotiating with an English group of financiers,
backed, so he tells m e, by the R othschilds, for a loan of 12 m illion sterling and that
he is very hopeful of the result. H e has not mentioned the nature of the security,
but it can hardly help being som ething Colonial.
I did not tell His E xcellency, nor was it within mv instructions to do so, when
I spoke to him of the Anglo-G erm an Treaty of 1898,(2) that certain Colonial revenues
had been definitely earmarked under it by its signatories.
I have. &c.
A R TH U R H . H A R D IN G E .

M IN U T E S .

T he T rea ty o f 1898 only a pplies to th e in terv en tion o f a th ir d P ow er and to loans from the
T ow ers, hu t I do n ot th in k w e cou ld see a loan o f th is m a g n itu d e u n d erta k en by a p riv a te
g rou p , esp ecially an A n g lo -F re n ch g ro u p w ith ou t ou r in terv en tion .
S ir A. H a rd in g e m ig h t w arn th e P o rtu g u e se G o v [e r n m e n ]t th a t we e x p e c t to be consulted
b efore any d efinite a ction is ta ken , a n d we should in fo rm th e G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t o f the
corresp on den ce.
S ir A. H a rd in g e m ig h t p o in t ou t th a t neith er ou r recen t assurances res p ectin g ou r trea ty
w ith G erm any, n or ou r trea ties o f a llia n ce w ith P o rtu g a l w ou ld b e u n a ffected b y an a rra n g e­
m en t w hich b u rd en ed th e colonies w ith so h ea vy a fo r e ig n loan and in tr o d u c e d such stron g
fo r e ig n influence.
J . A. C. T.
23.3.12.

I am disposed to th in k th a t the r e p o rt o f this con tem p la ted loan g iv es us a g ood reason

fo r u rg in g the G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t to assent to th e im m ed ia te p u b lica tion o f th e 1898
a greem ents.
O ur p osition b oth tow ards th e P o rtu g u e se govern m en t and tow ard s the B ritish subjects
w ho en ter in to n e g otia tion s fo r a P ortu g u ese loan is g e t t in g in crea sin g ly difficult. I t is no
use now a w a itin g fo r any dev elopm en ts in ou r p ou rp a rlers w ith th e G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t
resp ectin g T im or, and w e had m uch b e tte r fa ce the “ de fa cto ” situ ation .
M oreover a n y fu r th e r n e g o tia tio n w ith G erm any, w h ich is, I u n d ersta n d, to ex ten d t o th e
B elgia n C on g o, can only fu rth er com p lica te th a t situ a tion , and m ay lea d t o y et another secret

(*) [A cop y o f this despa tch was sent to th e C olonia l Office, w ith a letter from S ir E y re
C row e, on M a rch 27, 1912. v. in fra , pp. 452-3, N o. 284.]
( 2) [r . G ooch <£• T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 7 1-5, Nos. 9 0-2, encZs.]
 447
trea ty . F o r I d o not see how w e can well p u b licly avow th a t w e are o b ta in in g from G erm any
the re c o g n itio n o f B ritish claim s t o K a ta n g a , w hich G erm any has no rig h t to g iv e or refuse,
seeing th a t th e K a ta n g a is actu a lly e ith er B elgia n or (p en d in g ou r rec o g n itio n o f th e B elgia n
an n exa tion ) C ongolese, and th a t th e rig h t o f pre-em p tion ov er the B elgia n C on g o is in the
possession not o f G erm any, b u t o f F ra n ce. I fe a r th erefore t h a t should th e A n g lo-G erm a n
discussion res p ectin g t e rr ito ria l “ exch a n g es ” m a teria lize, we should proba b ly be ra th er w orse
than b etter off as reg a rd s m a k in g a fu ll and p u b lic revelation o f ou r p olicy and aims.
Q u [e r y ],
P ress th e C olon ia l Office fo r th eir con cu rren ce in u rg in g up on the G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t
the im m ed iate p u b lica tion o f th e 1S98 agreem ents.
E. A . C.
M [ a r ]c h 25.

I a gree w ith S ir E y re Crowe.

A. X .

W e cou ld th en com m u n ica te this to th e G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t as a reason fo r p u blica tion .

E. G.

No. 282.

Sir A . Iiardinge to Sir E duard G rey.

F.O. 367/1463.
1 26 2 4 /1 2 08 0 /1 2 /3 6.
(No. 40.) Confidential. Lisbon, D. March 16, 1912.
Sir, E . March 25, 1912.
I have the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation o f m y despatch No. 38
o f the 15th,(*) a summary of Senhor Y asconcellos’ speech in the Chamber of Deputies
upon the foreign policy and relations o f Portugal.
I should mention that before making it he sent m e, not telling me that he meant
to quote it in Parliam ent, a memorandum which he had prepared on the Anglo-
Portuguese alliance, upon which he requested m y opinion. Its general gist was m uch
the same as that o f his remarks, but m y suspicion that something more was aimed
at was aroused by my noticing that in the text o f the Treaties appended to it, the
names o f the British and Portuguese Sovereigns by whom they were concluded had
all been deliberately erased, and that for them were substituted the words “ Portugal ”
and “ E n g la n d ” or “ Great B ritain.” In the Treaty of 1654 even the name of
Oliver Cromwell, for whom, as a regicide, H is E xcellency might have been expected
to feel a certain respectful tenderness, was ruthlessly expunged with that o f Dom
John the Fourth, the restorer o f Portuguese independence, and I could not resist
the impression that the object was to strengthen, without saying so totidem verbis,
the contention of the Portuguese Governm ent that the alliance can never be affected
by any change in the form of Governm ent o f the contracting parties.
I am personally of opinion that the contention is sustainable, and that we may
on our side fully admit it, in certain circum stances, but that the possibility o f another
interpretation o f the Treaties is a lever which it m ay be politic to keep in the back­
ground, especially if this Governm ent should show itself unyielding and captious in
regard to a Treaty of Commerce. I accordingly observed to His E xcellency that
while his account o f the Treaties coincided with m y general historical recollections,
I thought the m ention of the names o f the signatory Sovereigns not entirely
insignificant from the standpoint of the historia n ; I called his attention to the som e­
what curious fact that the Treaty concluded by John IY with “ K ing Charles I. his
heirs and successors,” had been form ally renewed b y Oliver Cromwell, and that
that concluded with Cromwell had been again renewed a few years later by Charles II.
This seemed to m e, I said, to suggest a certain doubt at the time in the minds of

(*) [r . supra, pp. 445 -6 , X o . 280.]

 448

both Governments as to whether engagements contracted by Charles I were fully

binding on a prince who, like Cromwell, was not that K in g’ s heir or successor,
and whether engagements contracted by Cromwell, on behalf o f the Commonwealth
were binding upon Charles II. This suggestion in its bearing upon the present
situation of Portugal rather disturbed him , and he reminded me that Sir F . Villiers
had verbally assured Senhor Machado that all our pledges to the Portuguese
Monarchy bound us equally to the Portuguese Republic, and that I my6elf had
referred to the “ a llia n ce” in my speech on presenting my credentials to President
Arriaga. I said that no verbal assurance by Sir F . Villiers nor speech by m yself
was equivalent to a ratification by the K in g ; I thought personally, and for all I
knew you did so too, that the old treaties were binding on us notwithstanding the
formal change in the political status of one of the contracting parties, but a different
opinion appeared to have been held in the 17th century, and might perhaps at some
future date be again maintained by a lawyer on the strength of that precedent. He
asked if I thought a fresh treaty advisable confirming between Great Britain and the
Portuguese Republic the old engagements contracted towards the Portuguese
M onarchy. I said I could give no opinion on that point, and had not meant to
suggest it; all I had intended to point out was that the formal re-enactment of
our reciprocal obligations just after the Great Rebellion and then again after the
Restoration was a matter of historical significance and interest to the student of
A nglo-Portuguese Relations, which ought not to be lost sight of in any official account
o f them. On the strength o f this caution he has confined him self to stating in
Parliament that “ no communication had been made since the establishment of the
R epublic of a nature to suggest that the old treaties are not b in d in g ” instead of
asserting, as he would probably, but for it, have done, that their binding character
had been reciprocally recognized. I do not wish to insinuate to him that this is not
the case, but I think that the existence in his mind of a certain feeling of doubt
upon the point may be useful in our commercial negotiations, especially if we
suggested, later on , the insertion in our commercial treaty o f an article form ally
extending t-o the Portuguese Republic our ancient obligations to the Portuguese
M onarchy.
I have, &c.
A R T H U R H . H A R D IN G E .

E nclosure in No. “282.

Summary of speech delivered by S enhor Augusto de Vasconcellos, M inister fo r Foreign

Affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies on the lo th of March 1912.

In the course of his speech he avails him self o f the opportunity to reply to the
questions put to the Government at the preceding Session regarding matters o f signal
importance relating to the external relations of the Republic and connected with his
Department. He will proceed to reply with precision and sincerity.
Has the system of international relations with our country suffered any
modification owing to the introduction o f the R epublic?
It was said in the time of the Provisional Governm ent, and he has the satisfac­
tion to confirm the statement, that the Governm ent has no reason to believe that
any modification since the establishment o f the Republic has taken place in the
system of international relations with Portugal. The external relations o f the
Republic are based on our secular alliance with E ngland, on our intimate friendship
with our neighbours both on the European continent and in the Colonies, therefore,
with Spain, France, Germany, Belgium and Holland, and on our friendship and amity
towards all other nations with which we maintain the best political and commercial
relations.
There is much talk about our alliance with E ngland, but few know the scope
of our ancient treaties o f alliance which, since the end of the X IV Century (1373,
 449
1386) up to the present day, have always been recognized and observed by that
powerful and loyal Power, and, though nearly all these treaties have been published,
it is precisely in Portugal that they are so little known. He hopes the cham ber will
grant him perm ission, briefly and concisely, to touch upon the clauses contained in
those treaties taken from notes he had caused to be collected when he first took
office as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Based for six centuries on the same com m on interests and upon the same inter­
national situation, the several Anglo-Portuguese treaties m ay be considered, in their
main points, as form ing one only treaty. Additions to them, some only provisional,
have been made at different times to meet historical incidents of the .m om ent, again
to become archaic.
The first of these treaties was concluded in 1373 between Edward. K ing of
England and France and Ferdinand. K ing of Portugal and Algarve, and Eleanor,
his consort. Then followed the treaties of 1386, 1642. 1654, 1660, 1661 and 1703,
the Treaty o f Vienna in 1815,(-/ and the confirmations by notes and Parliamentary
messages, notably the notes from the Duque o f Palmella in 1825 and 1826,(3) the
message by the King of Great Britain to Parliament in 1S36, 4) the notes in 1S28-1S29
from the Marquis of Barbacena and from the Earl of A berdeen,(5) the despatches from
Earl Granville to the British Legations at Lisbon and Madrid in 1873,( 6 and the
presentation to the House of Lords by the British Government in December 1S98,
•of the Articles in force of the treaties up to lS 1 5 .(r)
The follow ing is a summary of the conclusions contained in the said papers
submitted to the House o f Lords :
I. That there shall be constant and perpetual alliance and friendship between
Portugal and Great Britain.
II. That no other alliance or treaty made by either o f these two nations shall
derogate from the treaty between Portugal and Great Britain.
II I . That neither of the allied parties shall join the enemies or rivals o f the
other party or give them counsel or aid or adhere to any war, counsel
or treaty to the prejudice o f the other.
IV . That each of the allied parties shall prevent the injury, discredit o r
v illa [i]n y which they know to be contemplated at any future time
against the other, and shall advise the other party com pletely and
imm ediately of any such designs.
V. That neither o f the allied parties shall harbour or favour the rebel or
fugitive enemies o f the other on their lands, or willingly suffer them
to be harboured or favoured, or publicly or privately to reside there.
Exception is made for fugitives and exiles who are not traitors
to the nation they have fled from , or which has exiled them , or those
who are not under suspicion o f procuring detriment or discord to either
allied party.
In this case such persons shall be handed over, at the request of
one of the parties, to the other party, or expelled from its territory.

( 2) [T h e T rea ties o f A llia n ce b etw een G rea t B r ita in and P o rtu g a l are p rin ted in “ T rea ties
co n ta in in g G uaran tees or E n g a gem en ts . . . .” .4: & P ., (1399), C I X , [C . 9083], pp. 73-85.
T his retu rn g iv es th e te s t s o f 1373, 1386. 16-12. 1654. 1660, 1661, 1703, and 1815. W ith the
ex ce p tio n o f the last th ey are all p rin ted in B.F.S.P., V ol. 1, pp. 462-507. T h a t o f 1815 is
published ibid.. V ol. 2. p p . 343 -5 5.]
(3) [r . B.F.S.P., V ol. 13, p p . 1116-27. cp. also G ooch d- T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 9 4-5,
Ed. X o t e .]
(4) [S ic. v. B.F.S.P., V ol. 13, p. 1127, w here a m essage from the K in g o f D ecem b er 11, 1826,
is p rin ted .]
(5) [r . B.F.S.P., V ol. 16, pp . 4 17 -3 3.]
( 6) [r . G ooch d: T em p erley, V ol. I. pp. 5 1-2. N o. 69, and e n d s.]
{ ' ) [c p . H o u s e o f L ord s J ournals. V o l. C X X X I , p. 14. T he p a p er was also presen ted to the
H ou se o f Com m ons by com m and (.in pu rsu a n ce o f th eir A ddress o f J u ly 15, 18981 d u rin g the
recess o f 1S93-9. v. H o u s e o f C om m ons Journ als, V ol. C L I V , p. 7.]
[10900] 2 G
 450
V I. That neither o f the allied parties shall consent the enemies o f the other
to freight or obtain ships in their territories which may be used in
prejudice of the other party.
V II. That should the lands of one of the allied parties be molested or invaded
by enemies, or rivals, or the latter attempt, design or appear in any
wav about to molest or invade them, the other party when requested to
do so, shall supply armed men, ships etc. for the defence o f the territories
o f the attacked party either in E urope or in any other dominions o f
it, against which invasions are prepared.
V III. That should any conquests or colonies o f one of the allied parties be
molested or invaded by enemies, or if they attempt, design or appear
in any way about to molest them, the other party, when called upon,
shall send armed m en, ships etc. for the defence o f such colonies, or
for the recovery of them if lost.
IX . That should France or Spain make war upon Portugal, either in her
territories of the European continent or in her other dom inions, Great
Britain shall use its friendly offices for the observance o f peace, but
this proving unsuccessful, Great Britain shall send troops and ships
to fight for Portugal.
Such are the conditions which for centuries have bound the powerful and noble
British nation to the modest but brave and loyal Portuguese nation. W e have not
got, nor could we all at once produce, a powerful army or a formidable fleet. We
possess, however, in different parts o f the world, excellent bases of operations and
ports of shelter suitable for any fleet, and therefore the duty devolves upon us to
seeto their proper fortification and utility, in such a manner that our situation as
a Power may be all that it should be. To maintain such a position with dignity in
the international world we must be considered as an item o f value worthy of being
taken into account and not as refuse to be cast aside.
No alteration in these treaties or its clauses has been communicated to the
Governm ent of the Bepublic. Of course he is not referring to commercial treaties,
because as the Chamber is well aware, several commercial conventions on new bases
were concluded by the Provisional Governm ent.
Finally reference has been made to the campaign which a certain press has for
some time past conducted against the integrity of our colonial dom inions. He has
already had occasion to refer in the Senate to the irritating echoes o f that campaign
which he always considered destitute of serious foundation. W e need have no fear
for our colon ies; we are perform ing our duty as a colonial Power, contributing, with
intelligent and honest efforts, sometimes at a great sacrifice, towards that colossal
work o f civilization in which both the great and small nations are expending their
best energies. Let us show the world that the object of the Republic is not, and
could not be, to keep her dominions closed to all foreign enterprize, to create only
obstacles and impediments to all attempts at intelligent colonization. No, we can
and must protect our trade and industry, but for this purpose we need not impede
the progress of those who desire to penetrate our territories, to avail [them selves] of
our excellent ports, to utilize our railways, to cultivate our lands, to explore our mines
and to develop the wealth of the country. The example is shown to us by the Great
Powers in throwing open the doors of their rich colonial lands to the boldest
enterprizes, in which capital from all purses is sewn [s ic ]. W e cannot follow a different
p o lic y ; should we refuse the intercourse and co-operation of those who dispose of
capital, of the power of work and initiative. No, what we have to do is to accom pany
them and aid them wherever our duty towards civilization calls for our assistance
and wherever our interests are at stake.
A last question had been put to the G overn m en t:
“ W hether at the M inistry for Foreign Affairs there was any official
knowledge of the secret treaty between England and Germ anj' signed in 1898,.
 451
and if so, does it threaten in any way the integrity and independence o f our
colonial d om in ion s."

It is with great satisfaction that he is able to reply that the Government of the
Republic is satisfied that no treaty exists between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland and the German Em pire which contains anything of a nature
to menace the independence, the integrity or the interests o f Portugal, or o f any
portion o f her dom inions. This statement is made with the assent of the Cabinets
of London and Berlin.
Senhor Vasconcellos concluded his speech by saying : ‘ ‘ Let us work with
confidence and faith. The Governm ent has modestly and peacefully com plied with
its duty. At this moment it enjoys full com pensation for the difficulties, the hard­
ships, the acute crisis through which it has passed, and the attacks that have been
aimed at it. I repeat once more the words of a believer in the future of his country
— Let us w ork! W e must w in! ”

M IN U T E S .

I t is ra th er a p ity th a t S ir A. H a rd in g e raised the question.

I t is a w ell established p r in c ip le of in tern a tion a l law th a t trea ties are b in d in g upon the
co n tr a c tin g S ta tes eveu if the form o f g o v [e r n m e n ]t in one o f them changes from a m ona rchy
to a rep u b lic, or v ice versa. I t is not p o litic fo r us to th row any d ou b t upon th e v a lid ity of
th is d octrin e. I f, as S ir A . H a rd in g e a ppea rs t o suggest it w ere im p o rta n t fo r G rea t B rita in
to be able to rep u d ia te th e o b lig a tion s im posed u p on her in v ir tu e o f th e trea ties o f a lliance
w ith P o rtu g a l, this en d cou ld alw ays be a tta in ed b y ou r d en ou n cin g the a lliance. F o r a lthough
th ere is no tim e-clau se in the trea ties, it is ob viou s th a t eith er p a rty m ust ha ve the pow er to
w ith d ra w from an allia n ce in som e m anner or form .
I am a fra id th a t th e result of S ir A . H a r d in g e ’ s ob serv a tion s m ay be th a t the P ortu g u ese
g overn m en t w ill a p p roach us w ith a request fo r a fresh con firm ation o f the old trea ties, w hich
is not, I should say, w hat w e desire a t th is m om ent. N or w ere his a rgum ents q u ite sound. I t
is q u ite tru e th a t C harles I ’ s tre a ty w as confirm ed b y Crom w ell, and C rom w ell’ s by C harles II.
B u t it is equally tru e th a t th e w hole o f th e trea ties w ere a ga in confirm ed in 1703, in 1815 and
once m ore in 1899. N on e of these la tte r con firm ation s w ere p rov ok ed by any ch a n g e in the
form o f govern m en t in eith er c o n tr a c tin g S ta te T he conclusion, th erefore, w hich S ir A.
H a rd in g e u ot so m uch drew , as in sin u ated as flow ing, from the renew als in 1660 and 1661,
nam ely th a t th ey becam e necessary in consequ en ce o f the establishm ent o f th e Com m onw ealth
a nd the R es to r a tio n , in E n g lan d , is n ot a leg itim a te one.
O ur gen era l relation s w ith P o rtu g a l are likely to pass th rou g h a c r itica l stage b e fo re lon g,
a nd in view o f possible com p lica tion s w ith G erm any w hich m ig h t easily arise in th is con n ection ,
it is o f som e im p orta n ce th a t w e should preserve th e g ood -w ill o f the P ortu g u ese g overn m en t,
w ho a re in m a n y w ays show ing a g en u in e desire both to cu ltiv a te th e frien d liest rela tion s w ith
us, and to m eet ou r wishes and follow ou r a d v ice in m a tters o f g ood a d m in istra tion . The
P ortu g u ese allia n ce has a p ositive valu e fo r us. I f w e alien ate P ortu g u ese op in ion , the
R e p u b lic m ay th row herself in to G erm a n y ’ s arm s, w h ich w ou ld crea te a situ a tion ca lcu la ted
to h am per us in m ore w ays th a n one.
I th in k w e should tell S ir A . H a rd in g e th a t H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] have no
desire to th row d ou bt on the con tin u ed v a lid ity o f th e ancient trea ties and th a t th e re fo re he
should re fra in from ca u sin g any such appreh en sion s in th e m iuds o f th e P ortu g u ese g o v [e r n -
m e n ]t.
E. A . C.
M [ a r ]c h 27.

S ir E y re C row e's argu m en ts seem sound.

A N.
E. G.

[10900] 2 G 2
 452

N o. 283.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . Goschen .(*)
F.C. 371/1463.
12080/1 2 08 0 /1 2 /3 6.
(No. 67.)
Sir, Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.
Count Metternich commented to me to-day on the announcement which the
Portuguese Government had made, and which was reported in to-d ay’ s “ T im es,” ( 2)
as to the Treaties between Great Britain and Portugal. He said that he noticed the
announcement referred to Portuguese Colonies.
I sent for the text o f the Treaties with Portugal, as it appears in the Paper laid
before Parliament in 1898,(3) and showed it to Count Metternich. In doing so, I
observed that the Treaties had first been made a long time ago, and had been
reaffirmed from time to time, but without enlarging their text or extending the scope
o f our obligations; and nothing had been reaffirmed which was not to be found
textually in the published paper which I had given to him.
Count Metternich asked me whether the Alliance had not been reaffirmed soon
after K ing Edward came to the Throne.
I said that I thought not. My recollection was that nothing in that respect had
been done since the accession of K ing E dw ard.(4)
[ I am, &c.]
E . G [B E Y ].
0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g an d t o the C a bin et.]
( 2) [T h e re p o rt from L isbon in The T im es (M arch 18. 1912, p. 6) was as fo llo w s: —
“ T he P rem ier has pu blish ed in the P ress an ex tra ct o f the A n g lo-P ortu g u ese T rea ty
o f A lliance. A c co rd in g to the T rea ty n eith er p a rty w ill help a n other n a tion in a tta ck in g
e ith e r o f th e co n tr a c tin g P ow ers, or g iv e asylum to the enem ies o f th e other, e x ce p t to
p o litica l fu g itiv e s or exiles. In case o f w ar or in va sion both P ow ers a gree to assist each
oth er w ith arms, m en, and a m m u n ition w hen requ ired, and w ill also assist in the p rotection
o f each o th e r’ s colonies by send ing troop s or w arships. Shou ld eith er S p a in o r F ra n ce
a ttem p t to m ake w ar a ga in st P o r tu g a l or her colonies G reat B rita in is to in terv en e and
to en d eav ou r to secure peace, fa ilin g w hich she w ill len d the assistance o f h er tro o p s.” ]
( 3) [ v . A. & P ., (1899), C I X , [C. 9088], pp. 73-85.]
(-1) [ cp . in fra , p. 455, N o. 287, and n o te (3).]

No. 284.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.(')

F.O. 367 284.
1 2 2 7 7 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
Sir, Foreign Office, March 27, 1912.
W ith r e fe r e n c e ] to m y letter o f the 14th in s t[a n t](2) regarding the Anglo-
German Agreement of 1898,(3) I am directed by S ec[reta r]y Sir E . Grey to forward
herewith for the in f[orm a tio]n of Mr. S ec[reta r]y Harcourt a copy o f a desp[atch]
from II [is ] M [a jesty’ s] Minister at Lisbon reporting the rumour o f negotiations
by the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t for a foreign loan of about 10 m illion sterling with
the London Biver Plate Bank and with the Paris firm of Bonardel, on the security
of the customs of certain of the Portuguese Colonies.(4)
Mr. Harcourt is well aware o f the great inconvenience and embarrassment which
the fact that the agreements o f 1898 between G [rea t] Britain and Germany remain

(*) [A cop y o f this letter was sent t o L isbon (as N o. 44 A fric a , S ecret).]
( 2) [F o rw a rd in g a cop y o f S ir A. H a rd in g e ’ s despatch (N o. 17). v. supra, pp. 439-40,
N o. 275, and n ote 0 ) . ]
(3) [v . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 71-5, Nos. 90-2, e n c !s ]
( ') [v. supra, p. 446, N o. 281.]
 453
secret has on more than one occasion caused to H [is ] M [a jesty’ s ] G ov [ern m en ]t.
Their secrecy was the principal cause of the uneasiness recently felt and expressed
by the Portuguese M [m ister for] F [o re ig n ] A [flairs] as to the integrity of the
Portuguese dom inions, it has embarrassed H [i s ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t] in their
endeavours to secure for the enterprises o f British firms that favourable treatment
which these naturally expect, and it has resulted in a state o f general political
uncertainty over a large part of Southern A frica. In the case of the present financial
situation at Lisbon it will clearly be difficult, if not impossible, for Sir A. Hardinge
to take any action consistent with the obligations and interests o f Great Britain
without a further confidential com m unication to the Portuguese Governm ent on the
subject of the Anglo-Germ an Agreements.
In these circumstances Sir E . G rey considers that the y resent situation
would afford H [is ] M [a jesty’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t] a convenient and reasonable oppor­
tunity for urging upon the German G o v [e m m e n ]t the immediate publication of the
1S9S agreements. The magnitude of the loan which the Portuguese G o v [e m m e n ]t
appear to be endeavouring to raise, on the security o f the Colonial customs, can be
brought forward as a reason for doi: g so without further delay. I am therefore to
express the hope that M r. Hareourt will concur in instructions 1 eing sent in this
sense to H [ is ] M [a jr sty ?s] Ambassador at Berlin, and to request the favour o f an
early reply.
[ I am, Ac.
E Y B E A. C R O W E .]

No. 2S5.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.

P.O. 367/2S4.
14033 391 12 436.
Secret.
Sir, Colonial Office, April 1, 1912.
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Hareourt to acknowledge the receipt o f your
letter No. 12277 12 o f the 27th u ltim o,!1) respecting the publication o f the S :ret
Agreements of 1S9S between Great Britain and Germany.
2. I am to reques' you to inform Sir E . Grey that Mr. Hareourt is o f opinion
that publication should be delayed as it is possible that the terms o f the Agreements
m ay be revised.
3. I am to add that if and when publication takes place time should be allowed
for previous com m unication o f the text or substance of the Agreements to the self-
governing Dom inions, and more particularly to the Union of Sc uth Africa and the
Commonwealth o f Australia.
I am. Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
H . W . JU ST.

M IN U T E S

T his is p r a c tic a lly a refusal. I t look s as if M r. H a re o u r t w ere co n tin u in g his ow n p riv a te

n eg otia tion s w ith th e G erm an em bassy fo r ex ch a n g es o f t e rr ito ry . I am not a w are th a t there
is any reason to suppose th ere w ill b e any r e v i s i n o f th e 159S agreem en t in th e n ea r fu tu re.
I th in k it is m uch m ore im p o rta n t th a t ou r ex istin g re la ti' ns w ith G erm a ny an d w ith
P o rtu g a l should b e clearly b rou g h t to th e k n ow ledg e o f th e B ritish p u b lic th a n th a t th e fa ct
o f H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] h a vin g a greed t o let G erm any ta k e T im or should con tin u e
to be con cealed fr o m th e A u stra lia n G o v e r n m e n t ].

O [r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]

 454
B u t I am a fra id th a t even if S ir E . G rey agrees w ith this view , M r. H a r c o u r t is n ot likely
to allow this q uestion w hich is p rim a rily one o f fo r e ig n p olicy to be d ecid ed , as it ou g h t to he
from the p oin t o f view o f foreig n p olicy , unless S ir E d w a rd speaks to him personally.
E. A. C.
A p [ r i l] 2.
A. N.

I w ill speak to M r. H a rc o u rt, hut m odifica tion s o f the A nglo-G erm a n a greem en t are b ein g
discussed and th e m a tter m ust w ait.
E. G.

No. 286.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir A . Idardinge.

F.O. 371/1463.
1 262 4 /1 2 08 0 /1 2 /3 6.
(No. 22.)
Sir, Foreign Office, April 9, 1912.
I have received your despatch No. 40 of the 16th u ltfd m o ]^ 1) recording a
conversation with the Portuguese M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [flairs] respecting the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
Your supposition, as stated to Senhor Vasconcellos, that I should consider the
ancient treaties between Great Britain and Portugal to remain binding in spite of
a formal change in the political status of one o f the two contracting parties, is in
accordance with the view taken by H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] of the nature
of these instruments, which, I am advised, retain their validity unless and until
the alliance is terminated whether by a war between the parties or in some other
manner.
I would therefore deprecate any doubt being thrown on their continued validity
or any opening being given to the Portuguese Government for approaching H [is ]
M [a je s tv ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] with a request for a formal renewal or confirmation.
You should therefore in any further conversation which you may have with the
M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A fffa irs ], say nothing which may give rise to any such
apprehension, or suggestion, in the minds o f the Portuguese Governm ent.
[ I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]
t1) [v. supra, pp. 447-8, X o . 282.]

No. 287.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en .(l)

F.O. 371/1373.
1 53 7 1 /5 5 69 /1 2 /1 8 .
(No. 81.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, April 10, 1912.
The German Ambassador inform ed me to-day that in consequence of his last
conversation with me, he had received a long letter from the German
Chancellor.............. (2) On this, I remarked that, assuming these things to be so, I
thought the fact that such matters had been discussed between the two Governments
was in itself evidence of a more cordial spirit, which 1 trusted would be maintained,
though we had neither of us been able to go so far as to agree upon everything that
had been discussed.
(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and t o the C a bin et.]
( 2) [F o r C ou n t M e tte r n ic h ’ s rep ort cp. G.P., X X X I , pp. 267-70. F o r the op en in g p a ra ­
g ra p h s o f this despatch v. G ooch cfc T em perleij, V ol. V I , p. 746, X o . 573.]
 45 5
Count Aletternich went on to say that the Chancellor would like to proceed with
the negotiations for Colonial and territorial exchanges. Should an agreement be
come to between us, he thought that all the matters should be comprised in one
instrum ent: viz. the agreement as to Portuguese C olonies; smaller Colonial m atters;
Zanzibar and Pem ba, if they could be included; the Bagdad R ailw ay; and southern
Persia.
The Chancellor thought that the agreement as to Portuguese Colonies, which was
perhaps the most important of the territorial questions to be discussed, would be
useful only if the British Government would show a disposition to assist in creating
conditions under which the acquisition o f Portuguese Colonial territory would be
possible without raising the “ casus fo e d e ris ’ ’ o f the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance,
w'hich bound Great Britain to resist encroachm ent upon Portuguese Colonies. Count
Aletternich said that, speaking for him self personally, he thought one way in w'liich
this might be effected would be that Portugal should borrow m oney from Britain
and Germany rather than from other countries, and that Britain and Germany
might create material influences in the Portuguese Colonies.
I said that the difficulty in the wav of this was that Portugal was very sensitive
and suspicious. I felt that we were placed in a very delicate position by the joint
existence o f our Agreement with Germ any as to the Portuguese Colonies and our
Alliance with Portugal, which had been reaffirmed as lately as 1904, when we
concluded an Arbitration Treaty with Portugal.(3) All I could say at the moment
was that the question of the Portuguese Colonies was a very delicate one for us.
Count Aletternich then said that the Chancellor felt that the islands of San
Thom e and Principe would not be a set-off for Tim or. San Thome and Principe
were outside the scope o f our present Agreem ent, and if the scope were extended
to include them , the question o f the Azores and Cape Verde Islands should also be
brought in. Timor was valuable in itself, and the interest which Australia took in
it added to its value from our point o f view. Germany should, therefore, receive
a fair equivalent if she resigned lier position with regard to it.
I observed that the value o f Timor was lessened by the Dutch right o f pre-em ption
which, though not directly recognised by Germ any or by us, was perfectly legitimate
as between Portugal and Holland. The Dutch right of pre-em ption would, I imagine,
hold good before any tribunal except that o f force ; and a Great Power in such a
matter would be reluctant to incur the odium of refusing arbitration to a small
Power, and of using force.
Count Metternich further said that the elimination o f Timor and the cession
by Germany o f the square near the 22nd Degree indicated by Mr. Harcourt might
be made the equivalent for the strip across Angola reserved to us by the Anglo-
German Agreem ent. W hat Air. Harcourt had asked in Mozambique would entirely
cut off Germany from Lake Xyassa, and would restrict her “ hin terla n d ’ ’ too m uch.
In B erlin. Lord Haldane had been understood to indicate that an arrangement
about the Bagdad Railway and the Persian G ulf, etc., might be an equivalent for
Zanzibar and Pemba. I had subsequently demurred to this and it was therefore
presumably not a basis for real discussion. Nevertheless it would be very useful if
Zanzibar and Pemba could somehow be brought in. W hat Air. Harcourt had suggested
as an equivalent in East Africa was, how ever, too valuable : it was extensive and
densely populated. But perhaps the Caprivi tassel might be a set-off against Zanzibar
and Pem ba. In extent it was greater than the Islands, and it was territory actually
held in fee simple, while the Islands were only a protectorate.
In conclusion, Count ATetternich said that the Chancellor hoped that the
continuation o f a frank exchange o f ideas about territory and about matters which
concerned both of us would not only lead to a “ d étente,’ ’ but in time to an agreement
between the two countries that would be o f mutual advantage.
I cordially reciprocated this, and said that I would do all I could on m y side
to continue the exchange o f frank ideas.
(3) [r . Gooch & Temperley, V ol. V I I I , p. 49, Ed. Note ]
 456
As he was leaving, Count Metternich again referred to the importance of making
some progress in connection with the Portuguese Colonies.
I said that, speaking personally and frankly, I felt that we were in an
embarrassing position. It was wrong materially and m orally that the Colonies should
remain derelict; they ought to be developed. If we in Berlin and L ondon felt this
to be the case, Count Metternich could be sure that the Union Government of South
Africa felt it still more keenly with regard to the Portuguese territory in which
Delagoa Bay was situated. I should be only too glad if Portugal could be brought
to see that it was to her interest to have her Colonies developed, and that this could
be done only through Great Britain and Germ any. But, on the other hand, there
was our Alliance with Portugal, reaffirmed in recent y ea rs ; and it would be
dishonourable for us to put pressure on Portugal. It was a most embarrassing
position for us, and, if I spoke with reserve, it was not because I did not appreciate
the desirability of seeing the Colonies developed, but because the situation in which
we were placed was very delicate. I would consider what he had said and must
consult my colleagues.
In the course of conversation Count Metternich also informed me that the
Chancellor felt that publication either of the existing or o f a revised agreement about
the Portuguese Colonies would be fatal to any prospect o f Portugal borrowing m oney
from Germany or Great Britain or giving us concessions in her colonies.
[ I am, & c.];
E. ■ B E Y ] .

No. ‘288.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir A. Ilardinge.

P.O. 367/289.
1 5518/1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
(No. 51.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, April 20, 1912.
W ith reference to your despatch No. 26 Africa Confidential of the 2nd instant,^)
I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Mr. E . «T. Frewen respecting his
proposals for a loan to the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t, and the establishment o f a
chartered Company for the exploitation of Angola, of which he appears to have already
given you an outline.
Mr. Frewen called at this Office on the 12th instant, and 6aid that he had
m entioned to Baron Schröder, who is interested in Mr. Frew en’ s scheme w'ith regard
to the Cocoa Plantations in San Thom e, his proposals respecting the loan and the
establishment o f a chartered Company. Baron Schröder had replied that any scheme
for the establishment o f such a Company in Angola would most seriously affect
A nglo-G erm an relations, but, on Mr. Frewen suggesting that Messrs. Schröder should
take part in the schem e, the Baron had expressed the opinion that an Anglo-German
scheme for developing Angola or part of Angola would have an excellent effect on
European politics and had said that he would gladly take a share in it. H e had
further offered to visit this Office with Mr. Frewen in order to give his support to
the scheme.
On the 16th instant Mr. Frewen again called at this Office and was by my
instructions inform ed in strict confidence that owing to political reasons H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] could not give official support to any scheme of this nature

0 ) [S ir A. H a rd in g e ’ s despatch (N o. 26 A fric a ), D A p ril 2, R . A p ril 9, 1912, is not rep ro­

du ced. In it he rep orted a con v ersation w ith M r. F rew en on the subject o f the com b in a tion
p roposed by his S y n d ica te w ith the San T hom e planters. T he P ortu g u ese G overnm ent had
sta ted th eir readiness n ot to opp ose this com b in a tion . S ir A . H a rd in g e suggested to M r. F rew en
th a t he should con su lt H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent b efore he proceed ed fu rth er w ith his proposals
fo r ra isin g a loan to establish a C h a rtered C om pany. (F .O . 367 /28 9. 1 4 7 1 2 /1 8 4 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .)]
 457

in Angola which had not the previous knowledge and consent o f the German
G ov [ern m en ]t. Mr. Frewen was advised to convey this information confidentially
to Baron Schroder, who would no doubt consult the German G ov [ern m en ]t on the
subject in the same way that Mr. Frewen had consulted H [is ] M [a je stv ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t].
The German Charge d ’ Affaires was inform ed on the 15th instant o f the
communication made to Mr. Frewen.
[ I am, A c.]
A. NÏCOLSON
(for the Secretary of State).

No. 289.

Sir A . Johnstone to Sir Edward G rey.(')

F.O. 371, 1102.
18338/7293 12,36.
(No. 52.) Confidential. The Hague, D. April 25. 1912.
Sir, B . May 1, 1912.
H aving seen in the newspapers an account of fresh native disturbances in
Portuguese Tim or I took the occasion yesterday in m entioning the matter to
Monsieur van Swinderen of asking H is Excellency if the arbitration respecting the
boundary between Dutch and Portuguese Tim or would soon take place.
H is E xcellency told me that he hoped arbitration would soon com m ence. There
would be only one arbitrator and the idea o f both Powers was to carry out the
arbitration as cheaply as possible. Dutch Tim or had been unaffected by the unrest
in the Portuguese portion o f the island. H e could not understand why the Portuguese
so desired to maintain their sovereignty over a country which brought them in little
and was a constant source o f worry and expense. He could tell me quite frankly
that the Netherlands were prepared to purchase from the Portuguese the latter’ s
territory on the island. But when he had spoken to the Portuguese Minister here,
Monsieur Ferreira, on the subject, he had been met with an absolute “ non
possum us,” and had been given to understand that the Portuguese Government
were unable in the existing state of their internal affairs to even approach the question
of parting with any of their Colonial possessions.
I lately learnt unofficially that it was thought possible the German Government
had hinted to the Government o f the Netherlands in connection with the rumours
of arrangements between Great Britain and Germany respecting Portuguese Colonies
that Germany had herself no designs on Portuguese Tim or, but I failed to discover
from Monsieur van Swinderen’ s language that he had an idea of any Power even
thinking o f touching Tim or. His E xcellency considers no doubt that the Treaty
arrangements of 1904 between the Netherlands and Portugal(2) ceding the right to
the form er of pre-emption o f the latter’ s territory in the island are now well known
to all the Powers.
I ventured to take the occasion to state to His E xcellency that, as he was
doubtless aware, the policy o f Great Britain had always been to help to maintain
as far as possible the integrity and independence o f the smaller Powers. I was
speaking quite unofficially and without instructions but I thought that he might rest
assured that the spoliation of a weak Power was still entirely contrary to the policy
of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
I have. Ac.
ALAN JOH N STON E.
(*) [A co p y o f this despatch was sent to L isb on (as X o . 33). A cop y was sent to th e Colonial
Office.]
(2) [®. B .F .S .P ., V ol. 101, pp. 497-500.]
 458

N o. 290.
Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 367/289.
19078/1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
(No. 34.) Africa. Confidential. Lisbon, D. April 27, 1912.
Sir :— E . May 6, 1912.
I liave the honour to report in continuation o f m y despatch Africa No. 26 of
the 2nd instant(') and with reference to your despatch No. 48 (14381) of the
11th instant,(2) that I received a further visit to-day from Mr. Frewen who has
returned to Portugal.
H e stated that during his visit to London he had, as suggested by m e, called
at the Foreign Office and had an interview with Mr. Tilley, as the result of which
he had seen Messrs. Schroder, who had expressed their willingness to participate
in a loan of fifteen millions sterling to the Portuguese Governm ent, and had
ascertained from the German Ambassador in London that no objections to their doing
so would be made on political or other grounds by the German Governm ent. The
security on which this loan was to be made was to be the revenue of a concession
to be obtained by the financial com bination supplying it, in Angola, in the shape
of rights similar to those enjoyed by the Chartered Companies in South Africa and
elsewhere. Mr. Frewen added that the German financiers interested in the scheme
were very adverse to the participation in it of French capitalists, but that their
opposition to this feature— an essential one in it— had been overcom e, and that the
Chartered Company to be created, whose operations would embrace practically the
entire province of Angola, would eventually become mainly German.
I asked if lie had since his return here, laid these suggestions before the
Portuguese Governm ent. He said he had had an interview respecting them with
Senhor Sidonio Paes, the Minister of Finance. The latter was quite willing to
grant the Charter in return for the loan, but had insisted that there should be no
apparent connection between the two operations— as they would otherwise not he
sanctioned by the Chambers— and that the loan should be nom inally guaranteed by
the surplus revenues of the Portuguese Customs, which yielded two millions a year,
after paying the interest on the Foreign Debt. Mr. Frewen said that these proposals
would have to be carefully scrutinized, before they could be accepted, but that they
seemed to him to contain the elements of a satisfactory arrangement. I said it was
n o business o f mine to advise him even unofficially, but that if his friends really
wanted the Charter and had obtained the sanction to this operation of the British
and German Governm ents, they had better, in my private opinion, secure it, not
m erely as a promise, but as an accomplished fact, before they actually signed the loan
contract. He replied that they fully meant to do so before they parted with a single
sovereign of the fifteen millions which the Government hoped to obtain from them.
Mr. Frewen appears satisfied, as the result of his interview with Mr. Tilley,
that his scheme is not of a nature to provoke any objection on the part of your
Department. I should be glad to be assured that this is correct, as if it is not the
case, I could I think pretty easily put a stop to it.
I should add that his scheme for acquiring the S. Thom e cocoa plantations
would appear to be progressing satisfactorily.
I have, Ac.
A R TH U R H . H A R D IN G E .

0 ) f cp. supra, p. 456, No. 2S8, n ote 0 ) . ]

( 2) [M a rg in a l n o t e : “ T his s h [o u l]d be 13763.’ ’ S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (N o. 48
A fric a ) o f A p ril 11, 1912, is not rep rod u ced . S ir A. H a rd in g e was in stru cted n ot to “ su p p ort
any proposals fo r a loan based upon colon ia l securities as these m ay co n flict w ith the A n glo-
G erm an A greem en t if they receive official su p p o r t.” (F .O . 3 67/289. 1 3 7 6 3 /1 8 4 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .)]
 45 9
M IN U T E S .

B a ron S ch rod er has a p p a ren tly ob ta in ed th e necessary assurance from C ou n t M ettern ich
th a t the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t w ould raise no objections.
I t also a p p ea rs :
(a) th a t th e G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t are prep a red to con n iv e at th e p a rticip a tio n o f F rench
ca p ita l,
and (6) th a t th e reason fo r this is th a t the C ha rtered C om p any, w hen form ed, is lik ely to be
pred om in a n tly G erm an.

I d o n ot lik e th is last fea tu re (M r. F rew en p a rticu la r ly asked M r. T illey th a t the schem e

should n ot be m entioned to S ir E. Cassel), n or the p rop osal t o “ nom in ally gu a ra n tee ” the
loan b y the surplu s revenues o f th e P o rtu g u e se Customs.
M r. F rew en does n ot a p p ea r to be ju stified (see 15518(3) ) in g iv in g S ir A . H a rd in g e the
im pression th a t his schem e was u n ob jection a b le to H f is ] M fa je s t y ’ s] G o v [e rn m e n ]t. On the
con tra ry, I th in k it is clear from the m in u tes th a t M r. T illey con v ey ed to him a w a rn in g
m essage from th e S ecretary o f S tate.
S ir A. H a rd in g e says he cou ld stop the schem e i f necessary, an d it seem s necessary to stop
it, i f it is to h a ve a com p letely G erm an com p lex ion . H e w as fully in form ed o f w h at M r. T illey
said to M r. F rew en b y ou r d e s p [a tc h ] N o. 51 o f the 20th A p ril la st.(3)
T he cocoa-esta tes schem e is on a com p letely differen t fo o tin g and a ppears to be prosp erin g .
F . E . F . A.
6.V.1912.

Q [u e r ]y . Could we n ot tell M r. F rew en th a t w e m ust see to it th a t as m uch B ritish ca p ita l

is em ploy ed as G erm an, and th a t the custom s m ust n ot be m o r tg a g e d : otherw ise H [ is ]
M fa je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] cou ld not cou n ten an ce the C h a rtered C o fm p a n y ] proposed.
F . E . F . A.

B u t it seem s in evitab le th a t such a schem e, i f it com es to a n yth in g , m ust u ltim a tely becom e
p red om in an tly G erm an, an d i f we h elp M r. F rew en to realize it w e d o so w ith ou r eyes fu lly
open to th is p roba b ility .
I ta k e it th a t ou r p osition is th a t on the one ha n d w e ca n n ot o b ject to any arra n g em en ts
w hich M r. F rew en m ay m ake w ith G erm an B a n k in g houses fo r the disposal o f his ca p ita l, w ith
w hich he ca n do as he p lea ses; on th e oth er ha n d w e decline to su p p o rt him in a n y schem e
con n ected w ith A n g ola w ith ou t the con cu rren ce o f th e G erm an G o v [e rn m c n ]t. I f how ever
this should be fo r th co m in g w e cou ld su p p ort h im to the sam e e x ten t th a t we have h ith erto
done in reg a rd to Cocoa.
W e m ig h t so in form S ir A. H a rd in g e w ho w ill b y now have receiv ed ou r d e s p fa t c h ] N o. 51
A fr ic a .(3) N o fu rth er a ction w ou ld be necessary fo r the m om ent.
E . G. L.
7.V.12.

I agree w ith M r. L ister. S ir A . H a r d in g e ’ s presen t d e s p fa tc h ] was w ritten b e fo re he had

receiv ed our N o. 51 (15518)(3) w hich p ra ctica lly answ ers the q uestion he here asks.
E . A. C.
M a y 7.

P u t cru d ely, w hat w ill b e p ra ctica lly a G erm an C h a rtered C o fm p a n y ] w ill ta k e ov er

A n g ola — I do n ot know how ou r R h od esian a d m in [is t r a tio ]n w ill view this. S h ou ld n ot the
C fo lo n ia l] O fffice] be con su lted ?
A. N.

C onsult th e C fo lo n ia l] O fffice] and m eanw hile send a teleg ram to S ir A . H a rd in g e to say

th a t we are d o in g so and th a t p en d in g fu r th e r in stru ction s he should ta ke no a ctio n .(4)
E. G.

(3) [u. sup ra , pp. 4 56-7, N o. 288.]

(4) [T he C olon ia l Office was con su lted on M a y 11, 1912, and S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s telegram
(N o. 30) in th e sense in d ica te d above was d espa tch ed on M a y 9, 1912, 5-45 p . m . (F .O . 367 289
1 9 0 7 8 /1 8 4 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .)]
 46 0

N o. 291.
Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Edward G r e y .{ 1)
F.O. 367/289.
2 1 4 0 1 /1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
(No. 41.) Africa. Confidential. Lisbon, D. May 16, 1912.
Sir, R . May 20, 1912.
Mr. Frewen came to see me this m orning to give me an account of the progress
of the loan negotiations upon which I had the honour to report to you in my despatch
No. 34 of the 27th ultim o.(2)
He said that Messrs. Schröder had insisted on a written undertaking by the
Portuguese Governm ent to grant the concession to a Chartered Company in Angola,
stipulated for as one of the conditions of their loan, and that after a long struggle
by the Portuguese Ministers to evade putting anything definite on paper, the
Portuguese Legation in London had been instructed to furnish Messrs. Schröder
with the necessary written assurances. A representative of that firm was to arrive
in Lisbon early in June.
The loan which, although not secured on the revenues of the chartered territory
to be made over to the Syndicate advancing the m oney, was dependent on the success
o f the negotiations for this object, would amount to 15 millions sterling secured on
the revenues of the European customs of Portugal. It would be nom inally issued
at 92 really at 86 and would bear interest at the rate of 4 | % . German, French and
British financiers would participate in it in about equal proportions, and the ‘ ‘ Banque
d ’ Outremer ” at Brussels would also join. Mr. Frewen was quite satisfied with the
security, since the actual annual revenue o f the customs being £3,8 00 ,0 0 0 , and the
interest paid to existing creditors being £ 1,2 00 ,0 0 0 , a margin of over £2,500,000
was left. Indeed he said the French group were prepared to make a loan to Portugal
on this security alone, without reference to the Colonial concessions, but now that
these had been thrown in as a further consideration the French were anxious to
share in them, and this might Mr. Frewen thought, give rise to some delicate
questions with the Germans.
One important feature of the scheme was the construction by the new Chartered
Company of a railway from S. Antonio, a port on the Portuguese side of the Congo
facing Banana Point, which would run due South East to North West Rhodesia,
f asked how this would affect the Ambaca and Lobito Bay railways. Mr. Frewen
said that the new syndicate would buy them upand make them branch lines or
feeders, connecting the new trunk line with S. Paul de Loanda and Benguella
respectively.
I then enquired whether, inasmuch as this arrangement would have to be
submitted to the Portuguese Parliam ent, he believed they would meet with no
opposition in that body. Dr. Costa and his fidus Achates, Dr. Bernardino Machado,
had of late made public pronouncements against any large loans, and the rumour
o f colonial concessions to Germans and Englishm en might be gladly seized on by
the Opposition, led by Senhor d ’ Alm eida, to attack the Governm ent— an attack in
which some of the independents might join. He intimated that Dr. Costa had been
“ squ ared ” and that he had him self persuaded Senhor d ’ Almeida of the advantage
to Portugal of his proposals. He seems in fact to have exp’ ained to the Evolutionist
leader that they were the only means of enabling the Republic to retain its hold
on its Colonial dominions. lie returns to London to-morrow and will come back
with Messrs. Schroder’s representative.
Ile tells me that his S. Tliome scheme has been attended with complete success.
His syndicate have already acquired 40,000 acres of cocoa plantations, i.e ., about
half the whole amount of the plantations in the islands, and those proprietors who
C1) [A cop y o f this despatch was sent to B erlin (as N o. 43 A fric a ) on M a y 22, 1912. A
co p y was sent to the C olonia l O ffice.]
(2) [r . im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t.]
 4G1

originally stood out for absurdly high prices for their properties are now, he says
anxious to come into his schem e, and are lowering their terms accordingly, but he
is in no immediate hurry to close with them.
I asked how he and his friends intended dealing with the labour problem. He
said they would procure labour from Liberia, on the basis of a 12 months contract
and one m onth holiday, and that the natives whom they hoped to recruit there,
and who were Mahommedans and good workers, would be housed in com pounds on
the plantations. He expressed his conviction that the effect o f these new arrange­
ments would be to put an end, at no distant date, to the disguised slavery which
still existed, in spite of all the efforts made to stop it, in S. Thom e.
Although I have encouraged Mr. Frewen to talk to me of his schem es, and
have listened sympathetically to them , with a view to being able to keep you informed
of their progress. I have since the receipt of your telegram No. 30 of the 9th instant,(3i
made no reference to the loan question in conversation with the members of the
Portuguese Governm ent, deem ing it best, pending further instructions from you to
have no cognisance of them.
I have. Ac.
A R TH U R H . H A R D IN G E .

M IN U T E S .

C op y to C [o Io n ia l] 0 [ff ic e ] (in p r in t) w ith r e ffe r e n c e ] an d aw a it th e ir ob serv a tion s b efore

sen d in g fu r th e r in stru ction s to S ir A . H a rd in g e. W e shall have to g et som e sa feg u a rd fo r our
rev ersion a ry rig h ts to p a rt o f A n gola in clu ded in the con s titu tion o f the C ha rtered C o [m p a n y ] :
perhaps by p r o v id in g i g ain st p r e ju d ic ia l ra ilw ay rates.
M r. F rew en certa in ly a ppea rs to ca rry all b efore him hut I feel som e h esita tion in
a cce p tin g all he says. I t is difficult to believe th a t th e L oh ito B a y ra ilw ay can he b ou gh t up
so easily as h e seem s to th in k and. on a m in or p oin t, I w on d er w hether these M ahom m edan
w orkers are rea lly to b e h a d in L ib eria.
I t m ig h t be w ell t o m en tion the m a tter a g a in t o the G erm an Em bassy w hen it is d ecid ed
w hat we w ant in reg a rd to ou r T rea tv rights.
J . A . C. T.
20.5.12.
A. X .

S end to the C [o lo n ia l] 0 [ffic e ].

E . G.
A. N

( 3) [ v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t, m in ., a n d n ote <.*).]

No. 292.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. Harcourt.

F.O. 3G7/2S9.
21401 1S41 12/436.
Private.
My dear H arcourt, Foreign Office, May 20, 1912.
A further despatch from A. Hardinge has com e iii(') from which it looks as if
the loan to Portugal was going throu gh; but it is to be secured on revenue of
Portuguese European Customs only and in the concessions in Angola British, German
and French are to participate. Hardinge is doing nothing to support it, but on these
lines I do not see that we can or need object to it.
Yours sincerelv,
E.‘ G R E Y .

The despatch is going to the C [olon iall 0 [ffice"1 bv the official channel.
E . G.
( ') j r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]
 46 2
N o. 293.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en .(1'1

F.O. 367/287.
2 20 5 1 /9 1 6/12 /4 3 6 .
(No. 46.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 21, 1912.
Count Metternich referred to-day to a communication which we had made last
September, to the effect that we were entitled to support the application of a W haling
Company for a harbour in Angola on the ground that it did not involve an exclusive
m onopoly. His Government considered that Article 5 of the Anglo-German Secret
Agreement precluded either Governm ent from giving support to any enterprise,
whether m onopoly or not, in the sphere assigned to the other.(2)
I said that I would refer to the Article and examine this point.
I then told Count Metternich that I understood the German Embassy had been
kept inform ed about Mr. Frew en’ s negotiations. M y latest inform ation was that
the loan was to be secured upon the European Customs Duties o f Portugal, but that
there was a large land concession in Angola involved. I had instructed Sir Arthur
H ardinge not to give it any support without instructions. Mr. Frewren had been
informed that, for political reasons, this was not a thing which could be assisted
without the consent of the German Governm ent. I understood that, when he had
been inform ed of this, he had com m unicated with Baron Schroeder, in order to get
into touch with German financiers.
Count Metternich said that he thought Sir i\rthur Hardinge was very active
in Lisbon in giving support to British enterprises.
I said that he had not given support to this project in Angola. He had, however,
kept us inform ed about it. It seemed likely to go through, because the promoters
had, by their own m ethods, secured the support o f such people in Portugal as were
likely to oppose it.
[I am, A c.]
E Y R E A. CEO W E.
(for the Secretary of State).
t 1) [T h is despatch was rep eated to L isbon (N o. 68 A fric a ), on M a y 24. A cop y was sent to
M r. H a rc o u rt.]
(2) [u. G ooch c£ T em p erley, V ol. I, p 72, N o. 90, e n d ]

No. 294.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E . G oschen .(*)

F.O. 367/289.
22213/1841 12/436.
Tel. (No. 2.) Africa. Foreign Office, May 23, 1912, 9 -3 0 p . m .
S ecret. M y despatch No. 4 3 .(2)
Messrs. Schröder inform me that they hope to be able at a very early date,
and in any case before adjournment of Portuguese Chambers on June 10, to complete
arrangements for (1) a loan of £ 15 ,000,000 by Anglo-Franco-Germ an syndicate to
be secured on Portuguese home cu stom s; (2) grant of an option for formation of
Portuguese Chartered Company in which non-Portuguese bondholders would have
controlling influence, for administration o f w'hole o f Angola, on terms which are
expected to prove both profitable to shareholders and source of revenue to Portuguese
go v [e rn m en ]t.

( ’ ) [A cop y o f this teleg ram was sent to the C olonial O ffice.]

( 2) [v. svpra, pp. 4 60-1, N o. 291, and note f 1).]
 468
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] have so far refrained from supporting applica­
tion for this concession and Messrs. Schröder were inform ed some time ago that no
arrangement can be so supported unless it has the approval of the German governm ent.
In view o f present developments it is important for us to know exactly what view
the German gov [ern m en ]t take of the matter and what they on their part propose
to do. H aving regard to agreement o f 1898 and the joint interest of G [r e a ]t Britain
and Germ any in Angola any com m unication to the Portuguese gov [ern m en ]t in
support o f the proposed concession or o f any particular conditions to be attached
to it ought, in m y opinion, to be made b y both the British and German legations
at Lisbon.
Messrs. Schröder are advised that action in order to be successful, must be taken
at once and their Bepresentative is leaving for Lisbon M ay 25. E arly decision of
German g ov [ern m en ]t being important, the firm are com m unicating through private
channels with the German Chancellor direct, who will therefore be inform ed.
Please report as soon as possible.

No. 295.

M emorandum by Sir E yre Crowe.

F.O. 867/289.
2 22 1 3 /1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6. Foreign Office, May 23, 1912.
1. Mr. Tiarks, partner of Baron Schröder, called upon me to-day in order to
explain the arrangements which his firm proposes to make with the Portuguese
Government for the floating o f a lo a n ; for the purchase o f certain cocoa plantations
in the islands of San Thom e and P rin cip e; and for the development of Angola. I
gathered from him that Mr. Frew en, whose proceedings at Lisbon have formed the
subject of recent correspondence, is now practically acting as Messrs. Schroder’s
agent. As regards the cocoa plantation scheme, Mr. Tiarks said it was to be carried
out by a syndicate in which, besides Messrs. Schröder, French and German capitalists
would be represented. This scheme would be on a totally different footing from the
other parts of the proposed arrangements, with which it was not in fact connected.
2. M r. Tiarks read to me a letter which he had received from the Portuguese
Minister in L ondon, containing an assurance that his Government was prepared to
negotiate agreements with Mr. Tiarks respecting the loan and the setting up of a
Portuguese Chartered Company for the administration of Angola. The Portuguese
Government insists that these two matters must be treated separately, because they
cannot allow any connection to be established between the grant o f a concession by
which the administration of a Portuguese colony would in practice be placed under
the control o f foreign bondholders, and the raising of a large loan to finance the
Portuguese government at hom e.
3. Mr. Tiarks admitted, when I pressed him , that this separation of the two
questions could only be ostensible, and was obviously designed for the sole purpose
o f saving the face o f the Portuguese Government in the eyes of their public opinion.
4. In fact it was clearly understood that the Portuguese Government would get
no loan unless they gave the concession in Angola. He explained that he was going
to apply for the option of establishing the Chartered Company for him self, and in
his own nam e, whilst, as regards the loan, the proposal was that there should be
equal participation between British, German and French capitalists. He had been
advised that this was the moment to get both these affairs settled at Lisbon. It
would probably be necessary to get the formal approval of the Portuguese Chambers,
and as they were to adjourn on the 10th of June, he intended to start for Lisbon,
in the com pany of Mr. Frew en, on Saturday next (May 25th). H e asked that His
 4 64
M ajesty’ s Minister at Lisbon should be instructed to afford him support, and he
added that it would eventually be necessary for the British Governm ent to authorize
some public announcement to the effect that they were interested in the success of
the loan, and had taken note of the security offered, as, without some such declara­
tion, there would be little prospect o f any subscriptions being forthcom ing. ( xj
5. I pointed out to Mr. Tiarks the unusual character of any such proceeding.
He referred to the precedents of China, Liberia and others, as fully warranting the
course suggested. I did not pursue this matter beyond pointing out that those had
been altogether exceptional cases, and that Portugal was in a very different position
from the countries he had named.
6. I then enquired whether it was correct, as we had been inform ed, that the
Chartered Company, although the concession for it was to be obtained by and in
the name of British capitalists, was to pass almost immediately into German hands.
Mr. Tiarks said that was so, and added that the m oney for floating the Company
would under his scheme be found wholly in Germany.
7. I therefore asked him on what grounds he based his request for our official
support. W hat he desired to obtain was a concession for the exclusive benefit of
Germany, and I understood that the loan had to be made because, without one, the
Portuguese Government would grant no concession. W ould it not, in these
circumstances, be more natural that he should seek to obtain the support of the
German rather than that of the British Governm ent, no British interest being really
involved? Mr. Tiarks replied that no application on the part of Germans had the
slightest chance of being granted by the Portuguese Governm ent.
8. I asked why in these circumstances Mr. Tiarks was so anxious to oblige
German capitalists. In answer to this question, he made a remarkable statement.
He said he thought that he was acting in the best interests o f the British Govern­
m ent, and indeed in accordance with their wishes, in facilitating the acquisition of
German rights in Angola, by lending the name of his firm in the manner proposed.
He repeated several times that he had reason to believe that the British Government
were most anxious to prove to the German Governm ent that they welcomed German
expansion in those regions, and to go out o f their way to prom ote it by active
assistance, in order to dispel in the most effective manner the suspicions that we were
standing in G erm any’ s way.
9. It was difficult not to realise that Mr. Tiarks must have been encouraged
b y someone speaking with authority, of what he assumed to be the intentions and
wishes of His M ajesty’ s Governm ent. I can only venture to guess that H err von
Kuhlm ann has, with or without the approval of Mr. H arcourt, put these ideas into
Mr. Tiarks’ h ea d .(2)
10. I restricted m yself to observing that any development of the Portuguese
colonies on sound commercial lines must always be welcomed by the British Govern­
ment, but tbat they also were under an obligation to the Government of Portuga1
not to do anything which might be interpreted as a blind for the covert introduction
of German control into Angola under the semblance of an ostensibly British enter­
prise. If the Portuguese Government were, as Mr. Tiarks suggested, determined
not to listen to a German application for the concession of a Chartered Company,
whilst they were ready to give such a concession on application by a British firm,

i 1) [M a rg in a l note b y S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ I do n ot th in k w e can do this. W e have done

som eth in g like it in th e case o f P ersia and o f L ib eria, h u t I did n ot at all lik e th e L ib eria n
m a tte r and w ould not have it d on e had it not been in fu lfilm ent o f a p led g e g iv en by a p rev iou s
G o v fe rn m e n jt. [E . G .] ” ]
(2) [M a rg in a l n ote by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ I am sure th a t n eith er 1 n or M r. H a rc o u rt
have ever suggested sacrificin g B ritish in terests fo r n oth in g. W h a t we have said gen era lly is
th a t w hen our own in terests and claim s are not in volved w e do n ot w ant to stand in G erm a n y ’ s
way. B u t the statem ent m ade b y M r. T ia r k [s ] w ould only he tru e o f th is business if w e had
g iv en up ou r strip in A n g ola and even then w e could n ot p la y th e p a rt o f sta lk in g horse fo r
G erm any a t L isbon. [E . G .] ” ]
 465

it seemed to me difficult for His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to lend their support to a
scheme which did not plainly indicate the proposed transfer of the concession to
German shareholders.
11. Mr. Tiarks acknowledged the force of this argument, but said, very earnestly
and with what appeared to me complete sincerity and good faith, that nothing was
further from his mind than any wish to mislead the Portuguese Governm ent. He
intended, and always had intended, to make it quite plain that he reserved the
absolute right of disposing of the shares o f the proposed Company to whomever he
liked, and that he would decline to be fettered in this respect by any restrictions
whatsoever. But, as I again rem inded him he apparently drew the line at clearly
inform ing the Portuguese Governm ent o f his real intentions in regard to a most
important feature of his plan.
12. I then explained, as Sir Edward Grey had authorized me to do, that His
M ajesty’ s Government were bound in a matter of this kind to act only in complete
agreement with the German Governnm ent, and that, whilst I had no hesitation
in accepting his statements as a com plete explanation of the situation, we should
have to obtain from the German Governm ent some form al" announcem ent of their
intentions and wishes. I did not feel at liberty to explain to Mr. Tiarks why it is
important for us, so long as we retain our lien over a certain portion of A ngola, not
to allow undivided control over the whole o f that colony to pass into German hands.
But I urged upon him the desirability o f maintaining a proper share of British
participation in the Chartered Company on the ground I had already put to him :
that if the British Government is to support an application for the concession, that
concession must be a bona fide British concern— at least to the extent of an important
British share in it being retained.
13. M r. Tiarks then assured me, and he repeated the assurance in a very precise
and emphatic m anner, that if he succeeded, as he hoped he would, in obtaining the
option for the concession for him self, he would not part with it, or with any single
share, to anyone, without being previously told that the British Governm ent approved
his doing so. He would never do anything to embarrass his own governm ent or act
contrary to what they might consider was demanded by the interests o f his country.
He suggested that he should be free, for the present, to negotiate for the desired
option strictly on his own account, without in any way bringing in, or asking for,
the support of the British Governm ent. It would be time enough to consider how
to deal with the concession, and to what extent to meet German wishes in regard
to it when he had secured the option. The affair was very pressing. It was essential
for him to open negotiations at Lisbon at on ce, and if he were to refrain from m oving
until the British and German governm ents had come to a form al agreement, the
favourable m oment for success might pass away, and the opportunity be definitely
lost. He therefore begged that he might have a letter of introduction to Sir Arthur
Hardinge m erely for the purpose that the latter should introduce him to the
Portuguese authorities as the representative o f a respectable British house, willing
to negotiate for the proposed international loan, but without any reference being
made to his scheme regarding the Chartered Company as to which he would, quite
independently, do what he could for him self, unless an understanding with the
German Government were come to at once. I told him that it was of course not
in the power o f the British Governm ent to prevent him from entering upon such a
negotiation. M oreover in view of the pledge which he has given, not to proceed to
the alienation to third parties o f any rights that he m ay obtain without further
reference to us, I think there can be no objection to his having a letter of introduction
in the terms suggested. I therefore told him that we should at once instruct
Sir E . Goschen to approach the German Government and that we should let him
(Mr. Tiarks'» know as soon as it was possible to indicate the course which His
M ajesty’ s Government might feel able to adopt. In the meantime he would be
given the desired letter of introduction. H e offered, in order to expedite the matter,
to get Baron Schroeder to write by to-nigh t’ s post to the German Chancellor with
[10900] 2 H
 466

whom he was on terms of intimacy, begging him to take the question into immediate
consideration.
14. Throughout the interview, at which Mr. Tyrrell was present, I had the
impression that Mr. Tiarks wished to be perfectly straightforward and above-board
with us. But I cannot help feeling that Mr. Frew en’ s mode of procedure may have
misled the Portuguese Government into the belief that they were dealing with a
group of independent British capitalists who intended themselves to control the
concession they were endeavouring to secure, and not with persons who, for what­
ever motives, propose to part with it, as soon as obtained, to the very people whom
the Portuguese are credited with the determination to keep out.
15. And it remains a little mysterious why this British firm should exert itself
in the way it does for the now avowed purpose of prom oting purely German interests.
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Messrs. Schroder are consciously taking part
in a political m ove, and that they are being used as the agents of the German
Governm ent. I am in ignorance as to whether His M ajesty’ s Government on their
part have been aware of this particular aspect o f the affair and whether they have,
as M r. Tiarks clearly thinks, actually intimated through some channels which seem
to him authoritative their anxiety actively to promote a German scheme by engaging
on behalf of it the credit o f an English house of standing in the City.
16. Our safeguard, so far as our attitude towards the Portuguese Government
is concerned, consists in the course which by Sir E . G rey’ s direction, Sir E . Goschen
will be instructed to urge upon the German Governm ent, nam ely that any com m uni­
cation to the Portuguese Governm ent in support of an application for such a concession
as a Chartered Company in Angola, should be made by both the German and British
Legations at Lisbon together.
17. After reporting the interview to Sir A. Nicolson, and with his approval,
I have despatched the annexed telegram to Sir E . Goschen. (3)
E . A. C [B O W E J .

( 3) [M a r g in a l n o t e : “ (N o. 2 A fr ic a Secret.) ” v. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t.]

No. 296.

M emorandum by Sir E yre Crowe.

Second Interview with Mr. Tiarks.

F.O. 367/289.
2 22 1 3 /1 8 1 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 . F oreign Office, May 24, 1912.
Mr. Tiarks called again today, for the purpose of showing me a copy of the
letter which Baron Schroder had written to the German Chancellor. I asked him
whether we could keep it, and also communicate it to Sir E . Goschen. He agreed
to this. I have accordingly sent a copy of the letter (in German) to Berlin tonight
and now annex a translation^) hereto.
I told Mr. Tiarks that I did not like the passage in it relating to the inducement
held out to German financiers to take up part of the Portuguese loan in the shape
of a prospect o f large orders for armaments. It seemed to me regrettable that
Portugal should be encouraged to spend a large part of the loan for such a purpose.
Mr. Tiarks entirely agreed, and deplored the intentions of the Portuguese gov[ern -
m en ]t, but said it was they who insisted on devoting the m oney to this o b je c t : they
talked of spending about ¿7 ,000,000 in this w ay! He would have preferred to limit
the loan to the barest necessities, and thought ¿2,000,000 would be enough. In fact
he was not at all interested in the success o f the lo a n ; all he cared about was the
Angola scheme.

0 ) [T h is letter is n ot rep rod u ced as its con ten ts are sufficiently in d ic a te d above.]
 407
This gave me an opening for further questions, as a result o f which, I got
Mr. Tiarks to explain to me the exact history and position of the negotiation and
the relative share of Mr. Freweu and of Messrs. Schröder in i t :
Mr. Frewen was a capable and good man of business, of whom Sir E . L ipton
had form ed a high opinion. Mr. Frew en had no means o f his own, but has control
of a respectable syndicate worth about £20,000. H e him self (Mr. Frewen had alone
been concerned in the scheme for the purchase of the cocoa plantations in San Thom e
and Principe. In the course o f his negotiations on this subject with the Portuguese
governm ent, he was met with their demand for a loan. At this stage he referred to
Messrs. Schröder and asked for their financial support. The house o f Schröder had
been established in England for over 150 years. Mr. Tiarks’ father had been the
late Baron Schroder’s principal partner for 50 yea rs; and his son holds the same
position now. The present Baron Schröder, nephew o f his predecessor, had been
brought into the business from H am burg, as there was no direct heir, but he had
always shown him self determined to m aintain the English character of the German
house, and would never allow his own German nationality to in flu e n c e the business
in any “ G e r m a n ” direction.
Mr. Tiarks at once told Mr. Frewen that he took little interest in either the
cocoa venture or the loan, but that these schemes offered an opening for a plan which
he (Mr. Tiarks* had thought about for months. He assured me that this plan of
getting Angola developed by Germ any with British assistance, originated absolutely
in his own head. The study of public opinion in England and Germ any had convinced
him o f the important effect such a scheme would have on the betterment o f Anglo-
German relations, and he determined to make every effort to realize it. M r. F rew en’ s
negotiations gave him his chance. He went to expound his plan to H err von
Kühlm ann, and asked what he thought o f it. H err von Kühlmann had replied that
Mr. Tiarks had by great good fortune hit upon the one thing more calculated than
any other to bring about the object he desired, and without expressing any further
opinion or advice, had never since ceased to encourage him to persevere in his plan.
M r. Frewen was accordingly sent back to Lisbon, this time practically as the agent
of Messrs. Schröder, and there succeeded in reaching the preliminary agreement with
the Portuguese governm ent which Sir A. Havdinge had reported. Mr. Tiarks, having
gone so far, declined to go any further unless and until he received something in
writing to show that the Portuguese governm ent were serious in the negotiation. That
is how and why he obtained the letter from the Portuguese Minister here which he
read to me yesterday.
The above account, which I have every ground for believing to be quite accurate
and com plete, puts a somewhat different, and more favourable, com plexion on the
proceedings of both Mr. Frewen and Mr. Tiarks, although, as I again reminded the
latter today, it did not get us over the difficulty that the Portuguese gov "ern m en ]t
might only be induced to give the concession because they had no suspicion o f its
proposed transfer to Germany. As to this, he repeated his assurance o f yesterday,
and went even further : He said that if he succeeded in getting the option for the
concession, he would practically place it at the disposal of H i s 1 M rajesty’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ], If they wished, he would either drop it. or dispose of it to Germany,
or let H H s] M [a jesty’ s] G [ov ern m en t] make us^ of it as something they could
offer to Germ any as part o f a political bargain or otherwise, as we thought best.
I thanked M. Tiarks for his frank explanations and for his offer, which I said
I would form ally record, and lay before Sir E . Grey.
It seems to me that there m ay be here all the elements o f a useful deal with
the German governm ent, provided we can get over the difficulty of opening the eyes
of the Portuguese g o v [e m m e n ]t to the real nature of the transaction offered to them,
without thereby destroying its prospect o f success.

E. A. C [B O W E ].
May 24.
[10900] 2 H 2
 4G8
M IN U T E S .

T he dev elopm en t o f A n g ola by an A n g lo-G erm a n C om pany w ould be a v e ry suitable p roject.

I f a rea rra n g em en t o f the secret agreem en t w ith G erm any o f 1898 was m ade un d er w hich we
gave u p ou r strip across A n g ola in retu rn fo r concessions elsew here the B ritish share in this
com p an y cou ld be pu rchased by G erm an in terests and it w ould b ecom e w holly G erm an, b u t
u n d er present circum stan ces the C om p any w ould have to be A ng lo-G erm a n . W e ca n n ot how ­
ever ob ta in by the su p p o rt o f B ritish dip lom a cy a concession fo r a B ritish subject, w ith th e
in ten tion o f tra n sfe rrin g a g re a t p a rt o f it to G erm any, w ith ou t te llin g th e P ortu g u ese w hat
the real n ature of the p r o je c t is. T o con ceal this w ou ld be to ob tain th e concession from
P o rtu g a l un d er false preten ces and w ou ld be b ad fa ith .
I f the G erm ans wish the p r o je c t to g o forw a rd I th in k th e best course w ould be th a t we
should both p o in t ou t to P o rtu g a l th a t her colon y ca n n ot be d ev eloped e x ce p t b y fo r e ig n
ca p ita l, th a t G erm any and ourselves b ein g neigh b ou rs have a p r io r claim as com p ared w ith
oth er fo r e ig n e rs to p rov id e this ca p ita l, th a t we ca n n ot in deed see oth er foreig n ers a d m itted
in p r eferen ce to us. I t is also tru e t h a t we ca n n ot see P o r t u g a l’ s colonies le ft p ra ctica lly
d erelict, as th ey are now , in defin itely, b u t this is a delicate p o in t to state.
W e m ust now w a it fo r the G erm an reply.
E. G.
M r. H a rc o u rt should have this p a p er a t once fo r his ob serv a tion s.(2)
E. G.

(2) [v. in fra , pp. 46S-9, N o. 298.]

No. ‘297.

Mr. Harcourt to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 367/289.
2 14 0 1 /1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
M y dear Grey, Colonial Office, May 24, 1912.
The proposed C o[m pany] will eventually be almost entirely German.
I think this is quite inconsistent with the Secret Treaty as it at present exists,
and if it goes through will prejudice our position in future negotiations.
Yours sincerely,
L . H ARCOU RT.
24.5.12.
M IN U T E .

T he p o in t raised in M r. H a r c o u r t ’ s n ote has been dea lt w ith in the tw o m inu tes in which
I record ed my con versation s w ith M r. T i a r k s / 1) and w hich w ent in S ir E d w a rd ’ s pou ch last
night.
Sec also the passage m arked in the a n n exed te l[e g r a m ] to S ir E. G oschen (N o. 2 A fric a
M ay 23).( 2)
E. A. C.
M a y 25.
t1) [v. supra, pp. 463-7, Nos. 2 95 -6 .]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 462-3, N o. 294. N o passage is m arked on the cop y preserved in the F oreig n
Office arch ives.]

No. 298.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. Harcourt.

F.O. 367/289.
2 2 2 1 3 /1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
My dear Harcourt, Foreign Office, M ay 26, 1912.
I am sending you a m em orandum /1) explaining the Angola Concession. I have
written m y view upon it and should like to have yours when you have all the facts

C ) [v. supra, pp. 463-7, Nos. 2 95 -6 .]

 469

before y o u . It was upon this m e m o r a n d u m ] that the telegram o f M ay 2 3(2) wa 3

sent to Goschen, but your view ought to be expressed before we do anything at
Lisbon.
Y rou 1rs sincerely,
E. GREY

( 2) [c . sup ra , p p . 462-3, N o. 294 ]

No. 299.

M r. H arcourt to Sir Edicard G rey.

F.O. 367 '2S4.
23909 391 12 436.
M y dear G rey, M incham , May 26, 1912.
I asked Kühlmann to give me a draft of the alterations he w lo u ljd suggest in
the Secret Treaty to make it accord with the new proposals. I enclose it herewith.
The fact that Tim or drops out will be apparent when the old Treaty is published
with the new.
The Germans ask that we shall not tell the Dutch about Tim or without previous
com m unications with them (the Germans!.
YYrars sincerelv,
L . H A RC O U R T.

Enclosure in No. 299.

C onvention.

In view of the possibility that Portugal m ay require financial assistance from

some foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate the international com plications
which such a condition of things m ay produce, and to preserve her integrity and
independence, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Sovereigns,
have agreed as follows :
1.) W henever either the British or the German Government is o f opinion that
it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance o f m oney to Portugal on the
security o f the Customs revenues of M ozambique, Angola and Sao Thom é and
Principé, it shall communicate the fact to the other Governm ent, and the other
Governm ent shall have the right to advance a portion o f the total sum required.
In the event of the other Governm ent signifying its intention to exercise this
right, the two Governm ents shall consult as to the terms o f the two loans and
these loans shall be issued on the security of the Customs revenues of M ozambique,
Angola and Sao Thom é and Principé as near as possible simultaneously. The loans
shall bear as near as possible the same proportion to each other as the amounts of
the Customs revenues respectively assigned as their security.
The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition
o f the m oney market and the security o f the loans perm it, and shall in other respects
be subject as near as possible to similar conditions.
2.) Of the Customs revenues, referred to in Article I, those o f the province of
Mozambique south o f a line beginning at the mouth o f the river Licun go and along
this river, along the Lugera up to the most southern point of Lake Schirwa, and
those o f the portions o f the Province o f Angola, as hereinafter described, shall be
assigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues o f Mozambique and Angola
 47 0

and the Customs revenues o f Sao Thomé and Principe shall be assigned io the
German loan.
The portion of the Province of Angola east of the 20th parallel beginning at the
northern frontier of German South-west Africa to the point where this parallel crosses
the Talweg of the Kassai riverf1) shall be assigned to the British loan.
8.) A ny Delegates sent by Great Britain or Germany to take note of the collection
of the revenues which are the security for their respective loans shall have only
rights o f inspection, but no rights o f administration, interference or control, so long
as there is no default in the paym ent o f interest or sinking fund.
4.) In case of default in the paym ent of the interest or sinking fund of either
loan, the administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces and in
Sao Thom é and Principe shall be handed over by P ortugal; those assigned for the
German loan to Germ any, those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5.) It is well understood that all rights, whether British or German, acquired
in the provinces affected before the date of this Convention, shall be fully safe­
guarded provided they are o f a purely private character, and convey neither political
rights nor territorial or administrative jurisdiction.
It is also understood that no influence will be used in the future, either by the
British or the German Governm ents, to obtain fresh concessions, except in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their
respective loans.
6.) The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall
be exchanged as soon as possible. The Convention shall come into force immediately
after the exchange o f ratifications.

In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized, have eigned the same,
and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate, at London, the . . . .( 2)

M IN U T E S .

T h is d r a ft a greem ent raises a num ber o f points. I t is not, I thin k, a d ocu m en t th a t could
possibly be sign ed in its present form .
T he w ord in g is p ra ctica lly th a t o f th e first con v en tion o f 189S,(3) w ith certa in m odifications
as to the several t e rr ito ria l u n its th erein re fe rre d to. I t is th erefore assum ed th a t it is m eant
to rep la ce the form er a greem ent. T his w ou ld h ow ever have to be m ade clea r in the docum ent
itself, p roba b ly both in the pream ble an d in a sp ecific a rticle, b y w hich the prev iou s con v en tion
w ould be form a lly abroga ted.
T h e in clu sion o f the islands o f S an T hom é and P rin cip e in the pla ce o f T im or is an
im p orta n t in n ova tion . These islands d o n ot b elon g to Sou th A frica . T h ey are close to the
F ren ch G aboon as well as to ou r colon y o f N ig eria . W e are at th is m om ent a ctiv ely su p p ortin g
a schem e fo r the pu rchase o f m ost o f th e im p orta n t cocoa estates in the islands b y a B ritish
sy n d ica te in w hich F ren ch and G erm an ca p ita l is also represen ted. B y su b stitu tin g fo r the
e x is tin g con v en tion the agreem en t now p roposed, we shall, in v irtu e o f ou r engagem ents under
the second (secret) con v en tion o f 1898('1) be b ou n d to opp ose any F ren ch p a rticip a tio n o f this
kind. T his raises a v ery aw k w ard q uestion.
M o reov er we a re pled g ed to in fo rm th e F ren ch g overn m en t o f a n y colon ia l proposals o f a
t e rr ito ria l ch a ra cter th a t we m ay be d iscu ssin g w ith G erm any. W e have so fa r led M onsieur
C a m bon to b elieve th a t on ly Sou th A fric a n te rr ito rie s (south o f the e q u a tor) w ere in question.
It does not seem rig h t a t all th a t the C olon ia l Office should w ith ou t a w ord to this D epa rtm en t,
e n te r in to even an in form a l a rra n g em en t w ith the G erm an em bassy fo r the disp osa l o f these
islands.
A r tic le 2 o f the proposed new con v en tion w ill req u ire recon sidera tion .
T he con clu d in g sentence o f th e 1st p a ra g ra p h does n ot ha rm onize w ith w hat preeedes. I t
is p roba b ly b y som e e rror o f cop y in g , o r carelessness o f d r a ftin g , th a t the eustom s revenue o f

(*) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l note : “ m eets the fr o n t ie r o f th e B elgia n C on g o near the source

o f the riv er K a s sa i.” ]
(2) [T hus in orig in a l.]
( 3) jy . G ooch c£ T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 7 1-2, N o. 90, en cl.]
(•') [v. ibid., V ol. I, p. 73, No. 91, en cl.]
 471
the w hole of M oza m b iq u e is, in the second sentence assigned as secu rity fo r the G erm an loan.
The first sentence co rrectly assigns th e reven u e o f the southern p a rt o f th a t p r ov in ce to the
B ritish loan.
B y an u n in ten d ed slip, the second p a ra g ra p h o f the same a rticle speaks o f the p ortion o f
A ngola east o f th e 20th p a ra llel!
These are m in or points. B u t a m ore serious prohlem arises from th e p roposed new te x t o f
the a rticle. T he p rov ision s as to th e assignm ent o f custom s revenues have been ta k en over
from the clauses o f the 189S a greem ent. Those prov ision s w ere ca refu lly fram ed t o a p p ly to the
te rrito ria l un its in question, w hich com p rised each a coast strip and p ort, hesides a stretch o f
hin terla n d . B u t now the p a rt of A n g ola orig in a lly ea rm a rk ed fo r th e B ritish loa n has been
cu t out, and fo r it th ere is su b stitu ted an in land d istr ict on th e B ech u an a lan d hord er, w ith ou t
any coa st-strip co n n e ctin g it w ith th e seas. I t seem s to have been ov erlook ed th a t t o a d is tr ict
so situ ated th e re feren ce to the custom s revenues is n ot a p p rop ria te. T he m a ch in ery con tem ­
pla ted hv th e o rig in a l con v en tion as the cloak u n d er w hich E n g lan d and G erm a ny w ere
ev en tu ally to a cq u ire con trol ov er these P ortu g u ese colonies, was the pled g e of th e custom s
reven u e collected a t the ports, as secu rity fo r loans to he raised in those tw o cou n tries
respectively. In v ir tu e o f the revenues so pledg ed, they w ere to ohta in, in p r a c tic e , a lien on
th e p rovinces. B u t th is m a chin ery is not su ited to d istr icts in th e in te r io r h a v in g no ports
w here custom s a re collected. Such sm all custom -houses as m ay he established on the in la n d
fr o n tie r w ere, I am sure, n ever m eant to he ta k en in to a ccou n t, and w hatever reven u e is
a ctu a lly collected th ere ca n n ot seriously he h rou gh t fo r w a rd as secu rity fo r a loan.
Y et it w ou ld be difficult to earm a rk any p a rticu la r p o r tio n o f the P ortu g u ese h e rita g e fo r
E n g la n d hy a n y oth er m ethod th a n th a t of p le d g in g the custom s as secu rity fo r a loa n , w ithout
offen d in g th e leg itim a te su scep tibilities o f th e P ortu g u ese govern m en t. A n d in deed, to
“ assign ” th e d istr ict in question to G rea t B r ita in hy any less rou n d a h ou t and v eiled device
w ou ld be a ltog eth er co n tra ry to the w hole s p irit o f th e first o f th e con v en tion s o f 189S. I t
w ould a m ou n t to an open d ecla ra tion th a t G rea t B r ita in con tem p la ted t a k in g the d istr ict
from P o rtu g a l. T he w ord in g o f th e first con v en tion was d eliberately devised to a void this.
I n the second p a ra g ra p h of a rtic le (2) of the new con v en tion , th e w o r d s : “ T h e p ortion
o f th e p rov in ce o f A n g ola . . . . shall he a ssigned to the B ritish loan ” m a y have been
in ten tion a lly chosen to g et ov er th is difficulty. T he t e x t of 1S9S sa y s: “ th e re v e n u e s o f the
p ortion . . . . shall he a ssigned.” B u t i f the a ltera tion is in ten tion a l— w hich m ay p erh a ps b e
d o u h t e d ; fo r the w hole d r a ft shows tra ces o f careless p r e p a ra tio n — it does n ot seem a very
happ y solution. I t does not, in fa ct, dispose o f th e difficulty, h u t m erely slurs it ov er b y the
em ploym en t o f in accu ra te ph raseology.
I t is a q u estion fo r con sid era tion w heth er th e reserv ation to E n g la n d o f th e in la n d d istr ict
cou ld p erh a ps be effected, w ith less v iolen ce h ein g d on e to the p rin cip le u n d e rly in g th e first
con v en tion of 1393, b y a sep arate clause in a revised version o f th e second (secret) con v en tion
o f the sam e d a te, w hich does con tem p la te th e d efinite d iv ision of A n g ola and M oza m b iq u e in to
G erm an and B ritish spheres or zones. I t w ou ld req u ire som e difficult re d ra ftin g , if n ot the
e n tire reca stin g o f th e second con v en tion . B u t a rev ision w ill in any case be req u ired , as the
a ltera tion o f the t e rr ito ria l a rra n g em en ts in the first, necessarily in volve [s ic ] consequ en tia l
am endm ents in th e second.
T he m ost im p orta n t fe a tu re o f the d r a ft a greem ent is the n eg a tiv e one o f the elim in a tion
o f T im or an d o f the helt o f A n g ola te r r ito r y ru n n in g east and w est from th e sea to the
B ritish S ou th A fric a n fron tier. T h is b elt was stip u la ted fo r in 1S93 fo r the oh v iou s p u rpose
o f g iv in g us d irect access to the A tla n tic coa st from R hod esia. I t in clu des th e im p o rta n t
h a rb ou r o f St. P a u l de L oan d a, w hich is alrea d y th e term in u s o f a sh ort railw ay.
T here ca n be no d ou bt th a t in du e cou rse o f tim e a con sid era ble p r o p o r tio n o f th e tra d e
and traffic o f the B ritish possessions not only in Sou th A fric a p rop er, h u t also in C entral
A fric a , E a st A fric a , U ganda, and the U p p er S u d a n w ill seek th e m ore d ire c t a n d q u ick er
ou tlet to E n g la n d and W estern E u r o p e in gen era l th rou g h W est A fr ic a n ports. Such a lin e o f
com m u n ica tion , if ru n n in g th rou g h te r r ito r y ow ned an d a dm in istered b y th is cou n try , m ust
have som e s tr a teg ica l as well as com m ercia l-p olitica l im p orta n ce, an d any new a rra n g em en t,
by w hich so im p o rta n t an asset secured un d er M r. B a lfo u r’ s con v en tion o f 1393 w ou ld he once
fo r all g iv en aw ay, w ill he liahle to severe and leg itim a te criticism if it should a p p ea r th a t
the stra teg ica l and gen era l p o litica l a spect o f th e q u estion had not been fu lly con sid ered in
con su lta tion w ith th e tech n ica l advisers o f the govern m en t. F rom this p o in t o f v iew alone,
it w ou ld he a t least p ru d en t to ask fo r the con sid ered op in io n of both the A d m ira lty and the
W a r Office, h efore co m m ittin g H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] t o a d efinite decision. T he
W a r Office a re d ire c tly in terested in th e q u estion o f a b a n d on in g the only prosp ect w hich w e
now still have, u n d er th e co n d itio n s g u a ra n teed hy the 1393 con v en tion s, o f h ein g ahle, at a
fu tu r e da te, w hen th e A fric a n ra ilw ay system shall have been m ore fu lly d ev elop ed , to
estahlish an a ll-B ritish lin e o f com m u n ica tion w ith the S udan and the N ile b y the w est coast
o f A fric a as an a ltern a tiv e to the M ed iterra n ea n route.
T he q u estion of its aba n don m en t seems, so fa r, t o have heen con sid ered on ly in the
C olon ia l Office, and w ith ex clu siv e referen ce to th e possihle w ishes o f th e Sou th A fr ic a n Union.
W h eth er the U n ion g ov ern m en t rea lly th in k th e p roposed schem e so sa tisfa ctory as to m ake
 47 2
them in d ifferen t to the loss o f a B ritish ou tlet on the A tla n tic in the la titu d e o f L oan d a, I do
not know . E ven from th e ir p o in t of view , it seems shortsighted . T hey above all others ou g h t
to rea lize how necessary it is, in d ea lin g w ith A fric a n questions, to look som ew hat far
ahead, and to a void all h a n d -to-m ou th arrangem ents.
The C olonial Office a p p a ren tly con sid er the o u tlet t o b e g iv en to N yassaland on th e east
coast, by th e in clu sion o f Q uilim ane in the B ritish sphere, a m a tter o f suprem e im p ortance,
l e t th ey them selves are at this m om ent stron gly su p p o r tin g a ra ilw ay schem e in M ozam bique
w hich is en tirely based on the assum ption th a t n ot Q uilim ane, b u t B eira is the n a tu ra l ou tlet
fo r N yassaland, and B eira is o f cou rse a lread y in th e B ritish -ea rm a rk ed zone.
B u t even if S outh A fric a and N yassaland w ere satisfied t o see the ou tlet to th e west,
th rou g h L oan d a, g iv en up, the q u estion concerns th e em p ire as a w hole, an d deserves special
con sid era tion from a g en era lly B ritish p o in t o f view .
I am appreh en sive lest H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] should be accused o f rep ea tin g
the m istak e th a t was m ade in ced in g H elig ola n d . T h at also was trea ted a t th e tim e as o f no
im p orta n ce, it was also effected w ith ou t any con su lta tion w ith the stra teg ica l advisers. I
b elieve it is now agreed th a t i f H e lig o la n d w ere not in G erm an hands, G erm any w ould never
h ave been able to crea te th e trem en d ou sly stron g d efen sive position on her N orth Sea coast
w hich w e have to m eet by so costly a su p e rio rity o f floa tin g and offensive forces.
I f and w hen G erm any shall have con solid a ted her A frica n em pire b y the a bsorption,
besides A n g ola and N orth ern M oza m b iq u e, o f m ost o f th e B elgia n and F ren ch C ongo— w hich
she is clea rly a im in g at— and shall h a ve raised and p e r fe cte d a p ow erfu l n a tiv e arm y there—
w hich she w ill certa in ly d o— it is not difficult to foresee th a t the a ction o f H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G [o v e rn m e n t] in th row in g aw ay the a d v a n ta g e which th ey possessed in th e A n g ola b elt w ith
th e p o r t o f L oan d a, w ill be b itte rly la m en ted and blam ed.
A t any rate, so serious a step ou g h t h a rd ly to be taken e x cep t a fte r the m ost searching
ex a m in a tion o f th e p o litica l and s tr a teg ica l issues in volved , and it seems u n fo r tu n a te th a t
M r. H a r c o u r t ’ s n e g otia tion s should h a ve com m itted us so fa r as a ppea rs to be the case,
w ith ou t such ex a m in a tion h a v in g a p p a ren tly ta ken place.
I t m ay, how ever, n ot be too late to stip u la te th a t n oth in g can be settled definitely w ith ou t
p rev iou s referen ce to th e naval and m ilita ry advisers. T he fa c t th a t the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t
on th e ir p a rt have con d u cted the w hole discussion in a m ost unusual and secretiv e m anner,
m ay w ell ju s tify H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] in p u ttin g in such a ca v ea t even at this
stage.
I t is q u ite possible th a t w e m ay have, in M r. T ia rk s’ schem e fo r th e d evelopm ent of
A n g ola by a C h a rtered C om p any u n d er G erm an con trol, an asset w hich we cou ld use in fu rth er
d iscussion w ith the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t, i f it w ere decid ed th a t we ca n n ot, a fte r all, p a rt
w ith th e A n g ola belt. M r. T ia rks still believes he ca n ca rry his schem e w ith th e P ortu g u ese
g o v [e r n m e n ]t , and he w ill in a day or tw o let us have a m em orandum clearly ex p la in in g the
p osition . T he g ist is th a t P o rtu g a l ca n n ot, in his op in ion , g et any m oney anyw here ex cep t
by th e a d op tion o f his schem e a n d th a t th erefore the P ortu g u ese G ov['ern m en ]t m ust accep t
it. W e should then be in a p osition t o offer a cu t-a n d -d ried , w ell-th ou g h t-ou t plan, b y w hich
G erm any cou ld sta rt at on ce on th e d ev elop m en t o f her p a rt o f A ng ola. She cou ld n ot hope
to do this w ith ou t our help. Sim ila rly , we cou ld, ev id en tly , fa cilita te h er a cq u irin g con trol
ov er th e B en gu ella ra ilw ay, b y using ou r in fluen ce w ith the T a n g a n y ik a C o fm p a n y ], These
are assets w hich o f course are no fu ll eq u iv a len t o f the possession o f the A n g ola belt, b u t they
w ou ld perhaps m ake it fea sible to a rra n g e a fresh settlem ent on oth er lines, even i f w e had
to g iv e up Q uilim ane or the in land d istr ict o f A n g ola, and to lea ve u n a ltered the ex istin g
u n d ou b ted ly u n sa tisfa ctory a rra n g em en t abou t T im or.
T h a t arra n g em en t abou t T im or w ou ld n ever have been m ade at the tim e i f the d ep a rt­
m ents con cern ed had been du ly consulted . I t is v ery m uch to be h op ed th a t fu tu r e g overnm ents
m ay n ot a ga in find them selves tie d by tre a ty stip u la tion s o f g ra v e in con v en ien ce because they
w ere en tered in to w ith ou t p rop er a n d exh au stive stud y o f th e issues in volved. I w ould
ea rn estly u rge th a t th e w hole m a tter ou g h t to b e gon e in to m uch m ore th orou g h ly and
circu m sp ectly than can have been possible un d er th e p ecu lia r con d ition s in w hich th e proposed
r.ew con v en tion has been n eg otia ted , ev en if this course should in volve some unw elcom e delay.
E. A. C.
J u n e 4.

S ir E. C row e is q u ite ju stified in p u tt in g all these con sid era tion s fo r w a rd and they w ill
b e b orn e in m in d b efore a final con clu sion is m ade.
E. G
 47 3
N o. 300.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.
F.O. 367/2S9. Berlin, M ay 28, 1912.
22798/1841 12/436. D. 7 -55 p . m .
Tel. (No. 2. Africa. Secret. B . 10-15 p . m .
Your telegram No. 2, A frica, o f M ay 2 3rd (1' : Portuguese loan.
German Government regard proposals with favour and will take steps to induce
participation o f German capital. This can, however, probably not be secured before
receipt o f full details o f proposals, conditions, security, &c. In any case definite
decision before 10th June seems impossible. They are inform ed that Portuguese
Parliament will probably sit till end o f June, which would give plenty o f tim e. An
answer in this sense is being sent to Messrs. Schroder’ s private letter to Chancellor.
German Governm ent therefore ask, in view of terms o f 1898 treaty, that His
M ajesty’ s Governm ent will abstain from supporting Messrs. Schröder for the present,
and, further, that they will use their influence with Portuguese Governm ent to prevent
both loan and concession, in case Messrs. Schröder or Mr. Frewen should attempt
to pursue plan before question of German participation has been decided. In view
of suspicions of German activity lately shown in Portugal, German Governm ent
consider it inadvisable for the present to show Portuguese Governm ent that they
have any interest in matter. They fear that knowledge o f an intention to allow
the participation of German capital would wreck the undertaking.

M IN U T E S .
M r. H a r c o u r t :
T he G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t have in m in d th e id ea o f con cea lin g from the P ortu g u ese
G o v [e r n m e n ]t the G erm an elem ent in the sch em e: S ir E. Crowe has alrea d y p o in te d ou t to
M r. T ia rk s th a t th is w ou ld be u n fa ir. W e need n ot how ever deal w ith th is p o in t a t present.
Q [u e r ]y . R e p e a t th is an d the t e l[e g r a m ] t o w hich it is an answ er to S ir A. H a rd in g e.
R eq u est him to com m u n ica te the first pa ra [g r a p h ] o f th is t e P e g r a m ] to M r. T ia rk s (w ho is
now at L isb on ) and to add th a t we hope he w iil d e fe r fu r th e r n e g otia tion s u n til q u estion o f
G erm an p a rticip a tio n has been d ecid ed and rep ea t to S ir E. G oschen fo r in fo r m [a t io ]n o f
G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t.(2)
J. A. C. T.
29.5.12.
I n fo rm C [o lo n ia l] 0 [ff ic e ] secret.

I have ta lk e d this ov er w ith M i. T illey an d w e th in k th a t th e a ction su ggested w ill stop

M r. T ia rk s a n d th a t there is n oth in g else to be don e u n til we hea r a ga in from the G erm an
G o v [e rm n e n ]t. M r. T ia rk s w ill have to find som e ex cu se fo r d e fe rrin g the n eg otia tion s.
W . L.

I tru st we shall conceal n o th in g from the P o rtu g u e se G o v [e r n m e n ]t i f the q u estion takes

m ore definite shape. In v iew o f ou r en g ag em en ts we should be q u ite str a ig h tfo rw a r d w ith the
la tter. A c t as p roposed b y M r. T illey.
A. X .

C ertain ly if we ta ke any a ction a t L isb on in su p p o rt o f this p r o je c t we m ust le t the

P ortu g u ese G o v [e r n m e n ]t k n ow th a t th ere is G erm an p a rticip a tio n . As w e ha ve n o t g iv en it
any su p p ort a t L isbon a t present we need say n o th in g y e t to the P o rtu g u e se G o v [e rn m e n ]t.
E . G.

0 ) [r . sup ra , pp. 462—3. N o. 294.]

(2) [T h is w as don e in S ir E d w a rd G rev 's teleg ra m (N o. 33 A fr ic a ) to S ir A. H a rd in g e , o f
M a v 30. D . 3-30 p . m ., and rep ea ted to S ir E. G oschen (N o. 3 A fric a ). (F .O . 367 /2S9. 22793/
1 8 4 1 /1 2 ,4 3 6 .)]
 474

N o. 801.
Draft Telegram from Mr. Ilarcourt to Lord Gladstone.
F.O. 367/284.
26203/391/1*2/436. Colonial Office, May [28 ? ] , 1912.
During conversations we are having with Germany it has been suggested that
wre should revise the Secret Treaty o f 1898 in regard to Portuguese African Colonies
and we contemplate the following alterations of which you should inform General
Botha as he is personally aware o f the contents of the existing treaty. W e should
abandon our ultimate reversion to the strip in Angola as specified in the treaty,
receiving in return a reversion of all that part o f Portuguese W est Africa which lies
east of parallel 20 from Cubango River on the South to point where parallel 20
touches boundary o f Belgian Congo near source o f Kassai Biver, and Germans wo
give undertaking that there should be no differential Railway rates against British
goods in favour of German goods in transit on railways now or to be hereafter
constructed in German sphere o f what is now Portuguese West Africa.
In addition the British sphere in Portuguese East Africa is to be extended
northwards from the Zambesi as in present treaty to a line following the Lukuga
River from the coast and to its junction with the Lugera River then up the Lugera
to its source and thence to the southern end of Lake Shirwa. This will give Nyassa­
land direct access to the sea, with the whole province and port of Quilimane.
I assume that Botha will agree with us that this is an advantageous readjustment
of future possibilities. During the conversations further suggestions have been made
which directly concern the Union G ov [ern m en ]t and on which we should wish to
have B otha’ s view's.
Germany is willing to cede to us the whole o f the Caprivi strip eastward of
parallel 21 up to the Zambesi in exchange for Seal and Penguin Islands in Angra
Pequena Bay and the acceptance o f the talweg o f the Orange R iver as the boundary
between Cape Colony and Namaqua Land. They would also be willing to lease or
cede all that part o f German South West A frica'east o f parallel 20 in exchange for
a lease or cession o f W alfisch B ay. These tw’o things can be treated separately.
Please explain that we do not press these on the Union G ov [ern m en ]t but that
though seeing the advantage we feel the decision must rest with them.
An early answer on these latter points would be convenient to us, but on the
matter of the secret treaty vTe shall proceed at once.
It is proposed that both the original treaty and the new one shall be published
on com pletion and I am sure that it will be a satisfaction to South Africa to learn
definitely that the future o f Delagoa Bay and Beira is assured to us.
M IN U T E .
I have teleg rap h ed a g reein g to th is teleg ram to L ord G ladstone. j; q
2 S.5 .12 .

No. 302.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.
F.O. 367/289.
2 34 5 7 /1 8 41 /1 2 /4 3 6.
(No. 29.) Africa. Secret. Berlin, D. May 29, 1912.
Sir, R . June 3, 1912.
W ith reference to my telegram No. 2 Africa o f yesterday’ s date,(M I have the
honour to transmit to you herewith copy and translation of a M emorandum which I
have received from the German Government in regard to the proposed Portuguese
Loan.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.
. (i) [r . sujira, p. 473, N o. 300.]
 475

Enclosure in No. 302

AufZeichnung.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung steht dem Projekt der Firm a Schröder durchaus
sympathisch gegenüber und ist bemüht, deutsches Kapital für die Beteiligung an der
geplanten portugiesischen Anleihe sowie der Chartered Company in Angola zu
interessieren. Es ist indessen unwahrscheinlich, dass diese Bem ühungen E rfolg
haben werden, solange keine näheren Angaben über die Grundlagen und die
Bedingungen der beiden Unternehmungen vorliegen. Insbesondere aber erscheint
die M öglichkeit einer endgültiger Stellungnahme bis zum 10. Juni ausgeschlossen.
Die Kaiserliche Regierung bittet daher die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung
in Gemässheit der Vereinbarungen des Vertrages von 1898 von einer Unterstützung
der Bestrebungen der Firma Schröder bei der portugiesischen Regierung einstweilen
Abstand nehmen zu wollen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung glaubt aber auch der
Erwartung sich hingeben zu dürfen, dass, solange die Frage der deutschen Beteiligung
nicht geregelt worden ist, die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung im Geiste
dieser Vereinbarungei} nötigen Falls ihren Einfluss bei der portugiesischen Regierung
dahin geltend machen wird, dass die Vergebung der Anleihe sowie der Landkonzession
nicht erfolgt. Angesichts des in Portugal in neuerer Zeit bezüglich der deutschen
Bestrebungen hervorgetretenen Misstrauens, hält es die Kaiserliche Regierung
einstweilen für untunlich, ihrerseits der portugiesischen Regierung gegenüber
irgendwelches Interesse an der Angelegenheit zu bekunden. Es steht vielm ehr zu
befürchten, dass das Bekanntwerden der Absicht, deutsches Kapital an den Unter­
nehmungen zu beteiligen, dieselben zum Scheitern bringen würde.

Berlin, den 26. Mai 1912.

M IN U T E S .
T he rep ly to Sir E. G osch en’ s t e l[e g r a m ], w hich S ir E. G rey has m eanw hile a p p rov ed
(See 23256 seems to m e to m eet th e case an d cou ld th erefore b e sent off as d ra fted .
Q u [e r y ]. D o so.
D on e
(See X o . 5 A fric a , teleg ram to B erlin , o f J u n e 4. 1 9 l2 .)(2>
E. A. C.
J u n e 3.

W e cou ld h a rd ly h a ve d on e less th a n w e d id i f th e G erm an m e m o r a n d u m ] had been

b efore us.
E . G.
A. X .

(2) [T h e t e x t o f th is teleg ram to B erlin (X o . 5 A fr ic a ) o f J u n e 4, D. 1 p .m ., is as fo llo w s : —

“ A frica . Y ou r despatch X o . 29.
S ir A. H a rd in g e ’ s t e l[e g r a m ] X o . 16 A fr ic a , shows th a t brea kdow n o f n e g otia tion s
w as not du e t c ou r in stru ction s w hich w ere, how ever, as w e believed, in a ccord a n ce w ith
wishes o f G erm an G overnm ent as ex pressed in y o u r teleg ram X o . 2 A fr ic a .” vE-0 367 2S9.
23256/1S41 12 436.)

F o r S ir A. H a r d in g e ’ s telegram , v. in fra , p. 476, X o . 304.]

No. 303.

Mr. H arcourt to Sir Edward G rey.

F.O. 367/289.
22213; 1S41 12/436.
Sir E. Grey, Colonial Office, May 30, 1912.
Of course I never made any such suggestion to von Kuhlmann.O) M y view has
always been that unless and until the Secret Treaty is revised any concession o f a
(!) [cp . supra, pp. 463-6, X o . 295, and n ote (2).]
 476
Chartered C o[m p any] in Angola to what will ultimately be German control is in
derogation of our rights under that Treaty. If Baron Schroeder keeps the control in
British hands till we are satisfied the case is somewhat altered : but supposing the
Secret Treaty was not revised, we cannot compel Schroeder to rem ain in control and
we m ight have to find other British financiers who would buy him out, which w [o u l]d
probably be difficult.
I f the revision of the Secret Treaty is going to be initialled almost immediately
m uch of the difficulty disappears for us and German development of Angola becomes
quite desirable.
But ought we not to arrange that the proposed concessions should not operate
east of parallel 20 which will ultimately become our sphere.
You will not forget that the Germans have promised to give us an undertaking
that on any line under their control through Angola there shall be no differential
rates in favour of German over British goods.
L . H [A E C O U B T ].
30.5.12.

No. 304.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward G rey.{f)

F.O. 3 67'289. Lisbon, May 31, 1912.

2 3 2 5 5 /1 8 4 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 . I). 4 -1 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 16.) Africa. II. 8 p . m .
Your telegram No. 33 of vesterday.(2)
I have made this com m unication to Mr. T ia rk [s], who leaves for London
to-morrow, negotiations with Portuguese Government having broken down, at least
temporarily, owing to differences in Lisbon Cabinet. He will explain situation fully to
Sir E . Crowe on Tuesday next.
I agree with German Governm ent that any suspicion that Germany was interested
(even indirectly) in this Angola scheme might wreck it, and I think that His M ajesty’ s
L egation should have as little official knowledge or responsibility for it as possible.
I have never alluded to it in conversation with Portuguese Ministers.

0 ) [T h is teleg ram w as sent to B erlin (as N o. 4). A cop y was sent to the C olonial Office.]
( 2) [cp . supra, p. 473, N o. 300, m in., and n o te (2).]

No. 305.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G osclienJ1)

P.O. 367/284.
2 5 1 2 2 /3 9 1 /1 2 /1 3 6 .
(No. 57.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, June 4, 1912.
Mr. Harcourt and I saw Count M etternich(2) in m y room at the House of Commons
this afternoon.
Count Metternich had been instructed to go into the question of a revision of the
Anglo-German Secret Agreem ent about Portuguese Colonies. The German Colonial
Secretary would not be able to com e to London for some tim e; and the German
Governm ent thought that, in the meantime, the revision of the Secret Agreement

(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g an d to the C a bin et.]

( 2) [cp. G.P., X X X I , pp. 2 81 -7 .]
 477
might be dealt with by itself, without discussing other territorial questions for the
present.(3)
Mr. Harcourt then explained what we proposed, and Count Metternieh took
notes o f it.
W e proposed that we should have transferred to the side in which we were
interested all the territory of Angola east o f the 20th meridian from the river Cubango
to where the 20th meridian cuts the frontier of the Belgian Congo, near the source of
the Kasai river. On the eastern side of Africa, we proposed that there should be
transferred to the side in which we were interested all the territory of Portuguese
East Africa to the south of a line following the river Lukugu up to the river Lugera,
and then following the latter river and being continued to the southern point of lake
Shirwa. On the other hand, there sh^ ’ ld be transferred to the side in which Germany
was interested the strip, which was at present on our side, across Angola. The island
of Tim or should be omitted from the A greem en t; and we should agree that we would
not acquire interests in >an Thom é and Principé, but leave the field there open to
Germany.
Count Metternieh thought that Tim or should not be dealt with, but that San
Thom é and Principé should be part of the concession to Germany to compensate her
for the concessions of territory asked from her in Portuguese East Africa.
Air. Harcourt pointed out that what was asked from Germany in Portuguese East
Africa and in Angola east o f the 20th meridian did not amount in extent to the strip
which we offered to give up across Angola. It was further pointed out to Count
Metternieh that, not only had the extent of the strip across Angola to be considered,
but also the fact that, by giving up our interest in it, we should give up any chance
of controlling a main railway from the southern Atlantic into the middle o f Africa.
W e held, therefore, that, if San Thom é and Principé came into the agreement, Tim or
should go out.
I also observed to Count Metternieh that, during the negotiations last year asto
Morocco, on every occasion when France contemplated the cession o f territory to
Germany near British interests, she had first asked us whether British interests would
be prejudiced. In every case, we had replied that they would not. But, as France had
consulted us, and as the islands of San Thom é and Principé were as near to French
territory as to German territory, we could not enter into an engagement with Germany
to join her in resisting the intervention of a third Power in these islands, without
consulting France as to whether that would embarrass her interests. Therefore, I saw
difficulty in bringing these islands into Article I of the Secret Convention as
distinguished from the Convention and Secret Note of 189S.(4) W e could, o f course,
disinterest ourselves in the islands; but we could not do more without consulting
France.
Count Alettem ich did not demur to this, and suggested that we m ight ask France
not to make objection: but he requested that we should not do this until he had
communicated with Berlin as to what we had now put before him.
It was made quite clear to Count Metternieh that if we gave up any interest in
the strip across Angola reserved for us in 1S98 there must be perfect equality of
treatment of British and German trade on any railways in Angola.
I am, Ac.
E . G [R E Y ].

(3) [M a r g in a l notes b y S ir E d w a rd G rey and Air. H a rc o u rt : —

“ Air. H a rc o u rt should see th is first and say w hether he has any co r re c tio n s or a d d ition s
to m ake. E. G.
T his is now correct. L. H . 5.6.12.” ]
(*) [v. Gooch ct Temperley, V ol. I, pp. 71-5, N os. 9 0-2, and ends.]
 478

N o. 306.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward G r e y J 1'

F.O. 371/1373.
24 2 1 3 /5 5 6 9 /1 2 /1 8 .
(No. 251.) Secret. Paris, D. June 5, 1912.
S ir;— R . June 7, 1912.
I com m unicated to Monsieur Poincare this afternoon(2) the contents of your
despatch No. 262 Secret (20940/12) o f the 31st ultim o(3) in regard to the relations
between England and Germany and discussion between H is M ajesty’ s Government
and the German Government of territorial arrangements or exchange of territory in
Africa south of the Equator.
M onsieur Poincare observed thereon that you had made a very similar com m uni­
cation to the French Ambassador and he added that if in the course of the discussions
between H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent and the German Government a willingness were
shown to cede Zanzibar to Germany, and it were not carried out owing to French
objections the German Government would feel resentment on that account and would
bear malice to France.
I have, Ac.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .

M IN U T E S

S ir E. G rey.
M a y I suggest th a t it w ould p roba b ly be fou n d con v en ien t in the en d if we cou ld obtain
from M r. H a rc o u rt a sta tem en t show ing precisely w hat has been th e cou rse of any discussions
he m ay have had w ith H e r r v on K ü h lm a n n or C ou n t M ettern ieh w ith reg a rd to Z a n zib a r and
any oth er question to b e com p rised in a fu rth er genera l agreem en t w ith G erm a n y?
T he G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t have a w ay o f re fe rrin g m any years a fter th e ev en t to th in gs
said in m ore or less in form a l conversation s, and a tta ch in g to them an em barrassing m eaning
w hich m ay o r m ay n ot have been in ten d ed a t th e tim e, b u t w hich ca n n ot a fterw a rds be
checked unless a relia b le and com p lete record has been k ep t of ev ery th in g th a t passed.
Y ou m ay rem em ber som e ra th er disa greea ble in cid en ts o f this v ery k in d in form er y e a r s:
th e difficulty fo r in stan ce w hich L ord R osebery en cou n tered in reg a rd to the lease from the
C on g o S ta te o f a strip o f te rr ito ry c o n n e ctin g L ak e T a n g a n y ik a w ith U ga nda , when the
G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t m a in ta in ed th a t this ran cou n ter to som ething said a t th e F oreign
Office on som e p rev iou s occasion o f w hich no record could ev er be fou n d and w hich was
u n d ou b ted ly never u n d erstood h ere to have com m itted H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G [ov ern m en t] in
any way.
S im ila rly som e casual rem ark of th e E m p eror o f R u s sia ’ s was tw isted by th e Germ an
E m p eror in to an en g ag em en t w hich p reclu d ed R ussia from ra isin g any protest a ga in st the
Germ an a n n exa tion o f K ia o-ch a u .
It w ould, I th in k , b e only p ru d en t to sa feg u a rd ourselves a ga in st som e m anœ uvre o f the
sam e kin d b ein g ca rried ou t a t a fu t u r e da te to ou r d isa dv a n tag e, by h a vin g an a u th orita tive,
com p lete and con tem p ora ry record o f w hat passed in con n ex ion w ith th e present in form a l
pou rpa rlers. O ur recen t ex p erien ce in reg a rd to L ord H a ld a n e ’ s discussion at B erlin illu stra tes
the ex p ed ien cy of h a v in g such a record.
P erh a p s I m ay be allow ed to a dd th a t, from a m erely d ep artm en tal p o in t o f view also, it
w ould be o f real adv an ta g e, in d ea lin g w ith cu rren t corresp on d en ce w ith B erlin , P aris, L isbon,
a nd the C olon ia l Office, if th e F o re ig n Office w ere in a position to know how the q uestion of
these G erm an n eg otia tion s stands from tim e to tim e.
E . A. C.
J u n e 8.

(*) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e M inister.
A cop y was sent to B erlin on O ctob er 29, w ith cop ies also o f S ir F . B e r tie ’ s despatch (N o. 211)
o f M a y 16 (v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 753-4, N o. 585) and of S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s
despa tch (N o 262) o f M a v 31. v. in fra , n o te (3).]
(2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3™ S er., V ol. I l l , pp. 9 0-1, No. 71.]
(3) [n. G ooch cfc T em p erley, V ol. V I , p. 756, N o. 589.]
 479
W e have now g ot a record of w hat has been discussed resp ectin g revision o f the secret
a greem ent o f 1893 abou t P ortu g u ese C olon ies(4) an d I w ill ask M r. H a rc o u rt fo r a m em o­
r a n d u m ] o f a n y th in g else th a t m ay have been discussed in form a lly ou tside this.
E . G.
17.6.12.

(4) [c p . su p ra, pp. 440-3, N o. 2 76 ; p. 474, N o. 3 0 1 ; cp. also in fra , pp . 480-1, N o. 309.]

X o. 307.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir A. IIardinge.(l)

F.O. 367 284.
24219'391 ¡ * '4 3 6 .
Tel. (Xo. 31.) Africa. Secret. Foreign Office, June 7, 1912, 7 -3 0 a . m .
As secret Anglo-G erm an Agreement about Portuguese Colonies is now being
discussed with German Government and question of bringing San Thom e and Principe
into it has been raised you should give no further support as regards British
concessions in these islands without fresh instructions.
You should also not give support to any project for a loan to Portugal of any kind
at present.

0 ) (T h is teleg ram was rep eated to B erlin (N o. 53 A fric a ). A pa ra ph ra se was sent t o the
C olonial O ffice.]

Xo. 3(J8.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen J1)

F.O. 367 284.
251 3 3 '3 9 1/12 , 436.
(Xo. 58.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, F oreign Office, June 10, 1912.
Count Metternich inform ed Mr. Harcourt and me to-d ay(2) that the German
Foreign Office and Colonial Office were discussing the proposed revision of the Anglo-
German Agreem ent. They felt that German public opinion would be very sensitive at
the large concession made by Germany in giving up T im o r: and that, if Tim or was to
be given up, the part of Angola east o f the 20th meridian ought to be regarded as
sufficient set-oif for the strip which we were to give up across Angola and the islands
of San Thom e and Principe, and that Germ any ought not to be asked to give up the
Quilimane piece on the east.
W e urged that the section asked for in East Africa to include Quilimane, and the
part of Angola east of the 20th meridian, were not both together as large in area as
the strip across Angola which we would give up. W e repeated the arguments as to
the value of this strip, and as to the criticisms to which we should be exposed for
giving up our one means of access for the shortest route from Europe to the middle of
Africa. W e also pointed out that, though Germany might drop Tim or out of the
Agreement, we could not obtain the island; and, though we could renounce any
interest in San Thome and Principe without saying anything to any one, we could not
undertake to keep any third Power, i .e .: France, out of them, without first com m uni­
cating with the French Government. It was not a matter of being very sensitive

( ’ ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to the C a b in et.]

( 2) [ cp. G.P., X X X I , p. 289.]
 480

about French opinion, it was a question of treating France in the same way as she
had treated us during the negotiations as to M orocco last year.
The proposed revision of the Agreem ent was therefore left to await the
consideration which the German Foreign Office and Colonial Office are giving to it.
[1 am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

No. 309.

Lord Gladstone to Mr. H a rcourt.lh

F.O. 367/284.
262 0 3 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .
Tel. June 13, 1912.
Private and Personal. V ery Secret June 13th. E. 8 -45 p . m .
Yours of May 29th.( 2) I have consulted General Botha under obligation of the
strictest secrecy. H e has written to me two letters, copies of which accom pany m y
letter Private and Personal of yesterday.(3)
As regards revision of Secret Treaty of 1898 he asks me to convey his apprecia­
tion of the course adopted by you. He is grateful to note that the principle of
consulting Self-governing dominions in regard to negociating treaties, which may
directly affect their interests has been followed. H e considers proposals for revised
treaty would constitute an improvem ent on the present Secret Treaty and he trusts
that the negotiations will be successful. H e adds that you are correct in thinking that
South Africa will be much gratified to learn when the time comes that the future of
Delegoa B ay and Beira is assured to the Empire.
H is attitude on the further suggestions is as follows—

After careful consideration of suggestion as to eventual surrender of Seal and

Penguin Islands to Germany, he has no hesitation in saying that it would be quite
impossible for any Governm ent of the Union to assent to such a proposal without
creating the gravest dissatisfaction in this country. From the strategical point of
view he says Luderitz Bucht is a splendid harbour, which could shelter the whole of
the German fleet and be made absolutely safe from attack if Germ any could fortify
those islands. Such a strong naval base in the vicinity of the U nion would be a
source of imm ense danger to the Union. In the event of war we could not hope
successfully to defend the islands against German a ttack; but so long as they remain
British Germany would be unable in time of peace to establish fortifications essential
for safety of harbour. Retention of islands is therefore of the greatest importance
and even if their surrender were the only concession demanded in exchange for
Caprivi Zipfel east of parallel 21, which is a com paratively unimportant strip of
country, the bargain in General B oth a’ s opinion would be a very one-sided affair, in
which Germany would receive the L io n ’ s share. H e adds that the further concession
in regard to the Orange River Boundary would also not be inconsiderable. Unless
therefore Union could gain much more considerable advantages in other directions
by concessions in exchange, he is certain that it would not be possible for his or any
other Government of the Union to concur in cession of those islands.

Similar considerations apply in regard to second suggestion nam ely as to Walfish

Bay. Strategic value to Germany o f W alfish B ay is much greater than the economic
value to Great Britain of the strip o f country offered in exchange.

0 ) [A cop y o f th is teleg ram was com m u n ica ted to the F o re ig n Office by th e C olon ia l Office
on J u n e 17, 1912.]
( 2) [v. supra, p. 474, N o. 301.]
( 3) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 481

H e ends by saying that his Government is anxious to do what it can to assist

Im perial Governm ent in bringing the negotiations with Germany to a conclusion
satisfactorv to Em pire and also to the Union.
GLA D STO N E .

No. 310.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. W inston Churchill.

Private. O'
Dear Churchill. Foreign Office, June lS l 191*2.
You will remember that, early in the year, I asked the opinion of the Admiralty
from the strategic point of n e w about certain proposals which we might put before
the German Government. The matter has now taken a more limited but more
concrete shape.
W e propose to abandon our reversion to the strip in Angola specified in the 1898
Treaty. In return, we propose that we should have the rev rsion of all that part of
Portuguese W est Africa that lies east of meridian *20 from the Lubengo Kiver on the
south to the point where meridian *20 touches the boundary of the Belgian Congo near
the source of the Kasai river. In addition, the British reversion in Portuguese East
Africa would be extended northwards from the Zam besi, as indicated in the present
Treaty, to a line following the Lukuga river from the coast to its junction with the
Lugera river, then up the Lugera to its source, and thence to the southern end of
Lake Shirwa. Germany is to give up her reversion of the Portuguese part of the
island of Tim or, leaving the Dutch with an undisputed right of pre-em ption to the
island: and we are to renounce any ir.rcrest in the reversion o f the islands of San
Thorne and Principé.
I do not think that there is any thing in all this that raises any strategic point
which the Adm iralty did not consider earlier in the y e a r ; but I think that the matter
might now be finally considered.
W ill you please let us have an answer as soon as possible?
[Yours, Ac.
u E. G R E Y .]
(>) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 45.]

No. 311.

Sir Edicard G rey to Colonel Seely.

Privat e.(M
M y dear Seely, Foreign Office. June 18, 191*2.
The following modifications of the Secret Treaty of lo9S with G erm any,!2> about
the Portuguese African Colonies, are contemplated :
W e propose to abandon our reversion to the strip in Angola specified in the ISPS
Treaty. In return, we propose that we should have the reversion of all that part of
Portuguese W est Africa that lies east of meridian *20 from the Lubengo river on the
south to-the point where meridian *20 touches the boundary of the Belgian Congo near
the source o f the Kasai river. In addition, the British reversion in Portuguese East
Africa would be extended northwards from the Zam besi, as indicated in the present
Treaty, to a line following the Lukuga river from the coast to its junction with the
Lugera river, then up the Lugera to its source, and thence to the southern end of

(») [G rey M S S ., V o l. 63.]

( 2) [r . G ooch d T em p erley, V o l. I, pp. 73-5, X os. 9 1-2, e n d s .]
[10900] 2 I
 482

Lake Shirwa. Germany is to give up her reversion of the Portuguese part of the
island of Timor, leaving the Dutch tfith an undisputed right of pre-em ption to the
isla n d ; and we are to renounce any interest in the reversion of the islands of San
Thome and Principe.
There is one point in this which the W ar Office should consider; in giving up
the strip across Angola, we are giving up the possibility of controlling direct railway
com m unication from the Atlantic to the middle of Africa.
Personally, I do not think that this point is of importance. I cannot believe that
we would ever make a railway through this strip, with German territory on each side
of u s ; especially as the Benguella Railway is already under construction, and
considerably advanced, and is in the part to which Germany has the reversion in
any case. W e shall never acquire so much of the Belgian Congo as to enable us to
control railway communication direct from the west to the east of Africa. Assuming
that the Union Government of South Africa are satisfied with the proposals now made,
I cannot see why we should oppose them on Imperial or strategic grounds.
I think, however, that the matter ought not to be finally concluded without
having been before you and your m ilitary advisers. W e wish to get on with the
matter as soon as possible, and would therefore like to have an answer as soon as you
can get it.
[Yours, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]

No. 312.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. Goachen.O)

F.O. 367'284.
28649/391 '1 2 /4 3 6 .
(No. 70.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.
The German Ambassador(2) said to-day that he had been reading the papers about
the Anglo-German Agreement as to Portuguese Colonies, and he saw that the question
was not a purely academic one. As things were at present, we should be bound to
support any British subject who wished to have a railway or other concession in the
strip across Angola. He thought, therefore, that it would be a good thing to go on
with the re-arrangement of the Agreem ent. Some exchanges of territory were
p roposed; they would require consideration in detail, and he supposed that I should
have to discuss them with Mr. ITarcourt. He saw that his Government had been
opposed to the idea of com m unicating the Agreement, when completed, to the
Portuguese Government. He thought that they were wrong in this, as no progress
could be made until it had been communicated. H e also saw that I had suggested
that, in com m unicating the Agreem ent, we might give a joint guarantee of Portuguese
sovereignty. H e thought that this might be rather too formal a matter. He quite
agreed that the Portuguese Colonies, though they were at present economically
derelict, could not remain always in this condition and should be developed, and that
this would be in the best interests of Portugal and would not necessarily conflict with
the obligations of our Alliance or with Portuguese sovereignty.
I said that I had not contemplated anything necessarily so formal as a signed
guarantee of Portuguese sovereignty by Germany and Great Britain, but I had
thought that when we communicated the Agreement to the Portuguese Government
( ’ ) [T his despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and to the Cabinet. A
priv a te letter from S ir E d w a rd G rey t o S ir E. Goschen re fe rrin g to the same con v ersation is
prin ted in Gooch <f: T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 759-60, No. 593.]
( 2) [i.e., B a ron M arschall von B ieberstein, who had presented his letters o f credence on
J u n e 24. H is first con versation w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey — on J u n e 25— is record ed in G oorh &
T em p erley, Vol. V I, pp. 757-8, No. 5 91 ; cp. also (I P., X X X I , p. 239. R eferen ce was m ade in
this con v ersation to the question o f the P ortu g u ese C olonies.]
 483

we might point out that neither Germany nor Great Britain had any designs upon
Portuguese sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the development of the Portuguese
Colonies was in the best interests of Portugal. H er financial position would oblige
her to m ortgage her Colonies by raising m oney on the security of th e m ; sooner or
later there would be a revolution in Lourenzo Marques if the Colonies were not
developed; and from this danger to her sovereignty she would be saved by the
com m ercial development of her Colonies. It was a somewhat invidious thing to make
any Agreem ent of this sort about the Colonies of another cou ntry; but, as this
Agreement had been made 14 years ago, I thought it was clearly the best thing to
revise it and communicate it to the Portuguese Government when revised.
The Ambassador observed that it would be necessary to communicate the original
as well as the revised Agreement.
I said that this certainly would have to be done.
I added that, whenever he wished to discuss the details of the revision, I would
ask Mr. Harcourt to come, in order that we might have the discussion a trois.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 313.

Colonel Seely to Sir Edward Grey.

Private. ( l)
My dear Grey, li ar Office, July 4, 1912.
In reply to your private note of the 18th instantf2) regarding the Secret Treaty of
1898 with Germany, I do not think it is possible for us to give a considered opinion,
without being in possession of the Secret Treaty and of the views of the Admiralty.
It is, however, gathered that, in accordance with the terms of the old Treaty, we
were, in any case, to have the reversion of such territory in Portuguese East Africa
as would give us access to the sea from Nyasaland, and therefore the extension of
the British reversion northwards to the line indicated in the present Treaty would not
seem of great material advantage to us.
On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that in years to com e the ability to
secure com m unication with the sea from Ilhodesia through Portuguese W est Africa
may prove of considerable importance to us. In this connection, I would draw
attention to the great disadvantage under which we laboured during the late South
African W ar, owing to our being unable to make use of the line of com m unication
from Lourenco Marques, which port it is believed we had, at one time, an opportunity
of acquiring on favourable terms.
W orking on the inform ation now at our disposal, and regarding the question from
the military point of view, we are therefore opposed to the contemplated modification
of the Treaty.
Yours sincerely,
JOHN B E R N A R D S E E L Y .

(*) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 63. T his letter is en d orsed as h a vin g been sent to M r. H a rc o u rt.]
(2) [a. supra, pp. 481-2, N o. 311.]

[E D . N O T E . - On J u ly 10, 1912, H e r r von K u h lm a n n w rote a p r iv a te letter to M r. T yrrell

co n ta in in g the follow in g q u e stio n : “ C ould y ou kin dly let me know , if a p a rt from this
A rb itra tion T rea ty o f 1904 any T rea ty or C on v en tion con firm in g the old A llian ce T rea ty was
[10900] 2 1 2
 484
sign ed betw een E ngland and P o rtu g a l a f t e r th e p u blica tion in 1398.” (F .O . 3 67/284. 29512/
3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 .) T he m inu tes on this note are o f som e in terest and are th erefore rep rod u ced in
fu ll: —
M IN U T E S .
S ir A. N icolson. F o reig n O ffice, J u ly 17, 1912.
A fte r ta lk in g this ov er w ith S ir W . L an g ley I should p refer, if y ou a p p rov e, to leave this
en q u iry unansw ered. I f H e r r von K iih lm a n n returns to th e ch arge, I can answ er him by
re fe rrin g him to th e M a rch con v ersation , [r . supra, p. 452, N o. 233.]
W . T.

T he T rea ty o f 1899 w hich is secret confirm ed the a n cien t trea ties and p rov id ed fo r the
frien d ly a ttitu d e o f P o rtu g a l d u rin g th e S [o u t h ] A fric a n W a r.
I t has been in con tem p la tion to pu blish it, if and w hen, the agreem ents w ith G erm any are
pu blish ed and w e so in form ed S ir A . H a rd in g e the oth er day when he to ld us th a t S [e n h o ]r
V a scon cellos was pressing fo r its p u blica tion now (S ir A. H a rd in g e erron eou sly calls it the
tre a ty of W in d s o r : the trea ty o f 1904 w hich is pu blic is really th e T rea ty o f W in d sor). The
P ortu g u ese w ould no dou bt consent to publish the tre a ty o f 1899 any day b u t w e cou ld n ot well
tell H e r r v [ o n ] K iihlm a nn abou t it w ith ou t asking them .
P erh a p s the best answ er is to re fe r to the con v ersation w ith C [ o u n ]t M ettern ich of
M arch 18— b u t the question is n ot a p rop er one to ask.
J. A . C T.
11.7.12.

W e cou ld tell H e r r v [o n ] K iihlm a nn th a t the T rea ties m en tion ed in his letter are the only
pu blished T reaties. T his w ill in d ica te th a t there is a secret T rea ty, b u t there w ould be no
g rea t harm in th a t as the P ortu g u ese are ready to pu blish it and we are con tem p la tin g d oin g
so if th e agreem ents w ith G erm any a re published.
W . L.

I a gree w ith M r. T illey. I suppose it is n ot fo r g o tte n th a t the 1661 T rea ty confirm ed in

1399 was b ila tera l in so fa r as w e a greed to p rotect P o rtu g a l in retu rn fo r B om b ay b ein g
g iv en to us. As w e have received and en joyed ou r p a rt o f the b a rg a in w c ca n n ot back out of
a llow in g P o rtu g a l to profit by her part.
A. X .
E. G.

On th e sub ject of th e in accu ra cy o f th e term “ T rea ty of W i n d s o r ” as a p p lied to the A n g lo-

P ortu g u ese D eclaration of 1899, v. G ooch & T em p erlcy, V ol. V I I I , p. 49, Ed. N o t e .]

No. 314.

Sir Edward G rey to Lord Granville.(*)

F.O. 367 284.
8 0 8 2 8 /3 9 1/12 /4 8 6 .
(No. 75.) Africa. Secret.
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.
Mr. Ilarcourt and I had a conversation with the German Ambassador to-day(2) on
the subject of the Anglo-G crm an Agreem ent about Portuguese Colonies.
The Ambassador emphasised the criticism to which Germany would be exposed :
it was alleged that there was sleeping sickness in the Angola strip which we were to
resign in favour of Germany, while there was much rubber in the part of Angola
that Germany was to resign in our favour; in Quilimane, where Germany was to
resign her interest, there was a very good labour supply; and Germany would be
attacked for giving up Timor. He asked why we would not include San Thom e and
Principe in the part of the Agreem ent that would bind us to help Germany in
excluding third Powers from certain districts.
In reply to the last point, we said that we did not wish to extend that obligation
of the Secret Agreement to any territory not originally included in it. In addition to
this, San Thom e and Principe lay far away from the region in Africa dealt wTith by

( ’ ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the C a bin et on J u ly 23, 1912.]

(2) [,cp. G.P ., X X X I , pp. 294-300.]
 4S5

the existing Agreement, and were in fact just as near to French territory as to
German territory, and remote from our territory.
W e then emphasised the attacks which would be made upon us for giving up the
Angola strip, and pointed out again that the area of that strip was greater than the
total area which Germany was being asked to resign in our favour in compensation
for the strip, to say nothing of the fact that it cut us off from the control of any
direct com m unication with the Atlantic.
The Ambassador haring said that tiiere would be an outcry in Germ any at the
sacrifice of Tim or in our favour, we said that it would be quite possible for us to enter
into a self-denying ordinance about Tim or, and to make it appear that, Germany and
ourselves haring becom e aware of the Dutch right of pre-em ption, had mutually
entered into a self-denying ordinance, s > that we gained nothing there of what
Germany resigned.
The Ambassador seemed to be favourably impressed by this.
nI am, A c.l
E. G [E E 1'J .

No. 315.

■Sir Edward d r ey to Lord G ranville.(‘

F.O. 3 6 7 '2S4.
31120 391 12 436.
(No. 76. Africa. Secret.
M y Lord, Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.
In discussing the Anglo-G erm an Agreement about Portuguese Colonies to-day,
the German Ambassador laid great strv ss on the fact that, owing to our Alliance with
Portugal, the Agreement was one-sided. It was open to us, under our Alliance with
Portugal, to initiate and come to arrangements with Portugal about her Colonie.'. On
the other hand, if Germany made any proposals to Portugal, or took any steps, the
Portuguese could appeal to the Alliance, and bring us in against Germany, i he rtale
of the Portuguese Colon: s was very bad : they were derelict. That they should

(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g beer, sent to th e C a bin et on J u ly 24, 1912. tog eth er
w ith th e follow in g m in u te by s . r E d w a rd G r e y : —

I wish to cal! th e a tten tion oí the C abin et to the a ccom p a n y in g re co rd o f a

con v ersa tion w ith the G erm an A m bassador.
I feel th a t th e e x istin g co n d itio n o f a ffa irs is v e ry u n sa tisfa ctory . T he a d m in istration
o f th e P ortu g u ese Colonies is hopelessly bad . T he ‘ pra zo ’ system in P o rtu g u e se East
A fric a is a b om in a b le; and the scandals o f P o rtu g u e se a d m in istra tion are such th a t p u b lic
o p in io n w ou ld h a rd ly su p p ort us in p r o te ctin g th e state o f th in gs th a t now ex ists in the
P ortu g u ese Colonies.
W e h a ve la tely had a case, th a t o f C a p ta in Cam pbell, w here a B ritish su b ject has, we
believe, g re a t cause o f com p la in t o f th e w ay in w hich he has been trea ted . In fa ct we
m ay som e day ha ve to ta k e in ha n d som e cases o f in ju stice, an d deal w ith th e P ortu g u ese
G overn m en t som ew hat drastically.
A sim ilar case m ig h t easily arise in co n n ection w ith a G erm an subject, and th en under
the A llia n ce P o rtu g a l w ou ld a p p ea l to us fo r p rotection , i f G erm any took stn u g nnsures.
T he p osition is v ery u n com forta ble, if not in h eren tly false, and I m ust ask th e C a bin et
to con sid er it.
It is tru e th a t it w ould be sham eful to throw ov er th e P ortu g u ese A llia n ce in ord er
to fa cilita te a d iv ision o f h er A fr ic a n colon ies betw een G erm any and ourselves. I t is also
tru e th a t it w ou ld be m ora lly in defen sib le t o p r o te ct th e scandalous sta te o f th in g s th a t
exists in th e P ortu g u ese C olonies, b u t the A llia n ce g ives us no d iscretion in this m a tter

F o reig n Office, E. G.
17 J u ly, 1912 ]
 48G

continue in such a state was intolerable to England and Germany, who were
neighbours in our Colonies to the Portuguese Colonies. W e, as neighbours, and in
view of our Alliance, could call the Portuguese to account, and insist upon the
development of their C olonies; while Germany could not take any corresponding step
on her own initiative without finding the Alliance against her.
W e admitted the force of this point, and said that it was inherent in the
Agreement of 1898. If the Ambassador chose to press it as a defect in that
Agreement which must be considered if the Agreement wTas to be revised, we could not
say that his request was unfair. It was, however, a point on which I could not say
anything without full consideration, and it must be brought before the Cabinet. Had
our Portuguese Alliance been, like modern Alliances, renewable at fixed intervals,—
as wras the case with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and, I believed, with the Triple
Alliance,— we could of course have dealt with the point whenever our Alliance with
Portugal came up for renewal. But, at present, there was no such provision in the
Anglo-Portnguese Alliance.
TI a m ,'A c.]
‘ E. G [R E Y ].

No. 316.

Mr. Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey.

Private, f 1)
My dear Grey, Admiralty, July 17, 1912.
I referred your letter of June 18th(2) on the subject of proposals which might be
put before the German Governm ent, to the W ar Staff, and I now send you a
Memorandum in which I concur, as do the First and Second Sea Lords.
Yours verv sincerely,
W INSTON S. C H U R C H ILL .

Enclosure in No. 316.

Portuguese IFcsf and East African Possessions.

Most Secret.
Sir Edward Grey in his letter of 18th June, after outlining the new7basis of
negotiation with Germany in W est and East Africa, writes :
“ I do not think there is anything in all this that raises any strategic point
which the Admiralty did not consider earlier in the year.”

There is, however, a new feature.

Under the 1898 Treaty, we reserved a strip of territory in Portuguese West Africa
wThich gave Northern Rhodesia a natural outlet to the s e a ; this is not in itself a naval
question except in so far as in the distant future a new British trade route would
probably have been established; but that Treaty also reserved for Great Britain the
port of S. Paul de Loanda.

(*) fG rev M SS ., V ol. 48. T his letter is end orsed as h a vin g been sent t o M r. H a rcou rt. A
n ote was in serted by him as fo llo w s: —

“ T his is on the w hole sa tisfa ctory .

T he A d m ira lty do not realise th a t L o b ito B a y w [o u l]d g o to G erm any und er the
presen t T reatv. A nv dispersion o f th e G erm an fleet w fo u lld be a g rea t advantage. L. H.
22.7.12.” ]
( 2) [v. supra, p. 481, N o. 310.]
 4S7

The abandonment of this port will doubtless have an indirect effect upon our
disposition of naval forces if the new Treaty becomes operative.
The trade route from Cape Town to Great Britain upon which a trade of
approximately a hundred millions sterling per annum passes will, under the new
Treaty, be flanked as to 2.500 miles of its length by a coastline distant from it from
400 to G50 miles and occupied by a great naval Power.
Under the Treaty of 1898, with S. Paul de Loanda in our possession, we should
have been in a favourable position to watch and to neutralise the action of any force
operating from the other ports upon the coast.
It is certain that one or more of these ports will be developed if they pass into
the possession of Germany.
They are as follows :—
1. Great Fish Bay, the southernmost, a fine harbour 19 miles in length, arid
5 miles in width of navigable waters, easily defended and a good climate.
2. Messamedes, a fair harbour— an important place and a good climate.
3. Benguella, a roadstead, not capable of great development.
4. Lobito Bay, about 15 miles to north of Benguella and 600 miles from the
trade route. A fine harbour enclosing two miles of excellent anchorage. A
railway centre, and would undoubtedly be developed into a naval station.
5. San Paul de Loanda. Good anchorage of 1^ miles, perfectly sheltered, bad
climate. At present the Portuguese seat of Government.

The effect upon our naval policy of the fulfilment of this new Treaty would be
that we should be obliged to make such additions to our Cape of Good H ope Squadron
and West Africa Squadron, as would make us superior to any force Germ any would
station in those waters, and thus ensure the safety of our com m erce upon this route.
Had S. Paul de Loanda remained a possible British possession, the watching of
hostile ships in the adjacent ports would, as stated above, have been more sim ply and
effectively carried out.
Under the new conditions, our bases of operation will be the Cape of Good Hope,
Sierra L eone, St. Helena, and Ascension.
It is, however, reasonable to refer to the other point of view.
The acquisition by Germany of these territories will no doubt result in the
establishment of lines of German steamers which to reach Germany must pass over
routes in proxim ity to our naval stations.
Ships of war detached from Germany to distant stations can only be em ployed
upon a service that it is unlikely will vitally affect Great Britain in war. They will
in fact be rem oved from the vital theatre.
As extraneous interests .grow, so does national diplom acy becom e m ore cautious
and more accom m odating to new neighbours, and any threat to our seaborne
com m erce that may ensue from the possession by Germany of the harbours of
Portuguese West Africa may perchance be balanced against the fact that their
African land frontiers will march with our own for m any more miles than at present
and be vulnerable to attack or invasion by our South African Colonial forces.
It would therefore seem that the only effect upon naval policy of the proposed
new Treaty will be a future augmentation of our squadrons at the Cape and Sierra
Leone proportional to whatever the Germans decide to keep upon the station, and
possibly increased fortifications and garrisons at those places, neither of which
contingency is in itself very serious or important.
The change in East Africa does not appear to affect our naval policy in any way.
 48 8

N o. 317.

Sir Edward G rey to Lord Granville .( ')

F.O. 367/284.
32861 '3 9 1 '1 2 /4 3 6 .
(No. 82.'' Africa. Secret.
M y Lord, Foreign Office, August 1. 1912.
The German Ambassador had an interview with Mr. Harcourt and myself to-day,
in which he referred again to the one-sided character in practice of the Secret
Agreement about the Portuguese Colonies, owing to the fact that our Alliance with
Portugal bound us to prevent any interference with those Colonies. H e suggested that
there might be some declaration or understanding that, if Great Britain found it
necessary to occupy any part of, or assert rights to protect her interests in, a
Portuguese Colony com ing under the Secret Agreem ent within the British sphere of
interest, then Germany should be entitled, if similar circumstances occurred, to take
similar steps in any part of a Portuguese Colony that was in her sphere of interest.
W e said that, “ prima facie,” we saw no objection to such an understanding, but
would consider it.
The Ambassador also referred again to bringing San Thom e and Principe into the
Agreement.
W e again said that what we proposed was, not to undertake any responsibilities
with regard to those Islands, but sim ply to disinterest ourselves, not to put forward
a claim in any eventualities to the Islands ourselves, and not to support further
British concessions there.
The Ambassador said that he proposed to go away on Monday, the 5th instant;
and it was agreed that we would resume the discussion in October.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to th e C a bin et on
A u g u st 8, 1912.]

I E D . N O T E .— T he first record s o f con v ersation s on th is question in th e B ritish F oreig n

Office a rchives a fter the in terv al foresha dow ed in th e im m ed ia tely p reced in g docum ent are
g iv en below. H err von K lihlm a nn, how ever, had som e corresp on den ce w ith H e r r v on Bethm ann
H ollw eg and H err von K id e rle n -W a ch te r on the sub ject in O ctober, v. (l . P ., X X X I , pp. 302-5.
B a ron von M arschall died on S eptem ber 24 and his successor, P rin ce L ich n ow skv, rep orted his
first con v ersation on N ovem b er 20. cp. G .E., X X X V I I (I), pp. 9-11, and S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s
re p o rt in th e im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docum ent. H e r r v on K u h lm a n n rep orted conversation s
w ith M r. H a rc o u rt on O ctober 31, and w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey and M r. H a rc o u rt on N ovem b er 13.
v. G .E., X X X V I I (1), pp. 3 -4 . 7-9. N o corresp on d in g B ritish record o f these con versation s has
been tra ced .]

No. 318.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. Goschen.G)

F.O. 367/284.
5 0 8 0 6 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
(No. 145.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, N ovem ber 21, 1912.
The German Ambassador inform ed me to-day that, after his conversation with
Mr. Harcourt and m yself yesterday, respecting the revision of the Secret Treaty of
1898, he had communicated to his Governm ent what we had proposed, and he had

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C abinet on

N ov em b er 29, 1912.]
 489

suggested that it should be accepted. He had said that we attached importance to the
favourable effect which an Agreement might have on public opinion, and that this
could not be obtained without publication. H e added that he hoped that we would
let him have a draft as soon as possible, as he was returning to Germany at the end
of next week.
I said that Mr. Harcourt and I had already given instructions as to the prepara­
tion of a draft, and I thought that we should be able to let him have it to take with
him on his return to Berlin.
In the conversation yesterday Mr. Harcourt had explained to the Ambassador
verbally what we proposed and as the proposals made will be embodied in the draft
agreem ent/2) I have made no separate record of the conversation. The draft itself
will be the most accurate and complete record.
I am, Ac.
E. GR E Y.
(2) [i\ im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 319.

Draft Text of R evised Anglo-G erm an C onvention.I1)

F.O. 367/284.
53544^391 12'436. Colonial Office, D ecem ber 9, 1912.
In view of the possibility that Portugal m ay require financial assistance from
some foreign power or powers and in order to obviate the international complications
which such a condition of things m ay produce and to preserve her integrity and
independence, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective sovereigns, have
agreed as follows :—
1. W henever either the British or the German governm ent is of opinion that it
is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of m oney to Portugal on the
security of the customs revenue or other revenues o f Mozambique or Angola it shall
com m unicate the fact to the other governm ent and the other governm ent shall have
the right to advance a portion of the total sum required.
In the event of the other governm ent signifying its intention to exercise this
right, the two governm ents shall consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these
loans shall be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique or Angola
as near as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible the same
proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues respectively assigned
as their security.
The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition of
the m oney market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects be
subject as near as possible to similar conditions.
2. Of the customs revenues referred to in Article I. those of the province of
Mozambique south o f a line starting from the mouth of the river Lukugu or
Likungo thence along that river to its confluence with the river Lugera or Luzhella
thence along that river to its source, thence due north to the 16th parallel of south
latitude and thence along that parallel to the boundary of the British Protectorate of
Nyassaland and those of the portions of the province of Angola, as hereinafter
described, shall be assigned to the British loan. The customs revenues of the
rem aining parts of the provinces of Mozambique and Angola shall be assigned to the
German loan.
The portion of the province of Angola of which the customs revenues shall be
assigned to the British loan shall be all that part of the province lying to the east of
the 20th meridian of east longitude and south of the 11th parallel of south latitude.

0 ) [C om m u n ica ted by the C olon ia l Office on D ecem b er 9, 1912.]

 49 0

3. Any delegates sent by Great Britain or Germany to take note of the collection
o f the revenues which are the security for their respective loans shall have only rights
of inspection, but no rights of administration, interference or control, so long as there
is no default in the payment of interest or sinking fund.
4. In case of default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either
loan, the administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces shall be
handed over by Portugal ; those assigned for the German loan to Germany, those
assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5. It is well understood that all rights, whether British or German, acquired in
the provinces affected before the date of this convention, shall be fully safeguarded
provided they are of a purely private character, and convey neither political rights nor
territorial or administrative jurisdiction.
It is also understood that no influence will be used in the future either by the
British or the German Governm ents to obtain fresh concessions except in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their
respective loans.
G. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall come into force immediately
after the exchange of ratifications.

In witness, Ac.

S ecret Convention.
W hereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding convention of this day’ s
date, it may unfortunately not be found possible to maintain the integrity of the
African possessions of Portugal south of the equator, the undersigned duly authorised
by their respective sovereigns have further agreed as follows :
1. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the intervention of any
third power in the provinces of Mozambique and Angola, either by way of loan to
Portugal on the security of the revenue of those provinces or by way of acquisition
of territory, by grant, cession, purchase, lease or otherwise.
2. It is understood that, from the conclusion of the conventions of this day’ s
date, Great Britain will abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the
possession, occupation, control or exercise of political influence in or over those
portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues have been
assigned to Germany, and that Germ any will in like manner abstain from advancing
any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control or exercise of
political influence in or over those portions of those Portuguese provinces in which the
customs revenues have been assigned to Great Britain.
3. In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights over Mozambique and Angola,
or loses these territories in any other manner, it is understood that the subjects of,
and natives of the Protectorates of, one contracting party, together with their goods
and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures of its dominions, possessions,
colonies and Protectorates, shall, in such portions of the territories comprised in the
present convention as may fall to the other contracting party, participate in all the
prerogatives, exemptions and privileges with regard to railway rates and charges,
trade, com m erce, taxation and navigation which are there enjoyed by the subjects of
and natives of the Protectorates of the other contracting party.
4. W ith regard to the Yth article of the convention of to-day’ s date, which refers
to private rights of British or German subjects in the provinces of Mozambique and
Angola it is well understood between the two governm ents that this article applies,
among others, to the so-called Katembe concession, and further that the government
o f Great Britain will adopt a friendly attitude in respect to the confirmation of this
concession by the Portuguese governm ent in case such a confirmation should be
applied for.
 491

5. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall come into force imm ediately
after the exchange of ratifications.
In witness, &c.

Secret Note.
In case either government applies for special privileges of an occasional character
it shall immediately inform the other governm ent and if these privileges are granted
and if the other governm ent should desire it shall use its influence to obtain for the
other governm ent similar special privileges of an occasional character and of equal
value.
M IN U T E S .

D r a ft C on v en tion s to re p la ce those o f 1898.

T he new C olonia l Office d r a ft follow s, in gen era l, the line o f th eir previou s d r a ft (23909),( 2)
b u t w ith som e n ota ble d e p a r t u r e s :
T ogeth er w ith T im or, all m ention o f the islands o f San T om é and P rin c ip e has disa pp eared.
I con clu d e th a t the self-d en y in g ord in a n ce to w hich I und ersta n d E n g la n d and G erm any are
to set th e ir ha n d as reg a rd s the 3 islands, w ill be em b odied in a fu r th e r and su p plem en tary
con v en tion . I t w ill presum ably b e necessary to h a ve such su p plem en tary con v en tion rea dy at
the sam e tim e as the others, and to publish them all sim ultaneously.
T he p resen t d r a ft rem ains open to th e tw o ob jection s to w hich T ca lled a tten tion in m y
m in u te on 2 3 9 0 9 : (1) T here is no p rov ision fo r th e a broga tion o f the con v en tion s o f 1898, so
tha t, on the sign a tu re o f the new con v en tion s, b oth the old and the new w ould be in force. It
w ill be necessary eith er to have an a b rog a torv clause in each o f the new con v en tion s and in the
secret N ote, or to have a fu rth er and sep arate in stru m en t sign ed, p r o v id in g fo r the a b rog a tion
o f the th ree in stru m en ts o f 1898.
(2) T here rem ains th e difficulty o f the custom s revenue o f th e strip o f h in terla n d of
A n g ola w hich a cco r d in g to a rticle 2 o f th e new con v en tion is to b e a ssigned to a B ritish loan.
A s I p oin ted ou t in 23909, there is, for p ra c tic a l purposes, no such revenue to pledge.
T he m a ch in ery und er the form er con v en tion s con tem p la ted (a rt 1) the issue o f B ritish and
G erm an loans on th e secu rity o f the custom s revenues o f eith er A ngola or M oza m b iq u e, it
b ein g a ch a ra cteris tic o f the tra n sa ction th a t in both A n g ola and M oza m b iq u e th ere w ere to
be B ritish a n d G erm an spheres, each h a v in g sea ports w here custom s a rc collected.
In p r a ctice, th e p roced u re w ou ld have been as fo llo w s : P o rtu g a l b ein g desirous o f ra isin g
a loan secured on th e revenues o f A n g ola , E n g la n d and G erm any w ou ld in form P o r t u g a l th a t
there m ust b e tw o loans, E nglish and G erm an, “ b ea rin g as near as possible the same
p r op ortion to each oth er as th e am ounts o f the custom s revenues respectiv ely assigned (u n d er
the con v en tion ) as th eir secu rity ; th a t is to say the G erm an loan w ou ld stand, in am ount,
to the B ritish loan, as th e custom s revenue o f th e north ern and southern section o f A n g ola
tog eth e r stood to th a t o f the cen tra l (B ritish ) section.
T his th eoretica l a rra n g em en t is reta in ed in a rticle 1 o f the new con v en tion , b u t ow in g to
the rep la cem en t o f the cen tra l east-to-w est section , b y a h in terla n d strip w ith no p ort, its
a p p lic a tio n becom es fu tile. T here w ill be no p r o p o r tio n o f custom s revenue fa llin g to the
B ritish share, the custom s revenues w ill be all a ssigned to G erm any. H ence, u n d er th e new
tre a ty th ere w ou ld b e only a G erm an, and no B ritish loan.
T he old a rra n g em en t w ould still, on the oth er hand, rem ain a pplicab le, and eq u ita ble, if
a loan w ere raised secured on the M oza m b iq u e revenues, because th ere w e reta in p a rt o f the
coast lin e in ou r sphere.
T he d ifficulty is a serious one, an d I have th o u g h t a g ood deal a bout som e m eans o f g e ttin g
ov er it w ith ou t en tirely u p settin g th e w hole pla n o f th e a greem ent. I am unable t o offer an
en tirely sa tisfa ctory solution. B u t I w ou ld su g g est an arra n gem en t w hich w ould, so fa r as I
can ju d g e, offer a m odus op era n d i th a t m ig h t w ork in pra ctice. T he su g g estion is t o a lter the
first sentence o f th e second pa ra g ra p h o f a rticle I. I t now ru n s:
“ . these loans shall b e issued on the secu rity o f the custom s revenues o f M oza m ­
biq u e or A n g o la . . . .”
I w ould su b stitu te w ord “ a n d ” fo r “ o r ,” and add th e w ord “ b o th ,” v iz :
“ . . . . these loans shall be issued on the secu rity o f th e custom s revenues o f both
M oza m b iq u e and A n g ola . . . .”

T he effect w ould b e to p rev en t P o rtu g a l from issuing any loan on the secu rity o f the
custom s o f A n g ola alone or o f M oza m b iq u e a lo n e ; and this m ay not be con sid ered very con ­

( 2) [i\ supra, pp. 469-70, No. 299, and encl.]

 49 2
ven ien t. B u t it w ou ld serve the pu rpose I have in view , o f p rev en tin g an en tirely one-sided
a p p lic a tio n o f the trea ty . O f course it m ay be u rg ed th a t the a dm itted in con v en ien ce is really
u nnecessary in the case o f a M oza m b iq u e loan, as, on the east coast, the p ro p o r tio n a te d ivision
o f eustom s revenues is a reality. I t m ay he possible, by a g ood deal of re d ra ftin g , to lim it
m y above suggestion to the case w here a loan is to he secured in the first in stance on the
revenues o f A ng ola. I have h ow ever n ot a ttem p ted this, fo r the sake of sim plicity .
I d o n ot und ersta n d th e reason w hy it is proposed to om it from a rticle 4 o f the S ecret
C on v en tion , the prov ision dea lin g w ith the Ivatem he concession, hut I presum e there is some
ex p la n a tion .
E q u a lly u n ex p lain ed is the proposed om ission o f the pream ble and the im m ed ia tely follow in g
p a ra g ra p h o f th e S ecret N ote.
T he d isa pp earan ce o f the rest o f the secret note, e x ce p t the 3rd pa ra g ra p h , follow s from
ou r aban don m en t of ou r A n g ola ea st-to-w est section.
E. A. C.
D ec [em b er] 9.

I und ersta nd th a t all these pa pers are to he pu blished im m ed ia tely a fte r sign atu re and
t h erefore the h ea d in g “ S e c r e t ” seems su perfluous— and I believe th e W in d so r re-affirm ation
o f th e alliance is also to be published. I do n o t know if b efore p u blica tion they are to he
co m m [u n ic a te ]d to the P ortu g u ese G o v [e r n m e n ]t w ith som e ex p lan a tion s. I presum e they
w ill be subm itted to the K in g b efore sign atu re.
A. N .

S ir E . G rey has spoken to me a b ou t this, and asked m e to p repa re a revised d r a ft con v en ­

tion em b od y in g and a d a p tin g the th ree in stru m en ts o f 1898.
D r a ft a ccord in gly p rep a red and subm itted.
See 5 5 7 1 6 /12.(3)
E. A. C.
D ec [em b er] 18, 1912.

(3) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 320.

Notes by Sir E yre Crowe on Revised Anglo-G erm an Convention.

F.O. 367/284.
55716 391/12 436.
Sir E . Grey, Foreign Office, D ecem ber 18, 1912.
I submit herewith, in accordance with your instructions a revised draft conven­
tion, to replace the Convention, Secret Convention, and Secret Note, o f 1898.C)
The printed notes in the margin are intended to explain the origin of each
a rticle: “ 1898 ” indicates that the text has been taken over verbatim from the
Convention of 1898. “ C.O. d r a ft ” means the text of Mr. Harc-ourt’ s recently
com m unicated text.(2)
I have, in the printed text, made only such changes as seemed to me necessary
owing to the amalgamation of the three documents of 1898 in one. There are
however, a few further modifications which I should like to see introduced, for various
reasons. These modifications are indicated in ink on the attached cop y,(3) and the
reasons for them explained in the accom panving Notes.
E. A. C.
Dec [em ber] 18.

0 ) [S ir E. C row e’ s revised d r a ft w as based upon the p r eced in g C olon ia l Office d r a ft, the
am endm ents b ein g the resu lt o f a n n ota tion s by M r. T illey and S ir E. C row e him self. F o r the
1898 C onventions, v. G ooch cfc T em p erley, V ol. I, pp. 71-5, Nos. 9 0-2, en cls.]
(2) [v. im m ed iately p r eced in g doeu m en t.]
(3) [T hese m odifica tion s are shown in footn otes to the d r a ft.]
 493

E n clos u re 1 in N o. 320.

Draft Convention.
Confidential. D ecem ber 16, 1912.
In view of the possibility that Portugal may require financial assistance from 18ys-
some foreign Power or Towers, and in order to obviate the international complications
which such a condition of things may produce, and to preserve her integrity and
independence, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have
agreed as follows :—

1.— (1) W henever either the British or the German Government is of opinion c.o. draft,
that it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of m oney to Portugal on the
security pf the customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique or Angola, it shall
com m unicate the fact to the other Governm ent, and the other Government shall have
the right to advance a portionG) of the total sum required.
( 2 ) In the event of the other Governm ent signifying its intention to exercise this c.o. draft,
right, the two Governments shall consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these
loans shall be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique o r(5)
Angola as near as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible
the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues respec­
tively assigned as their security.

(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition c.o. draft
of the m oney market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects
be subject as near as possible to similar conditions.

2. O ff6) the customs revenues referred to in article 1, tliosef7) of the province of c o . draft
M ozam bique( 8) south of a line starting from the mouth of the River Lukugu, or fiedh' !j m0
Likungo, thence along that river to its confluence with the River Lugero, or
Luzhella, thence along that river to its source, thence due north to the 16th parallel
of south latitude, and thence along that parallel to the boundary of the British protec­
torate of Nyassaland, and thosef9) of the portions of the province of Angola lying to
the east of the 20th meridian of east longitude and south of the 11th parallel of south
latitude, shall be assigned to the British lo a n ;(10) customs revenues of the rem aining
parts of the provinces of Mozambique and Angola shall be assigned to the German
loan.

3. A ny delegates sent byfjH Great Britain or G erm anyf 12) to take note of the r e ­
collection of the revenues which are the security for their respective loans, shall have
o n ly f13) rights of inspection^4) but no rights of administration, interference, or control,
so long as there is no default in the payment of interest or sinking fund.

4. In case of default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either c.o. draft.
loa n ,(10) the administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces shall
(4) [C o rre c tio n suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ p a rt.” ]
( 5) [C o rre c tio n suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ a n d .” A n n o ta tio n by S ir J. A n d e rs o n :
“ Yes. J. A .” ]
( 6) [C o rre c tio n suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ In the con tin g en cy con tem p la ted in th e
p reced in g a rtic le ,” ]
( 7) [C o rre c tio n su ggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ o f th a t p o r tio n .” ]
( 8) [A d d itio n suggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ ly in g .” ]
( 9) [C o rre c tio n su ggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ also the custom s rev en u es.” ]
( 10) [C o rre c tio n su ggested by S ir E . C r o w e : “ ; w hilst th e .” ]
( u ) [C o rre c tio n suggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ In the ev en t o f .” ]
( 12) [C o rre c tio n su ggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ send ing d eleg ates.” ]
( 13) [C o rre c tio n su g g ested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ the P ortu g u ese g o v [e r n m e n ]t shall be asked
to g iv e such d eleg ates.” ]
( 14) [C o rre c tio n su ggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ on ly .” ]
( 15) [C o rrection suggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ it shall be a greed w ith the P ortu g u ese
g overn m en t th a t th ey w ill hand o v er.” ]
be handed over bv Portugal,( 16) those assigned for the German loan to Germany, those
assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5.— (1) A ll(17) rights, whether British or German, . acquired in the provinces
affected before the date of this convention shall be fully safeguarded, provided they
are of a purely private character and convey neither political rights nor territorial or
administrative jurisdiction.

(2 It is well understood betw een the two Governm ents that the above stipula­
tion applies, amona others, to the so-called K atem be coixcession, and further that the
G overnm ent of Great Britain ivill adopt a friendly attitude in respect to the
confirmation of this concession by the Portuguese Governm ent in case such a
confirmation should he applied fo r .(ls)
(3) It is also understood that no influence will be used in the future either by
the British or the German Governments to obtain fresh concessions except in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues a re(19) assigned to their
respective loans.( 20)

6. From the conclusion of the conventions of this day’ s date, Great Britain will
abstain from advancing any claim o f whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation,
or control of those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues
have b eenf21) assigned to Germany, or of the islands of San Thom é and Principé, or
to the exercise of political influence in those territories, or islands and Germany
will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the
possession, occupation, or control o f those portions of the Portuguese provinces in
which the customs revenues have b een(22) assigned to Great Britain, or of the
Portuguese part of the island of Tim or, or to the exercise of political influence in those
territories or in that island.

7. In case either Government applies for special privileges of an occasional

character in those portions of the Portuguese provinces of which the customs revenues
have been(23) assigned to it, it shall immediately inform the other Government and, if
these privileges are granted, and if the other Government should so desire, shall use its
influence to obtain for the other Government similar special privileges of an occasional
character and of equal value.

8. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the intervention of any
third Power in the provinces of Mozambique and Angola, either by way of loan to
Portugal on the security of the revenues of those provinces or by way of acquisition
of territory, by grant, cession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.
fl. In the event of Portugal renouncing her sovereign rights over Mozambique and
A ngola.(2') or losing these territories in any other m anner,(2S) it is understood that
the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, of one contracting party, together with
their goods and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures of its dominions,

(>6) [S ir E. Crow e suggested the om ission o f the w ord s: “ shall . . . . P o r t u g a l.” ]

( 17) |C orrection suggested by S ir J. A n d e rso n : “ In th e con tin g en cy con tem p la ted in the
p reced in g A r ticle .” ]
( l8'' [S ir J. Anderson suggested th e om ission o f th e p a ra g ra p h : “ I t is w ell und erstood . . .
be a p p lied fo r .” ]
( Is) |C orrection suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ w ou ld b e.” ]
(-" ) [C orrection suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ und er th e present co n v e n tio n .” ]
( 2l) |C orrection suggested by S ir J. A n d e rs o n : “ w ould un d er the present con v en tion b e.” ]
[C orrection suggested by S ir J. A n d e rso n : “ w ould u n d er th e present con v en tion b e.” ]
( 2;l) j C orrection suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ w ou ld be und er the present con v en tion .” ]
(2I) j C orrection suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ or any p ortion o f those prov in ces.” ]
( 25) [C orrection suggested by S ir J. A n d e rs o n : “ O m it and su b stitu te A : —
“ ‘ A. In so fa r as G [r e a ]t B r [it a in ] or G erm any m ay h erea fter in flu en ce or control
the a d m in istration o f M o z a m b iq u e ] o r A [ n g o la ] o r any portion o f those P rov in ces.’ ” ]
 495
possessions, colonies, and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the territories
comprised in the present convention as m ay fall to the other contracting party,
participate in all the prerogatives, exemptions, and privileges with regard to railway
rates and charges,(2Sy> trade, comm erce, taxation and navigation which are there
enjoyed by the subjects and natives of the protectorates, of the other contracting
party.
10. In the event of either Government obtaining from the Portuguese Government Jfi^t.r' raN ^fPh
before the contingency contemplated in the preceding article a cession of territory. i>*>. mourned.'
or the concession of special privileges not of an occasional character, in those portions
of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the customs revenues have been
assigned to it. such cessions of territory or concessions of p rivileges'27 \ shall not
become operative until analogous grants as near as possible of equal value have been
accorded to the other Governm ent in those portions of the provinces of which the
customs revenues have been assigned to it by the present arrangement.*2S
11. The present convention, duly ratified, shall replace as between the contracting
Powers the convention, of the 30th August, 1898, the secret convention, of the same
date, and the secret note, also of the same date.(29

12. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall come into force immediately
after the exchange of ratifications.
In witness. Ac.
Enclosure 2 in Xo. 320.

X otes on R evised Draft Convention.

Proof dated lGth December.)

Article i i b . The term " p o r t io n ," read in the context, tends to give an
impression that only a small or insignificant share in the total loan is thereby con­
templated. The word " p a r t ” would avoid this shade of meaning, and it exactly
corresponds to the German word " Theil ” which stands in the German version.

Article i (2>. I suggested in a previous minute (53544 30> that it would be

advisable, in order to meet the altered situation, to put " Mozambique and A ngola,”
instead of " o r . ” It was then thought that by retaining the first part of the Secret
Note of 1S9S which the C ol[on ial] Office seemed to wish to drop , and adding the
word “ loan,” it would be made clear that a German-pledged loan for Angola must
be counterbalanced not by a British-pledged loan on the strip of Angola Hinterland,
which has no port and practically therefore no customs revenue to pledge, but by a
British loan on so xthem Mozambique. W hilst I agree that the 10th article of the
present revised draft, with the Ms. addition noted in the margin, would probably give
effect to the desired arrangement. I think, on further consideration, that the substi­
tution of " a n d ” for " o r ” in Article i 2 is still required. Otherwise this article
will really mean something different from what will be said in article 10, and although
it would probably be agreed that art[ic-le] 10 would override any reading contrary to
it of a rt[icle ] i (2 , it would yet be better to avoid all ambiguity. As a rt[iele] i (2i
stands at present, it clearly contemplates the possibility of 2 simultaneous loans : one
German, secured on the seaports of Angola, the other, British, secured on the

( 2S) [S ir J . A nderson suggested th e om ission o f the w ord s “ t o ra ilw ay . . . . ch a rg es.’ ]

i 27) [C o rre c tio n suggested by S ir E. C r o w e : “ , o r loan c o n tr a c t.’ ]
( 2S) [S ir J . A nd erson suggested the om ission o f A r ticle 10.]
( 29) [C o rre c tio n suggested b y S ir E. C r o w e : “ con clu d ed and sign ed in L on d on on tho
30th A u g u st, 1393, w hich a re h ereby a b r o g a te d .” ]
( 30) [r . sup ra , pp. 491-2, X o . 319, m in.]
 49G
insignificant (if any) customs revenue of the British-earmarked hinterland strip of
Angola. As the loans are to be proportionate in amount to the respective customs
revenues pledged to the two countries, it follows that of a loan of say £1,000,000, all
but say £10,000 would have to be German. In fact the provision no longer meets the
situation created by our giving up the central belt of Angola. The remedy is, as I
suggested, to stipulate that any loan arrangement must apply to both Mozambique
and Angola.
Article 2. The alterations suggested are mere questions of phrasing. Owing to
the lengthening of the description of the line, the sentence has becom e too involved.

Articles 3 and 1. The old wording is rather inconsiderate towards Portugal. It

is not really for England and Germany to say in a convention between themselves
what the Portuguese Governm ent shall or shall not do. Of conrse the old convention
was not intended for publication, and there was no harm in neglecting questions of
form of this kind. In a published treaty it would be preferable to adopt a warding
more consonant to the real position, which is that England and Germany when making
a loan agreement with Portugal, will stipnlate for certain things which the Portuguese
G ov [ern m en ]t wull be expected to accept.

Article 5 (2'». The words in italics were, according to a marginal note by

Mr. Harcourt, to be omitted. But it is not quite understood wThat the position of the
Katembe concession now7 is.
Article 5 (3). The slight verbal alteration proposed is inspired by the same
consideration as that explained above, writh reference to articles 3 and 4 : Germany
and England may in a secret agreement speak somewhat loosely of having
“ assigned ” to one another certain Portuguese colonies. But in fact the convention
only designates the colonial territories of which the revenues icill, in certain circum ­
stances, be pledged to the twro countries. A more correct phraseology would also be
the more courteous.
Article 6. It had been intended to insert in this article the “ islands of San
Thom e and Principe,” but to deal with Timor in a separate article; as, owing to the
mention of Timor in the original convention of 1898, the case of the several islands
is not quite analogous. W e gave up any British claim to Timor, and assigned it to
Germany. As regards the two W est African islands, w7e disinterest ourselves now,
without there having been any question of an assignment to Germany. If, as
Sir E. Grey suggested, we have a separate article in which both England and Germany
undertake not to claim Tim or, it is possible, though not probable, that w7e may be
undertaking too much. W e propose to recognise the Dutch right of pre-emption.
But supposing the Dutch, when the time comes, do not exercise or wush to exercise,
their right of pre-em ption? Supposing Portugal still wishes to dispose of Tim or, shall
E ngland then still be bound by an engagement with Germany not to acquire it? We
are buying the Germans out not because wre want Holland to have Tim or, but we want
to recognize Dutch rights because Australia objects to Germ any having it. W e do
intend to let Holland have it if she wants. But if she does not, I do not think we
should be precluded from stepping in, since we are paying the price for buying off
Germany anyhow.
Article 7 contains the same alteration as article 5, and for the same reason.
Article 9. The existing text does not cover the case of a portion only of Angola
(as was contemplated in the Tiarks concession) being pledged. It would be well to
meet this by adding the words “ or any portion of those provinces.”
Article 10. The reference to a loan or loan contract has already been explained
in reference to the suggested change in article i (2>.
E. A. C [B O W E j.
D ec[em b er] 18.
 49 7
M IN U T E .

M r. l i a r cou rt.
I a gree gen era lly w ith S ir E y re C row e’ sob serv a tion s, and esp ecially in his proposal to
su b stitu te “ and ” fo r “ or ” in s e c [t io n ] 2. T hat, i f a d op ted , w ou ld rend er s e c [t io n ] 10
w hich is not q u ite con sisten t w ith w hat preced es it unnecessary, and I should lik e t o see it
com e out.
T he in sertion o f San T hom e and P r in c ip e and T im or as he proposes in p a r [a g r a p h ] 6
w ill ren d er u nnecessary the sep arate n ote w hich w as I u n d erstood from y ou con tem p la ted
ahout these places, and w ill leave us as free a h a n d as reg a rd s T im or as the G erm ans w ill have
as reg a rd s th e tw o form er.
T he first p a rt o f p a r [a g r a p h ] 9 I should v ery m uch lik e t o see rep la ced b y som eth in g like
w hat I have suggested in pen cil on th e a tta ch ed sheet, and th e w ord s as t o R a ilw a y ra tes and
charges w ill have t o com e out.
M y reason fo r p r op osin g th e om ission o f s e c [t io n ] 5 (2) as t o th e K a tem b e concession
was th a t I u n d erstood from S ir H . J u st th a t th e concession had been confirm ed an d th a t the
article w as th e re fo re no lon g er necessary.
I f th e d [ r a ] f t is m odified as p roposed in p en cil m y ob jection s t o its p u b lica tion w ill be
la rg ely m et, b u t n ot m y o b j[ e c t io ] n t o th e p u b lica tio n o f th e 1898 T rea ty.
I f in stead of p u blish in g th e old T rea ty in the notes ex ch a n g ed as to th is T re a ty it was
set fo r th th a t th e T rea ty w hich it is to rep la ce was su b sta n tia lly th e sam e b u t th a t the
“ spheres o f in flu e n c e ” o f G erm any and G [r e a ]t B r ita in w e r e : (s ettin g fo rth th e spheres as
defined in th e old T rea ty ), I do n ot th in k m uch harm w ou ld be done.
I shall b e g la d to discuss th e q u estion o f p u b lica tion w ith S ir E. G rey a t any tim e w hich
m ay be con v en ien t to him .
J. A.
23.12.

No. 321.

Sir J. Anderson to Sir E yre Crowe

F.O. 367/284.
557 1 7 /3 9 1/12 /4 3 6 .
Private.
My dear Crowe, Colonial Office, D ecem ber 24, 1912.
Apropos of our talk the other day, how is France likely to take our binding
ourselves to Germany to prevent any third power (i.e., France) taking a hand in the
partition of Portuguese A frica?
In view of German action in Morocco, w on ’ t they think our friendship rather
one-sided?
Could the obligation be cut out or worded to the effect that the parties will each
do their best to secure the acquiescence of other powers?
Of course if it is not to be published, it does not matter.
Yours very truly,
JOHN AN D EBSON .

M IN U T E S .

T he q u estion raised by S ir J . A n d erson is on e g o in g m uch b eyon d a p o in t o f m ere d r a ftin g

or o f a d a p tin g the new con v en tion to a ltered con d ition s.
I th in k it w ill be a greed th a t i f we cou ld d o w hat he suggests, it w ould serve us well.
B u t w hether G erm any w ou ld agree, is a n oth er m a tter, an d I m ust fr a n k ly con fess th a t I find
it difficult t o form an op in ion .
I t m ig h t be possible b y a d o p tin g this su g g estion t o m eet H e r r von K iih lm a n n ’ s p o in t as to
San T hom e an d P rin cip e , w ith w hich I dealt in another m in u te. I f so, I th in k such a
com p rom ise w ou ld be w orth fig h tin g for.
S ir J. A n d erson is stron gly op p osed t o th e p u b lica tio n o f th e 1898 agreem ent, an d w e had
som e discussion a bou t this. I ex p la in ed to him m y reasons fo r d esirin g p u b lica tio n o f any
a greem ent w ith G erm any by w hich w e rem a in hound. H is m a in o b jection is th e dep lorab le
im pression w hich the tra n sa ction o f 1898 w ill m a ke not only in P o rtu g a l b u t all ov er the
w orld, from th e p oin t o f view o f w hat G reat B r ita in was ca p a b le o f co n te m p la tin g d o in g to
her ow n ally. I th in k th ere is now g en era l a g reem en t th a t th a t tra n sa ction w as n o t cred itab le
[10900] 2 K
 49 8
to a cou n try like E n g lan d Still w e a re b ou n d b y its term s, and unless the term s are now
ra th er seriously m odified, or at least v ery d ifferen tly w ord ed, any revised con v en tion will be
b ound to crea te the sam e u n h a pp y im pression. T h a t is w hy, h a vin g decid ed th a t P ublicity
was in itself necessary, as th e lesser o f tw o evils, we proposed to pu blish n ot only th e new
con v en tion (w hen m ade) b u t also the old , so as to show how it had been im p rov ed.
T he problem assum es a d ifferen t a spect the m om ent th ere is a q uestion o f so m od ify in g
th e con v en tion th a t its provision s and w ord in g lose m uch o f th eir offensive and, if I m ay use
th e expression , bru ta l, cha ra cter. I f it w ere possible so to revise th e old con v en tion s th a t
E n g la n d w ould no lon ger a p p ea r to be cy n ica lly d iv id in g w ith G erm any th e m ost v aluable
colon ies of h er P ortu g u ese ally, then, I understa n d, S ir J. A nd erson , on th e one hand, w ould
no lon g er ob ject to the p u b lica tion o f such a revised con v en tion , w hilst, at th e sam e tim e, there
w ou ld be every reason not to publish th e old con v en tion now to be a b roga ted , w hich it w ould
then certa in ly be b etter to bu ry finally ou t o f sight.
I th in k this suggestion deserves every con sid era tion , and it w ould be w ell w orth w hile to
m ake a g rea t effort w ith the G erm an A m b assa dor in ord er to ob ta in a t e x t w hich w ould free
us from the w orst rep roaches certain t o be m ade a ga in st us if the 1898 con v en tion becom es
know n.
E. A. C.
D ec [em b er] 28.

I t has alw ays stru ck me th a t it was an a rb itra ry and unusual act fo r tw o P ow ers to p lace
restriction s and p r oh ib ition s such as a re em b odied in the 1898 con v en tion on a th ird P ow er,
w hich is still a sovereign in depen den t P o w e r— and I h a ve w ondered w hat w ould occu r if
P o rtu g a l w ere to en d eav ou r to raise a loan in F ra n ce. W e and G erm any w ould have to
p r o h ib it this presum a bly— if necessary v i et a rm is— and w hat w ould F ra n ce say to this closin g
o f th e open d o o r— not to speak o f P o rtu g a l h ers elf? In 1898 we w ere not on th e sam e term s
w ith F ra n ce as w e are now — and to ex clu d e the g rea test m on ey len d in g P ow er w ho is also our
in tim a te frien d from len d in g m oney to ou r ally w ould possibly be reg a rd ed w ith some su rprise
in P a r is — It w ou ld be m ost desirab le if som e form o f w ords could be devised w ith th e assent
o f G erm any to g et ov er the difficu lty — W e m ust publish th e new C onvention in any case— as
well as th e W in d sor recon firm a tion o f the T rea ty o f A llian ce
A . N.

I a gree th a t th e p rov ision to keep o u t a th ir d P ow er is one th a t w ould be offensive to

F ra n ce if we p u t it in now fo r th e first tim e. I h a ve th erefore refused t o ex ten d it to any
te r r ito r y such as A n g ola and P rin cip e n ot in clu ded in the 1898 agreem ent, so th a t w e m ay be
able t o say when a n y th in g is pu blished th a t the p rov ision is som ething don e, w heth er rig h t or
w ron g, in 1898 and th a t ca n n ot now be undone. I d o n ’ t th in k we can elim in a te it now.
M r. H a rc o u rt and S ir J. A nd erson should be asked to com e to discuss this and the other
p o in ts in these p a pers w ith S ir A. N icolson , S ir E. Crow e and m yself at th e F [o r e ig n ] 0 [ffic e ]
on som e m orn in g in this week.
E . G.
29.12.12.

No. 322.

M inute by Sir E yre Crowe.

Anglo-G erm an A greem ent.

F.O. 367/284.
5 5 7 1 6 /3 9 1 /1 2 /4 3 6 . Foreign Office, D ecem ber 26, 1912.
At the request of Sir John Anderson I went on Tuesday the 24th to see him at
the Colonial Office in order to discuss our revised draft of an agreementO) to replace
the two conventions and note of 1898.
I found him in general agreement with the views and suggestions which I had
put forward, and ready to accept the revised draft with some further slight m odifica­
tions. He was not only in favour of the alterations in articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 which I
had suggested with the view of making the wording less discourteous to Portugal, but
wished to extend the process of m ellowing-down to the important opening phrase of
article 9. I told him that I should warmly support any modification which slurred
over the contingency o f Portugal renouncing her sovereign rights, and still more of
her “ losing these territories in any other m anner,” which clearly contemplated some

0 ) [v. supra, pp. 492-6, N o. 320, and ends.']

 499

forcible process of divestment. I said I had not ventured to make such a suggestion
myself, because I was in complete doubt— not knowing the course taken by the
negotiations between Mr. Harcourt and H err von Kiihlm ann— as to whether the
Germans were likely or not to agree to a less drastic wording. One of the inevitable
results of the treaty when it became known, a result therefore fully anticipated at
Berlin, must be friction between Great Britain and Portugal. H ow far Germany may
be disposed to co-operate for the purpose o f m inimizing that friction, I do not know.
It seems to me possible that she will not be eager to do so. I f so she m ay object to
Sir J. A nderson’ s suggestion for toning-dow n the first phrase of article 9. It will be a
matter for negotiation, presumably between Mr. Harcourt and H err von Kiihlm ann.
Sir J. Anderson agreed with m y proposed substitution of “ a n d ” for “ o r ” in
article i (2>, and this confirmed him in his desire to omit article 10, which had been
eliminated in the original C ol[on ial] Office draft, and which we had restored, as
Sir E. Grey will remember, in order to give effect to the idea that any loan on Angola
revenues must in future be counterbalanced by a similar loan on Mozambique
revenues. I f this is already effected by the slight change in article i (2 f, I agree that
article 10 might go.
Later in the afternoon, H err von Kiihlm ann called upon m e(2) and, after talking
of other business, asked what was the cause o f the delay in settling the draft of our new
convention. He suggested that if he could meet someone at a round table, lie would
be able to settle the draft in half an hour. I remarked that he probably had not gone
very deeply into the technical points of drafting which arose under the changed
conditions, but he refused to believe that there were any difficulties.
I therefore pointed out to him what these technical matters were. In the first
instance there must be one document instead of three. To this he agreed. Then
certain parts had become obsolete by efflux of time (Katembe concession1). Then there
was the difficulty that the new BritLh-earm arked portion of Angola had no customs
revenue that could be pledged for a loan, which necessitated an arrangement by
which any loan would have to be secured on the revenues of the East and W est Coast
colonies simultaneously. To this also he saw no objection.
Lastly I m entioned the special provision to be made regarding Tim or and the
islands of" San Tomé and Principe. I explained that according to the arrangement
agreed upon between Sir E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the two countries would
mutually disinterest themselves : Germ any in Tim or, and England in the two other
islands. _
Herr von Kiihlm ann expressed some surprise at this suggestion. H e maintained
that Sir E. Grey had finally agreed to place San Tom é and Principe on exactly the
same footing in the convention that Tim or had originally occupied. I rem inded him
of the several conversations in which it had been explained to the German Ambassador
that England did not wish to enter into an engagement with Germany to join her in
resisting the intervention of a third Power in these islands. H e however said that
this had been subject to the proviso that the consent of France might be obtained to
the wider engagem ent. (See conversation of June 4th— 25122.) (3) It seems to me
clear from the subsequent conversations 'see 25133,(4) 30S28,(5) 32861(6) ) that
Sir E . Grey adhered throughout to his original intention.— Possibly the German
Ambassador did not keep H err von Kiihlm ann fully inform ed.
He was however, very insistent on the point and repeatedly argued that all
Sir E . Grey had to do was to obtain the consent of France to the proposed substitution
of San Tom é and Principé for Tim or in the 189S agreement. ^
W hy, otherwise, had Sir E. Grey brought in France at all. I explained that there
were probably in his mind two rea son s: one was the fact that the two islands were so

(2) [cp . G.F., X X X V I I (I ), p. 16.]

(3) [i?, su pra, pp. 4 76-7, X o . 305.]
0 ) [i>. su pra, pp. 479-80, X o . 30S.]
(5) [i\ su p r a , pp. 484-5, X o. 314.]
(6) [i\ su pra, p. 485, X o . 317.]
[10900] 2 K 2
 500
close to the French Guinea co a s t; this had in fact been m entioned in the
conversations.
Secondly, the original German proposals dealt also with the British islands off
the coast of German South-W est Africa. So long as there was any question of oui
ceding these islands to Germany, we were bound under our agreements with France
and Spain of 1907 (the so-called Mediterranean agreem ent)(7) to notify such a proposed
cession to the two other Powers.
Herr von Kühlmann remained under the impression that the proper course was
to place San Tomé and Principé in the position occupied by Tim or in the old
convention. I could only say that I had no authority to do this in the revised draft
which I had been instructed to prepare, and that he must fight this out with
Sir E . Grey himself.
Our conversation was entirely friendly and informal.
E. A. C.
Dec. 26.
A. N.

( 7) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 1-5 1, C h a p ter L .]

No. 323.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen J1)

F.O. 3 G 7 /3 4 0 .
2 0 4 G /1 1 G 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 .
(No. 5.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, January 11, 1913.
I gave the German Ambassador to-day the accom panying drafts with m y covering
letter for the revised Anglo-Germ an Agreem ent as to Portuguese African Colonies.( 2)
I said that the question of publication would have to be considered later, and it had
occurred to us that, as there tvere some phrases in the original Agreem ents of 1898(3)
that were not suitable for publication, we might consider the alternative of drawing
up a Mem orandum explaining the nature of the original Agreem ents to publish with
the new Agreem ent instead of the text of the originals.
The Ambassador said that his Governm ent would agree to publication if we could
com e to some agreement under which, if the British Government or a British Colony
intervened and gained a footing in a Portuguese Colony, Germ any should be entitled
to do the same, and vice versa; and if there was an understanding that, if, owing to
Portuguese misrule or other misdeeds, Germany had to intervene to protect German
subjects and property, the Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal would not be
in v o k e d ; and also if it was understood that the Alliance did not apply to a Portuguese
C olony or part of a Colony that declared its independence. He did not, however, wish
to bring these points up for discussion to-day.
I observed on the last point that I did not think that the Alliance would apply to
a Portuguese Colony that declared its independence. W ith regard to the Alliance
itself, although it was of very ancient date it had been confirmed, though the confirma­
tion was not published, in 1899 :( 4) the year after the Agreem ent with Germany. No

O [T h is despatch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g on J a n u a ry 14, 1913, and

to the C a bin et (w ith th e im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t) on J a n u a ry 15. A cop y was sent
to th e C olon ia l Office. A cop y was sent to L isbon (w ith the im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t)
on J u n e 19, 1913.]
( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t, cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 1 6-19 .]
( 3) [u. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I , pp . 7 1 -5 , Nos. 9 0 -2 , en d s.]
(«) [r . ibid., V ol. I, pp. 93-4, N o. 118.]
 501

change had been made in it then, there had simply been a confirmation of what had
been already published. The Portuguese Government were always pressing that the
confirmation of 1899 should be p u blished; but I had always declined to do so, feeling
that it ought not to be published unless at the same time the Agreem ent with Germany
was made public.
[ I am, &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

M IN U T E S .

The qu estion s to w hich the am ba ssa dor’ s su g g estion s n a tu ra lly g iv e rise, are so im p orta n t
th a t I v en tu re to offer the follow in g ob serv a tion s on t h e m : —
T he new con v en tion , ta k en as a w hole, ca n only be reg a rd ed as a fresh a d v a n ta g e to
G erm any, fo r w hom th e a cq u isition o f the cen tra l b elt o f A n g ola, in a d d itio n to the rest o f the
colon y w ith all its seaboard, and possibly San Thome' and P rin cip e is clea rly o f grea t
im p orta n ce.
L ik e all concessions to G erm any, th is one is at once m ade the sta rtin g p o in t fo r fu rth er
dem ands.
T he dem and now is fo r a fresh b a r g a in : O n one side, E n g la n d is to h a ve th e p r iv ileg e o f
pu blish in g the con v en tion w hich so clearly illu stra tes h er g ood w ill tow ards G erm any. G erm any,
on her p a rt, is to be left free to despoil P o r t u g a l o f h er colon ies definitely an d in a dvance o f
any such fin an cia l difficulties in P o rtu g a l as th e a greem ent contem p la tes. Nor this is the
m ea ning o f th e dem and th a t the A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se alliance shall n ot be in vok ed a ga in st a
G erm an “ in te r v e n tio n to p r o te ct G erm an sub jects an d p r o p e r ty .” In any case, th is w ould n ot
be a fa ir, or even a possible b arga in . I t w ou ld n ot be a fa ir b a rg a in because fo r E n g la n d to
sully her g o o d nam e by a b a n d on in g h er ally fo r the pu rpose o f fa c ilit a t in g her sp olia tion b y
G erm any, w ou ld be a m a tter ill com p en sa ted b y th e perm ission to pu blish a con v en tion w hich
she con clu d ed m ost relu cta n tly at G erm an d icta tio n in 1SP3 an d has now revised t o G erm any’ s
fu rth er advanta ge.
B u t ev en i f E n g la n d w ere disp osed so t o act, she is not free to decla re th e a lliance
in op era tiv e w ith respect to the te rr ito rie s a ffected b y th e A n g lo-G erm a n a greem ent. The
sign atu re o f the agreem en t o f 1S98 was a ccom p an ied b y definite assurances to the P ortu g u ese
g overn m en t th a t, u n d er its prov ision s, the in te g r ity and in d ep en d en ce o f P o rtu g a l rem ained
in ta ct, and th a t no loss o r cession o f te r r ito r y on her p a rt w ere in volved . T h is assurance was
fortified b y th e sign ifica n t d ecla ra tion m ade b y L o rd Sa lisbu ry to the P ortu g u ese M in ister in
L on d on , w ith sp ecial referen ce to the A n g lo-G erm a n a greem ent, th a t H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G o v e r n m e n t ] recogn ized “ the presen t v a lid ity ” o f the a n cien t trea ties, b in d in g E n g la n d to
defen d those v ery P ortu g u ese colon ies to w hich the a greem en t ap p lied . L o rd S a lisbu ry ’ s
decla ra tion stren gth en ed the desire o f th e P ortu g u ese g ov ern m en t fo r a form al con firm ation
o f the old trea ties, and th is w as effected b y th e tre a ty sign ed in L on d on the y ea r afterw a rds.
T he new A n g lo-G erm a n con v en tion is to rep la ce the agreem ent o f 1398, w ith ou t a lterin g
its gen era l ch a ra cter. In so fa r as its clauses m ust be read tog eth er w ith the assurances g iv en
to P o r t u g a l in 1S9S, it w ould be im possible fo r H f i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] to d isrega rd or
disavow those assurances in referen ce to the new con v en tion , w hich differs from th e old m erely
in reg a rd to the lines o f t e rr ito ria l su b -d iv ision o f the P ortu g u ese prov in ces in to B ritish and
G erm an spheres.
A n y such disavow al, m oreover, t o have any rea l value, w ou ld req u ire to be p la ced form ally
on record , in the shape o f eith er an a d d itio n a l clause to the A n g lo-G erm a n co n v e n tio n —
presum ably n ot an oth er secret a rticle— or a t least an ex ch a n g e o f notes. T his w ou ld in volve
fu r th e r difficulties. I t has b een d ecid ed to p u blish th e L on d on tre a ty o f 1899 at th e same tim e
as the new A n g lo-G erm a n con v en tion . N o th in g co u ld be m ore ca lcu la ted to p lace us in a false
p osition th a n th e p u b lica tion sim ultaneously o f the fa ct th a t in 1899 we solem nly reaffirm ed
our o b lig a tio n to d efen d P o r t u g a l’ s colon ia l possessions aga in st fo r e ig n aggression — in retu rn ,
too, fo r a sp ecial con sid era tion , nam ely P o r t u g a l’ s u n d erta k in g n ot to decla re n e u tra lity d u rin g
the S ou th A fr ic a n w ar— ; and y et th a t in 1898 we had m ade an a greem en t w ith G erm any
a ffectin g the P ortu g u ese colon ies in S [o u t h ] A fric a , to w h ich w e n ow decla red th a t the a lliance
d id not apply.
It w ou ld be an im possible position .
I f, then, the G erm an dem and fo r rem ov in g th e P ortu g u ese colonies in S [o u t h ] A fric a from
the scope o f the a llia nce is one w hich we are p reclu d ed from a g reein g to, it rem ains to be seen
w hether G erm any w ill con tin u e to w ith h old h er con sen t to the p u b lica tion o f the new
con v en tion .
Such a refu sa l w ould p u t H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] in an em b arra ssing position .
I leave ou t o f a ccou n t the d esira b ility on gen era l g rou n d s o f p olicy , o f pu blish in g fr a n k ly to
the w orld w here we sta n d w ith G erm any and w ith P o rtu g a l. B u t a p a rt from this, are H [ is ]
M [a je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] prep a red , a fte r all th a t has been said in p a rlia m en t o f late, to
 502
con clu d e an oth er secr et trea ty w ith G erm a n y at this m om en t? I t w ould h a rd ly be possible to
ex p la in th a t the new con v en tion does n ot a lter the fu n d a m en ta l ch a ra cter o f the old one which
it replaces, w ith ou t d iv u lg in g som e p a rticu la rs as to the t e rr ito ria l an d perhaps also the
finan cial a rrangem ents con tem p la ted . T h is how ever w ould proba b ly be w orse, it w ould certain ly
be w orse from the p oin t o f view o f the im pression w hich w ould be crea ted as to ou r a ttitu d e
tow ards P o rtu g a l and the alliance, than if n oth in g w ere said.
In fa ce o f this dilem m a the safest and w isest course w ould be th a t we should refuse
a ltog eth er to sign any new con v en tion unless it is a greed t o pu blish it. The reasons fo r
p u b licity are so stron g, and the a d v an ta g es to G erm any un d er th e revised con v en tion so obvious,
th a t she m ay be cou n ted u p on w ith som e degree o f assurance, not, finally, to reject our
con d ition s, w hich should b e : fu ll p u b licity , and no ta m p erin g w ith th e A n g lo-P ortu g u eso
a llia n ce in con n ection w ith the a rra n g em en ts o f 1898
E. A. C.
J an . 17.
T here is g rea t force in S ir E y re C row e’ s argum ents.
A . N.
Y es ! w e shall have to ta k e this line, b u t I wish to g et the P ortu g u ese A llia n ce subsequently
m ade fo r a term o f years in stead o f fo r etern ity .
E. G.

No. 324.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich n ow sk yJ 1)

F.O. 367/340.
1 1 6 5 /1 1 6 5/13 /4 3 6 .
(Confidential.)
M y dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, January 11, 1913.
I am glad to be now in a position to put before you the draft of a fresh
convention, to take the place of our agreements of 1898.(2) I trust you will find that
this draft form ally carries out what we have already agreed upon provisionally.
The particular question of Tim or is, as you will see, dealt with partly in the new
agreement itself, and partly in a draft Note, sent herewith, which, I would suggest,
might be com m unicated to the Netherlands Government by our two legations at the
Hague in such form as may be thought most suitable, and as nearly as possible
simultaneously with the publication of the new agreement.
In order to enable you the better to jndge of the effect of the revised convention
as now drafted, I would make the following explanations, showing exactly in what
respects the present draft differs from the stipulations of 1898, and giving the reasons
for the changes introduced. These changes flow from four main considerations :
1. The agreement of 1898 consists of three docum ents: a convention, a secret
convention, and a secret note.(2) It must have been intended originally to publish the
first of these documents, but it was ultimately preferred to keep them all secret. His
M ajesty’ s Government are desirous that the new agreement should be laid before
parliament. It would clearly be inappropriate that stipulations all dealing connectedly
with the same subject, and destined for simultaneous publication, should be separated
into different instruments bearing the same date and signatures. The most suitable
and most convenient course would obviously be to make one comprehensive convention
cover all the points form erly distributed over three instruments.
2. The changes agreed upon as regards the particular territories to be earmarked
respectively for Great Britain and Germany involve consequential modifications in the
text of 1898.
3. Certain portions of the old agreement have become inapplicable in consequence
of the changed conditions.

0 ) [cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 19-25. T his despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the
K in g on J a n u a ry 11, 1913, and to the C a bin et on J a n u a rv 15. A cop y was sent to L isbon on
J u n e 19.]
(2) [v . G ooch <Sc T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 7 1-5, Nos. 9 0-2, encZs.]
 503

4. Owing to the fact that the original arrangement constituted a secret pact
between the contracting parties, not intended to meet the eyes of the Portuguese
Government, some of its provisions were, quite unintentionally, no doubt, drafted with
some want of precision, which it seems desirable to rectify in so far as the existing
wording might appear to imply, in form at least, a disregard of the actual position of
Portugal in some of the transactions contemplated.

It will be convenient to mention first certain modifications which affect a large

number of the articles :

A. The island of Tim or has been rem oved wherever it occurred in the old
agreements. It has been reintroduced however at the end of Article 6 (old Article 2
of the Secret Convention). To balance this new provision, which constitutes the
renunciation by Germany of the special rights she acquired in respect to Portuguese
Tim or under the 1898 agreement, a corresponding provision is inserted in the same
article, by which Great Britain disinterests herself in the islands of San Thom e and
Principe. The effect of this, read together with the proposed joint Note to the
Netherlands Government, is that, on the one hand the Dutch right of pre-em ption over
Portuguese Tim or is form ally recognised, and that, on the other, Great Britain is
precluded from any intervention in the two other islands.
B. The portions of Angola and Mozambique of which the revenues are respec­
tively assigned to Great Britain and Germany, are now defined, throughout the draft
Convention, in accordance with the fresh delimitation agreed upon.
The rem ainder of the modifications will be most readily dealt with by going
through the draft convention article by article, and com paring each with the
corresponding clauses of 1898 :

P rea m b le: No change.

Article 1. The only alteration consists in the revision of the territorial
delimitation.
A rticle 2. The two paragraphs of the 1898 convention have been condensed into
one, and the new delimitation of the British and German spheres introduced. There
is no other change.
Article 3. The old text defines and limits the rights to be conferred upon any
British or German delegates that may be sent to take note of the collection of the
respective revenues. Such rights can of course only be conferred by the Portuguese
Governm ent, and, technically speaking, it is not for Great Britain and Germ any to
prescribe in a treaty between themselves what the Portuguese Government is or is
not to do. In practice, of course, the British and German Governm ents would
stipulate in their loan contracts with the Portuguese Government for the proper rights
to be conferred on the delegates. It would therefore be more correct, and would not
alter the real purport of the original stipulation, if itwere said that “ the Portuguese
shall be asked ” to give such rights to the delegates. This has accordingly been done
in the revised draft.
Article 4. The same consideration has led to the introduction in Article 4 of the
additional w ord s: “ it shall be agreed with the Portuguese Government that . . . .”
Article 5.
1) The question of mutually safeguarding British and German rights
previously acquired in the Portuguese provinces can only arise if and when the two
contracting governm ents shall have obtained administrative control. It would be
better and less likely to be misunderstood by Portugal, if this were expressed explicitly
in the article.For this reason it is suggested that the new text should begin with the
w o rd s: “ In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article . . . . ” The
words “ It is well understood that “ seem unnecessary, and have been omitted.
t'i'i The second paragraph of the original article speaks of customs revenues which
“ are assigned ” to the respective British and German loans. For the sake of greater
 504

accuracy, it seems desirable to say : “ would be assigned to their respective loans

under the present convention.”
Article 6. This reproduces Article 2 of the Secret Convention of 1898. The
m ention in it of the islands o f Tim or on the one hand, and of San Thom é and Principé
on the other, has already been explained. No other change is made except for the
altered wording of the reference to the ‘ ‘ assigned revenues,” introduced for the reason
given above under the head of Article 5 (2).
A rticle 7.
(1)— is a transcript of the first operative paragraph of the Secret Note of
1898, with the modifications necessitated by the territorial rearrangement.
It appears, however, to His M ajesty’ s Government that the clause is hardly any
longer required under existing conditions, since it contemplates a contingency not
likely to occur. They would accordingly be disposed to omit it, but have deferred
actually doing so in the present draft, in order that the German Government should
have the opportunity of considering the point.
2. Tlie second section of Article 7 corresponds to the second operative paragraph
o f the Secret Note of 1898, the warding being only slightly altered so as to allow of
its standing in its present form even if the first section of the article is suppressed, as
suggested by H is M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
Article 8 reproduces the first article of the Secret Convention o f 1898. In view
however of tlie publicity to be given to the new convention, and in order to indicate
more explicitly the reason for, and justification of. the policy embodied in this article
as agreed upon by the Contracting Parties, it has been thought desirable to refer in a
few words to the fact that the intervention of any third Parties would materially affect
the interests of the British and German possessions in South and East Africa
contiguous to Angola and Mozambique. This addition leaves absolutely unchanged
the actual stipulation contained in the article.
A rticle 9 follows the text of Article 8 of the Secret Convention o f 1898 except as
regards the opening phrase. There seems to be no necessity, from the point of view
of clearness, to refer in set terms to the contingency of Portugal renouncing her
sovereign rights over her colonies, or losing them in some other manner,— words
which, if made public, would be calculated to give umbrage to the governm ent of a
country which is in alliance with Great Britain and with which Germany is in friendly
relations. It is thought that the object which the article wTas designed to meet would
be as fully attained by the adoption of the alternative wording : ‘ ‘ In so far as Great
Britain or Germany may hereafter influence or control the administration of
Mozambique or Angola, or any portions of those provinces . . . .”
A rticle 10 makes the necessary provision for the abrogation of the agreement of
1898.
Article 11, finally, is identical wTith the ratifying clauses of the 1898 convention.

The eleven articles of the present draft convention thus re-em body, with the
modifications indicated, all the provisions of the three instruments of 1898, except
Article 4 of the Secret Convention, and the last two paragraphs of the Secret Note.
The latter dealt with geographical details no longer in point owing to the territorial
rearrangement. Article 4 of the Secret Convention had reference to the Katembe
concession, and has been om itted because it is understood that the situation as regards
that concession is no longer such that the stipulations of 1898 would be applicable.
[I have, &c.
E. G R E Y .]

M IN U TE B Y KIN G GE OR GE .

A pp[rov e]d .— G.R.I.

 505
E n closu re 1 in N o. 324.

Draft Convention.

(Confidential.) January 9, 1913.

In n e w of the possibility that Portugal m ay require financial assistance from some
foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate the international com plications which
such a condition of things m ay produce, and to preserve her integrity and
independence, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have
agreed as follows :—
1. (1.) W henever either the British or the German Government is of opinion that
it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of m oney to Portugal on the
security of the customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique or Angola, it
shall communicate the fact to the other Governm ent, and the other Governm ent shall
have the right to advance a part of the total sum required.
(2.1 In the event of the other Government signifying its intention to exercise this
right, the two Governm ents shall consult as to the terms o f the two loans, and these
loans shall he issued on the security o f the customs revenues of Mozambique and
Angola as near as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible
the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues respectively
assigned as their security.
(3. The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition
of the m oney market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects
be subject as near as possible to similar conditions.
2. In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article, the customs revenues
of that portion of the province of Mozambique lying south of a line starting from the
mouth of the Paver Lukugu, or Likungo, running thence along that river to its
confluence with the River Lugera, or Luzhella. thence along that river to its source,
thence due north to the 16th parallel o f south latitude, and thence along that parallel
to the boundary of the British protectorate o f Xyassaland. as also the customs
revenues o f the portions of the province o f Angola lying to the east of the
20th meridian of east longitude and south of the 11th parallel o f south latitude, shall
be assigned to the British loa n ; whilst the customs revenues of the rem aining parts
of the provinces of Mozambique and Angola shall be assigned to the German loan.
3. In the event of Great Britain or Germ any sending delegates to take note of
the collection of the revenues, which are the security for their respective loans, the
Portuguese Governm ent shall be asked to give such delegates rights of inspection only,
but no rights of administration, interference, or control, so long as there is no default
in the paym ent of interest or sinking fund.
4. In case o f default in the paym ent of the interest or sinking fund of either
loan, it shall be agreed with the Portuguese Governm ent that they will hand over the
administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces : those assigned for
the German loan to Germany, those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5. (1.) In the contingency contem plated in the preceding article all rights,
whether British or German, acquired, in the provinces affected, before the date o f this
convention shall be fully safeguarded, provided they are o f a purely private character
and convey neither political rights nor territorial or administrative jurisdiction.
(2.) It is well understood that no influence will be used in the future either by
the British or the German Government to obtain fresh concessions except in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues would be assigned to their
respective loans under the present convention.
6. F rom the date of the conclusion of the present convention Great Britain will
abstain from advancing any claim o f whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation,
or control, of those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues
would under the present convention be assigned to Germany, or of the islands of
San Thom e and Principe, or to the exercise of political influence in those territories, or
 506

islands; and Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim of
whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or control, of those portions o f the
Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues would under the present conven­
tion be assigned to Great Britain, or of the Portuguese part of the island of Tim or, or
to the exercise of political influence in those territories or in that island.
7. (1.) In the event of either Governm ent obtaining from the Portuguese Govern­
ment a cession of territory, or the concession of special privileges not of an occasional
character, in those portions of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the
customs revenues would be assigned to it, such cessions of territory or concessions
of privileges shall not becom e operative until analogous grants as near as possible of
equal value have been accorded to the other Government in those portions of the
provinces o f which the customs revenues would be assigned to it by the present
convention.
(2.) In case either Governm ent applies for special privileges of an occasional
character in those portions of the Portuguese provinces o f which the customs revenues
would be assigned to it under the present convention, it shall imm ediately inform the
other Government and, if these privileges are granted, and if the other Government
should so desire, shall use its influence to obtain for the other Government similar
special privileges of an occasional character and of equal value.
8. Great Britain and Germany, having regard to the interests o f their respective
possessions in South Africa contiguous to the Portuguese provinces o f Angola and
Mozambique, which would be materially affected by the intervention of any third ;
Power in those provinces, agree join tly to oppose such intervention, whether by way
of loan to Portugal on the security o f the revenues of the said provinces, or by way
o f acquisition of territory by grant, cession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.
9. In so far as Great Britain or Germ any may hereafter influence or control the
administration o f Mozambique or Angola or any portion of those provinces, it is
understood that the subjects, and natives o f the protectorates, o f one contracting
party, together with their goods and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures
o f its dom inions, possessions, colonies, and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the
territories comprised in the present convention as may fall under the influence or
control of the other contracting party, participate in all the prerogatives, exemptions,
and privileges with regard to trade, com m erce, taxation, and navigation which are
there enjoyed by the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, of the other contracting
party.
10. The present convention, duly ratified, shall replace as between the contracting
Powers the convention, secret convention, and secret note concluded and signed in
London on the 30th August, 1898, which are hereby abrogated.
11. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall com e into force immediately after
the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the same, and
have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the day of ,1 9 1 3 .

Enclosure 2 in No. 324.

D m )t Note for com m unication to the Dutch G overnm ent.

(Confidential.'
In 1898 the British and German Governments considered it desirable to conclude
an arrangement for safeguarding their mutual interests in the possible event o f an
alienation or mortgage by Portugal of certain of her colonial dominions.
 507
It was only subsequently that it came to the notice of the two contracting
parties that, by the Dutch-Portuguese Convention of 1893('3) the Netherland Govern­
ment had acquired a right of pre-em ption over the Portuguese portion of the island of
Timor, which had been included in the scope of the Anglo-G erm an agreement. As
soon as the attention of the British and German Governm ents was drawn to the
existence of the convention of 1893, and its bearing on the agreement of 1898, they
realised that the provisions of that agreement in regard to Timor were incapable of
execution without infringing the prior treaty rights of a Power with which they were
both on terms of cordial friendship.
It therefore became necessary to recast the agreement of 1898 in aform which
would exclude the island from the operation of the treaty arrangements as originally
contemplated. This necessity involved considerable alteration in other provisions of
the agreement, and the result has been a new convention which is now to be made
public.
The convention itself will make plain the general policy which the two contracting
parties propose to adopt in the event of Portugal desiring to alienate certain parts of
her colonial dominions, but the British and German Governments, animated by
feelings of friendship towards the Netherland Governm ent, have been anxious to give
this explanation of the m ention of Timor in their convention, and to let it be known
that they are aware of, and are determ ined to respect, the rights of pre-em ption
acquired by the Netherlands in respect of that island.

(3) [v. B .F .S .P ., V ol. So, pp. 394-6.1

[E D . N O T E .— T he fo llo w in g m inu tes in d ic a te the o rig in o f th e m em ora n du m w hich is

p rin ted as the im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t (F .O . 367 /34 0. 3 3 5 3 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 ): —

M IN U T E S .

I subm it herew ith a d r a ft m em orandum , on th e lines I suggested at th e recen t con feren ce

w ith S ir E. G rey and M r. H a rc o u rt, e x p la in in g sum m arily th e su b sta n tiv e a ltera tion s to he
in trod u ced in to th e A g reem en t o f 1898 b y the p roposed revised con v en tion . I h a ve ca refu lly
a void ed th e use of any w ord s su g g estin g a d iv ision in to “ spheres o f in flu en ce.”
I am in d eb ted to M r. A d a m fo r the sketch m ap, w hich it w ou ld he con v en ien t t o a tta ch
t o th e m em orandum , w hen th e tim e com es fo r p u b lica tion .
I subm it at th e sam e tim e a te n ta tiv e d ra ft o f a despatch to S ir A . H a rd in g e , a u th o rizin g
him to com m u n ica te the new con v en tion to the P o rtu g u e se g overn m en t. In ord er t o pla ce us,
as tow ard s P o rtu g a l, and th e w orld at la rg e, in no w orse p osition than we w ere a fter the
sign a tu re o f th e secret A g reem en t o f 1893 now t o he rep la ced , S ir A. H a rd in g e should recall,
a nd m ake a p p lica b le to th e new con v en tion , th e form al assurances g iv en by L o rd Salisbu ry
and M r. B a lfou r in respect to th e 1898 A g reem en t. T he in stru c tio n fu rth er cov ers a request
t o th e P o rtu g u e se g overn m en t to con cu r in th e p u b lica tion o f th e L on d on tre a ty o f 1899,
g en era lly (b u t w ron g ly ) re fe rre d to as th e W in d so r trea ty .
Q u [e r v ] : R e fe r the several p a pers t o M r. H a rc o u rt.
E. A . C.
J a n [ u a r y ] 13.
A . N.

A n d I w ill con sid er them finallv a fter G erm any has rep lied abou t ou r dra ft.
E. G.

I am q u ite satisfied w ith this m e m o [r a n d u m ] hut I th in k in p a r [a g r a p h ] 6 (1) it m igh t he

sta ted th a t our share in clu des the p o r t and a la rg e p a rt o f th e p r o v in ce o f Q uellim ane [s ic],
L. H.
17.1.13.
 508.
I see no o b jection to this em en da tion , e x cep t th a t I believe we m ust call it, to be correct,
the D is tr ic t (n ot “ P r o v in c e ” ) o f Q uelim ane.
E. A. C.
J a n fu a r y l 18.
A. N.
E. G.

T he a d d itio n m ade as the result o f M r. H a r c o u r t ’ s m inu te is in d ica ted in the te x t p rin ted
below by the use of square b ra ck ets.]

No. 325.

Draft Memorandum on the Anglo-G erm an Convention for Publication.

F.O. 867/340.
3 3 5 8 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 8 6 .
Secret. Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.
1. The convention signed in London on 1913 replaces,
as provided in its 13th article, an agreement concluded in 1898, in the form of a
convention, supplemented by a secret convention and a secret note, by the same
parties.
2. Apart from a few unimportant changes of wording, m ostly necessitated by
the substitution of one document for three, the stipulations of the new convention are
practically identical with those of 1898, except as regards the particular territories
affected.
3. The territories of which the revenues might be pledged as security for a
British loan under the agreement o f 1898, with all the consequences therein set out
— which rem ain exactly the same in the new convention— were :—
(i) The province of Mozambique south of the Zam bezi, as well as that part of
the same province lying on the left bank of the Zam bezi above its
confluence with the S h ire; and
(ii) The portion of the province of Angola comprised within the limits described
as fo llo w s : the northern frontier shall run from the coast along the
8th parallel of south latitude to the 16th degree of longitude east of
G reenw ich; thence it shall descend that degree to the 9th parallel of
latitude, and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as the frontier
of the Congo Free State. The southern frontier shall start from a point
on the coast 5 English miles north of Egito, and shall run thence due
east to the eastern frontier of the province of Angola. The western
frontier shall be the s e a ; the eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit
of the province of Angola.

4. The territories of which the revenues might similarly be pledged as security

for a German loan were :—
(i) The rem aining parts of the provinces of Mozambique and A ngola; and
(ii) The Portuguese part o f the island of Timor.
5. The exact geographical changes effected in the above arrangement by the
present convention— these being the only substantive alteration made in the
agreement— will be readily understood by com paring the above descriptions with the
corresponding provisions in the revised and substituted text. The com parison wi
facilitated by a reference to the annexed sketch m ap .(‘ )
6. It will be seen t h a t :—
(i) In Mozambique, the dividing line has been deflected to the north [o f the
port, and a large portion of the district, of Quelim ane] ; whilst
(*) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 509

(ii)
In Angola, the central belt of territory extending eastwards from the sea, as
defined in the agreement of 1898, of which the revenues might have been
pledged as security for a British loan, is replaced by an inland zone
running from north to south along the western border of Rhodesia.
(iii) The rights which, as stated above in § 4, were, under the form er
agreement, reserved to Germ any as regards Portuguese Tim or, are now
abandoned, both Germany and Great Britain having agreed to recognise
the right of pre-em ption acquired by the Netherlands in virtue o f a treaty
concluded by that State with Portugal in 1893, to which their attention had
not been drawn at the time when the agreement of 1898 was negotiated:
(iv) To counterbalance the inclusion o f Portuguese Tim or in the self-denying
declaration made by Germany in article 6, Great Britain extends the scope
o f the self-denying declaration made on her part in the same article, to
the islands of San Thom e and Principe, which did not figure in the
agreement of 1S98.
E . A. C.
January 13, 1913.

No. 326.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B ertie. (*)

P.O. 367 340.
6856/1165, 13 436.
(No. 11.) Africa. Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.
M. Cambon said to-day that statements had appeared in the Press that there
was to be an International Conference about African questions, and that the idea
of this Conference was attributed to me.
I said that there was no truth in any such report, and that I had not even
seen the report. It was true that the Portuguese, when we were discussing with them
the conditions of labour in some of their African Colonies, had thrown out a suggestion
for an International Conference as regards labour recruiting in A frica ; but I had told
Sir Arthur Hardinge to discourage the idea.
M . Cambon then said that the report had been connected with a rumour that
we were negotiating some thing with Germ any about African Colonies, and that we
intended to publish it; but surely the publication of anything such as our Agreement
of 1898 with Germ any would have great disadvantages?
I said that it would no doubt have disadvantages, but the disadvantages o f trying
to keep the Agreem ent secret were becom ing greater every year. I explained to him
generally what these disadvantages were. I said that we were discussing with Germany
a revision o f the spheres of interest in Portuguese Colonies which had been arranged
in 1898, but we had not yet made a new Agreem ent on this point. I f we did make
one, as was quite possible, we should consider the question of its publication.
M. Cambon said that, apparently, our Agreem ent with Germ any was for a
reciprocal right of pre-em ption over Portuguese African Colonies if Portugal parted
with them.
I said that this was practically the effect of the Agreem ent.
[ I am. &c.J
E . G [R E Y ].

(O [T h is despa tch w as rep ea ted to L isb on (N o. 31 A fric a ). A cop y was sent to th e C olonia l
Office.]
 510

N o. 327.

Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Eduard G rey.

F.O. 367/340.
8 39 2 /1 1 6 5/13 /4 3 6 .
Private.
M y dear Sir Edward, Lisbon, February 18, 1913.
Senkor Costa has been at me again about the publication o f the Treaty of W indsor,
in reference to the newspaper telegrams reporting a revision, or an impending
publication in their present form of the Agreements of 1898. I have told him as I
had already told Dr. Vasconelles that this matter has been for some time past under
consideration, and that if the German treaties were published that of W indsor would
I thought be published with them.
He intimated that he would propose to Parliament the ratification of the Treaty
of W in d sor./1) This was not thought necessary by the contem porary Portuguese
G ov [ern m en ]t as it was deemed to be a reaffirmation of ancient treaties, and not a
new one, in any essential respect. But under the legislation of the Republic it might
be thought preferable that it s [h o u l]d be passed and ratified in Parliament, and this
he said would of course be done with enthusiasm. H e spoke very strongly as to the
unanimity of Portuguese feeling against the alienation of any colonial territory

P ortu g u ese M in ister and o f w hat I w rote upon tha t. T he T rea ty o f W in d sor ca n n ot be
b rou g h t b efore the P ortu g u ese P a rlia m en t till it is published.
E. G.

(!) [F o r the m isuse o f the term “ T rea ty o f W in d so r ” v. supra, pp. 483-4, E d. N o t e .]

( 2) [T h e rest o f th e le tte r deals w ith p r iv a te m a tters.]

No. 328.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . G osch en .i1)

F.O. 367 '340.

8 59 2 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 .
(No.
Sir,

this day addressed to H [is ] M [a jes ty ’ s] Minister at L isb on /2) relating to two
conversations which have taken place here with the Portuguese Minister on the subject
o f the Anglo-G erm an Secret Agreem ents of 1898 and the Anglo-Portuguese Secret
Treaty of 1899.(3)
Herr v [o n ] Kiihlm aun was inform ed to-d ay,/4) by m y instructions, of the
Portuguese M inister’ s enquiry, with the omission however of all reference to the Anglo-
Portuguese Agreem ent o f 1899. It was explained to him that M. Gomes had been told
that there was no question of an A frican con feren ce; that it was true discussions were

(*) [T h is despatch was rep eated to L isb on (N o. 38 A fr ic a ).]

( 2) [v . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t.]
( 3) [v. G ooch T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 71-5, Nos. 9 0-2, encls., and pp. 9 3-4, N o 118.]
0) [cp . G .P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 3 0 -1 .]
 511

taking place with Germany as to a slight revision of the agreement of 1898, but that
this did not affect the principle of that agreement or change the position of Portugal
thereunder; that H [is ] M [a je s ty 's] G [ov em m en t] saw no objection to the Portuguese
G ov[ern m en ]t repeating the declaration made in March 1912 (referred to in Y [o u r]
E [xcellen cy’ s j despatch No. 126 of the 15th March ,(s) and that, whilst nothing had so
far been decided as to the publication of the Anglo-Germ an Agreem ent, I adhered to
m y n e w which, generally speaking, was in favour o f the publication of all agreements
whenever possible.
[I am. Ac.
E . G R E Y .]
(5) [p. supra, pp . 444—5, N o. 279, and enr/.]

No. 329.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir .4. Hardinge.
P.O. 367 340.
8592 1165 13 436.
No. 36. Africa. Secret.
Sir. Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.
The Portuguese Minister called at the F oreign Office on the 19th inst ant] and
communicated a long telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Lisbon
■translating from the Portuguese text in his hand . From this it appeared that the
Portuguese G o v [e m m e n ]t were seriously alarmed owing to the reports which had
reached them from Berlin, referred to in your desp[atch~ No. 19 Africa of the
15th i n s t a n t ] ,! 1) to the effect that G [r e a ]t Britain and Germany were engaged in
negotiations for the revision and extension of the Secret Agreement of 1898 and that
HTis] M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] proposed, as soon as the Balkan crisis was over to
call together an international conference for the consideration of general African
questions. M. Gomes implied that these reports had reached his G ov [e m m e n ]t
mainly through German and French newspapers and that the German newspapers
also foreshadowed the immediate publication in England o f the 1898 agreem ent, under
which important rights were acquired by Germany.
In view of these alarming rumours, the Portuguese G o v e r n m e n t were anxious
to make a statement to the Parliament at L isbon, and the Portuguese Minister begged
for authorization for such a statement.(2)
It was explained to M. Gom es, firstly, that there was no foundation whatever for
the statement that H [is ] M fa jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t intended to call an African
conference. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had already spoken to you on
the subject and you had received authority to give H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] this assurance
and there was no objection to the statement being categorically contradicted in the
Portuguese Parliament.
As M. Teixeira Gomes had alluded to the forthcom ing blue-book on the contract-
labour in the Portuguese Colonies, which, he presum ed, would include the text of the
Anglo-German agreement of 1898, he was told, secondly, that the papers laid before
Parliament would be strictly confined to the labour question. H e was also reminded
of the inform ation confidentially given to the Portuguese G ov [e m m e n ]t first in 189S
and again last year (m y desp[atch] No. 30, Africa. Secret, of the 29th F e b [r u a r y ],(3)
and your d esp[ateh] No. 17 Africa of March 8th ,(4) as to the general outline and
principle of the Agreem ents, which dealt with the contingency of a loan being raised
outside Portugal on the security of her colonial revenues. England and Germany
0 ) [S ir A . H a rd in g e ’ s despatch (N o. 19 A fr ic a ), D . F eb ru a ry 15, R . F eb ru a ry 21, 1913, is
not rep rod u ced , as the con ten ts are sufficientlv in d ic a te d above. (F .O . 36i 334. ?252 2 86 /
1 3 ,4 3 6 .)] ‘ . . .
(2) [c p S ir A. H a rd in g e 's p r iv a te le tte r to S ir E d w a rd G rey. r. supra, p. 510. N o. 327.]
(s) [r . supra, pp . 437-8. N o. 273.]
(4) [r . supra, pp. 439-40, N o. 275.]
 512

were naturally interested in preventing the establishment o f financial control in the

Portuguese Colonies by third Powers. The agreement therefore contem plated, as the
Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t were aware, such loans being in the first instance negotiated
in England and Germany, as the pledging of the revenues in certain of the Portuguese
Colonies affected principally British interests, whilst the pledging of those in other
colonies affected German interests.
M. Gomes said he was quite familiar with this aspect o f the question.
It was explained to him , thirdly, that all that was passing with the German
G ov [e rn m en ]t now was a rearrangement of the territorial division of the provinces, the
pledging of whose revenues were of special interest to G [r e a ]t Britain and Germany
respectively. In so far as the 1898 agreement affected Portugal and her relations
with G [r e a ]t Britain and Germany, no change whatever was now contem plated; the
proposed revision only affected the relative position of G [r e a ]t Britain and Germany.
M . Gomes was asked to consider this statement as a strictly private and personal one,
which he c [o u l]d not be authorized to report to his G ov [ern m en ]t until the matter had
been referred to me. There was however no objection to the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t
repeating in their P a rl[iam en ]t the general statement made with the concurrence of
the British and German G ov [ern m en ]ts in March last,(5) if, as the Minister had said,
the P o rtu g u e s e ] G ov [ern m en ]t desired to do so.
As regards the question of publication, M. Teixeira-Gomes expressed the hope
that if the Anglo-Germ an Agreem ent were published the Anglo-Portuguese agreement
o f 1899 w [o u l]d be made public sim ultaneously. He asked whether it was true that
I wished to publish the 1899 Treaty and was inform ed in reply that the public state­
m ents I had made in the House of Commons had made it clear that I favoured
generally the publication of international agreements whenever possible, but that
nothing could be said about this particular instance then. Obviously a secret agreement
c [o u l]d in no case be published except with the assent of the several parties to it. I f
therefore the question o f publishing the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 arose, it
w [o u l]d have to be discussed with the German G ov [ern m en ]t. The M inister’ s
suggestion as to the publication of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899 would however
be referred to me.
The Portuguese Minister finally declared that his G ov [ern m en ]t had asked for an
immediate telegraphic reply as they were much embarrassed in meeting their
Chambers whilst these rumours were abroad. He therefore asked how much of what
had been told him he might telegraph to Lisbon at once. He was inform ed that he
might certainly telegraph to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs :
(1) that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] have not proposed and do not
contemplate proposing an African C onference;
(2) that there is no objection to the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t now repeating, as
still applicable, the statement which the British and German G o v e r n ­
m e n t s authorized Senhor Vasconcellos to make last y e a r(5) ;
(3) that the forthcom ing P arl[iam en tar]y Paper will contain no reference
whatever to the agreement made with Germany in 1898.
It was made plain, however, that the questions resp [ectin ]g the reported revision
o f that agreement and of its possible publication, as also the publication of the Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty of October 14th, 1899. required reference to me and further
consideration.
After considering the matter I have authorized a further statement of our views
to be made to the Portuguese Minister, and he has to-day been inform ed verbally that
there is nothing in the revision of the agreements of 1898 which changes the character
of the original and that it is confined to changes such as have already been described
to h i m : that I consider secret agreements inconvenient and desire generally to
publish them when possible, but that no decision in this case has yet been come to
(5) [u. supra, pp. 438-9, N o. 274, and m in. an d n o te (3) ; pp. 444-5, N o. 279, and en cl.
pp. 448-51, N o. 282, en cl.]
 513
respecting publication : and that, if it is decided to publish any of these agreements,
they will be com m [unicate]d first to the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t for their infor­
mation. M . Gomes was also told that I have always held and still hold that the
agreement of 1898 with Germany, or any revision of it, should not be published
without the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 1899, and vice versa, and he was asked
to impress upon Senhor M adeira that this was a confidential statement for his own
information and not for publication by the Portuguese Governm ent.
[ I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 330.

Sir A . Hardinge to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

F.O. 367 340.
9 9 0 1 /1 1 6 5/13 /4 3 6 .
(No. 21.) Africa. Lisbon, D. F ebruary 25, 1913.
Sir, E . March 3, 1913.
In m y despatch No. 16 o f this series of the 13th instant,(2) I referred to the
rumours in the Lisbon Press with regard to the intention of Great Britain, Germany
and other Powers to hold a Conference at the Hague for the consideration o f various
colonial questions, and to the fears expressed here as to the possible effects on the
Portuguese colonial possessions of the decisions which might be come to at such an
international gathering. These rumours have been made the most o f by the
Opposition Press, and the Government have consequently thought it necessary to
make a statement on the subject, which took the form of a reply made yesterday
by Senhor M adeira in the Chamber of Deputies to an interpellation addressed to him
by Senhor Joao de Menezes, a prominent m ember of the Unionist party, who was
Minister of Marine in the Chagas Cabinet.
Senhor Menezes said that he did not wish to be indiscreet, but that the statements
published by several foreign and some Portuguese newspapers necessitated some
statement bv the Government on two points, (1) as to the negotiations for a Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, and (2\ as to the reports concerning
negotiations between Germany and Great Britain with regard to Portuguese interests.
° In replying, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked his questioner for the
spirit in which he had approached this matter, and for the opportunity thus afforded
to the speaker to contradict malignant rumours. As to the first question, neither the
Portuguese nor the British Governments had delayed the commercial negotiations.
Senhor Bernadino Machado had even proposed a “ modus vivendi,” such as he had
negotiated with France and I t a ly ; but a Treaty was preferred, and negotiations had
steadily continued to that end. 'O n the 17th instant he had sent a long Note to the
British Legation in reply to the British counter-proposals.
As to the second point, His E xcellency said that it was quite true that the
foreign Press had spoken of a Conference at the Hague under Anglo-G erm an auspices,
the discussions at which, it was said, would affect Portuguese interests, integrity and
sovereignty. There were, m oreover, rumours as to Anglo-G erm an negotiations
concerning Colonial matters affecting Portugal.
Once and for all he would most form ally and categorically contradict such false
reports, spread by enemies of the Republic. Senhor M adeira then made the following
statement, according to the reports in this m orning’ s Press :—
‘ ‘ W ith the express sanction of the Cabinets of L ondon and Berlin I confirm
the declaration of m y illustrious predecessor, Dr. Augusto de asconcellos, made
( ' ) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g .]
( 2) [S ir A . H a rd in g e ’ s despatch (X o . 16 A fr ic a ), D . F eb ru a ry 13, R . F eb ru a ry 17, 1913, is
not rep rod u ced , as the con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F.O . 3 67/334. 7 5 5 4 '2 8 6 /
13 436.)]
[10900] 2 L
 514

in this House in the session o f March 15th, 1912,(3) and I make to m y country
the following categorical declarations :—
(1) The English Governm ent neither thinks, nor has thought o f proposing
or accepting any International Conference on Colonial matters.
(2) The English Governm ent recognises that its sentiments for us, its allies,
do not permit of its making any Treaty, Convention or agreement of a like
nature, which in any way could affect our Sovereignty or Integrity, or our
Colonies.
(3) There does not exist between England and Germany any Treaty,
Convention or Agreem ent of this nature, nor are any negotiations in this sense
pending.
(4) The German Government is not considering the holding of any
International Conference to deal with Colonial questions and rejects the idea that
it has thought of affecting in any manner our Sovereign rights.”
These declarations were loudly applauded, and Senhor Joao de Menezes expressed
his pleasure at hearing them, and his recognition of the services rendered the country
by the Portuguese Minister in London.
Senhor M adeira told me a few days ago that he had received a very satisfactory
report from Senhor Gomes of a conversation on this subject with Sir Eyre Crowe,
which had contained the statements made by me to him, as reported in my despatch
No. 16, and had entirely dispelled any doubts in his mind as to the existence of
Anglo-G erm an negotiations about the Portuguese Colonies such as those suggested by
the Opposition Press at Lisbon. M y German colleague tells me that the Portuguese
Minister at Berlin has made similar enquiries of Herr von Jagow, and has been
assured that nothing has taken place to m odify the situation described by Senhor
Vasconcellos last year. It is doubtless these statements which H is E xcellency had in
mind when he referred to his ability to confirm, with the express assent of the Cabinets
o f London and Berlin, the declarations on this subject already made by his
predecessor.
I have, &c.
A R T H U R H . IIA R D IN G E .
M IN U T E S .
I do n ot th in k w e need pu rsu e th is m a tter w ith th e P ortu g u ese G overn m en t fu rth er at
present.
E . A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 5.
W e had b e tte r leave th e m a tter a lon e— b u t I do n ot view the results o f th e p u b lica tion of
the new T rea ty w ith com p la cen cy.
A. N.
E . G.

(3) [a. supra, pp. 438-9, No. 274, and min. and n ote (3) ; pp. 444-5, N o. 279, and e n d
pp. 448-51, No. 282, e n d .]

No. 331.

Prince Lichnowshy to Sir Edward G rey.M

F.O. 367 340.
130 7 6 /1 1 65 '1 3 /4 3 6 .
(Confidential.) German E m bassy, London,
Dear Sir Edward, March 18, 1913.
I have m uch pleasure in putting before you herewith enclosed an amended draft
of the fresh convention to replace our agreements of 1898 and some further proposals
relating to the same matter.
( ’ ) \rp. tr.P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 3 9 -4 1 ; cp. also H e r r von J a g o w ’ s in stru ction s o f M arch 14,
1913, ihicl., pp. 3 2-7. This letter is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to th e C a b in e t;
to M r. H a rc o u rt, and to L isbon on J u n e 19.]
 515

The changes suggested by the Im perial Government have been marked in red ink
both in the German and English text of the Draft Convention. The suggested changes
are as follows :
In Article 2 the words “ or Likungo ” and “ or Luzhella ” are to be left out. as
Stanford’ s Map of Africa does not m ention these names.
In the same article the words “ thence due North ” to be replaced by the words
“ thence along the meridian of that source.” This wording is suggested because it
seems doubtful whether this source is actually north or south of the 16th parallel.
In the same article the words “ the 11th parallel of south latitude ” should be replaced
by “ the Kassai R iver.” The river makes in the opinion of our experts a better
frontier line than the suggested parallel. In form er conversations the river has several
times been mentioned as boundary.
In article 6 it is suggested to leave o u t : “ or of the Portuguese part of the Island
of Timor ” and : " o r in that island.”
Considering that by the stipulation of Article 10 all the arrangements of 1898
shall be abrogated by the present treaty, there seems to be no necessity to mention
Tim or in the article.
As concerns paragraph 1 of Article 7 the Imperial Government would prefer to
see it embodied in the Convention as it stands.
Finally it is proposed to insert after Article 9 a new Article 10, which would run
as follows :
“ 10. Dem gegenwärtigen Abkomm en hat Stanford’ s Library [Map of Africa,
London 1911 zu Grunde gelegen. Es besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass das
nördlich des Kongo gelegene Gebiet von Cabinda ein Teil von Angola ist und unter
die Angola betreffenden Abm achungen des gegenwärtigen Abkommens fällt.” *
( “ I n drafting the present agreement, “ Stanford’ s Map of Africa, London
1911 ” has been used as basis. It is understood that the territory o f Cabinda
forms part of Angola and that all stipulations of the present treaty referring to Angola
shall equally apply to Cabinda.’ ’ )
The last two paragraphs^’ which remain unchanged would then be Articles 11
and 12.
The Imperial Government have felt considerable misgivings as to the effect a
publication of the present treaty may have. It considers that it can only overcom e its
great reluctance to accept the principle of publication if His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
agrees to supplementary arrangements which are necessary for assuring in cases not
sufficiently covered by the existing conventions com plete harm ony in the action of the
H igh Contracting Parties.
They are proposed as follows :
I. Zw ischen den Vertragschi ¡essenden besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass
durch die Vereinbarung in Artikel 7 (1) die beiden Regierungen nicht gehindert sein
sollen, falls ihre Interessen in den Teilen des portugiesischen Kolonialbesitzes, deren
Zolleinnahm en ihnen zugewiesen sind, durch Misswirtschaft der portugiesischen
Kolonialverwaltung bedroht sein sollten, diese Interessen dort nötigenfalls im W ege
der Selbsthilfe wahrzunehmen. E in solches Vorgehen soll jedoch nur nach vorheriger
gegenseitiger Benachrichtigung erfolgen. Die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung
erkennt an, dass in einem solchen Falle die portugiesische Regierung nicht berechtigt
sein würde, die Bündnisverträge anzurufen, oder englische H ilfe zu erwarten.
II. Zw ischen den Vertragschliessenden besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass,
falls eine der in diesem Abkomm en erwähnten portugiesischen Kolonien oder ein Teil
einer solchen sich selbständig erklären sollte, alle Vereinbarungen dieses Abkomm ens

* N o t e : As a m a tter o f conven ien ce, a tra n sla tion of th e proposed a rticle is g iv en , b u t the
G erm an te x t m ust be con sid ered th e official w ord in g .
(2) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l co m m e n t: “ ? a rticles .” ]
[10900] 2 L 2
 516
voll in Kraft bleiben. Insbesondere soll, falls eine der in Hede stehenden portu­
giesischen Kolonien, nachdem sie selbständig geworden ist, sich ganz oder zum Teil
einer der beiden vertragschliessenden Mächte oder einer ihrer Kolonien anschliessen
sollte, die andere vertragschliessende Macht ihrerseits berechtigt sein, nach vorheriger
Benachrichtigung der ersteren, sich die ihr durch dieses Abkommen zugewiesenen
Teile anzugliedern.
Die Königlich Grossbritannische Regierung erkennt an, dass ihre Bündnisver­
träge mit der portugiesischen Regierung auf den Fall der Selbständigmachung des
portugiesischen Kolonialbesitzes keine Anwendung finden.*
(Article I. Between the high contracting parties it is agreed that the first
paragraph of Article 7 shall not prevent them to resort, if necessity should arise for
the protection of their interests, to self-help, if in those parts of the Portuguese
colonies assigned to their respective loans their interest should be threatened in
consequence of the misrule of the Portuguese administration. But it is understood
that no such action shall be taken without previously inform ing the other Govern­
ment. The two Governments agree that in case of such intervention, the Portuguese
Government would have no right to invoke its treaties with Great Britain or expect
from her any help whatsoever.
Article 2. It is agreed between the high contracting parties that should a
Portuguese colony or part of a colony mentioned in this convention declare herself
independent all the stipulations of the present convention remain in full force. If
any of the colonies above mentioned after the declaration of her independence^) should
declare her annexation to one of the high contracting parties or to one of the
D om inions or colonies of one of the high contracting parties the other shall, after
having previously inform ed the other of the high contracting parties, be entitled to
assimilate her sphere defined in this convention.(4)
H is M a je s t[y ]’ s Government agrees that the alliance with the Portuguese
Republic wrould not apply to colonies or part of colonies which have declared(s) their
independence.)

The Im perial Government is of opinion that the first of those articles could be
arranged by exchange of N otes; as for the second, it may be preferable to em body it
in the convention as a special article of this instrument. Both should be communicated
to the Portuguese Government.
Yours sincerely,
LIC H N O W SKY.

Enclosure in No. 331.

Draft C onvention.(6) (Übersetzung.)

(Confidential.)
In view of the possibility that Portugal
may require financial assistance from
some foreign Power or Powers, and in
order to obviate the international com -
plications w'hich such a condition of
things may produce, and to preserve her
integrity and independence, the under-
Vertrags-Entwurf.
Im H inblick auf die Möglichkeit, dass
Portugal die finanzielle Unterstützung
einer oder mehrerer frem den Mächte in
Anspruch nehmen könnte, und um
etwaigen aus einer derartigen Sachlage
entstehenden internationalen Verwicke-
lungen vorzubeugen, und um Portugals

* N o t e : As a m a tter o f con v en ien ce, a tra n slation o f the proposed a rticles is giv en , but it is
u n d erstood th a t it is the G erm an te x t w hich is to be con sid ered as the official w ord in g.
( 3) [ C orrected in pen cil by S ir E. C r o w e : “ it has becom e in d ep en d en t.” ]
( 4) [C orrected in pen cil by S ir E. C r o w e : “ be en titled to an n ex those p ortion s o f such
colon y as are assigned to it un d er the present co n v e n tio n .” ]
( s) [C orrected in p e n c il: “ esta blished.” ]
(®) [T h e w ords deleted in the t e x t an d those in ita lics rep resen t the om issions and a d d ition s
suggested by P rin ce L ichnow sky ]
 517
Draft Convention — (contd.U
signed, duly authorised by their respective
Sovereigns, have agreed as fo llo w s :—
1. (1.) W henever either the British or
the German Government is of opinion
that it is expedient to accede to a request
for an advance of m oney to Portugal on
the security of the customs revenues or
other revenues of Mozambique or Angola,
it shall communicate the fact to the other
Government, and the other Government
shall have the right to advance a part of
the total sum required.
(•2.1 In the event of the other
Government signifying its intention to
exercise this right, the two Governments
shall consult as to the terms of the two
loans, and these loans shall be issued on
the security of the customs revenues of
Mozambique and Angola as near as
possible simultaneously. The loans shall
bear as near as possible the same propor­
tion to each other as the amounts of the
customs revenues respectively assigned as
their security.
(3.) The loans shall be issued on
terms as favourable to Portugal as the
condition of the m oney market and the
security of the loans permit, and shall
in other respects be subject as near as
possible to similar conditions.
2. In the contingency contemplated in
the preceding article, the customs
revenues of that portion of the province
of Mozambique lying south of a line
starting from the mouth of the River
Lukugu, er -tilrHseoT running thence
along that river to its confluence with the
River Lugera, or L «*bella. thence along
that river to its source, thence 4u e a orfh
along the meridian of that source to the.
16th parallel of south latitude, and thence
along that parallel to the boundary of
the British protectorate of Nyassaland, as
also the customs revenues of the portions
of the province of Angola lying to the
east of the 20th meridian of east longi-
Vertrags-Enticurf— (Fortsetzung).
Integrität und Unabhängigkeit zu er­
halten, sind die mit gehörigen
Vollmachten ihrer hohen Souveräne
versehenen Unterzeichneten über Nach­
stehendes übereingekommen :—
1. (1.) Sobald entweder die Deutsche
Oder die Grossbritannische Regierung es
für angezeigt hält, dem Ersuchen um ein
Portugal zu gewährendes Darlehen gegen
Verpfändung der Zoll- oder sonstigen
Einnahm en von Mocambique oder
Angola Folge zu geben, wird sie von
dieser Tatsache der anderen Regierung
Mitteilung machen, und die andere
Regierung soll das Recht haben, einen
Teil der gewünschten Gesamtsumme
darzuleihen.
(2) Für den Fall, dass die andere
Regierung die Absicht, von diesem
Rechte Gebrauch zu machen, kund gibt,
werden beide Regierungen über die
Bedingungen der beiden Anleihen
beraten, und die beiden Anleihen werden
gegen Verpfändung der Zolleinnahm en
von Mocambique und Angola möglichst
gleichzeitig zur Ausgabe gelangen. Die
Anleihen sollen so genau als m öglich in
demselben Verhältnis zu einander stehen,
wie die für jede derselben als Sicherheit
zugewiesenen Zolleinnahm en sich ihrer
Höhe nach zu einander verhalten.
(3 :) Die Anleihen sollen zu B edin­
gungen ausgegeben werden, die für
Portugal so günstig sind, wie es die Lage
des Geldmarktes und die Sicherheit der
Anleihen gestattet, und sollen im übrigen
soweit als möglich gleichartigen Bedin­
gungen unterliegen.
2. Bei Eintritt der in dem vorste­
henden Artikel vorgesehenen Umstände
sollen die Zolleinnalim en desjenigen
Teiles der Provinz Mocambique, welcher
südlich einer Linie liegt, die von der
Mündung des Lukugu o d e r -Likm igo
ausgeht, dann diesen Flnss entlang läuft
bis zur Einm ündung des Lugera o d er
Lua!»i4k:T dann dem letzteren Flusse bis
zuseiner Quelle folgt, dann
nÖFdheh entlang dem Meridian dieser
Quelle bis zum 16,,n Grad südlicher
Breite läuft und schliesslich diesen
Breitengrad bis zur Grenze des britischen
Nyassaland-Protektorates folgt, sowie die
Zolleinnahm en desjenigen Teiles von
 518
Draft Convention— contd.t.
tude and south of the 14th pa-ralle! o f
snnth latitude the Kassai River, shall
be assigned to the British loa n ; whilst
the customs revenues of the remaining
parts of the provinces of Mozambique and
Angola shall be assigned to the German
loan.
3. In the event of Great Britain
Germany sending delegates to take note
of the collection of the revenues, which
are the security for their respective loans,
the Portuguese Government shall be
asked to give such delegates rights of
inspection only, hut no rights of adminis­
tration, interference, or control, so long
as there is no default in the payment of
interest or sinking fund.
4. In case of default in the payment of
the interest or sinking fund of either loan,
it shall be agreed with the Portuguese
Government that they will hand over the
administration of the various custom ­
houses in the two provinces : those
assigned for the German loan to
Germany, those assigned for the British
loan to Great Britain.
5. (1.) In the contingency contem ­
plated in the preceding article all rights,
whether British or German, acquired, in
the provinces affected, before the date of
this convention shall be fully safeguarded,
provided they are of a purely private
character and convey neither political
rights nor territorial or administrative
jurisdiction.
(2.) It is well understood that no
influence will be used in the future either
by the British or the German G overn­
ment to obtain fresh concessions except
in those portions of the provinces of
which the customs revenues would be
assigned to their respective loans under
the present convention.
6. From the date of the conclusion
the present convention Great Britain will
Vertrags-Entrcurf— (Fortsetzung^
Angola, welcher östlich vom 20"
Meridian östlicher Länge und südlich
vom 4 4 ''n i-ira-4 4+dliiAeF B ren e Kassai-
Fluss liegt, dem britischen Darlehen
zugewiesen w erd en ; dagegen sollen die
Zolleinkünfte der übrigen Teile der
Provinzen Mocambique und Angola dem
deutschen Darlehen zugewiesen werden.
or 3. Im Falle dass Deutschland oder
Grossbritannien Delegierte entsenden,
um die Erhebung der für die Sicherheit
der betreffenden Anleihen verpfändeten
E innahm en zu beaufsichtigen, soll die
portugiesische Legierung ersncht werden,
diesen Delegierten nur Inspektions­
befugnisse zu geben, jedoch keine Bec-hte
in Bezug auf Verwaltung, Einmischung
oder Kontrolle, solange in der Zins- oder
Amortisationszahlung keine Unregelmäs­
sigkeit eintritt.
4. Für den Fall einer Unregelmässig­
keit in der Zins- oder Amortisations­
zahlung einer der beiden Anleihen, soll
mit der portugiesischen Legierung
vereinbart werden, dass sie die Verwal­
tung der verschiedenen Zollstellen in den
beiden Provinzen abgibt, und zwar die
der deutschen Anleihe zugewiesenen
Zollstellen an Deutschland, die der
englischen Anleihe zugewiesenen an
Grossbritannien.
5. (1.) Bei Eintritt der im vorherge­
henden Artikel vorgesehenen Umstände
sollen alle Bpchte, seien es deutsche oder
britische, welche vor dem Tage des
Abschlusses dieses Abkomm ens in den
in Frage kommenden Provinzen er­
worben worden sind, aufrecht erhalten
werden, vorausgesetzt, dass sie e in e [n ]
rein privaten Charakter besitzen und
weder politische Kechte noch territoriale
oder administrative Gerichtsbarkeit in
sich schliessen.
(2.) Es herrscht Einverständnis da­
rüber, dass künftig weder die deutsche
noch die britische L egierung ihren
Einfluss zur Erlangung neuer K on­
zessionen benützen wird, es sei denn in
denjenigen Teilen der Provinzen, deren
Zolleinnahm en nach dem gegenwärtigen
Abkomm en den betreffenden Darlehen
zugewiesen werden würden.
of G. Vom Datum des Abschlusses des
gegenwärtigen Abkomm ens ab wird sich
 519
Draft Convention— contd. .
abstain from advancing a n y claim of
whatsoever kind to the possession,
occupation, or control, of those portions
o f the Portuguese provinces in which the
customs revenues would under the
present convention be assigned to
Germany, or o f the islands of San Thom e
and Principe, or to the exercise of
political influence in those territories, or
islancis: and Germany will in like manner
abstain from advancing any claim of
whatsoever kind to the possession, occupa­
tion, or control, of those portions of the
Portuguese provinces in which the
customs revenues would under the present
convention be assigned to Great Britain,
er eT the -J-Weuguet-e p a « the- island
e f T im er, or to the exercise of political
influence in those territories i s fhae
island
7. (1. In the event of either Govern­
ment obtaining from the Portuguese
Government a cession of territory, or the
concession o f special privileges not of an
occasional character, in those portions of
the provinces of Mozambique or Angola
of which the customs revenues would be
assigned to it. such cessions of territory
or concessions of privileges shall not
become operative until analogous grants
as near as possible of equal value have
been accorded to the other Government
in those portions o f the provinces of
which the customs revenues would be
assigned to it by the present convention.
(2. In case either Government
applies for special privileges of an
occasional character in those portions of
the Portuguese provinces of which the
customs revenues would I assigned to it
under the present convention, it shall im ­
mediately inform the other Government,
and, if these privileges are granted, and
if the other Government should so dtsire,
shall use its influence to obtain for the
other Government similar special privi­
leges of an occasional character and of
equal value.
S. Great Britain and Germany, having
Vertrags-Entw urf— Fortsetzung^.
Grossbritannien enthalten, irgend einen
Anspruch zu erheben auf Besitz, Beset­
zung, Kontrolle oder Ausübung politi­
schen Einflusses in den Teilen der
portugiesischen Provinzen, in welchen
die Zolleinnahm en nach dem gegen­
wärtigen Abkomm en Deutschland zu­
gewiesen werden würden, oder auf den
Inseln San Thome und P rin cip e:
Deutschland wird sich in gleicher Weise
enthalten, einen Anspruch irgend
welcher Art auf Besitz, Besetzung,
Kontrolle oder politischen Einfluss in
den Teilen der portugiesischen Provinzen
zu erheben, in welchen die Zollein­
nahm en nach dem gegenwärtigen
Abkomm en England zugewiesen werden
würden, «d er auf den p e rtu g iesisehe «
-Teil 4eF -De-el T i « « ? .
7. 1. Für den Fall, dass eine der
beiden Regierungen von der portugiesi­
schen Regierung eine Gebietsabtretung
oder die Einräum ung besonderer Privi­
legien nicht gelegentlicher Natur
erlangen sollte, in denjenigen Teilen der
Provinzen Mocambique oder Angola,
deren Zolleinnahm en dieser Regierung
zugewiesen werden würden, so sollen
derartige Gebietsabtretungen oder E in ­
räumungen von Privilegien nicht eher in
Wirksamkeit treten, als bis entspre­
chende Zugeständnisse von möglichst
gleichem W erte der anderen Regierung
in denjenigen Teilen der Provinzen
eingeräumt worden sind, deren Zollein­
nahmen ihr durch das gegenwärtige
Abkomm en zugewiesen werden würden.
•2. Für den Fall, dass eine der
beiden Regierungen besondere Privilegien
gelegentlicher Natur in denjenigen Teilen
der portugiesischen Provinzen nachsucht,
deren Zolleinkünfte ihr nach dem gegen­
wärtigen Abkommen zugeteilt werden
würden, wird sie unverzüglich die andere
Regierung benachrichtigen und wird,
wenn diese Privilegien bewilligt werden
und wenn die andere Regierung dies
wünschen sollte, ihren Einfluss dahin
geltend machen, um für die andere
Regierung gleichartige besondere Privi­
legien gelegentlicher Natur und von
gleichem W ert zu erlangen.
S. Mit Rücksicht darauf, dass die In-
 Draft Convention— (contd.).
regard to the interests of their respective
possessions in South Africa contiguous
to the Portuguese provinces of Angola
and Mozambique, which would be
materially affected by the intervention
of any third Power in those provinces,
agree jointly to oppose such intervention,
whether by way of loan to Portugal on
the security of the revenues of the said
provinces, or by way of acquisition of
territory by grant, cession, purchase,
lease, or otherwise.
9. In so far as Great Britain
Germ any may hereafter influence or
control the administration o f Mozambique
or Angola or any portion of those
provinces, it is understood that the
subjects, and natives of the protectorates,
o f one contracting party, together with
their goods and ships, and also the
produce and the manufactures o f its
dominions, possessions, colonies, and
protectorates, shall, in such portions of
the territories comprised in the present
convention as may fall under the
influence or control of the other con­
tracting party, participate in all the
prerogatives, exemptions, and privileges
with regard to trade, com m erce, taxation,
and navigation which are there enjoyed
by the subjects, and natives of the pro­
tectorates, of the other contracting party.
10. In drafting the present agreem ent
“ Stanford's Map of Africa, London
1911 ” has been used as a basis. It is
understood that the territory o f Cabinda
form s part o f Angola and that all stipula­
tions o f the present treaty referring to
Angola shall equally apply to Cabinda.
IQ. 11. The present convention, duly
ratified, shall replace as between the con ­
tracting Powers the convention, secret
convention, and secret note concluded
and signed in London on the 30th August,
1898, which are hereby abrogated.
Vertrags-Entw urf— (Fortsetzung),
teressen ihrer beiderseitigen, an die
portugiesischen Provinzen Angola und
Mocambique angrenzenden Besitzungen
in Süd-Afrika durch die Einm ischung
einer dritten Macht wesentlich beein­
trächtigt werden würden, kommen
Deutschland und Grossbritannien dahin
überein, jeder derartigen Einmischung
vereint entgegenzutreten, sei es dass
diese Einm ischung erfolgte auf dem
W ege einer Anleihe an Portugal auf die
Sicherheit der Einkünfte aus diesen
Provinzen, oder auf dem W ege der
Landerwerbung, durch Verleihung, Ab­
tretung, Kauf, Pacht, oder auf andere
W eise.
or 9. Für den Fall, dass Deutschland
oder Grossbritannien künftighin die
Verwaltung von Mocambique oder
A ngola oder irgend eines Teiles dieser
Provinzen beeinflussen oder kontrollieren
sollte, ist vereinbart, dass die Untertanen
und die Protektoratseingeborenen der
einen vertragschliessenden Partei m it­
samt ihren Gütern und Schiffen, sowie
die Erzeugnisse und Fabrikate ihrer
selbstregierenden Kolonien, Besitzungen,
Kolonien und Protektorate in denjenigen
Teilen der in dem gegenwärtigen
Abkomm en einbegriffenen Territorien,
welche unter den Einfluss und die
Kontrolle des anderen vertragschliessen­
den Teiles fallen sollten, teilnehmen
sollen an allen Vorrechten, Befreiungen
und Privilegien im Bezug auf Handel,
Verkehr, Besteuerung und Schiffahrt,
deren sich dort die Untertanen und
Protektoratseingeborenen des anderen
vertragschliessenden Teiles erfreuen.
10. D em gegenwärtigen Abkom m en
hat Stanford’ s Library Map of Africa,
London 1911, zu Grunde gelegen. Es
besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass das
nördlich des K ongo gelegen e Gebiet von
Cabinda ein Teil von Angola ist und
unter die Angola betreffenden Abm a­
chungen des gegenwärtigen Abkom m ens
fällt.
4-0. 11. Das gegenwärtige Abkommen
soll, gehörig ratifiziert, zwischen den
vertragschliessenden Mächten die K on ­
vention, Geheime Konvention und
Geheime Note, abgeschlossen und ge­
zeichnet in London am 30. August 1898,
 521
Draft Convention — (con td .).
i l 12. The present convention shall
be ratified and the ratifications thereof
shall be exchanged as soon as possible.
The convention shall come into force
immediately after the exchange of ratifi­
cations.
Vertrags-Enticnr/ — vFortsetzung .
ersetzen, welche hiermit ausser Kraft
gesetzt werden.
ü . 12. Das gegenwärtige Abkomm en
soll ratifiziert und die Ratifikationsur­
kunden sollen sobald als tunlich aus­
gewechselt werden. Das Abkomm en soll
sofort nach Austausch der Ratifikations­
urkunden in Kraft treten.

In witness whereof the undersigned, Zu Urkund dessen haben die Unter­

duly authorised, have signed the same, zeichneten, mit den nötigen Vollm achten
and have affixed thereto their seals. versehen, dieselbe vollzogen und ihre
Siegel beigedrückt.

Done in duplicate at London, the So geschehen in doppelter Ausferti­

day of , 1913. gung zu London, den , 1913.

M IN U T E S

Anglo-Ger man Secret Agreement.

P rin ce L ich n ow sk y M a rch 13.13.

I und ersta nd th a t M r. H a rc o u rt sees no o b jection to th e changes proposed in A r t [ic le ] V I.
I v en tu re to th in k w e should press fo r th e reten tion o f th e prov ision reg a rd in g T im or. W e are
p a rticu la rly anxiou s, on a ccou n t o f A u stra lia , th a t G erm any should not occu p y T im or. It
w ould b e alm ost b e tte r— i f pressed— to m ake ou r own self-d en y in g ord in a n ce a p p ly t o T im or
as well as S. T hom e, th a n t o a gree to th e p rop osed om ission.
A r t fic le ] V I I W e le ft th is poin t to th e a p p r e cia tio n o f th e G erm an G o v fe rn m e n ]t. If
they wish to reta in th e A r ticle I suppose we m ust now do so.
A r t [ic le ] X T h ey wish to decla re th a t C abinda is p a rt o f A ng ola. T his is a fa ct, see
7 5 5 2 /1 3 .(r) T h e G erm an A m b [a ssa d o ]r then goes on to ca ll a tten tion to the bad effects o f
pu blish in g the T rea ty and proposes as a rem edy the con clu sion o f a fresh agreem ent, d ea lin g
m ainly w ith th e cases in w hich they wish ou r P ortu g u ese allia n ce t o b e con sid ered as n ot
b in d in g . I g a th er from th is th a t w hat th e G erm ans ob ject to is not so m uch the p u b lica tion
o f th e A n g lo-G erm a n T rea ty as the sim ultaneous p u b lica tion o f th e so called T rea ty o f W in d sor ;
th e ta ste [s ic ] o f th e T rea ty o f W in d sor, th a t is, w ould be corrected by the p u b lica tion — fo r
p u b lica tion is e v id en tly in ten d ed fo r b oth a rticles an d sp ecifically p rop osed fo r one a rticle— o f
this fresh agreem ent.
T he w ord in g o f these A rticles is curious. T h e first states th a t A r t fic le ] 7 o f th e T rea ty —
i.e. the prov ision as to cessions o f terr ito ry and occasion a l priv ileg es fo r one p a rty h a vin g to bo
cou n terba lan ced b y cessions etc., fo r th e oth er— shall not prevent e ith er o f the p a rties from
resortin g to ‘ self h elp ,’ i f P ortu g u ese m isrule en d an g ers th e in terests o f th a t p a rty in its
sphere. I t is not ob viou s w hat the con n ection is betw een A r t [ic le ] 7 and the prov ision fo r
se lf-h e lp ; t o say th a t A r t fic le ] 7 shall not prev en t the p a rties from resortin g to self-help w ou ld
seem a t first sigh t to m ean th a t one pa rty m ay, when m isrule en d an g ers its in terests, dem and
a cession o f te r r ito r y w ith ou t the oth er p a rty b e in g able to d em a n d a sim ilar cession. I b elieve
it m ay be in ten d ed to m ean m uch less than th a t. T he tra n slation g iv en in the n ote is v ery
obscure and should I th in k be am ended t h u s :

P rin ce L ichnow sky. S uggested.

. . . . A r t fic le ] 7 shall n ot prev en t them to
resort, i f necessity should arise fo r th e pro­
tection o f th e ir in terests, to self-help, if in
those p a rts o f the P ortu g u ese colon ies assigned
to th eir resp ectiv e loans th eir in terest should
be th rea ten ed in consequen ce o f the m isrule o f
the P ortu g u ese a dm in istration .
if th eir in terests in those p a rts o f th e P o r t u ­
guese colonies, w hose custom s revenues are
assigned t o th e ir respectiv e loans, should be
th rea ten ed b y th e m isrule o f th e P ortu g u ese
colon ia l a d m in istration , they shall n ot be pre­
ven ted by A rt. 7 from ta k in g th e ir own
m easures to sa feg u a rd those interests.

( 7) [S ir A . H a rd in g e ’ s despatch tN o. 14 A fr ic a ), D . F ebru ary 11, R . F eb ru a ry 17, 1913, is

not rep rod u ced . In rep ly to an en q u iry S ir A. H a rd in g e sta ted that “ C a binda is in clu d ed in,
an d is the seat o f G overnm ent o f the ‘ D is tr ic t o f th e C o n g o ’ in the P ro v in c e o f A n g ola, from
the g rea ter p a rt o f w hich d istr ict it is how ever, sep arated b y a strip o f B elgia n C ongoleso
te rr ito ry , so th a t it is strictly sp eak in g in an en cla ve.” (F.O . 7 5 5 2 '2 4 5 0 /1 3 '4 3 6 .)]
 522
T his seems to me to m ean that, i f th ey ta ke th eir ow n m easures to prev en t a m ine from
bein g ruined, as C a p t [a in ] C a m pb ell’ s w as at T ete, e.g. send an escort to see th a t labourers
a re n ot driven away or to see th a t a roa d is b u ilt w here prom ised, this shall not cou n t as
sp ecial priv ileg es o f an occasional cha ra cter. I suggest this, as if it is a rig h t assum ption,
som e w ord in g m ig h t be fou n d to sa tisfy both us and the G erm ans. T he G erm ans are o f course
e n titled to p o in t out, th a t w ith ou t som e such prov iso, w hile we can claim to punish the P o r tu ­
guese ourselves, if th ey claim to resort t o ‘ self-help ’ o f any k in d they w ill b e prev en ted b y us.
I f the A r ticle ca n n ot be e x p la in ed aw ay as I have suggested, or if when ex p la in ed it is
still th ou g h t dangerous, there m ig h t be a p rovision fo r jo in t rep resen ta tion s to th e P ortu g u ese
when the necessity arises fo r th e p r o te ctio n o f in te r e sts: in th a t case th ere w ould be some
difficulty as to w ho is to ju d g e o f the necessity.
I n the second o f th e new A rticles it m ay be p oin ted ou t th a t w h ere the G erm an, in
sp ea k in g o f d ecla ra tion s o f in depen den ce, says ‘ nachdem sie selbstän d ig gew orden is t,’ th eir
E n glish says “ a fte r the d ecla ra tion o f her in d e p e n d e n c e ” w hich is not th e sam e t h in g ; it
o u g h t to be “ a fter she has becom e in d e p e n d e n t ” I th in k the use o f the w ord “ T eile,” w hich
is tra n slated “ s p h e r e ” in stead o f “ p a r t s ” im plies th a t th e d r a fte r m eant th a t w hen a colony
in w hole or in p a rt has annexed its elf to E n g lan d or G erm any, the p a rts o f th a t colon y
assigned to the oth er P ow er shall be a n n exed to th a t other P ow er. T h a t is reasonable.
A t the end of th a t A rticle, w hen P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s E nglish says th a t “ th e a lliance
w ould not apply to colonies or pa rts o f colon ies which have decla red th eir in d ep en d en ce ” the
G erm an says th a t “ the a llia nce w ith th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t does n o t a pply to th e case
o f an assertion o f in d ep en d en ce by th e P ortu g u ese colon ies.” M ig h t n ot th is m ean th a t w e are
not b ou n d to h elp P o rtu g a l to retain a re v o ltin g colony, w hereas P rin ce L ich n ow sk y 's E nglish
m eans wo are not to defend a rev olted colon y a ga in st G erm a n y?
I t seems to me th a t the Em bassy have m ade th eir proposals m ore u n p alata ble to us than
thev w ere m eant to be and th a t an a g reem en t may n ot be difficult.
J. A. C. T.
25.3.13.

A n g lo-G erm a n A g r eem e n t.

1. I annex a m em orandum b y M r. T illey, g o in g in to th e several p oin ts raised b y P rin ce

L ich n ow sky in his n ote o f M arch 18.
2. T he p roposed a ltera tion s in a rtic le 2 o f th e d r a ft con v en tion con cern p r in cip a lly the
C olon ia l Office. I f they a re satisfied, w e have no cause to ob ject. 1 am disposed to say the
sam e w'ith respect to the reten tion o f A r ticle 7 (1). Its om ission was stron gly urg ed b y Sir J.
A nd erson. I a gree th a t th e m en tion o f T im or m ust stand. I do n ot th in k the a ltera tion
suggested by M r. T illey w ou ld be advisable.
3. A s reg a rd s C abinda, S ir A. H a r d in g e ’ s despatch No. 14 A frica (7552),( 7) w hich is
a tta ch ed, shows th a t it is an in teg ra l p a rt o f the p r ov in ce o f A ngola. Tf the G erm ans are
a n xiou s to prev en t any m isu n d erstan d in g on this p oin t, it wmuld seem sufficient to in sert the
follow in g w'ords a fter “ A n g o la ,” in the last lin e o f A r ticle 2 thus a v oid in g the a d d ition o f a
new A r ticle 1 0:

“ . . . . A n g ola , (w hich la tte r in clu des the a d m in istra tive D is tr ic t o f the C ongo, w hich
has its seat o f g overn m en t a t C a bin da ) ” ..............

4. O f th e tw o sup plem en tary a rticles proposed, the second a ppears gen era lly a ccep table,
if m ore precisely w ord ed. Som e dou bts w ere raised in m y m ind by th e E n g lish version o f this
a rticle su p plied by P rin ce L ichnow sky, w hich I had a t first alone consulted. T he wTords sta n din g
at th e op en in g o f the second sentence seem ed to con tem p la te th a t a “ d ecla ra tion ” o f
in d epen den ce and o f self-a n n ex ation to G rea t B r ita in w ould suffice to g iv e G erm any the rig h t
to an n ex all the te rr ito rie s c o n s titu tin g h er sphere o f in fluen ce un d er the con v en tion . W e
cou ld n ot have agreed to this w hich w ou ld have been ta n ta m ou n t to p rev en tin g P ortu g a l from
m a k in g any effort w hatever t o reta in her colonies once they had, if only on paper, declared
them selves in depen den t. B u t, as ex p la in ed by M r. T illey th e o rig in a l G erm an te x t does not
bear o u t th is in terp reta tion . I t expressly sa y s: “ a fter it (th e colon y) has b ecom e in d e p e n d en t.”
5. M r. T illey also called a tten tion to the m istra n sla tion o f the G erm an w ord “ T eile ”
(i.e. “ pa rts ” or “ p ortion s ” ) by “ sphere ” at the end o f the 1st pa ra g ra p h o f the sup ple­
m en ta ry a rticle 2. I f it wTere q u ite clear th a t th e G erm an t e x t con tem p la ted the assim ilation
of on ly those “ p o r t io n s ” w hich form p a rt o f the p a rticu la r colon y th a t has becom e in de­
p en den t, then it w ould n ot be ob jection a ble. B u t I do n ot consid er th a t ev en b y su b stitu tin g
“ p a r t s ” fo r “ sp here,” the w o rd in g is q u ite in equ ivocal, and I should prefer th e fo llo w in g :

“ (the oth er high c o n tr a c tin g p a rty shall) be e n titled to annex those portion s o f such
colon y as are assigned to it und er the presen t co n v e n tio n .”

( 7) [See n ote ( 7) on page 521.]

 6. T he last pa ra g ra ph o f a rticle 2 is a ga in in correctly ren d ered in P rin ce L ich n ow sk y 's
E nglish tra n slation . B ut, again also, the G erm an tex t is not free from am bigu ity . G reat
B rita in is asked to recogn ize “ th a t h er trea ties o f a llia nce w ith the P ortu g u ese governm ent
do n ot a p p ly to th e case o f th e P ortu g u ese possessions m a kin g them selves in d ep en d en t.”
W h a t ought to be said, is : “ the trea ties o f a llia n ce do not a p p ly to any P ortu g u ese colon y
th a t m ay have becom e in d ep en d en t.”
7. T he first o f the proposed sup plem en tary a rticles seems to m e a ltog eth er un a ccepta ble,
fo r th e reasons w hich I fu lly e x p la in ed in m y m in u te on 2046.1s) T wish I cou ld agree w ith
M r. T illey in th in k in g th a t the p u rp o r t o f th is a rtic le is really q u ite harm less. B u t I am
unable t o ta k e th is view o f the m ea n in g o f th e G erm an tex t. T he expression “ resort, if
necessary t o self-help to sa feg u a rd h er in terests,” cou p led as it is w ith the p rov ision th a t in
such an ev en t P o rtu g a l shall not be e n titled to B ritish assistance u n d er th e trea ties o f
alliance, ca n m ean on ly one t h i n g : it m eans th a t G erm any w ill be free to ta ke th e P ortu g u ese
colonies assigned to her sphere, as soon as she con sid ers th a t her in t rests are su fferin g from
P ortu g u ese “ m isrule.” Mo possible definition o f “ m is r u le ” w ould m ake th is stip u la tion
accep tab le to us. and I th in k w e should insist th a t the w hole p r in cip le u n d erly in g th is dem and
m ust b e aba n don ed b efore th ere can be any qu estion o f sig n in g th e revised trea ty .
S. I an n ex a cop y o f the A n g lo-P ortu g n ese trea ty of 1S99, and also the several papers
d ra fted and p rep a red w ith a view to p u b lica tion , whi( .i > .r E . G rey proposed to con sid er m ore
fu llv on th e receip t o f the G erm an rep ly, now to hand. (See 3353.' 9
E . A . C.
M [a r ]e h 25.

(S ir E. C row e’ s cop y o f th e 1899 A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se tre a ty w as £ u t aw ay w ith th e A frica n

D e p [a r tm e u ]t cop v fo r safe keep in g , and is still there.
F . E. F . A.
29.iv.13.)

(See also th e record o f S ir E . G rey ’ s con v ersa tion w ith P r [in c e ] Lic-hnowsky con ta in ed in
the d e s p [a tch ] N o. 19 A fric a (secret) to S ir E. G oschen, (also k ep t in th is ja c k e t !.!10) and the
fu rth e r m inu tes w hich follow , e n d in g w ith the d r a ft rep ly to the G erm an A m bassador now
un d er th e con sid e ra tion o f th e C abinet. T he cop y o f the d [ r a ] f t a p p rov ed and retu rn ed by
the K in g is also annexed.
F . E. F. A.
29.iv.13.)
S ir E. G rey .!11)
P lease see S ir J. A n d erson ’ s M in u te in w hich I con cu r. H e does not o f course refer to
the proposed ch a n g e (p. 7 o f the A m b assa dor’ s le tte r ) in a rtic le 7, w hich is a m a tter o f h igh
p olicy fo r the F [o r e ig n ] 0 [ffie e ].
B u t he a grees in v ou r view s and m ine on th is subject which I ex p la in ed to him orallv.
L. H.
29.3.13.

O f course T im or m ust rem a in in th e new T rea ty, as it is proposed to pu blish a M em o-

[ra n d u m ] o f the te rr ito ria l p rov ision s o f the orig in a l secret trea ty , in ord er to show w hat
have been th e changes.
[L . H .]

S ir A . N icolson should see this and the oth er pa pers w hich have been con sid ered w hile he
was awav.
E . G.
31.3.13.
M r. H a rcou rt.
I th in k w e m ay a ccep t th e K assai R iv e r in stead o f th e 11th parallel. (I a nnex a n ote
from th e In tellig en ce D ep a rtm en t as to the cou rse o f the R iv e r fou n d ed on y o u r P ortu g u ese
m ap I fa n cy .( 12 )
As to K a b in d a I see no o b j[e c t io ]n . W ith reg a rd to th e first o f the proposed sup plem en tary
A rticles, it is im possible to a ccep t it as it stands. B u t the con tin g en cy it a ppea rs t o con tem ­
pla te is one th a t m ig h t w ell arise. I f ow i g to local distu rba n ce th e lives and p r o p e r ty of
B r [it is h ] or G erm an su b jects a re endangc red, a re w e or G erm any to be p reclu d ed from send ing
a ship and possibly la n d in g a p a rty to p r o te ct ou r or th eir in terests?
I f the p rov ision is lim ited to such a con tin g en cy it m igh t be useful in p re v e n tin g m isu n der­
standing.

s) [r . supra, pp. 501-2, N o. 323, m in.]

( 9) [r . sup ra , pp. 50S-9, N o. 325.]
( 10) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]
(,u j [T h is m in u te and those th a t follow are filed to g e th e r a fter the docum ent to w hich they
refer, w hilst th e ea rlier m inu tes a re at th e b eg in n in g .]
( 12) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
 5‘2 4
I t m ig h t be som ething to th e effect t h a t : I f ow in g to local distu rba n ces the lives and
p r o p e r ty o f B r [it is h ] or G erm an subjects are end angered th e B r [it is h ] and G erm an G o v [e rn -
m e n ]ts shall determ in e in con su lta tion and a fte r com m u n ica tion w ith the G o v [e rn m e n ]t of
P o rtu g a l w hat m easures should be taken fo r th e p r o te ctio n of such in te r e sts'a n d the ex ecu tion
o f such m easures shall unless th e spheres of both G o v [e rn m e n ]ts are a ffected devolve up on the
G o v [e r n m e n ]t w hose sphere is affected.
I f the spheres o f both G o v [e rn m e n t]s are affected jo in t a ction shall be taken.
T o th e second proposed new a rticle as a ltered in pen cil I see no o b j[e c t io ]n .
J. A.
20.3.13.

S ir E d w a rd G rey. A p ril 1, 1913.

I have read the papers in this box. I f you con cu r, I w ou ld g iv e in stru ction s fo r a D [ r a ] f t
rep ly to be draw n up em b od y in g the view s expressed in th e M in u tes a tta ch ed to 13076 and in
the M in u tes o f M r. H a rc o u rt and S ir J . A nd erson. T he m ain difficulty arises as to w hat to
do w ith the first su p plem en tary A rticle. I t is clear th a t it ca n n ot possibly be accep ted as it
stands, and on this ourselves and C olon ia l Office seem to he q u ite agreed. I thin k th a t S ir J.
A n d e rso n ’ s proposed w ord in g m ig h t be m ade a little m ore precise, and b in d in g and I should
like t o see som e w ord in g to the follow in g effect . . . . “ and th e P ortu g u ese A u th orities are
n ot in a position to afford the necessary p r o te ctio n . . . . ” the B ritish and G erm an G o v [e rn -
m e n ]ts shall determ in e in con su lta tion tog eth er, and a fter a jo in t com m u n ica tion w ith the
P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t, the n ature, d u ra tion and scope of any m easures w hich it m ay be
deem ed necessary to ta ke e tc............. I u n d ersta n d th a t som e such w ord in g w ould be substi­
tu ted fo r the w hole o f the first su p plem en tary A r ticle and th a t no referen ce w ill b e m ade to
th e suspension o f the prov ision s o f the a lliance. W e should in ou r reply reinsist on our desire
to publish, and in tim a te th a t b efore a ctu a l p u blica tion w e should have to in form the P o r t u ­
guese G o v [e rn m e n ]t con fid en tia lly of th e term s of the new A greem ent.
A. N.

P re p a r e d r a ft as proposed.
E . G.

A n g lo-G erm a n A g r eem e n t.

S ir A. N icolson.
I subm it a d r a ft to P rin ce L ichnow sky w hich I th in k em bodies the v a riou s m inu tes on his
let t e r .(13)
I wish p a rticu la r ly to call y o u r a tten tion to th e w ord in g w hich I h a ve g iv en to th e tw o
new A rticles and to m ake on e or tw o ob serv a tion s on th is p oin t.
(1) A t the b eg in n in g I have a dded to S ir J ohn A n d e rso n ’ s w ord s w hich w ere “ if
en d a n g ered by loca l d is tu r b a n ce s ” th e w ord s ‘ ‘ or by the action of th e local a u t h o r itie s ” and
to y o u r ‘ ‘ if the P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t are n ot in a position to a fford the necessary
p r o t e c t i o n ” the w ords “ or otherw ise fa il to do so.” T he action of th e loca l a u th orities is in
fa c t the m ost likely source o f trou b le, b u t the S ecretary o f S ta te m ay p refer to lim it th e cases
fo r in terv en tion as m uch as possible, or at any ra te to leave it to G erm any to propose an
exten sion as I have no d ou bt they w ould . T o p u t it in now shows perhaps disp osition to m eet
t h eir views.
O n the oth er hand I should have th ou g h t we m igh t stop at “ m easures w hich it m ay be
deem ed necessary to take fo r th e p r o te ctio n o f th e in terests en d an g ered ,” and say n oth in g
a bout the ex ecu tion o f those m easures in th e B ritish and G erm an spheres. T he w ords proposed
hv S ir J . A nd erson seem to suggest a G erm an in vasion o f A n g ola rath er open ly, w hereas if we
say n oth in g on this p o in t the m easures to be taken m ig h t be a jo in t dem on stra tion at L isbon
o r a b lock a d e o f L ourengo M arques.
I f the A rticle is le ft as d ra fte d by S ir J oh n A n d erson I w ould suggest th a t there m igh t be
ob jection to his second h y p oth esis; fo r in stance, if the distu rba n ces affect the w hole of the
p rov in ce of M oza m b iq u e and the “ m e a s u re s ” are to be “ ex ecu ted j o i n t l y ” does th a t im ply
G erm an soldiers in L ourengo M arques. P erh a p s fo r “ ex ecu ted j o i n t l y ” he w ou ld sub stitute
“ shall be ex ecu ted by the tw o G overn m en ts a ctin g in co n c e rt.” A rt. II. I have said
“ decla re its a n n exa tion to th e dom in ion s o f one o f th e tw o co n tr a c tin g P ow ers ” in stead of
“ to one o f the tw o c o n tr a c tin g P ow ers or one o f its c o lo n ie s ” as in P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s
G erm an tex t, or “ to one o f th e h igh co n tr a c tin g pa rties or to one o f the D om in ion s or
colon ies o f one o f the h igh c o n tr a c tin g p a rties ” as in his E x ce lle n c y ’ s tra n slation . The
G erm ans doubtless h a ve in m in d an a n n exa tion of L ourengo M arques to S ou th A fric a , b u t I
presum e a n n exa tion to the B ritish or G erm an dom in ion s cov ers every possible case and I
d o u b t w hether we should recogn ize a n n exa tion to one o f ou r colonies.

( 13) [ v. infra, pp. 526-30, N o. 333, and encl.]

 525
T ow a rd s th e end o f th a t pa ra g ra p h I have in serted the w ord s “ b ein g thus in d ep en d en t ”
to describe w hat m a y be annexed. T he A r ticle con tem p la tes a p a rt o f a colon y d ecla rin g its
in depen den ce. T he G erm an t e x t m ig h t m ean th a t i f th e tow n o f L ou ren ço M a rq u es acquires
its in d ep en d en ce and annexes itself to S outh A fr ic a , G erm any could an n ex th e north ern h a lf
o f th e p r ov in ce w hich m igh t not have decla red its in depen den ce. In th a t case w hat a bou t our
A llia n ce? I suppose i f th e case arose w e should h a ve to refuse t o a ccep t L ou ren ço M arques
u n til G erm any could le g itim a tely a cq u ire som eth in g (a very u n p op u la r p olicy in Sou th A frica ).
A n o th e r difficulty in reg a rd to the q u estion o f in d epen den ce is how its establishm ent is to
be settled. Unless it is recogn ized b y P o r t u g a l we m ay a ga in be co n fro n te d by th e T rea ty.
I h a ve pu t in w ords w hich w ould d efer th e “ establishm ent ” o f in depen den ce t ill w e at least
w ere satisfied th a t we w ere not b rea k in g our ob lig a tion s to P ortu g a l.
I am in deb ted to M r. C lerk fo r several valu a ble suggestion s in reg a rd to th is dra ft.
J . A . C. T.
3.4.13.

T he am endm ents proposed b y M r. T illey seem pru d en t and reasonable. T h e D [ r a ] f t cou ld

now g o to th e C olonia l Office fo r con cu rren ce. M r. T ille y ’ s e x p la n a tory m in u te should also
be sent.
A. N .

M r. T illey has g on e in to the q uestion and ex p la in s it v ery well.

Send t o M r. H a rc o u rt fo r his con cu rren ce an d say th a t if he a p prov es I should p ropose
to have the pa pers p rin ted fo r con sid era tion b v th e C a b in et.(14)
E . G.

( 14) [M r. H a rc o u rt expressed con cu rren ce in a letter to S ir J. A n d erson o f M a y 7, 1913.]

No. 332.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen.( J)

F.O. 367/340.
1 3 0 7 6 /1 1 6 5 '1 3 '4 3 6 .
(No. 19. Africa.) Secret.
Sir, . Foreign Office, March 20, 1913.
The German Ambassador explained to Mr. Harcourt and m yself to-d ay(2) the
alterations that Germany desired in the draft Agreem ent about the Portuguese
Colonies.
W e thought that there would be no difficulty as regards the slight territorial
changes. W e should have to make sure that Cabinda was really administered as part
of Angola, and was therefore covered by the 1S9S Agreem ent. It was also necessary
that the elimination of the island of Tim or should remain in for publication : otherwise
we should lose one defence against the criticism that would be brought to bear upon
us for the concessions which we had made. W ith regard to the new Article proposed,
dealing with the contingency o f Portuguese misrule, we explained that this Article
would not be consistent with the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and would be construed
as an intention on the part of Germany and E ngland to find a pretext for obtaining
Portuguese Colonies.
The Ambassador suggested that action might be dependent upon an agreement
being com e to between England and Germ any when a case arose. This, he thought,
would make the Article quite safe.
W e still doubted whether, even with this, the Article could be accepted.
The Ambassador’ s idea was that the Article might be separate from the
Agreem ent, and form the subject of an exchange of Notes that need not be published.
W e urged however that there should be nothing secret, so that when publication
took place we should be able to say that everything had been disclosed. The history
of the 1898 Agreement had shown the great inconvenience of secrecy.

(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g on M a rch 26, 1913, and t o
th e C abinet on M a rch 31. I t was sent to L isb on on J u n e 19.]
(2) [F o r P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s rep ort, cp. G.P., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 3 7 -9 .]
 526
W ith regard to Article 2, dealing with the contingency of a declaration of
independence by a Portuguese Colony, Mr. Harcourt and I said that we saw no
difficulty about this, provided the Article was understood to apply only to the Colony
that declared its independence, and not to mean that, if, for example, Mozambique
declared its independence, Germany would be entitled to turn the Portuguese out of
Angola, and “ vice versa.”
W e said in conclusion that we must have time to consider these points, and we
would refer them to the Department for this purpose.
[I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

N o. 333.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich now s];y.fe^g&

F.O. 367 310.
1 3 0 7 6 '1 1 6 5 /1 3 136.
(Confidential. 1
My dear Ambassador, Foreiyn Office, May 13, 1913.
I lost no time in com m unicating to the Secretary of State for the Colonies the
contents of your letter of the 18th M arch.!2) regarding the revision of the Agreements
of 1898, and we have given the most careful consideration to the suggestions of the
Im perial Government.
To take these suggestions in order, we have no objection to offer to any of the
alterations which you propose in A rt[icle] II, namely, the omission of the words ‘ ‘ or
Likungo ” and “ or Luzhella,” the substitution of the words “ thence along the
meridian of that s o u rce ” for “ thence due n o r th ” and the substitution of “ the
Ivassai Iiiver ” for “ the 11th parallel of south latitude.”
In A rt[icle] Y I Y [o u r] E [xceilen cy ] proposes to leave out the words “ or of the
Portuguese part of the island of T im o r ” and “ or in that island.” As to this, I
cannot help feeling that it is essential to retain the words, in order to avoid any of
those doubts being raised as to the intentions of the two Governments, which
certainly would be raised if the destiny of Timor, which was prom inently mentioned
in the agreement of 1898, were now passed over in silence. Even a statement in the
explanatory Memorandum with which, as I inform ed you on the 11th J an [u a ry], we
propose to accompany the new Agreement when published, would not, in our opinion,
be an adequate way of dealing with a point of such considerable importance, whilst
the omission of any such statement would involve a new element of secrecy which
might subsequently he misunderstood. Moreover, if nothing be said of Timor, there
will be no apparent explanation in the treaty of the introduction of so striking a
concession on the part of I I [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t as the declaration in
regard to San Thome and Principe.
As regards para[graph] 1 of A rt[icle] Y1I, IT [is] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t]
will not object to its retention if desired by the German G ovrernm enjt.
The insertion of a new article specially to deal with the status of Cabinda seems
hardly necessary and I would suggest that it would be sufficient to insert after
“ A ngola,” in the last line of Art[_ic!ej II, the words “ . . . . (which latter includes
the administrative district of the Congo, which has its seat of government at
Cabinda)............. ”

C ) [cp. d . r . , X X X Y J i (!), pp. 42-7. The despatch was d ra fted in A p ril and sent to
M r. H a rc o u rt and S ir J. Anderson fo r con cu rren ce. The d r a ft was then p rin ted for circu la tion
to the C abinet and it was also su b m itted to the K in g . A cop y was sent to B erlin (N o. 28 A fric a )
on M a y 14, and to L isbon on J u n e 19, 1913.]
( 2) [v. supra, pp. 514-21, No. 331, an d encl.]
 527
The next point for consideration is the additional “ arrangement ” which is put
forward in t'our letter as a corollary of the publication of the new Agreement. H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t cordially welcome the assent which the Im perial
G ov [ern m en ]t accord in principle to such publication, as that is a matter which they
have always considered of essential importance, and they also concur with the Im perial
G ov [ern m en ]t in thinking that the new agreement might well include provision for
the contingencies contemplated in the two articles of which drafts are em bodied in
your letter, although not themselves regarding this question and that of publication
as interdependent.
The actual wording proposed does not, however, seem to us to be sufficiently
precise, and H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t could not agree to any statement
respecting the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Alliance such as that at the end of the first
draft article being made without the previous concurrence of the Portuguese
Government, for it would amount to an infringem ent o f the Treaty, or at least an
ex parte interpretation of its terms, and would therefore be without validity in
international law.
The wording which we would propose for the first draft article is as follows :

If in any part of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola the lives or property

of British or German subjects are endangered by local disturbances or by the action
of the local authorities, and the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t are not in a position to
afford the necessary protection, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and German
Governments shall determine in consultation together, and after a joint com m unica­
tion with the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t, the nature, duration and scope of any
measures which it m ay be deemed necessary to take for the protection of the interests
endangered. (3)

The second draft article calls for little observation, but the translation of the
second and third sentences might, in our opinion, be amended as follows in order to
make the sense clearer :
“ If any of the Portuguese colonies in question, after it has becom e independent
and has been recognized as such by the two H igh Contracting Parties, or if any part
of such independent colony, should declare its annexation to the dom inions of one of
the two Contracting Powers, the other Contracting Power shall, for its part, be entitled,
after having previously inform ed the first Power, to annex those portions of such
colony, being thus independent, of which the customs revenues would be assigned to
it under the present convention.
H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] Government agree that the treaties of alliance between them
and the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t would not apply to Colonies, or parts o f Colonies,
whose independence has been established, and has been recognized by the two High
Contracting Parties.”

I should explain that, in redrafting the above sentences, I have sometimes

followed the text of your translation even where it does not literally represent the
German text: for instance, in the last sentence the words “ or parts of c o lo n ie s ”
have no equivalent in the German. I may also point out that at the end of the second
sentence I have used the phrase “ those portions . . . . of which the customs
revenues would be assigned to it ” as that phrase is consistently used elsewhere in the

(3) [T h e o rig in a l d r a ft con ta in ed the fo llo w in g : —

“ and the ex ecu tion o f w hich m easures shall devolve up on th e G overn m en t t o w hich the
custom s revenues o f the t e r r it o r y affected w ou ld he assigned u n d er th e presen t C onvention.
I f b oth te rr ito rie s o f w hich the custom s revenues w ou ld be a ssigned to G rea t B rita in
and those o f w hich the custom s revenues w ou ld be assigned to G erm any are affected, the
m easures d eterm in ed up on shall he e x e cu te d b y th e tw o G overn m en ts jo in t ly .”
T here is a m a rg in a l note by M r. T ille y : ‘ ‘ S ir J. A n d erson a grees to the om ission o f this.
J A. C. T .” ]

I' .
 528

draft agreement. It will of course.-be necessary to harmonize the English and German
texts later on.
W ith regard to the last paragraph of your letter I would suggest that, in the
interest of simplicity, both of the new articles should be embodied in the general
Agreement, and should form Articles 8 and 9, and I beg to inclose, for convenience of
reference, a reprint of the draft Agreem ent amended in the sense of this letter.
I understand that the German G ov [ern m en ]t agree that the Agreement should
be communicated confidentially to the Portuguese Government before its actual
publication and I assume that the Im perial G ov [ern m en ]t will also agree to the terms
of the note which I have proposed to address at the time of publication to the
Netherlands G ov[ernm en]t.
[Yours sincerely
(In Sir E. G rey’ s absence),
A. NICOLSON.]

M IN U TE BY KIN G GE OR GE .

Apr)\j'oze\d.— G.R.I.

Enclosure in No. 333.

Draft Convention.
(Confidential.)
In view of the possibility that Portugal may require financial assistance from
some foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate, the international complications
which such a condition of things m ay produce, and to preserve her integrity and
independence, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have
agreed as follows :—
1.— (1) W henever either the British or the German Government is of opinion that
it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of m oney to Portugal on the security
of the customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique or Angola, it shall
communicate the fact to the other Government, and the other Government shall have
the right to advance a part of the total sum required.
(2) In the event of the other Government signifying its intention to exercise this
right, the two Governments shall consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these
loans shall be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique and
Angola as near as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible
the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues respectively
assigned as their security.
(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition
of the m oney market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects
be subject as near as possible to similar conditions.
2. In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article, the customs revenues
of that portion of the province of Mozambique lying south of a line starting from the
mouth of the River Lukugu, running thence along that river to its confluence with
the River Lugera, thence along that river to its source, thence along the meridian of
that source to the 16th parallel of south latitude, and thence along that parallel to the
boundary of the British protectorate of Nyassaland, as also the customs revenues of
the portions of the province of Angola lying to the east of the 20th meridian of east
longitude and south of the Kassai River, shall be assigned to the British loa n ; whilst
the customs revenues of the rem aining parts of the provinces of Mozambique and
Angola (which latter includes the administrative district of the Congo, which has its
seat of governm ent at Cabinda) shall be assigned to the German loan.
3. In the event of Great Britain or Germany sending delegates to take note of
 52 9

the collection of the revenues, which are the security for their respective loans, the
Portuguese Government shall be asked to givt such delegates rights of inspection
only, but no rights of administration, interference, or control, so long as there is no
default in the payment of interest or sinking fund.
4. In case of default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either
loan, it shall be agreed with the Portuguese Government that they will hand over the
administration of the various custom-houses in the two provinces : those assigned for
the German loan to Germany, those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5.— (1) In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article all rights,
whether British or German, acquired in the provinces affected, before the date of this
convention, shall be fully safeguarded, provided they are of a purely private character
and convey neither political rights nor territorial or administrative jurisdiction.
( 2 1 It is well understood that no influence will be used in the future either by the
British or the German Government to obtain fivsh concessions, except in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues would bt assigned to their
respective loans under the present convention.
6. From the date of the conclusion of the present convention Great Britain will
abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation,
or control o f those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues
would under the present convention be assigned to Germany, or of the islands of San
Thome and Principe, or to the exercise o f political influence in those territories or
islands; and Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim of
whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or control of those portions of the
Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues would under the present
convention be assigned to Great Britain, or of the Portuguese part of the island of
Timor, or to the exercise of political influence in those territories or in that island.
7.— (1) In the event of either Government obtaining from the Portuguese Govern­
ment a cession of territory, or the conctssion of special privileges not of an occasional
character, in those portions of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the
customs revenues would be assigned to it, such cessions of territory or concessions of
privileges shall not become operative until analogous grants as near as possible of
equal value have been accorded to the other Government in those portions of the
provinces o f which the customs revenues would be assigned to it by the present
convention.
(2 In case either Government applies for special privileges of an occasional
character in those portions of the Portuguese provinces of which the customs revenues
would be assigned to it under the present convention, it shall immediately inform the
other Government and, if these privileges are granted, and if the other Government
should so desire, shall use its influence to obtain for the other Governm ent similar
special privileges of an occasional character and of equal value.
S. I f in any part of the provinces of M ozambique or Angola the lives or property
of British or German subjects are endangered by local disturbances or by th e action of
the local authorities, and the Portuguese G overnm ent are not in a position to afford
the necessary protection, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and Germ an Govern­
m ents shall determ ine, in consultation together ami after a joint coininunication with
the Portuguese Governm ent, the nature, duration, and scope of any measures which
it may be deem ed necessary to ta le for the protection of the interests endangered.
9. If any of the Portuguese colonies in question, after it has becom e independent
and has been recognised as such by the two high contracting parties, or if any part of
such independent colony should declare its annexation to the dominions of one of the
two contracting Powers, the other contracting Power shall, for its part, be entitled,
after having previously informed the first Power, to annex those portions of such
colony, being thus independent, of u'hich the customs revenues would be assigned to
it under the present convention.
His M a jesty’ s Governm ent agree that the treaties of alliance between them and
the Portuguese G overnm ent would not apply to colonies, or parts of colonies, zchose
[10900] 2 M
 580

independence has been established and has been recognised by the two high
contracting parties.
10. Great Britain and G erm asr, having regard to the interests o f their respective
possessions in South Africa contiguous to the Portuguese provinces of Angola and
Mozambique, which would be materially affected by the intervention of any third
Power in those provinces, agree join tly to oppose such intervention, whether by way
of loan to Portugal on the security of the revenues of the said provinces, or by way of
acquisition of territory by grant, cession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.
11. In so far as Great Britain or Germany may hereafter influence or control the
administration of Mozambique or Angola or any portion of those provinces, it is
understood that the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, o f one contracting
party, together wflth their goods and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures
o f its dominions, possessions, colonies, and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the
territories comprised in the present convention as may fall under the influence or
control of the other contracting party, participate in all the prerogatives, exemptions,
and privileges with regard to trade, com m erce, taxation, and navigation which are
there enjoyed by the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, of the other contracting
party.
12. The present convention, duly ratified, shall replace as between the contracting
Powers the convention, secret convention, and secret note concluded and signed in
L ondon on the 30th August, 1898, which are hereby abrogated.
13. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be
exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall come into force immediately
after the exchange of ratifications.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the same, and
have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate at London, the day of , 1913.

M IN U TE BY KIN G G E OB GE .

App\rove~\d.— G.R.I.

No. 334.

Note by Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

P.O. 307/310.
2 5 7 3 0 /1 1 0 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 . Foreign Office, June 2, 1913.
The German Ambassador gave me to-day the following draft of alterations in the
Anglo-G erm an Agreement about the Portuguese C olonies./2)
E. G.
Enclosure in No. 334.

Prince Lichnow sky to Sir Edward G rey.{3)

A. 545/Confidential.
Dear Sir Edward, London, May 30, 1913.
I have taken the opportunity to discuss during m y recent stay at Berlin the
contents of your letter of the 13th of May with the competent departments of the
( x) [I n a ccorda n ce w ith in stru ction s from S ir E d w a rd G rey a cop y o f P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s
le tte r and o f th e co v e rin g note w ere sent to M r. H a rc o u rt on J u n e 6.]
(2) [P rin ce L ichnow sky enclosed a c o p y of the d r a ft con v en tion a m ended to show the
a lte ra tio n s suggested in his letter. T h is is not rep rod u ced as the only changes are clearly
in d ic a te d in the letter.]
( 3) [A cop y o f this letter w as sent t o L isb on (as N o. 76 A fric a ) on J u n e 19, 1913.]
 531

Im perial Governm ent.(4* I am glad to be able to say that the latter accepts the draft
as suggested by you and Mr. Harcourt on the whole, but would like to propose some
trifling alterations to the convention.
It seemed to us that the original wording of the treaty in its preamble lays rather
excessive stress on the financial question and we would therefore prefer the preamble
somewhat as follows :
‘ ‘ The undersigned :

haring in view the existing sp.rinl interests of Germany and Great Britain in
their colonial possessions and protectorates in East- and West Africa, conterminous
to certain P o[r]tu g u ese dom inions, have com e to the following agreement on
behalf of their respective governm ents:— ”
In Article S we would like to insert after “ German subjects ” : “ or the vital
interests of the adjoining British and German Colonies and Protectorates.” The
Im perial Government feels that the present wording is too narrow. The protection
of life or property is very important, but there may be cases where most vital intert sts
of the Colonies might be seriously endangered without life or property o f the two
Powers’ respective subjects being directly threatened. The Im perial Government
consider this point of very essential importance and hope that it will meet with the
approval of H is M ajesty’ s Government.
It is further suggested to insert in the same Article 8 after “ to do s o ” the
w ords: “ or should fail to carry out the stipulations of the anti-slavery conference
held at Brussels in 1S90.” Article S would then r e a d :—
“ I f in any part of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola the lives or
property of British or German subjects or the vital interests of the adjoining
British and German colonies and protectorates are endangered by local
disturbances or by the action of the local authorities, and the Portuguese Govern­
ment are not in a position to afford the necessary protection, or otherwise fail to
do so. or should fail to carry out the stipulations of the anti-slavery conference
held at Brussels in 1890, the British and German Governments shall determine,
in consultation together and after a joint com m unication with the Portuguese
Governm ent, the nature, duration, and scope of any measures which it m ay be
deemed necessary to take for the protection of the interests endangered.”
In Article 9 we are now of opinion that after the alterations introduced in the
wording of that article the second half of it beginning with “ His M ajesty’ s ” and
ending with “ contracting p a rties” might be omitted, as it seems self evident that
treaties about Portuguese Colonies could not apply to territories the independence of
which has been recognised by E ngland and Germany'.
As soon as the English wording shall be definitely established wt shall undertake
to harmonise the English and German texts.
As stated in a previous communication we think Stanford's map of Africa should
be annexed to the Convention and we would prefer to m ention this somewhere in the
text.(5)
Believe me, Ac.
LIC H X O W SK Y .
M IN U T E .
F ou r am endm ents are proposed :
(11 An a ltera tion o f the pream ble is suggested, on the g rou n d th a t th e old te x t lays too
m uch stress on the q uestion o f finance. I f the new tex t w ere sim ply to take the pla ce o f th a t
pa rt o f the form er pream ble w hich referred to finance, I should see less ob jection . B ut und er
cov er o f th is criticism o f the financial co m p lex ion o f the pream ble, the G erm an G overn m en t

( ' ) [r . im m ediately preced in g docum ent, and cp. G .P., X X X V I I (II. pp. 51 2, >ft ]
(5) [A co p y o f the C on v en tion was ann exed to th is letter. It is not rep rod u ced as it is
id en tical w ith th e te x t g iv en in th e im m ed ia tely p reced in g docum ent, encl., e x cep t fo r the
a ltera tion s g iv en in this le tte r.]
[10900] 2 M 2
 532
q u i e t ly e l i m i n a t e t h e i m p o r t a n t p h r a s e : “ t o p r e s e r v e h e r i n t e g r i t y a n d in d e p e n d e n c e .” I d o
n o t t h in k w e c a n a c c e p t t h is o m is s io n , b e c a u s e in o u r c o m m u n ic a t io n s to t h e P o r t u g u e s e
G o v e r n m e n t in 1 8 9 8 w e la id s p e c ia l a n d r e p e a t e d s tr e s s o n t h is a s s u r a n c e o f o u r g o o d in t e n t io n s .
T h is w a s d o n e , in a g e n e r a l w a y , in s e v e r a l c o n v e r s a t io n s w ith th e M a r q u is d e S o v e r a l, b u t th e
m o s t e x p lic it a ssu r a n c e s w e r e th e fo llo w in g :
“ I ( i .e . M r . B a l f o u r ) i n f o r m e d h i m ( M . d e S o v e r a l ) t h a t i n a n y a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h
G e r m a n y t h e s o v e r e ig n r ig h t s o f P o r t u g a l w o u ld b e m o s t c a r e fu lly s a fe g u a r d e d , a n d t h a t
n o c e s s io n o f t e r r it o r y w o u ld b e a s k e d o f h e r ( D e s p [ a t c h ] t o H [ i s ] M f a j e s t y ’ s ] C h a r g e
d ’ A f f a i r e s a t L i s b o n N o . 9 0 A f r i c a , A u g [ u s t ] 1 8 , 1 8 9 8 ) . ( 6)
“ I t w o u l d b e m y ( M r . B a l f o u r ’ s ) e a r n e s t d e s i r e to provide t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t i o n o f
s u c h a lo a n b y P o r t u g a l s h o u ld i n v o lv e n e it h e r lo s s n o r d i m i n u t i o n o f h e r s o v e r e i g n r ig h t s ,
s t i l l le s s a n y c e s s i o n o f t e r r i t o r y ( N o t e t o M . d e S o v e r a l A u g . 3 1 , 1 8 9 8 ) . ” ( 7)
F in a lly H [ i s ] M [ a je s t y ’ s ] C h a r g e d ’ A ffa ir e s , a c tin g o n M r . B a lf o u r ’ s in s tr u c tio n s , m a d e a
c o m m u n ic a t io n t o t h e P o r t u g u e s e G o v [ e r n m e n ] t , r e p o r t e d in h is d e s p a t c h [ s i c : t e le g r a m ) N o . 2 5
A f r i c a o f S e p t e m b e r ] 1 2 , 1 8 9 8 . ( 8) a s f o l l o w s :
“ I n a c c o r d a n c e w ith a n a g r e e m e n t c o m e t o w ith t h e G e r m a n M in is t e r , I c a lle d u p o n
t h e M i n [ i s t e ] r fo r F o r e ig n A ffa ir s a n d im p r e s s e d u p o n H [ i s ] E x c e l l e n c y ] t h e n a t u r e o f
t h e a d v a n t a g e s w h ic h t h e p r o p o s e d A n g lo -G e r m a n lo a n w o u ld c o n fe r o n P o r t u g a l.”
“ . . . . H [ i s ] E [ x c e l l e n c y ] e x p r e s s e d h im s e lf t o m e a s h ig h ly g r a t if ie d t o fin d t h a t
the proposal contained assurances t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h i s c o u n t r y
w o u ld b e m a in t a in e d ........... ”
I n t h e fa c e o f t h e a b o v e a s s u r a n c e s , i t w o u ld n o t b e r ig h t o r h o n o u r a b le o n o u r p a r t to
o m i t t h e c la u s e fr o m t h e p r e a m b le . M o r e o v e r i t w o u ld r e a lly b e t o s o m e e x t e n t t o fa ls if y t h e
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e 1 8 9 8 a g r e e m e n t i f w e w e r e t o r e m o v e fr o m t h e p r e a m b le t h e c la u s e d e a lin g
w ith “ fin a n c ia l a s s is t a n c e .” A f t e r a ll, i t w a s t h e lo a n c o n t e m p la t e d in 1 8 9 8 w h ic h g a v e r is e
to t h e w h o le a g r e e m e n t ; it w a s t o m e e t t h e p o s s ib le c o n s e q u e n c e o f a m o r t g a g in g o f t h e
P o r t u g u e s e c o lo n ie s t h a t w a s it s a v o w e d ju s t ific a tio n . W h y n o w r e tr o s p e c tiv e ly a lt e r t h is ?
I t i s t o G e r m a n y ’ s i n t e r e s t , a n d h e r p r e s e n t a m e n d m e n t s s h o w c l e a r l y t h a t i t is h e r i n t e n t i o n ,
t o a c c e n t u a t e h e r c la im , a s a c o t e r m in o u s P o w e r , t o in t e r f e r e in t h e s e P o r t u g u e s e c o lo n ie s .
I t is t h e in t e r e s t o f H [ i s ] M [ a j e s t y ’ s ] G [ o v e r n m e n t ] , w h o h a v e t o d e f e n d t h e a g r e e m e n t b e f o r e
p a r lia m e n t , n o t t o a lt e r o r c o n c e a l t h e s p e c ific a n d r e s tr ic te d s c o p e a n d in t e n t io n o f t h e
o r ig in a l a g r e e m e n t.
I w o u ld t h e r e fo r e s u g g e s t t h a t w e s h o u ld s t a n d b y t h e o ld p r e a m b le . I f , w h a t I d o u b t,
G e r m a n y w e r e t o b e v e r y in s is t e n t , w e m ig h t a llo w h e r n e w p r e a m b le t o b e in s e r te d in fr o n t
o f t h e e x is t in g p r e a m b le , t h u s a d o p t in g b o th .
(2 ) I d o n o t lik e t h e a d d itio n o f “ v it a l i n t e r e s t s ” t o t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s w h ic h m a y , u n d e r
a r t ic le 8 ju s t if y t h e G e r m a n G o v [ e r n m e n ] t in d e m a n d in g t h e t a k in g o f c e r t a in m e a s u r e s o f
i n t e r f e r e n c e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a ll t h a t H [ i s ] M [ a j e s t y ’ s ] G o v e r n m e n t ] a r e b o u n d in s u c h
a c o n t in g e n c y t o d o is t o “ c o n s u l t ” w i t h t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d i t m a y t h e r e f o r e b e
t h o u g h t t h a t t h e a m e n d m e n t d o e s n o t r e a lly a m o u n t t o m u c h . H e r e a g a in , if G e r m a n y in s is ts
v e r y s t r o n g ly , I t h in k w e c o u ld c o n c e d e t h e p o in t , t h o u g h i t w o u ld b e p r e fe r a b le n o t t o d o so .
(3 ) T h e s e c o n d a m e n d m e n t in a r t i c le 8 is a lt o g e t h e r o b je c t io n a b le . T h e a g r e e m e n t h a s
n o th in g w h a t e v e r t o d o w ith s la v e r y , a q u e s t io n w h ic h w a s n e v e r t h o u g h t o f in 1 8 9 8 , a n d w h ic h
h a s n o r e a l c o n c e r n a t a ll f o r G e r m a n y , w h a t e v e r v i e w H [ i s ] M [ a j e s t y 's ] G o v e r n m e n t ] m a y
t a k e o f a g e n e r a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t in a ll q u e s t io n s o f s la v e r y .— G e r m a n y n e v e r m o v e d a fin g e r
w h e n w e u r g e d h e r to a s s o c ia te h e r s e lf w ith o u r r e p r e s e n ta t io n s a t B r u s s e ls r e s p e c t i n g ] th e
C o n g o . T h e y h a v e b e e n q u i t e c y n ic a l in t h e i r a t t i t u d e in t h i s q u e s t io n , a n d i t is c le a r t h a t t h e
p i e s e n t in t r o d u c t io n o f t h e s u b je c t is d u e n o t t o a n y h u m a n i t a r i a n s y m p a t h y w i t h t h e v ic t im s
o f s la v e r y , b u t t o t h e d e s ir e t o fin d a n a d d it i o n a l p r e t e x t fo r i n t e r v e n t io n in t h e P o r t u g u e s e
c o lo n ie s .
I c a n n o t h e lp h e r e r e c a llin g t h a t t h e P o r t u g u e s e M in is t e r h a s o n s e v e r a l o c c a s io n s
c o m p la in e d m o s t b it te r ly o f t h e in t r ig u e s c a r r ie d o n b y t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h t h e
B r it is h a n t i -s la v e r y a g i t a t o r s , a g a in s t t h e P o r t u g u e s e c o lo n ic s . H e h a s s t o u t ly m a in t a in e d
t h a t t h e a g i t a t io n ,e s p e c ia lly a s d ir e c t e d a g a in s t A n g o la , w a s d ir e c tly o rin d ir e c tly c o n tr o lle d
fr o m B e r lin t h r o u g h t h e G e r m a n e m b a s s y h e r e , w h o u s e t h e ir in flu e n c e w ith t h e A n g lo -G e r m a n
F r ie n d s h ip C o m m it t e e in t h is d ir e c t io n . D o e s n o t t h is p r e s e n t G e r m a n a m e n d m e n t s h o w t h a t
t h e r e is in f a c t a c lo s e c o n n e c t i o n ? I n a n y c a s e t h e a m e n d m e n t is a d is in g e n u o u s o n e , a n d
s h o u ld b e r e s is te d a t a n y c o st.
(4 ) I s e e n o o b je c t io n t o t h e o m is s io n o f t h e se c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f a r tic le 9 . I n fa c t I s h o u ld
b e g la d o f it . E A C
J u n e 5.
( 6) [ v . Gooch <£• Temperley, V o l . I , p . 6 6 , N o . 8 4 . ]
( 7) [v. ibid., V o l . I , p . 7 5 , N o . 9 3 . ]
( 8) [ c p . supra, p . 4 3 2 , N o . 2 7 0 , note ( 7) . ]
 533

N o. 335
Sir Edward G rey to Sir A . Hardinge.
F.O. 3 67'340.
27115'1165 13/436.
Private.
M y dear H ardinge, London, June 11, 1913.
Soveral told me today that, before the Anglo-G erm an Agreement of 1898 about
the Portuguese Colonies was made, Chamberlain had been prepared to make a bargain
with him under which, while preserving Portuguese sovereignty, the Portuguese
Colonies would be taken in hand and developed by British capital. This had been
defeated by German intervention, and subsequently Lord Salisbury’ s Government had
made the Agreem ent of 1898. Soveral was most anxious that the Portuguese Colonies
should not be lost, and he said that the renewal of the Alliance with Portugal in 1899
really negatived the Agreement of 1898 with Germany.
I said that both Agreements existed, and I had to deal with the situation as it
was. It was impossible for the Portuguese Colonies to remain for ever undeveloped.
If Portugal could develop them for herself, the Anglo-Germ an Agreement of 1898
would remain a dead letter. But the development of these great Colonies required
both men and m oney, which Portugal had not. They must therefore be developed
by foreign help and capital. Neither Germ any nor we, being neighbours of these
Colonies, could agree to their being developed by other foreign assistance than our
own. The 1898 Agreement with Germ any had made it impossible for us to make any
such agreement as Chamberlain had contemplated, under which we alone should
undertake the development of the Portuguese Colonies. Therefore the wise course for
Portugal would be, on the firm understanding that Germany as well as Great Britain
would respect her sovereignty, to encourage British and German capital respectively
to develop the Colonies on the lines of the Agreem ent of 1898. I thought that
probably before the year was over I should communicate this secret Agreem ent
officially to the Portuguese Government, and give them some advice of this kind, for
it was the only thing to be done if the Colonies were ever to be developed.
[Yours, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 336.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen J*)

F.O. 367/340.
2 57 3 6 /1 1 65 /1 3 436.
(No. 39.) Africa.
Sir, Foreign Office, June 13, 1913.
Mr. Harcourt and I saw the German Ambassador to-d ay.(2) W e explained to him
that we did not like to touch the preamble of the 1898 Agreement about African
Portuguese Colonies.
The Ambassador said that the preamble was felt to be rather too narrow ; that
there were things in the Agreem ent that went beyond the scope of the prea m ble; and
that it would produce a better effect on public opinion in Germany if it was altered
as he suggested. This has been the view of Herr von Bethm ann-Hollweg.

(* ) [T h is d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e P r im e M in is t e r a n d t o t h e C a b in e t .
I t w a s r e p e a te d to L is b o n (N o . 7 6 A fr ic a ), on J u n e 1 9 , a n d a c o p y w a s se n t w ith it o f th e
“ le t t e r fr o m G e r m a n A m b a s s a d o r t o w h ic h it r e fe r s .” ( r . supra, p p . 5 3 0 - 1 , X o . 3 3 4 , encl.)
I t w a s s u b m it t e d t o M r . H a r c o u r t , a n d is m in u t e d b v h i m : “ I a g r e e . L . H . 1 6 .6 .1 3 .” ]
( 2) [c p . G .P ., X X X Y I I ( I ) , p p . 5 4 -S .]
 534

W e argued that our intention was not to extend the scope of the 1898 Agreement ;
and that, if the preamble was considered too narrow, it would be easy, when it was
published, to explain that it was left as it was because that was how it had been made
in 1898. In fact, it \Vould be much more easy to explain why the preamble was left
as it was than why it was altered.
Finally, we gathered from the Ambassador that, if we saw objection to altering
the preamble, the German Government would not press their proposal about it.
W ith regard to the second suggestion, that the words “ or the vital interests in
the adjoining British and German Colonies and Protectorates ’ ’ should be inserted in
Article 8, Mr. Harcourt and 1 said that we would agree to these words. We deprecated,
however, the introduction of any m ention of slavery in this Article. It would not
be relevant to the Agreement, and would be an extension of its scope and object.
W e said that we would agree to the omission of the latter paragraph of Article 9,
as desired by the German Government.
[I am. Ac.
E. G i H EY Hi

No. 337.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. Go$clicn.(l)

E.G. 367 340.
25736 1165 13 436.
(No. 40.) Africa.
Sir, Foreiyn Ojhcc. ■June 13, 1913.
In the course of the conversation that Mr. Harcourt and I had with the German
Ambassador to-day, I told the Ambassador what had passed with the Marqnis de
Soveral in conversation this week. lie hod learnt, when he was Portuguese Minister
here in 1898. a good deal more about the origin of the seen t Treaty with Germany
than I had been able to discover from papers in the Foreign Office. He had been
very much opposed to it. and in conversation with m e the other day he had expressed
the opinion that it ought to remain a dead letter. I had not entered with him into
any discussion on the revision of the 1898 Agreement, but I had pointed out that if
Portugal herself were in a position to develop these great Colonies of Mozambique
and Angola the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 would remain a dead letter, but
that it was against all nature, and impossible, that these great Colonies should remain
undeveloped. To develop them would require men and money that Portugal had
not. Great Britain and Germany, being neighbours to the Colonies, could not agree
to their being developed by foreign capital that would get a lien upon the Colonies,
unless the capital was British or German, and I thought that before the end of the
year the 1898 Agreement would probably be communicated to the Portuguese
Governm ent. These considerations would be pointed out to them and they would be
advised that, on the understanding that there was no intention on the part of Great
Britain or Germany to disturb their sovereignty, they should encourage the develop­
ment of their Colonies by British and German capital and companies respectively on
the lines of the Agreement. The Agreement communicated to them would, of course,
be the revised one, of which I had made no mention to M. de Soveral.
The Ambassador said that he feared that, if Portugal knew of the Agreement,
she would oppose concessions to British and German companies.
W e said that at present she was disposed to play one off against the other, for
instance to encourage British concessions imagining that she was thus creating a bar

P ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C abinet. I t was

su b m itted to M r. H a rc o u rt and is m in u ted by h im : “ I agree. L. H . 1 6.6 13 .” I t was
rep ea ted to L isbon (as an enclosure in X o . 76 A frica ) on J u n e 19.]
 535
to German concessions. H ow much M. de Soveral had told the present Portuguese
Government o f what he knew I could not say, but they probably already knew more
or less about the Agreement, and the com m unication of it to them would, I thought,
make things not more, but less, difficult.
Some things that the Ambassador said seemed to indicate that Germ any hoped
for more than a mere com m ercial development of Portuguese Colonies. H e said, in
fact, that the position I seemed to assume was that of medical adviser to the
Portuguese Colonies, while what Germ any contem plated was that of being the heir.
I said that what I did contemplate was rather that the Colonies should be
developed by British and German capital and com panies respectively, in which case
Germany and Great Britain would not be so much medical advisers as agents or
lessees to develop the Colonies without disturbing the ownership. Of course, if
Portugal herself broke up or sold the Colonies we should be the heirs or purchasers;
but if she mortgaged the Colonies it would only be carrying out the sort of thing
that we contemplated.
[I am, A c.l
E. G [B E Y ].

No. 33S.

Sir Edirard G rey to Sir E. G oschen J1)

F .O . 307 310.
3329-2'1105 0 3 430.
(No. 47.) Africa.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 7, 1913.
The German Ambassador said to-day(2) that the German Chancellor found it
necessary to consider public opinion in Germany, and did not understand why we
objected to any widening of the preamble of the revised Convention about the
Portuguese Colonies, in view of the fact that the words now suggested by Germ any
for that preamble did not go nearly so far as words that had been used in the Secret
Convention of 1898.(3) In the preamble of that Convention, for instance, there
occurred the words : ‘ ‘ W hereas it m ay unfortunately not be found possible to
m aintain the integrity of the African possessions of Portugal south of the Equator ” ;
and again in Article 3 of the same Convention there occurred the words : “ In case
Portugal renounces her sovereign rights over Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese
Tim or, or loses these territories in any other m anner.”
I remarked, parenthetically, that no doubt the reason for our objection to the use
of any words like these was that they had a disagreeable sound.
The Ambassador said that the words now suggested by Germany for the preamble
of the revised Convention were not open to this objection, and as we objected to
substitute them for the draft preamble he would now suggest that they should be
added to, or inserted in. that preamble without eliminating anything that was now in
it. The words he suggested were : ‘ ' and in n e w of the existing special interests of
Germany and Great Britain in their Colonial possessions and protectorates in East
and West Africa conterminous to certain Portuguese dom inions.” (4)
I said that I would discuss with Mr. Harcourt what the Ambassador now
proposed.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [B E Y ].

(l) [T h is d e s p a tc h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v in g b e e n s e n t to th e P r im e M in is t e r a n d to
M r . H a r c o u r t .]
( 2 ï [c p . G .P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 5 9 - 6 0 . ]
( 3 ) [ r . Gooch d: T em p erley, V o l . I , p . 7 3 , X o . 9 1 , e n c l . ]
(4) [ M a r g in a l c o m m e n t b y M r . A s q u it h : “ I s h o u ld le a v e o u t ‘ e x i s t i n g ’ o th e r w is e I se e
n o h a r m in th e s u g g e s tio n . H . H . A .” J
 536
M IN U T E S .

Anglo-German agreement respecting Portuguese colonies.

I t is q u i t e t r u e t h a t t h e w o r d s q u o t e d b y P r i n c e L i c h n o w s k y a s o c c u r r i n g i n t h e p r e a m b l e
o f t h e s e c r e t c o n v e n t io n o f 1 8 9 8 , a n d a s n o w o m itt e d fr o m t h e r e v is e d d r a ft c o n v e n t io n , w e r e
e lim in a t e d h y u s, p a r t ly b e c a u s e it s e e m e d d e s ir a b le in a t r e a t y t o h e p u b lis h e d , t o a v o id a n y
e x p r e s s io n s n e e d le s s ly a la r m i n g t o t h e P o r t u g u e s e g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s is a ls o in t h e G e r m a n
i n t e r e s t ; f o r it is t o G e r m a n y t h a t a n y P o r t u g u e s e i ll-f e e li n g o n t h e s c o r e o f t h e t r e a t y w ill
b e m a in ly d ir e c te d .
T h e r e w a s h o w e v e r a n o t h e r m o r e t e c h n ic a l r e a s o n fo r th e o m is s io n : T h e r e w e r e in 1 8 9 8
tw o c o n v e n tio n s . T h e fir st c o n t a in s s t ip u la tio n s b a s e d o n th e a s s u m p tio n t h a t th e in t e g r it y o f
t h e P o r t u g u e s e c o lo n ie s w ill b e m a i n t a i n e d ; a n d t h e r e fo r e t h e p r e a m b le r e fe r s e x p lic it ly t o th e
d e s ir e o f th e s ig n a to r ie s to se e it m a in ta in e d . T h e w o r d s q u o te d b y P r in c e L ic h n o w s k y o c c u r
in t h e p r e a m b le o f th e se c o n d (s e c r e t) c o n v e n t io n , w h ic h d e a lt w ith t h e c o n tin g e n c y o f a
p a r titio n .
A s b o th t h e c o n v e n t io n s w o u ld n o w h a v e t o b e p u b lis h e d , w e e x p la in e d to t h e G e r m a n
g o v e r n m e n t ,— a n d t h e y a g r e e d — t h a t t o m a k e t w o n e w c o n v e n t io n s , a v o w e d ly fo r p u b lic a t io n ,
a n d y e t m a k e o n e s e c r e t , w o u ld b e a b s u r d . I t t h e n b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y t o h a v e o n e p r e a m b le to
c o v e r t h e r e v is e d t e x t o f b o th th e o ld c o n v e n t io n s . I t is c le a r ly im p o s s ib le t o p u t a t t h e h e a d
o f a t r e a t y a p r e a m b le b a s e d o n t h e a s s u m p t io n t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e P o r t u g u e s e c o lo n ie s
w o u ld n o t h e m a i n t a in e d , w h e n a la r g e p a r t o f t h e t r e a t y d e a ls w ith t h e c o n t r a r y c o n t in g e n c y .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e is n o r e a l d iffic u lty in r e fe r r i n g in t h e p r e a m b le t o t h e d e s i r e d m a i n ­
t e n a n c e o f i n t e g r i t y a n d y e t d e a lin g , in t h e t r e a t y , a ls o w i t h t h e p o s s ib ilit y o f s u c h d e s ir e n o t
b e in g r e a lis e d .
A p a r t fr o m t h is , w e c o u ld in n o c a s e a g r e e t o o m i t fr o m t h e p r e a m b le t h e r e fe r e n c e t o t h e
d e s ir e to m a in ta in th e in t e g r it y a n d in d e p e n d e n c e o f P o r t u g a l, sin c e , a s I h a v e a lr e a d y p o in te d
o u t in a f o r m e r m i n u t e , w e g a v e a s s u r a n c e s t o t h e P o r t u g u e s e g o v [ e r n m e n ] t t h a t t h e t r e a t y
c o n t a in e d su c h a r e fe r e n c e .
A s t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t n o w a g r e e to le t o u r r e v is e d p r e a m b le , w h ic h d o e s c o n t a in th e
r e fe r e n c e , s t a n d , w e c o u ld , a s I s u g g e s te d in m y p r e v io u s m in u t e , a c c e p t t h e G e r m a n w o r d in g
a s a n a d d itio n in th e w a y p r o p o s e d b y P r in c e L ic h n o w s k v .
I q u ite a g r e e , if I m a y sa y so , w ith th e P r im e M in is t e r ’s m a r g in a l s u g g e s tio n a s to
o m i t t in g t h e w o r d “ e x is t in g .”
E. A. C.
J u ly 13 .
P S e n d m i n u t e t o C o l o n i a l O f f i c e .( 5)
W . T.
I a ls o a g r e e t h a t “ e x i s t i n g ” s h o u ld b e o m i t t e d .
E. G.

( 5) [M r . H a r c o u r t r e fe r r e d th e G e r m a n p r o p o sa l to S ir J . A n d e r s o n , a n d th e y b o th
c o n c u r r e d w ith S ir E y r e C r o w e ’ s m in u t e a n d t h e o m is s io n s u g g e s te d b y t h e P r im e M in is t e r .
P r i n c e L i c h n o w s k y w a s s o i n f o r m e d o n J u l y 1 7 . cp. i m m e d i a t e l y s u c c e e d i n g d o c u m e n t . ]

No. 339.

Sir Edward, G rey to Sir E. Goschen.

F.O. 3 4 8 5 6 /1 1 65 /1 3 /4 3 6
(No. 49.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Ofjice, July 17, 1913.
I informed Y [o u r] E [xcellen cy ] in m y desp[atch] No. 47, A f[rica ], Secret, of
the 7th in s t[a n t],(1) of the amendment proposed by the German G ov[ernm en]t in
the preamble of the draft Anglo-German Convention regarding the Portuguese
Colonies.
I have to-day inform ed the German A m b[assad o]r that H [is ] M [a jesty’ sJ
G o v e rn m e n t] agree to that amendment, subject to the omission of the word
“ existing ” from the words proposed to be inserted.

0 ) [v. im m ed ia tely preced in g d ocu m en t.]

 537
I enclose for Y [o u r ] E x c e lle n c y ’ s] con f[id en tia ]l inform ation copy o f a note
which I am addressing to Prince L ichn ow sky(2) with a copy of the draft convention as
revised.
[ I am, &c.
E. G R E Y .]
( 2) \v. infra, p p . 5 3 7 - 4 0 , N o . 3 4 1 , a n d encl.]

No. 340.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich n ow sk yJ 1)

F.O. 367 310.
3 48 5 6 /1 1 65 /1 3 /4 3 6.
M y dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, July 26, 1913.
W ith reference to the conversation which we had on the 7th in s t[a n t ],(2) and to
the further com m unication made to you on the 17th in s t[a n t],(3) I now transmit a
draft of the Convention regarding the Portuguese Colonies as revised.
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] will observe that in the preamble I have used instead of
the word conterminous the word “ contiguous ” which is that used in A rt[ic le ] 10.
I have made in A rt[ic le ]s 8 and 9 the alterations to which I agreed on June 13.(4)
In A rt[ic le ] 10 I have altered “ South Africa ” to “ East and W est Africa ” to
correspond with the preamble. I have added between A rt[ic le ]s 11 and 12 o f the last
draft an Article mentioning, in accordance with Y [o u r ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s suggestion,
the fact that Stanford’ s Map of Africa 1911 has been used in drafting the Convention
and im plying that a copy of that map will be annexed to the Convention.
Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] will perhaps be good enough to favour me with a German
version of the draft Convention as revised.(5)
[ I have, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ].
(!) [ c p . G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 6 6 - 7 0 . T h i s d e s p a t c h i s e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e
P r im e M in is t e r a n d t o M r . H a r c o u r t . I t is m in u t e d : “ I c o n c u r . L . H . ” A c o p y w a s s e n t to
S ir E . G o s c h e n .]
( 2) [i>. supra, p . 5 3 5 , N o . 3 3 8 . ]
(3) [v . im m e d ia t e ly p r e c e d i n g d o c u m e n t .]
(4) [v. supra, p p . 5 3 3 - 4 , N o . 3 3 6 ]
(s) [v. infra, p p . 5 4 1 ^ 1 , N o . 3 4 3 , a n d encl.]

No. 341.

Sir Edward G rey to Prince L ich n ow sk yJ 1)

F.O. 367/340.
356 3 5 /1 1 65 /1 3 /4 3 6.
(Confidential.')
M y dear Ambassador, F oreign Office, July 31, 1913.
Since I wrote to you on the 28th instant(2) in regard to the proposed convention
on the subject of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, we have thought it advisable to
make a few slight verbal alterations in the English text of the draft convention.
This has been done partly with a view to facilitating the work of translation into
German and partly as an improvem ent of the English text itself.
(1 ) [ c p . G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 6 4 - 6 . ]
( 2) [ N o r e c o r d c a n b e t r a c e d in t h e F o r e i g n O ffic e A r c h i v e s o f a c o m m u n ic a t io n t o P r i n c e
L i c h n o w s k y o n J u l y 2 8 . T h e l a s t r e c o r d e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s t h a t o f J u l y 2 6 . v. i m m e d i a t e l y
p r e c e d i n g d o c u m e n t . S i r E d w a r d G r e y ’ s l e t t e r o f t h e 2 6 t h is file d in a ja c k e t w i t h t h e d a t e -
s t a m p “ J u ly 2 8 , 1 9 1 3 .” ]
 538

W e have thought it preferable to replace the word “ colonial ” in the preamble

by the word “ respective.”
In article o (1) we have made the last part of the sentence after the words
“ private character ” run as follows :—
“ and do not convey either political rights, territorial jurisdiction, or adminis­
trative powers.”

In article 8 we have altered the words from “ vital interests ” to run as follows :
‘ ‘ of the adjoining British or German dom inions or protectorates.”

In article 13 we have omitted the words “ duly ratified,” as being superfluous.

The above emendations will no doubt entail some slight verbal alterations in the
German translation.
In addition to these some verbal alterations have been made in articles 8 and 9
purely with a view to making the English text clearer, and the com m a after the word
“ in te rv en tion ” in Article 10 has been removed.
I have the honour to send you herewith three copies of the English text
containing these emendations.
[ I have, Ac.
E . G B E Y .]

Enclosure in No. 341.

Draft Convention.

(Confidential.)
In view of the possibility that Portugal may require financial assistance from
some foreign Power or Powers, and in order to obviate the international complications
which such a condition of things m ay produce, and to preserve her integrity and
independence, and in view of the special interests of Great Britain and Germ any in
their respective possessions and protectorates in East and W est Africa contiguous to
certain Portuguese dominions, the undersigned, duly authorised by their respective
Sovereigns, have agreed as follows :—
1.— (1) W henever either the British or the German Governm ent is of opinion
that it is expedient to accede to a request for an advance of m oney to Portugal on the
security of the customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique or Angola, it shall
com m unicate the fact to the other Governm ent, and the other Governm ent shall have
the right to advance a part of the total sum required.
(2) In the event of the other Governm ent signifying its intention to exercise
this right, the two Governments shall consult as to the terms of these two loans.G) and
these loans shall be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique
and Angola as n ea r(1) as possible simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near(4) as
possible the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the customs revenues
respectively assigned as their security.
(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Portugal as the condition
of the m oney market and the security of the loans permit, and shall in other respects
be subject as near(4) as possible to similar conditions.
2. In the contingency contemplated in the preceding article the customs revenues
of that portion of the province of Mozambique lying south of a line starting from the
mouth of the River Lukugu, running thence along that river to its confluence with
the River Lugera, thence along that river to its source, thence along the meridian of
that source to the 16th parallel of south latitude, and thence along that parallel to
the boundary of the British protectorate of Nyassaland, as also the customs revenues
o f the portions of the province of Angola lying to the east of the 2(Eh meridian of

( 3) [T h e fin a l t e x t in i t ia lle d o n O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 , h a s h e r e “ t h e t w o lo a n s .” ]
( 4) [ T h e fin a l t e x t in i t ia lle d o n O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 , h a s h e r e “ n e a r ly .” ]
 539

east longitude and south of the Ivassai River, shall be assigned to the British loan;
whilst the customs revenues o f the rem aining parts o f the provinces o f Mozambique
and Angola ( which latter includes the administrative district o f the Congo, which has
its seat o f governm ent at Cabinda shall be assigned to the German loan.
3. In the event of Great Britain or Germ any sending delegates to take note of
the collection of the revenues, which are the security for their respective loans, the
Portuguese Governm ent shall be asked to give such delegates rights o f inspection
only, but no rights o f administration, interference, or control, so long as there is no
default in the payment o f interest or sinking fund.
4. In case o f default in the payment of the interest or sinking fund of either loan,
it shall be agreed with the Portuguese Governm ent that they will hand over the
administration of the various c •stom-houses in the two provinces : those assigned for
the German loan to G erm a n y: those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain.
5 .— 1 In the contingency contem plated in the preceding article all rights,
whether British or German, acquired in the provinces affected, before the date of this
convention, shall be fully safeguarded, provided they are of a purely private character
and do not convey either political rights, territorial jurisdiction, or administrative
powers.
(2 It is well understood that no influence will be used in the future either by
the British or the German Government to obtain fresh concessions, except in those
portions o f the provine, s o f which the customs revenues would be assigned to their
respective loans under the present convention.
6. From the date o f the conclusion of the present convention Great Britain will
abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation,
or control o f those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues
would under the present convention be assigned to Germany, or o f the islands of San
Thom e and Principe, or to the exercise o f political influence in those territories or
isla n d s: and Germ any will in like m anner abstain from advancing any claim of
whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, or control o f those portions of the
Portuguese provinces in which the customs revenues would under the present
convention be assigned to Great Britain, or of the Portuguese part o f the island of
Timor, or to the exercise o f political influence in those territories or in that island.
7.— 1 In the event of either Government obtaining from the Portuguese
Government a cession of territory, or the concession o f special privileges not of an
occasional 4 character, in those portions of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola o f
which the customs revenues would be assigned to it, such cessions o f territory or
concessions o f privileges shall not become operative until analogous giants as near(5)
as possible of equal value have been accorded to the other Governm ent in those
portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues would be assigned to it by
the present convention.
2 In case either Government applies for special privileges o f an occasionalf 6)
character in those portions o f the Portuguese provinces of which the customs revenues
would be assigned to it under the present convention, it shall im m ediately inform the
other Government and, if these privileges are granted, and if the other Governm ent
should so desire, shall use its influence to obtain for the other Governm ent similar
special privileges of an occasional character and o f equal value.
3. If in any part of the provinces of Mozambique or Angola the livrs or property
of British or German subjects, or the vital interests of the adjoining British or German
dominions or protectorates, are endangered by local disturbances or by the action of
the local authorities, and the Portuguese Governm ent are not in a position to afford
the necessary protection, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and German Govern­
ments, after consulting together, and after a joint com m unication to the Portuguese
Governm ent, shall determine the nature, duration, and scope of such measures as it
may be deemed necessary to take for the protection of the interests endangered.
(5) [ T h e fin a l t e x t in i t ia lle d o n O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 , h a s h e r e “ n e a r ly .’ ]
(sj [ T h e fin a l t e x t i n i t i a lle d o n O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 , a d d s h e r e “ t h a t is , m in o r o r t e m p o r a r y .” ]
 54 0

9. If any of the Portuguese colonies in question, having becom e independent and

having been recognised as such by the two high contracting parties, or if any part
of such independent colony, should declare its annexation to the dominions of one of
the two contracting Powers, the other contracting Power shall, for its part, be entitled,
after previously inform ing the first Power, to annex those portions of such colony,
thus becom e independent, o f which the customs revenues would be assigned to it
under the present convention.
10. Great Britain and Germany, having regard to the interests of their respective
possessions in East and West Africa contiguous to the Portuguese provinces of Angola
and Mozambique, which would be m aterially affected by the intervention of any third
Power in those provinces, agree join tly to oppose such intervention whether by way
of loan to Portugal on the security of the revenues o f the said provinces, or by way
o f acquisition of territory by grant, cession, purchase, lease or otherwise.
11. In so far as Great Britain or Germany may hereafter influence or control
the administration of Mozambique or Angola or any portion of those provinces, it is
understood that the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, of one contracting party,
together with their goods and ships, and also the produce and the manufactures of
its dominions, possessions, colonies, and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the
territories comprised in the present convention as m ay fall under the influence or
control of the other contracting party, participate in all the prerogatives, exemptions,
and privileges with regard to trade, com m erce, taxation, and navigation which are
there enjoyed by the subjects, and natives of the protectorates, of the other contracting
party.
12. The effect of the provisions of the present convention is shown generally on
the annexed copy of Stanford’ s Map of Africa, 1911.
13. The present convention shall replace as between the contracting PowersC) the
convention, secret convention, and secret note concluded and signed in London on
the 30th August, 1898, which are hereby abrogated.
14. The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall
be exchanged as soon as possible. The convention shall come into force immediately’
after the exchange of ratifications.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the same, and
have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the day of , 1913.

( 7) [T h e fin a l t e x t in itia lle d on O cto b e r 2 0 , 19 1 3 , o m its th e w ords “ as b etw e en th e

c o n t r a c t i n g P o w e r s .” ]

No. 342.

Sir Edward, G rey to Lord Granville.(*)

F.O. 367/340.
3 76 5 8 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 .
(No. 55.) Africa. Secret.
M y Lord, Foreign Office, August 13, 1913.
W ith the German Ambassador this afternoon I initialled the text of the revision
of the Secret Agreem ent o f 1898 about the Portuguese Colonies.(2) Only the English
text was initialled, the Ambassador observing that the German text was not yet ready,
and that when it was ready some alterations might be required, owing to the fact that

(* ) [T h is d e s p a tc h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v in g b e e n s e n t t o th e K i n g ; t o t h e P r im e M i n i s t e r ; to
M r . H a r c o u r t .]
( 2) [T h e in i t i a lle d t e x t is p r e s e r v e d in t h e F o r e i g n O ffic e S e r ie s o f O r i g i n a l T r e a t i e s ,
(G e r m a n y N o . 7 2 ). I t is id e n t ic a l w it h t h e d r a f t s e n t t o P r in c e L ic h n o w s k y o n J u ly 3 1 , 1 9 1 3 .
( v. i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g d o c u m e n t , encl.) cp. infra, p . 5 4 4 , Ed. N o t e . ]
 541
there were some expressions, such as “ territorial jurisdiction,’ ’ which had no
equivalent in German.
I said that I would record what he had told me, and we could settle subsequently
by agreement verbal alterations of this kind, and also the date of publication.
[ I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

No. 343.

H err von Kühlmann to Sir Edward G r e ift1)

F.O. 367/340.
4 0 7 0 4 /1 1 65 /1 3 /4 3 6.
Euerer Exzellenz London, Septem ber 1, 1913.
beehre ich mich in der Anlage den verbesserten deutschen Text der von Euerer
Exzellenz und dem Kaiserlichen Botschafter paraphierten K onvention ergebenst zu
übersenden.
Zwei Änderungen des paraphierten englischen Textes erscheinen im H inblick auf
eine gute deutsche fÜbersetzung w ünschensw ert:
1. dass in Artikel 7 hinter dem W orte “ occasional ’ ’ eingefügt werde : “ that is
m inor and temporary character.’ ’
2. dass in Artikel 13 “ as between the contracting p ow ers” gestrichen werde.

Es ist ohne weiteres klar, dass der Vertrag von 1898 sowohl wie der gegenwärtige
nur zwischen England und Deutschland Recht schafft, der Satz erscheint daher
überflüssig und ist wegen der Möglichkeit von Missverständnissen sogar nicht
unbedenklich.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten H ochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
Euerer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
K Ü H LM A N N .
Enclosure in No. 343.

Vertrags-Entwurf.
Im Hinblick auf die Möglichkeit, dass Portugal der finanziellen Unterstützung
einer oder m ehrerer fremder Mächte bedürfen könnte, und zu dem Zwecke,
internationalen Verwickelungen, die aus einer solchen Lage der Dinge entstehen
könnten, vorzubeugen und Portugals Unversehrtheit und LViabhängigkeit zu erhalten,
sowie mit Rücksicht auf die besonderen Interessen, die Deutschland und Gross­
britannien in ihren an portugiesische Gebiete angrenzenden Besitzungen und
Schutzgebieten in Ost- und Westafrika haben, sind die mit gehörigen Vollm achten
ihrer hohen Souveräne versehenen Unterzeichneten über Nachstehendes übereinge­
kommen :
Artikel 1.— (1.) Sobald entweder die deutsche oder die grossbritannische
Regierung es für angezeigt hält einem Ersuchen um ein Darlehen an Portugal gegen
Verpfändung der Zolleinnahm en oder sonstiger Einkünfte von Mocambique oder
Angola Folge zu geben, wird sie von dieser Tatsache der anderen Regierung
Mitteilung machen, und die andere Regierung soll das Recht haben, einen Teil der
erforderlichen Gesamtsumme darzuleihen.
(2.) Für den Fall, dass die andere Regierung die Absicht, von diesem Rechte
Gebrauch zu machen, kundgibt, werden beide Regierungen über die Bedingungen der
beiden Anleihen beraten, und diese Anleihen sollen gegen Verpfändung der Zollein­
nahmen von Mocambique und Angola möglichst gleichzeitig zur Ausgabe gelangen.
0 ) [c p . H e r r v o n K ü h lm a n n ’s d e s p a tc h o f A u g u s t 1 9 to H e r r v o n B e th m a n n H o llw e g a n d
H e r r v o n J a g o w ’ s r e p l y o f A u g u s t 2 9 , 1 9 1 3 . G.P., X X X V I I ( I ) , p p . 7 3 - 8 2 . ]
 542

Die Anleihen sollen zu einander so genau als möglich in demselben Verhältnis stehen,
wie die Beträge der Zolleinnahm en, die für jede von ihnen verpfändet sind.
(3.) Die Anleihen sollen zu Bedingungen ausgegeben werden, die für Portugal so
günstig sind, wie es die Lage des Geldmarktes und die Sicherheit der Anleihen
gestatten, und sollen im übrigen soweit als möglich gleichartigen Bedingungen
unterliegen.
Artikel 2.) W enn der in dem vorstehenden Artikel vorgesehene Ball eintritt,
sollen für das britische Darlehen verpfändet werden : in Mocambique die Zollein­
nahm en des Teiles der Provinz, der südlich einer Linie liegt, die von der Mün
des Lukugu ausgeht, diesen Fluss entlang läuft bis zur Einm ündung des Lugera,
dem letzteren Flusse bis zu seiner Quelle folgt, dann entlang dem Meridian dieser
Quelle bis zum 16"‘n Grad südlicher Breite führt und schliesslich diesem Breitengrad
bis zur Grenze des britischen Nyassaland-Protektorates fo lg t ; in Angola die Zollein­
nahm en des Teiles der Provinz, der östlich vom 2 0 t,n Meridian östlicher Länge und
südlich vom Kassai-Fluss liegt. Dagegen sollen die Zolleinnahm en der übrigen
Teile der Provinzen Mocambique und Angola (mit Einschlnss des Verwaltungsbezirks
des Kongos, dessen Regierungssitz sich in Cabinda befindet) für das deutsche Darlehen
verpfändet werden.
Artikel 3.) Im Falle dass Deutschland oder Grossbritannien Vertreter entsenden,
um sich von der Erhebung der für die betreffenden Anleihen verpfändeten Einnahm en
zu überzeugen, soll die Portugiesische Regierung, solange kein Verzug in der
Zinszahlung oder Amortisation vorhegt, nur um die Erteilung von Inspektions­
befugnissen an diese Vertreter ersucht werden, nicht aber um die Übertragung von
Verwaltungs-, Eingriffs- oder Aufsichtsbefugnissen.
Artikel 4.) Für den Fall eines Verzugs in der Zinszahlung oder Amortisation
einer der beiden Anleihen soll mit der Portugiesischen Regierung vereinbart werden,
dass sie die Verwaltung der verschiedenen Zollstellen in den beiden Provinzen
überträgt, und zwar der für die deutsche Anleihe verpfändeten Zollstellen an
Deutschland, der für die britische Anleihe verpfändeten an Grossbritannien.
Artikel 5.)— f lh W enn der in dem vorstehenden Artikel vorgesehene Fall eintritt,
sollen alle Rechte, seien es deutsche oder britische, welche vor dem Tage des
Abschlusses dieses Abkomm ens in den in Frage kommenden Provinzen erworben
worden sind, in ihrem vollen Umfange aufrechterhalten werden, vorausgesetzt, dass
sie rein privater Art sind und weder politische Rechte, noch territoriale Gerichts­
barkeit oder Verwaltungsbefugnisse in sich schliessen.
(2.) Es herrscht Einverständnis darüber, dass künftig weder die deutsche noch
die britische Regierung ihren Einfluss zur Erlangung neuer Konzessionen benützen
wird, es sei denn in den Teilen der Provinzen, deren Zolleinnahm en nach dem
gegenwärtigen Abkom m en für ihr Darlehen verpfändet werden würden.
Artikel 6.) Vom Datum des Abschlusses des gegenwärtigen Abkomm ens ab wird
Grossbritannien davon absehen, einen Anspruch irgendwelcher Art geltend zu m achen
auf die Erwerbung, die Besetznng oder die Beherrschung der Teile der portugiesischen
Provinzen, deren Zolleinnahm en nach dem gegenwärtigen Abkomm en an
Deutschland verpfändet werden würden, sowie der Inseln San Thom e und Principe
oder auf die Ausübung politischen Einflusses in diesen Gebieten oder auf diesen
In seln ; in gleicher W eise wird Deutschland davon absehen, einen Anspruch irgend­
welcher Art geltend zu m achen auf die Erwerbung, die Besetzung oder die
Beherrschung der Teile der portugiesischen Provinzen, deren Zolleinnahm en nach
dem gegenwärtigen Abkommen an England verpfändet werden würden, sowie auf den
portugiesischen Teil der Insel Tim or oder auf die Ausübung politischen Einflusses in
diesen Gebieten oder auf dieser Insel.
Artikel 7.)— (1.) Im Falle, dass eine der beiden Regierungen in den Teilen der
Provinzen Mo 9ambique oder Angola, deren Zolleinnahm en dieser Regierung
verpfändet werden würden, von der Portugiesischen Regierung eine Gebietsabtretung
oder die Einräum ung besonderer Privilegien nicht bloss gelegentlicher Natur, d.h. von
geringerer Bedeutung und vorübergehender Art erlangen sollte, sollen derartige
 543
Gebietsabtretungen oder Privilegien nicht eher in W irksamkeit treten, als bis
entsprechende Zugeständnisse von möglichst gleichem W erte der anderen Regierung
in den Teilen der Provinzen eingeräumt worden sind, deren Zolleinnahm en nach
dem gegenwärtigen Abkomm en ihr verpfändet werden würden.
12. Für den Fall, dass eine der beiden Regierungen in den Teilen der
portugiesischen Provinzen, deren Zolleinnahm en nach dem gegenwärtigen Abkomm en
ihr verpfändet werden würden, besondere Privilegien gelegentlicher Natur, d.h. von
geringerer Bedeutung und vorübergehender Art nachsucht, wird sie unverzüglich die
andere Regierung benachrichtigen und wird, wenn diese Privilegien bewilligt werden
und wenn die andere Regierung dies wünschen sollte, ihren Einfluss geltend machen,
um für die andere Regierung gleichartige besondere Privilegien gelegentlicher Natur
und von gleichem W erte zu erlangen.
Artikel S.) W erden in irgend einem Teile der Provinzen von Mocambique
oder Angola Leben oder Eigentum deutscher oder britischer Staatsangehörigen oder
Lebensinteressen der angrenzenden deutschen oder britischen Besitzungen oder
Schutzgebiete durch örtliche Unruhen oder durch das Vorgehen der Ortsbehörden
gefährdet, und ist die portugiesische Regierung nicht in der Lage, den nötigen
Schutz zu gewähren oder verabsäumt sie dies aus irgend einem ändern Grunde, so
werden die deutsche und britische Regierung nach gem einsamer Beratung und nach
einer gem einsamen Mitteilung an die portugiesische Regierung Bestim m ungen
treffen über Art, Dauer und U m fang der Massregeln, die etwa zum Schutze der
gefährdeten Interessen für nötig gehalten werden.
Artikel 9.) Erklärt eine der genannten portugiesischen K olonien, nachdem sie
unabhängig geworden und ihre Unabhängigkeit von den beiden hohen Yertrag-
schliessenden anerkannt worden ist, oder ein Teil einer solchen unabhängigen
Kolonie den Anschluss an das Gebiet der einen vertragschliessenden Macht, so soll
die andere Macht ihrerseits das Recht haben, nach vorheriger Mitteilung an die
andere Macht die Teile einer solchen unabhängig gewordenen Kolonie, deren Zollein­
nahm en nach dem gegenwärtigen Vertrage ihr verpfändet werden würden, sich
anzugliedern.
Artikel 10.) Mit Rücksicht darauf, dass die Interessen ihrer an die
portugiesischen Provinzen Angola und Mocambique grenzenden Besitzungen in Ost-
und W est-Afrika durch die Einm ischung einer dritten Macht in diesen Provinzen
wesentlich beeinträchtigt werden würden, kom m en Deutschland und Grossbritannien
überein, jeder derartigen Einm ischung vereint entgegenzutreten, sei es, dass diese
Einm ischung erfolgt auf dem W ege einer Anleihe an Portugal gegen Verpfändung
der Einkünfte dieser Provinzen oder auf dem W ege des Landerwerbes durch
Verleihung, Abtretung, Kauf, Pacht oder auf irgend eine andere W eise.
Artikel 11.) Sollten Deutschland oder Grossbritannien künftig einm al die
Verwaltung von Mocambique oder Angola oder von Teilen dieser Provinzen
beeinflussen oder beherrschen, so besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass die
A ngehörigen und die Schutzgebietseingeborenen des einen vertragschliessenden Teiles
mitsamt ihren Gütern und Schiffen, sowie die Erzeugnisse und Fabrikate ihrer
Gebiete, Besitzungen, Kolonien und Schutzgebiete in den Teilen der in dem gegen­
wärtigen A bkom m en bezeichneten Territorien, welche unter den Einfluss oder die
Herrschaft des anderen vertragschliessenden Teiles fallen, an allen V orrechten,
Befreiungen und Vergünstigungen in Bezug auf Handel, Verkehr, Besteuerung und
Schiffahrt teilnehm en sollen, deren sich dort die Angehörigen und Schutzgebietseinge­
borenen des ändern vertragschliessenden Teiles erfreuen.
Artikel 12.) Das Ergebnis der in dem gegenwärtigen Abkom m en getroffenen
Vereinbarungen ist auf dem anliegenden Abdruck von Stanford’ s Karte von Afrika,
London 1911, im Allgem einen ersichtlich gemacht.
Artikel 13.) Das gegenwärtige Abkom m en soll die Konvention, die geheime
K onvention und die geheime Note ersetzen, die am 30. August 1898 in London
abgeschlossen und gezeichnet worden sind und die hiermit ausser Kraft gesetzt
werden.
 544

Artikel 14.) Das gegenwärtige Abkomm en soll ratifiziert werden und die
.Ratifizierungsurkunden sollen sobald als m öglich ausgetauscht werden. Das
Abkomm en soll sofort nach dem Austausch der Ratifikationsurkunden in Kraft treten.

Zur Urkund dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, mit den nötigen Vollmachten
versehen, das Abkomm en unterzeichnet und ihre Siegel beigedrückt.
So geschehen in doppelter Ausfertigung zu London, den 1913.

No. 344.

H err von Kühlmann to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 367/340.
4 07 0 5 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 .
A. 2073.
Euere Exzellenz, London, Septem ber 1, 1913.
W ährend der Verhandlungen über die K onvention, die portugiesischen Kolonien
betreffend, ist mehrfach zum Ausdruck gekom m en, dass überall, tvo in dem bezeich-
neten Abkomm en Flüsse als Grenze genannt sind, der Tahceg des Flusses die
wirkliche Grenze bilden soll. Ich wäre Euerer Exzellenz für eine geneigte Mitteilung
darüber verbunden, dass auch die K öniglich Grossbritannische R egierung mit dieser
A uslegung einverstanden ist.
Mit der ausgezeichnetsten Hochachtung habe ich die Ehre zu sein
Euerer Exzellenz
ganz gehorsamer Diener
KÜ H LM AN N .

[ED . N O T E .— T h e A n g l o - G e r m a n C o n v e n t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e P o r t u g u e s e c o l o n i e s w a s
in itia lle d b y S ir E d w a r d G r e y a n d H e r r v o n K iih lm a n n o n O c to b e r 2 0 , 1 9 1 3 . T h e in itia lle d
t e x t is in t h e F o r e i g n O ffic e S e r ie s o f O r i g i n a l T r e a t i e s ( G e r m a n y N o . 7 4 ). I t w a s in i t i a lle d in
b o t h G e r m a n a n d E n g l i s h . T h e E n g l i s h t e x t i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h a t g i v e n supra, p p . 5 3 8 - 4 0 ,
N o . 3 4 1 , encl., e x c e p t f o r t h e s l i g h t c h a n g e s s h o w n t h e r e i n notes. T h e G e r m a n t e x t i s g i v e n i n
t h e im m e d ia t e ly p r e c e d i n g d o c u m e n t .]

No. 345.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(x)

F.O. 367/340.
4 95 1 5 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 .
(No. 75.) Africa.
Sir, Foreign Office, October 29, 1913.
M. Cambon spoke to me to-d ay (2) of the reports that had appeared in the Press
about our Secret Agreement with Germany. It had always been understood that the
Secret Agreem ent of 1898 consisted of an agreement between E ngland and Germany
as to what their spheres of interest should be in the Portuguese Colonies in Africa,
should Portugal sell those Colonies. But there had been rumours that the Germans
had asked us to give up Z a n zib a r; and the Belgians, so M. Cambon inform ed me, felt
great anxiety about the supposed new Agreement.

f 1) [ T h i s d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v i n g b e e n s e n t t o t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d to
M r . H a r c o u r t . I t w a s r e p e a t e d t o B e r li n ( N o . 6 3 A f r i c a ) ; t o L i s b o n ( N o . 1 0 7 A f r i c a ) .]
(2 ) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 ’« Ser., V o l . V I I I , p p . 5 0 1 - 2 , N o . 3 9 7 . ]
 545

I told M. Cambon speaking in strict confidence that the Germans had not asked
as to give up Zanzibar. The scope of the Secret Agreement of 1S98 was of the nature
that he had stated. All that we were now doing was to make a revision of the
territorial spheres of interest under that Agreem ent. W e gained more on the east than
we had under that Agreement, but gave up everything on the west. The Agreement,
however, did not affect the Azores or anything north of San Thom é and Principe.
M. Cambon asked me how San Thomé and Principe came into the Agreement.
I replied that what it meant was that we disinterested ourselves in San Thomé
and Principé and everything on the west coast.
M. Cambon observed that, when the 189S Agreement was made, the Germans
must have counted upon our seizing Delagoa B ay in the event of war with the
Transvaal, and so precipitating a break-up of the Portuguese C olonies; but this had
not happened, and, though it was often reported that Portugal would be obliged to sell
her Colonies, he doubted whether she would do so.
I said that no doubt the Portuguese ought to sell their Colonies, for they needed
m oney, and could not develop their Colonies or make any use of th em ; but I agreed
that Portuguese feeling was such that they could not sell them. They might, however,
let them be developed by German and British concessions, just as they had, without
any pressure from the British Governm ent, years ago given a British concession for a
railway from Benguella on the west coast, though, as a matter of fact that happened
to be in the German sphere of interest under the 1S9S Agreement.
[ I am, A c .'
• E . G [R E Y ].

No. 846.

Mr. O'Eeirne to Sir Echcard G r ey .(l)

F.O. 867 340.
52090'1165 1 3'36.
(No. 335.) St. Petersburgh, D. N ovem ber 3, 1913.
Sir, Pi. N ovem ber 17, 1913.
The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said pointedly to me yesterday that His
M ajesty’ s Government seemed to be com ing to an Agreement with Germany
concerning Colonial possessions in Africa, and that such an Agreement would be
regarded with some anxiety by Russia— and also, he added, by France.
I said that I had no inform ation on the subject but that of course n i s M ajesty’ s
Government were ready to com e to agreements with Germany on particular questions,
just as they had done concerning the Bagdad Railway. There was absolutely no
question of any general agreement with Germany such as could affect our
arrangements with Russia.
Monsieur Sazonow did not appear altogether reassured. He remarked that the
Russian Government perfectly understood H is M ajesty’ s Government negotiating an
arrangement respecting the Bagdad Railway, but an Agreem ent concerning the
African Colonies was a different matter, and he expressed some apprehension as to
the further consequences to which it might lead.
I have, Ac.
H U G H O ’ B E IR N E .

M IN U T E S .
T h e r e is n o r e a s o n w h y t h e R u s s ia n G o v [ e r n m e n ] t s h o u ld fe e l a n y a n x i e t y . A s t h e y h a v e
r a is e d t h e q u e s t io n i t m ig h t b e w e ll fo r M r . O ’ B e ir n e t o e x p la in t h a t n o n e w a g r e e m e n t is
u n d e r d is c u s s io n , b u t m e r e ly a v e r y s lig h t m o d ific a t io n o f a n a g r e e m e n t w h ic h h a s b e e n in

(* ) [T h is d e s p a t c h is e n d o r s e d a s h a v in g b e e n s e n t to t h e K in g , a n d a s h a v in g b e e n se e n
a t B e r l i n .]
[10900] 2 N
 546
ex isten ce since 1898, (See the c o m m [u n ic a tio ]n to M . Cam bon 49515),(2) and w hich in this
m odified form it is hop ed soon to publish, when M. Sazonow w ill be able to con v in ce him self
that it does n ot bear any such con s tru ction as he appea rs to fear.
H . N.
N ov. 17

Eastern D e p [a r tm e n ]t to see.
II. S.
E. A . C.
N ov. 17.
A. N.

I th ou g h t 1 had already sent a teleg ram to M r. O 'B c ir n c a bout this. I n stru c t him as
proposed in the m inute.
E. G

N o t officia lly? P riv a te S ecretary.

R. S
See priv a te telegram annexed, w hich m ust have reached M r. O ’ B eirn e fou r days a fter the
con v ersation here re p o rte d .(3)
? Send off the despatch so as to p u t the e x p la n a tion on record officially.( ')
R . S.
E. A C.
N ov. 22

(2) [u. im m ed ia tely preced in g d ocu m en t.]

(3) [r . in fra , pp. 546-7, N o. 348.]
( ‘ ) [r . in fra, p. 547, N o. 349.]

No. 347.

Mr. O ’Deirne to Sir Echcard Grey.

F.O. 367/340. St. Petersburgh, N ovem ber 6, 1913.

5 2 0 9 0 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /3 6 . D. 3-5 p . m .
Tel. Private. R. 4 -1 0 p . m .
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has recently expressed to me some anxiety as
to the scope of our pending negotiations with Germany as to which different
announcements are appearing in the press in anticipation.
You might think it desirable to send him some reassuring message, while he is
at L ivadia.f1)
0 ) [v. im m ed ia tely succeed ing d ocu m en t.]

No. 348.

Sir Edicard G rey to Mr. O ’ Beirne.

F.O. 367/340.
5 2 0 9 0 '1 1 6 5 /1 3 /3 6 .
Tel. Private. Foreign Office, N ovem ber 7, 1913, 4 p . m .
Your private tel[egra m ] of Nov [em ber] 6 .0 ) There was a secret agreement made
with Germany in 1898 providing for certain spheres of interest in the event o f
Portugal selling her African Colonies, raising loans or granting concessions respecting
them.
(*) fv. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 547

The new agreement does not extend the scope of 189S agreement, but revises the
geographical limits of respective spheres o f interest. You m ay inform Minister for
Foreign Affairs very confidentially.(2)

(2) [M a r g in a l n ote bv S ir E d w a rd G re v : “ M r. H a rc o u rt to see.” In itia lle d bv

M r. H a rc o u rt : “ L . H . S.11.13."]

X o. 349.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. O'Beirne.

F.O. 367 340.
5*2090 1165 13 36.
(X o. *2.) Africa. Secret.
Sir. Foreign Office. N ovem ber *25. 1913.
I have received your despatch Xo. 335 o f the 3rd instant^1 in which you report
the observations made by the Bussian M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] with
regard to the Anglo-G erm an Agreement respecting Portuguese Colonies in Africa.
I have to request that you will explain to M. Sazonow that no new agreement is
under discussion, but m erely a very slight revision of an agreement which has been
in existence since 1S98. This agreement in its revised form it is hoped soon to publish,
when M. Sazonow will be able to convince him self that it does not bear any such
construction as he appears to fear.
[I am, Ac.
E. G B E Y .]
(*) [r . supra, p. 545, X o . 346.]

X o. 350.

Sir Edward G rey to Lord Granvilleff1)

F.O. 367 '34 0 .
54363 1165 13/436.
(Xo. S2. Africa.
My Lord, F oreign Office, N ovem ber -lb, 1913.
M. Cambon having inform ed me that M. Pichon was anxious about our
Agreem ent with Germany respecting the Portuguese Colonies, I asked M. Cambon to
come to see me to-day. Sir E yre Crowe was present at the interview to explain how
things stood.i2
M. Cambon had the impression that, in the Agreement with Germany, we had
disinterested ourselves in the Azores and Portuguese Guinea, and in fact all the
Portuguese Colonies generally, except certain parts of Angola and M ozam bique: or,
at any rate, that the Agreem ent with Germ any dealt with all the Portuguese Colonies.
I explained to M. Cambon that this was an entire mistake. The Agreem ent
affected none of the Portuguese Colonies except Portuguese East Africa, Angola, and
the Islands o f San Thom e and Principe. It was a revision of a Secret Agreem ent made
in 1S9S, and. had that Agreement not existed, there would probably have been no
discussion o f the sort now going on between the Germans and us. I then told
M. Cambon roughly the provisions of the Agreem ent.

t1) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g an d to the C abinet. It was
rep eated t o B erlin (X o . 69 A fric a ) on D ecem b er 3 .]
(2) [M a r g in a l n ote by S ir E d w a rd G r e v : “ S ir E. Crow e should first see this in case he has
any ob serv a tion s to m ake in th e record as he was p resen t th rou g h ou t th e con v ersation and
co n tr ib u te d to it. [E . G .] ” In itia lle d by S ir E y re C r o w e : “ E . A . C. D e c[e m b e r] 1.” ]
[10900] 2 X 2
 518

H e said that it would be very annoying íor France if Germany obtained Kabinda
and the northern part of Angola, which practically commanded the mouth of the
C o n g o ; and so it would also be if the Island of San Thorne, which was opposite
Libreville, went to Germany. It would be annoying to Spain if the Island of
Principé went to Germany.
I told M. Cambon that I was quite aware that it must be inconvenient for France
that Kabinda and the northern part of Angola should be allotted to Germany, but
this was done in 1898, before any “ E n te n te ” with France had been established;
indeed, before the Boer war. B y the Agreement of 1898, Germany and we had under­
taken mutnal obligations, with regard to certain spheres of interest in the Portuguese
Colonies of Angola and Mozambique, to support each other in excluding any other
influence than English or German respectively. The engagement as to Kabinda
which was part of Angola administratively, had existed since 1898, and there was no
means of escape from it. San Thorne and Principé had com e into the Agreement that
was now under discussion because in 1898 Germany had obtained the reversion of
the Portuguese part of Timor, and we now wished, in the interests of Australia, to
eliminate this German claim. W e had not ourselves acquired any interest in Timor,
but we had induced Germany to renounce her interest, and in return for this, we had
agreed not to put forward any claim of our own to San Thomé and Principé. In the
course of the present negotiations, it had been suggested that these two Islands should
com e into the Agreement in the same way as Mozambique and Angola, but we had
declined to undertake any obligation to support German claims with regard to the
Islands, and had confined our obligation purely to one of the renunciation of any
British claim. W e had done this because we did not wish to come into conflict with
any other Power about San Thom é and Principé, by having to support German
claim s; and the obligations that we had undertaken to support Germany were
confined to those that liad existed since 1898.
I impressed upon M. Cambon that, till the Agreement was published, what I had
told him must be regarded as very confidential.
He continued to say that there would be much annoyance for France, especially
in connection with Kabinda.
I said finally that this was one of the objections to the secrecy of A greem ents:
they had to become known sooner or later, and were apt to cause disappointment.
M. Cambon said that he would inform M. Pichón, l í e felt that, if Portugal had
to part with her Colonies, and Germany and England obtained the enormous increase
of territory that was provided by Angola and Mozambique, France ought to have
compensation somewhere, especially in respect of Kabinda. He also observed that,
as Mozambique was on the coast opposite to Madagascar, it would have been natural
for France to have some interest in Mozambique.
[ I am, Ac.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 351.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 367/340.
5 6 3 1 7 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 /4 3 6 . Lisbon, D. D ecem ber 13, 1913, 8-15 p . m .
Tel. (No. 30.) Confidential. R. D ecem ber 14, 1913, 11 a . m .
The Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to-day to impress on you the very
great importance attached by the Portuguese Government to a visit from one or more
of H is M ajesty’ s ships.
H e then referred to the statement made recently by the German Chancellor
respecting negotiations between England and Germany in regard to their economic
interests in Africa. He said that he was absenting him self from the Chamber as he
 549
was certain to be interpellated, and did not wish to have to admit that he knew
nothing about them. Although the Portuguese colonies were not mentioned, it was
impossible to believe that they were not concerned. He asked me if I could give him
any information. I replied that I had no instructions on the subject. H e said that
he had instructed the Portuguese Minister in London to speak to you.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs was evidently much perturbed, which is natural
in view of the categorical denial made by him that there was any new agreement
between England and Germany (see m y despatch No. 143 of 25th November .f 1)
I told the German Minister, who was waiting to see the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, of the enquiry made by the latter and of m y reply. He will, if questioned,
give a similar answer. He considers that when the fact of the new agreement
becomes known the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and possibly of the
whole Governm ent, will become very precarious.
In the circumstances the earnestness shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
regarding the visit of a British ship is explainable, as the credit which the Government
would gain thereby might enable it to weather the storm.

0 ) [M r. C a rn eg ie’ s despatch (N o. 143), D. N ovem b er 25, It. D ecem b er 3, 1913, is n ot

rep rod u ced . In it he referred t o a speech m ade by Senhor M a cieira at a m eetin g o f the
P ortu g u ese G eograp h ical S ociety, iu the course o f w hich he den ied the tru th o f all ru m ou rs o f
an u n d ersta n d in g or tre a ty betw een G reat B r ita in and G erm any w ith reg a rd to the P ortu g u ese
Colonies. A sum m ary o f the speech was enclosed. (F .O . 54531 54531 13 3 6.)]

No. 352.

■sir Edward G rey to Sir E. Gosclien.('

F.O. 367/340.
57191/1165 13'436.
(No. 71.) Africa.
Sir, Foreign Office, D ecem ber 15, 1913.
The German Ambassador told me to-d ayf2) that anxiety was caused to the German
Chancellor by a report that we intended to publish, at the same time as the Anglo-
German Agreement about the Portuguese Colonies, a declaration guaranteeing the
integrity o f Portuguese Colonies. I f this was done it would shake the whole position
of the German Chancellor.
I said that the old Treaties o f Alliance with Portugal contained an obligation on
our part to defend Portuguese Colonies and com m erce. These old Treaties had been
confirmed by a Treaty in 1S99.(3) There was no new obligation undertaken in 1899
towards Portugal. The Portuguese Government had for some time been dem anding
that we should publish the Treaty of that year, and we considered that we could not
publish it without the Agreement with Germ any of 1 8 9 8 ; but we intended to publish
the whole thing together, including a covering despatch com m unicating to the
Portuguese Government the Agreem ent with Germany. I would, however, let the
German Government have everything that we proposed to publish before we settled
a date for publication, and they would be able to see what the papers were.
[I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

(!) [T h is d espa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ;

to M r. H a rc o u rt. It was sent to th e C a binet, w ith oth er papers, on M a rch IS, 1914, cp. in fra ,
p. 565, N o. 369, note (*)•]
(2) [c p . G .P ., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 9 0 -1 .]
( 3) [cp. t e s t o f A n g lo -P o rtu g u e se D e cla ra tio n o f O ctob er 14, 1S99, G ooch & T em p e rle y
V ol. I, pp . 9 3-4, N o. 118.]
 550

N o. 353.
Sir Edward G rey to M r. Carnegie.
F.O. 367/340.
5 63 1 7 /1 1 65 '1 3 /4 3 6 .
Tel. (No. 28.) Africa. Confidential. Foreign Office, D ecem ber 19, 1913, 5 -1 0 r.M.
Your tel[egram ] No. 30 C on f[id en tia ]! (of D ec[em ber] 13).C)
You should remind Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t of the explanation of principles
of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 already made to them (see Sir A. H ardinge’ s
despatch No. 17 Africa of March 8, 1912)(2) and inform them that any further
negotiations with Germany have remained strictly within the scope of that agreement
which there is no intention to extend.

f 1) [v. supra, pp. 548-9, X o . 351.]

( 2) [v. supra, pp. 439-40, N o. 275.]

No. 354.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward G rey.(l)

F.O. 367/340.
5 8 2 3 6 /1 1 6 5 /1 3 '4 3 6 .
(No. 92.) Africa. Confidential. Lisbon, D. Decem ber 22, 1913.
Sir, R. D ecem ber 29, 1913.
On receipt of your telegram No. 28 Africa, confidential, of the 19th instant.!2) I
wrote a private note to Si nhor M adeira, stating that I had a com m unication to make
to him in regard to certain negotiations, about which he had spoken to me at our last
interview. I begged him at the same time to read the record, which presumably
existed in the archives of his Ministry, of a conversation which Sir Arthur Hardinge
had had with Senhor Yasconcellos on March 8th, 1912.(3)
I saw Senhor M adeira to-day, and after referring to his enquiry as to the
negotiations proceeding at present between England and Germany in regard to Africa,
I communicated to him confidentially the sense of your telegram referred to above.
H is Excellency appeared to be much relieved, and requested me to thank you for the
com m unication which you had instructed me to make. H e went on to say that he had
not had time to study the notes made of Sir Arthur Ilard in ge’ s conversation which I
had mentioned in m y private letter and begged me to give him, if possible, the
substance of it. As I thought it possible that no record of the conversation existed in
the Portuguese Foreign Office, I had brought with me, in anticipation of such a
request, your despatch No. 30 Africa, Secret, of February 29th, 1912,(’ ) which, I
explained, contained the instructions on which Sir Arthur Hardinge had acted. 1 then
read to His Excellency in French the greater part of the despatch. H e took some
notes while I was reading, and when I had finished, begged me again to thank you.
On the m ention of the treaty of W indsor of 1899, he observed that he understood that
it and the Anglo-Germ an Agreement of 1898 were about to be published together. I
replied that I did not know what had been decided.
After leaving the Ministry for Foreign Affairs I called on the German Minister,
who has on more than one occasion expressed to me his conviction that we should
find it mutually advantageous to let each other know of any com m unications which
we may make to the Portuguese Government in regard to the Anglo-German
Agreement. I confined m yself to m entioning briefly to Doctor Rosen the nature of

0) [A cop y o f this despa tch was sent to th e C olon ia l O ffice.]

(2) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 439-40, No. 275.]
(4) [v. supra, pp. 437-3, No. 273.]
 551

the com m unication which I had made to Senhor Macieira. as contained in the latter
part of your telegram, and did not refer to the rest of the conversation. I trust that
m y action will meet with your approval.
Doctor Rosen told me that he was almost certain that the whole of the 1S98
Agreement was known to the Portuguese Governm ent.
I have, Ac.
LA N C E LO T D. C A R N EG IE.

M IN U T E S .
H e acted rig h tly .
I am in terested in D r. R o s e n ’ s surm ise th a t the P ortu g u ese governm ent know th e w hole
tex t o f the 1593 agreem ent. I have g ath ered the same im pression from m y several con versa ­
tion s w ith the P ortu g u ese M in ister here. I f it be correct, then sp ecial sign ificance m ust be
a tta ch ed to the la tte r ’ s recent earnest request fo r p u b lica tion . It w ou ld show th a t a t least in
b is op in ion there w ould be little da n g er o f the P ortu g u ese govern m en t b ein g p a rticu la rly
incensed by the term s o f the a greem ent o f 1395 b ecom in g generally know n. F o r it certa in ly
does not en ter in to M. G om es’ ca lcu la tion s to em b roil his g overn m en t w ith H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s]
G [ov ern m en t],
C opv C o l[o u ia l] Office (Secret).
E. A . C.
D ec [e m b e r] 29.

T he P ortu g u ese k now all about the 1393 a g reem en t and are relieved to be to ld th a t the
revised agreem en t is no worse.
E G.

No. 355.

Sir Edirard G rey to Mr. Carnegie.( 1

F.O. 367 340.
57833 1165 13 436.
(No. 134.) Africa. Secret.
S ir :— Foreign Office, D ecem ber 22, 1913.
The Portuguese Minister in conversation to-day again referred to the difficulty
in which his G ov [ern m en ]t was placed by the partial revelations made constantly in
Germany to the Agreement under negotiation with England. He expressed thanks
for the instructions sent to you in m y tel[eg ra m ] No. 28 A fr[ica ] of the
19th instant,!2 and then went on to urge that it would be in the best interest not only
of Great Britain and Germ any but also of Portugal herself that the mystery
surrounding the negotiations anil the secret convention of 1898 should be definitely
lifted by full publication.
At the present moment the several tranquillizing declarations made from time to
time by the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t had produced the effect that the public was
persuaded that the 189S agreement meant practically nothing. No doubt under it
Germany had been allowed to earmark as her sphere of interest certain African
colonies: hut the public believed that this was a mere paper claim which E ngland had
a free hand, and would undoubtedly rem ain determined, to prevent from maturing.
M. Teixeira-Gom es. on his part, said he knew very well that this was an illusion,
and that the rights acquired by Germ any under the convention of 1898 represented
something very material. He had therefore urged his G ov [ern m en ]t to prepare public
opinion in Portugal in good time for the publication which he again pleaded should
not be very long delayed. He said that if S"enho~r Costa played his cards well he

0 ) rThe re co rd o f the con v ersation , b etw een S ir E y re C row e and M . T eix eira-G om es, on
w hich this despatch is based, is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K i n g ; to th e P rim e
M in ister ; to M r. H a r c o u r t ; to L o rd C r e w e ; to L o rd M orley. T he despa tch was rep ea ted to
B erlin (X o . 73 A fr ic a ), w ith the om ission o f the sentences m arked b y lines in the m a rg in .]
( 2) [p. sup ra , p. 550, X o . 353.]
 552

ought to be able to reconcile public opinion in advance with the unpleasant features
of the 1898 agreement. In this connection he again mentioned the visit of a British
man-of-war and urged that it ought to take place before the publication of the Anglo-
German Agreement, as it would certainly help to ensure a better reception for the
latter when it became known.
M. Teixeira-Gomes was informed that his remarks would be communicated to
me, and that they would no doubt receive most sympathetic consideration. It was
however pointed out to him that it was impossible at this moment to say anything
about the publication of an agreement which as a matter of fact had not vet been
signed; and that the visit of a ship to Lisbon was a question which concerned the
Admiralty in the first instance and which must be considered in connection with the
very complicated movements of our fleets and squadrons.
[I am, Ac.
E. GREY.]

Mi. 356.

Sir Edivard Grey to Mr. Carnegie.(')

F.O. 325/325/14/36.
(No. 5.) Secret.
Sir:— Foreign Office, January 5, 1914.
The Portuguese Minister again called at this l)ep[artmen]t on the 31st ultimo to
speak to Sir E. Crowe about the Anglo-German Agreement under negotiation and said
that the Portuguese M[inister for] F[oreign] A [flairs] proposed to make a statement
in answer to a Parliamentary interpellation at an early date, and had drawn up the
outline of what he intended to say. He wmild however like to have the authority of
H[is] M[ajesty’s] Government] for making the declaration.
It was pointed out to M. Teixeira-Gomes that it appeared preferable that the
Portuguese Minister for] F[oreign] A[tfairs] should himself decide wdiat he wrould
say and say it on his own authority. M. Gomes quite shared this viewr and had
intended to express it in his report to Lisbon, but he desired quite informally and
confidentially to read the draft statement, and proceeded to do so.
The gist of the draft wfas that in view of the reiterated statements of the German
Chancellor it must be accepted that an agreement had been negotiated between
Germany and England and was on the point of being concluded. It was to be hoped,
as the British Sfecretary] of S[tate] for l^oreign] A [flairs] was known to be
opposed to the signature of secret treaties, that the agreement, when completed, would
be published. As there was a treaty of alliance in existence between England and
Portugal the Portuguese Gov[ernmen]t was confident that the agreement would be
found to contain nothing prejudicial to the sovereign rights of Portugal or running
counter to the terms of the alliance.
It wras understood that a secret agreement had been signed in 1898 and that what
was being negotiated now would remain within the same limits.
I am, Ac.
E. GREY.

P ) [This despatch was repeated to Berlin (No. 7).]

 553

No. 357.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. Bertie.F)

F.O. 1216/325 14'36.

(No. 1*2.1 Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, January 6. 1914.
M. Cambon spoke to me to-day(2) with renewed concern about Germany’s
acquiring, under the Anglo-German Agreement, the right of pre-emption over Kabinda
at the mouth of the Congo. He said that Germany and France, in their agreement of
1911 as to Morocco, had agreed not to be parties to changes in the Conventional
Basin of the Congo without consulting each other and the Powers who were parties to
the Act of Berlin. This Agreement had been communicated to us. With regard to
Ivabinda, if our Agreement with Germany was published. France would either have
to tell Germany that she must not dispose of Kabinda without consulting other
Powers, or protest to the Portuguese that, if they wished to sell Kabinda. they must
not do so without consultation. The publication of our Agreement with Germany
would produce a very unfortunate effect in France, where opinion was still sore about
the entrance to the French Congo given to Germany by the Franco-German Agree­
ment of 1911 : for this right of pre-emption over Kabinda would give Germany new
access to the French Congo.
I explained what, I found, M. Cambon had not yet clearly understood : that, with
regard to Kabinda and the north of Angola, our revised Agreement with Germany
made no change at all. If our new Agreement with Germany were cancelled and
obliterated, Germany’ s right of pre-emption over Kabinda would remain exactly the
same under our Agreement of 1S9S.
M. Cambon said that it would not be understood in France that this arrangement
with Germany really dated from 1S98. In 1S9S, we were not on good terms with
France, and as far as she was concerned we were quite free to do whatever we pleased;
but the French would feel that, since 1904, we ought not to have made any Agreement
with Germany at the expense of France.
I explained again that, had it been a question of our now giving up to Germany
territory near the mouth of the Congo, I should not have done it without consulting
France; and, had this territory been a part of the Agreement into which we were
introducing changes favourable to Germany. I should not have agreed to those changes
without consulting the French Government. But the only change with regard to
Angola was that we gave up a strip in the middle of Angola in return for compensa­
tion in the interior or on the eastern side of Africa. The north of Angola, from which
Kabinda had always been administered, was left as it was.
M. Cambon said there must be time for reflection, and he would speak to me
again.
[1 am, Ac.]
E. G[REY],

P ) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the K in g and to the Cabinet. It was
repeated to Berlin (X o. 16 Secret) on January 12.]
( 2) [cp. M . Paul Carabon’ s report o f January S, 1914, D . D . F . , 3me Se r., Vol. IX , pp. 39-40,
No. 35.]
 554

N o. 358.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . Goschen .(U

F.O. 1370/325 14/36.

(No. 11.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, ■January 7, 1014.
The German Ambassador said to-d ay(2) that, if the German Government could
know exactly what our obligations under the Portuguese Alliance were, it might get
over the difficulty about the publication of the Anglo-German Agreement respecting
Portuguese Colonies. The German Government had been under the impression that
the Portuguese Alliance referred only to the Portuguese Colonies existing in about the
year 1400, or whatever the date of the Alliance was: but, if another Agreement had
been made in 1898 or 1899 which extended the British obligation to the Portuguese
Colonies as they were to-day, and the German Government only became aware of this
after having made the Agreement with us about the Portuguese Colonies, and on the
publication of the Alliance with Portugal, they would be made to look very foolish.(3)
I said that the idea that the Alliance with Portugal had referred only to
Colonies of an ancient date had never occurred to me. It was true that it had been
last confirmed in 1899, but this had been done without altering the wording of it or
its obligations, which had applied to Portuguese Colonies generally.
The Ambassador admitted that the point he had now put before me was one that
had not previously occurred to him either.
I said that the terms of the Portuguese Alliance had been published.(4) I would
look into the matter and see what I could send him.
[I am. A c .lg ji
E. G [R E Y ],
M IN U T E .

I should be in clin ed to g iv e the w h ite p a p e r /4) to the G erm an A m bassador saying th a t the
T rea ties have alw ays been referred t o in com m u n ica tion s betw een the B ritish and P ortu g u ese
G o v [e rn m e n ]ts as b ein g in full force an d th a t on the latest occasion when th ey w ere confirm ed
in 1899 A r t fic le ] 1 o f the T rea ty of J a n [ u a r v ] 29, 1642, and the final a rticle J u n e 23, 1661,
w ere sp ecially referred to. B u t I w ill d o this verb ally when I retu rn on M on d a y and should
like t o discuss it w ith S ir A. N icolson and Sir E. C row e first.(5)
E. G.
13.1.14.

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g . It was sent to th e C abinet,

w ith oth er papers, on M arch 18, 1914, cp. in fra , p. 565, N o. 369, n ote 0 ) . ]
(*) \cp. G .P., X X X V I I (I), pp. 99-10 0.]
(3) [M a rg in a l n ote by S ir E d w ard G r e y : “ I th in k th ere is a pu blished p a p er th a t gives
all the A lliances. P lea se let me have it and also the unp u blish ed con firm ation o f 1899. E .G .” ]
(>) [u. A. A P ., (1899), C I X , [C. 9088], pp. 7 3 -85 .]
(5) [cp. in fra, pp. 555-6, No. 360.]

No. 359.

Minutes by Sir A. Nicolson and Sir Edicard Grey.

F.O. 3 1 2 4 /3 2 5 /1 4 /3 6 .
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office, January 8, 1914.
M. Cambon spoke to me to -d a y /1) at considerable length as to the Anglo-German
negotiations regarding the Portuguese Colonies in Africa. H e, and his G ov[ernm en]t,
are most seriously preoccupied at the deplorable effect on French public opinion which
will be produced on the publication o f the Convention with Germany. He dilated at

(i) [cp . D .D .F., 3me Sér., V ol. I X , pp. 4 0-2, No. 35.]
 555

length on this point— but I need not trouble you with the considerations which he
put forward. In a few words he is extrem ely anxious that his G ov [ern m en ]t should
be able, when the treaty is made public, to be in a position to reassure French public
opinion that French interests have not been endangered or ignored by H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] in their a rra n g [em en J s with Germany. H e knows that
nothing is being done now which was not done in 1S98— but the French public will
not examine this point closely— and will m erely take the fact that H [is ] M fa je sty’ s]
G [overnm ent] have concluded with Germany an act. which in certain eventualities,
would leave to Germany an enclave (Kabinda) in the French Congo. M. C a r b o n says
this would produce an explosion against our entente— and he has in his m ind an idea
that he should write to us and say that there are reports we are dealing with
Germany tfcc., and that he would wish to rem ind us that under the Brussels A ct(2) no
modifications can take place in the territories lying in the Conventional basin of the
Congo without the consent of all parties signatories of that Act. I f wecould reply
that we were aware of our obligations under that Act, he thought thatthe French
G ov [ern m en ]t would be able to show their public that they had not been unmindful
of their interests— and also that we had had no wish of ignoring those interests. If
also we could com e to some arrang[em en ]t with France as to no impediment being
caused to the Madagascar trade with Mozambique were we to come into possession
of Mozambique, much could be done towards lessening the ill effects of the Anglo-
German arrang[em en ]t. I give but a hurried sketch of what M. Cambon said— but
it will be desirable to see whether some means cannot be devised for breaking the
‘ ‘ coup ’ ’ on French public opinion.
A. N.

It looks to me as if the publication and even the signature o f the new agreement
with Germany may be delayed for some time owing to the German anxiety about the
terms of the alliance with Portugal.
Let me see the passage of the Brussels Act to which M. Cambon refers.
H e may be assured that nothing will be done before I return to London and see
him again.
My mind inclines more and more to the publication of the agreement of 1898
and the confirmation of alliance with Portugal in 1899 by them selves before we have
actually signed anvthing with Germany.
The F rench public could not then mistake the matter.
E . G.

(2) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l note b y S ir E y re C r o w e : “ E x p la in ed to S ir A. X ico lso n th a t

Brussels A ct has n oth in g to do w ith the p oin t. M . C am bon possibly had B erlin A ct in m ind.
[E . A. C .] -’ cp. H e r t s le t : M a p o f E u r o p e by T rea ty , V ol. I V , pp. 3 26 3-4.]

No. 360.

Sir E duard G rey to Sir E. G oschen.(M

F.O. 4 8 3 9 /3 2 5 /1 4 '3 6 .
(No. 25.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office. ■
J anuary 29, 1914.
I reminded the German Ambassador to-d ay (: i of what he had said to me recently
about the publication of our Alliance with Portugal and the possible effect upon the
position of the German Chancellor. He had told me of the impression of the German
Foreign Office that all we had guaranteed by our Alliance was the Portuguese Colonies
(*) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g . It was sent to the C abinet,
w ith oth er papers, on M a rch 13, 1914, cp. in fra , p. 565, N o. 369, n o te (*). I t was rep ea ted to
L isb on (X o . 27 S ecret) on F eb ru a rv 4 .]
G ) [cp. G .P ., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 106 -1 .]
 55C>

as they existed in the year 1373, or whatever the date of the alliance was. I had said
that such an idea had never occurred to me. I now told him that in 1899. though the
actual Treaty of that date had never been published, there had been, as at various
times previously, a general confirmation of the old Treaties of Alliance with Portugal,
and Article 1 of the Treaty of the 29th January 1642 had been specially confirmed,
as had also the final Article of the Treaty of the 23rd June 1661. I showed the
Ambassador these Articles in published copies of the Treaties of 1642 and 1661, and
pointed out that the obligation to defend and protect all conquests or colonies
belonging to the Crown of Portugal obviously applied to Colonies existing at any
present date.
The Ambassador told me that the authorities in Berlin were much concerned
about this point.
I suggested that one wav of meeting the difficulty might be to publish by itself
the Treaty with Portugal of 1899. which the Portuguese Government were always
urging us to do: and also to publish the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. We
could then let public opinion digest these documents, for neither of which could the
German Chancellor be held in any way responsible. W e might subsequently publish
the revised Anglo-German Agreement, and people would then see that it had its
origin entirely in what had taken place in 1898, and could be judged only with
reference to that.
The Ambassador thought that this might be a way out of the difficulty.
[I am, &c.J
E. G[BEYJ.

No. 361.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.(')

F.O. 6509 325/14/36.

(No. 88.) Secret. Paris, D. February 11, 1914.
Sir :— P. February 13, 1914.
I had occasion yesterday morning to be received in audience by the President of
the Republic.
M. Poincare spoke to me on the subject of the negotiations between Ilis
Majesty’s Government and the German Government in regard to the Portuguese
Colonies, which had, he heard, resulted in the initialling if not yet in the signature
of an agreement whereby Kabinda and Luanda would be considered as within a
German zone of influence and also the islands of San Thome and Principe. He said
that when the secret Anglo-German Arrangements of 1898 were made England and
France were not on good terms for it was soon after Fashoda. It was comprehensible
that England should at that period enter into engagements adverse to French
interests. What had then been done could not be undone, but since then the relations
between France and England had entirely changed, and it was regrettable that the
question of the attribution of the Portuguese Colonies in certain contingencies should
have been raised afresh and finally settled— so he feared— in a manner detrimental
to French interests without consultation by Ilis Majesty’s Government with the
French Government.
I told M. Poincare that I was not acquainted with the details of the negotiations.
We had waived certain contingent claims on the West Coast of Africa in return for a
waiver by Germany of contingent claims on the Fast Coast.
M. Poincare observed that, according to his information Ilis Majesty’s Govern­
ment had gone further than this for they had waived in favour of Germany any claim

0 ) [Copies of this despatch were sent to the K in g ; to the Prim e M in ister; to Lord C rew e;
to Lord M o rle y ; to Mr. H arcourt. It wTas sent to the Cabinet, with other papers, on M arch 18,
1914, cp. infra, p. 565, No. 369, note (') .]
 557

to the islands of San Thomé and Principé. The possession by Germany of Principé
and San Thomé would be injurious to French interests and it would also be an injury
to Spain if Germany established herself at Principé. He knew that the King of Spain
felt strongly on the subject.
M. Poincaré reminded me that during the Morocco negotiations the French
Government had kept Ilis Majesty’s Government informed and had consulted them
on the subject of any concessions of territory which they contemplated offering to
Germany, and they had expected to be treated in like manner by Ilis Majesty’ s
Government in their negotiations with the German Government when there w?.s a
possibility of French interests being affected. Unfortunately this had not been done.
If the arrangements with Germany were made public the result on public opinion in
France would be deplorable. It would affect in a manner prejudicial to the
“ Entente.” the opinion now held by the French people of the trust to be reposed in
the friendship of England. Such publication would necessitate a protest by the
French Government in protection of French interests, for in the Franco-German
Agreement of November 1911 which was adhered to by England and Spain it was
stipulated that in the event of any territorial change in the Congo basin due to the
action of either of the contracting parties they would confer together and also with
the other Powers signatories of the Berlin Act. \\ hat a deplorable position it would
be that it should be incumbent on France to protest in defence of her undoubted
interests against the action of England.
In the evening of yesterday I had an interview with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who though apparently less perturbed than the President of the Republic,
spoke in a deprecating manner of the negotiations of His Majesty’s Government with
the German Government having been concluded without consultation with the French
Government and urged that the result should not be published as the effect on public
opinion in France would be very bad and would necessitate a formal protest by the
French Government.
I explained to Monsieur Doumergue that except as regarded the islands of San
Thomé and Principé and Timor there had been no modifications in the Secret Anglo-
German Agreements of 1S9S affecting French interests, and that the contingent
position of Germany in Kabinda and Loanda would not be changed by the fresh
arrangements.
Monsieur Doumergue said that he intended to instruct Monsieur Paul Gambon to
explain to you the views of the French Government.
I find that the stipulation in the Franco-German Agreement referred to by the
President of the Republic is Article XVI which says:— “ Dans le cas où le statut
territorial du bassin conventionnel du Congo tel que celui-ci est défini par l’acte de
Berlin du 26 février 1885,(2) viendrait à être modifié du fait de l’une ou de l’autre des
Puissances contractantes, celles-ci devraient en conférer entre elles, comme aussi avec
les autres Puissances signataires de l ’Acte de Berlin.” (3)
There is no doubt that what will particularly offend public opinion in France is
the renunciation by England of any claim to San Thomé and Principé, which islands
were not included in the Secret Anglo-German Agreement of 1898, for such renuncia­
tion will be regarded as a gratuitous invitation or a suggestion to Germany that she
should establish herself there and this in spite of the injury which would be thereby
caused to French interests, and without even consultation of any kind with the French
Government.
In a Despatch dated the 18th April, 1912.Ç) in which I had the honour to
acquaint you that Monsieur Poincaré, then President of the Council and Minister of
Foreign Affairs had informed me that he had learnt from Monsieur Cambon that the
conversations between the British and German Governments in regard to territorial

O Up. H ertslet : M o p of E u r o p e by Tre aty, Vol. IV , pp. 326-4-4.]

(3) [cp. B .F .S .P ., Vol. 104, p. 960.]
(4) [v. Gooch <£ Tem peri e y, Vol. V I, pp. 749-50, No. 573.]
 558

questions in Africa were to be continued, I reminded you that during the Morocco
negotiations between the French and German Governments the form er had kept His
M ajesty’ s Government informed of such of the proposed territorial concessions or
exchanges as might in their opinion affect British interests, and I stated that I felt
sure that the French Government would expect like considerate treatment from His
M ajesty’ s Government in regard to any proposed cessions to Germany which might
affect French interests. A month later (May 15th, 1912) Monsieur Poincaré said to
me “ Quant aux questions d ’ échange de territoires, elles ne regardent pas d ’ une
manière directe le gouvernement français, mais il ne peut cependant pas être
indifférent à la question de Zanzibar à cause du voisinage des îles Comoros et
Madagascar et il aurait le désir d ’ être renseigné, le moment venu, sur les projets du
gouvernement anglais de même que le gouvernement français a tenu le gouvernement
anglais au courant des propositions territoriales pendant les négociations au sujet du
Maroc. ” (s)
The question of a cession of Zanzibar was dropped, but the discussion of other
territorial arrangements continued.
The French Government have no case against His M ajesty’ s Governm ent so far
as Kabinda and Loanda are concerned, but it is otherwise, 1 think, as regards the
islands o f San Thomé and Principé. They will naturally contend that if it was a
British interest to persuade Germany to waive her contingent claims on the
Portuguese portion of Timor compensation should have been provided for Germany
at the cost of Great Britain and not to the injury o f France in the Gulf of Guinea.
B y the Secret Convention of August 30t.h, 189S, Great Britain and Germany
agreed ‘ ‘ jointly to oppose the intervention of any third Power in the Provinces of
Mozambique, Angola and in Portuguese Timor, either by way of loan to Portugal on
the security of the revenues o f those provinces or by way of acquisition of territory
by grant, cession, purchase, lease or otherwise.” This stipulation was however made
in ignorance by the British and German Governments of thé antecedent pre-emptive
rights of Holland to the Portuguese portion of Timor. In these circumstances would
Great Britain have been bound to aid Germany in enforcing against Holland and
Portugal the German claim s? It would not have suited Germany to estrange
H olland by forcible action of her own without the co-operation of Great Britain.
I am very much afraid that if and when the fresh arrangements with Germany
are made public or become known there will be a great outcry in the French
Parliament and in the French press. It will be said that ‘ ‘ perfide Albion ’ ’ has played
her form er part and has placated Germ any not at her own cost but by the sacrifice
of the interests of her friend France without any consultation with or preliminary
warning to the Government of the Bepublic. This will be regarded as a poor return
for the conduct of the French Governm ent towards His M ajesty’ s Government in
regard to the question of French territorial concessions to Germany during the
M orocco negotiations resulting in the Franco-Germ an arrangements of November
1911.
I have, A’c.
FBANC1S B E B T IE .

M IN U T E S .

T he F rench m ake th e m ost o f the g rieva n ce th a t they w ere not consulted or w arned
con cern in g the in trod u ction o f San T hom é and P rin cip e in to the revised d r a ft convention.
A s a m a tter of fa ct, they w ere w arned, a lthough not u ntil the m a tter was practically
settled by the in itia llin g o f the d r a ft con v en tion tO ct[o b e r] 20, 1913).(6)
T h at the b rin g in g -in o f these islands w ould be ex ceed in g ly d ista stefu l to F ra n ce is o f course
a th in g o f which we w ere fu lly aware, and it was, perhaps, alw ays the w eakest spot o f the new
agreem ent.
T here is now a possib ility o f a way ou t o f the w hole difficulty : nam ely not to proceed with
the new convention.

(5) [w. Gooch cfc Temperley, V ol. V I , p. 754, N o. 585.]

f 6) [v . supra, p . 544, Ed. Note.]
 559
T here is one p oin t w hich I v en tu re stron gly t o urge. I f G erm any con tin u es to o b ject to
the p u b lica tion , w e should n ot allow th e offer o f th e revised con v en tion to rem ain open
in definitely. I f the la tter is not sign ed w ith in reasonable tim e, it should be clea rly u n d erstood
that this ch a p te r is closed. I t w ou ld b e m ost in con v en ien t an d not eq u ita ble if G erm any w ere
le ft free to com e dow n at any tim e it m ay su it h er in fu tu r e years, to dem and th e sign atu re
o f the new agreem ent. She ou g h t to be p u t to th e ch oice o f (a) sign a tu re an d p u b lica tion , or
(6) a ba ndonm ent o f the con v en tion .
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r y ] 13.

M. C am bon to ld me yesterd ay (F e b [r u a r y ] 13> th a t he h op ed to have a con v ersa tion w ith

S ir E. G rey on the w hole su b ject next week. H e said H e r r v [o n ] J a g ow had to ld M. J ules
Cam bon th a t G erm any w [o u l ]d a ct up to A r t [ic le ] X V I o f th e F ra n co-G erm an A greem en t.
I t is in deed u n fo r tu n a te th a t ju st at this m om ent w hen we have som e troublesom e questions
w ith R u ssia w e s h [o u l]d be in cu rr in g the discon ten t of F ra n ce— an d I a gree w ith S ir E y re
Crow e that if th e revised C on v en tion cou ld he d r o p p e d it w ou ld be well.
A. X

W h a t M. Cam bon ob jected to was th e a lloca tion o f K a b in d a C ' to G erm a n y ; b u t th a t is

in herent in th e 1S9S agreem ent. A ll w e have since don e to w hich the F rench o b ject is to
disin terest ourselves i.. S . T hom e an d P rin cip e , n ot to tra n sfer them to G erm any and I do
not consid er th a t this con flicts w ith any oth er lite ra l or m ora l ob liga tion s. N evertheless the
F ren ch fe e lin g has to be ta ken in to accou n t.
T he presen t position is that the G erm ans h esitate to g o on w ith the agreem ent if the
renew al o f th e P ortu g u ese A llian ce is pu blished, as it m ust be pu blished, if a n y th in g is sign ed
or pu blished at all.
E . G.

O [T h e w ord g iv en h ere as “ K a b in d a ” is difficult to read w ith certa in ty . F o r M. P a u l

C am bon 's view s cp. supra, pp. 5-54-5, N o. 359.]

Xo. 802.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward Grey.

Private and C on fid en tia l/1

My dear Grey :— Paris. February 12, 1914.
I have sent to you in a despatch of yesterday*2! an account of the observations
made to me by the President of the Repiibljg and by the President of the Council on
the subject of the Anglo-G erm an negotiations for a m odification of the secret
agreements of 1S9S.
M. Poincare spoke more in sorrow than in anger but he evidently regards with
great apprehension the effect on public opinion in France which will result from a
disclosure of the fresh arrangements between England and Germ any and he feels
that the French Government have not been treated with the same confidence by His
M ajesty’ s Government in these questions with Germ any as the French Government
treated H is M ajesty’ s Government in territorial matters during the Franco-Germ an
negotiations on the subject of Morocco.
I am very m uch afraid that if and when the new arrangements with Germany
become known there will be a cry of *’ Perfide Albion ” with more justification for it
than usual.
Can you avoid a publication or will the German Government make the arrange­
ments known in order to create a sore between France and E ngland?
Yours sineerelv.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
O ) [G rey M SS .. V ol. 16 ]
<21 [r . im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t.]
 560
N o. 363.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. Bertie.

Private.(*)
My dear Bertie, Foreign Office, February 13, 1914.
From your letter of the l*2th(2) it is clear that Poincare and Doumergue do not
understand that the new arrangement with Germany does nothing to which France
can take exception or which injures her in any way.
The thing to which France objects was in the agreement of 1898, when we had
no obligation to France.
To make this quite clear I am thinking of publishing the 1898 agreement by
itself and letting the new arrangement appear a month or two later. But nothing is
decided yet.
I have great difficulty in getting Cambon to understand the point, but surely if
we publish the 1898 agreement by itself they must understand. W e had no
obligation to France when that was made.
Yours sincerely,
E. GR E Y.
(1) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 16.]
( 2) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]

No. 364.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.G)

F.O. 7 72 4 /3 2 5 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 88.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, February 18, 1914.
M. Cambon told me to-day(2) that he had had a long despatch from
M. Doum ergue,(3) about the Portuguese Colonies and our Agreement w-ith Germany.
M. Doumergue was very much concerned at the prospect of the publication of this
A greem ent; concerned, at any rate, as regards the effect it would have on public
opinion. The fact that England and Germany should have divided between them the
Portuguese Colonies, including such places as Kabinda and Loanda, intimately affecting
the Congo Basin, was bound to put the French Government in a position in which they
would have to make some protest or reservation. In 1911, the French Government
of the day had been very m uch attacked, because they gave Germany a means of
entrance into the Congo Basin. They had done this for the sake of peace, as part of
a general Agreement that took other considerations into account. Now-, through
Kabinda and Loanda, Germany would have two other means of access to the Congo,
and the power to close the Congo. Curiously enough, it was Germany who had
pressed France in 1911 for the Clause stipulating that all changes in the Congo Basin
should be discussed with the other Powers who were parties to the Berlin A c t : these
included Portugal. H err von Kiderlen had attached great importance to this. The
Clause, and even its drafting, had been discussed with u s; and we had advised that
it should be adopted.(4)

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r: to

L ord C rew e; to L o rd M o r le y ; to M r. H a rc o u rt. I t was rep eated to B erlin (N o. 42 S ecret) to
L isbon (N o. 39 Secret). I t was sent to the C abinet, w ith oth er papers, on M a rch 18 (cp. infra,
p. 565, No. 369. n o te 0 ) ) . ]
(2) [cp. D D F ., 3me S (r., V ol. I X , pp. 4 25-6, N o. 333.]
(3) [cp . ibid., pp. 316-21, No. 256.]
(•') [cp. Gooch <t T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 597-8, No. 612.]
 561

M. Cambon made no m ention of the Islands of San Tkom é and Principé, but
dwelt upon the effect that the publication of even the Agreem ent of 1S9S would have.
It was true that the fact of its having been made in 1S98, before there was any under­
standing with France, would to a certain extent m odify the French view. But this
would be counteracted by the reflection that we had, by revising the Agreem ent,
confirmed it at the present day.
I admitted the force of what M. Cambon had said, to this e x te n t: that, had not
the Agreem ent already been made in 189S, I m yself, since I had been in Office, should
never have thought of entering into arrangements with Germany to divide the
Portuguese Colonies into spheres o f interest, each of us undertaking, as we did by the
1898 Agreem ent, to join in excluding any third Power from these spheres, without
some com m unication with France, though in 1S9S there was no reason for such
com m unication. The whole thing was an example o f the inconvenience of Secret
Treaties. If this Agreem ent had been published at the time, all the fuss would have
been over long aso. But it had been kept secret, and subsequently our relations with
France had changed : in fact, they had been most happily reversed. M y view with
regard to the 1S98 Agreement had been that, the longer it rem ained secret, the more
difficulty and inconvenience it would ca u se: I could not undo what had been done in
1898. and, therefore, I had thought it would be better to have the Agreem ent made
public, and get the publication over. W ith this object in view, we had revised some
things in the Agreem ent, and it was we, and not Germany, who had pressed for
publication.
M. Cambon said that some formula might be sought which might protect the
French position, but M. Doumergue had not given him any instructions to make
suggestions, and had sim ply asked him to talk over the matter with me.
I said that the present position was that I had suggested that the 1898 A gree­
ment, coupled with the most recent renewal of our Alliance with Portugal (m ade in
1899 . should be published by themselves. The Germans had not replied to this
suggestion, and I thought that they hesitated about publication. I would wait for
their reply, and I would not now press the point of publication. If, later on, I found
that the Germans were anxious for publication, I would talk to M. Cambon again when
the matter was taken up afresh.
rI am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

No. 365.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 86S2 325 14 '36.

(No. 112.) Secret. Paris, D. F ebruary 25, 1914.
Sir, B. February 27, 1914.
In your despatch No. SS Secret o f the 18th instant(2) which I had the honour to
receive yesterday evening you inform me that Monsieur Cambon stated to you t h a t :
“ Curiously enough it was Germany who had pressed France in 1911 for the clause
stipulating that all changes in the Congo Basin should be discussed with the
other Powers who were parties to the Berlin Act— these included Portugal.
H err von Kiderlen had attached great importance to this. The clause, and even its
drafting, had been discussed with us, and we had advised that it should be adopted.”
Monsieur Cambon is mistaken if he supposes that Monsieur von Kiderlen attached
great importance to the clause in the form in which it appears as Article 16 in the
Franco-Germ an Convention of November 4th, 1911.

0 ) [T h is despa tch was sent t o B erlin (as No. 45>.]

(*) [r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t ]
(10900]
 562

The facts were as follow : on the 28th o f October Monsieur de Kiderien-W àchter
suggested that the French Ambassador should address to him a secret letter declaring
that if the question o f France taking over the Belgian Congo were to arise, the
French Government would consult with the German Government before taking any
steps in the matter. Monsieur de Selves considered this demand quite inadmissible,
and that it might lead to a rupture o f the negotiations. He therefore proposed as a
compromise the following formula :—
“ Dans le cas où le statut territorial du bassin conventionnel du Congo
viendrait à être modifié du fait de l ’une ou l ’ autre des puissances contractantes,
celle-ci devront en conférer entre elles comme aussi avec les autres puissances
signataires de l ’ Acte de Berlin du 26 février, 1885.”

This counter-proposal of Monsieur de Selves was accepted by Germany and

carried out in slightly modified wording by Article 16 of the Convention, which is as
follows :
“ Dans le cas où le statut territorial du Bassin Conventionnel du Congo, tel
q u ’il est défini par l ’ Acte de Berlin du 26 février, 1885, viendrait à être modifié
du fait de l ’ une ou de l ’ autre des parties contractantes, celles-ci devraient en
conférer entre elles, com m e aussi avec les autres Puissances signataires dudit
Acte de B erlin.”

You thought that a more explicit formula, making mention of the French right
of pre-em ption which had been spoken of by Monsieur Paul Cambon, might arouse
apprehensions in Belgium , with a very undesirable political effect, that France,
Germany and perhaps E ngland intended to force Belgium to sell her colony for
division between them. You considered, however, that it was quite reasonable" that
if Belgium voluntarily disposed of her colony Germany should have an opportunity
of acquiring some considerable portion of it, and the matter might then be a fair
subject of negotiation on its merits.
Monsieur de Kiderlen-W iichter’ s object was that in the event o f the question of
France taking over the Belgian Congo arising, the French Government should be
bound to consult with the German Governm ent. Monsieur de Selves countered this
demand by making the question of any change in the territorial status quo in the
Conventional Basin o f the Congo a matter for discussion between all the Powers
signatory of the Act of Berlin. It would have been difficult for Monsieur de Ividerlen
to give good reasons for a refusal to adopt Monsieur de Selves’ counter-proposal, the
effect of which however was to protect France by Treaty stipulation against the
obvious intention betrayed by the German demand for the secret undertaking from
the French Government.
I have, Ac.
FR A N C IS B E R T IE .

No. 366.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E. G oschen .(x)

F.O. 9 8 6 6 /3 2 5 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 50.)
Sii-, Foreign Office, March 3, 1914.
The German Ambassador inform ed me to-d ay(2) that the German Government
were still very much afraid of the effect of the publication of the “ W indsor Treaty ”

0 ) [T his despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

L ord ^C rcw c; to L ord M or le y ; to M r. H a rc o u rt. It was rep eated to P a ris (N o. 1 3 1 ); to Lisbon
(N o. 50). I t was sent to the C abinet, w ith oth er papers, on M a rch 18 (v. in fra , p. 565, No. 369,
n o te ( » ) ) . ]
(2) [cp. U P ., X X X V I I (I), pp. 106 -7 .]
 563
of 1899, confirm ing the British Alliance with Portugal. Under these circumstances,
he would suggest to me that the whole matter of the Anglo-German Agreem ent
respecting the Portuguese Colonies should be left alone, as it was.
I said that our object in entering upon the negotiations for the m odification of
this Agreem ent had, I thought, been twofold.
In the first place, we had wished to improve the relations between Germ any and
ourselves, and to show that there was more agreement between us than people had
supposed. H ad the 1S98 Agreem ent not existed, I did not think that we should have
entered into an Agreem ent in recent years to divide Portuguese Colonies into spheres
of interest; but, as that Agreem ent existed, we had thought that it might have a
beneficial effect upon relations between Germ any and England to bring out the
measure of understanding that there was.
In the second place, we had wished to get Timor out of the A greem en t: because,
if the Agreement was published, the part about Tim or would be most unfavourably
received in Australia.
The more important motive had been the improvement of relations with Germany.
If anything was published, we must publish the confirmation of the Alliance with
Portugal. The Portuguese had long been pressing for it. But, if this was likely to
have a bad effect in Germany, I would agree that it would be better to leave the whole
thing alone for the present.
The German Ambassador said with emphasis that this would absolutely meet the
views of the German Governm ent, and they would like to put off the whole thing.
I said that the negotiations had been begun with Count Metternich. at a time
when our relations with Germany were m uch less good than at present, owing to the
difficulties about Morocco. Since that time, the working of the reunions of
Ambassadors in London and the way in which we had dealt with each other during
the Balkan cifisis had greatly improved our relations, and the Ambassador him self
had personally contributed to this. From this point of n ew , therefore, the thing was
not as necessary as it had been as a friendly transaction between Germ any and
England. The only thing in the nature of a concession which was operating in a way
to affect the 1S98 Agreem ent was the Benguella Bailway, in which case, as he knew,
we had advised the concessionnaire to go to Germany if he wished to get foreign
capital.
The Ambassador said that the Benguella Railway affair, which the Germans had
in hand and had not yet completed, was one of the things that contributed to make
the Germans desire to leave things alone for the present.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 367.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 1 04 1 8 /3 2 5 /1 4 '3 6 .
(No. 42.) Lisbon, D. March 3, 1914.
Sir B. March 9, 1914.
The question of the Anglo-G erm an Agreem ent as to the Portuguese Colonies was
raised yesterday by interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies.
The attention of the Prime Minister, acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs, was
called to the continued reports in foreign newspapers as to the existence of an
agreement between Great Britain and Germ any establishing spheres of influence in
Angola in spite of the declarations on the subject of the form er Minister for Foreign
A ffairs; and also to the absence of any official dementi discouraging such reports.
This in com bination with the recent introduction in Angola of the regime of free port
[10900] 2 0 2
 564

and free transit, was causing fresh apprehension as to an Anglo-Germ an Agreement

prejudicial to Portuguese sovereignty and proceeding beyond the limits of present
international Conventions.
A series of categorical qnestions was thereupon addressed to Senhor Bernardino
Machado to which he replied as follows :—
“ The reports to which Senhor Mesquita Carvalho refers affect the interests
not only of ourselves but also of the other nations concerned— nations in friendly
relations with us, one of which is still our ally. The Portuguese Government is
prepared to open its Colonies to the fullest extent to the benefits of foreign
enterprize. Such valuable co-operation is all the more welcome that it is a proof
of confidence in the prosperity of our over-seas dominions. But there is no
question of forcing these services on ns. The final decision as to the acceptance
of such a co-operation and the regulation of its sphere of action remains with us.”

Senhor Machado told me last Saturday that the above-m entioned interpellation
was going to be made and gave me the gist of the reply which he intended to give.
As he evidently expected me to say something on the subject, I remarked that I had
nothing to add to what I had been authorized to communicate to Senhor Macieira,
which I repeated ("see your telegram No. 28 of the 19th December la st)./1) I also
observed that he was no doubt conversant with the substance of the Anglo-German
Agreem ent of 1898. His Excellency replied in the affirmative but added that he had
never seen the text. He asked me no further questions, having evidently been
informed by the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who had
sounded me a few days previously, that I had no fresh instructions on the subject.
Senhor M achado’ s reply in response to the direct question as to the existence of a
new Agreement contrasts with the previous categorical denials of Senhor Macieira
and amounts to an admission of the truth of the reports. It has caused very little
com m ent as yet possibly because the previous denials had found as little credence.
I have, Ac.
LAN CELOT D. CAB N EG IE.
(*) [r . supra, p. 550, N o. 353.]

No. 368.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F. B ertie .(l)

F.O. 1 0 0 2 2 /3 2 5 714/36.
(No. 129.)
Sir, _ ^ Foreign Office, March 4, 1914.
I reminded M. Cambon to-day(2) that, after he had spoken to me the other day
about the Anglo-German Agreem ent respecting the Portuguese Colonies, and had
expressed his desire to discuss the matter with me, I had promised to let him know if
there was any new development. The German Ambassador had com e to see me
yesterday, and had inform ed me that the German Government, for reasons of their
own, did not desire to proceed any fnrther with the matter. The thing would therefore
remain as it was for the present, and it might be some time before it went any
further. ‘
[I am, A c.]
E. G [ B E Y ] .

t 1) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r; to

L ord C rew e; to L ord M o r le y ; to M r. H a rc o u rt. I t was sent to the C abinet, w ith oth er papers,
on M a rch 18. cp. im m ed iately su cceed in g docum ent, n ote O - l
( 2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 me S er., V ol. I X , pp . 513-6, N o. 401.]
 5(55

N o. 369.
X ote by Sir Edward G rc y .( *)

F.O. 1 0 0 2 2 '3 2 5 /1 4 '3 6 . Foreign Office, March 16, 1914.

I circulate some papers to the Cabinet to show why the revision of the Anglo-
German Agreem ent with regard to Portugal has not been com pleted and what is the
position now.
F or the present the Germans are content with the agreement as it stands, and
they consider that the publication of the confirmation of the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance in 1S99 would more than counterbalance in Germany any good effect that
might otherwise follow from a revision and publication of the Anglo-G erm an
Agreement of 189S respecting the Portuguese colonies.
E. G [R E Y ].

( J) [T h is n ote is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the C abinet on M a rch IS, 1914. F o r the
pa pers circu la ted at th e sam e tim e r. su p ra , p. 549, N o. 3 5 2 ; p. 554, N o. 3 5 6 : pp. 555-6, N o. 3 6 0 ;
pp . 556—6, N o. 3 6 1 ; pp. 560-1, N o. 3 6 4 ; pp. 562—3, N o. 3 6 6 ; p. 564, N o. 368.]

No. 370.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Greu.

Private k Seeret.(L
M y dear Grey. Berlin. March 28, 1914.
I have just received a letter from ,Tagow(2) to the following effect :—
“ I want particularly to talk to you about our agreement on the subject of the
Portuguese Colonies. As we know from Liehnow sky’ s reports Sir E. Grey attaches
considerable importance to our engagements being published. Although we con ­
sidered that this was contrary to our interests we had resigned ourselves to consent
to the publication of the Agreem ent when we learnt of the existence of a Treaty
concluded between the British and Portuguese Governm ents in 1899, a treaty which
in a sense renewed the old Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of Alliance dating from some
centuries back. B y this Treaty, com m only called the ‘ Treaty of W indsor,’ the
British G ov [ern m en ]t guarantees for Portugal in perpetuity her whole territory
including her colonies. Now, according to what Sir E . Grey has said to Liehnowsky,
he intends, at the demand of the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t to publish this treaty also.
You are sufficiently acquainted with our public opinion to be able to form an idea
of the disastrous effect which the publication of this Treaty either before, or sim ul­
taneously with, our agreement, will produce here. There is no doubt but that we
shall be reproached with having made a ‘ fo o l’ s bargain ’ (marché de dupe) with
Great Britain— and that there will be a violent outcry against ‘ Albion ’ who will be
accused of duplicity in guaranteeing only one year after the conclusion of our
agreement o f 1S9S.— the Portuguese Governm ent against the loss of her Colonies.
Far from contributing to a * rapprochement ’ between the two countries our Colonial
Agreement will under such circumstances result in increased coldness.
I go still further and do not hesitate to tell you that I am convinced that the
publication of the Treaty of W indsor would give rise to an agitation in this country
which would seriously compromise the position of the Chancellor. Of course I have
let Liehnowsky know m y views— but what I have just told you is such a very delicate
point that I have not been able to be quite so explicit in m y instructions to him.
Therefore I will ask you to regard what I am saying to you as absolutely confidential.
But if, as I believe, Sir Edward Grey considers that it is to the interest of our two
( x) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 23. T his letter is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to the K i n g ; to th e
P rim e M in ister ; t o L o rd C rew e ; to L o rd M orlev ; t o M r. H a rc o u rt.]
(2) [ c p . G.P., X X X V I I (I i. pp. 113-4 ]
 5G6
countries that M. de Bethmann H ollweg should remain as long as possible at the head
of the affairs of the Empire, I hope that he will resign him self to this sacrifice, a small
one, I venture to think from the English point of view, and give up the idea of
publishing the Treaty of W indsor. W e certainly wish that our agreement on the
subject of the Portuguese Colonies should be signed as soon as possible, but up till
now we have hesitated to make a definite proposal on the subject in London, precisely
because of this question which has as yet received no exact solution in the conversa­
tions o f Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnow sky.”
I have only just had time to scribble down this rough but exact translation of
Jagow ’ s letter— which I only received just now. l i e wants me to go and see him early
this afternoon— so I have had no time to telegraph to you to ask what you would like
me to say. I will perhaps telegraph to you the substance of the foregoing— but in the
meantime I will, if Jagow presses me, confine m yself to repeating what you have said
to Lichnowsky.
I have not time for a word more so please excuse haste and believe me
Yours verv sincerely,
W . E . GOSCHEN.

No. 371.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

Private. ( 2)
M y dear Grey, Berlin, March 29, 1914.
I sent you by Messenger yesterday a translation of a letter(3) which I had received
from Jagow7 on the subject of the publication of the Anglo-German Agreement and
the Treaty of W indsor. At his request I went to see him yesterday afternoon.
W hat he wants me to do is to tell you that I think that the publication of the Treaty
of W indsor would have the disastrous effect on German public opinion which he
described in his letter.
W e ll! I do honestly think that public opinion here would be upset and that the
Chancellor’ s enemies in the Reichstag, ahvavs on the look out for grievances against
him, would make hostile speeches and use the opportunity to add a few more nails to
his official coffin. I told Jagow that, while admitting the possibility and even the
probability of such an agitation, I could not admit that it would be justified. Such
excitement on the part of public opinion could, in my opinion, only come from
misunderstanding as to the nature of the Treaty and the Agreements. Broadly
speaking the Treaty of W indsor was merely the reaffirmation of our old Treaty with
Portugal, while the Treaty of 1898 or our new7 agreement would only com e into force
if Portugal wished, or circumstances compelled her, to sell her colonies. Herr von
Jagow answered that in the new agreement there was more than I had indicated (by
which I presume he meant Articles 8 and 9, particularly Article 8 )(4) and that at all
events the certainty remained that the reaffirmation of the old Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance only a year after the conclusion of the 1898 Agreement with Germany would
cause trouble here. I said that one thing was equally certain and that was that the
Portuguese Government would be in a very difficult position if the one Treaty was
published without the other. Jagow seemed to think that the Portuguese were such
a despicable people that it didn’ t much matter whether their Government was put

f 1) [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

S ir A. N ic o ls o n ; to S ir E. Crowe. 1
( 2) [G rey M S S , V ol. 23.]
( 3) [v. im m ed iately preced in g d ocu m en t.]
('*) [v . supra, pp. 539-40, No. 341.]
 567
in a hole or not. I said that I did not admire them m uch m yself but that after all
an Alliance was an Alliance and we had to treat them as allies and not throw
difficulties in their way when it could be avoided.
He then returned to the argument about the C hancellor: he said that
Lichnowsky never took enough account of public opinion in G erm any; he talked of
British public opinion and said “ you m ustn’ t do this and you m ustn’ t do that
because it will upset public opinion in E ngland.” but he never seemed to trouble
him self about what was thought in Germany. ‘ ‘ If he was sitting here., or if he was
Chancellor, which he never will be, he would very soon realise the strength of German
public opinion and change his tone.” After this little outburst I thought it better not
to say anything about Lichnowsky having said to you with some emphasis that to
leave the whole thing alone for the m oment would absolutely meet the views o f the
Governm ent. But I said to him that as far as I knew your mind you were very firm
as to the necessity of publishing the two treaties as soon as the new Agreem ent was
signed, and as he seemed to think that that would affect the position of the
Chancellor, I wondered whether it would not be better to let the matter drop for the
present and go on with other things. He said that personally he was in principle
rather averse from dropping things after they had been initialled, but perhaps in this
case there was no violent hurry : the worst o f it was that it had been so m uch talked
about, particularly in England. I observed that the Chancellor had given away the
fact of negotiations going on in nearly all his recent speeches. Jagow said that he
had been obliged to do so just because they had been so much talked of in England.
X o ! they had been most discreet and he told me with m any chuckles that, for fear
that H is M ajesty would give the thing away they had originally kept it from the
E m peror that negotiations were going on. His Majesty had however one day sent
for Jagow and said to him : “ I suppose you think that you have been very discreet
in not m entioning these negotiations to me : well, I can tell you that I have heard
all about them from m y friends in E ngland.” Jagow said that the Em peror was so
pleased at having caught him out that H e forgot to be angry. Finally Jagow said
that it would perhaps be the lesser of two evils if the matter was to be left alone for'
the moment. Personally I hold this view very strongly, but I didn’t insist upon it
too much.
Yours very sincerely,
W . E . G O SC H E X.

Xo. 372.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschcn.( 1

F.O. 15491 325 14 36.

(X o. 98.) Secret.
Sir, F oreign Otfice, April 1, 1914.
The German Ambassador told me to-day(2) that he was instructed to impress upon
me again the unfavourable effect that would be produced on German public opinion
by the publication of our confirmation with Portugal in 1S99 of the provisions, in our
Treaties o f Alliance with Portugal, about her C olon ies; but he was to point out that it
was not satisfactory to leave the revision of the Anglo-G erm an Agreem ent of 1898 in
the air, as it was at present, and to ask me whether we would not be prepared to sign
it, leaving the date of publication to be discussed later. It might be arranged that
the Anglo-German Agreem ent and the confirmation of the Anglo-Pcrtuguese Alliance
might be published on different dates.

0 ) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a r in g been sent t o th e K in g and to th e C a binet. It

w as rep ea ted t o P a r is (X o . 1 9 6 ); t o L isbon (X o . 75) on A p ril 8 ]
( 2) [c p . G .F ., X X X V I I (I ), pp. 1 15 -7 .]
 568
I said that Herr von Jagow had spoken to Your Excellency lately more strongly
than ever of the bad effect on German public opinion of the publication of the Anglo-
Portuguese A lliance.(3) As I had explained to the Ambassador some days ago, our
prim ary object in negotiating for a revision of the Anglo-Germ an Agreement had been
to improve the relations between Germ any and England, which were very unsatis­
factory at the time when the negotiations began. Happily, these relations had since
becom e much better. The last thing, therefore, that we should wish would be to
publish anything that would give a set-back to our good relations. But we could
not publish the Anglo-Germ an A greem ent without publishing also the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance. For years the Portuguese Government had pressed us for the
publication of the last confirmation o f the Alliance. I thought that the Agreement
and the Alliance would have to be published simultaneously : otherwise, no matter
which was published first, there would be great disappointment to someone when the
other was published later. W e could not sign the revision of the Anglo-German
A greem ent without an arrangement as to publication : for we disliked making any
secret arrangements. Indeed, the present British Government had not made any
secret agreement o f any im portance; and I thought that we were, in effect, pledged
by what we had said in Parliament not to make secret agreements. I could only tell
the Ambassador that this was m y view, but as he pressed what he had said I would
discuss it with the Prim e Minister, when the latter was more at liberty, after the
present crisis was over. There was not, it seemed to me, a great hurry, as the Anglo-
German Agreem ent of 1898 existed and was being given effect to as far as there was
opportunity.
I added to the Ambassador that, in any case, having now negotiated up to the
present point with the German Governm ent about the Portuguese Colonies, we would
not, without inform ing the German Governm ent, make in future an Agreem ent of any
kind with Portugal affecting the territory that had been the subject of the negotiations
with Germany.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [E E Y ].

(3) [v. su p ra , pp. 565-7, Nos. 3 70 -1 .]

No. 373.

Sir Eduard G rey to Sir E. G osch en .O

P rivate.(2)
My dear Goschen, Foreign Office, April 7, 1914.
M y last conversation with L ichnow sky(3) about the Portuguese Colonies will have
reached you by now and will show that I take the same view as you do in your letter
to me of the 29th of March. (“I
I cannot undo what was done with Portugal in 1899 and with Germany in 1898,
and I must stand by both these agreements. But I will not do, nor if I can help it
publish, anything that is likely to embarrass Bethm ann-Hollweg or Jagow in this
matter, or to have an unfavourable effect upon German public opinion.
On the other hand I cannot publish the Anglo-Germ an Agreement, without
publishing the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as confirmed in 1899. And I cannot make
any new secret agreement.

0) [T h is letter is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ; to

S ir A . N ico ls o n ; to S ir E. C row e.]
(3) [G rey M SS., V ol. 23.]
(3) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
( 4) j/u. supra, pp. 566-7, N o. 371.]
 569
The on ly thing therefore for the present is to leave things as they are. But you
will see that I promised Lichnowsky not to make any new agreement with Portugal
nor, you m ight add, with anyone respecting the territory affected by the Anglo-
German Agreem ent o f 1898 or by the revised draft initialled lately, without letting
Germany know and consulting with her beforehand.
I didn’ t state this quite so explicitly to Lichnowsky and I d on’ t know what he
reported, so perhaps you had better explain this to Jagow as explicitly as I have stated
it in this letter, and report what you say to Jagow in an official despatch, which I will
approve, that it m ay be on record.(3) It is, I think, only fair to the German
Government to give this assurance.
Yours sincerelv,
E. G R E Y.
(s) [r . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t.]

No. 874.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.G )

F.O. 18800 3 2 5 /1 4 '3 6 .

(No. 172. Secret.) Berlin, D. April 21, 1914.
Sir, R . April 27, 1914.
As you are already aware the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recently
spoke to me very strongly of the bad effect which the publication o f the so-called
Treaty of W indsor, as well as the Revised Agreem ent with Germany, would have on
public opinion in G erm any.(2t H e particularly dwelt upon the opportunity for attack
which the publication of the Treaty would give to the Chancellor’ s numerous
opponents and hinted that H err von B ethm ann-H ollw eg’ s position might thereby be
gravely com prom ised.
I had to admit that, owing to ignorance of our relations with Portugal, o f the
object o f the Anglo-G erm an Agreem ent of 1898 and o f the reasons which led to its
revision, there might be amongst the public some such agitation as he had described.
He replied that such agitation was certain to ensue and not only amongst the
general p u b lic; it would be seen at once that some o f the provisions o f the revised
Anglo-G erm an agreement were weakened by the reaffirmation of the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance and there would be a storm o f questions in the Reichstag as to what German
diplom acy had been a b ou t! Further, and still more certainly, the knowledge that the
reaffirmation o f the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance had taken place in the very year
following that during which the Anglo-G erm an Agreem ent of 1897 [ s i c : 1898] had
been concluded, would cause universal dissatisfaction and great trouble for the
Im perial Governm ent.
I said that it was equally certain that the Portuguese Government would be
in a very difficult position if the one Treaty was published without the other.
H err von Jagow did not seem m uch affected by this consideration and continued to
harp on the disastrous effect which the publication of both Treaties would have on
the position o f the Chancellor, a Chancellor who, he said with intention, had always
shown him self so friendly and well-disposed to England, and who from that point of
view might be difficult to replace.
I said to H err von Jagow that H err von Bethm ann H ollw eg’ s friendly spirit
towards Great Britain, and the frankness with which he had always dealt with the
questions between the two countries, had always been highly appreciated by His
M ajesty’ s G overnm ent; and I could assure him that nothing was further from their

O [T h is d espa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to th e C a b in et.]

( 2) [r . supra, pp . 5 66-8, Nos. 3 7 1 -2 .]
 570

wishes than that anything should he done which would in any way render his position
difficult. As, therefore, the publication o f the Treaties would almost certainly have
that effect, and as. on the other hand, the signature of the Revised Anglo-German
Agreem ent without publication would bring the latter into the category of Secret
Agreements, against which your mind was firmly set, it seemed to me, personally, that
it might be better to let the whole matter drop for the moment, all the more that one
o f the chief reasons for which the 1897 [s ic : 1898] Agreement had been revised had
happily now ceased to exist. Herr von Jagow said that personally he was in principle
rather averse from dropping agreements after they had once been initialled, but
perhaps in this case signature m ight he postponed without inconvenience. Such
postponem ent was in any case the lesser of two evils. Finally Herr von Jagow begged
me to inform you confidentially of his views, which I had the honour to do in my
private letter of the 29th ultim o.(3)
A few davs later Herr von Jagow again returned to the subjectC) and asked me
whether I had inform ed you of his views with regard to the effect that the publication
o f the two Treaties would have upon public opinion in Germany. I said that I had
done so and that I was now able to tell him quite explicitly and unreservedly what
was in your mind as regards this subject.
You wished me to tell him that, while you must necessarily stand by the arrange­
m ents which were made by the Governm ent of the day with Germ any in 1898 and
Portugal in 1899, you would certainly not do, nor, if you could help it, would you
publish, anything in connection w’ith this question that was likely to cause
embarrassment to the Im perial Chancellor or him self or to have an unfavourable
effect upon German public opinion. On the other hand, you wished it to be clearly
understood that you could not publish the Anglo-German Agreem ent without
publishing the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Alliance as confirmed in 1899, and that
you could not make any new Secret Agreement.
I then inform ed His E xcellency that under these circumstances you felt that the
only course for the present was that the whole question of the Anglo-German
Agreem ent respecting the Portuguese Colonies should be left as it w as; but that you
wished me, in expressing your opinion on that point, to give him the assurance that
His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would make no new agreement either with Portugal, or
any other Power, respecting the territory affected by the Anglo-Germ an Agreement
of 1898, or by the revised draft agreement, which had lately been initialled, without
previous consultation with the Im perial Government.
H err von Jagow seemed to be very grateful for this explicit statement of views,
and agreed that “ for the present ” the matter should be allowed to drop. H e hoped,
however, that soon, namely, when German colonial territory reached larger dimensions
and w’hen consequently public attention on colonial matters would be extended over a
larger field, the Imperial Governm ent would be in a position to raise no further
objections to the publication of both Treaties. In the meantime the Imperial
Governm ent considered themselves m orally bound by the initialled agreement.
I have, Ac.
W . E. GOSCHEN.
M IN U T E S .

T he view o f the G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t, as set forth in the last p a r a fg r a p h ] of this

despa tch , is tha t, un til th e tim e com es w hen they a re ready to a gree to the p u blica tion of both
agreem en ts they consid er them selves “ m ora lly b o u n d ” by th e new a g reem en t as in itialled .
P resum ably this does not only m ean th a t the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t reg a rd the in itia lled
v ersion as the definitely settled form w hich the new A g reem en t is to ta ke w hen th ey are ready
to sign it, b u t im plies th a t they con sid er the in itia lled in stru m en t to have rep la ced , for
p ra c tic a l pu rposes, th e 1898 agreem ent. I f this view w ere a ccep ted the in itia lled agreem ent
w ou ld becom e p racticallj- the eq u iv a len t of a new secret agreem ent.
G. H. V.
A p [ r i ] l 27.

(3j [t\ sup ra , pp. 566-7, No. 371.]

(4) [cp . G .P., X X X V I I (I), p. 118.]
 571
I t m ig h t perhaps be on the safe side to in form th e G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t th a t H [ is ]
M fa je s t y ’ s] G fo v e rn m e n t] con sid er th e 1893 agreem ents to b e b in d in g u n til th ey are rep la ced
by som e oth er form a l a greem ent.
I t is n ot sta ted w here, n or at w hose expense, the ex p a n sion o f the G erm an colon ies is to
take place in th e n ea r fu tu re.
R . S.
28.4.

I do th in k th a t H e r r v on J a g o w ’ s express sta tem en t to th e effect th a t the G erm an G overn ­

m ent con sid ered them selves b ou n d b y the revised a greem ent, w hich has been in itia lle d but is
not now to be sign ed, creates an em b arra ssin g situ a tion . I foreshadow ed in m y m in u te on
6509 ju st this d a u g e rf5) : th a t is to say that we m a y [b e ] held to be b ou n d by th e term s o f
th e in itia lled d r a ft con v en tion ju st as if it ha d been sign ed and ra tified , in w hich case
G erm any w ould have g o t all the a d v an ta g es o f th e a greem en t w ith ou t a ssen tin g to ou r
co n d itio n as to pu b lica tion .
I th in k it w ou ld be v e ry desirable (if th is cou ld in som e w av, and on a suitab le occasion
arisin g , be d on e) th a t w e should g iv e it clearly to be u n d erstood th a t fa ilin g sig n a tu re o f th e
revised d ra ft, w e stand n ot on the term s o f th a t d r a ft, but on th e term s o f 1698 agreem ents.
I recogn ize how ever th e risk th a t if w e m ade to o a b ru p t and ca te g o rica l sta tem en t to this
effect, it m ig h t have th e effect o f m a k in g G erm a ny p r e fe r sign a tu re o f the revised a g reem en t
to its p ra c tic a l aba ndonm ent. On th e oth er h a n d, if w e are to a cce p t th e situ a tion th a t we
are held b ound by th e term s o f th e revised d r a ft, then w e g a in n oth in g b y not sig n in g it.
E. A . C.
A p [ r i l ] 23.

I th in k th a t H e r r v [ o n ] J a g o w ’ s sta tem en t th a t the G erm an G o v [e r n m e n ]t w ill con sid er

them selves “ m ora lly b o u n d ” by th e in itia lled agreem en t m a y m erely m ean th a t he is
resp on d in g to ou r d ecla ra tion th a t w e w ou ld m ake no new a g reem en t resp ectin g th e te r r ito r y
affected b y th e 189S C on v en tion or b y th e in itia lle d a greem ent w ith ou t p rev iou s con s u lta tio n
w ith the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t. W e cou ld ta k e no ex ce p tio n to th is— and w e m ay in terp ret
bis statem ent as m ea n in g this. I s h [o u l]d be in clin ed to lea ve th e m a tter th ere— and n ot
con tin u e a ra th er em barrassing discussion.
A. X.

It w ill be sufficient fo r the m om en t sim ply to w r it« a despa tch to S ir E . G oschen sa y in g

th a t I en tirely a p p rov e w hat he said and th a t he co r re c tly sta ted m v view .
E . G.

(5) [r . supra, pp . 55S-9, X o . 361, m in.]

No. 375.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

F.O. 1 83 0 0 /3 2 5 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 123.) Secret.
Sir •— Foreign Office, M ay 2, 1914.
I have received your despatch No. 172 Secret of the 21st ultim o,(*) reporting the
conversations which you have had with the German S ec[reta rv] of State for Foreign
Affairs on the question of the publication of the Anglo-G erm an Agreem ent respecting
the Portuguese Colonies and of the Treaty of 1899 renewing the A nglo-Portuguese
Alliance.
Your E xcellency correctly stated the view which I hold on this matter, and I
entirely approve the language held by you to H err von Jagow during the course of
your discussions.
[I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]
0 ) [r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
 572
N o. 376.
Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Greg.
F.O. 2 9 1 0 3 /6 9 9 5 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 102.) Confidential. Lisbon, D. June 23, 1914.
Sir :— R. June 29, 1914.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me very confidentially to-day about
the attitude of the Germans towards Angola. They had, he said, becom e very pressing
in their demands, and the Portuguese Government were at a loss to know howT far
they should go in acceding to them. The principal demand was for a concession to
construct a railway from some port in Southern Angola to connect with the Otavi
mines and the railways in German South-W est Africa, and permission had been given
to a party of German engineers to survey the harbour and country (see m y despatches
Nos. 72 of April 18 and 88 of May 21).(M The Portuguese Governm ent however
did not at all desire to see a virtually German line and port established in their
territory but wished to push on the construction of the Mossamedes Railway for which
the assistance of foreign, including German, capital would be welcomed. There
would be no objection whatever to building branch lines into the German colony.
Then there was the Ambaca Railway which the Government had proposed to take
over (see m y despatch No. 23 Commercial of March 17 )(2) but now certain
Oporto Bankers backed by a German group come forward and had offered to fulfil all
the engagem ents undertaken by the Ambaca Company involving an expenditure of
some £80,000, the neglect of which had necessitated the action taken by the Govern­
ment. There being now no further reason for Government interference the railway
would be left in the hands of the Company the control of which would to all intents
and purposes pass into German hands.
In regard to the Benguella Railway the Portuguese Government felt considerable
uneasiness. Mr. W illiam s had asked them to guarantee the interest on the sum
required to com plete the line, but that was quite out of the question as thejr could not
do it. Mr. W illiams had rather attempted to blackmail the I’ortuguese Government
in the matter, hinting that he would hand the whole enterprize over to the Germans.
H e was nowr in Brussels and the Portuguese Government had every hope that the
Belgians, of whom they were not afraid, would find the m oney and take the railway
over, but the control would remain in Portuguese hands.
There was still another matter, H is E xcellency said, which he would mention
privately as it was connected with the affairs of the Marquis de V alflor(3) as whose
agent he had, as I know, been recently acting. The Marquis not long ago had an
offer, from a Frenchm an, of forty m illion francs for his property in the cocoa Islands,
and he, Senhor Freire d ’ Andrade, had gone to Paris to investigate the matter. H e
had found that the offer purported to come from a small firm who neither had nor
could raise anything like the abovem entioned sum. Further enquiries revealed the
fact that the proposed purchase m oney was to come from London, and though he had
no proof, he had a strong suspicion that the Germans were at the back of the whole
thing.
The German Minister, His Excellency continued, was soon returning to Lisbon
from leave and would no doubt press the demands already made and would probably
formulate new ones. The position of the Portuguese Government had become difficult
and dangerous and before deciding upon their line of action they wished to know
what attitude His M ajesty’ s Government wished them to adopt. Did H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent entirely disinterest themselves about the fate of Angola, he asked, and
would they view with equanimity a com pliance by the Portuguese Government with
0 ) [M r. C a rn eg ie’ s despatch (N o. 72), D . A p ril 18, R . M ay 4, 1914, and his despatch
(N o. 88), D . M a y 21, R . J u n e 2, 1914, a re n ot rep rod u ced , as the con ten ts are sufficiently
in d ica te d above. (F.O . 1 9 5 5 8 /6 9 9 5 /1 4 /3 6 ; 2 4 4 4 9 /6 9 9 5 /1 4 /3 6 .)] ‘
(2) [N o t rep rod u ced .]
(3) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ W e kn ow o f him as the ow ner o f a p la n ta tion in San Thom e,
bu t th a t is a ll.” ]
 57 3
all the demands o f Germany and the Germanisation of that Province, or was there a
point beyond which His M ajesty’ s Governm ent would not wish the Portuguese
Government to go— for instance the grant of a port to the Germans— and would
His M ajesty’ s Government support the Portuguese Government if they refused to go
beyond this point ? He did not want to see a ‘ ‘ Panther ’ ’ sailing up a Portuguese
port in order to enforce some demand of the German Government to which the
Portuguese Government would have no alternative but to yield. I confined m yself to
replying that I would not fail to report his enquiry to you.
I have, &c.
LA N C E LO T D. C A R N E G IE .
MINTJTES.
The .Im & aca B a ilw a y (S. P a u l de L oa n d a ) is in th e B ritish sphere und er th e 1S98
con v en tion . I f the G erm ans do n ot ob ject to B ritish m oney in th e B en guella R a ilw a y we
ca n n ot o b ject to G erm an m oney in th e A m baca R a ilw ay .
As reg a rd s the B en gu ella B a ilw a y w e kn ow now th a t M r. "Williams has g o t all the m oney
he w anted, som e o f it from G erm an sources, th ou g h n ot as m u ch as th e G erm ans w ou ld have
liked to p rov id e. T here w ill n ot be G erm an con trol.
T he C ocoa islands are not m en tion ed in th e 1893 con v en tion s o r note. In th e revised
con v en tion o f 1913, w hich does n ot b in d (4) us, as it was n ot sign ed, th ey w ere on ly m en tion ed
as t e rr ito ry in w hich H [ i s ] M [a je s t y 's ] G o v e r n m e n t ] w ou ld n o t a ttem p t possession, o ccu p a ­
tion , con trol, o r ex ercise o f p o litica l in fluen ce. N o sp ecial rig h t o f G erm any in them is
m entioned.
I t is n ot clear w h at the P ortu g u ese M fin is t e r fo r ] F fo r e ig n ] A [fla ir s] m eans by a
dem and fo r a p ort b y G erm any. W e ca n n ot, I ta k e it, ob ject if G erm ans m erely ask fo r leave
to b u ild a ra ilw a y from a p ort in S. A n g ola , th ou g h w e should b e b ou n d to su p p o r t P o rtu g a l
if G erm any dem a nded possession o f a p ort a ga in st h er w ill.
T he re p ly to the P ortu g u ese G o v [e r n m e n ]t m ig h t be th a t H f i s ] M fa je s t y ’ s] G fo v e rn m e n t]
w ill o f course, as th ey a re bou n d, su p p ort P o r t u g a l in resistin g G erm an a gg ression d irected
tow ards th e dism em berm ent o f P ortu g u ese possessions b u t th a t in reg a rd to com m ercia l en ter-
prizes such as those in co n tem p la tion in A n g ola th ey ca n n ot a d op t any oth er a ttitu d e than
th a t o f d isin terested specta tors.
C. W . 0 .
J u n e 29.

I t looks ra th er as though the P ortu g u ese w ere a n g lin g to find ou t ra th er m ore a b ou t the
A n g lo-G erm a n secret a greem en t th ou g h , as a m a tter o f fa c t, w e b elieve th a t th ey do k now
p retty a ccu ra tely w hat its term s are.
I f it is tru e th a t M r. W illia m s has been a tte m p tin g to b la ck m a il th e P o rtu g u e se G o v fe rn -
m e n ]t by th re a te n in g to hand ov er th e B en gu ella R a ilw a y en terp rise to the G erm ans, we
Bhall h a rd ly be in clin ed to su p p ort him .
Q [u e r ]y . R e p lv as proposed.
D.
30.vi.14.

T he P ortu g u ese know all a bou t the 1893 a greem ent, and have b een to ld th a t th e 1913
a greem en t in volves no m ore. B u t th is does lo o k ra th er as if th ey w ere fishing fo r fu rth er
in fo r m [ a t io ] n a bou t the la tter agreem ent. A n y w a y th a t a greem ent enters in to th e con sid era ­
tion o f the re p ly — if any— th a t w e shall send t o this feeler.
I t m ay, in th e first place, be en q u ired w hether w e con sid er ourselves b ou n d b y th e 1398
or 1913 agreem en t. I t w [o u l]d be w ell to settle th is p oin t, th ou g h , as ex p la in e d la ter, the
p o in t is h a rd ly essential t o th e con sid era tion o f the m a tters ra ised in th is despatch. T ech n i­
ca lly , I suppose, w e a re on ly b ou n d b y th e 1393 agreem ent. T he revised v ersion was only
in itia lled b u t n ot s ig n e d ; and, ow in g to G erm a n o b jection s to th e sim ultaneous p u b lica tion o f
our T rea ty o f A llia n ce w ith P o rtu g a l as confirm ed in 1899, the m a tte r has slid in to abeyance
fo r th e present. T he G erm ans have h ow ev er sta ted th a t th ey con sid er them selves m ora lly
b ound b y th e 1913 agreem ent. T hey w [o u l]d certa in ly hold, or a ffect to hold, th a t w e w ere
equally “ m o r a lly ” b ou n d b y th e la ter and in itia lle d a greem ent w hich is e x p lic itly sta ted to
rep la ce th e 1398 a greem ent. T he q uestion has n ot been definitely raised, and w e h a ve no
in terest th a t I can see in ra is in g it— rath er th e con tra ry. I f it w ere raised, it m ig h t be
difficult fo r us, ev en if w e so desired, to dissent from the G erm an view .
O stensibly th e m a tter is to som e e x ten t in v olv ed in the second pa ra [g r a p h ] o f this
d e s p fa t c h ], because the A m baca R a ilw a y is in the B ritish sphere as defined in the 1898

( 4) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ T he G erm ans say th ey ‘ con sid er them selves m ora lly
b ound ’ by th e new A g r e e m e n t : it is n ot certa in q u ite w hat they m ean, and w e have not
ta ken up the p oin t. See 1 33 00 /14 .” (v. supra, pp . 569-71, N o. 374, and m m .]
 574
agreem ent, b u t not in th a t describ ed in th e 1913 agreem ent. P lease see M r. O rd e’ s sketch m ap,
a tta ch ed to this despatch, w hich also shows the va riou s A n g olese railw ays 111 question.
O f these th ree railw ays, the M ossam edcs and M a la n g e (A m b a ca ) system s do not pay
w ork in g expenses, and are a h eavy ch a rg e on th e state. The Benguella (L ob ito) system is
m ore fa v ou ra b ly situ ated , and pays w ork in g expenses but w ill n ot pa
con stru ction u n til ex ten d ed to K a ta n g a . In fa c t the fu tu re o f all these railw ays as a
com m ercia l asset dep ends on th eir exten sion to the hin terla n d . I t is m a in ly for this p u rpose
th a t a b ill has been in trod u ced in the P ortu g u ese P arliam en t to em pow er the G o v [e rn m e n ]t
to raise £8,000,000. O ne at least o f th e im p orta n t g rou p s— M r. B lock ’ s, th e L isbon g ro u p —
in terested in railw ay con stru ction in A n g ola is m a rk in g tim e to see w hether this bill is
a d o p te d by P a rliam en t. A n d th e p rosp ects seem fa v ou ra ble. T h e P ortu g u ese R e p u b lic seems
ben t on a grea t effort in th is d ire ctio n , very la rg ely w ith the idea o f k eep in g out
co n tr o l as fa r as possible.
Unless, a fter all, the P ortu g u ese are g o in g to fu n k th e loan bill, I do not q u ite un d er­
stand th eir trou b le over the A m baca R [a ilw a ]y . In M arch th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t
G azette pu blished a decree ta k in g over the R [ a ilw a ]y from the T ra n s-A frica n R a ilw a y Co.,
as a prov ision a l m easure in the in terests of the C olony o f A ngola, w ith o u t p reju d ice to the
settlem en t o f the n e g otia tion s b etw een the G o v [e rn m e n ]t and the C om p an y as to th eir
respectiv e lia bilities. T he G o v [e rn m e n ]t h a v in g on ce ta k en this step, ow in g to the fa ilu re o f
the Co. to fulfil its ob liga tion s, I d o n ot see th a t the G o v [e rn m e n ]t are in the least ob liged
to rescin d th e ir a ction , and allow a G erm an con cern to step in as a life-b u oy to the corpse
o f th e C o [in p a n y ], thus sq ueezing ou t the m uch ta lk ed o f G o v [e rn m e n ]t scheme. Had
th e G erm an g ro u p com e forw a rd b efore the C o [m p a n y ] fa iled in its engagem ents and was
ta k en over, and had p riv a tely finan ced th e C o [m p a n y ] to the e x ten t o f th e necessary £80,000,
th e position m ight have been different. As it is, th e A m baca railw ay prop osition seems to me
to be clearly “ up t o ” the P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t if they really m ean business w ith th eir
bill. As fa r as we are con cern ed , we ca n n ot help them in this, if they d o n ’ t m ean to help
them selves. I f w e w ere to assume th a t the 1898— and not the 1913— agreem en t was th e only
one th a t b ou n d us, we s h [o u l]d n a tu ra lly not wish to see an ex clu siv ely G erm an-financed
show in the Am baca sphere. B u t, as has been a lready p oin ted out, we c [ o u l] d h a rd ly ob ject
to G erm an p r iv a te ca p ita l and en terp rise em p loy in g itself in the Am baca region in w hatever
p r o p o r tio n — if th e G erm ans are not o b je c tin g to the W illia m s en terp rise in th e Benguella
system , w hich is in th e G erm an sphere both under the 1898 and 1913 agreem ents. I f it is
th e 1898 agreem en t w hich is in force, th e G erm ans w [o u l]d be p la y in g th e gam e by beh av in g
as w e d id tow ards W illiam s, i.e. by a d v isin g him to enlist G erm an ca p ital. B u t they d o not
con sid er the 1898 agreem en t to be th e v a lid one, and anyhow w [o u l]d proba b ly not “ play
the g a m e .” F u rth erm ore, to recu r to m y p reced in g ob serv a tion s to the effect th a t th e secret
agreem en ts are not really and e ffectiv ely in volved in this m a tter, I do n ot th in k that the
G erm ans could ob ject to W illiam s, even if th ey w an ted to, and equally w e cou ld not ob ject
to G erm an ca p ita l in the Am baca system , even if the 1898 a greem ent w ere in force. A r ticle 5
on ly deals w ith G overnm ent concessions, not w ith p r iv a te en terp rise. I have a lread y— on
26809(5)— v en tu red to suggest a p olicy o f n on -in terv en tion and in a c tiv ity in reg a rd to the
va riou s railw ay prop osition s in the S outh. I v en tu re to th in k w e m ust ta k e the sam e line
in re g a rd to A m baca. W e ca n n ot in terv en e to keep the G erm an g rou p out. I th in k we
s h [o u l]d confine our rep ly to th e lines in d ica ted at the b eg in n in g o f this pa ra g ra p h o f m y
m in u te, viz. tell th e P ortu g u ese G o v [e r n m e n ]t th rou g h M r. C a rnegie tha t, for the reasons
I ha ve g iv en , the rem edy appea rs to be in th eir own hands. I f they wish to a p p ly th eir bill,
they can, and th erew ith th e G erm an g ro u p vanishes from the tapis.
P a ssin g now to th e B enguella ra ilw a y q uestion, we orig in a lly p la yed the p a rt o f the
honest in term ed iary, and advised M r. W illia m s to com e to an a rra n g em en t w ith G erm an
ca p ita l. H e trie d and fa iled. I do n ot know how hard he tried , or w ho was to blam e fo r
the fa ilu re. A nyhow he c [ o u l] d not com e to an arra n g em en t sa tisfa ctory t o him self, and the
idea o f G erm an p a rticip a tio n d rop p ed out, th ou g h the G erm ans a p p recia ted our action.
F u rth erm ore, w e heard recen tly from L isb on th a t M r. W illia m s w as g e t t in g the m oney he
req u ired from local financiers. I th in k these tw o fa cts m ake it u nlikely th a t M r. W illia m s
w [o u l]d have tried , as alleged, to bla ck m a il the P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t by th rea ten in g to
hand the w hole con cern ov er to the G erm ans. T he a llega tion is also n ot con son an t w ith our
p rev iou s know ledge o f M r. W illia m s’ ch a ra cter. I f he d id try b la ckm a il, we sh [o u l]d
a ltog eth er revise ou r estim ate o f the m an, and w ith d ra w any sym pathy fo r him. B u t we
cou ld, and should, no m ore m ix up in the m a tter than when we d ecid ed no action to be
necessary on our p a rt on a d ifferen t estim ate o f the m an and d ifferen t in fo rm a tio n as to the
prosp ects o f his plans. (See m in u te on 26809.(s) )

(5) [M r. Y a n s it t a r t ’ s m in u te was w ritte n on M r. C a rn eg ie’ s despatch (N o. 94), D . M a y 31,

R . J u n e 15, 1914. The despatch and m in u tes are n ot rep rod u ced fo r reasons o f space. N o
a ction was taken on them and m uch o f the com m ent con ta in ed in M r. V a n s it t a r t ’ s very lon g
m in u te is also g iven above. (F .O . 2 6 8 0 9 /6 9 9 o /1 4 /3 6 .)]
 575
T he p osition as reg a rd s railw ays in Sou th A ngola is b riefly this. W e w ere in form ed that
a L isbon g ro u p was p rep a red to finance the Sou th A ngola (M ossam edes) system . The ob ject
o f the P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t was to e x clu d e G erm an p a rticip a tio n in any specifically
G erm an form . B u t the L isb on g ro u p — o f w hich M r. B ieck, P resid en t o f the B ritish C ham ber
o f C om m erce, is a lea d in g m em ber, and w hich is com p osed o f P ortu g u ese B anks w ith
prosp ectiv e E nglish, F ren ch and B elgia n p a r ticip a tio n — w ere qu te ready to a dm it G erm an
p a rticip a tio n on an equal fo o tin g . P ossibly they m ay fa il to com e to an a rra n g em en t, as
M r. W illia m s did, th ou g h th a t w [o u l]d be no m ore con cern o f ours than w as M r. W illia m s’
fa ilu re. T he prospects, how ever, p oin t the o th e r w ay, and M r. B lock seems t o th in k an
arra ngem ent probable. T he G erm ans w ant a ra ilw ay as a d éb ouche fo r th eir O tavi m ines in
G erm an S W . A fric a . T here w [o u l]d not be room fo r a n other lin e besides the M ossam edes
on e as a p a y in g con cern , and a ju n ctio n s h [o u l]d suit the G erm aus iust as w ell as a sep arate
line, m ore esp ecially as w e u n d ersta n d that they w [o u l]d reg a rd M ossam edes as an ou tlet as
b ein g as sa tisfa ctory as T ig e r Bay.
This b ein g the p osition , I th in k th e P o rtu g u e se are ov e r-p itc h in g it a b it in ta lk in g o f
th e G erm a n isation o f the prov in ce, o f the g ra n t o f a p ort to th e Germ ans, an d o f the P a n th er
“ s a il in g ” u p it to en force G erm an dem ands. T he P ortu g u ese G o v [e rn m e n ]t a re un d er no
o b lig a tion to gra n t a p o rt. P o r t o f th e p roceed s o f the loans con tem p la ted in th e ir above­
m en tion ed b ill were, w e u n d erstood , t o be dev oted to h a rb ou r con stru ction as well as to
railw ays. G erm an p a rticip a tio n on an eq ual fo o t in g can be a d m itted in the la tte r ; b u t th ere
is absolutely no necessity to g ra n t G erm any a p ort, even if they d o n ’ t really m ean business
w ith th e ir b ill a fte r all.
I th in k w e m igh t in stru ct M r. C a rn eg ie to rep ly v erb ally to the P o rtu g u e se a p p re­
hensions on th e lines o f the p r e ce d in g p a ra g ra ph s, viz. to tell them w hat we u n d ersta n d to be
the position b oth as reg a rd s the W illia m s and th e B leck g rou p s, and to say th a t w e th erefore
do not q u ite un d ersta n d those appreh en sion s as rega rd s the ra ilw ays— w here th e ca p ita l
appea rs destin ed to be cosm op olita n — and still less as reg a rd s th e ha rb ou r, w here the rem edy
is in th e ir ow n hands. W e do not u n d ersta n d the G erm ans t o have a p p lied fo r a harb ou r
(and I d ou b t if they w ill). I f they do, th e P ortu g u ese can easily refuse if th ey w ish— and
they do so wish m ost ev id en tly , fo r the m a in ob je ctiv e o f th e ir loa n -b ill is t o keep th e
G erm ans ou t. As the P ortu g u ese are aw are ou r agreem en t w ith G erm any n ever con tem p la ted
any coercion o f P o rtu g a l in to d o in g som eth in g she d id n 't w ant to do, an d w ith one o f the
parties to th a t a greem ent she has an a ctu a l a llia nce. M r. C a rn eg ie c [ o u l] d say som ething
to the above effect con fid en tia lly, p r iv a te ly a n d v erb ally t o the M fin is te r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ]
A [ffa ir s ], O f course it c [ o u l] d equally w ell be said here, i f Senhor d e M a ttos calls. B u t I
hope he w o n ’ t, as th e con v ersation m igh t ta k e an a w k w ard tu rn , an d it m ig h t have been
b etter i f M r. C a rnegie h a d discou ra ged th e idea.
A s reg a rd s the M a rq u is de V a lflo r we k n ow little, e x ce p t th a t he has a p la n ta tion in
San Thom é. W e m igh t possibly let the A d m ira lty kn ow the con ten ts o f the p a ra g ra p h th a t
deals w ith th is m atter. W e s h [o u l]d p roba b ly not be pleased to see th e G erm ans in stalled
there, hut u n d er the agreem ent o f 1913 we c [ o u l] d not ob ject, esp ecially if th e con cern w ere
G erm an p riv a te ca p ital. T he P ortu g u ese, how ever, seem d isin clin ed to sa u ction th is deal.
I f th ey a r e opp osed to it, th e sam e con sid era tion s in reg a rd to any a ttem p t at coercion
w [o u l]d a p p ly as in the h y p oth etica l case o f a dem a n d fo r a harbour, w hich has been dealt
w ith above.
R . G. V .
J u ly 2.

T he P ortu g u ese g o v [e r n m e n ]t ask w heth er H [ is ] M [a je s t v ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] disinterest

them selves in the fa te o f A n g ola an d w ou ld be in d ifferen t t o the G erm a n iza tion o f the w hole
prov in ce o f A n g ola . I t is a v ery n a tu ra l question, in the circum stan ces, fo r th e P ortu g u ese
g o v [e r n m e n ]t to ask. B u t fo r us, it raises the seriou s issue to w hich I have p rev iou sly
ca lled a tten tion : are we, in d ea lin g w ith p r a c tic a l schem es an d a p p lication s, to w ork on the
basis o f th e 1893 a greem ents, or on th a t o f the p roposed revised te x t w hich has been
in itia lled th is year, b u t not proceed ed w ith ?
The in con v en ien ce o f ou r p osition is en h a n ced by th e fa ct th a t one o f the ra ilw a y -p rojects
has referen ce t o what is the B ritish sphere o f A n g ola un d er the 1593 agreem ents, b u t w ould
be in th e G erm an sphere a cco r d in g to th e revised d r a ft con v en tion .
I th in k we m ust ta k e the strictly correct lin e an d hold th a t w hat we are b ou n d b y is the
1S93 a greem ent an d not th e d r a ft o f 1913.
In th e circu m stan ces, any answ er th a t M r. C a rn eg ie cou ld be a u th orized t o m ake, should
be o f a som ew hat v a g u e ch a ra cter. H e m ig h t perh a ps speak in th e follow in g sen se: —
H [ i s ] M [a je s t y 's ] G o v e r n m e n t ] w ou ld look w ith g en u in e sa tisfa ction on a n y effectiv e
m easures ta ken by th e P ortu g u ese G ov ern m e n ]t fo r th e developm en t o f A n g ola. I f the
P ortu g u ese g o v [e r n m e n ]t can do so by rely in g on th eir own resources, so m uch th e better,
b u t H Lis] M [a je s t y ’ s] G [o v e rn m e n t] w ou ld see no o b jection t o the em ploym en t o f G erm an
ca p ita l esp ecially in those reg ion s b o rd e r in g up on the G erm an colon ies in ¿ . A fric a . It is
fo r the P ortu g u e se g o v [e r n m e n ]t them selves to a tta ch to any concessions they m ay desire to
 576
g ra n t, such con d ition s as w ill in th e ir ow n o p in ion sa feg u a rd th eir n a tion a l and te rritoria l
rig h ts, hut in view o f th e trea ty en gagem ents restin g up on H [ i s ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ]
they w ould n a tu ra lly wish to be in form ed o f any definite concessions of ports, railw ays, &c.,
w hich th e P ortu g u ese g o v [e r n m e n ]t m ay con tem p la te g ra n tin g to foreig n subjects other than
B ritish.

T his w ould g iv e us the op p o rtu n ity o f ra is in g w ith the G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t , if necessary,

th e qu estion of G erm an concessions in the B ritish sphere o f A ng ola, such as th e proposed
h a n d in g over to G erm an con trol th e A m b aca railw ay (w hich is the ra ilw ay o f St. P a u l de
L oan d a). I a gree w ith M r. V a n sitta r t th a t if in the ord in a ry course o f business the A m baca
ra ilw ay passes in to G erm an hands, we h a ve no g rou n d (u n d er th e term s o f the secret a gree­
m ent o f 1898) to object. B u t it is clear from w hat we are now told , th a t the G erm an M inister
at L isb on is officially pressing, or is ex p e c te d officially to press, fo r such an arrangem ent.
A n y such a ction on the p a rt of the G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t w ou ld be con tra ry to the letter as
w ell as the s p irit of the 1898 a greem ent, an d cou ld only be d efen ded on th e assum ption th a t
it is n ot the 1898 a greem ent b u t the d r a ft agreem en t o f 1913 w hich is in force.
I t seems to m e th a t it is im p o rta n t n ot to allow such an in te r p r e ta tio n o f the ex istin g
situ ation . A n d if we hear in fu tu r e th a t the G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t is a ctu a lly su p p ortin g
G erm an a p p lica n ts fo r concessions in ou r sphere (und er the 1898 a greem ent) "w e shall be
b ou n d to ta k e n otice of it. T h is m ig h t ev en tu ally he done by ca llin g th e a tten tion o f the
G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t to the fa ct th a t th e status qu o as defined in the 1898 a greem ent m ust
n ot be d istu rbed u n d er cov er o f the 1913 d r a ft so lon g as the la tter is not con v erted , by
sign a tu re and ra tifica tion , in to a b in d in g con v en tion , and th a t we a ccord in g ly ex p ect the
G erm an g o v [e r n m e n ]t fo r th e present t o re fra in from su p p o r tin g such a p p lica tion s in respect
tc. th e B ritish zone.
A s reg a rd s the cocoa islands, I do n ot th in k it is fo r us to in terfere w ith schem es for the
pu rcha se o f pla n ta tion s in them . T he 1898 a greem ent does not refer to them , and under the
d r a ft con v en tion of 1913 we should certa in ly e x p e c t som e such G erm an schem es to be pushed,
w ith ou t op p o sitio n from us.

T he w hole situ a tion is u n sa tisfa ctory , and it is to be hop ed th a t b efore lon g a suitable
o p p o rtu n ity w ill presen t itself fo r m a k in g it clear to the G erm an g overn m en t th a t the d r a ft
co n v e n tio n o f 1913 rep resen ts an a b ortiv e schem e w hich has been d r o p p e d and is w ith d ra w n
b eca use G erm any has refu sed to sign it on th e co n d itio n on w hich H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n ­
m en t] from th e b eg in n in g in sisted as a sine qua n o n : i.e. p u b licity .
E. A. C.
J u ly 4.
T h e w hole q uestion is discussed so fu lly in th e above m inu tes th a t I have no rem arks
t o m ake.
A. N.

Send this to the C [o lo n ia l] 0 [ffic e ] and say th a t I p ropose to in stru ct M r. C arnegie to

rep ly as S ir E . Crow e su ggests.(9)
E . G.

(6) [u. in fra , p. 579, N o. 380.]

No. 377.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 3 09 5 4 /6 9 95 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 111.) Confidential. Lisbon, D. July 2, 1914.
S ir;— R. July 9, 1914.
W ith reference to m y despatch No. 102, Confidential, of the 23rd ultim o,(2) I have
the honour to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me whether I
had anything to tell him in regard to the remarks which he had made to me about
the Germans and Angola. I replied that I had not failed to report to you what he
had said, and that there had scarcely been time enough to get an answer.

(!) [A cop y o f this d espa tch was sent t o the C olonial O ffice.]
( 2) [u. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 577
Senhor Freire d ’ Andrade then said that the Germans were becom ing very
pressing in their demands for the Angola Loan of £8,000,000 (see m y despatch No. 88
of the 21st M ay),(3) which if obtained by them would include other concessions such
as the port and railway in South Angola. Parliament had now authorized the
Minister for the Colonies to raise part of it immediately, viz : £1,600,000. This
the German group wished to have, with an option on the rem aining £0,400,000, the
subsequent issue of which had also been sanctioned with the provision that the
conditions of the issue were submitted to and approved by Parliament. He would
like to see the loan taken up by an international group in which the Germans would
be of course at perfect liberty to participate. Meanwhile, H is Excellency continued
German policy in Angola resembled that of a skilful general who before making a
final attack occupied positions of advantage in various parts of the country. If the
Portuguese Government made no attempt now to hinder those manoeuvres they would
wake up one day and find that Angola had to all intents and purposes becom e a
German possession. The Portuguese Government were at a loss to know what policy
to adopt, and before taking any action they wished to ascertain the views of His
M ajesty’ s Government.
I have, Ac.
LA N C E LO T D. C AR N EG IE.
(3) [M r. C a rn eg ie’ s despa tch (N o. 88), D . M a y 21, R . J u n e 2, 1914, is n ot rep rod u ced , as
the con ten ts a re sufficiently in d ica te d above. (F .O . 2 4 4 4 9 /6 9 9 5 /1 4 /3 8 .)]

No. 378.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

F.O. 2 91 0 3 /0 9 95 /1 4 /3 6 .
Secret and Immediate.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 10, 1914.
I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a
despatch from H [is ] M fa jesty’ s] Minister at Lisbon reporting a conversation with
the Portuguese M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [flairs] on the subject of German
aspirations in A n gola ./1)
The question asked by Senhor Freire d ’ Andrade as to the attitude of H [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] towards these aspirations necessitates a consideration of
the position in Angola as affected by the secret agreements with Germany o f 1898 and
the revised convention initialled by Sir E. Grey and the Germany Embassy in
O ct[ober] last.
In the first place it is necessary to decide whether H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s]
G [overnm ent] are, in dealing with practical schemes and applications for concessions
in Angola, to work on the basis of the 1898 agreement or on that of the revised text
of 1913.
In agreeing that the question of the signature of the revised convention should
be dropped for the present the German Secretary of State for F [o re ig n ] A [flairs]
informed H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] Ambassador that the German G ov [ern m en ]t considered
themselves morally bound by its terms. It was not considered advisable to make
enquiry as to the precise meaning of this statement, which may possibly have been
intended merely as a response to the declaration of IT[is] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t]
that they would not make any new agreement respecting the territory affected by the
conventions of 1898 or the revised draft agreement without consulting the German
G ov[ern m en ]t. H owever that may be, Sir E . Grey considers it undesirable that I I [is ]
M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] should allow themselves to be placed in the position of
admitting that they are bound by the revised agreement so long as it is not converted,
by signature and ratification, into a binding convention, and he is of opinion that the
situation should be considered as governed by the conventions of 1898.
( ' ) [u. supra, pp . 572-3, N o. 376.]
[10900J
 578

As Mr. Ilarcourt is aware, the Ambaca Railway, a Portuguese undertaking

financed chiefly wflth British capital, lies in the part of Angola defined by the 1898
agreement as the British sphere of interest. Sir E. Grey considers that if in the
ordinary course of business the railway passes into German hands H [is ] M [a jesty’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] have no ground under that agreement to object. It appears however
from Mr. Carnegie’ s despatch that the German Minister at Lisbon is officially
pressing, or is expected officially to press, for such an arrangement. Any such action
on the part of the German G ov [ern m en ]t would be contrary to the letter as well as
the spirit of the 1898 agreement and could only be defended on the assumption that
it is not that agreement but the draft convention of 1918 which is in force. If it
should appear in future that the German G ov [ern m en ]t are actually supporting
German applicants in the British sphere it will hardly be possible to avoid taking
notice of such action.
In the circumstances Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to the concurrence of
Mr. Ilarcourt, to instruct PI [is] M [a jesty’ s] Minister at Lisbon to inform the
Portuguese M [inister for] P '[oreign] A fffairs] verbally to the following effect: H [is ]
M [a je sty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would look with genuine satisfaction on any effective
measures taken by the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t for the development of Angola, more
especially if this can be done while relying entirely on Portuguese resources. At the
same time I I [is ] MTajesty’ s] G [overnm ent] would see no objection to the em ploy­
ment of German capital, especially in the regions bordering on the German colonies
in South Africa. It is for the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t themselves to attach to any
concessions they may desire to grant, such conditions as will in their own opinion
safeguard their national and territorial rights, but in view of the treaty obligations of
Great Britain towards Portugal H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] w’ould naturally
wish to be inform ed of any definite concessions of ports, railways, Ac., which the
Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t m ay contemplate granting to foreigners other than British
subjects in the Portuguese African colonies.
This answer to the Portuguese M [inister for] F [oreig n ] A [ffairs] would in
Sir E. G rey’ s opinion give H [is ] M [a jesty’ s l G o v e rn m e n t] the opportunity of
raising with the German G ov [ern m en ]t the question of German concessions in the
sphere of Angola reserved to Great Britain under the agreements of 1898 and of
inform ing them, if necessary, that H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] expect them to
refrain for the present from supporting such applications in the British zone.
Copy of Mr. Carnegie’ s despatches Nos. 23 com m ercial and 88, referred to in his
despatch No. 102,C) are transmitted herewith. A copy of tire latter would have already
been sent to your D ep [a rtm en ]t but for a delay in printing. A copy of despatch
No. 72 from L isbon(3) was sent to you in a letter from this Office of May 11th last.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [K E Y ].
(2) [r . supra, pp. 572 -3 , No. 376, and n o te s ( 0 and ( 2).]
(3) [v. supra, p. 572, N o. 376, n o te 0 )-]

No. 379.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.

F.O. 3 1 9 8 2 /6 9 95 /1 4 /3 6 .
Sir, Downing S treet, July 13, 1914.
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ilarcourt to acknowledge the receipt of your
letters Nos. 29103(0 and 30954 of the 10th instant,(2) and to request you to inform
t1) [t\ im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t.]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s le tte r to th e C olon ia l Office o f J u ly 10, 1914, is not rep rod uced .
I t enclosed a cop y o f M r. C a rn eg ie’ s despa tch No. I l l (v . supra, pp. 576-7, No. 377), and Sir
E d w a rd G rey sta ted th a t he “ w ould be g la d . . . . [t o ] be fa v ou red w ith M r. H a r c o u r t ’ s
v ie w s ” b efore J u ly 16. (F.O . 3 0 9 5 4 /6 9 0 5 /1 4 /3 6 .)]
 579
Secretary Sir Edward Grey that he concurs in the instructions which it is proposed
to send to H is M ajesty’ s* Minister at Lisbon regarding the position of affairs in
A ngola.(3) _ _
2. Mr. Harcourt, however, thinks that it is most desirable that the whole
question of the secret agreement of 1898 and the revised convention should be con ­
sidered and decided by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent without further delay.
I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
JOIIN ANDERSON.
(3) [«;. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 380.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. C arnegieJ1)

F.O. 3 1 9 8 2 /6 9 95 /1 4 /3 6 .
(No. 150.) Secret.
g ir Foreign Office, July 15, 1914.
’ I have received and considered your despatches Nos. 102 and 111 of the
23rd u lt [im o ](2) and the 2nd instant(3) respecting the apprehensions of the
Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t as to German aspirations in Angola and reporting an
enquiry by the Portuguese M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] as to the views of
H [is ] M [a je sty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] with regard to the attitude which should be adopted
by the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t towards German claims for concessions in that

I have to request that you will inform Senhor Freire d ’ Andrade verbally to the
following e ffe c t :—
H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would look with genuine satisfaction on any
effective measures taken by the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t for the developm ent of
Angola, more especially if this can be done while relying entirely on Portuguese
resources. At the same time, H [is ] M [a jestv’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would see no objection
to the em ploym ent of German capital, especially in the regions bordering on the
German colonies in S [ou th ] Africa. It is for the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t them ­
selves to attach to any concession they may desire to grant such conditions as will in
their own opinion safeguard their national and territorial rights, but in view of the
treaty obligations of Great Britain towards Portugal H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n ­
m ent] would naturally wish to be inform ed of any definite concessions o f ports,
railways, Ac., which the Portuguese G ov [ern m en ]t may contemplate granting to
foreigners other than British subjects in the Portuguese African colom es.(4)
I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y.

( 1) [T h is d espa tch was rep eated to B erlin (N o. 224).]

( 2) [u. supra, pp. 572-3, N o. 376.]

( 4) r M r UC a rn eg iei^ d esp a tch '^ (N o. 123 S ecret), D . J u ly 20, R . J u ly 27, 1914, rep orted his
action in a ccord a n ce w ith these in stru ction s. (F .O . 3 4 0 4 3 /6 9 9 5 /1 4 /3 6 .)]

[10900]
 580

C H A P TE R XCVI.
M EDITERRAN EAN AGREEM EN TS.

1.— THE GREY-CAM BON LETTERS OF NOVEMBER, 1912.

[ED. N O TE.— A referen ce to the ex ch a n g e o f letters on N ovem b er 22 and 23, 1912, is made
in Gooch & Temperley, V ol. I X (I I ), p. 193, Ed. Note. cp. also D .D .F., 3me Sér., V ol. I l l , where
the references can be ob tain ed from th e Table Méthodique, pp. x x x i -x x x i ii , and ibid., Vol. IV ,
pp. x x x v -x x x v i.]

No. 381.

Captain [S ir ] M. Hankey to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 371/1560.
19598/1 9 59 8 /1 2 /5 0.
Secret. Com m ittee of Imperial D efen ce,
Dear Sir Edward Grev, 2, W hitehall Gardens, S.W ., April 30, 1912.
I enclose for inform ation a copy of the Prime M inister’ s directions for an enquiry
into the strategical situation created in the Mediterranean by the new naval disposi­
tion s,/2) together with an Agenda for preliminary meetings of the Committee of
Im perial Defence which the Prime Minister proposes to hold at Malta at
W hitsuntide./3) ’
2. It is understood that the practical effect of the new naval dispositions is that,
in the event of a war with Germany, in which one of the Mediterranean Powers was
also opposed to us, the Admiralty could not guarantee the safety of British com m uni­
cations through the Mediterranean until the situation has cleared up in the North Sea,
which might be some months after the outbreak o f war.
3. Papers are being prepared both in the Admiralty and W ar Office for the
consideration of this preliminary m eeting at Malta. At an inform al meeting held
yesterday to discuss the scope of these papers, at which Admiral Troubridge, General
H . H . W ilson, and Sir E yre Crowe were present, the view was expressed that it was
extrem ely difficult to formulate any naval or military views of value unless the Foreign
Office would offer some guidance as to what is the strongest com bination of Powers
which might reasonably be assumed as hostile to us, in making calculations regarding
the defence of British interests in the Mediterranean.
Yours sincerely,
M. P. À. IIAN K EY .

Enclosure 1 in No. 381.

Secret.
The Prime Minister desires the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider the
effects of the new naval dispositions on the strategical situation in the Mediterranean
and elsewhere. He proposes to take advantage o f his forthcom ing visit to Malta with
the Board of Admiralty to examine the local aspects of the question.
A preliminary meeting o f the Committee of Imperial Defence will be held at Malta
to discuss the enclosed agenda.

( ') [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to S ir A . N ieolson and to S ir E. Crowe.

A n ote by S ir E d w a rd G rey follow s this e n d orsem en t: “ S ir E. C row e has th e m a tter in hand.” ]
( 2) Icp. Speech by M r. W in ston C h urchill in the H ouse o f Com m ons on M arch 18, 1912.
Earl. Deb., 5th Ser., (H ou se o f C om m ons), V ol. 35, pp. 1564-9. cp. also ibid., V ol. 41, pp. 8 3 8 -4 6 ;
and W in ston C h u r ch ill: The World Crisis, l'Jll-1914, (1923), pp. 111 -3 .]
(3) [T h e te x t o f both enclosures is taken from the cop y p rin ted fo r th e C om m ittee o f
Im peria l D efence, as the o rig in a l d r a ft is not a va ila ble.]
 581

The results of these preliminary meetings will be discussed at subsequent

meetings o f the Committee of Im perial Defence in London.
The following are to be invited to the m eeting to be held at Malta :—
The Prime Minister (in the chair'.
The First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
A representative of the W ar Staff.
A representative o f the General Staff.
Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum.
The General Officer Comm anding-in-Chief, Mediterranean Command.
His E xcellency the Governor of Malta.
The Naval Commander-in-Chief.
Captain M. P. A. H a n le y (Secretary).
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.TT\,
April 29, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3S1.

Agenda for M eetings o f the Com m ittee of Im perial D efen ce at Malta.
W hitsuntide 1912.
1. The scale of oversea attack to be provided against in time of war at Malta
having regard to—
(a) The new naval dispositions in the Mediterranean.
(h The degree of reliance to be placed on the co-operation of the French fleet.
2. The scale of defences and the garrison required at Malta to meet such
attack.
3. The scale of oversea attack to be provided against in E gypt, having regaid
to (a) and (b) in 'T .
4. The possible use of Alexandria as an additional base in the Mediterranean,
and any naval or military dispositions entailed thereby.
5. The scale of land attack from Turkey and Tripoli to be provided against in
Egypt.
6. The strength of garrison required in E gypt to meet the scales o f attack
decided on, and to protect the Suez Canal.
7. The arrangements, consequent on decisions on the above points, for the
protection or diversion of trade through the Mediterranean.
8. The effect of the new naval dispositions on India and the dom inions and
colonies east o f the Mediterranean.

April 29, 1912.

No. 382.
Minutes by Sir E yre Crowe, Sir A. Xicolson and Sir Eaicard Grey.
F.O. 371 1560.
19598/19598 12/50.
Sir E. Grey, Foreign Office, April 30, 1912.
I met Admiral Troubridge, General W ilson and Captain H ankey yesterday
afternoon, as arranged, in order to consult as to the probable effects on British policy
of our evacuating the Mediterranean, and the strategical considerations arising
therefrom.
The heads o f the W ar Staff and the General Staff urged very forcibly that, as a
basis for the observations which they were called upon to put forward it was essential
 58-2

that they should have an authoritative statement on the questions o f foreign policy
involved. The whole problem centres round our relations with France, Spain, Italy
and Turkey and unless the Staffs are afforded some definite guidance as to the manner
in which those relations might be affected by our withdrawal from the Mediterranean,
they will, as they pointed out yesterday, be obliged to base all their work on such
political assumption as they may be able to form themselves. Such assumptions
would necessarily be made without special knowledge and without the authority which
wrould alone justify their acceptance by the Cabinet.
I verbally explained what appear to me the points of policy requiring to be taken
into account, but what is desired is a written paper put forward in the name of the
Foreign Office.
I said I would explain the matter to Sir Edwrard Grey who would, I had no doubt,
direct a paper to be accordingly prepared.
I propose to submit a draft memorandum (as brief as possible) for your
consideration.
E . A. C.
A p [ril] 30.

Sir E yre Crowe should prepare a d [r a ]ft memorandum— to be submitted to you.

The question is a very important one.
A. N.

C ertainlv; I shall be very glad if Sir E . Crowe will prepare a draft.(J)

E. G.
0 ) [v. in fra , p p . 585-9, N o. 386, and n o te 0 ) . ]

No. 383.

Sir A. M colxon to Sir Edivard, G rey.( *)

Private. (-)
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office, May 4, 1912.
M. Cambon remarked to me today(3) that the French naval authorities were
desirous, through their naval attache, to renew conversations with our Admiralty in
regard to certain a rrang[cm en]ts which should be made in possible eventualities. I
understood from M. Cambon that these conversations had originated in the days of
L ord Fisher— and had arisen from an enquiry made by the latter as to whether the
French G ov[ern m en ]t would undertake the I care of the M editerranean” should
British fleets be em ployed elsewhere. The French G ov[ern m en ]t, after examining
the question, had replied that they could be responsible for the western basin of the
Mediterranean— but could not answer for the eastern. Later conversations were to
have taken place between the present Lord o f Admiralty and M. Delcasse through the
respective naval attaches in London and Paris. These conversations have not yet, I
understand, reached a conclusion, though the French G ov [ern m en ]t desire that the
British navy will look after the Channel and the northern coasts of France, if the
latter, as with her renovated fleet is now possible, will undertake the ‘ ‘ care of the
whole of the Mediterranean.” The French Naval a uth[orit]ies and ours have left
over for discussion details as to dispositions o f submarines, destroyers and the “ mobile
d e fe n ce ” of French coasts. I told M. Cambon I knew nothing absolutely about all
these arrang[em en Jts and I made no other remark.
M. Cambon then continued to say that I was doubtless aware that a military
Convention existed between France and Russia, in which all details were carefully

O [ ‘th is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in is te r ; to L o rd H a ld a n e ;

to M r. C hurch ill.]
( 2) [G rey M SS ., Vol. 55.]
(•’’ ) [N o re p o rt o f this con v ersation by M. P a u l Cam bon is p rin ted in D .D .F .]
 583
worked out and which was periodically submitted to revision and exam ination.f4 Quite
recently the Russians have intimated that they would like a Naval Convention also
to be drawn up. and the French G o v e rn m e n t are disposed to accede but have
suggested to Prussia that it would be preferable if G [rea t Britain were also asked to
become a part}’ to the Naval Convention. I understood from M. Cambon that we
might then expect sooner or later to receive an invitation.
1. I think that these inter Admiralty discussions or conversations should not
have been undertaken without the knowledge and approval of the S ec[reta ry] of
State for F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] at least. Indeed I should have thought Cabinet sanction
should have been solicited. W e shall have confusion if the D ep[artm en]ts
intervene in what are important foreign questions.
2. It is clear that we shall very shortly have to decide our future policy in regard
to our relations with France and Russia. It is evident that we shall probably be asked
if we intend to take a more active part than hitherto in mutual assistance.
A . N.
M IX F T E S .
The con v ersation s b egan o rig in a lly w ith m y kn ow ledge and th a t o f the P rim e M in ister
in 1906,(3) they have been kep t up to d a te ever sin ce,— this was the case as regards the W a r
Office, th e A d m ira lty I th in k bega n la ter th a n 1906. B n t it was alw ays u n d erstood th a t they
d id not com m it eith er G o v [e rn m e n ]t to g o to w ar to assist the oth er, b u t w ere to ena ble the
respective naval and m ilita ry a u th orities, betw een w hom alone they to o k p lace to ca rry ou t
co-op era tion at short notice, if th a t w as in any em erg en cy th e decision o f th eir G o v [e rn m e n ]ts .
T he C a bin et has now the sam e k n ow ledg e o f w hat has taken p lace th a t the P rim e M in ister
and 1 h a v e : th e u n d ersta n d in g is th a t [t h e ] F ir st L ord o f the A d m ira lty and the S [e c r e t a r y ]
of S [t a t e ] fo r W a r w ill keep in tou ch w ith the C a bin et from tim e to tim e and a ct a ccord in g
to its decisions.
E. G.
5.5.12.
N o such arra n gem en ts as M. Cam bon in d ica tes cou ld in any ev en t be m ade w ith ou t
C abinet sanction.
H . H . A.
6 M av, ’ 12.
E. G.
C onsid erable progress in th e d eta il o f these a rra n g em en ts was m ade in the tim e o f my
predecessor, b u t since th e C abinet discussion ea rly in th e y ear I have n ot been able t o renew
and revise them .
T he tim e is now a p p roa ch in g when a fu r th e r con v ersation m ust ta k e p la ce ; an d a fter
W h itsu n tid e I m ust ask fo r the necessary a u th ority .
M ea nw hile I w ill tell th e F ren ch a tta ch e th a t the sub ject w ill be rip e a fter w e return
from M alta.
W . S. C.
10.5. [1 2 ].

(■*) [ep. Pribram, V ol. II. pp. 214-6, fo r the tex t o f the d r a ft M ilita r y C on v en tion of
A u gu st 17, 1 89 2; also D .D .F ., 3 me Ser.. V ol. II. pp. 85-90, X o . 90. Annexe, w here th e proccs-
uerbat o f A u g u st 31. 1911, is g iv en — the m ost recen t o f the p e rio d ic re v isio n s ; v. also infra,
p. 617, X o. 418, and note ( 3).]
( 3) [cp. Gooch & Teinperley, V ol. I l l , pp. 169-203, C h a pter X X ; r. esp ecially pp. 170-1,
X o . 210, 173-4, X o . 212, ends, a nd min., p. 177, X o . 215, pp. l> 0 -2 , X o . 219.

No. 384.

Sir A. FicoJson to Sir F. Bertie.

Private.f1)
M y dear Bertie, Foreign Office, M ay 6, 1912.
. . . ,( 2) I cannot remember if I related to you— but I think that I did— the
conversation which I had some little time ago with Cambon, in which the latter
sounded me as to the likelihood o f this Government being disposed to extend and
t 1) [C a rn ock M SS ., V ol. 4 o f 1912.]
( 2) [T h e op e n in g p a ra g ra p h of this letter refers to the v isit o f “ L o rd C hester ” to P aris
a nd T ou lon .]
 584
consolidate the understanding between the two countries.(3) I then felt compelled,
very much against the grain, to deprecate any opening o f this question at the present
m oment. Since then, however, other developments have arisen causing me some little
anxiety. You will see from the reorganization o f our naval distribution that practically
the whole of our Fleets are to be concentrated in the North Sea and the Channel, and
the Mediterranean will be evacuated with the exception of a cruiser squadron. To my
mind this is a most risky and unfortunate proceeding, as I do not think, when the
whole European situation is in such a state of chaos and the status of the
Mediterranean is on the point of undergoing very considerable changes, that it is at
all wise to withdraw our naval forces from that Sea. Moreover, I believe that the
idea is that the care of the Mediterranean should be left to France, who it is believed
will be quite ready to safeguard our interests. This, I think, is a large assumption,
and I doubt very m uch if France would be disposed to render us such a service
without obtaining a very substantial guarantee on our part that we on our side will
assist her in safeguarding her interests on her eastern frontier. The fact of the
matter is, that the whole o f the British Navy, with the exception o f a few scattered
squadrons here and there, is now to be locked up in the Channel and the North Sea
until we have succeeded in the by no means easy or rapid task of demolishing the
German fleet. There seem to me only two courses to take if the naval people do
insist upon evacuating the Mediterranean, and this is, first, either to add a very
considerable sum to our naval budget so as to enable us to organise a fleet specially
for the Mediterranean, but as this would mean a large addition to the £45,000,000
already voted for the Naval Budget, I imagine the Government would hardly be
disposed to put forward such a proposal. The other alternative is to come to an
understanding with France on the subject which would, I do not deny, be very much
o f the character of a defensive alliance. I think certain members o f the Cabinet see
this very clearly and would be disposed to agree to it, but I do not know if they would
be able to carry all their colleagues with them. In fact I doubt if such would be the
case.
The day before yesterday, Cambon mentioned to me, very confidentially, that no
doubt as I was aware there was a military convention between Russia and France,
wTiich provided for the action which each country would take in all possible
eventualities.(4) The details of this Convention were revised and brought up to date
periodically by the General Staffs in each country. Quite recently the Russians had
proposed that they would like to see a similar convention drawn up in respect to
maritime operations, and the French Governm ent had replied that they would be
perfectly ready to do so, and had suggested that it would be a very great advantage if
Great Britain were invited to take part in such a Convention. He hinted to me that
very likely sooner or later we should receive an invitation for that purpose. I f such
an invitation is presented, it would, I trust, compel the Government to come to some
definite decision as to what their future policy is to be, as we can hardly continue
sitting on the fence very m uch longer, and continue to give evasive and uncertain
answers.
Cambon also communicated to me on Saturday the fresh proposal they are about
to make to Spain in regard to this question of territorial arrangements in Morocco,
but which differed very slightly from the one they have already put forward and which
had been so decidedly rejected by Spain. I have not yet spoken to Grey on the subject,
but I doubt if we shall see our way to supporting this proposal, especially after the
telegram which we received yesterday from de Bunsen pointing out that there was
no hope that the Spaniards would consent to such an arrangement.
[Yours, Ac.
A. N ICOLSON.j
( 3) [u. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 747-9, N o. 576. S ir A. N icolson th ere record s in a
m in u te to L o rd M orley a con v ersation w ith M . P a u l C am bon on A p ril 15, 1912. F o r S ir Edw ard
G rey ’ s com m en t v. ibid., p. 751, N o. 580. cp. also D .B .F ., 3me S ir., V ol. I I , pp . 3 70-1, N o. 363.]
(4) [ d . im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t ]
 585

N o. 385.
Sir A . Nicolson to Sir Edward G rey.
Private^1)
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office, May 6, 1912.
I transmit herewith a memorandum by Sir E yre Crowe in regard to the effect on
foreign policy in the event of a British evacuation in the M editerranean^2) The
question is so fully examined in the m emorandum that I need add nothing to the
matters discussed there.
I f the Admiralty consider that it is essential to concentrate all their naval forces
in the Channel and North Sea, and that therefore the naval force in the Mediterranean
must be very materially reduced, I can conceive only three alternative courses open
to us.
A. to increase the Naval Budget so as to enable an additional squadron to be
created for permanent service in the Mediterranean. This solution would presumably
be ruled out as imposing too heavy a charge on the Estimates.
B. to com e to an alliance with Germany so as to free a large portion of the fleets
at present locked up in hom e waters for the purpose of watching Germany. Such a
measure would
(1) place us in an inferior naval position to Germany who would be then very
m uch the predominant partner, and able to put unendurable pressure upon
us whenever she thought it necessary. Moreover the safety o f our vital
parts would be left dependent on the favour of Germany.
(2) It would throw the three Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Holland into
the arms of Germany who would in general estimation be the dom inating
Power.
(3) It would cause France and Russia to be at least cold and unfriendly— and
our position throughout the mid East and on the Indian frontier and
elsewhere would be seriously shaken and imperilled. These are three
indisputable facts. I do not allude to the probabilities of German pressure
on France and the risk of a European war, and the loss of our prestige
throughout the world who would regard us as having been com pelled to
make terms with Germany and becom e practically dependent on her. I
would therefore rule out this solution.
C. An understanding with France whereby she would undertake, in the early
period of a war and until we could detach vessels from hom e waters, to safeguard our
interests in the Mediterranean. She would naturally ask for some reciprocal engage­
ments from us which it would be well worth our while to give. This to m y m ind offers
the cheapest, simplest and safest solntion. N.
0 ) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 55.]
( 2) [ v . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 386.
Memorandum on the effect of a British Evacuation of the Mediterranean on
Questions of Foreign P o licy .f 1)
F.O. 371/1560.
1959 8 /1 9 59 8 /1 2 /5 0.
Secret. Foreign Office, May 8, 1912.
1. The evacuation o f the Mediterranean by the British naval forces would affect
the relations of Great Britain with the principal Mediterranean Powers in several
important ways.
0 ) [T h e t e x t above is th a t o f the m em ora ndum revised and a p p rov ed b y S ir E d w a rd G rey
and sent on M a y 8, 1912, t o the S ecreta ry o f the C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D efen ce, t o G eneral
W ilson , and t o A d m ira l T rou b rid g e. I t is based on the d r a ft by Sir E. C row e, cp. sup ra ,
p. 582, N o. 382.]
 58G

2. The political situation in Europe is dominated by the grouping of the Powers

in the Triple and Dual Alliances, and the relation in which the other States 6tand
towards these groups. Of neither alliance are the exact terms known. Whilst it
seems certain that, under neither, does the casus foederis arise in every case where
one of the contracting States may find itself at war, there has never been any
authoritative indication as to what precisely are the conditions under which one of
the partners can refuse to join his ally or allies in warlike operations.
3. There are good grounds for believing that conflicts arising out of
Mediterranean questions are not specifically covered by the terms at least of the
Triple Alliance. Italy has on several important occasions claimed in such connection
a liberty of action which Germany accepted, however unwillingly, as not involving any
breach of treaty stipulations.
4. This attitude on the part of Italy is symptomatic of the spirit animating the
relations of the members of the Triple Alliance among each other. Austria desires to
restrict the scope of the alliance to com m on defence in case of overwhelming danger.
Itahr, whatever were originally her motives for joining the alliance, remains in it
m ainly because it offers her the only effective safeguard against an Austrian attack,
against which she would be practically helpless. Both countries endeavour to resist,
so far as they can, any attempt on the part of Germany to direct their foreign policy
generally on lines mapped out at, and in the interest of, Berlin, whilst the German
Government are disposed to claim that an alliance necessarily implies a certain unity
of general policy, and that it is for Germany, as the predominant partner in the
alliance, to shape its course.
5. These divergences of view, which at times manifest themselves openly, but
are ordinarily latent, give their peculiar complexion to the special relations between
France and Italy, between France and Austria, between Russia and Italy, and between
Russia and Austria. But these are at the same time strongly influenced by the
eccentric position of Great Britain, Turkey and Spain.
6. At the time when the two alliances were concluded, England was in a state
of chronic and hardly veiled antagonism to France and Russia, and the one serious
conflict for which she appeared called upon to prepare, was a war against these two
Powers. It was Germ any’ s interest, and her constant endeavour, to accentuate and
perpetuate a situation in which the enemies of the Triple Alliance were also the
enemies of England, and although E ngland refused to join that alliance, the inter­
national constellation gave to British policy a natural leaning towards co-operation
with its members.
7. So long as this situation lasted, both Italy and Spain were whole-hearted in
their allegiance to the Triple Alliance. How much this attitude was indirectly
consequential upon the position occupied by England, was clearly seen when the
growth of Anglo-Germ an friction first revealed the danger of a possible conflict in
which England and the Powers of the Triple Alliance would be ranged on
opposite sides.
8. Neither Italy nor Spain could contemplate without grave anxiety a war in
which they would be faced by an A nglo-French combination. One of the results
therefore of the change in the orientation of British policy was that Spain left the
orbit o f the Triple Alliance and, in spite of strong national antipathies, entered into
close relations with France, thus rem aining in touch with E ngland. At the same
time Italy, whilst not leaving the Triple Alliance, which she cannot afford to do,
made it clear that in a war between France and Germany, and still more in a war
between England and Germany, she would not consider herself bound to fight by
G erm any’ s side.
9. The resulting somewhat indeterminate position of Italy has been a feature of
the general balance of power in Europe well calculated to serve the maintenance of
peace, and therefore em inently favourable to British interests.
10. It is to be feared that recent events, arising out of the Tripolitan war, may
somewhat disturb this nice balance o f power. It is likely, on the one hand, that the
 587
bonds which connect Italy with the Triple Alliance will be tightened, because, with
her military forces engaged overseas, she will more than ever be at Austria’ s m ercy.
On the other hand, the very fact that she is giving hostages to fortune over the water
will render her more acutely sensitive to maritime préssure, so that the fear o f a
possibly hostile British fleet would, again, tend to restrain any Italian Government
from throwing themselves unreservedly into the arms of Germany for better or for
worse, and accepting all the consequences bound up for them with an attitude of
definite antagonism to England and France.
11. In these circumstances, the disappearance of the British fleet as an element
in the disposition of force in the Mediterranean can only have the effect of
d im in ish in g any hesitatiqn which Italy may feel in abandoning her policy of half­
hearted or incomplete membership o f the Triple Alliance, and of maintaining a
position of semi-independence in her relations with France and England by way of
re-insurance. H er whole disposition towards England would be changed. F rom a
friend she would turn into a potential enem y. v
12. It is a matter rather for the consideration of the Colonial Office, what effect
a perm anently unfriendly and potentially hostile Italy would have on the peaceful
administration of the colony of M a lta : but it is clear that if Italy had seriously to
contemplate the contingency o f a war against England, she would even in peace time
turn her eyes on the islands which form part of “ Italia Irridenta.”
13. Ultimately, the course o f Italian policy must largely depend upon the
position and attitude of France. I f France were certain actively to espouse the British
cause in a war between England and the Triple Alliance, and were known to be ready
to fall upon an Austro-Italian combination with adequate naval forces, this would
undoubtedly make Italy think twice before breaking with her former policy of facing
both ways. But unless France, on her part, can definitely rely on British assistance
in case she herself is attacked by Germany, it will be impossible for her to concentrate
an overwhelm ing naval force in the Mediterranean after providing for the defence of
her Atlantic coast against the German fleet. The question therefore whether Italy
and Austria can be kept in check by the French navy, is seen to depend on there
being some definite naval understanding between England and France, amounting in
practice to an agreement for mutual assistance in case either is attacked by the Triple
Alliance.
14. Given the circumstances which would, in the absence o f either a British or
a French superior fleet, leave the Triple Alliance, as represented by the com bined
Italian and Austrian navies, in command of the Mediterranean, Spain also would be
tempted to revert to her form er anti-French policy, which is in reality much more
congenial to her national instincts, and, if not to join, at least to resume her serious
leaning towards, the Triple Alliance.
15. Spain fears France. She has the choice between two policies : she can
either go with the Triple Alliance, or have an understanding with France, and so
ward off F rench, designs much in the same way as Italy seeks safety from Austrian
designs by becom ing Austria’ s ally. The second alternative, which is the one Spain
has chosen, would, having regard to the relative strength o f the two countries, involve
for Spain the acceptance of a French political hegem ony, were it not for the fact that
E ngland, the friend of France, is also a party to the understanding. The three
Powers have entered into agreements for co-operation in Morocco and for the
maintenance o f the status quo in their territories in the Mediterranean and on the
Atlantic coast of Africa.
16. Spain undoubtedly relies on the presence of England in the partnership
acting as an effective restraint on any French inclination to engage in anti-Spanish
schemes. W ithout this participation o f E ngland, it must be doubtful whether Spain
would or could continue on the lines of her present policy. The probability is that
she would again attach herself to the Triple Alliance, if she felt assured that her
coasts and islands would not thereby becom e exposed to an attack by the British fleet
or a British military expedition. So long as the British navy retains its present
 588
general supremacy, it is unlikely that Spain would ever bind herself to support the
Powers of the Triple Alliance in a war against Great B rita in ; but she might commit
herself to a general co-operation with them even to the extent of joining in a scheme
of com m on operations against France, provided England did not fight on the
French side.
17. A change of Spanish policy from one of general reliance on France and
England to one of attachment to the Triple Alliance, with only a reservation as to
not joining in a war against E ngland, could not but react on Anglo-Spanish relations.
Many things that are under existing conditions amicably discussed and settled, would
be approached in a different spirit. The vital interests of Great Britain might not be
sensibly affected,— although there are always questions about Gibraltar which are only
prevented from becom ing the source of serious disagreement by courteous and
conciliatory handling— , but, on the whole, less cordial relations with Spain would add
their quota to the diplomatic difficulties which His M ajesty’s Government have to meet.
18. In the eastern Mediterranean, the position of Turkey and of Egypt invite
special consideration.
19. It would be difficult to overrate the importance o f the part which the
sea-power outwardly and visibly exercised by Great Britain in those waters has played
in creating the position which she holds at Constantinople. The policy of Turkey,
like that of all weak oriental countries, is to prevent combination amongst the Powers
against herself, by playing them off against each other, and there is in consequence a
constant shifting of the relative positions occupied by them. Yet certain stable
elements make themselves felt, such as Bussia’ s pressure on the eastern Asiatic
frontier, and her proximity to the sea approaches of the Turkish capital, and the
influence exercised geographically and historically by Austria-Hungary on the minor
Balkan States. Am ong these stable elements has also hitherto counted the prestige
attaching to the Power whose flag has floated on all the seas, and in particular has
dominated the Mediterranean. This attribute of sea-power is held sym bolic of the
potential strength which the State wielding it can put forward. The respect which
English sea-power commands, more especially in oriental minds, is the measure of
the attention with which her voice is listened to.
20. The influence of Great Britain at Constantinople has varied much from time
to time, but such as it was at any given moment, it has always rested mainly on her
position as the mistress of the Mediterranean Sea, and it would be contrary both to
reason and to experience to expect that this position would remain unaffected by a
permanent withdrawal o f the British fleet.
21. Such a retreat, as it must present itself to the Turkish mind, would shift
the weights in the diplomatic scales at Constantinople markedly in favour of Germany,
and would materially increase the chances of Turkey being persuaded definitely "to
throw in her lot with the Triple Alliance. This course would secure for her the most
effective assistance she could hope for in resisting Bussia, and would also hold out a
fair prospect of a possible reconquest of Egypt.
22. At the commencement of a war between the Triple Alliance and either
England or France alone, unless there were a naval agreement between those two
Powers under which France would remain in force in the Mediterranean, whilst
England undertook to look after the German fleet, the French naval forces would
necessarily, as already explained, be concentrated in the Channel. This would give
the Turks their opportunity for attempting a descent upon E gypt. The mere
possibility of such an event would be bound to exercise a powerful influence on the
Egyptian population, and the question what, if any, reliance could in such circum ­
stances be placed on the native arm y, would require anxious consideration. Here,
again, the part played by the mere prestige deriving from the fluidity and ubiquity of
British sea-power cannot wisely be neglected. W e hold Egypt and control her
administration at present not by the actual number o f British bayonets assembled in
the Nile \ alley, but in virtue of the political authority attaching to our position as
com m anding the sea. A good deal of makeweight would be required to counterbalance
 589
the apparent loss of the command of the Mediterranean. In fact, the British
occupation o f Egypt is so intimately bound up with the control of the maritime
com m unications, that it seems superfluous to set out an elaborate argument to prove
that the evacuation of the Mediterranean b y the British naval forces must materially
affect the situation.
23. There are other aspects o f the near-Eastern question which are bound up
with the same issue.
24. At the height of the Bosnian crisis, Austria contemplated the seizure of
Salonic-a, and was only held in check by her belief that the British fleet was ready to
intervene for the purpose of preventing such an enterprise. It was the mere presence
of our fleet in those waters that preserved the peace on that occasion.
25. The questions o f Crete and Cyprus are smaller matters, though if Crete
forced a violent solution, it might have very grave consequences. But it will be
enough to say generally that the disappearance o f the British fleet from the
Mediterranean would encourage and strengthen all the elements that make for disorder
and war.
Conclusions.
26. The evacuation of the Mediterranean by the British naval forces would tend :
(1 To throw Italy com pletely into the arms o f the Triple Alliance and place her
in a position of definite hostility to France and Great B ritain;
N ote.— All political forecasts of this nature are necessarily to a certain extent
speculative. The Tripolitan war is introducing many com plications into a
situation already exceedingly complex, and no attempt is here made to foretell
what will be the immediate outcome of the war as regards Italy’ s relations with
Turkey and with Pmssia, or the manner in which the nature of those relations
will in turn react on the attitude of Turkey towards the Triple Alliance and on
Italy’ s “ h e d g in g ” policy towards France and England. It may however be
safely said that the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean can
only add further to the com plexity of the political problems to be solved, and
by increasing the elements of uncertainty, make it more difficult to devise the
appropriate measures for m eeting the situation.
(2> To detach Spain from her present understanding with France and E ngland,
and make her ready to co-operate with the Triple Alliance in a war against F ra n c e ;
(3) Seriously to weaken British influence at Constantinople and encourage Turkey
to join forces with the Triple Alliance and to attempt the reconquest of E gypt :
(4 To create in E gypt a state of dangerous unrest, which would gravely
embarrass the administration of the country, besides inviting Turkish intervention;
(5) To stimulate all efforts directed to a disturbance of the status quo, a ffe ctin g
probably Crete and possibly Cyprus, and to endanger the general peace.
(6) These consequences could to a certain extent be averted if the place of the
British Mediterranean squadron were effectively taken by a powerful French fleet.
*7) If A nglo-French co-operation were assured in the case of either country being
at war with the Triple Alliance, and if the French fleet were in a position 'to beat
those o f Italy, Austria and Turkey com bined, and to win the com m and o f the
Mediterranean, Italy would probably continue to refuse allowing her partnership in the
Triple Alliance to involve her in a war with the two western Powers, and Spain would
have no sufficient inducement to change her present policy. Malta and Gibraltar
would be as secure as they are now.
(8) It is less certain that the British position in Turkey would remain un affected;
our hold over Egypt might have to be materially strengthened.
 590
N o. 387.
Sir Edicard G rey to Lord Kitchener.

P rivate^ 1)
M y dear Kitchener, London. May 8, 1912.
I understand that you are being kept informed from the Imperial Defence
Committee direct of the arrangements for the m eeting in Malta to which the Prime
Minister is goin g.(2)
The proposal of the Admiralty to withdraw ships from the Mediterranean raises
very serious questions. W e are on such good terms with France that it is not
necessary for us to keep ships in the Mediterranean to counterbalance the French
sh ip s: but we have no arrangement with France, such as an Alliance, which would
give us a right to assume that France would necessarily be involved in any war in
which we were involved, and would protect our Mediterranean possessions or
occupations for us. . . _
It may be contended that, if we were at war with Germany, we could let things
take their "course in the Mediterranean for the first two or three months, and after
having established unqueMioned superiority in the North Sea. or won in the war, we
could then recover every thing in the Mediterranean. But this raises very serious
questions for E gypt. For, if this prospect were admitted, it seems to me that it would,
here and now, very materially affect the investment of capital in E gypt and the
Soudan. W e could not I suppose, hold E gypt and the Soudan against an attack by
Turkey or any great European Power unless we had command o f the sea in the
Mediterranean. Apart from this, have we a force sufficient to control native risings
in E gypt or the Soudan, that might he the consequence of our being involved in war
elsewhere. And, if the answer is in the negative, liow can wye reinforce the British
Arm v in E gypt unless we have a considerable Fleet in the Mediterranean to insure
the safe transport of troops from Malta or elsewhere?
But all considerations of this sort will be m uch more familiar to you than they
can be to me. No decision will be com e to at the meeting in Malta : the decision must
be taken at home. I am writing this letter only to explain why I sent you a telegram
this m orning,(3) as to the importance of your attending the meeting in Malta, so that
the Prim e Minister may get your view7 there at first-hand.
Yours sincerely,
E. G B E Y.
( 0 [G rey M SS., V ol. 9 .]
(2) [In a subsequent p r iv a te letter t o L ord K itc h e n e r o f M ay 16, 1912, S ir E d w ard G rev
w r o t e : “ I un d ersta n d th a t th ere is n ot to be a form a l m eetin g o f the D e fe n c e C om m ittee in
M a lta , an d the P rim e M in is ter w ill no d o u b t com m u n ica te w ith y ou as t o w heth er an d when
he w ishes y ou to m eet him th e re .” (G rey M SS ., V ol. 9 .)]
(3) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s p r iv a te teleg ram o f M a y 8, 1912, D. 12-55 f . m , is n ot rep rod u ced
as the con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (G rey M SS., A ol. 9 .)]

No. 388.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir A. NicoJson.(l)

Private & Confidential. ( 2) .

My dear Nicolson, Paris, M ay 9, 1912.
Thank you for your letter of the 6th.(3) •
I should have been surprised if the French Governm ent had not made advances
for a clearer understanding with us. The sympathies more or less avowed of some
C ) [ T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e P rim e M in is t e r ; th e endorsem ent
is in itia lled bv Sir E d w a rd G rev.]
( 2) [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. 4 o*f 1912.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 583-4, No. 384.]
 591

members of the British Cabinet and the advocacy in certain political and newspaper
circles o f a general understanding and co-operation with Germany make political
people here nervous. The French Gov ern m en ]t would like to know how they are
likely to stand in the event of war. I tliink that they would accept to leave to be
settled between the two Governments when a question of hostilities seems near
whether the two Countries are to act as allies, but they would desire to be arranged
now and to be re-arranged periodically as changing circumstances may dictate exactly
what assistance the British Army should give to France and where, and what the
mutual support should be navally so that when a critical moment politically comes
there should be an organized plan instead of confusion. Last Autumn the French
Government knew that if France and E ngland became active alii* s the British Arm y
would render certain services. 1 T hey would like to know that the arrangements
between the British and French W ar Offices will hold good in the event of the two
countries being W ar Allies. It would be necessary in an exchange o f notes to define
generally the respective and joint interests of England and France and to say that in
the event of their appearing to either to be in danger the two Governments will
consult together. I think that we shall have to do something o f the kind before long
unless we prefer to ran the risk o f being stranded in splendid isolation. W e cannot
expect the French not to make use of our desertion of the Mediterranean as a lever
to extract something tangible from us. I am no judge as to their capability to protect
in that sea our interests as well as their own. It seems a weighty task.
Yours ever,
FR A X C IS B E B T IE .
4) [rp . G ooch <£• T em p erley. V ol. V I I , pp. 625-32, X os. 639-40 ]

X o. 369.

Sir Edirard Greij to Mr. IFtnsfo/i Churchill.

Private.^1'
Dear Churchill. Foreign Office, May 11, 1912.
I told Cambon to-day that we were considering certain redistributions o f our
Fleet, especially in connection with the Mediterranean, and that till these were finally
decided we could hardly go into questions with the French Xaval Attaché.
Cambon said that, last Xovem ber, the First Sea Lord had asked the French Xaval
Attache to go into more detailed arrangements for supporting us in the Channel in
the event of war. Apparently, the idea was that the French torpedo boats, destroyers,
and submarines,— which are all that the French keep in this region,— should be used
to help us in blocking the Channel against an enem y. Last January, our Xaval
Attache made the same request in Paris. I n reply, the French asked us to define
what it was that we wanted. W e had not said any thing m ore, and the position now
was that the French Xaval Attache was ready to go into the matter. It did not depend
upon any new distribution of the Fleet, it related to the Channel. The arrangement
come to some time ago was that, in time of war, the French should look after the
Mediterranean, while we should look after the Xorth Sea, Ac.
I explained that I had had time only for a word with you late at night last week,
as you had been so m uch away with the Fleet. I would talk the matter over with you
as soon as you come back to London.
Y'ours sincerelv,
E. G R E Y.
(i) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 4S.]

[E D . S O I E .— The follow in g note b y M r. C hurchill, a tta ch ed to the im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g

docu m en t, record s a con v ersation o f M a y 14, 1912. (G rey M SS ., V ol. 45.
On T u e s d [a y ] 14 I saw the Com te de S a in t-S ein e the F ren ch naval a tta ch é and told
him th a t we had b een re con sid erin g th e w hole o ” A«T-ion o f th e F leet d istr ib u tio n and our
 592
naval plans, that this w ork was now nearly com p leted , and th a t a fte r W h itsu n tid e
I e x p ected to be in a p osition to discuss w ith him the sp ecial a rra n g [e m e n ]ts w h [ich ]
w fo u l ld be necessary in certain con tin g en cies.
w. S. c.
19.5.
I t is m inu ted by S ir E d w a rd G re y : “ This is enough for the present. E. G .” ]

No. 390.

Lord K itchener to Sir Edward G r e y .!1)

Private. (2)
M y dear Grey, Cairo, M ay 19, 1912.
I am much obliged to you for allowing me to address you in this way. I shall
attend the meeting at Malta with great interest.
There is no doubt that the proposed reduction of the Naval forces maintained in
the Mediterranean must seriously affect and endanger our position in E gypt, besides
lowering our prestige and influence in the surrounding countries. I much hope
therefore that the proposed changes may not be found necessary.
Considering the matter from a purely military defence point of view, if the
scheme is carried out, it will, as far as I can see, result in making Egypt rely upon
India in the future for supports and reinforcem ents, instead of, as at present, looking
to Malta and England.
E gypt would thus becom e, not only a connecting link with India, but one of
India’ s outposts in case of war, which she would be obliged to d e fe n d ; and wireless
connection between India and Egypt would be a matter of supreme importance.
W ar with Germany alone would, I understand, remove the battle fleet from the
M editerranean; if this were only a temporary measure, I do not look upon it with very
great anxiety, as there would still remain enough smaller ships in the Mediterranean
to prevent a serious attack on Egypt by sea, as well as to stop the Turkish fleet from
taking part in any possible attempt by their arm y.
A successful invasion of Egypt by land by a Turkish army would be a most serious
blow to our position here, and one that would give us grave internal trouble. Any
such attempt, however, would have to be made through the desert lying East of the
Canal, and this would render the concentration of an army in large enough numbers
to force the passage in the face of gunboats supported by sufficient troops a very
difficult military operation. The Navy could doubtless spare the three or four gunboats
that would be necessary for service in the canal, and there should be time enough for
troops to arrive from India.
But wrar with Germany might mean war with the Triple Alliance, all the more so
if our fleet is reduced in the M editerranean; in such a case we could not hope to hold
the Mediterranean sea coast of E g y p t; and would have to defend the country internally
with supports from India, very much as the Turks are doing in Tripoli.
A military point of the greatest importance in the consideration o f the effect of
the proposed Naval changes in the Mediterranean is whether India would be in a
position to send to Egypt from three to four divisions of troops whenever they might
be required; I think that the Government of India should be able to do this unless
they have let the army run down.
Yours very sincerely,
K IT C H E N E R .

0 ) [T his letter is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to L o rd H a ld a n e ; to S ir A . N icolson .l

(*) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 9 .]
 593

N o. 891.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B ertie.(l)

F.O. 371 1383.

21920 '1 8 3 0 8 /1 2 /2 2 .
'N o. 252.) Secret.
Sir. Foreign Office. May 24, 1912.
Monsieur Cambon. in a conversation with Sir A. Nieolson on the 18th instant,(2)
stated that M. Poincare was uneasy as to the future situation in the Mediterranean.
He was aware that hitherto the Mediterranean had been kept out of the sphere of
action covered or contemplated by the Triple A llia n ce; it was on that account that
Italy had had a free hand to make such arrangements as she thought desirable in her
own interests. M. Poincare anticipated, said M. Cambon, that when the Triple
Alliance came up for renewal, before long, Germ any and Austria would, in view of
the changed conditions established, or about to be established, in the Mediterranean,
require that the provisions of the alliance should be so revised as to extend the
obligations and engagements o f the several parties to its waters. This would be, in
the opinion o f the French M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs ], a very serious matter
both to France and to England, as the Triple Alliance would form a very powerful
naval and military com bination. M. Poincare considered that France would have
great difficulty in making head against such a com bination, and would, in the event
of war, incur great risks and difficulties in transporting troops from Algeria to Europe.
He thought the matter should receive earnest attention both in Paris and in Londou
and that the problem was one which would exist in time of peace as well as in time
of war, since Turkey and others m ight, even in peace time, consider it desirable to
associate themselves with a combination which would probably be the dom inating one
in the Mediterranean.
The Ambassador said that M . Poincare was revolving in his mind some project
whereby an arrangement could be made with Italy providing for the maintenance of
the “ status q u o ” along the whole seaboard from the Suez Canal to the entrance of
the Straits o f Gibraltar. H is idea was for some mutual engagement between France,
Italy, and G [r e a ]t Britain that each country would respect and maintain the integrity
of the possessions of the others.
Sir A. Nieolson made no reply to M. Cam bon’ s observations, but I discussed the
question last week with Sir R . Rodd who is at present in London on leave o f absence.
Apart from the merits of the proposal, it is clear that no steps can be taken during
the continuance of the Tureo-Italian hostilities, for any such steps would postulate the
recognition of the Italian annexation of Tripoli. W hen the time comes for recognising
the annexation, H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G ov [ern m en ]t might demand from Italy a
reciprocal engagement such as M. Poincare suggests, in return for recognition.
The foregoing is for Y [o u r] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s confidential inform ation.
TI am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]

0 ) [T h is d esp a tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and t o the P rim e M in ister.

It was rep ea ted to R om e (N o. 1 1 3 ); to C airo, on N ov em b er 4, 1912.]
( s ) [T h ere is a b rie f re p o rt o f this con v ersa tion by M . P a u l Cam bon in D .D .F ., 3 r'e S cr.,
V ol. I l l , p. 19, N o. 1 5 ; cp. also ibid., p. 79, N o. 57.]

[10900|
 594
N o. 392.
Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward G rey.C ) .

Private.i2)
M y dear Grey, The Palace, Malta, June 2, 1912.
W e have had several consultations, and it has been no easy task getting some
better settlement of the questions involved as the Sea Lords were both very much
inclined to cut down the naval forces in the Mediterranean to the lowest possible
figure. However I found some support in Mr. Asquith and I think the result is not
unsatisfactory particularly if you get the points I have noted in the enclosed
m e m o ra n d u m ] which I was unable to obtain although I was supported in them by
Mr. Asquith.
In all our Defence schemes it has been laid down that the fleet m ay be removed
in time of war so we are no worse off than we were in that respect. I hope the
wireless system will be now decided on and carried out. I do not anticipate any
great difficulty about the Fort at Alexandria, as the present saluting fort is much
wanted by the municipality, and I expect the proceeds will about build the new Fort.
I m entioned to Mr. Asquith the importance to us of an entente with Turkey as
soon as this war allowed us to make friends with them. W e should o f course take no
responsibility for complications in Turkey in Europe ; but we might be very useful to
Turkey in Arabia, Syria and the Far East.
Please excuse this hurried letter as I am leaving today and have very little time.
I have enjoyed the trip very m uch. _
Yours very sincerely,
K ITC H E N E R .

Enclosure in No. 392.

The following is the approximate outcom e of the consultations on the Naval

position in the Mediterranean.
It was considered essential that a definite agreement should be made with France,
if we defend her Northern coasts that her Fleet in the Mediterranean, together with
the permanent British ships stationed there should be sufficient to ensure victory
against Italy and Austria com bined in case of war with the Triple Alliance.
In this connection France will doubtless consider, whether under the following
new arrangements the com bined fleets in the Mediterranean will be adequate to enable
her to carry out this engagement.
The following are the proposed arrangements :—
The Admiralty are prepared to maintain perm anently in the Mediterranean 2 and
preferably 3 Battle Cruisers. I think that if you insist they will find 3 o f these.
Also a Cruiser Squadron of 4 ships, 2 of which and preferably all will be of the
Devonshire class. Here again I think if you insist the Cruiser squadron will be made
hom ogeneous, of a larger type.
A ll smaller ships now in the Mediterranean to be maintained for Diplomatic
purposes.
A Battle squadron consisting of 8 battle ships, will be based on Gibraltar, it will
cruise in the Mediterranean and though available in case of war with Germany, will
not be removed in peace time except under serious circumstances.
Though not mentioned, I think you might arrange that in peace time this battle
squadron should not be rem oved from the Mediterranean without the concurrence of
the Foreign Office.
This Squadron will be designated the Mediterranean Battle Fleet (Fourth Battle
squadron).
0 ) [T h is letter is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to S ir A. N icolson .l
(2) [G rey M SS., V ol. 9 .]
 595

B y next January, 2 Dreadnoughts will be attached to the squadron and

subsequently the whole squadron will becom e Dreadnoughts.
Complete Submarine defence will be arranged and maintained at Malta and a
long distance Submarine defence at Alexandria. The latter will be based on an old
battle ship, with 13-5 guns and a nucleus crew stationed in Alexandria harbour.
A Fort will be required to defend the Harbour and the W ireless station, which will
be established there. The armament of this Fort will consist o f two 9 -2 and four
6in. guns, these will be provided, with mountings complete, free at Alexandria, b y the
Admiralty. The maintenance of this Fort and an extra battalion, required for the
defence o f the Wireless station, will entail no extra charge on E gypt.
The Malta dockyard will be maintained at its present com plement.
Four gunboats will be provided by the Admiralty for the defence o f the Canal,
when necessary.
I think that under the circumstances these are the best arrangements, that can
be obtained.

No. 393.

Sir M. de B unsen to Sir A. X icoh on .

F.O. 371 1560.

265S1 1959S, 12 50.
Private.
M y dear N icolson, G overnm ent H ouse, Gibraltar, June 8, 1912.
W e have had an interesting time here— and I had the advantage o f hearing from
the lips of the First Lord an exposition of our Mediterranean policy as delivered at a
m eeting last Thursday between the Prime Minister, Churchill, Sir A. H unter and
General Perrott, to which Lister and I were admitted. The impression left is that we
do mean to keep up a position in the Mediterranean which, with the French fleet on
our side, will be undoubtedly stronger than the possible but improbable cdmbination of
Italy and Austria. H ow this is to he done, you no doubt know— Mediterranean
battleships fat Gibraltar) brought up to eight, of a m uch stronger type than the present
lo t; Malta and Gibraltar cruiser squadrons m uch strengthened; submarines at Malta
and Alexandria, with the necessary defences, Ac. I was surprised at nothing being
said of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which m ay presumably becom e a Mediterranean
item as a consequence of the Italian war. I was asked m y opinion about Spain.
I said Spain should be kept in the right orbit, and encouraged to resist the perennial
temptation to seek refuge from France in Germ any. This should not be difficult, for
she prefers going with us and will stay on our side as long as we see fair play. Spain
as an enem y to the Entente Powers could make the situation at Gibraltar very
unpleasant (in case of war, with the help o f foreign artillerists , besides imm obilising
a French A rm y Corps by keeping her arm y massed on her northern frontier. Also
the Canaries in hostile hands would be an obvious danger.
As this will go b y sea in a British ship, I feel I can write as I would b y bag.
I am most grateful for the clear and deeply interesting letter on the Mediterranean
question you so kindly wrote to me on M ay 2 9 .(L M y own feeling is that, of the
alternatives given, the best would be to face the extra expenditure—°which surely we
can afiord— and make the Mediterranean secure for u s ; in other words, if possible it
is better to depend on ourselves than on positive alliances with anybody. But I must

( !) [T h is le tte r ca n n ot be tra ced , b u t cp. su p ra , pp. 533-4, X o . 384. S ir A . X ic o ls o n 's

letter t o S ir F . B e r tie p r in te d th ere refers to th e sam e su b ject.]
[10900] 2 Q 2
 596
beware to “ rush in ” on this thin ice where angels fear to tread. I see o f course the
Parliamentary difficulty.
>) . . . .
As to the Warga, I quite agree as to the unreality of the discussion and that
Spain will never in practice make military use of it. But Spain proceeds on the
assumption that she can and will run her zone properly and efficiently— perhaps quite
a mistaken assumption— and as she has a valid treaty in her pocket, it is not
surprising that she holds out for a settlement which would not cut the two halves of
her zone asunder. The French have shown no consideration to Spain. In the long
run I feel all the country will ( ? ) becom e French by the force o f events and the
F rench would have been much wiser to humour the Spaniards a little and win them
over to be friends on G eoffray’ s lines.
I do not yet know what is the French answer to the last Spanish proposal (of
May 3 1)(3) which quite satisfied Geoffray, and which the Minister of State regarded as
m erely an interpretation of our last two suggestions jumbled up together. I hope
there will be no breach, but if there is, the Spaniards will not be afraid to face the
consequences, as they feel that they have a good case and an appeal to the Algeciras
Powers might secure them a good deal o f sympathy.
Yours ever
M AU RICE DE BUN SEN .

(2) [T h u s in o rig in a l text..]

( 3) [cp. D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. I l l , pp . 73-4, N o. 5 3 ; pp. 79-80, N o. 5 8 ; pp. 101-2, N o. 82.]

No. 394.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. Nicolson.(*)

Private. ( 2)
M y dear Nicolson, Berlin, June 11, 1912.
Certain remarks made in the newspapers, chiefly by naval writers, on the subject
of the agitation for an A nglo-French alliance and the so-called Malta Conference lead
one to consider the effect that any diminution of our actual naval strength in the
Mediterranean m ay have upon German naval construction— or that of their allies.
F rom the language of the above writers on naval matters it would seem that the
“ strong navy ” party in Germany regard, or at all events affect to regard, any new
Fleet organization which may have the effect of shifting our Mediterranean naval
forces to a stage nearer the North Sea as a triumph for Germany— i.e. they consider
that by the development of German naval strength we have been obliged (to use their
own words) to hand over waters where once we were supreme to the guardianship
and influence of another Power. It is not inconceivable that in the hands of experts
in making people believe what the}r want them to believe this way of putting the
matter m ay prove a strong weapon in favour of a still further increase in the German
naval programme, or a useful lever for persuading G erm any’ s allies to push on their
naval construction to the utmost extent of which they are capable. T hey may argue
that, though the fleet stationed at Gibraltar can move both ways— either to the North
Sea or the Mediterranean— it cannot go both ways at o n c e ; and that if circumstances
draw it northward the Austrian and Italian fleets which in very few years will both
in number, strength of units and in personnel be by no means inferior, and perhaps
superior, to the French Toulon Fleet, "will have a very fair chance of becom ing masters
of the Mediterranean.

0 ) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

M r. C h u r c h ill; the en dorsem ent is in itia lle d by S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
( 2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 23.]
 597

To the non-expert mind this would seem not to be such a very impossible point
o f view, and I should not be at all surprised, if the shifting of our naval base from
Malta to Gibraltar is finally decided upon, to see increased activity in the German
dockyards and at all events in those of Austria and Italy.
Austria can probably always be influenced from here to develop her naval
strength, while it is quite certain that the rivalry between that country and Italy can
always be counted upon to ensure that a naval increase on one side will always be
followed by an increase on the other. So that Germany will only have to persuade
Austria, and Italy is sure to follow. Here they say that up to 1915 the com m and of
the Mediterranean would probably rest with the trip le Entente, but that after that
it must come to the Triple Alliance.
But m any things m ay happen before 1915, and one of those is, I hope, that we
shall have sufficient ships not only to make the North Sea safe, but to maintain our
old position in the Mediterranean as well..............(3)
Yours very sincerelv,
W . E. GOSCHEN.
(3) [T h e rest o f the le tte r deals w ith B a lk an p o litics and F ra n co-G erm a n relation s in
M orocco, b u t adds n oth in g o f in terest to docu m en ts p rin ted elsew here.]

No. 395.

Sir Edu-ard G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(*)

F.O. 371/1560.
2 70 7 2 /1 9 5 9 8 /1 2 /5 0 .
(No. 309.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, June 21, 1912.
M. Cambon called here to-d av(2) and, in conversation with Sir A. Nicolson,
observed that he had no instructions to speak on the subject of the “ Mediterranean
question,” but that he had been reading certain documents which his messenger from
Paris had brought him. H [is ] E fx cellen cy ] said that personally he thought that it
would be a mistake for Great Britain to reduce her forces in the Mediterranean, even
if she based her battle squadron on Gibraltar, as the withdrawal of our most powerful
units to the extreme western limit o f the Mediterranean would inevitably diminish our
prestige and influence throughout the Levant. W hat IT [is ] E [xcellen cy ] wished to
point out was that, if we were to discuss the future with France— and inform al naval
discussions had already taken place— we should both invite Spain to discuss also, and
perhaps enlarge or confirm the arrangements which were made between us and Spain,
and Spain and France, in 1907.(3) The geographical position of Spain, and her ports
both on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, besides the fact that she was astride the
entrance to the Mediterranean, rendered it o f the utmost importance that, in case of
conflict, she should not only not be hostile, but that she should not even be neutral—
that she should, in fact, be a co-partner. Spain could, without m isgiving, enter into*
any combinations that might be proposed, since she herself was quite safe from any
attack from Germany.
M. Cambon added that he might possibly be instructed later on to speak to me on
the subject.
[I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]
0 ) [T h is d espa tch is based on S ir A. N ico lso n ’ s record o f his con v ersa tion w ith M . P a u l
Cam bon. T he record is end orsed , on J u n e 28, as h a v in g been sent to the K i n g ; to th e P rim e
M in is t e r ; to M r. C hurchill. T he despa tch was rep ea ted also on J u n e 28 to M a d r id (N o. 6 5 );
to B erlin (N o. 153).]
(2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 " " S e t.; V ol. I l l , p. 155, N o. 129.]
(3) [cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 1-5 1, C h a pter L .]
 598

N o. 396.
Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)
F.O. 371/1381.
2 7 8 0 3 /2 7 80 3 /1 2 /2 2.
(No. 172.) Confidential. Posillipo, D. June 24. 1912.
Sir, R . July 1, 1912.
In m y despatch No. 169 of the 22nd instant(2) I have pointed out that, so far
as I can see, there is little or no real improvem ent in the feeling in this country
towards France. In considering the relations of the two countries at the present time
it is impossible not to be impressed with the bearing they must inevitably have on
the Mediterranean situation, which has been occupying so much public attention.
I have of course no knowledge of what the views or ultimate intentions of His
M ajesty’ s Government may be as regards the position there, but I feel it to be my
duty to record m y opinion that if the Mediterranean interests are to be left in the
first place as a charge to France, we shall greatly increase the prospect of Italy
becom ing the mere vassal of the Triple Alliance and of establishing a situation there
to the advantage of that com bination, and therefore presum ably prejudicial to
ourselves. In spite of much that has occurred to produce a feeling of soreness with
the traditional friend of Italy, and some deliberate efforts to undermine cur influence
in this country, I think the m ajority of Italians still believe in and appreciate our
essential goodwill and disinterestedness, and in the most influential quarters there is
due recognition of the entire fairness and loyalty of an attitude on our part which
contrasts favourably for us, in their opinion, with the record of other powers. This
feeling is, I think, a growing force, and the prejudice created by the utterances of
certain journals at the initiation of hostilities has largely subsided. 'British influence
in the Mediterranean remains, in m y opinion, the most potent factor to prevent Italy
from falling entirely under Triple Alliance control, and the dangers which this may
involve I have consistently done m y best to indicate. France cannot becom e our
substitute in this respect, and she now com m ands no confidence in that public opinion
which here directs the orientation of politicians. Russia it is true has taken a
certain hold on the popular mind as a well-wisher of Italy, but it is felt that as yet
she can play little part in purely Mediterranean questions. Germ any and Austria are
as cordially disliked as they have always been by the mass of the people, but the fear
of them will remain for Italians the beginning o f wdsdom, unless some counter­
balancing weight is maintained in the opposing scale. It has been and m ay still be
in the hands of Great Britain to prov'd that counterpoise, which I venture to think
it is her interest to constitute hersJt. xhis aspect of the question should, at any rate,
not be lost sight of when Mediterranean issues are under consideration.
I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD.

M IN U T E .

I th in k this should be circu la ted to the C abinet.

H . H . A.
10 J u ly , [19]12.

( J) [T his despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;

to M r. C h u r ch ill; to th e C abinet. A co p y was sent to the D ir e cto r o f N a val In tellig en ce.]
(2) [S ir R . R o d d ’ s despa tch (N o. 169), D. J u n e 22, R . J u ly 1, 1912, is n ot rep rod u ced . It
referred to M . P o in c a r e ’ s speech o f J u n e 14, 1912, on th e in tern a tion a l relation s o f F ra n ce, in
the cou rse o f w hich he said th a t “ R e c e n t in cid en ts . . . . had n ot m odified th e close ties w hich
u n ited F ra n ce and Ita ly , and m isunderstan din gs' w hich had now been d issipa ted had effected
no a ltera tion in the m utual sentim ents o f the tw o peop les w ho w ere u n ited by so m any
m em ories and associa tion s.” S ir R . R o d d observed th a t he d ou bted the v a lu e o f such sta te­
m ents and sum m arized b riefly th e Ita lia n n ew spaper rep orts on this speech. (F .O . 371/1384.
2 7 8 0 0 /2 7 8 0 0 /1 2 /2 2 .)]
 599

N o. 897.
Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E . G oschen .[l
F.O. 371 1377.
2S666 *27914 12 IS.
(No. 161.)
Sir, Foreign Office, July 5, 1912.
In the course of general conversation to-day, the German Ambassador referred to
the Debate in the House of Lords about the M editerranean^2 and said that amongst
the various hypotheses there discussed the question of the effect of good under­
standings between Powers had been omitted. People generally had fallen into the
habit now-a-days o f discussing the relations between Powers in terms of naval strength,
and he did not think that this was wholesome.
I said that one could not leave naval strength out of account. If Germany, with
the greatest A rm y in the world, had continued to have only a small Fleet, while we,
with the greatest Navy in the world, continued, as at present, to have only a small
Arm y, the two nations might have been of considerable use to each other, and certainly
neither could have threatened the life of the other. But, if the German Fleet became
stronger than ours, Germany would be able to threaten our very life.
The Ambassador said that it would obviously be against G erm any’ s own interests,
even if it were in her power, to attack us. Almost after the first day of war, there
would be financial disturbances throughout the world that Germany would feel more1
than any other country. It would be of no use to her to annex territory of ours, and
he appealed to the history of the last few years to show how baseless was the
supposition that Germany desired territorial expansion.
I said that public opinion was not always guided by self-interest. W hen any
diplomatic difficulty arose between two Powers, there was a question as to which should
give way. and political power might be an object quite apart from territorial expansion.
So. even without attributing aggressive designs to Germany, people here could not but
ask to what use the German armed forces might be put at some future tim e, if her
Fleet became stronger than ours. If we, having the greatest Fleet, were to announce
that we intended to have an A rm y on the Continental basis, so that we should be able
to put m illions of m en into the field, would not the German Press take notice of this,
and say that it was intended as a menace to Germ any?
The Ambassador said that he did not think the German Press would take this
line.
I remarked that, if the experiment were not so expensive, it would be very
interesting that we should make it, in order to see what the German Press would say :
a suggestion which afforded us both some amusement.
[ I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

(*) [T h is d espa tch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to th e C a b in et.]

(2) [ » . P a ri. D eb ., oth S er., (H ou se o f L ord s\ V o l. 12. pp. 298-336. T he d eb a te to o k p lace
on J u ly 2, 1912.]

[E D . N O T E .— T here is an a ccou n t b y th e F re n ch N a v al A tta ch e o f a con v ersa tion w ith

A d m ira l S ir F ra n cis B rid gem a n on J u ly 10, 1912, in D .D .F ., 3 me S er., V ol. I l l , pp . 235-6,
N o. 189. N o corresp on d in g B ritish re co rd has b een tra ce d .]
 600

N o. 398.

Sir E dvard G rey to M r. Carnegie .(*)

F.O. 371/1561.
3 0 0 5 5 /2 9 03 7 /1 2 /5 0.
(No. 339.)
Sir, Foreign Office, July 11, 1912.
W hen speaking of the Mediterranean to-d ay ,/2) M. Cambon dwelt upon the
importance, from the political point of view, of our retaining a squadron at Malta. He
gathered that we had not yet come to a decision.
I said that, though our final decision might not be announced till the Navy Vote
on the 22nd instant, we should undoubtedly keep a squadron based on Malta ; and the
force which we should keep there w'ould be at least sufficient to ensure that the naval
strength of France and ourselves was superior to that of Italy and Austria combined.
W e did not anticipate war in the Mediterranean, but a maintenance of this strength
was necessary to preserve diplomatic equilibrium there. I added that, when we were
in a position to make a com m unication, the French Naval Attache would be inform ed
by the Admiralty ; but he should wait until he heard from Mr. Churchill or the First
Sea L ord about it.
[I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].
(!) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to th e C abinet. Copies
w ere sent t o the A d m ir a lty ; t o the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p eration s.]
(2) [M . P a u l C am bon referred to th is con v ersation in a p ostscrip t to a despatch o f this
date. v. D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., V ol. I l l , p. 248, N o. 194.]

No. 399.

Memorandum by Mr. W inston Churchill.

P rivate.(x) Admiralty, July 17, 1912.

The French Naval Attache, the Comte de St. Seine, came to see me this m orning.(-)
I told him in the presence o f the First Sea Lord that we were now prepared to bring
the arrangement for joint action made last autumn up to date. He must clearly
understand that no discussion between naval or military experts could be held to affect
in any way the full freedom o f action possessed by both countries ; that the basis was
purely hypothetical, and that nothing arising out of such conversations or arrange­
ments could influence political decisions. On such matters the Foreign Office alone
would express the views of H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t]. The Comte de
St. Seine said that he perfectly understood this, and entirely agreed with it. It was
arranged that he should meet the 1st Sea Lord next week to deal with the various
technical questions involved.
I then told him the arrangements we proposed for the M ed it[erranea]n and
explained that these were arrangements made in our own interests, and adequate in
our opinion to the full protection o f British possessions and trade in the
M ed it[erranea]n. I also told him the strength we should have in home waters in
1915. I told him that speaking as 1st L [o r ] d of the A d m [ira l]ty and in that capacity
especially, I thought that France w [o u l]d be wise to aim at a standard o f strength in
the M edit[erranea]n equal to that o f Austria and Italy com bined; and I imparted to
him m y inform ation as to possible further Austrian increases. In reply he said that
that was the standard they had set before them selves; that they had already decided
to move their six rem aining battleships from Brest into the M edit[erranea]n to form a
0 ) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 48. T his m em ora n du m is end orsed as h a vin g b een seen by S ir A.
N icolson .]
( 2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3™« S ér., V ol. I l l , pp . 270-2, N o. 207.]
 601
3rd squadron there, leaving the Northern and Atlantic Coasts solely to the protection
of their torpedo flotillas ; that they had at present 7 Dreadnoughts building ; and that
M. Delcasse intended to accelerate the laying down o f 4 more ships next year, of
which 2 would be begun in April, and 2 not later than S ept[em be]r.
In conclusion I remarked on the pleasure with which we had heard at the
A d m [ira l]ty of M . Delcassé’ s continued retention of the Ministry o f Marine, altho’ a
verv fine alternative had been open to him.
W . S. C.
17.7.12.

No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. C arnegie.C>

F.O. 371 1368.
31295 31295 12 17.
(No. 356.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 22, 1912.
I told M. Cambon to-day that, had I been able to see him last week, I should
have told him that conversations could be resumed with the French Naval Attaché at
the A dm iralty.(: ) The conversations would of course be on the same footing as before :
it being clearly understood that any thing which passed between experts, Naval or
Military, was not to be taken as prejudicing the freedom of decision of the Govern­
ments so as to com mit either Government to come to the assistance of the other in
time of war. It was necessary to be clear about this, because though the Governm ents
might be cognisant o f the fact that the experts were arranging details for co-operation,
they could not be sure of every thing which passed between the experts, and Govern­
ments ought not to be committed by the latter, but only by what passed directly
between Governm ents themselves.
M . Cambon said that his Naval Attache had reported to him his interview with
Mr. Churchill.(3) Mr. Churchill had made it quite clear that nothing must be taken
as com m itting the Governm ents, or as having passed between them. This was well
understood, and if we were asked whether there was a Military or Naval arrangement
between the two Governments we could say that there was none.
I remarked that of course there was no formal “ E n te n te ” between the two
Governments.
M. Cambon replied that there was nothing but a moral “ E n ten te,” which might
however be transformed into a formal “ E n te n te ” if the two Governments desired,
when an occasion arose.
I said that this meant that what passed between the experts did not com m it the
two Governments, and left their decision perfectly free. W hat passed between the
experts was to enable assistance to be given, if when the time came one G ov [ern m en ]t
desired to give it to the other.
M. Cambon seemed quite satisfied with the conversation.
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [ K E Y ].

0 ) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a rin g been sent to th e K in g and to th e C a b in et.]

(2) [t;. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t.]
(3) [r . im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t.]
 602
[E D . y O T E .— The follow in g t e x t o f a d r a ft da ted J u ly 23, 1912, is taken from the
A d m ira lty A rchives, Case 0091. It should be com p ared w ith the F ren ch t e x t in D .D .F .,
3me S er., V ol. I l l , pp. 507-8, N o. 420, A n n e x e I : —

1. The follow in g a greem ent relates solely to a con tin g en cy in w hich G reat B r ita in and
F ra n ce w ere to be allies in a w ar, and does not a ffect the p olitica l freed om o f eith er G overn­
m en t as t o em b ark in g on such a war.
2. I t is und erstood th a t F ra n ce has disposed alm ost the w hole o f h er b a ttle fleet in the
M ed iterra n ea n , lea v in g her A tla n tic sea b oard t o the ca re o f F lotillas.
G rea t B rita in on the oth er hand has con cen tra ted h er b a ttle fleets in hom e w aters, lea vin g
in the M e d [ite r r a n e a ]n a stron g co n ta in in g force o f b attle and arm ou red cruisers and torp ed o
cr a ft. These disp osition s have been m ade in d ep en d en tly because they are th e best w h [icli] the
sep arate in terest o f each cou n try suggests, h a vin g reg a rd t o all the circu m stan ces and
p r o b a b ilitie s ; and they d o n ot arise from any naval agreem en t or con v en tion .
3. In the ev en t o f a w ar in w h [ie h ] th e G overnm ents are allies the fo llo w in g a rrangem ents
are a greed upon betw een the respectiv e A dm ira lties.

M ed iterra n ean .
G en era l P rin cip les.
B ritish ob jectiv e.
P ro te ctio n o f A n g lo -F re n ch in terests in E a stern B asin o f th e M ed iterra n ean i.e. E ast o f
M a lta :
F ren ch ob jectiv e.
P ro te ctio n o f A n g lo -F re n ch in terests in W estern B asin o f the M ed iterra n ea n i.e. W est of
M a lta .
C om bined a ction if possible fo r the pu rposes o f gen era l engagem ent.
T h e ships o f th e tw o N a tion s t o m ake use o f each o th e r’ s P o r ts as req uired.

S tra its o f D o v e r — P a tr o l.
F ren ch lines
W . H in d e r L t. ship to N ie u p o r t— S.E.
V a rn e L t. ship t o C ape G risn ez— S.E.
W . H in d e r t o S a n d ettie and V a rn e L t.— S.W . [sic]
E nglish lines
W . H in d e r t o N . F orela n d — E a st [s ic]
V a rn e L t. ship to D un gen ess— „ [s ic ]
W . H in d e r t o S a n d ettie and V a rn e L t.— S.W .

The above proposed lines as su b jects of discussions pu t forw a rd by [S ir ] F [r a u c is ]

B [r id g e m a n ],

T he follow in g notes a p p ea r on sheets im m ed ia tely follow in g the above t e x t : —

I t is desirable and even necessary t o a sa tisfa ctory u n d ersta n d in g th a t w e should have a
rou g h id ea w h at forces are lik ely to be em ployed by each side, in th e v a riou s areas of
operation s.
M ed iterra n ean .
T he qu estion o f com m and u n d er certa in con d ition s s h [o u l]d be considered.

23.7.12.
T he F ren ch N aval A tta ch e said he w ould lay S ir F [r a n c is ] B [ r id g e m a n ]’ s proposals b efore
th e F ren ch N a v al W a r S ta ff early in A u g u st and w ould b e back w ith th eir replies or proposals
a b o u t S e p t [e m b e ]r 15th.
E . T R O U B R ID G E ,
C.O.S.
23.7.12.

T here follow s a d r a ft o f in stru ction s fo r F la g Officers t o be open ed only on the re c e ip t o f

an o rd e r to d o so. T hey are n ot rep rod u ced o w in g to th eir tech n ica l ch a ra cter.]
 603

N o. 40 1.
M inute by Sir A . X icolsonJ1)

Private, (*)
Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Office, July 24, 1912.
M. Cambon mentioned to me today that liis Naval Attache had shown him a
D [r a ]ft agreement of a technical nature regarding dispositions of British and French
fleets which had been given to him by the First Sea L ord .(3) The first Article of this
D [r a ]ft agreement laid down very clearly that neither G ov [ern m en ]t was committed
by the provisions of the D [r a ]ft Agreem ent. So far, so good— this was in accordance
with what you had said to him (M. Cambon). But the D [r a ]ft Agreem ent provided
for the immediate carrying out o f a disposition of the French Navy, which entailed
that 9 '1 0 th s o f the naval force of France would be sent to the Mediterranean. Now
this meant that the Channel and the Atlantic would be practically abandoned by
France, and would expose her to an attack by Germ any without any guarantee at all
that the British fleet would com e to her aid. In short the engagem ent to be taken
was really unilateral— France was to m ove practically all her naval force to the
Mediterranean and leave her other coasts unprotected, and E ngland was free to aid
France or not as she liked, and be under no obligation to do so— M. Cambon said that
it was possible these objections might occur to M. Poincare, and that the French
Admiralty before concurring in the proposed disposition of the French naval forces
would require that they should have some assurances that British naval aid would be
forthcom ing for the Channel and Atlantic coasts. M. Cambon had received no
instructions : the above were ideas which had occurred to him. H e is leaving for
Paris on Saturday 27th.
‘ A. N.

M IN U T E S .

T he F ren ch m ay n o t raise th e p o i n t : if they do raise it we shall h a re to con sid er h ow it

can be m et w ith ou t a lterin g the first a rticle o f th e D r a ft N a v a l A g reem en t re ferred to in
this m inu te.
E. G.

T his k in d o f difficu lty is in h eren t in all such c o n tin g e n t a rrangem ents.

H . H . A.

T he passage re ferred t o had the sp ecific and sole o b ject o f p r e v e n tin g such a d ifficu lty ;
and it has been u n d erstood in the e x a c tly op p osite sense to w hat I in ten d ed .
T he w o rd in g w as as follow s (so fa r as I can rem em ber w ith ou t referen ce)
“ I t is u n d erstood th a t F ra n ce has a lrea d y m oved alm ost th e w hole o f her F le e t in to
the M e d [it e r r a n e a ]n le a v in g the d efen ce o f th e Channel to h er flotillas.
G rea t B r ita in also has con cen tra ted h er fleet in H om e W a te rs a n d lea ves a con ­
t a in in g squ a dron in th e M e d [it e r r a n e a ]n . T hese d isp osition s h a ve been m ade in d ep en d en tly
hv each pow er, n o t as th e resu lt o f any a greem en t hut beca use these a re th e a rra n g em en ts
b est suited t o th e sep arate in terests o f e ith e r P o w e r .”
I t rem ains to p r o v id e fo r th e co-op era tion o f th e fo r ce s thus in d ep en d en tly disposed.
W . S. C.
24.7.

( ! ) [T h is m in u te is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e P rim e M in is t e r ; to M r. C h u rch ill.]

(2) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 55.]
(3) [cp . im m ed ia tely p reced in g Ed. A o f e .]
 604

N o. 402.
Sir Edward G rey to M r. Carnegie.(')

F.O. 371/1368.
32143 31-295/12 17.
(No. 364.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 26, 1912.
M. Carabon spoke to me to-day(2) about the document drawn up in the Admiralty
with his Naval Attached3) The docum ent was headed by an explicit statement of
non-com mittal, of which M. Cambon showed me a copy in English. It was based on
a disposition of forces by which the French left their Atlantic and Channel coasts
unprotected by their ships, and concentrated all their Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Such a document, headed by this explicit declaration o f non-com mittal, would
certainly, though M. Cambon had not yet heard anything from his Government on
the subject, provoke in Paris the question o f what assurance France would have that,
if she was attacked on her unprotected northern and western coasts, we should provide
protection for her there. Mr. Churchill had explained to the Naval Attache that the
docum ent was founded on the assumption that this disposition of naval forces had
been made by each Governm ent quite independently of the other, to suit their own
in terest; and that all that was being done was to arrange what use should be made of
the naval forces so disposed, if one Government came to the assistance of the other.
M . Cambon said that this assumption was an error. As long ago as 1907 there were
verbal com m unications with Sir John Fisher,(4) in which the French had said that
they could assure only the western part of the Mediterranean, and vre had said that
we could undertake the eastern part. Eventually, the French had said that they
would look after the whole of the Mediterranean, and Sir John Fisher had said that
we would look after the North Sea and Channel. It was in consequence of these
conversations that France had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean. Therefore,
if this written declaration o f non-com m ittal, which seemed out o f place in an arrange­
ment between experts, remained at the head of the Admiralty docum ent, it would be
essential that there should be some understanding between the two Governments that
they would at least communicate with each other if there was menace, and concert
beforehand. M. Cambon suggested that private Notes might be exchanged to this
effect, and he referred to a note which Lord Lansdowne had given him on the
25th of May 1905.(5) The fall of M. Delcasse came soon afterwards, and nothing
further had followed at the tim e ; though there had been verbal statements by me in
January 1906.(6) If private Notes such as he suggested were exchanged, we should
still be able to say truthfully that no binding agreement existed between us, to
take action.
I said that there were great objections to exchanging any Note which was secret.
At the present m oment, if by some indiscretion the conversations between our experts
were revealed, and I was asked a question on the subject, I should be prepared to say
openly exactly what the state of things was between the two Governments. It was
now what it had been for several years past, why could not it be left as it was?

t 1) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in ister and to

M r. C h u rch ill on J u ly 27, 1912; to the Ciibinet on J u ly 30, 1912.]
( 2) |T here is no rep ort by M. P a u l C am bon o f this in terv iew in D .D .F .) b u t a reference to
it in his despatch o f Septem b er 21, 1912, shows th a t he had g iv en a verbal a ccou n t to
M . P oin ca re, v. D .D .F ., 3 mK S er., V ol. ITI, p. 544, N o. 448.]
( 3) [i>. supra, p. 602, Ed. N o t e .]
(4) [R eferen ce is m ade to this su b ject in B rig a d ier-G en era l S ir G. N . N ich olson ’ s m em o­
ra n d u m o f N 'ovem ber 6, 1911. v. G ooch tb T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 6 26-9, X o . 639.]
( 5) [ v . Gooch & T em p erley, V ol. I l l , pp. 77-8, X o. 9 5 ; D.D.F., 2me S er., V ol. V I , pp . 558-9,
N o. 465, A n n e x e .]
( 6) [rp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I l l , pp. 170-1, N o. 2 10 ; pp. 177-8, Nos. 2 1 5 -6 ; pp. 180-2,
N o. 219.]
 605
M . Cambon then pressed that the declaration should be omitted from the naval
paper, or that if it remained there should be given some assurance that, in the event
of menace, each Government would ask the other what they were going to do.
I observed that, as a matter of fact, as things were now each Government would
o f course consult with the other in the event of m enace, and ask whether the other
Government were prepared to give assistance. I understood that what M. Cambon
meant was that, as there was no Alliance between the two Governments, and as France
might be menaced b y Germany, we should promise to discuss the situation with
France, if there was a m enace, in order that, if we were not prepared to com e to her
assistance, she should have time to withdraw her Fleet from the Mediterranean to
defend her Atlantic and Channel coasts by herself. Similarly, if we were menaced,
we might ask France what she was going to do, so that if she was not going to assist
us we should be able, if need be, to alter the disposition o f our naval forces. But,
under the existing state of things, there would undoubtedly be conversations between
the two Governments in the event of either being m enaced, and I could not exchange
a Note containing an engagement unless it was to be made public.
Finally, we separated, agreeing to reflect upon the matter during the holidays.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ] .

No. 403.

N ote by Mr. W inston Churchill.

Private.(M Admiralty, July 29, 1912.
I was not aware of the extent to w h [ic h ] the Admiralty had been committed
under m y predecessor.
I still think the non-com mittal proviso desirable and perfectly fair.
The present dispositions represent the best arrangements that either power
can make independently. It is not true that the French are occupying the
M ed[iterranea]n to oblige us. They cannot be effective in both theatres and they
resolve to be supreme in one. The Germans w [o u l]d easily defeat them at sea.
W . S. C [H U R C H IL L ],
29.7.
( 0 [G rey M SS ., V ol. 4 S ; e n d o rse d : “ W r it t e n on record o f con v ersation w ith F ren ch
A m h [a ss a d o ]r J u ly 26, 1912.” v. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]

No. 404.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 371 1368.
32299, 31295 12/17.
(No. 330.) Secret. Paris, D. July 30, 1912.
Sir, R. July 31, 1912.
The President of the Council returned to Paris last night, and I had an interview
i with his E xcellency this morning.
I referred to the com m unications which had recently passed between the F rench
and British Naval Experts and I said that H is E xcellency had no doubt had a report
from the French Ambassador in London of a conversation which you had had with
him on the subject.(2) Monsieur Poincare observed that he had seen Monsieur Cambon
this m orning and had discussed the matter with him. I continued that you had
instructed me to make to His Excellency the same observations as you had com m uni­

i 1) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g heen sent to the C a bin et on A u g u st 6, 1912.]

(2) [i>. supra, p. 601, N o. 400 ; pp. 604 -o, N o. 402.]
 G06
cated to the French Ambassador, v i z .: that it must be clearly understood that any
com m unications between the naval and military experts of the two countries were not
to be taken as prejudicing the freedom of decision of the two Governments so as to
com m it either Governm ent to com e to the assistance of the other in time of war. It
is necessary to be clear about this because, though the Governments might be
cognisant of the fact that the experts were arranging details for co-operation, they
could not be sure of everything which passed between the experts and Governments
ought not to be committed by them, but only by what passed directly between
Governments themselves. 1 added that what passed between the experts was to enable
assistance to be given if, when the occasion arose, one Governm ent desired to give it
to the other Government. I also observed that Monsieur Cambon seemed to have been
under a misapprehension in regard to the reasons for the transfer of the greater
portion of the French Fleet from the Channel and Atlantic to the Mediterranean.
The transfer was a spontaneous decision of the French Governm ent and not in
consequence of the conversations between the British and French experts in the same
way as the decision o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent to withdraw for the present from the
Mediterranean some of the British ships hitherto stationed there.
Monsieur Poincare said that the decision of the French Governm ent was quite
spontaneous but it would not have been taken if they could suppose that in the event
o f Germ any making a descent on the Channel or Atlantic ports of France, England
would not come to the assistance of France. If such was to be the case the conver­
sations between the Naval Experts would be useless and the French Governm ent must
have their best ships to face Germ any in the Channel.
Monsieur Poincare said that of course the two Governments, French and British,
must reserve for themselves the decision as to putting in force the arrangements
arrived at by the experts, and for that reason the first articles of the Draft Naval
Agreem ent or Convention which had been forwarded from London wrere quite out of
place.(3) H is E xcellency told me that they contained reservations similar to those
which you had made to the French Ambassador and which I had just repeated. A
M ilitary or Naval Convention should deal only with military or naval matters so long
as it was a Convention between experts and not one between Governments. Political
reservations could only suitably be made in conversations or in communications
between Governments.
W hat Monsieur Poincare would like would be some form of declaration which
would entail conversations taking place between the British and French Governments
the m oment that there appeared to be danger to their interests so as to decide at once
whether the arrangements made between the experts should be put into force.
Monsieur Poincare proposes that Monsieur Cambon should renew the discussions
with you in September.
I have. Ac.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
(3) [v. su p ra , p. 602, E d. N ote.]

No. 405.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G rey.(l)

Private & Confidential. (2)

M y dear Grey, Paris, July 30, 1912.
In the course of the conversation with Poincare reported in my despatch of
today,(3) I recomm ended him not to press his views regarding the discussions between

( ' ) [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in is t e r ; t o M r. C hurchill.]

( 2) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 14.]
( 3) [v. im m ed iately p r eced in g docu m en t.]
 607

the experts for the present. The Cabinet were not— the m ajority of them— in a
disposition to make declarations such as he would like. H e said that he had been
inform ed by Cambon of differences of opinion.
I told him that so long as you remained he might be sure that there would be no
abandonment of the spirit of the Entente. H e naturally argues that the object of
the Entente is that the two Powers should stand together not for aggression but for
the maintenance of each other and defence against attack— unprovoked attack, and the
balance of power. To begin a Military or Naval Convention by saying that it means
nothing so far as the Governments are concerned is superfluous and quite out of place
in such a Convention. I f the Entente does not mean that England will com e to the
aid o f France in the event of Germany attacking the French ports its value to France
is not great, so says Poincaré. W e must wait until September and then see what are
the dispositions on both sides of the Channel.
Yours sincerely,
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .

No. 406.

Mr. Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey.

Private^1)
M y dear Grey, Admiralty, August 2, 1912.
I cannot help thinking this has got off the rails.!2) The second proviso!3) was not
required by the Cabinet, and was only inserted by me because I wished to preserve in
its integrity our full freedom of choice. 1 still think it perfectly right and fair. But
I s h [o u l]d be sorry that this s h [o u l]d obstruct the further conversation between the
experts, or be taken as altering in any way the basis o f the entente. N othing in the
naval agreement ought to affect in any way the relations of the two Powers. If
desired, I c [o u l]d quite easily redraft it in a m ore general form as fo llo w s:— “ Both
Powers will make such dispositions of their Naval strength as shall best conduce to
the preservation of their own national interests. They will exchange full inform ation
as to these dispositions, actual or prospective.” The docum ent w [o u l]d then proceed
to deal with the best way in w h [ich ] the forces thus disposed c [o u l]d be utilized in
a war in w h [ie h ] the 2 Powers were allies.
Yours v [e r ]v sincerely,
W IN STON S / C H U R C H IL L .
(>) [G re y M S S , V ol. 48.]
( 2) [v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t, and n o te 0 ) . B y S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s in stru ction s
a co p y o f M r. C h u rch ill’ s le tte r was sent to S ir F . B e r tie on A u g u st 7.]
( 3) [» . supra, p. 602, E d. N o te .]

No. 407.

Sir A . Xicolson to Sir Edward G rey.

Private.O)
M y dear Grey, Palace H otel, B uxton, August 4, 1912.
The papers announce that Russia and France have concluded a naval conven­
tion ^ 2) You will rem em ber that when Cambon first mentioned to me that Russia had
requested that such a convention should be negotiated, France had suggested that we
should be invited to be a party to the instrum ent.(3) Since then we have heard

0 ) [G rey M S S , V ol. 55.]

(2) [v . P rib ra m , V ol. I I, pp . 2 2 2 -5 - D .D .F ., 3™ S ér., V o l. I l l , p. 270, N o. 206.]
( 3) [r . supra, pp . 5 82-3, N o. 383.]
 608

nothing, so presumably Russia did not wish to fall in with the proposal. In the
autumn France will, doubtless, recur to the question as to our naval arrang[em en]ts
with her. I know' howT divergent are the views as to our future naval arrang[em en]ts
in regard to the Mediterranean, and the objections which exist to any definite binding
a rran gfem en ]t with France in respect to those matters. W ere it possible to conclude
a naval arrang[em en ]t both with Russia and France, I am sure that our position
would be more secure— and it is probable that Germany, in view of such a strong
naval combination, would be disposed to slacken her rate of construction as she would
be convinced that she could not hope to compete. I fear, h ow e v e r that we are
precluded from entering into any snch understanding, owing to our unfortunate
Parliamentary exigencies— but failing it we shall have difficulty in persuading France
to take any of our Mediterranean burdens off our shoulders— and we will be compelled
to maintain a large force there as well as our preponderance in the North Sea.
Y [o u ]r s sincerelv,
A. NICOLSON.

No. 408.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371/1868.
3 38 4 3 /3 2 9 0 3 /1 2 /1 7.
(No. 371.) Berlin, D. Atigust 8, 1912.
Sir, R. Ana'-st 12, 1912.
The announcement that a Naval Convention had been concluded betw'een France
and R ussia(1) has been received very calm ly in the German press. The papers have
quoted the various reports that have appeared in different organs o f the French and
Russian press, denying, affirming and explaining the original announcem ent, and
there have been many leading articles on the subject. The line which is taken with
practical unanimity is that the convention in itself, whether it has actually been
concluded or is only about to be, is of no importance whatever. It is pointed out
that, when two countries have a treaty of alliance and a military convention, it stands
to reason that in case of war their navies will not remain neutral and it is therefore
most natural that the respective Admiralties should consult together as to howT those
navies can be used to the best purpose in the same way as the W ar Offices do wTith
regard to the land forces. On the other hand the Russian navy is a thing that need
not be reckoned with for a good m any years to com e. It is further remarked that the
statements made both in France and Russia that the convention is in no way aimed
against Germany is [sic] absurd : no secret was made in the Duma that the object
of the new fleet was to be able, if necessary, to meet the German fleet or rather a part
o f it in the Baltic, and, so long as the Triple Entente ■exists, there could be no other
object. But some of the papers express the belief that the resurrection of a Russian
navy and this naval convention with France are not looked upon by any means with
unmixed pleasure in England. Of course, they say, it is hoped in England that the
strain of the naval com petition with Germany m ay be lightened thereby, but there is
a wide-spread belief that the convention contains or is attended by a promise on the
part of France to assist Russia in opening the Dardanelles for ships of war, and, so
soon as that occurs, the conditions in the Mediterranean will be entirely altered and

t 1) [S ir F . B e r tie ’ s despatch (N o. 339), D . A u g u st 1, 1912, R . A u g u st 2, 1912, in form ed

S ir E d w a rd G rey th a t th e Tem ps ha d m a de an annou n cem en t t o the effect th a t “ im p orta n t
n e g otia tion s are b elieved to have ta k en pla ce in the last few w eeks b etw een the F ren ch and
R ussian G overnm ents w ith a view to con clu d in g a na va l con v en tion .” T his was the earliest
in form a tion receiv ed on the subject by th e F oreig n Office. (F.O . 371/1368. 3 2 9 0 3 /3 2 9 0 3 /1 2 /1 7 .)
In his telegram (N o. 294) o f A u g u st 17, 1912, D. 8-30 p . m ., R . 9-30 p . m ., S ir G. B u chanan stated
th a t th e n a va l con v en tion had been ratified b y an ex ch a n g e o f notes, sign ed in P aris.
(F .O . 371/1368. 3 4 8 2 0 /3 2 9 0 3 /1 2 /1 7 .)]
 G09

England will have to reckon with the possibility of .Russian ships threatening the
route to India.
Of course what really rather worries the German journalist is the fact that this
naval convention should be concluded or announced so soon after the m eeting of the
two Emperors at Baltic P ort.f2'1 One or two papers have taken it upon themselves to
declare that the Germans were inform ed about it on that occasion, but, in default of
any confirmation of this on the part of the semi-official press, it is taken for granted
that this was not the case. The “ Tageblatt ” reminds its readers that sixteen days
after a particularly warm and affectionate m eeting of the two Emperors at Peterhof in
August 1S97 President Faure arrived at Kronstadt and three days later the Franco-
Bussian Alliance was announced, and the writer points to the coincidence that this
naval convention, unimportant though it m ay be, is announced within a m onth of the
meeting at Baltic Port, which was described officially in Germany as having been such
a “ brilliant success.” Still the German papers try to make the best o f it and say
they do not grudge France this bit of gilding for the Baltic Port pill, and they warn
their Western neighbour with one accord that the most immediate and perhaps the
most important outcome of the convention will be the flotation in Paris o f a new
Russian loan.
I have, Ac.
(F or the Ambassadori,
G R A N V IL L E .
(! ) [F o r the m eetin g at B a ltic P o r t on J u ly 4 -6 , 1912, v. G ooch <£• T em v erley, V ol. I X (I ),
p. 580, Ed. X o f e .]

No. 409.

Sir F . B ertie to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

Private & S ecret.(2)
M y dear Grey, Paris, A ugust 13, 1912.
I reply to your letter of the 7th instant inclosing a copy of one of August 2nd
from the First Lord o f the Admiralty. (3)
I am not sure that he quite apprehends P oincare’ s view which I understand to be
that His M ajesty’ s Government have consented to the renewal of the consultations
between the British and French Naval experts so as to bring up to date, in accordance
with recent experiences and circumstances and the views of a new Board of Admiralty,
the naval arrangements to be carried out in the event o f the British and French
Governments being agreed to act together in a war. His M ajesty’ s Government desire
not to commit themselves. They wish to have a free hand so as to be able when a
crisis arises to decide whether they will give armed support to France or not according
to circumstances.
Such being the case Poincare does not think that a naval agreement or Convention
or whatever you like to call the arrangements between the experts, who are not
Plenipotentiaries, is the proper place for reservations b v either the British Government
or the French Government. He holds, and technically he is right, that any such
reservations should be placed on record by an exchange of notes or declarations or
records of conversations between the Diplomatic R epresentatives of the two countries
and to be communicated to each other.
not thi° k Poincare would consider as acceptable
Mr.Churchill s offer to amend the Naval agreement so as to make it read : “ Both
/ p [ P 115 lsTend orsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in is t e r : to M r. C h u rch ill 1
(-) [G rey M > S ., \ ol. 14.] J
t ^ L d ,ra rd G re.v’ s co v e rin g letter o f A u g u st 7, 1912. is n ot rep rod u ced . In it he
sta ted th a t he was fo r w a rd in g M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s le tte r “ fo r y o u r in form a tion , b u t I
ca n n ot m ake a n y new p rop osal to the F ren ch G overn m en t at present, as w e are all scattered
N o 4 0 6 ]' M S S '’ T ° L 14> F ° r M r ' C h u rch ill’ s letter o f A u g u st 2, 1912,

T109001 2 p
 610

Powers will make such dispositions o f tlieir naval strength as shall best conduce to the
preservation o f their own national interests. They will exchange full information as
to these dispositions, actual and prospective.”
I think that what might be acceptable to the French Government would be that
the naval agreement should state that the British and French Naval Authorities will
exchange full information as to the actual and prospective dispositions o f their naval
strength which they may make as best conducing to the preservation of their own
national interests. The document would, as Mr. Churchill says, then proceed to deal
with the best way in which the forces thus disposed could be utilised in a war in which
the two Powers were allies.
The two Governm ents would in some separate form lay it down that it is well
understood that the naval arrangements will only come into force if and when both
Governments are agreed that they shall act together navally in certain given
circumstances.
I only write this to prepare you for what I believe will be Poincare’ s attitude
when Cambon renews in September the conversations with you.
W e have withdrawn or are about to withdraw some of our ships from the
Mediterranean in order to have a larger disposable naval force in the H ome waters to
face Germany. We say that we do this for our own purposes and irrespective of
French intention to move the greater and more powerful part of their fleet into the
Mediterranean, and that the naval force wdiich we shall maintain in that sea will be
sufficient of itself to deal with the Austrian (and Italian ?) fleet. The French
contention is that this may possibly be, but that wTe would not have withdrawn the
ships from the Mediterranean unless we had felt confident that were we in difficulties
there the French fleet would come to our assistance and that it cannot reasonably be
supposed that the French Government would transfer the greater and more powerful
part of their ships to the Mediterranean and denude their Atlantic and Channel coasts
and leave them exposed to a German attack unless they had reason to suppose that in
such a contingency the British fleet would intervene.
What the French Government would like best would be an exchange of diplomatic
notes defining the joint interests of France and England and stating that in the event
of any of those interests being in the opinion of one o f the two Powers endangered it
will confer with the other as to whether any and if so what steps should be taken to
defend those interests, and if they be agreed that com bined armed action should be
taken the naval and military arrangements already agreed on between the French and
British experts will come into fo r c e ; or it might be put the other way, viz, that they
wyould not com e into force unless the twTo Governments after conference were agreed
that joint naval and military action was advisable.
If such an exchange of diplomatic notes be not acceptable to His M ajesty’ s
Government the French Government might for the moment be satisfied by an
exchange of declarations in some form or other to the effect that the hands of the two
Governm ents remain entirely free, notwithstanding any arrangements signed by the
experts, to determine whenever circumstances arise affecting their interests whether
the two Governments shall give each other armed support, and that only in the event
of their being agreed to that effect wfill the experts’ arrangements c o m e in to force.
Poincare is not the only French Minister for Foreign Affairs who has been
dissatisfied with the present uncertain conditions. Pichon, Cruppi and Selves have
one after another deprecated it to m e, and of course Clemenceau also. I put them off
with generalities and platitudes. You m ay remember that Clemenceau gave a very
enigmatical answer to a Senator or Deputy who inquired whether a Military'
Convention with England existed. Clem enceau’ s reply without savin» that there was
such a Convention implied that there might be.
Yours sincerely,
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
 ou
[E D X O T E .— I n The W orld Crisis. 1911-1914. (1923), pp. 112-13, M r. W in ston C h urchill
rep rod u ces a m in u te o f A u g u st 23, 1912. in w hich he p oin ts out the difficulties o f th e p roposed
a rra ngem ent w ith F ra n ce. T he m in u te c o n c lu d e s: “ E v ery one m ust feel w ho know s th e fa cts
th a t we have th e ob liga tion s o f an a llia nce w ith ou t its advan ta ges, an d above all w ith ou t its
precise defin ition s.” T he m in u te was a ddressed to the P rim e M in ister and to th e F oreig n
S ecretary. X o c o p y has been fo u n d a m ong eith er th e official or p riv a te papers o f th e la tte r.]

No. 410.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F. B ertie. ( l

F.O. 371 136S.
40010 31295 1-2 17.
No. 467.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office Sc 4em ber 19, 1912.
M. Cambon told me to-day ( 2) that the removal of French warships to the
Mediterranean was a temporary step in connection with the manœuvres. It was not
yet definitive, and could not be so till France knew where she stood with regard to us.
He thought it not impossible to come to some understanding which, while not entailing
an alliance or any obligation to take action, would ensure that, in the event o f either
Government being threatened with attack by a third Power, the two Governments
would consult together as to what they were prepared to do. H e then gave me, as
his personal suggestion, the following form of words :
“ Dans le cas où l'u n ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements aurait des rai&cns
d ’ appréhender un acte d'agression de la part d'u ne tierce puissance ou des
complications menaçantes pour la paix, ils se livreraient ensemble à une discussion
sur la situation et rechercheraient les m oyens d'assurer de concert le maintien de
la paix et d ’ écarter toute tentative d 'agression.”

I said that, in fact, this was what would happen under the existing conditions if
either of us had reason to fear attack by a third Power.
M . Cambon agreed that this was so in fact, but said that there was no written
understanding.
I said that I would consider the wc r is which he had given to m e. The Prime
I Minister was going abroad immediately, but I would discuss the matter with him on
his return.
[ I am. & c.]
E . G [K E Y ].

( 1) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in ister on Septem b er

I 1912; t o the K in g an d to the C abin et on O ctob er 11, 1912 ]
( 2) [cp . D .D F ., 3 me S ér., V ol. I l l , p. 543, N o. 4 4 6 ; pp. 544-6, X o . 448.]

No. 411.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B ertie. ( l)

F.O. 371 13GS.
| 39577 31295 12/17.
[ (X o. 468.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, Septem ber 21, 1912.
In conversation with Sir A. X icolson on the 17th instant(2> Monsieur Cambon
alluded to the comments in the public press in regard to the concentration of French
naval forces in the Mediterranean. H e stated that the press had been a little too

( l ) [T h is despatch was rep ea ted on Septem b er 25, 26,1912, to R om e (X o . 2 2 9 ); t o B erlin

(X o . 2 3 9 ); to V ien n a (X o . 641; to C on stan tin ople (X o . 4 6 1 ); to C a iro (X o . 1 4 4 ); t o St. P eters-
b u rg h (X o . 3 2 6 ): to M a d r id (X o . 108».]
O [TP- D .D .F ., 3'™ S er., V ol. I l l , pp. 524-5, X o . 431.]
[10900] 2 R 2
 612

hasty in drawing conclusions from the transfer of French Atlantic battleships to the
Mediterranean, as this transfer was m erely a temporary measure taken in order to
enable those vessels to take part in certain manœuvres in the Mediterranean, while
there was no intention, for the present in any case, of definitely transferring them to
the Mediterranean command. The Ambassador stated that explanations in this sense
had already been given to the Italian G ov [ern m en ]t, and added that o f course no
decision could be taken by the French G ov[ern m en ]t in regard to their Atlantic
squadron until they knew exactly what the position was as between them and H [is ]
M [a je sty’ s] G [overn m en ]t.
[I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 412.
Mr. Asquith to Sir Edward Grey.
Private. (’ ) 10 Downing S treet, W hitehall, S. IF.
M y dear Grey, October 11, 1912.
I d on’ t see any harm in Gambon’ s form ula(2); indeed it is almost a platitude.
I am not sure that he and Lansdowne were quite ad idem in their correspondence
in M ay 1905.
Yours,
II. H . A [S Q U IT H ].

( 0 [G rey M SS ., V ol. 61.]

( 2) [u. sup ra , p. 611, N o. 410.]

[E D . N O T E .— T he corresp on den ce b etw een L o rd L ansdow ne and M. P a u l Cam bon in M ay

1905 is p rin ted in G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I l l , pp. 7 7-8, No. 95, and in Ü .D .F ., 2me S ir.,
V ol. V I , p. 539, N o. 455, A n n e x e , and pp . 558-9, N o. 465, A n n ex e. In view o f th e com m ent
m ade by M r. A squ ith in the im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t referen ce m ay be m ade to M. P aul
C a m b on ’ s letter o f M a y 29, 1905, D .D .F ., 2mt S er., V ol. V I , pp. 5 57-8, N o. 465. cp. also the
m em orandum headed “ N ote sur les a ccord s F ra n co-A n g la is ” prep a red in th e F ren ch F oreign
Office on A p ril 17, 1914, D .D .F ., 3 me S er., V ol. X , pp. 177-80, N o. 110. I t covers the period
1 905-12.]

No. 413.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . B ertie .G)
F.O. 371/1368.
4 6 3 0 5 /3 1 29 5 /1 2 /2 2.
(No. 533.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, October 30, 1912.
I told M. Cambon to-day(2)that, in thinking over his proposal for a draft letter as
to our naval negotiations, it had seemed to me well to embody the three points which
described the situation. One was that consultations took place between our experts;
another was that these consultations did not bind the Governments to a ctio n ; and the
third was that, in the event of a threatening situation, the Governments would consult

(*) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and t o the C a bin et.]
( 2) [cp. M . P a u l C a m bon ’ s lon g despa tch su m m a rizin g th e conversations, D.D .F., 3me Ser.,
V ol. I V , pp 318-22, N o. 301.]
 613

together as to whether they were prepared to take action in com m on, and if so what
it should be. I then gave M . Cambon the following draft of a letter :—
“ F rom time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that
such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at
any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. W e have
agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as
an engagement that commits either Governm ent to action in a contingency that
has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French
and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
engagement to co-operate in war.
“ You have however pointed out that if either Government had grave reason
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might becom e essential to
know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the
other.
“ I agreed that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power or something that threatened the general
peace it should immediately discuss with the other, whether both Governments
should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what
measures they would be prepared to take in com m on .”

M. Cambon, after reading the draft, asked whether the Cabinet were aware of it.
I replied that it had been read to them, and that I was in a position to write him
a letter drawn up as the draft stood. The substance o f it represented the actual facts
of the situation, but the form was perhaps a little brusque. I therefore gave him the
draft for consideration.
M. Cambon made no adverse comment 011 it, and took it away for consideration.
[ f am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 414.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.( l)

F.O. 371/1368.
4 8 0 5 5 /3 1 29 5 /1 2 /1 7.
(No. 546.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, N ovem ber 7, 1912.
M. Cambon inform ed me to-day(2) that M. Poincare was ready to accept the letter,
of which I had given W. Cambon a draft on O ct[ob er] 30th,(3) but he would like to
add at the end of it the following w o r d s :—
“ si ces mesures comportaient une action les ententes de nos Etats-M ajors
produiraient leur effet.”
[ I am. &c.]
E, G [K E Y ].

( x) [T h is d espa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to the C a b in et on

N ovem b er 12, 1912.]
(2) [cp . D .D .F ., 3 me Ser., V ol. I V , p. 535, N o. 534 ]
(3) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 014

N o. 415.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. Bertie .( ')
F.O. 371/1368.
49808 '3 1 2 95 /12 /1 7 .
(No. 5 6 4 a .) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, Novem ber 21, 1912.
I explained to M. Cambon that the words he had suggested in our conversation
on the 7th instant/2) would bind the two Governments, if they decided to co-operate
to carry out plans made by the General Staffs. But the plans drawn up at one time
m ight be impracticable or undesirable if an em ergency arose two or three years hence
under conditions which could not be foreseen.
For instance a European em ergency might come when our troops were engaged
in or required for trouble in E gypt the Soudan or India. I thought therefore that
the words used must leave it open to the G ov[ernm en]ts, even If they decided to
co-operate to reconsider plans previously made by the General Staff.
I therefore suggested the following words “ if these measures involved action
the plans o f the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the
Governm ents would then decide what effect should be given to them .”
M. Cambon said that this would do perfectly and he accepted the words. He
asked me if I would now write him a letter in these terms.
I said that I would do so in English, and he said that he would reply with a
corresponding letter in F ren ch ./3)
[ I am, A c.]
E . G [B E Y ].

O [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a bin et.]
(2) [u. im m ed ia tely preced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [ v. in fra, pp. 614-5, N cs. 416 -7 .]

No. 416.

Sir Edward G rey to M. Paul Cambon.f 1)

F.O. 371/1368.
5 0 2 0 6 /3 1 29 5 /1 2 /1 7.
Private.
My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, N ovem ber 22, 1912.
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military
experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consulta­
tion does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time
whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits
either Government to action in a contingency7 that has not arisen and may never
arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at
the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know
whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Governm ent had grave reason to expect an unprovoked
attack by7 a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should
immediately discuss with the other, whether both Governments should act together
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so what measures they would be

P ) [ cp. D.D .F., 3me Sér., V ol. I V , pp. 535-7, N o. 534, and Annexe I.]
 615

prepared to take in com m on. If these measures involved action, the plans of the
General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would
then decide what effect should be given to them.
Yours. Ac.
E. G E E Y .

[E D . y'O T E .— T he final sentence o f the a bove letter, b e g in n in g “ I f these m easures in volved

a ction . . . . ” was om itted by S ir E d w a rd G rey when he read the le tte r in the H ouse o f
C om m ons on A u g u st 3. 1914. v. P ari. D eb ., oth S er., H ou se o f C om m ons . V ol. 65. p. 1813.
H e alludes to th is fa ct in T w e n ty -F iv e T ea rs. V ol. I I , pp . 16-17. T he letter is p r in te d in full
in the W h ite P a p e r C ollected D ip lom a tic D ocu m en ts, p. SO. X o . 105. encl.]

No. 417.

M. Paul Cambon to Sir Edward G rey .■1

F.O. 371 1368.

50207 31295 12 17.
Privée. Ambassade de France, Londres,
Cher Sir Edward, ce 23 novem bre. 1912.
Par votre lettre en date d ’ hier 22 Novembre, vous m 'avez rappelé que. dans ces
dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande­
Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps ; qu’ il avait toujours été entendu
que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de
décider dans l ’ avenir s’ ils se prêteraient l'u n l ’ autre le concours de leurs forces
arm ées: que. de part et d ’ autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n ’ étaient et ne
devaient pas être considérées com m e des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements
à agir dans certains cas : que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l ’ un ou
l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d ’ appréhender une attaque
non provoquée de la part d ’ une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s’ il
pourrait com pter sur l ’ assistance armée de l ’ autre.
Votre lettre répond à cette observation et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que.
dans le cas où l ’ un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un m otif grave d ’ aj préhender
soit l ’ agression d ’ une tierce puissance, soit quelqu’ evênement menaçant pour la paix
générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l ’ autre si les deux
Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l ’ agression u de sauve­
garder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures
qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en com m un ; si ces mesures comportaient une action,
les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états
majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.
Votre sincèrement dévoué.
PA U L CAMBON.

(*) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 mt| Eér., V ol. I V , pp. 537-8, X o . 534. A n n ex e I I ]

 016

N o. 418.
E xtract from the Annual R eport for France for the year 11)1*2.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 4 60 0 9 /4 6 00 9 /1 3 /1 7.
(No. 4 0 7 a .) Paris, D. August 1, 1913.
Sir, R. August 3, 1913.
1. In order to form a judgm ent as to the ability of the French Ministries to
carry out their views in regard to the foreign policy of the French Republic, it would
be advisable to read the chapter “ Ministerial and Parliamentary ” in my present
despatch (paragraphs 1*29-141, pp. 26-29) before those now following relating to the
foreign policy and the foreign relations of France.
2. In m y report for the year 1911 and in previous reports I stated that the bases
of F rench foreign policy are : the alliance with Russia, the Agreements of 1904 and
the good understanding with E ngland resulting th erefrom ; the Franco-Italian
Agreem ent of 1900 respecting Tripoli and M orocco; and the Franco-Spanish Agree­
ments of 1904 and 1905 relative to M orocco; the understanding of 1907 between
France, Spain, and England for the preservation of the territorial status quo and their
respective rights in the Mediterranean and in the part of the Atlantic which washes
the shores of Europe and A frica ; and the Secret Agreement (1902) between the
Italian and the French Governments that, in the event of a German attack on France,
Italy will remain neutral, so that the French troops on the Italian frontier can be
directed against Germany.
3. The political situation was changed in the course of the year 1912 by the
following even ts: the Franco-Germ an Convention of the 4th November, 1911, relating
to M orocco, was finally ratified by the French Parliam ent; the French Government
concluded a treaty with the Sultan of M orocco for the establishment of a French
protectorate over his country (not yet officially recognised by Ilis M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment) and a convention on the subject with the Spanish G overnm ent; the Italian
Governm ent came to terms with the Porte on the subject of Tripoli and the iEgean
islands occupied by Italian troops, imm ediately before which the Balkan States went
to war with Turkey, the result of which, together with the continued occupation by
Italy of some of the iEgean islands, raised the question of the balance of power in the
Mediterranean.
4. W ith the French people the en tente between France and England has become
the national policy and the means for the preservation of peace, viz., as the obstacle
which stands in the way of a German attack on France. W hilst, therefore, they regard
the en tente as an insurance against Germany, I do not think that either the French
Government or the French public are at all inclined to take advantage of expected
British aid against Germany to pursue an aggressive or hazardous policy or to incur
any reasonably avoidable risks.
5. As I have said in previous reports, whenever the French Government have to
deal with a matter relating to foreign affairs they never feel confident that any action
that they m ay take will not be made an occasion for obstruction or intrigue against
them by the German Government, whose agents and press take every opportunity that
presents itself to endeavour to impress on the French people the disadvantage and
danger of friendship with England— whose support they represent would not be forth­
com ing in an em ergency— and the benefits to be derived from an understanding with
Germany. The German Government keep questions and grievances simmering in tho
pot alongside the fire, ready at any m oment to be put on it and boiled up for use when
thought advisable. The French people and Governm ent strongly desire peace,
and there need not be any fear of the French Government provoking war with
G erm a n y; but they are less in awe o f her than they were, and they would not submit
to German dictation as they would have done a few years ago, for they have become
confident in the capacity of their officers, the superiority of their artillery over that
 617

of Germany, and the efficiency of their troops of all arms. They dread, however,
what a struggle with Germany would entail in sacrifice of life and m oney and the
possibility of defeat, but by no means do they believe in the probability of another
disastrous defeat such as that of 1870-1.
6. During the M orocco crisis the feeling against Germany was very strong, and
if war had becom e a certainty owing to the attitude and preparations of Germany the
French could not have been expected to forego the advantage of seeking a successful
battle on German soil to infuse spirit into the French troops so necessary at the first
set-off, given the élan in victory and depression in reverse characteristic of the French
race. In such case which would have been the real aggressor? France because her
troops had crossed the frontier in order to anticipate a German invasion, or Germany
because she had forced France into a position in which war had become inevitable?
7. The French Government and people look to Russia to support France as her
ally, and they feel that England will, for the sake of her own interests, come to the aid
of France in a war brought on by Germany. The French Government realise the
parliamentary difficulties which lie in the way of His M ajesty’ s Government form ally
binding England to give such aid, and the difficulty o f defining the circumstances in
which the French Government would have the right to call upon England to com e to
the assistance o f France. They would like to have something more definite than the
understanding o f 1904, something that w7ould assure to them the immediate material
aid of England on a prearranged plan in the event of a war being forced on France by
Germany. They have, however, to content themselves with the conviction that in the
event o f war between France and Germany England will be bound in her own interest
to support France, and that so long as Germ any believes that if she attack France she
will have to fight England also, there will not be war. It is for that reason that
French Ministers have regretted and deprecated the repudiation by His M ajesty’ s
Government, in reply to enquiries in the House of Commons, of the existence of any
engagement binding England to give armed assistance to France.C)
8. In France generally more confidence is felt in England than in Russia. W hat
the French Government and people object to as regards Russia is that France is
always expected to provide m oney, and is dragged about by the Russian Governm ent
into the support of what are often merely sentimental or unavowable Russian interests,
and by no means the permanent interests of France. Moreover, the Russian Govern­
ment have not alw'ays acted loyally towards France w'here Germ any is concerned. H is
M ajesty’ s Government make no like demands on France, and have invariably given
to her what is generally known to have been a loyal co-operation and support in
accordance with their undertakings.
9. Great political importance was attached to M. Poincaré’ s visit to Russia,
during which a Naval Convention was, it is said, concluded(2) supplementary to the
Russo-French Military Convention of 19u2,(3) and to the visit of the Grand Duke
Nicholas to the French military manœuvres.
10. An important statement was made in the Chamber on the 31st December by
M. Poincare regarding the relations o f France, England, and Russia during the
Balkan war. (See paragraph 141, p. 29.)(4)
C ) [ cp . S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s sta tem ent in th e H ou se of C om m ons on M a rch 30, 1911,
p. 338, N o. 277 ; G ooch et T em p erley, V ol. I, p. 291, N o. 361, and V ol. I I , p. 82, No. 94.]
(2) [cp. supra, pp. 607-9, Nos. 4 0 7 -8 .]
(3) [cp. D .D .F ., 2me S ér., V ol. I, pp. 131-46, N o. 112; V ol. I l l , pp. 601-14, A n n ex es , w here
docum ents are p rin ted o f d a te F eb ru a ry 21, M a y 16-17, D ecem b er 21, 1901, and A u g u st 1903;
cp. also P. R e n o u v in : “ L es E n g a gem en ts de l ’ A llia n ce F ra n co-R u sse.” B e v u e d ’H is to ir e de
la G u e r r e . M on d ia le, O ctober 1934, pp. 297-310. T he M ilita r y C on v en tion was revised a t a
m eetin g o f J u ly 13, 1912, th e p rocès-v erb a l o f th e m eetin g b ein g g iv en in D .D .F ., 3 me S ér.,
V ol. I l l , pp. 258-64, No. 2 0 0 ; cp. also supra, pp. 582-3, N o. 383, and n ote ( 4).]
(4) [T h e p a ra g ra p h cited sum m arized M . P o in c a r é ’ s speech, d escrib in g it as g iv en “ ju st
before his ca n d id a tu re fo r the P rem iersh ip w as a n n ou n ced .” T he speech is g iv en in g rea ter
d eta il in P o in ca ré , I I , pp. 400-412. T he d a te o f the speech is said th ere to be th e 21st.
M . P o in c a r é states th a t he had su b m itted in a d v an ce to S ir E d w a rd G rey the passages
re fe rrin g to th e E n te n te cordiale.']
 618

11. The policy of France being one of peace, she desires the relations between
England and Germany to be such as to obviate a recourse to arms between them, for
she feels that, whether her engagements bound her to become a party to such a war
or not, she would inevitably be dragged into it, either by being attacked by Germany
for the purpose of being forced to join against England, or in defence of her vital
interests in the contingency of a prospective defeat of England by Germany. Provided
that a rapprochement between E ngland and Germany have only for its object the
removal of any outstanding difficulties between the two countries, and it therefore
tend to the preservation of peace, no objection would be felt in France ; but, as I have
stated in m y reports, it is “ essential that the French public should not be led to
suspect that Ilis M ajesty’ s Government wish to have an agreement with Germany,
not only on specific questions that may be at issue, but on general policy.” It was
therefore with much misgiving that the French Government regarded the negotiations
between the British and German Governments, of which they were made cognisant
through the French Ambassador in London : and it was with alarm that they learnt
the readiness of His M ajesty’ s Government to agree to a formula which the French
Government considered would be a limitation of British freedom of action, detrimental
to the interests of France in the event of a dispute between her and Germany. Jn
present circumstances it is not conceivable that a French Government would act with
Germany against England, but it must be borne in mind that many people in France,
and military authorities, though they feel confident that, so long as Germany believes
that England will actively support ¿’ ranee, Germany will not attack France, fear that
if war should break out without much preliminary warning British military aid might
not arrive in time or be numerically sufficient to stay a German invasion of France
by land, and that in the absence of adequate British military aid the useful assistance
of England would be limited to dealing with the German navy and the cutting off of
supplies to Germany by sea. There is more universal and openly expressed hatred of
Germ any in France now than some years back. I think that this is due to the
attitude of the German Government and the tone of the German press in regard to
M orocco, and to the feeling that France is militarily stronger and more able to assert
herself than hitherto.(s)

Suggestion of an Anglo-French Alliance.

18. The French press as reported by me in the last week of May took up and
discussed the question of an alliance between Great Britain and France which had
been raised by the “ M orning P ost.” Generally speaking the more important organs
of the French press, while showing sympathy with the desire for a closer union,
recomm ended that full time should be allowed for such an idea to ripen in the minds
of the British public as indiscreet comments in France with regard to it might do
more harm than good. Other French papers expressed more clearly the view that
the necessary preliminary to an A nglo-French Alliance would be the adoption of
com pulsory military service in Great Britain enabling the British arm y to be put on a
level with the principal continental armies and thus make the suggested alliance really
valuable to France in the event of a war with Germany. M. Poincare alluded to the
press discussion in the Chamber o f Deputies on the 14th June in the following
terms :—
“ La presse anglaise a récemm ent débattu la question de savoir s ’ il était
désirable de transformer cette entente en alliance proprement dite. Les avis se
sont partagés sur ce point de l ’ autre côté du détroit; mais les deux Gouverne­
ments amis ne se sont pas mêlés à cette discussion. L ’ entente cordiale a pour
elle, à défaut de parchemin, la garantie d ’ une opinion, en immense majorité
favorable, dans chacun des deux pays. Elle laisse entière la liberté d ’ action des

(s) [P a ra g ra p h s 12-17 are om itted as they discuss aspects o f F ren ch p olicy not relevant to
the present su b ject.]
 619

deux Gouvernements ; mais elle leur facilite le règlement quotidien de beaucoup

d ’ affaires communes, et la recherche de solutions concordantes dans les problèmes
de politique générale. C’ est ainsi que la Triple Entente contribue à maintenir
l ’ équilibre européen sans que personne puisse prendre ombrage d ’ aucun de ses
actes ni d'aucune de ses intentions: c ’ est ainsi que, sans rien aliéner de notre
indépendance nous trouvons dans cette entente pour notre diplomatie, com m e les
deux nations amies et alliées y trouvent, elles aussi, de précieux éléments de
succès.’ !

You informed M. Cambon on the 18th June that what M. Poincaré had said about
French relations with Great Britain seemed to you right and very well expressed.

Naval Co-operation beticeen Great Britain and France.

19. Throughout the summer the press was engaged in discussing the m eaning of
the withdrawal of British battleships from Malta and the questions which such action
involved. The announcement of the negotiation o f a naval agreement between France
and Russia was stated in certain quarters to have a connection with the reduction of
the British naval forces in the Mediterranean which, it was supposed, was to be left to
France to protect. It was announced by the “ Matin ” on the 10th September that the
French Government had ordered the transfer to Toulon of the six battleships which
form ed the third squadron, hitherto stationed at Brest. The “ T em p s” commented
on this decision, describing it as being consistent with the prevailing theories as to the
best manner o f em ploying fleets and as strategically sound. The “ Temps ” assumed
that the respective duties of the British, French, and Russian fleets had been laid
down. W ithout seeking to define the rôle of each fleet, a glance at the geographical
situation showed that the Russian fleet would prevent the massing of the entire
German fleet in the North Sea, thus increasing the superiority of the British one.
It would be the duty of France to confront the Austrian and Italian squadrons in the
Mediterranean, and by concentrating her naval force there France would be able to
fulfil that duty more effectually. Some attention was paid to a suggestion made in
the “ E cho de P a ris ” of the 13th September by Vice-Adm iral Germinet, who liad
been m entioned as a possible successor to M. Delcassé as Minister of Marine. It was
to the effect that France and England should, on the outbreak of war, regard the
English Channel as territorial waters and notify to neutrals its closure.
20. B v arrangement with His M ajesty’ s Government Vice-Adm iral Boué de
Lapeyrère, com m ander-in-chief of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean,
proceeded with three battleships to Malta in January to salute the King on his return
journey to England from India. The “ T e m p s ” newspaper observed on this visit to
Malta that the A nglo-French friendship had been affirmed in the most striking manner
in the summer of 1911 by Mr. Lloyd George. It had an incomparable preventive
action. It did not entail a written alliance, but Europe recognised that it had the
value of one. It had been shown on several occasions what it could effect in time of
peace, and no one doubted that if war broke out England would be found side by side
with France in taking military action.
 620

I I — NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ANGLO-ITALIAN PACT, 1 9 1 2 -1 4 .

No. 419.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rcy.(')

F.O. 371/1383.
1 830 8 /1 8 30 8 /1 2 /2 2.
Private. Rom e, D. April 13, 1912.
M y dear Sir Edward, P- April 30, 1912.
Not very long ago I tentatively put forward the suggestion(2) that it might he
worth while considering whether we might not try to obtain at a favourable moment
from Italy some undertaking similar to the secret agreement which she contracted with
France in 1902,(3) which appeared to render Italy’ s participation in the Triple Alliance
relatively innocuous as far as France was concerned, and has enabled the French to
draw off a considerable number of troops from her Alpine frontier and to station them
in positions more directly menaced.
I am not now going to revert to that particular suggestion, but only refer to it
because it has a certain indirect analogy with another one, more easily realisable
perhaps, which I hope you will not think me importunate in submitting to you.
I would preface it by saying that the developments of the last month or two seem to
me rather to point to the grip of the Triple Alliance closing round Italy more tightly
than before. The position which France commanded in this country at the beginning
of the war has been lost, in a sense perhaps irretrievably; not that com m unity of
interests may not well bring France and Italy closer together again, but because
Italians have convinced themselves that little trust can be placed on French professions
o f friendship, when a minor issue arising out o f a naval seizure, which could have
been composed by a little mutual forbearance, aroused such a storm of anti-Italian
feeling and denunciation as did the “ C arthage” and “ Manouba ” incidents. So far
as we are concerned I think in spite o f an unfortunate press campaign, the correct and
friendly attitude of the Government has been, and continues to be, justly appreciated,
certainly by all those whose opinion is of consequence. But the old theory that
popular feeling and traditional friendship would override all other influences, has been
somewhat shaken. Russia at present, of the three so-called friendly powers, rather
holds the first place for the moment in public sympathy and is no doubt bidding for
it, but if the efforts she is making towards peace have no effect she may not retain it.
Meanwhile unremitting efforts are made by the agents of the two allied Empires to
draw Italy into their orbit and no opportunity is missed by the press of those two
countries for utilizing the ‘ suppressio veri ’ and the ‘ insinuatio falsi ’ to our detriment,
while Italians are constantly rem inded that in the Triple Alliance is now their only
chance of salvation. The great expenditure entailed by the protraction of the war and
the consumption of the material strength o f Italy seem to be destined, unless she could
assure herself of something more than moral support elsewhere, to reduce her to a
condition of almost vassalage for m any years to come to Austria, at whose m ercy an
exhausted Italy must inevitably be, wrhile from all one is led to believe the future ruler
o f Austria is not likely to leave her any alternative. I have already referred, though
no doubt there was no necessity for me to point it out, to the difference in the
Mediterranean situation which must result from the Triple Alliance gaining a footing
on the North African coast;— to the position of Malta half-way between an actual and
a contingent strong naval station, controlled by the Triple Alliance pow ers;— and to
the advantage which obviously would lie in our controlling the narrow part of the

t 1) [T h is letter is end orsed as h a vin g been sent t o the P rim e M in is t e r ; to S ir A. N icolson.]

( 2) [cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I X (T), pp. 365-6, N o. 368.]
(3) [cp . G ooch (t- T em p erley, V ol. V I I I , p. 23, Ed. N o te, w here referen ce is g iv en to P ribram ,
V ol. I I , pp. 230-41, 250 ; D .D .F ., 2me S er., V ols. I and I I passim , and esp ecially to V ol. II,
p. 338, N o. 2 77 ; Gooch T em p erley, V ol. I , p. 291. N o. 361, and V ol. II, p. 82, N o. 94.]
 621
Mediterranean which separates the naval area o f one central Em pire from that of the
other. It m ay be impracticable at the present time to contemplate the realisation of
this last contingency : but there is still something which might be realisable and
probably o f considerable value to our interests.
Personally I have always believed, and I think there is somewhere evidence to
show that the belief is not wholly fantastic, that one o f the ambitions of Germany—
or shall I say of the Pan-Germ ans?— is, in the event of some resettlement after a
great European war, to obtain possession or control o f E gypt, and with it of the great
trade route to the East, in any case to rem ove it from our control. G erm any’ s ally,
established in Tripolitania, might be utilized conceivably for the furtherance o f such a
design. The part assigned to the weakest m ember of the Triple Alliance might not
inconceivably be an attack on E gypt. (W e have just seen in the last two or three
days a very large force, it is said some 20,000 men, landed without great difficulty at
the western end of the Tripoli coast where there was no harbour and shallow water on
a shelving shore.)
Now it seems to me that we might well, starting perhaps from the point of view
of a com m on interest as Christian powers, occupying Mussulman countries in North
Africa, find Italy net indisposed at the present time to enter into an agreement with
us by which we mutually bound ourselves to respect our reciprocal areas of influence
in North Africa, and pledged ourselves to regard them as outside all other issues
which might arise, undertaking under no circumstances to engage in any aggressive
action, we as regards Tripoli and Italy as regards E gypt. Perhaps a similar agreement
might be entered into between Italy and France as regards Tripoli and Tunis, and
Italy might well I think be not reluctant to do so, having in mind the dangers which
might arise for her new possessions from a possible antagonism o f the F rench. Of
course it m ay at once be said that such an agreement would be tantamount to a
recognition b y us of Italy’ s annexation of Tripoli, but it could not be held that it
implied the presumption that we had annexed E gypt. It would on ly hold good
inasmuch as it affected the reciprocal attitude o f powers in m ilitary occupation. Such
an agreement need not be made public but even were it to becom e known, her allies
would have, as things are now, no reasonable ground for objecting to such action on
the part of Italy, and indeed to do so would be to give themselves away.
I can o f course see plenty of difficulties in the path, but not necessarily
insurmountable ones, and there might, I venture to think, be real advantages in thus
to some extent safeguarding the Mediterranean situation, while the realisation of such
a scheme m ight have further consequences than those immediately apparent.
Yerv sincerely vours,
P E N N E L L EODD .

[E D . A O T E .— N o record has been tra ce d o f con v ersation s betw een G rea t B rita in and Ita ly
on th is subject u n til O ctober, 1912. R eferen ces w ere, how ever, m ade t o the su b ject in th e course
o f th e A n g lo-F ren ch n eg otia tion s describ ed in th e p reced in g S ection . cp. sup ra p. 593
N o. 3 9 1 ; D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. I l l , pp. 119^-20, N o. 96.]
 622

N o. 42 0.
Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edxcard Grey.
F.O. 371 1384. '
44837/44084 12/44.
(No. 330.) Confidential. R om e, D. October 20, 1912.
Sir, R. October 24, 1912.
I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me when
I went to see him on my arrival in Rome, that the Marquis Imperiali had informed
him that you had expressed your readiness to discuss an arrangement for the safe­
guarding of our mutual interests in North Africa. He had, he said, no further
indication than this what form of arrangement might be contemplated but if any
proposal with this object were submitted to him he would be glad to give it his most
serious consideration. I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD.
M IN U T E .
T he Secretary of S ta te has spoken to th e M a rq u is Im peria li on th is subjcct.(>)
R . G. V.
O c t [o b e r ] 25.
R . P . M.

(>) [N o record can be tra ced of a con v ersation w ith the M a rq u is Im p eria li on this date.
On O ctob er 18, the A m bassador in form ed S ir A . N icolson th a t the M a rq u is di San G iuliano
w ished fo r fu r th e r in fo rm a tio n a bou t m utual in terests in N orth A frica . S ir A. N icolson 's note
is m in u ted by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ I have spoken a ga in to the Ita lia n A m bassador. E. G.
30.10.12.” (F.O . 371/1384. 4 4 0 8 4 /4 4 0 8 4 /1 2 22.) T his second con v ersation is record ed infra,
p. 623, N o. 423.]
!

No. 421.
Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r ey .{1)

F.O. 371 1384. R om e, October 25, 1912.

4 5 1 5 5 /4 4 0 8 4 /1 2 /2 2 . R- 7-35 p . m .
Tel. (No. 149.) Confidential. R- 10-30 p .m .
M y despatch No. 330 of O ct[ob er] 19.(2) .
Prime Minister before leaving Rom e some days ago told the French Ambassador
in conversation that he was favourably disposed to the idea of entering into
arrangements with Great Britain and France for safeguarding our respective interests
in North Africa. French Ambassador said that he had not yet mentioned this to his
Government.
0 ) [C opies of this teleg ram w ere sen t to the A d m ir a lty ; to th e D ir e cto r o f N aval
I n te llig e n c e ; to th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O peration s.]
( 2) [a. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t. The despatch was d a ted O ctob er 20, 1912.]

No. 422.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(l)

F.O. 371/1383.
4 6 3 0 6 ; 1 8308/12/22.
(No. 532.) Secret.
g ]r> Foreign Office, October 30, 1912.
* M. Cambon told me to-d ay(2) that M. Poincare entirely shared m y idea of the
advantage of an Agreem ent with Italy, for guaranteeing our respective possessions in
North Africa, and he thought of proposing such an Agreement in Rom e.
( ’ ) [T his despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and t o the C abinet. It
was rep eated to R om e (N o. 2 5 7 ); to C a iro (N o. 158) secret, on N ovem b er 4 .]
(2) [cp. D.D.F., 3 me S ir., V ol. I V , p. 296, N o. 285.]
 023
I said that “ gu aran tee” was perhaps a rather strong word, which might imply
com bined action. Also “ possessions” might be held not to cover E gypt, which was
not technically a possession of ours. W hat I had in mind might be more exactly
expressed by an Agreement to respect the “ status quo ” in North Africa. I proposed
to sound the Italian Ambassador a little more before putting forward a definite
proposal.(3)
[ I am. &c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
( 3) [t\ im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 428.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. R odd.f1)

F.O. 371/1388.
40852./18308 12 22.
(No. 252.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, October 30, 1912.
I said to the Italian Ambassador to-day that I heard that the Marquis di San
Giuliano would like to know what was in my m ind about an Agreement with Italy, as
to the countries under our control in North Africa, to the idea of which he seemed
favourable. My object was that Italy, France, and ourselves should be free from
anxiety as to the preservation of the “ status quo ” in North Africa. As to the actual
form and formula, I would rather like to know what the Italian Governm ent thought.
The Ambassador said that he gathered m y idea to be that Italy and ourselves
should each agree, no matter what happened, to maintain the status quo ” in North
Africa. ( 2)
I replied that this was the sort of thing which I had in m y mind.
H e observed that it seemed to him very practical. It meant that we would not
disturb Tripoli, and Italy would not disturb E gypt. This was no doubt already the
intention we both had.
I said that undoubtedly it was, but some public mutual assurance might give
confidence to public opinion that, when European questions were disturbing the
atmosphere, the disturbance would not spread to North Africa.
I am, &c.
E. G R E Y.
( ' ) [T h is despa tch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and to the C a binet. It
1 was rep eated t o P a r is (N o. 5 3 9 ); to C airo (N o. 159) on N ov em b er 5.]
(2) [v. im m ed iately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 424.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 371/1384. R om e, N ovem ber 3, 1912.
4 6 5 4 2 /4 6 5 4 2 /1 2 /2 2 . D. 3 -45 p . m .
Tel. (No. 150.) R. 5 -3 0 p . m .
French Ambassador saw Italian Minister for Foreign A ffairs)-) before latter’ s
departure for Berlin, and said to him that, in view of secret agreement between
France and Italy, he hoped it would not be indiscreet on his part to enquire, if he had
any intention on this occasion of dealing with renewal of Triple Alliance, any
modification in its terms might affect the conditions of 1902 agreem ent.(3)
( 0 [T h is teleg ra m is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p eration s
on N ovem b er 5 .]
(2) [cp . D .D .F ., 3™ S er., V ol. IV , pp. 327-8, N o. 308.]
(3) [r . supra, p. 620, N o. 419, n ote (3).]
 624

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that renewal of Triple Alliance had not been
dealt with at Pisa, nor would it be settled now at Berlin. He regarded it as probable
that it would eventually be renewed, but if so it would be without any m odification:
in that case, French Ambassador enquired would agreement of 1902 be regarded as
holding good ? Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would remain in full effect.

M IN U T E S .

T he 1902 a greem ent is presum ably th a t o f whose existen ce we heard in 1907,C ) to the effect
th a t, in the event o f an a tta ck by G erm any on F ra n ce, Ita ly w ould rem ain n eutra l, thus
e n a b lin g F ra n ce to den ude her Ita lia n fr o n tie r o f troop s. I d o n ’ t find th a t we knew the
ex a c t date o f the a greem ent b efore, it was supposed to have been m ade “ a bou t 1903.”
Q [u e r ]y . D.M .O . re f[e r e n c e ] our secret letter to the W .O. of M arch 5, 1907.(s)
C. W . 0 .
G. R . C.
4.11.12.
See_109.(6)
'0 9
E. A. C
N ov [em b er] 4.
A. N

A teleg ram such as this relatin g to a secret agreem en t betw een tw o oth er P ow ers should
have been m arked secret and not p rin ted for circu la tion in the sections.
E. G.
I have had it taken out.
O.

(4) [u. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I X (1), p. 28, No. 24, n o te (2).]
(5) [T h e letter to the W a r Office o f M a rch 5, 1907, enclosed a despatch o f F eb ru a ry 25, 1907,
from th e m ilita ry atta ch e at Rom e. T his stated th a t the w ritten a greem ent betw een F ra n ce
and Ita ly up on whose ex isten ce he had re p orted on F eb ru a ry 9 was said t o have been m ade
“ a b ou t fo u r years a g o .” (F.O . 3 61/267. 6 8 3 1 /5 1 0 7 /0 7 /2 2 .)]
( 6) [T he referen ce is to S ir R . R o d d ’ s despatch (N o. 205), D. D ecem b er 28, 1908,
R . J a n u a ry 2, 1909. I t n a rra ted a con v ersation w ith an unnam ed a cq u ain tan ce in R om e on
the su b ject o f the p olicy of the M a rq u is d i R u d in i and M a rq uis P rin e tti in con n ection w ith the
T rip le A llian ce and relation s w ith G rea t B rita in and F ra n ce. (F .O . 371 /68 2. 1 0 9 /1 0 9 /0 9 /2 2 .)]

No. 425.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rey .(*)

F.O. 371/1383.
4 8 7 6 7 /1 8 30 8 /1 2 /2 2.
(No. 353.) Confidential. R om e, D. N ovem ber 10, 1912.
Sir, B. N ovem ber 16, 1912.
W ith reference to your despatch No. 252 Confidential of the 30th ultimo, (2) 1
have the honour to report that the French Ambassador received definite instructions
to discuss with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs the conclusion of an
agreement, to be an extension of the existing agreement of 1902,(3) tending to
guarantee the status quo in North Africa as regards the territories controlled by the
respective parties. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been absent since the
receipt of these definite instructions, and the French Ambassador is awaiting his
return to make some form al proposal and ascertain the views of the Italian Govern­
ment. Having occasion, however, a few days ago to see the President of the Council,

(! ) [T h is despatch was sent to P a ris (as N o. 5 7 0 ); to C a iro (as N o. 172) w ith S ir R . R o d d s

teleg ram (N o. 169), and S ir E. G rey ’ s telegram (N o. 539) o f N ov em b er 21 to R om e, on
N ovem b er 25. cp. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docum ent, and m in .]
(2) [v. supra, p. 623, No. 423.]
(3) [v. supra, p. 620, No. 419, n o te ( 3).]
 625

to whom he had already spoken vaguely of such a scheme., he said that he had now
received instructions to approach the matter officially. Signor Giolitti said he was
very favourable to such a proposal and that he was even ready to approve the
principle of a reciprocal guarantee. Monsieur Barrere has promised to keep me
inform ed as to the terms which it will be proposed to give such an arrangement, and
as to the progress of iiis negotiations.
I have, Ac.
R E X X E L L RODD.

M IN T T E S .

S ig n or G io litti goes so fa r as to b e rea d y to a gree to a m u tu a l g u aran tee.

S ir R . R o d d has re p orted in cid en ta lly in a n oth er d e s p [a t c h ](4) th a t th e F ren ch A m bassador
has postp on ed sp eak in g to th e M [in is t e r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A [ffa ir s ] on th e subject u n til th e
risib le effects o f his v isit to B erlin have w orn off.
T his is perh a ps h a rd lv w orth p r in tin g .
C. W . 0 .

(I th in k S ig n o r G io lit t i’ s ex pression o f o p in io n is v alua ble, an d should be p rin ted .)

G. R . C.
16.xi.12.
The m a tter is o f g rea t im p orta n ce.
E. A. C.
N o v [e m b e r] 17.
A. N.

In stru ct S ir R . R o d d to m en tion th e m a tte r to the M [in is t e r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A [ffa ir s ]

on th e lines o f m y last con v ersation w ith th e Ita lia n A m b assa d or,(5) i f M . B a rrere finds th e
M [in is t e r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A fffa ir s ] w illin g to pu rsu e n eg otia tion s.
* E . G.

(4) [S ir R . R o d d ’ s despatch (N o. 356 >), D . N ov em b er 12. R . N ov em b er 16, 1912, is not

rep rod u ced , as th e con ten ts a re sufficiently in d ica te d above. I t re p orted th e retu rn o f th e
M a rq u is d i S an G iu lia n o from B erlin on N ov em b er 9. (F 0 . 371/13S4. 4S770 46047 12 2 2 ) ]
(5) [r . sup ra , p. 623, N o. 423.]

No. 426.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F.O. 371 1383.
49517 18308/12 22.
Tel. (X o. 169.) Confidential. R om e, N ovem ber 20, 1912.
Mediterranean agreement.
French Ambassador has approached question with Minister for Foreign Affairs
without submitting any draft text, and found him well disposed as regards principle.
Form er adopted attitude that it should be step in advance of agreement entered into
between France and Italy in 1902. and suggested that it should contain provision that
if the circumstances made any change in the status quo in the Mediterranean
probable, two countries should exchange views as to what their attitude should be.
He has, meanwhile, submitted to Paris first draft of suggested text. In view of
considerable criticism in this country of the support given b y Italy to Austria in
Servian question, I think moment is favourable for these negotiations.

t 1) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta k en from th e C on fid en tial P r in t, as th e orig in a l d ecy p h er

ca n n ot be tra ced . T his teleg ra m was sent t o P a r is (as N o. 5 7 0 ); to C a iro (as N o. 172) w ith
S ir R . R o d d ’ s despa tch (N o. 353) and S ir E . G rey ’ s teleg ra m (N o. 539) o f N ov em b er 21 t o R om e,
on N ov em b er 25, v. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t, an d n o te (5) b elow .]
[10900] 2 S
 626
M IN U T E S

In view o f w hat S ir R . R o d d says as to the m om ent b ein g fa v ou ra ble, we should perhaps

a ct on S ir E. G rey ’ s M in u te on 48767(2) w ith ou t loss of tim e.
Q [u e r ]y tel. to R o m e : — C onfidential.
“ Y o u r despatch N o. 353(2) and y o u r telegram N o. 169.
“ Y o u r E x cellen cy should ta k e an early op p o rtu n ity o f a p p roa ch in g M .F .A . on
qu estion o f M ed iterra n ea n A greem en t. Y ou should base y o u r ob serv a tion s on the lines
o f my con v ersation w ith Ita lia n Am bassador, record ed in my despatch No. 252.” (3)
G R . C.
20 . 11.12
A. N.
L e t me see the tex t o f ou r p rev iou s secret agreem en t w ith Ita ly about T rip o li.('•)
E. G.
20 . 11 . 12 .
I suppose this teleg ram has been s e n t : if not it should g o at on ce.(s)
E. G.
21.1112

(2) [i\ im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t, min.']

(3) [v. supra, p. 623, N o. 423.J
(4) [cp. G ooch cfc T em p erley, V ol. I, pp . 287-90, N o. 359.]
(5) [T he teleg ram was sent (N o. 539) on N ov em b er 21. (F.O . 371/1383. 4 9 5 1 7 /1 8 3 0 8 /1 2 /2 2 .)]

No. 427.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rey .(*)

F.O. 371/1383.
5 10 9 2 /1 8 30 8 /1 2 /2 2.
(N o. 367.) Confidential. R om e, D. N ovem ber 23, 1912.
Sir, R . N ovem ber 30, 1912.
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained
in your telegram No. 529 Confidential of the 21st instant,(2) I have approached the
Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of an agreement with Italy as to the
countries under our control in North Africa.
M y observations were broadly to the following e ffe ct: that in view of the
responsibilities which attach to those who have to administer, or control the admini­
stration of widely extended territories in North Africa, inhabited by populations of
alien race, religion and customs, it was desirable that they should be free from all
anxiety of disturbance in their task, and that relations o f good neighbourhood should
be established in those Mediterranean regions no matter what happened elsewhere.
It had therefore been suggested that we should enter into some form of mutual
assurance with Italy, which would give confidence to public opinion that, when
European questions were disturbing the atmosphere, such disturbance should not
spread to North Africa. If he was in agreement, as I had no doubt he was, as to the
desirability o f this object, we ought to endeavour to find some formula which would
respectively bind us,— Great Britain not to disturb the action of Italy in T ripoli,— and
Italy not to disturb the action of Great Britain in E gypt,— and that to make such an
understanding of permanent value I felt that such areas o f occupation or dependencies
ought to be regarded as excluded from the sphere o f other obligations.
In order not to commit m yself at present definitely, I assured him that though I
thought I had interpreted the spirit o f what you had in view, I was solely responsible
for the manner in which I had put forward the proposal.

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to th e P rim e M in ister.]

( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t, min., and note (5) : th e teleg ram referred to is
N o. 539.]
 627

The Marquis di San Giuliano observed in reply that a question of considerable

importance was opened by this suggestion, he would study it, and consult the
President of the Council, as it was not a matter on which he could come to a
decision alone.
It occurred to him at once to say that the idea that our North African areas o f
interest should be liberated from all fear of disturbance whatever might happen
elsewhere, desirable in itself and to the undoubted advantage o f Italy though it would
be, to some extent involved a principle quite new in international relations. He
him self refused even to contemplate the possibility o f a state o f war ever existing
between Italy and Great Britain, but assuming for the sake of argument such a
hypothesis, the suggestion I had put forward, reduced to its real terms, meant that,
even in a case of two countries being at war with one another, certain regions would
have been by prior agreement excluded from the sphere of warlike operations,
whereas in the generally accepted theory of war, its object was to damage the enem y
everywhere that any advantage could be gained by so doing. Such an agreement
would therefore by convention limit the field o f hostilities.
I observed that in the recent war between Turkey and Italy such a principle had
been applied, and certain regions had been regarded as excluded from the operations
of war. His E xcellency admitted that this was so, but it had not been in consequence
of an anterior agreement with the other belligerent, but owing to reasons of policy.
I observed that there were precedents such as Geneva Conventions for restricting
the conditions o f warfare, and that even if his theory as to the novelty of the principle
involved were correct, I did not see that novelty impaired its value. It was rather to
be regarded as a step in advance in the march o f civilisation that we should guarantee
populations whose administration we had occasion to undertake, without consulting
them though as we believed for their own ultimate advantage, against being involved
in consequences and sufferings which our responsibilities in other parts o f the world
might entail upon ourselves.
The Marquis di San Giuliano said he did not at all dispute this idea, which on the
contrary rather commended itself to him, but it would on account o f its novelty require
careful study.
H e added that there was another point which occurred to him , and as a preface
to it he entered into a short dissertation on the ethical value o f loyalty, which he
regarded as the strongest obligation in international relations. He would have to
consider how far it would be possible for Italy to enter into an understanding o f this
character without felling her allies of her intention to do so. He felt that at the time
when an agreement was made with us which pledged us to disinterestedness as regards
Italy’ s aims in Tripoli, and when a similar agreement was made with France, it would
ha\e been better if Italy had inform ed her allies, as in that case Germany would have
known beforehand that she could not expect Italian support against French designs
on Morocco.
I said we were o f course not in a position to know what were the terms o f Ita ly’ s
obligations under the Triple Alliance.(3) W e had however seen that that instrument did
not preclude Prince Bismarck from entering into another agreement vThich apparently
partook o f the nature of counter insurance. F or aught we knew Italy might also have
other sjnnlar contracts. I did not wish him however to imagine that I was inviting
her to be disloyal to other engagements. The suggestion which had been made was
one which seemed to be to our mutual advantage, and perhaps the advantage would be
even greater to Italy than to ourselves.
rr • ,H ^ 11? xcellency did not dispute this, and said that Ita ly ’ s obligations under the
Pie Alliance were purely defensive. Outside the obligation to co-operate in defence
under certain conditions if one o f her allies were attacked, she had no obligations. It

*i n g ;t h e n a tU re- ° f th e T r ip ,e A llia n c e ’ Gooch *

C0900] ' 2 g 2
 628

however occurred to him that it might be argued that a country’ s utility to her allies
would be diminished by her agreeing to exclude certain areas from the field of
operations which had hitherto been unrestricted. He did not now lay down definitely
that it would be necessary to inform their allies of our intention to enter into such an
agreement as we were discussing, hut it was a point which he would have to study,
and if Italy did feel it incumbent on her, even then he saw no necessary reason to
anticipate objections on their part.
Meantime he thought it would be easier to consider the question, if a definite
formula were advanced. I said it seemed premature to draft a formula until we knew
whether the question of principle were accepted. To this he replied that the
acceptance of a principle might largely depend on the manner in which it was
formulated, and that the two seemed to him inseparable. I urged that when once we
knew frankly how far Italy was anxious or able to go, it would become easier to define
the scope of an agreement in the terms of a form u la ; without some expression of
opinion on her side we should not advance.
Finally he asked whether it was contemplated that such an agreement should be
public. I said I thought that you were as a general principle in favour of international
understandings being public, and that I had been quoting your own words in saying
that what we should aim at was a mutual assurance, “ which would give confidence
to public op in ion ,’ ’ that questions which might be disturbing the European atmosphere
would not spread to North Africa. From this I felt no doubt you would prefer such
an agreement to be public. His E xcellency said that this was entirely in accordance
with his own views.
As the French Ambassador has kept me fully inform ed of the instructions he has
received on the subject of a Mediterranean agreement, I felt it would be in accordance
with your wishes that I should tell him that I had now received instructions to sound
the Italian Government on the subject.
I have, &c.
R E N N E L L RODD.

M IN U T E S .

T he proposals m ade by S ir R. R o d d to the Ita lia n g ov ern m en t raise som e v ery in trica te
points. I t is not easy, from rea d in g th is despatch, [t o see] w hat he h im self had in his m ind,
o r w h ether he had a p e r fe ctly clear idea w hich he w ished to follow out.
S ir R . R o d d b ega n b y an in tim a tio n of w hat H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] desired,
I rea d this, as set ou t in the second p a ra g ra p h of the despatch, to m ean th a t if there were
at any tim e a grea t con flict o f policies d istu rb in g the E u rop ea n atm osphere, such conflict
should not em b ra ce E g y p t and T rip o li, and th a t these cou n tries should a ccord in gly be
“ reg a rd ed as ex clu d ed from the sphere o f oth er ob lig a tion s .”
H a v in g reg a rd to th e con n ection b etw een th is su g g estion and the F re n ch proposal to
e x ten d th eir secret agreem en t w ith Ita ly of 1902 to T rip o li and the N orth coast o f A frica
g en era lly, its m ea n in g w ould seem c le a r : J u st as the F ren ch succeed ed in 1902 in g ettin g
I ta ly p r a ctica lly to co n tr a c t h erself ou t o f the trip le alliance so fa r as con cern ed a quarrel in
w hich G erm any w ere to m ake a d elib era te a tta ck on F ra n ce, and ju st as I ta ly agreed not to
reg a rd the trip le a lliance as co v e rin g th e case o f disputes arisin g in T rip o li on the one hand,
o r in M o rocco on the other, so H [ is ] M [a je s t y ’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ] now h op e to ob tain an
a ssurance from Ita ly tha t, in any disp u te in v olv in g E g y p t, she w ill not consid er herself bound
t o su p p o rt G erm any in a possibly a n ti-E n g lish policy.
T h a t th e Ita lia n M in ister fo r F [o r e ig n ] A [fla ir s] u n d erstood S ir R . R o d d to m ean this,
is m ade clear by his rem arks as rep orted in the second h a lf of the present despatch, w here he
speaks o f loy a lty to the a lliance an d is answ ered b y S ir R . R o d d ’s allusion to B ism a rck ’ s
“ r e in s u r a n c e ” tre a ty w ith R ussia. A ll th is seems p la in sa ilin g , and a n y arra n gem en t we
cou ld g et on these lines w ould u n d ou bted ly be o f g rea t advantage.
B u t the M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o led S ir R . R o d d on to en tirely differen t g rou n d , and
in follow in g him there, S ir R . R o d d m ade su ggestion s w hich seem to me to g o q u ite beyond
w hat the above arra n gem en t contem p la tes, or ra th er w hich lead in another d ire c tio n altogether.
T his is a proposal th a t when E n g la n d and Ita ly are them selves actu a lly at w ar w ith each
oth er, E g y p t and T rip o li shall be con sid ered as n eutralized.
I do not know w hat a u th ority S ir R . R o d d had fo r m a k in g such a proposal, and it seems
to m e fu ll of difficulties. In a w ar w ith us, Ita ly m ay be eith er ou r only enem y, or engaged
a t th e sam e tim e as her pa rtn ers in th e trip le (o r any oth er) alliance. I do not suppose that
 629
anyone con tem p la tes a w ar betw een E n g la n d an d Ita ly singly. B u t should such a w ar take
place, w hat a d v a n ta g e should w e deriv e from an a rra n g em en t p re v e n tin g us from a tta ck in g
T r ip o li? Such an agreem ent, w hilst co n fe rr in g n o a d v an ta g e to us. m ig h t be ex ceed in g ly
con v en ien t to Ita ly . A t the sam e tim e, it w ou ld b e open to all th e criticism s p u t fo r w a rd by
the M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o : W h a t g u a ran tee w ou ld th ere be fo r the observance o f such an
a greem ent by th e b ellig eren ts? T he n orm al, n ot t o say general, rule is th a t, w ith a w ar, all
trea ties lapse. C ertain ex cep tion s have from tim e to tim e been m ade from this rule. S ir R .
R o d d m entions th e G eneva con v en tion ! B u t is th ere a real a n alog y betw een a tre a ty reg u ­
la tin g m odes o f w a rfa re an d trea tm en t o f w ou n d ed soldiers, and such a t e rr ito ria l restriction
on w a r-op era tion s as the suggested agreem en t w ou ld in v o lv e ? S ir R . R o d d m ig h t h a ve q u oted
the provisions o f the B erlin A c t res p ectin g the possible n eu tra liza tion o f th e A fr ic a n t e r r i­
t ories (i.e. th e C on g o basin) o f bellig eren ts. B u t at least th e B erlin A c t only suggests th a t
in a p a rticu la r w ar, b oth pa rties m ay a gree to leave u n m olested each o th e r’ s possessions in
th e C on g o basin. Such an agreem en t w ou ld have to b e m ade on the ou tb rea k o f a w ar and
fo r the pu rposes o f th a t w ar. It is not a g en era l a greem en t a p p licab le t o w h atev er co n tin ­
gencies m ay arise. X o r a re th ere any in d ica tio n s th a t these perm issive p r ov ision s of the
B erlin A c t are lik ely t o he p u t in to p ra ctice by a n yon e in a life or dea th stru gg le. I con clu d e
th a t in a w ar w ith Ita ly alone, th e p rop osed arra n g em en t w ou ld h a ve n oth in g t o recom m end it.
W h a t w ou ld b e th e position in a w ar in w hich w e w ere fa ce d b y th e w hole trip le a llia n ce?
T here can be n o question, then, o f E g y p t b e in g n eutra l. A t least I do n ot sup pose fo r a
m om ent th a t it is con tem p la ted to in d u ce G erm any an d A u stria to ta k e a co v en a n t not to
.treat E g y p t as h ostile. I t w ou ld b e an ex tra o rd in a ry com p lica tion , and a h igh ly a rtificia l
situ a tion , i f th ree P ow ers b ein g a t w ar w ith us, tw o o f them w ere h eld to be fr e e to operate
a ga in st E g y p t, b u t n ot the th ird . T he sam e d ou b t m ust arise in an a ccen tu a ted form , w hich
was in d ic a te d in the case o f a w ar w ith Ita ly alone, nam ely w hether such an a rtificia l a rra n g e­
m en t cou ld be relied up on to stand. T he da n g er o f its b ein g broken w ill h a ve to be p r o v id e d
a ga in st a ll th e tim e. I f the Ita lia n s d id n oth in g to m ake T rip o li a base o f a tta ck upon
E g y p t, we n eed n ot trou b le in a n y case t o m ake ela b ora te p rep a ra tion s fo r defen ce again st
such an a tta ck . B u t we cou ld never be certa in th a t Ita ly m ig h t n ot be d oin g som ething.
A n d i f she d id , w e should have to ta k e cou n ter m easures, w hether th ere w as a self-d en y in g
cov en a n t or n ot. M oreov er any real a tta ck on E g y p t m ust be m ade eith er b y sea or from
S in ai. T he success o f a la n d in g dep ends on th e com m a n d o f th e E a stern M ed iterra n ean . The
d ecisive fa cto r w ill be, in th e h ypothesis re fe rre d to, th e en em y ’ s fleets. I t a ly w ou ld be free
t o let her navy ta k e p a rt in a b a ttle a t sea th e resu lt o f w hich w ou ld in fa c t d ecid e the fa te
o f E g y p t, th ou g h th e b a ttle itself m ay be fo u g h t h u n d reds o f m iles aw ay. The situ a tion w ou ld
be e n tirely u n logica l.
I th erefore th in k th a t this p a rt o f S ir R . R o d d ’ s pla n req uires a g o o d deal fu r th e r con ­
sid eration b e fo re it can be p roceed ed w ith, an d it seems t o m e a p ity th a t it was p u t forw a rd .
In these circu m stan ces I feel m uch sym pathy w ith th e Ita lia n M in is te r’ s req u est fo r a
m ore definite p rop osal, an d th ou g h it m ay be p refera b le n ot to com m it ourselves to o defin itely
t o th e Ita lia n g o v [e r n m e n ]t by p rop os in g a form u la , it w ould, I th in k be an a d v a n ta g e if
w e cou ld form u la te som e definite schem e fo r th e con fid en tia l in fo rm a tio n an d g u id a n c e o f
S ir R . R od d .
E. A. C.
D ec [e m b e r] 1.

I t is necessary in the first p la ce th a t we ourselves should have a clear id ea o f w hat w e

desire— a n d the best w ay o f clea rin g ou r ow n m inds w ou ld be to p u t dow n on p a p er, not
necessarilv fo r c o m m u n [ic a tio ]n to the Ita lia n G o v [e r n m e n ]t b u t fo r the con sid era tion o f the
C a bin et and C [o m m itte e o f ] I [m p e r ia l] D [e fe n c e ] w hat assurances or engagem ents w e wish
to ex ch a n g e w ith Ita ly . I am a fra id S ir R . R o d d en tered on g ro u n d w hich it w as n ot necessary
o r desirable to b reak, a n d his allusion to the G eneva C on v en tion w as n ot illu m in a tin g or
apposite. W e should g et th e question, if it is t o be p u rsu ed and it ca n n ot now w ell be
d rop p ed , in to m ore precise and definite term s, a n d I w ou ld suggest th a t S ir E y re C row e
shouid d r a ft som e form o f a greem en t w h ich w ou ld m eet ou r wishes and rem ove th e M [a r q u i]s
d i San G iu lia n o’ s v erv reasonable hesitation .
A. X .

Y e s : it w ill be u seful to have a d r a ft. O f cou rse i f w e d id g o to w ar w ith Ita ly the area
cou ld n ot be a rtificia lly lim ite d b y T rea ty. T he o b je c t should be t o prom ise n ot t o in te r fe r e
w ith each oth er in T rip oli or in E g y p t n or to a ttem p t t o d istu rb th e status quo— i.e. th a t
Ita ly w ill n o t a tte m p t to distu rb us in E g y p t a n d we w ill n ot a ttem p t to d istu rb her in
T rip oli.
I t w ou ld b e u sefu l i f w e co u ld see th e F re n ch d r a ft o f th eir p rop osed agreem ent:^ and
o u r secret a greem en t w ith Ita ly a bou t T rip o li should be referred t o : it m ay p r o v id e a
sta rtin g p o in t fo r ou r d ra ft.
E. G
 630
P ro p o sed a g r eem e n t w ith I ta ly r e sp ectin g E g y p t and T ripoli.

In a ccord a n ce w ith S ir E. G rey ’ s m inu te, I sub m it herew ith a rou g h d r a ft o f a D eclara ­
tio n .(4) I do so w ith m uch d iffid e n ce ; and b eg to offer the follow in g e x p la n a t io n s :
I suggested in my p rev iou s m in u te th a t w hat we really desire is som e assurance th a t any
con flicts th a t m ay arise in or res p ectin g E g y p t w ill n ot be held to con stitu te a “ casus
foederis ” und er the term s o f the T rip le A llian ce, ju st as M orocco was in 1906 and in 1910
con sid ered to be ou tside the scope o f th e A lliance.
T o ob tain such an assurance, how ever, by a definite w ritten agreem en t seems to me a
d elica te m a tter. M oreover we know t h a t Ita ly has b ou n d herself to F ra n ce (1902 A greem ent)
to rem a in n eu tra l in a F ra n co-G erm an w ar i f the w ar w ere to be p rov o k ed by G erm any. I t
is certa in th a t G rea t B r ita in w ou ld nev er be in volved in a w ar w ith th e T rip le A llian ce in
w hich F ra n ce w ere the aggressor, so th a t we are p ra ctica lly assured th a t in any con flict in
w hich E n g la n d is a t all likely to be in v olv ed w ith the T rip le A llian ce (a g gressiv e a ction by
G erm a ny) we m ay cou n t up on Ita ly n ot jo in in g in h ostilities a ga in st us. I th in k we should
rest con ten t w ith th is and n ot risk c r e a tin g difficulties, suspicions, and offence, b oth at B erlin
an d V ien n a , b y d o in g a n y th in g w hich g ives the im pression o f ou r schem ing to d eta ch Ita ly
fr o m the T rip le A lliance.
I have th erefore restricted my p roposed D ecla ra tion to the specific problem o f E g y p t and
T rip o li, a d d in g h ow ever a prov iso t h a t the term s o f this D ecla ra tion do n ot con flict w ith any
oth er en gagem en ts w ith th ird P ow ers.
I have th ou g h t it necessary to a v oid any referen ce t o th e te r r it o r ia l status quo, because
we ou g h t n ot to b in d ourselves to m a in ta in the a ctu a l status quo in E g y p t. T he tim e m ay
com e w hen a ch a n ge o f the ten u re by w hich we h old ou r presen t p osition in E g y p t w ill be
un a voida b le, and a t such a m om ent w e should n ot be needlessly fe tte r e d by any a greem ent
w ith Ita ly.
I th erefore base the D ecla ra tion solely on the m u tu a l re c o g n itio n o f the a u th ority o f
E n g la n d and o f Ita ly in those region s as a necessary con d ition o f th e ir w elfare and d ev elop­
m en t in the w ay o f ord erly and stable g overn m en t, and deduce th erefrom an o b lig a tion on
th e p a rt o f the c o n tr a c tin g S tates n o t to em barrass or en d an g er each o th e r’ s c iv iliz in g w ork
in the tw o A fric a n cou n tries un d er th e ir con trol.
The w eakness o f such a D ecla ra tion is, I a dm it, th a t it am ounts t o v ery little and is
alm ost superfluous. B u t th is is, I th in k , u n a voida b le, g iv en the problem as raised by
S ir R . R o d d . F o r p ra c tic a l purposes, we shall really be as w ell off w ith ou t as w ith such a
D ecla ra tion .
I ts ch a ra cter m ig h t, on the oth er hand, be im p rov ed and the D ecla ra tion m ade m ore
u seful, if it cou ld be a rra n g ed th a t F ra n ce also should b ecom e a pa rty t o it. In th a t case,
at least, it w ould look businesslike and w ould really cover some good g rou n d . I t w ould am ount
to a form a l re c o g n itio n th a t the 3 P ow ers a ccep t th e d iv ision o f N orth ern A fric a am ong
them selves as a necessary and beneficent a rra n g em en t w hich th ey a gree n ot to disturb.
I have, w ith this view , so w ord ed m y D r a ft th a t by the in tr o d u c tio n o f a few w ord s it
c ou ld be a d a p ted to sign a tu re by the three P ow ers.
E. A. C.
D ec [em b er] 6.

I agree.
A. N.

Send the d r a ft to S ir R . R o d d fo r his observations, b u t say th a t b efore proceed in g

fu r th e r he should en d eav ou r to ascertain w hat are the lines and if possible w h at is the d r a ft
o f the proposed a greem ent betw een F ra n ce and I ta ly resp ectin g N orth A fric a .
E. G.
( 4) [v . in fra , pp. 633-4, N o. 429, encl.]

No. 428.
Sir R . Rodd to Sir Edward G rey.E )
F.O.. 371/1883.
533 2 4 /1 8 3 0 8 /1 2 /2 2 .
(No. 384.) R om e, D . D ecem b er 6, 1912.
Sir, B . D ecem ber 14, 1912.
W ith reference to my despatch No. 367 Confidential o f the 23rd ultimo, (2) I have
the honour to report that I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs this m orning
(*) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e
M in is te r.]
(2) [u. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t.]
whether he had further considered the question of a North African agreement on
which I had approached him nearly a fortnight ago. The Marquis di San Giuliano
replied that he was still waiting for some more definite formula on which to pronounce
an opinion, to which I replied that in that case we had evidently not quite understood
one another, as I felt it was not possible to be more precise until we knew how far he
was prepared to accept the principle involved.
H e then said he had discussed the question with the President o f the Council and
they had both agreed that the suggestions made were a little too vague to enable them
to reply definitely. W hen the matter was considered from a practical point o f view
certain concrete difficulties occurred to him. The general idea was that the regions
in which we were respectively interested in North Africa should be excluded from the
area which might be affected by a state of war. It was hardly possible for him to
contemplate a situation in which Italy could be in a state of war with E ngland, and
there was something unusual in the idea of an agreement as to what should be done if
a state of war arose. The prevailing doctrine had always been that war extinguished
all agreements. I said we should be as reluctant as he would to consider the possibility
of ever being at war with Italy, but that I thought the underlying idea was that one of
our countries might, without having any definite issue of its own to fight for, be
compelled by existing engagements to embrace the quarrel of another state and that it
seemed desirable under these circumstances to secure for the native races for whose
well-being we were responsible, that they should not suffer from the consequences of
engagements we had undertaken with other ends in n ew . I quoted to him the
engagement taken b y Eussia in 1877 when at war with Turkey not to extend military
operations to E gypt.
He then said, with the object c f g i v i n g me a practical illustration of the difficulties
which he foresaw, that so far as we were concerned he did not believe that such a state
of war could ever exist, but with France it was perhaps not altogether inconceivable
and as France was, with Great Britain and Italy, the third power interested in North
Africa, Italy would no doubt have to enter into similar arrangements with the Eepublic
to those made with us. Now France had in Tunis a very strongly fortified harbour
and naval station at Bizerta. Suppose just for the sake of argument that there had
been a naval engagement and that the Italian fleet found itself at a given moment in
a position of superiority to a French fleet, and the latter took refuge in Bizerta.
W ere an arrangement in existence excluding the North African territories on the
Mediterranean from the sphere of warlike operations, would the French fleet become
neutralized b y entering such a neutral zone, or could Bizerta be used as a base of
naval operations again=t Italy, to which it stood in dangerous proxim ity?
He then suggested again that if some concrete proposal could be put on paper it
would be possible to consider it in all its bearings, and see how far it could be
practically applied. He thought there were other points of internal order and
administration which it would be well worth our while to consider, and begged me to
ask you to formulate some tentative form of text on which we could get to work.
My F rench colleague has as yet received no further instructions from Paris as to
the form o f agreement to be proposed.
Under the circumstances I feel that I ought also to await further instructions
from you before resuming the conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
I have, &c.
B E N N E L L EODD.
M IN U T E S .

I t is u n fo r tu n a te th a t S ir R . R o d d has b een so im p a tien t in th is m a tter. H is last

despatch le ft us u n d er the im pression th a t he w as g o in g t o a w ait a com m u n ica tion from th e
Italia n P rim e M in ister.
T he despa tch g o in g to him in rep ly to 51092(3) can only be sent by h a g n ex t F rid a y and
w ill n ot rea ch him till C hristm as. W e ca n n ot b e sure, in sp ite o f the last p a ra g ra p h o f the

p ! [r . im m ediately su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

 632
p resen t despatch, th a t S ir R . R o d d w ill n ot a ga in plu n ge in to this discussion, and as the
risk o f com m ittin g us grow s w ith each con v ersation on the lines he has h ith erto a d op ted , it
w ou ld , I thin k, be p ru d en t to send the fo llo w in g : —
T e l[e g r a p h ] to S ir R . R o d d .(4)
“ N o. 552. Secret.
“ P lea se a void any fu rth er con v ersa tion on the su b ject discussed in y ou r despatch
N o. 384 p e n d in g re c e ip t o f in stru ction s b y n ex t b a g .”
E . A . C.
D ec [em b er] 15.
E . G.

T he D r a ft d e c la ra tio n (5) is a g re a t im p rov em en t on S ir R . R o d d ’ s nebulous and fa r-

rea ch in g suggestion s. B u t even in its p resen t form I am in clin ed to be sceptica l as to its value.
H . H . A.
24 D e c[e m b e r] [19]12.

( 4) [T eleg ram (N o. 552) D ecem b er 18, 1912, D. 1-10 p .m . (F.O . 371/1383. 53324 /18 3 08 /
1 2 / 22.)]
( 5) [w. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g docu m en t, encZ.]

No. 429.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd.O)

F.O. 371/1383.
5 1 0 9 2 /1 8 30 8 /1 2 /2 2.
(No. 285.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, D ecem ber 20, 1912.
I have given m y serious consideration to Your E xcellency’ s despatch No. 367 of
Nov [em ber] 23rd la st,(2) reporting your conversation with the Italian Minister for
F oreign Affairs on the question of a North African Agreement.
I am convinced, after a careful perusal, that the main thought in the mind of the
Marquis di San Giuliano during the interview was, how would such an Agreement
affect Italian relations with Germany, and I sympathise with His E xcellency’ s Hew
that a definite formula would facilitate consideration of the question, in the light of
Ita ly ’ s engagements to her allies.
1 agree with Your E xcellency’ s statement of what His M ajesty’ s Government
desire, as expressed in the second paragraph of your despatch— that if there were at
any time a great conflict of policies disturbing the European atmosphere, such a
conflict should not embrace Egypt and Tripoli, and that these countries should
accordingly be “ regarded as excluded from the sphere of other obligations.’ ’ The
connection between this suggestion and the French proposal to extend the Franco-
Italian Secret Agreement of 1902 to Tripoli was of course obvious to the Marquis
di San Giuliano : it is shown by His E xcellency’ s allusions to the duty of loyalty to
the Triple Alliance. He would probably reflect that just as France succeeded in 1902
in getting Italy practically to contract herself out of the Triple Alliance in a case
where Germany should make a deliberate attack on France, and just as Italy agreed
not to regard the Triple Alliance as covering disputes arising in Tripoli or M orocco, so
H is M ajesty’ s Government now hope to obtain an assurance from Italy that, in any
dispute involving E gypt, she will not consider herself bound to support Germany in a
possible anti-British policy.
This would, I think, be a reasonable inference and any arrangements on these
lines would certainly correspond to the wishes o f His M ajesty’ s Governm ent.
But I observe from Your E xcellency’ s despatch that the Marquis di San Giuliano
brought the discussion a good deal further than this point and led Your E xcellency to
the suggestion that if E ngland and Italy were at war, Egypt and Tripoli should be
0 ) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g an d to the P rim e
M in ister. I t was rep ea ted to L o rd K itc h e n e r (N o. 11, S ecret) on J a n u a ry 17, 1913.]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 626-8, N o. 427.]
 633

regarded as neutralised, a proposal which goes considerably beyond any idea that His
M ajesty’ s Government have so iar entertained. I do not propose to go at length into
the difficulties and anomalies such an arrangement would entail, but I m ay point out
that, assuming England and Italy at war without allies, the fate of Egypt would be
decided at sea by the battle which would probably decide the issue of the whole
campaign, and E gy pt’ s neutrality would be of no advantage to this country. On the
other hand, inability on our part to attack Tripoli might be a decided disadvantage
to us. I share also the criticisms made b y the Marquis di San Giuliano : there would
be no guarantee that the agreement would be observed, and it would be just as
necessary to provide for the defence of Egypt as if it did not exist, for otherwise Italy
might be using Tripoli as a base of attack against E gypt.
As regards a war between Great Britain and Italy in which the latter were
supported by her allies, it is enough to observe that such allies would in any case be
free to attack E gypt, and the agreement would therefore be valueless.
In view of these various considerations, I am disposed to agree with the Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the advantage of having a definite draft form ula to
discuss, and I transmit to you herewith a tentative text of such a declaration as would,
in m y opinion, cover the desired ground. This draft is however on ly at present for
Your E xcellency’ s confidential inform ation and for any observations you m ay have
to offer in regard to it, as I do not think it advisable at this stage to commit His
M ajesty’ s Government to too definite a proposal to the Italian Government.
Your E xcellency will notice that the terms o f this Declaration are restricted to
the specific problem of Egypt and Tripoli, with the proviso that they do not conflict
with any other engagements with third Powers. The Franco-Italian Agreement of
1902 m ay be presumed— although we do not know its precise provisions— to safeguard
this country against Italy joining in hostilities against Great Britain arising out of
aggressive action on the part o f Germany. This renders it unnecessary to deal with
such a contingency in the proposed Declaration, and I am particularly anxious to
avoid anything which may create suspicion in Berlin and Vienna and give the
impression of an attempt on our part to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance.
No reference is made in the Declaration to the “ territorial status q u o ,’ ’ as it
would not be politic for Great Britain to bind herself to the indefinite continuance of
the present régime in E gypt, and as Italy is already pledged to support His M ajesty’ s
Government in any measures which they m ay hereafter find it necessary to take for
improving the position of E gypt.
In conclusion, I would add that I would certainly prefer, as you stated to the
Marquis di San Giuliano, that any Declaration or Agreement should be such as could
forthwith be published.
[ I am, &c.
E . G B E Y .]

Enclosure in No. 429.

Draft Declaration.
Recognising that the preservation o f peace and tranquillity in the North African
territories washed b y the Mediterranean, and the security of their borders from
external attack, which are essential conditions o f the welfare of the native populations
and o f the prosperity and progressive developm ent of those territories, are bound up
with the maintenance of the authority of the European Great Powers now severally
exercising therein rights of sovereignty, protection, or control :
The British and Italian Governments declare that they are firm ly resolved, on
their part, to maintain their respective rights in and over the aforesaid territories.
Each Government will refrain from any political or other action o f a nature to
endanger or embarrass the authority of the other in those regions.
 634
The two Governments declare at the same time that they are not bound to any
third Power by engagements conflicting with the foregoing undertaking, and that they
will not enter into any such engagements in the future.

No. 430.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 1 48 7 /1 4 8 7/13 /2 2 .
(No. 3.) Confidential. Rom e, D. January 4, 1913.
Sir, R. January 11, 1913.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 285
Confidential of the 20th u ltim o/1) on the subject of a proposed North African
A greem ent with Italy, containing a Draft Declaration transmitted for m y confidential
inform ation and for any observations which I may have to offer upon it.
I have carefully considered the terms o f this declaration, which, 1 take it, is to
be regarded as a basis for future discussion, subject to eventual amendment from
either side. The only observation which, for the present, it occurs to me to submit
has reference to the second paragraph, where it is stated that the contracting Govern­
ments “ are firmly resolved, on their part, to maintain their respective rights in and
over the aforesaid territories.” The nature of the “ rights ” in question is suggested
in the previous paragraph defining them as ‘ ‘ rights o f sovereignty, protection or
con trol.” I have the honour to suggest as an amended drafting o f the beginning of
the second paragraph : ‘ ‘ The British and Italian Governments declare that they are
firm ly resolved, on their part, respectively to maintain these rights in and over &c.,”
m aking it clear that it refers to the rights of sovereignty, protection or control.
Italy, having at the present m oment certain consuetudinary rights as regards
the capitulations in E gypt, which we hope shortly to see modified, it appeared to me
that the text as it stands in the draft might be interpreted as a declaration of
intention to maintain all rights now existing in as well as over one of the territories
in question, nam ely Egypt.
In a speech which, in accordance with long established precedent, the French
Ambassador makes to the French colony on New Y ear’ s day, Monsieur Barrere, basing
his observations on the Marquis di San Giuliano’ s recent speech in the Chamber of
Deputies, referred to the advisability o f extending the agreements wThich France and
Italy had entered into for the defence of their respective interests in North Africa,
and not only have his remarks been very w’ell received by the press of all shades but
he tells me that he has privately received messages from m any parts o f Italy warmly
supporting the idea of such a policy. There is no doubt that the ostentatious and
rather premature renewal of the Triple A lliance/2) has not been m uch appreciated by
unofficial public opinion in Italy, and that is certainly one reason why some make­
weight on the other side is likely to be sym pathetically received at the present
m om ent. The French Ambassador has not, however, hitherto received any further
instructions as to the terms of an agreement with Italy.
I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD.
M IN U T E S .
P ossibly S ir R . R o d d ’ s su ggestion rem oves the chance o f an erron eou s in terp reta tion to
w hich he draw s a tten tion , th ou g h it seems to m e th a t th e a rg u m en t he foreshadow s cou ld be
as w ell a p p lied in one case as the oth er. I should have th ou g h t the sa feg u a rd was the use
o f th e w ord “ s e v e r a lly ” in th e first p a ra g ra ph .
G. R . C.
11.1.13.

0 ) [a. im m ed iately p reced in g docu m en t.]

( 2) [F o r the te x t o f the 5th T re a ty o f the T rip le A llian ce, v. P rib ra m , V ol. I, pp. 244-259.]
 685
A ll p ossib ility o f such a m isu n d erstan d in g as S ir R . R o d d apprehends, w ould, I th in k be
o b viated by th e om ission o f the w ords “ in , and ” in the second pa ra g ra p h o f the D r a ft
D ecla ra tion (S ee cop y a n n ex ed ).(3)
Qu : su ggest this to S ir R . R o d d .(4)
E. A. C.
J a u fu a r v ] 12.
A. X .
E. G.

(3) [T he p a p er annexed is a cop y o f S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s despatch (X o . 2So, C on fid en tia l)

to S ir R . R o d d , o f D ecem b er 20, 1912. It enclosed a d r a ft o f th e proposed decla ra tion .
v. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t, and en r/.]
(4) [ » . im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 431.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir It. Rodd.

F.O. 14S7 '1 4 S 7 /1 3 /2 2 .

(X o. 18.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.
I have received Y [our| E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s despatch Xo. 3 con f[id en tia ]l of the
4th in s tfa n t]^ 1) suggesting a slight modification in the Draft Declaration transmitted
in m j desp [a tch ] X o. 285 of December 20th last(2) concerning the territories in Xorth
Africa controlled by Great Britain and Italy.
I recognize the importance of the point to which Y [ou r] E x c e lle n c y ] calls m y
attention, but I am inclined to think that the risk of erroneous interpretation as to
the respective rights of the two countries, the maintenance of which is the object of
the proposed Declaration, would be perhaps even more securely prevented by the
om ission of the words “ in and ” after the word “ rights ” in the second paragraph
of the draft.
[ I am, Ac.
E . G B E Y .]
t 1) [e . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 632-4, X o . 429, and encl.]

Xo. 432.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 3744/1487 13/22.

(X o. 15.) Secret. R om e. D. January 21, 1913.
Sir, B. January 25, 1913.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch Xo. IS Secret of
the 17th instantf1) on the subject of a modification to be made in the Draft
Declaration concerning territories in Xorth Africa controlled by Great Britain and
Italy.
W hile taking careful note of this slight alteration in the text, I am assuming that
the conditions referred to in your despatch X o. 2S5 Confidential of the 20th D ecem ber(2)
last still hold good, and that no further com m unication should be made to the Italian
i Government on the subject until further instructions have been received.
I have, Ac.
R E X X E L L BODD.
t 1) [v. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
( 2) [r . supra, pp . (332-3, X o . 429.]
 636
M IN U T E S .

I t m ig h t perhaps be as w ell to tell S ir R . R o d d th a t his assum ption is correct.

G. R . C.
2 7 .1 .1 3 .
Q u [e r y ]. Say th a t the presen t m om ent does n ot seem v ery suitable fo r ou r a p p ea rin g to
press the Ita lia n G o v [e rn m e n ]t in a question of this kin d, and th a t it w ou ld th erefore be
p refera b le to w ait un til a m ore fa v ou ra b le o p p o rtu n ity should present itself.
M ea nw hile S ir R . R o d d m ig h t en d ea v ou r to find ou t, if th is can be don e w ith ou t raising
aw k w a rd questions, w hat is the state o f the F ra n co -Ita lia n n e g o tia tio n .(3)
E. A. C.
J a n [u a r v ] 27.
(3) \y. im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 433.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd.

F.O. 3 7 4 4 /1 4 8 7 /1 3 /2 2 .
(No. 31.) Secret.
Sir, F oreign Office, January 30, 1913.
I have received your despatch No. 15 secret of the 21st inst[ant/](1) on the
subject of the proposed agreement with Italy respect ing North Africa, in which Y [our]
E [x ce lle n cy ] states that you are making no further com m unication to the Italian
G ov [ern m en ]t on the subject pending the receipt of instructions to do so.
It appears to me that the present m oment is not very suitable for H [is]
M [a je s ty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] to seem to press the Italian G ov [ern m en ]t in a question
of this kind. It would, therefore, in my opinion, be preferable to wait until a more
favourable opportunity presents itself. In the meanwhile I should be glad if Y [our]
E [x ce lle n cy ] would endeavour to ascertain, if it can be done without raising delicate
questions, what is the state of the Franco-Italian negotiations on the same subject.
[ I am, Ac.
E. G R E Y .]
(! ) [v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]

No. 434.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 6 0 0 6 /1 4 8 7 /1 3 /2 2 .
(No. 23.) Secret. Rom e, D. February 2, 1913.
Sir, R- February 8, 1913.
W ith reference to your despatch No. 31 secret of the 30th ultim o,(*) I have the
honour to report that the French Ambassador the other day asked me whether we
were doing anything more with regard to a North African Agreem ent, and I replied
that so far as I knew, the question was quiescent and that I had no instructions to deal
with the subject. Monsieur Barrere said that so far as France was concerned no
further steps had been taken and he had heard nothing more from Paris.
I quite understand that the present moment m ay not be a very suitable one in
which to take up this matter. At the same time in view of the reference made in the
speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber in December last to the

( ! ) [v . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

readiness of Italy to treat all questions concerning North Africa with Great Britain
and France in the spirit of form er and still existing agreements., and in n e w of the
fact that he suggested that I should submit a formula for a new agreement, I think
that it is very probable that he will him self before long ask me whether anything has
been done to give effect to this suggestion.
I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD .
M IN U T E S .

W e w an ted i f I rem em ber rig h tly to see ex a c tly w hat the F ren ch m eant to propose.
E. G.
Yes, and S ir R . R o d d rep orted th a t the F ren ch w ere q u iescen t fo r the m om ent.
W e m ig h t perhaps now tell S ir R . R o d d th a t if the M i n i s t e r ] fo r F o re ig n A ffa irs again,
speaks t o him on the su b ject, he m ay ten ta tiv ely p u t fo r w a rd ou r d r a ft “ form u la .” (2)
E. A . C.
F e b fr u a r y ] 12.
A. X .
E. G.
( 2) [r . supra, pp. 633-4, X o . 429, en c l.; p. 635, X o . 431.]

No. 435.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd.

F.O. 600G/ 14S 7/18/22.

(No. 49.) Secret.
Sir, F oreign Office, February 13, 1913.
I have received Y [o u r ] E [x c e lle n c y ]'s despatch No. 23 secret of the
2nd in s t[a n t ](1) relative to the proposed Anglo-Italian North African Agreement.
In the event of the Italian AI[inister fo r] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] reverting to the
subject I see no objection to Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] putting forward tentatively the
formula for a draft declaration enclosed in m y despatch No. 285 of Dec [em ber] 2C)th(2)
last, with the omission o f the words “ in, and “ in the second paragraph, as suggested
in m y despatch No. 18 of the 17th u lt [im o ].(3)
[ I am, Ac.
E . G R E Y .]
t 1) [i?. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
(2) [v. supra, pp. 633 -4 , X o . 429, encl.]
(3) [t\ supra, p. 635, N o. 431.]

No. 436.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 849 3 /1 4 8 7/18 , 22.

(No. 37.) Secret. R om e, D. F ebruary 15, 1913.
S*1» T , , F ebruary 22, 1913.
I have the honour to report that the French Ambassador asked me tod ayp ) whether
we had taken any further steps to open negotiations for a North African Agreem ent
with Italy, adding that he had had no further instructions on the subject from his
Government. I replied that I was also without instructions to proceed further in the
matter.

(*) [c p . M . B a rr e re ’ s rep ort, D .D .F ., 3 me Sér., V ol. V , pp . 521-2, X o . 427.]

 638
Monsieur Barrere then observed, and I venture to think with some justice, that
as two months had passed since the question was first broached, that the Italian
Governm ent might perhaps begin to be puzzled why the matter had fallen into
abeyance, and would form their own conclusions which m ight be quite erroneous.
E ven if there were good reasons for not appearing to be too urgent or to press the
matter, he suggested that it might be as well to take an opportunity of saying to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, that there had been so m any more urgent issues of late
to occupy the attention of Governments, that this particular question had had to fall
into the second line, but that this did not mean that it had been dropped and that it
was only waiting for a more favourable opportunity to be resumed.
I imagine my French colleague would like to go further than this, and rather
regrets that the French Governm ent have not hitherto put forward any definite
p ro p o sa l: but I did not, in view o f your form er instructions,encourage the idea of
urgency.
At the same time I think the suggestion is worthy of consideration that some word
of explanation should be given which would preclude any assumption here that we
had some special reason, after having raised the question, for allowing it apparently
to drop. '
I have, Ac.
F E N N E L L RODD.

M IN U T E S .

W h en this despatch was w ritten , S ir R . R o d d ha d n ot receiv ed o u r despatch N o. 49

(6006),(2) in w hich H is E x cellen cy was told th a t if th e M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffa irs raised
th e subject, ou r d r a ft form u la m ig h t be p u t forw a rd , ten ta tiv ely .
I v en tu re to suggest th a t w e m ig h t leave it at th a t fo r th e present. I t m ay b e well to
show th e Ita lia n s th a t we have not d r o p p e d the question, b u t to do so m ay also be in terp reted
b y them as ov er-a n x iety on ou r p a rt. I t is a delica te subject, and should not be “ rushed.”
G. R . C.
22.2.13.
I agree.
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r y l 24
A. N.
E. G.

( 2) [x\ im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]

No. 487.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir R. Rodd.

F.O. 8 4 9 3 /1 4 8 7 /1 3 /2 2 .
(No. 70.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.
I have received Y [o u r ] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s despatch No. 37 of the 15th u lt [im o ](1)
in which Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cv ] suggests that, to avoid any possible m isconception on
the part of the Italian G ov [ern m en ]t, the M in is te r for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] should
be inform ed that the question of the proposed North African Agreem ent between this
country and Italy is only tem porarily in abeyance.
Since writing that despatch Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] will have received m y despatch
No. 49 o f the 13th u lt [im o ],(2) in which I authorised you, in the event of the

( ’ ) [i>. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

( 2) [r . supra, p. 637, N o. 435.]
 639

M in is te r fo r] F [o re ig n ] A [ffairs] recurring to the subject, to put forward

tentatively the draft declaration proposed b y H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G o v e r n m e n t ]. I
consider that it would be preferable not to take any initiative in the matter for the
present and that it will be sufficient if you confine yourself to the action authorised
in m y despatch No. 49.
[ I am, Ac.
E. G B E Y .]

No. 43S

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie .f1)

F.O. 11261 14S7/13 22.

(No. 174.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.
M. Cambon asked me todayO) for m y opinion as to whether we should take the
initiative in pressing the Italian Governm ent about a Mediterranean Agreement. The
French Ambassador in Rom e was raising the question of whether the time had not
yet come to do this.
After some discussion with M. Cambon of the pros and cons. I said that I thought
that, if we pressed the matter at this m om ent, the Italian Government might wish to
miv the question of the SEgean Islands, and perhaps of the coast of Asia M inor, with
any designation of a “ status q u o ” that should be respected. M y first impression,
therefore, was that it would be better for us to leave the matter as it was for the
present. Sir Rennell Rodd had been supplied with a rough form ula,(3) which he
could put forward if the Italian Minister for F oreign Affairs spoke to h im ; but he
was not at present instructed to take the initiative.
[ I am. A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].
(*) [T h is despatch was rep ea ted to R om e (N o. 761 on M a rch 12.]
<2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3 m* S e r ., V ol. V , pp. 630 -1 , N o. 525.]
( 3) [i\ supra, pp. 632—4, N o. 429, and encl ; p. 635, N o. 4 3 1 ; p. 637, N o. 435.]

[E D . N O T E .— R eferen ces to the M ed iterra n ea n q u estion w ere m ade in con v ersa tion s d u rin g
the m onth o f O ctob er both at R om e and L on don , r. G ooch <£• T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp . 136 -7 ,
N o. 151, and m in., pp. 13S-9. N o. 152. cp. also M . de F le u r ia u 's a ccou n t. D .D .F ., 3 r'« S er.,
Vol. V I I I , pp. 47S-S0, N o. 377.]

No. 439.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edicard G r ey .f1)

F.O. 5 8 0 8 1 '5 8 0 8 1 /1 8 '»2 .

(No. 350.) R om e, D. D ecem ber 16, 1913.
Sir, R. D ecem ber 29, 1913.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received
from Captain W . II. B oyle, naval attache to H is M ajesty’ s Embassy, reporting upon
the naval position of Italy at the end of 1913.
I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD .

(*) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ;

to L o rd C r e w e ; to L o rd M o rle y .]
 64 0

E n closu re 1 in N o. 439.
Captain B oyle to Sir R. Rodd.(2)
Sir, R om e, D ecem ber 13, 1913.
I have the honour to submit for your E xcellency’ s consideration the following
remarks upon the naval position o f Italy at the end of 1913.
I have, Ac.
W IL L IA M H . D. B O YLE.
Enclosure 2 in No. 439.
M emorandum by Captain B oyle on Naval Position of Italy at end of 1913.
A certain uneasiness has recently made itself manifest in that section of the
Italian press which interests itself in naval matters, more particularly as regards the
maritime position now occupied by their country.
This, if the circumstances be considered, is certainly not to be wondered a t;
indeed, it is surprising that more anxiety has not been shown regarding the very
difficult situation into which Italy has gradually drifted.
A country always dependent for her welfare upon the security o f her maritime
com m unications, she has by her recent acquisition of territory on the North African
coast added greatly to the responsibilities of her navy.
In spite of the numerous references from both press and platform as to the
com m anding position now held by Italy in the Mediterranean as a result of these
conquests, it must be clear that this is purely geographical, and that the fact of
holding two widely separated coasts is of little avail unless the fleet based upon them
is sufficiently strong to deny passage to the ships of possible enemies.
W ere any attempt made to enforce this control it would be at the expense of two
of the principal sea Powers, both o f whom are possessed of excellent bases either in or
adjacent to the waters in dispute.
Far from having strengthened her maritime position by the annexation of Tripoli
and Cirenaica, Italy has much increased her dependence upon the sea and, conse­
quently, her vulnerability to attack from that element. The centre of gravity of the
country has, as it were, been shifted south— that is, away from those military Powers
with whom she is allied.
That this is to some extent recognised is shown by the nervous irritability
displayed at any reference in France to the determination of that country to be
predom inant in the Mediterranean Sea.
The resources o f Italy, either as regards finance or ability to build and arm ships,
greatly as these have increased in recent years, are not, and cannot be for some
generations, such as to render possible a com petition with France in the development
of a preponderating naval force in the Narrow Sea. She cannot hope to dispute her
rival’ s claim to look on the Mediterranean as aFrench lake without depending upon
the assistance of the fleet o f her ally, Austria.
As in the present state of European politics this support can probably be safely
counted upon, it may not be without interest to compare the naval strength of the
two countries combined, as against that of the French fleet kept in the Mediterranean
at the present time :— A llies. F
B a ttlesh ips (D ) .................................................................. 8 8
„ .................................................................. 13 12
Cruisers ... ... ... ... ... ... ••• 10 8
D estroy ers ... ... ... ... ... ... ••• 44 35
S u b m a r in e s .................................................................................... 20 18
Under the heading of battleships (D) have been included those ships that have
been built since the com m encem ent of the Dreadnought era, although the majority
do not belong to that class, and the local defence flotillas, school ships, and battleships
over twenty years afloat have been omitted.
( 2) [T h e t e x t o f th e enclosures g iv en a bove is ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t , as the
o rig in a l docu m en ts w ere sent to th e A d m ira lty .]
 641
The table, although, perhaps, not strictly accurate, is sufficiently so to give an
idea of the comparative naval strength as far as such a comparison can be made on
paper.
Whereas France has nine battleships of the latest type actually in course of
construction, her possible opponents have only five that have as yet been com m enced.
A glance at this table may give the impression (leaving out of consideration the
inherent weakness of an allied force) that with an average amount of good fortune the
allies may reasonably hope to achieve success.
But there are other factors to be considered that cannot be left out of account,
for as long as it is possible to reach the Mediterranean from the Atlantic, it is
impossible to consider the situation there apart from that of the sea at large.
W hereas the resources of the French navy are by no means exhausted by the
enumeration of the ships given above, the list includes every vessel of any value
belonging to the Adriatic Powers. I f it is held that, in the event of hostilities, France
will not be able to spare reinforcem ents from the Channel ports, owing to the fact
that the German empire will be found ranged in line with her allies, the position is
not materially altered, for in the present grouping of Powers it is fair to assume that
at least some British ships will be in the Mediterranean, and in a position to very
materially aid the French squadrons. Then, in glancing into the future, the rising
naval power of Russia must not be overlooked; it is such as will shortly place the
fleets of the Triple Alliance in a position of marked inferiority to those o f the Triple
E ntente.
But even nearer to her shores naval events are shaping that Italy cannot afford
to disregard. H er recent policy has raised against her a bitterly hostile spirit in
Greece, a Power that shares with her the position of doorkeeper of the Adriatic. That
country, already in possession of an efficient destroyer flotilla, will shortly own a
1st class battleship, and is now considering a programme to still further develop her
navy. W ith her m ilitary services controlled by British and French instructors, there
cannot be much doubt on which side the Greek officers’ sympathies would lie, and
these in recent years have proved their power to influence legislation in their country.
However, in this case it seems possible that public opinion would not require much
influencing, and that the prospect of a war of revenge for what are considered as past
humiliations would be welcomed by all classes of the com m unity.
The coast of Greece would form an ideal base for the Greek destroyers and
submarines to work from , possibly assisted by a British flotilla that in peace time had
been based on Alexandria. Such a com bination at the entrance to the Adriatic would
not only be a threat that neither Austria nor Italy could afford to ignore, and which
therefore must neutralise some part of their naval forces, but would on the Austrians
have the depressing influence that a hostile force on a line of retreat must always
exercise on those who feel their com m unications to be insecure. The idea of the
possibility of Turkey taking advantage of any such action on the part of Greece may
be dismissed when the proxim ity to Constantinople of the Russian Black Sea fleet is
considered, constituting, as it does, a threat that will effectually prevent any ill-tim ed
adventures by the Turkish fleet in the Higean Sea.
To attempt to outline the strategy of such a war would be out of place here, but
as the com m on danger lies to the west, it is in that direction that an offensive
campaign would have to be conducted.
At the com m encem ent of a European war France is likely to be preoccupied in
the passing o f troops from Africa to Europe, and a vigorous offensive by the allies at
this time might yield great results.
It m ay, however, well be asked if Austria will be prepared to see the whole of
her naval force leave her shores to act to the westward of Italy, thereby cutting itself
off from its base and becom ing dependent on the ports o f her ally.
And this frame of mind will be accentuated if the entrance of the Adriatic (only
40 miles in width) cannot be guaranteed as safe for the passage for her ships.
Only this month an influential Austrian paper has repeated a statement often
[10900] 2 T
 G42

made before that Austrian naval policy aims at being in a position to control the
Adriatic.
If, however, the allies allow themselves to becom e entangled in secondary under­
takings nearer at home— if, for instance, Malta plays the part of Lissa in 186G, France
will have ample leisure to concentrate her squadrons in preparation for an offensive
m ove to the eastward, while incidentally Malta will have fully justified the m oney
expended upon her upkeep.
Yet another factor in the situation is the development of a Spanish squadron,
and, in consequence, the Franco-Spanish rapprochement of this year has created some
uneasiness in Italy. If all these considerations be taken into account it cannot be
said that the future o f Italy in the Mediterranean is very bright, and if military needs
must eventually dictate the foreign policy of the country, it wrould seem as if the near
future might see Italy cultivating an understanding with the maritime nations, of
whom she is essentially one, rather than protract an unnatural alliance with the
military Powers whose attention is occupied to the north, east, and west, and whose
ability to aid her is limited.
That Austria has thought of this possibility is evidenced by the fact that during
the debate on the vote for further shipbuilding held this month it was urged in support
o f the Bill that the assistance that Italy might expect to receive from Austria by sea
was the only thing that made it worth her while to remain in the Triple Alliance.
It was also stated by the Minister introducing the Bill that Austria was not
building against Italy, but rather to be in a position to assist her.
But the assistance that Austria can give is not, under present circumstances,
likely to be sufficient to render Italy secure on the sea.
Italy is suffering from a growing maritime pressure brought about both by her
acquisition of territory which she can only reach by water (but which, it must be
borne in mind, is open to invasion by France), and also b y the support she has recently
given to Austrian policy in the Near East.

M IN U T E S .

T he con clu sion s reached are th a t Ita ly has becom e m ore vu ln erab le ow in g to the new
a cq u isition s in A fric a , and m ay be im p elled to join the trip le en ten te ra th er than th e trip le
alliance.
R . S.
A n in terestin g review o f the m a ritim e situ ation in the M ed iterra n ean .
E. A. C.
D ec [em b er] 29.
E. G.

No. 440.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r e y J 1)

F .O . 2 1 8 0 /2 1 8 0 /1 4 /2 2 .
(No. 19.) Confidential. Rom e, D. January 13, 1914.
Sir :— R. January 16, 1914.
I learn from the print sections which have just reached me, from your despatch
to Sir F . Bertie No. G63, of the 5th November la st,(2) and also from Sir M. de
B unsen’ s despatch No. 190 of the 5th ultim o,(3) that the French representatives both
in Vienna and London, have expressed a conviction that the renewal of the Triple
Alliance had been accompanied or followed by some new engagements between the
allies affecting the Mediterranean. This conviction, I may add, is shared by my
( 0 [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r;
to L ord Crewe ; to L o rd M orley .]
I2) [a. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), p. 142, N o. 157.]
(3) [v. ibid., pp. 71-2, N o. 87.]
 643

French colleague in Rom e, although he does not seem to have any conclusive evidence
in support o f it.
In these circumstances it may be as well that I should officially record a conversa­
tion which recently took place here between the Russian Ambassador and the Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The form er has just returned from spending a m onth’ s leave in Paris, and on the
M inister’ s enquiring of him what impressions he had brought back with him from
France, M. Kroupenskv, who affects a certain blunt frankness, replied that they
seemed to be convinced there that there had been, if not a modification of the Triple
Alliance when it was re-signed,(4) at any rate some subsequent addition which had
extended the obligations and scope o f that instrument.
The Marquis di San Giuliano said he on ly wished that he were at liberty to
publish the full text of the Alliance, of which indeed he had always been in favour.
All he could do was to state explicitly on his word o f honour that there had neither
been any modification of the text of the Triple Alliance when it had been renewed,
nor any subsequent addition of any kind whatever. On M. K roupenskv’ s observing
that he was very glad to have this explicit statement because it had even been said
in Paris that there were documents justifying the assumption which had been made,
His E xcellency replied that if any such documents existed in Paris he could only say
in the most positive manner that they were forgeries.
M y Russian colleague was evidently impressed with the genuineness o f the
repudiation by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the suspicions to which more than
one French representative has given expression.
I have, &c.
R E N N E L L RODD .

(4) [r . P rib ra m , V ol. I , pp . 241 -5 9.]

No. 441.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r e y .{1)

F .O . 1 4 8 3 6 /1 4 83 6 /1 4 /2 2.
(No. 117.) Confidential. R om e, D . March 30, 1914.
Sir, R . April 4, 1914.
I learn that immediately after Easter, unless circumstances should intervene to
prevent it, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs will pay his long deferred return
visit to Count Berchtold. Although this visit has long been on the order of the day,
and has therefore no special significance, the most will no doubt be made of this
occasion for emphasizing the continued cordiality of relations with Austria-Hungary.
On the other hand, I hear confidentially through sources which are certainly well-
inform ed, that the Italian Government have o f late been by no means satisfied with
the attitude o f their ally on various questions, and the press is once more beginning
to revert to the normal condition of complaint at the treatment of Italians in
Dalmatia and alleged persecutions at Fium e, while the long-standing grievance of the
non-concession of an Italian University or Faculty of Law in the Em pire is
reassuming a prominent place in the topics o f the day. Nor has the knowledge that
Austria-Hungary m ay becom e a rival in competition for economic concessions in the
neighbourhood of Adalia tended to promote good feeling. I am assured that it is only
the paramount necessity of first securing a settlement of the Albanian question which
entails a submissive attitude on the part of Italy, and that once Albania has been
fairly started on her path there will be a considerable change in this respect.

(») [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g . A cop y was sent to
P a r is.]
[10900] 2 T 2
 644

On the other hand, the Foreign Department has through several writers in the
Rom an press, whose pens are at its com m and, been emphasizing the friendly support
which the aims of Italy for concessions in Asia Minor have received in England, and
the semi-official “ T rib u n a ” returns to the point this m orning in dealing, in what
appears to be an inspired article, with the repeated assumptions o f the Paris “ Temps ”
that some new clause has found its way into the terms of the Triple Alliance. After
com plaining that the “ T e m p s ” ignores all the semi-official announcements that have
been made on the subject, and charges Italy, after a long period of perfect agreement
with France and England in Mediterranean questions, with turning towards her
continental allies in the hopes of realizing her imperialistic aims, the article concludes :
“ The answer of Italy is the more easy inasmuch as it rests upon concrete
and not on imaginary impressions. The agreements of 1902 between France and
Italy remain unm odified.(2) This is one fact. The recent negotiations between an
Italian syndicate and the Smyrna Aidin Company, with reference to the Adalia
railway, together with the disposition displayed by the British Government
towards possible Italian econom ic activity in that region, which proves the
cordiality with which a collaboration between English and Italian activity is
regarded, constitute another fact. Now what do these facts point to, if it be not
that the international policy o f Italy— while rem aining faithful to alliances—
follows without any modification the tradition of her friendships? What do they
indicate if not that these preoccupations about the Mediterranean, so far as Italy
is concerned, are fa n ta stic?”
I have, Ac.
R E N N E L L RODD.

(2) [v. supra, p. 620, No. 419, n ote (3).]

No. 442.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F.O. 1823 6 /1 8 23 6 /1 4 /2 2.
(No. 144.) Secret. R om e, D. April 22, 1914.
Sir, R . April 27, 1914.
In the course of a long conversation which I have just had with Signor Ferdinando
Martini, the Minister of the Colonies, the question came up, while we were discussing
the uncomfortable relations between France and Italy, of the docum ent which the
French Government claim to have knowledge of, referring to a modification o f or an
addition to the terms of the Triple Alliance, extending its operativeness to the
Mediterranean.
Signor Martini said that the matter had been brought up at one of the recent
Cabinet councils held during the brief period that had elapsed since he became a
Minister. I understood that some o f his colleagues had asked for information. They
had gone into the matter thoroughly. No genuine document of such a nature could
exist, because the Cabinet had assured themselves that no additions or modifications
in the terms of the Alliance had been made. If therefore anyone claimed to be in
possession of such a document it was obviously a forgery. This corresponds exactly
with what I have reported the Marquis di San Giuliano to have said m ore than o n ce .(2)
I was very glad, however, that it should be confirmed by Signor Martini, who was
deploring the present situation between France and Italy, and was trying to find an

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;

to L o rd C r e w e ; to L o rd M orley. It was sent to P a r is (as No. 2 5 4 ); to B erlin (as N o. 1 2 5 );
to V ien n a (as N o. 66).]
(2) [v. supra, p. 643, No. 440.]
 645
explanation for what appeared to him to be an unaccountable attitude of hostility in
France. I have known Signor Martini for nearly twenty years, and have had many
official dealings with him as Governor of Erithrea, besides being intimate with him in
Rome since his return to Italy, and, in m y experience, his word can be relied upon.
I have. &e.
R E X X E L L RODD .

Xo. 443.

Sir R . Rodd to Sir Edicard G rey.

F.O. 18*241'4425 14'2-2.

(X o. 149.) Confidential. R om e, D. April 23. 1914.
Sir> R . April 27, 1914.
In the course of m v conversation with the Minister of the Colonies, which has
been reported in several despatches in d e w o f the diversity of subjects dealt with,
Signor Martini spoke with some depression o f the present relations between Italy and
France, and of the unfriendly and dictatorial tone of the French press, especially with
regard to the difficulty which has arisen in regard to the status of Tripolitan subjects
in Tunis.
In m y despatch Xo. 33 of the 23rd January last(x' I submitted a brief statement
of the issue between the two Governments in this respect, as it was then exposed to
me by the French Ambassador. Since that date S’ gnor Bertolini has retired from
the Colonial Department and has been succeeded b y Signor Martini, who is much
more disposed to be conciliatory and seems really anxious to bring about a better
relation with the Government of the Republic.
He said he had practically accepted a proposal for the solution of the difficulty
put forward b y M. Barrere, with the exception of one or two minor points of form.
He had hoped the question might have been regarded as settled, but now the French
Government did not seem satisfied with the proposal o f M. Barrere. A settlement
was, it appeared, to be made contingent on the renunciation o f the capitulations in
M orocco by Italy. Italy was pledged to renounce them, but the M inistry found
difficulty in form ally taking this step till the other Great Powers had also agreed to
do so. * If they gave way at once without waiting for this, it was conceivable that
certain other Powers might delay their assent for a long time, and in that case Italian
subjects in M orocco would be placed in a position o f inferiority to those of other
countries, which was a difficult condition for any Government to accept and rendered
them liable to attack. The matter had now been brought to a point at which his
colleagues were prepared to renounce the capitulations in M orocco as soon as one of
the other Great Powers did so, and Great Britain had especially been mentioned as
the Power from whom they would wish to take their cue. He asked me whether I
thought there was any likelihood of our taking this step within a measurable time.
I told him I could not m yself answer this question. I understood our position
depended on the settlement o f certain other pending questions: but I would enquire
whether an answer could be given. He said he would be very grateful to learn how
matters stood, as if they had even a reasonable certainty that we should renounce the
capitulations in M orocco at an early date, Italy might be able to even anticipate this
date, and if b y so doing she could settle the other question concerning the legal status
of Libyans in Tunis in a satisfactory m anner, one o f the most troublesome issues
with the French Government would be eliminated, and the satisfaction which the

(*) [S ir R . R o d d ’ s despatch (X o . 33), D . J a n u a ry 23, R . J a n u a ry 31, 1914, is not rep rod u ced .
I t dealt w ith the qu estion o f th e leg a l sta tus o f the T rip olita n s since th e a n n exa tion .
M . B a rrere sta ted th a t he h op ed t o a rra n g e a com p rom ise, p r o lo n g in g th e con d ition s p rev a ilin g
b efore the a n n ex a tion fo r at least tw o years. (F .O . 4 425/4425 1 4 /2 2 .)]
 646

renunciation of the capitulatory régime in M orocco would occasion in France would

naturally help to improve relations.
* He said that throughout a great part of the long period during which Italy had
been a member of the Triple Alliance, her relations wfith France had been excellent
and cordial, and he could not see why her being associated in a purely defensive
alliance should entail the enmity of France, with which country Italy was able and
willing to co-operate in so many ways. But the present continual state o f suspicion
and mistrust added considerably to the anxieties of the situation.
As I apprehend it is also rather desirable from our point of view that the tension
which has arisen between the countries should be diminished and that more normal
relations should be re-established, I have ventured to report Signor Martini’ s view’s at
some length, in the hope that, if we might be o f some service in this respect by
allowing our intentions with regard to the capitulations in M orocco to be known to
the Italian Governm ent, the opportunity should not be missed.
I have, &c.
B E N N E L L RODD.

No. 444.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G r ey . { *)

F .O . 1 9 3 1 6 /4 4 25 /1 4 /2 2 .
(No. 158.) Confidential. R om e, D. April 27, 1914.
Sir, R . May 2, 1914.
I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs having expressed
the wish to tell me about certain difficulties that had arisen with the French Govern­
ment, which formed the subject of m y despatch No. 149 of the 23rd instant, (2) I called
upon him this morning.
ITis Excellency began by saying that I had no doubt followed the recent campaign
in the French press against Italy regarding the questions of jurisdiction in Tripoli and
Tunis and the abolition of the capitulations in M orocco. He said the French were
never easy to negotiate writh, they had a very one-sided view o f the principle of “ give
and take.” But at the present moment he believed the attitude of the public and
perhaps of the Government in France towards Italy had been envenom ed by the
belief that there had been some modification in the Triple Alliance providing for
Mediterranean contingencies in a sense hostile to the republic. There was the story
o f a mysterious document, which he understood M. Cambon and Mr. Steed of the
Times believed in. M. Barrere did not, or said he did not. He gathered that this
story was to be traced to the brother-in-law and personal adversary of Count Berchtold,
who professed to have seen such a document. I f it existed, it wTas a forgery and
Count Carolyi had been imposed upon. H e had stated publicly more than once, and
would state to me again, that neither before, at, nor after the renewal o f the Triple
Alliance had there been any modification in or addition to its terms. W hat more could
he do to convince the French that there were no grounds for their apprehensions?
H e went on to say that there had been some talk two years ago of an African
agreement with us, and of an African or Mediterranean understanding wfith the
F rench. At the time it had been difficult to find aformula on which to work, and
then other circumstances had intervened. He had made it clear at the time that
Italy would not be able to enter into any agreement affecting the Mediterranean
without inform ing her allies. But he still saw advantages in resuming these
negotiations. It was to the benefit o f all to eliminate as far as possible by preliminary

( 1) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed ash a vin g been sent to the K in g .]

(2) \y. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
 understandings any possible occasions of subsequent divergences. He had reason to
know that Germany would not o n ly (3) be opposed to such an agreement between Italy
and Great Britain, but would welcome it as a guarantee for peace and stability. As
to an agreement between Italy and France, G erm any’ s attitude was more hesitating,
but he had realised that you could not contemplate any understanding which would
affect the Mediterranean situation from which France would be left out, nor would it
be desirable from Ita ly’ s point of view, and he thought that Germany would not oppose
any agreement entered into b y her ally, which was not directly disadvantageous to
her own interests. Before this could be contemplated it would be necessary to
eliminate certain questions which had arisen between Italy and France which were
causing him considerable preoccupation. They ought to be and must be disposed of,
but at present he did not see his way quite clearly in view of the rather intractable
attitude which the French governm ent had adopted.
Although I have already explained the nature of these difficulties, I propose
nevertheless to recapitulate the exposition of the questions made to me by the
Marquis di San Giuliano, as though in general it agreed with that of Signor Martini,
reported in m y despatch above referred to,(4) there were some points of difference, and
His E xcellency did not seem to consider that the twoquestions were correlated.
In the first place there was the question of the jurisdiction over Tripolitans in
Tunis and Tunisians in Libya. A fter the annexation of Libya, one uniform judicial
system was adopted, and no special privileges could thereafter be claimed for the
subjects o f other states. In the protectorate of Tunis, on the other hand, there were
two separate jurisdictions, the French courts for French and foreign subjects, and
Mohammedan courts for natives. Now that the natives o f Tripoli had becom e Italian
subjects, Italy was entitled to claim for them in Tunis a position as favourable as
that o f the Mohammedan subjects of any other state.
I here interposed that I apprehended that the Mohammedan subjects of other
States in Tunis were very few, whilst the number of Tripolitans was very considerable.
His E xcellency said that this was so, and, while it did not affect the question of
principle they had fully recognised the practical importance of this consideration.
They had, therefore, been disposed to go very far to meet the French view that
Tripolitans should be justiciable in the native Courts o f Tunis, but they maintained
that in so doing they were making a great concession, as they would find it difficult
to explain to natives of Tripoli that they were to have the obligations but not the
privileges of Italian subjects. E ventually, after much discussion, they had agreed to
a suggestion put forward by the French Resident in Tunis, in accordance with which
all Tripolitans should be justiciable in the M ohammedan courts, but that a notification
should be given to the Italian Consulates when anyone of them was summoned to
appear. This seemed to meet the case by saving the question of form and
distinguishing between Italian citizens and the native subjects o f a protectorate. It
was however, a very considerable concession for Italy to have made. To his surprise
it had been repudiated by the Governm ent at Paris, who would only agree if
reciprocity was guaranteed in L ibya, and notification also given to the French consul
whenever a Tunisian was summoned.
This, the Marquis di San Giuliano contended, implied that France would make
no concession in return for the concession which Italy had declared herself ready to
make, but insisted on the subjects of the Protectorate being treated on precisely the
same footing as the Italian colonial subjects, although France had recognised the
annexation of Libya without condition.
This was one question. The other was that of the abandonment by Italy of
the capitulations in M orocco. The French government argued that in view o f the
agreement o f 1902, in which the two contracting parties undertook to refrain from
placing difficulties in each other’ s way, France as regards Tripoli and Italy as regards
M orocco, the Italian Government were bound to renounce forthwith the privileges of
(3) [U n sign ed m a rg in a l n o t e : “ ? n o t.” ]
(4) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
 648

the capitulations for Italian subjects in M orocco. The Italian Government were in
principle quite ready to do so, but their arrangement with France also gave them
most favoured nation treatment in M orocco, and they would be liable to be called in
question if they renounced certain definite advantages before other States had done
so, and thus placed Italian subjects there for an indefinite period in a position of
disadvantage. The French Government replied that Russia and Spain had already
abandoned the capitulations on behalf of their subjects. To this the Italian Govern­
ment answered that so far as Russia was concerned the renunciation was purely
platonic, as there were no Russian subjects. As far as Spain was concerned the step
was the result of a specific agreement by which France did the same as concerned her
subjects in the Spanish sphere. There was there a “ quid pro q u o .’ ’ He had
expressed his readiness to abandon the capitulations as soon as His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment did so. Our case had its analogies to that of Italy as we had important interests
and a considerable number of subjects in M orocco. This apparently did not satisfy
the French who required immediate renunciation on the part o f Italy.
I then asked, if this point could he settled, did he anticipate the other issue
regarding Tripoli and Tunis would find an easier solution as Signor Martini had
seemed to think? His E xcellency said that he did not consider that the two questions
were correlated. Both of them had to be solved, and he hoped that M. Barrere, who
had gone to Paris, might return with more conciliatory instructions. If he did not
the situation would becom e difficult. He did not see that Italy could go any further
than she had declared herself ready to do to meet the views o f the French government.
On the other hand he was most anxious to see these points settled and to
eliminate any pretext for recrimination or tension. There were no real issues or
divergence of interests between Italy and France— no reason whatever why they
should regard one another with hostile feelings, and so far as he could see, no grounds
for conflict in the future. I f these two matters, which were really rather points of
“ amour propre ” than of any real intrinsic importance, could be eliminated, they
m ight go on to a general agreement, which would have a substantial value in clearing
away misapprehensions about the Mediterranean. He believed that this must be to
some extent an interest to us also, and that we should be glad to see all tension
between France and Italy removed. He therefore begged me to submit the foregoing
exposition of the situation to you in the hope that if an early opportunity offered
itself, you would use your influence in the direction of conciliation, and he would
much appreciate an indication of our intentions as regards the capitulations in
M orocco.
After our interview I received a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
asking that anything which he had said about African or Mediterranean agreements
might be regarded as strictly confidential between the two Governments, as any
reference to it* in Paris might lead to discussions in the press which would prejudice
the future liberty of negotiation.
I have, &e.
R E N N E L L RODD.

Iso. 445.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. R odd.(')

F.O. 21054/14630/14/2*2.
(No. 134.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 6, 1914.
The Italian Ambassador said to-day that the Italian Government were quite
ready to proceed with us at once with the arrangement of an agreement about North
0 ) [T h is despatch was rep ea ted to P a ris (N o. 2 8 6 ); to B erlin (N o. 136).)
 649
A frica; and they would do so with the French, if France would only be more
conciliatory to Italy.
I said that the Italians had opened this matter with both the French and us
W hen it hung fire, the French had asked us whether we meant to take it up again.
I could not do so unless it was taken up with them as well.
The Ambassador said that he wished me not to m ention the matter to the French
till the Italian Government had been able to inform B e rlin ; otherwise it would appear
in the French Press that Italy had approached France, and the German Government
would be annoyed at hearing the news in that way.
[ I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

No. 446.

Sir Edward. G rey to Sir R. Rodd.f1)

F.O. 21035/21035/14,. 22.

(No. 136.)
Sir, Foreign Office, M ay 6, 1914.
The Italian Ambassador, on his return from his holiday, spoke to me to-day about
Italian difficulties with the French, in the same way as the Marquis di San Giuliano
and the Italian Minister for the Colonies have spoken to Your E xcellency.( 2)
The Ambassador said that the French had even threatened to terminate the
Agreement made between France and Italy about Tunis in the time of the Marquis
Visconti Venosta in 1S96.(3) The object of this Agreem ent had been p o litica l: to
establish m ore friendly relations with France. B y it, Italy had given up various
things in Tunis, and had made great concessions. In return, Italy had received
certain privileges as regards schools and hospitals. As there were 120,000 Italian
subjects in Tunis, if this Agreement was denounced there would be a tremendous
sensation. M. Doumergue, speaking to Signor Tittoni, had admitted that this would
be the case, but had spoken of the denunciation of the Agreem ent as a possibility.
The Ambassador went on to say that, in case the French attitude towards Italy
was being unfavourably influenced by a belief in the minds of the French that Italy
had made some Agreement with the Triple Alliance about the Mediterranean, he was
instructed to give me again the most explicit assurance that Italy had made no special
Convention about the Mediterranean, and that the Triple Alliance had been renewed
without the addition of anything whatever, precedent, concom itant, or posterior,
hostile to France affecting the Mediterranean. The report that there was some new
Agreement was an idle tale. It had already been most explicitly denied; and, if I
could say a word to the French in this sense, it would be very useful. The
Ambassador was instructed to ask me to do so. H e asked me also whether I thought
that he him self might speak to M. Cambon.
I replied that I saw no objection to his doing so, though I thought that he might
find M. Cambon already convinced. I had already spoken to the French as the
Ambassador desired, but I was quite prepared to say again that I had received the
most explicit assurance, and also that I believed it.
W ith regard to Tunis and Morocco, about which the Ambassador spoke to me as
Your E xcellency has already been spoken to in Borne, I said that I could only say at

( 1) [T h is d espa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K i n g ; t o the P rim e M in is t e r ;

t o L o rd C r e w e : to L o rd M orley .]
( 2) [r . su p ra , pp. 645-8, Nos. 4 43 -4 .]
O ) [cp . G .P., X I , pp. 2 99-300.]
 650
the moment that the question of the Capitulations in M orocco was bound up for us
with the question of the Capitulations in E gypt. W e could not make any progress
with the French in M orocco until we had an arrangement about E gypt, as
contem plated by our public agreement with F ra n c e ; and, in the same way, we
should expect the Italians to agree to what we wished in Egypt.
The Ambassador said that this was understood; though, as previously stated,
Italy could not give up her rights till other Powers did so too. L ord Kitchener
had, howrever, reported that the Italian consul-general in Egypt was the one whom
he had found most helpful in the working of the Capitulations.(4)
I promised to look into this question of the Italian attitude in E gypt.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

(4) [M a r g in a l notes by S ir E d w a rd G rey and S ir E. C r o w e : “ H a v e we g o t such a

rep ort? [E . G .] ” “ I believe the ex a c t co n tr a r y is th e case. T he Ita lia n s a re the m ost
ob stru ctiv e. E. A. C. S lav 8.’ ’ In rep ly to an en q u iry from Sir E d w a rd G rey, L o rd K itch en er
s t a t e d : “ I ha ve no recollection o f h a v in g ever m en tion ed th a t ‘ th e Ita lia n C onsul-G eneral
in E g y p t was th e one w hom I had fou n d m ost h elp fu l in th e w ork in g o f the C a p itu la tion s.’
N o r d o I know o f a n y th in g w hich should cause m e to con sid er th a t he was so.” (L ord
K it c h e n e r ’ s despa tch (N o. 112), D. J u n e 12, R . J u n e 23, 1914. F.O . 2 7 9 9 3 /8 7 0 /1 4 /1 6 .)]

No. 447.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd.

F.O. 1 82 4 1 /4 4 25 /1 4 /2 2 .
(No. 133.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 11, 1914.
I have re c [e iv e ]d Y [ou r] E [x c e lle n c y ]’ s d esp [atche]s Nos. 149 and 158,
C on f[id en tia ]l, of the 23rd and 27th u lt [im o ](1) resp [ectin ]g the present relations
between France and Italy, and the desire of the Italian G ov [ern m en ]t to learn the
attitude and intentions of H [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] in regard to the
Capitulations in Morocco.
Y [o u r ] E [xcellen cy ] s h [o u l]d take an opportunity of explaining to the Italian
G ov [ern m en ]t that, in accordance with the terms of the A nglo-French declaration of
1904,(2) H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] desire to proceed pari passu with the
abolition of the Capitulations in M orocco and in E gypt, and that so far as H [is ]
M [a je sty ’ s] G [overn m en t] are concerned no progress can be made except on this
condition.
Y [o u r] E [x cellen cv ] s h [o u l]d also on this occasion rem ind the Italian
G ov [ern m en ]t that IT [is] M [a jestv’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] are still awaiting a reply to the
com m unication addressed to them by Y [ou r] E [x cellen cy ] so long ago as
D ec[em b er] 10, 1912,(3) in regard to the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, a
matter which had already been discussed by the two G ov [ern m en ]ts prior to the
recognition by H [is ] M [a jesty’ s] G [overn m en t] of the abolition of the Capitulations
in Tripoli.

0 ) [ v . supra, pp . 645-8, Nos. 4 43 -4 .]

(2) \v. D ec la r a tio n . . . . r e sp ectin g E g y p t an d M o rocco of A p ril 8, 1904, S ecret A r ticle II.
G ooch & T em p crley, V ol. I I , p. 393, N o. 417.]
(3) [S ir R . R o d d ’ s despatch (N o. 390), D . D ecem ber 14, R . D ecem b er 28, 1912, is n ot
rep rod u ced . I t enclosed a cop y o f his com m u n ica tion to th e Ita lia n G overnm ent o f D ecem ber 10,
1912, w hich ex p la in ed th e n a tu re o f the schem e fo r the m odifica tion o f the C a p itu la tory régim e
in E g y p t, and expressed th e h op e th a t th e Ita lia n G overn m en t w ould a gree to it. (F .O . 3 71 /
1362. 5 5 3 3 6 /1 5 8 3 5 /1 2 /1 6 .)]
 651

As regards the suggestions for a Mediterranean agreement, the recurrence of

which Y [o u r ] E [x cellen cy ] reports in your d esp [atch] No. 158, H [is ] M [a je s ty ’ s]
G o v e rn m e n t] can only await more definite proposals.
[I am, &c.
E . G R E Y .]

No. 448.

Sir Edxrard G rey to Sir R. Rodd.(*)

F.O. 21799 1 4 6 3 0 '1 4 /2 2.

(No. 142.) Confidential.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 12, 1914.
The Italian Ambassador inform ed me to-day of his instructions from the
Marquis di San Giuliano, authorising him to speak to M. Cambon as he had suggested
and give the assurance that Italy had not entered into any Mediterranean Agreem ent
when the Triple Alliance was last renewed. The x\mbassador was also to inform me
that the Marquis di San Giuliano thought that, before consulting Berlin, he would
like to have some formula about the li status quo ” in North Africa. There was no
reason why I should not discuss such a formula, if I wished, with the French Govern­
ment, though I must not let them know that the Italian Government had approached
us. The Italian Government were quite ready to conclude an Agreem ent with us at
any time, and Germ any would not object to th a t; but Germany would be sensitive
about negotiations with France, and therefore, though the Italian Governm ent quite
understood that anything they discussed with us must be only on condition that
France was a party to it, they were afraid that, if they now mentioned the matter to
the French Governm ent, or if the latter heard that Italy had moved in the matter,
M. Herbette or M. Tardieu or some one else in Paris would get hold of the news
and give it out in the French Press, and Germany would be very annoyed. The
Ambassador him self was very anxious to bring about this Agreem ent, and he thought
that a model for it might be found in the first part of the North Sea A greem ent^2'
though his Governm ent could hardly go so far as the second part of that. H e thought
that the phrase “ status quo in North Africa ” might not altogether satisfy us, as it
might be that we did not regard the ‘ ‘ status quo ’ ’ in E gypt as something that was
to continue ind efinitely; or. at any rate, it was possible that a time might com e when
we should wish to change it.
I said that it would be rather difficult for me to open the question of a formula
with the French Governm ent without disclosing the fact that I was doing so because
I had received an indication that the Italian Government were ready to discuss it.
I must have some peg upon which to hang m y reopening o f the conversations with
the F rench Governm ent. There had originally been conversations in R om e between
M. Barrere and the Marquis di San G iuliano: between Your E xcellency and the
Marquis di San G iuliano; and between Your E xcellency and M. Barrere. I would
look back and see how matters were l e f t : in other words, I must see how the last
chapter had ended before I decided to begin a new on e.(3)
The Ambassador said that he thought that the conclusion of an Agreem ent would
have a good effect politically. It would improve matters between Italy and France,
and this was very desirable. But, especially at the present moment, Italy had to

0) [T h is d espa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e P rim e M in is ter.]

(2) [ v . G ooch <L- T em p erley, V o l. V I I I , pp . 1 75-7, N o. 153.]
(3) [M a r g in a l note b y S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ T he D e p [a r tm e n ]t should let m e k n ow th is—
it ca n be d on e v erbally n ex t week. E . G .’ ’ ]
 652

consider German susceptibilities, partly because France had cooled towards Italy very
m uch, and partly because of the difficulties that arose owing to Italian feeling with
regard to Austria, which had been illustrated by recent demonstrations in Italy.
[ I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

No. 419.

M inute by Sir E. Croice.

F.O. 2 3 5 7 8 /1 4 63 0 /1 4 /2 2.
Foreign Office, May 17, 1914.
Italy and the Mediterranean.

The Italian ambassador asked me to-day to tell Sir E. Grey that he had spoken
to Monsieur Cambon about last yea r’ s renewal of the triple alliance, giving him the
same assurances and explanations that he had given to Sir E . Grey. H e said
M onsieur Gambon seemed readily to accept the assurances and evidently wished to
convey the impression that he CMons[ieur] Cambon) had never attached much
importance to the reports and rumours current some time ago as to the alleged further
com m itm ents of Italy in respect to her policy in the Mediterranean. Monsieur Cambon,
he said, in fact declared that the subject had been a matter of much graver concern to
the British than to the French Government If1)
Marquis Imperiali then proceeded to discuss the question of some understanding
or agreement to be arrived at between Italy and Great Britain, into which France
would also have to come, respecting future policy in the Mediterranean. II [is]
E [x ce llen cy ] practically went over the same ground as he did in his recent conver­
sation with Sir E. Grey. His object in speaking to me was to ask, or rather to beg and
implore, me to draw up a “ formula ” which should cover the desired agreement, and
which should be in a form to place on a more friendly footing the relations between
France and Italy, and at the same time be satisfactory both to England and to
Germany.
I naturally enquired what was the nature of the agreement contemplated by the
Italian G ov [ern m en ]t.............. (2) H e first suggested “ something like the North Sea
A greem ent.” I reminded him that he had himself, when discussing the matter with
Sir E. Grey, called attention to the weak spot of that suggestion : namely the fact
that under the North Sea Agreem ent the signatory Powers undertook to uphold the
status quo, whilst in the Mediterranean there were points where certain Powers could
hardly proclaim their determination not to have the status quo altered. Such a point
was, for us, E gypt, with which, m oreover, the wider question of the ultimate fate of
the Ottoman Empire was in a certain way connected. These were very delicate issues
and I felt sure that I I [is ] M [a jesty ’ s] G o v e rn m e n t] would be reluctant to enter
upon any course bringing those issues prematurely and needlessly into discussion.
The ambassador quite agreed and appeared instantly ready to throw overboard
the suggestion that the desired formula should be built up on the basis of the
maintenance of the status quo. But he continued to urge that some formula should
be found and that I in particular should sit down and find it.............. (3)
I am afraid that nothing I said as to m y inability to prepare or suggest formulas
in ignorance of what they were intended to contain, made any impression on His
E xcellency, who, when he finally left me, said : ‘ ‘ I rely on your finding the formula.
I am sure you will find it.”

0 ) [M a r g in a l note by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ T his is q u ite u n tr u e : we took the rep ort

v ery q u ietly : it was the F ren ch w ho b rou g h t it to us and w ere upset a bou t it. E. G .” ]
( 2) [A few w ords o f personal com m ent are om itted h ere.]
(3) [A sentence is o m itted here. I t adds n oth in g to the substance o f th is m in u te.]
 653
I annex hereto the text of the formula which I drew up in 1912 and which
Sir E. Eodd was at the time authorized to bring forward, if pressed. (4)
The criticism which can be made on this formula is, as I explained at the time,
that it is really quite valueless for any practical purposes. What the French
government desired, and no doubt still desire, to obtain is a guarantee that if
Germany forces a war upon her. Italy will not consider herself bound under the
terms of the triple alliance to join in the war against France. Such a guarantee
France was supposed to have received under a secret understanding with Italy in
1 S 9 2 /5) and this understanding she would no doubt wish to have confirmed. But Italy
cannot apparently give such a guarantee now without getting into difficulties with
Germany which she is not prepared to face. She now seeks for a means of reassuring
France without com m itting herself to anything distasteful to Germany. She does
not know at all how to accomplish this and, in accordance with her usual practice,
expects other Powers to do something for her that she cannot do herself. I doubt
whether the problem can be solved without Italy saying m uch more definitely and
with greater precision what exactly she wishes us to do. Our draft formula of 1912
will not, I think, help in the slightest towards a solution of the difficulty with France.
I f Italy and France were to enter into a similar exchange of declarations as regards
Tripoli on the one hand, and Tunis. Algiers, and Morocco on the other. France may
well say : this is quite meaningless, because the declaration will lapse on the outbreak
of war. If Italy were to give assurances that in case France were at war with
Germany. Italy would put no obstacles in the way of th transport of French troops
from N [o rth ] Africa to France, that would be valuable to France. But such an
undertaking would not be acceptable to Germany.
Italv wants to square the circle : without exposing herself to a charge of breach
of faith, she wants to remain in the Triple Alliance and yet not to go to war with
France in accordance with its stipulations. No Anglo-Italian “ fo rm u la ” can solve
this ethical problem.
E . A. C.

M IN U T E .

I shall tell th e Ita lia n A m bassador th a t the Ita lia n G o v [e rn m e n ]t m ust m ake som e
proposal to us th a t w e can com m u n ica te to th e F rench.
E. G.

[r . su p ra, pp. 633-4, N o. 429. encl.]

( s) [s ic : 1902. cp. P rib ra m , V ol. I I , pp. 24S-57.]

No. 450.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir R. R odd.il)

F.O. 25898 146 3 0 /1 4 '2 2.

(No. 170.1
Sir, Foreign Office, June 4, 1914.
The Italian Ambassador pressed me again to-day for a formula about a North
A frican Agreement with Italy, which his Government might put forward in Berlin.
I said that I could not suggest a formula without consulting the French Govern­
ment, and the Ambassador had asked me not to let the French G ov [e m m e n ]t know
that the Italian G ov [ern m en ]t had made any su g g estion /2) As the Ambassador

(*) [T h is despatch was rep ea ted to P a r is ^ o . 3561.]

( 2) [r . sup ra , pp. 651-2, N o. 443. cp. D .D .F ., 3m* S er., V ol. X , p. 641. N o. 4 4 5 ; p. 652,
N o. 454 ]
 654

knew, conversations had taken place between the Italian Governm ent and the French
Governm ent on this subject, as well as between the Italian Governm ent and ourselves.
Som e time ago the French Governm ent had asked me whether I meant to take up
the subject again with Italy, and I had replied that I would wait till Italy resumed it
with us. That was how I had left the matter with the French Governm ent. I f I
proposed a formula to them, with a view of putting it before Italy, they would at
once ask whether Italy had raised the question with me again and, if not, why I had
departed from my intention of waiting till she did so. I suggested that as the Italian
Governm ent said they could not m ove without consulting the German Government,
they should tell the German G ov [ern m en ]t what had passed with both the French
Governm ent and ourselves, and, if they liked, suggest to the German Government
that the negotiations with France and ourselves should be continued on the lines of
the North Sea Agreement.
[I am, A c.]
E . G [R E Y ],
 655

C H A P TE R XCVII.

G R E A T BRITAIN , FR AN CE AN D GERM AN Y, 1 9 1 2 -1 4 .

No. 451.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. G oschen .F )

F.O. 371 1377.
3 2 5 6 0 /2 7 9 1 4 '1 2 /1 8 .
(No. 187.)
Sir, Foreign Office, August 8, 1912.
The German Ambassador called here on July 25 last and conversed at
considerable length on a variety of subjects, of which the following are the most
important.
After enquiring whether we had any recent news from Constantinople, His
E xcellency said that he had been reading with considerable interest the speeches of
Mr. W inston Churchill. (*J Sir A. Nieolson observed that the German Press had
apparently, so far as we could judge, received the statements of the First L ord in a
very reasonable and sensible spirit. His E xcellency replied that this undoubtedly
was the case, but that he could not do otherwise than characterise the tone and
substance o f the First L ord ’ s speeches as o f the new style. He said that we were
really pursuing phantoms. Sir A. Nieolson observed that the phantoms had assumed
a very solid shape on the water. His Excellency said that might be, but it was
perfectly ridiculous to imagine for one single m oment that the German fleet was in
any way intended for aggressive purposes against England, and that our desire to
build against it was based upon visionary and groundless fear. Sir A. Nieolson said
if such were the case and if the German ships had not been built for any warlike
purpose of an aggressive character, he thought the simplest thing would be for both
Powers to reduce the expenditure on what he characterised as mere phantoms built on
simple illusions. Baron Marschall then went into some length as to the impossibility
of com ing to any agreement as to limitation of armaments, saying that if an agree­
ment, which he really considered outside practical politics, were ever reached, it would
necessitate constant and minute scrutiny and examination by the experts of both
sides, who would probably be perpetually differing, and he considered that such an
agreement might give rise to constant causes of friction. The thing was to create a
thoroughly good and healthy atmosphere between the two countries and then they
would see that it was perfectly absurd to continue this com petitive race in defensive
arms.
H is E xcellency again returned to the speech of Mr. W inston Churchill and said
that he was picturing to him self what would happen if the German Minister of W ar
got up in the Reichstag and entered into minute examination of the number of
squadrons, batteries and regiments possessed by Russia and gave a similar enumera­
tion of the forces on the German and Austrian side. Such a declaration would
inevitably lead to the belief that war between the two countries was imm inent and
would certainly produce a shock to European public opinion. To this Sir A. Nieolson
replied that he thought the com parison between such a speech and the one which had
been recently delivered by the First Lord could hardly hold good. His E xcellency
would understand that when the First Lord had to com e down to Parliament and

t 1) [T h is despa tch is based on S ir A. X ic o ls o n ’ s record of his con v ersation w ith B a ron von
M arschall. T he record is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;
to M r. C h u rch ill.]
(2) [F o r M r. C h u rch ill’ s speeches on S u p p lem en ta ry E stim ates on J u ly 22, 1912, v. P ari.
D eb ., o th S er., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 41, p p . 8 37 -5 9.]
 656
demand an addition to the already heavy navy estimates which had been voted, it
was inevitable that he would have to explain at some length and detail the reasons
which led him to request the British public to make still further sacrifices in money
and men. There was nothing whatever provocative in such statements which were
m erely explanatory and in justification of the very heavy burden which this country
had assumed. _
The Ambassador remarked that notwithstanding the fact that Russia kept a
large armed force on the frontier she was on most friendly terms with Germany
and neither side was anxious or suspicious. Sir A. Nicolson referred H is Excellency
to the passages in Mr. Churchill’ s speech as to the difference between military and
naval forces.
The Ambassador remarked that there was no more pacific man in Europe than
the Em peror W illiam — a sentiment with which Sir A. Nicolson entirely agreed.
There was no man, His Excellency continued, who was more desirous of being on
the friendliest relations with this country. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was sure
the Ambassador would admit that this feeling was fully reciprocated here. Baron
Marschall added that it would be impossible for the German Em peror to sign a
decree for m obilizing the army or navy unless H is Majesty could prove to his public
that the vital interests of Germany were in imminent peril. Sir A. Nicolson could
quite understand, His E xcellency said, that mobilization in Germany meant millions
of German mothers and children being deprived of their bread-winners, and no one
in Germany would ever admit that such a measure would be necessary unless the
most vital interests of Germany were in danger. It was most unfortunate that
people in both countries had not fully realised that Germany had no hostile intentions
whatever towards us, or that we had any hostile intentions against Germany. His
E xcellency perfectly realised that we found it necessary and desirable to settle both
with Piussia and France all outstanding questions between the respective countries,
and he was glad that we had been able to remove the friction between ourselves and
the two countries which he had m entioned. At the same time he could not see why
these agreements should lead us to suspect and mistrust Germany, or hinder us from
being on the most intimate relations with her. Sir A. Nicolson told the Ambassador
that he quite agreed with him, and that he thought that the recent communiqué
which had been published in Germany in reference to the recent meeting of the two
E m perors(3) had put the position very fairly, by the German Government accepting as
a very natural situation the present grouping o f the several Powers. This grouping
really in itself was a good guarantee of peace. The Ambassador remarked that he
him self did not attach very great importance to Alliances and Ententes. H e thought
that when a moment of crisis arrived such arrangements did not govern the situation
and each country took the course which was dictated to it by its vital interests
irrespective of engagements which might have been concluded. Nearly every Alliance
or Entente contained in its preamble a phrase that it would becom e operative only
if one of the countries were attacked. It would always be extrem ely difficult to
determine who was the attacking party.
H is E xcellency regretted on general grounds that international affairs seemed
to be passing from the hands of diplomatists into those of the m ilitary men, and he
thought that diplom acy was being thrust into the background, and that the
interests of a nation and its importance seemed to be calculated on the basis of how
m any Dreadnoughts or battalions any country might possess. He remarked that we
seemed to have invoked a new phantom in the increases which were contemplated
in the Austrian or Italian fleets, and we appeared to consider it very necessary that
we should adopt measures to face the imaginary risks with which these increases
might threaten us. His Excellency could not for one moment conceive where was
the enem y Austria or Italy might have to face in the Mediterranean. Sir A. Nicolson
observed that in those circumstances it seemed curious that Austria should incur the
(3) [T he m eetin g betw een the E m p eror W illia m and the C zar took pla ce at B a ltic P o rt
on J u ly 4 -6 . cp. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I X (I ), p. 580. E d. N o te .]
 657

heavy expenditure entailed by the creation of a powerful fleet. The Ambassador

replied that it appeared to be now considered a necessary adornment to every Great
Power that she should possess a fleet of Dreadnoughts, though it was always left in
doubt as to the use to which these m ighty instruments should be put. Sir A. Nicolson
told His E xcellency that though any danger arising from the creation of an Austrian
or Italian fleet m ight be remote or even improbable, still the very large interests which
we possessed in the Mediterranean made it necessary for us to take certain measures
for safeguarding those interests in every conceivable circumstance, however unlikely
it might appear that such circumstances would ever arise. The Ambassador said
that he quite recognised that we, as an insular Power, were in a different position
from continental nations.
Baron Marschall then turned to the m ischief which was done by the Press
generally, and instanced the tendency o f English correspondents at Berlin, in
particular the representative of the “ Tim es,” to telegraph the views of every
insignificant paper in Germany, especially o f the class which he believed could but
be described by the term “ jin g o.” H is E xcellency remarked that it was curious
that in Germ any they had to use the foreign expressions of ‘ ‘ jingo ” or “ chauvin ’ ’
when they desired to characterise that class of journal. In Germany there was no
expression equivalent to the terms which he used, because the spirit of “ jin g o is m ”
or ‘ ‘ chauvinism ’ ’ did not exist in Germ any and they therefore had no German term
to express it. He also remarked on the articles which had been written by Colonel
Bepington on the German manœuvres. He thought they had done very great harm
by depreciating the German A rm y and unduly praising France, thus stimulating
that spirit of revanche which existed in France and which apparently showed no
signs of dying out.
Sir A. Nicolson said that he thought the present relations between France and
Germany were better than they had been for a long time past and that the recent
agreement in regard to M orocco(4) had considerably cleared the atmosphere. The
Ambassador replied that it was perfectly true that France and Germany had now
come to an arrangement in regard to certain special questions, such "as that of
M orocco, but that it would be quite impossible for any French Government to venture
to sign for instance a political agreement with Germany, even if it m erely stated
that neither country had aggressive designs on the other. He said that the relations
with France were correct and normal, but that he was not able to go further than
that. However, this situation did not prevent Germany from being on the very best
possible terms with Russia, who was the ally of France, and this proved that
Germany was not at all jealous or suspicious of her friends having special relations
with other Powers.
H is E xcellency then turned to the question of the Portuguese Colonies. He
alluded to the fact that we stood as guarantors of the Portuguese colonies.
Sir A. Nicolson said that this was true, and that as Portugal brought us in 1601
Tangier and Bombay, we had declared our readiness to defend Portuguese possessions,
and that this engagement had not been modified or abrogated. The Ambassador
then observed that he had been thinking over the matter and he thought perhaps it
might be found possible to lay down as a doctrine that a country whose administra­
tion of her possessions inflicted injury and inconvenience on her neighbours should
be called upon to improve that administration or be rendered liable to her neighbours,
but H [is ] E [x cellen cy ] was not very explicit on this point.
[ I am, &c.]
E. G [R E Y ],

(4) [T h e t e x t o f the F ra n co-G erm a n C on v en tion res p ectin g M o rocco is g iv en in G ooch &
T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 831 -6 , A p p . I V .]

[10900]
 658

N o. 45 2.
King George V to Sir Edicard G rey.(')
Private.(2)
My dear Grev, York Cottage, Sandringham, D ecem ber 8, 1912.
Prince H enry of Prussia paid me a short visit here two days ago.(3) In the
course o f a long conversation with regard to the present European situation, he
asked me point blank, whether in the event of Germany and Austria going to war
with Russia and France, England would come to the assistance o f the two latter
Powers. I answered undoubtedly yes under certain circumstances. H e professed
surprise and regret but did not ask what the certain circumstances were. He said
he would tell the Emperor what I had told him. Of course Germany must know that
we could not allow either of our friends to be crippled. I think it is only right that
you should know what passed between me and the E m peror’ s brother on this point.
I hope to see you when I com e to London at the end of this week.
Relieve me,
Very sincerely yours,
G E O R G E R.I.
0 ) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e P rim e M in is ter.]
( 2) [G rey M SS., V ol. (34. T he le tte r is prin ted in T re v e ly a n : U rey o f F allod on (1937),
p 230. P rofessor T rev ely a n has added a n ote in th e follow in g term s: “ D r. G ooch and
P rofessor T em perley had already fou n d this letter o f th e K in g ’ s, and decid ed on its pu blica tion ,
w hen I m ade my own search in th e archives. It will be published in due course in G. and T.,
X (I I ).” ]
( 3) [R e fe re n c e to P rin ce H e n r y ’ s v isit is m ade in G .P., X X X I X , pp. 119-20, n ote. F o r the
v isit of 1914 v. Ed. N o t e .]

[E D . N O T E .— T he follow in g telegram , da ted J u ly 26, 1914, is pu blished in the K a u ts k y

D o cu m e n ts (C arn egie E nd ow m en t, O x ford 1924), p. 215. It was sent by th e G erm an N aval
A tta ch e a t L on don to the G erm an Im p eria l N a val Office, m arked “ A b solu tely c o n fid e n t ia l” : —
“ E n g lan d proposes jo in t a ction G erm any, F ra n ce, Ita ly fo r p a cify in g R ussia, A u stria -
H u n g a ry . K in g o f G rea t B r ita in said to P rin ce H en ry o f P russia, E n g la n d w ould m ain­
ta in n eu tra lity in case w ar should break ou t betw een C on tin en tal P ow ers. F leet has
d isch arged reservists and g iv en leave to crew s a ccord in g to p ro g ra m .” ]

No. 453.
Sir Edward G rey to King George F.C)

P rivate.(2) D ecem ber 9, 1912.

Sir Edward Grey presents his humble duty and begs to thank Your Majesty for
the inform ation respecting what has passed with Prince H enry o f Prussia.
Sir Edward Grey thinks that it would be dangerous and misleading to let the
German Government be under the impression that under no circumstances would
E ngland come to the assistance of France and Russia, if Germany and Austria went
to war with them, and he thinks it very fortunate that Your Majesty was able to give
an answer to Prince H enry that will prevent him from giving this impression at
Berlin.
Your M ajesty’ s Government is not committed in the event of war and the public
opinion o f this country is, so far as Sir Edward Grey can judge, very averse to a war
arising out of a quarrel about Servia. But if Austria attacked Servia aggressivel}'
and Germany attacked Russia if she came to the assistance of Servia and France
were then involved, it might becom e necessary for England to figh t; as the German
Chancellor said that Germany would fight, for the defence o f her position in Europe
and for the protection of her own future and security.
( ’ ) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e P rim e M in is ter.]
( 2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 64.]
 659

If however M. Sazonow holds to the solution that he has lately indicated of an

international railway for. Servia giving guaranteed access to a free and neutralized
Albanian port for Servian tra d eH it should not be difficult to bring about agreement
between Kussia and Austria and Sir Edward Grey proposes to do all in his power
to promote this solution.

(3) [cp. Gooch <b T e m p e rle y . V ol. I X (I I ), p. 244, X o. 32S.]

No. 454.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward G rey.(')

Private. (2)
M y dear Sir Edward, R om e, January 6, 1918.
After spending a long quiet evening from 8 to 11, talking round every subject
with the German Ambassador, who is about to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, I
must try and give you as accurate a picture as I can of the frame of mind in which
he is entering on his new work, reluctantly because he was happy and contented
here, because of the great difficulties he foresees and because o f some m isgiving
which he feels as to whether his health will prove adequate.
First of all as regards the present crisis, which we were less concerned to discuss
because he is not yet quite sure whether he will have to start imm ediately or, as he
hopes, only on the 18th. l i e feels if he went to Berlin tomorrow he would only he
able to follow in the lines already engaged rather than to take a lead, and he believes
that the Under Secretary, Zim m erm ann, will deal with the matters in hand quite
satisfactorily. H is own feeling as regards Austria is that she is very difficult to
manage because there is a total absence of leadership there. He thinks very little
of Count B erchtold’ s qualities as a statesman— that he is, in fact, another of
Aehrenthal’ s mistakes— though it should be said in defence of him that he did not
at all seek his present office. Germany is bound to give Austria support but it is
very difficult to do so because her policy shows so little consistency and m eth od;
views change from day to day, and her allies don’ t know what they are in for.
He is fully alive to the gravity of the Scutari question, but on that point does not
think Austria can be m oved, though he believes a com prom ise can and will be found
in making tangible material concessions to M ontenegro without the actual town of
Scutari, which has always been regarded as the capital of Albania,— concessions
which ought to satisfy her. H e agrees that the present sovereign of M ontenegro
must be maintained, the more so as it is undesirable that M ontenegro should be
absorbed by Servia, holding that the people of unmixed Slav stock are not capable
of political development, but he considers the sons of the K ing o f M ontenegro have
no capacity or character and doubts whether, when the K ing is gone, M ontenegro
will be able to preserve an independent existence.
The real preoccupation which he feels is for the Austrian Em pire itself. There
seem to him to be present there and rapidly maturing all the elements of dissolution,
and he believes the time is not so very far off when it m ay go the way o f the Ottoman
Em pire. Out of the break-up a Slav State or com bination m ay arise, which will be
numerically stronger than the Magyar com ponent, and the German element will go
to the wall. Its aggregation to the German Em pire would be (from his Prussian
standpoint) a disadvantage, because Germ any has already too m any C atholics;
German Catholics take their religion very seriously, and, as it is, they constitute an
imperium in imperio, recalcitrant to the essentially Germanic idea of whole-hearted

(*) ITh is le tte r is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g an d to the P rim e M in is ter.]
( 3) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 25.]
[10200] 2 U 2
 660

subservience to the State. Merged in the German Em pire the Austrian Catholics
would enable that party to swamp the progressive protestant element. This possible
disruption of the Austrian Empire, often contemplated but never perhaps with such
good reason, filled him as a German with misgivings, for, he said, “ the Austrians
are the only friends we have in E urope,” he evidently did not include the Italians.
This is, however, a matter of rem oter interest. What you will rather care to
hear will be his views as to how our mutual relations can be maintained or improved.
I gather that, exclusive of the contingencies which may arise from the present
complicated Balkan settlement, he does not see any particular tangible occasion of
difficulties in the near future. The problem is how to m odify a certain mental
attitude which has grown up in the two nations, and which it is no use pretending
to m inimize. H e does not believe in rushing things and assuming that all will be
well because for the moment there is a détente. It has gone too deep for that. He
frankly admits that for us the difficulty lies in our never having been able to know
what Germany really wants, and to a great extent the reason of this is that Germany
does not know herself. H er com m ercial prosperity had developed with extraordinary
rapidity. The desire for national expansion had grown up concom itantly with this
com m ercial development, but there had been no pre-conceived scheme of expansion.
W ith the Germans themselves it had taken no concrete form and its manifestation
rather took the shape of resentment at their having themselves neglected the
opportunities which others were seen in the meantime to be taking advantage ^of.
The M orocco affair, he candidly admits, was a defeat for Germany. H e maintains,
though here I don’ t quite agree with him, that German resentment on that account
is not against us, but against France, and he was equally ready to admit, when I
recalled recent history, that German action had been responsible for bringing us into
closer relations with F ra n ce; it was inevitable under the circumstances that we
should have been ranged alongside of her in the M orocco question and, as an
Englishm an, he would have approved of the M orocco agreement. However, that was
done with and buried. It had meanwhile taught its lesson and this brought him to
a point on which he felt very strongly. He greatly doubted whether the Ottoman
Em pire would long be able to maintain itself even in Asia. H e felt sure the end
had com e of a Power existing only in virtue of aggressive conquest and incapable of
higher developm ent. As long as it could, however, maintain some semblance ^of
coherence and authority he believed German interests lay in supporting the remains
of the Ottoman Em pire in Asia, and he thought our aim would be similar. Sooner
or later, however, he regarded the extinction of Turkish rule as inevitable. There
were not in Asia Minor and Syria the same elements as had been present in
European Turkey for the evolution of new States. There were the Armenians, it
was true, and the Syrians, such as they were. Both of them were impatient of
Turkish rule, but perhaps neither of them were ever likely to be able to assert
themselves as the Balkan peoples had done. There was, he thought, a far greater
likelihood, if and when the Turkish dom inion finally went bankrupt, of a partition.
Russia aimed at closing round the Black Sea— H e acquitted us of any covetousness
as regards Anatolia and Syria, notwithstanding certain indications of a movement in
Syria°towards assim ilation'to E gypt, but France affected to claim a traditional sphere
of interest in Syria. On the other hand a feeling had grown up in Germany— he
would not discuss how far it was justified, it was sufficient that it could not be
ignored— that Anatolia, where Germany had widely extended her com m ercial under­
takings, and had entered on the Bagdad railway enterprise with a sort of national
enthusiasm, should not be definitely closed as a sphere of German interest. H e did
not think that any one in Germ any had as yet a concrete or definite ambition there.
But the point he was com ing to was this : should circumstances suggest a division
of Asia Minor and Syria into spheres of interest, a com bination of the three Powers
generally described as the Triple Entente, working with this object, to the exclusion
of Germ any and without consulting her, would inevitably mean war. Germany
could not endure a second M orocco in Anatolia.
 661
I asked him what ambitions he could apprehend on our part in those regions
and he replied that he did not think we had any, but he mistrusted France and
Russia, and when there was a definite grouping of Powers such as now existed,
circumstances made them work together for com m on ends. I observed that where we
held we had a vital interest was in the Persian Gulf. H err von Jagow said he fully
recognized that, and Germany was entirely disposed to do so. They were anxious
for an equitable commercial exit for the Bagdad railw ay;— that might or might not
have been a wise undertaking— he seemed not to be very enthusiastic about it
him self— but it had taken hold of the German imagination. As far as the Persian
Gulf was concerned there was no difficulty in recognizing our political supremacy. I
said I thought if we could com e to terms on such a mutual understanding, one great
source of mistrust m ight be cleared away. I also urged upon him the necessity, if
we were to get on better, of our knowing more what German aims and ideals were.
There was no a priori determination on our part to raise opposition to Germany at
every point, but as long as we were in the dark it was inevitable that we should run
up against obstacles which a little light would enable us to avoid. I f Germ any had
been more frank with us long ago m any difficulties might have been avoided.
Jagow said he traced the era of misunderstandings as having begun in 1889.
Bismarck had not long before his fall written a letter to Lord Salisbury and suggested
a certain programm e for us and Germany to follow in Eastern policy.(s) Lord Salisbury
had returned a very cold answer, and when imm ediately afterwards the German
Em peror full of ideas and enthusiasm went to England, Lord Salisbury would not
go to W indsor to meet him and remained like Achilles in his tent at Hatfield. This
had greatly offended His Majesty and to the ensuing condition of soreness were to be
traced many subsequent developments including the unfortunate Kruger telegram.
At heart the Emperor was more English than the English, and his dream had
always been to march hand in hand with us,— these outbursts were really due to
“ depit am oureux.” It was a favourite phrase of his when some incident in which
we were concerned ruffled him to blurt o u t ; ‘ ‘ and this they say of me, of me the
Grandson of Queen V ictoria ! ” when his listeners would be more gratified if he had
referred to him self under the conditions as “ the German E m peror.’ ’ Jagow ’ s own
predilections would be the same as the E m peror’ s. H e believes wholly and only in
the Germanic stock. H e does not think the unadulterated Slav will ever have the
dom inion— he lacks what he calls the “ staatsbildender Geist,’ ’ the qualities essential
to the vital maintenance of the State. H e thinks the Russian Em pire would have
been nowhere without the virtues of the non-Slav element in the Baltic provinces
and the dynasty of the R om anow s; and he holds that the Latin nations have mostly
run their course and that their m entality is too different for the Germanic nations
ever to be perm anently associated with them. The assimilative Germanic nations
have learned much from them and are able to put what they have learned to
profitable use. It ought not to be impossible for England and Germ any to clear up
their misunderstandings, difficult as the task may seem after 20 years of widening
divergence, but there is between them no record of humiliation or disaster imposed
by one on the other and therefore no ingrained national hatred.
Eventually we came to naval questions and, rem em bering how strongly he had
expressed him self once to me on the subject of Admiral Tirpitz, I asked how he
thought he would get on with him. Perhaps now that they are to be colleagues he
feels the obligation to be more discreet. In any case, he said that he did not think
that Tirpitz was, or wanted to be, a politician. But it had becom e an obsession with
him to make his fleet the most perfect instrument that organization and concentra-
(3) [T h e referen ce is presum ably to B ism a rck ’ s ov ertu re a t the b e g in n in g o f 1889, em bodied
in his despa tch to C ou n t H a tz fe ld t o f J a n u a ry 11, v. G .P ., I V , pp . 400-3. S a lisbu ry ’ s a ttitu d e
on the receip t o f this com m u n ica tion is d escribed ibid., pp. 403-6. This o v ertu re how ever was
not con cern ed w ith th e N ea r East. cp. also Cecil, V ol. I V , pp. 115-20. T here is possibly som e
con fu sion w ith B ism a rck ’ s letter to S a lisbu ry o f N ovem b er 22, 1887, v. G .P ., I V , pp . 376-80,
to w hich Sa lisbu ry rep lied on N ovem ber 30, v. ibid ., pp. 386-8. cp. also Cecil, V ol. H ,
pp. 7 2 -7 .]
 662

tion of purpose could devise. Ilis only thoughts were how to improve and augment
the fleet which was largely his creation, and with this end in view he was capable
of putting forward arguments in order to overcom e opposition which it was really
dangerous to use. It did not imply that Tirpitz meant mischief, but to him all was
legitimate that served his purpose in producing his ideal of a fleet. Personally he
had deprecated the exaggerations of German naval policy. H e wanted his country
to have an adequately powerful naval armament, but it was absurd to aim at
com peting with us to whom the fleet was all in all. As things stood now, he thought
Germany should com plete the naval programme actualty in hand and stop there,
and so far as his influence might go he should oppose any further augmentation, even
if we augmented ours. The two programmes ought not to be regarded as correlated.
All the same he did not really hold with the policy of agreements for the limitation
of armaments which were contrary to the national sentiment.
H e asked me whether I thought the Conservative party, should they return to
office, would be less disposed than the Liberal party to work for a better under­
standing with Germany. I said that I thought in foreign relations we pursued a
consecutive and consequent policy, and that the political colour of the part}r in office
made no difference. He also asked me about various individuals, whether they were
likely to be anti-German. I said and he agreed with me, that it was in m y opinion
a mistake to endeavour to label individuals as Germanophil or Germanophobe.
People who did so were liable to make erroneous assumptions, and the fact that a
particular individual’ s culture or temperament had associated him rather with
German than French or Italian studies did not mean that he was less interested than
any other in his own country’ s advantage. Jagow seemed to think that in Germany
they had been too curious to go into these questions and that we must look to other
and more practical bases for the improvem ent o f relations.
I asked him whether he had in his fo rm e r-experiences found any difficulty in
submitting his views to the Em peror. H e said he found no difficulty when an
opportunity was offered of seeing H is Majesty alone. The Em peror was then a
sympathetic and receptive listener, and accepted a difference of opinion in very good
part. It was by no means however easy when a number of other persons were
present. The Em peror had a quickness and brilliancy of repartee which put his
interlocutor at a disadvantage, as the latter had to take into account the obligations
not to put His Majesty at a disadvantage before witnesses. Hitherto the Emperor
had always been most ready to listen to him and had known him since boyhood.
H e expressed his great appreciation of the message you had authorized me to
give h im (4) and said it was very encouraging to begin on this mood which he welcomed
from one whose frankness and sincerity he had always recognized and done justice
to, the more so as it was a quality rare in his experience in diplomatic life. He
meant to do all in his power to help on that understanding which he believed in
with all his heart as the right and normal relation— and a little touch of the old
junker which is inherent in him came out as he said “ if only we could stand together
you would see how the others, Austria, Italy and all of them would com e to h e e l! ’ ’
V ery sincerely yours,
R E N N E L L RODĐ.

M IN U T E .
V e r y in terestin g. .
E. G.

( ‘ ) [O n h ea rin g o f the a p p oin tm en t o f H e r r v on J ag ow , S ir E d w a rd G rey teleg rap h ed to

S ir It. R o d d on J a n u a ry 6, 1913, D . 11.35 a . m . : —
“ E v e ry th in g I have hea rd from y ou m akes m e w elcom e this a p p o in tm en t. Y ou can
te ll G erm an A m bassador th a t 1 look forw a rd to p u rsu in g w ith him th a t frien d ly policy
w h ich d u rin g last weeks has been so v aluable to peace o f E u rop e and to g o o d feelin g
betw een ou r tw o cou n tries .” (G rey M SS ., V ol. 25.)]
 663
M IN U TE B Y K IN G GEORGE V.

Most interesting and instructive.

G. R. I.

No. 455.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir R. Rodd. ( l)

Private.(2)
M y dear Rodd, London, January 13, 1013.
Your letter with its account of your conversation with Jagow is verv interesting
and helpful. (3)
You were quite right in saying that one of our difficulties in past years has been
that we never know what Germany really wants. Metternic-h used to say to me with
reproach that there was a time when we leant upon Germany. It is quite true that
we used to do s o ; the French Press used even to talk at that time of the “ Quadruple
Alliance,” so as to include us. During all that time, the attitude o f Germ any war
never reallv that of a friend. The Germans used to give Lord Salisbury to under­
stand that when Germany wanted something she must have it, because as we wero
on bad terms with France and Russia we could not afford to quarrel with Germany.
Such an attitude would not do now that the days of isolation are over. W e must
have friendship if we are to give friendship.
The Press Bureau in Berlin has always been an obstacle to good relations
between us. A Press Bureau is used to make m ischief, and some German
Diplomatists have done a good deal of m ischief-m aking. That was the bad side of
Bism arck’ s policy, or rather a bad m ethod which he used in his policy.
I f we could only have ten years of a man like Jagow to deal with, really
controlling the policy of Germany, we should be on intimate terms with her at the
end of the time, and on increasingly good terms all through it.
I quite agree that France, Russia and ourselves cannot treat Asia M inor as
Morocco. If there is to be a partition, Germ any must be well in it, and I should not
think of trying to exclude her. Indeed, we could truthfully say the same thing to
Germany about Anatolia as we said to France about S y ria : that we have no political
designs there. Security as regards the Persian Gulf and its littoral is all that we
want, and it can perfectly well be reconciled with the development of German
interests.
As to the Navy, we must keep ahead of the German N a vy; and every year the
justification for our shipbuilding must be given openly to Parliament, which involves
a comparison with the German strength. Having but a small Arm y, we cannot rest
the defence of Great Britain and the Capital o f the Empire on diplomatic agreements
or relations. H our Fleet was not superior to the German Fleet, our very
independence would depend on Germ any’ s g ood w ill; and even granting that people
like Jagow would not take advantage of such a situation, there must be others who
would take advantage of it, or be compelled by public opinion in Germany to do so.
The Prussian m entality is such that to be on really good terms with it one must be
able to deal with it as an equal.
H ence the persistent and inevitable com parison here of German and British
Navies. These comparisons are resented in Germany as evidence of a gratuitous

0 ) [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent t o th e K in g an d to th e P rim e M in is te r.]

C-) [G rey M S S , V ol. 25.]
(3) [p . im m ed ia tely p reced in g docu m en t.]
 664
and unfriendly assumption on our part that Germany is hostile to us. But this is not
their real motive. Germany has the biggest Arm y in the world as well as her Navy,
but the Navy is our one and only means of defence and our life depends on it and
upon it alone.
I shall send to Goschen a copy of your letter and of this letter of mine to y o u ;
so that if Jagow wants to continue conversation with him , he will know what to
expect and on what lines to speak.
Yours sincerely,
E . GR E Y.
M IN U TE BY K IN G G E O R G E V.

A n admirable reply to Sir R. Rodd's letter.

G. R. I.

No. 456.

Captain H. W atson to Sir E. G oschen.( l)

E.O. 371/1649.
3 9 2 8 /3 9 2 8 /1 3 /1 8 .
Germany, N.A. No. 2. Confidential.

A R eview of the Policy and Position of the Germ an Naval Expansionist Party.
Sir, Berlin, January 20, 1913.
I have the honour to forward some remarks reviewing the policy and position of
the German Naval Expansionist Party. To facilitate such review it is necessary to
glance back over the past few years.
The remarks I make herein on .the past are substantiated by personal observation
and by evidence which I received from com petent observers at various times since
August 1910. Some of this evidence, as to German thought and opinions during my
predecessor’ s time, was of a nature which leaked out after the period at which these
opinions were current.
For convenience I sub-divide m y remarks under the following headings :—

1. Prior to 1912.
2. Naval “ Novelle ” of 1912 and events leading up to it.
3. Remarks on the effect on the German Large Navy Party of the British reply
to the German “ Novelle ” of 1912, before the offers of Colonial assistance
became known.
4. Remarks on apparent effect in Germ any of the British Colonial offers of
capital ships.
5. Remarks on the possible effect on the German Naval Expansionist Party of
a Programm e for 1913 of 8 or 9 capital ships if adopted by Great Britain
and her colonies.
6. Concluding remarks.

1. P rior to 1912.
F rom the evidence above alluded to, I submit that the following points
stand o u t :—
(a) The Large Navy Party of Germ any did at one time think they saw a chanc
of rivalling E ngland on sea, whatever interested Germans m ay say to the contrary.

(!) [E n closu re in S ir E. G osch en’ s despa tch (N o. 23), D. J a n u a ry 24, R J a n u a ry 27, 1913.
T h e despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g . T he o rig in a l te x t w as sent to the
A d m ira lty on F eb ru a ry 6, 1913.]
 665
This fact is patent to an observer living in Germany in recent years; and it is now
(1912-13 being more disclosed by the German critics of the Naval Expansionist
Party.
(b) B y each successive amendment of the Fleet Law the Expansionist Party felt
that they secured an advantage over England, and so each time somewhat reduced the
Naval superiority held by England.
(c) The voting of 8 Battleships by England in 1908-9 was a blow to the hopes,
aspirations and declarations of the German Large Navy Party, and form ed a temporary
check to the Great Naval activity before prevailing in Germany, evidence o f which I
reported on in the autumn of 1910. From this check, which may be called the first, the
German Expansionist Party recovered to a certain extent by spreading the idea that
the British increase was temporary, and not continuous, and could therefore be lived
down.

2. The Saval “ N ovelle ” of 1912 and events leading up to it.

(a) In reviewing the influence at work in Germany in connection with the Naval
“ Novelle ” of 1912, it is necessary to recall the Naval Press Campaign of the winter
of 1911-12 in support of the Fleet “ Novelle ” of 1912, which m ay be said to have
com m enced publicly in September 1911 after the speech of H is Majesty the Em peror
at Hamburg. The preparatory work for that publication is to be found in the previous
action of the Navy League, and in various rumours current during the winter of
1910-11 and during the spring of 1911.
This press campaign, with its violent anti-English tone, was most illuminating
to an observer who had a good knowledge o f the persons and parties concerned and
the connection existing between the various individuals and groups of people. It
threw considerable light on the methods em ployed. It is not out of place to remark
that the cam paign in support of the Novelle ” of 1912 was conducted on similar
lines to the campaigns in support of the foregoing “ Novelles ” ; especially in regard
to the part played by the Reichs-M arine-Am t Press Bureau. But it differed in that,
com ing late in the series, and particularly in view of the General E lection of January
1912, it had to be conducted with greater violence against England, and therefore
perhaps betrayed its purpose more than its predecessors.
A com m ent on the methods of the German Large Navy Party lies in words used
recently (January 1913^ by a German critic in the Press. He says :—

“ On the part of our Fleet fanatics the strength of our Navy is usually
represented as being very limited, while the armament of other nations is
described as being very powerful and threatening. But when it can be proved
that there is the possibility, which certainly exists, of our overtaking the British
Navy, then trouble is taken with rare power of conviction to make it clear that
the fighting value of our Naval Defences rapidly approaches that of the B ritish.”
(b) There is little reason to doubt that the Novelle of 1912 was, as originally
designed, greater in its demands than the ‘ ‘ Novelle ” as published and passed
into law.
I submit that the German Naval Expansionist Party really received a Second
check when they became aware in the spring of 1912 of E ngland’ s strong objections
to the, as then proposed, German Naval “ N ovelle.”
(c) It is apparent to a student of Naval Affairs in Berlin during the last
2^ years, that the political element of Naval Officers at the Reichs-M arine-Am t have
made during recent years, and particularly during the winter of 1911-12, a strong
bid for political and social power.
Their efforts to advance the cause of the Navy in Germany and to increase the
power of the Reichs-M arine-Am t, wei’e com m ented on to me by Germans in other
branches of life during the winter o f 1911-12. These efforts were also to be noticed
in studying the tactics of the Naval Political element in the Reichstag.
 6G6
In the winter of 1912-13 this element, devoid of the inspired agitation in support
of German Fleet “ Novelles,” and faced with the probability of a British-Colonial
increase in 1913, appear to be “ laying on its oars,” and to be leaving such tentative
efforts as are being made to fan the ‘ ‘ Navy F i r e ” to other branches of the Naval
Expansionist Party.

3. Rem arks on the effect on the Germ an Large Navy Party of the British reply to
G erm an “ N ovelle ” of 1912, before the offers of colonial assistance became
known.
During the past four months I have endeavoured to ascertain the opinion held
as to the British reply, as made public by the First Lord of the Admiralty, to the
German Naval ‘ ‘ N o v e lle ” of 1912. Owing to the Leave season I heard practically
no com m ent until October 1912.
From what I have heard and read since then I am left with the impression that,
though the Large Navy Party were somewhat disappointed in being robbed by the
B ritish reply of some of the advantages of the German “ Novelle ” of 1912, still they
felt that their Bill had done something towards reducing the superiority of the British
Fleet, though it had not achieved so much success in this direction as the preceding
“ Novelles ” were considered to have effected. In that view they were undoubtedly
encouraged by the following considerations :—

(a) It was widely reported in Germ any that England could not undertake the
effective building of an increased shipbuilding programme.
(b) Another report was to the effect that even if E ngland could build the ships,
it was impossible for her, under any voluntary system, to obtain the necessary men
for m anning them.
(c) It is thought, or pretended to be thought, in some German circles connected
with the Navy that E ngland’ s political affairs would render it difficult for any British
Governm ent to justify Naval increases, when the German Naval ‘ ‘ Novelle ” of 1912
and its predecessors figured less prom inently in the public mind. Also the German
Professors, and Expansionist Party, have spread the idea in Germ any that England
is decadent.

4. R em arks on apparent effect in Germ any of the British Colonial offers of capital
ships.
The feeling of satisfaction with progress achieved alluded to in Paragraph 3
was, I am of opinion, current prior to the offer of the Malay States of an armoured
vessel and the announcement of Canada’ s contemplated Naval Policy, containing as
it did the proposal to contribute three Super-Dreadnoughts, becom ing widely known
in Germany.
The rumour of the gift from India m ay be dismissed, but in dismissing it I would
say that it was probably not without its effect, in that it pointed the minds of the
opponents of Naval increases in Germ any to a British reserve source of strength,
which might be brought into being should further German Naval increases take
place.
In m y letter No. 85 of December 11th, 1 9 f2 ,(2) I submitted some of the views
expressed in Press articles on the Canadian offer of three Battleships.
Since the publication of those articles various indications support me in the view
that disappointment at what threatens to be the Third check to Naval ambitions is
present amongst the German Naval Expansionist Party, and that this Party is making
attempts to discount the value of the Colonial offers in the minds of the German
public.

(2) [r . infra, p. 687, N o. 464, note ( 7).]

 067
I would quote one adverse Press critic of the Xaval Expansionist Policy on the
point. The writer says in concluding a long article on the proposals of the British
Colonies :—
“ The calculation made up to the present Tin Germany), that E ngland could
not count upon her colonies for support in respect of an increase in her Xavy,
rests upon a fundam entally false judgm ent.”

Further evidence of disappointment com es to me from a different quarter. I am

inform ed on good authority that a highly placed official in Berlin said a few days ago
in regard to the proposed Canadian gift o f three Battleships: “ It is not true that
they will be giv en : the British Admiralty sent emissaries over to Canada to stir up
a Xaval agitation there, and you see it has failed and the Canadian Government will
not give the ships.” M y informant said that the attitude now taken up amongst such
German Governm ent officials towards the Canadian proposal was that they would not
believe it to be true, because the idea of it was distasteful to them.
At the present moment there is little doubt that the German Large X avy Party
entertains hopes that the Canadian gift will not materialise : or that the offer of the
3 Battleships, for political, manning, or shipbuilding difficulties, m ay effect a reduction
o f the British Adm iralty Programm e of 5 capital ships, announced in 1912 as the
number of ships required in the 1913 Estimates.
The Large Xavy Party here are aware that the present time is unpropitious in
Germ any for a Xaval increase to be successfully engineered. Such propaganda as they
are spreading is wisely devoid of the anti-English note that was its characteristic last
winter. From m y experience I would submit that signs have accumulated during the
past twelve months, showing that the policy of the German Large Xavy Party, though
supported b y an influential Party, has declined in popularity, and that its critics have
increased in number, as it became more clear to the German people that German Xaval
increases were met by larger increases of the British Xavy.
Still the German Large X avy Party is an influential party, and I would refer to
the words I used in m y Letter X o. So of Decem ber 11th last, and would corroborate
what I then said that they will use all their efforts to prevent a Programm e of 8 or 9
British capital ships for 1913 becom ing a fact ; and will endeavour to obtain a reduction
of the British Programm e or an increase of the German.

5. Remarks on the possible effect on the German Xaval Expansionist Party of a

Program me for 1913 o f 8 or 9 Capital Ships if adopted by Great Britain and
her Colonies.

(a I submit that some study of the German Xaval Expansionist P arty’ s methods
appears to show that their aim is, by the aid of successive “ Xovelles,” to reach such
a point of Xaval strength in relation to E ngland, that in a period of political quiet
between the two countries it would be difficult for E ngland to make a large Xaval
increase to rem edy the Xaval balance in her favour, without disturbing the peaceful
conditions and so incurring odium from certain s( crions of opinion in both countries.
Such odium would, if Germ any had reached the point the Expansionist Party desire,
then be utilized to the advantage of that Party.
The point of relative strengths desired must also be one which, in time o f political
tension between the two countries, would render it easy for Germ any to obtain an
adequate answering Xaval increase, should England at such time of tension augment
her Xavy. Has Germany, at the present time, reached such a point*?
Despite certain manœuvres on the part of the Expansionist Party in the last
2 years, which m ay be described as savouring of the ‘ ‘ bluffing ’ ’ order in regard to
the present prospects of relative Xaval strengths, I am of opinion that Germ any has
not reached such a point.
(b) I f this is so. I submit it seems likely that the fulfilment of the British-Colonial
proposals of 8 or 9 capital ships for 1913, will probably have the effect of creating
 G68
another in the series of recent checks to the ambitions of the Naval Expansionist
Party, and by materially assisting the arguments of the Party in Germany who are
in opposition to the Naval Expansionist Policy, might have the effect of stopping plans
for the further increase of the German Fleet.
On the other hand it appears probable that the com m encem ent in 1913 of less
than the numbers of British-Colonial Ships above indicated, now that these numbers
have been so m uch discussed in the Press of England and Germany, would assist the
German Large Navy Party and give point to their assertions that England and her
Colonies are not at one in the Naval question, that E ngland’ s Naval Policy is not likely
to be continuous in strength, and that Germ any has therefore only to go on to succeed
in the ambition set up for her by the Naval Expansionist Party.
I am convinced, in that case, opportunity would then be taken later for another
German Naval increase; a logical grafting point for which could be found, as is the
custom o f German Naval and Military increases, in the Battleship and two Small
Cruisers of the 191‘2 “ N ovelle,” the date of laying down of which is held u p;
provided such further increase had not to be produced at an early date.
(c) I would submit for consideration that the use of Germany in England as a
Naval Standard of comparison evokes much resentment amongst even the moderates
in Germany. I f it is possible not to use Germany as a standard of comparison in
publishing a larger British Programm e than indicated in 1912, the German
Expansionist Party will be robbed of one o f their principal weapons of agitation in
Germany. Instancing the requirements of the Mediterranean and the Colonies would
probably not at the present time arouse feelings of resentment in Germany. From
rumours current in Germany it seems doubtful if Austria and Italy will care about
incurring further increased Naval expenditure after their recent efforts in that
direction, unless again spurred on ..by Germany.
(d) It is worthy of consideration whether, noting the lead England would gain
by a Programm e of 8 or 9 ships, it is possible for Germany to keep up the financial
pace, taking into consideration the demands of G erm any’ s army, which must retain
its position as the first arm of that c o u n t y ’ s defence, despite the Naval agitation.
R ecognition of this fact was not wanting amongst the Left W ing Parties o f the
Reichstag at the time o f the General Election of 1912, and during last winter. Also
German Military support of the Naval Expansion has, up to date, been somewhat
grudgingly given, though the influence of the Naval P olicy over the Arm y Authorities
appears to have increased latterly.
(e) I should however report that the old arguments for increasing the Navy are
now cropping up again to a certain extent, nam ely for an earlier replacem ent o f the
School Cruisers by Battle Cruisers in order to ensure a m inimum annual Building
Program m e of Capital Ships up to 1917 in clu sive; when the replacem ent of the Fleet
on a 20 j^ears’ ship age limit will come into force at the rate of com m encem ent of
3 new capital ships per annum.

6. Concluding Remarks.
(a) I submit that it appears a matter o f doubt at the present time if the German
Admiralty, notwithstanding the Naval Expansionist Partjr agitation for more Battle
Cruisers, would be prepared to again imm ediately embark on a reply increase to a
British-Colonial Programme of the magnitude referred to in the heading to
Paragraph 5, on account of the uneasy feeling which they are aware their past
German Naval increases have evoked in the British Colonies, which anxiety Germany
is m uch more anxious now to allay than to increase.
(b) I am, and have so reported to Your E xcellency from time to time, perfectly
convinced of the sincerity of the large m ajority of German Naval Officers in their
deprecation of ill-feeling between England and Germany, and in their expressed desire
for a better understanding between the two countries.
I believe that even the German Naval Political Section, whose careers are
dependent on promoting Naval increases, individually share these very friendly views
 669
towards E n gla n d ; though collectively, and as a policy, they seem unable to express
these views to the German Public, though they convey them to the British ear at times
when there is no possibility of German Naval increases being brought forward.
(c) I would however point out that German Naval officers entertain legitimate
ambitions for their Service, which they hope to fulfil if they can carry the country with
them. M y Naval experience in Germany teaches that it would be wiser for England
to remove temptation out of reach, lest ambition fulfilled by the German Large Navy
Party should lead in the future to a wider spread loss of sincerity in Naval circles
towards E ngland than it has done in the past.
I would quote the words of a German Naval Officer to me in September 191*2.
This officer said, after speaking of the events of the previous 12 m on th s: “ I find
it difficult amongst m y mess-mates to maintain the old friendly feelings I hold towards
England.” Of course the feeling indicated m ay be temporary and not continuous, and
only dependent on the tension of 1911, but it shews that a dangerous spirit has been
present fairly recently.
I believe I rightly interpret the large m ajority of German Naval Officers when I
say that there is nothing they more desire to see than an England strong on sea and
on land, and at the same tim e friends with Germany. W ords to this effect have often
been used to me by the best and rising type of German Naval Officers.
Should however these officers’ ambitions for Naval power be further aroused they
would tend to swell the power of the German Naval Expansionist Party. This Party
must at the present be regarded as the potential enem y of England.
I am of opinion that the present time, in respect of the position of the Naval
Expansionist Party in Germany, is a m ore favourable moment for a large British
Naval increase than is likely to occur later.
I would point out strongly that m y experience shews the present position of the
Naval Expansionist Party in Germany to be one in which the offensive powers of that
Party are for the moment exhausted, and the Party is akin to an enem y in retreat; the
moment is the psychological one for England to use to the utmost in hitting this enem y
the harder.
The events of previous years have shewn that lack of a strong Naval Policy on
E ngland’ s part only widened the ambitions and power of the German Naval
Expansionist Party.
I have, &c.
H U G H W ATSON,
Captain and Naval Attache.

No. 457.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.( J)
P.O. 371/1649.
7 4 8 2 /6 2 0 9 /1 3 /1 8 .
(No. 58.) Confidential. Berlin, D. February 10, 1913.
Sir, B. February 17, 1913.
The statements made by Admiral von Tirpitz before the Budget Committee of
the Reichstag on the 6th and 7th instant(2) have excited considerable interest here
and given rise to all sorts of rumours. I also notice that much importance is
attributed to them in England. M any of the Berlin newspapers at once jum ped to
the conclusion that a Naval Agreem ent had been arranged between Great Britain
and Germ any and published statements to that e ffect; while others took the
precaution of sending representatives to this Em bassy to inquire whether such was

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g and t o th e C a binet. A

co p y was sen t t o the A d m ira lty on F eb ru a ry 26.]
( 2) [v. infra, p p . 675-83, X o . 462, and e n d .]
 670
the case. I may also m ention that my French and Russian colleagues showed
considerable curiosity on the subject.
M y own impression is that Admiral von Tirpitz did not at first intend to say
very m uch or to go very deeply into his naval policy, and meant to confine himseif
to stating that it was not his intention for the m oment to ask for any additions to the
Fleet. Questions, however, w'ith regard to the British Navy appear to have led him
to reply, first that the strength of G erm any’ s Fleet was dependent on Germ any’ s
needs and not on the naval strength of other Powers, and subsequently that he
considered that the claim of Great Britain to superiority at sea was justified, and
lastly that he would welcome a “ sensible agreement ” with Great Britain on the
subject of the proportionate strength between the British and German Navies. The
com parative secrecy of the proceedings in the Budget Committee renders it impossible
to know exactly what passed, but I presume these remarks were made in answer to
isolated questions as it is hardly likely that in a set speech Admiral von Tirpitz
would have said at one m oment that G erm any’ s fleet was G erm any’ s business alone
and that its strength was regulated entirely by G erm any’ s requirements, and at
another that he welcomed the idea of an agreement with Great Britain such as would
fix the proportionate strength of the British and German Navies. Ilis E xcellency’ s
statement on this head is certainly a new departure, as up till now Admiral von
Tirpitz has done anything but welcome the idea o f an exchange of naval information.
It m ay, in fact, be said that it is owing to his disinclination to do so that the last
proposals made by His M ajesty’ s Governm ent on this subject have to this day
remained unanswered.(3)
It was on the Thursday that Admiral von Tirpitz made the above statements.
On the following day Herr von Jagow, in speaking of the relations o f Germany with
other Powers, made special allusion to the cordiality now existing between the British
and German Governments.
Admiral von Tirpitz was then deputed to say something to emphasize H err von
Jagow ’ s cordial utterances, probably with the idea that, as head of the department
most responsible in the eyes of the world for the somewhat strained relations between
the two countries during the last few years, a few friendly words from him would
carry considerable weight both here and in England.
His Excellency thereupon addressed the Committee and, after some polite
remarks upon the improvem ent in Anglo-G erm an relations, referred to the speech
made by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the 18th March of last yea r(4) and stated
that, as the Head of the German Naval Department, he had no objections to raise
against the ratio of 16 to 10 being taken as an acceptable proportion between the
British and German Battle Fleets.
In thinking over this statement one cannot avoid the impression that while
carrying out the wishes of his colleagues to say something Ivhich would throw into
strong relief the increased cordiality in the relations between the two countries,
Admiral von Tirpitz did also a little business on his own account. H is Excellency
knows perfectly well that public attention is for the moment concentrated on the
Arm y and that as regards the Navy he will have to mark time for a period of which
he cannot foresee the extent. Under these circumstances it wTould be perfectly
natural that he should hope that Great Britain might be induced to mark time also,
and abstain from taking advantage of what might appear to be the psychological
m oment for forging ahead. It is therefore quite within the bounds of possibility that
he threw out his references to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty and the
ideas, but not the reservations, which it contained, in the hope that they might bear
fruit in certain sections o f public opinion in England, and produce an agitation in
favour o f naval econom y. Indeed any hopes which his E xcellency m ay have in this

( 3) [T h e t e x t o f th e B ritish proposals fo r th e ex ch a n g e o f naval in form a tion was com m u n i­

ca ted to H e r r von K id e rle n -W a e ch te r on J a n u a ry 23, 1912. v . G ooch & T e m p e r le y , V ol. V I,
pp. 662-3, N o. 489, and encl.]
(D [a . l ’arl. D e l . , 5 th S er ., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 35, pp. 1549-74.]
 671
respect would seem to have been already partially justified, by the extremely unwise
and premature discussions in certain English newspapers as to whether the capital
ships offered by the Colonies should be included, or not, in the 16 to 10 proportion.(s)
If m y views as to Admiral von Tirpitz’ s motives in making his statement are
correct, H is E xcellency has been greatly assisted by those German newspapers, and
they are m any, who have interpreted his words as meaning that Mr. Churchill had
proposed, and he had accepted, a 16 to 10 proportion “ in all ships and for all tim e.”
Since writing the above I have been inform ed on good authority that, on being
asked why he had chosen this moment for making such important statements on
the naval question, which appeared by mutual consent to have been allowed to rest,
Admiral von Tirpitz replied that he had been asked to say a few words pleasing to
England and that he had thought nothing would be more agreeable to H is M ajesty’ s
Governm ent than to hear that he had no intention of m aking further demands for
the Navy, and that he was in agreement with them as regards their suggested
proportion between the two Navies.
I m ay m ention in conclusion that Admiral von Tirpitz’ s remarks w ere-not at all
appreciated by the Conservatives and National Liberal members of the Committee
and that, at their request, every effort was made to prevent their being given to the
Press, but their efforts came too late, as W olff’ s Telegraphic A gency published an
account of what had passed on the Friday evening.
I have, Ac.
W . E. GOSCHEN.
M IN U T E S .
S ir E. G osch en ’ s in te r p r e ta tio n o f A d m ira l von T ir p it z ’ s statem ents is v ery lik ely a ccu ra te,
and is certa in ly a p lausible one. Such a p olicy has th e a d d itio n a l a d v a n ta g e o f sow in g seeds
o f su spicion o f us in the very fe r tile soil o f F ra n ce.
G. R . C.
17.ii.13.

I am firm ly co n v in ce d th a t on e o f th e m ain reasons w hy A uglo-G erm a u -relations are now

m ore cord ial (— I d o not ov erlook th e obviou s oth er reasons— ) is th a t w e h a ve e n tirely ceased
to discuss the qu estion o f a lim ita tio n o f arm am ents. I feel eq ually certa in th a t any resum p­
tion o f th a t discussion w ill h a ve th e in ev ita b le effect o f m a k in g relation s w orse again.
I am th e re fo re ea rnestly h o p in g th a t the m a tte r w ill not be rev iv ed b y us.
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r v ] IS.
A. X .
E. G.

(5) [M a r g in a l n ote b v S ir E y re C r o w e : “ cf. M r. S pen d er in the ‘ D a ily N ew s’ of

F e b r u a r y ] 13. [E . A . C .] ” ]

No. 45S.
Memorandum.
Admiralty Archives Case 0091.
Secret. 10 Février, 1913.
Action com binée dans la M éditerranée.(*;
1. Dans l ’ éventualité d'une guerre où la France et la Grande Bretagne seraient
alliées contre la Triple Alliance, les deux Puissances s ’ efforceront de coopérer dans la
Méditerranée,— comme ailleurs-au mieux de leurs capacités respectives et autant que
la situation générale le permettra. La Mer du Nord sera le théâtre décisif des
opérations navales, et il est absolument nécessaire au succès final de l ’ ensemble des
opérations, que la Grande Bretagne conserve la liberté complète de concentrer sur ce
champ d ’ opérations, telles forces qui sont nécessaires pour vaincre l ’ ennemi. Le
Gouvernement Britannique ne peut en conséquence admettre aucun accord spécifiant
C1) [A n E n g lish t e x t o f this d ocu m en t is p r in te d w ith a F ren ch tra n sla tion in D . D .F .,
3 me S ér ., V ol. V , pp. 4^6-9, N o. 397, A n n e x e I I .]
 672

que la flotte Anglaise de la Méditerranée sera maintenue à un effectif déterminé de

façon permanente. Mais le but de la politique Britannique sera, en principe, de
maintenir dans la Méditerranée, en temps de paix com m e en temps de guerre, une
force telle qu’ elle soit en mesure de combattre, avec chances raisonnables de succès, la
flotte Autrichienne si celle-ci sortait de l ’ Adriatique.
2. Il est convenu, en conséquence, que si l ’ ouverture des hostilités trouve la
flotte Britannique de la Méditerranée constituée à sa force normale déterminée par
l 'objectif spécifié ci-dessus, l ’ idée directrice des opérations qui en découle sera basée
sur le principe que, quoiqu’ un appui mutuel puisse être promptement prêté, le champ
d ’ opérations des deux flottes devra, en général, être maintenu distinct, la flotte
Française opérant dans le bassin occidental et la flotte Britannique dans le bassin
oriental de la Méditerranée.
3. La flotte Britannique aura comme base Malte où les bâtiments cuirassés se
concentreront dès la déclaration de guerre. Les croiseurs légers et destroyers
s’ efforceront de surveiller les m ouvements de la flotte Autrichienne si elle quitte
l ’ Adriatique dans le but d ’ opérer sa jonction avec la flotte Italienne ou d ’ effectuer des
opérations offensives dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée avec la totalité ou une
partie des ses forces.
4. La flotte Britannique s’ efforcera d ’ empêcher de telles opérations et d ’ amener
les forces Autrichiennes au combat et elle sera en général capable de commander les
routes maritimes et de protéger le com m erce dans la partie Est de la Méditerranée.
5. Les forces navales Françaises auront pour objectif principal de rechercher
et de s’ efforcer d ’ amener au combat la flotte Italienne. E n agissant ainsi, elle
garderait les routes maritimes et protégerait le com m erce dans le bassin occidental.
6. Dans l ’ éventualité où les flottes Italienne et Autrichienne essaieraient
d ’ effectuer leur jonction, les flottes Française et Britannique peuvent être amenées
à un contact tactique rapproché. Dans ce cas, il est convenu que les deux flottes
alliées n ’ essaieraient pas de se form er et de combattre en une seule ligne de bataille,
mais que plutôt elles opéreront séparément tout en se soutenant mutuellement. Elles
utiliseront leur livre de signaux com m un et leurs m oyens de com m unications optiques
ou phoniques préalablement com binés, pour assurer la réussite de ces dispositions.
7. L a disposition générale des forces Françaises à la déclaration de guerre sera
la suivante : les escadres de ligne et les croiseurs-cuirassés seront d ’ abord concentrés
a Toulon prêts à effectuer les opérations mentionnées au § 5.
Cependant si des renseignements ultérieurs montraient que les forces Italiennes
doivent effectuer leur mobilisation dans le golfe de Tarente, la concentration des forces
Françaises pourrait avoir lieu à Bizerte.
Les croiseurs légers à Toulon ou en croisière seront expédiés pour croiser sur les
côtes d ’ Algérie et de Tunisie.
Les contre-torpilleurs et sous-marins n ’ appartenant pas aux défenses mobiles
seront attachés aux bâtiments cuirassés.
Une partie des troupes du X I X ème Corps d ’ Armée stationné en Algérie et Tunisie
sera transportée en France du 5ème au 10ème jour de la mobilisation.
L es points d ’ embarquement seront : Tunis, Bizerte, Philippeville, Alger et Oran.
Le port de débarquement sera Marseilles, au prin eip [a l].
8. S ’ il survient dans la Mer du Nord ou près de cette mer une situation obligeant
le Gouvernement Britannique à rappeler dans les eaux Métropolitaines assez de navires
de la Méditerranée pour que ceux qui y seraient laissés ne soient plus en force
suffisante pour agir séparément contre la flotte Autrichienne, les navires restant [s ]
se joindront à la flotte Française en temps de guerre. Us opéreront sous les ordres
de l ’ Amiral Français Commandant en Chef, étant toujours entendu qu ’ ils pourront
être rappelés en Angleterre, à un m oment quelconque, si les circonstances l ’ exigeaient.
9. La force et la com position de la flotte Britannique dans la Méditerranée seront
notifiées de temps à autre par l ’ Êtat-M ajor Général de l ’ Amirauté Britannique au
Ministère de la Marine Française par l ’ intermédiaire de l ’ Attaché Naval Anglais à
Paris. A tout m oment de tension politique, quand il paraîtra vraisemblable que la
 673
France et la Grande Bretagne pourront avoir à agir com m e alliées, si cette tension se
terminait par une guerre, tout changement dans la flotte Anglaise de la Méditerranée
serait prévu connue conséquence de la situation générale, sera communiqué à l ’ avance,
par la même voie.
10. A tout moment où les deux Puissances agiront comme alliées contre un
ennemi, tout port de guerre et base d ’ opérations appartenant à l ’ une d ’ elles sera mis
à la libre disposition de l ’ autre. Toutes les facilités pour l ’ assistance mutuelle seront
pleinement étendues aux deux N ations; par exemple, appui des batteries de terre
pour les navires qui auraient besoin de ce soutien; fourniture de combustible et
d ’ approvisionnement et carénage et réparations aussi bien qu’ aide mutuelle entre
les navires des deux Puissances.

No. 459.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E. Goschen.

Private.f 1)
Mv dear Goschen, F ebruary 15, 1918.
I have not said anything to Lichnowsky about Tirpitz's reported statement to
the Budget Com m itteef21) because 1 am under the impression that the German Govern­
ment would not like anything that looked as if we were going to make Tirpitz’ s
statement the starting point for proposals about a naval agreement.
But Jagow ’ s and Tirpitz’ s statements as reported have made a good impression
here and they will certainly affect very favourably the tone of Churchill’ s statement
about our Naval Estimates in Parliament when he comes to make them next month.
If the matter comes up in conversation you can take this line.
Yours sincerely.
E. G B E Y .
0 ) [G rey M SS ., V o l. 23.1
( 2) [ r su pra, pp . 669-71. N o. 457, and note (2).]

No. 460.

Sir .4. Xicolson to Sir Edward Grey.

Private, f 1)
Mv dear Grey, February IS, 1913.
The K ing sent for me this m orning, as he had been disturbed by the rather
alarming news which the papers had been circulating during the last two days. I
gave him a resume o f the present situation, which to m y mind has not appreciably
changed for the worse— indeed as regards Boumania and Bulgaria for the better
rather— as they both seem disposed to accept mediation.
H [is ] M [a je sty] read to me a long letter from Prince H enry recording that he
had com m unicated to the German Em peror the opinion which the K ing had expressed
to P [r in ]c e H enry at Sandringham (2) in regard to our helping our friends— an
opinion, the K ing said to me this morning, which “ I as an honest man was bound to
give.” I entirely agreed with him. Prince H enry said that the Em peror had been
struck by what the K ing had said but still more by the fact that Haldane on the
same day had used practically precisely the same language to P r[in c e ] Lichnowsky.

0 ) [G re y M SS., V o l. 55.]
(2) [r . supra, p. 658, N o. 452.]
[1 0 9 0 0 ] 2 X
 674

The Em peror observed that he now knew where he stood : that he was always in
favour of peace, but in view of the possible or probable attitude of G [r e a ]t Britain in
future complications he could not be blamed if he were to make every preparation to
meet every possible eventuality. There w7as a good deal more in this strain, with
some half-veiled reproaches to us— but evidently what nettled the German Emperor
most was that Haldane had also replied in the same sense as the King.
The Em peror observed that he supposed that G [rea ]t Britain understood the
great responsibility as regards peace which she was undertaking by the attitude she
assumed. The usual sting in the tail.
Granville had a most interesting conversation with the Em peror two or three
days ago.(3) His report has just reached the office and I will hand it to you so soon
as the D ep [a rtm en ]t transmit it to me. Granville is in waiting.
All the Powers, Italy excepted, have agreed to the message for Tewfik. Imperiali
sees me today, and if he has re c [e iv e ]d approval I will hand it to Tewfik this
afternoon.(4)
Y [o u ji-s sincerelv,
A. NICOLSON.

(3) [v . Gooch & T e m p e rle y , V ol. I X (I I ), pp. 503-5, No. 624, encl. 1
(•*) [u. ibid., V ol. I X (I I ), p. 512, E d . n o te .)

No. 461.

Sir F. B ertie to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

P.O. 371/1650.
8 2 4 0 /7 7 2 0 /1 3 /1 7 .
(No. 92.) Paris, D. February 19, 1913.
Sir, B. February 21, 1913.
The French Press is practically unanimous in applauding the intention of
Monsieur B riand’ s Ministry to adopt a series of measures for strengthening the
French Arm y. It is stated that Parliament is to be asked to sanction credits
amounting in all to over £20,000,000, twenty million pounds, bnt no reliable details
as to the exact amount or objects of these credits are at present known. It is also
stated that the Ministry for W ar is considering the question of a return to the
three-years system for some or all branches of the A r m y ; but, here again, reliable
inform ation is not yet forthcom ing. The idea, however, is widely discussed by the
Press and warmly advocated by m any important newspapers.
The case for increased armaments has been put before the public with great force
and ability, especially by the “ Temps ” which has evidently been preparing the way
for a new developm ent in military policy for some little time past by a series of
articles on German policy and armaments written by its foreign editor, M. Tardieu,
who has just been made “ Officer ” of the Legion of Honour.
The most noteworthy fact in the internal situation of France during the last
twelve months has been the recrudescence of a spirit of energetic patriotism.
M onsieur Poincare’ s Ministry, and especially Monsieur Millerand as Minister for W ar,
did much to foster this spirit.
One of the early signs of the “ nation a list” wave which is now sweeping over
France was the extraordinary enthusiasm shown by the crowds during the weekly
military tattoos through the streets of Paris which wore re-established by
M onsieur Millerand. Monsieur Poincare is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as the
em bodim ent of the new7 spirit in France and his great popularity at this moment is

P ) [T his despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e M inister.
A c o p y was sent to the W a r O ffice.]
 675
largely to be attributed to this fact. The public are frequently reminded that he
comes from French Lorraine, and he is credited with sharing the feelings of his
fellow-Lorrainers who pass for being the most patriotic o f all Frenchm en.
Just as the last “ nationalist ” revival, following upon the Fashoda affair in
1898,(2) was directed against Great Britain, so the present one, following upon the
Agadir incident, is directed against Germany. Public attention is now constantly
called to the two lost provinces, and cries of “ Vive 1’ A lsace-L orraine! ” are
frequently raised when regiments appear in the streets. Theatrical managers are
utilizing this tendency of public opinion and producing plays of an ultra-patriotic
character. A plav at the Theatre Rejane called “ Alsace.” which deals entirely with
the question o f ‘ ‘ La Revanche,” is at present one of the most popular pieces in
Paris, and the tirades in it against Germany are received with rapturous applause by
the audience.
The M inistry doubtless count on the current of chauvinistic feeling in France,
on the apprehensions arising from the uncertain nature of the European situation
and, above all, on the sentiments aroused by the announcement of further increases
in the German Arm y, to secure public support when Parliament is asked to sanction
the financial measures necessary to strengthen the French Arm y, and possibly
proposals for extending in some form or other the period of service with the colours.
I have, &c.
FR AN C IS B E R T IE .
M IN U T E S .

The jin g o s p ir it to w hich S ir F . B e r tie refers is a d istin ct da n g er to the peace o f E urope.

G. H . V .
2 1 /2 /1 3 .
P erhaps, b u t M in isters m ust foster and ta ke a d v a n ta g e o f th a t s p irit to pass th e b u rd en ­
some m easures w hich w ill ensure som e g u a ra n tee o f eq u ality o f fig h tin g efficiency betw een
F ra n ce and G erm any.
G. R . C.
21.ii.13.
E. A . C.
F eb. 21.
A. N.
E. G.

( 2) [F o r the F ashoda in cid en t, v. Gooch & T e m p e rle y , V ol. I, pp. 158-93, C h a p ter I V (I I ).]

No. 46*2.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.{ *)

F.O. 371/1619.
8 6 7 6 /6 2 0 9 /1 3 / 18.
(No. 74.) Confidential. Berlin, D. February 21, 1913.
Sir, R. February 24, 1913.
In m y despatch No. 58 of the 10th instant (2) I had the honour to report upon tho
statements made by Admiral von Tirpitz to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag
on the 6th and 7th instant.(3) M y report was founded upon the accounts o f the
proceedings furnished by the newspapers, which, as the debates in the Committee
are supposed to be kept secret from the public, were necessarily incomplete.

O [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a vin g been sen t w ith S ir E. G osch en’ s despatch (N o. 58)
o f F eb ru a ry 10 (v. su pra , pp. 669-71, N o. 457) to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is t e r ; to the
L o rd C h a n ce llo r; to L o rd C r e w e ; to M r. C h u r c h ill; to the C hancellor o f th e E x c h e q u e r ; to
L o rd M orlcv. A cop y was sent to the A d m ira lty on M a rch 5 .]
( 2) [r . su p ra , pp. 669-71, N o. 457.]
(3) [cp . G .P ., X X X I X , pp. 15-17, and n o te .]
[10900] 2 X 2
 676

On the day before yesterday, however, the Protocol of the proceedings, which is
printed for the use of the Budget Committee alone, found its way, either by accident
or design, into the columns of the “ Tageblatt.” I thereupon asked H err von Jagow
whether he could give me an official copy of the protocols, and he was good enough
to send me one of them, namely that of the second day which contained the report
of his speech. As this tallied almost exactly with the Berliner Tageblatt reproduction
I presume that the protocol of the first day published by that paper is equally
correct.
I have now the honour to furnish translations (by Mr. Gurney) of the two
protocols, which contain not only the statements made by H err von Jagow and
Admiral von Tirpitz, but also the observations made in committee which led to, and
subsequently commented upon, those statements.
I see nothing in these official reports which lead me to change the opinions I
form ed on first reading Admiral von Tirpitz’ s statements, and which I ventured to
lay before you in m y despatch under reference. But there are a few other points lo
which I should like to call your attention. But first I must not omit to repair an
error into which I was led by the abbreviated report supplied originally by the Press.
I said that Admiral von Tirpitz referred to the “ speech of the First Lord of the
Admiralty and to the ideas, but not the reservations, which it contained.” This is
not correct, though it would have been correct had I said the ideas and not all the
reservations it contained. For, as you will see in the protocol, Admiral von Tirpitz,
in his quotation from Mr. Churchill’ s speech, included the w ord s: ‘ ‘ Further than
that it is idle to speculate. I must not however be taken as agreeing that the ratio
of 16 to 10 could be regarded as a sufficient preponderance for British naval strength
as a whole above that o f the next strongest Naval Power.”
There H is Excellency stopped, and made no mention of the further reservations
made by Mr. Churchill, reservations which, as you may remember, caused Admiral
von Tirpitz to take anything but a favourable view o f the speech when it originally
came under his notice. It was perhaps natural that Admiral von Tirpitz should not
mention that portion of Mr. Churchill’ s speech; but, in view of the persistence
shown by members of the Committee in their demands for inform ation as to whether
Great Britain had made any other naval proposals to Germany, one cannot but think
how interested they would have been to have heard Admiral von T irpitz’ s views as
to Mr. Churchill’ s statement that any retardation or reduction in German construc­
tion within certain limits would be prom ptly followed in England, as soon as it was
apparent, by large and fully proportionate reduction. Admiral von Tirpitz, however,
failed to remind his hearers of that practical proposal, though he had every
opportunity of doing so.
It is impossible for me in the short time at m y disposal before the departure of
this week’ s messenger to go fully into all Admiral von Tirpitz’ s statements. But
there are one or twro of his utterances to which I would venture to call your attention.
In one of these utterances he states that the wishes o f the Naval Administra­
tion, to which he had called the attention of the Beichstag last year, did not refer
to an increase of the German Navy but m erely to the quicker replacement of some
antiquated cruisers.
In considering that remark it must not be forgotten that the replacement of
those antiquated cruisers will almost certainly mean their replacement by modern
‘ ‘ battle cruisers,” which are, I believe, essentially fast ‘ ‘ battleships.” It would
seem therefore that should the washes of the Naval Administration be fulfilled, and
the replacement in question take place at an early date, the German Navy wrould, as
a matter o f fact gain an increase in strength and England be faced with a stronger
German fleet at an earlier date than has been anticipated.
Admiral von Tirpitz followed that observation by saying that even his last
‘ ‘ Novelle ” had not so much the object of making a moderate addition to the German
Navy as o f rendering their battle fleet more ready for war. Of course here His
Excellency alluded to the form ation of a third squadron which was to be fit and ready
for service at any time; still there may be two opinions as to the addition to the fleet
of three battleships and two small cruisers outside the fleet law being such a moderate
increase to German naval strength as His Excellency’s words would seem to convey.
Later on the Admiral uses words to the following e ffe c t: “ W e have no intention
of passing the actual limits of the Fleet Law and I hope by these words to rem ove all
uneasiness.”
I feel sure that His E xcellency on this occasion meant what he said, as, for
reasons I gave in the despatch under reference, it is not likely that he will for some
time be in a position to make further naval dem ands; but I believe that I am right
in stating that similar statements in the past have on m any occasions preceded the
introduction of fresh amendments to the Fleet Law of 1 9 0 0 -0
W ith regard to the statement of Admiral von Tirpitz to the effect that if they
could arrive at a suitable agreement with Great Britain, then the Fleet Law could be
regarded as having done its work, I would state that the perusal of the whole of his
remarks leads me to the conclusion that an agreement which to his mind would be
suitable would be one, which, leaving out Mr. Churchill’ s limitations, would fix the
proportion of the whole of both the British and German fleets at the ratio of 16 to 10.
As I mentioned in m y preceding despatch on this subject, a considerable section
of public opinion here, basing its conclusions on the original hearsay reports of the
proceedings in the Budget Committee, and therefore unaware of any of
Mr. Churchill’ s reservations, is nourishing the belief that an agreement to the above
effect has already been practically concluded between the two Governments.
I have, Ac.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 462.

Account of the Proceedings in B udget Com m ittee of the Reichstag,

February 6th and 1th, 1913.
The following represents the account of the proceedings on F eb [ru a ry ] 6 as
given by the “ Tageblatt ” :—
The Beferent, Baron Thiinefeld (Centre! began by referring to Mr. Churchill’ s
speech on the Navy and asked why no semi-official correction of the erroneous figures
had been issued.
Herr Grober (Centre) asked for precise inform ation as to how relations with
England stood in the present critical situation.
Admiral von Tirpitz replied that he could not furnish this inform ation.
“ Negotiations with England in regard to the respective strength of the Navies, are
not at present taking place and have not taken place for a long time past.”
Herr Noske (Socialist) and Dr. W iem er (Radical) desired the attendance of the
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, whilst Count Westarp (Conservative) opposed
the conjunction of a debate on foreign affairs with the Naval discussion.
Herr Ledebour ("Socialist) asserted that the statement of Admiral von Tirpitz
betrayed a strong feeling against England.

To this Admiral von Tirpitz replied as follows :—

‘ ‘ I must protest against the view that m y utterances revealed a feeling against
England. I cannot understand how H err Ledebour could hear that in them. I am
the first who would gladly welcome an understanding with England. To make
comparisons about proportionate strength is very difficult. The numbers of ships
alone afford no correct comparison. There are also the type of ship, the age of the
ships and other factors which can hardly be compared. The British Minister of
Marine, Mr. Churchill, made such a com parison last year. But in doing so he left

(4) [F o r th e G erm an N a v y B ill o f 1900, v. Gooch db T e m p e rle y , V ol. V I , S u b je c t In d ex ,

pp. 824-5.]
 678
gaps open. He said that the British Dreadnoughts are at present in a proportion of
1 -6 to 1 to the German Dreadnoughts. This ratio is in m y opinion acceptable for
the battle fleet. It expresses the fact that we do not intend and also have not
intended to enter into com petition with England. It gives us such a proportion of
strength that it is difficult to attack us. This proportion is maintained by the Navy
Law, more we do not require. There can be no question of our desiring to proceed
aggressively towards England. For aggressive procedure requires considerable
superiority. W e have always insisted that we do not aim at a Navy as large as the
British Navy. The Navy which we require is provided by the Navy Law. W e were
at one time faced by the question whether to give to our strongly developing trade
and to our industry an adequate protection by means of a sufficiently strong navy,
or to stand always with our hat in our hand. W e adopted the form er course. The
unsatisfied wishes (Zurückgestellte W ünsche) of the Naval Authorities, of which I
spoke last year in the Reichstag, refer not to an increase of the Navy, but to the more
rapid replacement of some obsolete cruisers. Even the last Navy Bill had not so
much the object of making this moderate addition to the strength of our Navy, as of
making our battle fleet more rapidly ready for war. This had becom e necessary
through the modern development of types of ships, the introduction of wireless
telegraphy, the concentration of ships in the North Sea and other things beside. The
intention to exceed the present limits of the Navy Law does not exist. I hope by
these words I have allayed any uneasiness which may have arisen.”

A ccording to the “ Tageblatt ” report, Ilerr Ledebour then spoke again to the
effect that Admiral von Tirpitz had given evidence of want of faith in the readiness
of the British Government to deal loyally with Germany.
To this Admiral von Tirpitz rep lied : ‘ ‘ Nothing is known to me of a readiness
on the part of England to enter into naval negotiations.”
H err Erzberger (Centre) said that he considered the statement of Admiral von
Tirpitz as of extreme value politically, since it contained the declaration that the
ratio of 16 to 10 offered by the British Government was acceptable for Germany.
The Secretary of State had expressed doubts whether his readiness would be
reciprocated by England. This shewed how necessary it was that there should be a
connection between the Ministry of Marine and the Foreign Office. The explanations
of Admiral von Tirpitz were politically of extraordinary value; he begged that they
might be embodied in the protocol, since he was convinced that the explanations
would largely contribute to term inating the strained relations with England.
Dr. W iem er (RadicaL agreed with Herr Erzberger that the proceedings during
the present debate were extrem ely welcome. He would consider it highly desirable
that similar explanations to those now given should also be given in the Reichstag.
This would materially contribute to an understanding with England. W hether
proposals would come from England in regard to the proportion of naval construc­
tion, remained to be seen; and it must be considered with every care but without
prejudice how far such agreements could be carried out. But he expressed the hope
that should such proposals come from England, the German Government would not
at once adopt an attitude of refusal, but would submit the proposals to an objective
examination.
H err von Tirpitz then said :

“ I have in m y statements only expressed my personal point of view, not that of

the Government or of the Imperial Chancellor. That we would agree (eingehen) to
a practicable British proposal, I do not doubt for a moment. I have always supported
this view. It is absolutely untrue that we have ever rejected such a proposal. If we
reach a practicable agreement, the Navy Law has had its effect. But in the case of
a formal agreement, guarantees for its execution are necessary. Therein lies the
difficulty. If moreover two parties desire to conclude a difficult bargain, which is
to satisfy both of them, one of them must not run to meet the other with open arms.
 679
Such intricate matters must be handled with foresight and skill between man of
business and man of business.”

After H err Ledebour bad stated that the gratification evoked by these explana­
tions was modified by the fact that Admiral von Tirpitz bad only spoken from his
personal point of view and after Herr Bassermann and Count Westarp had pointed
out the difficulties of the question of guarantees, Admiral von Tirpitz again spoke as
follows :—
“ I can only agree that the handling o f this question in the Press must be
conducted with great care. Misunderstandings in this connection are only too likely
to arise. England can in m y opinion not be in doubt that we would be willing to
enter into negotiations, if she would begin them .”

The following is the translation of the Protocol reporting the proceedings in the
Budget Committee on the 7th in s ta n t:—
The general discussion of the question o f the relations of Germany with England
was coijtinued.

H err von Jagow, Secretary of State of the Foreign Office spoke as follows :—
“ One of the last statements— unless I am mistaken quite the last— made by m y
late predecessor in the Reichstag dealt with our relations with England. H err von
K iderlen stated on that occasion that throughout the recent crisis our relations with
England had been specially trustful. H e pointed out the good sendee rendered to the
cause of an understanding among all the Powers by the frank conversations conducted
in entire confidence between London and Berlin during all the phases of this crisis,
and he expressed the expectation that they would continue to render this sendee. It
affords me special satisfaction that on the first occasion which has presented itself
for me to speak in this place, I can affirm that this expectation has been absolutely
and entirely fulfilled. The intimate exchange of views winch we are m aintaining
with the British Government has very materially contributed to the rem oval of
difficulties of various kinds which have arisen during the last few months. W e have
now seen that we have not only points of contact with England of a sentimental
nature but that similar interests also exist. I am not a prophet, but I entertain the
hope that on the ground o f com m on interests, which in politics is the mo^t fertile
ground, we can continue to work with England and perhaps to reap the fruits of our
labours. I should like however to point out to you, Gentlemen, that we have here to
do with a tender plant, which must not be prevented from blossoming by being
touched and discussed too soon.”

Dr. H echscher (Radical stated that he welcomed the statement of Herr von
Jagow. His party attached the greatest importance to the existence of good relations
with England. They had not yet abandoned the hope that in England too the idea
would gradually penetrate that friendly relations with Germany were not only
possible but natural. The statement of the Secretary of State o f the Foreign Office
however was somewhat at variance with the statement of the Secretary of State of
the "Ministry o f Marine. He could not continue the debate until it was known whether
the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Marine could succeed in bringing his views
into harm ony with the statement of the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office.
Admiral von Tirpitz then spoke as follows :—
“ I do not quite understand in what Dr. Heckscher sees a divergence between my
statement of yesterday and that made by the Secretary of fctate of the Foreign Office
today. I agree with the latter in every respect. Besides I have always endeavoured
in debate to touch as little as possible on the political relations between us and
England. If I expressed an opinion vest* rday in regard to these relations, I did
so under compulsion. I imm ediately begged you at the time to regard m y statement,
which I desired should be understood solely from the m ilitary point of view, as
 680

confidential. I caused a request to be conveyed to the Secretary of State of the

Foreign Office, however, to come here.”

H err Noske (Socialist) stated that his party had always advocated good relations
with England. He was opposed to the agitation conducted by the Navy League.
Herr Gröber (Centre) said that he too considered that there was some divergence,
or at least the appearance of a divergence, between the statement made by Admiral
von Tirpitz the day before and that just made bv Herr von Jagow. He welcomed
the announcement of Admiral von Tirpitz that the ratio mentioned was acceptable
from the German point of v ie w ; this announcement was of great value, even if it
were only the expression of an expert opinion. Hitherto the principal difficulty in
the way of the discussion of an understanding with England had lain in the fact
that it was said that no formula could be found for the ratio. H e was of opinion
that if an agreement were reached in principle, it would also be possible to agree as
to the guarantees. Though the declaration of Herr von Tirpitz was of great value
and though the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office had described the political
situation as a whole in a very friendly manner, yet no individual fact had been com ­
municated which the Committee was in a position to verify. He begged that the
details might be discussed at any rate in the Committee, even if confidentially. He
especially desired that the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office should state how
he viewed the statement made on the previous day by the Secretary of State of the
Ministry of Marine.
H err Bassermann (National Liberal) welcomed the “ rapproch em en t” between
E ngland and Germany. The only question was how far it had been rendered
necessary for England by her Balkan interests. He had always urged that an under­
standing with England would be possible on two con dition s: firstly that England
should recognize that the size of Germ any’ s navy was exclusively determined
according to her own interests; and secondly that England should not meet every
attempt to extend the German sphere of influence by an unfriendly policy on her
part. The armaments question could not be passed over in silence in the Reichstag.
H e was indeed of opinion that there was no need for such anxiety in this connection.
The strength of British policy consisted in the fact that it was carried out openly and
without any attempt at secrecy. In reply to the observations of H err Noske in regard
to the activity of the Navy League he remarked that since Admiral von Köster had
been at its head, the Navy League had pursued a very quiet policy. The previous
day’ s statement of the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Marine had been clear
and simple. The Secretary of State had, however, also pointed out that the
difficulties began with the guarantees. These difficulties were, in his (the speaker’ s)
opinion so great that success was not to be expected.
Admiral von Tirpitz then spoke as follows :—
“ I desire again to emphasize that no differences exist between m y statements
and those of the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office. Even the statements of
H err Gröber have not convinced me of such differences. I explained the point of
view of m y military department. The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office dealt
with the general political questions. I desire to point out once more that the
proportion of 16 to 10 for the battle fleet aimed at by the British Minister of Marine,
Churchill, exists already in fact and to read to you now the following extract from
the speech made by that Minister last spring.(5)
“ ‘ The actual standard of new construction which the Admiralty has in fact
followed during recent years, has aimed at developing a 6 0% superiority in vessels
of the Dreadnought type over the German Navy on the basis of the present German
Navy Law. There are other and higher standards for the smaller vessels, with which
however 1 do not desire to com plicate this argument, since they do not materially
affect the finance.

(5) [fp . Pari. Deb., 5th Ser., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 35, pp. 155 5-6.]
 681

“ ‘ I f Germany adheres to her existing Navy Law we believe that that standard,
if no unexpected developments occur in other countries, could continue to be a guide
for our finance for the next four or five years, that is to say so far as that class of
capital ships is concerned. Further than that it is idle to speculate. One thing
further I must certainly say. It must not be assumed that I would agree that the
ratio of 16 to 10 is a sufficient preponderance for British naval strength as a whole
over the next strongest Power.’

“ I said yesterday quite clearly that I too considered the ratio of 16 to 10 for the
two battle fleets acceptable, a ratio which in fact already exists. For there are
provided 8 British battleship squadrons against 5 German battleship squadrons;
that is the ratio of 16 to 10. The British Minister of Marine. Churchill, spoke of
numbers of ships: I reckon in squadrons of 8 ships each. That is simpler and
easier of control. I am far from taking back one word of what I said yesterdav. My
utterances are entirely in accord with those o f the Secretary of State o f the Forei<m
Office.”

Dr. W iem er (Radical) then urged that in the statement of the Secretary of State
of the Foreign Office the most important fact was that the British as well as the
German Government were convinced of the existence of not only ideal but also real
com m on interests. He admitted that the statement of the Secretary of State of the
Foreign Office was not quite in accordance with that of the Secretary of State of the
M inistry of Marine, since it said nothing about the essential point' of any negotia­
tions, nam ely the establishment of a ratio for naval forces. He begged the Secretary
of State of the Foreign Office to confirm the statement of the Secretary of State of
the Ministry of Marine. He further requested that the portions of the speech of the
British ^Minister of Marine, Churchill, read by the Secretary o f State of the Ministry
of Marine might be added to the Protocol. H e hoped that an earnest effort would be
made by negotiations between the German and the British Governments to bring
about an understanding with England. As regards the discussion of the armaments
question in the open sitting of the Reichstag, there was no need for special anxiety.
H e hoped that the proceedings in the Reichstag would produce an atmosphere of
confidence throughout Germany outside the Budget Committee and the Reichstag.
H err von .Jagow said :
“ If I have said nothing positive as to the substance of our conversations with
England, it is because binding agreements in regard to definite questions do not exist.
M e have however been able in the course of the exchange of views on the present
acute Eastern question to note with gratification a very welcome com m unity o f views.
As regards the question of the relative strength of our Navy to that of England, I
would of course have no objection to raise, from the standpoint of m y department, to
the idea of the establishment o f this ratio at 10 to 16, which the Secretary of State of
the Ministry of Marine characterises as acceptable. These are military questions, on
which I cannot claim to give an expert opinion.”

H err Erzberger (Centre'' welcomed the statement of the Secretary of State of the
Foreign Office, which amounted, he said, to the political and diplomatic signature of
the technical naval statement of the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Marine.
A fter this statement there could be no further talk of a difference between the views
of the two Secretaries of State. He also thought it would not be so difficult to find
guarantees for the ratio, though it was not necessary to discuss this question in public.
H e begged that all the proceedings of the British House of Commons on the
armaments question might be com m unicated to the Reichstag as an annex to the
protocol of the Budget Committee. H e also drew attention to the development of
the Russian Navy and the advance of Russia to the sea. The debate in the British
House of Comm ons had, he said, led to the proceedings in the Budget Committee.
N othing had hitherto been done publicly to contradict Churchill’ s mistake. I f the
Government did not do anything, it could be done by the Reichstag.
 682

H err Ledebour (Socialist) said that the Socialists had always advocated an
understanding with England. If the Government had acquired the conviction that
real interests now bound Germany and England together, he inferred that Germ any’ s
foreign policy had hitherto been even more despicable than his political friends had
assumed. That the united econom ic interests of England and Germany ought to
render a war between these States quite impossible, must be publicly made known
with absolute clearness. Open discussion of all political matters was the only right
course. In England no one allowed his mouth to be shut. For Germans to wrap
themselves in a mantle of silence was only to arouse mistrust against their country.
The publication of the proceedings of the Budget Committee in the present and the
previous day’ s sittings could only facilitate the negotiations between England and
Germany. He pointed to the experiences made in this connection by the former
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, von Kiderlen-W aechter, and Baron
Marschall.
Count W estarp (Conservative) said that if an improvement in relations with
E ngland had of late been observable it was due to the quiet and determined manner
in -w h ich Germany was building her navy. H e recalled the impression created by
the vote without discussion of the Navy Estimates in 1909 and the Navy Bill last
year. The feeling in England would not be improved by wearisome discussions of
the numerical ratio, and he who would not be convinced in England would also not
be convinced by speeches in the Beiehstag. H e proposed that, however valuable the
discussion of Germ any’ s relations with England might have been, the Navy Estimates
should be voted as quietly and silently as possible.
H err Bassermann (National Liberal) said that the result of the discussion might
be taken to be that there existed a desire for greater publicity in the conduct of
foreign affairs. The inform ation obtained nowadays originated frequently from
discussions in foreign parliaments. On the other hand the German people had, in
view of the heavy burdens which they had to bear in the interest of territorial defence,
a claim to be inform ed as to the general lines of policy. It was further evident that
differences of opinion did not exist between the Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office and the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Marine. Such doubts would
however be avoided if the Imperial Chancellor would furnish inform ation in the
Committee in regard to the general lines of foreign policy before the discussion of the
Arm y and Navy Estimates. The question of an armaments agreement was more
difficult than before. He did not consider it desirable for Germany to be drawn into
disarmament negotiations or into a disarmament Conference.
Dr. H eckscher (Badical) said that Admiral von Tirpitz had defended himself
with exaggerated sensitiveness against the charge that he had made a difference
between his explanations and the statements of the Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office. He admitted that the later statements of Admiral von Tirpitz and the
explanations of Herr von Jagow were now in agreement in many essential particulars.
It was thus of special importance to point out that Herr von Jagow had declared his
concurrence in the numerical ratio announced. The recent episode o f the European
crisis had shown how necessary the “ rapprochement ” between Germany and
England was, and 011 what a real foundation the rapprochement could take place.
England had, as Herr Bassermann had rightly stated, placed herself by the side of
Germ any in the Balkan crisis on account of British interests; that showed however
that it was not sentimental but political considerations which determined the attitude
of England, and political considerations were those which lasted longest. He agreed,
in conclusion, with Count Westarp in thinking that nothing had made such a strong
impression on British opinion as the developm ent of the German navy and especially
the adoption of the last Navy Bill in the Beiehstag. It was a result of practical and
dispassionate considerations that the desire was gaining ground in England to come
to an understanding with Germany.
I)r. Siidekum (Socialist) said that the establishment of a ratio of strength of
16 to 10 between the British and German Navies was not indeed in accordance with
 6S3
the ideals of his party, but it was welcomed as an advance. The question o f relative
strength must be discussed in public in order to improve the confidence o f the two
peoples towards each other. H e agreed with the statements of Herr Bassermann to
the effect that the Committee must demand inform ation from the Imperial Chancellor
in regard to the main lines of foreign policy. He did not hesitate to demand that for
this purpose the estimates for the Im perial Chancellor should be referred to the
Committee.
This closed the debate.

M IX T T E .
It is w ell t o b ear in m in d th a t we have even now no official statem ent o f w hat A d m ira l
von T ir p itz a ctu a lly said. R em em b erin g past e x p erien ce w e m ust alw ays rem a in p rep a red to
be to ld th a t w hat we m av q u ote w ere not th e w ord s reallv used.
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r v ] 24.
A. X . ’
E . G.

No. 463.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . S'icolson.

P rivate.(*)
M y dear X ico, B erlin, February 22, 1913.
• • • -O I got a letter from Grey the other day(3 showing a certain amount
of enthusiasm over Tirpitz’ s statements. He said however that he had said nothing
to Lichnowsky about them because he was under the impression that the German
G ov [ern m en ]t would not like anything that would look as if H [is ] M [a je s ty 's]
G o v e r n m e n t] were going to make Tirpitz’ s statement the starting point for proposals
about a Naval Agreem ent.
That I sim ply d on’ t understand— but what upsets me rather is that Grey wants
me to tell Jagow if the m atter com es up in conversation that both his and T irpitz’ s
statements have made a good impression in England and that they will certainlv
“ affect very favourably the tone o f C hurchill’ s statements on the Naval Estimates
| in Parliament next m onth.” Now the worst o f it is that Tirpitz's statements have
not made a good impression on me— nor the manner in which th o[u g h ] secret thev
i allowed to leak out at once— only subsequently to be corrected by an official
Protocol after they had created a certain impression on the Public mind— nor, in fact
the circumstances— i.e., Tirpitz’ s necessity to mark time as regards further naval
expenditure, in which his statements were m ade. You see Tirpitz is a sly dog— and
not the bluff sailor he posed as being in the Budget Committee. I have studied
! his methods now for some four years— so I ought to know something o f them ; and
' I confess to regard all his doings with suspicion.
But I hope you d on ’ t think I have gone too far in m y despatches. M y object
in writing them was not so m uch to enforce m y own views on H [is ] M [a je s ty 's]
G o v e rn m e n t] as to warn them that there is often more than meets the eve at a
first glance at what Tirpitz says. So until I hear what is thought o f m y arguments
I rather hope to avoid the subject “ com ing up in con versa tion ” with Jagow as I
should not like to hamper Churchill b y a prom ise, more or less, that his speech on
the Estimates would be favourably affected b y Tirpitz’ s remarks. It must also be

(*) [C a rn ock M S S ., V ol. I I o f 1913.]

(z) [T h e op e n in g pa ra g ra p h s o f this le tte r are n ot rep rod u ced as they deal w ith personal
m a tters.]
(s) [r . sup ra , p. 673, X o . 459.]
 684

remembered that these remarks were not supposed to be made public at all having
been delivered in the bosom of the Budget Committee— whose proceedings are secret.
If Tirpitz repeats them in the Reichstag— then it will be time enough to say
something.
Please tell me what you think. B y the way I wrrote my despatch before speaking
to W atson— but I have read it to him and he corroborates every word I have said.
. . . .C>
Yours ever,
W . E . GOSCHEN.

( 4) [T h e rem a in in g pa ra g ra p h s o f this letter refer to the p ossibility o f a R oy a l v isit to

B e r lin .]

No. 464.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y d 1)

P.O. 8 7 1 ' 1649.
9842 /6-209/13/18.
(No. 84.) B erlin, D. March 2, 1913.
Sir, R . March 3, 1913.
I have the honour to forward, herewith, a report, as marked in the m argin,/2)
which I have received from Captain W atson, Naval Attache to this Embassy, relating
to Admiral von Tirpitz’ s remarks in the Budget Committee on February 6th and 7th,
1913.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 464.

Captain W atson to Sir E. G oschen .(3)

(Confidential.)
Sir, B erlin, March 1, 1913.
In m y despatch No. 7 of the 13th February, 1913,(4) I reported to your
E xcellency on opinions expressed here as to the reasons underlying Admiral von
T irpitz’ s remarks in the budget committee on the 6th and 7th ultimo, to the effect
that “ reasonable agreement with E ngland over the strength of the respective war
fleets was to be w elcom ed,’ ’ and further that, “ for his part, as leader of the German
Adm iralty, a proportion of sixteen to ten between the British and German fleets was
for the next few years acceptable.’ ’
I have now- the honour to report that I have carried out further enquiries as to
the reasons for the remarks indicated. I would report that competent observers of
Admiral von Tirpitz’s policy for some time past in Berlin state that they consider,

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent, on M a rch 18, to the K in g ; to the

L ord C h a n ce llo r; to L ord C r e w e ; to L o rd M o r le v ; t o th e C hancellor o f the E x c h e q u e r ; to
M r. C h u rch ill.]
( 2) [M a rk ed in the m a r g in : “ G erm any N. A . N o. 10.” ]
(3) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta k en from the cop y in the C onfid en tial P r in t, as the orig in a l
was sent to th e A d m ira lty .]
( 4) [C a p ta in W a tso n ’ s despatch (N o. 7) o f F ebru ary 13, 1913, w hich was enclosed in S ir E.
G osch en’ s despatch (N o. 67), D . F eb ru a ry 16, R . F eb ru a ry 17, 1913, is not rep rod u ced . I t was
sent to th e A d m ira lty and no cop y can be tra ced in the F o re ig n Office A rchives. (F .O . 371/1649
7 4 9 1 /6 2 0 9 /1 3 /1 8 .)]
 685
in his skilful particular allusion to the words of the First Lord o f the Admiralty in
respect o f the proportions of sixteen to ten, the admiral has done one o f the cleverest
o f his m any clever acts in respect of E ngland in his long successful career in the
conduct of German naval policy.
These observers remark that, in German eyes, Admiral von Tirpitz has already
accomplished more in weakening E ngland’ s superiority at sea than he ever reallv
hoped to achieve when he com m enced his navy law, and that his policy now is to
tie England down to a complete sixteen to ten proportion.
These observers consider it undoubted that, in view o f army expansion, it is
“ low tide “ in the naval expansionist party. Further, that everything tends to show
that the German naval expansionist party itself is in a bad position at present to
engineer a further German naval increase if the British colonial naval programmes
are accomplished.
I would here remark that study of the last few years shows that some checks to
the German naval expansionist policy have been imposed by British naval increases.
The most important check being the recent action o f the colonies.
2. Observers o f past German naval policy remark that the history o f recent
years shows that the line o f that policy has been in some measure adapted to suit
the state of feeling current in E ngland, and that it has been part o f German naval
policy to endeavour to cloud its issues to British eyes.
Close observation o f the German naval anti-British press campaign of the winter
of 1911-12 tends to show that, if not Admiral von Tirpitz him self, at least his press
showed themselves to be the apostles of a three to two naval proportion. As I
reported to your E xcellency at the time, it would appear that it was then the first
time a definite public German objection to a two to one British superiority was
raised, and a claim for a three to two proportion substituted for it as a definite policy.
8. Two more notes I would make from observations of the p a s t :—

(a) German naval “ Novelles ” have been floated on an orgy o f Anglophobia,

rather than upon a really honest demand on the part of the German people for a naval
increase. The present time does not appear ripe for a continuance of a forward line.
(b) A good observer here o f German naval policy has remarked that Admiral
von T irpitz’ s policy towards England has been all through an alternation of doses of
provocation and soothing syrup. That once the admiral got a B ill through the
Reichstag he exerted him self to calm public opinion in England until he was ready
with the next Bill.

4. As to the position in 1913 and the reasons for the present taking up o f the
sixteen to ten figures of proportion, or rather o f a part of the First L o rd ’ s words,
after a year has elapsed since their utterance, critics here remark that, if Germany
now, so to speak, lets the case go against her by default, the naval party will put
themselves in a bad position by allowing the British and colonial access of strength
to enable England to take a long le a d ; and that Germany will so lose the advantages
which Admiral von Tirpitz is held to have gained for his countrv between the vears
1900 and 1909.
Another criticism is that if Germany does so allow the case to go against her
without action on her part, the German naval expansionist party will be put in a
weak position in Germany from which it will be difficult for them to press for future
naval increases. Further, that if they do then press for increases, their critics on
the score o f the expenses and futility of such naval com petition against E ngland
will grow in numbers and power.
5. I f these critics are correct, what is Admiral von Tirpitz’ s present case?

(a If he agrees com pletely to an agreement with England he will weaken his

hand for the future, and will anger his supporters in the Conservative and National
Liberal parties more than he has done at present.
 686
(b) He cannot be considered to be in a favourable position in Germany in respect
of asking for a naval increase at the present, the “ Novelle ” of 1912 being so recent,
and army demands being now to the fore.

6. I submit to your E xcellency that in making the following remarks I am

only forwarding the results of considerable study I have made of the reflex action
of British naval policy upon the German expansionist party. As a result o f that
study I may be permitted to submit my opinion that there appears to be no doubt
that the best thing for the German large navy party at the present time would be
that England should reduce any part o f the programme previously foreshadowed by
the First Lord of the A d m ira lty; or that the com pletion o f the naval development
o f the colonies should be retarded. The worst state o f affairs for the German naval
expansionist party would seem to be created if England adheres to her determination
in respect of naval policy, as expressed hv England and her colonies during the last
twelve m onths. In other words, if a British colonial reduction or retardation did
take place, it would have the effect o f assisting the German naval expansionist party
in any future dem ands; and, further, that adherence to the British colonial policy
as foreshadowed will make it increasingly difficult for the German party indicated
to pursue their policy.
It is probable that, as the result of such adherence on the part o f England,
there may be some present squeals in G erm any; but even then any such complaints
would seem better than future naval increases.
It is quite possible that, out of such adherence to her programme on the part
of England, the German large navy party m ay reap some temporary advantage out
of any irritating remarks that may be made in public in England while naval
estimates are the topic o f the day, remarks which might be o f use to inflame German
public opinion in support of the German large navy party.
But any such German irritation would be temporary in its effect, while a British
access of strength would be permanent. The existence o f such a possibility merely
proves that it is undesirable to make any such remarks in England.
7. W hen the remarks o f Admiral von Tirpitz in Budget Committee were first
made they [w ere] eagerly canvassed in all circles here, and, as reported, were at first
discussed as if they possessed the importance o f a complete agreement on a sixteen
to ten basis between England and Germany.
I would report to your E xcellency that in conversation here I find that the
remarks of Admiral von Tirpitz are now more regarded as a pleasant expression of
opinion tending towards better feelings between the two countries.
Both amongst critics and supporters of the German large navy party I find an
increasing tendency to support Admiral von Tirpitz in his doubt as to the wisdom
o f going into exact public definitions or details as to the respective naval strengths
o f England and Germany. The objection logically raised to it is that it gives a
handle to press articles, and consequent controversy.
T o give Admiral von Tirpitz his due I should say that I believe his objections,
in the past and present, to such definite binding guarantees to be largely due to an
honest doubt as to their practicability, apart from any patriotic motives by which he
may be actuated.
I am in touch with various circles o f opinion in Berlin, and, generally speaking,
opinions expressed to me during the last three weeks concerning Admiral von
T irpitz’ s remarks appear to me to be additional evidence that these observations of
the admiral are now largely regarded by public opinion as an expression o f hope for
the future rather than as a definite desire for a binding agreement. Public opinion,
m oreover, seems now to recognise that both nations will in any case carry out the
naval programmes they have already respectively foreshadowed.
8. I have the honour to submit that I see no reason to alter in the main the
opinions I have expressed to your E xcellency in despatches during the past two and
a-half years on the methods, policy, and position o f the German naval expansionist
 GST

party, as written prior to the recent sittings o f the Budget Committee alluded to in
paragraph 1 o f this despatch.
I would particularly indicate the following despatches : Secret of the 24th May.
1911 5>: Secret of the 2nd July, 1912^* : No. S5 of the 11th December, 1912C : and
Xo. 2 o f the 20th January. 1913fs : all dealing with Germany.
I have. &c.
H U G H W A T S O X . Naval Attaché.
i s > [C a p ta in W a tso n ’ s secret despatch o f M ay 24. 1911, is not rep rod u ced . It was forw a rd ed
to S ir E d w a rd G rey oil J u ly 13. 1911. It re fe rre d t o the a ttitu d e o f A d m ira l von T ir p it z
tow ards E n g la n d and the rem ark s m ade b v him in an in terv iew w ith the C hilean X a v a l
A ttache. (F.O . 371 1123. 2"170 44-51 11 i s ',]
( 6> [C a p ta in W a tso n ’ s secret despatch o f J u ly 2. 1912. is not rep rod u c
con v ersation w ith P rin ce H en ry o f P russia “ on the subject o f relativ e sta n da rd s o f X a v a l
S tren g th s o f E n g la n d and G erm a n y.’ ’ P rin ce H e n r y " e x c la im e d w ith som e w arm th a ga in st
E n g lan d re g a rd in g th e G erm an fleet as a m enace, and said fu r th e r th a t it was a bsurd tor
E n g lan d t o a n v lon ger claim su p rem a cv at sea. th a t she had alrea d v lost it .’ ’ F.O. 371 1377.
31294 31294 12 IS.»]
( 7) [C a p ta in W a tso n ’ s despa tch (X o . So C on fid en tia l o f D ecem b er 11, 1912. is n ot rep ro­
du ced. I t con ta in ed a sum m ary o f tw o a rticles b y C ount R ev en tlow and K a p ità n zu r See
P ersius. C ou n t R ev e iitlo w ’ s a rticle, d a ted D ecem b er 7. dealt w ith “ the recen t offer o f the
C anadian G overnm ent in respect of th e Im p eria l fleet o f E n g la n d .” K a p ita n P ersiu s referred
t o the same subject, w ith p a rticu la r em phasis on th e recen t speech o f M r. B orden . (F .O . 3 7 1 /
1379. 53496 -53496 12 Is. ]
( 8> [r . sup ra , pp. 664—9, X o . 456.]

Xo. 465.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. G oschen.(')

P rivate.^ '
M y dear Goschen, London. March 5, 1913.
Xicolson showed me your private and personal letter to h im .C ' from which it
appears that you did not understand m y motive in writing to you about Tirpitz's
naval statement.(4) The fault is mine, because I had not time to explain all the
circumstances.
F or seven years some of the Pan-Germ ans in Germany have been working upon
Pro-Germ ans in this country. The Pan-Germans are chauvinists; our P ro-G (rm ans
are pacifists: but the latter are nevertheless very subject to the influence of the
former.
It came to m y knowledge that Professor Schiem ann, one o f the Pan-Germans
aforesaid, had written to one of the Pro-Germ ans here after Tirpitz’ s speech,
emphasizing the friendly nature of the statement, and saying that everything would
depend upon whether we responded to it.
I had no intention of responding by proposing a naval agreement.
In the first place, I had been given to understand, indirectly, that when
Lichnowsky came here he hoped that I would not raise the question o f naval
expenditure with him.
In the second place, if I were to do so. the naval Press Bureau in Germany
would, if it suited it. construe m y action as an attempt to put pressure on Germany
to reduce her naval expenditure; and Tirpitz might, at some future time, say that
his moderate statement had been abused for this purpose, and that therefore he
could not say anything again of which similar advantage might be taken.
In the third place, I do not wish to enter upon a discussion of a proportion of
16 to 10, because we never intended Colonial ships to be included in that, and we do
not wish to enter into explanations.
0) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a v in g been sent t o S ir A. X ico ls o n .]
<-> [G rey M S S ., V ol. 23.]
(*) [r . supra, pp. 6 33-4. X o . 463.]
(*) [ r . supra, p. 673, X o . 459 ]
 688
But, if Lichnowsky were to say any thing to me about the statements o f Tirpitz
and Jagow to the Budget Committee as reported in the Press, or if Jagow were to
say anything to you, and we made no response at all, it seems to me that we might
be represented as having put our hand behind our back in a repellent fashion. Of
this the Pan-Germans would take full advantage with the Pro-Germ ans here.
I think, therefore, that you might say, but only if you are obliged to say some­
thing, that the statements reported in the proceedings of the German Budget
Committee will have a favourable effect upon the tone of Churchill’ s statement in
Parliament here. This will of course be the case. They will not affect the substance
o f the statement as regards our own naval expenditure, but I hope that they will
enable the tone of the statement to be less stiff than it has been before, when we
have been continually faced with fresh increases o f German naval expenditure.
I hope that this will make clear to you the motive of m y previous letter to you.
The Pan-Germans have worked upon the Pro-Germ ans here with varying
intensity, but with unvarying want of success so far as influencing the foreign policy
of the British Government is concerned. But this is no reason why we should give
them more material than we can help.
I do not, how’ever, wish you to say any thing about Tirpitz’ s statement, unless
something is said to you, because I agree that what Tirpitz said does not amount to
much, and the reason of his saying it is not the love of our beautiful eyes, but the
extra 50 millions required for increasing the German Army.
Nevertheless our relations with Germany have improved because Kiderlen
worked for peace in the Balkan crisis and Jagow has done the same, and I shall do
my part to keep relations cordial as long as the German Governm ent will also do
their part in good faith. To be sure of each other’ s good faith is all that is wanted
to make our relations all that can be desired.
Yours sincerely,
E. GR E Y.

No. 466.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie.(p

Private. ( 2)
M y dear Bertie, March 11, 1913.
Cambon observed to me to-day that the Prime M inister’ s statement(3) about our
being under no obligation to send a military force to the Continent, though true,
might have an unfortunate effect; it was a pity it could not have been wrapped up
in some less abrupt form.
I said it was an interruption made in Lord Hugh Cecil’ s speech and in such
circumstances could not contain explanations.
Cambon also deprecated the special m ention o f Germany in the Prime Minister s
speech. (“)
0 ) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the P rim e M in ister and to S ir A.
N icolson .]
P ) [G rey M SS., V ol. 15.] .
(3) [I n th e course o f th e D eba te on th e A d dress on M a rch 10, 1913, L ord H u g h C ecil sta te d :
“ T h ere is a very genera l b elief th a t this cou n try is un d er an o b lig a tion , n ot a trea ty obli­
ga tio n , b u t an o b lig a tion a risin g ou t o f an assurance g iv en b y th e M in is try in the course of
d ip lo m a tic n eg otia tion s, to send a v ery la rge a rm ed force ou t o f this cou n try to operate in
E u rope. T h at is the gen era l b elief. I t w ould be v ery presu m p tu ou s o f anyon e w ho has not
access to all the fa cts in the possession o f the G overn m en t ”
T he P rim e M in is t e r : “ I ou g h t to say th a t is n ot t ru e .”
P a ri. D eb ., 5th S er ., (H ou se o f C om m ons), V ol. 50, pp. 4 2 -3 .]
(4) [M r. A squith spoke w ith sa tis fa ctio n o f the co -o p e ra tio n b etw een G rea t B r ita in and
G erm a ny in N ea r E a stern A ffairs, v. ibid., pp. 3 3 -4 .]
 GS9
I replied that, after what H err von Jagow had said, as reported in the German
Press, and after all that had passed, it was necessary for us to make some reference
to G e rm a n y : what the Prime Minister had said was after all less than what
H err von Jagow had said, and it was preceded by a special statement respecting our
friendship with France and Russia, and by a general reference to all the Powers.
Yours sincerely,
E. G R E Y .

C'ambon made it plain that he personally understood and took no exception to

what the Prim e Minister had said, and was speaking solely with reference to what
might be the effect upon some part of public opinion in France that might fail to
understand.
As a matter of fact, the part of the Prime M inister’ s speech to which he referred
was arranged with me, and I think no one in France ought to take exception to it.
E . G.

No. 467.
Questions asked in the H ouse of Commons, March 24, 1 9 1 3 .0
F.O. 13882 13882 '13, 50.
Sir William B yles asked the Prime Minister whether he will say if this country is
under any, and, if so, what, obligation to France to send an armed force in
certain contingencies to operate in E u ro p e ; and. if so, what are the limits of our
agreements, whether by assurance or treaty with the French nation.
Mr. K ing asked the Prime Minister (1) whether the foreign policy of this country is
at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements, or obligations
under wliich British military forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon
to be landed on the Continent and join there in military operations: and
12' whether, in 1905. 1908, or 1911. this country spontaneously offered to France
the assistance of a British A rm y to be landed on the continent to support France
in the event of European hostilities.
The Prim e Minister (Mr. Asquith’»: As has been repeatedly stated, this country
is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament which com pels it to
take part in any war. In other words, ii war arises between European Powers there
are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the
Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate
in a war.(2) The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the
Government and Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not
a matter about which public statements can be made beforehand.

0 ) [P a ri. D eb ., oth Ser.\ (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 50, pp. 1316-7.]

( 2) [M r. A s q u ith ’ s statem ent was based on a d r a ft by S ir E d w a rd G rey. In th is d r a ft th e
follow in g sentence a p p ea red as th e p en u ltim a te se n te n c e : —

“ T his is the qu estion to w hich th e H ou se is e n titled to have an answ er an d has had

it m ore th a n on ce.” ]

[10900]
 G90
No. 468.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G r cy .(l)

F.O. 371/1649.
1 4 4 5 4 /6 2 09 /1 3 /1 8 .
(No. 117.) Berlin, D. March 28, 1918.
Sir, E. March 31, 1913.
The statement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on the
26th instant on introducing the Navy Estim ates(2) was reported at length in the
German Press and has given rise to considerable comment. This comment varies
according to the political interests which the newspapers represent. The Liberal papers,
which are inclined to oppose the armament schemes of the Government, welcome the
speech as an important Germanophil declaration, and discuss in friendly terms the
practicability of Mr. Churchill’ s proposal. The Conservative papers, such as the
“ K reuz-Zeitu ng,” whilst welcom ing the friendly tone of the speech, maintain that
Mr. Churchill’ s scheme is not practicable and urge against it the disadvantages which
would accrue to Germany from its adoption. The Pan-German and Agrarian organs
hear in it the voice of the tempter, who is endeavouring to stimulate in Germany
opposition to the increase of the German Navy, and such papers as the “ Post ” and
the “ Tagliche Hundschau ” are distinctly hostile and suspicious.
No paper seems to welcome whole-heartedly Mr. Churchill’ s proposal for a year’ s
cessation in ship-building; even the Eadical “ Tageblatt,” which generally advocates
m oderation in questions connected with armaments, sees great difficulties in the way
of the adoption of a scheme of this nature and thinks that it would have been better
not to make such a proposal at the present time.
The “ T a geb la tt” article, which is signed by Captain Persius, the naval
expert, thoroughly agrees as to the desirability of arriving at a limitation of armaments
and warm ly welcomes the conciliatory tone of Mr. Churchill’ s speech. At the same
time it holds that the Anglo-G erm an naval question must be treated with great
circum spection, and that the tender plant of an understanding, the growth of which
has been so m uch stimulated by the co-operation between the two countries during
the Balkan wrar, must be carefully protected from all violent blasts. Close
co-operation between the two countries was, it believes, probable in the future, but to
render possible the realisation of such an ideal, each country must recognize the
advantages to be derived from the support of the greatest land and sea power respec­
tively, and when this came about the present deplorable com petition in armaments
would automatically come to an end.
The Liberal “ Frankfurter Zeitung ” speaks most appreciatively of the idea
underlying Mr. Churchill’ s proposal for a holiday year but it fears that it is not
practicable. It thinks indeed that it would be easier to arrange for a reduction of
naval construction during a term of years than to agree to a com plete cessation of
building for one year. For such a proposal raised all kinds of difficulties; w'hat was
to be done with the yards, would the naval authorities order their construction and
inventions departments to cease work, A c.? After expressing the hope that
Mr. Churchill’ s view that the difficulties involved were not insuperable would prove
to be correct, it concludes by stating that in any case it was a momentous fact that the
Minister of Marine o f the greatest Sea Power of the world considered that the time
had com e to call a halt.
The “ Lokal-Anzeiger ” says that whilst Mr. Churchill’ s speech is more friendly
in tone towards Germany than his last Budget speech, he still holds Germany
responsible for everything. A ccording to Mr. Churchill, it says, the increase in naval
expenditure was due to the necessity for placing more ships in commission in
consequence of the German Navy Law. It was however well known that the Navy
Law wras m erely a precautionary measure against the overwhelm ing superiority
0 ) [A cop y o f this despatch was sent to th e A d m ira lty on A p ril 8 .]
( 2) [v. infra, p. 693, No. 469, note (3).]
 691

systematically accumulated by England in the North Sea. Again Mr. Churchill said
that it was necessary to keep pace with the increase in the size o f ships and guns
constructed by other countries. But it was in reality England who had built the first
Dreadnought and compelled other States to follow her lead and she was also the
first to construct guns of a calibre exceeding 3 0-5 centimetres.
Mr. Churchill’ s proposal for a universal suspension of shipbuilding sounded very
well, but it was an idealistic one and did not take account of the realities with which
the various States were confronted. E ach State set up for itself, according to its vital
needs, a standard for the development of its armaments. Its strength was naturally
relative but if it could not approach that of the strongest State, it could outdistance
others and not only better its general position but add to its desirability as an ally.
To suspend construction therefore meant not the maintenance of a satisfactory position
already won but the interruption of progress towards the attainment of a satisfactory
position. It was obvious that the maritime position of Germany towards E ngland had
considerably improved but England did not afford the only standard of comparison,
and every yea r’ s delay would involve an interruption in G erm any’ s advance as
compared with other nations if not in relation to England.
The Conservative “ Post ” has a very bitter leading article on the subject,
criticizing adversely both the tone and the substance of Mr. Churchill’ s speech. After
disputing the accuracy of his assertions as to the excellence of English shipbuilding
and the capacity of England to build as many ships as might be necessary to maintain
her superiority at sea, it goes on to characterize as grotesque and absurd his suggestion
for a year’ s cessation of shipbuilding. E ven if the proposal were adopted, what, it
asks would becom e of the thousands o f workpeople who would thereby be thrown
out of em ploym ent, and o f the vast yards and other works maintained for the special
purpose o f naval construction. And what guarantee would Germany have that
England would not shamelessly deceive her by seizing the opportunity afforded by
the German pause to outstrip her uncom fortable opponent by increasing her colonial
fleet? England could also at any time, by means of the ships built by her for foreign
customers, make good any deficiency in her shipbuilding due to such a pause. That
no reliance could be placed on England in this respect, it says, was shewn by the ease
with which, by the creation of the colonial fleet, she had succeeded in destroying the
possibility of any practical arrangement with Germany.
The “ Post ” is of opinion that one object of Mr. Churchill’ s speech was to create
difficulties for the German Government and to allay the enthusiasm of the German
people for the development of their N a v y : but it sees in it also a more serious aspect.
It was in itself a suspicious circumstance that E ngland should have treated Germany
recently with such extreme amiability, though it was partially explained by the fact
that Germany was then doing her best to advance British interests in the Balkans.
Mr. Churchill had now shown the true object of this friendliness. E very time that
England had made such a suggestion for the limitation of armaments, it had been
after a period of studied affection in the diplomatic relations between England and
Germany similar to that just experienced. So it had been in 1910 and before
Agadir, and so it was now. It was equally certain that following the same procedure
Germany would again feel the whip as soon as it became evident that the sugar
treatment would yield no result. England could easily find a pretext and would do
so as soon as Germ any again attempted to pursue an active policy in any part of the
world. In this connection it quotes Mr. Churchill’ s statement that Great Britain
could never allow another Naval Power to approach her so nearly as to deflect or
restrict her political action by purely naval pressure and reads in these words a
repetition of the old claim that England should be regarded as the arbiter of the
world.
It concludes with the usual phrase that if England really desired an under­
standing with Germany, she must first prove b y deeds the sincerity of her intentions.
The Conservative “ K reuz-Zeitu ng.” which has in the past not been conspicuous
for its Anglophil tendencies, criticizes Mr. Churchill’ s speech in a temperate spirit.
 692
It expresses satisfaction at the friendly tone of the speech, “ all the more since no
sensible German desires war with E ngland,” but it points out various objections to
Mr. Churchill’ s proposal for a year’ s pause. In the first place it says it could hardly
be admitted that Germany should alter her building programme as fixed by law at
the bidding of the Minister of a foreign State. In the second place, Germany would
be placed at a serious disadvantage by such a pause. Apart from the fact that time
was an essential factor in the creation of a fleet, such a pause, though it would benefit
the over-burdened British shipbuilding industry, could only affect adversely the
German industry, which was not so overburdened. The English yards wTere working
day and night and clamoured for an extension of time for the com pletion of their
contracts, but such was not the case with the German yards which wanted not time
but work. As regards the question of personnel too England could only gain by a
delay. England had m oney in abundance but not sufficient yards and not sufficient
personnel, and therefore she needed time. This implied no blame on Mr. Churchill,
since he intended to ask for further grants, as soon as circumstances permitted, to
m aintain the superiority of the British Navy, “ a superiority which already existed
and which nobody wanted to contest.”
I have. &c.
\V. E . GOSCHEN.
P.S. March 30th.
The following paragraph, which would seem to be semi-officially inspired, appears
in the “ Lokal-Anzeiger ” this m orning :—
“ The speech of the British Minister of Marine in regard to the competition
in naval armaments lias been received in m any quarters in Germany in a more
unfriendly manner than it deserved. In consequence of misunderstandings in
the translation encountered by the official telegraph bureau, the impression was
created here that Mr. Churchill had made use of several expressions which wTere
calculated to wound our legitimate susceptibilities. Ail examination of the English
text of his speech shows that there is no ground for this. It must on the contrary
be recognised that Mr. Churchill clearly endeavoured to pay all due regard to
the German standpoint on the navy question and that he was further desirous
of him self advancing the good political relations which have developed between
the two countries these last months. The fact is incontestable that the friendly
co-operation of German and British diplom acy for overcom ing the Balkan crisis
has already borne good fruits. It can therefore only be hoped that this
co-operation may continue to be preserved in the future from unnecessary
interruptions.”
W . E . G.

No. 469.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.(l)

F.O. 371/1647.
1 44 5 6 /1 4 0/13 /1 8 .
(No. 119.) Confidential. B erlin, D. March 29, 1913.
Sir, B. March 31, 1913.
That the speech, which you delivered in the House of Commons on the-
25th instant,/2) made a most excellent impression in Germany is beyond all question.
I have gathered this more from conversation with German officials and friends than
from the press, which has been somewhat sparing in articles on the subject. The

O [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and to th e P rim e M inister.
A co p y was sent to the A d m ira lty on A p ril 10.]
( 2) [i>. Pari. Deb., 5th Ser., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 50, pp. 1496-1503.]
 693

newspapers, in fact, seemed to be more occupied in reproducing notices from the

British press than in furnishing any remarks of their own.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday, and who
expressed the greatest admiration for what he termed your wonderfully clear and
statesmanlike speech, attributed the comparative reticence of the German press on
the subject to the fact that yonr speech was followed at such a short interval by that
o f the First L ord of the A d m ira lty /3) which contained matter of perhaps more intimate
interest to the German people as a whole than the progress o f the negotiations with
regard to the Albanian frontier.
Herr von Jagow seemed to regret this as he thought it a pity that public
attention should have been so quickly drawn from a speech which emphasized the
manner in which England and Germany had done such good work side by side and
which therefore could do nothing but good to the relations between the two countries,
to one which raised questions, on which there was considerable diversity o f opinions,
and which, he had hoped, had entered into a period o f quiescence. I observed that I
was sure he conld not find one word in the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty
which denoted anything but the greatest friendliness to Germany, and as for the
“ period of quiescence ” it seemed to me that that was just what the First L ord of
the Admiralty had proposed and was striving to bring about. H err von Jagow
admitted that H r. Churchill’ s words as regards Germany had certainly been of the
friendliest description: what he regretted, and what he had alluded to'w h en he used
the words “ period of quiescence.” was that, owing to the quiet and reserved manner
in which the German Naval Estimates had been treated by Admiral von Tirpitz, the
question of naval construction, so long a source o f controversy between the two
countries, had ceased at all events for the m oment, to occupy a large place in public
attention. Now he was afraid that public interest in the question would be again
rerived and that the newspapers on both sides would begin to show the heat which
always had characterized their discussions of this thorny subject. As regards the year
o f inactivity suggested by H r. Churchill he said that personally speaking he considered
it to be for m any reasons wholly unworkable. This was however quite out of his
province.
I should m ention that Herr von Jagow said to me expressly that the foregoing
were only his own personal views after reading the German telegraphic reports of
H r. Churchill’ s speech. H e intended to read the English text of the speech carefully,
when he would be more in a position to form a correct judgm ent as to H r. Churchill’ s
meaning and intentions.
In another despatch I have had the honour to furnish you with a sum m ary of
the opinions o f the Press upon H r. Churchill’ s s p e e c h /4)
H ost of the leading newspapers have short articles on your sp eech ; but beyond
recording its chief points, saying that there is nothing in it to criticize, welcom ing
the hopeful n e w which yon were able to take of the situation, and pointing out that
your remarks as to Anglo-Germ an cooperation during the whole crisis had given
equal pleasure both in England and Germany, they make no observations to which it
is necessary to call your attention.
I have, &c.
W . E. G O SC H E X.

(3) [i\ P a ri. D eb ., oth S er., (H ou se o f C om m ons), V ol. 50, pp. 1757-1767. cp. also G ooch <b
T em p erley, Vol. I X (I I ), p. 659, X o . 813. R e fe re n ce is th ere m ade t o H e r r v on B eth m a n n
H ollw eg ’ s com m ents on th is speech in th e R e ich sta g on A p ril 7, 1913. v. G .P., X X X I X ,
pp . 35-6, n o fe .]
(4) [i\ im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]
 G94

No. 470.
Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F. Bertie.

Private. (*)
M y dear Bertie, April 10, 1913.
Cambon told me to-day that Prince H enry of Prussia was com ing to England
im m ediately,(2) and that this visit, following upon the apprehension caused by the
language of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Government
about the possibility of war, and other indications, seemed to make it certain that the
object of Prince H en ry’ s visit was to ask us to give an assurance of neutrality.
I said that I had not before heard of the visit :( 3) but, as Cambon thought that
it m ight have this object, I would tell him very privately that, when Prince Henry
of Prussia was last on a visit to this country, he did what he ought not to have done :
attempted to get an assurance from the K ing of our neutrality. This assurance was
declined.(4) Prince H enry went away considerably annoyed, and I hardly thought
that he would repeat the question.
Yours sincerelv,
E. GR E Y.
t1) [G rey M S S , V ol. 15.]
( 2) [ v . Gooch & Temperley, V ol. I X (I I ), p. 675, Ed. note. cp. also D .D .F., 3 mt Ser V ol. V I .
p 314, N o. 259.]
(3) [cp . Siebert, p. 673. C ount B en ck en d orff states there, u n d er da te A p ril 11, that
P rin ce H e n r y ’ s “ a rriv a l was so u n ex p ected th a t the F o re ig n Office was advised o f it only
y esterd a y .” ] '
( 4) [r . supra, p. 658, N o. 452.]

[ED . N O TE .— R e fe re n ce is m ade in th e im m ed ia tely su cceed in g d ocu m en t t o a file o f papers

sent hy M r. W in ston C h urchill t o S ir E d w a rd G rey on A p r il 10, 1913. T he con ten ts o f this file
ca n n ot he id en tified w ith certa in ty , hut it is prohahle th a t th ey con cern ed th e discussions of
th e d eta iled arra n gem en ts necessitated hy the possib ility o f A n g lo-F ren ch n a va l co-opera tion .
A le tte r from th e Com te de S a in t-S ein e o f A p ril 4, 1913, refers to an in terv iew w ith Adm iral
S ir H . J ack son on th e 3rd. In his re p o rt th e C om te de S a in t-S ein e sta ted th a t in stru ction s
w ere h ein g prep a red “ qui d oiv en t être adressées a u x com m a nda nts des forces navales et des
b âtim en ts qui peu ven t être appelés à co o p é re r avec des n avires fran çais e t . . . . aux com ­
m an da n ts des ports de gu erre et bases navales des zones com m unes ” ( v . D .D .F ., 3 mc S ér ., V ol. V I,
p. 247, N o. 198). In th e sam e re p o rt he referred t o the p rep a ra tion o f a secret cod e o f signals.
T his had form ed p a rt o f the arra n gem en ts discussed in A u g u st-S e p te m b e r 1911 betw een the
B ritish A d m ira lty and th e F ren ch N a val A tta ch é (C om m a nda nt de L osten de), and a fte r the
la t t e r ’ s death L ieu ten a n t G ig n on (v . ibid., Vol. I, p. 328, N o. 336, note). T he question o f a
sign al b ook was also on e o f th e subjects o f the tech n ica l discussions betw een th e F ren ch N aval
A tta ch é (C om te de S a in t-S ein e) and S ir F . B rid gein an and A d m ira l T ro u b rid g e in the autum n
o f 1912 (cp. ibid., V ol. I V , p. 418, N o. 398, Annexe II ; pp. 5 43-4, N o. 544 ; cp. also supra,
p. 602, Ed. Note). T he B ritish d r a ft o f th e book was rea dy by D ecem b er 13, w hen the F irst
Sea L o rd g av e the C om te de S a in t-S ein e a “ cop y o f a proposed A n g lo-F ren ch sign al book
in clu d in g re c o g n itio n sign als.” T he book was stated on M a rch 18, 1913, to be “ rea dy for
p r in tin g e x cep t in stru ction s fo r T e le g r a p h is t s ” (A d m ira lty A rchives, Case 0091). A c cord in g
to th e C om te de S a in t-S ein e’ s re p o rt o f A p ril 4, 1913, it had been sent to th e p rin ter by that
da te (a. D .D .F ., 3 mc S ér ., V ol. V I , p. 248, N o. 198). A n ote in th e A d m ira lty A rchives, dated
M a rch 5, 1913, stated th a t it was proposed “ to issue the A llied F leet sign al book t o C [om -
m a n d e rs ]-in -C [h ie f]s , &c., sealed w ith ord ers n ot to open it till a sp ecial ord er is receiv ed ”
(A d m ira lty A rchives, Case 0091).
In J a n u a ry 1914, the F ir st Sea L o rd refu sed a proposal tra n sm itted by th e F ren ch N aval
A tta ch é th a t the jo in t sign al books should be pu t in to use, on th e g rou n d th a t “ ou r G overn­
m ent h a ve n ot au th orised the A d m ira lty t o do m ore than prep a re fo r an allia n ce betw een the
tw o cou n tries, and th a t it is consid ered th e a ctu a l use or p ra c tic e w ith ou r jo in t signal books
w ould g o b eyond th a t sta ge o f p rep a ra tion , and is th erefore in ad m issible.” (C h ief o f W a r
Sta ff to the F ren ch N aval A tta ch é, J a n u a ry 29, 1914.) T w o days la ter th e F irst Sea L ord
confirm ed his verb al con cu rren ce in the sim ultaneous proposal fo r the ex ch a n g e o f in form a tion .
(A d m ir a lty A rchives, Case 0091.)]
 695
No. 471

Mr. Churchill to Sir Edu-ard Grey.

P rivate. ( ‘ )
M y dear Grey, Admiralty, April 10, 1913.
Please look through this file.f2)
I am proposing to approve the letter to the C [om m a n d er]-in -C [h iefls subject to
the following note :—
“ This letter is supplied for your guidance and consideration. You are not
to act upon it until you receive the message in code ‘ Proceed in accordance
with Admiralty letter M. 0416.’ ”

This will safeguard the diplomatic situation and enable it to be judged at the
moment.
I do not think the matter fit for official correspondence between Departments.
Yours v [e r ] v sincerelv,
W INSTON C H U R C H IL L .
(*) [Grey M SS., Vol. 43.]
(2) [r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g E d . V o t e .]

No. 47-2.

Sir E duard G rey to Mr. Churchill.

Private. ( ‘ )
Dear Churchill, Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.
I can see no objection to provisional in stru ction s: when the em ergency arises
the Adm iralty or the Government must decide what effect is to be given to them.
It has been believed in Belgium that in the event of our being engaged in war
with Germ any we intended at once to land a force in Belgium to operate against the
Germans.
I assured the Belgian Minister the other day that we should never be the first
to violate the neutrality of Belgium or any eountry.(2)
This would not be consistent (so long as Germ any respected the neutrality of
Norway) with seizing a Norwegian harbour to make it base of operations against
Germany. But an attack upon an enem y’ s ships actually in Norwegian waters is
another matter.
...................................................n
I f our enem y is the first to violate the neutrality of another country we are of
course entitled to treat that country as brought within the area of war.
German ships of war found in Norwegian waters on the outbreak of war would
presumably have been put there for strategic reasons.
Yours sincerelv,
E. G R E Y .
(1) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 48.]
( 2) [v . G ooch d T em p erley, V ol. V I I I , p. 409, N o. 330.]
(3) [T h u s in o rig in a l.]
 Ü9G
N o. 473.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . Nicolson .(*)

Personal and Secret.(2)

My dear Nicolson, Berlin, April 20, 1Ü13.
I doubt if it is a good plan to begin my letter to you so early, for events mov
very quickly nowadays, and things I write to-day may be ancient history by next
Monday. Still there are one or two things I want to tell you before they are crowded
out by other matters.
I have been very uneasy about Franco-Germ an relations lately. Things are not
going well, and unpleasant incidents are following each other too rapidly. I think
the past week has been a very dangerous one, more dangerous perhaps than people
think. The German Government (let alone the Press) have been very nasty, and all
I can say is that we may all congratulate ourselves that the French have a represen­
tative here who looks before he leaps, is both patient and firm and who never loses
that long head of his.
One of the causes of trouble has been that the German Government have heard
that the Sous Préfet of Lunéville, where the Zeppelin airship landed, has been
prom oted.(3) This has offended them deeply, and Jagow spoke very seriously to
Cambon about it. Cambon replied in the first place that the prom otion of a French
official was a purely French internal concern, secondly that if the German Govern­
ment had any complaint to make it would be better if it were addressed to the
F rench Governm ent through Schoen and thirdly that it was strange that the German
Governm ent should raise objections to the prom otion of an official whose prompt
and correct action they had already gratefully recognized. Jagow said that that was
true, but the Captain o f the airship had since then sent in a report which had put a
different com plexion on the affair. H e had shown how he and the other officers and
m en on the airship had been subjected to every sort of insult and bad been stoned
and hustled generally. In fact, according to this report, the affair had been very
serious indeed. Cambon replied that he happened to know that this report had been
issued by the Captain after a long interview with the Crown Prince, and everyone
knew what His Imperial H ighness’ views were as he took no pains to conceal them.
Jagow denied that the Crown Prince had any bias against the French, so Cambon
rem inded him of Ilis Imperial H ighness’ “ pantalonades ” in the Reichstag.
Jagow said that that had happened a long time ago, and that m oreover the Crown
Prince had been very severely punished for his conduct on that occasion, and was
not likely to err in that way again. Jagow then said that it might be found necessary
to publish the Captain’ s report. Cambon advised him very strongly not to take this
course, and to leave things as they were. Cambon told me in confidence that if the
German Governm ent published this report, which was sure, owing to the Crown
P rince’ s influence, to be very highly coloured, the French Government would have
to publish the report of French eyewitnesses which stated that it was absolutely false
for the German pilot to say that the wind drove them over the frontier, because the
wind did not prevent them from circling round fortifications and cruising over
strategic railway lines. Cambon told me that he didn’ t tell this to Jagow as he
didn’ t want to embitter things and raise fresh issues, but he would do so “ s’il
m ’ em bête.”
But the most serious thing was that Jagow said to him, in speaking of the grave
aspect o f the Lunéville affair as shown by the German report, that if things went on
like that and the French Government promoted officials who had failed to restrain
the populace, the Im perial Governm ent might be forced to their regret to recall
0 ) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g . T he end orsem ent is in itialled
by S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
(*) [C arn ock M SS., V ol. I V o f 1913.]
(3) [cp . D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., V ol. V I , p. 231, N o. 1 88 ; p. 235, N o. 193; pp. 366-8, Nos. 3 1 2 -3 ;
pp. 3 70-1, N o. 3 1 6 ; p. 389, N o. 3 4 1 ; pp. 405-6, No. 3 5 3 ; p. 410, No. 3 5 3 ; pp. 455-6, No. 396.]
 697

Herr von Schoen from Paris. Cambon told me that Jagow’ s tone was more friendly
than his words, so he had not taken the matter au grand sérieux but had replied
“ E h bien! celà me donnera à moi aussi l ’ occasion de prendre un petit con gé.” To
which Jagow answered “ Mon cher Ambassadeur, il ne faut pas être égoiste à ce
point là.” And so the matter ended in a laugh, but a laugh which has rather too
bitter a ring in it for m y taste. Cambon told me he passed rather an uneasy night
after this conversation because he thought that things might take a very serious
turn if the German Government did publish the German officer’ s report. H e looked
anxiously in the papers next day and was m uch relieved when he saw that there was
no mention of it.
Cambon begged me to keep all this to m yself, as he had made up his mind not
to say anything to his Government about the threatened recall of Schoen. He felt
sure, if he did so, that it would leak out in the French Press, and that in the present
excited state o f public opinion in both countries might lead to war. But he told me
that I might tell it ‘ secretly ’ to you, as I told him that I should like you to know
what was going on. But he begged me to ask you to keep it to yourself. As a
matter of fact I ’ ll bet that Cambon has reported it privately, perhaps to his brother,
perhaps to M. Pichon with whom he is 011 good terms. But it is rather alarming,
isn’ t it? It is these beastly military proposals, it seems to me, which are at the
bottom of the m agnifying of all these incidents, as the Governm ent here are. I expect,
anxious to make a ‘ Stim mung ’ and create an atmosphere favourable to their being
rapidly passed and to the way to people’ s pockets being made easier.
I think you will agree with me that the air is too electric to be pleasant and that
a few more incidents may lead to trouble.
April 26. Cambon is delighted that he did not report Jagow’ s words about the
recall of Schoen. as the whole of the rest of the conversation appeared in the German
papers this m orning taken from the ‘ Gaulois! ’
He tells me that he is going to report Herr von Jagow’ s words to M. Pichon in
a private letter and at the same time to explain why he had not done so officially.
In this letter he will also give a list of the conversations between him and
Herr von Jagow which he has reported confidentially to the French Foreign Office
and which have prom ptly appeared in the French Press, adding that under such
circumstances diplomacy becomes impossible.
Yours very sincerely,
W . E. GOSCH EN.

No. 474.

Sir A. Xicolson to Sir Edicard G rey.

Private. (*)
Sir E. Grey, Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.
M. Cambon left me the enclosed papers marked private. H e said that if the
proposals were approved he would place his M ilitary Attaché in com m unication with
our General Staff.
A. X [IC O L S O N ].
Enclosure 1 in No. 474.

Communication from M. Paid Cambon.(2)

Private.
Dans le cas où la France et la Grande Bretagne prendraient part, comme alliées,
à une guerre, les com m unications directes entre leurs Etats Majors seraient en
principe restreintes aux cas de nécessité reconnue.
(1) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 55.]
(2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 15.]
 698

Cependant les renseignements échangés entre l ’ État Major Français de la

Marine et l ’ Amirauté Britannique pourront être communiqués directement à cause
de l ’ urgence que présentent les inform ations relatives aux positions des flottes
ennemies.
De même des armées opérant sur le m ême théâtre ou des théâtres voisins se
mettront en relations directes l ’ une avec l ’ autre.
En revanche toutes les com m unications adressées en temps de guerre au W ar
Office par le Ministère Français de la Guerre seront toujours transmises par
l ’ intermédiaire du Ministère Français des Affaires Étrangères et de l ’ Ambassade de
France à Londres ; des mesures ont été prises pour assurer la rapidité de ces
transmissions. Il serait à désirer que, dans les mêmes circonstances, les télégrammes
du W ar Office au Ministère Français de la Guerre fussent expédiés par l ’ intermédiaire
de l ’ Ambassade d ’ Angleterre à Paris ou de l ’ Ambassade de France à Londres.
30 Avril 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 474.

Communication from ill. Paul Cam bon.(3)

Private.
L e Gouvei’nement Français a été amené à rechercher par quels moyens il
pourrait assurer ses com m unications télégraphiques avec la Russie dans certaines
circonstances graves, qui ne lui permettraient pas d ’ utiliser la ligne directe. On lui
a suggéré de se servir d ’ une des trois voies :
1° Valentia, Terre-Neuve, Vancouver, l ’ Australie, Zanzibar, Aden, l ’ Inde, la
Perse et Saint-Pétersbourg;
2° Pointe de Cornouailles, Saint-Vincent, le Cap, Zanzibar, Aden, l ’ Inde et la
Perse ;
3° Câble Ecosse-Norvège et ligne terrestre norvégienne jusqu’ en Russie.

M. Paul Cambon est chargé de demander si le Gouvernement Britannique

autoriserait le Gouvernement Français à faire, par les trois voies ci-dessus indiquées,
des expériences de com m unication entre la France et la R ussie; et il désirerait
égalem ent savoir si, dans de graves éventualités, le Gouvernement Bi’itannique
serait disposé à accorder aux télégrammes français destinés à la Russie le droit de
priorité qu’ il s’ est réservé pour ses télégrammes d ’ Ëtat.
30 Avril 1913.

M I N U T E S .(4)
T h e M ilita r y A tta ch é m ay com m u n ica te w ith the G eneral S ta ff on these points.
A s reg a rd s teleg ra p h ic com m u n ica tion b etw een F ra n ce and R ussia, th ere is no objection
t o m a k in g tria l o f it.
W h eth er p r io r ity w ere g iven in an em erg en cy w ould o f course dep en d u p on circum stances.
So lon g as G rea t B r ita in , F ra n ce and R ussia w ere a ctin g tog eth er no d ou b t it w ould be so.
E. G.

I a gree : grea t ca re should o f course be observed to keep the ex p erim en ts secret.

H . H . A.

( 3) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 15.]

(4) [T hese m in u tes a p p ea r on S ir A . N ico lso n ’ s m in u te to S ir E d w a rd G rey, enclosin g the
com m unications. (G rey M SS., V ol. 55.)]
 G99

N o. 47 5.
Captain Watson to Sir E . G oschen . ( ’ )
S e c r e t .i2)
Rem arks o f His M ajesty the E m peror to Xaval Attaché.

Germ any.
S iï’ Berlin, May 12, 1913.
As reported in m y Despatch Germany No. 25 of this date,(3) I today presented
His Majesty the Em peror with the British Navy List.
H is Majesty before luncheon in the Palace held a short conversation with me,
the sense o f which was as follows :—
On presenting the Em peror with the Navy List, His Majesty chaffingly
remarked that by the time the book was given him it was already out o*f date.
His Majesty said he was delighted to hear that ^ ice-Admiral Jellicoe was com ing
to Berlin, and that he had given orders for him to be asked to the Gala-opera. His
Majesty said he would like to see the Admiral personally. W ith regard to Admiral
Pohl (Chief o f German Admiralstab) having had some doubt as to whether he could
dine with Captain W atson on M ay 21st to meet Admiral Jellicoe and the German
officers in the ‘ S ey m ou r” Pekin Expedition, the Em peror said “ oh, he must go,
tell him so from m e .”
After luncheon His Majesty sent his Naval adjutant for me and had about
f hou r’ s conversation. His Majesty rem arked, apropos of his remarks about Admiral
Pohl before luncheon, that he had given the Admiral “ o rd e rs ” to dine with m e.
The E m peror then turned the conversation to Naval training, and said he
considered the recent step of taking Merchant Sendee officers for the British Navy
to be a great mistake ; it was unfair to the regular line o f officers and held out no
prospect o f advancement to the Merchant Service officers themselves.
Also His Majesty remarked that a regulation had been issued that “ Deck
office rs” (W arrant officers) should mess in the officers’ Messes— a great mistake in
j his view. Such regulations were the evil result o f having Civilians to administer
■ the Navy.
His Majesty alluded to the outrages o f the Suffragettes, and said that in his
opinion the on ly way to deal with them was to flog them.
H is M ajesty spoke with pleasure o f the approaching visit o f His M ajesty the
K ing to B erlin ; and said that it had given him great pleasure that Germ any and
1 England had been working together in the Balkan affairs.(4,) “ B ut,” H is Majesty
said, “ I d on’ t agree with a number o f things Sir E . Grey has d on e; I have however
' consented to them when put before m e, because I wanted to work with G rey. As
! for the Ambassadors’ conference I consider it a most “ clum sy impossible machine ”
j and some o f the decisions are quite unworkable. Albania, for instance. There must
I be International administration. The lot of a Prince o f Albania would be impossible.
Notices would have to be put up all round the country, like in American bars,
“ D on ’ t shoot the Pianist, h e ’ s doing his b est.” The condition of the country makes
it impossible for a Prince, there’ s nowhere for him to make his Headquarters, there
are no R evenues, no roads, no railways, absolutely nothing. It will becom e a second
Macedonia. I have been asked to nominate a Prince for Albania and have declined.
Four times during last winter have the Diplomats been to me to suggest candidates.
I The first one they suggested was a Moham m edan. I said “ all rig h t.” The next
was a Catholic. I replied “ all right.” The next was a Roman Catholic, I agreed

O [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been senc t o th e P rim e M in ister. T he en d orsem ent

is in itia lled by S ir E d w a rd G rey. I t w as sent p riv a te ly t o S ir A. N icolson bv S ir E. G osch en.]
(2) [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. V I o f 1913.]
(3) [T h is despatch is not rep rod u ced as it ca n n o t be tra ce d .]
(•*) [in G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. I X (I I ), pa ssim .]
 700

to that. W hen the fourth suggestion came it was a Protestant, to which I agreed;
but said to the Diplomat who brought the suggestion that “ I thought you would
suggest a Jew, because then they would cut his head off, and his m oney would serve
to enrich the cou n try.” I was talking to that splendid fellow Mahmoud Mouhktar
Pasha the other day about Albania, and he said it was an impossible country to rule.
Personally I d on ’ t know the country, but as I see it from my house at Corfu, it
appears a black country.
Again on the subject of the Blockade of the Montenegrin coast, I never agreed
with the principle of it, but consented to it to please G rey.(5) I always thought a
Naval blockade o f an Alpine State was ridiculous. H owever as England said she
would bring troops from Malta, should it he necessary to land, I agreed to it. But
when the time came when troops might have to be landed, England suddenly said
‘ ‘ no, we are sorry, we must think o f public opinion, we cannot land any English
troops, they are not intended to he shot at by M ontenegrins.” His Majesty then
remarked ‘ ‘ If they are not intended to he shot at, what are they intended for, and
England should remember that she is not the only country that has to consider
public opinion, but that Germ any has to do so a lso.” (His Majesty seemed perhaps
a little heated over this.)
His Majesty then remarked with pleasure that Admiral Milne had given the
German Admiral (Triimmler) a hint of com ing trouble, which had enabled His
Majesty to send out the ‘ ‘ Strasshurg ” and “ D resd en ” at high speed, and they
arrived just in time to prevent a little coup (I understood His Imperial Majesty to
indicate that the French were implicated in the coup he alluded to). (H [is]
H m p erial] M [a jesty] spoke with pride o f the high average speed the ships had
maintained on their passage out (17 knots), and also of the fine type of ship the
Constructors had evolved in the newest o f the German “ T o w n ” Class of cruiser.)
H is Imperial Majesty spoke with pleasure of the way in which the German and
British ships had co-operated in the Mediterranean. He also spoke with contempt
of the, as reported to him , appallingly indisciplined state of a French cruiser in
the Mediterranean, the “ Jurien de la G raviere.” H [is ] I[m p eria l] M [a jesty] spoke
with amusement o f the very clever sketches in Punch over the Balkan business, and
over the Germ an-English Fleet questions, and said he had sent those on the latter
subject to Admiral Tirpitz.
H is Imperial Majesty then alluded to Lord Roberts, and remarked “ but I don’t
like what he is saying about me and G erm any.” On my suggesting that I had seen
an explanation by Lord Roberts as to the meaning that had been “ r e a d ” into his
w ords; H [is ] I[m p eria l] M [a jesty] said there was no question o f “ rea d in g”
anything into them, he had read the text of them him self.
“ It is too ridiculous,” H [is ] I[m p eria l] M [a jesty l remarked, “ the suggestion
that I want to go to war with England and invade her. If I had wanted to go to
war, nothing you have in the way of preparations would have stopped m e ; and if
T d o n ’ t want to go to war you are not going about it in the best way to encourage
me. W hat should I do if I did capture you, take away St. Paul’ s Cathedral or the
W allace C ollection ?”
“ Your Territorials are useless, your old Volunteers were m uch better, with Lords
W antage and W em yss I saw a Brigade about the year 1890 do really splendid work
together with the Regulars, they were just as good as the regulars; it was only a
matter o f training them properly and that Wantage understood. The Volunteers
were in accordance with the spirit o f English people. But these Territorials are
useless. But the supply o f men trained to arms hinges on the question I asked
employers in London, “ are you ready to let your clerks etc. go away for Military
Service ” ? and also “ W ill you keep the billets open for them if they go ” ? ; to my
astonishment the answer to both questions from these English employers was “ N o.”
If that’ s the point of view taken in England then nothing can ever be done to get

(5) [v. Gooch & Temperley, V ol. I X (I I ), p. 640, N o. 789, note (3).]
 701
proper training. In Germany the employers find the men they em ploy are all the
better for a period of Military Training. But as regards England whatever your
Military System, the Navy must remain first, and the Arm y second. That is what
I would order in E ngland.”
His Im perial Majesty then referred to the attitude of E n gla n d : “ Sir E . Grey
is always harping on ‘ ‘ Balance o f P ow er.” The real matter is that the balance of
power was upset in Europe when you ranged yourselves on the side o f Bussia and
France. It was due to m y poor Lncle, who in a misguided moment was persuaded
at Beval to sign the agreement, and join England to an alliance o f two Nations who
have offensive agreements against G erm any.(B) Since that these Nations have
traded on the fact that they have England backing them up. ‘ ‘ Now I have to put
every man and bit of steel into readiness that I ca n .” If England had stayed out
of it, the balance of power would have been preserved, her joining has upset it. Of
course Grey argues that it is now three Powers on each side ; but on the one side
are two Nations who are wanting to go to war (m eaning France and Bussia) and on
the other side is Germany who does not want to go to war.”
His Majesty also spoke o f the upsettal of European politics owing to the Balkan
war being another reason for the German arm y increases. Of the successes o f the
Balkans, H [ is ] I[m p eria l] M [a jesty ] said that on September 30th 1912, when he
heard o f the preparations o f those countries, he called his House Party at Bominten
together, and said “ Mark you this means a new racial m ovem ent, such as occurred
in the olden times, it is a big Slav m ovem ent, such as modern diplom acy has never
had to deal with, and it will drive back the T urks.”
His Im perial Majesty then spoke of the Admiralty and o f Mr. W inston Churchill
and remarked very decidedly that he had not asked the First Lord to Kiel Begatta,
but that the First Lord seemed to have a habit o f turning up uninvited, as he had
done that at the Kaiser Manoeuvres, and that the Em peror had been forced to take
notice o f his presence there as being an English Cabinet Minister. H [is ]
I[m p eria l] M [a je sty] seemed to indicate that it would be the same at K iel, though
the First Lord would be there purely privately (Apparently Lord Lonsdale had on
the occasion o f the Kaiser Manoeuvres inform ed the Em peror as to the First Lord
com ing without invitation to the Manoeuvres'1. The Emperor remarked that he did
not know how to take the First L ord, what he said to him he thought Mr. Churchill
transposed later. He was a man who could not be trusted, he turned 15 points to
starboard too often.
His Majesty then spoke o f the Balkan affairs and said “ 1 was very glad o f the
Balkan source o f co-operation with E ngland. Things seemed to be hopeless between
the two Nations, and I felt I had exhausted all m y efforts to bring about better
feelings between the Nations. M y people were getting angry at the position o f affairs.
The attitude o f the countries to each other reminded me of a scene in the “ Corsican
Brothers.” The two Nations were shaking hands with each other, but always looking
away from each other when doing so.”
In alluding to the relations between England and Germany, His M ajesty said
that L ord H aldane’ s visit to Berlin last year was a fiasco, it was beginning to do
good and then the Cabinet threw over Lord H aldane.i7)
The E m peror’ s last remarks were “ I like your Captain o f a Cruiser who recently
at a dinner at Constantinople of the assembled Nationalities drank to the ‘ ‘ two
white Nations ” (England and G erm any).”

Return journ ey to Berlin.

“W hen returning in the train from Potsdam I overheard some of the German
General officers and Austrian Military Attaché talking together. Their remarks were
to the effect that it was ridiculous France putting such great trust in aircraft, that

( 6) \v. G ooch & T e m p e r t e y , V ol. V , p p . 232-46. C h a pter X X X V I I . ]

C ) [v. ibid., V ol. V I , pp. 666-761, C h a p ter X L I X ]
 702

they were only auxiliaries to war. That the introduction of three years Military
Service in France would ruin the country industrially, as it could not afford to spare
all her young men for so long a period out of civil life. (It struck me at the time
that the last remark was expressly made by a Court official, who had been talking
to me before on Franco-Germ an matters and their relations to E ngland, for me to
hear.) The German Generals enquired of the Austrian Military Attache if in
Austria they took all possible men for Military Service, to which he replied No,
that there was still a surplus to draw upon.
From the conversation o f the Court official (Master o f the Horse) indicated, T
form ed the opinion that he is uneasy, both as to how the present Military increase
will go down in Germany with the public and in the Beichstag, and also as to
G erm any’ s outside relations to other Powers. The official remarked to me that it
had been very unpleasant for Germany to have had to stand by Austria in recent
yeans, and instanced the recent affair of Durazzo. He said if it had come to war
over such a matter it would have been difficult to have put the matter in a good
light to the German people in order to enlist their good will in the war. On my
assenting, he added “ but I think the German people would have taken it well,
they rather are inclined for a game like war, Germany having had such a very large
amount o f fighting in her history.
“ As to England it is ridiculous, as you with your long residence in Germany must
see, that Germany could ever want to invade E ngland .”
I have, Ac.
H U G H W ATSON .
Captain and Naval Attaché.

No. 476.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .(l)

Private. ( 2)
My dear Grey, B erlin, May 28. 1913.
Their Majesties have just left B erlin,(3) and I must write to you a few lines to
tell you what a splendid success the visit has been. There has not been a hitch of
any s o r t; everything has gone sm oothly, the arrangements have been perfect and
the K ing and Queen have, I hope and believe, enjoyed themselves very much and
have not been over fatigued by the numerous festivities, apart from the wedding
itself, which have been arranged in their honour. It has been a real pleasure to me
to hear the enthusiastic way in which everyone, both at Court and in Berlin society,
in fact everyone who- had the privilege of approaching Their Majesties, have spoken
of th e m ; and the general feeling tvas put into words by Herr von Jagow when he
said to me that he should feel satisfied if Their Majesties had enjoyed their visit
half so much as the German Court and people had enjoyed having them here amongst
them. The papers have as yet been very quiet on the subject of the visit, and while
stating that the meeting o f the three most powerful sovereigns of Europe cannot
but be regarded as an event o f the highest political importance, have abstained as
yet from drawing any extravagant conclusions. The visit has, as you will have seen,
been given every appearance o f a State visit, which, considering its perfectly natural
cause, is not a bad thing, as it will almost certainly obviate the necessity of a formal
State visit later on.

P ) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g ; t o the P rim e M in is t e i; to

the L o rd C h a n cellor; to L ord C rew e; to L o rd M o r le y ; t o S ir A. N icolson .]
(*) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 23.]
( 3 ) [ c p . Gooch & Temperley, V o l . T X ( T I ) , p . 6 7 5 , Ed. N o te .]
 703

After saving G oodbye to Their Majesties at the station, the Emperor talked to
me for some time. After expressing to me His pleasure at having had the King
and Queen as His guests and saying m any charming things o f Their Majesties,
especially calling my attention to the enthusiastic reception they had received from
the public, H is Majesty told me that He had never known a E oyal visit at which
politics had been so freely and thoroughly discussed, and He was glad to be able to
inform me that H e, the K ing and the E m peror o f Russia had been in thorough
agreement on all the points which they had had under review.
From His M ajesty’ s account, the point on which all three Sovereigns had
agreed most heartily was that K ing Ferdinand (to whom His Majesty applied a
strong epithet) must be called to order and kept in order! He also told me that the
Em peror o f Russia had sent K ing Ferdinand a telegram couched in the strongest
possible terms and that He (the Emperor) had followed suit by instructing His
representative at Sofia to speak to the K ing in similar terms. W hat these terms
were I have not heard.
I shall be able later to tell you more o f what the Press thinks on the subject
of the visit; as yet I can only speak of what I have heard from the Court, the
official world and m y own circle o f friends. Amongst these there is but one opinion,
nam ely that the visit was an unqualified success and that there was an intimate and
cordial flavour about it which is sometimes lacking in such visits. Making all
allowances for the enthusiasm of the moment caused by the personal charm
exercised by Their Majesties and the wonderful popularity they gained on all sides
during their stay in Berlin, and by the festive character of the occasion which brought
them at, politically speaking, such a particularly favourable m oment to Berlin, m y
impression is that the visit has done real good and that its effect willperhaps be
more lasting than is usually the case with State visits o f foreign Sovereigns.
The Chancellor told me that he had had the most useful and interesting
conversations with the K ing and that he had been greatly struck with His M ajesty’ s
thorough grasp of every detail o f the international situation and much gratified by
His friendly tone towards Germany. The graciousness and intelligence of the Queen
seemed also to have made a deep impression on him , and he told me that he had
rarely enjoyed a conversation more than that which he had had with H er Majesty
during the luncheon at this Em bassy.
Yours verv sincerelv,
‘ W . E . GOSCH EN.

No. 477.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. N icolson.(l)

Private. (2)
! M y dear Nicolson, Berlin, May *28, 1913.
You will have probably seen m y letter to Sir Edward Grey of yesterday’ s date(3)
and you will have seen from it how successful the visit of Their Majesties to Berlin
has been and how charmed everyone has been by the K ing and Queen and what
pleasant memories they have left behind them. You will also have seen the substance
of what the Em peror said to me at the station after the departure of Their Majesties.
I have told Cambon just enough to let him see that there was nothing said here
; which could in any way affect the solidarity o f our entente with France, and he told
me that what he had heard from Jagow and Sverbeef, from the Em peror o f Russia

(*) (T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g and to the P rim e M in ister.
T he en d orsem ent is in itia lled hv S ir E d w a rd G rev .]
( 2) [C a rn ock M SS ., V ol. V I ¿ t 1U13.J
(3) [u. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

I
 704

and me seemed to indicate that nothing but good, as regards the present international
situation, could result from the m eeting of the three sovereigns. He told me that he
had only had five minutes conversation with the Czar, but that those five minutes
had been full of interest. The Czar had at once spoken to him of the recent mutinous
conduct of French soldiers and had said “ Such incidents are unpleasant, but have
no real importance ; we have had m any such ; they caused annoyance for the moment
but were soon forgotten and that will be the case with those which have occurred in
France. Here they have been dinning them into my ears and pointing out to me
with emphasis what a sad state the French army must be in, but I can assure you
that nothing that they have said has made the slightest impression on m e.” That was
all the conversation which Cambon had with the Czar, but if the conversation was
short it must be admitted that it was pregnant! . . . .(4)
Yours very sincerely,
W . E. GOSCHEN.

(4) [T h e rem a in in g pa ra gra ph s o f th is letter refer to B alkan affairs. They a dd n othing

o f im p orta n ce t o in form a tion g iv en elsew here.]

No. 478.

Sir A. M colson to Sir E. Goschen.

Private, f 1)
My dear Goschen, Foreign Office, June 2, 1913.
I am much obliged to you for your letter which reached me by last m essenger.(2)
The visit certainly seems to have been a complete success and has established, I
think, a very pleasant and friendly atmosphere. At the same time I trust that we
shall not be so giddy as to go too far in showing our appreciation of the very friendly
welcome which was extended to the K ing and Queen. Already I see certain
indications o f the Germans following their usual habit of im proving friendly
relations by putting on the screw and we must be very careful that their effusions
are not taken too light-heartedly.............. (3)
[lo u r s , Ac.
A. NICOLSON.]
(») [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. V I o f 1913.]
( 2) [t\ im m ed iately p r eced in g docu m en t.]
(3) [T he rem a in in g pa ra g ra ph s o f th is letter relate chiefly t o B alkan affairs. T hey add
n oth in g o f im p orta n ce t o in fo rm a tio n g iv en elsew here.]

No. 479.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. N icolson.(l)

Private.(2)
My dear Nicolson, Berlin, June 5 [ 7 ] , 1913.
. . . .(3) January [s ic : June] 7, 11 p . m . I have just com e back from a dinner
where I met both the Chancellor and Jagow. They were both, but the former

(*) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g been sen t to th e K in g and to th e P rim e M inister.

The en d orsem en t is in itia lled bv S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
( 2) [C arn ock M S S ., V ol. V I o f 1913.]
(3) [T h e op en in g p a ra g ra ph s o f th is letter refer t o B a lk an affairs. T h ey add n oth in g of
im p orta n ce t o in form a tion given elsew here.]
 705

particularly, very upset about Mr. Churchill’ s statement.(4) Jagow only said that it
was unfortunate that the Navy question should turn up just now and hoped that it
wouldn’ t spoil the effect of the visit. The Chancellor, however, told me that he was
very much perturbed by the First L ord ’ s statement, but particularly by the article
which had been written upon it in the ‘ Daily News ’ (*) which had been freely repro­
duced here and which had made a disagreeable impression. He didn’ t know how far
, it was correct for the ‘ Daily News ’ to say that Mr. Churchill had deceived everyone
by first saying that the Canadian ships had nothing to do with his naval programme
and were | extra ’ and bv now stating that the rejection of the Canadian Naval Bill
rendered it necessary for Great B ritain’ s naval requirements that 3 battleships
should be laid down at once. What he did know was that people here reading this
in a Liberal English newspaper would believe it and that it would make a very bad
impression on their minds. Personally he did not care whether the ships were laid
down at once or n o t ; it would have no effect on his policy. But what he did care
for was the impression made on public opinion which would, he was afraid, sadly
interfere with the great progress towards better relations which had undoubtedly
taken place and tend to mar the excellent effect which had been produced by the
B oyal visit. li e spoke very earnestly and seemed greatly perturbed, and indeed it
is unfortunate that the Naval question should just come up at this particular m om en t;
but anyway it can’ t be helped, and I expect public opinion in England would have
been equally ill-humoured if His M ajesty’ s Government had done nothing in view
of the action o f the Canadian opposition. The ‘ Tageblatt ’ has a long article
to-night by ‘ Persins ’ labelled “ Churchill’ s inconsistency.’ ’ I will have it
translated, but I d on’ t think we shall have time to do it before the messenger goes.
Jagow is rather perturbed by a statement made to him by the Turkish
Ambassador to the effect that sooner than give up the islands off the coast of Asia
Minor she will not hesitate to go to war again! Jagow asked him how they were
going to war without ships, to which Mahmoud Muktar replied that they could easily
buy some. And to the qnestion “ W here are you to find the m o n e y ? ’ ’ answered
“ O h! there w on’ t be any difficulty about that.’ ’
Yours verv sincerelv.
\Y. E. GOSCHEN.

0 ) [I n th e H ouse o f Com m ons on J u n e 5, 1913, M r. W in ston C h u rch ill s t a t e d : “ The

situ ation crea ted by the rejection o f the C anadian N a v a l A id B ill requires im m ed ia te a ction ,
in ord er th a t the m a rgins o f naval stren gth necessary fo r the w hole w orld p r o te ctio n o f the
B ritish E m p ire m ay be adeq uately m a in ta in ed fo r the autum n and w in ter o f 1915, an d in the
sp rin g o f 1916. In these circu m stan ces the G overn m en t have d eterm in ed to adv an ce the
con stru ction o f the three co n tr a c t ships o f th is y e a r 's p rogram m e, and ord ers have been issued
by the A d m ira lty , w hich w ill ensure th e ir b ein g b egu n at the ea rliest possible date, instead
o f in M arch n e x t.” v. F ar}. D eb ., 5th S er., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 53, pp. 1043-4.]
(5) [T he a rticle referred to a p p ea red in the D a ily X e ic s o f J u n e 6, 1913. I t discussed
M r. C h u rch ill’ s sta tem ent and sta ted th a t it w as not clear w hether M r. C h urchill m eant to
b u ild three ships in lieu of the C a n a dia n ships, v. D a ily N ew s, J u n e 6, 1913, p. 4 .]

No. 480.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

Private.(2)
T el. Berlin, July 3, 1913.
Em peror told Naval Attaché at Kiel that he had heard that the First L ord of
I the Admiralty intended in his next Naval Statement to refer again to Naval

( ! ) [T h is teleg ram is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ;

• to L o rd M orlcv ; to L ord Crewe ; to M r. C h u rch ill.]
(2) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 23.]
[10900] 2 Z
 TUG
construction holiday.” (3) II [is ] M [a jesty] expressed strong hope that such reference
would not be made, as otherwise he could not answer for the state of opinion in
Germany adding that it had been only by the efforts of his G ov [ern m en ]t that a
press agitation had been suppressed on occasion of the First L o rd ’ s statement
respecting Canadian Dreadnoughts. Em peror said that he did not wish to make a
fuss, but that he wished his words to be repeated quietly and privately in the proper
quarter. As it seems evident if the naval holiday is mentioned the Navy League
people and others will use it for the purposes of further agitation I venture to express
the opinion that it would be better on all accounts if such reference could be avoided.

M IN U TE BY KING G E O R G E V.

I entirely agree with the hope expressed by the Emperor.— G. R. I.

( 3) [r . supra, pp . 692-3, N o. 469, and n o te (3).]

No. 481.

M inute by Mr. W inston Churchill.

P rivate.!1)
Sir Edward Grey,
Prime Minister, Admiralty, July 8, 1913.
It is very natural that the German Emperor, who finds the greatest difficulty in
getting m oney for the Navy in a period of extraordinary military expenditure, should
not relish the prospect of proposals being made by this country, the good sense of
which will be increasingly appreciated the longer they are studied. W e are however
face to face with the declaration of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on the
7th of April 1913 that they “ awaited ” the formulation o f . ” definite proposals ” from
u s.(2) The German Government cannot expect to enjoy the advantages of saying
in public that they ‘ await proposals ’ and of saying confidentially that they will
resent it if they are made. If therefore it is decided that no further reference to a
‘ naval holiday ’ should be made at the present time, I ought to be at liberty to state
that we have received representations from the German Governm ent to the effect
that they do not desire to discuss any such proposals. The invitation of the German
Governm ent to make definite proposals was made in public, and if it is withdrawn it
should be withdrawn in public. W e ought not to be placed in a position where we
can be accused of ignoring the invitation or even of having broken faith with them
when all the time they are refusing even to receive the proposals they have invited.
I m ay add that I believe that any agitation which the German Navy League
m ay start will depend for success upon whether the m oney is forthcom ing or not
and upon nothing else.
Lastly, I am quite willing to be guided by your view and that of the Cabinet on
this question provided that it is clearly understood that it is not the Admiralty which
presses for, or is the prime cause of, heavy expenditure on new construction. I think
that the matter should certainly be m entioned to the Cabinet in view of the strong
feeling that exists in the Liberal Party against our increasing liabilities.
W . S. C [H U R C IIIL L ].
8 .7 .[1 9 1 3 ]. J
M IN U T E S .

I w ill show th is to S ir E. Goschen w hen it is retu rn ed to me. I agree th a t if no proposal

is m ade G erm any m ust ta k e pu blicly the responsib ility.
E. G.

(i) [G rey M SS., V ol. 48.]

(*) [cp . G.P., X X X I X , pp. 3 5-6, note.]
 707
I ca n n ot a t all see w hv we should not fall in w ith th e E m p eror’ s hopes.
‘ M.

1 >Sr“ H . H A.

S“ ” ' W . S C.
9 7.

R ea d by S ir E. Goschen.
E . G.
10.7.13.

No. 4S2.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. X ico h o n .(lt

Private and Secret.G")

M y dear Xicolson, Berlin, October 11, 1913.
I inclose a letter addressed to me by "Watson— in which he details the remarks
made to him bv the German Emperor on the occasion of his goodbye interview. I
told W atson that I thought it best that this report should not go in a Public despatch
but that I would send it to you privately— as it appeared to me that the E m peror’ s
remarks were not o f a nature to be circulated to everybody.
W atson said that he would like the Board of Admiralty to see it at all events
but he agreed with me that it would not do for it to be exposed to the eye of the
Admiralty or any other public department generally. I told him that it would be
better to leave you to judge to whom it should be shown. The E m peror’ s remarks
are chiefly interesting as an example of the manner in which he lets himself go when
talking to subordinate officials: and he said much more than W atson has dared to
put in°his letter. According to him W atson the only member of H [is ] M [a je sty ’ s]
G [o v e m m e n t] of whom H [is - M [a jesty] did not speak in “ l u n d ’ ’ terms— was
Sir Edward Grev. H e appears to have been especially down on Lord Haldane— of
whom he said " Thev send him out because he is supposed to know German and
G erm any: as a matter of fact he knows very little German and nothing about
Germany except Goethe! ” . .
But it passes belief that he should have selected M atson as a proper recipient of
his grievances against Hardinge— and to pour into his ear the ‘ words ’ which had
passed between H im and Hardinge.
H is remarks about Tangier are also strange. He is also a little vague about the
Automatic nature of the German Fleet Law. It is automatic as long as there are no
‘ Novelles ’— but as a matter of that [ric : ? fact] it has already been relieved three
times of its Automatic character. But he is, I should think, on more solid ground when
he points out the strategic mistake of concentrating our fleet in the North Sea. lo u will
be amused by His remarks about the endeavours of H [is j M a je s t y s ]G [o x e in m e n t ]
to get a Russian Squadron to make its headquarters off the Scottish Coast while the
British Squadrons were in the Mediterranean and at the reply of the R ushan Gox e m ­
inent! W here does H [is ] M [a jesty] get his inform ation on such subjects from . He
has often told me that he has lots o f correspondents in E ngland who keep him pretty
well inform ed as to what is going on. , , qcc
I am— and we are a l l - v e r v sorry to lose W a ts o n : his unfading lightheartedness
and good spirits made him a most excellent com panion— and though his despatches

(1) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a rin g been sent to the K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r ; to

M r. Churchill. T he endorsem ent is in itia lled by S ir E d w a rd Grey.J
( 2) [C arn oek M SS ., V o l. X o f 1913.1
[10900]
 708

are diffuse and not without their com ic side— he has done excellent work and while
doing his duty to his own country unflinchingly, has also captivated the hearts of both
the Seniors and Juniors of the German Navy. He will be greatly missed here by all
hands.
Yours ever,
W . E. GOSC1IEN.

Enclosure in No. -182.

Secret.
Rem arks made by His M ajesty the E m peror, October 4th 1913, to Captain Hugh
TT'afsoir, Naval Attache, on the occasion of his taking leave of His M ajesty.
According to instructions I took the 11-15 a . m . train from the Potsdamer Bahnhof
to W ildpark, where a Boval carriage awaited me. Drove to the Neues Palais, where
1 had to wait for about an hour for the Emperor to return from his walk, and also
for Ilerr Hagenbeek (the son of the famous Ilagenbeck) to explain to His Majesty
his proposals for improving the breed of stags at Kominten.
His Majesty then received me on the steps o f the Palais leading into the
gardens, where he was accompanied by his two Dachshunds; and handed me a
photograph of him self, say in g: “ There, W atson, is something for your writing
table, so that you can show your friends what that dangerous person to England
looks lik e.’ ’
Leading me away His Majesty said : “ I want to thank you for the nice way
in which you have treated my people and for your loyalty to me. You have lived
through some very difficult times for yourself here very successfully, and I
congratulate you. Now you have seen enough o f m y people and life in Germany
generally to know that this talk of invasion o f England by Germany is all nonsense.
But in England it is made the tool o f both political parties, Liberal and Conservative.
I except Sir Edward Grey entirely in making that remark. It is stupid that it should
still go on now that the countries have worked so well in the Balkan business, and
that the difficulties of the Bagdad Bailway are practically finished, there only remain
some small arrangements to be arrived at as to percentages of trade etc. You have
promised to deepen the Shat-el-Arab, and so long as our ships can get round to
some port in the Persian Gulf we do not mind much which port it is.
“ In the Colonies our differences are also being settled, so it is absurd that the
nations should suspect each oth er; and, owing to Sir E . Grey, my Ambassador there
now works in harm ony with him. Form erly everything was decided by the British
Foreign Office with the French and Bussian Ambassadors, who merely told my
Ambassador what had been settled. It was not a pleasant position for me. England
should rem em ber Germany only wants her rightful share in the world.
“ You English are a very practical people and do not introduce sentiment into
international politics, but I wish you could remember that I am always bound to
England by family and personally sympathetic ties, and thatI would (or do)
introduce sentiment into my international politics with England.
“ It is forgotten in England how I broke all sorts o f State and national
obligations to go to England on the occasion that m y dear Grandmother died in my
arms. But it is not forgotten in Germany.
“ There are telegrams in the Foreign Office in Berlin to show how I strenuously
fought against going to Tangiers on that occasion some years a g o,(3) but that I was
forced to do so by Biilow and my statesmen, who wished to test how far England
would support France. You would not fight and France would not fight, and the
result was that Delcasse was turned out of office.
“ England has forgotten W aterloo; they should let their minds go back to it.
What the Balkan business has shown is that Europe is moving towards a Slav-Latin

( 3) [ r . G o o c h <fc T em p ev lc.ii, V ol. I l l , p . 463, I n d e x o f P e r s o n s , su b H .I.M . W i l l i a m I I .]

 709
m ovem ent, particularly a Slav one and the Balkan war has shown that the Slavs
are not civilized .” .
His Imperial Majesty remarked on the present British fondness for everything
French, and said he had asked Lord Stamfordham (when here with His Majesty the
King : “ Are you English going to stand by and see your blood relations, the
German race, perhaps be conquered by the Slav-Latin u n io n ? ”
His Im perial Majesty remarked on the tendency of France to endeavour to
draw England into her support at every turn, and s a id : ‘ ‘ they are mad over this
Alsace-Lorraine question but I have it from the Czar of Bussia that he will never
support France in an Alsace-Lorraine war of revenge.”
His Majesty then remarked that the three yeaTS military service would hit
France very hardly, that 110 nation could stand having the flower of its young men
taken away foT so long a period, and said : “ Mark my words, this means the doom
of France, look at her present position and national deficit.”
“ I am threatened with Naval increases by Bussia and France, and at any time
von Tirpitz, or if it happens later on, von Tirpitz's successor, may come to me and
say that they must have an increase o f the Fleet to meet the Bussian increase. It
is absurd of people to com plain of our Navy L a w : our Navy Law goes on
automatically, and if it is required the Beiehstag will vote the necessary amounts
to it. It is the result of England always threatening G erm a n y; m y people have
got tired of it. Your great mistake was when you withdrew your ships from foreign
stations and brought them into the North S (a. because then Germany realised it
was a threat to her. But it was also a mistake strategically, because it was an
upsetting of carefully balanced strategical conditions. It was similar to Bussia
massing all her tToops on m y border and then having none to deal with the Japanese
when trouble arose there. In 1904 when FisheT withdrew the squadrons from abroad,
m y Chief o f the Staff remarked to me on the strategical unsoundness of the m ovem ent,
and said at o n c e : ‘ This means waT, perhaps in four or five years tim e.’ W ar did
not com e, but what has resulted? Ten years o f mutual recriminations and an
increased German Fleet and German resolve to have a Fleet.
‘ ‘ I am very glad to see that your squadrons are going to visit the Mediterranean
and so free the North Sea. I hope it will be noticed that Germany has not started
drawing the sword because your squadrons have left the North Sea. But I heaT
that every endeavour was made by England to induce the Bussian Squadron recently
over there to make its headquarters in Scotland during the absence of the English
Squadrons in the Mediterranean. I also hear that the suggestion was politely
refused by Bussia. with the rem ark: ‘ All I can see is that you seem afraid .’
His im perial Majesty remarked that he had heard English complaints that the
German Navy was in the North Sea and again if it was in the Baltic, and asked
wheTe he could send it without having com plaints, rem arking that it was impossible
to train seamen in the Baltic properly.
His Imperial Majesty then spoke of meeting King Edward 011 some occasion in
Germany when Lord IJaTdinge was in attendance on His Majesty. (L Hardinge
said to the EmperoT : “ Germany must stop building ships.” His Imperial Majesty
said to H a rd in ge: “ You have, by that remark made direct to me. stepped over the
heads of all the recognised channels of intercourse between nations, over the heads
of your own Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and m y Ambassador in
London, and over those of m y Chancellor, m y S>vretary for Foreign Affairs, and
your Ambassador in B erlin, and you have made a remark to the Sovereign of the
country whose guest you are at present which cannot be tolerated. Please tell me
how it would be received in England if one of my officials had made a similar remark
to K ing Edward when he was a guest of H is M ajesty’ s in E n gla n d .” His Im perial
Majesty rem arked: “ I gave Hardinge, at K ing E dw ard’ s request, the Order of the

( ' ) [T h e referen ce a ppea rs to be to K in g E d w a rd ’ s v isit to C ron berg in 1908. v. S ir C.

H a r d in g e ’ s re p o rt in G ooch <b T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 1S3-90, Nos. 116—7.]
 710
Red E ag le; and when he remarked that it was the second in his fam ily, as one of
his ancestors had been in attendance on Bliicher at W aterloo and had received the
Red Eagle, I said : “ And yet you can make a remark such as you did that Germany
must stop b u ildin g.” I know that Hardinge was told to make the remark by the
British Admiralty, and that the order came from Fisher.
“ Hardinge afterwards told Count Aehrenthal what he had said to me. When
Aehrenthal heard o f it, he said to H ard inge: “ Did you leave the room by the
d oor?” Also I know that the old Em peror of Austria spoke very harshly to King
Edward when he asked him to interfere in German naval shipbuilding programm es.”
The Emperor concluded with the remark that what England and Germany
wanted was a period o f quiet development of their relations. H e spoke some words
o f praise o f Sir E . Grey and Lord M orley. Of Lord Haldane’ s mission to Germany
on the Naval Question o f 1912,(5) the Emperor spoke with considerable scorn o f its
utility; and also rem arked: “ It is just as if I was to have sent old Heeringen
(ex-M inister of W ar) to negotiate with the British Admiralty. How people would
have laughed at i t .”
His Majesty paid a tribute o f praise to Admiral von Tirpitz and said : “ He is
a moderate man, and a great admirer of E n gla n d .” He also spoke in admiration
o f several German Naval Officers known to me.
H is Im perial Majesty then wished me good-bye and sent his best greetings to
m y wife.
W hen speaking o f the improved state o f affairs between England and Germany,
His Im perial Majesty said : “ I shall do all that lies in my power to rebuild Turkey
in regard to sending people to reorganise the army etc. and I understand from your
King that he intends to do all in the way o f getting people appointed to reorganise
the Civil Service and P olice .”
W hen His Majesty spoke of W aterloo, he remarked on the approaching
Centenary o f that battle, and said that he understood that it was doubtful if England
would join in the celebration o f the Centenarv of W aterloo.
‘ H U G H W ATSON ,
Captain and Naval Attache.

M IN U T E .
V e r y ch a ra cteristic.
H . H . A.

(5) [v. Cooch T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 666-761, ch a p ter X L I X . ]

No. 483.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.G )

F.O. 4 75 5 0 /4 7 5 5 0 /1 3 /1 8 .
(No. 368.) Berlin, D. October 15, 1913.
Sir, R. October 20, 1913.
I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a report which I have received from
Captain W atson, Naval Attache to His M ajesty’s Embassy, forwarding some remarks
on naval affairs during the period o f his appointment as Naval Attaché to this
Embassy.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.

0 ) [T his despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the P rim e M in ister. I t was sent to
the A d m ira lty .]
 711

E n clos u re 1 in N o. 4S3.

Captain Tl'aison to Sir E. G oschen.(2)

(Confidential.
Your Excellency, Berlin, October 18, 1918.
On the com pletion of m y period of appointment as naval attaché to Berlin
(August 1910 to October 1913\ I have the honour to forward some remarks on naval
affairs of that period.
I have. Ac.
H I GH W ATSON , Captain,
Naval Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4S3.

R eport hy Captain Tfatso«.

Naval Policy.
]. W hen I first came to Berlin the naval questions at issue between England
and Germany had hardly recovered, at any rate in the press, from a somewhat petty
and undignified method of reproachful attack and counter-attack directed by each
nation against the other. Charges of secret acceleration in ship construction against
Germany, o f duplicity against England, were still current. It seems certain that
Germany did actually collect the material, or even lay down one of the ships of the
1909-10 programm e before the German Naval Estimates were actually passed.
Inform ation which I received when I first came here showed that the German naval
preparations in the years prior to 1909 had been, if not actually of feverish activity,
were [s ic ] of a nature of forced preparations, which ail competent observers in Germany
count as haring been a definite attempt to “ jum p ” Great Britain at a moment when
that country was reducing her Naval Estimates. At the same time it is fair to state
the German view, which is that Great Britain threatened Germany by withdrawing
all her ships into the North Sea. and, further, that Great Britain inaugurated a period
of naval secrecy in respect of programmes and ships. G erm any’ s naval authorities
have certainly proved themselves apt pupils and followers in the policy of secrecy.
Of the withdrawal of the British ships to the North Sea, Germans somewhat logicaliy
say that it was one of the principal steps which has enabled them to pass successive
naval amendments to the Fleet Law. There is no doubt whatever that the petty
irritation and remarks that were noticeable in E ngland at the growth of the German
fleet had also a potent effect in increasing the number of supporters of a large
German navy policy, and that the reduction of the British Naval Estimates in certain
years had previously whetted the ambitions and raised the hopes of the German
naval authorities and their supporters in the production of increased navai
programmes.
I would revert to the statement of Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz of the 29th March,
1909,(31 in which his E xcellency said that 10 battleships and 3 battle cruisers would be
ready in the autumn of 1912. and not before. It will be remembered that in July
1909.(4) it was stated by the First Lord of the Admiralty for the second time that
England must expect to see 13 German Dreadnoughts completed by the autumn
of 1911, and 17 by April 1912. It seems fair to examine which of the statements has
been proved by time to be correct. From such inform ation as I have at m y disposal
in this office, it appears to me that Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz’ s statement was
substantiated, but in saying this I would remark that the prolonged German

( 2) [T h e t e x t o f C a p ta in W a tso n 's re p o rt is ta k en from the C onfidential P r in t, as the

orig in a l docu m en t w as sent to th e A d m ira lty .]
(3) [cp . G ooch dc T em p erley, V ol. V I , pp. 2 50-1, No. 160, encl. ; pp. 256-7, N o. 166.]
( J) [cp . P a ri. D eb ., 5th S er., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. S, pp . 855-970.]
 712

dockyard strike of 1910 appears to show that the times for shipbuilding as given by
Admiral von Tirpitz in 1909 (viz., three years for a battleship in private yards, and
three years and four months in Im perial yards), appear to admit of a very considerable
margin for delays.
So much for the time previous to my appointment. I have only alluded to it
in respect of points which were not visible at the time, and which became more clear
after I relieved Rear-Adm iral II. L. Heath.
With regard to August 1910 to the spring of 1911, so far as naval questions went
in Germany, the paramount and absorbing topic to people in naval circles, except to
the British naval attache, was that of spies and spying. It is probable that this
period was the result o f the times of the inauguration o f greater secrecy in both
countries. Over-secrecv bred a greater amount of spying, and spying helped to breed
suspicion between the countries. Germany carried the secrecy to an absurd extent,
and even the main details of her ships were not published, not even on the launching
of the ship. They were gradually found out, and at about the time of commission
were perhaps made public. England published the main details of her ships at the
time of launch. It is pleasant to be able to place on record that 1913 appears to
show a greater openness on the part of Germany in this respect, details o f ships only
just laid down having this year been published in semi-official journals; and in other
respects I would report that I have observed less desire to maintain such close secrecy
in ordinary naval matters than was niv experience in 1910.
One other point stands out as regards 1910-11, and that is Gross-xVdmiral von
T irpitz’ s still existing indignation at having had, as he considered, his word doubted
over the question o f shipbuilding before alluded to. His Excellency, as I reported
at the time, made so much parade of his grievance against Mr. M cKenna during the
winter o f 1910-11, that a strong feeling was left behind in the minds of observers
that the parade of his indignation was largely due to a desire to work up political
capital. A doubt was also engendered in the minds of some whether his Excellency
is really so great a man as has been thought.

Spring 1911 to Autum n 1911.

The political affairs of M orocco appear to have had at this time little effect on
naval policy, but in autumn 1911 the hints of naval increases grew stronger,
beginning with the speech o f Ilis Majesty the Emperor in September 1911 at
IIam burg(5) ; and the large navy party, actuated from the German Admiralty Press
Bureau, astutely fed the fires of indignation aroused in Germany, or supposed to have
been aroused, by certain reports in England of the intention of our fleet to fall on
Borkum.

Autum n 1911 to June 1912.

These preliminary hints o f a naval increase led to the production of the naval
“ N ovelle.” Friction is believed to have been created between the heads o f the
navy and anny over their respective “ N ovellen.” The naval increase, which was
generally understood to have been shorn o f some o f its original proposals in relation
to more battle cruisers, passed the Reichstag and became law.
This period also saw the head of the navy rumoured as a candidate for the
Chancellorship; it also saw his position later becom e less secure and his chances
of becom ing Chancellor somewhat small.
The speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty o f March 1912(b) gave the taxpayers
o f Germany food for thought as to where the naval com petition was leading Germany.
I would remark here that the cam paign in support o f the “ N o v e lle ” o f 1912

(5) [cp. G ooch d• T em p erley, V ol. V I I , pp. 450-2, N o. 476.]

( 6) [i>. P ari. D eb ., 5th S er., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 35, pp. 1549-74.]
 713
is interesting to study, and may perhaps be worth bearing in mind in case there
are future German naval “ N ovellen.” I f a com parison were made between the
campaigns of the Fleet Laws and “ Novelles ” of 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912, it is
probable a similarity of methods employed would be observed. The period of a
“ N ovelle,” and the campaign in support o f it, is certainly the most illuminating
time for an observer in Germany, and the time when he learns the most. An
interesting study during the “ N ov elle” campaign of 1911-12 was to note the
determined efforts made by the German naval section to acquire power in the Berlin
social-political world, at present m ostly in the hands of the Court and military
officers.
I would here record m y very earnest sense o f the comradeship of German naval
officers during the whole of m y three years in Germany. Naturally they, as keen
officers and patriotic Germans, are out to obtain as large a naval increase as they
can, and it should be remembered that they only wait their opportunity; but they
possess a real admiration for their brother officers in the British navy. During the
sometimes difficult times of relations with England the German naval officers
invariably behaved towards me as officers and gentlem en, and were real comrades.

July 1912 to Autum n 1912.

The naval question in Germany concerned itself with consideration of the first
part of the British reply to the German naval “ N ovelle.” As reported at the time,
the opinion of the German large navy party did not then seem to regard the British
reply as being very dangerous, and a feeling of satisfaction existed amongst that
party that the “ N ov elle” of 1912 had done something to whittle down the naval
superiority of Great Britain, though not so m uch as its predecessors.

Autum n 1912 to Spring 1913.

The colonial offers o f battleships occasioned a feeling o f something approaching

consternation in the minds of the German large navy party, com ing as the offers
did at a time when the German military authorities were clamouring for increases
which, it was urged by the military officers, had been long neglected owing to the
last ten years of naval increases. The German large navy party hoped, and still
hope, that the Canadian ofEer o f three battleships would not materialise.
In addition to other reasons for m ilitary increases, the Balkan affairs put
German naval affairs still further in the background for the time.
In the Reichstag itself the naval political party was weakened b y the Centre
party turning against Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz and refusing several naval proposals,
one o f which refusals led to a threat o f resignation on the part o f the Admiral.
This period will also be remembered for tbe reported semi-adoption of the figures
of fleet proportion mentioned by the First L ord of the Admiralty in 1912.(7) It may
be remarked that it was noticeable that Gross-Adm iral von Tirpitz did not reproduce
the whole of the conditions and words of the First L ord ’ s speech of the previous
year. It is also noteworthy that when the estimates emerged from the Budget
(Committee and went to the Reichstag for the second and third reading the question
of the naval proportion between the two countries was scarcely raised, if at all.

Spring 1913 to present tim e.

Since the spring naval affairs in respect o f England may be said to have under­
gone a com paratively dormant period. The large navy party have declared in favour
of building another battle cruiser in each year in which only two Capital ships are
by the present programme to be built, and so to establish the ship construction at
three Capital ships per year up to the year in which the automatic replacement of

( 7) [v . Pari. Deb., 5th Ser., (H ou se o f C om m ons), V ol. 35, pp. 155 2-8.]
 714
the German battle fleet 011 a 20-year age basis of replacement com m ences. There
seems little doubt that the large shipbuilding yards o f Germany require increased
German naval orders, or else orders from foreign nations, in order properly to support
the large resources they have collected in view of German naval expansion. Should
they get their desires, however, it seems likely that additional plant may be laid
down, and be made the basis o f a demand for more naval activity through the
so-called “ armour plate p a rty.”
Up to date (13th October, 1913) the routine o f the year in respect o f naval
policy and currents o f opinion acting on it has pursued its normal way, though there
have been one or two indications of suggestions for naval increases being put forward
when and as convenient. The programme of the Navy League is a standing one,
always there for the Admiralty to fall back on and use or m odify as desirable.
At the moment o f writing it seems unlikely that a proposal for a German naval
increase would have much chance o f success in the Reichstag at p resen t; the voice
o f the taxpayer in respect of taxation for naval purposes appears to be decidedly
against it.
The governing factor in respect o f Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz appears to be
whether the Centre party will continue its opposition to him or not during the coming
Reichstag session. It is not out o f place here to remark that during the last three
years the naval demands for m oney have often met with sturdy opposition in the
Reichstag, and m any existing votes have also been pared down. But another election
m ay o f course result in a decreased number of Social Democrats and Radicals being
returned as compared with the election of January 1912.
In regard to the prospect of Anglo-Germ an questions affecting the position of
the naval expansionist party o f Germ any. I am of opinion that if Canada herself gives
the three battleships the party in Germ any will suffer a loss of prestige, as their
writers have consoled themselves with the thought that Canada would never give
them. If Great Britain is obliged to vote them there will probably be some squeals
in G e rm a n y ; but the new army expenditure and the growing vote for upkeep of the
fleet, which is now7 com ing home to the nation, should prevent any possibility of
further German naval increases maturing.

Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz.

2. So far as m y observation goes I am no believer in the Admiral being anti-
K n glish ; on the contrary he is a great admirer o f E ngland, and was, I believe,
greatly pained by that period o f petty attacks made by each nation on the other.
In respect o f his policy, I submit its cleverness has consisted in his being able
to prove to the satisfaction o f the R eichstag that each successive naval “ Novelle ”
was no increase on the original Fleet Law, but only a filling up of a defect in its
organisation. The disarming phrase has often been heard from him : “ No increase
in the Fleet Law is intended.” Besides the above, his success has also lain in so
constituting each amendment that it form s a logical stepping-stone on which the next
can be built, should it be desired.
The petty criticism of the German naval increases in England undoubtedly
helped Gross-Admiral von Tirpitz. A more self-reliant policy and attitude on the
part of England is undoubtedly making his task of getting m oney for the navy more
difficult, and is increasing the number in Germany, even in the navy itself, who are
again beginning to s a y : “ Of course you English have a very large navy compared
with us, and we must put our strength into our a rm y,” which is somewhat a reversal
o f the remarks made in Germany in the winter of 1911-12 during the naval
“ N o v e lle” campaign.
It is fair to assume that a continuation of this attitude in England will tend
to damp over-ambitious naval projects in Germ any, so long as the English attitude
is not o f an irritant nature.
 715

Naval D efen ce o f Germ any.

3. M y predecessor in his closing report, dated the 6th August, 1910,(*,) stated :—
“ Thus the German naval front, together with the principal fighting force,
is being moved from the interior defensive position in the Baltic, to the open
waters o f the North S ea.”
That this statement has become true, and that the principle indicated has been
very consistently followed from 1910 to 1913, is shown by the difference of the
allocation o f the German squadrons to the various ports in 1913 as compared with
1910. It is also borne out by the steady growth of the coastal defences from Borkum
to Sylt, a growth which is being definitely carried out with the idea of still further
freeing the German fleet from a coastal defensive role, and enabling it to undertake
that o f an offensive strategy remote from its bases, while still keeping the German
B ay as a closed sea for hostile vessels, with H eligoland as the pivot for the German
fleet on which to retire if pressed, or from which to conduct more offensive
operations.
I submit that the growth of emancipation of naval opinion from the old coastal
policy is one of the most interesting points o f recent years, and the one most to
be regarded in respect o f the possible use of the much improved material now at the
disposal of German flag and other officers.
The Kiel Canal is now widened, or nearly completed, and this will tend to the
adoption of a permanent scheme of strategy, in which the dangerous passage round
Skagen holds no part.
Of the other works m entioned by m y predecessor in August 1910—
(a) The deepening of the E m s-Jad e Canal appears not to have been proceeded
with, probably owing to the local difficulties and to the protection of
Borkum being now better assured. On the other hand, the large new
inner harbour at E m den is practically completed, and has been used this
year by small cruisers in the manoeuvres.
(b) Borkum fortifications are probably com pleted, and it is now often used as a
fleet base, a m ining ship haring also been established at Em den.
(c) W ilhelm shaven Harbour has been com pleted, and the channel of the Jade
deepened to allow of the free use of it by deep-draught ships.
<d) Batteries have been placed on the Frisian Islands where necessary.
(e> The Torpedo Boat Harbour at Heligoland is nearly com pleted. The
armament of this island has been improved.
<f ) Cuxhaven has seen an increase of the personnel and material of the m ining
department, and is now being equipped with an airship and aeroplane
station.
(g) Brunsbiittel Docks and W orks are approaching completion.
( h) A naval high power wireless station has been opened at Neu-Miinster.
(i) M oney has been voted to connect the island of ¡Sylt with the mainland by
rail, and it is believed the erection of batteries on that island is
com m enced.
Naval Material.
4. Owing to certain questions pending in 1910, it was not advisable for me to
1 visit German naval and shipbuilding yards. It has therefore been difficult for me
personally to observe naval work, either in the fleet or the dockyards, except by
occasional visits to Kiel and such other ports as were convenient to stay at or pass
1 through. It is to be hoped that the difficulties and restrictions which m y predecessor
| met with in respect of making visits, and which I have avoided incurring, m ay not in
the future be experienced.
W ith regard to the growth and improvement of material during the three years
just ended, a com parison of any naval book shows this.
(*) [t>. Gooch & Temperley, V ol. V I , p p 506-10, No. 390, encls. 1, 2 .]
 710

W hether German naval material will continue to be about one and a-half years
behind England in progress of design may be doubted. I f the com petition in naval
designs continues, it seems probable that the increased talent of the German ship­
building trade may at any time produce a design of greater originality than it has
possessed in the past. At the same time it would seem that part of the reluctance to
change types of ships or guns has been due primarily to the cost of change— a cost
which Krupp, with its gun m onopoly, would charge on the Government. The
m onopoly of Krupp, and its power over the Government, has been often shown in the
last two years. At the same time it should be remembered that Krupp is a very
active agent for the Fatherland at hom e and in m any foreign countries. The heads
of big firms, such as Herr von Bohlen und Halbach, Herr Ballin (H am burg-Am erica
L ine), H err von Gwinner (Deutsche Bank), the Princes’ Concern (now in financial
straits), H err Thyssen, and others, have all had very potent and patriotic influences
in many places for the furthering of plans for the advancement of Germ any’ s sea
power.

F leet W ork and Exercises.

5. From various sources I have forwarded a certain amount of inform ation from
time to time on the fleet exercises, but my personal knowledge of the fleet work is
small.
In gunnery I am under the impression that the German navy is now going in
for longer range firing than in the past.
I have no inform ation on the torpedo work of the fleet.
Such reports as I have forwarded from time to time on the fleet work showed
that the observers were much struck by the tactical work of the fleet and by the
individual efficiency of the ships at gunnery practices and internally.
The German naval officers still com plain much of the three years’ service, under
which they are every year called upon to make trained men out of a fresh lot of
conscripts totally strange to sea life. At the same time the more forceful officers
indicate that, though the evils do exist, the means adopted tend to eliminate them,
and that the constant freshening of brains due to the annual training is even good for
the ship. Certainly the German naval officers go far to lessen the defects of a system
by their thorough methods.

Officers.

6. The development of the battle fleet and cruiser squadrons and the con­
tinuance of the very good destroyer flotilla work is now giving the German navy flag
officers and senior captains, who should be in no way inferior to their corresponding
numbers in the British navy, in view of the practice in fleet work they now have.
The work and aim of the training of the fleet appears to be consistent and thorough,
and I see no reason to think that the German naval officers of 1913 are inferior to
their British comrades. The class from which the officers now in the junior ranks of
the German navy have been drawn appears to be better than in older days.
One remark of a senior German naval officer to me is of interest. He said :
“ Our great defect as Germans is to lose ourselves and the object in view in a mass
of detail.” He also added, however, ‘ ‘ W e naval officers are less prone to that than
are our cou n trym en ; also it has its good side, as it leads to absolute thoroughness
and continuity, and is invaluable for our system of service in regard to the
personnel.”
Of the ages and prospects of prom otion in the Imperial German navy I have
from time to time forwarded remarks thereon as information came to hand. From
what I know of the German naval officer I feel convinced that in the day of trial he
will be proved more capable than the officers of navies with which we are politically
m ore closely allied.
 717
In the last two years the number of flag officers and Kapitàne zur See who are
placed at the disposal of the Comm anders-in-Chief at Kiel and W ilhelm shaven has
increased. It is the equivalent of our “ half pay when waiting for appointment,
the German officer receiving the full pay of his rank, less the allowances he receives
when afloat.
One point is worthy of note. The old German naval officer fond of table
indulgence has nearly passed away. The modern German naval officer and his wife
are strenuous sport lovers. Leave is spent in active exercise. Golf, tennis, hockey,
and football are really well played. Shooting and walking tours are the sport of the
older officers.

M en.
7. It would probably be a fair appreciation to say that the following units should
be considered as being able to bear favourable com parison in regard to efficiency in
their respective duties to men doing similar duty in the British navy :—
(a ) The whole of the German naval long service personnel.
(b) The personnel of the destroyer flotillas, owing to the usually previous sea­
going experience of such conscripts as go to the flotillas.
(c) The technical ratings who volunteer for any period over three years’ service
in the navy.
(d) A portion of the conscripts in their third year of service.

Discipline.
S. Undoubtedly the discipline in the German navy is severe. It is necessarily
so for the due training of the first year conscripts. But m y evidence goes to show
that it is not nearly so severe as in the German arm y. After all what is to he
expected hut severe discipline from a nation one of whose Monarc-hs ordered the army
in Berlin that when they saw anyone smoking in the streets they were to tear away,
or knock out, the offending pipe or cigar from the mouth of the person contravening
the orders His Majesty had then issued against sm oking?
As to wearing of plain clothes, it is certainly growing amongst naval officers in
Berlin whenever ] ossible. I have heard senior officers remark that the regulations
for the wearing o f uniform are out of date, and that they should be revised to bring
them more in accordance with the spirit o f the age and to give the officer more
freedom when on leave. I do not suppose that the question of wearing plain clothes
has yet permeated to the warrant officers, petty officers and men.
9. In conclusion, I would remark that the impression I have received o f the
German navy, and o f the organisation operating it, is that it possesses continuity
of purpose and training, and singleness of aim to the highest degree.

Co-operation o f Xaval and Military Attachés.

10. W ith regard to paragraph 11 of the “ Instructions to Naval A ttaches,” it

has been strongly born in upon me during the period of m y appointment how many
questions there are in which the naval and m ilitary attachés can work together and
assist each other to the benefit of the public service.
The help that Lieutenant-Colonel Russell has given me has facilitated the
carrying out o f the instructions above alluded to. This ready co-operation has
emphasised in m y mind the importance o f collaboration between the naval and
military attaches on a number o f subjects o f amphibious interest with a view to the
acquisition of a more complete knowledge o f the countries they are appointed to.
By studying together on the spot the questions in regard to their foreign countries,
in which their respective departments are interested, and by the application o f the
naval and m ilitary point o f view to these subjects, reports o f greater utility are, I
am convinced, liable to be produced.
 718

11. As previously submitted to your Excellency, I am strongly of opinion that

the public service would gain if the naval attaché had an assistant to do the routine
clerical work.
I would further submit, from my experience as naval attache in Germany,
H olland, and Denmark, that the present pay and allowances for naval attachée, all
of whom have more than one country to study, results in only officers with considerable
private means being able to take these posts, and therefore in a limited area of
selection.
M y experience in the countries indicated is that, unless the naval attaché enter­
tains the naval officers of the country, he will find it difficult to get to know them and
so be in touch with the trend of thought in the navies he is studying. If he is not
in touch with such trend of thought it appears to me that he might just as well have
his office in London.

M IN U T E .

A very in terestin g and well a rra n g ed rep ort.

E. G.

No. 484.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E . G oschen.( J)

F .O . 371/1653.
4 8 2 1 1 /4 8 2 1 1 /1 3 '1 8 .
(No. 311.)
Sir, Foreign Office, October 20, 1913.
H err von Kiihlmann told me to-day that Herr von Bethm ann-H ollweg had
instructed him to say that he hoped the frank com m unication that had kept Germany
and England in touch with such good results during this Balkan crisis would be
maintained.
To this I cordially agreed. I said that I did not propose to suggest the
reassembling of the Ambassadors’ Conference unless it seemed really to be required,
but that I would none the less endeavour to keep closely in touch, as I had previously
done through the Conference.
[ I am. & c.]
E . G [E E Y ].
C ) [T h is despatch is en d orsed as h a v in g heen sent to th e K in g and to the P rim e
M in is ter.]

No. 485.

Sir E . G oschen to Sir Edicard G r ey ff1)

F.O . 371/1653.
48702 /4 8 2 1 5 /1 3 /1 8 .
(No. 382.) B erlin, D. October 22, 1913.
Sir, E . October 27, 1913.
Mr. Churchill’ s speech at Manchester on the 18th instant,(2) in which he
renewed his proposal for a “ holiday y e a r ” in shipbuilding, has been fully reported
in all tbe more important German newspapers and has been received with almost

0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r;

to M r. C hurchill. A cop y was sent to th e A d m ira lty on N ovem b er 10.]
( 2) [v. The T im es, O ctob er 20. 1913, pp . 9-10. F o r G erm an com m ents on M r. C h u rch ill’ s
speech v. G .P., X X X I X , pp. 5 2-62 1
 719
universal disapproval. The only papers in which I can see any expression of approval
at all, are the Radical “ Berliner T a geb la tt” and “ Frankfurter Zeitu n g.’ ’ In the
“ Berliner T a geb la tt” Captain Persius, a retired Naval Officer and constant
contributor to that paper on naval matters, writes that there are no real practical
objections to Mr. Churchill’ s proposal, which is an excellent one and should certainly
be taken up and discussed by the German G overnm ent; but Captain Persius observes
that it will be exceedingly difficult to overcom e the opposition o f the Navy League
who are already supposed to be preparing the way for a new “ N ovelle,” and he
also argues that it is out o f the question that any exceptions can be allowed, such as
the three Canadian Dreadnoughts or their equivalent and such ships as England
might consider necessary in view o f Italian and Austrian shipbuilding— if a holiday
year is agreed to it must be a real and com plete holiday year and no Dreadnought
must be laid down by either country. The “ Frankfurter Z e itu n g ” says very much
the same and points out that if England calculates the Austrian and Italian fleets
as added to the German, Germany must add the French, Russian and Japanese
fleets to the British.
The Cologne Gazette published the following apparently inspired telegram from
Berlin yesterday ev en in g: “ Mr. W inston Churchill has met with little approval
either in the English or the German Press for his renewed suggestion o f a holiday
year in ship-building, adverse judgments being in the m ajority on both sides of the
Channel. In some cases the criticisms seem to overstep the limits of pertinent
objection. W hatever may be said against the practicability o f Mr. C hurchill’ s idea,
there can be no doubt of the good intentions o f the Plnglish Minister of Marine and
of the honesty o f his statements. Mr. Churchill has said no word that could adversely
affect the friendly development o f Anglo-G erm an relations. The recognition o f this
fact cannot however prevent one from declaring openly, as to the question itself,
that the path on which Mr. Churchill seeks an alleviation o f the burden o f naval
shipbuilding is hardly likely to lead to the goal within an appreciable period .”
The com m ents in all the other papers m ay be summarized in a very few words
as their unanim ity is really remarkable, especially as their comments seem to have
appeared too early for a “ mot d ’ordre ” to have been issued. The only difference
between them lies in the varying degrees o f politeness or rudeness with which they
refuse even to consider the holiday year suggestion. They object to Mr. C hurchill’ s
speech as an interference in German internal affairs, as the German fleet is, they
declare, built according to G erm any’ s needs and with no reference to E ngland, and
some o f them say it was an impertinence on Mr. C hurchill’ s part to point out to
Germany how she could save .£6,000,000; but more especially they argue that what
Mr. Churchill’ s suggestion amounts to, with the exceptions which he claims, is that
England should lay down 4 or 5 Dreadnoughts and Germany none. They also argue
that Mr. Churchill was influenced by three considerations, first a desire" to save his
position in the opinion o f his Eadical supporters, second the undoubted fact that
the English ship-building yards are so over-crow ded that the Admiralty orders suffer
very heavy delay, and third that there is a shortage o f men in England so that the
ships if built could not be manned. The first o f these considerations, they say, is
a matter o f no concern to Germany and the second and third do not apply to
Germany. M any o f them blame Mr. Churchill severely for renewing the suggestion
which, they say, can only have a deplorable effect on Anglo-German relations, and
Count Reventlow suggests in the “ Deutsche Tageszeitnng ” that what would be really
desirable would be for Mr. Churchill to take a “ Redefeierjahr ” — a holiday year in
speech making.
I have, Ac.
W . E . GO SCH EN.
 720

N o. 486.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A . Nicolsonmm

Private.C2)
My dear NicoLson, Berlin, October 24, 1913.
I am exceedingly sorry to hear from you that you are troubled with a bad ‘ limb ’
and I hope that by the time you get this letter you will be all right again.
Y es! the German Press is very down on Churchill’ s speech.(3) It was quite
certain that there would be an uproar here if the Naval H oliday was again mentioned
— in fact I told Sir E. Grey so when I saw him last. One could almost have foreseen
the very language they have used. I am not looking forward to my meeting with the
Em peror— on Monday next I think-—as he made such a very special point of the
Na'ral H oliday not being brought up again— in his conversation with W atson at
Kiel. But the worst is that it brings up the whole naval question again— a question
which had rather gone to sleep— and which Lic'nnowsky and I have scrupulously
abstained from awakening. It seems a pity that political exigencies of the moment
should have led the First Lord to bring it all up again. It may be that he has more
than that in his mind and thinks that the further ‘ Novelle ’ foreshadowed by the
Em peror if the Naval Holiday was again m entioned— may come to pass and free his
hand by enabling him to say to the extreme Badical supporters of the Government
for in sta n ce:— “ W ell I have tried m y best to reduce armaments but Germany will
have none of it— so I must go ahead and ask for the m oney necessary to maintain
our maritime suprem acy.’ ’ But this method would seem to be rather a roundabout
one— and one cannot help thinking that a determined execution of what he outlined
in 1912 would have had a far greater effect upon German shipbuilding than what he
has now done. But I confess to being rather a fanatic in this matter and cling to
the belief that the best way of taking the wind out of the sails of the Big Navy Party
in Germ any is to state frankly that if threatened with further efforts to reduce our
supremacy we shall make a big effort, by loan if necessary, to render that supremacy
unassailable.............. ('*)
Yours verv sincerelv,
W . E. GOSCHEN.

M IN U T E .

I will d icta te a rep ly to S ir E. G oschen e x p la in in g the position a bou t naval arm am ents.
Tt w as essential a fte r the pu blic sta tem en t o f Bethm ann H ollw eg th a t he a w aited proposals
a b ou t a naval holida y to say som eth in g to our ow n people. T he a ltern a tive to w hat Churchill
did say w ould have been to say p u blicly th a t we u n d erstood the G erm an G o v [e rn m e n ]t w ould
dislike any proposals and th erefore th a t we should m ake none. T he G erm ans w ould have
resented this still m ore.
E. G.

D on e O c t [o b e r ] 28, 1913.(5)

O [T his letter is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e M inister.
The en d orsem en t is in itia lled by S ir E d w a rd G rey.]
( 2) [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. X of 1913.]
( 3) [ v . T he Tim es, O ctob er 20, 1913, pp. 9 -1 0 .]
( 4) [T h e rem a in in g p a ra g ra p h s o f this letter q uote v ariou s statem ents from G erm an news­
p a pers on M r. C h u rch ill’ s speech on the B alkan situ ation and the q uestion o f the possible
cession o f Z a n zib a r and W alfisch B av to G erm a n y.]
0 ) [ v . in fra , p. 722, N o. 488.]
 7*21

N o. 48 7.
Mr. W inston Churchill to Sir Edward G rey.

Personal & Secret.(*)

My dear Grey. S heerness, October 24, 1913.
It w [o u ]ld be kind of you to give me some aid about the naval holiday, and you
w [o u ]ld be right I am sure to do so on general grounds.
The proposals have been criticised in Germ any as being unfavourable to German
naval p o w e r: and in Great Britain as being unfavourable to British naval power.
These m utually destructive views are set out in parallel columns with extreme
simpleness by the Times of M onday last.(21» The offer is in fact not only fair to
Germany but favourable to her. I f no holiday takes place she will be relative
weaker than if she agreed to one. This is true not only of her strength in regard to
Great Britain, but g* nerally as regards the world. On the other hand although by
a naval holiday we s h [o u ]ld lose or postpone the ‘ overhaul ’ w h [ich ] our forecasted
programm e w [o u ]ld give us. we should gain enormously <thorughJ not at G erm any’ s
expense1 from a general arrest in the building of great ships. The simultaneous
building by so m any powers great and small of capital ships, and their general naval
expansion, are causes of deep anxiety to us. Germ any m ay fall behind in the race
she has herself provoked, and we m ay yet be left to face a great preponderance of loose
Dreadnoughts, w h [ich ] at v [ e r ]y short notice, a diplomatic grouping or regrouping
may range against us.
Naval strength to other powers is a mere panache. But as the frogs said to the
boy in the fable “ It is sport to you : it is deatb to us.” It is not possible to dwell
on this in p u b lic; but surely reflecting m en should see the profound advantage to us
of procuring a cessation.
It is I am certain not so far off as it seems. The nervousness w h [ich ] exists
about sucb proposals is a sym ptom of tbe unreality of tbe need for continuous
building by all otber powers. The burden is becom ing very heavy to all except us.
Italy and Austria are extrem ely ill circumstanced for new programmes. The Triple
Alliance is being outbuilt by the Triple Entente. But that is no consolation or only
I a half consolation to us, who see in the revival of the Bussian fleet a counterpoise to
Germany, w h [ich ] might suddenly becom e a makeweight. It is a profound British
interest to procure a halt, and worth running serious risks for.
And we ought never to allow the discussion of this vitalquestion to be stifled
' just because it is unwelcome to tbe ruling classes in Germany, or still less because
France for obvious reasons wants tbe naval strain to continue. It is worth a good
push. I w [o u ]ld not hesitate for the sake o f a world-wide cessation for one year of
Dreadnought building to ask Canada to postpone ber 3 ships as well as our own four.
But this could not be breathed to any one.
I am v [ e r ] y conscious o f tbe fallibility of m y judgm ent and of tbe reactions
w b [ic b ] events produce on m y opinions. But I do think this is right. I am sure
of it. t
I f it fails we must try to invent a new type of ship. But what? N othing as
yet is to hand.
Yours always,
W . S. C [H 'U R C H IL L !.

(i) [G re v M SS ., V ol. 4S.]

C ) [c . The T im es, O ctober 20, 1913, pp . 9 -1 0 .]

[10900]
 722

N o. 488.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir E . G oschen.(l)

P rivate. ( 2)
My dear Goschen, London, October 28. 1918.
I have seen your letter to N icolson(3) about Churchill’ s speech, referring to a
“ naval holiday.” (4)
It was absolutely necessary that some reference should he made to it in public.
All that the public knew about it hitherto was that Churchill made the proposal some
months ago, and that the German Chancellor thereupon said in public that he would
await proposals from us. W e were bound to discuss this question with our own
people, and the alternative was either to speak as Churchill did, or else to say
publicly and definitely that we had been given to understand that the German
Governm ent did not wish to hear any more of the matter, and that in deference to
their objection we had dropped it. This would, however, have been a breach of
confidence on our part, for all the com m unications made to us have been of the most
private character, and the most important have com e direct from the Emperor. It
would also have had the appearance of fixing upon the German Government in the
most abrupt and invidious way the responsibility for not proceeding further.
W hat Churchill has done is to elicit German opinion in the Press in a way that
does not fix responsibility on the German Governm ent. l i e has also pointed out that
reduction of naval expenditure, or a “ naval holiday,” is no longer a matter for
which England and Germany alone can be responsible, but that it is a great European
question that can only be dealt with by England and Germany in concert with their
respective friends and allies.
The German Government had put us in a very difficult position by saying
publicly that they would await proposals, and then saying privately that they would
resent any that were made. They must realise that we have to be frank in a matter
of this importance with our own people, and I think that Churchill handled a very
difficult situation in the only way in which it could be done with fairness to the
British Governm ent and the British People and himself, while yet showing regard for
German feeling, and avoiding any attempt to fix directly on the German Government
in public the responsibility for not carrying the matter further.
(5) . * . - . .
As to the policy of concentrating our ships in the North Sea : All the best naval
opinion here is unanimous in regarding the steps taken as necessary. W e must have
sufficient force in home waters to protect ourselves against any attack that might be
made upon us suddenly. The more the Germans build, the more we shall have to
concentrate, unless of course we increase our Fleet to such a size that we can have
not only sufficient force in home waters but also a great m any ships abroad. In such
a case there would not be the same proportion of concentration, but it would be
because our Fleet was much larger and our expenditure greater.
Yours sincerely.
E . GR E Y.

0) [T h is letter is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

M r. C h u r ch ill; to S ir A . N icolson .]
( 2) [G re y M SS., V ol. 23.]
(3) [v . supra, p. 720, N o. 486.]
F ) [i\ The Tim es, O ctob er 20, 1913, p p . 9 -1 0 .]
( 5) [T h u s in o rig in a l.]
 7 ‘2 3
N o. 4 8 9 .

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y d 1)

Private.( 2)
My dear Grey, Berlin, X ovem ber 8, 1913.
Very m any thanks for your enlightening letter(3) about the First L ord ’ s speech
which will be of great assistance to me should I ever be attacked by the Chancellor
about it. I doubt, however, whether he will say anything about it though, from what
I hear, he has spoken very sharply on the subject to others. They cannot get it out
of their heads— and the idea is diligently fostered by the Pan-German Press— that
in proposing the Naval H oliday the First Lord has something up his sleeve,
something that would be advantageous for the British, and detrimental to the German
Navy.............. (4>
Yours verv sincerelv.
\Y. E . GOSCH EN.

t1) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a v in g heen sent t o th e K in g ; t o the P rim e M in is t e r ; to

M r. C h u r ch ill; to S ir A . N ic o ls o n ; to S ir E. C row e.]
(2) [G re y M S S ., Vol. 23.]
(3) [r . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
(4) [T h e re m a in in g pa ra g ra p h s o f this le tte r sum m arise b riefly an a rticle hy C a p ta in P ersius
ir. the T a g eb la tt o f N ov em b er S, 1913, in w hich he discusses the naval q u estion .]

No. 490.

Lord Granville to Sir A. X icolson d 1)

Private.(2)
Dear Sir A rth u r;— Paris, D ecem ber 4, 1918.
I have been in Paris so few days that I cannot possibly venture on any opinions
regarding the fall of the Ministry, and still less on any attempts at prophecy. I may
say, though, that the general idea, dans le m onde at least, seems to be that
the President will not ask Caillaux to form a Ministry, but someone who can form a
“ MiHiStere de d eten te." o f much the same com plexion as the last, and in that case
we may hope that Tichon can stay on. It seems to be generally realized how
necessary he is at the Foreign Office in the middle of these negotiations with
Germ any &c.
In the course of a conversation I had with Paleologue yesterday on the subject
of the German Military Mission to Turkey, he told me that he had been very hopeful
of some acceptable solution being found as a result of the friendly spirit shown both
by the Em peror and by Zim m erm ann to K okovtzoff, but that he was a little less
hopeful now as the Germans seemed to be in a very uncom promising humour. H e
referred to the Saverne incidents/3) and said that he had heard of some very
disquieting remarks that had heen made at Berlin, and then, after a little hesitation,
told me, in the strictest confidence, that the K ing of the Belgians had inform ed them
that the Em peror had declared to His M ajesty that war between France and Germ any
was inevitable, and that General von Moltke, the Chief of the Staff, had used the
same expression to His M ajesty and had added that it was even desirable, and that

(*) [T h is le tte r is end orsed as h a v in g heen sen t to th e K in g and to th e P rim e M in ister.

T he end orsem ent is in itia lled hy S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
(2) [C a r n o ck M S S ., V ol. X o f 1913.]
(3) [T h e first re p o rt o f th e Zah ern in cid en t was g iv en in S ir F. B e r tie ’ s d espa tch (N o. 554),
1). N ov em b er 11. 1913, R . N ov em b er 12, 1913. (F .O . 5 13 4 5 /5 1 3 4 5 /1 3 18.) This and the
succeed ing despatches are n ot rep rod u ced as th e in fo rm a tio n con ta in ed in them was taken
from the F ren ch press, and a fu ll a ccou n t is g iv en in The Tim es, N ov em b er and D ecem b er 1913.]
[10900] 3 A 2
 724

“ dans un bref délai.” I asked whether there was anything going on between
Germany and Belgium in the way of negotiations which could explain these remarks
as having been intended to put pressure on Belgium , but Paléologue said he knew of
nothing of the sort and he added that K ing Albert was such a serious wrell-balanced
man that his account of what had passed could not be taken lightly.
I think it was M. Jules Cambon to whom the King reported these remarks, and,
if so, you will probably have learnt them from Sir Edward Goschen, but it is safer to
repeat the inform ation in case Sir Edward has not heard it.
Yours very sincerely,
G R A N V IL L E .

No. 491.

Sir E . G oschen to Sir A. N icolson.(*)

Private. (2)
My dear Nicolson, Berlin, D ecem ber 4, 1913.
The Zabern incidents have reached a thrilling stage and a great struggle is
taking place between the Civilian and Military world. A resolution, which wras
practically a vote of censure, has been passed this afternoon in the Reichstag against
the manner in which the matter has been handled by the Chancellor and as the
latter in this case is sim ply covering the Emperor and has simply taken the military
point of view, the resolution may be said to be against the Military advisers of the
E m p eror.(3) W hat will come of it, I d on ’ t k n ow : o f course in countries with a
parliamentary regime it would mean that the Governm ent would have to resign en
b lo c; but here it is different and as the Chancellor will be supported by the Emperor
there will be no reason for him to go— unless he wants to and wishes to seize the
opportunity of retiring from a post which, as far as Germany is concerned, has as
yet brought him but little satisfaction— beyond the title of M ajor-General and a
high order or two. The French have been very prudent and sensible in this matter
chiefly, I think, owing to Cambon. W hen I last wrote to you Cambon had seen
and talked to Zim m erm ann who had begged and prayed him not to make any official
dem ands. Afterwards he tried to have some conversation on the subject with Jagow
(on the latter’ s return), who cut the conversation short by saying ‘ ‘ Ne me parlez
pas, je vous prie, de cette affaire— parce que j ’ en ignore tous les details.” Subse­
quently Jagow asked Cambon to com e and see him and, after thanking him for
his friendly and discreet attitude in the matter, practically told him what the
Chancellor was going to say. They had a little discussion as to Lieutenant von
Forstner’ s alleged insulting words with regard to the French Flag— and Jagow said
that that point had been inquired into— and that it had been proved that Lieutenant
von Forstner had not spoken against the French Arm y but only against the Foreign
Legion. On which Cambon pointed out to him that the Foreign Legion was
com m anded by French officers, that a large proportion of the men were French
and that as a matter of fact it was an integral part of the French Arm y. He
therefore hoped that the Chancellor would find it possible to say a few nice words
about the French Arm y so as to remove the painful impression that Lieutenant

C ) [T h is letter is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g and to th e P rim e M inister.

T he en dorsem ent is in itia lled by S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
( 2) [C arn ock M SS ., V ol. X o f 1913.]
(3) [S ir E. G osch en’ s despa tch (N o. 438), D . D ecem b er 5, R . D ecem b er 8, 1913, is not
rep rod u ced . In it he rep orted in deta il the proceed in g s in th e R eich sta g in con n ection with
the Z a b ern in cid en t. The C h a ncellor sta ted th a t he had ta k en no stron g m easures b u t th a t a
gen era l officer had been sent to Z a b ern t o do w hat was necessary as fa r as the A rm y was
con cern ed (F .O . 5 5 1 3 6 /5 1 3 4 5 /1 3 /1 8 .)]
 725
von Forstner’ s outburst had made in French military circles. You will have seen
that the Chancellor did say something in the sense desired by Cambon— but, as the
latter said to me, his words were not particularly warm or very convincing.
W here Cambon in m y opinion has done so well is that he saw at once from what
Zim mermann originally said to him that there was going to be a great struggle
between the Civilians and the M ilitary advisers of the Emperor— and that if either
the F rench Governm ent or the French Press got excited and made a row it would
unite the whole of German public opinion against France. His language therefore
to Pichon was “ For goodness sake keep the Press quiet (which Pichor: has done)
and d on’ t instruct me to make official representations or demand punishm ent.”
W hat Cambon has said to Jagow in friendly conversation is that it was almost
incomprehensible rhat Lieutenant von Forstner had not at once been transferred
to some other town— instead of his being allowed to continue to walk about Zabern
— cutting down lame shoemakers and almost inviting riot. To which Jagow seems
to have replied that such a procedure would have had a bad effect on the arm y! ”
The Chancellor is in a difficult position— all the more that he probably shares
the opinion of Zim m erm ann, who as I told you said to C am bon: “ I agree with all
you are probably going to say but please d on ’ t say it officially.” But he has either
to defend the Em peror or to resign and I doubt if that would be pleasing to His
Majesty who likes him and trusts him. Today, December 4, it is said that he is going
down to Donaueschingen to see the E m p e r o r: and I shall be very curious, if he goes,
to hear the result of the visit.
The ‘ Tageblatt ’ o f this evening draws a trenchant parallel between the
E m peror’ s stay at Donaueschingen in Novem ber 1908 (the time of the Daily
Telegraph revelations (4) when Biilow went there and extracted certain promises from
the Em peror— and the present stay— when the Minister of W ar and the General
Commanding at Strassburg go and receive their orders from His Majesty and
Bethmann H ollw eg does not go but only repeats in the Beichstag what he is told
by the Minister o f W ar. And the paper makes some unpleasant remarks as to the
bad advisers His Majesty always has around him at Donaueschingen. I daresay
that before I finish this letter I shall have more to tell you about the situation
caused by this Zabern affair.
Cambon showed me this afternoon a telegram sent by Sir E . Grey to Mallet
about the German Military M ission.(s) It puts things very straightly indeed. I
should think that when the Em peror comes to hear of it, it will make him sim ply
rabid! and I am wondering whether it will act as a red herring dragged across the
line of the Zabern affair.
D ecember 5. The Chancellor did go off to the Em peror last night and had to
take with him the report that the vote of censure had been passed by 296 votes
against 5 4! The speech he made yesterday was on a higher level than his first
speech— in a sense that it was more eloquent and temperamental, but the huge
m ajority against him shows that its effect on the Beichstag was but small.
Constitutionally speaking this vote of censure changes nothing. As the ‘ Post ’
says today “ Theoretically a Chancellor can have a vote of censure passed on his
policy every day— and can nevertheless remain tranquilly at his p ost.”
In speaking of the feeling in Alsace the ‘ Post ’ says that the vote in the
B eichstag can d o nothing but good as it shows that the representatives of the
German people take the part of the civil population of Alsace against the m ilitary!
In this opinion the ‘ Post ’ differs widely from the Alsatian deputies in the Beichstag
— and incidentally from Cambon who considers that this incident will have retarded
the Germanisation of Alsace for about twenty years.
M y own opinion is that a very small question has becom e a big one owing to
faulty m anagem ent. In the first place had the young subaltern, who caused all

(«) [v G ooch d T em p erley. V ol. V I . pp. 201-226, C h a pter X L I I I . section I I I . ]

( 3) [c p . ibid., V ol. X (I ), p. 347, X o . 387.]
 726

the trouble, been at once given a long leave or been transferred to another town—
very little more would have been heard of the affair. Then if the Chancellor had
made his second speech first, and if the Minister of W ar had not spoken immediately
after him— thus giving the appearance o f their both speaking in accordance with
instructions from Military Headquarters : and if above all the Chancellor had been
able to read out the orders which I hear that the Em peror, immediately on hearing
of the incident, had sent to the Military Authorities— to the effect that the erring
lieutenant should be severely reprimanded and that the corps o f officers should be
told to be more careful in their dealings with the civilian population— I think the vote
of censure would have fallen very flat.
The general opinion amongst such members o f the Reichstag as I have seen is
that the matter is now settled and that the vote of censure will have no effect upon
the Chancellor’ s position.
Most people here speak highly o f the calm and dignified attitude of the French
throughout the affair.
_ There is a notice in this evening’ s paper to the effect that General von Sanders
will be received by the Em peror on M onday next— and will be in Constantinople by
the end of the week— taking up his military duties on the 20th instant.(6)
December 6. I have recorded in a despatch the decision o f the Em peror in the
Zabern affair after receiving the Chancellor’ s report. M y despatch also records an
interesting com m unication made by the Head of the Im perial Chancellor’ s Office—
to the effect that the Chancellor was indisposed when he made his speeches and by
a lapse o f m emory om itted to mention the communications he had received from
the E m peror as regards the steps taken by His Majesty to calm the excitement in
Zabern.
I f this is true it is a pity— and I think it is true because a Member o f the
Bundesrath hinted to me that there had been certain inexplicable omissions in the
Chancellor’s speech.
This Zabern affair has put everything else in the background— so I have had
little else to write about.
L ichnow skv (with whom I passed two very pleasant days and had excellent
sport) tells me that he expects to be in London about the 14th instant.
Thanking you very much for your last interesting letter,(7) I remain,
Yours verv sincerelv,
' W . E . GOSCHEN.

( 6) [ c p . G ooch d T em p erley, Y o l. X (I), p. 343, N o. 3 8 9 ; p. 349, N o. 391, en c l.: p. 369

E d. N o t e .]
C ) [S ir A. N ico lso n ’ s letter o f D ecem b er 2, 1913, is not rep rod u ced . I t refers m ainly to
the a p p oin tm en t o f G eneral L im a n von Sanders and to B alk an questions, b u t adds nothing
o f im p orta n ce to in form a tion giv en elsew here. (C arn ock M SS ., V ol. X of 1913.)] ~

No. 492.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir E . Goschen.

P rivate.(*)
My dear Goschen, Foreign Office, D ecem ber 8, 1913.
I am very sorry that to-day I have so very little time to write you, but I must
send you a line to thank you for. the letter which I received by the last Messenger. (2)
Your Zabern incident has certainly created a very great stir and I daresay it
will have stillfurther consequences. I must say that it wasrather hard on the

0 ) [C a rn ock M S S ., V ol. X o f 1913.]

(2) [v. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g d ocu m en t.]
 Em peror that the Chancellor forgot to m ention the steps which His Majesty had taken
even before the debate had taken place in the Reichstag. I imagine that the incident
is really part of a wider question and is important as it raises the whole question o f
the relations between the civil and m ilitarv populations. Moreover the Em peror
him self is inevitably dragged into the matter and I can understand how annoved
he must feel at being prevented from upholding at all costs, as I have no doubt"'he
[ would like to, the prestige and position o f his arm y. It is perhaps fortunate in
some ways that at this m oment the I reneh are involved themselves in a serious
Ministerial crisis and have not much time to give to outside matters. Granville
wrote to me the other day and said that he had been verv eonfidentiallv inform ed
that the German E m peror had inform ed the King o f the Belgians that war between
France and Germ any was inevitable and would take place before very lo n g .'3) I
do not m yself believe that the E m peror would make so positive a statem ent.0 M ore­
over I should think that the present time is most inopportune for trying to create
a serious incident with France which might lead to hostilities. Furtherm ore I am
quite sure that you will agree with me that the E m peror is reallv most paeifieallv
inclined and would be very unwilling to find him self com pelled to initiate what would
certainly be a general European war. I think all this talk should be left on one
side as purposeless.
I hope that Petersburg and Berlin will be able to arrange in a friendlv manner
between themselves this question o f the German military mission. N o' doubt it
would be a matter o f extreme inconvenience to all other* Powers for the German
General being placed in executive command at Constantinople, though I think that
the danger is really more apparent than real. The bother is that in all these
questions we have to deal with Sazonoff, who one day grows exceedingly hot and
the next day very frigid. One never really knows from day to day what* course he
intends to pursue, and we have to be very careful not to be led astrav bv his passim*
moods. I am quite sure that the Russian Em peror would not push matters to
I extremes and would content him self with any compromise which could be offered bv
B erlin f 4) * *
[Yours, Ac.
A. N IC O LSO X.]

(3) [r . supra, pp. 723-4, X o . 490.]

0 ) [T h e rem a in in g p a ra g ra p h s o f this le tte r refer to th e delay caused in th e F ra n co ­
G erm an n e g otia tion s by th e Z a b ern in cid en t, and to m a tters o f a p ersonal n a tu re.]

No. 493.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 371 1654.
56361 56361/13 IS.
\ ^ ° - 456.) Berlin, D. D ecem ber 13, 1913.
! ^ r’ R. D ecem ber 15, 1913.
I have the honour to forward herewith a report as marked in the m arginf1) which
I have received from Colonel Russell, Military Attaché lo this Embassy, relating to an
\ article by General von Bernhardi on G erm any’ s financial and econom ic preparedness
; for war.
1 have, Ac.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

0 ) [M a r g in a l n o t e : “ M .A . 44.” ]
 728
E n c lo s u re in N o. 493.

Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to Sir E . G oschen.(2)

(No. 44.)
Sir, Berlin, D ecem ber 11, 1913.
I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of an article by the wrell-
known military writer, General of Cavalry F . von Bernhardi, on G erm any’ s financial
and econom ic preparedness for war.(3) This essay appeared in the N ovember number
of “ Der G reif,” a new m onthly periodical which made its first appearance in
October last.
Bernhardi is convinced that the German Empire is fully equal to meeting the
financial strain even of a prolonged war ; the recent additions to the w ar treasure
will, m oreover, in the author’ s opinion, greatly facilitate the work o f overcom ing the
first financial difficulties during mobilisation.
The writer of the article under review' considers the problem of food supply
during war time as a difficult but not an insoluble one, and suggests measures for
im proving existing conditions. H e believes that the industrial state of Germany
during a war would present less favourable features than the question of the people s
food supply. For this state of affairs the general also suggests remedial and
precautionary measures. _
There are three conditions on the importance of which the general lays special
stress :—
1. That the trade routes to the Balkan States and Turkey should be kept open.
2. That the German navy should be supreme in the Baltic.
3. That a wise diplom acy should exclude the possibility o f a war being forced on
Germany. German statesmen must, on the other hand, ^foresee an
inevitable war, prepare for it systematically, and seize the initiative at the
most favourable moment.
Such policy as this certainly does not present any new features to Bism arck’ s
fellow-countrym en.
The English of the attached translation is a little rough in places, but the
m eaning is, I think, quite clear throughout.
I have, &c.
A L IC E B U S S E L L .
Military Attaché.

(2) [T h e t e x t o f L ieu ten a n t-C olon el R u s sell’ s despatch is ta ken from th e C onfidential P rin t,
as th e orig in a l d ocu m en t was sent to th e W a r Office. P rin te d cop ies w ere sent to the B oard
o f T r a d e ; to th e C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D e fe n c e ; to th e A d m ira lty .]
(3) [N o t re p rod u ced .]

No. 494.

Sir M. de B unsen to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private. C)
M y dear Nicolson, Vienna, D ecem ber 19, 1913.
. . . .(2) T sch irs[ch ]k y has talked to me two or three times about German
politics. H e says the parties which voted against the Chancellor in the Zabern
affair have all got bad headaches after their orgy (haben alle schon Katzenjammer)
and will not play the fool again in a hurry. Germany is com pelled to back up her

0 ) [C a rn ock M SS ., V ol. X o f 1913.] .

( 2) [T h e op en in g pa ra g ra p h s o f th is letter refer to the A lba n ian q uestion. T hey add n othing
o f im p orta n ce to in form a tion g iv en elsew here.]
 729
army through thick and thin. Its task is to keep the principle of authority above
water. A “ w a v e ” of dem ocratic and even anarchic sentiment is for ever pressing
on Germany from East and W est, and even from the interior. This Germany will
resist at all costs. It is not the action of any particular French or Russian statesman
or statesmen— but a “ w ave,” requiring high dykes to keep it out. Austria he
thinks is in a very bad way, from the pressure of the said “ wave ” internally. H e
thinks the same of Russia and France— and safety, apparently, is only to be found
in the constant efforts of Germ any to present an irresistible armed front to the
promoters o f disorder. These ironclad sentiments I hope are not held by all in
authority in Germany. To me T scliirs[ch jk y is very polite— and even friendly— and
he says Sir Edward G rey’ s recent proposals(3) are sure to be met in Berlin in the most
friendly spirit, and supported as far as possible, though he regards the prospect of
early agreement as slight.
Shebeko, the new Russian Ambassador, called today. H e said he was glad to
begin his activity here by form ally supporting Sir E. G rey’ s proposals. Neither he
nor the French A m b [a ssa d o]r have elicited anything to show how C [o u n ]t Berchtold
will reply.
I must stop to catch the Messenger.
Y [o u ]r s ever,
M A U RIC E DE BUN SEN .

( 3) [v . G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 7 6-7, N o. 91.]

No. 495.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward G reyd 1)

F.O. 1 95 5 /8 4 /1 4 /1 8 .
(No. 6.) Munich, D. January 13, 1914.
Sir, R. January 15, 1914.
The Chancellor of the E xchequer’ s energetically phrased denunciation of the
“ organized insanity ” of m odem armaments has excited intense interest in Germany.
E very paper has reported his words and also the com m ents of the British press
thereon. ( 2)
But it is one of the advantages of the Press Bureau that, except in the case of the
Social Dem ocratic journals, it can dictate what events shall be com m ented on and
what shall not. In the present case those who direct it have apparently decreed that
com m ent would be out of place, and their astuteness has been amply rewarded by
the press controversy in England, which has been fully reported here.
Nothing could make pleasanter reading for the average German than the
inform ation, from English sources, that the British Cabinet is hopelessly divided on
the question o f the next Navy Estimates. In the present instance this satisfaction
has not been denied him.
The Prim e Ministers, both of Bavaria and W ürttemberg, have spoken to me on
the subject, and both asked if Mr. Lloyd G eorge’ s words implied a split in the
Cabinet. I replied in both instances to the effect that England was the country of
free discussions, that the Cabinet was a large one and that without doubt differences
of view must occasionally arise between Ministers charged with different functions,
but we had the Prim e M inister’ s assurance that the present Cabinet was absolutely
united and, as far as I could see, Mr. L loyd George had done nothing more than

C ) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ;

to L o rd C r e w e ; to L o rd M orley . A co p y w as sent to th e A d m ira lty .]
(2) [v. The T im es, J a n u a ry 2, 1914, p. 6, w h ere M r. L loy d G eorg e’ s sta tem ent was re p ro ­
du ced. I t was orig in a lly pu blished in the D a ily C h ron icle.]
 73U
voice the opinion not only of the Government but of the vast m ajority of Englishmen
when he condem ned the present insensate expenditure. W e had, I reminded their
Excellencies, for the last ten years been in favour o f calling a halt in naval expendi­
ture and Mr. Churchill had even made concrete proposals in that sense. The
Chancellor had said nothing new.
It is perhaps a pity that Mr. L loyd George should have drawn a distinction
between foreign naval and m ilitary armaments with its suggested indifference to
the interests of France, and it is certainly to be deplored that other public speakers
should have dwelt on the 10 to 10 standard, which was never, as far as I recollect,
form ally laid down by the First Lord as a perm anently desirable one. Comparisons
are always invidious and frequently, as in the present case, offensive. The arrogant
talk, in which we used to indulge, of so many keels to one was not only absurd in
itself, but by goading German pride was, I am confident, one of the most potent
causes of the success of the German Navy League.
At a time when the statesmen of England and Germany h a ^ done so much to
bring about a more friendly feeling between the two countries, when not only the
German taxpayer but the various Federal Governments are beginning to feel the
pinch of increased taxation, when moreover the Zabern incident has brought
the military and civil, or in other words the aristocratic and democratic elements in
the Em pire, into sharp conflict, at a m oment, therefore, which is the most favourable
that has ever occurred for the development o f an internal movement for the restric­
tion of unremunerative expenditure, it would be deeply to be regretted if the speeches
of politicians or newspaper controversies in Great Britain should lead the Germans
to believe that the British Government were wavering in their determination to
maintain at all costs armaments adequate to guarantee the safety of our possessions
and our trade.
As I have already had the honour to report, no specifically hostile feeling to
Great Britain exists, or has ever existed, in South Germany, and, since the
“ W ehrbeitrag ” has begun to be exacted, the conviction has been brought home both
to the well-to-do classes, who are our trade rivals, and to the Finance Ministers of the
various States that some limit must be put to naval and military expenditure. This
view is not shared by naval and military men and their influence would again make
itself felt the moment there was reason to believe that the British Government were
unable to exact any more sacrifices from the British People.
The London and provincial papers that proclaim that the supporters of the
Government will stand no more taxation for armaments are so far from contributing
to strengthen our present improved relations with Germany, that they only serve to
encourage the class in this country, which I believe to be dim inishing but which is
unhappily still far from uninfluential, that sees in the British Em pire an opponent
to German development with whom an armed struggle is sooner or later inevitable.
I have, &c.
V INCENT COBBETT.

M IN U T E .

S ir V . C orbett m ade ju d icio u s answ er to th e 2 prim e m inisters, and I th in k his language

should he a p p rov ed .
I am a fra id his estim ate o f the effect prod u ced , and to he ex p ected , on G erm an public
op in io n by the m ovem ent in E n g la n d fo r red u ction o f B ritish arm am en ts at any price, is
in everv w av correct.
E. A. C.
J a n [ u a r v ] 16.
A. X . *
E. G.
 73 J

N o. 49 6.

M r. Hoxcard to Sir Edicard G rey.(')

F.O. o S 5 3 '5 8 .v 2 1 4 '4 2 .
(No. 9.) Very Confidential. Stockholm, D. January 27, 1914.
Sir, R. February 9 ’ 1914.
Continuing the conversation recorded in ray preceding despatch,(2i Count
Ehrensward went on to speak of the question of National Defence.............. (3)
H e then earnestly begged me not to believe that these increased armaments in
Sweden were made with any intention of embarking in a policy o f adventure. It was
true that they had their Hedins and Fahlbecks. who advocated an alliance with
Germany and these m en’ s speeches had been m uch read and com m ented on abroad.
Speaking for him self and his (.ovem m ent he could say that nothing was further
from their intentions than to abandon their policy of neutrality in which the safety
of Sweden lay. To ally herself with any Great Power would be for a small State
like Sweden equivalent to becom ing the vassal of that Power, and for his own
part he honoured his country too highly to wish to see it occupy a position like
W urtemberg.
In this he thought he could speak for the Opposition also who could not be
considered to be represented by the Sven H edins and Fahlbecks. No responsible
leader o f the Opposition had ever yet hinted, however much he might attack the
Governm ent, that he was in favour of abandoning the policy of neutrality and Count
Ehrensward’ s opinion was that no man responsible for the Government of the countrv
would ever abandon that policy. As long as the country remained neutral and had
the force necessary to make its neutrality respected by others there was nothing to
fear. But if Sweden joined one of the two groups of Powers, and if her side lost in
a war. it would mean annihilation for her. Germany, if defeated, would not, could
not, lose so very m uch, but if Sweden shared that defeat there was no knowing what
sacrifices might not be imposed on her.
I said that it seemed to me indeed obvious that strict neutrality was not only
the safest policy for a country placed as Sweden was, but that it was also a great
blessing for any country since it relieved it of m any inconvenient responsibilities.
I could well understand and sympathize with the desire of Swedes not to be
altogether dependent on Treaties and paper guarantees for the maintenance of their
neutrality and for security from attack. W hile I quite believed that no responsible
leader in Sweden would willingly abandon a policy of neutrality, I should be glad,
I said, to know what His E xcellency thought was the feeling o f the m ajority of the
electors in regard to this question. Count Ehrensward replied that in his opinion
the large m ajority of the people were absolutely opposed to any alliance. The Swedish
peasants had no wish to be dragged into a quarrel with France because Germ any and
France fought over Alsace-Lorraine. H e believed that the feeling in the country
was quite sound on this question. H is E xcellency spoke all the time with great
earnestness, and when declaring that he never desired to see Sweden allied to
Germany because that would place Sweden in a subordinate and vassal position, he
spoke with considerable heat. Although he said that he personally had the greatest
sympathy with and admiration for Germ any and the Germans, I do not see any
reason to doubt his sincerity when he declares him self to be strongly opposed to
any alliance with that country.
I have, Ac.
E SM E H O W A R D .

(*) [T h is despa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g and t o the P rim e M in ister.
C opies w ere sent to th e W a r Office an d to St. P etersb u rg h .]
(2) [M r. H o w a rd ’ s despatch (X o . 8), D. J a n u a ry 27. R . F eb ru a ry 9, 1914, is not rep rod u ced ,
as it dea lt m a in ly w ith R usso-Sw edish relations. (F .O . 5S52 5 8 5 2 /1 4 /4 2 .)]
(*) [T h e o m itte d pa ra g ra p h s deal w ith the q u estion o f naval an d m ilita ry stren g th .]
 732

N o. 497.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.C )

F .O . 4 6 0 7 /4 6 0 7 /1 4 /1 8 .
(No. 45.) Confidential. B erlin, D. January 31, 1914.
Sir, R . February 2, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from
Captain Henderson, naval attache to His M ajesty’ s E m bassy, giving an account of
an interview with H [is ] R [o y a l] II[ig h n ess] Prince H enry of Prussia.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCITEN.
Enclosure in No. 497.

Captain H enderson to Sir E . G osch en .( 2)

(No. 5.) Confidential.
Sir, B erlin, January 27, 1914.
I have the honour to report that I had m y first interview to-day with His Royal
Highness Prince H einrich o f Prussia.
His Royal Highness received me most graciously and kindly, and after referring
to the good impression made b y m y predecessor, Captain W atson, proceeded to
outline for me his views on Anglo-Germ an relations.
His R oyal Highness said that he was glad to feel that relations between the
two countries had improved remarkably of late. Speaking as a German naval officer,
His R oyal Highness was convinced that between naval officers of both nations no
misunderstandings e x is t: the cordiality which was always evident in the relations
between British and German naval officers, whenever they were thrown together,
was in marked distinction to the form ality o f the relations between British or German
naval officers and naval officers belonging to other large European maritime Powers.
• • • ■(’ ) . . *
His Royal Highness hoped that this good understanding which exists between
British and German naval officers will infect more and more the lay com m unity of
both nations, and lead eventually to a thorough and close co-operation between the
two countries.
The need for close co-operation exists at the present moment. His Royal
Highness had recently been in the Far East, and had seen with his own eyes and
heard with his own ears the working of Japanese diplomacy and intrigue. In spite
of the fact that Japan is at present an ally o f E ngland, this activity o f Japan would
eventually operate to the disadvantage o f England and her colonies, and also to the
disadvantage o f German colonies.
It is to the Far East that the eyes o f England and o f Germany should be turned.
As far as Germany is concerned, there is absolutely nothing at stake for England
in the North Sea. His R oyal Highness was most emphatic in declaring that all
rumours o f sinister intentions on the part o f Germany are absolute “ lie s.” His
R oyal H ighness even apologised for using the word “ lie ,” but did so because no
other was strong enough to express his meaning.
German naval policy is clear, above-board, and straightforward. It is framed
against no Power in particular, nor, in fact, can it be, for it is forecast for years
ahead. A full statement o f it can be bought anywhere for 6d., and there are no
mental reservations.
His Royal Highness deplored the tendency that exists always to compare the
British and German fleets to the exclusion o f all others when maritime affairs are
( x) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a bin et.]
(2) [T h e te x t g iv en above is ta ken fr o m the C onfid en tial P r in t, as the o rig in a l docum ent
was sen t to the A d m ira lty .]
(3> [A few w ords o f a personal ch a ra cter are om itted h ere.]
 733
being discussed. This tendency on the British side kept up a constant feeling of
irritation in Germ any, which, in view of the fact that German naval policy is fixed
for years in advance and is public property, is unnecessary, and acts as a constant
deterrent to the full establishment o f the closest friendship between the two great
sister nations o f Northern Europe.
His B oyal H ighness was of the opinion that, if the constant mention o f Germ any
in connection with British naval affairs could be stopped, and if all attempts to
induce Germ any to alter her Fleet Law were relinquished, then England m ight build
as m any ships as she cares to afford, without affecting Anglo-Germ an good relations
in the least degree.
It will be within your E xcellency's recollection that His Im perial M ajesty the
German Em peror expressed similar views to m y predecessor, and my predecessor
urged your E xcellency to recomm end that no further m ention o f a shipbuilding
holiday should be made publicly in England. (4}
The German press frequently voices like opinions, and conversations which I have
had with various persons here all point in the same direction.
I am therefore drawn to the same opinion as m y predecessor, viz ., that German
resentment against British naval policy appears to be born only o f constant
comparison between the respective fleets, and the consequent implication that, for
E ngland, Germ any is the enem y.
I f, in pursuance of British naval policy, it were possible to adopt our programm e,
whatever its m agnitude, without pointing the finger publicly and officially at any
particular neighbour, then 1 believe that, beyond occasional excursions in the press
by some of the irrepressible naval expansionists on both sides o f the North Sea, the
bitterness which has been engendered in the past by Anglo-Germ an naval comparisons
and discussions will disappear.
There seems to be 110 disposition in Germany to deny or grudge E ngland a fleet
of unconquerable superiority; all that Germ any appears to want is to be left alone
to complete the programme which she has established b y law without being
constantly held up as the potential apple of discord.
A quiet and dignified determination to maintain that naval superiority which
we have decided upon as necessary for our national existence, exemplified by making
the requisite annual additions to our fleet without attempting to give incom plete
public arguments for doing so, and by endeavouring to persuade the British press
to abstain from discussing possible or probable naval futurities on inadequate data,
would, I believe, have a very steadying effect on German opinion, and would conduce
to fuller development of the recently apparent amelioration in the good feeling between
both countries.
This need not, o f course, preclude reasonable and warrantable interest on the
part o f the press in the naval affairs o f so large and important a maritime Power as
G erm any; but it would be more soothing to German feeling if our press were to
discuss these affairs less critically— that is to say, in an abstract rather than in a
personal m anner, in m uch the same way, for example, as the naval affairs o f the
United States are discussed.
At any rate, the experiment is suggested as worth trial; it woxxld meet the
prevalent desire on this side o f the North Sea, and for this reason affords grounds for
believing that it would produce satisfactory resixlts.
I f it fails to produce the anticipated results we can at least point to our effort
at reconciliation. I do not think, Ixowever, that it would fail here if the German
press were suitably inspired.f5)
I have. &c.
"W ILFRED H E N D E R SO N ,
Naval Attaché.
(4) [cp . sup ra , pp. 705-6, N o. 480.]
(5) ¡A tta c h e d as an a p p e n d ix to C a p ta in H e n d e rso n ’ s despatch is p a rt o f an a rticle hy
C ount R ev en tlow in the D eu ts ch e Z eitu n g o f J a n u a ry 22, 1914. I t is n o t re p ro d u ce d .]
 734
M IN U T E S .

P rin ce H en ry g ives us a re-hash o f w hat has been recited fo r our benefit “ ad nauseam ”
fo r years. W h en G erm a ny w ants to in crease her n a va l progra m m e (i.e. ev ery 2 -3 years) she
sta rts on the m ost scu rrilou s a n ti-B ritish ca m pa ig n . W h en , to defen d our consequen tly
in crea sin g n a va l estim ates, w e have t o ex p la in to the B ritish elector the cause and reason,
E n g la n d com m its an u n p ardon a ble sin in m en tion in g G erm any !
B u t h ow ever com p lete our ju stifica tion in p o in tin g to G erm any as th e “ fon s et orig o
m a li,” e x p erien ce su p p orts C a pta in H e n d e rso n ’ s a d v ice th a t we do b etter to a ct vig orou sly
and to say as little as possible. I have no dou bt th a t, a p a rt from the necessary con sid era tion
o f p a rlia m en ta ry ta ctics, the A d m ira lty w ill n ot dissent from th e soundness o f th e advice.
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r v ] 2.
A. N.

I ha d n ot seen this b efore I spoke on the su b ject y esterd a y ,(6) b u t I d o n ’ t th in k w hat

I said w ill fit ill w ith the line a d v oca ted here.
E. G.
4.2.14.

( 6) [O n F eb ru a ry 3, 1914, S ir E d w a rd G rey spoke t o the M a n ch ester C ham ber o f Com m erce

c n the sub ject o f arm am ents. D u rin g the cou rse o f his speech he said th a t little cou ld be done
to a rrest the ex p e n d itu re on arm am en ts in oth er cou n tries, and a dded : “ I t is fe lt by us that
w e m ust w ait t ill oth er g rea t cou n tries in E u rop e are pen etra ted w ith the sam e feelin g s that
w e ourselves have w ith reg a rd to the d es ira b ility o f a rrestin g the ex p e n d itu r e on a rm am en ts.”
r. The Tim es, F eb ru a ry 4, 1914, p. 10. M . P a u l Cam bon com m en ted on this speech in a
despa tch o f F eb ru a ry 5. cp. D .D F ., 3 me S er., V ol. I X , pp. 231-3, No. 224.]

iso. 498.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . Goschen.

P .O . 5472 547*2/14/18.
Tel. (N o. 42.) Urgent. Foreign Office, February 5, 1914, 7 -3 0 p . m .
Times report( l) represents Admiral Tirpitz as saying that idea of a holiday year
could not be realized, but that positive proposals had not yet reached Germany and
if they did would certainly be examined with good will.
The sole reason why positive proposals from us have not reached Germany is
that private intimations reaching us from high German sources gave us to under­
stand that such proposals would be unwelcome and would impair good relations
between Germ any and ourselves.
It was in consequence of these intimations that I spoke at Manchester as I did
on Tuesday(2) to deprecate our being pressed in this country to make proposals.
But now when Parliament meets we shall be reminded thatGerman Chancellor
after Mr. Churchill first mentioned Naval holiday said he would awaitproposals and
Admiral Tirpitz’ s fresh statement will be quoted.
This being so it is essential that we should know for use in Parliament exactly
what Admiral Tirpitz meant and also whether proposals for a Naval holiday would
be resented.
W e desire not to make any proposal that would be unwelcom e, but being quite
ready ourselves to make proposals, if they would be welcome, we must either make

(1) [u. The T im es, F ebru ary 5, 1914, p. 8 .]

(2) [v. ibid., F e b ru a ry 4, 1914, p. 10.]
 735
them or give some explanation in Parliament why after Admiral Tirpitz's statement
as reported we do not do so.
You should explain this situation to M [inister for] F [o re ig n ] A [ffa irs ]. Tt
would be very desirable for us to have an answer by Monday if possible.

No. 499.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.I1)

F.O. 5534 5472 14 18.

Tel. No. 17. Berlin. February 6, 1914.
Your telegram No. 42 of 5th F ebruary.(2)
I have explained to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs position as regards
naval holiday arising out of Admiral von Tirpitz’ s speech, which he quite understands.
At his request I gave him an aide-m em oire containing substance of your telegram ,(3)
so that he could discuss matters with Admiral von Tirpitz. He has prom ised to answer
as soon as possible.
Speaking for him self, he said that necessity of making statements on this subject
in both Parliaments made things very difficult. Admiral von Tirpitz had had to
m ention subject, and his observation to the effect that proposal, if officially made,
would be received with good-will was presum ably a parliamentary utterance to keep
a certain section of Commission quiet, and in no way implied that proposal would be
accepted. Opinion expressed in high quarters to which I had referred was perfectly
correct, and there was no doubt that idea o f naval holiday, while regarded by Imperial
Government as Utopian, would not be favourably received by a large and powerful
section of German public opinion. He personally thought that if questioned on the
subject you m ight point out that, though Admiral von Tirpitz had expressed readiness
of Im perial Governm ent to consider proposal with good-will, he had gone no farther
than that.
Speeches in Commission as reported in the press showed that idea o f naval
holiday met with strong opposition from all parties except the extreme wing of the
Liberals. He hoped, however, after consultation with Admiral von Tirpitz to be able
to furnish official answer to your message by the time m entioned in your telegram .(4

M IN U T E .

The answ er cou ld not have been m ore shiftv.

E. A . C.
F e b fr u a r v ] 7.
A. N.
E. G.

f 1) [T h e t e x t g iv en above is ta ken fr o m th e C on fid en tial P r in t, as th e orig in a l d ecy p h er

ca n n ot be tra ced . A co p y was sent to M r. C h u rch ill.]
( 2) [» . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g d ocu m en t.]
( 3) [r . G .P., X X X I X , pp. 7 4-6, and n o te .]
(4) [r . in fra , pp. 736-7, N o. 501.]
 730

N o. 500.
Sir E . Gosclien to Sir A . Nicolson.(l)
Private. (2)
M y dear Nicolson, Berlin, February 6, 1914.
The message which I com m unicated to H err von Jagow today(3) on the subject of
the ‘ Naval H oliday ’ is probably very embarrassing for the German Government.
They d on’ t like the idea and if they say officially “ make your proposal and we will
consider it ” they will have the odium of eventually refusing it and will have lost
their convenient answer to all inquiries, namely, that the proposal has never been
officially made to them. Admiral von Tirpitz must I think be sorry that he said “ Tf
it is officially made we will give it our sympathetic consideration,” as this remark
has very naturally caused His M ajesty’ s Government to say “ W ell, if you mean
this we will make the proposal officially,” and he obviously did not m ean his remark
to be taken seriously as the idea of the Naval H oliday is anathema to him and, as far
as one can judge, to most people in Germany except the Socialists. Jagow told me
that he would consult Tirpitz, and gave me to understand by an expressive gesture
that the latter would find a way to wriggle out of the dilemma some way or another.
As Jagow told me today they are against the Naval Holiday both on the general
principle that the idea is Utopian and unworkable, and because the conditions are so
different here from what they are in England. W ith us there are always orders from
foreign Governments to he carried out, and so m any vessels building for our
Mercantile Marine and so m any shipbuilding yards where men can find work, if not
in one, then in another : here the shipbuilding yards are few in number and the
interruption for a whole year of Naval construction would throw innumerable men on
the pavement, without their being able to find work elsewhere. I am very anxious to
see what their official answer to His M ajesty’ s Government will b e.............. (4)
Yours very sincerely,
W . E . GOSCHEN.

( x) [T h is letter is en d orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e M inister.
T he en d orsem en t is in itia lle d bv S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
( 2) [C arn ock M SS ., V ol. I o f 1914.]
(3) [t>. im m ed iately preced in g docu m en t and n o te (3).]
(4) [T h e o m itted p a ra g ra p h s o f this le tte r re fe r to B a lk an affairs. T h ey a dd n oth in g of
im p orta n ce to in fo rm a tio n g iv en elsew here.]

No. 501.

Sir E. Gosclien to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 6 3 1 0 /5 4 7 2 /1 4 /1 8 . Berlin, D. February 10, 1914, 11-32 p . m .

Tel. (No. 21.) R. February 11, 1914, 1 2-50 p . m .
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave me to-day a memorandum of
which the following is a summary :—
The Minister of Marine declared quite generally in the Budget Committee that
the German Government had received no official proposals for the limitation of
armaments, e.g. on the basis of 10 to 16.C)
H e added that he could not regard Mr. Churchill’ s remarks in M anchesteiS)
respecting naval holiday as an official (g r [o u ]p omitted : ? com m unication to) the

(1) [ Cp. T he Tim es, F eb ru a ry 9, 1914, w here th ere is an a rticle from the B erlin corres­
p on d en t e n titled “ S ix teen to T en .” A c o p y o f this a rticle is filed w ith th e above docum ent.
F .O . 6 3 1 0 /5 4 7 2 /1 4 /1 8 .]
( 2) [v. The Tim es, O ctob er 20, 1913, p p . 9-10. cp. supra, pp. 718-9, No. 485, and n o te ( 2).]
 737

German G ov [ern m en ]t : but that in any case the idea of such a holiday seemed to
him impossible to carry out under existing conditions in Germany. German
programme for next year provided only for construction of replacing ships; to delay
them one year would mean making them up next year and this irregular increase in
number of finished vessels would upset German finances and dislocate work in ship­
building yards and military arrangements. The entire suppression of replacing ships
for one year would bring total number of ships below that ordered by Laic therefore
impossible.
M inister’ s remarks show that Im perial G ov[ernm en t do not consider idea of
naval holiday possible in practice. If H [is ] M [a jesty ’ sn G o v e rn m e n t] wish to make
proposals to German G ov [ern m en ]t on basis o f 5 squadrons to 8, each consisting o f 8
battleships, Im perial G ov [ern m en ]t would examine them. These proposals must
make some provision that other Great Powers do not add too heavily to their
armaments. Translation of above aide-m ém oire and revised extract from M in is te r ]
of M arine’ s speech follows by post.

M IN U T E S .
T he G erm an G overnm ent con tin u e to speak w ith tw o tongues.
I feel confid ent th a t if w e m ake a “ definite p r o p o s a l” w e shall not be trea ted stra ig h t-
forw a rd ly in th e n eg otia tion , and I reg a rd any such n eg otia tion w ith so u n scru p u lou s an
adversa ry as h igh ly dangerous.
E. A. C.
F e b [r u a r y ] 11.
A w a it te x t o f aid e m ém oire
A. N
E. G.

No. 502.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edicard G r ey .{1)

F.O. 6 3 3 6 /5 4 7 2 /1 4 /1 8 .
I (No. 55.) Berlin, D. February 11, 1914.
I Sir, R. February 12, 1914.
W ith reference to m y telegram No. 21 o f the 10th instant(2) I have the honour
to transmit to you herewith translation of a memorandum regarding the speech
delivered by Admiral von Tirpitz before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on
the subject of Anglo-German naval relations which was handed to me yesterday by
H err von Jagow .(3)
A translation of the revised proof of Admiral von Tirpitz’ s remarks which was
enclosed in the memorandum is likewise transmitted herewith.
I have, &c.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 502.

M emorandum.

(Translation.!
The Im perial Secretary of State for the Navy declared quite generally in the
Budget Committee that official proposals for the limitation of armaments— e.g. on
the basis of 10 to 16 had not reached the German Government.
. .
O [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent t o th e K in g and to th e C abinet. A
cr.py was sent t o the A d m ira lty .]
( 2) fv. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g d ocu m en t.]
(3) [ c p . Ct.p., X X X I X , pp. 79-80. cp. also H e r r v on B ethm ann H o llw e g ’ s rep ort to the
E m p eror W illia m o f F eb ru a ry 8, ibid., pp. 7 7 -8 .]
[10900] 3 B
 738
He then added that he could not regard the remarks made by Mr. Churchill on
the occasion of a speech in M anchester(4) concerning a Naval H oliday as an official
proposal. He wished nevertheless to add at once that he did not consider that the
idea of a holiday was possible to carry out under existing conditions in Germany.
The German programme for the next years provided only for the construction of
replacing ships. To delay these for one year would mean making them up in the next
year. This would upset German finances and dislocate work in the ship-building
yards and also the military arrangements owing to the irregular increase in the
number of new vessels that would be completed.
If the construction of the replacing ships for any one year were permanently
abandoned, the total number of effective ships would be brought below that ordered
by law and this was therefore impossible.
A revised proof of that part of the official report of the sitting which contains the
above declarations of Admiral von Tirpitz is enclosed herewith.
These declarations show that the Imperial Government does not regard the idea
of a holiday year in armaments as possible in practice.
If Ilis Britannic M ajesty’ s Government intends to make proposals to the
Im perial Governm ent on the basis of a proportion between the English and German
battle fleets at the ratio of 5 squadrons to 8, each squadron consisting of 8 Battleships,
then the Imperial Governm ent will examine them. These proposals would have to
make some provision that other great Powers do not add too heavily to their
armaments.
Berlin, February 10, 191 1.

Enclosure 2 in No. 502.

Estim ates for the administration of the Im perial Navy, A nnex 6. Ordinary
Expenditure. Chapter 45 (Title 11.
(Translation.)
The reporter Dr. Pfleger proposes first of all to enter upon a general debate and
to discuss the question of our relations to England. H e requests the Imperial
Secretary of State of the Navy to define his attitude towards the questions raised by
the English Admiralty and requests inform ation as to the manner in which the
proposals for the limitation of the naval armaments had been brought to the official
knowledge of the German Government and whether, and if so how, the official
proposals had been answered by us.
The Im perial Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral von Tirpitz, said :—
The political side of the question will be dealt with by m y colleague of the
F oreign Office.
In connection with the explanations which I had the honour to give on this
subject, I should like to say that my views regarding the question of armaments
have undergone no alterations of any kind. I have nothing either to add to, or to take
away from , the observations which I made at that time.
You will remember that m y colleague of the English Admiralty declared at that
time that he would regard it as sufficient if the proportion of strength between the
English and German Navies were in the ratio of, say, 16 : 10. I declared then
here in the Committee that such a proportion would be acceptable. It corresponds
also to the spirit of the Fleet Law\ Our naval policy has never pursued aggressive
tendencies against England, but has rather followed the aim of attaining a respectable
measure o f naval strength. M y remarks referred particularly to organisation.
The First Lord of the Admiralty stated that the English Fleet ought to consist of
eight squadrons and I thereupon pointed out that according to the standard laid
down by our Fleet Law we ought to have five squadrons, each consisting of eight

(4) [t>. im m ed ia tely p reced in g docum ent, note (2).]

 739
battleships. B y this means we are, it is true, to a certain extent at a disadvantage
owing to our conditions of defence, and also owing to the fact that our reserve
divisions are greatly undermanned, &c. But I believe that we could make this good
by means of our intensive training system. I did not then, and I do not now,
consider it advisable in such a comparison o f forces to include the other kinds of
vessels (cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats, submarines). For if it is desired to obtain
a comparison which will be of any practical value, this com parison must be a simple
one. The inclusion o f the above-m entioned vessels— especially as England needs her
cruisers in other ways than we do— would only complicate matters.
Neither nation has completed the naval organisation at which it is aiming.
Germany needs 41 battleships for her five squadrons, England needs 65 battleships
for her eight squadrons. I f we take the life of a ship at 20 years, then Germany
must on the average build two replacing battleships every year. And we do not
intend to do more than this. England, with her 65 battleships, must build
yearly three replacing battleships. But as a matter of fact in the last five years,
E ngland has built 24 battleships, i.e., fire battleships per year, or 24 battleships
instead o f 15, which is a considerable deviation from the proportion of 16 : 10. If
under these circumstances it is really desired to com e to an understanding on
armaments then it is only natural, that England, as by far the strongest naval power
of the world, should be the Power to make positive proposals. I have no doubt that
such positive proposals would be most carefully examined by us.
Since the discussions of last year, m y colleague in England, on the occasion of
an election speech delivered last autumn, suggested the introduction of a holiday year
in naval construction for the whole world. At any rate I read this in the newspapers,
for I have received no further intimation of the matter, but I cannot regard that as a
positive proposal, and m oreover I should like to add at once that I believe we should
regard any such proposal as impracticable. For either the constructions must be
postponed for a year, in which case the om ission must be made good in the following
year. This would upset our finances, dislocate work in the shipbuilding yards, and
also our military arrangements, i.e. the regular placing of ships in com m ission on
their com pletion. In addition we have other difficulties. E ngland’ s shipbuilding
I yards are congested with vessels under construction, while our building business is
I slack. England has to build not only for her own Navy but also for a number of
I foreign cou n tries: we have not. W e should therefore have to dismiss a large
number of workmen and the whole organisation of our shipbuilding yards would be
upset.
I f on the other hand it was desired perm anently to drop the construction of
’ the ships for the holiday year in question, that would mean, since we only undertake
| the construction of replacing ships, a reduction in our organisation as established
by law.
Moreover I have not heard that the Russian or the French Governm ents
( have given any indication of their agreement to this suggestion.

[E D . N O T E .— An im p orta n t letter, d a ted F eb ru a ry 13, 1914, from C ount S v erb eiev to

M . Sazonov is g iv en in S ich e rt, pp . 709-10. ep. S ieh e rt-B en c k e n d o rfj, I I I , p p . 253—5 ;
. Im peria lism u s, 1st Ser., V ol. I, pp. 2 43-4, X o . 252. I t refers to the C h u rch ill naval proposals,
and record s a con v ersation w ith S ir E. G oschen, fo r w hich no date is giv en . S ir E. G oschen
referred in it t o his discussion w ith H e r r v on J a g o w describ ed supra, pp . 735-6, X os. 499—500.
; C ou n t Sv erb eiev rep orts also the view s o f M . J u les C am bon.]

[10900J 3 B 2
 74U

N o. 503.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .I 1)

F . 0 . 1 2 6 9 5 /1 2 6 9 0 /1 4 /]8 .
(No. 124.) Berlin, D. March 21, 1914.
Sir, R . March 23, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from
Captain Henderson, R.N., Naval Attaché to His M ajesty’ s Embassy, on an interview
with Admiral von Tirpitz on the subject of the British naval estimates.
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.
Enclosure in No. 503.

Captain H enderson to Sir E . G osch en .( 2)

(Confidential.)
Sir, Berlin, March 21, 1914.
I have the honour to report that on receipt of the copies of the British naval
estimates, which arrived here on Thursday, I took the opportunity of calling on
the Secretary of State of the German Navy and presenting him with one.
H is E xcellency w7as in good humour and spoke to me freely.
Discussing the British estimates, Admiral von Tirpitz said he recognised how
difficult it must have been for the Government to adopt the programme they have,
and he heartily congratulated his “ esteemed colleague at the head o f the British
Admiralty for having so successfully steered the naval budget through Parliam ent.”
Of course Mr. Churchill had made a slip when he talked o f lack o f personnel,
that was impossible in a country where conscription exists.
At the same time, his E xcellency still thought that, from the German point of
view, the programm e seemed unnecessarily large. What it was wanted for apart
from Germany wras, o f course, no business o f his. W hat he was anxious to do was
to understand the real feeling o f the British Admiralty on the shipbuilding question.
H e, on his part, had been as frank as he knew how. He had got my predecessor
to his desk and had explained his own interpretation of the position— he had explained
to m y predecessor what he thought was a fair statement o f the ca s e ; it was seen
through German spectacles, of course, but at any rate it was open and honest. He
was rather afraid that he was still somewhat misunderstood in England.
His owm view7 was that nothing could be more desirable than that both
Admiralties should know each other’ s feelings. These could not be discovered from
a study o f the estimates of either country. It was also impossible to get at the real
feeling by reading Ministerial speeches or press leaders.
This brought his E xcellency to the subject of the press, he s a id : “ I am going
to say a thing which will no doubt surprise you : in spite of your ‘ liberty o f the
p ress,’ at a hiut from your Government your whole national press becomes unanimous
on questions outside your domestic politics— it is the best handled press in the world.
At the time o f the Dogger Bank incident, for three days the British press was in
eruption against Russia, but on the fourth day all traces of that eruption disappeared
and the wrath descended on w hom ?— G erm any! W h y ? ” and here his Excellency
shrugged his shoulders, spread out his hands, and laughed.
The German press was different; except for a few7 official and semi-official organs,
the German press were all “ ocean tram ps,” each representing the views o f its own
little party.

0 ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent on A p ril 6 to the K in g ; to the P rim e

M in is t e r ; to L o rd C r e w e ; to L o rd M orley .]
(2) [T h e te x t given above is ta ken from the C onfidential P rin t, as the o rig in a l docum ent
was sen t to the A d m ira lty .]
 He thought Anglo-German relations would undoubtedly be sweetened if the
British press would leave Germ any alone for a bit. H e, on his part, deprecated
constant discussion of other countries’ affairs, he had no desire to discuss E ngland’ s,
and except when driven in Parliament to allude to other countries never did so of
his own accord; even when driven to do so by questions from Ministers, he always
endeavoured to make his replies as short as possible.
W hen I withdrew, his Excellency begged me to transmit his compliments to “ my
colleagues on the Board o f the British A dm iralty.”
I have. &c.
W IL F R E D H E N D E R SO N .

No. 504.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir F. B ertie. ( ! )

F .O . 18899'8195 14 17.
(No. 240.)
Sir, Foreign Office, April 25, 1914.
At the end of m y interview with M. Doumergue on the 23rd instant,(2) he showed
me thecom m unication that he suggested should be made to the Press on the subject
of the K in g’ s visit.(3) The following is a copy of his draft :—
“ Au cours des entretiens qui se sont poursuivis entre Sir Edward Grey et
Monsieur Gaston Doumergue à l ’occasion de la visite de Leurs Majestés le Roi
et la Reine d ’ Angleterre, les différentes questions intéressant les deux Pays ont
été envisagées et l ’ identité des vues des deux ministres sur tous les points s’ est
affirmée.
“ E n constatant les résultats de l ’ action concertée des deux Gouvernements,
Sir Edward Grev et M . Gaston Doumergue sont tombés d ’ accord sur l ’ intérêt
des Puissances de la Triple Entente à associer d ’ une façon de plus en plus
intime leurs efforts en vue du maintien de l ’ équilibre européen et de la p a ix .”

After reading it, I said that I had no objection to the first paragraph, but the
second paragraph would be open to the misconstruction that we had concluded some
new Agreem ent in the nature of an Alliance, and this would cause considerable
trouble in E urope, especially in the Press.
After some discussion, it was agreed that the second paragraph should read as
fo llo w s:— “ E n constatant les résultats de la politique poursuivie par les deux
Gouvernements avec le Gouvernement Im périal russe, Sir Edward Grey et M . Gaston
Doumergue sont tombés d ’ accord sur la nécessité pour les trois Puissances de
contribuer leurs constants efforts en vue du maintien de l ’ équilibre et de la p a ix .”
I subsequently pointed out to M . Margerie, after dinner in the evening, that we
feared that the word “ con certée” might give an impression that we had been
attempting to exercise pressure upon other Governm ents, whereas the only impression
that we wished to convey was that we had been acting in agreement.
[I am, & c.]
E . G [R E Y ].

(*) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a vin g b een sent to th e K in g ; to th e P rim e M in is t e r ;

to L o rd C rew e ; to L o rd M o r le v .]
( 2) [cp . N o t e by M. D ou m ergu e, d a ted A p ril 24, g iv in g a record o f the con v ersation s on
th e 23rd, D .D .F ., 3 me S ér., V ol. X , pp . 264-70, X o. 155. T here is a referen ce to these con v ersa ­
tion s in Gooch T em p erley, V ol. X (I), p. 250, X o . 269. cp. also in fra , pp. 787-S, X o . 541.]
(3) [T h e v isit o f the K in g and Queen to P a r is to o k pla ce on A p ril 21-4, 1914.]
 742

N o. 505.

Sir Eduard G rey to Sir E . G osch en .(l)

F .O . 19113/8105 14/17.
(No. 118.)
S ir, Foreign Office, April 2 7 , 1914.
I saw the German Ambassador to-day,( 2) and told him that the reception of the
King and Queen during their visit to Paris last week had been exceedingly cordial,
particularly so on the part o f the crow d: it had been even more cordial than we had
thought possible.(3) The King and Queen had been very much touched by it, and we
were all much gratified. 1 had also been impressed by the fact that the mood of
the Krench, both of the Governm ent and, as far as I could judge, o f the crowd,
was very peaceful and unaggressive. This had made their exceedingly cordial feeling
for us quite unembarrassing.
I was sure that the French had no desire to make difficulties. At the moment
when I arrived in Paris, there was a hitch about accepting the modifications that
Germ any. Austria, and Italy had proposed in the com m unication to be made in
Athens. I had found that the French were just as anxious as I was toremove the
difficulties in the way of accepting the modifications, and as amatter of fact that had
now been done and the Note had been presented.(M
The German Ambassador said that he was sure that my impression of the
disposition o f the French was correct. W ith regard to what I had said about the
crowd, he mentioned that, when he had travelled in France, he had always found
them a most good-hum oured people.
[ I am. A c.]
E . G [B E Y ].

(*) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a bin et.]
(2) [cp . O .P., X X X I X , pp. 6 03 -9 .]
(3) [cp. D .D .F .. 3"1' Sér., V ol. X , pp . 292-3, No. 176.]
( ') \y. G ooch <t- T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 248-9, N o. 26S.]

No. 506.

Sir E duard G rey to Mr. Wingfield.

F .O . 21033,19733/14 3.
(No. 74.)
Sir, Foreign Office, May 6, 1914.
Count MensdorfT came to see me to-day on his return from holiday.
A fter enquiring about the E m peror’ s health, of which he gave me a more
favourable account, I expressed the great pleasure with which I had read what
Count Berchtold had said about British policy. It was things of that kind that gave
one a little pleasure in public work.
Count Mensdorff said that Count B erchtold’s reference to Great Britain had met
with very warm approval in the Austrian Press, and there had just appeared a most
favourable article in the “ Frem denblatt ” about the approaching visit o f the British
Fleet. G)

(*) [M a r g in a l n ote by S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ I should like to see th e despatch a bout the

a rtic le in the F re m d e n b la tt: (S ir M. d e Bunsen says he sent one) when it arrives. E. G .”
S ir M . de B u n sen ’ s despatch, (N o. 82), D. M a y 3, R . M a y 6, 1914. is n ot rep rod u ced . It
m erely sum m arized the a rticle whieli a p p ea red in the F rem d e n b la tt on M av 3, 1914. (F .O . 20148/
1 2 1 6 6 /1 4 /5 0 .)] ‘
 743
I said that all this added to the satisfaction, and I asked Count Meusdorff to
let Count Berchtold know what great pleasure his words had given me.
[ I am, Arc.]
E . G [R E Y ].

No. 507.

Sir Edward G rey to Mr. K idston. /

F .O . 215S3 215S3 14 15.

(No. IS.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 11, 1914.
Monsieur Di Scavenius came to sep me this afternoon.
W e agreed that there was no political question between Denmark and England
which required to be discussed. But I took the opportunity of saying that we were
aware o f the delicate position o f Denmark, that we should never be the first to
violate her neutrality, and that we always desired to avoid placing her in an
embarrassing position. I pointed out that, when we had recently proposed a visit of
ships to Danish ports, we had also proposed a visit o f ships to a German port, so
that the German Press could not say that there was any anti-German motive in the
movements o f our ships, as I thought had been said in the German Press on some
previous occasion when we sent ships into the Baltic. It had s o u k times been
suggested in the German Press that G erm any’ s neighbours, such as Denmark and
Holland, must take precautions, or even that Germany must take precautions, to
prevent our violating their neutrality. But all that we desired was that their
neutrality should be maintained.
M. de Scavenius said that, happily, at the present moment relations between
England and Germany were such that these matters were easy, and Germany held
the same language about neutrality that we did. He also spoke with some satisfaction
of the improvem ent of the relations between Sweden and Norway, and he said that
the Swedish apprehension about Russia was very real.
[ I am. &c.J
E . G T t E Y ].

(' [T h is despa tch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g and t o the C a bin et.]

No. 50S.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . K icolson J 1

\ Private. .2
i M y dear Nicolson. Berlin. May 15, 1914.
. . . \ou will read in one of my d e sp a tch e d a short analysis of the hook
I on the Crown Prince written by Lim an— the publicist not the general. It :s a
most tactless production and deserves even severer criticism than that meted out
, to it by the Frankfort Gazette. It is in fact a comparison between the Crown Prince

<11 [T h is le tte r is en d orsed as h a vin g been sent t o the K in g and to the P rim e M in ister.
T he en dorsem ent is in itia lled bv S ir E d w a rd G rev .]
( 2> [C a rn ock M S S ., V ol. I l l o f 1914.]
(3) [T h e op e n in g pa ra g ra ph s o f th is le tte r re fe r t o H e r r von J a g o w 's speech in the
R eich sta g , an d t o an a rticle in the Lot: a I .I n s t ip r r .]
(4) [S ir E. G osch en ’ s despatch (N o. 199). D . M ay l'l. 1914. R . M a y IS. 1914, is not rep ro­
d u ced as th e con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F .O . 22070. 2 2070/14 IS .)]
 744

and the Emperor highly unfavourable to the latter. It is a book which, as the
Frankfort Gazette says, can serve no useful purpose, and which will do no good to
Germany in general or the Grown Prince in particular. I do not believe for a
moment that the book will encourage the Crown Prince to go still further in the
direction of what Herr Lim an considers to be German ideals, which are truculent
to say the least of them, but it cannot do him much good to see some o f his most
reprehensible outbursts, in which he has publicly placed him self in opposition to the
policy adopted by His Father and His Father’ s responsible advisers, elevated into
heroic and patriotic actions such as stamp him as an ideal German Em peror in the
future.
The Crown Prince, as everybody knows who is at all intimately acquainted with
him , requires holding back and not urging on. He has m any charming and lovable
qualities, but discretion is not one o f them, and his impulsive nature leads him to
say m any things that were better left unsaid. I have known him now for five years,
but much as I like him I cannot find that during those years he has become an atom
more reticent or careful in expressing his views on subjects upon which one in his
exceptional position would do better to be silent. As an example I may mention
that only recently in conversation with a young m ember o f m y staff whom [h e]
has only known for a few weeks, he gave his opinion on various subjects with
extraordinary freedom . He said amongst other things that unless Pmssia changed
the present order of her going, Germany would one of these days read her a bitter
lesson which she would not easily fo r g e t : the Russians, he added, were incurable
liars and incapable of running straight. For France he expressed the greatest
contem pt, and he maintained that the day o f the Latin races was past. They had
com pletely degenerated and were now practically worn out. The future was to the
Anglo-German race, and if England and Germany were wise they would join
together in a regular Alliance and keep the other nations in order. I confess that
I have heard at all events some o f these opinions expressed in still higher quarters
but I expect there would he ructions if it was ever known that the Heir Apparent
poured them into the oars of his young friends in the intervals of a game of Lawn
Tennis.
Yours very sincerelv.
W . E . GO SCH EX.

No. 5i)9.

Sir E . Goschcii to Sir Edward G r cy .(')

Tel. Private.(2) May 18, 1914.

The Xaval Attaché has just had a conversation with Prince H enry o f Prussia
on the subject of the Fleet visit, from which he gathered that the Em peror wishes
it to be understood that he has invited the First Lord o f the Admiralty and the Sea
Lord to Kiel officially, and that he hoped that at all events both Mr. Churchill and
Prince Louis o f Battenberg would be present during the Kiel week in the“ Enchan
tress ’ ’ and not in a private yacht or a liner.
Prince H enry gave the Xaval Attache to understand that the Emperor was going
out o f his way to show special friendliness, and that His Im perial Majesty would be
hurt if his invitation was not responded to.

(•) [T h is telegram is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

M r. C h u rch ill.]
( 2) [G rey M SS., V ol. 2.1 |
 745
M IN U T E .
This w ill nev er do at the present m om ent and there was so I und erstood no question o f
the F ir st L o rd and the F ir st Sea L ord g o in g w ith the fleet.
E G.

No. 510.

Sir A. Ficolson to Sir E . Ooschcn.

Private. (*)
My dear Goschen F oreign Office, May 18, 1914.
I did not write m y letter to you last week as I thought you would be away in
Brunswick. M oreover, I really had very little to say, for as you know matters are
pretty calm. The account you give o f the Crown P rince’ s conversation is certainly
( interesting.(2) I think he talks great nonsense when he says that an Anglo-German
Alliance would keep the peace o f the world. I am quite sure that if we broke away
from Russia and embarked on such an engagement we should bitterly rue the day.
Russia would be able to make herself exceedingly disagreeable to us in regions where
we are unfortunately very weak and where German assistance, even if wdllingly
offered, would be o f no avail,— indeed could not be operative. The general tenour
o f the Crown P rince’ s conversation certainly makes one hope that the life o f his
father will be much prolonged, though I imagine that when he does com e to the
throne he will not be able to exert any dom inating influence over German foreign
| policy. I was rather surprised to read Jagow ’ s attack upon the attitude and tone
of the Russian press. I thought that the press polemic had been buried for ever,
and I do not quite understand why Jagow should go out o f his way to revive it. 1
should have thought that Germany would now do her utmost to get on the friendliest
footing with Russia, but it does not look from Jagow’ s speech as if for the m oment
she was particularly anxious to do so. B uchanan’ s French colleague is starting a
hare that Russia is becom ing a little uneasy as to G erm any’ s attitude, and even
goes so far as to say that the Russian Minister of W ar considers that war is almost
I inevitable within the next year. I do not m yself believe that there is anything
\ at all in this. There is no question at present existing which would necessarily lead
| to any strained relations between Russia and Germany, and I am quite sure that
neither Sovereign has the slightest intention or desire to break the peace. The
French Ambassador at Petersburg is well known as an alarmist and disseminates
some exaggerated reports.
Our overtures to Russia in regard to our Convention with China and Tibet have
not met with a very favourable reception from Sazonoff. However, this I fully
expected. One can hardly expect that Russia would readily acquiesce in the
arrangements which we have made with China and Tibet, without receiving a very
substantial quid pro quo. That is just what we are not very well in a position to give
her. Buchanan certainly spoke very strongly and openly with Sazonoff on the
I subject, as you will see from his telegram No. 113 .(3) though I must say that I do
not think his arguments would have convinced me had I been a Russian. He was
quite right to make the very best o f our case, but I am not sure that Russia could
not have had the best o f the argument. It is a little unfortunate that just at this
, moment we have to discuss this troublesome question with Russia. I must say that
Buchanan has the gift o f using forcible language without causing the slightest
irritation in Sazonoff’ s mind.
I expect that the Germans will make great capital out o f our squadron’ s visit
to K iel, and I do consider it rather unfortunate that the visit should fall within

t1) [C a rn ock M S S ., V ol. I l l o f 1914.]

( 2) [v . sup ra , p. 744, N o. 508.]
(3) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s teleg ra m (N o. 113), o f M a y 17, 1914, D. 5-4 p . m ., R . 10-30 p . m ., is
n ot rep rod u ced as it refers exclu siv ely t o th e T ib eta n question. (F .O . 2 1 9 8 6 /2 7 0 /1 4 /1 0 .)]
 7 16

the Kiel week. H owever, we are sending a squadron to visit three Russian ports,
so I hope that no jealousy will be created in Russia.
You will see from the print that there is very little of interest taking place at
this moment in E urope, and were it not for the troubles in Mexico we should be in
comparative calm here.
I am afraid that the health of the Austrian Em peror is causing a good deal of
uneasiness in his immediate entourage. It is naturally not very satisfactory that
a man of his age should have been an invalid during six or seven weeks without any
marked im provem ent. I do not m yself think that there will immediately he a great
change on the accession of his successor, although there is no doubt that the advent
of Franz Ferdinand will cause a good deal of disquietude.
W e are a little perturbed by the exceptional activity which the Germans are
showing in pushing their trade in the Persian Gulf, and they seem to have succeeded
for this year in practically capturing the whole o f the trade on the Ivarun. W e
shall have to give some support to our com pany on that river. I have little doubt
that before long the Germans will come forward with the demand to be consulted
on all Persian and Gulf questions owing to the commercial interest which they have
succeeded in establishing. In fact it will be M orocco over again.
W e are not ourselves very happy as to the outlook in Persia. I do not mean
to say in regard to the internal situation, but owing to the fact that Russia will
probably before long com m ence construction o f railways in the North which will
enable her trade to compete very successfully with ours in the South, and it is
unlucky that just at this moment we are confronted with German com petition also
in those regions. W e have so long enjoyed what was practically an undisputed
m onopoly in the South of Persia and along the Gulf, that our people seem to have
considered that such a state of things would last for ever, and they have been
rather unprepared for the rude awakening which has come upon them. However,
we have carefully avoided introducing Persia into our discussions which have been
going on, as you know, during the past fewT weeks here with the German Embassy
in respect to the Bagdad Railway and the oilfields in Mesopotamia, although
Kiihlm ann has on more than one occasion, I hear, endeavoured to lead up his
conversation as to some com m on policy in Persia. It was certainly a com fort that
Jagow made no reference to Portuguese matters, and I do sincerely trustthatthat
question w-ill be hung up for some time to come.
W e are entering into a phase o f great anxiety and crisis in this country. Though
I do not intend to bother you with my views on the question I must say that I do
not see much hope of a peaceful solution, though everybody is crying out that it is
absolutely necessary that one should be found. Next week will be an important one.
I do not know for how long it will be possible for Elster to passively maintain the
severe strain which has been put upon h er................(4)
[Yours ever,
A . NICO LSO N.]

(•‘ ) [T he final pa ra g ra p h o f this letter refers b riefly to the v isit o f th e K in g and Queen of
D en m ark t o L o n d o n .]

No. 511.

M emorandum by Mr. Churchill.

P riv a te ^ 1)
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey. Admiralty, May 20, 1914.
In Madrid at Easter Sir Ernest Cassel told me that he had received from
H err Ballin a statement to this effect: “ How I wish that I could get Churchill

(>) [G rey M SS., V ol. 49.]

 747
here during the Kiel W eek. Tirpitz will never allow the Chancellor to settle any
naval questions, but I know he would like to have a talk with his English colleague
on naval matters, and I am sure that if the subject of limiting naval armaments
were ever approached in a businesslike way, some agreement would be reach ed.”
On the same day I received a telegram from the Admiralty, saying that the Foreign
Office particularly wished a British Squadron to visit German ports simultaneously
with other naval visits. I thereupon told Cassel that if it were certain that Tirpitz
really wanted to see m e, I would consult you both. I should personally welcome the
opportunity, but of course I must obtain permission. I said that I did not think
it would be suitable for me to go on a great liner as B allin’ s guest, and that if I
were to go at all, probably the best opportunity would be for me to turn up in the
“ E n ch an tress” at some German port at the time when our squadron was visiting.
I told Grey about this when I came back to London and showed him the extract
from B allin’ s letter. Since then I have heard verbally from Cassel that he knows
for a fact through Baffin that Tirpitz would like to see m e ; but at G rey’ s wish I
have asked that this matter should be made quite clear and I have not yet heard
again from Cassel. Personally I should like to meet Tirpitz, and I think a non­
com m ittal, friendly conversation, if it arose naturally and freely, might do good, and
could not possibly do any harm. Indeed, after all I have said about a Naval
H oliday, it would be difficult for me to repulse any genuine desire on his part for
such a conversation. The points I wish to discuss are these :—
1st. M y own Naval H oliday proposals and to show him , as I can easily do,
the good faith and sound reasons on which they are based. I do not expect any
agreement on these, but I would like to strip the subject o f the misrepresentation
and misunderstanding with which it has been surrounded, and put it on a clear basis
in case circumstances should ever render it admissible.
•2nd. I wish to take up with him the suggestion which he made in his last speech
on Naval Estimates, o f a limitation in the size o f capital ships. Even if numbers
could not be touched, a limitation in the size would be a great saving, and is on every
ground to be desired. This subject could only be satisfactorily explored b y direct
personal discussion in the first instance.
3rd. I wish to encourage him to send German ships to foreign stations by
showing him how much we wish to do the same, and how readily we shall conform
to any dispositions which have the effect o f reducing the unwholesome concentration
o f fleets in H om e waters. Quite apart from the diplomatic aspect, it is bad for the
discipline and organization of both navies, and the Germans fullv recognise this.
4th. I wish to discuss the abandonment of secrecy in regard to the numbers
and general characteristics (apart from special inventions^ o f the ships, built and
building, in British and German dockyards. This policy o f secrecy was instituted
by the British Admiralty a few years ago with the worst results for *us, for we have
been m uch less successful in keeping our secrets than the Germans. I should
propose to him in principle that we gave the Naval Attaches equal and reciprocal
facilities to visit the dockyards and see what was going on just as they used to do
in the past. I f this could be agreed upon it would go a long way to stopping the
espionage on both sides which is a continued cause of suspicion and ill-feeling.
I hope, in view o f the very strong feeling there is about naval expenditure and
the great difficulties I have to face, m y wish to put these points to Admiral Tirpitz
if a good opportunity arises, and if it is clear that he would not resent it, m ay not
be dismissed. On the other hand I do not wish to go to Germ any for the purpose
of initiating such a discussion. I would rather go for some other reason satisfactory in
itself and let the discussion of these serious questions come about only if it is clearly
appropriate.
Much the best opportunity that could be found would be when our squadron is
visiting a German port. I appreciate very fully the importance of doing nothing
which would give the visit o f the battleships to Kiel any superior significance or
eclat to that o f the battle cruisers to Kronstadt, and what I propose for your
 748
consideration is that I should go in th e-“ Enchantress ” to Kronstadt, arriving there
with our squadron on the 24th o f June, stay there two days and then go as I can
quite easily do in 48 hours, to K iel, where I should find our other squadron, and
where I would also stay a day and a half or two days, thus accepting the German
E m peror’ s invitation and providing the opportunity for my talk with Tirpitz. It
seems to me that from a European point of view any special significance that might
be attached to one visit would be effectively counterbalanced by the other, while at
the same time the opportunity sought for would be secured. It would be necessary
if I went away that the First Sea Lord should remain at his post. But Sir John
Jellicoe is a personal friend of Tirpitz and has had a good deal of cordial correspon­
dence with him on various professional matters. He had in fact been planning to go
him self privately on leave to Kiel for the yachting week. I have told him that
he could not do this without your sanction. I should propose to take him with me
on the yacht both to Kronstadt and to Kiel.
I think I understand the general position and the naval position well enough
to get through without making any m ischief.
I do not believe that the E m peror’ s invitation (which I have not yet received)
arose from any plan to make an unfair use of such a visit, but that it came quite
naturally out o f what he heard from Ballin, though the risk would be fully guarded
against by the arrangements I propose.
If you approve, I do not think the matter need be the subject o f Cabinet
discussion, because that would be lending an undue importance to conversations
which may never take p lace; and what I suggest is that I should have permission
to cruise in the Baltic in the -week 24th to 31st June, and visit Kronstadt and Kiel
while our two squadrons are there.
The French would certainly have no reason to com plain, as I have already
visited their fleet at Toulon and have for two days entertained the late French
Minister o f Marine on board the “ E n ch an tress’ ’ at Portland and with the British
fleet manoeuvring at sea. I am going again to welcome their squadron at Portland
on June 13.
F or the present I suggest that nothing should be done until the Em peror’ s
invitation arrives; and secondlv, until we hear what Tirpitz’ s real wish is.
W . S. C [H U R C H I L L ],
20th M ay, 1914.

No. 512.

Memorandum by Sir Edward G rci/.f1)

P rivate.( 2) May 25, 1914.
It is of course very desirable that the points named should be discussed with
Tirpitz if he is willing to discuss them .(3)
But hitherto all efforts on our part to get naval expenditure discussed have
been resented by Tirpitz even when welcomed by Bethmann H ollweg. When
Lichnowsky arrived an intimation was conveyed to me on his behalf that it was
hoped in the interest o f good relations between the two countries that I should not
m ention naval expenditure to him . I think therefore that a visit to Germany with
the intention of raising with Tirpitz the points in the memorandum may not only
be futile hut may cause resentment.

(L [T h is m em orandum is endorsed by S ir E d w a rd G re y : “ T he K in g should see these

w ith the orig in a l telegram from S ir E. Goschen. E. G .” l
(*) [G rey M SS., V ol. 55.]
( 3) [ c p . im m ed ia tely preced in g docu m en t.]
 749
What I think— though 1 put this forward with diffidence as it is out of m y sphere—
I should do if I were at the Admiralty would be to send for the German Naval
Attaché : tell him o f the statements that Ballin has made : give him a M emorandum
of the points I should like to discuss : say that I was prepared to take them up, if
Tirpitz wished, either through the German Naval Attaché here or British Naval
Attaché at Berlin, and even to meet Tirpitz to discuss them if it appeared after
preliminary discussion through Attachés that this would be profitable. But that
while this would remain my attitude I should not press any discussion that was
unwelcome to Tirpitz and hoped that he would be quite frank in letting me know
direct through Naval Attachés at any time what his desire was about discussion.
As to the personal visit to Kronstadt and Kiel. I am most reluctant to stand
in the way. hut they will make a terrible splash in the European Press and give a
significance to the cruize of the squadrons that is out of all proportion to anything
that was contem plated when the cruizes were planned. The wildest reports will
be circulated and we shall be involved in constant explanations to Ambassadors at
the F [o re ig n ] 0 [ffic e ] and denials to the Press o f the things that will be attributed
to us.
I hope therefore the Prime M inister and First Lord will agree to a telegram
to Gosehen on the lines of the following draft :(/)
I do not gather that the Em peror has actually sent an invitation yet and no
formal answer perhaps is required.
” Your private tel[egra m ] of the lS th .(5
“ The E m peror’ s intended invitation is very much appreciated and so is
the friendly feeling that has prompted it, but it must have arisen from an
impression that Mr. Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg were going to
accom panv the cruizes of the squadrons : this has not been their intention ; it
is impossible for them to do so and they will be unable to go to any of the ports
that the squadrons will visit.
The report of the E m peror’ s intended invitation came therefore as a
complete surprise and it is hoped that the inability o f Mr. Churchill and Prince
Louis to come will not be construed in any way as wanting in respect to the
Em peror or as due to any want of appreciation o f his kindness, which they
both feel very m u ch .”

(■*) [T h is teleg ram was despa tched 011 M ay 26, 1914, 5-55 p .m .]
(5) [r . su p m . p. 744, X o . 509.]

No. 513.

Minute by Mr. W inston Churchill.

Private. O
Sir Edward Grey.
Prim e M in is te r / Admiralty, May 26, 1914.
I am convinced that no discussion other than by me and Tirpitz personally
w [o u ]ld be useful on the points m entioned. These sort of questions becom e much too
crude and form al when treated through routine channels. E v e n - kind of guarding
condition to meet all possible contingencies w [o u ]ld have to be hammered o u t ; and
there w [o u ]ld not be m uch confidence or good-will left at the end.
I must o f course defer to G rev’ s opinion on the telegram.
W. S. C [H U R C H IL L ],
26.5.
( i ) [G rey M SS ., T o i. 49.]
 750
N o. 514.

Prince Lichnow sky to M r. Tyrrell .(*)

Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschajt,

P rivate.(2) 9 Carlton House Terrace, S.IF.,
My dear Tyrrell, London, May 30, 1914.
The papers announce this m orning that Tirpitz is going to Ivonopischt and point,
out that he has lately seen the Italian Sea Lord.
I learn from Berlin that the Archduke invited him specially in order to get some
inform ation about naval technical questions and I am told that this visit does not
meet the wishes of the Foreign Office at Berlin as Jagow foresees that it will give rise
to tidings about naval arrangements concerning the Mediterranean. On best authority
I am able to certifie [sic] that nothing of the kind is meditated, on the contrary they
very much regret that T [irp itz] should have succeeded in going there.
Perhaps you might find an occasion of inform ing your Chief of these facts in
order to avoid m isapprehensions.(3)
Believe me,
Tours sincerely,
LIC H N O W SKY.

C1) [T his le tte r is end orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r; to
M r. C h u r ch ill; to S ir A. N icolson . The end orsem ent is in itia lled b y S ir E d w a rd G rey.]
(2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 23.]
(3) [N ote b y M r. T y r r e ll: “ I have th a n k ed him and said I w ould let y ou know . W . T .” ]

No. 515.

Sir E . G oschen to Sir Edicard G r ey .(x)

Berlin, June 3, 1914.

P rivate.( 2) D. 9 p . m .
Tel. R . 10-45 p . m .
Private. Your private telegram of M ay 2Gth.(3)
The Em peror gave a State Luncheon today in honour of the K in g’ s Birthday.
H aving ascertained that His Im perial Majesty had indirectly through Prince Henry
o f Prussia invited the First Lord o f the Admiralty and Prince Louis of Battenberg
to K iel, I explained to him that they were unable to come and spoke to him in the
sense o f your above telegram. His M ajesty quite understood the situation and
expressed his regret that they could not come in the most friendly manner.

( !) [T h is telegram is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to the P rim e M in ister;

to M r. C hu rch ill.]
(2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 23.]
(3) [v . supra, p. 749, N o 512, and n o te (4).]
 751

N o. 51G.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y J 1

F.O . 25531 25531 14 18.

(No. 231. Berlin, D. June 6, 1914.
Sir, E . June 8, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a report which I have received from
Captain W . H enderson, Naval Attaché to Ilis M ajesty’ s Embassy, on the recent
Annual Meeting of the German “ Flottenverein.”
I have, Ac.
W . E . GOSCH EN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 51G.

Captain H enderson to Sir E . G oschen .( 2)

(No. 23.) Confidential.

Sir, Berlin, June 1, 1914.
I have the honour to report that the annual general meeting of the “ Flotten­
verein ,” under the presidency of Grand-Admiral von Koester, took place at Breslau
on the 24th M ay in the presence of Prince Frederick W illiam of Prussia.
The German Admiralty and Colonial Office were officially represented, the former
by the head of the “ Nachrichten B u rea u ” (Press Department of the Admiralty.
The following resolution was unanim ously adopted :—
“ W hile taking into consideration the growing expense of the German fleet,
the ‘ F lotten verein ’ stands for an energetic carrying through of the Fleet Law,
particularly for the solution of the cruiser question by adherence to a 3-ship
tempo, for the raising of sufficient personnel, and for the em ploym ent o f existing
ships according to Fleet L a w .”
The gist of the speeches is appended hereto.
I have, Ac.
W IL F E E D H E N D E E SO N ,
Naval A ttaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 516.

Gist of S peeches.

Grand-Adm iral von Koester, in the course o f a long speech, said t h a t :—

“ The ‘ F lotten verein ’ must work with the object o f ensuring that the
provisions of the Fleet Law are fully com plied with by 1920. To this object
belong the 3-ship tempo, the existing shortage of personnel, and that the ships
in reserve shall have their reserve com plements increased to at least the half
of their full com plements instead of one-quarter, as at present.
“ It is essential that sufficient personnel shall be available to put the entire
fleet on a war footing within a few days.
“ The exchange of 3 ‘ Preussens ’ during the year for 3 new ships, and the
relegating of the form er to the reserve, was a measure that had surprised the

(*) [T h is d espa tch is en d orsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g and to th e C a binet. A

co p y was sent to the A d m ira lty .]
( 2) [T h e te x t o f these enclosures has been ta k en from th e C onfid en tial P r in t as th e o rig in a l
docu m en t was sent to the A d m ira lty .]
 752

‘ Flottenverein,' and would cause an unexpected and sensible weakening of the

Second Division.
“ The older armoured cruisers were ageing prematurely, and those in the
Far East could only be regarded as cruisers.
“ The full 3-ship tempo must be adopted and new ships built to replace
those which do not correspond to modern requirements.
“ It was satisfactory that the admitted dearth of cruisers had been
emphasised by sending battleships on a cruise abroad, but it could not be denied
that their absence had been a severely felt disadvantage to the fleet. They
were in no way a suitable substitute for the* desired ‘ flying squadron.’
“ The 1 6 : 10 proportion was hardly heard of now adays; people only spoke
o f a 2 0 : 10 proportion, and, if Unionists had their way in E ngland, the dispro­
portion would be greater still.
“ It must not be forgotten that the improvement in Anglo-Germ an relations
coincided with the strengthening of the German fleet.’ ’

The speech ended with the statement that France possessed 13 battleships in
service, 10 under construction, and 4 projected for 1915. Russia will shortly have
at lier disposal a very valuable modern squadron of armoured ships.
The foregoing was followed by a speech delivered by Professor W olff, o f Berlin,
on the econom ic position of England and Germany.
P rofessor W olff said that the British merchant fleet amounted to 12,000,000
register tons against 3,000,000 G erm an; the English output o f coal is worth nearly
a milliard m o re ; and England had 56,000,000 cotton spindles running against
hardly 11,000,000 German.
In some industries, such as iron, steel, and electricity, England w-as behind
Germany.
There could be no doubt that the financial reserves of Germany were greater
than those of England.
The total burden of taxation in Germany amounts to some 4 -3 m illiards; in
E ngland, owing to the Lloyd George finance reform of 1914, it will reach
4 -9 milliards.
The British nation therefore pays 6,000,000 M. more in taxes than the German
nation. At the same time, the German population is 20,000,000 more num erous;
the German national wealth 50,000,000 higher than the E n g lis h ; the English
national incom e amounts to the same as the German, v iz., 40 milliards.
E ngland’ s high burden o f taxation is attributable to her fleet, arm y, and debt.
It will be very difficult to increase the L loyd Georgian incom e and inheritance taxes—
the form er 13 per cent, and the latter 21 per cent.— even from children.
It was to he feared that the result of all this wrould be that English capitalists
would evade these taxes. The principal indirect taxes, v iz., spirits and tobacco, are
not capable of being raised any further.
It was o f the greatest importance that Germany has at her disposal much
stronger reserves o f taxation than E ngland.
E ngland therefore need not hope that by forcing armaments Germany will be
the first to lose her breath.

M IN U T E S .

I t is o f in terest to n ote th a t the G erm an G o v [e rn in e n ]t w ere officially rep resen ted at the
m eeting. T he b urd en o f the a rg u m en ts used is th a t—
(а) B e tte r relation s w ith E n g la n d are du e to E n g lish fea r o f the G erm an navy.
(б ) E n g lan d is a t the end o f her finan cial resources w hilst G erm any is m ore lig h tly ta xed
and at the sam e tim e has la rg er ca p ita l reserves to draw upon.
E. A. C.
J u n e 10.
A. N.
 753
T he com p arison as to ta x a tio n seems to have been very cru d e, e.g., th ere w ere no ded u c­
tions from ou r ta x a tio n fo r rep ay m en t o f debt o r con trib u tion s fo r local purposes.
F. D . A.
T he G erm an levy on ca p ita l did not look as if G erm an reserves w ere g re a te r th a n ours.
E. G.

No. 517.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . N icolson J1)

Private. ( 2'
M y dear Xicolson, Berlin, June 13, 1914.
. . . .( 3) The papers are attributing considerable political importance to the fact
that Tirpitz has accompanied the Em peror to Konopischt, all the more that the
Head of the Austro-Hungarian Navy is said to be there too. It has been officially
denied that anything of a naval-political nature will be discussed, and you will
remember that Jagow went out of his way to tell me the same thing. But for m yself
I don’ t in the least see why between Allies anything they like should not be discussed,
and it is difficult to imagine that with the Heads o f the two Navies together the
conversations will not extend over the whole naval field. Talking of naval matters,
most o f the Berlin papers, and especially, of course, the Tageblatt, have received
Sir E. G rey's statement respecting an Anglo-Bussian Naval understanding C4' with
considerable scepticism, in fact they point out that they have always said that
Sir E. Grey would deny the truth of the rumours on that subject and that his denial
need not be taken too seriously.
As yet the Press has written quite soberly and sensibly about the visit of the
British squadron to K iel, and say that, though of course it is a sign that Anglo-
I German relations are steadily im proving, too much political importance must not
! be attached to the visit..............(5)
Yours very sincerelv,
‘ W . E . GOSCH EN.

G) [T his le tte r is en d orsed as h a vin g b een sent to th e K in g an d to th e P rim e M in ister.

T he endorsem en t is in itia lle d b v S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
(2) [C a r n o ck M S S ., V ol. I l l o f 1914.]
(3) [T h e first p a ra g ra p h o f th is le tte r refers to a con v ersa tion w ith H e r r von J a g o w on
th e subject o f A lba n ia. It adds n oth in g o f im p o rta n ce to th e m a teria l p r in te d elsew here.]
(4) [i\ in fra , p. SOI, N o. 543.]
( 5) [T h e o m itte d pa ra g ra p h s re fe r to v a riou s m in or subjects, b u t co n ta in n o th in g of
im p orta n ce.]

[10900]
 754

C H A P TE R XCVIII.

RUSSIAN R E LA TIO N S W ITH GER M A N Y AND

G R E A T BRITAIN , M ARCH JULY, 1914.

I.— RU SSO-GERM AN TENSION, MARCH 1914.

[E D . N O T E .— F o r the su b ject o f this section cp. S ir G. B uchanan : M y M ission to Itussia
and O th er D ip lo m a tic M em ories, (1923), V ol. I, pp. 1 8 2 -3 ; G .P., X X X I X , pp. 533-89, Chapter
C C IC , passim , cp. also A n ton J u x : D e r K r ieg ss ch r eck en des F rü h jah rs 1914 in d er euro­
p ä isch en P res se (B e rlin -C h a r lo tte n b u rg 1929), and com m ents by J. F. S co tt in J ournal of
M o d e rn H isto r y , D ecem b er 1931, pp. 636-7. R eferen ces occu r also in Im peria lism u s, 1st Ser.,
V ols. I —I I , passim .]
Xo. 518.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G r e y .j1)

F .O . 10302/10302/11 18.
(X o. 95.) Berlin, D. March G, 1914.
Sir, II. March 9, 1914.
In view of the nervousness prevailing in Vienna in regard to Russian intentions,
reported by Sir M. de Bunsen in his despatch X o. 32 of the 13th ultim o,I an article
upon the subject o f Russo-German relations which was recently contributed to the
“ Cologne G a zette’ ’ by its St. Petersburg correspondent, is not without interest.
This article declared that Russia was certainly not at the moment in a position
to support by force of arms any political pressure she might desire to exert. It
would he folly for Russian diplomacy to set at stake its last weapon before it had been
perfected. Xo apprehensions need therefore be entertained as to any immediate
danger o f war from Russia, however loudly the Russian sabre might be rattled in
its scabbard by the French. Of course in three or four years time the value of the
Russian army would he a very different affair. The amelioration of Russia’ s financial
situation and the raising of her credit had set her on the path o f progress, the goal
of which would be attained in the autumn of 1917, should there meanwhile be no
interruption. The com pletion of her artillery and war material was being pushed
forward on an unexampled scale, without waiting for the final establishment of the
gigantic arsenals at Zaritzin on the Volga, in the heart of Russia.
During the war fever in the spring of 1913. the want of siege artillery was
sharply felt. It was not love of mankind, nor a Christian desire for peace, that
kept Russia back from crossing the German and Austrian frontiers. Had the Russians
possessed guns to shell the German forts in East Prussia, the Commander of their
forces on the Vilna, General von Rennenkam nf, who at the time made several
significant visits to Petersburg, would have gladly set his troops to lay waste the rich
lands on the German side o f the frontier. This want of artillery was very clearly
recognised by the French allies. Against whom would Russian policy be most inclined
to direct the weapon, which would he at its disposal in a fevl years? Two years ago
it was hinted, and now openly said— even in official military periodicals— that Russia
was arming for a war against Germ any. Just as surely as, during the Russo-
Japanese war. Germany allowed Russia to withdraw her best troops from the Polish
frontier, would Russia com pel Germany to retain at the least a large force on the
Eastern frontier if the latter were engaged in war with her face to the W est. The
official Russian policy should at any rate serve to destroy once and for all the legend
of historical Russo-German friendship.
0 ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and t o the C abin et.]
( 2) [i;. Gooch d: Tcmperlcy, V ol. X (I ), pp. 310-1, X o. 346.]
 755
The article appeared almost simultaneously with one couched in a somewhat
similar strain in the “ G erm ania,” the Centre organ, and has excited considerable
com m ent in the Press generally.
The “ Berliner Tageblatt " in a leader scoffed at the alarmist nature of the
article, and put forward the opinion that it was the work of irresponsible persons.
It believed that these pessimistic views were not shared by diplomatic circles in
Germany. It had, of course, for a long time been known that Russia was reorganising
, her arm y, but everybody knew that this was being done in view o f certain obligations
which Russia had undertaken vis-a-vis of France. The language o f the Russian Press
had certainly been very unfriendly towards Germ any, esptcially since the despatch
of the military mission to Constantinople. But in responsible circles there was held
to be absolutely no reason for any uneasiness at the present moment.
The “ Vossische Z< itung ” also threw cold water on the Cologne Gazette article,
and observed that it was a most curious coincidence that Mr. Ram sey [s ic ] MacDonald
— just before the publication of the article— should have stated in the H ouse of
Commons that “ everything pointed to the probability that in Germany the
armament firms were about toorganise a panic as a means of exerting pressure on
the G overnm ent.” The “ Vossische Zeitung ” goes on to say that such a panic
would also be very welcome to those who might desire to make further demands in
regard to the “ W ehrbeitrag.” It points out. however, that whatever may be the
motive of the article in question, it will certainly suffer the fate of previous alarmist
articles, such as the famous “ W ar in s ig h t ” and “ On the edge of the K n ife ,”
and fail to excite a panic. It had been a long established axiom that, in the words
of Bismarck, “ to force a war before on e’ s opponent had completed his armaments,
was like com m itting suicide through fear o f death .”
It might well be that Russian policy was not at the moment very friendly to
Germany, and that the Russian forces on the frontier were being strengthened at
the instance of France. But all that was nothing new. W hen Bism arck, however,
conducted German policy no panic-stricken talk was indulged in, but Germany quietly
took her own counter-measures. She should, o f course, continue to prepare herself
against any unpleasant surprise, but should on no account allow herself to get
nervous or excited over the doings o f her neighbours. It was a matter of indifference
that Russia should be in a state of readiness for war by the autumn o f 1917. Much
might happen before then to render a war between the two Empires impossible. In
i any case it was a matter of importance for com m erce and industry that confidence
in peace should be restored, and it was sincerely to be hoped that the bacillus of
unrest would not fructify.
The “ Lokal-Anzeiger ” published an article in much the same sense as that
of the “ Vossische Z eitu n g .” pointing out that more harm than good would be done
by attempts to arouse alarm over the very natural desire on the part of Russia to
reorganise her arm y. It further quoted a denial by the Petersburg organ of the
Russian Finance Ministry that there is the slightest foundation for the statements
of the Cologne Gazette.
It is somewhat significant that a sharp fall was experienced yesterday on the
Berlin Bourse, which m ay almost certainly be ascribed to the Cologne Gazette
article.
I have. tS:e.
W . E . GO SCH EN.
M IN U T E .
M. S a zon of has taken u m brage at th e a rticle in th e C ologn e G azette.
I t has been p oin ted ou t th a t A u stria n m ilita ry ex pa n sion s are b e in g pushed on m uch
m ore ra p id lv th a n the R ussian m easures.
R G. V .
M a rch 9.
R S
E. G.

[10900] 3 C 2
 75G

N o. 519.
Sir M . de Bunsen to Sir Edward G r e y .{ 1)

F.O . 1 03 9 9 /0 9 0 1 /1 4 /3 .
(No. 43.) Vienna, D. March G, 1914.
Sir, R . M arch 9, 1914.
A renewed outcry against the suspected hostile designs of Russia has been
occasioned by an article in the Vienna “ M ilitarise® R undschau,” attributing to the
Russian Military Authorities the intention to hold in the com ing spring an extensive
series o f manoeuvres designed to test the capacity of the army for rapid mobilization.
The cost of the proposed exercises is given at something over ten millions sterling.
After striking this note of alarm, the inspired military organ concludes with the
advice to its readers not to take the matter too seriously. France having supplied
Russia with ample means for m ilitary purposes, it is not unnatural that the latter
country should utilize the present period of peace to put its army through a thorough
course o f instruction, and it is unnecessary to assume any hostile intention, at least
for the present.
These smooth phrases have not sufficed to lay the public apprehension, and,
though I have not •heard the matter mentioned during m y conversations at the
Ballplatz, it cannot be denied that a certain vague uneasiness continues to exist with
regard to possible Russian schemes of aggression. These are generally held here to
be directed against Austria-H ungary, and, judging from numerous articles in the
Press, their object is supposed to be the invasion of Galicia and the shifting of the
Russian frontier southwards to the Carpathians.
On the other hand a widely quoted article from the Cologne Gazette attributes
the Russian warlike preparations to the insistence o f France, which is said not to be
satisfied with the capacity of Russia to co-operate effectively with the French army
in the event o f a European war, and to require that the Russian army should be
re-distributed in a manner to enable it to be launched against Germany rather than
against Austria-H ungary. To-day a telegram from St. Petersburg, published in the
newspapers, denies the whole story of the proposed test mobilization. The irritation
against Russia is however not at all likely to cease. Frontier incidents are of almost
daily occurrence along the Galician border, which is said to be infested with Russian
spies. The flame has been fanned by the verbatim reports which have heen allowed
to be published o f the trial o f an Austrian officer and of his brother the former of
whom was sentenced to nineteen and the latter, in the Civil Court, to under five
years imprisonment for the sale o f military secrets to the late Russian Military
Attache, Colonel Zankiewutch. The part played by the latter in suborning Austrian
officers was related in detail in the colum ns o f the Press, from which it has always
been customary in the past to exclude the names of implicated foreign officers. The
‘ ‘ Neue Freie Presse ” made these disclosures the text of a violent article against
the activity of Military Attaches in general, but pointed out that the Russian Military
Attaches had always been the greatest offenders in this respect. The popular
animus against Russia has been further stirred by the trial of the Ruthenian priests
and peasants, 32 o f whom have been at last convicted at Marmaros Sziget in Eastern
H ungary o f having been made the victims of an organised Russian attempt to under­
mine their allegiance to the Dual M onarchy. The unwillingness o f Servia to come
to terms with this country in the matter of the Oriental Railways is also ascribed
here to Russian influence, and the suspected understanding between Servia, Greece
and R oum ania,(2) in view of a possible renewed disturbance of the peace in the Balkan
peninsula, is regarded as affording further evidence o f the activity of Russia in
re-establishing her influence in those regions b y seeking to promote the formation

( ') [T h is despatch is en d orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to th e C abinet.]

Vs) [cp. Gooch & Temperley, V ol. I X (I I ), p. 986, N o. 1 24 0; p. 1001, N o. 1257.]
 757

of a new Balkan league., with its point directed this time against Austria-Hungary
alone. Some consolation is derived from the alleged failure of Russia to induce
Bulgaria to join the league in question, and Albania is advised to join forces with
that country in resisting Servian, that is. Panslavist Russian., aggression.
The fear o f Russia is perhaps partly feigr.ed as a means o f securing the assent
of the Austrian Reiehsrat to the increased armaments already sanctioned by the
Delegations and by the Hungarian Chamber, as well as to those to be brought
forward this summer for the service o f the years 1914 and 1915: but some real
apprehension undoubtedly does exist in the public mind, and great emphasis is
consequently laid in the daily Press on the closeness o f the tics by which the Powers
of the Tripie Alliance are said to be more than ever united in a com m on policy of
defence against assanlt from whatever quarter. Special strt ss is laid, in this
connection, on the friendly attitude o f Italy, which is represented as seeing eye
to eye with this country in all matters relating to the Balkans and to the Adriatic.
This point is brought out in an autograph letter adlressed a few days ago b y the
Em peror Francis Joseph to the Due Avarna, Italian Ambassador, on the com pletion
by him of ten years’ activity here in that capacity. His E xcellency is thanked by
the Em peror for having contributed materially by his personal efforts to bring about
the relation o f intimate friendship so necessary for the maintenance o f the joint
interests o f the two countries. The Duke has also received from the King o f Italy
the Grand Cross o f the Order o f the Annunziata on this occasion. Great importance
is already ascribed to the anticipated effects o f the promised visit o f the Marquis di
San Giuliano to Count Berchtold at Abbazia in April next. The conversations of
these two Statesmen are expected to confirm in a conspicuous manner the identity
of the views o f the two Governments in the questions now calling more especially
for their attention.
Monsieur Sehebeko, the new Russian Ambassador, who only came to Vienna
in December last to present his credentials and has sirce been absent in Russia,
is expected in a day or two to take up his post here.
I have. &e.
M A U RIC E D E B U N SEN .
M IN U T E .

I t ca n h a rd ly be a ccid en ta l th a t th e R u ssia n scare should b rea k out sim ultaneously in

both G erm anv and A ustria.
R . S.
E. A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 11.
E. G

No. 520.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey.(x)

St. Petersbnrgh, March S, 1914.
F.O. 10266M 0 0 3 5 '14/3S . D. 8 -3 0 p . m .
Tel. (No. 67.1 Confidential. R. 10 p . m .
M y telegram No. 64 of 6 M arch/2) : German P r: ss.
Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that German Ambassador had
assured him that he had nothing whatever to do with the article in the “ Cologne

( 1) [A cop y o f this teleg ra m was sent t o th e D ir e c t o r o f M ilita r y O perations, m arked

“ C on fid en tia l.” ]
( 2) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s teleg ram (N o. 64), D . M a rch 6, 1914, S p . m ., R . 10-30 p . m ., is n ot
rep rod u ced . I t sta ted th a t M . S azonov was a n n oyed at th e aggressive ton e o f an a rtic le on
R u ssia in th e K ö ln isc h e Z eitu n g , and th a t he had in stru cted th e R u ssia n A m bassador in B erlin
“ in a fr ie n d ly m a n n e r ” t o ca ll the a tten tion o f H e r r v on J a g ow to the a rticle in q uestion.
(F .O . 1 0 0 3 5 /1 0 0 3 5 ,1 4 /3 8 .) cp. supra, pp. 754-5, N o. 513.]
 758

Gazette.” (3) His Excellency added that he had accepted these assurances in a friendly
spirit as he did not attach importance to incident, but that he knew as a fact that
article had been inspired by Counsellor o f German Embassy.
Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that projected Russian armaments were
for purely defensive purposes. Russia had to defend extended frontier on side of
Austria and Germany, and to be on her guard against Japan in the Far East.
Measures she was about to take would in three years’ time add some 460,000 men to
her peace effective.

M IN U T E .
It does look as if th e G erm an G o v [e r n m e n jt press-burcau w ere w ork in g u p a w ar-scare for
som e u lte r io r purpose.
E. A. C.
M [a r ]c h 9.
E. G.
(•'') [rp. G .P., X X X f X , pp. 547-50, and notes.]

No. 521.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir E . Goschen. (*)

F .O . 1 1 1 5 8 /1 0 03 5 /1 4 /3 8.
(No. 58.)
Sir, Foreign Office, March 10, 1914.
The German Ambassador, having spoken to me to-day(2) about the mistake in
Athens, as recorded in my telegram, number 68 to Your E xcellency,(3) observed that
he hoped that the incident would not be taken notice of in the Press, as this would
be unfortunate, especially at the m oment when there was trouble in the Press about
Russia.
I said that, as far as I was concerned, I had had the news about the communica­
tion in Athens in m y possession for two days without taking any notice of it; but
now that it had been announced in the Greek Chamber of course it must be known.
I also said that if the Powers took to acting separately we should have to
consider whether we should not withdraw altogether from Albania.
As the Ambassador had spoken of the agitation in the German Press about
Russia, I said that I was unable to understand from what it arose. Since the question
of the German Command in Constantinople had been settled, (4) now some six weeks
ago, M. Sazonof had, so far as I could recollect, not referred to that question; and,
neither in anything that M. Sazonof had said to m e, nor in anything that Count
Benckendorff had said, was there any indication whatever that there was anything
in the Russian mind, or any question pending between Russia and Germany, to give
rise to the apprehension that was being expressed in the German Press.
Prince Lichnowsky said that the German Press must not be regarded as officially
inspired, or as necessarily deciding German opinion : especially what was called tlio
Pan-Germ an chauvinistic Press. H e him self was unable to understand what was
the origin of this agitation. There was nothing of which he was aware to cause it,
unless it wTas the creation of nevT Russian Arm y Corps towards the Austrian frontier.

(*) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a bin et.]
( 2) \rp. G .P., X X X I X , pp. 5 5 7 -8 .]
(3) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 68), o f M a rch 10, 1914, D. 11 p . m ., is n ot reproduced.
I t referred to a com m u n ica tion m ade in A thens on M a rch 8, 1914, bv rep resen ta tives o f the
T rip le A llian ce reg a rd in g th e reorga n isa tion o f A lbania. (F .O . 1 0 8 4 3 /1 0 2 5 9 /1 3 /5 3 .) v. G ooch <i
T em p erley, V ol. X (1), pp. 108-9, X o. 123, and w in.-, rp. also ibid., pp. 110-1, X o. 124, and
v o te (4).]
(*) [u. G ooch & T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 338-423, C h a pter L X X X V I I , passim .]
 759

I said that of course the Russian Arm y was growing stronger, but I had no
indication of any sort that it was being strengthened with anv aggressive purpose,
or with reference to any particular question now pending between Germany and
Russia. The danger of a Press campaign was that it made the public opinion in
each of the two countries concerned think that there was illwill on the part of the
other co u n try : and. once this was presumed, though most incidents were accidental,
any incident that happened to occur was looked upon in an unnatural light and
attributed to some sinister m otive.
[I am. &e.]
E . G [R E Y ],

No. 522.

Sir Eduard G rey to Sir G. Buchanan. 1

F.O. 11161 10035 14 3S.
(No. 97.)
bir- Foreign Oijicc, March 10. 1914.
I asked Count Benekendorff to-d ay(2) whether he could account for the Press
campaign in Germany about Russia. I was puzzled bv it.
Count Benekendorff said that he was entirely unable to account for it. H e knew
of nothing to justify it. The explanation given in the Press : that it was designed to
secure an easy passage for German Arm y Estimates did not seem to him sufficient
to account for a Press campaign of such dimensions.
[I am, &c.J
E. G [B E Y ].

0 ) [T h is d espa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g an d t o the C a b iu et.l

( 2) [cp. Im perialism us. 1st S er., V ol. I. p. 421. X o . 421.]

No. 523.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G r ey .(l

F.O. 10946 10302, 14 IS.

(No. 100. Berlin, D. March 10, 1914.
Sir, R. March 12 , 1914.
W ith reference to m y despatch No. 95 of the 6th instant,'2) I have the honour
1 to report that the German press continues to show great interest in the alarmist article
\ on Russo-German relations published in the Cologne Gazette. This paper has
I denied that there was any official inspiration for the article, which, it states, emanated
from its Petersburg correspondent. It adds that there was also no reason for the
1 imputations which had appeared in various organs as to there being any ulterior object
for its publication. This is, no doubt, meant to refer to the suggestion that the article
had been inspired by the arms manufacturers, as a means of exerting pressure on the
Government. The Cologne Gazette has, further, published a Berlin telegram
ridiculing the idea of the Berlin correspondent of the " Tem ps,” that the fall on the
.B ourse was due to the belief that the article had been officially inspired, with a view
to preparing the way for further demands in connection with armaments.

( 1) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to th e C a b in et.]

( 2) [» . sunra, pp. 754-5, X o . 518 ]
 760
The “ Lokal-Anzeiger ” had pointed out in a leading article that the conclusion
of a satisfactory commercial convention between Germany and Russia was already
difficult enough, and that the publication o f articles which were calculated to embitter
relations between the two countries would only increase the difficulties o f the task.
The “ Lokal-Anzeiger ” however itself adds fresh fuel to the flame in an article
published last night. In this article it says that in all the flood o f talk about Russo-
German relations one thing was clear, nam ely, that neither the German Embassy in
St. Petersburg nor the German Foreign Office had originated the present movement.
Both the Russian and the German Governments were actuated by the steadfast desire
to maintain peace : of this sufficient evidence had been given in connection both with
General Lim an von Sanders’ m ission(3) and with the unfriendly statements made in
the sitting of the committee of the Duma. It was a pity that in the present discussions
so m uch weight had been attached to Russian armaments, for unfortunately every
nation was arming, and Russia was m erely pursuing a.program m e which was already
known in German official circles. It would have been better if attention had rather
been drawn to the unscrupulous stirring up of public opinion in Russia which had been
going on for years past, and which m ight one day suddenly exhaust the patience of
the German nation. “ In the almost unanimous attitude of our Press o f all shades
of opinion in opposing the torrent of foul abuse and misrepresentation which has for
years past been hurled uninterruptedly upon us from over the border, we see the proof
that precisely at the present moment such a change of opinion as this must seriously
be reckoned with.”
It must, it says, be recognised with regret that all G erm any’ s forbearance and
consideration for Russia had met with nothing but hatred, mistrust and ingratitude.
Though the Russian people were as peacefully inclined as were the Germans, there
was no sufficient counterpoise to the agitation of an unscrupulous Press “ and that
fact filled one with grave m isgiving.”
E ven the Radical “ Tageblatt,” which generally is opposed to all forms of
Chauvinism, printed yesterday an article by an anonymous writer, who is described
editorially as a “ prominent personage experienced in all branches of international
politics,” in which it was urged that a stop must be put once for all to Russia’ s
pretensions, if necessary by the sword. I am forwarding in a separate despatch a
translation of this article, which presents certain features of interest, in view o f the
political com plexion o f the ‘ ‘ Tageblatt,” and the weight which the Editor, whilst
deprecating the idea of a preventive war, attaches to the opinions of the writer.
Today the “ L ok a l-A n zeig er” somewhat changes its tone. In an article which
has the appearance of semi-official inspiration, it says that its attention has been
drawn in “ com petent q u a rters” to two circumstances which were calculated to set
matters in their true light. The first was the fact that Germany and Russia were still
working together in harm ony over the Arm enian question,(4) and the second, that
the plans for the E m peror’ s journey to Corfu had not been changed.(5) Could it be
assumed for a m oment, it asks, that the Em peror would make up his mind to leave the
country for an indefinite period if the slightest cloud obscured the political horizon?
It could, it continues, not be repeated too often that the present situation was
m erely the result of a press cam paign with which neither Governm ent had anything
to do. The most regrettable feature of the controversy was that it must cause the
liveliest satisfaction to the French press which could not fail to pour oil upon the
fire. It was to be hoped that the German press would not play into their hands by
replying to the French insinuations. The true designs of the French press were
clearly shown by the publication in a Paris newspaper of an entirely unfounded report
to the effect that the Russian Ambassador at Berlin had protested against the article
in the Cologne Gazette. If German Ambassadors abroad were to busy themselves

(3) [cp . G ooch 11- T em p erley, V ol. X (I ), pp. 338-423, C h a p ter L X X X V I I , passim .]
(4) [cp . ibid., pp. 424-525, C h a p ter L X X X V I I I , passim .]
(5) [F o r the E m p eror W illia m ’ s v isit to C orfu cp. ibid., pp. 251-2, N o. 272, and n o te (2).]
 761
in exacting disclaimers of newspaper articles from the Governments to which they
were accredited, they would have no time left for anything else.
As a specimen of the n ew s of the more Chauvinistic section of the Press I may
quote some extracts from an article by the notorious General Bernhardi, which
appeared in the “ P o s t ” of the 7th instant. This article, which is entitled “ The
Dangers o f the Military Situation,” is chiefly directed against the development of the
French Arm y, and suggests that France is secretly planning to surprise and capture
Metz. General Bernhardi also makes a good deal of capital out of the anti-Bussian
agitation and reproduces the usual alarmist reports with regard to Russian military
preparations. It continues :—
“ And so France, it seems, holds today all the trumps in her hand. If she means
to play the game at all she must begin it without delay. H er only rem aining task is
so to open the contest that Russia and E ngland must join in with her, and that
Austria should be as much fettered as possible in the Balkans.
“ And what conclusions ought we to draw from this situation? I cannot, of
course, judge what is possible or impossible from the purely political point of view.
But one thing is certain : we must be prepared for every eventuality and therefore
even for a war in the immediate future, and we must make ready for it from a military
point of view with every means in our power. If we wish to regard the future with
any confidence, we must devote our last man and our last penny to increasing our war
strength both at sea and on land. At the same time we must reckon with the
possibility o f a strategic coup ’ on the part of the so-called French ‘ covering troops ’
(Deckungstruppenh and we must on the other hand remember also that the
probability o f victory increases if we succeed in taking the initiative ourselves, in
beginning the war in either one direction or the other with a strategical offensive and
in proceeding on offensive lines even in defence.............

“ In 1913 it was still impossible to foresee the m ighty m ilitary preparations of

Russia and the army increases in France. In consequence thereof a com pletely new
situation has been created which, in m y opinion, demands new measures on our part
as well.”
I have, Ac.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

No. 524.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 11295/10302/14 18.

(No. 107.) Berlin, D. March 1 1 , 1914.
Sir, R . March 14, 1914.
W ith reference to m y despatch No. 100 o f yesterday’ s d ate,(l) I have the honour
to report that the Frankfort Gazette has now published an apparently inspired
telegram from Berlin which aims at reassuring the public in regard to Russo-German
relations.(2)
This telegram points out that, in all the flood of printed matter which had
resulted from the recent article in the Cologne Gazette, absolutely no facts or
I arguments had been em ployed which might not have been equally well brought
forward at any time during the past twelve m onths. As a matter o f fact the relations
between Germ any and Russia had not of late changed for the worse. The Press
I 0 ) [ v . im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
I (2) [cj>. M . de S v erb eiev ’ s re p o rt on M a rch 12, 1914, o f a con v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on J ag ow ,
an d his com m en ts on the press ca m pa ig n . Im p eria lism u s, l s f S er., V o l. I, pp . 435-8, N o. 434.
I T here is an ex tra ct in S ieb er t, p. 711.]

I
 70*2
controversy over the German military mission to Turkey had been greatly exaggerated
and had in no wav affected Russo-German relations. The same might be said of
Paissian armaments, for, as had already been pointed out, it was known that a
reorganisation of the Russian army was impending and had indeed begun, at the time
when the big German Arm y Bill was introduced. The assertion, also, which had
appeared in some newspapers that prominent officials of the Imperial Foreign Office
had expressed pessimistic views as to G erm any’ s relations to Russia. was entirely
devoid of foundation.
It was easy enough at any time to enlarge upon the dangers of Panslavism,
especially when supported by French Chauvinism. Discussions similar to those now
going on as to an approaching conflict with Russia had constantly arisen in the past,
when, as for instance in 1888, they had been supported by precisely similar arguments
to those at present employed. The “ Vossische Zeitung ” had aptly quoted a speech
made by Prince Bismarck in the year above mentioned, in which he had scoffed at
the idea that the concentration of Russian troops near the German and Austrian
frontiers need constitute a source o f anxiety for Germany. It was useless, he had
said, to make official representations against such concentrations— the proper course
for Germ any to pursue was to adopt precautionary measures. This advice held good
in the present juncture, and the necessary counter-measures had been taken by the
passage of the last Arm y Bill and the voting of the armaments contribution.
Professor Schiem ann’ s weekly article in the “ Ivreuz-Zeitnng ” is. of course,
largely devoted to a discussion of Russo-German relations. lie accuses the Russian
Press of a persistent animosity against Germany and Austria and he expresses
indignation that the Russian nationalist organs should represent the “ after all very
moderate ” article in the Cologne Gazette as an open attack on Russia. The attitude
of Germ any and Austria was a defensive one, and their military preparations had for
their object the defeat and punishment of any aggressive movem ent on the part of
their Eastern and W estern neighbours, which seemed to he ever growing more
im m inent— “ that the two countries were acting together there could be no doubt.’ ’
I have, &c.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

No 525.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 11537'10035 14/38.

(No. 113.) ' Berlin, D. March 13, 1914.
Sir, R. March 16, 1914.
W ith reference to m y despatch No. 107 of the 11 th Instant,/2) 1 have the honour
to report that the North German Gazette of this evening contains a semi-official
com m unique, in reply to the pacific declarations of M. Sasonow and the “ Rossia,” of
which the following is a translation.
“ The Petersburg Bourse Gazette is reported by telegraph to have published
an article, which, whilst emphasising the pacific tendencies of the policy of the
Emperor, lays stress upon the excellence of the Russian army and its readiness
for an offensive war. W e do not feel that we need criticise this praise of the
Russian Army, which is doubtless fully justified, but we are also unable to deduce
from it any grounds for uneasiness. There is rather reason for confidence that
such discussions, conducted in a tone of military superiority, can disturb the good
relations existing between the two Governm ents, as little as the unjustifiably

C ) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g ; to th e P rim e M in ister;

to L o rd C rew e ; to L ord M orley .]
( 2) [v. im m ed ia tely preced in g docu m en t.]
 763
alarmist article, which was recently published in a German newspaper from
its Petersburg correspondent. It would above all be wrong to see any particular
significance in the recurrence of well-worn attempts by scribblers in the Press to
endanger by nationalist agitation the firm and sincere official policv of peace.
e quite agree with the “ Rossia,” that the Governments of the two neighbouring
Empires cannot intend to place a cross against the “ Legend ” of Russo-German
friendship.”

H err to n Jagow told me this afternoon in conversation that he was going to

publish the above communique in the North German Gazette, as he considered that
the stir made by the article in the Cologne Gazette was assuming a rather
exaggerated form , and had gone on too long. H e had not been surprised that the
German Press had taken the matter up with such warmth, because during the last
month or two certain portions of the Russian Press had w-ritten so violentlv against
Germany that public opinion here had becom e more and more excited. This was so
much the case that, as he had told the Russian Ambassador, it would have been out
of the power o f the Government to allay the storm which had been raised by the article
in the Cologne Gazette, or to prevent the latter from being published. " The Press
had evidently been looking for an opportunity to retaliate upon the Russian Press
and this opportunity they had found in the article in question. H err von Jagow
also said that he had told M. Sverbeev that, though it was true that the Imperial
Foreign Office sometimes used the Cologne Gazette for semi-official communications,
it had nothing to do with articles signed by their correspondents either at hom e or
abroad.
Although H err von Jagow deplored to me the fact that a newspaper article signed
by a correspondent should raise such a storm, I rather gathered from his conversation
that he might have done more to prevent it reaching such a pitch, had he not thought
that the unfriendliness recently displayed by Russia, not only in the Press but also°to
a certain extent by the Russian Governm ent, merited some little retaliation.
I have, &c.
W . E. GOSCHEN.

M IN U T E S .

It is really absurd fo r H e r r v on J a g ow to th in k th a t a n yb ody w ill b elieve his d iscla im er of

resp on sib ility fo r this press ca m pa ig n . T he w ay th is ca m p a ig n was con d u cted is to anyone
fa m ilia r w ith th e classic w ork o f M. B usch con clu siv e ev id en ce o f the a u th orsh ip o f the F o re ig n
Office press-bureau, w hich w orks u nd er H e r r von J a g o w ’ s orders.
E. A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 17.
T he only results o f the press ca m p a ig n have been a v e ry con sid era ble in crea se o f E u s sia ’ s
peace establishm ent and also o f a feelin g o f h ostility to G erm a ny— h a rd lv results w hich are of
a d v an ta g e to G erm any.
A. X.
E. G

No. 526.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 11514 '10035 14 38.

(No. 53.) Confidential. Vienna, 1). March 13, 1914.
S ir> R . March 16, 1914.
The newspaper war between Russia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary and
Germam T on the other, still occasions uneasiness in Vienna, but though I have "heard

0 ) [T h is d esp a tch is endorsed as h a vin g been sen t to th e K i n g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ;

to L o rd C r e w e ; t o L ord M o rle y .]
 764

the subject discussed on all sides I cannot say that I have derived much enlighten­
ment from the various views expressed. There are of course racial, historical, and
geographical reasons of a permanent character sufficient to render difficult at all times
the relations between this M onarchy and Russia. No fait nouveau, however, unless it
be that o f the increased armaments to which Russia is resorting in com m on with the
other great countries of the Continent, is alleged to explain why the present time has
been chosen for a controversy which could be hardly m ore embittered if a war were
on the point o f breaking out. The outburst of ill-feeling is ascribed rather to general
tendencies, such as the dreaded advance of Slavism, than to any concrete cause of
offence on one side or the other, and it is noteworthy that, though this country has
m ore reason to be alarmed in this respect than Germany, the Press attack on
Russia has been decidedly less virulent here than in Berlin. Indeed one or two
articles which I have recently read in the Vienna Press would seem to indicate that
the continuance of the German onslaught is becom ing a little embarrassing here.
M. de Tschirschky, German Ambassador, speaks always with great bitterness of
the attitude of Russia towards his own country. H e has m ore than once described to
me the position of Germany as that of an island threatened to be swamped with the
rising tide of revolution which flows in upon it from the East and from the West. In
his eyes Germany stands for the maintenance on the Continent of the idea of law
and order. France he holds to be a decadent nation, doomed sooner or later to become
the prey o f anarchism. Russia he regards as being in danger o f internal convulsions
which will drive the Czar and his Governm ent into foreign adventures at the dictation
of the Panslavist Party. Russia has been bought by 18 milliards o f French money
and is now the obedient vassal of France in military matters. His Excellency speaks
of recent French demands at St. Petersburg as having induced the Russian Military
Authorities to resort to measures of a very alarming character. To this cause he
ascribes the alleged plans for new lines of strategic railways leading straight to the
German frontier. He points to the retention with the colours of 400,000 men who
have com pleted the ordinary period of service. Germany he believes, has becom e the
prim ary objective of these forces. The attitude of France and her ally has become
distinctly menacing. The situation is well nigh intolerable for the intervening
country. I f Russia succeeds in setting up again the Balkan Alliance, Germany will
be affected thereby almost as directly as her principal ally. She cannot be expected
to acquiesce in a hostile com bination of this kind, which will threaten the very
existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. E ngland will have to choose, sooner
or later, into which scale it will best suit her interests to throw her weight. W ill she
support a Germanic or a Slavonic solution of the pending questions?
The above is perhaps sufficient to show that the ex-Germ an Foreign Minister is
in a very uneasy frame of mind. H e seems firmly convinced that Germany is
entering on a struggle in which she will represent the cause of light against darkness,
and that of civilization against barbarism. H e spoke to me yesterday at some length
to the above effect. I confined m yself to saying that, as a general principle, it was
probable that England would continue to pursue her traditional policy of opposing
the dom ination of any one Power over the rest of Europe, and that she would be
likely to sympathize with the Power she held to have been unjustly attacked. He
said in that case England would be found on the side of Germany, for Germany
would never embark on a war of aggression, as France certainly would if she had the
power. The French quarrel with Germ any was not really due, he added, to the loss
of her Eastern Provinces. B efore the icar of 1870 the Alsatians u e re in little esteem
in F ra n ce.(2) W hat the French could not forgive was their deposition from the
dominant position in Europe, and their hatred o f Germany for having brought this
about would be as intense as it now is even if no territory had been taken from them.
M. de Tschirschky said he did not apprehend any immediate conflagration m

( 2) [M a r g in a l n ote b y S ir E y re C r o w e : “ M . v on T schirschky is v ery ig n o r a n t o f history.

E. A . C .” ]
 765

Europe. The leading statesmen were honestly striving to prevent war. Popular
forces, hovexer, were at work in m any places which might easily compel them to
embark on perilous courses.
I have, &c.
M A U RICE DE BUN SEN .

No. 527.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e g .{1)

St. Petersburgh, March 15, 1914.

F.O . 1 14 5 6 /1 0 03 5 /1 4 /3 8. D. 4 -5 6 p . m .
Tel. (No. 70.) B . 7 -3 0 p . m '
M y telegram No. 6 7 .(2)
E vening edition of “ Bourse G a zette’ ’ published on 12 th March contained
chauvinistic article entitled “ Russia desires peace, but is prepared for w ar,’ ’ which,
! after reciting military measures taken by Russia during last five years, declared that
Russian army had put aside all idea of defensive tactics, and would, should circum -
, stances render it necessary, at once assume offensive.
Following m orning conciliatory article appeared in semi-official “ R ossia,” which
concluded by saying that, although Germany might have cause to complain of having
| been “ b a ite d ’ ’ by Russian press, Russia had equal reasons to complain o f tone of
German press. It did not, however, follow that Russian and German Governments
intended to put an end to Russo-German friendship.
Latter article was inspired by Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me it was
in consequence o f representations made through Russian Ambassador that German
press had now received orders to close anti-Russian campaign.

On m y asking whether it was true that the first-mentioned article had been
inspired by the Minister o f W ar, his E xcellency replied in the negative, though he
I admitted that some o f the details given about military measures m ight have°been
supplied by som e subordinate official of the M i n i s ® of W ar.
On the other hand, a leading member of the staff o f the “ Bourse G azette,’ ’
form erly in the Russian Diplomatic Service, assures me in confidence that the editor
received his instructions direct from the Minister o f W ar, who, in an audience which
he had with the Em peror two days previously, had been authorised to reply to the
* attacks of the German press by a strongly worded article.
French Chargé d ’ Affaires tells me that, at Council of Ministers held on
' 12 th March, Minister for Foreign Affairs had opposed the course advocated by the
I Minister of W ar, but without success. W hether this was the case or not, the French
Charge d ’ Affaires’ inform ation confiim s the fact that the Em peror was much incensed
\ by thè German press campaign, and is determ ined to show that Russia is not gom«?
| to be bullied.
I Unless the article had been officially inspired, the “ Bourse G a zette’ ’ would
have been fined for publishing unauthorised inform ation about Russian armaments.
I am therefore inclined to believe that the article was so inspired, and change of
attitude on the part o f the German press, due to intervention of Minister for F oreign
. Affairs at B erlin, now makes the Russian Government anxious to conceal this fact.
\ If this is the case, it would appear from the simultaneous publication of two such
» contradictory articles that Minister of W ar has won over the Em peror to the adoption
I of a stronger policy than that pursued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that
the position o f the latter would have been com prom ised had not the German Govern­

(*) [T h is teleg ra m was sent to B erlin b y b a g on M a rch 17.]

( 2) [v. supra, pp. 757-8, N o. 520.]
 766

ment, in consequence o f his representations, already put a stop to the press

campaign. U nfortunately, yesterday the “ Novoe Vremya ” published a violent
article which may provoke a reply from the German Governm ent.
It is announced to-day that a conference took place yesterday between the
Government and members representing the different groups of the Duma on the
subject of national defence and foreign policy. The President of the Council, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, the Ministers o f W ar, Marine, and Finance, and the Chief of
the General Staff were present.

No. 528.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edicard G r e y .(l)

F .O . 1 2 7 1 6 ,108 0 2 /1 4 /1 8.
(No. 75.) St. Petersburgh, D. March 18, 1914.
S ir :— E . March 25, 1914.
I have in previous despatches reported on the self restraint displayed by the
Eussian Press in replying to the provocative article published in the Cologne Gazette,
and on the change of tone which marked its utterances as the plan of a campaign
of intimidation was taken up by other organs of the German Press. W hile dwelling
on E ussia’ s desire for peace, the Press has let it clearly be seen that Eussia is not
going to be dictated to and that, confident in the strength of her arm y, she is ready
to face all eventualities.
In m y telegram No. 70 of the 15th instant(2) I referred to the simultaneous
publication by the “ Eossia ” and the “ Bourse G a zette’ ’ of two articles representing
respectively the views of the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs and of W ar. The former
was couched in conciliatory language and held out a hand clothed in a velvet glove,
while the latter met provocation with provocation and made an ostentatious display
of a mailed fist. It is not perhaps surprising that the Ministers of W ar and of Foreign
Affairs should advocate different methods of meeting the attack made on Eussia by
the German P ress; but it is curious that they should both have been received in
Audience by the E m peror on the 10 th of this month and that two such contradictory
articles should have been published two days later. According to one account which
T believe to be correct, General Sukhomlinoff, who saw the Emperor after
Monsieur Sazonow, expressed the opinion that it was necessary to adopt a firm attitude
and to give Germany to understand that Eussia was prepared and did not fear war.
The Em peror apparently acquiesced and authorised the general to publish a strongly
worded article to that effect. A ccording to another account, given me by the French
Minister, the question was subsequently discussed in a Council of M inister® in which
Monsieur Sazonow strongly opposed the publication o f such an article but without
succeeding in winning over any of his colleagues to the adoption of more conciliatory
tactics. W hether this latter account is correct or not, there is strong evidence to
show that the Em peror and the m ajority of his present advisers are in favour of
giving a new course to Eussian foreign policy and of adopting a firmer and more
resolute attitude than that which characterised it during the recent Balkan crisis.
Germany, it is argued, will go on trying to exploit Eussia so long as she thinks that
she can do so with im p u n ity; and the fact that the German Press has now received
the m ot d'ordre to discontinue its anti-Eussian campaign is attributed in some
quarters to the outspoken language of the article in the “ Bourse Gazette.”
Monsieur Sazonow however gave me to understand that the change which has taken
place in the attitude o f the German Press was due to the representations which he

(■) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g .]

(2) [u. im m ed iately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
 767

had made through the Eussian Ambassador at B e rlin ; and he even attempted to
deny that the article in question had really been inspired bv the Minister o f W ar.
W hile it is but natural that His Excellency should wish to take the credit o f having
accomplished by diplomatic and conciliatory methods what the Minister o f W ar
proposed to achieve by rattling his sabre, the fact remains that, if Ilis E xcellency
is to retain his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he will have to conform his
| policy to the views which now find favour both in Court and Government circles.
Eussia is determined to place her house in order and to ensure it against the
danger of any attacks from without by a large increase o f her army. W ith a
population, which is now estimated at about I S O , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , she has almost unlimited
resources to draw on , while her finances are on such a satisfactory footing that they
will hardly feel the strain of the additional expenditure which these military measures
will entail. The Government are taking the Duma into their confidence and have
I been holding conferences with the prominent members o f the various parties, with
a view to facilitating the voting o f the necessary credits. Since his appointment as
| President o f the Council Monsieur Goremykine has been untiring in his efforts to
establish better relations between the Government and that Cham ber; and if those
j efforts, as there seems some reason to hope, are crowned with success and if he is
j able to secure a good working m ajority, the hands o f the Government will be
strengthened both at home and abroad. Even the Council o f Empire, which is the
| one doubtful factor in a possible combination between the Executive and the Duma
for the passing of moderate measures o f reform , would hardly be able to persist in
its present obstructive tactics if it knows that those measures have not only the
support of the Government but the approval of the Em peror. Though it is impossible
to speak with any certainty o f what is going on behind the scenes, the belief is gaining
ground that Monsieur Gorem ykine’ s tenure o f office will be longer than was originally
supposed and that Monsieur Ivrivoscheine who is expected back at St. Petersburg at
once will not immediately succeed him as President o f the Council. W hether
Monsieur Krivoscheine remains at the M inistry o f Agriculture or whether, as is also
reported, he eventually replaces the reactionary Monsieur Maklakow as ¡Minister of
the Interior, he is certain to make his influence felt. A confirmed Nationalist,
i Monsieur Krivoscheine advocates the adoption of a strong foreign policy, and unless
J Monsieur Sazonow adapts him self to the altered, eireumstanc. s of the situation, it
■ ie doubtful whether he will for long retain the confidence of the Emperor.
Though Monsieur Sazonow professes to attach but little importance to the recent
utterances o f the German Press and though the official relations between the two
Governments remain unchanged, it is difficult to forecast the future till the motives
underlying this anti-Eussian campaign have been more clearly established. W hether
the object o f the German Government was to prepare public opinion at home for some
new Arm y Bill or, by the exercise of pressure at St. Petersburg, to render the Eussian
‘ Government more amenable in the approaching negotiations for the new Treatv
i o f Commerce, or whether this ebullition o f temper on the part o f the German Press
| is to be regarded merely as an echo of the friction occasioned by the late Balkan crisis
and the von Sanders incident, the real cause o f G erm any’ s uneasiness and nervous
irritability! must be sought in the steps now being taken by Eussia to strengthen her
military position. The temporary advantages, which Germany has secured by her
Arm y Bill o f last year, will in a few years time be eclipsed by the counter measures
which Eussia has been obliged to take in self defence. B y the year 1917 she will
have increased by some 4G0,000 men the peace strength o f her arm y, which will
then amount to 1.750,000 m en; while she will possess a fleet in the Baltic, which,
I though not very formidable in itself, will nevertheless prove a thorn in the side of
Germany, should that country be at war with E ngland. Unless therefore Germany
is prepared to make still further financial sacrifices for m ilitary purposes, the da vs
of her hegem ony in Europe will be n u m b ered ; as, even without the co-operation
of E ngland, Eussia and France combined will then be strong enough to confront the
united forces of the Triple Alliancp. There are. however, still three critical years
 768

to pass before that result is achieved. In the race for armaments Russia has more
staying powers than G erm any; and, as Germany is aware of that fact, there is
always the danger that she may be tempted to precipitate a conflict before Russia is
fully prepared to meet it. During these crucial years, therefore, Russia will stand
in need of our support; and, should we fail to give it when she appeals for it, England
will no longer be numbered among her friends.
I have, &c.
G E O R G E \V. BUCHANAN.

M IN U T E .

M y own personal opinion is that Germany will do her utmost to win over Russia— finding
that threats do more harm than good— and that the new factors in Russia will not he
indisposed to listen to overtures— especially having regard to the internal situation hoth here
and in France.
A. N.
E. G.

No. 5*29.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. Nicolson.G)

Private. (A
M y dear Nicolson, St. Petersburgh, March 18, 1914.
You will have seen from the telegram (3) reporting m y conversation with Sazonow
about the Swedish gendarmerie, that 1 utterly failed to overcome his opposition to the
em ploym ent of that force in North Persia. I never thought that he would consent to
it, as, however unreasonable his objections, he has always given us clearly to under­
stand that the Cossack Brigade was the only force which Russia would tolerate there,
if the Russian troops had to be withdrawn.
I have dealt fully in a despatch with the German Press cam paign.(4) What
Germany hoped to gain by it is more than I can say, as the only result has been
to make Russia more determined than before to strengthen her means of defence
and to be on her guard against any possible surprises. The reason for it, however, is
not so far to seek. Germany is discovering that instead of having improved her
military position by the Arm y B ill of last year, she will in three years be much worse
off than before. France has, in consequence, reverted to the three }rears service and
Russia will, by that time, have increased her army by some 460,000 men and raised
its peace effectives to the enormous figure of 1,750,000. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Germ any should show signs of nervous irritability. The question of absorbing
interest is what will she d o? W ill she bring in another Arm y B ill? I f she does,
Russia will go one b etter; and in this race for armaments she can always outdistance
Germany. Russia is conscious of her latent strength and is determined to use it.
She is and will, I believe, rem ain thoroughly pacific, but she has had enough of the
weakness and vacillation which marked her policy during last year’ s crisis. She is
also, perhaps, aw7are that she cannot count on our armed support in all eventualities,
and she m ay wish to be strong enough to act independently of us. Can Germany

(*) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the K in g ; to the Prime M inister; to
Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley. The endorsement is initialled hy Sir E. Grey.]
(2) [Carnock M SS., Vol. II of 1914.]
(3) [Sir G. Buchanan’ s telegram (No. 71) of March 15, 1914, D. 8-25 p . m ., R. 11 p . m .,
reported a conversation with M. Sazonov on March 14. Sir G. Buchanan stated in this
telegram that he had been unable to overcome M. Sazonov’s opposition to the employment of
Swedish officers in the Persian g en d a rm erie. (F.O. 11 45 7/10 36 /1 4/34 .) On this subject cp.
G ooch d T em p erley, Vol. X (I), p. 1001, S u b j e c t I n i » x , sub S w e d e n , P ers ia an d .]
(4) [v . immediately preceding document.]
 769

afford to wait till Russia becomes the dominant factor in Europe or will she strike
while victory is still within her grasp? I w-ill not attempt to answTer this question but
the danger and the temptation are both there. Till she has completed her armaments,
Russia will have need of our support; and her eventual attitude towards us will
depend on whether we stand firmly by her in any crisis which may arise during the
intervening years.
(")
Ever yours,
G E OR GE W. BUCHANAN.

(s) [The remaining paragraphs of this letter refer to matters connected with the Court.]

No. 530.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r ey .(l)

F.O. 1276 7 /1 0 30 2 /1 4 /1 8.
(No. 76.)
Sir, St. Pelersburgh, March 19, 1914.
The “ Novoe Yrem ya ” published in its yesterday’ s edition an unsigned article
giving an extract of a conversation said to have taken place in ‘ ‘ one of the Petersburg
salons ” respecting the German Press campaign and incidentally concerning the whole
question of armaments and of the grouping of the Powers in Europe.
One high Government official described the present armament of Europe as a mad
race by each country to catch up and if possible to outstrip the other. He expressed
the opinion that the steps taken by the Russian Minister for W ar will undoubtedly
evoke renewed efforts on the part of Germany to increase her military strength.
France cannot of course remain indifferent and so the race will continue ad infinitum.
This led to a discussion as to how- to put an end to this state of affairs. The recent
Press campaign had shown that neither Russia nor Germany desired war and if
General Sukhomlinov, under instructions from the Emperor, was carrying out a
programme of military reform, it was only because Russia wished to be strong and
was in no way to be attributed to any chauvinistic leanings on her part.
The “ Novoe Yrem ya ” then proceeds to give the views expressed as to the general
political situation in Europe by “ a highly authoritative State official who has recently
returned from abroad where he had opportunities of conversing with representatives
of the ruling circles ’ ’— a description which, though I have no proofs in support of the
conjecture, would seem to fit no one so exactly as Monsieur Kokovtsoff. This official
declared that the present grouping of the Powers was the source of much uneasiness,
and he said that during his stay in Germany and in France well inform ed persons had
repeatedly said to him that the general situation would undergo a radical change if
it was possible to bring about the new political programme and that an alliance between
Russia, France and Germany together with England would constitute the greatest
guarantee for peace. The speaker was here interrupted by one of his listeners w-ho
declared that France would never conclude an alliance with Germany owing to Alsace
Lorraine. But the speaker replied that this question had been raised both in Berlin
and later in Paris and he added that, although the French would of course never
become reconciled with regard to Alsace Lorraine there was a body of opinion m
Berlin which was sanguine as to the possibility of a satisfactory solution. It was no
secret that on the death of the aged Emperor of Austria the whole edifice of the Dual
Monarchy at present held together by the personal prestige of the Monarch, would
crumble to the ground and would bring down the Triple Alliance in its fall.

(!) [T h is despatch is en d orsed “ seen at B erlin .’ ’ ]

[10900]
 770

Germany could then acquire Austria’ s German territories in place of Alsace, while
Eussia would take Galicia. H ungary and Bohemia would become independent S tates:
and the Slavs would pass over to Slav States. The speaker declared that this plan
existed but was, as yet, spoken of with bated breath in Berlin and Paris. W ere it to
be carried out, the inevitable result would, in his opinion, be the creation of a
“ meridional a llia n ce” in place of the present “ p a ra llel” alliances.
The speaker maintained that Austria was in a worse position than Turkey and
had gradually lost her importance among her allies. It was well known that Italy
found it very difficult to go hand in hand with Austria and looked longingly towards
France and Eussia. He had been told by Italian statesmen that they had often
inform ed representatives of Eussian ruling spheres that it would need very little to
create a wave of Italian public opinion hostile to the alliance with Austria and Germany
and in favour of Italy being ranged on the side of France and Eussia. In any case, a
new grouping of the Powers could only be of benefit to Italy. The best proof of the
ever growing general conviction of the impending break-up of the Austrian Empire
was Eoum ania’ s changed attitude towards the Dual Monarchy. In conclusion, the
speaker declared that the realization of the programme he had outlined would lead to
a cessation of the present mad com petition of armament and would form the basis
of a durable peace. He also declared that a new grouping of the Powers based on the
im pending break-up of Austria was a subject which had been frequently discussed of
late by influential circles in Berlin and Paris and had form ed the subject of much
com m ent in St. Petersburg.
In its edition of to-day the ‘ Novoe Yrernya ’ continues to give extracts of the
conversations which it reported in its yesterday’ s issue. To-day it gives the opinions
expressed by another high statesman “ who was for m any years at the head of the
Governm ent and who has always followed, in accordance with his high position,
questions of foreign policy.” This statesman is very generally supposed to he
Count Witte.
H e stated that, shortly after the accession of the present Em peror of Eussia, the
German Emperor visited St. Petersburg and honoured him with a very lengthy
conversation on the subject of foreign affairs, which took place in the German
Embassy. The speaker expressed to the German Emperor his opinion that the
tranquillity of Europe would be guaranteed by an alliance between Eussia, France and
Germany. This idea proved of the greatest interest to His Majesty who, however,
declared that he had no desire to direct its point against England. The speaker replied
that other Continental Powers would join this alliance which would represent
enormous strength. The statesman in question declared that, while the German
E m peror did not conceal his desire to enter into relations with the French, His
Majesty declared that at the moment the strength of the alliance should be directed
against America, and he once more emphasized his wish to be on good terms wTith
England.
Continuing, the speaker declared that at that time correspondence, which began
with a Note from the German Government, took place between St. Petersburg and
Berlin in which his views, as expressed to the German Emperor, were discussed. The
speaker declared that the Em peror W illiam , throughout his conversation with him,
emphasized the danger of America to which he, the speaker, replied that he saw no
danger from America to Eussia especially as Eussia had but recently afforded the
W ashington Cabinet important services in connection with its quarrel with South
America. The Speaker then went on to say that after this speech there followed some
stormy years for Eussia and that it wTas not until after the Eusso-Japanese W ar that
he once more met the German Em peror and again the question of an Alliance between
Eussia, Germany and France was mooted. On this occasion the German Emperor
regarded the question with great enthusiasm and appeared to be ready to adopt the
suggested Alliance wdiich seemed to His Majesty practicable, not by coaxing France
hut by com pelling her to enter the Alliance. The speaker, however, maintained that
the Alliance could have been effected by the development of good relations. This.
conversation took place after the signature o f the Peace Treaty at Portsmouth. During
that time England had supported Japan who,— it seemed to the speaker— would not
have tackled Russia had it not been for British support.
England then proposed an Agreement with Russia which the speaker opposed as
it seemed to him that an alliance of the three States and the realisation of his political
programme was possible. H e continued to consider that a continental Alliance was
practicable and would, if realised, govern the whole world. Under such conditions it
appeared to him that the Agreement proposed by Great Britain was superfluous, as
an Alliance of the three Powers would be a sufficient guarantee of peace. Continuing,
the speaker said that Monsieur Isvolskv thought differently and consented to the
conclusion of an Agreement with England. As long as Russia was a participant in
the Triple Entente the idea of an Alliance between France, Russia and Germany lost
all real ground.
“ It appears to m e ’ ’— the speaker continued— “ that with the present political
grouping we shall be perpetually dangling in mid-air. Russia is between two stools.
On the one sits Germany and consequently the Triple Alliance. On the other the
Triple Entente. W e cannot continue to sit 011 the edge of one stool with one foot on
the stool of the Triple Alliance. Under these circumstances it is futile to speak of an
Alliance of the three States. The whole .plan has been upset by Monsieur Isvolskv.”
The speaker was then asked by his listeners what he thought of the break up of
Austria, and replied by pointing out the number of years Europe had been talking of
the break up of Turkey, yet Austria was stronger than Turkey. Besides it must be
remembered that Austria was a Christian State and possessed a higher culture than
Turkey. ITe suggested that although Austria was undoubtedly passing through
troublous days any attempt to divide up Austria would meet with considerable
difficulty. In a word, the difficulties which would be met with in the process made
the dividing up of Austria very problematical. The speaker then reverted to his idea
of a Franco-Germ an rapprochement, and expressed the opinion that, as a basis for
pourparlers in this sense, Germany might make certain concessions in Alsace
Lorraine and in this manner satisfy the self esteem of the French. But in conclusion
he again expressed the opinion that his plan for a new grouping of the Powers under
existing conditions seemed to have little hope of realisation.
I have, Ac.
GEORGE W . BUCHANAN.

No. 531.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.
F.O. 12718/1 0 30 2 /1 4 /1 8.
(No. 77.) Confidential. St. Petersburgh, D. March 19, 1911.
Sh-, R. March 23, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have
received from Commander II. Grenfell, Naval Attache to this Embassy on the subject
of the Russo-German Press campaign and the naval situation in Russia.
I have. Ac.
GE OR GE W . BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 531.

Commander Grenfell to Sir G. Buchanan.(l)

(Confidential.)
gp. St. Petersburgh, March 19, 1914.
In connection with the press campaign of the last fortnight between Russia and
Germany, and the present apparent decision of the Russian Government to proclaim to
0 ) [The text given above is taken from the C onfidential P rin t, as the original despatch
vas sent to the Admiralty.]
[1 0 9 0 0 ] 3 2
 77*2

the world its complete confidence as to the satisfactory condition, now and hereafter,
of Russian armed force, more especially with regard to the particular date of 1917,
I must beg to be allowed to represent to your Excellency that it is impossible for me
to share this optimistic estimate, at any rate so far as the naval situation is concerned.
There is small chance of the new naval programme being com plete by 1917, but
if even by some miracle this should prove to be the case, it does not at all follow that
Germany intends to he seriously alarmed. I happen to be upon extremely good
personal terms with m y German colleague, and have a fair idea of the sense in which
he is reporting to his Government concerning the value of Russia’ s naval developments
in the Baltic. H e, as a seaman, equally with m yself, has recognised the fundamental
mistake of the Russian Admiralty in devoting its energy and m oney principally to
increase of purely material strength rather than to the far more urgent problem of
building up a system of honest administration and the creation of a well-trained,
capable, well-paid, and contented personnel. Germ any’ s older type battleships,
together, say, with her four earlier Nassau class Dreadnoughts, will amply suffice to
mask any strength by sea that this country is likely to possess before the year 1918.
The shattering revelations of the Japanese war discovered, not only to us, but to
the whole world, the feet of clay of this lum bering colossus ; is it, therefore, reasonable
to imagine that within the subsequent period of less than ten years, politically marked
as they have been, not so much by progress as by reaction, the old corruptive
influences form erly at work have already ceased to propagate their evil fruit?
I am, &c.
H. G R E N F E L L , Naval Attaché.

No. 532.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . N icolson.( l )

Private. (2)
My dear Nicolson, B erlin, March 27, 1914.
In the despatch in which I recorded m y conversations with Jagow on the subject
of the S m yrna-A idin and Bagdad Railway com panies(3) I had just got to a rather
interesting point when I had to stop because I found that Jagow’ s further remarks
had nothing to do with the subject of the despatch. I also find that they were not
enough to fill another despatch and m oreover that they perhaps would be more
fittingly recorded in a private letter. Jagow had just said that he gave Turkey, under
the favourable circumstances of Great Britain and Germany co-operating together in
Eastern Affairs, twenty more years o f existence as an Empire : under less favourable
circumstances, in which I gathered he would include, besides the non-co-operation of
Great Britain and Germany, the intrusion of Italy into German and British preserves,
he wrould give her a far shorter life.
He then proceeded to say that there was one matter which had caused him far
more anxiety than the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and that was the future of
the Dual Monarchy. H e hated to say it, or to think it, but he could not unpack his
mind of the fear that it was a race between the two Empires which would go to pieces
first. I said that I was not one of those who believed that the Dual Monarchy would
necessarily break up the moment the aged Em peror passed away. H e replied that it
was not the change of rulers that he had so much in his m in d ; though in a
crum bling edifice like the Dual M onarchy the change from a Sovereign, popular and

(D [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the K in g ; to the Prime Minister. The
endorsement is initialled by Sir E. Grey.]
(2) [Carnock M SS., Vol. II of 1914.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 354-5, No. 223.]
 picturesque, to an unpopular one, was certainly a matter for some misgiving. W hat
troubled him m uch m ore was the want of cohesion in the M onarchy which was
becom ing more marked every day. The people in the M onarchy who had hitherto
had some, and at all events the most, Im perial feeling, were the Austrian Germans.
These were also falling victims to the ‘ nationality ’ fever, and were beginning to
follow the example of the other nationalities in Austria and looking entirely after
their own interests and neglecting those of the Empire. This was the most disquieting
symptom of all as the Austrian Germans had always been the best and most reliable
element in the State and really the chief factor in keeping the Em pire together. As
for the rest H ungary was striving harder than ever to increase her independence,
and to m agyarize her heterogeneous populations; the populations of the Servian
provinces were gravitating towards Servia, and the Hungarian Roumanians towards
Roum ania, while Slovaks and Croats were struggling for the recognition as separate
nationalities. W hen one came to think of it, it was almost chaos, and he could not
help sometimes appraising the alliance value of a country in such a state.
I think I have reproduced his words fairly correctly, but if the words are not
absolutely his own, what I have written gives the substance of what he said absolutely
correctly.
I wonder whether these views are held generally in political circles, for if they
are, it would explain not only the enormous increases in the German army, and their
sensitiveness as to the increases in the military strength of France and Russia, but
also the prom inence recently given to the W itte conversations and the m any ballons
d ’ essai which have recently been sent up with regard to a fresh grouping of the
European Powers. In this case the recent tirades against Russia could only be
regarded as a blind. But m y own belief is that Jagow ’ s observations were the result
o f the temporary depression which must sometimes com e upon Austria’ s friends. But
there is no doubt that the fact, if it is a fact, that the Austrian Germans are getting
demoralised and will not in the future form a reliable bulwark against the Slavs, must
be a source of considerable preoccupation to the Directors of German Policy.
I have had to break off short, as I have had suddenly to write a letter to
Sir E. Grey on the subject of the publication of the “ Treaty of W indsor ” (4) which is
preoccupying -Jagow very much.
Yours verv sincerelv.
W . E. GOSCH EN.

(4) [r. su p ra , pp. 565-6, No. 370 ]

No. 538.

Sir A. Xicolson to Sir E. Goschen.

' Private.(’ )
■ M y dear Goschen, Foreign Office, March 30, 1914.
I am exceedingly obliged to you for your most interesting letter of the 27th.(-)
Your conversation with Oagow was of very great interest and confirms in m y mind
the opinion which I recorded in an ofticial minute as to the probability of an impending
change in the relations between Russia and Germany. I know very well that this
m ay seem a wild statement at a moment when Russia is exceedingly annoyed and
offended by the press campaign which has been directed against her, and no doubt
Germany is not pleased by the response which Russia gave to the attacks which were
carried on which such vigour in the German press. But one knows German m ethods;
and I think that on the one hand Germany does fear the possibility, or even the

(*) [C a rn ock M S S ., V ol. I I o f 1914.]

( 2) [w. im m ed ia tely p r e ce d in g docu m en t.]
 774

probability, that before long she will find herself in an isolated and critical position,
unless she steers an entirely different course to that which she has hitherto followed.
On the other hand we must not forget that Russia has never had any quarrel of a
serious character wTith Germany, but on the contrary in critical moments in the
history of each country Russia and Germany have afforded each other mutual
assistance and have acted in close co-operation. Furthermore Russia must feel that
both her ally and her friend are plunged in most serious crises and are, at any rate
for the present, perfectly powerless to act with any efficiency as factors in European
politics. This perhaps is going a little too far as regards France, but in regard to
ourselves I do feel that if the situation develops much further on the present lines
we shall really be regarded as of little account in foreign affairs. In any case
whether France and ourselves wrould be an efficient ally and friend, or not, it is
perfectly clear that we are both steering towards what would be regarded in Russia
as a revolutionary and ruinous course. It would then indeed be strange if Russia
were to feel that it was to her interest to be linked with countries in such a condition,
and whose prospects for the future were so doubtful and obscure. She would in the
nature o f things be disposed to gravitate towards that great central Power, which in
any case on the surface has the appearance o f stability and where the monarchical
system is firm ly established. I do not mean to say that Russia intends to denounce
her alliance with France or to break off her understanding with us, but I do think
that she must feel that it would be safer to be on far better relations with Germany
than she has been recently. Of course one obstacle to the improvement of such
relations has been the support which Germany has felt it necessary to give to Austrian
aims and policy, but if it be true that Germany is beginning to doubt whether Austria
is really a country which it is worth while supporting in the measure which has
hitherto been the case, I do foresee the probability that Russia and Germany will
soon join hands. These I daresay you will consider as mere speculations, but I do
think that we should consider very carefully and bear in mind the possibilities which
I have ventured to indicate.............. (3)
[Yours, &c.
A. N ICOLSON.]

(3) [The rest of this letter refers briefly to internal affairs in Great Britain ; to the question
of the German Military Mission in Constantinople. It adds nothing of importance to the
material printed elsewhere.]

[E D . A O T E .— On April 9 the Russian Ambassador at Berlin reported a relaxation of

tension in the Press and public opinion of Germany, and stated that “ secret informations ”
confirmed the view that the Berlin Cabinet was not bel'icose. S ieb er t, pp. 711-2.]

II.— ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS, MARCH-JULY 1914.

[E D . N O T E .— On February 12, 1914, M. Sazonev telegraphed to Count Benckendorff “ that
we lack an organ which would unite the views, and the common action of the Powers, an organ
such as the Ambassadorial Conference in London last year. The correspondence resulting from
this lack, leads to delays, which have an injurious effect on the progress of affairs. As the
London Cabinet does not desire again to convene last year’ s Conference, we shall not further
insist upon it, but Grey, perhaps, will not object to the proposal that, at least, the three Powers
of the Entente should through their representatives in London establish the community of their
views. For, while the Powers of the opposite group are acting, we are merelv deliberating.”
S ieb er t, pp. 712-3. cp. D .D .F ., 3"'c S ir., Vol. I X , pp. 373-4, No. 28 7; p. 386* No. 304. For
Sir Edward Grey’s attitude to the re-summoning of the Conference of Ambassadors in November
1913 cp. O ooch & T cm perley, Vol. X (I), p. 67, No. 8 0 ; cp. also suprci, p. 718, No. 484
Count Benckendorff reported on February 18 that M. Paul Cambon had received instructions
' yesterday,” i.e., the 17th (cp. D .D .F ., 3 "“ S er., Vol. I X , p. 392, No. 30 8; pp. 410-1, No. 317),
and that he himself had seen Sir Edward Grey ‘ 'tod a y.” He said that Sir Edward Grey told
him “ he was pleased to accept ” M. Sazonov’s proposal and had so informed M. Paul Cambon.
v S ieb ert, p. 713.
X o record of these conversations can be traced in the Foreign Office archives, and there is
no report by M . Paul Cambon of the interview of the 13th in D .D .F .. but Sir Edward Grey’ s
minute on the private letter from Sir G. Buchanan printed below confirms this evidence.]

No. 534.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. X icolson.(l

Private. (2)
M y dear Nicolson, St. Petersburg, March 5 , 1914.
M any thanks for yonr last letter.
I have in a long despatch ventured to submit my views with regard to the
Trans-Persian E ailw ayf 3 and the other questions which are indirectly connected with
it and, as it is almost impossible to summarize them. I must ask you to forgive me if
I only send you a short private letter by this Bag.
I am, I must confess, rather preoccupied about our relations with Eussia. To all
outward appearance they are excellent, but the foundation on which our understanding
rests is so fragile and there are so many questions which may at any moment causf
friction between us that I sometimes take a rather despondent view of the future. I
had a further conversation yesterday with Sazonow about Mongolia and Thibet, but
I cannot say that it was altogether satisfactory. W hile not denying that he had in
our first conversation virtually admitted our right to ask for the open door in
M ongolia, he qualified this admission by contending that whatever duties might be
imposed by the Mongols, Eussian goods had a prescriptive Treaty right to exemption
from duties of all kinds. I told him that, while not disputing the fact that Eussian
goods had the right to enter Mongolia duty free over the northern frontier, we should
never tolerate a differential treatment of our goods should, as he gave me to
understand was likely to be the case, Likin [s ic ] or other transit dues be imposed in
the interior. Finally he said that he did not want to make “ des chicanes ” and that
he would do what he could to help us. He could not however give me an answer
“ à la légère ” as he did not him self sufficiently understand the question to reply
straight off. H e was greatly pleased on hearing that we would not ask for concessions
in Thibet as com pensation for what Eussia had obtained in Mongolia ; but while
expressing his readiness to meet our wishes as far as possible he said that he would
have to ask for something in return. I am personally sorry that we have dropped
the argument that Mongolia must be regarded as set off to Thibet. Though
Eussia cannot, I imagine, prevent our sending a Mission to Urga to negotiate a
com m ercial arrangement, she can prevent the Mongols giving us what we ask for, and
has thus acquired a predominant position there which may be prejudicial to our
interests. Sazonow acknowledges that Eussia has no real interests in Thibet and he
ought not therefore, as I told him yesterday, to " marchander ” when we ask him to
enable us to safeguard what are for us almost vital interests. He has been so much
attacked for his weak and vacillating foreign policy and his position was at one moment
so compromised that I fear that he wants to show how firm he can be at our expense.
As we ought to have a margin for bargaining. I think that we should begin by asking
for more than we expect to get and reduce our demands subsequently if we find that the
price he demands in return is too high. As I have pointed out in a despatch/ ) I should
personally prefer to discuss all these questions— Thibet, Mongolia, Trans-Persian
Eailway, Neutral Zone— simultaneously on the basis of a policy of give and take. B y

( ') [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the K ing and to the Prime Minister.]
U) [Carnock M SS., Vol. II of 1914.]
(3) [Sir G. Buchanan's despatch (Xo. 531, D. March 4, R. March 9, 1914. is not reproduced
for reasons of space. It dealt chiefly with the Russian desire for railways, with or without
British co-operation, in Persia. (F.O. 1 0 3 3 1 /6 5 9 /1 4 /3 4 .)]
 776
treating them separately we are likely to have to do all the giving and Russia all the
taking.
Revelstoke has just left after a stay of five days. He seems to have been
favourably impressed with Bark, the new Minister of Finance, though he doubts
whether he will be strong enough to carry through the gigantic task entrusted to him.
From all I hear nothing is likely to come of the E m peror’ s rescript about the Alcohol
M onopoly and things will go on just as before. A great deal will depend on whether
Krivoschein is well enough to take up the post of President of the Council. He is
undoubtedly the ablest man available and I am told he is not nearly so reactionary
as he is supposed to be.
Is it a fact that it has been arranged that Cambon and Benckendorff are to confer
with Sir Edward on all questions in which the Triple Entente is interested, so as to
save time and to ensure the adoption of an identic attitude by all three Governments?
Sazonow said something to me about it the other d a y ; and I only ask as if these
questions are treated in London I need not telegraph his remarks about them. . . .(*)
Ever yours,
G. BUCHANAN.
M IN U T E .

All that happens about discussions in London is that Cambon and Benckendorff come to see
me together about Near Eastern questions when they have similar instructions. They have
come once so far.
E. G.
10.3.14.

(4) [The final paragraph of this letter is omitted as it relates to personal matters.]

No. 535.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.( l)

Private. ( 2)
My dear Buchanan, London, March 18, 1914.
I am sure that your idea of a general discussion with the Russians is right.(3)
W e shall want very little as regards Tibet, beyond what we already have under
our Trade Convention and are entitled to have in accordance with the Anglo-Russian
Agreement.
The chief point on which we shall have to ask for a modification of the Anglo-
Russian Agreement is in connection with the concessions. I am much disturbed by
the Russian proceedings in Ispahan. It is clear that the Russians will act in the
Neutral Sphere by extending Russian protection in a way that will make the
continuance of the Neutral Sphere an advantage to them, and no advantage to us.
The weakness of our position in Persia is that the Russians are prepared to occupy
Persia, and we are not. We wish Persia to be a neutral buffer State; they are willing
to partition it. But, if the idea of the Anglo-Russian Agreement had been to partition
Persia, we should have claimed the southern part, and to claim that now would be to
absorb the whole of the neutral sphere.
As regards Afghanistan, the Russians have some ground for com plaint, as the
Ameer never has recognised the part of the Agreem ent dealing with his country. Wo
are helpless to get anything from the Ameer at present.
As regards Mongolia, though it is outside the Agreem ent, that need not prevent
us, if we have a general reopening of the discussion of Russian and British interests,
from bringing it forward as giving us some ground for consideration elsewhere.

P) [This letter is endorsed as having been sent to Lord Crewe.]

(2) [Grey M SS., Vol. 35.]
(3) [v. immediately preceding document, and n o te (3).]
 You will see, therefore, that, as regards Persia, we wish to have practically the
whole of the neutral sphere, and have nothing to concede there to R u ssia ; as regards
Afghanistan, we cannot concede anything to Russia, because we cannot get the
A m eer’ s con sent; as regards Tibet, the change that we wish to have, and to which
Russia’ s consent is necessary, is very slight, but we have nothing to give in return.
So, all along the line we want something, and we have nothing to give. It is
therefore difficult to see how a good bargain is to be made.
A firm agreement about the Trans-Persian Railway and the through-route to
India would be a substantial “ quid pro quo ” for Russia. But I should have difficulty
in getting it through the Committee of Defence and the criticism of the Indian
Government.
For these reasons, I hesitate to propose a general discussion at present, though
I realise that events are forcing us nearer to it, especially such action as that of Russia
in Ispahan.
Y'ours sincerelv.
E. G R E Y.

No. 53G.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r e y .iF

P .O . 15087/15087 14/38.
(No. 93.) St. Petcrsburgh, D. March 31, 1914.
Sir, R . April 6 , 1914.
It is hardly necessary to state that a great deal of interest has been aroused
here by the series of “ con versations” recently published in the “ Novoe Yrem ya ”
on the subject of a possible regrouping o f the European Powers.
In m y despatch No. 76 of the 19th instant D I gave a summary o f the conversa­
tions reported in the “ Novoe Y r e m y a ” of that and the previous day. The High
official “ who had recently returned from a b roa d ” is now most generally supposed
to be not M r. Kokovtsov, as suggested in m y despatch, but the Minister o f War
General Sukhom linov, who visited Berlin and Paris last autumn about the time ol
the celebration o f the anniversary o f the battle o f Leipzig. I should add however
that Monsieur Sazonow inform ed me that General Sukhom linov had nothing to do
with the conversation attributed to him , and that an official dém enti to the same
effect has lately been issued.
However that may be, there is no question but that the Statesman whose views
are expressed in the “ Novoe Yremya ” o f the 19th instant is Count W itte. A further
conversation with the same Statesman appeared 5 days later, on the 24th instant.
He then referred once more to the question o f a new grouping of the Powers, which
he said deeply interested him . Had he remained in power he probably would have
succeeded in carrying it through. It was most difficult of accomplishment now , while
the Triple Entente existed, but nevertheless he considered that it offered the only
means o f securing a permanent peace. The Count said further that he had no
unfriendly feelings towards England, but he held that so great a Power as Russia
should adopt a policy under which her hands would be as free as possible.
Count W itte’ s statement that the German Em peror has at various times seriously
considered the possibility of an Alliance with Russia is borne out b y a story related
to me two days ago by a Mr. Sehelkin form erly a Russian Diplomatist and now a
journalist connected with the “ Bourse G azette.” Mr. Sehelkin stated that when

0 ) [T h is despa tch is endorsed as h a v in g b een sent to th e K in g and to th e P rim e

M in is te r.]
(2) [r . supra, pp. 769-71, N o. 530.]
 778
the late Count Osten Sacken was Russian Ambassador in Berlin and he, Mr. Schelkin,
was a Secretary of the Em bassy, the Ambassador received a visit from the German
E mperor in the course o f which His Majesty made some allusion to the efficacy and
solidarity o f the Triple Alliance. Count Osten Sacken retorted “ W hat is the value
o f your Triple A lliance? It is an alliance between one force (Germany) one weakness
(Austria) and one doubtful quantity (I t a ly )’ ’ ; upon which the Em peror said to him
with great emphasis “ Then what do you say to making an alliance between two
fo r c e s ’ ’ adding words to the effect that he would abandon his Austrian ally.
Mr. Schelkin vouched for the authenticity of this story which he said that he had
from Count Osten Sacken’ s own lips, and he has now published it in a somewhat
attenuated form in a paper named the “ Peterburgski C ourier.”
Count Witte is of course well known to be one of those who consider that it should
be a fundamental principle o f Russia’ s foreign policy to establish the closest possible
relations with Germany. At first sight it might appear curious that the advocates
of such a policy should choose the present moment for opening a press campaign
in support o f their ideas. But it m ay well be that it is precisely the present tension
in Russo-German relations, and the consciousness that that tension must tend to
increase while the competition in armaments between the two countries continues,
that have led the partisans of a German rapprochevient to urge the necessity of some
readjustment of Russia’ s foreign policy. W hether the indiscretions of which Count
W itte has been guilty, were inspired by motives of this character, or whether, as
seems now probable, they are to be attributed to his desire for 6elf-advertisement.
the views, to which he has given expression, would only acquire any leal weight in
the event of their being regarded with favour in exalted quarters. There has always
been a German party at Court and there can be no doubt that persons in the
immediate entourage of the Emperor not infrequently contrast the material advantages
to be derived from an understanding with Germany with the very problematic ones
which the Anglo-Russian understanding has to offer. Certain of these persons have,
if I am correctly inform ed, been recently impressing on H is Majesty the view that,
as Russia cannot count on E ngland’ s support in the event of war, an understanding
with the latter country is of no practical value. Even among the warmest advocates
o f close relations with England complaints are often heard of the vague and
undefined character of the Anglo-Russian understanding and of the consequent lack
of solidarity that renders the Triple Entente an unequal match for the Triple
Alliance. W hile, therefore, no undue importance need be attached to Count W itte’ s
utterances, it must be admitted that they reflect the prevailing feeling of dissatisfac­
tion with the arrangements which at present govern R ussia’ s international position.
In a conversation which I recently had with Monsieur Sazonow, His Excellency told
me that he had called the E m peror’ s attention to the sensation which the conversa­
tions published in the “ Xovoe Yremya ” had produced, and had enquired whether
H is Majesty wished him to take any notice of them. The Emperor had replied that
it was better not to do so as they did not deserve to be taken seriously, adding that
a form er Minister, like Count W itte, ought to know that, now that he was no longer
in office, it was his duty to hold his tongue.
In the course of the same conversation M. Sazonow admitted that the idea of
of alliance between Russia, France and Germany, which would virtually have been
directed against England, had been mooted in conversation between the Emperor
W illiam and Count W itte at a time when Anglo-Russian relations were very different
from what they are now. At the present moment such an alliance was, he said,
quite unthinkable, as, apart from the question of Alsace Lorraine which blocked the
way, Germany stood in too great need of Austria’ s services as an ally to counten­
ance her dismemberment. This view o f G erm any’ s dependence on Austria does
not quite tally with what the Em peror said to me in an Audience which I had with
ITis Majesty in the spring of last year. H is Majesty then spoke of the disintegration
o f the Austrian Empire as a mere matter o f time. The day, He said, would come
when we should see a Kingdom o f H ungary, a Kingdom of Bohemia and the incor-
 779

I>oration of the German Provinces of Austria in the German Empire, while the
Southern Slavs would be absorbed by Servia and the Roumanians o f Transylvania
by Roum ania. Austria, His M ajesty held, was at present a source o f weakness to
Germany and a danger to the cause of peace, and it would make for peace were
Germany to have no Austria to drag her into war about the Balkans.
Though the Emperor thus contemplates the disiutegration o f the Austrian
Empire as a possible eventuality, He appears, from what Monsieur Sazonow told me,
to regard a fresh grouping of the Powers on the lines suggested by Count Witte as
a purely Utopian idea. It does not, however, follow that His Majesty is entirely
satisfied with existing arrangements. M. Sazonow has more than once o f late spoken
to me o f the necessity o f converting our understanding into an alliance o f a purely
defensive character and in so doing, he has, as I have reason to believe, voiced the
views of the Em peror. The uncertainty which His E xcellency feels as to what
England would do, should Russia be involved in war with Germany, causes him
much preoccupation, and this preoccupation has notably increased since the Ulster
question has entered on an acute stage. During the past fortnight he has repeatedlv
spoken to me o f the anxiety with which the various phases of the present crisis are
being followed by the Russian Government and the Russian public, and he has
expressed his apprehension lest internal dissensions and disaffection in the army
might so weaken E ngland’ s position as to render her voice of no account in the
' Councils o f the Nations.
Very similar views respecting Russia's relations to England have been expressed
to me recently by m any other persons besides M. Sazonow, and, though I am well
aware that the question o f an alliance is impractical at present. I record what thev
have said as showing how difficult we may find it in the long run to maintain our
understanding with Russia unless its basis can be enlarged. Persia has hitherto
been looked on as the rock on which it might one day suffer shipw reck; but it is in
Europe that danger now seems to threaten it. There is, I regret to say, a growing
| tendency in this country to regard England as a fair-weather friend who cannot be
| depended on to stand by Russia should the storm burst.
I have. Ac.
GE O R G E W . BUCH ANAN.

[EJJ. A O T E . — In consequence of the commercial losses resulting from the closing of the
Straits during the Tripoli and Balkan W ars, in view of the increasing fragility of the Ottoman
Empire, and as a result of the anxieties generated by the Liman Mission, Russian relations
with Turkey were thoroughly explored in the winter of 1913-14 (i\ Gooch <£• T e m p e rle y ,
Vol. X (I), passim ). In a lengthy Memorandum of December 8, 1913, M. Sazonov, while

I declaring his desire to preserve the sta tu s quo as long as possible, advised the framing of
i plans to seize the Straits in the event of European complications, and thereby to prevent a
solution of the question contrary to Russian interests. (S tieve: D e r D ip lo m a tisch e S c h rift-
vceclisel Isw olsk is. 111, pp. 374-3S3.) The Tsar approved the Memorandum, and, in accordance
I with the desire of M. Sazonov, summoned a Conference of Ministers to discuss the situation.
Before it met, M. Sazonov circulated a memorandum, dated January 5, 1914, to serve as a
' basis for discussion, in which, after referring to the Liman negotiations, he sketched out
I measures of compulsion to be used against Turkey if Russia’s demands were unsatisfied, but
insisted on the necessity of making sure beforehand of French and British support. (Stieve:
IswoJski und d e r W e ltk r ie g . pp. 234-246.) The Conference, over which M. Kokovtsov presided,
I was held on January 13, 1914. It was decided that the negotiations with Berlin in reference to
the Liman Mission should be continued so long as there was anj- prospect of success. Unless,
I however, the active co-operation of France and Great Britain were assured, it would be
I impossible to proceed to measures of coercion which might involve a war with Germany.
I Though the dangerous issue of the Liman Mission was soon settled, a further meeting was held
on February 21. (Stieve: Isw olsk i u nd d er W e ltk r ie g , pp. 247-266.) The Conference, over
which M. Sazonov presided, recommended preparatory measures, amoug them an increase and
more rapid mobilisation of a landing force, the collection of naval transports, the strengthening
of the Black Sea Fleet and the building of strategic railways in the Caucasus. The recom­
mendations of the Conference were approved by the Tsar on April 5.]
 780

N o. 537.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey . ( l)

F.O. 1531 2 /1 5 31 2 /1 4 /3 8.
(No. 100.) Secret. St. Petershurgh, D. April 3, 1914.
Sir, E. April 7, 1914.
The Em peror having been pleased to receive me in Audience this morning, I had
the honour of having a long conversation with H is M ajesty(2) on the general political
situation.
His Majesty began by referring to the Irish question and to the acute crisis
which had arisen out of it, saying that it was one which H e found it very difficult
understand. H e trusted, however, that it would not take such a serious turn as to
affect our position abroad. I replied that I saw no reason to fear this and that it
appeared from Lord M orlev’ s recent statement in the House of L ord s(3) that, in spite
of some regrettable misunderstandings, there had been no question of any
disobedience or want of discipline on the part of either the officers or the men of the
army.
Speaking next of the European situation, the Emperor said that the only
question which caused Him any anxiety was that of Albania. (4) l i e did not know
whether it would be possible in the long run to keep Austria and Italy in line wit
the other Powers or whether they would not leave the Concert and adopt a policy of
partition. In the latter case they were almost certain to quarrel, and, as this would
mean a weakening of the Triple Alliance, it would have some countervailing
advantages. He was very sorry for the Greeks as they were being rather hardly
treated both with regard to the present situation in Epirus and the question of the
islands. If the latter were to be neutralized, it seemed but fair that the Powers should
guarantee them against attack by Turkey. H e did not, however, know what could be
done. It was the old story. Europe was divided into two camps and it was impossible
to get the Concert to work together.
This led His Majesty to say that Pie would like to see a closer bond of union
established between England and Eussia, such as an alliance of a purely defensive
character.(s) On m y rem arking that I feared that this was impracticable at present, the
Em peror said that we might at any rate conclude some arrangement similar to that
which existed between His M ajesty’ s Government and the Governm ent of the French
Eepublic. I replied that I was ignorant of the terms of this arrangement. His
Majesty said that H e was also unacquainted with them but that H e believed that, if
we had not actually a military convention with France, we had discussed and agreed
on what each country was to do in certain eventualities. On my observing that the
despatch of an expeditionary corps to có-operate with the Eussian army was, for
material reasons, out of the question, the Em peror said that, even if it was feasible,
it would serve no useful purpose, as He had men enough and to spare at home. It
might, however, be advantageous to arrange beforehand for the co-operation of the
British and Eussian fleets. B y the year 1917 H e hoped to have 8 Dreadnoughts in
the Baltic, and, in the event of war, the Germans would have to detach more than
that number o f ships to watch them. H e would never propose that a British fleet
should be sent to the Baltic on account o f the dangers to which it would be exposed

(L [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the K in g ; to the Prime Minister;
to Lord Crewe. It was sent, marked secret, on April 20, to Paris (as No. 216) ; to Berlin (as
No. 106); to Vienna (as No. 5 9 ); to Rome (as No. 104); to Constantinople (as No. 224); to
Tehian (as No. 93).]
( 2) [This interview is described by Sir G. Buchanan in M y M ission to R ussia (1923), Vol. I,
pp. 183-5.]
(3) [v . P a ri. D eb ., 5th S er., (House of Lords), Vol. 15, pp. 696-705.]
( ’ ) [cp. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. X (1), pp. 1-129, Chapter L X X X I V , passim,.']
(s) [cp. “ Note pour le Président du Conseil,” D .D .F ., 3m* S ér., Vol. X , pp. 180-5, No. 111.]
 781

from mines in the Belt and from attack by a superior German fleet passing through
the K iel Canal. The existence, however, of a Russian fleet in the Baltic would ea°se
the situation for the British fleet in the North Sea, At present, Ilis Majesty continued,
our understanding was confined to Persia, and H e was strongly o f opinion that that
understanding ought to be extended, either by some sort of arrangement such as He
had suggested, or by some written formula which would record the fact of Anglo-
Bussian co-operation in Europe.
I told the Emperor that I could not speak on this subject in the name of H is
M ajesty’ s Governm ent, but that I personally should welcome any arrangement that
would tend to consolidate Anglo-Russian relation?. I could not, however, but ask
m yself whether, supposing that England had last year been the ally of Russia, she
could have rendered her any more effective sendees than she had actually done as her
friend. On several occasions during the prolonged Balkan crisis she had been able
to play the role of mediator at Berlin and V ien n a ; and it was thanks to her friendly
intervention that a more or less satisfactory settlement of the Servian port question
had been arrived at and that Austria had yielded about Djakova and Dibra which
were blocking the way to a friendly settlement of the all-important question of
Scutari.( 6) It was doubtful, I thought, whether we could have accomplished so m uch
either at Berlin or Vienna had we approached those two Governm ents as the ally
of R ussia; whereas the fact that we were only a friend who might be turned into an
ally should Germ any and Austria force a war on Russia, made them m uch more
ready to listen to us. I f Russia had had to yield on the question o f Adrianople, this
was not so m uch due to anything which His M ajesty’ s Government had done or left
undone as to the desire of the French Government that Russia should take no action
that might possibly provoke German intervention. In the question of the German
military mission to Constantinople, Ilis M ajesty’ s Government had again used their
friendly offices at Berlin with very considerable success.
The Em peror admitted the truth of what I had said about the French and the
Adrianople question and also acknowledged the m any services which H is M ajesty’ s
Government had rendered Russia during the crisis. There might, he said, be
something in the argument which I had used, but H e would nevertheless prefer to
see our present understanding assume a more precise and definite character.
As the conversation 'then turned on the proposals published in the ‘ Xovoe
Vrem ya ’ respecting a new grouping of the Powers, on which I reported in m y
despatch No. 93 of the 31st ultim o,(7) the E m peror remarked that Count W itte had a
bad m emory and had placed in the mouth of the Em peror W illiam things which he
had him self said. The idea of such an alliance as Count W itte had suggested was
ridiculous at present. Austria might or might not be m oving towards disintegration,
but he did not believe that Germany wished to accelerate the process. It was, His
Majesty then proceeded to say, com m only supposed that there was nothing to keep
Germany and Russia apart. This was, however, not the case. There was the
question of the Dardanelles. Twice in the last two years the Straits had been closed
for a short period with the result that the Russian Grain industry had suffered very
serious loss. F rom inform ation which had reached Him from a secret source through
Vienna H e had reason to believe that Germ any was aiming at acquiring such a
position at Constantinople as would enable her to shut in Russia altogether in the
Black S ea.(s) Should she attempt to carry out this policy H e would have to resist it
with all H is power, even should war be the only alternative. The Em peror said
nothing further to explain what steps Germany proposed taking in order to give effect
to the policy with which His Majesty credits her. On m y remarking a little later on
that, while determined to abide by our understanding with Russia, we were following
the example which His Majesty had set us when H e concluded the Potsdam

(6) [cp. G ooch d T em p erley, Vol. I X (II), pp- 1122-24, S ubject Index, sub A l b a n ia ,
Frontiers.~\
(7) [v immediately preceding document.]
( 8) [r. su p ra, p. 779, Ed. A'oie.]
 782

A greem ent^9) and were endeavouring to place our relations with Germany on a more
friendly footing, the Em peror said that we were quite right to do so and that He also
wished to live on good terms with Germany.
In the subsequent course of the conversation, the Em peror spoke of the interest
which Tie took in the trans-Persian Railway scheme and said that H e hoped that we
should be able to arrive at a satisfactory understanding about the alignment. I
therefore told His Majesty that this question was now under the consideration of His
M ajesty’ s Government and that I should shortly be instructed to submit proposals
which would, I trusted, prove acceptable to the Imperial Governm ent.( 10) I ventured to
add that what preoccupied me most about the future of Persia was the fear that
circumstances might render it difficult for His Majesty to withdraw His troops and
that Russia might in consequence remain in permanent occupation o f North Persia.
The Em peror assured me that this was far from His thoughts. The Viceroy of the
Caucasus was, His Majesty said, constantly pressing for the recall of these troops, but
whenever there had been a question of it, the merchants of Tabriz had petitioned for
their retention, as they were afraid o f the anarchy which was almost certain to follow
the departure of the troops. I had not the courage to suggest that these petitions
had probably been drawn up at the Russian C onsulate; but, as H is Majesty had
alluded to the extension of the Cossack Brigade, I inform ed H im of what I had been
instructed to say to M. Sazonow about the employment of Swedish Gendarmerie.(u )
I pointed out that the Cossack Brigade which had been originally form ed as a body­
guard for the Shah, was not so well fitted to maintain order on the roads as the
Swedish Gendarm erie; but the Em peror was evidently so little acquainted with the
facts of the case that I did not pursue the matter further.
In conclusion, His Majesty once more expressed His desire for the maintenance
o f the closest possible relations between the two countries.
I have, Ac.
GEO R G E W . BUCHANAN.

P.S. Mr. Sazonoff whom I saw this afternoon told me that what the Emperor
had said about Germany and the Straits was founded on secret military information
which might or might not be correct. There was, however, no doubt that Germany
aimed at acquiring a moral protectorate over Turkey and, if she succeeded in this,
she would one day convert it into an effective one. Russia would never take any
aggressive action against Turkey so long as she remained an independent State, but
she would never permit her to becom e the dependency of another Power.
Reverting next to the question of our understanding His Excellency said that, if
an Alliance was out of the question, it must at any rate be given such a definite
character that Germany would know that, were she to embark on an aggressive policy,
she would in certain eventualities be confronted bv the united forces of England.
France and Russia. Such an understanding would, His E xcellency maintained,
guarantee the peace of Europe, as Germany was too much afraid of the British Fleet
to risk a war in which that Fleet would be opposed to her.
G. W. B.

M IN U T E S .

An interesting Despatch which might, I submit, be printed (Secret Series) and sent to
Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople: also, the last two paragraphs to Teheran.
As regards an alliance, I doubt much whether the public here would ever be willing to
entertain an idea in the case of Russia of any en te n te resembling the Anglo-French Under­
standing.

(9) [cp. Gooch if; T em p erley, Vol. X (I), pp. 549-723, Chapter L X X X I X , passim .]
(in) [cp . ibid., Vol. I X (I), pp. 767-8, No. 809, encl. (3) and (4 ).]
( n ) [r. supra, p. 768, No. 529, and n ote (3).]
 783
I v en tu re, how ever, stron gly to advoca te an am ple exch a n g e o f view s and som e a greem ent
o f a definite n a tu re resp ectin g P ersia, th ou gh even there form id ab le obstacles are in the w ay
c.f. M. K o ro s to v e tz ’ s trea tm en t o f S ir W . T ow n ley.
Q u [e r v ] : D istrib u te cop ies as proposed above, and a p p rov e H [ i s ] E x [c e lle n c v ]'s language.
L. 0 .
7 A p r[il],

T his opens up a serious qu estion o f high policy , w hich, personally I should p r e fe r to le t

lie u ntil we see w hat sort o f recep tion ou r T ra n s-P ersia n R a ilw av proposal gets.
G. R . C.
7.iv.l4.

T he only p o in t w hich, I th in k , calls fo r a d efinite decision at not to o la te a date, is th a t

of an u n d ersta n d in g as to n a va l co-op era tion betw een the tw o cou n tries in th e possible case
o f a w ar w ith G erm any.
T he u n d ersta n d in g o f a sim ilar ch a ra cter w ith F ra n ce, to w hich the E m p eror referred ,
relates solely t o the m easures w hich the naval a u th orities o f th e tw o cou n tries would ta k e
if and when th eir g overn m en ts decid ed on jo in t w a rlik e operations. T hat is to s a y : if the
tw o cou n tries w ere t o find them selves both a t w ar w ith G erm any, then th e ir resp ectiv e naval
forces w ill be d istrib u ted and em ployed on a p recon certed plan.
I can n ot see any possible ob jection s a gain st a sim ilar in form a l arra n gem en t b ein g
discussed betw een th e B ritish and R ussian naval authorities. I t com m its neith er side, it
establishes no “ casus foed eris,’ ’ w hilst it does p rov id e aga in st the serious d a n g er of h a vin g
sud denly to im p rov ise plans w ith a d ista n tly situ ated g overn m en t a t a cr itic; 1 m om ent when
a nv delav m av in volve the gravest consequences.
E. A. C.
A p [r i l] 5.

A n in terch a n g e o f view s betw een the resp ectiv e naval staffs, w ith ou t in any w ay b in d in g
th e G o v [e rn m e n ]ts , as has occu rred w ith F ra n ce m ig h t be taken in to con sid era tion a n d w ould
u n d ou bted ly have g rea t advantages.
(T his d e s p [a t c h ] s h [o u l]d be k e p t fo r S ir E. G rev— b e tte r not send it t o him b v post.)
A. X . ‘
M.
S ir G. B u ch an a n con d u cted his pa rt o f the con v ersation very w ell.(12)
I f th e F ren ch a greed we m ig h t let the R ussians know w hat has passed betw een m ilita ry
and naval a u th orities on each s id e (13) but w e ha d b etter postpon e discussion o f a n yth in g as
lon g as we can.
E. G.
16.4.14.

( 12) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s a p p rov a l o f S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s la n gu a gt on this occasion was

con v ev ed to him in S ir E d w a rd G rev ’ s despatch (X o . 144 o f A p ril 20. 1314. (F .O . 1-5312,1
15312’ 14 3S.)]
( I3> [rp . in fra , p. 7S5, X o . 539, and note (3).]

[E D . X O T E .— On A p ril 2 M . S azonov w rote a con fid en tia l letter to M. Isvolski in fo rm in g

him th a t the com in g v isit o f K in g G eorge V t o P a r is m ig h t be utilised fo r the ra is in g o f the
q uestion o f A n g lo-R u ssia n relations. “ A fu rth er rein forcem en t and developm en t of th e so-called
T rip le E n ten te, and if possible, its tra n sform a tion in to a new T rip le A lliance, a ppears to m e to
be a dem and o f the presen t h ou r.’ ’ H e alluded to “ certa in s t e p s ’ ’ already ta ken b y F ra n ce
and E n g la n d “ fo r a m ore precise defin ition o f m u tu a l ob liga tion s,” and suggested th a t these,
and “ the p o litica l con v en tion , w hich y ou speak o f as h a vin g been con clu d ed between E n g la n d
and F ra n ce ,” m igh t serve as a basis fo r closer A n g lo-R u ssia n relations. S icb cr t, pp. 713-5. cp.
Im periaU sm us, 1st S’er., V ol. I I , pp . 136-7, X o . 137. A le tte r from M . Isvolski t o M . S azonov
o f A p ril 9 decla red th a t M . D ou m erg u e had stated “ th a t F ra n ce and E n g lan d w ere n ot b ou n d
by p ositive p o litica l o b lig a tion s ,’ ’ and th a t he fa v ou red an A n g lo-R u ssia n naval con v en tion .
S ieb er t, p. 715. cp. Im periaU sm us, 1st S’er., V ol. I I , p. 199, X o . 1S5.]
 78 f

N o. 538.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A . Sicolson .( ’ y
P riv a te .^
M y dear Nicolson, St. Pctersburgh, April 16, 1914.
. . . .(3) As regards the question of doing something to strengthen our
understanding with Russia, I think that it would be better to await the result of the
K in g’ s visit to Paris(4) before saying anything to the Russian Government in reply
to the tentative suggestions made to me by the Emperor and Sazonoff. From what
Paléologue tells me, I gather that the French Government are rather preoccupied with
regard to the possibility of maintaining the Anglo-Russian understanding for any
length of time on its present rather shaky basis and would like to see it take a more
precise and definite shape. It is therefore more than probable that Poincare will
speak both to the K ing and to Sir Edward on the subject, though whether he is likely
to put forward any concrete proposal I do not know. W hat the Emperor and Sazonoff
apparently want is a written agreement which would make it clear to the world that, in
the event of Russia being involved in a defensive war, England would give her armed
support. They argue that the publication of an agreement of this character would
secure the peace of Europe, as the Germans would never force a war on Russia did
they know that they would have to deal with the British fleet as well as with the
Russian a rm y; but as such an agreement would virtually amount to a defensive
alliance I do not imagine that there is much chance of His M ajesty’ s Government
agreeing to it. The Naval agreement of which the Emperor spoke as an alternative
to an alliance is perhaps more feasible, as without binding ourselves to support Russia
at sea in the event of her being at war, we might enter into an interchange of views
with regard to a com bined naval plan of campaign, should a war break out in which
both countries had becom e involved. The two fleets would then be in a position to
co-operate effectively with one another without having to wait till the naval staffs had
been able to consult together after the outbreak of hostilities.
Another way might be to extend by an exchange of notes the scope of the Anglo-
Russian Agreement of 1907,(5) which is the only official record of our understanding,
so as to ensure Anglo-Russian co-operation in Europe as well as Asia. The difficulty
here would be to find a formula which would not, on the one hand, commit us to a
regular alliance and which would not, on the other, be of so platonic a charactei as
to leave things virtually as they are at present. In a conversation which I had with
him a few days ago, Sazonoff again reverted to the subject, saying that, unless
something was done, the Triple Entente would soon becom e a quantité négligeable.
Germany, lie maintained, was bent on establishing her hegem ony in Turkey and she
would one day push matters too far, with the result that we should all be diagged into
war W e had made an alliance with Japan; but that alliance, it was true, had been
directed against Russia. W hy could we not then conclude an agreement with Russia
that would" guarantee us both'against German aggression. I le did not care what form
that agreement took; but, if we wished to maintain peace, we must proclaim to the
world "the solidarity of the Triple Entente.
I fully realize all the difficulties in the way of an agreement of this nature, but
I ca n ’ t help feeling that we shall be running a great risk if we do nothing to
consolidate our understanding. Russia is rapidly becom ing so powerful that we must
retain her friendship at almost any cost. If she acquires the conviction that we are
unreliable and useless as a friend, she may one day strike a bargain with Geimanv
(1) [T h is letter is endorsed as h a v in g heen sent t o th e K i n g ; to the P rim e M in is te r; to
L o rd C rew e; to la u d M orley. The endorsem en t is in itia lled by S ir L . G rey .]
(2) [C arn ock M SS., V ol. TT o f 1914.] ,
(3) [T h e op en in g p a ra g ra ph s o f this le tte r are om itted as they deal w ith th e B a g da d a»
T ra ns-P ersia n R a ilw a y and are n ot relev an t to this ch a p ter.]
(«) [cp. supra, p. 741, N o. 504, and note ( 3) ; p. 742, N o. 5 05 ; in fra , pp. <85-8, Nos. 539-41,
and E d. N o t e .]
(*) [v. G ooch & T em p erley, Vol. I V , pp. 618-20, A p p . I.]
 and resume her liberty of action in Turkey and Persia. Our position then would be
a very parlous one.
You will have seen from m y telegram that the .Russian Government want to buy
the two Dreadnoughts which Armstrongs are building for the Chilean Government.
Gregorovitch told me that they are required for service in the Baltic, and he expressed
the hope that H is M ajesty’ s Government would do all they could to facilitate the
purchase. It is quite a new departure for Ilussia to order battleships abroad, and the
fact of her doing so now shows the serious view she takes of the international
situation.^6;
E ver yours,
G E O E G E . W . BUCHANAN.

( 6) [T h e p ostscrip t to this letter is not re p rod u ced as it refers only to th e q uestion o f the
possible a ction o f the T u rk s a fte r the a cq u isition o f th e ir new D rea d n ou g h t.]

No. 539.

Minute by Sir A. S icolson .i1)

1 . 0 . 17370 1531*2, 14 38.

Secret.
Sir Edward G rey, Foreign Office, April 17, 1914.
M. de Fleuriau said that he wished to speak to me on a very confidential matter.(D
M. Doumergue had been approached by M. Sazonov with the proposal that during
your visit to Paris the form er should speak to you as to enlarging the scope of the
Anglo-Russian understanding either by transforming it into a defensive alliance or
by confine to som e naval convention. M . de Fleuriau was unaware whether
I M. Doumergue would act on this suggestion— but he, M. de Fleuriau, thought you
should be prepared for some conversation on the subject.
M. de Fleuriau said that he had seen from the reports of M . Paleologue that
the E m peror and M. Sazonov had both spoken on this subject to Sir G. Buchanan—
and he understood that some interchange of views had taken place. I told M. de
Fleuriau very confidentially that both the E m peror and M. Sazonov had “ touched
u p o n ” the subject (effleure was the word I used) but that there had been no inter­
change of views as we had not as yet made any reply— and that the matter would
require very careful consideration. I said that we should naturally, before making
> any com m unication to M. Sazonov supposing we did make any, ascertain from the
French Governm ent whether they would agree to our letting St. Petersburg know
what had passed between our respective naval and military staffs. 3)
A. X .
It is a very delicate matter and I am glad to be w arn ed; but it is possible that
it is the French who have inspired the Russians with the idea. It is curious that
the Russians should be suggesting more than the French have got from us.
E . G.

( J) [T h is m in u te is end orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r ;

to L o rd C r e w e ; t o L o rd M orlev . T he endorsem en t is in itia lle d by S ir E d w a rd G rey .]
G ) [c p . D .D .F ., 3m* S ir., V ol. X , pp. 192-5, X o . 1 1 7 ; p. 196, X o . 119.]
( 3) [cp . in fra , p. 789, X o . 542 ]

[10900]
 78G

N o. 540.
Sir A . Xicolson to Sir M . de B u nsen .(M
P riva te .
My dear de Bunsen, Foreign Office, April 27, 1914.
. . . .(2) The Paris visit(;!) went off very successfully and the reception accorded
to the King and Queen far exceeded all expectations. It is quite untrue for the German
and Austrian press to assert that proposals were made to us either directly or indirectly
for converting our present understanding into an Alliance. The French quite
understand that such an Alliance is not possible and would not be feasible for anv
Government here. It is quite true— but I do not quite know how the papers have any
specific knowledge of the subject— that the Emperor of Russia and Sazonoff would like
to see our understanding with Russia extended, and perhaps rendered more binding.
This, I may tell you privately, was simply and solely with a view that our respective
naval authorities should come to some understanding as to what action should be
taken by them respectively in certain possible eventualities. I do not know whether
an exchange of views between the naval authorities on either side would lead to any
real practical results. Of course Russia would I daresay like to see her naval forces
in the Baltic strengthened by a British naval contingent. It would be quite impossible
for us, in case we were at war with Germany, to detach any ships into the Baltic,
firstly because we could not reduce our numbers in the North Sea, and secondly it
would be a most risky operation to place ships in the Baltic where they might be
bottled up without any great difficulty. Of course Russia does not require any
military help from us. even supposing we were in a position to afford any. She has
enough men and to spare. Still 1 do think there may be a little disappointment at
Petersburg if we do not give some evidence that we are anxious that our relations
with Russia should be given a more precise and definite form. It is very difficult to
know how this could be managed, but I do fear— and I know the French are haunted
with the same apprehension— that if we do not try to tighten up the ties with Russia
she may become weary of us and throw us overboard. In that case we should be in
an exceedingly awkward position, as she could cause us an infinity of annoyance, to
put it mildly, in the Mid and Far East, without our being in any way able to
retaliate. I do not mean to say that Russia would necessarily become really hostile
to us, but even were she to becom e indifferent to our wishes a situation would be
produced with which w7e really could not cope. She would act entirely as she pleased
in Persia, on the borders of Afghanistan and also in Mongolia, and we should be
quite incapable of taking any steps to moderate her altitude, whatever it might be.
She could, without being hostile or even if you like unfriendly, cause immeasurable
iamage to our prestige and seriously shake our political position in India and the
adjoining countries. This to me is such a nightmare that I would at almost any cost
keep Russia’ s friendship. Of course as a matLer of pure policy, apart from public
opinion here, there is no doubt that the right course for us to take would be to
transform both our understandings into definite alliances, and I am quite sure, though
of course there would be great searchings of mind in B eilin and Vienna, that such
a course would undoubtedly do more than anything else towards the preservation of
peace in Europe. A close com bination of France, Russia and ourselves would form
such a pow7erful factor that no other group would ever venture to tackle us. As matters
at present stand, with the exceedingly loose ties which bind us to France and Russia,
we always run the risk of being severed by some unexpected event. Moreover, the
uncertainty of onr attitude leads not only to misgivings in the minds of our friends, but
encourages also in the minds of other parties the hope that they may be able to break
( i f [C arnoek M SS.. V ol. I I of 1914 ] . . . .
( 2) [T h e op en in g p a ra g ra p h o f this le tte r is om itted as it is chiefly con cern ed w ith personal
m a tt e r s ]
(3) \ep. supra, p. 741, X o. 504, and note (3)\ p. 742, No. 5 05 ; p. 784, No. 538; infra.
pp. 7*7-8, No. 541, and Ed. N o te .]
 7S7

up so fragile a com bination as that of the Triple Entente. However, the question of
an Alliance is of course out o f the question so long as the public in England remain
in their present mind, so it is hardly worth seriously taking into consideration.p* . . . .
[Yours. Ac.
A. N ICO LSO N.]
( 4) [T h e final pa ra g ra ph s are om itted as they refer to B alk an questions. T hey a d d n oth in g
to in form a tion g iv en elsew here.]

No. 541.
Sir Edward G rey to Sir F . D trtie.{'
F.O . 192SS 15312, 14 38.
(No. 249. Secret.
Sir.. Foreign Office, May 1. 1914.
On the 23rd u lt[im o] I had a long conversation with M . Doumergue at the
Quai d'O rsay. Sir W illiam Tyrrell was with m e, and M. Cambon and M. Margerie
were present also, i 2
M. Doumergue spoke at length and with great emphasis on the necessity for
doing something to make relations with Russia more secure. He evidently assumed
that Germ any would make great efforts to detach Russia from the French Alliance,
and might possibly be successful. In that case, France and England would be left
a lo n e ; for Italy, who had at one time been the least certain and effective member
of the Triple Alliance, was now taking Austria's place in it. Italy had ambitions in
the Mediterranean, and Germany was showing a disposition to consolidate Italy’ s
position in the Triple Alliance by keeping a German squadron in the Mediterranean.
Russia was anxious for some better understanding with us. and it was essential that
we should do something. The French knew that an Alliance between Britain and
Russia was out o f the question, but could not we at least promise to discuss matters
with Russia, if necessary?
I said that I thought it not impossible, if the French agreed, that we should
communicate to the Russian Government exactly what the state o f things was between
France and ourselves. W e might let them know o f the note that I had given to
M. Cambon. 3 and of the conversations that had taken place between the Military
and Naval Staffs. 1 Russia would then be able to ste exactly how things stood,
and what scope they left for any conversations with her. She would understand
that both the French and British Governm ents were left entirely free to decide
whether, in case of war. they would support one another or not. Russia would
realise also that, if the British Government did decide to engage in a Continental
war, any use that they could make of their m ilitary forces would be on the French
frontier: and. therefore, there could be no use in military conversations on the parr
of Russia and England. In making the com m unication we could ask Russia what
she wanted.
M. Doumergue agreed with this, and said that Russia did not want any military
arrangement as far as we were concerned.
I said that the matter would then be reduced to a conversation between the
Russian and British Naval Staffs. It could not amount to very much, but it would
be something, and I would consult the Prim e Minister about it on my return to
London, and see whether we could agree to such a conversation.
I may inform Your E xcellency, though I did not enter upon this detail with
M. Doumergue. that, unless it were to give the “ coup-de-grace.” atthe very end
(*) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K in g and to th e C a bin et on
M a v 2. It was rep eated to St. P etersb u rg h (as N o. 161), ?< r. x, on M ay 1 .]
> ) [r p . 'D D F.. 3 ”*' S er.. V ol. X . pp. 264-70. N o. l o o ]
(3) [t\ su p ra, pp. 614—5. X o . 416 ]
C ) [ r supra, p. 7S5, X o. 539, and n ote (3).]
[10900] 3 E 2
 788
of a war, when we had been practically victorious, it would not be considered safe
in time o f war for the British Fleet to enter the Baltic, lest the Fleet should be
caught in a trap and find its communications cut off. If, therefore, there were naval
conversations with Russia, they would, so far as I can see, amount simply to letting
Russia know that our naval forces would be used outside the Baltic, and that Russia
could put her own naval forces to the best use inside the Baltic.
Later in the evening, after dinner, M. Poincare spoke to me and expressed
him self satisfied with what he had heard that I had said to M. Doumergue.
I pointed out, in the course of conversation with M. Poincare and M. Doumergue(5)
that it was more difficult for us in the case o f Russia than in the case of France—
] would not say to enter into engagem ents, for we had no engagements with France,
— but to hold out to Russia any hopes of assistance from us. W hether we engaged
in a Continental war or kept aloof would depend on public opinion in Great Britain
when the time came. If there were a really aggressive and m enacing attack made
by Germany upon France, it was possible that public feeling in Great Britain would
justify the Governm ent in helping France. But it was not likely that Germany
would make an aggressive and m enacing attack upon R ussia; and, even if she did,
people in Great Britain would be inclined to say that, though Germany might have
successes at first, Russia’ s resources w’ere so great that, in the long run, Germany
would be exhausted without our helping Russia. Besides this, the French Govern­
ment were a free Governm ent, wdiile the Russian Government were n o t ; and this
affected the sym pathy of-p u b lic opinion in Great Britain.
W hen I made this latter remark to M. Poincare, he said that there was the same
difficulty in the French feeling for Russia.
On this I observed that I knew this to be so, hut in France the utility of an
Alliance w7ith Russia was felt, while in England the matter required much more
explanation.
M. Poincare observed that it was not an Alliance that wras suggested, for there
could be no question of anything more between England and Russia than existed
between E ngland and France.
I found that everyone conversant with politics, both those in office and such
men as MM. Clemenceau and Delcasse, were im m ensely impressed by the growing
strength of Russia and her tremendous resources and potential power and wealth.
[I am, A c.]
E. G [R E Y ].

(5) [cp. M. D ou m erg u e’ s a ccou n t o f S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s statem ent on th is p o in t in the

ea rlier con v ersation record ed here, D .D .F ., 3me S er., V ol. X , p. 269, N o. 155.]

[E D . N O T E .— On M a y 12 C ount B en ck en d orff rep orted th a t S ir E d w a rd G rey had detailed

to him his im pressions o f the K in g ’ s v isit to P aris, and th a t he spoke “ w ith a w arm th, which
is n ot usual w ith him ” o f the co n v ictio n w hich he had a tta in ed “ th a t th e fu n d a m en ta l idea
o f th e E n ten te had ta ken root as deep ly in F ra n ce as in E n g la n d .” “ H e w ished,” said Count
B en ck en dorff, “ to a nnounce to m o th e b eg in n in g o f a phase o f a still closer ra p p roch em en t to
F ra n e e ,” and spoke o f his in ten tion to in form E nssia “ o f all m ilita ry con v en tion s existin g
betw een E n g la n d and F ra n ce .” H e a d ded th a t lie m ust consult the C abinet. W hen Count
B en ck en d orff h in ted a t an alliance, S ir E d w a rd G rey dem urred , a d d in g “ A s you see, we have
no allianee to-d a y even w ith F ra n ce ” S ieb er t, pp. 716-7.
O n th e 16th S ir E d w a rd G rey was re p orted as h a vin g in form ed M. P a u l Cam bon on the
p rev iou s da y th a t he had consulted the C a bin et on the D ou m erg u e p rop osal and th a t they
fa v ou red n e g otia tion s fo r “ ev en tu al eo-op era tion o f the E ussian and E nglish navies.”
M . C am bon ha d coinm unieated this in tellig en ce to C ount B enckendorff. S ieb er t. pp. 718-9.
cp. D .D .F ., 3 me S er., V ol. X , pp. 3 61-2, N o. 2 32 ; pp. 371-4, N o. 241, w here S ir E d w a rd G rey’ s
con v ersation w ith M . P au l C am bon is said to have taken p lace on th e 14th.]
A fu rth er letter from C ou n t B en ck en d orff to M. S azonov on M ay 18 confirm ed this news,
and sta ted th a t M r. A squith fa v ou red the proposal b u t th a t there m ig h t be opposition,
esp ecially to an allianee, in the C a bin et and in the ranks o f the L ib era l pa rtv . S ieb ert,
pp. 719 -2 1.] '
 789
N o. 542.
Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F . B ertie.G '

F.O . 22807 15312 14 38.

(No. 313.) Secret.
Sir, Foreign Office, May 21, 1914.
I told II. Cambon on the 14th instant(2i that the Government had considered the
question o f making some communication to Russia, as I had suggested in my
conversation with M. Doumergue in Paris last month ;(3: and I was now prepared to
communicate to the Russian Government a copy of my letter o f the 22nd November
1912 to M. Cam bon .(4 In doing so, I would point out to Count B enckendorff that,
as he would see from the letter, conversations had taken place from time to time
between the French and British Naval and Military Staffs. W ith regard to conver­
sations between Military Staffs, I would say that, if ever the British Army was engaged
on the Continent, what force we could spare would be allocated to the French
frontier; and. therefore. |p could not enter into any military engagem ent, even of
the most hypothetical kind, with Russia. I understood that Russia did not desire
a military arrangement. But I should suggest that the Russian Naval Authorities
should ascertain from our Naval Authorities what had passed between the French
and British Naval Staffs,— and I supposed that the Russian Authorities could also
ascertain this from the French Naval Authorities. They would then be able to see
what scope there was for any conversations between the Russian and British Naval
Staffs. I said that I assumed that M. Cambon would communicate to Count
Benckendorff the letter of the 23rd November 1912.(5) which he had written to me in
reply to mine o f the 22nd. in the same ser.sr.
M. Cambon said that he must apply to his Government for definite authority
to agree to the communication o f the letters to Count Benckendorff. As soon as he
had received their consent, he would let me know, and I could then make to Count
Benckendorff the com m unication that I proposed.
[ I am. iSrc.]
E . G C R E Y ],

0 ) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g on M a y 25, an d to the

Cabinet on M a v 22.’
(2) [cp. D .D .F ., 3™ S er., V ol. X , p p . 3 61-2, N o. 2 3 2 ; pp . 3 71-4, X c 241.]
(3) [r . supra, p. 741, X o . 5 04 ; r. also im m ed ia tely p reced in g docum ent ]
(4) [r . sup ra , pp . 614-5. X o . 416.]
( 5) [ v. supra, p. 615. X o. 417.]

No. 543.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir F . B irtie.G )

F .O . 22808'15312 14 3S.
(No. 314.; Secret.
Sir. Foreign Office, May 21. 1914.
M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff came to see me together on the
19th in s t[a n t].(2)
I observed to Count Benckendorff that, as he knew, M. Doumergue had spoken
to me in Paris on the subject of relations with Russia :(3) I had suggested that we
might communicate to the Russian Government exactly how things stood between

0 ) [T h is d espa tch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g on M a y 2 5 ; a n d to the

C abinet on M a y 22. I t was rep eated to St. P etersb u rg h (as X o . 1S5), S ecret.]
(2) [c p . D .D .F .. 3 me S er.. V ol. X . pp. 339-90, X o . 250.]
(3) [r . sup ra , pp. 737-3. X o. 541, and n o te (2).]
 790
France and ourselves; and I was now authorised by His M ajesty’ s Government to
give Count Benckendorff a copy of the letter that I had written to M. Cambon on
the 22nd November 1912.(4)
M. Cambon at the same time gave Count Benckendorff a copy of the letter that
he had written to me on the 23rd Novem ber,(5) confirming my letter of the 22nd.
I said that Count Benckendorff would see from the letters that the French and
British Governments were not bound to each other by an alliance, and remained
free to decide in any crisis whether they would assist each other or not, but that
there had taken place between the Naval and Military Staffs certain conversations,
which, should the Governments decide to assist each other in a crisis, would enable
them to do so. The îeason for these conversations had been that, unless something
of the kind was arranged beforehand, however anxious the two Governments might
find themselves in a crisis to assist each other, they would be unable to do so when
the time came.
I observed to Count Benckendorff that I understood that the Russian Govern­
ment did not wish for conversations between the Russian and British Military Staffs.
The conversations that had taken place between the French and British Military Staffs
left no room for any other arrangement, even a conditional one, so far as England
was concerned. W e thought, however, that the Russian Government might be
inform ed o f what had passed between the French and British Naval Staffs. They
would then see what scope there was for conversations between the Russian and
British Naval Staffs, and we should be prepared that such conversations should take
place : on the footing of the letter that I had written to M. Cambon, and o f which
I had just given Count Benckendorff a copy.
Count Benckendorff raised some question o f whether the conversations between
the Naval Staffs should take place in London through the Russian Naval Attache,
or in St. Petersburgh through the British Naval Attache.
I said that I assumed that the conversations would be in London with the Russian
Naval Attaché, but this was a matter to be settled by the convenience of the Russian
and British Admiralties.
Count Benckendorff further asked me whether the Russian Government should
not be inform ed o f the conversations that had taken place between the French and
British Military Staffs.
M. Cambon said that there was presumably no objection to this.
I did not see any objection, but I said that, as Russia was the Ally of France,
presumably there were complete arrangements between their ¡Military Authorities for
a “ casus foed eris’ ’ under the Alliance. In Paris, o f course, the Authorities knew
these arrangements, and also the conversations that had taken place between the
French and British Military Staffs. In London, we knew nothing of the military
arrangements between France and Russia. W hile it seemed to me quite natural
that the Russian Military Authorities should wish to know from the French Military
Authorities what military arrangements they had made with any country besides
Russia, it seemed to me a matter to be dealt with by the Russian Government in
Paris rather than in London.
FI am. A c.]
E . G [R E Y ],
(4) fv. supra, pp. 614-5. No. 416.]
( 5) [v. supra, p. 615, N o. 417.]

\ED. N O T E .— There is a full a ccou n t by C ou n t B en ck en dorff o f an in terview w ith

S ir E d w a rd G rey on M a y 22 in S ieb ert, pp . 721-2. The substance o f th e con v ersation is in the
m ain id en tica l w ith th a t describ ed in the im m ed iately preced in g docum ent, w here the conversa­
t ion is assigned to the 19th. T his da te is g iv en also in M. P a u l C a m bou’ s a ccou n t in ]) .] ) . F.,
3 'nc S ir., V ol. X , pp. 389-90, No. 250, and in the rep ort by C ou n t B en ck en dorff g iven in
Im periulism us, 1st S er., V ol. I l l , pp. 2 1-2, No. 30.]
 791
N o. 544.
Sir E . Goschen to Sir Edward G rey.(M
F.O . 23G47 15087 14 38.
(No. 215., Berlin, D. May 23, 1914.
Sir, R . May 27, 1914.
The “ Berliner T a geb la tt’ ’ published last night an article of some interest in
regard to proposals alleged to have been put forward during The K ing’ s recent visit
to Paris for a naval understanding between Great Britain and Russia.!2) In the
course of this article the writer states that he has received a letter from “ a trust­
worthy Parisian personage, who in such cases has access to reliable sources of
inform ation.’ ’ to the effect that during the R oyal Visit a step forward had been taken
by the advocates of “ the Russian A ffiance.” The correspondent, he states, after
m entioning some incidents connected with H is M ajesty's visit, goes on to s a y :
" T h e s e were however in reality only matters o f secondary importance, and
I think that people in Germany underestimate the significance of the visit, or
pretend to do so. For everyone knows Isvolsky's activity. He has even taken
advantage of this opportunity to put forward fresh proposals and has made an
attempt to transform the Triple Entente into an alliance in spirit and substance.
Such a thing cannot be done all at once— it can only be brought about gradually,
hut he. and those who share his views, hope to attain their object by degrees.
I can assure you that during the English visit the idea was mooted o f com ing
to an arrangement which in certain circumstances must lead to military and
naval co-operation, but especially co-operation between the British and Russian
Navies. An Anglo-Russian Naval “ E ntente.” modelled upon the Naval Agree­
ment between Russia and France is. in the intention of those who recommend
it, to be the next step towards an alliance. This statement, if published, may
possibly he denied, hut the proposal exists, and. though it may be still far from
realisation, it seems not to have hitherto been definitely rejected.”
After stating that this letter would not have been quoted if there had not
been good reason to believe that the assertions contained therein were well founded,
the “ Berliner T a geb la tt” article goes on to say that whilst the value of such a
naval alliance between England and Russia might well be doubted, it was intended
by its authors m erely to pave the way towards a much greater thing, namely a
complete alliance. The clever originators of the idea meant to attain this end by
degrees, and hoped at the same time to place impediments in the way of an improve­
ment in Anglo-German relations “ which, to the satisfaction of all sensible Germans
and Englishm en, had made such a good b eginn in g.”
It was clear, it says, that an Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement directed against
the Baltic coast of Germany would not precisely strengthen the position of those who,
both in Germany and in E ngland, were working for a rapprochement and were
delighted at the results so far achieved. E very intelligent observer would admit
that the understanding between Great Britain and France could advance the interests
o f both countries in many respects. An Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement, however,
which could only have the Baltic coast as its objective, would be an “ understanding
of quite a different nature.” “ The big navy fanatics.” it says in conclusion, “ and
those who ceaselessly clamour for increased armaments in Germany, would see in
such an agreement a fresh and welcome excuse for their campaigns, and every noisy
Chauvinist would hasten to make capital out o f it. And even the visit of the English

( 1) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a vin g been sent to th e K in g ; to the P rim e M inister.

A cop y was sent to th e A d m ira lty .]
( 2) [T h a t A nglo-Itu ssian naval discussions w ere in progress was revealed by the E d ito r o f
the B e rlin er T a oeb la ft at the request o f the W ilholm strasse, r. T h eod or W o lff: The E v e o f 1914,
(1935), pp. 3 7 9 -4(j; the substance o f the rev elation s a ppears to have been know n to th e G erm an
G overnm ent from the docum ents sup plied by M. de S ieb ert.]
 792

squadron to Kiel during the Kiel W eek, which has just been announced, would be
an inadequate consolation for the friends of peaceful progress. W e would heartily
welcome our visitors, but at the same time we could not overlook the fact that such
festivities are passing manifestations and that an agreement is an abiding fa ct.”
I have, &c.
W . E . GOSCHEN.
M IN U T E .

A m ischievous article, based on som eb ody’ s m ost regrettab le in discretions.

C op y A d m ir a lty .
E . A . C.
M a y 28.
A. N.
E . G.

No. 545.

Sir E . Goschcn to Sir A. N icolsonA1)

Private. (2)
M y dear Nicolson, Berlin, May 23, 1914.
Your letter(3) was most interesting, especially the Russian part o f it. It is extra­
ordinary to me how many people, even including our own countrym en, fail to see
the importance of our maintaining our Entente with Russia. I see that the Crown
Prince is not the only one to make the statement that if Great Britain had an
alliance or entente with Germany, the two countries could rule the world. F or I
notice in the Print that Prince H enry used language to that effect in conversation
with Norman. Jagow is too sensible to make remarks like that openly but he too
would like to convince us that it would be more to our interest to go with Germany
than with Russia. He sent the other day for Mackenzie, the Times correspondent
here, to talk to him about his speech and the British Press. The conversation
appears to have been o f a friendly character and, after a discussion as to whether
the Germans or Russians began the late Press controversy between the two countries,
it seems to have travelled over a pretty wide field. But Russia seems to have been
the chief topic. Jagow tried hard to convince his hearer that our understanding
with Russia, particularly as regards Persia, was not only not advantageous to us
but absolutely disadvantageous. H e said that regarding things from a business
point of view, he would not like it very much if he was an Englishm an to see the
Persian trade falling so fast into the hands o f Russia. He did not apparently suggest
a com m on policy for England and Germ any in Persia, but no doubt that was what
he was thinking of. He did not take a rosy view o f the future as regards the Balkans.
He said that Russia was straining, and would in the future strain, every nerve to
get back all her old influence in the Balkans, and Austria would strain every nerve
to prevent this. This struggle for influence would be a matter of comparative
indifference to Germany, if it were not for the fact that her obligations to her ally
might drag her into the conflict. The impression left upon Mackenzie hv the whole
conversation was that Jagow is, at all events for the moment, very anti-Russian.
Sverbeef, when I last saw him , did not seem to think so, but I have not seen him
quite lately as he has gone to E m s. Cambon is also away.
Jagow sent for me yesterday to tell me confidentially that he would like to finish
off the business of the recognition o f the recent annexations to the Balkan States,
and that he thoroughly agrees with Sir E . G rey’ s point of view, hut that he is for
the moment powerless in this respect as the Austro-Hungarian Government have
t 1) [T h is lette r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g and to the P rim e M in iste r.
T h e endorsem en t is in itia lle d by S ir E d w ard G rey .]
( 2) [C a rn o ck M S S ., V o l. I l l of 1 91 4 .]
( 3) [v. supra, pp. 7 4 5 -6 , N o . 5 10 .]
 793
begged him to hold his hand until certain economical questions which they were
discussing with the Balkan States— i.e. S ern a — are settled. Speaking o f Albania,
he said, in answer to a question from me, that the first intimation he had received
o f the arrest o f Essad Pasha and the landing o f Austrian and Italian sailors was
from the Press but he added that the matter had been so pressing that there had
been no time for consultation with other Powers / 4 Of one thing Jagow seemed quite
certain, viz. that it was a thousand pities that Essad had not been shot. He was
much amused by a remark in a German paper to the effect that it was by no means
certain whether the latest developments arose from a plot o f Essad against the
Prince, or a plot o f the Prince against Essad. He was also rather amused by a report
he had received from the German Consul-General at Budapest saying that he had just
seen Turkhan Pasha who had told him that he was going to Vienna to attend a
dinner, but that his subsequent m ovements were uncertain as he was not quite sure
whether he was still Prime Minister of Albania or n o t !
Jagow says that he has read in the newspapers that Turkhan is com ing to
Berlin. H e hopes to goodness it is not true as he has nothing whatever to say to
him. In fact he wishes to have as little as possible to do with Albanian affairs. I
said I was sorry for the poor Prince, to which he replied “ Yes. but why the devil
did he go th ere.” His presence is in fact awkward for the German Government
as they wish to hold aloof from Albanian political affairs and are in perpetual dread
that danger to the Prince m ay call for their intervention. You will have seen from
m y telegram that Jagow is dead against the sending to Durazzo of the International,
particularly the German, troops.(5)
An article has just appeared in the ‘ Tageblatt ’ headed “ A Russian proposal
for an Anglo-P.ussian Naval understanding.” I think I must s nd it to you but
unfortunately there is no time by this bag. The gist of it is that a correspondent
in whom the ‘ Tageblatt ’ has every confidence has reported that such a proposal
was made during the R oyal visit to Paris and that it has not, at all events yet,
been rejected.
The ‘ Tageblatt ’ says that this report comes from such a good source that it
cannot be wholly disregarded; and while makir.a light of the danger to Germany
o f such an understanding, it points out that its effect would be to impede the growth
o f the good relations between England and Germany which to the satisfaction of
all sensible people in both countries has recently shown signs o f such healthy
developm ent.
This the Article hints is probably the chief aim o f the author of the proposal—
viz. Isvolski.
If this article had appeared in the ‘ Post ’ I should have seen in it a design to
prepare the ground for a Naval Novelle, but the ‘ Tageblatt ’ is usually against naval
expenditure. At any rate it points out that the proposal tcill serve as a pretext for
further Naval demands on the part o f the Naval League and the Big Navy Party.
The Article concludes by saying that the visit o f a British Squadron to Kiel will
scarcely be a consolation for the advocates o f good Anglo-German relations. “ W e
will give our visitors a hearty reception hut we cannot overlook the fact that such
Gala visirs are mere passing pageants, while an Understanding abides. ” You might
perhaps think it worth while to say a word to Lichnowsky on the subject o f this
Article which regards the proposal and its non-rejection as facts.
Yours verv sincerelv,
‘ W . E . GOSCIIEN .

(4) [cp. G ooch d T e m p e r le y , V o l. X ( I ), pp. 1 1 5 -6 , N os. 1 3 0 -2 , and E d . A 'o fe .]

( 3) [S ir E . G osch en ’ s te leg ra m (X o . 61) of M a y 22, 1914, is not reproduced. I t referred to
th e proposal to send 500 in te r n a tio n a l troops to D u ra z zo , an d states th a t H e r r von Jagow
wished to know S ir E d w a r d G r e y ’ s view s. “ P erson ally he is disinclin ed to send G erm an
troops, bu t w ill not of course refu se if all th e oth er G overn m en ts are agreed as to th e necessity
for em p lo y m en t o f in te rn a tio n a l tr o o p s.” (F .O . 2 2 9 3 0 /2 2 5 2 1 /1 4 /5 3 .) cp. Gooch d T em p erley,
V o l. X (I ), p. 120, N o . 1 37 .]
 i91
M IN U T E .

T h e T a g e b la tt shows a serious leak age in P aris. Th e article should n ot be m en tioned to

P r in ce L ichnow ski.
E. G.

No. 546.

Sir G. Buehanan to Sir Edward G rey.

F .O . 2 36 4 5 /2 3 14 5 /1 4 /3 8.
(No. 154.) St. Pctersburgh, D. May 24, 1914.
Sir, R . May 27, 1914.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation, made by Captain
Sm ith, of the statement made in the Duma yesterday hv the Im perial Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
I have, &c.
G E O R G E W . BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 546.

Speech of M. Sazonov, M inister for Foreign Affairs, delivered in the Imperial Duma,
M ay 23, 1914.
(Translation.)
G en tlem en ! Before you proceed to discuss the estimates for the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, I wish, with the gracious permission of His M ajesty, the Em peror,
to furnish you with a review of the present international situation, and as far as
possible to explain the action of Russian diplom acy of late.
H aving passed through a serious crisis last year, which was accompanied by
violent upheavals in the Near East more than once threatening an extension of
com plications beyond the limits of the Balkan Peninsula, we, fortunately, have
now entered a calmer period. Although there is yet much to put in order there is
no longer that tension which still hut a short time ago evoked serious concern.
The unanimity displayed by the Powers of the Triple “ entente ” to which Russia
belongs materially assisted in the happy outcome of the above-m entioned crisis.
As you know, in foreign policy, Russia continues to rest on her steadfast alliance
with France and on her friendship with England. On the significance of the Franco-
Russian Alliance it is scarcely necessary to dilate further as it has already given
sufficient proof of its productiveness during the twenty years o f its existence.
Conviction of its necessity for the welfare of the two States which it binds has become
deeply imbued in the two peoples. The impending visit during the present summer
of M. Poincare to Russia will give a fresh opportunity to display the mutual and
cordial feelings with which Russia and France are imbued.
B earing in mind that concordance of policy constitutes the fundamental condition
for the solidarity and productiveness of an Alliance, the Imperial and French
Governm ents are in constant com m unication with each other for the purpose of a
joint consideration of all questions interesting them. The friendly relations which
have been established between France and England, and also between England and
Russia, have permitted an extension o f this intercourse and Great Britain now takes
part in these councils. As I have already stated, this fact has proved of undoubted
service in the matter of a preservation of the peace during the recent difficult
m oments through which we have passed, and has in its turn induced us, upon the
conclusion o f last year’ s conference of Ambassadors in London, to lav on the
Representatives of Russia and France in the British Capital the duty of joint
consideration with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs of a whole series of
 795

questions connected with the final settlement of recent complications. W e are

convinced that this m ethod, which expedites and simplifies negotiations between the
Powers of the Triple “ entente.” will prove of substantial value.(*
In this connexion much has been said of late respecting a conversion of the
Triple “ e n te n te” into a new Triple Alliance. It appears to me that in the present
instance the question of form has assumed a somewhat exaggerated significance.
It is possible to imagine a formal alliance not based on an actual com m unity of
interests, and not relying on a mutual sym pathy o f the peoples: on the other hand
there are political unions of Powers which com e into being spontaneously as the result
of a com m unity of aims sought. In the latter case, a friendly aspiration towards these
aims is guaranteed apart from the form and range of written agreements. Speaking
generally only that which has not come to a standstill and is capable of moving
forward can be regarded as having life. In this sense our Alliance with France and
our friendship with England fully satisfy the condition specified, as both continue
to increase in strength and to develop.
Here it must be noted that just as with years there has disappeared the anxiety
which was manifested during the early period of the Triple Alliance, so now it is to
be hoped that all will be able to regard with tranquil[l ity the later union of Powers
which has been form ed and is known as the Triple “ entente.” Void of all
aggressiveness, it only supports the necessary balance of power in Europe and, as
we saw not long ago. is always ready to co-operate with the Triple Alliance in the
com m on interest o f a preservation of the peace.
Membership of one group does not necessarily exclude good relations with
rem aining Powers. In particular we continue to strive for a maintenance o f friendly
relations with the German Empire.
Of late there have been several occasions when it has seemed that these relations
might becom e dimm ed, and if undesirable results as the consequence of such incidents
have been averted, it is only due to the a bote-m entioned long-standing friendship
between Russia and Germany and the efforts of their Governments to preserve this
friendship in the future also. U nfortunately, in their efforts the Governm ents do
not always meet due support from the press on each side of the frontier. Support
o f public alarm without sufficient grounds is not wise and may be under certain
conditions dangerous. Therefore I cannot but express a hope that both the German
and Russian press will cease waging useless polemics and will discuss questions
affecting our mutual relations with greater calm. It must not be forgotten that we
are on the eve of the conclusion o f a new Treaty of Commerce with Germany which
can be productive only under the condition of conform ity with the just demands
of both contracting parties. To obtain such a result it is necessary that negotiations
shall be conducted under peaceful and businesslike conditions and not amidst the noise
o f incessant recriminations and suspicions which evoke mutual irritation and distrust.
The statement recently made in the Delegations by the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs that relations between Russia and the Dual Monarchy are of an
entirely friendly nature, and the hope expressed by the Minister that they will retain
this character in the future, is in accordance with our view as to the relations between
the two States, and also with our sincere desire to maintain good relations with our
neighbours. F or this reason, even if of late in Galicia, among those sections of the
population hostile to us. there has been noticeable a certain movement directed
towards the creation of difficulties for us in our frontier territories, we believe that
the Austro-Hungarian Government will not allow this movement to darken our
good-neighbourly relations.
Between Russia and Italy relations continue to be well-disposed, and from our
side nothing will be introduced which could alter their friendly character.

0 ) [ M a r g in a l com m en t by S ir A . X ic o l s o n : “ I t m ig h t h ave been w iser n ot to la y so m uch

stress on this. A. X .” ]
 796
Passing to the 6tate of affairs in the Near East I will not keep your attention
long on the events of last year.
It is difficult for me to add anything to the docum entary particulars given in the
Orange Book which has as its aim an explanation of the attitude o f Russia towards
the Balkan crisis. M oreover I am of the opinion that we must approach wounds
still unhealed and passions as yet unallayed with caution. The task of Russia is
the task of pacification. H er traditions are— impartial good feeling to all Balkan
States alike, and support of each, conditionally o f course on reciprocity of sincerity
and confidence. The events o f the late wars have expanded the limits of each of
the Balkan States, but at the cost o f great sacrifices and much bloodshed. The time
has now arrived for concentrated peaceful work on the part of each State in their
newly obtained possessions.
W e wish to believe that in the realisation of this task the Balkan Governments
will recognise that in the matter o f strengthening a State the mere acquisition of
territory is insufficient, the devotion and confidence o f the new citizens must be
enlisted.
Only upon this condition can internal pacification and the mutual “ rapproche­
m e n t ” of all these States be attained. “ R approchem ent” is necessary in the
interests of each for their peaceful prosperity and defence of their independence on
the basis o f a watchword, known and dear to all, “ The Balkans for the Balkans.”
Speaking of the Balkans, I cannot but mention the recent visit to St. Peters-
burgh of the Roum anian Grown Prince and Princess. In the cordial reception
afforded them our distinguished guests were able to convince themselves of the
sincerely friendly attitude o f Russia towards their country and respect for her wise
R uler.
In the immediate future. His Majesty the Em peror is visiting His Majesty King
Carol on Roum anian soil. This m eeting, while responsive to the reciprocal feelings
of the two Monarchs, will I am convinced at the same time serve as fresh encourage­
ment to proceed along the path of “ rapproch em en t” between the two peoples, who
are bound by the ties of a glorious past and mutual interests and sympathies. As
regards Albania, we of course will follow events in that country with due attention
so far as these events touch the interests o f neighbouring States.At the present
time the Country is in a condition bordering on anarchy.
The settlement of the Balkan crisis has favourably reflected on our relations
with Turkey. The European possessions o f Turkey were a source o f weakness rather
than strength. Henceforward there naturally rise before her fresh problems of
internal reorganisation for the general welfare of the peoples. In this direction the
Governm ent o f the Sultan will o f course find Russia ready to support her efforts
towards the attainment of these aims. Only with a peaceful development o f Turkey
can freedom of mercantile navigation in accordance with her interests and the vital
needs of Russia be duly secured.
The direction which the Arm enian Question has received of late is symptomatic
o f the pacific intentions of the present Turkish Governm ent. Contiguity of the
Eastern provinces o f Anatolia -with Russia including many Armenians among their
inhabitants, could not leave the Im perial Government indifferent to the position of
affairs near our frontier. As the result of friendly “ pour-parlers ” with Turkey, a
basis has been worked out for the perfection o f the administration, and for the
satisfaction of the cultural needs o f the Armenians and other nationalities residing
in the provinces bordering Russia. The seven “ v ila y ets” of Eastern Anatolia will
be divided into two districts, at the head o f which will be a European Inspector­
General, chosen by the Porte from am ong candidates recomm ended b y the Powers.
The rights o f the population, personal, property, and civic, receive fresh
guarantees which will serve as a bond for the peaceful development of the Christian
population of Eastern Anatolia.
In connexion with these new conditions under which Russo-Turkish relations are
form ing, we hope for a strengthening of the already existing econom ic ties between
 Eussia and neighbouring Turkish localities, and for a quickening of commercial
relations between us and Turkey.
In conclusion, I will add that the conversations which I had in the Crimea with
members of the Extraordinary Turkish M ission, who came in the name of the Sultan
I to greet His M ajesty the Em peror and am ong the staff o f which were the most
prominent representatives of the Turkish Governm ent, produced on me the impres­
sion of a serious wish on the part of Turkey to establish relations with Eussia
answering the interests o f the two countries in accordance with the new political
conditions................(2)
(2) [T h e r e m a in in g p a ra g ra p h s of th e speech are om itted as th ey refe r to P e rsia n affairs,
the F a r E a s t, th e in te rn a l reo rg a n isa tio n o f th e M in istr y , & c.]

[jE D . N O T E .— O n M a y 28 M . S a zo n o v w rote a confidential lette r to C ou n t B encken dorff

g iv in g the d e ta ils o f a “ c o n s u lta t io n ” which had ta k e n place on th e 26th in the office of the
C h ie f o f S ta ff a t th e R u ssia n A d m ir a lty . M . S azo n ov gave a fu ll accou nt of th e m e e tin g and
of the poin ts on which ag ree m en t was reached, v. S ie b e r t, pp. 7 2 A -7 ; Im p e r ia lism n s, 1st S er.,
V o l. I l l , pp. 7 3 - 5 , N o . S6. I t was a tten d ed by th e R u ssian n aval atta ch e a t L on d on , C ap tain
W olk ow . On J u n e 6 C a p ta in W o lk o w reported to th e R u ssia n A d m ir a lty th a t P rin ce L ou is of
B a tten b e r g , the F ir s t S ea L o rd , h ad sta ted th a t “ th e B ritish G o vern m en t is in no h aste [ab ou t
th e R u sso -B r itish n aval a r ra n g e m e n t] a n d it is th e F ren ch G overn m en t which in sists upon
e x p ed itin g th is m a tte r .” The F ir s t Sea L o rd h ad su ggested w a itin g u n til th e com in g A u g u s t
when he p roposed to v is it R u ssia . S ie b e r t, pp 7 2 7 - 3 ; Im p eria lism u s, 1st S er., V o l. I l l ,
pp. 1 5 9 -6 0 , X o . 1 7 5 .]

No. 547.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. B uchananJ1)

F.O. 2 62 8 3 /2 4 8 6 9 /1 4 /3 4 .
(No. 217.)
Sir, F oreign Office, June 10, 1914.
I spoke to the Eussian Ambassador to-day about your E xcellency’ s telegram
No. 130 of yesterday,(2) recording that M. Sazonof had begun a conversation by a
violent attack upon telegrams about Persia recently published in the Tim es.”
I said that, as a matter of fact, when these telegrams appeared in the “ Times ”
I had already com e to the decision that I must discuss these Persian matters with the
Eussian Governm ent, but the last thing I desired was that the subject should be
brought up in the press before I had done so. If therefore M. Sazonof thought that
this was a press campaign inspired by me, I could assure him that this was the last
thing that I desired at the m oment. I also pointed out that M. S azonof’ s idea, that the
Persian Committee exercised influence over H is M ajesty’ s Government, was quite
wrong. The only influence that the Committee could exercise depended upon their
power to influence public opinion, and this, in turn, depended on the material at their
disposal. I did not understand M. Sazonof’ s reference to German intrigues, unless he
meant that German influence was brought to bear on the press in England, which
might be the case, though I had no knowledge o f it. I said that M. S azonof’ s idea that
there was something behind all these attacks on Eussia was quite wrong. I was even
more upset about Persia than he was, because of the effect that the Eussian
proceedings in Persia might have on public opinion here.

f 1) [T h is desp atch is endorsed as h a v in g been sen t to th e K i n g and to the C ab in e t “ w ith

copy of th e m e m o [r a n d u m ] g iven to C o u n t B e n ck e n d orff.” Copies were sent t o C ou nt
B e n ck e n d o rff; to S ir W . T o w n le y ; to th e In d ia Office.]
(2) [S ir G. B u c h a n a n ’ s te leg ra m , (X o . 130) o f J u n e 9 , 1914, is n ot reproduced as th e con tents
are sufficiently in d ic a ted above (F .O . 2 5 9 2 7 /2 4 8 6 9 /1 4 /3 4 ) .]
 798

The Russian Ambassador pointed out that apparently concessions were being
made, the Governor-General of Azerbaijan was to be changed, and Shuja was no longer
to hold this post.
I said that it was not so much a question of whether this or that Persian was
Governor-General of Azerbaijan. It was a question of whether the Governor-General,
whoever he was, was influenced by the Russian consul to act fairly and properly
towards the Central Government in Tehran or whether he openly defied the Central
Government.
Count Benckendorfif asked me what I thought was really needed in connection
with Persia.
1 replied that I thought a closer grip over Russian representatives in Persia was
needed, and an understanding in the Russian Foreign Office that the effect of these
various actions of Russian consuls in Persia was cumulative and must react upon the
general political relations of Russia and the European situation. The representatives
of any foreign country in any particular part of the world were apt to have a wrong
perspective and to pursue particular objects in that one particular part of the world
without realising the effect that their action might have on general policy. The
essential thing was that the representatives and agents of a foreign Government in
each part of the world should be made to subordinate their action to the requirements
of general policy.
Finally, 1 gave Count Benckendorff a paraphrase of m y telegram to your
E xcellency,(3) in which I had recorded my conversation with M. de Etter, and the
memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed herein.
I asked him to take this paper away with him and read it as a statement of our
position. W hen he had read it we could discuss the matter further. I had defended
the sending of Russian troops into the north of Persia on the ground that the Anglo-
Russian Agreement of 1907 must not be interpreted in a way that altered to her
disadvantage the position of Russia in Persia as it existed in 1907; but it followed
equally that the position in Persia should not be altered to our disadvantage; and,
when I looked at the other side of the shield, the British and not the Russian side, it
was evident that the cumulative effect of all the events and of Russian action since
1907 had been to alter the situation to our disadvantage.
Count Benckendorff promised to study the memorandum that I had given him.
I am. Ac.
E . GR E Y.
Enclosure in No. 547.

Memorandum communicated to Russian Ambassador, June 10, 1914.C)

In a recent conversation with Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazonof alluded to the
intention of the Russian Government to ask His M ajesty’ s Government to recognise
more fully Russia’ s predominant interests in northern Persia. Although such
predominance of interest was fully recognised in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of
1907, his Excellency thought the Russian Government had reason to complain that
British consular officers in Persia did not always act in a manner conformable to such
recognition in practice. He referred on this occasion more especially to the opposition
which the British Legation at Tehran was alleged to have made to a Russian irrigation
scheme at Ispahan. A, separate memorandum will deal with this particular question.
M. S azonof’ s complaint of the attitude of British agents in Persia was, however, of
wider application, and he gave expression, not for the first time, to his dissatisfaction
with the spirit in which these agents are said to criticise the proceedings of the
Russian consular authorities in the northern zone. His Excellency foreshadowed

(3) [S ir E dw ard G r e y 's telegram (X o . 264) of Ju n e 10, 1914, is not reproduced, as its
c on tents are sufficiently in d icated above. (F .O . 2 5 9 2 7 /2 4 8 6 9 /1 4 /3 4 .) ]
( ') [T h is m em orandu m is founded on a “ rough s k e tc h ” drawn up by Sir E dw ard Grey
h im self, cp. Im perialism us, 1st. S er., V o l. I l l , pp. 1 8 0 -3 , X o . 197.]
 799
the presentation on his part of a note explaining in greater detail the view which the
Russian Government took of the situation, and their proposals for meeting it. The
promised note will, it need hardly be said, be duly examined with the greatest interest
and in the most friendly spirit. The British Government on their part are seriously
concerned at the present position in Persia and the direction in which it is developing.
Without, therefore, waiting for the receipt of M. Sazonof’ s note, they think it right to
place before the Russian Government certain observations, inspired by their desire
that the respective interests o f the two countries in Persia should continue as hitherto
to be frankly and amicably discussed between them.
In view of M. Sazonof's recent remarks, it appears desirable to recall that the
Anglo-Russian Agreem ent of 1907 was based upon the assumption of the independence
and integrity of Persia. The division into three zones flowed from strategic rather
than from political or commercial considerations, and in no sense did the agreement
contemplate, or aim at, a political or administrative partition of Persia. Important
events, however, which were not, and could not be, foreseen in 1907, have since
occurred, bringing in their train, among other things, a military occupation of northern
Persia by a Russian military force varying in numbers from 12.000 to 17,000 men, and
the establishment of what amounts in practice to a Russian political protectorate over
those regions.
It would be difficult to describe in any other way the de facto administrative
status o f the northern provinces of Persia. The Persian governor-general at Tabriz
is now to all intents and purposes an autonomous ruler. He pays no heed to the
authority of the Central Government, and even at times issues orders in a sense
contrary to their express instructions. The governor-general is. at the same time,
entirely under the control of the Russian consulate-general, whose behests he implicitly
obeys, and whose support alone prevents their protégé from being called to account
by his own Government. Again. Persian governors, as at Rosht and Kazvin and at
Julfa (Ispahan), are practically chosen, or. at any rate, maintained in their office, by
the Russian consuls, and the condition of their remaining in office is that they must
act as the Russian agents desire. The Central Government dare not dismiss them
except with Russian consent, however rebellious, dishonest, or otherwise unsatisfactory
their conduct. It will be remembered that the Russian Minister at Tehran recently
brought about, on grounds closely connected with an instance of this nature, the
resignation of the late Minister of the Interior, probably one of the least incapable and
least inefficient officers of State in the country, and originally selected for his post on
the strong recomm endation of the Russian Government themselves!
By the grant of Russian protection to individuals, with all that this implies, in
Azerbaijan. Meshed, and even as far south as Ispahan, the Russian administrative
control is extended in great measure into the financial administration, which is at times
seriously crippled therehv. In Azerbaijan instances have occurred where the major
part o f ‘ the taxes due from the very numerous Russian-protected persons have been
collected, to the total exclusion of the Persian finance administration, by the Russian
consuls, and by them lodged in the Russian Bank, without e\en an account being
rendered of the moneys thus diverted from the Persian Treasury, so that the finance
of the province has been com pletelv disorganist d.
It is true that the Russian Government have not in set terms annexed the north
of Persia but. on the contrary, have repeatedly disclaimed any intention of doing so.
Nevertheless, they have, in fact, acquired supreme political power and are the
predominant influence through their agents in all the administration, which has in fact
become Russian in all but name.
His M ajesty’ s Government have never failed to recognist Russia’ s claim to exclude
any other foreign influence from the north of Persia and adequately to safeguard
Russian interests there. At moments of crisis and disorder, as, for instance, at the
time of the Shuster incident and of the troubles at Tabriz, they have raised no objection
to the measures taken bv Russia to secure these objects. Even now, though tne
steadily increasing influence and activity of Russia's agents seems somewhat m excise
 800
of what is essential to secure the objects in question, the purpose of laying the present
considerations before M. Sazonof is to record the actual facts of the existing situation
rather than to make complaint regarding past actions.
It is, however, necessary for Jlis M ajesty’ s Government to consider the
consequences of what has occurred in their bearing on important British interests
which it is their duty to safeguard for the future. One result of Russian activity in
the north of Persia, com bined with the disturbed condition of the south, has been to
create almost a m onopoly in the north and north-west for Russian trade : and the
inevitable tendency must be for Russian trade, under the impulse imparted to its flow
by the substitution of Russian for Persian authority in the north, to penetrate to the
south, replacing in both regions British and other foreign trade, which cannot enter
Persia except by the southern trade routes, and cannot enter at all when these roads
are closed.
There is, m oreover, a general tendency for Russian political influence to extend
into the neutral sphere, as is apparent from the activity of the Russian consul at
Ispahan and his interference with the duties of the governor-general of that province,
and from the projected irrigation concession at the headwaters of the Karkunan. His
M ajesty’ s Government cannot remain unconcerned if Russian influence and activity
in the neutral zone threatens to assume the political and predominant character that
it has done in the north.
It will doubtless be readily admitted that H is M ajesty’ s Government have
always hitherto done their best, in the British Parliament, to explain, and even to
justify the general action of Russia in northern Persia on the ground that it was
necessary for her to protect the interests and maintain the position, commercial and
other, that she held there prior to the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian convention of
1907. His M ajesty’ s Government have taken the line that it would be unfair to
interpret or use the agreement of that year as an instrument for altering the
status quo of 1907 to the disadvantage of Russia. But it follows that British interests
in the south of Persia should also not be allowed to suffer by the changes that have
taken place since 1907, and that H is M ajesty’ s Government should be free to adopt
such measures as may be necessary to secure their strategic and political interests in
the British sphere and the Persian Gulf and their important interests in the neutral
sphere.
W hether this will require a revision of the agreement of 1907 is a matter for
consideration. His M ajesty’ s Government would have remained quite satisfied wTith
that agreement had Russian action in the Russian sphere been kept within the limits
of British action in the British sphere, but they cannot close their eyes to the fact
that the situation has altered to the disadvantage of British influence, trade, and
interests. Some special steps and some revision of the agreement of 1907 may
therefore appear necessary to restore the relative interests of Russia and Great Britain
to the position which they occupied respectively in 1907.

Foreign Office, June 10, 191-1.

[ E D . N O T E .— The s ta tem e n t m ade by S ir E d w a rd G rey in the H o u se of Com m ons on

J u n e 11, 1914, is given below in fu ll. I t aroused considerable atten tio n a t th e tim e , p articu larly
in G e rm a n y w here reports o f A n g lo -R u ssia n n egotiation s h ad appeared in th e B er lin e r T ageblatt
o f M a y 22. cp. O .P ., X X X I X , pp. 6 1 7 -8 , and n otes. A fu rth e r a rticle in th e N eu e Preu ssisch e
( K r e u z -) Z e itu n g on M a y 27 a ttra cted com m en t in the E n glish press, cp. ibid., pp. 6 1 9 -2 0 , and
n ote. cp. also T w e n t y -F iv e Y e a r s, I , pp. 2 8 8 -9 0 . On J u n e 11 C ou n t Bencken dorff reported
S ir E d w a rd G rey as c r iticizin g the in discretion s of G erm an and other new spapers an d learn in g
w ith g ra tifica tio n o f th e d é m en ti in th e N o v o e P rem ia , v. S ieb e r t, pp. 7 2 8 - 9 ; Im perialism u s,
I st S er ., V o l. I l l , pp. 1 9 8 -9 , N o . 210.
F o r P rin c e L ich n o w sk y ’ s report o f S ir E d w ard G r e y ’ s sta tem e n t in the H ou se of Com mons
v. G .P ., X X X I X , p p. 6 2 3 -6 . H e r r von B e th m an n H o llw e g ’ s com m en ts are given ibid.,
pp. 6 2 8 -3 0 . On J u n e 24 P rin ce Lich n ow sky h ad a con versation w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey in which
 SU1
he com m u n ica ted H e r r von B e th m a n n H o llw e g ’ s views. S ir E dw ard G r e y 's report of th is
con versation is g iven in Gooch <£ T e m p e rle y , V o l. X I , pp. 4 -6 , N o. 4, and P rin ce Lich n ow sky’ s
in G .P ., X X X I X , p p . 6 3 0 -3 3 . cp. also H e r r von J a g o w ’ s statem en ts to S ir E . Goschen given
in fra, pp. 8 0 2 -3 , X o . 550. R eferen ce is m ade th ere to an article in th e Birsh evia W ie d o m o sti
w hich w as sent to H e r r von B e th m a n n H o llw eg bv C ou nt P o u rtales on Ju n e 1 3, cp. G . P ,
X X X I X , pp. 5 8 6 -9 .]

No. 54S.

Sir Edward G r ey ’s Statem ent in the H ouse of Commons, June 11, 1914.i 1)

8. Mr. K ing asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into
between Russia and Great B rita in ; and whether any negotiations, with a view to a
naval agreement, have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and
Great B ritain?
5. Sir W illiam Byles asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Afiairs whether
he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between
Great Britain and R ussia: and how far such agreement would affect our relations
with G erm any; and will he lay Papers?
Sir E. G r e y : The h o n o u ra b le ] Member for North Somerset asked a similar
question last year with regard to military forces, and the honourable Member for
North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has again done
to-day. The Prime Minister then replied that, if war arose between European
Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the
freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain
should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the Paper. It
remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been
concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such
negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can
judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw
or m odify the Prime M inister’ s statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in
m y opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament.
(>) [P a ri. D e h ., o th S er., (H ou se o f C om m ons), V o l. 63. pp. 4 5 7 -8 ]

[ E D . X O T E .— T h e qu estion as to w hether tw o D r ead n ou gh ts, o rigin ally bu ilt b y the firm

of A r m s tr o n g fo r C hile, should be assigned to R u ssia or to T u rk e y is m en tioned in S ie b e r t,
p. 728. u nd er d a te of J u n e 6. C o u n t Bencken dorff reported on Ju n e 12 th a t Sir E dw ard Grey
had sta ted th a t the B ritish G overn m en t had “ no legal m ean s ” of in te rven in g in the m a tte r,
and th a t “ d irect co n tra cts have been signed betw een the T u rkish G overn m en t and E n glish
sh ip b u ild in g v a rd s w hich lie qu ite beyond th e influence of th e G o vern m en t.” S ieb e r t,
pp. 7 2 9 -3 0 .] *

[ E D . X O T E — The lette r w hich follow s fro m K i n g G eorge V to th e E m p eror N ich olas I I

has been p rin ted in a G erm an tra n sla tion in I m perialism u s, 1st S er., 4 ol. I l l , pp. 2 4 0 -1 . The
version of th e E n g lish o rig in a l g iven here is from a typ e w ritten d r a ft preserved in th e R o y a l
A rch iv e s a t W in d s o r . X o reply fro m N ich olas I I has been fou nd a t W in d so r , nor is a m such
docu m en t p rin te d in Im p e r ia lism u s.]

No. 549.

K ing G eorge V to E m peror Nicholas I I J 1)

M y dear N. W indsor Castle, June 16, 1914.
You will rem em ber the very satisfactory conversations we had last year m
B erlin,(2) when we both so entirely agreed upon the great importance of maintaining
I1) [cp . I m p eria lism u s, 1st S er ., V o l. I l l , pp. 2 4 0 -1 , X o . 2 i2 ]
(2) Tcp. su pra, p p . 7 0 2 -3 , X o . 476 , and n ote (3).]
o tt
[10900] •- r
 802
the most friendly relations between our two Countries with a view of securing the
peace o f Europe. I confess that I feel so anxious upon this subject that I wish to write
this private letter to explain what is causing me this anxiety. It is the present
unsatisfactory state of affairs in Persia.
I am sure that you will agree with me in my earnest desire that our two
Governments should work together cordially in endeavouring to assist the Persian
Governm ent in establishing their internal administration on a sound basis. A
memorandum setting forth the views o f m y Government in regard to recent develop­
ments has been handed to Count Benckendorff, and Sir G. Buchanan has received
instructions to discuss with M. Sazanoff the several points raised in this
m em orandum .(3) The memorandum goes into the subject at length, and I will not
repeat all that it says. It is my great desire to see a friendly feeling towards Russia
preserved in British public opinion and in both political parties, the Conservative as
well as the Liberal, that makes me most anxious that our two Governments should
have a frank and friendly exchange of views on the whole situation in Persia. It
would be most regrettable if any divergence of views were to arise between our two
Governments, or any impression were to gain ground that the Anglo-Russian
Agreement about Persia was working to the advantage of one country and the
disadvantage of the other, as I consider the maintenance of a thoroughly good
understanding between our two countries to be of paramount importance.
I feel certain you will sympathise with the views which I have expressed and I
trust you will see Sir George Buchanan at an early opportunity when he could explain
the situation more fully than I have attempted to do in this letter.(4)
I know m y dear N. that I can count upon your friendship of so many years to
do all you can to remove any difficulties or misunderstandings that may now exist
between our two countries with regard to Persian affairs.
Y [o u ]r s &c. &c.
(3) [u. supra, pp. 7 9 7 -8 0 0 , N o. 547, and encl.]
(4) [cp. in fra, pp. 8 0 5 -8 , N o. 5 53 .]

No. 550.

Sir E . G oschen to Sir Edivard G r e y .(l)

P .O . 2 80 2 8 /2 8 02 8 /1 4 /1 8.
(No. 244.) B erlin, D. June 16, 1914.
Sir, B . June 23, 1914.
H err von Jagow who, in view o f his forthcom ing marriage, is leaving Berlin
to-day, came to see me yesterday afternoon, and conversed on a variety of subjects
connected with the international situation. After deploring the unsettled state o f
F rench internal politics and touching lightly on what he characterized as the
extrem ely maladroit and tactless article on that subject which has appeared in the
Russian Press, he said that the only thing which had given him real pleasure of
late days was the declaration you had made in Parliament with regard to the
rumoured naval understanding between Great Britain and R ussia.(2) Though he
had always been inclined to disbelieve the rumour, he had, he admitted, been rather
shaken by the categorical and reiterated statements of the “ Berliner T ageblatt’ ’
on this subject, and your declaration had come to him as a great relief. H e added
that in making its statements the “ Berliner T ageblatt” had always pointed out
that they were sure to receive official denial, and that such denial need not be taken

P ) [T h is despatch is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to th e K i n g ; to th e P rim e M in is te r ;

to L o rd C r ew e ; to L ord M o rley. A copy w as sent to the A d m ir a lty on J u ly 3 .]
(2) [r . su pra, p. 801, N o. 548. A ccord in g to H e r r von Jagow his com m en ts on S ir E dw ard
G rey ’ s declaration in P a r lia m e n t were in ten d ed as a polite w arn in g n ot to proceed fu rth er with
th e n aval discussions, v . G. von J a g o w : E n gla n d u nd der K riegsa u sbru ch . . . (1925), pp. 1 9 -2 0 .]
 S03
too seriously; he, however, had no such ideas, and had so much confidence in your
loyalty and straightforwardness that his mind was now com pletely at rest. I f the
rumour had been true he thought the consequences would have been most serious.
Anglo-German relations would have, o f course, lost that pleasant cordiality which he
was glad to say characterized them at the present moment, but an even worse result
would have been that there would at once have been a revival of the armament fever
in Germany. And rightly so, he said, because Germany from her geographical
position could afford to run no chances. In the case o f war she would have to face
huge Eussia and France “ practically a lon e,” and if she had to take into account
also that the British fleet would be against her the Naval Authorities would be perfectly
justified in appealing to the country to make every sacrifice in order to meet that
em ergency. I said that no one wished to attack Germany. He said that he was quite
aware and even confident that no Government wished to do so. But the Russian
Governm ent was weak and at any moment Panslavism might get the upper hand.
M oreover there was no getting over the fact that the great mass o f the Russian
people hated the Germans and that a war against Germany would be popular. As
for France, he was sure that Monsieur Poincare was in favour o f good relations with
Germany, but in a democratic country like France foreign policy did not stand by
itself, but was apt to become an instrument in the hands o f politicians anxious to
obtain votes and to carry out the aims of their own particular party. A war cry
against Germany was for instance a certain vote-catcher, and it was. he said, used
far too frequently. He could not help fearing that some day the cry would be raised
once too often. * The frequent change o f Ministries was really a great misfortune.
It was always, a source of preoccupation to him how long a Ministry with whom he
had made arrangements would last and whether arrangements he had made with
one Ministry would hold good with the next.
The Russian article to which H err von Jagow referred, appeared in the
“ Birshewja W jedernosti.” It was reproduced here in the “ Lokal-Anzeiger,” under
the heading, “ Russia is read y: France must also be read y.”
In com m enting upon it the “ L ok a l-A n zeig er” m erely said that the closing
words o f the article to the effect that neither Russia nor France desired war, but that
Russia was ready, and expected France to be the same, a result which she could only
achieve by the three years’ service system , showed clearly that Russia’ s colossal
military preparations had been begun two years ago at the direct instance o f France.
I have, Ac.
W . E . GOSCHEN.

No. 551.

Sir E . Goschen to Sir A . X icolson J 1)

Private. (21
My dear N icolson, Berlin, June 20, 1914.
My time has been cut up this week by two journeys, one to Neustrelitz to the
funeral o f the late Grand Duke of M ecklenburg-Strelitz, and the other to W eimar
to present m v belated letters of credence which for one reason and another it has been
difficult for me to present before. At Neustrelitz I saw the Dowager Grand Duchess,
who, notwithstanding her 92 vears and the anxious time she has had during the last
few weeks, culm inating in the great sorrow o f losing her son. looked very well in
health. She talked very pathetically about H er loss but afterwards talked in her
own clever, piquant way about home politics in which she takes such a ti emendous

t1) [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the P rim e M inister.
The end orsem ent is in itia lled b y S ir E . G rey.]
( J) [C a rn ock M SS., V ol. I l l o f 1914.]
[10900] 3 F 2
 804
interest. I had a long talk with Jagow on the day before he went off to be married.
You will see from m y despatch recording the conversation how he harped on the
relief caused to him by Sir E . G rey’ s statement in the House respecting the rumours
of an Anglo-Russian Naval Understanding. (3) In the meantime the Tageblatt sticks
to its guns, and points out that the Parisian friend from whom it received the original
inform ation declares in a second letter that everything he said was absolutely true.
The Tageblatt also cites the Manchester Guardian as a witness that there are gaps
in Sir E . G rey’ s statement which if filled up would show that the rumours are not
so very wide o f the mark after all.
Jagow was very anxious to put before me the fatal consequences which would
have ensued if the Naval Understanding alleged to have been proposed by Russia
had been accepted by E n g la n d : these consequences being,— renewed ill feeling
between Great Britain and Germ any, Naval Novelles, and still further increases in
German military strength. But what did he mean when he said that in the case of
war with France and Russia Germ any would stand “ practically a lo n e ’ ’ ? does he
not count Austria and Italy at all, or does he mean that the war would be over
before the Allies of Germany could put in an appearance in the field? . . . ,(4)
Yours very sincerely,
W . E . GOSCHEN.
(3) [v. im m ed ia tely p r eced in g docu m en t, and n ote ( 2).]
(4) [T he rem a in in g p a ra g ra p h s of th is letter are not rep rod u ced , they refer to B alkan
a ffa irs.]

No. 552.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edicard G reyJ 1)

F.O. 2 7927/218G 9/14/34.

Tel. (No. 188.) St. Petersburgk, June 21, 1914.
Your despatch No. 217.( 2)
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I had a conversation this afternoon,
had not yet received aide-m em oire from the Russian Ambassador. I therefore read to
him its more important passages and gave him a copy.
He contended that our reports of Russian action were greatly exaggerated, but.
received all that 1 said in a very friendly spirit. On my reading the passage about
collection of taxes he protested that we wTere accusing Russia unjustly, as she was
but doing what she had been asked to do by the Treasurer-General. I reminded him
of what I had said to him in previous conversations on this subject, and added that
M ornard’ s action had been disavowed by the Persian Government. Minister for
Foreign Affairs replied that, if the Persian Government disapproved of what he had
done, they ought to dismiss him, and that it was only owing to the action of the
Russian consuls that any taxes were paid at all. I said that a system under which
taxes were collected without any account being rendered could not be tolerated by any
Governm ent. Finally, his E xcellency authorised me to tell you that he would give
orders that it was to be discontinued. On his Excellency remarking that this was the
only really serious com plaint that we could make against Russian action, I told him
that we were not making complaints but recording actual facts. The whole of
Northern Persia wras being governed as a Russian province, the Persian Governors were
being converted into Russian officials, and this system w^as being extended to
Ispahan and the neutral zone. Land was being illegally acquired and given to
Russian subjects, and numbers of Persians were being made Russian protected

( ' ) [T h is telegram was sent to S ir W . T ow n lev (T eh ra n ) on J u n e 27, and a cop y was sent
to th e In d ia Office.]
(-’ ) [i>. supra, pp. 797-800, No. 547, and encl.]
 805
subjects. H is E xcellency declared he would never consent to the appointment of
Persian Governors who intrigued against Russia in provinces where Russian interests
were predominant. W e did not, he added, allow this in the south. 1 replied that,
though we used our influence to secure the appointment of Governors who would
maintain order, we did not, as Russia was doing, govern the southern provinces through
our consuls, but tried to assist the Persian Government to carry on the Administration
through their own appointed agents.
On m y reading the passage referring to measures which His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment might have to adopt to secure their strategical and political interests in the
British sphere and the Persian Gulf, his E xcellency said that we wrere at liberty to take
whatever measures we liked. As regarded the penetration of Russian trade into the
neutral zone, he remarked that we were trying to secure our share by the projected
m ining concession. He said nothing about the oil concession, which has been made
the subject of a violent attack in the “ Novoe V rem ya.” He again suggested that we
should enlarge our sphere by incorporating part of the neutral zone. '
In conclusion his Excellency begged me to assure you that his one desire was to
maintain the closest possible relations with His M ajesty’ s Government and that he
would not let Persia stand in the way. H e had heard that relations between the
British and Russian Ministers at Tehran were not as good as they used to be, and he
was quite ready to recall M. Korostovetz if you thought that his doing so would
facilitate matters. I thanked his E xcellency for his friendly attitude and said that I
had not been instructed to make any complaint against the Russian Minister. W e did
not, m oreover, wish to challenge Russia’ s predominant position in the north, but this
position could quite well be maintained without the principle of Persian independence
being violated by consuls acting as if it was a Russian province.
I am to see Minister for Foreign Affairs again on Tuesday, and shall probably
have an audience with the Emperor on Wednesday.
I notice in the V iceroy’ s telegram of 11th June that his Excellency speaks of the
necessity of our preserving our commercial and political predominance in the neutral
and British spheres. I do not see on what we can base claim to such predominance
in the form er without a revision of the 1907 agreem ent,(3) but I feel very strongly
that, unless we come to some arrangement as to what we and Russia may respectively
do in the neutral sphere, we shall have endless trouble in the future. An enlargement
of our present sphere does not necessarily entail any military obligation, while the
important interests which we are now acquiring in the oil concession may force us one
day to take measures for their protection, whether they are situated wuthin or without
our sphere.
(3) [i\ Gooch <£■ T cm perley, V ol. TV, pp. 618-20, A p p . I.]

No. 558.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey .(l)

F.O. 2908-2/24869/14/34. „
(No 1 92 ) St. Petersburgh, D. June 25, 1914.
gir>' R. June 29, 1914.
I had the honour of being received in audience yesterday by the Emperor and of
delivering to him the letter which the K ing had commanded me to hand personally
to His M ajesty./2) . . .
After reading aloud to me those portions of it which had reference to Persia, an
after saying that he had on the preceding day read the memorandum which had been
given to Count B enckendorff,(3) the Em peror enquired whether it was only recently tha,.
(1) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent t o the K in g and to the C a bin et.]
(2) [u. supra, pp. 801-2, No. 5 49 ; cp. Im peria lism u s, 1st. S er., \ ol. I l l , pp. 240-1, N o. 2*2.]
( 3) [u. supra, pp. 798-800, No. 547, en cl.]
 80G
the situation in North Persia had been causing His M ajesty’ s Government such grave
preoccupation.
I replied that, though the anxiety which that situation was causing them had
recently become acute, it had been o f gradual growth. I had personally in the summer
of last year advocated a frank exchange of views on the subject of Persia, as I had
even then feared that the trend of events in the northern provinces would sooner or
later create a situation that might prove fatal to the Anglo-Bussian understanding.
Since then events had been m oving rapidly, and North Persia was now to all intents
and purposes a Russian province. In saying this I begged His Majesty to believe that
we did not for a moment doubt the assurances which he had given us as to his
determination not to annex any portion of Persian territory. W e were making no
complaints, we were only recording actual facts. Unforeseen events had led to the
occupation of certain districts in Northern Persia by Russian troops, and little by little
the whole machinery of the administration had been placed in the hands o f the
Russian consuls. The Governor-General of Azerbaijan was a mere puppet, who
received and carried out the orders of the Russian consul-general, and the same must
be said of the Governors at Resht, Kazvin, and Julfa. They were one and all agents
of the Russian Government, and acted in entire independence of the Central Govern­
m ent at Tehran. Vast tracts of land in North Persia were being acquired by methods
which were neither legal nor defensible, large numbers of Persians were being
converted into Russian-protected subjects, and the taxes were being collected by the
Russian consuls to the exclusion of the agents of the Persian financial administration.
The above system was being extended to Ispahan and even to the neutral zone. W e
had not the slightest desire to dispute Russia’ s predominant interests and position in
the north, but it was the methods by which that predominance was being asserted and
the attempts that wTere being made to extend it to the neutral zone that compelled us
to ask ourselves whether the time had not coine for us to take measures to safeguard
our own important interests in that zone and on the Persian Gull'. I had ventured to
speak thus frankly to H is Majesty, as I felt that the whole question of Anglo-Russian
collaboration not only in Persia but in Europe was at stake. The actions of the
Russian consuls had a cumulative effect, and, though the consuls were no doubt
animated by the laudable desire of advancing Russian interests in Persia, they forgot
that the policy that they were pursuing must react unfavourably on Anglo-Russian
relations all over the world. His Majesty was aware that without the support of
Parliament His M ajesty’ s Government, much as they might desire it, would be
powerless to maintain the Anglo-Russian understanding on its present close and
intimate footing. The sympathies of both the Liberal and Conservative parties were
being gradually alienated by wdiat was happening in North Persia, and it was
impossible for you to defend the actions of the Russian consuls or to represent them
as according with the principles of Persian independence and integrity laid down in
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.
The Emperor, who throughout our conversation, which lasted over an hour, spoke
to me in the most gracious and friendly manner, said that he heartily welcomed a
frank exchange of views as calculated to remove the danger of any possible m isunder­
standing in the future. H e quite understood the motives H iich had induced the King
to write to him. The present situation in North Persia had been brought about by
circumstances which the Russian Governm ent could not control. It had originated
with the troubles caused by the Fedais in Tabriz and by the necessity which had
subsequently arisen of safeguarding Russia’ s very important interests in .the north.
No one regretted this necessity more than himself. In the first place, he could give
me his word of honour that he sincerely desived to withdraw his troops, and, in the
second, he felt that he was laying him self open to the suspicion of acting contrary to
the assurances which he had given us.
W e were not the first to com plain of the action of the Russian consuls. The
V iceroy of the Caucasus had quite recently addressed a similar com plaint to him, and
had called his serious attention to the fact that each consul struck out a line of policy
 807
o f his own without any regard for the general iine of policy prescribed by his Govern­
ment. The first thing, therefore, to be done was to control his consuls, and he would
cause the whole matter to be enquired into by a committee at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.
The E m peror then turned the conversation on to the question of the neutral
zone, and expressed the strong conviction that by far the simplest and most rational
manner of defining our respective positions with regard to it was to partition it. I
replied that, though I personally entirely agreed with His Majesty that if misunder­
standings were to be avoided in the future some agreement ought to be com e to as to
what Russia and England were respectively entitled to do in that zone, His M ajesty’ s
Government had, I believed, no desire to extend their responsibilities by enlarging the
area of their present zone. W e were a naval, and not a military, Power, and we did
not wish to make unnecessary calls on our Indian army.
Subsequently the Emperor said that he would reply personally to the K ing’ s
letter, and that in the meanwhile he would have all the points raised in the
memorandum com m unicated to Count Benckendorff most carefully examined at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I would no doubt also continue my conversations with
M. Sazonof. It might, he thought, be, perhaps, necessary for us to revise the
agreement of 1907, and if such a course com m ended itself to His M ajesty’ s Govern­
ment he was quite ready to consent to its revision. He could only tell me, as he had
often told me before, that his one desire was to remain firm friends with us and that, if
he could prevent it, nothing should stand in the way of the closest possible under­
standing between Great Britain and Russia.
After leaving the Em peror 1 met M. Sazonof at a garden party given in honour of
the British squadron, and again later in the day at the Embassy dinner. In the
course of the two conversations which I had with his Excellency I inform ed him o f all
that had passed at m y audience with His Majesty. M. Sazonof professed to make
light of the difficulties raised by the action of the Russian consuls. He defended their
action in the matter of the collection of taxes on the ground that they were but doing
what M. Mornard had asked them to do, and he contended that it was impossible for
them to refuse to take under their protection persons who appealed to them to protect
them against extortion and violence. I told his Excellency that he was under an
entire misapprehension on both these points. It was owing to the action of the consuls
that Russian-protected persons had refused to pay taxes when those taxes were
collected by M. M ornard’ s agents, and if Ml Mornard subsequently, and without the
authorisation of the Persian Government, consented to the taxes being collected by
the consuls and paid into the Russian Bank, it was because M. Korostovetz had urged
this course and because M. Mornard feared that, if he did not agree to it, the consuls
would prevent any taxes being paid. As regarded what he had said about Russian-
protected subjects, he was wilfully blinding him self to the fact that by an organised
system of Russian immigration, and by the conversion of Persians into Russian-
protected subjects, whole districts were being treated as Russian territory. M. Sazonof
refused to admit this, and proceeded to complain of the action of the Imperial Bank
in continuing to receive the taxes collected in the Russian zone. I replied that, by
their charter which had been acquired before the signature of the agreement of
1907, the Imperial Bank were empowered to conduct financial operations all over
Persia, and that, if M. Mornard preferred to deal with them rather than with the
Russian Bank, it was simply because they had shown a greater readiness to transact
business with him on fairer and more reasonable terms.
i f . Sazonof tells me that he will send me a written reply to our memorandum in
a few days, and he seems prepared to meet our wishes to a certain extent by exercising
a greater control over the Russian consuls and by discontinuing the present system
under which the taxes are collected through their agency. On iny observing to him
yesterday that he would take a very different viewr of things could he see with his own
eyes all that the consuls were doing, he said that he might, perhaps, send an official of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on a tour of inspection to report on the whole question.
 808

li e further told me that he had spoken to the Emperor as to the advisability of

transferring M. Korostovetz to another post, as he had grounds for believing that the
relations between our two legations were not as good as they should be. He
com plained, however, of the tone of recent debates in the House of Commons and of
the inveterate suspicion with which Russia was regarded in England. One would
think, he said, from the language used whenever Russia was credited with harbouring
designs of aggrandisement that England had never laid her hands on Baluchistan and
other territories adjoining India in order the better to secure the strategic safety of
our Indian Empire. I replied that I was not aware that we had ever annexed territory
in violation of a formal agreement with another and friendly Government. The
suspicions of which he had spoken would inevitably be fostered were the progressive
advance of Russian political influence to be extended south through the neutral zone.
W hile it is, I think, possible that we may come to some agreement on the two
points above referred to, it will be very difficult to obtain a guarantee that will ensure
the strict observance of the agreement thus arrived at. W hat, however, presents the
greatest difficulty of all is the question of the neutral zone. Both the Emperor and
M. Sazonof advocate its partition. The latter yesterday remarked to me that he could
not consent to our absorbing the whole of it, and 1 am very strongly of opinion that, if
there are insuperable objections to partition, we must, by an exchange of notes, clearly
define our respective positions with regard to it. The Indian Government appear to
hold that we must assert our commercial and political predominance in that zone, but
that we must at the same time refrain from adding to our responsibilities by extending
the area of our present sphere. These two points of view are, so far as I am able to
judge, incompatible, nor do I know on what ground we can claim predominant political
influence in the neutral zone without a revision of the 1907 agreement. I have,
m oreover, always failed to understand how we shall add to our responsibilities by the
incorporation in our own sphere of some portion of the neutral zone. If we have
important interests to defend we shall have to defend them whether they lie within or
without our sphere, and the mere fact that we shall have a more extensive sphere of
influence than at present does not, to m y mind, entail the obligation of defending it by
force of arms. Should, in the future, differences of a serious character arise between
Russia and Great Britain we should be perfectly free to choose our own ground from
the strategical point of view for the defence, of India. I do not m yself foresee the
slightest ground for apprehending an Anglo-Russian conflict for years to come, but
nothing, I venture to think, is more calculated to create tension between the two
countries than to leave the neutral zone, as it is at present, a debatable ground, about
which there will be constant bickerings and mutual recriminations.
I have. Ac.
G E O R G E W . BUCHANAN.
M IN U T E S .

E n tirely a p p rov e S ir G. B u ch an a n ’ s language.

A. N.
S ir G. B uch an a n con d u cted the in terv iew adm irably.
F. D . A.
E . G.

T his (S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s despatch N o. 192) should be circu la ted to the C a bin et and w ith it
should g o our m em orandum on P ersia th a t has been g iv en to the R u ssia n G o v [e r n m e n ]t,(3) if
it has not a lread y been circu la ted to the C abinet.
E. G.
1.7.14.

(3) [v. supra, pp. 798-800, N o. 547, encl.]

 809
[E D y O T E . — In con n ection w ith the con v ersation record ed in the im m ed iately succeeding
docu m en t the follow in g rep ort by C ou n t B en ck en dorff to M . S azonov da ted J u n e 25. 1914, is of
in te r e s t : —

“ G rey to ld me to-d ay , th a t he was g rea tly alarm ed b y the false rum ours w hich w ere
circ u la tin g in the G erm an press con cern in g the con ten ts o f th e alleged N a val C onvention
betw een E n g la n d and R ussia in con n ection w ith the question o f th e S tra its ; he ha d deem ed
it necessary to speak o f this in confidence to L ichuow sky, w ho is g oin g to K ie l, w here he
is to see the E m p eror. G rey assured the G erm an Am bassador, th a t the qu estion o f the
S tra its ha d n ot been discussed betw een E n g la n d and Russia fo r 5 y e a r s ; he assured him,
th a t b etw een E n g lan d on th e one hand, a n d F ra n ce and R ussia there ex isted neither an
alliance n or a C onvention. H e. nevertheless, told him th a t he did not wish in any w ay to
con ceal from him , th a t the in tim a cy betw een the three g overnm ents had g row n so g reat
d u rin g these last years, th a t th ey had, on all occasions, com e to an u n d ersta n d in g u p on all
q uestions, ju st as th ou g h they w ere allies. O n the oth er hand, he affirm ed, tha t, d u rin g the
course o f these years such n eg otia tion s h a d never assum ed a ch a ra cter d irected against
G erm any, n or had they any referen ce to th e so-called ‘ e n circlin g p o lic y .’ ” r. S ieb ert,
pp. 730-5L.

T he con v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky to which S ir E d w a rd G rey re fe rre d is that
record ed in G ooch T em p erley, \ ol. X I , pp. 4—6, No. 4, and in G .P., X X X I X , pp. 6 3 0 -3 .]

No. 554.

Si) Edward G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.( ‘

F .O . 29293 lit)!'87 14 38.

(No. 243. t
Sir> Foreign Office, •June 25. 1914.
I observed to Count Benckendorff to-day that immense harm was being done
by the persistent reports about a naval agreement between Russia and Ei gland. I
heard that Germans like Professor Sehiemann were receiving information from friends
in Paris and St. Petersburg that, in spite of all 1 had said in the House of Comm ons,( 2)
there was a naval agreem ent;. and it was even assumed that it included a bargain
about the opening o f the Straits. No doubt the inform ation came from unofficial
people, who did not know the facts, and assumed them to be other than they were.
A question was to be addressed to me in the House of Commons on the subject of
the opening of the Straits to ships of war, and I intended to reply that this had not
been discussed for the last five years, and that the Treaties remained in force, but
that from time to tim e, though not within the last five years, the question of the
conditions on which the Straits might be opened to warships had been discussed with
us. As Count Benckendorff would rem em ber, we did go into this question with
M. Iswolskv when he was in L ondon in 1908.(3) W e had not discuss«d it since then.
The persistent reports would do great harm in Germany. They might lead to a new
“ Novelle ” in connection with the German Fleet, and they might impair our good
relations with Germanv. which had improved verv much during the last Balkan
crisis, and which I wished to maintain. I told Count Benckendorff the gist of mv
conversation vesterdav with Prince Lichnowsky (4t as to our relations with France and
Germany. I knew tliat Prince Lichnowsky held the same view as 1 did about these
relations.

( !) [T h is despatch is end orsed as h a vin g been sent t o the K in g and to the C abinet. It is
p rin ted also in Gooch d T ein p erley, V ol. X I , p. 6, No. 5, b u t is rep rod u ced here because o f its
relevance to the present ch a p ter.]
( 2) [v. sup ra , p. 801. No. 543.] _
( 3) [» . G ooch d• T em p erley, V ol. I X (I), p. 311, Ed. A o fe .]
(*) [v. ibid., V ol. X I , pp. 4 -6 , N o. 4 ]
 810

Count Benckendorff entirely endorsed what I had told him that I had said to
Prince Lichnowsky, and said that he was very glad that I had said it, as Prince
Lichnowsky would make excellent use o f it.
[ I am, & c.]
E . G [B E Y ]'.

[E D . N O T E .— In view of th e referen ce in the im m ed iately su cceed in g docum ent to the

a ttitu d e o f the R u ssia n press to th e A n g lo-P ersia n oil a greem ent, the follow in g telegram to
S ir G. B uchanan is rep rod u ced . T his telegram con ta in s in th e fou rth p a ra g ra p h the assurance
to w hich S ir E d w a rd G rey la ter re ferred as all “ th a t th e R ussians have a rig h t to ex p ect.”
cp. in fra , p. 813, N o. 558, n o te ( ])- In con n ection w ith th e referen ce here to M. S a zon ov ’ s visit
to B a lm oral in 1912, cp. G ooch d- T em p erley, V ol. I X (I), pp. 749-72, C h a pter L X X V I I I .

S ir E dw a rd G rey to S ir G. Buchanan.
F.O . 2 8 7 6 0 /2 7 7 0 9 /1 4 /3 4 .
Tel. (N o. 2S3.) F o r e ig n Office, J u n e 25, 1914, 8-10 p . m .
I have rem ark ed to R ussian A m bassador th a t th e R u ssia n P ress seem ed to he disturbed
a bou t the A n g lo-P ersia n oil agreem ent, w hich was n ot su rprisin g in view o f w hat som e British
N ew spapers had w ritten a b ou t it. I m ade ob servations on th ree poin ts a bou t which there
seem ed to [b e ] m isapprehension .

1. The B ritish G overn m en t did n ot a cq u ire any rig h ts th a t did n o t ex ist und er the
concession o rig in a lly. T hose rig h ts rem a in ed ex a ctly as they w ere b efore the A nglo-R ussian
a greem en t a bou t P ersia was m ade.
2. T he only new step I had h ith erto con tem p la ted in the n eutral zone was the loan of
B ritish officers to th e P ersian G o v [e rn m e n ]t t o p r o te ct the tra d e routes by a P ersian force.
T his I had m en tion ed to M. Sazonow 2 years a go a t B alm oral, b u t only as a th in g we m ight
h ave t o do, if g en da rm erie und er n eu tra l officers fa iled. T he idea had no special conn ection
w ith th e oil concession then and I did n ot suppose th a t the oil concession w ould precipitate
this. I f it arose it w ou ld proba b ly he in con n ection w ith B u sh ire-S h ira z roa d w hich did not
tou ch the oil p ip e line.
T here was at presen t no prosp ect th a t the oil concession w ould lea d to sp ecial measures of
p r o te ctio n by us, b u t o f course i f it or a n y th in g else req u ired in ou r o p in io n special measures
in th e neu tra l zon e in con sisten t w ith th e A n g lo-R u ssia n a greem ent or the in depen den ce and
in te g r ity of P ersia, we should con su lt w ith R ussian G o v [e rn m e n ]t b efore ta k in g them .
3. T he in fluen ce o f the A d m ira lty in the oil concession w ould he used n ot to push develop­
m en t in to the R ussian sphere, if the concession ex ten d ed so fa r, or to the n orth, b u t on the
co n tr a r y t o in sist fo r str a te g ic reasons th a t th e first new d evelopm ents should he on the islands
o r on th e m a in lan d as near the coa st as possible, and b y preferen ce in the B ritish sphere.
Y ou can rep ea t this to M [in s te r fo r ] F [o r e ig n ] A [ ffa ir s ].]

No. 555.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward, G r e y J 1)

F .O . 2 90 8 3 /2 9 08 3 /1 4 /5 0.
(No. 193.) St. Petersburgh, D. June 25, 1914.
Sir, B . June 29, 1914.
I have much pleasure in inform ing you o f the splendid reception with which
the First Battle Cruiser Squadron has met from all classes in this country from the
very highest dowTn to the crowds who came out in excursion steamers to meet the
Squadron in the Gulf of Finland and cheered themselves hoarse as they passed each
ship.
The officers of the Squadron describe the welcome accorded to them and to their
men by the naval officials as well as by the civilian inhabitants o f Beval as being
nothing less than affectionate; and the reception given to them here has well
accorded with the best traditions o f Bussian warm heartedness and hospitality.

( x) [A co p y o f this d espa tch was sent to th e A d m ira lty .]

 811
The Press has been friendly when writing o f the visit itself, but not so cordial
as it doubtless would have been hut for its anger at the purchase of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Com pany’ s shares with which I have dealt fully in my despatch No. 191
of yesterday.( 2) Nevertheless, most o f the papers have brought messages o f welcome,
the most cordial being one which appeared in English in the “ Novoe Y rem y a .”
W hatever the papers may have lacked in cordiality has, however, been more than
made up for by the thoughtfulness, the kindness and the munificence of the arrange­
ments made by the naval and municipal authorities for the entertainment o f our
officers and m en. Special steamers from Cronstadt have been put at the disposal
o f the men and one o f the Admiralty yachts at the disposal o f the officers; a
theatrical entertainment at one o f the im perial theatres for several thousands o f the
men has been arranged and a large dinner and ball is being given to the officers
by the municipal Duma. The latter is m oreover presenting both the Squadron and
the Admiral him self with pieces o f plate.
But that which has most impressed the Russians and most touched Sir David
Beatty, his officers and m yself has been the gracious and kindly manner in which
the Emperor has been pleased to honour the British Squadron. His Imperial Majesty
gave a luncheon party at Tsarskoe Selo yesterday which was attended by H er Majesty
the Empress and H er four daughters and which had been vested with the character
o f an inform al and intimate gathering. At a garden party given afterwards by the
Grand Duchess Victoria and the Grand Dukes Cyril and Boris, the Em peror wore
the uniform o f a British Admiral, a com plim ent which I am told by Russians is
quite unprecedented and which is equivalent to treating the Squadron with Sovereign
honours.
In addition to these signal marks of the E m peror’ s favour, His Imperial
Majesty has announced His intention o f inspecting the Squadron on Saturday and
of lunching, accompanied by the Empress, on board the Flagship.
In conclusion I would say that nothing that could possibly be done has been left
undone either by the Im perial Fam ily, by Russian officials or by the Russian public
to render the visit an ineffaceable souvenir for the officers and men o f the British
squadron and to furnish a further proof of the real friendship which Russia feels
I for England.
I have, Ac.
G E O R G E W . BUCHANAN.

( 2) [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s despatch (N o. 191), D . J u n e 24, R . J u n e 29, 1914, is n ot rep rod u ced .

In it he rep orted the u n fa v ou ra ble com m ents w hich had a p p ea red in the R ussian press as a
| resu lt o f the pu rchase o f shares o f the A n g lo-P ersia n O il C om pany. T he despatch was m in u ted
. b y S ir E d w a rd G r e y : “ The v iew ta k en b y th e R u ssia n P ress is absurd, but none the less
| tiresom e. E. G .” (F.O . 2 9 0 8 1 /2 7 7 0 9 /1 4 /3 4 .)]

No. 556.

Sir G. Bvchnnan to Sir Edward G reyJ 1)

P rivate./2)
M y dear Sir Edward, St. Petersburgh, June 25, 1914.
I am sending Nicolson an advance copy o f a despatch in which I have reported
at length the Audience which I had yesterday with the E m peror/3) after the luncheon
which H is M ajesty gave at Tsarskoe to Admiral Beatty and his officers. The Em peror
kept me for over an hour and, though m y language was very outspoken, his manner

0 ) [T his le tte r is en d orsed as h a vin g been sent to the K in g ; to the P rim e M in is te r ; to

M r. C h u rch ill.]
( 2) [G rey M S S ., V ol. 35.]
(3) [v. supra, pp. 805-8, N o. 553.]
 812

was most gracious and friendly throughout, and he is evidently most anxious to do
everything in his power to control his Consuls. H e advocates the partition of the
Neutral Zone, but is, I think, ready to accept any reasonable proposals which you may
put forward with regard to it. Ilis one aim and object is to remain friends with
England.
In the course of the Audience, he referred to the question of the naval conversa­
tions which are to be held between the two Governments, and deplored, as much as you
do, the leakage which has taken place at Paris on the subject. At a garden party
given later in the afternoon by the Grand Duchess Cyril, at which the Emperor was
present, Sazonow told me that he had heard from Benckendorff that these conversa­
tions were to be deferred till Prince Louis of Battenberg came to Tsarskoe towards the
middle or end of August. He begged me to urge you to let them begin at once.
W olkow, the Russian Naval Attache enjoyed the full confidence of his Government
and had received all the necessary instructions. He would, he said, be very
disappointed if these converations were put off for a couple of months, more especially
as he was going abroad to do a cure on August 14th and would probably not return till
the first days of October. Although he was not a naval expert, he wished to see the
final outcome of these conversations before going on leave. I said that I knew nothing
about what was being done, but that I thought it possible that it was in order to prevent
the danger of any future leakage that Prince Louis had been entrusted with the mission
of conducting the conversation during his visit to the Emperor.
Shortly afterwards the Em peror engaged me in conversation and, on my repeating
to him what Sazonow had said, His Majesty remarked that he certainly thought that
the preliminary conversations should begin at once and that Prince Louis might give
them the finisliing touch when he came to Peterhof. He, a little later, asked me to
fetch Sazonow whom he saw in the distance, and repeated to him what he had just
said to me. As he noticed that Sazonow did not look pleased, he turned to me again
and asked me what I thought. I said that M. Sazonow wanted to go away on a holiday
and would prefer to see the matter settled before he left. Sazonow then explained
that he would like to see the naval question, the Tibetan question and the Persian
question all settled together by the beginning of August. The Emperor laughingly
remarked that the naval and Tibetan questions were not closely connected but that
it would perhaps be well to get all these outstanding questions settled at once. He
would therefore ask me to represent to you the advisability of our com m encing the
naval discussion at once and of at the same time continuing our conversations about
Persia and Tibet. Could we arrive at an agreement on all these questions we should
be able to sleep com fortably in our beds without fear of any breach being made in the
Anglo-Russian understanding, though he was afraid that I should have to put off my
leave till the autumn. I replied that I was ready to make any personal sacrifice could
we only get rid of any possible cause of difference between the two Governments.
I fancy from what Sazonow said that his attitude with regard to Tibet and Persia
may be influenced bv our attitude on the naval question.
Yours sincerelv,
G E O R G E W . BUCHANAN.

M IN U T E .

I th in k th e con v ersation s are now in progress a t th e A d m ira lty.

E. G.
29.6.14.

[E D . N O T E .— On J u ly 2, 1914, C ou n t B en ck en d orff in a letter to M. Sa zon ov referred to

fu r th e r con v ersation s w ith S ir E d w a rd G rey “ d u rin g the last few days ” (cp. supra, pp. 809-10,
No. 554) and to the la tte r ’ s in ten tion to delay m a tters a b ou t th e naval con v en tion u n til P rin ce
L ou is o f B a tten b erg v isited St. P etersb u rg h , although the date o f his v isit had n ot y et been
fixed. C ou n t B en ck en d orff said fu r th e r th a t he th ou g h t th a t the alarm in B erlin had m ade
S ir E d w a rd G rey an xiou s “ th a t this [a la rm ] should be som ew hat allayed b efore he enters upon
 818
fu rth er n eg otia tion s. It is, in deed, t ru e ,“ C ount B en cken dorff added, “ that he w ou ld find it
difficult t o issue a dem en ti, and t o g o on n e g o tia tin g at the same tim e— a role w hich he w ould
be ob liged to play tow ards G erm any, as w ell as tow ards a considerable p ortion c f his own p a rty ,
a nd the E nglish Press.
I t is ev id en t th a t y ou r con v ersation w ith the B ritish A m bassador w ill exercise a g ood
in flu en ce.“ v. S ie l e r t , pp. 732-4.
S ir G eorge B uchanan, in M y M ission to Iiussia (1923), I, pp . 185-6, refers t o the statem ent
in A d m ira l T ir p it z ’ s M em oirs (E n g. ed ition , V ol. I, p. 256): “ D u rin g the visit o f th e E nglish
fleet t o K ie l at the end o f J u n e, 1914, the B ritish Am bassador at St. P etersb u rg . Buchanan,
a nnounced th e con clu sion o f an A n g lo-R u ssia n naval conven tion ” H e adds “ I m ay rep ly
that I d id n ot a nnounce the conclusion o f an A n glo-R ussian con v en tion — b ecause no such
con v en tion ev er existed. I m ay fu rth er in form the g alla n t a dm iral th a t I never even entered
in to n e g otia tion s w ith the R ussian G overnm ent fo r the conclusion o f a naval con v en tion , and
th a t, i f G rea t B r ita in even tu ally becam e R u s sia ’ s ally both by land and sea, th a t alliance ow ed
its b ein g to G erm a n y ’ s v io la tio n o f B e lg iu m ’ s n eu tra lity .”
On J u n e 15, A d m ira l B ea tty and officers o f the F irst B a ttle C ruiser S q uad ron w ere received
b y the E m p eror N ichola s at C ron sta d t.]

No. 557.

Sir Edward G rey to Sir George Buchanan.(*■

Private.
M y dear Buchanan, Foreign Office, July 2, 1914.
The contention of the Itussian Press that the Oil Concession tears up the Anglo-
Russian Convention shows an entire misunderstanding.
I am sending you a report of what I said in Parliament on June 29. (2) I have
looked at the part of m y speech about the oil in Persia; it is in substance accurate,
though the reporter has made obvious nonsense of one or two sentences, and you may
be able to make use of it.
The speech was unprepared as I never can be sure on the Foreign Office Vote
what subjects will be raised and with what I shall be required to deal.
Yours sincerelv,
[E . G R E Y ].

I think you handled the Persian question quite admirably in your talk with the
E m peror.(3)
( J) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 35.]
( 2) [v. P ari. D eb ., oth S er., (H ou se o f Com m ons), V ol. 64, pp. 109, 113-15.]
(3) [cp . supra, pp. 805-8, N o. 553.]

No. 558.

Sir Edicard G rey to Sir G. Buchanan.

F.O. 29579 2 7 7 0 9 /1 4 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 303.) Foreign Office, July 3, 1914.
Your telegram No. 145 of 30th J u n e./1)
I gather from the Russian Ambassador that M. Sazonof wants some statement
from us that he can use authoritatively to correct misapprehensions of Russian press
about Persian oil concession.
( 0 [S ir G. B u ch a n a n ’ s teleg ram (N o. 145) o f J u n e 30, 1914, is not rep rod u ced . I t rep orted
a con v ersation w ith M . Sa zon ov on J u n e 29 in w hich the la tter stated th a t he “ m ust have
som ething m ore d efinite to sa tisfy R ussian p u b lic op in ion ” than S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s statem ent
on the P ersia n o il concession con ta in ed in his teleg ram (N o. 233) o f J u n e 25 [r . supra, p. 810,
E d. -V ote], S ir G B uch an a n sa id fu rth e r th a t M . Sazonov was “ to subm it to the E m p eror
tod a y answ er w hich he proposes to retu rn to ou r m e m o ra n d u m ” (v. supra, pp. <9s-S00, N o. 547,
encl.). S ir E d w a rd G rey m in u ted this teleg ram : “ p a ra g ra p h 4 o f my telegram N o. 2S3 to
S ir G. B u ch an a n is ou r best answ er and does g iv e all th e assurance th a t the R ussians have a
rig h t to e x p e c t ’ (F .O . 2 9 5 7 9 /2 7 7 0 9 /1 4 /3 4 .)]
 814
I am sending you Hansard report of m y speech in Parliament on 29th June,(2)
and you can give that to M. Sazonof for any use he likes to make of it.
You can also point out to him that the British Government does not acquire any
rights under the concession that were not possessed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
already. The rights are now neither more nor less than they were when Anglo-Russian
Convention was made. I do not anticipate that the acquisition by the Government of
a share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will lead to our taking any action in the
neutral zone except what would be taken by any trader or commercial company.
You may rem ind M. Sazonof that when a force, now withdrawn, was sent
temporarily to Shiraz the Russian Governm ent was inform ed and consulted.
W hen M. Sazonof was at Balmoral I discussed with him the question of lending
British officers to organise a Persian force to protect the trade routes in neutral
zone, though that was only a contingency at the time, and, as a matter of fact, has
not been done yet.
Those, surely, are guarantees that, if the oil concession or anything else
required, in our opinion, special measures in the neutral zone that affected the
Anglo-Russian Agreement, we should consult with the Russian Government before
taking them.
M. Sazonof can, of course, make what statement he pleases in the sense of this
telegram and of m y telegram No. 283 o f 25th June to vou .(3)
(2) [v. P ari. D eb ., 5th Ser., (H ou se of C om m ons), V ol. 64, pp. 109, 113-5.]
(3) [u. supra, p 810, Ed. V o t e .]

No. 559.

Mr. TTinsio/i Churchill to Sir Edward G r ey .I1)

Private. ( 2)
My dear G rey, Adm iralty, July 7, 1914.
A conversation has taken place and another will occur s h ortly ; hut the Russian
Naval Attache is not sufficiently inform ed or possessed o f authority to discuss matters
o f such consequence with the First Sea Lord. At the best he can only listen and
report to his governm ent. No real progress will be made till a conversation takes
place between equals.
Yours sincerely,
W INSTON S. C H U R C H IL L.
t1) [T h is le tte r is endorsed as h a v in g been sent t o th e P rim e M in ister. I t is further
e n d o rse d : “ N ote on letter from S ir G. B u chanan o f 25 J u n e, 1914.” v. supra, pp. 811-2,
N o. 556.]
( 2) [G rey M SS ., V ol. 49.]

No. 560.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G r ey J 1)

F.O. 3 15 0 8 /2 4 68 9 /1 4 /3 4.
Tel. (No. 153.) St. Petersburgh, July 11, 1914.
I am sending by Dir. O ’ Beirne reply o f Russian Government to our
m em orandum ,(2) as well as copies of two letters which I have received from Minister
for Foreign Affairs, on subject of Persian oil concession and Swedish gendarm erie.(3)

( ‘ ) [T his telegram is taken from the C on fid en tial P rin t as th e o rig in a l decy ph er is not
a va ila ble.]
(2) [r . im m ediately succeed ing docu m en t.]
( 3) [v. Iinperialism us, 1st S er., V ol. I V , pp. 150-1, Nos. 156 -7 .]
 815

Russian reply is of inordinate length and disappointing. Considerable space is

devoted to defence o f Russia’ s action, but arguments are weak and tone childish.
Though no precise engagements are taken, it leaves it to be inferred that Shuja is to
be sacrificed, and that collection of taxes by consuls is to be stopped.
In telling me yesterday that I should receive reply in course of the evening,
Minister for F oreign Affairs said he was giving us satisfaction on both the above­
mentioned points as well as on that of the post-office, which he was prepared to
abolish, and that he understood from letter he had received from London that these
were the three questions to which we attached importance. I also gathered from
what he said that practice of creating protected subjects will be discouraged.
I f Minister for Foreign Affairs has not given through Russian Ambassador in
London more definite assurances with regard to all these questions than those
contained in Russian aide-m ém oire, we ought, I think, to ask for them. If
acquisition of lands by Russian subjects is to be continued, we might stipulate that
agents of the Persian Administration are not to be excluded from estates thus
acquired, as has been the case at Ispahan.
On m y referring in our yesterday’ s conversation to question of the neutral zone,
Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in concluding paragraph of his aide-m ém oire,
he had put forward what he termed an “ am orce,” by which I understand him to
mean an invitation for us to make proposals on the subject.
As his E xcellency could not see me to-day. and as he is leaving on M onday for
the country, I shall not see him again till end of next week.

Xo. 561.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward G rey J 1)

F.O. 3 1 8 0 1 /2 4 86 9 /1 4 /3 4.
, (Xo. 215.) St. Petersbvrgh, D. July 11, 1914.
Sir, ‘ R. July 14, 1914.
W ith reference to m y telegram Xo. 158 of to-day,(2) I have the honour to transmit
to you herewith translation of an aide-m ém oire which has been com m unicated to
me by M. Sazonof, and which contains the reply of the Russian Government to the
memorandum handed to the Russian Ambassador in London on the situation in
Persia. ( 3)
I have, Ac.
G E O R G E W . B U C H A XA X.

Enclosure in X o. 561.

Memorandum com m unicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. SazonovJ*■

(Translation.
In the m emorandum submitted by the British Foreign Office to the Imperial
I Embassy in London, and dated the 10th June of this year, the views of the L ondon
I Cabinet are put forward as to the present position occupied by Russia in Persia, and
I the opinion expressed is, in effect, that the actions of Russian representatives in
Xorthern Persia are undermining the principle of the independence and integrity of
I the country on which the Anglo-Russian Convention of 19u7 is based.

(*) [T h is despa tch is end orsed as h a v in g been sent to the K in g and to the C a b in et.]
I (2) [v. im m ed ia tely preced in g docum ent, cp. in fra, p. 520. m in ., and note (•*).]
( 3) [r . su p ra , pp. 7r5_S00. N o. 547, en c/.]
( 4) [cp. Im p e r ia lism u s, 1st S er ., V ol. I V , pp. 151-60, No. 155.]
 816
In support of this opinion the following data are quoted

The Governor-General of Tabriz has becom e an autonomous ruler who does not
obey the instructions of the Central Persian Government, and at times even acts in
direct defiance of orders given him. H e is at the same time com pletely under the
control of the Puissian Consulate-General, the commands of which he obeys implicitly,
and the support of which deprives the Central Government of the possibility of calling
this personage to account.
Further, Persian Governors such as, for instance, those at Pesht, Kazvin, and
Julfa (Ispahan) are in fact selected, or at least maintained, in their posts by Russian
consuls, and their residence in the locality is conditional on their acting in full
accordance with the wishes of Russian representatives. The Central Government do
not dare to dismiss them except with the consent of the Russians, however revolu­
tionary, dishonourable, or generally unsatisfactory their behaviour may be. The
Russian Minister at Tehran recently called for the resignation of the Minister for the
Interior, who, it is said, is one of the least incapable and inactive of the officials of the
State, and was selected for this post upon the recommendation of the Russian
Governm ent itself.
B y affording Russian protection to individual persons in Azerbaijan, Meshed, and
even in such southern localities as Ispahan, Russian administrative control has to a
considerable degree extended to the financial administration, which in consequence is
at times seriously embarrassed thereby. In Azerbaijan there have been instances when
a great portion of the taxes due from persons under Russian protection have been
collected, entirely independently of the Persian financial administration, by Russian
consuls who have deposited the m oney in the Russian Bank without rendering any
account of the amounts thus taken from the Persian Treasury. The result of this
action has been the complete disorganisation of the finances of this province.
Without annexing Northern Persia in the full sense of the word, the Russian
Governm ent have practically acquired the supreme political authority and a
preponderating influence through their agents in the entire administration, which, if
not in name, has in fact becom e Russian.
The result of Russian methods of action in Northern Persia in connection with
the unsatisfactory position of affairs in the south has been the creation in the north
and north-west of almost a m onopoly for Russian trade. W ith the impetus given to
this trade by the substitution in the north of Russian for Persian authority, it must
inevitably develop a tendency to penetrate to the south also, replacing both here and
there British and other foreign trade which can only enter Persia by southern trade
routes, and is entirely cut off when these routes are closed.
Further, a general tendency, it is said, is observed for Russian political influence
to extend to the neutral zone, as is evidenced from the action of the Russian consul at
Ispahan and his intervention in the duties of the Governor-General of this province,
as also from the project for an irrigation concession at the source of the Karkunan.
Before proceeding to a review of the above-quoted points from the memorandum
of the London Cabinet, the Im perial Ministry for Foreign Affairs deem it necessary to
express certain general considerations on the question of Russian methods of action in
Persia in connection with the situation in that country.
It is well known to the British Governm ent with what complications the change
of the State régime in Persia was attended, and how the events which took place in
that country reflected adversely on Russian interests, which, owing to the contiguity
of the two countries and the close economic ties which have long since existed between
them, appreciably exceed, at least in the northern part of Persia, the interests of any
other Power. Without entering into details, it must he noted that the decline of the
Government authority and the disorders which arose as the result of anarchy in the
country caused losses amounting to many millions to Russian subjects, and even led
to no small sacrifice of human life. At the same time, during this period, with rare
exceptions, there was noticeable a systematic attitude of ill-will towards Russia on the
 817
part of Persian ruling spheres, imbued with ultra-nationalistic ideas not in accordance
with the cultural or ethical level of these spheres, or with the general economic and
political condition of Persia. Under such a condition of affairs the Im perial
I Government, to their extreme regret, found themselves compelled to take their interests
I in northern Persia into their own hands by the installation of Russian troops in the
1 more important localities. This step, which was attended with considerable material
sacrifice and other inconveniences for Russia, tesulted in the establishment of com para­
, tive order within the localities specified, to the general advantage not only of Russian
subjects, but also of other foreigners, and, above all. of the local population. The
I presence of Russian colum ns in Pt rsia has not borne, and dot s not bear, at the present
time, however, any character of the nature of an occupation, as the Russian troops are
in no way concerned with the internal life and administration of the country. The
task o f the columns is to maintain order by the prevention of bloodshed and armed
attacks between mutually hostile local parties. On the other band, such circumstances
as the weakness of the ties uniting the provinces with the centre, and the above­
m entioned feeling of the latter, as also the impossibility of perm itting anti-Russian
agitation, lawlessness, violence, extortion, Ac-., in localities where the troops are
quartered have inevitably demanded the exercise of certain action on the local
authorities by the Russian consular representatives, who have been com pelled
nolens volens to take upon themselves to a certain degree a leading role in local affairs
in order to avoid com plications which might have far more serious consequences.
Again, local P« rsian administrators sincerely desirous of maintaining order in the
provinces entrusted to them, and who have not aimed solely at the gratification of
the nationalistic tendencies of the Extreme Liberal parties in the capital, or at deriving
personal material benefits from their official position, have naturally sought a
rapprochement with Russian representatives, clearly recognising that only with their
support and the presence of Russian detachments can the aims for which they are
striving be attained. Owing to this, the necessary state of affairs has now been
created, bv virtue of which in the m ajority of the northern provinces of Persia a
predom inating influence of Russian consular representatives is noticeable. This
influence brings about those conditions under which only is a peaceful development of
local life a n d 'sa fetv of person and property concert able, with the natural result of
prosperity of trade and industry. Although a recognition of this is possibly
displeasing to the national self-respect of Persian-ruling spheres, the people everywhere
fully appreciate the blessings which they obtain 111 this manner, blessings which they
couid scarceiv obtain at an early date under a weak and inconsistent Governm ent, the
activity of which is hampered by the absence of solidarity and an almost incessant
struggle by separate individuals for power.
The Im perial Government, as form erly, free from all aggressive aims and in no
way dreaming of any forcible acquisitions whatever, consider that in addition to
safeguarding their strictly com m ercial and industrial interests in Persia, they have a
cultural mission to perform , the pacification of the Persian provinces adjoining
! Russia, and the bestowal of tranquillity on their population, closely bound econom ically
and bv conditions o f life with the population o f their own outlying regions. T hey are
of the opinion that this duty will rest on them until the Pt-rsian Government
I themselves shall be in a position to guarantee law and order throughout the country.
Turning to the separate points of the British memorandum, the Im perial
Government think it their duty to put forward the following explanation
The most important province of Persia, from the point of h e w of Russian interests
is Azerbaijan, from time imm em orial closely connected with the ( aucasus. T le
Im perial Governm ent cannot he indifferent as to who stands at the head of this
province, which till quite rec-entlv was the scene of the gn atest disorders and most
unbridled action bv the dregs of the so-called Persian revolution. After a series of
unsuccessful local rulers, appointed by the Central Persian Governm ent, the power
finally passed into the hands of the present Governor-General. hhuja-ed-Dowleh. who
f 10900] 3G
 818
from the very com m encem ent displayed great firmness and a full knowledge of local
conditions, and knew how to restore order in the province within a comparatively
short period of time, and to inspire the necessary respect towards himself. It is natural
that such a personality won the approval of the Russian Government, and commenced
to enjoy the full support of their local representatives. Unfortunately, however, the
Tehran Cabinet up to the present have been unable to reconcile themselves to the
fact that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has established him self in Azerbaijan by an unusual
m ethod, i.e., without the proper reverences and gifts in Tehran. Sym pathy with the
ex-Shah, of which he is usually charged, was fully refuted hv the manner in which he
acted during the attempt of Mahomet Ali to recover his lost throne. Persistently
following one aim only— the restoration and maintenance of order in his province,
Shuja-ed-Dowleh remained a true servant of the Government, deviating only from the
execution of such proposals of the latter as either were contrary to the aim
specified, or threatened to involve him in a conflict with the Russians, whose support
he naturally valued as the sole means for a successful realisation of his task.
A ppreciating the ability and great energy of this man, the Imperial Government
cannot but esteem him, and wish that he may retain authority as long as possible.
Unfortunately, however, Shuja-ed-Dowleh him self is now with increasing frequency
com plaining of bad health, and is desirous of the necessary rest, therefore the question
of his replacement by another has perforce become one for consideration, and has
already formed the subject of discussion with the Government of the Shah.
As regards the selection of persons for administrative posts, and also the changing
o f such, this, in accordance with old-established custom, has ahvays been effected by
agreement between the Imperial and Persian Governments. So far as is known, the
British Government have also enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, this right, an instance
of which was recently noted in Seistan and Ivainat. This right of a voice in such
questions by the twro Powers most interested in Persian affairs arises from the necessity
that by a due choice of persons they shall guarantee their vital interests in their
respective spheres of influence. It is impossible, m oreover, not to note here that
Russian representatives, of course, never support Governors of “ revolutionary,
dishonourable, and unsatisfactory character.” The resignation of the form er Minister
for the Interior, Prince Ein-ed-Dowleh, a typical Persian of the old régime, was evoked
chiefly because he renewed to its full extent the form er method of sale of posts, and for
the sake of his own interested, avaricious aims removed men useful from a Russian
point of view. Apart from this, the Prince, in search of popularity am ong the extreme
nationalists, com m enced to conduct a policy clearly ill-disposed towards Russia, while,
on the other hand, as is well known to the Imperial Governm ent, playing a double
game and secretly in touch with the reactionary elements, assuring them of his
immutable devotion to absolutism. Such duplicity could only have the most ruinous
consequences from the point of view of the establishment of tranquillity in the country
which is so desirable. It is impossible not to mention, among others, also those
intrigues which Ein-ed-Dowleh conducted against other members of the Cabinet, as for
instance, Vosug-ed-Dowleh, who were recognised by the Russian and British Govern­
ments as the most useful members of this Cabinet.
During the burdensome times through wThich Persia has lived and is in part still
passing, and owing frequently to the insecurity of person and property, the number of
natives seeking the protection of foreign representatives has undoubtedly considerably
grown. In this category are principally those persons who are under financial
obligations to banks and trading firms and the ruin of whom would involve severe loss
for the latter, and also persons who, during the difficult time of persecution of
everything Russian in Persia had the courage, as form erly, to display feelings of
friendliness towards Russia. The protection of such persons from persecution and
violence is naturallv the duty of Russian representatives in Persia. The institution of
protected persons is undoubtedly undesirable in principle and conducive of no little
trouble, but it will automatically disappear when law, order, and respect for the
political convictions of others are reinstated in the country. Noting in passing that
 819
Ispahan, although it lies somewhat to the south, form s, nevertheless, a portion of the
zone apportioned to Russian influence by the agreement of 1907, the Imperial Govern­
ment cannot accept as correct the opinion that the protection afforded to the
above-m entioned persons is a source of embarrasment or loss to the finances of Persia.
On the contrary, the Im perial Government maintain that it is only owing to the
co-operation afforded by the Russian representatives to the Persian financial adminis­
tration that the latter is in a position to realise its functions, and regularly to increase
the revenue o f the Treasury of the Shah. The difficulties which this administration
at times meets in its path are for the most part the result of ignorant methods and an
unwillingness on the part of its separate organs to reckon with local conditions of life
and other peculiarities. Am ong these organs, unfortunately, are certain Belgian
officials, who do not listen to the good advice offered them by the Russian representa­
tives having relations with them, and always tendered in a kindly spirit. The frequent
conflicts which have in consequence arisen between officials of the “ maliat ”
administration on the one hand, and Russian subjects, together with those under
Russian protection, on the other, induced the Im perial Minister, in agreement with
the Chief Treasurer of Persia, to entrust the collection of taxes from these persons to
Russian consuls, with the participation of the Discount and Loan Bank of Persia. By
this measure, am ong others, has been partially decided the question of tlie deposit in
the above-nam ed bank of the Government revenues of Northern Persia, which, contrary
to the spirit o f the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, M. Mornard. since 1913, has
been placing in the British Bank. However, the Persian Government saw a violation
of their rights in this first attempt to introduce a new method, guaranteeing the
Government o f the Shah an accurate receipt of taxes and avoidance of such highly
undesirable mutual friction and recrimination, and M. Mornard hastened, not only to
repudiate the agreement concluded with them, but e\ en to talk of the arbitrary actions
of Russian consuls. At present, the question of the collection of the “ maliat ” from
Russian subjects and protégés also forms a subject of negotiation between the Im perial
and Persian Governm ents and with a readiness on the part of the latter to meet
half way the legitimate wish that the revenues of the northern provinces shall be
deposited with the Russian Bank, as was done in 1912, and with the establishment of
a certain control by the consulates as regards the correctness of the assessment, a
favourable settlement of the question appears fully possible. It is scarcely necessary
to mention that a precise account is kept of all sums collected by Russian consuls, and
that not one copeck of these amounts is taken from the Persian Treasury. If the
Persian Financial Department state otherwise such statement does not merit belief.
Owing principally to the geographical position of the two countries. Russian trade
has always predom inated in northern and north-western Persia over the trade of all
other States. I f the imports of the latter have specially diminished of late years it is
due— as is justly remarked in the British m emorandum — chiefly to the absence of
safety for traffic along the caravan routes of southern Persia. However, the Imperial
Governm ent cannot but recall that on their part they have never placed any obstacles
in tlie way o f the British Government in its endeavours to secure an effective
protection of the southern routes. As regards the penetration of Russian wares into
Southern Persia, no such movem ent is at present noticeable, and even appears to be
little likely beyond the limits of the Ispahan province, which constitutes, as has been
already pointed out, a portion of the Russian sphere of influence.
Finally, with reference to the m ention made in the memorandum of the tendency
of Russian influence to extend into the neutral zone, it can only be said that such
tendency m ay to a certain degree appear only in the Ispahan province, as is shown
bv the instance cited in the British m emorandum of projected irrigation work in the
same region. Moreover, the appearance of influence and a realisation of economic
enterprise within the limits of the neutral zone is not forbidden either Power by the
Anglo-Russian agreement, and. so far as is known, Great Britain is taking wide
advantage of this right in Baklitiaria, and in her relations with such persons, as, for
instance, the Sheikh Khasal of Mohammerah.
[1 0 9 0 0 ] 3 G 2
 820

In concluding with this point their reply (to the memorandum), the soundness of
which can scarcely be denied, the Imperial Government cannot conceal their profound
regret that their actions in Persia, dictated hy vital necessity, regularly meet with such
evident mistrust from British public opinion, notwithstanding repeatedly given
assurances as to the entirely disinterested motives of Russia, confirmed by all her
actions during the period of the Persian crisis. This symptom is all the more to be
regretted in that its action may extend far beyond the limits of the comparativelv
narrow scope of Persian affairs, and m ay find an echo in other points o f contact of the
interests of the two Powers. Deem ing such consequences as equally undesirable and
even dangerous for the two friendly Governments, and endeavouring by every possible
means to assist in the removal of the above-mentioned distrust, nourished apparently
to a considerable extent by traditional fears in India of a possible Russian invasion of
that country, the Imperial Governm ent are prepared with all attention and good
wishes to consider, jointly with the London Cabinet, what measures can be taken with
a view to a lasting establishment of a reciprocal correct understanding and complete
confidence, which is so important for their respective interests.

M IN U T E S .
A s S ir G. B u chanan said, these a rgum ents are both “ w e a k ” and “ ch ild ish .” It is almost
su rp risin g th a t they are pu t forw a rd in a docu m en t in ten ded to help ou r relations.
T h e q uestion o f the P ost Office m en tion ed 111 (3 l5 0 S )(5) is not dealt w ith.
T he a ction foresh a dow ed in the p en u ltim a te para [g r a p h ] o f (31508) a ppears m ost desirable
and m ig h t be em bodied in the m e m o r a n d u m ] a bou t to be draw n up by M r. Clerk.
L. 0
14 July.

I t is to be hoped th a t this “ rep ly ” w ill not be the only outcom e o f our rem onstrance.
I never read a flim sier docu m en t, and it seem s really useless to ta k e any n otice of it. It
w ill b e b etter to rely on a con tin u a n ce o f th e con v ersation s a t St. P etersb u rg . W hen we have
M r. C lerk ’ s m e m o[ra n d u m ] we m ust seriously consid er w hat w e shall p u t forw a rd .
E. A. C.
J u ly 14.

T he sooner we can con tin u e discussions the b etter it will be. I t w [o u l]d be desirable to
have som e settlem ent rea ch ed b efore M. S azonow leaves fo r his holida y n ex t m onth.
A. N.
E. G.

(5) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

 A P P E N D I X I.

M. S a z o x o v s P l a n in 1914 for .an A n g l o - R u s s i a n - J a p a n e s e G u a r a n t e e o f A s i a t i c P o s s e s s i o n s .

[E D . X O T E .— The follo w in g ex tra ct from a p r iv a te letter from S ir A. N icolson t o S ir G.

Buchanan o f J u ly 14, 1914, is o f in terest in con n ection w ith the m a tters record ed in the
prev iou s ch a p ter. T he letter is a lon g one and m uch o f it refers to questions o f th e N ea r East
and oth er su b jects w hich are not relevant h e r e : —
“ . . . . It seems t o m e that our relation s w ith Russia are now a p p roa ch in g a p oin t
when we shall have to m ake up ou r m inds as t o w hether w e should b ecom e really in tim a te
and perm anen t frien d s, o r else div erg e in to a n oth er path. W e w ill proba b ly receiv e in a
day or tw o th e R ussian rep ly t o ou r m em orandum , o f w hich y ou have a lread y teleg ra p h ed
th e g en era l ten ou r. B ut w hat has in spired m e w ith consid era ble h op e is the su ggestion
w hich Sa zon off has throw n ou t as t o a trip le g u a ra n tee in reg a rd t o ou r resp ectiv e A sia tic
possessions betw een J a p a n , Russia and ourselves. I m ust say th a t this idea a ppeals v ery
fo r cib ly t o m e personally. O f course it is one w hich w ill have to be decid ed by th e C abinet
b efore it ca n ev er ta k e a m ore definite shape, so m y view s, y ou w ill understa n d, are pu rely
personal. It w ou ld certa in ly t o m y m ind g o a lon g w ay tow ards d issip a tin g those a ppre­
hensions w hich u n fo rtu n a te ly d o ex ist here in reg a rd t o R ussian designs, and if w e cou ld
b rin g J a p a n in to som e trip a r t it e a greem ent th e a tm osphere w ou ld u n d ou bted ly be con ­
siderab ly clearer. I have only had a v ery cu rsory con v ersation w ith G rey on th e subject,
and as he says, th ere is m uch that is of in terest and w orth th in k in g a bout in y o u r letter.
It w ou ld rea lly be a g rea t a chievem ent, and one to w hich y ou personally w ould have co n tr i­
b u ted a very con sid era ble share, if w e cou ld rea lly pla ce ou r relation s w ith R ussia u p on a
perm anen t an d sa tisfa ctory basis, both in reg a rd to the M id East and to In d ia . I d o tru st
th a t Sa zon off w ill pu t his proposal in a m ore con crete form , th ou g h o f course u n til the
C abinet have discussed th e m a tter, and G rey has com e t o a definite op in ion , w e can n ot
m ake any su g g estion t o him to d o so. Should he a g a in allude to th e subject, I d o n ot see
why y ou should d iscou ra ge h im — o f course w ith ou t com m ittin g us in any w ay w hatsoever.
It w ould fa cilita te , m oreover, discussion in reg a rd to P ersia if th a t cou n try form ed really
a fa c t o r in th e la rg er q uestion, and I have little dou bt th a t it w ould disarm m uch suspicion ,
and, in deed, h ostility, in th is co u n tr y ” (C arn ock M SS ., V ol. I V of 1914.)
T his e x tra ct show s R u s sia 's desire t o rem ove E n g la n d ’ s fea r o f her a ggression tow ards In dia.
I S ir Jam es H ea d la m -M orley (r. Gooch <£• T em p erley, V ol. X I , pp. x i- x i i) alluded to th is m a tter
and q u oted som e docu m en ts rela tin g th ereto o f J u ly 1914. H e rep rod u ced , am ong others, a
p r iv a te and secret teleg ram from S ir G eorge B uchanan o f J u ly 19, and S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s
I rep ly o f th e 20th (G rey M SS ., V ol. 35). H e then adds “ This was th e end of th e m a tte r ,’ ’ but
th e follow in g telegram s show th a t this was not q u ite th e case.]

S ir G. B uchana n to S ir E d ica rd G re y J 1)

S t. P cte rsb u r g h , A u g u s t S, 1914.

F .O . 3 6 8 3 1 /3 5 4 4 5 /1 4 /2 3 . D . 12-35 a . m .
T e l (N o. 240.) R - 1 5 a .m .
Y ou r teleg ram N o. 38 t o T o k io .(2)
In con v ersation this m orn in g M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs referred to su ggestion record ed
in m y p riv a te [te le g r a m ] o f J u ly lS th (3) fo r tr ip le g u aran tee o f ou r A s ia tic possessions.
M om ent had he th ou g h t com e fo r g iv in g effect to it and we ought to ta k e a d v a n ta g e o f present
I fr ien d ly d isp osition s o f J ap an ese G overnm ent to in d u ce them to a ssociate them selves w ith
I T rip le E n ten te b oth in th eir d ip lom a tic and stra teg ica l a ction . J ap anese cou ld cr ip p le G erm an
com m erce in the F a r E ast and cou ld w rest K ia u -c h o u from G erm any. H e did not know
w hether J a p a n w ou ld ex p ect com p en sa tion fo r h er services but if she did he saw no o b jection
I t o ou r m a k in g a rra n g em en ts w ith her u n d er w hich w e should g iv e her W ei-h a i-w ei in ex ch a n g e
fo r K ia u -ch ou w hich was a m uch b e tte r h arbour. A t present E n g la n d and J a p a n w ere allies
by tre a ty and E n g la n d and R ussia allies de fa cto. R u s sia 's position w ith reg a rd to J a p a n was
I th erefore som ew hat anom alous and ou g h t t o be p la ced on a som ew hat sim ilar fo o tin g to th a t
o f E ngland .
F ren ch A m bassador w ho was present expressed g en era l con cu rren ce and is teleg ra p h in g in
a bove sense.

(*) [C opies o f this teleg ram w ere sent to the D ir e cto r o f N a v a l I n te llig e n ce ; to the D ir e cto r
o f M ilita r y O p e r a tio n s; to the C om m ittee of Im p eria l D e fe n ce .]
( 2) [S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s teleg ram (N o. 3S) to S ir C. G reene o f A u gu st 5, 1914, ex pressed the
a p p recia tion of th e A d m ira lty fo r th e assurance g iv en in S ir C. G reen e’ s teleg ram (N o. 61) of
A u g u st 4, 1914 (t>. G ooch <£• T em p erley, V ol. X I , pp. 327-8, No. 637). (F.O . 3 5 9 3 7 /3 5 4 4 5 /1 4 /2 3 .)]
(3) [s ic : 19th. v. G ooch ¿c T em p erley, V ol. X I , p. x i.j
 82 2
I said I cou ld express no o p in ion w ith reg a rd to a n y chances o f proposal abou t W ei-hai-w ei.
I th in k h ow ever a trip le gu a ra n tee by E n g lan d , R ussia and J ap an o f th eir respective
possessions in Asia w ould be o f grea t a d v a n ta g e to us in fu tu re and th a t w e shall never find a
m ore fa v ou ra ble m om ent than the presen t fo r con clu d in g an a rra n g em en t t o th a t effect.

M IN U T E S .

T h e m om ent is m ost fa v ou ra b le fo r rea lisin g M . S a zon ov ’ s o rig in a l proposal fo r a triple

g u aran tee.
A. N.
W e ca n n ot proceed fu rth er a t this m om ent.
E. G.

C om m u n ication from C ou n t B en ck en d orff.

F.O. 3 7 5 0 7 /3 5 4 4 5 /1 4 /2 3 . Itvssian Em bassy, L ondon, A u g u st 9, 1914.

M . S azonoff télég ra p h ié en da te du 25 J u i l l e t / 7 A oû t, 1914.

“ Au cours de mes entretien s avec l ’ A m bassadeur d ’ A n g leterre, j ’ ai ex p rim é l ’ opinion

que les difficultés que nous avons ren con trées en P erse prov en a ien t en g ra n d e p a rtie du
m a in tien en A n g leterre de l ’ a ncienne im pression d ’ in sécu rité p ou r ses possessions aux Indes.
C ’ est ce q ui m ’ a in d u it à su g g érer à l ’ A m bassadeur l'id é e d ’ un a ccord Anglo-Russe
g ara n tissa n t m utu ellem en t l ’ in té g r ité de nos possessions A siatiques. S ir E d w ard Grey
p a ra it a v oir fa it un accu eil fa v ora b le au r a p p o rt que S ir G. Buchanan lui fit à ce sujet.
L es événem ents actuels m a tu ra n t les choses, j ’ ai eu l’ idée d ’ une con v en tion à con clu re entre
la R ussie, l ’ A n g leterre et le J ap on p ou r une g a ra n tie m u tu elle de leurs possessions en Asie.
J ’ ai tou ch é ce p r o je t au cours de mes con v ersation s avec l ’A m bassadeur d ’ A n g leterre sans
re n c o n tre r chez lui d ’ ob jection s personnelles. V eu illez vous en e x p liq u er confidentiellem ent
a vec S ir E d w a rd G rey et lu i dem a n der com m ent il en v isag era it le p r o je t d ’ une pareille
con v en tion . D an s m on idée cette con v en tion d ev ra it a v oir p ou r b u t : I ) L a consolidation
et le m a in tien de la p a ix en Asie. 2) L e m a intien des droits t e rr ito ria u x et des intérêts
sp écia u x des pa rties con tra cta n tes dans cette p a rtie du inonde.
“ L es clauses de la con v en tion con tie n d r a ie n t un en gagem en t des p a rties con tra cta n tes:
I ) A u cas où ces droits et ces in térêts seraient m enacés, de se co n c e rte r sur les mesures à
p re n d re en v ue de leu r sa u v ega rd e et 2) de ne con clu re avec d ’ a utres P uissances aucun
a rra n g em en t r e la tif a u x questions visées pa r la con v en tion sans une en ten te préalable avec
les a utres p a rties con tractan tes.
“ D an s les con d ition s politiqu es a ctuelles la con clu sion de p a reille con v en tion m e parait
d ’ u tilité to u te spéciale, je dira is d ’ urgence, en vue des in térêts m ajeurs de nos pa ys.”

M IN U T E S .

This opens up a question w hich had a lread y been m ooted b efore the w ar.
I t w ill affect the discussion as to J ap anese su p port, b u t on genera l g rou n d s it offers
advan ta ges, and S ir G. B uch an a n has a d v oca ted it strongly.
P ersia is presum ably cov ered by the 1907 A greem ent.
T h e I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ] m ust be consulted.
C hina D e p [a r tm e n ]t first.
G. R . C.
9—vii i—14.

I have discussed this qu estion w ith S ir W . L an g ley and we are a greed th a t as regards the
m u tu a l g u a ra n tee o f our possessions in th e F a r E ast, as a p a rt from In d ia and the Persian
question, this proposal offers no a d v an ta g es to us th a t we can see. T he question o f the
m a in ten a n ce of peace in A sia is a b roa d er one w hich I und ersta nd is now b ein g discussed on
the id ea o f the n eu tra liza tion o f th e P a cific w hich a ppears to be fa v ou red b y S ir J. J orda n —
and w as pu t forw a rd by th e S ta te D e p [a r tm e n ]t in W a sh in gton on A u g [u s t ] 4 and subsequently
recon sidered on A u g [u s t ] 8 (see 37529 and 37530).
A s a genera l p rop os ition the R u ssia n proposal w ould seem unnecessary a t any ra te during
the w ar. It m ig h t m ore u sefully form th e sub ject fo r con sid era tion a f te r the war.
B. A.
9 /8 /1 4 .

In any case n oth in g cou ld be d ecid ed on w ith ou t fu ll con sid era tion w ith S ir C. G reene and
S ir J. J ord a n .
B. A.

I am sorry to differ a ltog eth er from S ir J. J o rd a n 's view , w hich is lim ited to the Chinese
h orizon . H e does not un d ersta n d w hat is the natu re o f a w ar on w hich ou r ex isten ce is staked.
 S23
1 ca n n ot to o stron gly express m y con v iction that n eu tra liza tion -p la n s are a fu tile absurdity.
W h a t is w an ted is to strik e h a rd w ith all ou r m ig h t in all the fou r corn ers o f the w orld.
E . A . C.
A u g fu s t ] 10.
W e should not dism iss this p rop osal— it w ould b e o f g rea t a d v a n ta g e to us qua In d ia w hich
is ou r ch ie f con cern . W e m ig h t g iv e M . S azonov an assurance that w e agree to th e p r in c ip le
a n d ask if he w ou ld lik e us to a p p roach J a p a n b e fo re w e discuss details.
A. X.
L et m e have th is fo r th e C abinet today.
E. G.
11.8.14.

A P P E X D I X II.

J apan and the O p e n in g of the W ar in 1914.

[E D . X O T E .— T he follow in g telegram s rec o rd in g the a ttitu d e o f J a p a n at th e ou tb rea k o f

the E uropea n W a r sup plem ent those p r in te d in G ooch & T em p erley. V ol. X I , p. 256, X o . 436;
p. 279, X o . 4 9 9 ; p. 292. X o . 5 34 ; p. 298, X o . 5 4 9 ; p. 305, X o . 5 71 ; pp. 327-5, X o . 6 3 7 ; p. 329,
X o . 641.]
S ir E dicard G rey to S ir C. G re en e.l})
F.O . 36645/35445 14 23.
T el. (X'o. 40.) S ecret. 10 D ow nin i S t r e it . S’. I T ., A u g u s t 6, 1914, 6-25 p . m .
A s ou r w arships w ill req u ire som e tim e to loca te and destroy th e G erm an w arships in
Chinese w aters it is essential that the J ap an ese should hunt ou t an d destroy the G erm an arm ed
m erchant cruisers w ho are a tta ck in g c u r com m erce now.
I f th e J ap an ese G o v [c r n m e n ]t w ou ld em ploy som e o f th eir w arships in th is w ay it w ou ld
be o f the very g rea test assistance to us. I t m eans o f course an act of w ar aga in st G erm any,
b u t w e d o not see how this is to be avoided .
R ep ea t P e k in g S ecret.

( 0 [T h is teleg ram , in S ir E d w a rd G rey ’ s h a n d w ritin g , is end orsed as ha vin g been sent to

th e D ir e cto r o f X a v a l I n te llig e n c e ; t o th e D ir e cto r o f M ilita r y O p e ra tio n s; to th e C om m ittee o f
Im p eria l D e fe n ce .]

S ir C. G reen e to S ir E d icard G rey.

F .O . 36830/35445 14 23. Tokh\ D . A u g u st 7, 1914, 5-30 p . m .

Tel. (X o . 64.1 V e r y U rgen t. R . A u g u st 8. 1914, 1-10 a .m .
S ecret. Y o u r teleg ram X o . 40.
M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs w ill lay y o u r m essage b efore the Cabinet to-m orrow an d b efore
th e E m p eror o f J a p a n a fterw a rd s and hopes t o g iv e m e an answ er on Sunday.
H e said th a t ships w ou ld be cru isin g in Corean S tra its by then and in readiness fo r a ction
if the C a bin et a p p rov ed . H e th ou g h t th a t an a tta ck u p on T sin gta u w ou ld b e th e q u ick est w ay
o f settlin g the business. I said th a t the Im p eria l G overnm ent w ould be th e best ju d g es o f that.
H is E x cellen cy p rom ised t o use his in fluen ce w ith th e Cabinet to m eet wishes o f H is M a je sty ’ s
G overnm ent. H e said th a t a decla ra tion o f w ar ( ? m ight not be) necessary but th a t in any
case it m eant w ar w ith G erm any.
R ep ea ted to P ek in g.

[E D . X O T E .— On A u gu st 5 (S a tu rd a y ) a C a bin et C ouncil was held in T o k io at w hich some

o f th e E ld er Statesm en w ere present, an d a fte r the F o re ig n M in ister had retu rn ed from an
A u d ien ce w ith th e E m p eror. A t that m eetin g a decision was taken substantially on th e above
lines ( r teleg ram from S ir C. G reene X o . 69 o f A u gu st 9. receiv ed A u gu st 10. F .O . 3 7 7 0 9 '
3-5445 14 23). T he J ap anese D eclaration o f W a r .ga in st G erm any, ultim a tely issued by
Im p eria l R es crip t on A u g u st 23, was m ade p u blic on the sam e day. (F.O . 42297 35445 14 2 33 ]
 824

A P P E N D I X I II .

L ord K it c h e n e r and the A rab N a t io n a l M o v e m e n t .

I.

P relim in a ries. L ord J ohn R u ssell’ s refusa l to fa v ou r in depen den ce of the Caliph (1860).
F ir st stirrin g s o f A ra b S ecret Societies (1865-1880).

II.

A ra b S ecr et S ocieties. F rom th e Y o u n g Turk D ev o lu tio n to 1912.

F ren ch Com m ents.
S yrian deleg ation to L ord K itch en er, 1912.

III.

A ra b S yria n C ongress in P a ris and F ra n co-S yria n C om m ittee in P a r is, Ju n e, 1913.

IV .

L ord K it c h e n e r ’ s con v ersa tion w ith E m ir A bdullah, F eb ru a ry 1914, and its a fterm a th .
(A ) L ord K itc h e n e r’ s accou n t and view s of Sir L ou is M allet.
(B ) E m ir A b d u lla h ’ s a ccou n t o f his con v ersation w ith L ord K itch en er, tra nsm itted
w ith notes by M r. G. A ntonius.

V.

A z iz B e y and the A rab M o v e m en t, 1914.

I.

The origin s of th e A rab N a tion a l M ov em en t.

[E D . N O T E .— The A ra b n a tion a l m ovem ent has its roots in the litera ry rev iva l w hich
began in Sy ria in the fifties of the X l X t h cen tu ry . T his rev iva l ultim a tely gave b irth to A rab
n a tion a l consciousness in the A r a b ic-sp ea k in g provin ces o f the O ttom an E m p ire, and to a
m ov em en t for the p olitica l em a n cip a tion o f those provin ces from th e T urkish yoke.
The p roject of using the G rand Sheriff as a kind o f C aliph to cou n tera ct F ren ch influence
in E g y p t was actu a lly discussed in 1860. I t was d ecisively vetoed by L ord J ohn Russell
(F .O . 7 8 /1 51 4 o f D ecem ber 12, I860), u. T em perley : E ngland and the N e a r E a st— th e Crim ea,
(1936), p. 422. There is no real evid en ce o f A rab su p p ort o f the idea.
T he first stirrin g s a p p ea r to have ta k en place betw een th e years 1865 and 1880, when
secret societies w ere form ed in B ey rou th and D am ascus. The celebrated M id h a t Pasha,
G overn or o f S yria in the late seventies, is know n to have lent some en cou ra gem en t to the
m ov em en t.]

II.

A rab S ecr et S ocieties.

[E D . N O T E .— R en ew ed a ctiv ity , on a m uch la rg er scale, m a nifested itself in the years

follow in g the prom u lg a tion of the O ttom an C on stitu tion in 1908. A rab litera ry societies,
po litica l clubs and oth er org a n isation s fo r the p rom otion o f racial in terests w ere form ed in
va riou s centres in the years 1909 to 1914. The m a jority of these w ere established in C on stan ti­
nople, b u t they had branches in C airo, B ey rou th , D am ascus and (in some cases) B a g da d and
Basra. A g ood m any o f them w ere secret societies in the sense th a t the m em bers, w hile
ca rr y in g on p a trio tic a ctiv ities open ly, w ere pledg ed never to disclose the existence o f the
org a n isa tion w hich directed th eir a ctiv ities
T he g ro u p com posed p rin cip a lly of D ruse and M uslim s o f the L ebanon and o f D am ascus,
who since th e m assacres o f 1860 had looked t o G reat B rita in as th eir p ro tector, approached
the B ritish Consul G eneral in B ey rou th w ith the request th a t the B ritish G overn m en t should
assist the A rabs in th eir stru gg le again st the T u rk s.(x) A deleg ation o f S y ria n M uslim notables

( x) [Figaro and Le Temps, N ovem ber 18, 1912; L ’Eclair, D ecem b er 2, 1912.]
 825
also visited L ord K itch en er. H ig h C om m issioner in E g y p t, p etition in g G reat B rita in to annex
Syria to E g y p t and to g iv e Syria an in depen dent a d m in istra tion .!2)
L ord K itch en er, no less than H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent, was aw are o f the im p orta n ce of
e x ten d in g B ritish influen ce in western A rabia as well as on the coast of the P ersian G u lf and
w ith Ihn Saud. Such influence was essential if a K h a lifa t in depen dent o f O ttom an control
and o f G erm an in fluen ce were to be cr e a te d )3) and if the still nebulous p roject o f a T rans­
A rabia railw ay from A kaba to the P ersian G u lf w ere to he realised. The advances o f the
S yrian s and o f the A rab N a tion alists w ere, therefore, ta ctfu lly received ]

( 2) [L e Tem ps, N ovem ber IS, 1912; L 'E ch o de P aris, F ebru ary 2S, 1913; also N a jib A zuri
to Quai d'O rsa v, M arch 16, 1913, cited by E. J u n g : L a B e v o lte .1 r a le. Vol. I (P a ris, 1924),
pp. 6 0-1.]
(3) [F o r an in d ica tion o f the in fluen ce o f this policy on w ar-tim e n eg otia tion s r. E. A d am ov :
D ie E u rop ä isch en M a ch te und die T ürkei w ährend des W eltk rieg es . A u fteilu n g d er A sia tisch en
T ürkei (D resden , 1932), especially p. 30, No. 32. S ir A. N icolson to M. Sazonov, M a rch 20, 1915.]

III.

A rab -S yrian C ongress in P aris, J u n e 1913.

[E D . X O T E .— In J u n e 1913, as a result o f prep a ra tion s m ade by one o f these Societies,

an A ra b -S y ria n C ongress was pu blicly held in P aris. It sat from the l'sth to the 23rd J u n e.]

S ir G. L o w th er to S ir E dw ard G rey.

F.O. 2 6655/253 13 44.

(N o. 504.) C on stan tin ople, D. J u n e 7, 1913.
Sir. R . J u n e l i , 1913.
W ith referen ce to m y despatch No. 409 o f the 13th ultim o, I have th e honour to forw a rd
herew ith a despa tch from H is M a jesty ’ s con su l-gen eral at B eirou t rep ortin g on the d ep artu re
o f th e reform delegates fo r P a r is and L ondon.
I have, &c.
GERARD LOW TH ER.

E nclosu re.

C onsul-G enera l C u m b erba tch to S ir G. L ow th er.

(N o. 47.)
Sir, B e ir o u t, M a y 30, 1913.
W ith referen ce to my despatch N o. 36 o f th e 28th ultim o, rep ortin g the dep a rtu re o f tw o
m em bers o f the B eirou t R e fo rm C om m ittee fo r C airo and the ca p ita ls o f E u rope, I have the
h onour to rep ort th a t th ree others le ft on the 26th in stant to join them in C airo and proceed
t o P aris tog eth er.
T he nam es o f the m en com p osin g th is sp ecial com m ission or “ delegation ’ ’ are—

1. A hm ed Bey M ou k h ta r B eyhoum (M oslem ), m em ber o f the m ost in fluen tial M oslem fam ily
o f B eirout.
2. K h a lil E ffendi Zey n ieh (n ot Seliin T aiarah , as m en tion ed in m y a bov e-q u oted despatch),
a G reek C a th olic jou rn a list.
3. Selim E ffendi Selam , a M oslem m erchant o f very h igh sta n din g o f B eirou t.
4. A hm ed E ffendi T abbarah, a p rom in en t M oslem jou rn a list of B eirout.
5. D r. A y ou b T ab et, M a ro n ite o f B eirou t. H ig h ly respectable m edica l pra ctition er.
6. A lb ert J. Sursock, a m em ber o f one o f th e lea d in g G reek o rth od ox fam ilies o f B eirou t
(th is g entlem an has not left y et).

T he m ission o f these g entlem en, w hose expenses are b ein g d efra yed by a p u blic subscription,
is to plead the cause of reform s and to lay sp ecial stress on the adm ission o f A ra b ic as the
official la n g u a g e a lon g w ith T u rk ish in Syria, the ex ten sion o f the pow ers o f the G eneral
P ro v in cia l C ouncils b u t n ot those o f th e valis, the a p p oin tm en t only o f officials w ho speak
A rab ic, and last, but not least, the em ploym en t o f foreig n advisers.
T hey h old no w ritten m andate, b u t have letters of recom m en da tion from som e o f th e heads
o f relig ion s a t B eirou t to th e “ F ra n co-S y ria n ” C om m ittee in P a ris, w hich is com posed o f a
d ozen F ren ch m en in terested in the affairs o f S yria and a few natives of S yria resid in g in
F ra n ce. .
T hey ha ve no co n n ection w ith the “ A ra b -S y ria n ” Congress C om m ittee though they will
no d ou bt m eet and discuss m atters w ith them .

I
 826
T hey w ill first presen t them selves a t the O ttom an Em bassy in P a ris to m ake the ob ject of
th eir m ission know n, and, a fter a p p roa ch in g such F ren ch statesm en as they can, they will
p roceed to L on d on , and possibly to th e other E u rop ea n capitals, to aw aken in terest and
sym pathy in th eir efforts on b eh alf o f th eir cou n try .
I have, &c.
H . A. C U M B E R B A T C H .

M r. C a rn eg ie to S ir E dw ard G rey.
F .O . 2 9 0 3 7 /2 9 0 3 7 /1 3 /4 4 .
(N o. 339.)
Sir, P aris, Ju n e 24, 1913.
I have the h on ou r to tra n sm it to y ou h erew ith cop y o f th e resolutions v oted at an A rab -
S y ria n C ongress in P aris, w hich have been forw a rd ed t o me by the officers o f the C ongress w ith
a req u est th a t they should be com m u n ica ted to y ou r D epa rtm en t.
I have, &c.
L. D. C A R N E G IE .
Enclosu re.

R esolu tion s v o tée s p a r le C on grès A ra b e-S yrien .

Le C ongrès ara be-syrien, réuni à P aris, 184, B ou lev ard Sain t-G erm a in , a a d op té dans
sa séan ce du 21 J u in 1913 les résolutions suivantes :

1° D es réform es radica les et urg en tes sont nécessaires dans l’ E m p ire O ttom an.
2° Il im p orte d ’ assurer aux arabes ottom an s l ’ e x ercice de leurs droits p olitiqu es en rend ant
effectiv e leur p a rticip a tio n à l ’ a d m in istra tion cen trale de l ’ E m pire.
3° Il im p orte d ’ é ta b lir dans chacu n des vilay ets syriens et arabes un régim e décen tra lisa teu r
a p p r o p r ié à ses besoins et à ses a ptitu d es.
4° Le v ila y et de B ey rou th , a ya n t form u lé ses rev en d ica tion s dans un p r o je t spécial v o té le
31 J a n v ie r 1913 par une Assem blée g én éra le ad h oc et basé sur le dou ble p r in c ip e de l ’ex tension
des p ou voirs du conseil gén éra l du v ila y et et de la n om in ation de conseillers étrangers, le
C on grès d em ande le m ise en a p p lica tion du susdit p rojet.
5° L a langue arabe d o it être recon n u e au P arlem en t O ttom an et con sid érée com m e officielle
dans les pays syriens et arabes.
6° L e service m ilita ire sera rég ion al dans les v ila y ets syriens et arabes, en dehors des cas
d ’ ex trêm e nécessité.
7° L e C ongrès ém et le v oeu de v oir le G ouvernem ent Im p eria l O ttom an assurer au
M u tessa riflik du L ib an les m oyens d ’ am éliorer sa situ ation financière.
8° L e C ongrès affirme sa sy m pa th ie pou r les dem andes réform istes et d écen tra lisa trices des
arm énien s ottom ans.
9° Les présentes résolutions seront com m uniqu ées au G ouvernem ent Im p éria l O ttom an.
10° Il sera fa it égalem en t com m u n ica tion des m êm es résolutions aux puissances am ies de
l ’ E m p ire O ttom an.
11° L e C ongrès ex p rim e ses ch a leu reu x rem erciem en ts au G ouvernem ent de la R ép u b liq u e
p ou r sa géneureuse h osp ita lité.

L e P resid en t : L e V ice -P re s id e n t :
[Ille g ib le .] C H U K R I GANEM.
F E H R A V IN

L e S ecrétaire :
C H A RLES DEBBAS.

IV .

L o rd K it c h e n e r 's con v ersa tion w ith E m ir A bdullah on F eb ru a ry 5, 191J, and its afterm a th .
(A ) L ord K it c h e n e r 's a ccou n t and view s of S ir L ou is M a llet.

[E D . N O T E .— L o rd K it c h e n e r ’ s m eetin g w ith the E m ir Abdullah, the son o f the G rand

S h eriff o f M ecca H ussein, in F eb ru a ry, 1914, has been the subject o f m uch discussion.
I t has been suggested by C a pta in L id d ell H a rt (v. “ T. E . L a w r e n c e ," (1934), p. 61) and by
oth er auth orities, th a t som e acq uiescence in a possible A rab revolt was w inked at by L ord
K itch en er, and these hints have been m agn ified in to positive assertions in the A rab press, but
no a u th en tic evidence has h ith erto been produced.
The E d itors w ere unable to tra ce the official letters rela tin g th ereto in the E g y p tia n
corresp on den ce, bu t ev entually fou n d the relev an t m a teria ls in the T urkish files, the m atter
h a v in g been referred to S ir L ou is M a llet a t C onstan tin ople. A ll the relevan t official evidence
is h ere rep rod u ced , and in a d d ition th ere is a m ost im p orta n t priv a te letter from L ord K itch en er
to S ir W illia m [L o r d ] T yrrell, of A p ril 26, 1914, w hich sums up th e w hole affair. The E m ir’s
ow n sta tem ent w ill b e fou n d in p a rt (B ) o f this section .]
 827
Lord Kitchener to S ir Edward Grey.
F.O. 6672 6672 14 44.
(X o . 22.) S ecret. C airo, D . F eb ru a ry 6, 1914.
Sir, R . F eb ru a ry 14, 1914.
T he S h erif A b dulla h, son o f th e S h erif o f M ecca, is now sta y in g in C airo on a short v isit
and called u p on m e yesterday.
H e b egg ed me to con vey to y ou his fa th e r’ s com p lim ents, and said that affairs in the H ed ja z
w ere not g o in g on as well as could be w ished ow in g to th e recent a p p oin tm en t o f a new T urkish
Y a li w ho com b in ed civ il an d m ilita ry fu n ction s and w ho is n ot in sym pathy w ith the peop le
an d does not act harm oniously w ith his fa th er in the con d u ct o f the in tern a l affairs o f the holy
places as well as fo r the com fort and secu rity o f th e M oslem pilg rim s from all p a rts o f the w orld
fo r w hich his fa th er as S h erif has been so lon g responsible.
H e w ished m e to ask y ou w hether in case th is fr ic tio n becam e acute and an attem p t was
m ade by the T urkish G overnm ent to dism iss his fa th er from the h ered ita ry office o f S h erif o f
th e holy places, y ou w ould use y ou r g ood offices w ith the Sublim e P o rte to prev en t any such
a ttem p t. H e p o in te d out th a t his fa th e r had alw ays d on e his best to assist In d ia n M oslem
p ilg rim s am ongst w hom he had m any friends. H e sta ted v ery decid edly that in case th e
T urkish G overn m en t dism issed his fa th er th e A rab trib es o f the H ed ja z w ould fight fo r the
S h erif and a sta te o f w ar against the T urkish troop s w ould ensue. H e h op ed in such circu m ­
stances th a t th e B ritish G overnm ent w ould not allow rein forcem en ts to be sent by sea fo r the
pu rpose o f p rev en tin g th e A rab s from e x ercisin g the rig h ts w hich they have en joyed from tim e
im m em orial in th e ir ow n cou n try rou n d the h oly places.
H e w ished his rem arks to be kept v ery secret and oil no accoun t to be know n in C on stan ti­
nople, and he also asked m e w hether you w ould send his fa th er some message. I said I thought
it w ould be im p rob ab le that y ou w ou ld d o so.
I have, &c.
K IT C H E N E R .

L ord K it c h e n e r to S ir E dw ard G rey.

Cairo, F eb ru a ry 14. 1914.
F.O. 6795 6672 14 44. D- 11-35 a .m .
Tel. (X o . 7.) R 10'30 A M
C onfidential. M y despa tch X o . 22. Secret. 0
I now h ea r th a t th e difficulties b etw een th e T u rk s and th e S h erif o f \£ecca ha ve been
a m icably settled.
(D [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

F.O. 13571 4555 1 4 .4 4. .
g/ vr on. io q\
i m .,
C on sta n■tin
RopMle, D. M arch I s.
a r c h 3Q^ i g u
1914.

" ’ In iny despa tch X o . 1021 o f D ecem b er 20th last.O ) I m entioned a ru m our that som e lea d in g
A rab ch iefs con tem p la ted h old in g a congress at K ow eit or elsew here, w ith a view t o b rin g in g
pressure to b ear on the T urkish G overnm ent, w hich show ed som e signs of uneasiness at the
a ttitu d e o f th e O ttom an A rab w orld. In p a ra g ra p h eleven o f his sum m ary o f events fo r the
th ree m onths en d in g J a n u a ry 1914. the A c tin g B ritish Consul G eneral at B a g d a d reprod u ces
the sam e ru m ou r w ith th e added d eta il that a m ong those to be rep resen ted at th e Congress
w ere the G ra n d S h erif o f M ecca, Ibn Saud o f X e jd . Ibn R a shid Jebel Sham m ar, A jey m i Sheikh
o f M un tefik , and S e w id T alib o f Basrah. A lth ou g h Colonel E rskiu e goes on t o state that the
p rojected co n fe re n c e 'is u n likely to be held, the rep ort is sign ificant in view o f the d issa tisfa ction
w hich p rev ails am ong O ttom an A ra b s genera lly ; and the list of nam es g iv en is an in d ica tion ot
th e p ossib ility o f the g rea t C h iefta in s on th e A rab frin g e o f th e E m p ire sin kin g th e ir personal
differences in' ord er to en force na tion a list a sp ira tion s as against th e C entral G overnm ent, w hich
is d irected b v th e C om m ittee o f U n ion and P rog ress and w hich they still rega rd as p u rsu in g a
T u rk ifv in g policy . So fa r th ere had been little sign o f cohesion, th e G rand s h e r if h a v in g been
at open en m ity w ith Ib n Saud, fo r in stance, an d A jey m i ha vin g been u n til recen tly an avow ed
enem y o f S ti .Id T a lib ’ s. . ..
f h e G ra n d S h e rif’ s a ttitu d e b ein g o f sp ecial in terest in consequence o f his recent a p p li­
ca tion t o L o r d K itch en er, I enclose a m em orandum w hich I have had prepa red con cern in g him.
\s fo r Ibn S a u d his o ccu p a tion o f E l H assa last y ear is an eloquent dem on stra tion b oth o f his
pow er and o f his feelin g s tow ards the C entral G overnm ent. S eyyid T alib s in fluen ce in Basrah
the skill w h ich he has disp la yed in co n solid a tin g it, and the relations w hich he m a in ta in s w ith
K ow eit an d X e jib are w e lf k n o w n to H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent. I f these leaders w ere to
com bine eith e r in a co n s titu tion a l a g ita tio n fo r d ev olu tion or autonom y or in an avow edly

(») TSir L. M a llet’ s despatch (X o . 1021) D . D ecem ber 20, 1913. R . D ecem ber 29, 1913. is not
rep rod u ced as th e con ten ts are sufficiently in d ic a te d above. i.F.0. 55132 1 1 9 5 0 '1 3 /4 4 .)]
 828
sep aratist m ovem ent they cou ld u n d ou b ted ly cause m uch trouble. In this con n ection I m ay
refer to th a t p a rt o f my despatch N o. 117 o f F ebru ary 2 4th(2) last w hich deals w ith the w id er
aspects o f the A ziz A li case.
I t is still im possible to say w hat real prosp ect there m ay be of any u n ited A rab m ovem ent.
T h at the C entral G overn m en t is on the alert is perhaps in d ica ted hv the fa ct th a t en ergetie
m ilita ry valis on whom the C om m ittee can rely have been w ithin the last few m onths appoin ted
to B a g d a d , Basrah and the H ed ja z. Ibn Saud has been n e g o tia tin g term s o f subm ission to the
G overnm ent. T he G rand S h e rif’ s son, A b du lla h , w ho is a d ep u ty in the T urkish P arliam en t,
has com e on from E g y p t to C on stan tin op le by in v ita tion from them and a ccord in g to a ccoun ts
whieh I have heard, he a ppea rs to he nerv ou s as to w hat m ay a w ait him here.
I have th ou g h t it pru d en t to abstain from show ing any pa rticu la r in terest in the A rab
qu estion in m y con versation s w ith the G ra n d V iz ie r and other M in isters In view o f the suspicion
w hich it m igh t arouse, as the T urkish G overn m en t are proba b ly aw are o f th e in clin a tion o f the
A rab s to look to H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t fo r sym pathy in th eir m ovem ent and even for
ev en tu al p rotection if they are successful in a ch ievin g th eir in depen dence. I have rep orted in
m y despatch No. 117 of the 24th u ltim o (2) the la n g u a ge w hich has been held to A rab officers
in the T urkish arm y w ho have v isited H is M a je sty ’ s Em bassy and have enquired w hat w ould
be the a ttitu d e of H is M a jesty ’ s G overn m en t in certain eventualities. As I am disposed to see
in the recent ou tra g es at Basrah w hich are p rin cip a lly directed again st B ritish subjects an
a ttem p t on th e p a rt o f the A rab s to fo r ce the hand o f H is M a jesty ’s G overnm ent in the
d ire c tio n o f in terv en tion , I in form ed M r. Crow on the 17th u ltim o th a t I cou ld not recom m end
the despatch of a B ritish m an -of-w a r to the Sh a tt-el-A ra b.
T he need for ca u tion is a ppa ren t a t th e present m om ent, when th ere is evid ence o f a
con certed m ovem ent on the p a rt of the A rabs. I f these projects should m atu re and if the Arabs
are ev en tu ally successful in d e fe a tin g the O ttom an arm ies the loss of the C a lipha te w ould
proba b ly follow , when, shorn of a fu r th e r la rg e p o rtio n o f t e rr ito ry and o f the relig iou s lea d er­
ship, T urkish rule, as it ex ists tod a y , w ou ld presum ably disappear. E u rop e m igh t then be
fa ced w ith the question of a p a rtitio n of the T urkish E m p ire which m ig h t easily produ ce
com p lica tion s o f a serious nature, w hilst it is difficult to estim ate w hat m ig h t be the effects on
In d ia o f a p rolon g ed stru gg le fo r the possession o f the C aliphate.
I should im a gin e th a t in view o f the g rea t issues at stake th e present G overnm ent w ould
do all in th eir pow er to a void b rin g in g m a tters to a p o in t at the present m om ent and that
they w ill proba b ly tem porise w ith th e G ra n d S h erif a t any ra te u n til they have either div id ed
the A rab s and feel th a t they are in a p osition to face them w ith certa in ty of success.
I have, <£c.
L O U IS M A L L E T .

E nclosure.

M em oran d u m on th e p osition o f the G rand S h eriff o f M ecca.

T he position o f the G rand S h erif o f M ecca differs consid erably from th a t o f other A rab
poten ta tes in as m uch as he is alw ays in vested w ith his a u th ority by th e S u lta n ’ s firm an, and
is in close tou ch w ith the ca p ita l, w here several m em bers o f his fa m ily o rd in a rily reside. A ny
g iv en G rand S h erif m ig h t q u ite con ceiv a b ly pu t him self at the head o f an A rab m ovem ent, and,
if he w ished to do so, his alleged descent from the P rop h et, and m em bership o f the Ivoreish
trib e w ould dou btless be a v aluable a sset; b u t in ord er to g ain any w id espread in fluen ce he
w ould have to sta rt alm ost from the b egin n in g, and, in the case of the present m an, I th in k he
w ou ld have to live dow n a past in w hich, w hile w ork in g fo r his ow n agg ra n d izem en t, he has
posed v ery definitely as the rep resen ta tive of th e C entral G overnm ent. T he follow in g is a
sk etch o f his recen t h istory so far as it is know n to me.
D u rin g the last years o f the old reg im e S h erif H ussein P asha was a m em ber o f the cou n cil
o f S ta te here. T ow ard s the end of 1908 he was a p p oin ted G rand S herif in th e ord in a ry course
of succession, his predecessor A bdullah (w ho seems to have been G rand S h erif w ith ou t p ro­
ceed in g to M ecca ) h a vin g died th a t year. H e was then a bout 56 years of age. On his arrival
he crea ted a good im pression, and it was hop ed th a t he w ould not prove ex to rtio n a te and w ould
restore secu rity in the cou n try a b ou t M e~ca. In re p o rtin g his a p p oin tm en t to the F oreign
Office S ir G. L ow th er spoke fa v ou ra b ly o f him , and m en tion ed th a t some m onths b efore, at a
tim e when th ere was no prosp ect o f his b ecom in g G rand Sherif, he had gon e ou t o f his w ay to
express his frien d sh ip tow ards E n glan d . S in ce his a p p oin tm en t it ca n n ot be said th a t he has
don e a n y th in g definite to alleviate the p ecu n ia ry b urd ens o f the pilgrim s. On the oth er hand,
alth ou g h in secu rity con tin u ed to p rev a il on the roa ds in 1909, no robb eries w ere rep orted to
th e Em bassy in the th ree follow in g years un til nearly the end o f 1912, when there was a
recrud escence o f b rig a n da g e. M eanw hile the G rand S h erif was en g ag ed in con solid a tin g his
ow n pow er, and his success in d oin g so was fa cilita te d by the freq u en t ehanges o f \ alis, m ost

( 2) [S ir L. M a lle t’ s despatch (N o. 117) D. F eb ru a ry 24, 1914, R . M arch 2, 1914, is not

rep rod u ced as the con ten ts are sufficiently in d ica ted above. (F .O . 9 0 3 3 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .)]
 829
o f the uom iuees to that post ha vin g been m en o f little a ccoun t. H e and his sons took a
con sid erable share in m ilita ry operation s, w hich though u nd ertaken in the nam e of the
G overnm ent, con trib u ted to his own aggra n d izem en t. Thus, in 1910, he con d u cted an
ex p ed ition a ga in st the X e jd ru ler Ibu Sa^.d, w hich ended in a p a p er success fo r the T urkish
G overnm ent, th ou g h the prom ises m ade b y Ibn Saud w ere never kept and ex trem ely bad
relation s subsisted between him and th e G rand S h erif th rou g h ou t the follow in g year. In 1911
again he (th e Gran . S h erif) and his sons ca m p a ig n ed in A sir and in Ju ly he actu a lly succeeded
in relievi lg Ebha, w hich had been besieged by the follow ers of Idris fo r m any m onths.
B y 1912 th e position as rep orted b y H is M a jesty ’ s late Consul was that th e im p roved
p ilg rim a g e con d ition s w hich follow ed th e C on stitu tion had been superseded by a renew ed p olicy
o f ex to rtio n on the pa rt o f the G rand S herif, an d that his a u th ority had grow n vastlv, while
th a t o f the Mali had sunk to n othing. W hen in the sum m er o f that year three In d ia n s were
fou n d m u rd ered in the M ed in a d istrict, th e Consul was assured that the g u ilty p a rties w ere
em issaries of the G ra n d .Sherif. who had been ord ered by the G overnm ent to w ithd ra w his son
and his B ed ou in s front Asir, and w ho, so the in form a n t said, was delib era tely seek ing to create
d istu rba n ce in the M ed ina d istrict so as to cou v in ce th e G overnm ent o f the necessity o f
b rin g in g it also und er his au th ority . H ow ev er that m ay be there was certa iu ly a
recrud escence of b rig a n d a g e, as m entioned above, tow ards the end o f 1912.
W h ile th e G rand S ’. ?rif has stood fo r the a u th ority o f the T urkish G overnm ent, as above
described, v is-a-vis ch iefs lik e Ibn Saud and Id ris, he has not been well disposed tow ards the
C om m ittee o f U n ion and P rogress. H is ow n sou S h erif A bdullah sat fo r M ecca in the first
P a rlia m en t, an d in th e packed C om m ittee P arliam en t o f 1912 he was able to pu t in one sou
fo r M ecca and th e oth er. F aizal, fo r Jeddah. T h ey pla yed no prom inent pa rt in P a rlia m en ta ry
life here, b u t it is sign ifica nt that in 1911, som e m onths b efore th e second election , the
C om m ittee Clubs in M ecca and J ed d a h “ died a n a tu ra l d ea th .” It is also in terestin g to nete
that the tw o best know n Sherits resid ent in C onstan tin ople. Ali H a id a r and J a fe r, are close
allies o f the C om m ittee, the form er h a vin g been fo r a tim e M in ister of E v k a f and b ein g now
V ice-P res id en t o f the Senate, w hile J a fe r tou ri d Syria in the C om m ittee in terest at th e tim e
o f the 1912 elections. N ow these brothers are rep orted to be b itterly hostile to th e present
G rand S h erif. A li H a id a r is the head o f th e dispossessed M ota llib bra nch o f th e Sherifian
fa m ily and is said to cherish the a m bition of b ecom in g G rand S h erif him self.
U n der all these circu m stan ces it is easy to u n d ersta n d how an xiou sly H ussein Pasha m ust
have v iew ed the advent o f a y ou n g and possibly en erg etic V ali. T his doubtless ex p lain s his
sen d in g A b d u lla h B ey to L ord K itch en er. As fo r the subsequent rep ort o f an a m icable settle­
m ent o f his differen ces w ith the T urks, it is difficult to form an op in ion as to the sin cerity o f
eith er side. It is con ceiv a ble th a t statesm en h ere m ay have th ou g h t it best not t o seek for
trou b le aud th e G rand S h erif m ay not th in k his position sufficiently m enaced to m ake it w orth
his w hile t o risk ev ery th in g on open defiance o f the C entral G overnm ent. On th e oth er hand
C on stan tin ople m ay feel that his agg ra u d izem en t has gon e too fa r, and the G rand Sh erif m ay
th in k th a t th e ex isten ce o f a rival, fr ie n d ly to th e C om m ittee and a lread y a ca n d id a te fo r the
post, in creases very con sid era bly the da n g er o f his position. In that case the recon ciliation
w ou ld be m erely a form o f tem p orisin g aud th e G rand Sh erif m ight still be tem p ted to
associate him self w ith A rab a dventures. E v id en tly he has no desire to p r e cip ita te m a tters fo r
his son A b du lla h has just com e front E g y p t to C on stan tin op le at the in vitation o f the Central
G overnm eut, a ccom p an ied by the G rand S h e rif's b roth er, S h erif N assir, also a S enator, who,
I understa n d, w ent to E g y p t to fetch him. S ir W . G arstin has to ld Y ou r E x cellen cy in w hat
a nervous fra m e o f m in d the y o u n g m an was as to his recep tion here.

M IN U T E S .

A v ery d e lica te situ ation . I have alw ays felt that the policy we are p u rsu in g tow ards
Ib n Saud is fr a u g h t w ith g ra v e da n g er to th e in te g r ity o f T urkey, and I was alw ays personally
stron gly op p osed to the in terview s w hich took pla ce betw een him and ou r officials.
Q u [e r y ] teleg rap h to S ir L. M allet.

“ Y o u r E x cellen cy 's despatches Nos. 193(3) and 20o.(4)

“ I fu lly a p p re cia te the delicacy o f th e situ ation , and th e ob jection s to pressin g ou r
m ed ia tion a bou t B in [s ic : I b n ] Saud. On th e oth er hand, if th e O ttom an G overnm ent do
not reach an a m icable settlem ent shortly by d irect n eg otia tion , w hich seems v ery un certain ,
it m ay be prefera b le b oth to them and to us that our m ediation should be offered again
rath er th a n th a t th ere should be a genera l ou tb rea k o f hostilities w ith possible consequences
in d ica te d in pen u ltim a te pa ra g ra p h o f y o u r E x ce lle n c y ’ s despatch No. 193.(3)

(3) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

(4) [S ir L. M a lle t’ s despatch (N o. 205') D . M a rch 25, 1914, R . M arch 30, 1914, is not rep ro­
d u c e d ; it re p orted a con v ersation w ith T alaa t B ey on the general A rab question. (F.O . 13883/
45SS 1 4 /4 4 .)]
 880
“ I f you do offer m ed iation y ou should m ake an em p h a tic sta tem ent in w ritin g to the
effect th a t H is M a je sty ’ s G overnm ent adhere strictly to th e trea ty o f J u ly 29, 1913,(5) and
have no in ten tion w hatever of u n d erm in in g O ttom an a u th o rity .”

C op y to I [n d ia ] 0 [ffic e ].
A. P.
M arch 31, 1914
E. A. C.
M a rch 31
F. D. A.
A. N.
(5) [v. supra, pp. 183-98, No. 124.]

L ord K itc h e n e r to S ir E dw ard Grey.

Cairo, M arch 21, 1914.
F.O. 1 2 6 5 2 /6 6 7 2 /1 4 /4 4 . D. 2-30 p . m .
Tel. (N o. 20.) R . 2 p .m .
S ecret. A m essenger from the S h eriff o f M ecca to the K h ed iv e rep orts th a t the Sheriff
and V a li have fallen ou t ahou t the ex ten sion o f the H e d ja z railw ay and T a l i’ s high-handed
a ctio n ( ? g ro u p om itted ) Arahs. M essenger says th a t th e Arahs are all w ith the S h erif and
w ill n ot ( ? ) to le r a te T a li whose recall th ey have dem anded. H e rep orts th e roa d from J edda h
to M ecca closed hy Arahs.
S en t to C onstantinople.

M IN U T E S .

T he a m icable settlem ent has n ot lasted long.

I f th e T urkish G overn m en t now a ttem p t to rem ove th e Sherif, the qu estion w hether H is
M a je sty ’ s G overn m en t can profitahly su p p o rt him m ay arise. P lease see L ord K itc h e n e r’ s
despa tch N o. 22 (6672).(1)
Q [u c r ]y . A w a it fu rth er in fo rm a tio n from C a iro or C on stan tin ople hefore ex pressin g any
o p in io n to the In d ia Office.
C. N.
M a rch 21.
B u t send them a copy.
E. A. C.
M a rch 21.
A. N.
E. G.
(*) [v . supra, p. 827.]

L ord K it c h e n e r to S ir E dw a rd G rey.
F.O. 1 5 8 8 3 /4 5 8 8 /1 4 /4 4 . '
(N o. 58.) C onfidential. Cairo, D . A p ril 4, 1914.
Sir, R . A p ril 11, 1914.
In the enclosure to S ir L ou is M a lle t’ s despatch No. 1 9 3 0 ) ° f th e 18th ultim o o f which
H is E x cellen cy forw a rd ed me a cop y , I n otice it is sta ted th a t the S h erif of M ecca sent his son,
A b du lla h Bey, to me. T his does not, how ever, q u ite a ccu rately rep resen t w hat took place, as
A bdu lla h B ey was actu a lly on a v isit to th e K h ed iv e and only called on m e q u ite unofficially,
and som e tim e a fter his a rriv a l in C a iro, w hen he spoke to me as re p o rte d in m y despatch
N o. 22 S e cre t,(2) o f th e 6th o f F eb ru a ry last. Y ou w ill rcm em her th a t he received no sort of
en cou ra gem en t from me.
I q u ite a gree w ith S ir L ou is M a llet in th in k in g th a t g re a t ca re w ill have to he taken in
d ea lin g w ith the A rah q uestion, so as n ot to w ou n d T urkish su scep tibilities and arouse th eir
suspicions. A t the sam e tim e we ca n n ot afford to lose sigh t o f the in terests w hich G rea t B rita in
m ust alw ays ta k e in th e H o ly P la ces, ow in g to the annual p ilg rim a ge w hich is a tten d ed hy
thousa nds of In d ia n M oslem s and also b y m any E g y p tia n s. The w elfare an d in deed safety of
these pilg rim s is in tim a tely b ou n d up w ith the m ain ten a n ce o f ord er in the d istricts in question
an d of a g ood relation sh ip hetw een T u rk s and A rahs w hose an im osity has un d ou bted ly heen
roused hy the recen t T urkish p olicy o f ce n tra liza tion a d op ted d u rin g the last few years and
m ore esp ecially hy the proposal to push forw a rd ra ilw ay com m u n ica tion s w hich w ould cause
g rea t p ecu n ia ry loss to the A rabs w ho live on th eir cam el hire.

C ) [v. supra, pp. 8 2 7 -8 .]

(2) [v. supra, p. 827.]
 831
I take th is o p p o rtu n ity of sa y in g th a t the suspicion s en terta in ed b y the G rand V iz ie r w ith
reg a rd to my in terest in the case o f A ziz B ey el M asri are q u ite ground less (see S ir L ou is
M a lle t’ s T eleg ra m No. 191 o f M a rch 2 7th (3) ). E g y p tia n p u b lic op in ion has been g en u in ely and
sincerely a roused b y th e arrest and tria l o f this officer, and so fa r from ta k in g the in itia tiv e in
p ressing the m a tte r at C on stan tin ople I have had som e difficulty in ca lm in g the resentm ent
caused by th e p roceed in g s o f the T urkish G overnm ent. N oth in g is know n here o f his alleged
in trig u es w ith the A rab leaders in M esopotam ia and his arrest is g en era lly a ttrib u ted to the
personal a n im osity a n d jealousy o f E n v er Pasha.
I have, &c.
K IT C H E N E R .

(3) [v. in fra , p. 835.]

L ord K it c h e n e r to S ir IT'. T yrrell.

G rey M SS., V ol. 9.
M y d ear T yrrell, B ritish A g e n cy . Cairo, A p ril 26, 1914.
I d o not th in k it necessary to w rite a despatch a bout th e S h erif Abdullah h a v in g passed
throu gh here on his way hack from C on stan tin op le t o the H ed ja z. as I d id not see him. H e
sent fo r S torrs w ho und er my in stru ction s to ld h im th e Arabs o f the H ed ja z cou ld ex p ect no
en cou ra gem en t from us and th a t ou r only in terest in A rabia was the safety and com fort of
In d ia n pilgrim s. I have w ritten p riv a tely t o M a llet a bout w hat passed. The Sh erif seem ed to
be d isa p p oin ted w ith the result o f his v isit t o C on stan tin ople and w ith th e d eterm in a tion o f the
T urkish G o v [e rn m e n ]t to push the railw ay on to M ecca which he saw w ould m ean the econ om ic
dea th o f th e ca m el-ow n in g p op u la tion of A rabia.
It w ill be in terestin g to set d evelopm ents as the Arabs seem t o be m uch ex cited.
Y ou rs v erv trulv,
K IT C H E N E R .

[E D . X O T E .— R eferen ces are m ade in S ir G eorge A rth u r, L ife o f K itc h e n e r , (1920),

V ol. I l l , p. 153, to an im p orta n t Sheikh, w ho is stated to have sent a message, on T u rk ey ’ s
en try in to th e w ar, cou ch ed in these term s : “ F o llo w in g fo r L ord K itch en er. R em em ber our
con v ersation at . . . . th e d a y has com e.” S ir G eorg e A rth u r in form s the E d itors th a t he can
th row no lig h t on this in cid en t and S ir R o n a ld ^t irrs, when he was consulted, w as equally
at a loss. M r. G. A n ton iu s th in ks th a t th ere was an in terview betw een S a yy id T alib al N akib
o f B asra and L o rd K itc h e n e r at C a iro in 1913 or possibly in 1912, but the E d itors have fou n d
no ev id en ce re la tin g thereto. S ir R on a ld S torrs genera lly confirm s th e a ccoun t g iven in the
a bove docu m en ts as to th e n eg otia tion s w ith A b d u lla h .]

(B ) E m ir A b d u lla h ’ s a ccou n t o f his con v ersa tion s with L ord K itc h e n e r , tra n sm itted w ith notes
by M r. G. A n ton iu s.

[E D . X O T E .— T he E d itors are here able t o rep rod u ce, th rou g h the kindness o f M r. G.
A ntonius, on the a u th ority of th e E m ir A b du lla h , H is H ig h n ess’ s accou n t o f his conversation s
w ith L o rd K itch en er. Som e notes have been a dded by M r. G. A nton iu s, based on A rab
in form a tion .]

Jerusalem , M a y 1. 1936.
In th e cou rse of m y researches in to th e o rig in s and developm ent o f the A ra b N a tion al
M ovem en t, I had occasion to consult H is H ig h n ess the E m ir A bdullah, R u ler o f T ra n sjorda n ,
and was p riv ileg ed to draw up on his u n riv alled k now ledge o f certain phases o f its history.
T he follow in g a ccou n t o f H is H ig h n ess's relation s w ith the late L ord K itc h e n e r in the years
im m ed iately p r e ce d in g th e W a r. when the E m ir was d ep u ty fo r M ecca in the O ttom an Cham ber,
a nd K itc h e n e r H is B r ita n n ic M a jesty ’ s A g en t an d C onsul-G eneral in C airo, was draw n up by
m e, at th e request of the E d itors o f B ritish D ocu m en ts on the O rigin s o f the ITar, from notes
ta ken at my num erous conversations w ith the E m ir. I have H is H ighness's a u th ority to state
th a t this a ccou n t is a fa ir sum m ary o f his recollection o f the fa cts and th a t it is pu blished w ith
his perm ission : —

“ M y a cq u a in ta n ce w ith L ord K itc h e n e r b egan in the sp rin g o f 1912 in C a iro w hen,

b ein g on m y w ay back from C on stan tin ople t o M ecca , I stayed at A b d in P a la ce as the guest
o f th e K h ed iv e. A ccom p a n ied by M r. (now S ir R on a ld ) S torrs, his O riental S ecretary,
 832
K itc h e n e r p a id me a v isit at the P a la ce, w hich I returned tw o days la ter at the B ritish
A g en cy . T he con v ersation we had d u rin g his visit to me had no sp ecial p olitica l sign i­
ficance, K itc h e n e r ’ s m ain co n tr ib u tio n b ein g th a t the B ritish G overn m en t had n oticed and
w ere g ra tified to know th a t the arra n gem en ts m ade in the H eja z fo r the sa fety and com fort
o f the p ilgrim s had im p rov ed since my fa th er had assum ed the d ig n ity o f S h erif o f M ecca.
On the occasion o f my v isit to him , K itc h e n e r disp la yed a m arked in terest in H eja z affairs
and qu estion ed me as to the form of its a d m in istration , the relation s betw een Y a li and
S h erif, and the degree to w hich the T urkish officials tried to exercise con trol in purely
relig iou s m atters. I did not feel at lib erty to answ er his p en etra tin g questions as fu lly as
I should have liked , y et tried to g iv e him a genera l id ea of ou r fears and anxieties. I had
lik ed him and been g rea tly im pressed w ith the pow er o f his person a lity, and we pa rted 011
v ery cord ia l term s. I t was tw o years b efore I was to see him again.
“ E a rly in 1914, I fou n d m yself in C a iro once m ore, and a ga in sta y in g w ith the
K h edive. One day, w hile I was h a v in g an audien ce o f H is H ighness, L ord K itch en er was
a nnounced . I g reeted him and took my leave. L ater in the m orn in g , when his own
a udien ce was over, K itc h e n e r paid me a visit in my a partm ents. I retu rn ed his call tw o
days later. T his tim e, the con v ersation b ore 011 p olitica l topics. In the tw o years that had
elapsed, I had k ep t up friend ly relation s w ith Storrs and becom e in fected w ith his own
enthusiasm fo r his chief. M oreover, th in gs had com e to such a pass betw een the P orte
and the Sherif, and in deed betw een T urks and A rabs in g eneral, th a t a con flict seemed
in evitab le. I decid ed to speak open ly to K itch en er.
“ A n op en in g was afforded me by K itc h e n e r rem a rk in g th a t he had heard o f the recent
stren gth en in g o f the T urkish garrison in the H eja z. I seized the o p p o rtu n ity to describe
to him , w ith g re a te r freedom than on the previous occasion, th e rea lities o f the situ ation
in the H eja z, the d elicacy o f the S h e r if’ s position , the causes o f the disa ffection between
T u rks and A rabs, and the aim s o f the A rab m ovem ent as a w hole. I ex p lain ed that
a lthough the im m ed ia te causes o f th e trou b le lay in the a ttem p ts m ade by the T u rks to
cu r ta il the p riv ileg es of the S h erifa te and to coerce the pop u la tion o f the H eja z in to
a cce p tin g a new and unsu ita ble b u rea u cra tic system , yet our problem was only p a rt o f the
m ain A rab problem and was bound up w ith th a t o f the fu tu re o f the oth er A rab provin ces
o f the O ttom an E m p ire. I expressed the view th a t unless the T urks w ere to abandon th eir
d ra g oon in g m ethods the situ ation in the H eja z m igh t ta ke a very serious turn.
“ K itc h e n e r a p p ea red to listen ca refu lly to my statem ent and asked me several
questions in elu cid a tion o f it. On m y rem a rk in g th a t the Sh erif o f M ecca was, in the last
analysis, a nom in ee o f th e P o rte and thus liable to a rb itra ry dism issal, K itch en er said that,
w h atev er th e ir pow ers in th eory, in p r a ctice the T urks w ould be relu cta n t to depose the
S herif. W h en I asked him to tell m e w hether, in the event o f a ru p tu re , th e Sh erif could
cou n t u p on any su p p ort from G rea t B rita in , K itc h e n e r rep lied n egatively, on the plea that
B ritish relation s w ith T u rk ey w ere frien d ly and that, in any case, the disp ute was an
in tern a l m a tter in w hich it w ould n ot be p rop er fo r a foreig n P ow er to in tervene. I could
n ot refra in from p o in tin g ou t th a t those fr ie n d ly relations had not preven ted G reat B rita in
from in terv en in g in the disp u te b etw een T u rk ey and the Sheikh o f K u w a it, which was
likew ise an in tern a l m atter. K itc h e n e r laughed and rose to dep art. As he was lea vin g,
he said th a t he w ould m ake a p o in t o f re p o rtin g ou r con versation to his G overnm ent.
“ T h at was m y last in terv iew w ith him . A b ou t tw o m onths later, I was in C airo
a ga in , on m y w ay back from C onstan tin ople. I saw M r. Storrs, w ith whom I had a lon g
a n d cord ial con v ersation , b u t not K itc h e n e r .”

I n ord er to a scertain the dates o f those in terview s, I have had recourse to the files of
con tem p ora ry new spapers. In its issue o f F ebru ary 6, 1914, at M u q a tta m (C airo) records that
the K h e d iv e had, on the p reced in g day, received the E m ir A bdullah and subsequently L ord
K itc h e n e r in a u dience at A b d in P alace. In its issue o f F ebru ary 9, 1914, the same paper
relates th a t, tw o davs ea rlier, L ord K itc h e n e r had pa id a visit to the E m ir Abdullah.
G. A N T O X IF S .

V.

A z iz B e y an d th e A ra b M o v em en t, 1914■

,[E I ). N O T E .— In M arch 1914, the tria l took place in C on stan tin ople o f C olonel A ziz-el-
M a sri, an A ra b officer of the T urkish A rm y. The ostensible charges on w hich he was tried were
con n ected w ith his alleged m isd irection o f the ca m p a ig n in C y renaica, b u t it has been supposed
th a t the real reason o f his arrest and t ria l was th a t he was know n (though actua l evid ence was
la ck in g ) to have been the fo u n d e r and g u id in g s p irit o f a secret p o litica l society whose
m em bership was confined to A rab officers o f the T urkish A rm y. H is tria l evoked a grea t deal
o f in terest and caused effervescence in E g y p t and Syria. As w ill be seen the British
A m b assa dor in C on stan tin ople (S ir L. M a llet) in terv en ed w ith the P o rte in fa v ou r o f Aziz.
T he pa rd on w hich was gra n ted to A ziz, a fte r death sentence had been passed, was hailed w ith
d elig h t th rou g h ou t the A rab provinces. T here Were m any loose statem ents on the subject in
the A rab press at the tim e and since th a t date, an d the E d itors thin k it best th erefore to
rep rod u ce h ere all th a t they have been able t o find of im p orta n ce on th e su b ject.]

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

C on stan tin ople, F eb ru a ry 21, 1914.

F.O. 7 9 6 3 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . D . 3-45 p . m .
Tel. (N o. 117.) V ery Confidential. R . 6 1 5 p .m .
A ziz B ey, an ex-officer o f E g y p tia n orig in w ho enjqys grea t con sid era tion in v arious
coun tries, was arrested here a bout tw elve days ago. H e has in fluen tial con n exions in E g y p t, and
at L o rd K it c h e n e r ’ s request I m ade frien d ly unofficial represen ta tion s to G rand V izier. M a tter
is extrem ely d elica te fo r reasons w hich I am re p o rtin g fu lly by bag. I d o n ot p ropose to ta ke
any fu r th e r a ction a t present, b u t I th in k it well th a t y ou should be aw are o f the m atter.

M IN U T E S .

S ir L. M a llet a p p a ren tly th in ks we m ay hear o f this from another source. A w a it rep ort.
T his is n ot A ziz B ey w ho was M ilita ry A tta ch e in South A fric a and elsewhere and later
C hief o f P olice in C onstan tin ople. H e was not o f E g v p tia n orig in .
C. R .
F e b [r u a r y ] 23.

H e is the m an w ho was E n v e r’ s second in T rip oli and earned m uch rep u ta tion there.

G. R . C.
23.ii.14.
E. A. C.
F e b r u a r y ] 23.
A. N.
E. G

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard O r e i/.(‘ )

F.O . 9 0 3 3 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .
(N o 1 1 7 ) C on stan tin ople, D . F eb ru a ry 24, 1914.
g ir>‘ R . M arch 2, 1914.
’ In m y teleg ram N o. 117 o f th e 21st in sta n t(2) I briefly rep orted th e arrest h ere a cou p le
o f days a go o f A ziz A li Bey, w hich has a ttr a c te d m uch a tten tion in E g y p t and elsew here. B orn
in E g y p t abou t th ir ty -fo u r years ago, A ziz B ey en tered the Turkish army^ in the usual way,
and served in M a ced on ia un d er the H a m id ia n regim e. A fte r the C on stitu tion he accom p an ied
I zzet P asha t o the Yem en, and is said t o have ha d a la rge p a rt in the n eg otia tion s w ith the
Im am Y ahya fo r the settlem ent o f th a t region. D u rin g the Ita lia n w ar he took a lea d in g p a rt
in org a n isin g resistance to th e Ita lia n s in B en gh a zi, and was one o f those w ho con tin u ed the
stru gg le a fte r th e T rea ty of L ausanne. H e retu rn ed to C onstantinople some m onths ago, b u t
was a lready in disfa v ou r in h igh places, and his refusal o f a post at A n g ora even tu ally led to
his resig n in g his com m ission. I t is alleged by A ziz A li’ s frien d s th a t personal dislike on the
p a rt o f E n v er P asha, w ho is said t o have pla yed a m ore con spicuous b u t in rea lity less
d istin gu ish ed p a rt in the Ita lia n W a r, has had a g ood deal to d o w ith his a r r e s t; b u t it
derives its ch ie f im p orta n ce from the effectiveness o f his own person a lity and the p osition
w hich he a ppea rs t o hold in the esteem of A rabs over a w id e area. Im m ediately a fte r his
a rrest I was a pproa ch ed from a v a riety o f sources w ith requests fo r in terv en tion and as one
o f these cam e from the G overn or o f Cairo, w ho is A ziz B e y ’ s broth er-in -la w , th rou g h L ord
K itch en er, I addressed frien d ly an d unofficial en q u iries t o both the M in ister o f th e In terior
and the G rand V izier. .
T he G ra n d V iz ie r g av e me t o und ersta nd th a t A ziz All Bey s arrest was du e t o his a ttitu d e
tow ards the G overn m en t since his retu rn to C onstan tin ople, and it is clear from w hat 1 have
since learn ed from oth er sources th a t th e m a tter is really a p olitica l one, fo r th ere is no d ou bt
that A ziz Ali Bey has been one o f the lea d in g sp irits in a g rou p o f y ou n g A rabs, officers and
others w ho a re dissatisfied w ith the present T urkish G overnm ent. It is difficult to g au g e the
im p orta n ce o f this g rou p , b u t it has com e to my know ledge th a t som e at least o f them are
id entified w ith m ore or less definite schem es fo r o rg a n isin g a m ovem ent which w ou ld aim at
releasin g th e w hole region from M osul to the P ersian G u lf from T urkish dom in a tion . They
claim to have established com m u n ica tion s w ith v ariou s local nota bilities, in clu d in g th e b heikh
o f K ow eit, w hose sym pathy they say th ey have secured, and one o f th eir plans w ou ld appea r to
be to atta ch the tra ct o f cou n try in w hich they are in terested to the feheikh s dom inions. They

(*) [A cop y o f this despatch was sent to the India Office.]

( 2) [a. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
[109U0] H
 831
p rofess to be in a position to orga nise an in su rrection ary m ovem ent on such a scale as w ould
enable them to cop e w ith the stron g repressive m easures w hich the Turkish G overnm ent w ould,
they realise, ta ke to repress it.
Schem es o f this k in d are o f course not new, and I have no reason to believe th a t the
o rig in a to rs o f this one are p ow erfu l o r com p eten t. As, how ever, a definite rôle is a ttrib u ted to
the Sheikh of K o w eit, and in view o f the unrest w hich u n d ou bted ly prev ails at Basra, I th in k
it m y d u ty to b rin g it to y o u r notice. I f the plan o f cre a tin g an in su rrection in M esopota m ia
should take shape, one o f the aim s of its p rom oters w ould be to com p el B ritish in terv en tion .
I ha ve caused it to be know n to som e of the persons con cern ed th a t H is M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent
w ou ld g iv e no cou n ten an ce to any such schem es and have no in ten tion o f p u rsu in g a policy of
ad v en tu re, w hich could only com p rom ise serious B ritish econ om ic in terests in M esopotam ia.
In the m eanw hile, th e fa ct th a t A ziz A li’ s frien d s are m ix ed up in such projects, o f which
the T urkish G overnm ent have dou btless at least an in klin g, m akes it a very delicate m a tter
fo r m e to in terv en e fu rth er on his b eh alf ; and I have told L ord K itc h e n e r th a t I do not propose
to m ake any fu rth er rep resen ta tion s unless his life should a p p ea r to be in definite danger.
I enclose fo r y o u r in form a tion cop ies of the telegram s w hich have passed betw een his L ord sh ip
and m yself on the su b ject.(3)
I have, &c.
L O U IS M A L L E T .

P .S .— Sin ce w ritin g the above it has com e to m y k now ledge th a t A ziz Ali has been m ore
s trictly confined, and th a t there is some reason to fea r th a t his life may be in danger. I have
th erefore m en tion ed the m a tter a ga in to T a la a t Bey, and have the hon ou r to enclose a fu rth er
teleg ram w hich I am to-d ay addressing on th e sub ject to L ord K itc h e n e r.(3)
L. M .
F eb ru a ry 25, 1914.

( 3) [S ir L. M a llet enclosed cop ies o f a con sid erable corresp on den ce he h a d had w ith L ord
K itc h e n e r on this subject since F eb ru a ry 12, 1914; not rep rod u ced as the m a tter is sufficiently
in d ic a te d above. (F .O . 9 0 3 3 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .)] '

S ir E dw ard G rey to S ir L. M allet.

F.O . 9 0 3 3 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .
(N o. 135.)
S ir, F o reig n Office, M arch 16, 1914.
I have received y o u r E x c e [lle n c ]y ’ s despatch N o. 117 c o n f[id e n t ia ]l o f the 24 u l t [ im ] o (1)
r e l[a t in g ] to the arrest and im p rison m en t o f A ziz A li Bev. I approv e y o u r a ction as therein
rep orted , and I agree th a t the m a tter does n ot seem to ca ll fo r y ou r E x c e [lle n c ]y ’ s fu rth er
in terv en tion , unless, in y o u r op in ion , it should be occasion ed oil h u m a n ita rian grounds.
I am, &c.
[E . G R E Y .]
0 ) [r . im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

M erch a n ts of Cairo to S ir E dw ard G rey.

F.O. 1 0 4 4 4 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . Cairo, D . M arch 8, 1914.
Tel. ' R . M arch 9, 1914.
In the nam e o f h u m a n ity W e the u n d ersign ed beseech y ou r k in d in te r v e rtio n in the affair
o f A z iz B ey Elinasri w ho has been ly in g in prison at C on stan tin ople fo r a m onth and who is
com p letely unaw are o f th e cause o f his arrest. W e a ppeal to y ou to press fo r his fa ir trial or
release and in m a k in g th is appeal we express the sentim ents o f the en tire E g y p tia n nation.
P ro v o st o f C a iro M erch a n ts A bdelk h a lek M a dk ou r P ach a H assan R a d ou a n P ach a Sin ot
Bey H a n n a D ep u te N a ssif W issa B ey S aw iris M ikhail Bey A v o ca t M a n sou r C hedid Bey
D o cte u r S aad E lkh a dev A b d elm ag id Elreinali N ég ocia n t M ahm oud E lrem a li N ég ocia n t.

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.O )

F.O . 1 0 6 9 7 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . C on stan tin ople, D. M a rch 9, 1914, 9-40 p . m .

Tel. (N o. 153.) Confidential. R . M arch 10, 11-50 a . m .
M y despatch N o. 117.(2)
I m en tion ed again to-d a y to the G rand V iz ie r unofficially the case of A ziz Ali. The G rand
V izier told me in confidence th a t this Officer w as suspected o f ha vin g been in secret corres­
pon den ce w ith the K h ed iv e w ho had been en g ag ed in in trig u es w ith Ita lia n s at the tim e o f the
M a riu t railw ay affair. I was g rea tly su rprised a t this in form a tion which I said was q u ite new
to me and did not seem to be b orne ou t by Ita lia n sa tisfa ction a t his im prisonm ent. H is

O [T h is teleg ram was sent to C a iro.]

(2) [ v. supra, pp. 833 -4 .]
 885

H ighness assured me th a t his tria l, w hich was im m inent, w ould prove the tru th o f their
suspicion s and that the Italia n s w ere m erely p la y in g a com edy.
I said th a t, even if this w ere true, it w ou ld be b etter to let the man go back to C a iro under
guaran tees from the G overn or that he w ill not be allow ed to in tr ig u e w ith the A rab s because
the case was e x c it in g so m uch in terest and the “ T im es ” had published an a rticle on the subject
w hich in m y op in io n was ill-ju d g ed and u n called for but w hich m ight leave an u np leasant
im pression.
I said th a t I was sp eak in g q u ite unofficially and w ithout in stru ction s from you , as H is
M a jesty ’ s G overnm ent w ould net in te rfe re in such a m atter.
I do not p ropose to do a n yth in g fu rth er because there is some (g ro u p om itted ) th a t the
man was en g a g ed ill in trig u es w ith the Arabs, because, if the story o f in trig u es w ith Italia n s
is fou n d to be baseless, th e Ita lia n G overnm ent w ould have g ood g rou n d fo r resen tin g our
activ e in terv en tion to ob tain the release o f an Officer o f E g y p tia n o rig in w ho fou g h t again st
them in T rip oli a fte r peace was con clu d ed and because a lien ation o f E g y p tia n sy m pathies from
T u rkey w ould uot seem to be disa dva n tageou s fo r us.
Confidential. I am in form ed on g ood a u th ority that trial w ill ta k e place im m ed iately and
that, if fo u n d g u ilty , he w ill be p a rd on ed and set at liberty.

Sir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

C on stan tin ople, M areh 26. 1914.

F.O. 13434 796 3/1 4 44. D. 12-50 p . m .
Tel ( X o. 1S9.) R . 2-30 p . m .
M y t e lfe g r a m ] X'o. 153 o f M a r [c h ] 9 .(’ ) F ollow in g sent to L o rd K itch en er.
“ It is rep orted th a t A ziz A li B ey has been condem ned to death, but I have reason to
believe th a t he will be pard oned.
C onfidential. I shall speak to G rand V iz ie r to-d ay , but I w ould ra ther th a t this was
not m en tion ed ”

M IN U T E .

A t a m om ent w hen th e T urkish g o v [e r n m e n ]t are asking fo r the pa rd on o f th e Turkish

officer(2) w ho avow ed ly has en g a g ed in e n g in eerin g a rebellion in A lbania, it w ould be
singula rlv in a p p ro p ria te fo r them to insist ou ca rr y in g out this death sentence.
' E. A. C.
M [ a r ]c h 26.
A. X
E. G.
0 ) [ v. im m ediately preced in g d ocu m en t.]
(2) [B e k ir B ey .]

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G re y .(>)

C on sta n tin op le, M arch 27, 1914.
F.O. 13601/7963 14 -44 D - 210 p u -
Tel. (X o . 191.) R - 4 40 PM
M v t e lfe g r a m ] X’ o. 189 o f M a r [c h ] 26. ,2)
On h ea rin g rep ort that A ziz A li had been cond em ned to death, I spoke v ery seriously to
G rand V izie r , whom I m et last n igh t at a party, o f proba b le effect on op in ion in E n g la n d and
E g y p t, if sentence w ere ca rried out. G rand V iz ie r was stiffer than on previous occasion, seemed
to be suspiciou s o f L o rd K itc h e n e r ’ s in terest in the case, aud m ade light o f E g y p tia n pu blic
opin ion , w hich, he said, had been m a n u fa ctu red and m eant v ery little.
I f A ziz w ere to be lib era ted, th ere w ould be no g u a ran tee that he w ould not in tr ig u e w ith
A r a b s ; u n d erta k in g on the p a rt o f E g y p tia n G overnm ent or o f G overnor o f C airo w ould be
worthless. B ritish gu a ra n tee w ou ld be a differen t m atter.
I said th a t if he m ade a request o f this na ture, I w ould consider w hether I w ou ld recom ­
m end you to com p ly, but that it seem ed an unusual th in g fo r one G overnm ent to ask gu aran tee
from a n other in reg a rd to one o f th eir own subjects.
I th in k th a t v isit o f S h ereef o f M ecca 's son to C airo and L ondon n eg otia tion s about
Ibn Soud are ca u sin g su spicion o f our good fa ith iu reg a rd to A rab m ovem ent, and th a t g reat
pru den ce is necessary, especially w ith reg a rd to the la tter question.

(i) [T h is teleg ram was sent to C airo. C opies w ere sent to the In d ia Office ; to S ir A. H irtzel
on M arch 30.]
t2; [i>. im m ed ia tely p reced in g d ocu m en t.]
[10900] 3 H 2
 83G
Sir L. M allet to Sir Edward Grey
C on sta n tin op le, A p ril 1, 1914
F .O 1 4 4 8 6 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . D. 8-15 a .m .
T el (N o. 209.) C onfidential. R . 10 p . m .
M y telegram No. 191 o f M a r [c h ] 27.( x) I spoke to M in ister o f I n te rio r a ga in last n igh t
a bou t A ziz Ali. H e says th a t he w ill be pardoned.

( x) [r . im m ed ia tely preced in g d ocu m en t.]

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

F.O. 1 5 5 2 0 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . C on sta n tin op le, D. A p ril 7, 1914, 11-30 p .m .

Tel. (N o. 225.) R . A p ril 8, 8 a . m .
F o llo w in g sent to C a iro to-d a y : —

“ (P riv a te .) Y o u r teleg ram o f 6th A p ril. I have no con firm ation o f A ziz A li’ s
con d em n a tion . I have recen tly m ade fu rth er unofficial rep resen tations. (R ep ea ted to
F o re ig n Office.) ”

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G re y .(l)

F.O . 1 6 7 6 8 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .
(N o. 249.) C on sta n tin op le, D . A p ril 12, 1914.
Sir, R . A p ril 17, 1914.
A con n ection by m a rriag e o f A z iz A li, D r. K h ad em B ey by nam e, w ho a rriv ed last n ig h t
from C airo, called this m orn in g at the Em bassy. H e gave me the follow in g a ccou n t o f w hat
h a pp en ed in A fric a betw een El Senoussi, A ziz A li and E nver.
E l Senoussi had on the 28th Z u lk eid a 1329 (20th N o v [e m b e ]r , 1911) sign ed an a greem ent
w ith the Ita lia n s by which he u n d ertook to cease all resistance on con d ition o f receiv in g an
a n n u al su b ven tion and o f b ein g recogn ised as the relig iou s head o f the desert Arabs. He
subsequently b roke this a greem ent un d er pressure from E n v er Bey, w ho prom ised a la rger
subsidy than the Italia n s offered and the title o f Sultan. W hen E nver left C yrena ica he
prom ised E l Senoussi m ore m oney and am m u n ition , w hich, lie said, w ould be sent through
A ziz Ali.
D r. K h ad em sta ted tliac he did this w ith ou t any in ten tion o f k eep in g his prom ises, m erely
to m ake trou b le betw een El Senoussi and A ziz A li, o f whose influen ce w ith the A rabs E n v er
was jealous. W h a tever E u v e r’ s in ten tion s m ay have been, El Senoussi receiv ed noth in g, and
on tw o sep arate occasions El Senoussi w rote to E n v er com p la in in g th a t he had received n oth in g
from A ziz A li. In the last letter he said th a t he in ten ded to com e to term s w ith the Italia n s
as he1 had been betra yed by the Turks.
E nver, thereup on, sent him som e m oney w hich he had ob tain ed by p u ttin g on an illegal
t a x and said th a t the form er in stalm ents which had been reg u larly sent had been in tercep ted
b y A ziz A li fo r his own uses and th a t on his return to C on stan tin op le he w ould have him tried
by C ou rt M a rtial and executed .
T his in crim in a tin g letter has been ob tain ed from the Senoussi by the frien d s o f A ziz Ali
in E g y p t and Dr. K h ad em has com e from E g y p t to in form T alaat Bey tha t, unless A ziz A li is
released, th e letter w ill be published. A t his request, I gave D r. K h ad em a ca rd o f in trod u ction
t o T alaa t Bey, w hich he w ill use i f he finds any difficulty in ob ta in in g adm ission to H is
E x cellen cy in the ord in a ry way.
N o ju d g m en t has been p ron ou n ced in the case in sp ite o f m any rum ours b u t D r. K h ad em
has heard th a t the sentence w ill be p ron ou n ced to-d ay.
I shall ta ke an o p p o rtu n ity o f sp eak in g m yself to T alaa t B ey again to-d ay . H e is, I believe,
in fa v o u r o f releasing A ziz A li and realises the g ra v ity o f the position , b u t E n v er P asha is
said to be op p osin g his lib era tion ,— an a ttitu d e, w hich, I fea r, will not be m odified by the
personal atta ck s upon him in the colum ns o f the “ T im e s ” which I do not think well advised
in open ly a ttr ib u tin g to him m otives o f jealousy, as it makes it m ore difficult fo r him to g iv e
w ay w ith ou t loss o f face.
I have, &c.
L O U IS M A L L E T

( 1) [A cop y o f this despatch was sent to C a iro.]

 837
Sir L. M allet to S ir Edward Grey.
C on stan tin ople, A p ril 14, P 14
F.O. 16306 7963 14 44. D. 11-25 a m
Tel. (N o. 23*5.) R . 1 p .m .
On h ea rin g a ru m ou r last n igh t that A ziz Ali had been cond em ned to death, I sent to
T alaa t Bey w ho confirm ed th e new s b u t a dded th a t the sentence had been com m uted to 15 years
pen al servitu d e and h in ted that it w ill be still fu r th e r reduced.
R e p e a te d to Cairo.
S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

C on stan tin ople. A p ril 17, 1914.

F.O. 16904 7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . ' D. 10-45 a . m .
Tel. (S o . 243.) R . 2-40 p . m .
F ollow in g sent to C a iro t o -d a y : —

“ I h a v e spoken to th e G rand V iz ie r and u rged H is H ighness to p u t a stop to

accu sation a ga in st E n v er P asha by releasin g A ziz A l i : I arg u ed th a t now was th e tim e to
show th a t these ch a rges w ere baseless and th a t by p rom p t release th e G overnm ent w ould
g ain m uch m ore m orally than they w ould risk by possible fu tu r e in trig u es on the p a rt o f
A ziz Ali.
“ T his lin e o f arg u m en t seem ed to a p p ea l to H is H ighness and it is m y im pression
th a t som eth in g w ill be d on e.”

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

C on stan tin ople, A p ril IS, 1914.
F.O . 17083 7963 14 44 D . 7-5 p . m .
Tel. (S o . 246.) R 1 0 1 5 p.m.
F o llo w in g sent to C a iro to-d a y : —

“ M y telegram o f y esterd ay .( ')

“ M in is te r re fe rre d to in my last teleg ram tells m e th a t E n v er Pasha w ill ask Sultan
fo r free p a rd on fo r A ziz A li, and th a t he w ill b e released v ery shortly.

“ (V ery C on fid en tia l.) .

“ It w ill be p olitic, in view of possible fu tu r e in cid en ts o f sim ilar ch a ra cter, if
E n v er P ash a is allow ed to get th e cred it o f this and if it is assum ed that he has acted
spontaneously. I have ta ken line, in ta lk in g to th e G rand V izie r , that it w ill be easy
and n a tu ra l fo r E n v er P asha, w ho was A li's frien d , to a ppeal fo r his p a rd on .”

( ! ) [r . im m ediately p reced in g d ocu m en t.]

S ir L. M a llet to S ir E dw ard G rey.

C on sta n tin op le, A p ril 20, 1914.

F.O. 17373 7 963/14 '44. D- 5-30 p . m .
Tel. (S o . 251.) C onfidential. R 5-55 p . m .
T he G ra n d V iz ie r has in form ed m e con fid en tia lly th a t on the in terv en tion o f E n v er Pasha,
A ziz A li w ill be lib era ted , and w ill proba b ly lea v e fo r E g y p t tom orrow .
(S ent to C a iro.)

A hm ed A li and O thers to S ir E dw ard G rey.

F .O 1S121 796 3/1 4 44. E l M ehalla E l K u b ra , D. A p ril 16, 1914.
S ir E d w a rd G rey, R ±P ril 25, 1914.
W e have the hon ou r to subm it you that we, the in h ab ita n ts o f E l-M ehalla, b ecam e very
sorry fo r the evil news o f C on stan tin op le w hich tell o f the final ju dgm en t o f A ziz B ey E l-M asry
th e E g y p tia n officer. .
W e ca n n ot express ou r feelin g s tow ards such trial, which proves well th a t his punishm ent
was only fo r som e person a l deed. A nw ar P ash, th e M in ister o f W ar, is the only m an who hates
th is honest officer. I f som eone asks w hy he was let free fo r seven m onths w ithout punishm ent,
I ca n n ot answ er such question. I f y ou visit even the sm allest co tta g e in E g y p t you can hear
g r ie f and sorrow fo r A ziz Bey. A ll o f th e persons w ho accom p an ied A ziz Bey can tell his noble
deeds. W e w on d er w hy G reat B rita in did not set him at lib erty as he is a n a tiv e o f E gypt.
All th e E g y p tia n P a p ers a re not sa tisfa ctory tow ards such bad trea tm en t. Y ou can ask
L o rd K itc h e n e r to ex p la in y ou th e feelings o f all the in habitants, l h e A rab ia n N a tion is
very u n h a pp y to hear o f his ju dg m en t. You see that all the classes even the E u ropea n s are
 838
surprised tow ards his trea tm ent. W e never fo r g e t the T urkish fa u lt, this bad error which
proves th a t T u rk ey docs w hat w ill displease the E g y p tia n s, those persons w ho assisted her in
tim e o f trou b le. W o have placed ourselves near cannons in hon ou r of T u rkey. W e th in k th a t
She m issed th a t A ziz B ey is an E g y p tia n .
H e d id n ot err, b u t had don e all his best fo r th e sake of ra sin g the T urkish, those people
w ho cou ld n ot know th e ir enem ies ou t o f th eir own friend s. T he na tion is w a itin g y o u r help.
T o y ou w e send ou r a p p lica tion h op in g do y ou r best so as to let all th e E g y p tia n s know th a t
there is a G o v [e rn m e n ]t which look a fte r ou r own life and p rop erty.
W e are,
Y o u r M ost O b e d [ie n t] Servants,
‘ A L I W A H B I.
t ^nn non J K A M E L LUTFY.
fo r 400,000 persons ^ A H ^IE D A L I
H A S L A T IF .

S ir It. Itod d to S ir E dw ard G rey.

H om e, A p ril 26, 1914.
F.O . 1 8 2 0 7 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 . D. 12 noon.
Tel. (N o. 73.) R . 1 p .m .
T h e M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs has heard th a t A ziz Ali, w ho is p roceed in g to E g y p t on
his release, con tem p la tes re tu rn in g to C y ren a ica to orga nise op p osition to the Italia n s, and
g rea tly hopes th a t m eans m ay be fo u n d to dissuade him from d o in g so.

S ir L. M a llet to S ir Edw ard G rey.

F.O. 2 2 0 3 8 /7 9 6 3 /1 4 /4 4 .
(N o. 3 3 1 ) l ’ era, D. M a y 12, 1914.
Sir, R. 18, 1914.
I have the h on ou r to enclose herein cop ies o f an a rticle w hich has a p p ea red in the recently
pu blished p an-islam ic p eriod ica l, the “ J ih a n -i-Isla m ,’ ' re g a rd in g th e in terv en tion o f this
Em bassy in the case o f A ziz Ali.
I t is noticeab le th a t this a rticle is rep rod u ced b riefly in the A rab p o r tio n o f th e paper,
an d at g rea ter len gth in the U rdu p ortion . T he fr o n tic e p ie c e o f this p o rtio n is m oreover a
la rg e p h otog ra p h o f E n v er Pasha w hich is headed “ The Sw ord o f the S ta te and H elp er o f
the P e o p le .”
I have, &c.
L O U IS M A L L E T .

Enclosu re in S ir L. M a lle t’ s despatch N o. 331.

T ran sla tion from the T urkish o f a r tic le pu blished in T urkish, in th e issue o f M a y 7 (A p ril 24)
o f the “ J ih a n -i-lsla m .”

A ru m ou r had been published th a t the E g y p tia n A ziz Ali Bey who, a fte r cond em nation
by th e C ou rt M a rtial, becam e the o b je c t o f the Im p eria l clem ency, ow ed his p a rd on to the
in terv en tion o f the B ritish A m bassador. Because we knew how ex alted is the p a triotism of
ou r E g y p tia n breth ren , we con sid ered it im probable th a t they should have in v ited fo r e ig n
in terv en tion in con n exion w ith the tria l and con d em n a tion o f an officer on cou n ts rela tin g to
his m ilita ry du ty. The in terv en tion o f one G overnm ent in con n exion w ith the con d em n a tion
b y a n oth er G overnm ent o f an officer o f its own arm y b ein g com p letely co n tr a r y to th e essential
p rin cip les of in tern a tion a l law, w e cou ld not reg a rd such a direct in terv en tion as possible.
H ow ev er, w ith a desire to learn the tru th , our p r o p r ie to r v isited the M in ister o f W a r and
m ade enq uiry. T he M in ister decla red th a t A ziz A li B e y ’ s pard on w as du e to no foreig n
in terv en tion , but th a t th e Im p eria l p a rd on had been g ra n ted solely on his prop osition . H ere­
up on, ou r p r o p r ie to r sent th e follow in g telegram to the E g y p tia n new spaper, E s-Shaab, on
A p ril 1 5 /2 8 , 1914: —

“ I have had an in terv iew w ith H is E x cellen cy th e M in ister o f W a r. H is E xcellen cy

den ied the in terv en tion o f the B ritish A m bassador in the q uestion of A ziz A li, and stated
th a t the Im p eria l clem ency had been ex ten d ed to A ziz A li ow in g to his efforts.”

T he “ A g en ce O ttom ane ” a fterw ord s pu blished its dem enti.

 839

INDEX OF PERSON S.

S h o w in g W r it e r s of D espatches. & c ., a n d O f f ic ia l P o s it io n s d u r in g

t h is P e r io d of t h e P r in c ip a l P ersons m e n t io n e d in t h e T ext.

A b d u l l a h , B e y , R u le r o f T ra u s-J ord an , Son of the G rand Sheriff o f M ecca.

525-9 (.4pp. H I . iv), $35 (A p p . I l l , v .
C on versa tion w ith L ord K itch en er, 526-32 (A p p . I l l , iv>.

A c l a x d , M r. (since 1926, 5 .a i F r a n c is D ., B ritish P a rlia m en ta ry Under-St n ta ry o f S ta te fo r

F oreig n Affairs, 1 9 1 1 -5 : F in a n cia l S ecretary to the T reasury, 1915; S ecretary to the
B oa rd of T rade, 1915-6.
J /in u fe by, 753 (N o. 516>. SOS (N o. 5-53).

À C ourt R e p i x g t o n , L i e u t f. x a n t - C o i .o y f, r. C h a r l e >. B ritish M ilita ry A tta c h é at Brussels and

T he H a g u e. 1899-1902; M ilita r y C orresp ondent o f the Times, 1 9 0 6 -'.
A r tic les by, on G erm an m anœ uvres, 1912. 657 (N o. 451).

A d a m . M r . F r e d e r ic k E . F.. C lerk in the B ritish F oreign Office. 1910-7 ; A c tin g 3 rd Secretary

at Athens. 1 9 1 7-^ ; 1st >< reta ry in F oreig n Office, 1 9 2 0 -9 ; C ounsellor of Em bassy at
L isbon. 1929-34 (som etim es C harge d 'A ffa ires) ; M in ister and C onsul-G eneral at
P an a m a , 1 93 4- .
M in u te by. 459 (N o 29o| 523 (N o. 331).

A e h r e n t h a l . A l o is . B a r o n L e n ay o n (since 1909. C o u n t '), A u stro-H u n ga ria n Am bassador at

S t. P etersb n rg h . 1 '9 9 -1 9 0 6 : M in ister fo r F oreign Affairs. 1906-12 (F eb ru a ry 17
C on v ersa tion w ith L ord H a rd in g e. 710 (N o. 4>2, encl.).

A h m e d A g a ie f .
A r tic les by, in the J eu n e T urc, 6 (N o. IV

A hmed A u , of El Mehalla.
To S ir E d w a rd G rey, 5-J- 5 (.4pp. I l l , vV

A h m e d B e y M u k h t a r B e y h u m , o f B eyrouth.
$25 (.4pp. I l l , iii, encl.).

A h m ed E f f e x d i T a b b a r a h , M oslem jou rn a list o f B eyrouth.

S25 (.1pp. I l l , iii, encl. .

A j e y m i , Sheikh of M untefik.
$27 (.4pp. I I I . iv).
H .M . A l b e r t I, K in g o f th e B elgiaus, 1909-33.
R e p o rte d statem ent by E m p eror W illia m I I to, on M a r betw een t r a n c e an d G erm any,
D ecem b er 1913. 723-4 (N o. 490). 727 (N o. 492).

A Li H a id a r , .-s h e r if f . V ice-P res id en t o f the T nrkish Senate, 1914.

$29 (A p p . I I I . iv).
A l m e id a , S e n h o r C e l e s t i x o d \ P ortu g u ese M in ister fo r the Colonies, 1911; M in ister o f M arine,
1913.
460 (N o. 291).
A l s t o n . M r . (la te r S i r ) B e il b y F . S< . ir Clerk in the B ritish F oreign Office. 1 9 0 ,-1 5 -.A c t in g
C ounsellor of Em bassy at P ek in g, 1912.1913, 1 91 6-7; M in ister at P ek in g, 191.0-2,
at Buenos A ires, 1 9 2 2 -5 ; A m bassador at R io de J a n eiro. 192-5-9.
M in u te by, $22 (.4pp. 1).
A n d e r s o n . M r. (la te r S ir) J o h n . B ritish P erm a n en t Und« r-.$< reta ry of S tate fo r th e Colonies,
1911-$.
To F o re ig n Office, 578 -9 (N o. 379).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E y re Crowe, 49S—500 No. 322).
M in u te b y, 493—7 (N o. 320, and n otes), 523—1 (N o. 331).
P riv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir E y re Crowe, 497 (N o. 321
 84 0
A n d r a d e , S e n h o r F r e ir e d ’.
(v. sub F r e ir e d ’A n d r a d e .)

A n t h o p o u l o P a s h a , T urkish A m bassador at L on don , 1896-1901.

C om m u n ication from , 49 (ed . n ote).

A n t o n iu s , M r . G.
N o te s by, on E m ir A b d u lla h ’ s con v ersation s w ith L o rd K itch en er, 831-2 (A p p . I l l , iv (11)).

A r t h u r , S ir G e o r g e , P riv a te S ecretary to L ord K itch en er, 1914-6.

831 (ed. n ote).

A s q u it h , M r . H . H . (since 1925, F i r s t E
a r l o f O x f o r d a n d A s q u it h ), B ritish P rim e M in ister
and F irst L o rd o f the T reasury, 1908-16.
M in u te by, 424 (N o. 265), 535 (N o. 338, n ote), 583 (N o. 383), 598 (N o. 396), 603 (N o. 401),
632 (N o. 428), 698 (N o. 474), 707 (N o. 481), 710 (N o. 482).
R e p ly by, to q uestion in H ou se o f C om m ons, 689 (N o. 467).
S ta tem en t by, in H ou se o f Com m ons, 436 (N o. 272), 688 (N o. 466, n ote).
A n d naval forces in M ed iterra n ean , 594 (N o. 392).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir E. G rey, 612 (N o. 412).

A s s im B f.y , T urkish M in ister at Sofia, 1 90 9 -1 1 ; M in ister fo r F oreign A ffairs, 1911-2.

C on v ersa tion w ith S ir H . B a b in g ton Sm ith, 54 (N o. 39).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir G. L ow ther, 5 2 -3 (N o. 38), 55 (N o. 41), 88-9 (N o. 58).

A yub T ab et, D r .
825 (A p p . I l l , iii, encl.).
A zevedo da Sil v a , S e n h o r , P ortu g u ese H ig h C om m issioner in M ozam bique.
435 (N o. 272).
A z i z - e l -M a s r i , C o l o n e l , A rab Officer of the T urkish A rm y.
A n d th e A rab M ovem ent, 1914, 8 32-8 (A p p . I l l , v).
A rrest and tria l of, 828, 831 (A p p . I l l , iv).

B a b in g t o n S m i t h , S ir H.
(¡1 sub S m i t h , S ir H . B a b in g t o n .)

B a l f o u r , M r . A. J. (since 1922, 1s t E a r l o f ), B ritish F irst L o rd o f the T reasury, 1895-1905;

P rim e M in ister, 1 9 0 2 -5 ; F irst L o rd of the A d m ira lty , 1 9 1 5 -6 ; S ecretary o f S ta te for
F o re ig n A ffairs, 1 9 1 6 -9 ; L ord P resid en t o f th e C ouncil, 1919-22, 1925-9.
S p eech by, in H ouse o f Com m ons, 31 (N o. 20, n ote).
A n d A nglo-G erm a n Secret A greem en t, 1898, 425 (N o. 263), 427 (ed. n o te).
A n d L ord Salisbu ry, 425 (N o. 263).

B a l l in , H
e r r A l b e r t , G eneral D irector o f the H a m b u rg -A m e rica S team ship C om pany
162 (N o. 107), 167 (N o. 114), 443 (N o. 276), 746-7 (N o. 511).

B a r f ie l d ,
M r ., G eneral M a n a ger o f th e S m v rn a -A id in R a ilw a y C om p any, 1914.
333 (N o. 203).

B a r k , M . P e t e r L., R ussian M in ister o f F ina nce, 1914-7.

776 (N o. 534).

B a r n e s , Sir H u g h S., L ieu ten a n t-G ov ern or o f B urm a, 1 9 0 3 -5 ; M em ber of C ouncil o f India,
1 90 5-13 ; Chairm an o f Im p eria l B ank o f P ersia, 1916.
A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m C oncessions, signed by, M a rch 19, 1914, 3 45-6 (N o. 214).

B a r r e r e , M . C a m il l e , F ren ch A m bassador at R om e, 1897-1924.

C on versa tion w ith S ig n or G iolitti, 622 (N o. 421), 624-5 (N o. 425).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir R . R o d d , 636 (N o. 434), 637-8 (N o. 436).
C on v ersa tion w ith th e M a rq u is di San G iuliano, 623-4 (N o. 424), 625 (N o. 426).
S p eech by, 634 (N o. 430).

B asserm ann, H e r r E r n s t , M em ber o f th e G erm an R eich sta g . 1913.

S p eech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g , 680, 682 (N o. 462, encl.).

B a t t e n b e r g . A d m ir a l H .S .H . P r in c e L o u is A l e x a n d e r o f.
(v. sub M o u n t b a t t e n .)

B e a t t y , A d m ir a l S i r D a v i d (since 1919, 1s t E a r l B e a t t y ), N a val S ecreta ry to F irst L o rd of

the A d m ira lty , 1912; A d m ira l in com m and o f 1st B a ttle Squ ad ron , 1914-6.
811 (N o. 555), 811 (N o. 556), 813 (ed. note).
 841
B e a u m o n t , M r . H . H . D ., C ounsellor of Em bassy at B ritish L ega tion at C ettin jé, 1909-10
( C harge d 'A ffa ir e s ); 1st Secretary at Athens, 1910-4 (som etim es C harge d 'A ffa ire s))
C ounsellor o f E m bassy at C onstantinople, 1914 (som etim es C harge d ’ A ffaires).
To S ir E. G rey, 417-9 (N os. 261-3).
C on v ersa tion w ith D ja v id Bey, 417-8 (N o. 261), 418 (N o. 262).
C on v ersa tion w ith S aid H a lim Pasha, 419 (N o. 263).

B e ir a o , S e n h o r Y
e ig a , P ortu g u ese M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1898-1900.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. T h orn ton , 437-8 (N o. 273).

B e n c k e n d o r f f , A l e x a n d e r , C o u n t . R ussian A m bassador at L on don , 1903-17.

C om m u n ication from , 1 55-6 (N o. 99), 313 (N o. 194), 822 (.4pp. I).
To M. S azonov, 97 (N o. 66, n ote), 809 (erf. note), 812-3 (erf. note).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 2 3-4 »No. 13), 125-6 (N o. 77), 759 (N o. 522). 788 (erf. n ote),
789-90 (N o. 543), 797-8 (N o. 547). 809 (erf. n ote), 809-10 (N o. 554), 810 (erf. n ote). 812-3
(erf. note).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A . X ieolson, 97 (N o. 66, note).

B er c h to ld , L e o p o l d , C o u n t v o n . A u s tro-H u n g a ria n A m bassador at St P etersb n rgh , 1906-11 ;

M in is ter fo r F oreig n Affairs, F ebru ary 19. 1912-5.
P ers o n a lity of, 659 (N o. 454).
S p eech by, 742-3 (N o. 506).

B erg m ann, H e r r O.. D ir e cto r o f the D eutsch e B ank, 1914.

333 (N o. 203), 358 (N o. 225).
C on versa tion w ith M r. P ark er, 3 43-4 (N o. 213, encl.), 351 (N o. 219).
A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m Concessions, signed by, M arch 19, 1914,3 45-6 (N o. 214).

B e r n h a r d i , F . A. J.
v o n , P russian G eneral.
A r tic le by, in D e r G reif, 72* (N o. 493, encl.).
A r tic le b y, in the P o st, 761 (N o. 523).

B e r t i e , S ir F. (since 1915, 1s t B ar o n ; 1918, 1 s t V

is c o u n t B e i -.t if . o f T h a m e ), B ritish Am bassador
at P a ris, 1905-18. »
To S ir E. G rcv, 7 (N o. 2), 39-41 (N os. 2 7-8), 4 3-4 (N os. 3 2 -3 ), 123 (.No. 73), 217-8 (N o. 143),
3 67 -8 (erf. n ote), 478 (N o. 306), 556-8 (N o. 361), 5 61-2 (N o. 365), 6 05-6 (N o. 404), 608
(N o 408, n ote). 616-9 (N o. 41*/, 674-5 (N o. 461).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. C ru p p i, 39-41 (N os. 2 7-8), 43 (N o. 32).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. D ou m ergu e, 557 (N o. 361).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount H a tzfe ld t, 425 (N o. 268).
C on versa tion w ith M. P oin caré, 478 (N o. 306), 556-7 (N o. 361), 559 (N o. 362), 605-7
(N os. 404-5).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. de Selves, 4 3-4 (N o. 33).
C on v ersa tion w ith B aron v on Stum m , 421-4 (N o. 265, and note).
A nn ual li e p o r t on F ra n ce, 1912, 616-9 (N o. 418).
P riv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir E. G rey, 421-4 (N o. 265), 425-7 (N o. 268), 559 (N o. 362), 606-7 (.No. 405), 609-10
(N o. 409). '
To S ir A . N icolson , 421 (N o. 265, note ( 3) ), 590-1 (N o. 388).

B e r t o l i x i , S ig x o r P ie t r o , M em ber o f the Ita lia n C ham ber o f D epu ties, D elegate to the Ita lo-
T urkish P eace n eg otia tion s, 1912; M in is ter fo r the Colonies, 1913-4.
645 (N o. 443).
B e th m a xx H o l l w e g , H e r r T. v o x , P russian M in ister o f the In terior, 1 9 0 5 -7 ; G erm an M in ister
fo r the In te rio r, 1 9 0 7 -9 ; Im peria l C hancellor, 1909-17.
421 (N o. 265, and n o te (3) ).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. Gesehen, 31 (N o. 20), 703 (N o. 476), 705 (N o. 479).
A n d Z a b ern in cid en t, 1913, 724-6 (N o. 491). _
P o sitio n o f in 1914 (and p u b lica tion o f P ortu g u ese A greem ents), 555-6 (N o. 360), 565-6
(N o. 370), 566-7 (N o. 371), 568 (N o. 373), 569-70 (N o. 374).
S p eech es b y, in the R eich sta g , 706 (N o. 481), 725-6 (N o. 491).

B ig g e , S ir A. J ., 1s t B a r o x S t a m f o r d h a m .
(v. sub S t a m f o r d h a m .)
B is m a r c k , O t t o P r ix c e
v o x , G erm an Im p eria l Chancellor, 1871-90.
627 (N o. 427).
L e t t e r to L o rd Salisbu ry, 1889, 661 (N o. 454, and n ote).

B l e c k , M r ., P resid en t o f the B ritish Cham ber o f C om m erce at L isbon.

575 (N o. 376, m in.).
 84*2
B o m p a r d , M . M a u r ic e , F ren ch Am bassador at St. P etersb u rg h , 1902-7 ; at C on stantinople,
1909-14.
Con versa tion w ith S ir L. M allet, 414 (N o. 255).
C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P asha, 20 (N o. 10).
B o n a r d e l , M e s s r s .. P a ris firm of.
446 (N o. 281), 452 (N o. 284).
B o t h a , L o u is , G e n e r a l , P rim e M in is ter o f the T ransvaal, 1907-10.
C on versa tion w ith L ord G ladstone, 480-1 (N o. 309).
B o y l e , C a p t a in W
il l ia m H. D ., N a val A tta c h é at B ritish Em bassy at R om e, 1913-5.
To S ir R . R od d, 640-2 (N o. 439, encl.).
M em orandum by, on N a val position of Italy at end o f 1913, 640-2 (N o. 439, encl.).
B r id g e m a n , A d m ir a l S ir F r a n c is C h a r l e s B r id g f .m a n -, B ritish L ord o f th e A d m ira lty , 1 9 1 0 -1 ;
F irst Sea L ord , 1 9 1 1 -2 ; C om m a iider-in -C h ief H om e F leet, 1911.
599 (ec/. note), 602 (ed. note).
B u c h a n a n , S ir G eo r g e W ., B ritish Am bassador at St. P etersb u rg h , 1 9 1 0 -8 ; at R om e, 1919-21.
To S ir E. G rey, 57 (N o. 44), 59 (N o. 46), 180-1 (N o. 120), 200 (N o. 128), 2 01-2 (N o. 130),
216 (N o. 1411, 3 35-6 (N o. 205), 370 (N o. 231), 377-81 (N o. 236), 757-8 (N o. 520), 765-8
(N os. 527 8), 769-72 (N os. 530 -1 ), 777-82 (N os. 536 -7 ), 794-7 (N o. 546), 804-8 (N os. 552-3),
810-1 (N o. 555), 814-20 (N os. 560 -1 ), 8 21-2 (.4pp. I).
To M. Sa zon ov, 335 -6 (N o. 205, encl. 1), 377-9, 380-1 (N o. 236, en d s. 1, 4, 5).
C on versa tion w ith M. G reg orov icli, 785 (N o. 538».
C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror N ich ola s II. 778-9 (N o. 536), 780-2 (N o. 537), 805-7
(N o. 553), 8 11-2 (N o. 556).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. P aléolog u e, 784 (N o. 538).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . S azonov, 57 (N o. 44), 59 (N o. 46), 200 (N o. 128), 216 (N o. 141), 377
(N o. 236). 757-8 (N o. 520), 765 (N o. 527), 775 (N o. 534). 778-9 (N o. 536), 782 (N o. 537),
784 (N o. 538), 8 04-5 (N o. 552), 807-8 (N o. 553), 812 (N o. 556), 813 (N o. 558, n ote),
815 (N o. 560), »21 (A p p . I).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir E. G rey, 8 11-2 (N o. 556).
To Sir A. Nic-olson, 768-9 (N o. 529). 775-6 (N o. 534), 784-5 (N o. 538).

B ü lo w , B ernard C ou nt v o n (since 1905, P r in c e ), G erm an Im p eria l C hancellor, 1900-9.

421 (N o. 265, note).

B u n s e n , S ir M a u r ic e d e , B ritish M in ister at L isbon, 1 9 0 5 -6 ; A m bassador at M a d rid , 190 6-13 ;

at V ien n a, 1913-4.
To S ir E. G rey, 756-7 (N o. 519), 7 63-5 (N o. 526).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. Schebeko, 729 (N o. 494).
C on versa tion w ith H e r r von T schirschky, 728-9 (N o. 494),764 (N o. 526).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir A. N ieolson, 5 95-6 (N o. 393), 728-9 (N o. 494).
B y l e s , S ir W
i l l i a m P ., M .P . fo r S a lford N orth , 1906-17.
Q uestion by, in the H ou se o f C om m ons, 689 (N o. 467), 801 (N o. 548).
C am bon, M. J u l e s , Fre n c h Am bassador at M a d rid , 1902-7 ; at B erlin , 1907-14.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. Goschen, 696-7 (N o. 473), 703-4 (N o. 477).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on J ag ow , 696 (N o. 473), 724-5 (N o. 491).
Con versa tion w ith the E m p eror N ich ola s I I , 704 (N o. 477).
C on versa tion w ith H err Zim m erm an n , 724—5 (N o. 491).
C a m b o n , M . P a u l , F ren ch A m bassador at L on d on , 1898-1920.
To S ir E. G rey, 615 (N o. 417)
Con versa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 19 (N o. 9, n o te ), 20 (N o. 10), 37 (N o. 24), 41 (N o. 29),
125-6 (N o. 77), 130 (N o. 81), 133 (N o. 85). 313-4 (N o. 195), 314 (N o. 196), 509 (N o
5 44-5 (N o. 345), 5 47-8 (N o. 350), 553 (N o. 357), 560-1 (N o. 364), 564 (N o. 368), 591
(N o. 389), 600 (N o. 398), 601 (N o. 400), 604 (N o. 402), 611 (N o. 410), 612-4 (N os. 413-5),
6 22-3 (N o. 422), 639 (N o. 438), 688-9 (N o. 466), 694 (N o. 470), 789 (N o. 542), 789-90
(N o. 543).
C on v ersa tion w ith the M a rq u is Im p eria li, 652 (N o. 449).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A. N ieolson, 37 (N o. 24), 39 (N o. 27, m in.), 8 7-8 (N o. 57), 314
(N o. 196), 342 (N o. 212), 554-5 (N o. 359), 559 (N o. 361, m in.), 5 82-3 (N o. 383), 583-4
(N o. 384), 593 (N o. 391), 597 (N o. 395), 603 (N o. 401), 611-2 (N o. 411), 697 (N o. 474).
C om m u n ication from , 134-5 (N o. 87), 164-5 (N o. 110), 697-8 (N o. 474, en d s. 1, 2).
N o te, com m u n ica ted by, 169-72 (N o. 116, encl.).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir A. N ieolson, 169-72 (N o. 116).
 8-13

C a m p o s , S e n h o r E z e q u ie l
d e , M em ber o f the P ortu g u ese Cham ber of D eputies, 1912.
Q uestions by, in Cham ber o f D ep u ties, 445 (X o . 280).

C a r n e g ie , M r . (siuee 1916, S i r ) L a n c e l o t D ., C ounsellor of B ritish Em bassy at V ien n a, 1907-8

(som etim es C hargé d ’ A ffa ires) ; at P aris, 1908-13 (som etim es Chargé d ’ A ffa ires) ; B ritish
M in ister at L isbon, 1913-24 ;A m bassador, 1924 8.
To S ir E. G rey, 5 48-9 (X o . 351), 550-1 (X o . 354), 56:1-4 (X o . 367). 572-3 (X o . 376), 576-7
(X o . 377), 826 (.4pp. I l l , iii).
C on versa tion w ith Senhor F reire d ’ A n d ra de, 572-3 (X o . 376), 576-7 (X o . 377).
C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor M a cha d o, 564 (X o. 367).
C on v ersa tion w ith Sen h or M a cieira, 548-9 (X o . 351), 550-1 (X o . 354).
C on v ersa tion w ith D r. B oson, 549 (X o . 351), 550-1 (X o . 354).

C a r v a l h o , S e n h o r M e s q u i t a , M em ber o f the P ortu g u ese Cham ber o f D eputies, 1914.

564 (X o . 367).

C a s s e l , S ir E r n e s t , B ritish F in a n cier.
9 (X o . 4), 40 (X o . 28), 151 (X o . 95), 173 (X o . 117), 214 (X o . 140), 443 (X o . 276. , 459 (X o . 290,
nun.).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. W in ston C hurchill, 7 46-7 (X o . 511).

C a s t r o , S e n h o r J. L u c ia n o
d e , P ortu g u ese P resid en t o f th e C ouneil and M iiu ster o f the
I n te rio r, 1897-1900.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. T h orn ton , 438 (X o . 273).

C e c il , L o rd Hu g h , M .P . fo r G reenw ich, 1 89 5-19 0 6; for O x ford U n iversity, 1910-37.

S peech b y, in H ou se o f Com m ons, 688 (X o . 466, n ote).

C h a m b e r l a in , M r. J
o s e p h , B ritish Secretary o f S ta te for the Colonies, 1895-1903.
A n d A n g lo-G erm a n S ecret A g reem en t, 1898, 427 (ed. n ote).

C h i r o l , M r . (la te r S i r ) V
a l e n t i n e , D ir e cto r o f th e F oreig n D ep a rtm en t o f The T im es, 1899­
1912.
L e tte r s b y, in T he Tim es, 45 (X o . 34, n ote).

C h u k r i G a n e m , V iee-P resid en t o f th e A ra b -S y ria n Congress at P aris, 1913.

826 (A p p . I l l , iii).

C h u r c h ill , M r. W in s t o n S., B ritish P a rlia m en ta ry U n der-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r Colonies,

1 9 0 6 -8 ; P resid en t o f B oa rd o f T rade, 1 9 0 8 -1 0 ; Secretary o f S ta te fo r H om e Affairs,
1 9 1 0 -1 ; F irst L o rd o f A d m ira lty , 1 9 1 1 -5 ; C hancellor o f th e D uehy of L ancaster, 1 9 1 5 -8 ;
S ecreta ry o f S ta te for W a r ail'd fo r A ir, 1 9 1 8-21 ; S ecretary o f S ta te fo r th e Colonies,
1 9 2 1 -2 ; C hancellor o f th e E xch eq u er, 1924-9.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. Cassel, 746-7 (X o . 511).
C on v ersa tion w ith C om te de S a in t-S ein e, 591 -2 (ed. n ote), 600-1 (X o . 399).
M em oran d u m bv, 600-1 (X o . 399), 746-8 (X o . 511).
M in u te by, 583 ‘(X o . 383), 5 91-2 (ed. n o te), 603 (X o . 401), 605 (X o . 403), 611 (cd. n ote), 706
(X o . 481), 749 (X o . 513).
S p eech b v, at M anch ester, O ctober 18, 1913, 718-9 (X o . 485), 720 (X o . 486), 736 (X o . 501),
738-9 (X o . 502). .....................................................
S peech es by, in H ou se o f Com m ons, 580 (X o . 381, n ote), 655 (X o . 451), 670 (X o . 457), 676-8,
680-1 (X o . 462, and encl.), 6 90-3 (X os. 4 68 -9 ), 705 (X o . 479, and n ote).
A n d E m p eror W illia m I I , 701 (X o . 475).
I n v ita tio n to, to be present at K ie l w eek, 1914, 744-5 (X o . 509), 746-8 (X o . 511), 749
(X o . 512), 749 (X o . 513), 750 (X o . 515).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir E. G rey, 486-7 (X o . 316), 607 (X o . 406), 695 (X o . 471), 721 (X o. 487), 814
(N o. 559).

C l e m e n c e a u , M . G e o r g e s , F ren ch M in ister o f th e In terior, 1906; P rim e M in ister and M in ister

o f th e In te rio r, 1 9 0 6 -9 ; M em ber o f S en a toria l Com m ission for F oreig n A ffa irs and
A rm y, 1 9 1 1 -7 ; P rim e M in ister and M in ister fo r W a r, 1917 20.
R e p ly by, to qu estion in the F ren ch Cham ber, 610 (X o . 409).

C l e r k , M r. (la ter Sir) G e o r g e B ., C lerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office, 1907-10, 1 9 1 2 -3 ; A etin g
F irst S ecretary a t C onstan tin ople, 1 9 1 0 -2 ; S enior C lerk in F oreign Office, 1 9 1 3 -9 ;
P r iv a t e S ecretary to L o rd C urzon, 1919; M in ister at P ra gu e, 1919—2 6 ; A m bassador at
A n g ora , 1 92 6 -3 3 ; at Brussels, 1 9 3 3 -4 ; at P aris, 1934-7.
M in u te by, 324 (N o. 199), 364 (X o . 226), 372 (X o . 232), 374 (X o . 235, n ote), 420 (ed. n o te),
625 (X o . 425), 626 (X o . 426), 634 (X o . 430), 636 (X o . 432), 638 (X o . 436), 671 (X o . 457),
675 (X o . 461), 783 (X o . 537), 822 (.4pp. I), 833 (.4pp. I l l , v).
 8-14
H .M . K in g C o n s t a n t in e I, Crow n P rin ce of Greece, K in g o f G reece, 1913-7.
A n d o ccu p a tion o f D edea g atch , 1913, 212 (N o. 139).

C o r b e t t, Sir Vi n c e n t E. H ., B ritish M in ister at M u n ich and S tu ttg a rt, 1910-4.

To S ir E. G rey, 729-30 (N o. 495).
C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron H e r tlin g , 729 (N o. 495).
C on v ersa tion w ith D r. von W eizsa ck er, 729 (N o. 495).

C o s t a , S e n h o r , M em ber o f the P ortu g u ese Cham ber o f D eputies.

44.5-6 (N o. 280), 460 (N o. 291).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A. H a rd in g e , 510 (N o. 327).

C ox, L i e u t e n a n t -C o l o n e l S ir P e r c y Z ., P o litica l A g e n t
at M uscat, 1899-1904; Consul-G eneral
at B ushire, 1 9 0 4 -9 ; P o litica l R esid en t in th e P ersian G ulf, 1 9 0 9-14 ; tem p orarily
F oreig n S ecretary to the G overn m en t o f In d ia , 1914; C ivil Com m issioner a t B a g da d,
1 9 1 4 -8 ; A c tin g M in ister at T ehran, 1918-9.
84 (N o. 55), 115 (cd. n o te ), 145 (N o. 92, m in.), 146 (N o. 93), 157 (N o. 101).

C r a w f o r d , S ir R ic h a r d F., B ritish A d viser to Im peria l O ttom an M in istry of F in a n ce, 1911-4.

418 (N o. 261), 419 (N o. 263).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 419 (N o. 264).

C r o w , M r . F r a n c is E., B ritish Consula t Basra, 1903-14.

To S ir G. L ow th er, 1 (N o. 1).

C r o w e , M r . (since 1911, S i r ) E y r e , S en ior C lerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office, 1 9 0 6-12 ; A ssistant
U n d er-S ecreta rv o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1 9 1 2-20 ; P erm a n en t ITnder-Secretary,
1920-5.
To B oa rd o f T rade, 3 42-3 (N o. 213).
To C olonia l Office, 452-3 (N o. 284).
C onversa tion w ith S ir John A nd erson, 498-500 (N o. 322).
C on versa tion w ith M r. G ilm our, 429-30 (N o. 270), 434 (N o. 270, m in ).
C on v ersa tion w ith the M arquis Im p eria li, 652 (N o. 449).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r von K iih lm a n n , 371 (N o. 232), 443 (N o. 276, m in ), 499-500 (N o. 322).
C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor T eix eira Gomes, 5 11-3 (N o. 329), 551-2 (N os. 355-6).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. T iarks, 4 63-7 (N os. 295-6).
M in u te by, 36 (N o. 23), 233 (N o. 153), 243-7 (N o. 156), 303 (N o. 189), 324 (N o. 19
(N o. 203), 339 (N o. 209), 345 (N o. 214), 351 (N o. 219), 364 (N o. 226), 372 (N o. 232),
381 (N o. 236), 420 (ed. n o te ), 434 (N o. 270), 437 (N o. 272), 439 (N o. 274), 443
(N o. 276), 446-7 (N o. 281), 451 (N o. 282), 4 53-4 (N o. 285), 459 (N o. 290), 468
(N o. 297), 470-2 (N o. 299), 475 (N o. 302), 478 (N o. 306), 491-2 (N o. 319), 497-8 (N o. 321),
498 -500 (N o. 322), 5 01-2 (N o. 323), 507-8 (ed. n ote), 514 (N o. 330), 516, 522-3 (N o. 331),
531-2 (N o. 334), 536 (N o. 338), 551 (N o. 354), 555 (N o. 359), 558-9 (N o. 361), 571 (N o. 374),
5 75 -6 (N o. 376), 581-2 (N o. 382), 625 (N o. 425), 6 28-9 (N o. 427), 631-2 (N o. 428), 635
(N o. 430), 636 (N o. 432), 637 (N o. 434), 638 (N o. 436), 642 (N o. 439), 650 (N o. 446),
652-3 (N o. 449), 671 (N o. 457), 683 (N o. 462), 730 (N o. 495), 734 (N o. 497), 735
(N o. 499), 737 (N o. 501), 752 (N o. 516), 758 (N o. 520), 763 (N o. 525), 764 (N o. 526),
783 (N o. 537), 792 (N o. 544), 820 (N o. 561), 8 22-3 (.1pp. I), 830 ( A p p . I l l , iv ), 835
(.4pp. I l l , v).
M em oran d a by, 429-34 (N o. 270), 463-7 (N os. 295-6), 508-9 (N o. 325), 585-9 (N o. 386).
N o tes by, on R ev ised A nglo-G erm a n C on ven tion , D ecem ber 1912, 4 92-6 (N o. 320).
A n d C om m ittee o f Im p eria l D efen ce, 580 (N o. 381), 581-2 (N o. 382).
A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m C oncessions, sign ed by, M arch 19, 1914, 3 45-6 (N o. 214)

CR urP i, M . J e a n C. M ., F ren ch M in ister fo r C om m erce, 1 9 0 8 -9 ; M in ister for F oreig n Affairs,

1 911; M in ister fo r J u stice, 1911-2.
C o n v ersa tion w ith S ir F . B ertie, 39-41 (N os. 27-81, 43 (N o. 32).

C u m b e r b a t c h , M r . II. A., B ritish C onsul-G eneral a t B ey rou th , 1 9 0 8-14 ; em ployed in F oreign

Office, 1915-8.
To S ir G. L ow ther, 8 25-6 (A p p . I l l , iii).

D ’ A rcy , M r .
152 (N o. 95), 157 (N o. 97). 180 (N o. 119), 213 (N o. 139), 215 (N o. 140).

D a v i d s o n , M r . (since 1907, S i r ) W
i l l i a m E., K.C'., L egal A d viser to the B ritish F oreig n Office,
1886-1918.
M in u te by, 141-2 (N o. 90), 145 (N o. 92).

D e b b a s , M . C h a r l e s , S ecretarv o f the A ra b -S y ria n C ongress a t P aris, 1913.

826 (A p p . I l l , iii).
 845
D e t e r d i n g , M r . W ., o f the A n g lo-S a x on P etroleu m Co., L td., 1914.
A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m Concessions, signed by, M arch 19, 1914,3 45 -6 (N o. 314)

D j a v i d B e y (la te r P a s h a ), Turkish M in ister o f F in a n ce, 1 909-11; P u b lic W ork s, 1912; M in ister

o f F in a n ce. 1913-7.
9 (N o. 4), 1 1 -2 ' (N o. 6, n otes (*), ( 6) ). 26-7 (N o. 15, w in.). 264 (X o. 172 ,
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. B eaum ont. 4 17-8 (X o . 261), 41S (X o . 262).
C on v ersa tion w ith 51. Isvolski, 209 (X o . 136).
C on v ersa tion with M r. L yn ch , 179-50 (X o . 119).
C on versa tion w ith S ir L. M a llet, 4 11-2 (X o . 252).
C on v ersa tion w ith > ir H . B a bin g ton Sm ith, 53 (X o . 39).
A greem ent re R a ilw ay s in A s ia tic T urkey, sign ed by, Septem ber 1913, 231-3 (X o . 153).

D j e m a l B e y (la ter P a s h a ), T urkish M ilita r v G overn or at C onstantinople, 1913; M in ister o f

P u b lic W ork s, 1913-4.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L. M a llet, 323-4 (X o . 199).

D j e v a t ) B e y . C ounsellor o f T urkish Em bassy at L ou d on , 1908-13 (som etim es C hargé d 'A ffa ires).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. A. P a rk er, 65 (X o . 47, min.).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —-
To M r. A. P ark er, 66-7 (X o . 49).

D o u m e r g u e , 51. G a s t o n , F ren ch Sen a tor, P rim e 5 Iin ister and 5 Iin ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs,
1 913-4 ; 5 Iin ister for th e Colonies, 1914-7 ; P resid en t o f the F ren ch R ep u b lic, 1914-7 ;
P rim e 5Iin ister, 1934.
To 51. P a leolcg u e, 342 (X o . 212).
C on versa tion w ith S ir F. B ertie, 557 (N o. 361).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 741 (N o. 504), 7S7-S (X o . 541).
C on versa tion w ith S ig n o r T itton i, 649 (X o . 446).

D rog h eda. H e n r y C. P o n s o n b y 5I o o r e , 10t h E a r l o f . Clerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office,

1907-14.
M in u te b y, 573 (X o . 376 .

E c k a r d s t e in . B a r o n H
e r m a n v o n , 1st Secretary at the G erm an Em bassy at L on d on , 1599-1902.
A n d A n g lo-G erm a n Secret A greem en t, 1598, 427 (ed. note).

H .5 I. K in g E d w a r d V I I . 1901-10.
A n d A n g lo-G erm a n Secret A greem en t, 1895, 435 (X o . 271

E h r e n s w ä r d , C o u n t J . J. A l b e r t , Sw edish 5 Iin ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1911-4.

C on v ersa tion w ith 5Ir. E . H ow a rd , 731 (.Xo. 496).

E i n - e d - D o w l e h , P r in c e , P ersia n 5 Iin ister fo r th e In terior, 1913-5.

515 (X o . 561. encl.).

E l S e n o u s s i.
536 (A p p . I l l , v).

E n v e r B e y ( P a s h a ), C hief o f the Y ou n g T urk C entral C om m ittee, 1905; 5 Iilita ry A tta c h é at

B erlin . 1909V13; 5 Iin ister fo r W a r and C h ief o f the G eneral S t iff. 1914.
836-8 (,4pp. I l l , v).

E r s k in e . C o l o n e l .
527 (.4pp. I l l , iv).

E rzberger, H e r r 5 I a t t h i a s , 5Iem ber o f th e G erm an R eich sta g . 1913.

S p eech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g , 678, 651 (X o- 462, encl.).

E ssad P a s h a . T o p t a n i . 5Iem ber o f the T urkish C ham ber. 1911; C om m andant S< a a r i, 1913;
U su rp er in 54iddle A lb a n ia , 1913; A lba n ian 5 Iin ister fo r the In te rio r and 5 Iin ister fo r
W a r. 1914.
A rrest of, 793 'X o . 545).

F e h r a v i n . P resid en t o f the A ra b -S y ria n C ongress at P aris, 1913.

826 (.4pp. I I I . iii).
H .5 I. F e r d in a n d , K in g o f th e B ulgaria n s, 1909-18.
703 (X o . 476).
H .R .H . P r in c e F e r d in a n d o f R u m a n ia ; H .5 I. K in g F erd in a n d I of R u m a n ia , 1914 27.
V isit to St. P etersb u rg h , 796 (X o . 546, encl.).
F e r r e ir a . S e n h o r A. 51. B.. P ortu g u ese 5 Iin ister at T he H a g u e, 1911-6.
C on versa tion w ith 51. van Sw ind ereu, 457 (X o . 259).
 846

A d m i r a l S i r John* (since 1909, 1 s t B a r o n F i s h e r

F is h e r , of K ilv e r s to n e ), Adm iral of the
British Fleet ; First Sea Lord, 1901—10, 1914-5.
582 (No. 383).
Conversations on the (Mediterranean, 604 (No. 402).

F le u r ia u ,M. A im é J. d e , 2nd (later 1st) Secretary at French Embassy at London, 1904-21

(sometimes Charge d ’Affaires); M inister at Pekin, 1921-9; Ambassador at Lotidon,
1931-3.
Communication from, 119- 20 tNo. 70), 228-9 (No. 150), 231-3 (No. 153).
Conversation with Sir A. Nicolson, 785 (Ao. 539).
Conversation with (Mr. Parker, 210 (No. 137), 218-9 (No. 144), 222 (No. 146).
Memorandum by, 211-2 (No. 138).
Priva te L e tte r—
To (Mr. Parker, 219-21 (No. 145).

of t h e Prussian Army.
F o r s t n e r , L ie u te n a n t v o n ,
And Zabern incident, 1913, 724-5 (No. 491).

H .I.M . F ran z J osef I, Em peror of Austria and K in g of H ungary, 1848-1916.

Illness of, 1914, 746 (No. 510).

F r e ir e d ’ A n d r a d e , C o l o n e l , Portuguese Army, Governor-General of (Mozambique, 1910-1 ;

D irector-G eneral at (Ministry of the Colonies, 1911-3.
572 (No. 376).
Conversation with (Mr. Carnegie, 572-3 (No. 376), 576-7 (No.377).
Conversation with Mr. Gilmour, 429-30 (No. 270).

Adm iral in the British Navy.

F r e m a n t le , A d m ir a l t h e H o n . S ir E d m u n d K o iie r t,
Article by, in United Service Magazine, 428 (No. 269, encl.).

F r e w e n , (Mr . E J.
462 (No. 293), 463-7 (Nos. 295-6), 473 (No. 300).
Conversation with Sir A. H ardinge, 456 (No. 288, note), 458 (No. 290), 460-1 (No. 291)
Conversation with Senlior Paes, 458 (No. 290).
Conversation with Mr. Tilley, 456-7 (No. 288), 458 (No.290).

H .M . K i n g G e o r g e V , 1910-36.
Conversation with P rince H enry of Prussia, 658 (No. 452), 673 (No. 460).
Conversation with Em peror Nicholas II, 801-2 (No. 549).
Conversation with Sir A. Nicolson, 673-4 (No. 460).
L e tt e r to Sir E. Grey, 658 (No. 452).
Ijetter to the Em peror Nicholas II, 801-2 (No. 549), 805(No.553).
Minute bv, 504 (No. 324), 528, 530 (No. 333), 663 (No. 454),664 (No. 455), 706 (No. 480).
Visit to Berlin, 1913, 699 (No. 475), 702-3 (No. 476), 703(No.477),704 (No. 478).
Visit to Paris, 1914, 741 (No. 501), 742 (No. 505), 783 (ed. note), 784 (No. 538), 786 (No. 540),
788 (ed. note), 791 (No. 544).

P a u l L o u i s , V ice-A dm iral in the French Navy.

G e r m in e t,
Article by, in the Echo de Paris, 619 (No. 418).

M. M i c h a i l N. d e , Russian M inister at Bucharest, 1902-12; Ambassador at Constanti­

G ie r s ,
nople, 1912-4; at Rom e, 1915-7.
Conversation with Sir L. Mallet, 260 (No. 164).
Conversation with M r. M arling, 201 (No. 129).
D irector of the (Portuguese) M ozam bique Com pany (1912).
G ilm o u r , M r .,
Conversation with Sir E yre Crowe, 429-30 (No. 270), 434 (No. 270, min.).
Conversation with Colonel Freire d ’ Andrade, 429-30 (No. 270).

Italian Prim e M inister and M inister of the Interior, 1906-9, 1911-4.

G i o l i t t i , S ig n o r G io v a n n i,
Conversation with M. Barrère, 622 (No. 421), 624—5 (No. 425).

V i s c o u n t G l a d s t o n e o f H a w a r d e n , British Secretary of State

G la d s to n e , H e r b e r t J o h n , 1 s t
for H om e Affairs, 1905-10; Governor-General of South Africa, 1910-4.
To Mr. H arcourt, 480-1 (No. 309)
Conversation with General Botha, 480-1 (No. 309).

G o m e s , S en h o r T e ix e ir a .
(v. sub T e i x e i r a G o m e s .)

M. J. L., Russian President of the Council, 1914-6.

G o r e m ik in ,
767 (No. 528).
 847
G oschen . > ih W. E dw ard . British Ambassador at Vienna, lOO.vj" ; at Berlin, 190*« 14
To Sir E. Grey. 31 (X o. ‘A U 122-3 (X o. 7 2 . 132 (X o. <4 . 339 (X o. 209». 351 Xo. 21S),
332-3 (No. 22H. 354-3 (X o. 223.. 444 (No. 277». 444 3 Xo. 279). 473 Xo 300 . 474-5
iX o. 302). 569-70 (X o. 374). 6 0 -9 (X o. 40" . 669-71i No. 457 . 675 "3 No 462 . 6 '4 -7
iX o. 464). 690-3 iX os. 46" 9 . 710 " Xo. 4">3I. 71"-9 Xo. 4"5). 727-" Xo. 493 . 732-4
(X o. 497). 735 (X o. 43.*. 736-41 (No*. 501 3 . 751 2 No. 5 1 6 . 754 5 No. 51"-.759 6-3
(Nos. 52-'l—5'. 791-2 iNo. 544). "02-3 (No. 55oi.
Conversation with H err von Bethmann Holhveg, 31 Xo. 20). 703 .No. 4761. 7)45 No. 479
Con versa fi ,n with 51. Jules C'amboii. 696 7 No. 473). 7(41-4 (X o. 477
Conversation with H err von Jagow. 352-3 iNo. 221). 354 5 (X o. 223). 566 7 Xo. 371 .
.369-70 Xo. 374). 693 'N o. 469). 702 (X o. 4 7 6 , 70-3 i.Xo. 4 7 9 . 735 (No. 499(. 736
(X o. 500). 763 (No. 525). 772-3 (No. .332'. 792-3 (No. 545|. >02-3 'N o 550 . "04 Xo. 551 ,
C onversation with H err von Stumm. 354 Xo. 223).
Conversation with the Ei iperor "William II. 703 (N o 476).
Conversation with H err Zimmermann. .'339 (X o. 209).
P r iv a t e L e t t e r s —
To S r E. Grey. 565-7 (X os 370-1). 702-3 (X o. 476) 705-6 (X o. 4"0 . 723 Xo 4>9),
744 (No. 509). 750 (No. 515>.
To Sir A. Xicolson, 596-7 (No. 394-, 6>3-4 (No. 463). 696-7 (No. 173), 703-4 No.477),
704—5 (No. 479), 707-10 (X o. 4*2). 720 ■Xo. 4"6 . 724-6 Xo. 491). 736(X o. 50 0,
743-4 'N o. 50" . 753 (No. 517 772—3 ».No. 532). 792-3 (No. 5 4 5 . "03-4 Xo. 551).
G o u la p .t de M e d e i r o s . " f.x hop.. Member of Portuguese Chamber of Deputies. 1912.
.'ipeech by. in Chamber of Deputies, 42> (X o. 269, </it .).
G r a x v ille , G eorge G o w e r . 3 r d E a r l . 2 n d Secretary at British Embassy at Berlin.
L evesox
1904—5 ; 1st
Secretary at Berlin, 190)5-"; at Brussels. 190S-11 (sometimes Chargé
d Affairés)-. at Berlin, 1911—3 (sometimes l ’hargé d ’ AffnirPs)-, at Paris. 1913-7 (some­
times Chargé d"A f f aires) ; M inister at Athens. 1917-21; at Copenhagen. l.-'21-6; at
The H ague, 1926-" ; Ambassador at Brussels. 192" -33.
Con versatio n with M. Paléologue, 723-4 (X o. 490).
P rivate L etter —
To Sir A. Xicolson, 723-4 No. 490
British Ambassador at Tokio. 1912-9.
G re e x e . S ir W . C o x y x g h a m !
S2'_' ( A p p . I).
To Sir E. Grey, "23 (.4pp. II).
Conv er sa tio n with Baron K ato. 523 (4 p p . II).
G reexw ay, M u. C h a r l e s . D irector of the A nglo-Persian Co., Ltd.
Agreem ent re Turkish Petroleum Concessions, signed by. M arch 19, 1914.34-5-6 (X o. 214).
Russian Adm iral, M inister o f M arine. 1911-7.
G r e g o r o y ic h . M . Iy a x K .,
Conv ersatio n with Sir G. Buchanan. 7o5 (X o. 53"

H. G , British X aval Att a c h é at St. P etri'b u rg h . 1912—5.

G r e x f e i.l. C o m m axd er
To Sir G. Buchanan, 771-2 (X o. 531. encl.).

G rey, S ir E d w a r d (since 1916. 1 s t V i s c o u n t G r f .y o f F a l l o d o n ) . British Secretary of >tate for

Foreign Affairs, Decem ber 11, 190-5-Deceiuber 11. 1916.
To Mr Beaumont. 417 (No. 260), 419 (X o. 264).
To Count Benckendorff. 157—9 (No. 102), 159-60 (No. 103 . 161 (No. 105>, 315 (Xa. 197).
To S r F. Bertie. 2') (X o. 10). 3< (No. 24), 41 A o . 2! >, 42— 3 No. 31). "<-> No. 5< ), 125
(X o. 77), 130 (X o. >1). 153 (X o. >5). 313-4 (X o. 195). 342 (X o. 212 , 509 Xo. 326 ,
544—5 (X o. 345'. 553 Xo. 357 1. 560-1 X o. 364), 5b4 (X o. 36"). 593 No. 391). 597
(No. 395). 611-2 (Nos. 410-1), 612- 4 Nos 413-5), 622-3 'N o. 4 2 2 . 639 No. 43" . 741
(X o. 504), 757-90 (Xos. 541-3).
To > ;r G. Buchanan, 23-1 (X o. 13). 56 'X o . 43 , 5> No. 45 .156-i (No. 100 . 1"1Xo. 121 .
199-2« 0 iX o. 126), 202-3 (Xos. 131-2). 217 (X o. 142), 366-7 (Xps. 22" 9 . 759 (X o. 522),
797-"00 (X o. 547 1. "09-10 (X o. 554). >10 ted. note . >13-4 Xo. 55"
To M. Paul Cambon, 157-9 (X o. 102 . 161 iX o. 105'. 16>-9 (X o. 115), 3>9-92 Xo. 243 . 614-5
(X o. 416). _
To (Mr. Carnegie. 550 No. 353 . 551—2 (X os. 3-55-6 . 5i9 (X o. -3>( . 600 (X o. 3 "), 601
(X o. 400). 604 X o. 402
To Colonial Office, 5 7 7-" (X o. 37").
To (Mr. D ering. 249—50 (X o. 157).
To Sir E. Goschen. 42 No. 30). 7-5-6 «Xo. 53). 96- 7 (X o. 6-5. 12>-9 No 79 , 131No. "2),
133-4 'N o. So). 164 (No. ]()>). 336-7 (No. 206 . 346-> No. 215). 353 (X o. 222), 452
(X o. 2>3 1 454-6 (X o. 2>7). 462-3 (Nos.293-4). 476-7 (No. 30-5), 479-"U (No. 30>), 4>2 3
X o. 3 1 2 ’, 455-9 1 X 0 . 31 > ■, 500-1 (X o. 323 , 510-1 Xo. 3 2 " , 525 6 (X o. 3 3 2 . 533 7
Xos. 336-9 ) 549 (No. 352). 554 ‘ No. 35>i. 555-6 (No. 36»> . 562-3 Xo. .366). 567 >
(X o 372), 571 (X o. 375). 599 (X o. 397 .6-55-7<No. 451«. 71> (X o. 4"4 , 734-5 (X o 4.'"),
742 (Xo. 505), 75> 9 (X o. >21).
 848
G r e y , S ir E d w a r d ( s i n c e 1916, 1 s t V is c o u n t G r e y o f F a l l o d o n )— ( con tin u ed ).
To L o rd G ranville, 76 (N o. 54), 1 82-3 (N o. 122), 4 84 -6 (N os. 314 -5 ), 488 (N o. 317), 540-1
(N o. 342), 5 47-8 (N o. 350).
To S ir C. G reene, 823 ( A p p . II).
To H a k k i P asha, 374 -6 (N o. 235), 385 (N o. 239).
To M r. H a rc o u rt, 468 -9 (N o. 298).
To Sir A. H a rd in g e, 437-8 (N o. 273), 444 (N o. 278), 454 (N o. 286), 456-7 (N o. 288), 479
(N o. 307), 5 11-3 (N o. 329).
To M r. K id stou , 743 (N o. 507).
To H e r r v on K iihlm aiin, 251-2 (N o. 160), 262-3 (N o. 169), 2 66-9 (N o. 174k
To P rin ce L ichnow sky, 155 (N o. 98), 157-9 (N o. 102), 3 39-40 (N o. 210), 365 (N o. 227),
3 81 -5 (N os. 237-8*), 392 (N o. 244), 397-408 (N o. 249), 415 (ed. n o te ), 5 02-7 (N o. 324),
526-30 (N o. 333), 537-40 (N os. 340-1).
To S ir G. L ow th cr, 19-20 (N o. 9), 28 (N o. 16), 29 (N o. 18), 32 (N o. 21), 3 8-9 (N o. 26), 51-2
(N o. 37), 55 (N o. 40), 56 (N o. 42), 100-14 (N o. 68), 135-6 (N o. 88).
To S ir L . M allet, 2 58-9 (N o. 162), 2 61-2 (N os. 166-7), 265- 6 (N o. 173), 280-1 (N o. 185),
387 (N o. 241), 394 (N o. 245), 3 95-7 (N os. 247-8), 4 14-5 (N os. 256-7), 416 (N o. 259),
834 (A p p . I l l , v).
To M r. M a rlin g , 87 (N o. 56), 165-6 (N o. I l l ) , 183 (N o. 123), 199 (N o. 125), 200 (N o. 127),
229 (N o 151).
To M r. O ’ B eirne, 124 (N o. 75), 270 (N o. 176), 273-4 (N o. 180), 547 (N o. 349).
To S ir R . R od d , 4 9-50 (N o. 35), 623 (N o. 423), 632-4 (N o. 429), 635 (N o. 431), 636 (N o. 433),
637 (N o. 435), 638-9 (N o. 437), 648-52 (N os. 445-8), 6 53-4 (N o. 450), 662 (N o. 454,
n ote).
To Tewfik P asha, 7 6-86 (N o. 551, 108-9 (N o. 68, enel. 3, A n n ex e I V ), 1 95-6 (N o. 124 (5),
A n n e x e I V ), 197-8 (N o. 124 (7 )) .
To S ir W . T ow nley, 166 (N o. 112).
To M r. W in gfield, 742-3 (N o. 506).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount B eucken dorff, 2 3-4 (N o. 13), 1 25-6 (N o. 77), 759 (N o. 522), 788
(ed. n ote), 789-90 (N o. 543), 797 -8 (N o. 547), 809 (ed. n o te ), 809-10 (N o. 55
(ed. n ote), 812-3 (ed. note).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. P au l C am bon, 19 (N o. 9, n o te ), 20 (N o. 10), 37 (N o. 24), 41 (N o. 29),
1 25-6 (N o. 77), 130 (N o. 81), 133 (N o. 85), 3 13-4 (N o. 195), 314 (N o. 196), 509
(N o. 326), 544 -5 (N o. 345), 5 47 -8 (N o. 350), 553 (N o. 357), 560-1 (N o. 364), 564 (N o. 368),
591 (N o. 389), 600 (N o. 398), 601 (N o. 400), 604 (N o. 402), 611 (N o. 410), 6 1 2 ^
(N os. 413 -5 ), 6 22-3 (N o. 422), 639 (N o. 438), 6 88-9 (N o. 466), 694 (N o. 470), 789
(N o. 542), 789-90 (N o. 543).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir R . C ra w ford , 419 (N o. 264).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . D oum ergue, 741 (N o. 504), 787-8 (N o. 541).
C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 183 (N o. 123).
C on v ersa tion w ith the M a rq u is Im p eria li, 4 9-50 (N o. 35), 249-50 (N o. 157), 623 (N o. 423),
648-50 (N os. 445-6), 6 51-2 (N o. 448), 6 53-4 (N o. 450).
C on v ersa tion w ith H err von K iililm a nn, 128 (N o. 78), 128-9 (N o. 79), 131 (N o. 82), 718
(N o. 484).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, 96-7 (N o. 65), 133 (N o. 86), 164 (N o. 108), 182
(N o. 122), 488-9 (N o. 318), 5 00-1 (N o. 323), 5 25 -6 (N o. 332), 5 33-5 (N os. 336-8), 540-1
(N o. 342), 549 (N o. 352), 554 (N o. 358), 555 -6 (N o. 360), 5 62-3 (N o. 366), 564 (N o. 368),
5 67-9 (N os. 372 -3 ), 742 (N o. 505), 758-9 (N o. 521), 809 (ed. n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. M a rg erie, 741 (N o. 504).
C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron M arschall v on B ieberstein , 7 5-6 (N os. 5 5-6), 482-3 (N o. 312),
484 -6 (N os. 314 -5 ), 488 (N o. 317), 599 (N o. 397).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount M en sdorff, 742-3 (N o. 506).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t M ettern ich , 42 (N o. 30), 425 (N o. 267), 4 2 5 -6 (N o. 268), 440-3
(N o. 276), 452 (N o. 283), 4 5 4 -6 (N o. 287), 462 (N o. 293), 476-7 (N o. 305), 4 79-80 (N o. 308).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. P oin ca re, 788 (N o. 541).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . Sa zon ov, 810 (ed. note), 813-4 (N o. 558).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r Scaveuius, 743 (N o. 507).
C on v ersa tion w ith the M a rq u is de S overa l, 427 (ed. n ote), 533 (N o. 335), 534 (N o. 337).
C on v ersa tion w ith Tewfik P asha, 3 8 -9 (N o. 26), 87 (N o. 56).
M in u te by, 10 (N o. 5), 16 (N o. 6), 19 (N o. 9, n ote), 23 (N o. 12), 28 (N o. 15), 31 (N o. 19),
33 (N o. 22), 39 (N o. 27, n ote), 65 (N o. 47), 99 (N o. 66), 117 (ed. n o te ), 120-1 (N o. 70),
128 (N o. 78), 132 (N o. 83), 151 (N o. 95, n ote), 162 (N o. 106), 163 (N o. 107), 169
(N o. 116, n ote), 219 (N o. 144), 249 (N o. 157, n o te ), 279 (N o. 183), 314 (N o. 195, note),
374 (N o. 235, n ote), 420 (cd. n o te ), 434 (N o. 270), 435 (N o. 271), 439 (N o. 274), 447
(N o. 281), 454 (N o. 285), 459 (N o. 290), 461 (N o. 291), 464 (N o. 295, n otes), 468 (N o. 296),
472 (N o. 299), 473 (N o. 300), 474 (N o. 301), 475 (N o. 302), 477 (N o. 305,n o te), 479
(N o. 306), 485 (N o. 315, n o te ), 498 (N o. 321), 502 (N o. 323), 507 (ed. n o te ),
523 -5 (N o. 331), 536 (N o. 338), 546 (N o. 346), 547 (N o. 348, n o te), 547 (N o. 350, n ote),
 S49

G r e y , S ir E d w a r d (since 1916. 1s t V is c o u n t G r e y o e F a l l o d o n * <co n tin u e d ).

•>31 (,Xo. 354), 554 (X o . 358, and note), 555 ^Xo. 359), 559 <Xo. 361). 571 (X o . 374),
576 (X o . 376). 580 (X o . 381. n ote), 5S2 (X o . 382). 533 (X o . 383). 592 (cd. note). 603
(X o . 401), 622 (X o . 420, n ote). 624 (X o . 424'». 625 (X o . 425). 626 (X o . 426). 629-30
(X o . 427), 637 (X o . 434). 650 (X o . 446, n ote). 651 (X o . 44S. n ote). 652-3 (X o . 449), 693
(X o . 474), 706-7 (X o . 4SI), 718 (X o . 4S3). 720 (X o . 4S6). 734 (X o . 497), 742 (X o . 506. note),
745 (X o . 509). 74S (X o . 512. n ote). 753 (N o. 516). 776 (X o . 534). 783 (X o . .537), 7S5
(X o . 539). 794 (X o . 545). 80S (X o . 553), 812 (X o. 5-56), 813 (X o . 5-58, n ote), 8 22-3 (.4pp. I).
M em oran d a b y, 427 ( ed . n ote). 748-9 (X o . 512), 798-800 (X o . 547, encl.).
X o t e by, 530-1 (X o . 334). 565 (X o . 369).
X o t e s to be ex ch a n g ed w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky on the sign atu re o f A n glo-G erm an C on­
v en tion , J u n e 1914, 3 92-4 (ed. n ote). 406-8 (X o . 249>.
S peech by, to the M an ch ester C ham ber o f Com m erce. F ebru ary 3, 1914, 734 (X o . 497,
n o te), 734 (X o . 4 9 8 1.
S p eech es b y, in H ou se o f Com m ons. 31 (X o . 20. id note 132 (X o . 8 4' 615 (ed. n o te). 692-3
(X o . 469), 813 (X o . 557). 814 X . 558 .
S ta tem en t bv. in H ouse o f Com m ons. J u n e 11. 1914, 5 CA- 1 (ed. note). T e x t. 801 (X o . 548),
S04 (X o .‘ 551\
A n g lo-G erm a n C on ven tion re B a g d a d R a ilw ay , in itia lled by. J u n e 15, 1914. 397-403
(X o . 249).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t r, S h a tt-el-A ra b. A c., sign ed by. J u ly 2.’ . 1913, 183-98 (X o . 124 ;
S u pp lem en ta ry D ecla ra tion re S h a tt-el-A ra b. sign ed by, O ctober 21. 1913. 242 (ed. note).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t, D eclaration on N a v ig a tion of T ig ris and E up hra tes. S u p p le­
m en ta ry D eclaration s, sign ed by, D ecem b er 10. 1913. 2 81-2 X o. 186).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem ent, C on v en tion re P ersia n G ulf. S upp lem entary C on v en tion , signed
by. O ctob er 21. 1913. 241-2 (X o . 1 55 ); D ecem ber 10. 1913. sign ed by. 282 (X o . 187).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention re bounda ries o f A den, &c., sign e.l by, M arch 9, 1914, 340-1
(X o . 211).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir F . B ertie. 4 24 -5 (X o . 267), 560 (X o . 363), 6 33-9 X o. 466), 694 (X o . 470).
To S ir G. B uchanan. 776-7 (X o . 535). 813 (X o . 557).
To M r. W in ston Churchill, 431 (X o . 310), 591 (X o . 389), 695 (X o . 472).
To H .M . K in g G eorge V , 658-9 (X o . 453).
To S ir E . Goschen. 424 (X o . 266), 5 63-9 iX o . 373), 673 (X o . 459'. 687- 8 iX o. 465), 722
X o . 488'
To M r. H a rc o u rt, 461 (X o . 292).
To S ir A . H a rd in g e, 533 (X o . 335).
To L o rd K itch en er. 590 (X o . 387).
To M r. O 'B eirn e, 546-7 (X o . 348).
To S ir R . R od d , 663—4 (X o . 455).
To Colonel Seely, 4 81-2 (X o . 311).
G röber. H e r r A d o l f . M em ber o f the G erm an R eich sta g , 1913.
Q uestion by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f th e R eich sta g , 677, 680 (X o . 462, tn el.).
G t t l b e n k ia n , M . C S., A g en t of th e T urkish X a t io n a l B ank, 1910.
346 (X o . 214).
G w in x e r , D r . A rthur , Director of the Deutsche Bank.
9 (X o . 4), 98 (X o . 66, m in.), 154 (X o . 9 7', 163 (X o . 107 . 173 X o. 117■, 206 (X o . 134), 213
(X o . 139), 214 (X o . 140), 264 (X o . 172).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. L yn ch , 143 (X o . 91).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. A . P ark er, 142—4 (X o . 91). 300 (X o . 189).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir H . B a b in g ton Sm ith, 235 (X o . 154, n ote'. 301 X o. 159).
M em oran d u m by, 99 (X o . 67,
H a ji A d i l B e y , G overn or-G en era l o f A d r ia n o p le ; M in ister o f In terior, 1 9 1 3 -o ; M em ber of
C en tra l C om m ittee o f L n io n and P ro g re s s ; V a li o f A d rian op le, 1916.
11 (X o . 6).
H a k k i B e y (la ter P a s h a ) I b r a h im , T urkish M in is ter o f th e In te rio r and o f P u b lic In stru ction ,
190 8; A m bassador a t R om e, 1909; G ra n d V izie r , 1 9 1 0 -1 : D eleg a te at th e L ondon
C on feren ce, 1912-3. ^
C om m u n ication from , 94—5 (X o . 62), 9 5 -6 'X o s . 6 3-4), 130 (N o. 50 . 144 >No. -L , 1 s - o
(X o . 94), 164 (X o . 109).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 183 (X o . 123).
C on v ersa tion w itl. 5-ir A . H irtze l, 121-2 (X o . ,1).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd In ch cap e, 276-5 (X o . 153).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on K üh lm a n n , 206 (X o . 134).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir G. Low ther, 50-1 (X o . 36).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L. M allet, 154 (X o . 9. >.
[1 0 9 0 0 ] 3 1
 850
H a k k i B e y (la ter P a s h a ') I b r a h im — (con tin u ed ).
Con versa tion with M r A. P a rk er, 121 (N o. 71), 151-3 (N o. 95), 154 (N o. 97), 179-80
(N o. 119), 2 06-7 (N o. 134), 209 (N o. 136), 212-3 (N o. 139), 258 (N o. 162, n ote), 275-9
(N os. 182-3), 420 (ed. n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir H. B a b in g ton Sm ith, 10-1, 13-5 (N o. 6,and encl.), 16-7 (N o. 7).
C onversa tion w ith S ir H . L lew ellyn Sm ith, 121 (N o. 71).
N e g o tia tio n s w ith, 114-7 (ed. note).
V isit to L on d on , 90 (N o. 59).
W ith d ra w a l of, suggested, J u n e 1914, 397 (N o. 248).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u ly 29, 1913, signed hv, 183-98 (N o. 124).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem ent, D ecla ra tion on N a v ig a tion o f T ig ris and E up hra tes, A nnex,
in itia lled hv, A u g u st 19, 1913, 2 13 -4 (N o. 1 3 9 ); Supp lem en ta rv D eclaration s, signed by,
D ecem b er 10, 1913, 2 81-2 (N o. 186).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on ven tion re b ou n da ries of A den, <&c., sign ed bv, M arch 9, 1914, 340-1
(N o. 211).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t, C on ven tion re P ersian G ulf, Su pp lem en ta ry C onven tion , sign ed
by, O ctob er 21, 1913, 241-2 (N o. 1 5 5 ); sign ed by, D ecem ber 10, 1913, 282 (N o. 187).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on ven tion re ra ilw ays in Asia M in or, in itia lled by, M a y 6, 1913, 101-3
(N o. 68, enel. 2 ); in itia lled by, A ugust, 12, 1913, 203-6 (N o. 133).
A n g lo-T u rk ish D eclaration re T u rco-P ersia n fron tiers, in itia lled by, M a y 6, 1913, 100-1
(N o. 68, en d . 1).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re n a vig a tion o f th e Sh a tt-el-A ra b, in itia lled by. M ay 6, 1913,
109-14 (N o. 68, en d . 4 ); signed by, J u ly 29, 1913, 183-7 (N o. 1 2 4 ): Su pp lem en ta ry
D ecla ra tion , signed by, O ctob er 21, 1913, 242 (ed. note).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re P ersia n G ulf, &c., in itia lled by, M ay 6, 1913, 104-9 (N o. 68,
en d . 3 ) ; sign ed by, J u ly 29, 1913, 190-6 (N o. 124).
C oncession fo r the N a v ig a tion of T ig ris and E uphrates, in itia lled by, A u g u st 12, 1913, 206
(ed. note)-, signed by, D ecem ber 12, 1913, 283 98 (N o. li|S).
H a l d a x e , M r . R . B. (since 1911, 1s t V is c o u n t H a l d a n e o f C'l o a n ), B ritish S ecretary of State
fo r W a r, 1905-12; L ord C hancellor, 1924.
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, 673-4 (N o. 460).
I ’ i.s/f to B erlin , 1912, 56 (N o. 42), 441 (N o. 276), 455 (N o. 287), 478 (N o. 306, min.), 701
(N o. 475), 707, 710 (N o. 482, and encl.).
H a l i l B e y , T urkish P resid en t o f C ou n cil of S tate, 1913-4.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L. M allet, 3 86 -7 (N o. 210).
H a l im P a s h a .
(v. sub S a id H a l im P a s h a .)
H a n k e y , C a p t a in (la ter L i e u t k n a n t -C o lo n f .l S i r ) M a u r ic e , B ritish S ecretary o f the C om m ittee
o f Im peria l D efen ce, 1912- ; S ecretary o f the C abinet, 1919- ; Clerk of the P riv y
C ouncil. 1923­
5 81 -2 (N o. 382).
To S ir E. G rey, 580 (N o. 381).
H a r c o u r t , M r . L e w i s (since 1916, 1s t V is c o u n t ), B ritish S ecretary o f S ta te fo r the C olonies,
1910-5.
434 (N o. 270, m in.).
To F oreig n Office, 453 (N o. 285).
To L ord G ladstone, 474 (N o. 301).
To S ir E. G rey, 468 (N o. 297), 469-70 (N o. 299), 4 75-6 (N o. 303).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, 5 25-6 (N o. 332), 5 33-5 (N os. 336-7).
C on v ersa tion w ith B aron M arschall v on B ieberstein, 4 84-5 (N o. 314), 488 (N o. 317).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount M ettern ich , 440-3 (N o. 276), 476- 7 (N o. 305), 479-80 (N o. 308),
484 5 (N o. 314), 488 (N o. 317).
M em oran d u m by, 4 40-3 (N o. 276).
M in u te by, 477 (N o. 305), 486 (N o. 316), 507 (ed. n ote), 523 (N o. 331), 533 (N o. 336, n ote),
534 (N o. 337, note).
H a r d in g e ,
S ir A r t h u r H ., B ritish M in is ter at T ehran, 1 9 0 0 -6 ; at Brussels, 1 90 6 -1 1 ; at Lisbon,
1911-3.
To S ir E. G rev, 4 27 -9 (N o. 269), 4 35-6 (N o. 272), 438-40 (N os. 274-5), 445-51 (N os. 280-2),
458-61 (N os. 290-1), 476 (N o. 304), 513-4 (N o. 330).
C on v ersa tion w ith S enhor Costa, 510 (N o. 327).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. E. J. F rew en, 456 (N o. 288, n o te), 458 (N o. 290), 460-1 (N o. 291).
C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor M a d e ira , 436 (N o. 272), 514 (N o. 330).
C on v ersa tion w ith S enhor V ascoucellos, 428 (N o. 269), 4 35-6 (N o. 272), 438-40 (N os. 274-5),
446 (N o. 281), 447-8 (N o. 282).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir E. G rey, 510 (N o. 327).
 851
H a r d i n g e , S ir C h a r i .es (since 1910, 1 s t B a r o n H a r d in g e o f P e n s h u r s t ), B ritish Assistant
U n der-S e creta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1903-4; Am bassador at St. P etersb u rgh ,
1904-6; P erm a n en t U n der-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1906-10; V iceroy and
G ov ern or-G en era l o fM n d ia , 1910-6; P erm a n en t U n der-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n
A ffairs, 1916-8; A m bassador at P aris, 1920-3.
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount A eb ren th a l, 710 (N o. 482, encl.).
C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror W illia m II, 709 (N o. 482, encl.).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —•
To S ir A. X'icolson, 38 (N o. 25).

v o n , G erm an A m bassador at L ondon, 1S85-1901.

H a t z f e l d t - W il d e n b u r g , P a c l , C o u n t
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir F. B ertie, 425 (N o. 2 6 8 1.
C on versa tion w ith L o rd Salisbu ry, 425 (N o. 263), 431 (N o. 270h

W ., A ssistant D irector o f P o litica l Intellig en ce D ep a rtm en t of the

H e a d l a m - M o r l e y , S ir J a m e s
B ritish F oreig n Office, 1 9 1 8 -2 0 ; H isto rica l A d viser, 1920-S.
821 1,1pp. 1).

H e c k s c h e r , D r . S i e g f r i e d , M em ber o f the G erm an R eich sta g . 1912-3.

S peech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g , 679, 632 (X’ o. 462, encl.).

H e l f f e r i c h . H e r r I v a r l , D ir e cto r o f th e D eutsch e B ank, 1 9 0 8-14 ; D eleg a te to the P a ris

F in a n cia l Com m ission, 1913-4.
164-5 (X o . 110), 169-72 (X o . 116, fl/«i encl.), 213 (X o . 139), 323 (X o . 201), 353 (X o . 222).
C on v ersa tion w ith H err von J ag ow , 352 3 'X o . 221), 3 54-5 (X o . 223).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . de Lam ornaixJ 169-72 (X o . 116. and encl.).
M em oran dum by, 99 (X o . 67).

H e n d e r s o n , C a p t a in W i l f r e d , B ritish X a v a l A tta c h e a t B erlin , 1913-4.

To S ir E. G oschen, 7 32-4 (X o . 497, encl.), 740-1 (X’ o. 503, encl.), 751-2 (X'o. 516, en d s.).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce H en ry o f P russia, 732-3 (X o . 497, encl.), 744 (X’ o. 509).
C on v ersa tion w ith A d m ira l von T irp itz , 740-1 (X'o. 503, encl.).

H .R .H . P r in c e H e n r y o f P r u s s ia .
792 (X o . 545).
To H .M . K in g G eorge V , 673 (X'o. 460).
C on v ersa tion w ith K in g G eorge V , 658 (X o . 452), 673 (X o . 460).
C on v ersa tion w ith C a p ta in H end erson , 732-3 (X o . 497, encl.), 744 (X’ o. 509).
C on v ersa tion w ith C a pta in W a tson , 687 (X o . 464, note).
C o n v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror W illia m II, 673—4 (X’ o. 460).
U isif to E n g lan d , D ecem ber 1912, 658 (X o . 4 5 2 ); A p ril 1913, 694 (X’ o. 4 7 0 ); J u ly 1914, 658
(ed. n ote).

F ., B a r o n v o n . P rim e M in ister and M in ister for F oreig n A ffairs, B a v aria ,

H e r t l in c , G e o rg
1913-7.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir V. C orbett, 729 (X o . 495).

H il m i P a s h a .
(i l sub H u s s e in H il m i P a s h a .)
H ir t z e l , M r . (since 1911, S i r ) F . A r t h u r , S ecretary, P o litica l D epa rtm en t, In dia Office, 1909-17;
A ssistant U n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r I n d ia , 1 91 7-21 ; D ep u ty U n der-S ecreta rv, 1 92 1-4;
P erm a n en t U nder-Set reta ry , 1924-30.
5 7-8 (X o . 44, tnin.), 65 (X’ o. 47, « a n .), 145 (X’ o. 92).
C o n v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 1 21-2 (X o . 71).
M em oran dum by, 114-7 (ed. note).
M in u te by, 6 7-73 (X o . 50).
S ta tem en t by, com m u n ica ted to H a k k i P asha, 119 (X’ o. 69, encl.).
A n g lo-T u rk ish con v en tion re n a v ig a tio n o f th e S h a tt-el-A ra b, in itia lled by, M a y 6, 1913,
109-14 (X o . 6s, encl. 4).
A n g lo-T u rk ish con v en tion re railw ays in Asia M in or, in itia lled by, M a y 6, 1913, 101-3
(X o . 68, encl. 2).
A n g lo-T u rk ish con v en tion re P ersian G ulf, in itia lled by, M ay 6, 1913, 104-9 (X'o. 68, encl. 3).
A n g lo-T u rk ish d ecla ra tion re T u rco-P ersia n fron tiers, in itia lled by, M a y 6, 1913, 100-1
(X o . 68, encl. 1).
H o w a r d , M r . (since 1916, S ir E s m e W . (since 1923, 1s t B a r o n H o w a r d o f P e n r i t h ), B ritish
M in ister at B erne, 1 9 1 1 -3 ; a t Stock holm , 1 91 3-9; A m bassador at M a d rid , 191 9-24 ; at
W a sh in gton , 1924-30.
To S ir E. G rey, 731 (X o . 496).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ount E hrensw ard, 731 (X o . 496).
[10 9 0 0 1 3 1 2
 852
H u g u e n in , I I f.r r , D irector-G en era l o f A n a tolian and B a g d a d R a ilw ay Com panies.
50 (N o. 36).
M em oran d u m by, 99 (N o. 67).

H u r st, M r . (later S i r ) C e c il J. B., A ssista n t L ega l A d viser to the B ritish F oreig n Office,
190 2-18 ; L ega l S ecretary to the B ritish P len ip oten tia ries at the Secon d H a g u e P eace
C on ference, 1907; D eleg a te at L on doii N aval C onference, 1908; L eg a l A d viser to the
F o re ig n Office, 1 91 8-29 ; J u d g e o f the P erm a n en t C ou rt o f In te rn a tio n a l J u stice at
The H a g u e, 1929-
A n g lo-G erm a n C onven tion , R ev ised D r a ft o f A r ticle 6, by, 259-60 (N o. 163).

H u s s e in P a s h a , G rand S h eriff o f M ecca , 1908; K in g o f the H ejaz.

827 (.A p p . I l l , iv).
M em ora n d u m on the position of, 828 -9 (.1 pp. I l l , iv).

H u s s e in D j a h i d B e y , M em ber o f the T urkish Cham ber, E d ito r o f the T anine, 1909-11.

A r tic le s b y, in the T anine, 6 (N o. 1), 34 (N o. 23).

H u s s e in H il m i P a s h a , Turkish In sp ector-G en eral o f M a ced on ia , 1 9 0 2 -8 ; M in ister for the

In terior, 1 9 0 8 -9 ; G rand V izier, 1909; A m bassador at V ien n a, 1912-8.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. M a rlin g , 9 (,No. 4).

I bn R a s h id J e b b e l S h a m h a r .
827 (A p p . I l l , iv).

Ibn S a u d , o f X e jd , la te r K i n g o f th e H e ja z an d of N e jd .
8 2 7 -9 (,1pp. I l l , iv ), 835 (,4pp. I l l , v).
B r itish p olicy tow ard , 829 (A p p . I l l , iv).

I m p e r i a l i , M a r q u is G u g l ie l m o , Ita lia n A m bassador at L on d on , 1910-21.

C o n v e rsa tio n w ith M . P a u l C am bon, 652 (N o. 449).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E y re Crowe, 652 (N o. 449).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 4 9-5 0 (N o. 35), 249-50 (N o. 157), 623 (N o. 423), 648-50
(N os. 445 -6 ), 6 51-2 (N o. 448), 6 53 -4 (N o. 450).

I nchcape, J am e s L y l e M a c k a y . 1s t B a r o n o f S t r a t h n a y e r .
117 (ed. n o te ), 121 (N o. 71), 168 (N o. 114), 179 ^No. 119), 212 (N o. 139), 258 (N o. 162,
n o te (3) ) , 259 (N o. 162), 267 (N o. 174), 310-1 (N o. 192), 312 (N o. 193), 382 (N o. 237).
C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 2 76 -8 (N o. 183).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. A. P a rk er, 2 76 -8 (N o. 183).
C on v ersa tion w ith Sassoon E ffen di, 276 8 (N o. 183).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y A g reem en t, sign ed by, F eb ru a ry 23, 1914, 329-33 (N o. 202).
Concession fo r N a v ig a tio n o f T ig ris and E up hrates, in itia lled by, A u g u st 12, 1913, 206
(ed. note)-, sign ed by, D ecem b er 12, 1913, 283-98 (N o. 188).

I s m a il H a k k i B e y B a b a n z a d e , T urkish D ep u ty fo r B a g da d, 1910; M in ister fo r P u b lic Instruc­

tion , 1908-10.
A r tic le s by, in th e Tanine, 10 (N o. 5), 11 (N o. 6), 14 (N o. 6, encl.), 5 1-2 (N o. 37).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. M allet, 5 1-2 (N o. 37).

I s v o l s k i , M . A l e x a n d e r , R ussian M in ister at Copenhagen, 1 9 0 3 -6 ; M in ister fo r Foreign

A ffairs, 1 9 0 6 -1 0 ; Am bassador at P aris, 1910-7.
C on v ersa tion w ith D ja v id Bey, 209 (N o. 136).

J a c k s o n , Sir H
enry B r a d w a r d i n e , B ritish A d m ira l, C h ief o f W a r Staff, 1 9 1 2 -4 ; 1st Sea Lord,
1915-6.
694 (ed. n ote).

J ackson, M r . H u t h , D ire cto r o f the B a n k o f E n glan d .

117 (ed. n ote).

J a c k s o n , S ir J o h n , L t d ., B ritish E ngineers.
163 (N o. 115).

J a f er , S h e r if f .
829 (.1pp. I l l , iv).
 853
J agow , H err G. v o x . G erm an Am bassador a t R om e. 1 9 0 9 -1 2 ; Secretary o f S ta te fo r F o re ig n
A ffairs. 1913-6.
To S ir E. G osehen. 5 65 -6 (X o . 370 .
C on versa tion w ith M . J u les Cam bon. 696 (N o. 473), 724-5 (S o . 491).
Con ersa tion w ith S ir E . Gosehen, 3 52-3 (X o . 221'. 3 54 -5 (X o . 223). 5 66-7 (N o. 371), 569-70
(X o . 374). 693 ,X o . 469), 7u2 (X o . 4765, 7a5 X o . 4795. 735 X o. 499 . 736 (X o . 500),
763 (X o . 5 2 5 1. 772-3 (X o . 5325, 772 3 X o . 5455, $ 02-3 (X o . 5-50).$04 (X o . 551).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r H elfferich , 3 52-3 (X o . 221). 3 54 -5 X o. 223
Con ersa tion w ith M r. M a ck en zie, 792 (X o . 5455.
C on v ersa tion w ith M ahm ud M u k ta r P asha, 705 (X o . 479
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir R . R o d d , 659-62 A 'o . 454).
C on v ersa tion w ith th e E m p eror W illia m II. 567 (X o . 3715.
A p p o in tm e n t o f as M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 662 (X o . 454, n ote).
R e p ly by, to qu estion in the R e ich s tr g . 132 (X o . $4), 161 (X o . 106),163 (N o. 107).
S peech by, 670 (X o . 4 5 7 1, 679, 6$1 (N o. 462, encl.), 745 (X o . 5105.

J elal B e t , T u rk ish Consul at Bom bay. 1903-10.

R e p o r t by, on P ersia n G ulf, 1910, 6 (X o . 1).

J e l l ic o e , S i r J o h n R u s h w o r t h (since 1917, 1 s t V is c o u n t J e l l ic o e o f S c a p a , since l.*25,

1s t E a r l J e l l ic o e ), B ritish V ice -A d m ira l. 2nd Sea L o rd , 1912-4.
699 (X o . 4755.

J oh n ston e, M r. since 1905, S ir ) A l a n , S ecretary o f B ritish Em bassy at V ien n a, 1 9 0 3 -5 ;

M in ister at C op enhagen, L 45-10; at T he H a g u e, 1910-7.
To S ir E . G rey. 457 (N o. 2$S).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . v an Sw inderen, 457 (X o . 2$9).

J ordan. S ir J o h x , B ritish M in ister a t P ek in g , 1906-20.

$22 (A p p . I ). '

J u st. S ir H a r t m a n n W o l f g a n g , P rin cip a l C lerk in the B ritish C olon ia l Office, 1 39 7-19 0 7 ;

A ssista nt U n d er-S ecreta ry o f State, 1907-16.
497 (N o. 320, m i/i. .
To F oreig n Office, 453 (X o . 2s5).

K arolyi vox X a g y - K a r o l y , L u d w ig , C o u n t , M em ber of th e U p p er C ham ber of the H u n g a ria n

P a rlia m en t.
646 (X o . 444).

K ato . B aron T a k a a k t . J ap an ese Am bassador at L on d on , 1 90 9 -1 2 ; M in is ter fo r F o re ig n A ffairs,

1912-3, 1914-6.
C on v ersa tion with. S ir C. G reene, 323 (.4pp. II).

K hadem B ey. D r .
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L . M a llet, 336 (A p p . I l l , v).

I K h a l il E ffexdi Z e y n ie h , G reek C a th olic J ou rn a list.

325 (A p p . I l l , iii).

, K id e r l e x - W a e c h t e r ,
H err v o x . G erm an M in is ter at B uch arest, 1399-1910; A tta ch e d to
G erm an F o re ig n Office, 1 9 0 8 -9 ; M in is ter fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1910-2.
421 (X o . 265, and n o te C

K in g , M r . J o s e p h , M .P . fo r X o r t h S om erset, 1910-13. _
Q uestion by, in the H ou se o f Com m ons, 639 (X o . 4<6),801 (X o . 543,).

K i t c h e n e r , H e r b e r t H o r a t io . 1 s t V is c o u n t K it c h e n e r o f K h a r t u m (since 1914, E a r l "), B ritish

F ield -M arsh a l, A g en t and Consul-G eneral in Cairo, 1911^4; S ecretary f S ta te fo r W a r,
1914-6.
To S ir E. G rey, 650 (X o . 446, note), ?27, 830-1 (.1pp. I l l , iv5.
C on v ersa tion w ith E m ir A b dulla h, 326-32 (A p p . I I I . iv). _ _ _
D ra ft D e cla r a tio n re E g y p tia n b orrow in g pow ers. 121-2 X o . 71. and n ote <2' ), 152 (X o . 95)
A n d th e A ra b N a tion a l M ovem en t, 824-33 (.1pp. I I I ).
P r iv a te L e t t e r s —
To S ir E . G rey, 592 (X o . 390), 594—o (X o . 392'.
To S ir W . T yrrell, 331 (-Ip p- I I I , if)-

K lapka. M . E . d e , G eneral S ecretary o f the Im p eria l O ttom an B ank, 1913, 1914.

212’ (X o . 13$), 323 (X o . 201).
 854
K o e s t e r , A d m ir a l H . L. R . v o n , In sp ector-G en eral o f the G erm an N avy, 1 9 0 3 -7 ; P residen t of
th e G erm an N a vy L eague, 1908, 1909, 1913-4.
A n d G erm an N a v y L eagu e, 680 (N o. 462, encl.).
S p eech by, at the A n n u a l M e e tin g o f th e G erm an “ F lo tte n v e re in ,” 751-2 (N o. 516, encl. 2).

K o k o v t s o v , M ., R ussian M in ister fo r F in a n ce, 1 9 0 3-14 ; P resid en t o f the C ouncil, 1911-4.

769 (N o. 530), 777 (N o. 536).

K o r o s t o v e t z , M ., R ussian M in ister at T ehran, 1914-5.

805 (N o. 552), 807 (N o. 553).

K r i v o s c h e i n e , M., R ussian M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , 1906-15.

767 (N o. 528), 776 (N o. 534).

K r u p e n s k i , M . A. N., R ussian A m bassador at R om e, 1912-5.

C on v ersa tion w ith the M a rq u is di San G iuliano, 643 (N o. 440).

K u h l m a n n H e r r R i c h a r d v o n , S ecretary at G erm an L eg a tion at T an g ier, 1 9 0 4 -6 ; C ouncillor

o f Em bassy a t L on d on , 1908-14 (som etim es C ha rgé d ’ A ffa ires).
T o S ir E. G rey, 242-9 (N o. 156), 250-1 (N os. 158-9), 256 (N o. 161, n o te), 5 41-4 (N o 343)
544 (N o. 344).
To M r. P a rk er, 2 23-4 (N o. 147).
C om m u n ica tion from , 99 (N o. 67), 137 (N o. 89, encl. 1), 310-1 (N o. 192), 3 2 5 -9 (N o 201)
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E yre C row e, 371 (N o. 232), 143 (N o. 276, m in.) 499-500 (N o 3^2)
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 128 (N o. 78), 128-9 (N o. 79), 131 (N o. 82) 718 (N o 484)’
C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 206 (N o. 134).

A r b itra to r in B a g da d R a ilw a y A g reem en t, F ebru ary 23, 1914, 332 (N o. 202).

A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m Concessions, sign ed by, M a rch 19, 1914, 3 45-6 (N o. 214).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To M r. P a rk er, 364 (N o. 226).
To M r. T yrrell, 4 83-4 (ed. note).

L a m o r n a ix , M . d e .
(l\ Sul) S.ALLANÜRorZE DE LAMORNAIX.)

L a n g l e y , M r . (since 1912, S i r ) W a l t e r , S en ior C lerk in the B ritish F o re ig n Office, 1902-7;

A ssista nt U n der-S ecreta rv o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1907-18.
822 (.4pp. I).
M in u te by, 473 (N o. 300), 484 (ed. n o te ).

L ansdow ne, H e n r y C. K . P e t t y - F i t z Ma u r ic e , 5t h M a r q u e s s o f , B ritish S ecretarv o f State

fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, N ovem b er 12, 190 0-D ecem ber 11, 1905.
To A n th op ou lo P asha, 49 (ed. note).
M in u te by, 5 (N o. 1, n ote).
S p e ech e s by, in the H ou se o f L ord s, 6 (N o. 1), 79 (N o. 55)
V iew s of, on P ersian G u lf policy , 5 (N o. 1, and note). o te).

L a p e y i ie r e , Vic e - A d m ir a l B o u e d e , C om m a n d er-in -C h ief o f the F ren ch naval forces in the

M ed iterra n ean , 1912.
V iew s of, on P ersian G u lf policy , 5 (N o. 1, and n ote).

L a u r e n t , M . C h a r l e s F r a n q o is , F ren ch F in a n cia l E x p ert, F in a n cia l A d v iser to th e Turkish

Go\rernm ent, 1910, 1911; P resid en t o f th e C our des C om ptes
44 (N o. 33).

L aw rence, Co lo n el.
219 (N o. 144, m in.).

L edebour, H e r r G e o r g , M em b er o f the G erm an R eich sta g , 1910, 1913.

S p eech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f th e R eich sta g , 677-9, 682 (N o. 462, encl.).
 S 55

L i c h n o w s k y . P r in c e K
a r l M a x . G erm an Am bassador at L ondon. 1912-4
To S ir E. G rey. 134 (N o. >6. encl.). 174-9 (N o. 118). 315-23 (N o. 198>. 3 34 -5 (N o. 204), 352
(N o. 220), 36S-9 (N o. 230). 374 (N o. 2 3 4 . 3 s « - 9 (N o. 242). 514-21 (N o. 331), 530-1
(N o. 334).
C om m unication from . 16-5-6 (N o. 111. encl.).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E . G rey. S6-7 (N o. 65). 133 (N o. 86). 164 (N o. 108 . 182 N o. 122),
4 88-9 (N o. 31s . 500-1 (N o. 323). 5 25-6 (N o. 332), 5 33-5 Nos. 336 -8 ), 540-1 (N o. 342).
549 (N o. 352). 554 (N o. 3-58>. 5 55 -6 (N o. 360), 562—1 (N o. 366'. 564 (N o. 368), 567-S
(N o. 373 '. 742 (N o. 505). 758-9 (N o. 521), 809 (ed. note).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd H a ld an e, 67:3-4 (N o. 460).
C on versa tion w ith M r. H a rc o u rt, 5 25-6 No. 332), 533—5 (N os. 336-7).
C on versa tion w ith M r. A. P a rk er, 142-4 No. 91).
M em oran dum by. 315 -2 0 (N o. 198, encl. 1).
X o t e s to be ex ch a n g ed w ith S ir E. G rev on th e sign atu re o f A nglo-G erm a n C onven tion ,
J u n e 1914, 3 92-4 ied. n ote), 406-8 (N o. 249).
A n g lo-G erm a n C on ven tion re B a g d a d R a ilw a v , J u n e 15, 1914, in itia lled bv, 397-408
(N o. 249).
P riv a te L e t t e r —
To M r. T yrrell. 750 (N o. 514).

L id d e l l H . a r t . C a p t a in B. H ., M ilita r y C orresp on den t o f th e Times.

S26 (ed. n ote .

L im an . H e r rP a u l H .. G erm an w riter.
743-4 (N o. 5 0 s ..

L im a n v o n S a n d e r s . L i e u t e n a n t -G e n e r a l O t t o . H ea d o f G erm an M ilita r y M ission in T ü r k e i,

191:3-4.
A p p o in tm e n t of, at C on stan tin ople, 726 (N o. 491).

L i s t e r , M r . E. G., Clerk in the B ritish F o re ig n Office. 1890—If" >3 A c tin g 3rd S ecretary at C on­
s ta n tin op le an d Sofia, 1903—5 : at P aris. 1 9 0 5 -6 ; A ssistant Clerk in F o re ig n Office,
1 9 0 7 -1 3 ; tem p ora rily em ploy ed in F oreig n Office, 1915-9.
M in u te by, 459 No. 290).

L l o y d G e o r g e , M r . D ., B ritish C hancellor o f the E x ch eq u er, 1 9 0 8-15 ; P rim e M in ister an d F irst

L ord of the T reasury. 1916-22.
S peech by, M an sion H ouse, J u ly 21, 1911. 422 (N o. 2 6 5 ); 619 No. 41s .
S ta tem en t in D a ily C h ron icle, J a n u a ry 1914. 729-30 (N o. 495).

L onsdale. H u g h C. L o w t h e r , 5t h E a r l o f L onsdale.
701 (N o. 475).

L o r im e r . M r . J . G.. B ritish P o litica l R esid en t in T urkish A rab ia , 1910: A c tin g Consul-G eneral
at B a g d a d in 1809. 1910; C onsul-G eneral. 1911-4.
2 (N o. 1 .

H .S .H . P r in c e L o u is o f B a t t e n b e r g .
(r. sub M o u n t b a t t f .n .)
L o w th e r .M r . (since 1907. S ir ) G e r a r d A.. B ritish M in is ter at T an g ier, 1 9 0 5 -8 ; A m bassador at
C on stan tin ople. 1908-13.
To S ir E. G rev, 1 -6 (N o. 1). 1 8 -° (N o. 8). 2 1-2 (N os. 11-2 . 24-6 Nos. 14-5), 2 8 -9 N o. 17'.
30 (N o. 19). 3 2-5 (N os. 2 2-3 . 50-1 (N o. 36). 5 2-3 No. 36 . 55 (N o. 41 8 8 - ° No. 58 .
90 (N o. 59), 125 (N o. 76). 160-1 (N o. 104). « 2 5 -6 (.4pp. I I I . iii).
C on versa tion w ith Assim Bey, 52—3 (N o. 38). 55 (N o. 41), « « - 9 (N o. 5« .
C on versa tion w ith H a k k i P asha. 50-1 (N o. 36).
C on v ersa tion w ith M ahm ud rsh 'fk* t P asha, 90 (N o. 59 .
C on v ersa tion w ith R ifa a t P asha. 1 (N o. 1), 18-9 (N o. s 22 (N o. 12 , 2 4 -5 Nos. 14—51 2s
(N o. 17 .
L y n c h , M e s s r s .. o f B a g d a d , E u p h ra tes an d T ig ris N a v ig a tio n C om pany.
2. 3. 4 (N o. 1). 117 (ed. n o te). 118 (N o. 69). 121 (N o. 71:, 126 No. 77). 163 (N o. 107), 277
(N o. 183), 303 (N o. 169), 31s (N o. 198), 329 (N o. 202), 382 (N o. 237).

L y n c h , M r . H . F. B.
C on v ersa tion w ith D ja v id Bey, 179—80 (N o. 119).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r G w inner, 143 (N o. 91).
M acD o n a l d , M r. J am e s R a m s a y , M .P . fo r A b era v on , 1 9 2 2-29 ; Seaharn, 1 9 2 9-31 ; Scottish
U n iversities, 1 9 3 6 -7 ; L ead er o f th e L a b ou r P a rty . 1 9 1 1 -4 ; P rim e M in ister a n d F irst
L o rd o f th e T reasury, 1924, 1°29835._
S p eech by. in the H ou se of Com m ons, 755 (N o. 51S).
 850

M achado, S exh or B e rn a rd in o , Portuguese M inister for F oreign Affairs. 1910-2; Prim e

M inister and M inister of the Interior, 1914; President of the Republic, 1915-9.
460 (No. 291), 513 (X o. 330).
C onv er sa tio n with Mr. Carnegie, 564 (X o. 367).
R e p l y by, to questions in Chamber of Deputies, 564 (X o. 367).

M a cie ira , Senhor A., Portuguese M inister for Justice, 1911-2; Minister for Foreign Affairs,
1913.
C onv er sa tio n with Mr. Carnegie, 548-9 (X o. 351), 550-1 (X o. 354).
C onv er sa tio n with Sir A. Ilardin ge, 436 (X o. 272), 514 (X o. 330).
S peec h by, at Portuguese Geographical Society, 549 (A'o. 351, note).
S peec h by, in Chamber of D eputies, 513-4 (X o. 330).

M cK enna, M r . II., B ritish F irst Lord of the A dm iralty, 1908-11 ; Secretary of State for Home
Affairs, 1911-5.
M i n u t e by, 48 (X o. 34, note,).

M a ck en zie, M r., T im es correspondent at Berlin, 1914.

C onv er sa tio n with H err von Jagow , 792 (X o. 545).

M ahm ud Bey, Turkish Consul-General at Bombay, 1910.

R e p o r t by, on Persian Gulf, 1910, 6 (X’ o. 1).

M ahm ud M u kh tar Pasha, Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, 1913-4.

Con ver sa tio n with H err von Jagow , 705 (X o. 479).
Con ver sa tio n with the Em peror W illiam II, 700 (X o. 475).

M ahm ud S h e f k e t P a s h a , Turkish Com mander of I l l r d Arm y Corps, President of M acedonian

Financial Commission, 1908; Grand Vizier, Ja n u a ry-Jn n e 1913.
11 (X o. 6).
Conv er sa tio n with Sir G. Lowther, 90 (X o. 59).

M a k la k ov ,M. X J k o l a i A., Russian M inister of the In terior, 1914-5.

767 (X o. 528).
M a lk in , M r . (later Sin) H e r b e r t W., Em ployed in the British Foreign Office, 1911-4; A cting
2nd Secretary in the D iplom atic Service, 1914; Assistant Legal Adviser to Foreign
Office. August 1914-29; Legal Adviser to Foreign Office, 1929­
200 (X o. 127).
M i n u t e by, 141-2 (X o. 90), 144-6 (X o. 92).

M a lle t, M r . (since 1912, S i r ) L o u i s , Assistant Clerk in the British Foreign Office, 1902-5;
P rivate Secretary to Sir E. Grey, 1905-6; Senior Clerk, 1906-7; Assistant Under­
secretary o f State for F oreign Affairs, 1907-13, 1918-20; Ambassador at Constantinople,
1913-4. ‘
To Board of Trade, 93-4 (X o 61).
To Sir E. Grey, 258 (X o. 162, no te), 260-1 (Xos. 164-5), 262 (No. 16S), 263-4 (Nos. 170-1),
274 (X o. 181), 323-4 (No. 199), 386-7 (X o. 240), 395 (X o. 2461, 409-14 (Nos. 250-5),
415-6 (No. 258), 416 (No. 259, note), 827-9 ( A p p . I l l , iv), 833-8 (.4pp. I l l , v).
To H akki Pasha, 90-1 (No. 60).
To In dia Office, 16-7 (No. 7), 140 (No. 90), 157 (No. 101).
To India Office and Board of Trade, 136-40 (No. 89).
To Lord K itchener, 835 (/1pp. I l l , v).
To Said H alim Pasha, 410-1 (No. 251, enels. 1, 2).
C on ver sa tio n with M. Bonipard, 414 (No. 255).
C onv er sa tio n w ith D javid Bey, 411-2 (No. 252).
C on ver sa tio n with Djemal Bey, 323-4 (No. 199).
Con ver sa tio n with M. de Giers, 260 (X o. 164).
Con ver sa tio n with H akki Pasha, 154 (No. 97).
Con ver sa tio n with H alil Bey, 386-7 (No. 240).
Con ver sa tio n with Ismail Hakki Bey Babanzade, 51-2 (No. 37).
Con ver sa tio n with Dr. K hadem Bey, 836 ( A p p . I l l , v).
Con versa tio n with M ohmod Talaat Bey, 264 (No. 171), 834, 836 (-1pp. I l l , v).
Con ver sa tio n with Said Halim Pasha, 261 (No. 165), 262 (No. 1681, 263-4 (Nos. 170-1),
395 (No. 246), 409 (No. 250), 411-4 (Nos. 252-5), 415-6 (No. 258), 834-5, 837 (.4pp. I l l , v).
Con ver sa tio n with Baron von W nngenhcim , 412 (X o. 252), 413 (X o. 253), 414 (X o. 255).
M e m o r a n d u m bv, 114-6 (ed. note), 138-9 (No. 89, e n d . 2), 274 (Xo. 181, end. ).
M i n u t e bv, 13-5 (X o. 6, notes), 16 (X o. 6), 21-2 (X o. 11), 23 (X o. 12), 27 (No. 15), 29
(No. 17), 30 (No. 19), 33 (No. 22), 54 (X o. 39), 57-8 (X o. 44), 65 (X o. 47), 132 (X o. 83),
144 (No. 91), 153 (No. 95), 210 (No. 137), 219 (No. 144).
II, K i n g
H . M . M a .n o e l o f P o r t u g a l, 1908-10.
427 (ed. note).
 S57

J a c q u in r e . M . B r u n o F. M P., Assistant
M a p .c .e r ie . D ire c teu r Politique at the French
M inistry of F oreign Affairs. 1912.
C onversation with Sir E. Grey, 741 (X o. 504k

M a r lin g . M r . (since 1916. S i r ) C h a r l e s M.. Counsellor of Embassy at British Embassy at

Constantinople, 1903-10 »'sometimes Chargé (VAffaires') ; Chargé d'Affai res at Tehran,
1910; at Constantinople, 1910—5 (sometimes Chargé d'Affaires) ; M inister at Tehran,
1915-9 : at Copenhagen, 1919-21 ; at The H ague. 1921-6.
To Sir E. Grey. 7- 15 (X os. 3-61. 201 (X o. 129), 226-7 (X o. 149).
Con ver sa tio n with M. de Giers, 201 (No. 1291.
C onversa tion with Hussein H ilm i Pasha. 9 (X o. 4).
C onversa tion w ith M. M inorski, 201 »Xo. 129).
C onversa tion with B ifa a t Pasha, S—9 No. 4), 9-10 (X o. 5).

M a r s c h a ll to n B ie b e p .s t e in . A d o l f . B a r o n , German Ambassador at Constantinople, H 97-1912;

at London, 1912. ^
C onv er sa tio n with Sir E. Grey. 75-6 (X os. 55-6), 432-3 (No. 3121, 4b4-6 (X os. 314—o), 4ba
(X o. 317/, 599 Xo. 397). ‘
C on ver sa tio n w ith M r. L. H arcourt, 434—5 >Xo. 314),4bb(X o. 31 <>.
C on versatio n with Sir A. Xicolson, 65-5-7 (X o. 451).
D eat h of, 4b3 {ed. note).
TTeics of. on Alliances and Ententes, 656 (X’ o. 457).
M a r t in i, S ig n o r F e r d in .a n d o , Italian M inister for the Colonies.1914^6.
Con versa tio n with Sir R . R odd, 644—5 (X o. 4421, 645 >X o. 4431.

M a x w e ll. M r . R . P.. Senior Clerk in the British F oreign Office, 1902-13. _

M i n u t e by. 16 (X o. 61. 21 (No. 111. 33 (X o. 22». 65 (X o. 47). 163 (X o. 107).

W a ycock . M r . (since 1913. S ir » W i l l o u g h b y R . D.. Clerk in the British Foreign Office l S i 2-96 ;
E ditor o f British and F o r e i g n S ta t e Pa pers . 1S97-1903; Superintendent of Treaty
D epartm ent, 1903-13.
M i n u t e by, 141 (X o. 90).

M eade L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l M a l c o l m J.. British Consul-General at B u s h ir e ,lb 9 1-1902.

Agreem ent o f January 23. 1399, tvith the Sheikh of K ow eït, signed by, 10« (X o. bs,
’ encl. 31, 194-5 (X’ o. 124).
First V ice-President o f Turkish Chamber of D eputies, 1909 ; M inister of
M f.h m e d T a l a a t B e y .
the In terior, 1909-13; D elegate to the Peace N egotiations at Bucharest, 1913; Minister
of the Interior. 1913.
Conversation w ith s ir L. M allet, 264 (No. l i l ) , s34, S36 ( A p p . I l l , a ) .

M exezes, Senhor Joâo D u a r te de, P ortuguese M inister of M arine in the Chagas Cabinet,
1.911-2. _
Questions by, in Chamber of D eputies, 513 (X o. 330).

M e x s d o r ff-P o u illy -D ie t r ic h s t e ix ,
A lb e r t, C ou n t, 1st Secretary at the A ustro-H ungarian
Embassy at London. 1904: Ambassador at London, 1904-14.
C onversa tion with Sir E. Grey, <42—3 (X o. 506).

German A m b a s s a d o r at London, ^ F - I A
M e t t e r x ic h , P a u l v o n W o l f f - , C o u n t,
Con versatio n with Sir E. Grey, 42 (X o. 30). 42o (No. o _26S). 44<V3 (X «. - 6 ) ,
452 X o. 233). 404-6 (X o. 237), 462 (X o . 293), 4 ,6 -- (X o. 30o), 4 ,9 -b b (X o. 30S).
C on ver sa tio n with M r. H arcou rt, 440-3 (X o. 276), 476-7 (No. 30o , 4,9-bU (X o. 30b-, * .4 -o
(X o. 314), 4bb (X o. 317).
M iln e . A d m ir a l S ir A r c h ib a ld B e r k e le y , B ritish Adm iral, Coinmander-in-Chief, .Mediterranean
' Fleet, 1912-4.
700 (X'o. 475 i.

M in o r s k i. M. V. T., 2nd Secretary at Russian Embassy at Constantinople, 1913-4.

C on ver sa tio n with M r. M arling. 201 (X’ o. 129).

M o ltk e . H e llm u th , C o u n t v o n , Prussian General, Chief o f 190&- 14-

A n d W ar between France and Germany, D ecem ber 1913, i - (* - -

M o r le y . M r. J oh n (later 1 s t V i s c o u n t M o r l e y o f B l a c k b u r n ) Secretary of State for India,

1905-10, and « a r c h - M a y 1911; L ord President of the Council, 1910-4; in charge of
Foreign Office, Ju ly 1911, April 1913.
M i n u t e by, 45 (X o. 34, note), 70 1 (^ ° - • __
Speech by, in the House o f Lords, i fl I (X o. 537).
 858
M ornard, M. J., B elgia n A d m in istra tor-G en eral o f P ersia n Custom s at T ehran, 1900-15.
804 (N o. 552), 807 (N o. 553), 819 (N o. 561, encl.).

M o u n t b a t t e n , H .S .H . P r in c e L o u is (since 1917, 1 s t M a r q u e s s of M il f o r d H a v f .n ), F irst

Sea L ord o f B ritish A d m ira lty , 1912-4.
797 (ed. n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith the C om te de S a in t-S ein e, 694 (ed. note).
A n d A n glo-R u ssia n naval conversation s, 814 (N o. 559).
I n v ita tio n to, to be present at K ie l week, 1914, 7 44-5 (N o. 509, and m in ), 749 (N o. 512),
750 (N o. 515).
V isit to R ussia, proposal of, 1914, 812 (N o. 556), 812 (ed. n o te).

M u b a r a k - e l - S u b a h , Sheikh of K ow eit, 1899-1914.

8 33-4 (A p p . I l l , iv).
A greem ents, sign ed by, 1 07-8 (N o. 68, encl. 31, 194-5 (N o. 124).

M üller, D r . (o f M ein in gen ), [Member of the G erm an R eich sta g , 1913.

Q u estion by, in the R eich sta g , 132 (N o. 84).

E r i c h v o n , G erm an N a val A tta c h e

M ü l l e r , C a p t a in at L on don , 1912-4.
To G orm an Im p eria l N a vy Office, 658 (ed. n ote).

N a z im P a s h a , T urkish D irector-G en era l o f O rdnance in the G overnm ent o f A chm ed M u k h tar

and K ia m il P asha, 1910-3.
15 (N o. 6, encl.), 18 (N o. 8), 19 (N o. 8, m in.).

H .I.M . N ic h o l a s I I , E m p eror o f R ussia, 1894-1917.

C on versa tion w ith S ir G. B uch an a n , 778-9 (N o. 536), 780-2 (N o. 537), 805-7 (N o. 553),
^ 811-2 (N o. 556).
C on versa tion w ith M. J u les C am bon, 704 (N o. 477).
C on v ersa tion w ith K in g G eorge V , 801-2 (N o. 549).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. S azonov, 778 (N o. 536).
M e e tin g w ith the E m p eror W illia m II at B a ltic P o rt, J u ly 4 -6 , 1912, 609 (N o. 408), 656
(N o. 451).
T elegram to K in g F erd in a n d , 703 (N o. 476).
V isit to B erlin , M ay 1913, 703 (N o. 476).
A n d A n n ex a tion o f K ia o-ch a u , 478 (N o. 306, min.).
A n d v isit o f B ritish F irst B a ttle S q u ad ron to R ussia, 1914, 811 (N o. 555).

N ic o l s o n , S ir A r t h u r (since 1916, 1s t B a r o n C a r n o c k o f C a r n o c k ), B ritish Am bassador at

M a d rid , 1 9 0 5 -6 ; at St. P etersb u rg h , 1 9 0 6-10 ; B ritish R ep resen ta tiv e at C on feren ce at
A lgeeiras, 1906; P erm a n en t I n d er-S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r F oreig n Affairs, 1910-6.
To M. P au l Cam bon, 167 (N o. 113)
C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t B en ck en dorff, 97 (N o. 66, n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. P a u l C am bon, 37 (N o. 24), 39 (N o. 27, m in.), 8 7-8 (N o. 57), 314
(N o. 196), 342 (N o. 212), 5 54-5 (N o. 359), 559 (N o. 361, m in ), 5 82 -3 (N o. 383), 583-4
(N o. 384), 593 (N o. 391), 597 (N o. 395), 603 (N o. 401), 6 11-2 (N o. 411), 697 (N o. 474).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. de F leuria u, 785 (N o. 539).
C on v ersa tion w ith H .M . K in g G eorg e V , 673-4 (N o. 460).
C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron von M arschall, 655-7 (N o. 451).
C on v ersa tion w ith Tewfik Pasha, 1 9-20 (N o. 9, and n ote), 55 (N o. 40), 56 (N o. 42), 87
(N o. 56).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. de V illa u r ru ttia , 435 (N o. 271).
M in u te by, 14 (N o. 6, n ote), 19 (N o. 8), 22 (N o. 11), 23 (N o. 121 28 (N o. 15), 29 (N o. 17),
30-1 (N o. 19), 39 (N o. 27), 54 (N o. 39), 56 (N o. 43, note), 58 (N o. 44), 65 (N o. 47), 98-9
(N o. 66), 117 (ed. n o te ), 120 (N o. 70), 122 (N o. 71), 163 (N o. 107), 279 (N o. 183), 364
(N o. 226), 420 (ed. n ote). 434 (N o. 270), 447 (N o. 281), 151 (N o. 282), 459 (N o. 290),47
(N o. 300), 484 (ed. n o te ), 492 (N o. 319), 498 (N o. 321), 502 (N o. 323), 514 (N o. 330), 524-5
(N o. 331), 5 54-5 (N o. 359), 559 (N o. 361), 571 (N o. 374), 576 (N o. 376), 582 (N o. 382),
603 (N o. 401), 629-30 (N o. 427), 737 (N o. 501), 763 (N o. 525), 763 (N o. 528), 783 (N o. 537),
785 (N o. 539), 795 (N o. 546, n o te), 808 (N o. 553), 820 (N o. 561), 822-3 (A p p . I).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir F. B ertie, 583-4 (N o. 384).
To S ir G. B uchanan, 821 (ed. n o te).
To S ir M. de Bunsen, 786-7 (N o. 540).
To S ir E. Goschen, 704 (N o. 478), 726-7 (N o. 492), 745-6 (N o. 510), 773-4 (N o. 533).
To S ir E. G rev, 435 (N o. 271), 582-3 (N o. 383),585 (N o. 385), 6 07-8 (N o. 407),673
(N o. 460), 697-8 (N o. 474).
 859
X ocara, S ig n o r , Italia n E ng in eer. R ep resen ta tiv e o f the Banca C onim ere;ale d 'O rien te at C on­
sta n tin op le. 1912; D eleg a te on the O ttom an P u b lic D ebt. 191:1.
324 (N o. 199. mir..), 343 (X o . 213. encl. i. 374 (X o . 235. n o t . 376 (N o. 235)
A g reem ent re S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay . H ea ds o f proposed, in itia lled bv. M arch 6. 1914, 343
(.Xo. 213, n ote).

N orm an, M r . H . C.. 2nd Secretary at B ritish Em bassy at St. P etersburgh. 1 9 0 3 -6 ; em ployed
in F oreig n Office. 1 9 0 6-14 ; 1st Secretary. 1907; C ounsellor o f Em bassy at Buenos Aires,
1914—5 som etim es C harge d 'A ffa ir e s ): at T ok io. 1915 8 : M in ister at T ehran and Consul-
G eneral in P ersia, 1920-2.
M in u te by. 33 (X o . 22). 41 (X o 28>'. 54 (N o. 391. 119 No. 6J, n ote). 545-6 'X o . 3461. S30
(.4pp. I l l , i v

X o s k e , H e r r G u s t a v , M em ber of the G erm an Reichstag. 1913.

S peech b y, in the B u d get C om m ittee of the R eich sta g , 677. 6^0 N( 162. encl.).

O 'B e ir n e . M r . H . J „ 2nd Secretary at B ritish Em bassy at P aris. 1 9 0 0 -4 ; 1st Secretary, 1904;

at W a sh in gton , 1905: at P aris, 1 9 0 5 -6 ; C ounsellor o f Em bassy at St. P etersb u rg h ,
1906-15 (som etim es Charge d 'A ffa ires).
To S ir E. G rev. 12:3-4 (X o . 74). 131 X o . -S3 . 269-70 (X u. 1751 271-3 X os. 177-91. 279-80
(X o . 151). .545 (X o . 3461.
C on versa tion w ith M. ^ azonov, 123-4 (X o . 74 . 131 (X o . 831, 269-70 (X o . 175). 271-2
(X o . 17^ . 545 (X'o. 346).
P r iv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir E. G rey, 546 (X’ o. 347).

O 'C o n o r . S ir X ic h o l a s R .. B ritish A m bassador at v*t. P etersb u rgh , 1895—1

5 ; at C onstantinople,
1898-1905.
C on v ersa tion w ith Tewfik P asha, 49 (ed. n ote).

O l i p h a n t . M r . (later S i r ) L a n c e l o t .
C lerk in the B ritish F oreign Office. 1 9 0 3 -5 ; A ctin g
3rd S ecretary in D ip lo m a tic Service, 1 90 5 -1 6 ; A ssistant Clerk in F oreig r Office,
1916-20 ; C ounsellor, 1 9 2 0 -S : A c tin g A ssistant U n der-S ecreta ry of Sta te fo r F oreign
A ffairs. 1 9 2 " -9 : A ssistant U n d er-S ccreta rv . 1 9 2 9-36 ; D ep u tv U n der-Se reta rv , 1936- .
M in u te by, 782-3 (X o . 537), 820 ,X o . 561 .

O n s l o w , C o l o n e l S i r R ic h a r d W
A.. 5t h E a r l o f . A ssistant P riv a te S ecretary to S ir E . G rey,
1 9 0 9 -1 0 ; Clerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office. 1 9 1 0 -3 ; P riv a te S ecretary to S ir A .
N'ieolson, 1 9 1 1 -3 ; A ssistant C lerk, 1913-4.
M in u te by, 624 X'o. 424 .

O r d e , M r . C h a r l e s W ., Clerk in the B ritish F o re ig Office. 1 90 9-20 ; 1st S ecretary, 1 9 2 0 -9 ;

Counsellor in the F oreig n Office, 1 92 9- .
M in u te by. 573 (X o . 376). 624 'X 'o. 424), 625 (X o . 425).

O s t e n S a c k e n . C o u n t . R u ssia n Am bassador at B erlin . 1595-1912.

C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror W illia m II, 778 (X o . 536).

O str o r o g . C o u n t .
26 (X o . 15, m //i.), 386 (X o . 240 . 387 (X o . 241 .

P a e s . S e n h o r S i d o n io . P ortu g u ese M in ister o f F in a n ce. 1911—2 ; M in ister at B erlin. 1912 6.

C on versa tion w ith M r. E. J F rew en. 458 'X o . 290).

P a l e o l o g u e . |l. M a u r ic e . F ren ch D ip lo m a tic A g en t and Consul-G eneral (since 1909, M in ister)

at Sofia, 1 9 0 7-12 : P o litica l D ir e cto r at M in istry fo r F oreig n A ffairs. 1912-4
A m bassador at St. P etersb u rg h , 1914-7.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir G. B uchanan, 784 (X o . 535 .
C on v ersa tion w ith L ord G ranville. 723-4 (X o . 490).

P a r k e r , M r . A i .w y n . C lerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office. 1 9 0 6-12 ; Assistant C lerk. 1912- . ,

L ib ra ria n . 1918-9.
To H e r r v on K üh lm a n n , 358-63 ' X o . 225 .
C on v ersa tion w ith H err B ergm a nn, 3 43-4 (X'o. 213, encl.), 351 (X o . 219
C on v ersa tion w ith D jev a d Bey, 65 (X o . 47, miti.).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. de F leu ria u . 210 'X 'o. 137), 218-9 (X o . 144). 222 No. 146).
C on versa tion w ith H e r r G w inner, 142-4 (X'o. 91). 300 (X'o. 159). _ _
C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha. 121 (X’ o. 71), 151-3 (X o . 95), 154 (X o . 9 i ),l< 9 -3 0
(N o. 119), 206-7 (X'o. 134), 209 (N o. 136), 212-3 i.No. 139' 258 (X o . 162. n ofc), 275-9
(X'os. 152-3), 420 (ed. n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd Ineheape, 276-S (X o . 1n3).
 860
P a r k e r , M r . A l w y n — (con tin u ed ).
C on versa tion w ith H e r r v on K iihlm a nn, 97-S (N o. 661, 118 (N o. 69), 1 26-7 (N o. 78), 142-4
(N o 91), 162-3 (N o. 107), 167-8 (N o. 114), 172-3 (N o. 117), 206-7 (N o. 134), 214-5
(N o. 140), 221 2 (N o. 146), 225 (N o. 148), 236 (N o. 154, n ote), 333 -4 (N o. 203), 343-4
(N o. 213, encl.), 351 (N o. 219), 3 7 1 -2 (N o. 232, and w in.).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky. 142-4 (N o. 91).
C on v ersa tion with Sassoon E ffendi. 276-9 (N o. 183).
M em oran dum by, 74 (N o. 52), 117 (ed. n ote), 167-8 (N o. 114), 172-3 (N o. 117), 258 (N o. 162,
n ote), 298-303 (N o. 189).
M in u te bv, 7 (N o. 2), 11-2 (N o. 6, n o te s), 1 5-6 (N o. 6), 21 (N o. 11), 2 2-3 (N o. 12), 25 (N o. 15,
n ote), 26-7 (N o. 15), 28-9 (N o. 17), 30 (N o. 19), 33 (N o. 22), 36 (N o. 23), 45 (ed. note),
54 (N o. 39), 57 (N o. 44), 60, 65 (N o. 47), 6 7-73 (N o. 50), 73 (N o. 51, note), 89
(N o. 58), 9 7-8 (N o. 66), 116-7 (ed. n ote), 118 (N o. 69), 120 (N o. 70). 121-2 (N o. 71),
125 (N o. 76), 126-7 (N o. 78), 135 (N o. 87), 141 (N o. 90), 142 4 (N o. 91), 145 (No. 92),
151-3 (N o. 95), 154 (N o. 97), 162 (N o. 106), 162-3 (N o. 107), 172 (N o. 116), 179-80
(N o. 119), 198 (N o. 124, n ote), 206-7 (N o. 134), 208-9 (N o. 135, n otes), 209-10
(N os. 136-7), 2 12-5 (N os. 139-40), 2 18-9 (N o. 144), 221-3 (N o. 146), 2 25 -6 (N o. 148),
233 (N o. 153), 236-7 (N o. 154, n otes), 243-7 (N o. 156, n otes), 275-9 (N os. 182-3), 324
(N o. 199), 3 33-4 (N o. 203), 339 (N o. 209), 3 43-4 (N o. 213, encl.), 351 (N o. 219), 355
(N o. 223), 364 (N o. 226), 3 68 -9 (N o. 230, and n otes), 371-2 (N o. 232), 3 72-3 (N o. 233),
381 (N o. 236), 389 (N o. 242), 408 (N o. 249. n o te ), 411 (N o. 251), 418 (N o. 262), 419
(N o. 263), 420 (ed. n o te ), 829-30 (A p p . I l l , iv).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t, D ecla ra tion on N a v ig a tion o f T ig ris and E up hrates, Annex,
in itia lled by, A u g u st 19, 1913, 2 13-4 (N o. 139).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re ra ilw ays in Asia M in or, in itia lled by, A u g u st 12, 1913, 203-6
(N o. 133).
S ta tem en t by, com m u n ica ted to H a k k i Pasha, 119 (N o. 69, encl.).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To D jev a d Bey, 66 (N o. 48).
To H e r r von K iihlm ann, 264-5 (N o. 172), 355-8 (N o. 224).

P a r k e s , M r . E d w a r d , Sta ff Officer in L ib r a r ia n ’ s D ep a rtm en t, o f the B ritish F oreign Office,

190 5-14 ; Assistant, 1 9 1 4 -8 ; A c tin g L ib ra ria n and K e e p e r o f the P ap ers, 1918-9.
M in u te by, 145 (N o. 92).

P em b er, M r. F r a n c is W ., T em pora ry A ssista nt L eg a l A d viser in the B ritish F oreig n Office,

1912-3.
M in u te by, 142 (N o. 90).

P e r s i e s , C. L . Lo t h a r , C a pta in in the G erm an Navy.

A r tic le s by, in th e B e rlin er T a g eb la tt, 687 (N o. 464, n o te), 690 (N o. 468), 705 (N o. 479), 719
(N o. 485).

P ic h o n . M . S t e p h a n , F ren ch M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1906-11.

To M . P au l C am bon, 164-5 (N o. 110).
A g reem en t re R a ilw ay s in A s ia tic T u rk ey , Septem b er 1913, sign ed by, 2 31-3 (N o. 153).

P o h l, H u g o , G erm an A d m ira l, C h ief o f N a val Staff, 1914.

699 (N o. 475).

P o in c a r e , M . R a y m o n d , F rench M in is ter fo r F in a n ce, 1906; P rim e M in ister and M inister for

F oreig n A ffairs, 1 9 1 2 -3 ; P resid en t o f the F ren ch R ep u b lic, 1913-20.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir F. B ertie, 478 (N o. 306), 556-7 (N o. 361), 559 (N o. 362), 605-7
(N os. 404-5).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 788 (N o. 541).
P o s itio n of, in F eb ru a rv 1913, 674 -5 (N o. 461).
S p eech es by, 598 (N o. 396, note), 617 (N o. 418).
V isit to R ussia , 1912, 617 (N o. 418).

P o n s o t , M. H ., in F ren ch M in istry o f F o re ig n A ffairs, 1913, 1914.

328 (N o. 201).

R a t h m o r e , D a v id
R o b e r t P l u n k e t , 1 s t B a r o n , C hairm an o f the S m y rn a -A id in Bailwav
Com panv.
333 (N o. 203).
A g reem en t re S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay , in itia lled by, M ay 7, 1914, 387 (N o. 241).

R a u f P a s h a , T urkish G ra n d V izier, 1844-7.

To the P asha of B a g da d, 9 2-3 (ed. n ote).

R a w l in s o n , M ajo r (la ter S ir ) H enry.

84 (N o. 55).
 861
R e c o ü l y , M ., F oreig n E d ito r o f th e F ig a ro.
A r tic le by, in th e F ig a ro, 123 (N o. 73).

R e p ix g t o x , C o l o x e l .
( v . sub A C o u r t R e p i x g t o x .)

R e s c h id P a s h a , T urkish M in ister for F oreig n A ffairs, 1816.

C om m unication to S ir S tra tfo r d C a n n in g, 92 (ed. n ote).

R e v e l s t o k e , J o h x B a r i x g , 2x d B a r o x , D ir e cto r o f th e B ank of E n g lan d , P a rtn e r in B a rin g

Bros, and Co.
776 (N o. 534).

R e v f .x t l o w , C o u x t E., G erm an author.

687 (N o. 464, note).
A r tic le b y, in the D eu tc h e T a g eszeitu n g, 719 (N o. 485).

R ie s e , D r . O t t o , R ep resen ta tiv e o f the D eutsch e B a n k fo r B a g d a d R a ilw a y n eg otia tion s in

L on d on , 1914.
333 (N o. 203).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y A greem ent, F eb ru a ry 23, 1914, sign ed by, 329-33 (N o. 202).

R if a a t P asha, T urkish Am bassador a t L on d on , 1 9 0 8 -9 ; M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1 9 0 9-11 ;

Am bassador a t P aris, 1911-4.
C on versa tion w ith M . B om p ard, 20 (N o. 10).
C on v ersa tion w ith Sir G. L ow th er, 1 (N o. 1), 1 8-9 (N o. 8), 22 (N o. 12), 2 4-5 (N os. 1 4-5),
23 (N o. 17).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. C. M . M a rlin g , 8 -9 (N o. 4), 9 -1 0 (N o. 5).
M em oran dum by, 2 5 -6 (N o. 15, encl.).

R ob erts , F r e d e r ic k S l e i g h , 1 s t E a r l R o b e r t s o f K a x d a h a r , B ritish F ield-M arsh a l,

C om m a n der-in -C h ief in In d ia , 1 83 5 -9 3 ; C om m ander o f F orces in Irelan d , 1 8 9 5 -9 ;
C om m a n dcr-in -C h ief, S outh A fr ic a , 189 9-19 0 0; C om m an der-in -C h ief, B ritish A rm y,
1901-4.
700 (N o. 475).

R odd, S ir J.I I e x x e l l (since 1933, 1s t B a r o x R e x x e l l o f R o d d ), S ecretary o f B ritish Em bassy

at R om e, 1901-3 (som etim es Chargé d ’ A ffa ires) ; C ou n cillor o f Em bassy, 1904, M in ister
at Stock h olm , 190L 8 ; A m bassador a t R om e, 1908-21.
To S ir E. G rev, 598 (N o. 396), 622 (N os. 420-1), 623-31 (N os. 424-8), 6-34 (N o. 430), 635
(N o. 432), 6 36-7 (N o. 434), 6 37-8 (N o. 436), 639-48 (N os. 439-44), 838 (A p p . I l l , v).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. B a rrère, 636 (N o. 434), 637 -8 (N o. 436).
C on v ersa tion w ith H e r r v on J ag ow , 659-62 (N o. 454).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ig n or F . M a rtin i, 6 44-5 (N o. 442), 645 (N o. 443).
C on v ersa tion w ith the M a rq u is d i San G iu lia n o, 622 (N o. 420), 6 26-8 (N o. 427), 630-1
(N o. 428), 646-8 (N o. 444).
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir E. G rey, 620-1 (N o. 419), 659-62 (N o. 454).

R osex, D r . F r i e d r i c h , in G erm an F o re ig n Office, 1 9 0 1 -5 ; M in ister a t T a n g ier, 1 9 0 5 -1 0 ; at

B u ch arest, 1 9 1 0 -2 ; at L isbon, 1912-6.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. C arn egie, 549 (N o. 351), 550-1 (N o. 354).

R o sexberg, H err vo x , Counsellor in th e G erm an F o re ig n Office, 1912-8.

328 (N o. 201).

R u ete, H e r r S a id .
(v. sub S a id R u e t e .)

R u s s e l l , L i e u t e x a n t -C o l o x e l A. V . F ., B ritish M ilita r y A tta c h é at B erlin , 1910-4.

To S ir E. G oschen, 728 (N o. 493, encl.).

R ussell, M r. (later S ir ) C l a u d F . W ., 1st S ecretary in B ritish L eg a tion at B uenos Ayres,

1 9 0 8 -1 1 ; a t M a d rid , 1 9 1 0 -3 ; E m p loy ed in F o re ig n Office, 1 9 1 3 -4 ; C ounsellor a t Athens,
1 9 1 8 -2 0 ; M in ister in A byssinia, 1 9 2 0 -5 ; at B erne, 1 92 8 -3 1 ; A m bassador a t L isbon,
1931-5.
M in u te by, 833 (A p p . I l l , v).

R u s s e l l , L o r d J o h x (later 1s t E a r l R u s s e l l ), B ritish S ecretary o f S ta te fo r F o re ig n A ffairs,

1852-3, 1 8 5 9 -6 5 ; P rim e M in ister, 1865-6.
A n d refusal t o fa v ou r in d ep en d en ce o f th e C aliph, 1860, 824 (A p p . I l l , i).
 862
S a id H a l im P a s h a , T urkish M in ister fo r F oreign A ffairs, 1 9 1 3 -4 ; G rand V izier, 1913-7.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. B eaum ont, 419 (N o. 263).
C on versa tion w ith S ir L. M allet, 261 (N o. 165), 262 (N o. 168), 263-4 (N os. 170-1), 395
(N o. 246), 409 (N o. 250), 4 11-4 (N os. 252-5), 4 15-6 (N o. 258), 834-5, 837(,4pp. I l l , v).

S a id R u e t e , R ep resen ta tiv e of the D eutsch e Bank. 1910.

118 (N o. 69).
.1 rticte by, in th e B e rlin er Z e itu n y am M itta y , 163 (N o 107).

Sa ix t -R exe T a il l a x d if .r , M. G., F rench M in ister at L isbon, 1906-13.

C on versa tion w ith Seuhor Yasconeellos, 428 (N o. 269).

S a i x t -S e i x e , C o m tf ,
d e , F rench N aval A tta c h e a t L ou d on , 1912-6.
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce L ou is o f B a tten berg, 694 (ed. note).
(Conversation w ith M r. W in ston C hurchill, 591-2 (ed. n ote), 600-1 (N o. 399).

S a l is b u r y , R o b e r t C e c il , 3r d M a r q u e s s
o f , B ritish S ecretary o f S ta te fo r F oreig n Affairs,
1878-80. 1885-6, 1887-92, J u n e 29, 1 895-N ovem ber 12, 1900; P rim e M in ister, J u n e 29,
189 5-J u ly 12, 1902.
C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t H a tzfe ld t, 425 (N o. 268), 431 (N o. 270).
A n d M r. A. J. B a lfou r, 425 (N o. 268).
A n d the E m p eror W illia m II, 661 (N o. 454).
A nd A nglo-G erm a n Secret A g reem en t, 1898, 425 (N o. 268), 427 (ed. n ote), 435 (N o. 271).

Sallaxdrou ze d e L a m o r x a ix , I I., R ep resen ta tiv e of th e S y n d ica te fo r th e Sansoum -Sivas

R a ilw av , 1 9 1 1 -2 ; V ice-P resid en t o f the T urkish T aliak-regie, 1913.
169-72 (N o ' 116).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. H elfferich , 169-72 (N o. 116, and encl.).

S a m u e l , M r . W . H ., R ep resen ta tiv e o f the A n g lo-S a x on P etroleu m Co., L td.

A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m Concessions, signed by, M arch 19, 1914, 3 45-6 (N o. 214).

S a n G iu l i a x o , M a r q u is d i , Ita lia n M in ister fo r F oreign A ffairs, 1 9 0 5 -6 ; Am bassador at

L on don , 1 9 0 6-10 ; at P aris, 1910; M in ister for F oreig n A ffairs, 1910-4.
C on v ersa tion w ith M. B a rreie, 623-4 (N o. 424), 625 (N o. 426).
C on v ersa tion w ith M. Ivropenski, 643 (N o. 440).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir R . R o d d , 622 (N o. 420), 626 8 (N o. 427), 630-1 (N o. 428), 646-8
(N o. 444).
S peech by, 634 (N o. 430).
V isit to C ou n t B erch told , 1914, 643 (N o. 441).

Sassoon E f f e n d i , T urkish D ep u ty fo r B a g d a d , 1910.

2 (N o. 1).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd In ch cap e, 2 76-8 (N o. 183).
C on versa tion w ith M r. A. P ark er, 2 76 -9 (N o. 183).

S a y y i d T a l ib - a l - N a k ib , o f Basra.
827 (J p p . I l l , iv), 831 (ed. note).

S a z o x o v , M. S e r g e , Counsellor o f R ussian Em bassy at L on don , 1904-6 (som etim es Charyi

d ’A f fa i r e s ); A g en t to the V a tic a n , 1 9 0 6 -9 ; A c tin g M in ister fo r F oreig n Affairs,
1 9 0 9-10 ; M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1910-6.
To C ou n t B eu ck cn d orff, 774 (ed. n ote), 797 (ed. note).
To S ir G. B uchanan, 336 (N o. 205, encl. 2), 379-80 (N o. 236, encls. 2, 3), 822 (.1pp. I).
To M. Isvolski, 783 (ed. note).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir G. B uchanan, 57 (N o. 44), 59 (N o. 46), 200 (N o. 128), 216 (N o. 141),
377 (N o. 236), 757-8 (N o. 520), 765 (N o. 527), 775 (N o. 534), 7 78-9 (N o. 536), 782
(N o. 537), 784 (N o. 538), 8 04-5 (N o. 552), 8 07-8 (N o. 553), 812 (N o. 556), 813 (N o. 558,
n ote), 815 (N o. 560), 821 (,4pp. I).
C on v ersa tion with S ir E. G rey, 810 (ed. n o te), 813-4 (N o. 558).
C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror N icholas II, 77« (N o. 536).
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. O ’ B eirne, 123-4 (N o. 74), 131 (N o. 83), 269-70 (N o. 175), 271-2
(N o. 178), 545 (N o. 346).
M em oran dum by, 271 (N o. 177), 815-20 (N o. 561, encl.).
P lan fo r an A n glo-R u ssia n -J a p a n ese G uaran tee o f A s ia tic Possessions, 8 21-3 (.1pp. I)-
S p eech by, in the D um a, M ay 23, 1914, 794-7 (N o. 546, enel.).
V isit to B alm oral, 1912, 810 (ed. n o te), 814 (N o. 558).
P ers o n a lity of, 727 (N o. 492).

S c a v e x iu s , H e r r E. J. C., D anish M in is ter fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1913-9.

C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G rey, 743 (N o. 507).
 863
S c h e b e k o , M. X . X . R ussian M in ister at B ucharest. 1912 3 ; A m bassador at V ien u a, 1913-4.
L on v ersa tion w ith S ir M . de Bunsen, 729 (X o . 494).

S chf .l k t n g . M . I.. J ou rn a list, form er R u ssia n D ip lom a t. C orresp on den t o f the S'orne Y rem ya
in P a ris. 1914.
777-> (X o . 536).

S c h ie m a n n . Th e o d o r . P rofessor o f H istory at the U n iv ersity o f B erlin . C on trib u tor to X e u e

P reu ssisch e ( K ren z-yZ eitu n g .
6S7 (X o . 465), Si 19 (X o . 551).
A r tic le by, in the K r e u z -Z c itu n g . 762 (X o . 524

Sc h oen. H e r r W i l h e l m v o n . G erm an A m bassador at St. P etersb u rgh , 1 9 0 5 -7 ; M in ister fo r

F oreig n A ffairs. 1 9 0 7-10 ; Am bassador at P aris. 1910-4.
R ecall o f from P aris, th rea ten ed, 1913, 696-7 (X o . 473).
S c h r o e d e r . B a r o n B n rN O
v o n , E nglish Banker.
To H e r r von B ethm ann H ollw eg, 466 (X o . 296'.
S c h r o e d f .r . M e s k r s .. Bankers.
456 (X o . 2S"). 4 5 ' (X o . 290). 460 <X o. 291 . 4 62-3 (X o . 294). 463 (X o . 295 . 467 iX o . 296),
473 (X o 300).

S e e ly , Co lo n el J o h n E. B. (since 1933. 1 s t B a r o n M o t t i s t o n e ), B ritish S ecretary o f S ta te fo r

W a r. 1912-4.
P r iv a te L e t t e r —
To S ir E. G rey, 4S3 (X o . 313).
S e l im E f f e n d i S e l a m .
>25 (.4pp. I I I . iii).
Se l v e s . M. d e , F ren ch M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1911-2.
C on versa tion w ith S ir F. B ertie, 4 3-4 (X o . 33).
S e r g e n t . M. C . S u b -D irector o f the B ank o f F ra n ce, 1913-4.
32S (X o . 201).

Seym o u r, M r . H o r a c e J a m e s . Clerk in the B ritish F o re ig n Office. 190S-14 ; A c tin g 3rd S ecretary

at W a sh in gton , 1 9 1 4 -9 ; E m p loy ed in th e F o re ig n Office. 1 9 1 9-23 ; 1st S ecretary a t
th e H a g u e, 1923-5 (som etim es C ha rgé d ’ A ffa ires) ; at R om e, li*25-7 (som etim es C hargé
d rA ffa ir e s ); C ounsellor in th e F oreign Office, 1 9 2 9-32 ; P riv a te S ecretary to S ecreta ry
o f S ta te. 1932—5.
M in u te by, 443 (X o . 276'.
S h u j a - e d - D o w l e h , G overn or-G en era l o f the P ro v in c e o f A zerba ija n , 1914.
317-> (X o . -561, encl.).
S in g l e ,M r . F ., D ir e cto r o f th e S m v rn a -A id in R a ilw a v C om panv.
333 (X o 203).
A greem en t re S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay , H ea ds o f proposed, in itia lled by. M arch 6, 1914, 343
(X o . 213, n ote).
S m i t h , S ir H . B a b in g t o n , B ritish R ep resen ta tiv e on C ou n cil o f A d m in istra tion o f the O ttom an
P u b lic D ebt, 1900: P resid en t. 1901; P resid en t o f X a tio n a l B ank o f T urkev, 1909.
151 -X o . 95), ISO (X o . 119). 233 (X o . 153, min.).
C on versa tion w ith A ssim Bey. 54 (X o . 39).
C on versa tion w ith D ja v id Bey, 53 (X c 39).
C on versa tion w ith H e r r G w inner, 235 (X o . 154.n ote), 301 (X o . ISO).
C on versa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 10-1. 1:4—5 (X o . 6, and encl.), 1 6-7 X o. 7).
M em oran dum by, 1 3-5 'X o . 6, encl.), 5 3-4 (X o . 39'.
T ieirs of, on B a gda d R a ilw ay , 6 7 -9 (X o . 50).
A g reem en t re T urkish P etroleu m C oncessions, sign ed by, M a rch 19, 1914. 3 45 -6 ¡ X o 214/.

S m i t h , S ir H . L l e w e l l y n , P erm a n en t S ecretary o f the B ritish B oa rd o f T rade, 1911-9.

115-6 (ed. n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith H a k k i P asha, 121 (X o . 71..
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re railw ays in Asia M in or, in itia lled by, M ay 6, 1913, 101-3
(X o . 63. encl. 2).
S ta tem en t by, com m u n ica ted to H a k k i P asha, 119 (X o . 69. encl.).
M em oran dum by. 117 (ed. note).
S o v e r a l , M a r q u is
d e , P ortu g u ese M in ister at L on d on . 1397-1910.
C on versa tion w ith S ir E. G rey. 427 (ed. n ote), 533 (X o . 335 534 (X o . 337).
A n d A n g lo-G erm a n Secret A greem ent, 1393, 427 (ed. n ote), 435 (X o . 271 m in ), 437
(X o 273).
 864
S p e n d e r , M r . J. A l f r e d , E d ito r o f the W estm in ste r G a ze tte , 1896-1922.
A r tic le by, in the D a ily N ew s, 671 (N o. 457, and n ote).

S p e r l in g , M r . (la ter S ir ) R o w l a n d A . C., C lerk in the B ritish F o re ig n Office, 1899-1903;

A c tin g 3rd S ecretary, 1 9 0 3 -7 ; at St. P etersb u rg h , 1904; A ssistant Clerk, 1 9 0 7-13 ;
S en ior Clerk, 1913-9 ; A ssistant S ecretary, 1919-24 ; M in ister at B erne, 1924-7 ; at
S ophia, 1 9 2 8 -9 ; at H elsin gfors, 1930-5.
M in u te by, 546 (N o. 346), 571 (N o. 374), 642 (N o. 439), 757 (N o. 519).

S t a m f o r d h a m ( A r t h u r J. B ig g e ), 1s t B a r o n , P riv a te S ecretary to H .M . K in g G eorge V , 1910-31.

C o n v e rsa tio n w ith the E m p eror W illia m II, 709 (N o. 482, encl.).

S torrs, S i r R o n a l d , in E g y p tia n M in is try o f F in a n ce, 1904; O riental S ecretary to B ritish

A g en cy , 1909; M ilita r y G overn or o f Jerusalem , 1 9 1 7 -2 0 ; G overn or o f C yprus, 192 6-32 ;
G overn or o f N orth ern R h od esia, 1932-4.
8 31 -2 (A p p . I l l , iv).

Str a tfo r d d e R e d c l i f f e , S t r a t f o r d C a n n in g , 1s t V is c o u n t , B ritish A m bassador at C on stan ti­

nople, 1842, 1848-58.
A n d A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t, 1846, 91 (N o. 60), 277 (N o. 183).

S t u m m , F e r d in a n d , B a r o n v o n , G erm an A m b assa dor at M a d rid , 1879-90.

C on v ersa tion w ith S ir F. B ertie, 4 21-4 (N o. 265, and n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror W illia m I I, 423 (N o. 265).

S tu m m , H err W . v o n , 1st S ecretary at G erm an E m bassy at L on d on , 1 9 0 6 -8 ; Counsellor in

G erm an F o re ig n Office, 1908-11 ; D ir e cto r of P o litica l D ep a rtm en t, 1911-6.
C on v e rsa tio n w ith S ir E. G oschen, 354 (N o. 223).

Südekum, D r . A. O. W ., M em b er o f th e G erm an R eich sta g , 1913.

S p e ech by, in the R eich sta g , 6 82-3 (N o. 462, encl.).

R ussian M in is ter fo r W a r, 1909-15.

S u k h o m l in o v , G e n e r a l ,
766 (N o. 528), 777 (N o. 536).

S u rs o c k , M b. A l h e r t J.
825 (A p p . I l l , iii).

S v e r h e i e v , M . S.
d e , C ounsellor o f R ussian Em bassy at V ien n a, 1 9 0 8-10 ; M in ister at Athens,
1910-2 ; A m bassador at B erlin, 1912-4.
To M . S azonov, 739 (erf. n ote).

S w in d e r e n , M. v a n , D u tch M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 190S-13.

C on v ersa tion w ith M . F erreira , 457 (N o. 289)
C o n v e rsa tio n w ith S ir A. J oh n ston e, 457 (N o. 289).

T ala at B e y .
(r. sub M e h m e d T a l a a t B e y .)
T a r d i e u , M . A n d r é . F ren ch jou rn a list, la ter M em ber o f the C ham ber o f D ep u ties and P residen t
o f the Council.
A r tic le s by, in the T em ps, 674 (N o. 461).

T e i x é i r a G o m e s , S e n h o k , P ortu g u ese M in is ter at L on d on , 1911-3.

C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. Crowe, 5 11 -3 (N o. 329), 5 51-2 (N os. 355-6).
T e w f ik P asha,T u rk ish M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1895-1909; G rand V izie r , 1909;
A m bassador at L on don , 1909-14.
To A n th op ou lo P asha, 49 (erf. n ote).
To S ir E. G rey, 198 (N o. 124).
C on v ersa tion with S ir E. G rey, 3 8 -9 (N o. 26), 87 (N o. 56).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A. N icolson , 19-20 (N o. 9, and n ote), 55 (N o. 40), 56 (N o. 42), 87
(N o. 56).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir N. O ’ C onor, 49 (erf. n ote).
M em ora n d u m by, 5 9-6 5 (N o. 47), 7 3-4 (N o. 51).

T h o r n t o n , M r . C h a r l e s C o n w a y , S ecreta ry o f L e g a tio n at B ritish L e g a tio n at L isbon, 1893-8

(som etim es C ha rgé d ’ A ffa ires) ; C onsul-G eneral fo r K in g d o m o f H u n g a ry , 1899-1903.
C on v ersa tion w ith S enhor B eirä o, 4 37 -8 (N o. 273).
C on v ersa tion w ith Senhor de C astro, 438 (N o. 273).

M em ber of the G erm an R eich sta g , 1913.

T h Ün e f f . l d , B a r o n ,
Q u estion by, in B u d g et C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g , 677 (N o. 462, encl.).
 8(55
T i a r k s , M r .,p a rtn e r o f Messrs. S chroder.
472 (X’ o. 299, m in.), 473 (X o . 300, m in.), 476 (X o . 304).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E y re Crowe, 463-7 (X os. 295-6).

T il l e y . M r . (since 1919. S i r ) J o h n A C., A ssistant Clerk in the B ritish F oreign Office, 1 90 4-6;
1st S ecretary at C on stan tin ople. 1 9 0 6 -8 ; S enior Clerk. 1 9 1 0-3; C hief C lerk, 1 9 1 3 -9 ;
A c t in g A ssistant U n der-S ecreta ry o f S tate. 1919; A ssistant Secret; ry. 1 91 9-21 ;
Am b assa dor at R io de J a n eiro, 1 9 2 1 -6 ; at T ok io, 1926-31.
C on v ersa tion w ith M r. E. J. F rew en, 456-7 (X o . 2SS), 453 (X o . 290).
M in u te b y. 439 (X o . 274). 446 (X o . 231), 461 (X o . 291), 473 (X o . 300), 434 (ed. n ote). 521-2,
5 24 -5 (X o . 331), 527 (X o . 313, n ote).

v o x . G erm an G rossadm iral, S ecretary o f State for the X a v y , 1397-1916.

T l r p it z . A l f r e d
C on v ersa tion w ith C a pta in H end erson , 740-1 (X o . 503. encl.).
A n d alleged A n g lo-R u ssia n naval con v en tion . 1914. 313 (ed. note).
P o lic y o f. 661-2 (X o . 4-54), 6 33-4 (X o . 463), 6 34-5 (X o . 464. en d .). 711-4 (X o . 433, encl.).
S ta tem en ts by, in the B u d get C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g . F ebru ary 6 -7 , 1913, 669-70
(X o . 457). 675—S3 (X'o. 462. and encl.), 633 (X’ o. 463). 634-6 (X o . 464, en c l.); F ebru ary
1914. 734 (X o . 493», 735 X o. 499 , 736 (X o . 500), 736-9 (X os. 501-2).

T.. Ita lia n M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1903—5, 1 9 0 6 -9 ; Am bassador at P aris,

T it t o x i, S ig x o r
1910-7.
C on v ersa tion w ith M . D ou m erg u e, 649 (X o . 446).

V i c e - A d m i r a l E . C. T., C h ief o f W a r Sta ff o f A d m ira lty . 1 9 1 1 -2 ;

T R o r B R iD G E . P riv a te
S ecretary to F irst L o rd o f A d m ira lty , 1912; C om m anding M ed iterra n ean Cruiser
S q u ad ron , 1912; H ea d o f B ritish X a v a l ¡Mission to Serbia, 1915.
530 (X o . 331), 531 -2 (X o . 332), 585 (X o . 336, n ote).
M em oran d u m by, 602 (ed. note).

v o x , G erm an S ecretary o f S ta te fo r F oreig n A ffairs. 1906-7 ; A m bassador

T s c h ie s c h k y . H e r r
at V ien n a , 1907-16.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir M de Bunsen, 723-9 (X’ o. 494), 764 (XT 526 .

T ttr kh an' P a s h a . T urkish Am bassador at St. P etersb u rg h . 1 903-13: A lba n ian P rim e M inister,
1914.
793 (X’ o. 545).

T y r r e l l , M r . (since 1913, S ir W i l l i a m G . ; since 1929, 1s t B arox - T y r r e l l o f A v o x ). Senior

C lerk in th e B ritish F oreig n Office, 1907-13; P riv a te S ecretary to S ir E. G rey, 1907-15;
A ssistant U n der-S ecreta ry o f S tate fo r F oreig n A ffairs, 1913-25; P erm a n en t U n der­
s e c re ta ry , 1925-3; Am bassador a t P aris, 1923-414.
M in u te b y, 443 (X o . 276), 454 (ed. n ote), 536 (X o . 333), 750 (X o . 514, n ote).

V a l f l o r , M a r q u is d r .
572, 575 (X’ o. 376, and m in.).

V a x s it t a r t , M r . (la ter S i r ) R o b e r t G., 2nd S ecretary in the B ritish F oreig n Office, 1908; at
C airo, 1 90 9 -1 1 ; at F o re ig n Office. 1 9 1 1 -3 ; J u n io r C lerk, 1 9 1 3 -4 ; A ssistant Clerk, 1 914-20;
C ounsellor o f Em bassy, 1920; A ssistant S ecretary, 1 9 2 0 -3 ; P riv a te Secretary to L ord
C urzon, 1 9 2 0 -4 ; A ssistant U n d er-S ecreta ry ol o t. re, 192 3-30 ; P erm a n en t U n der­
s e c re ta ry , 1 9 3 0 -7 ; C h ief D ip lo m a tic A d v iser t o the F oreig n Office, 1933-
M in u te by, 5 73 -5 (X o . 376), 622 (X'o. 420), 755 (X o . 513

V asco xcello s, S e x h o r A t r c r s T O d e , P ortu g u ese P rim e M in ister and M in ister fo r F oreign

A ffairs. 1911-2.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A. H a rd in g e, 423 (X’ o. 269', 4 35-6 (X’ o. 272', 433-40 (X’ os. 274-5),
446 (X o . 231), 4 47-3 (X o . 232).
C on v ersa tion w ith M . S a in t-R en e T aillan d ier, 428 (X o . 269).
S peech b y, in P ortu g u ese P a rlia m en t, 423-9 (X o . 269, encl.), 445 (X o . 280), 447-51 (X’ o. 232,
and encl.).

VrLLAVRRUTiA. S e x o r d e , Spanish M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, 1905; Am bassador at L on don ,

1906-13.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir A. X icolson , 435 (X o . 271).

M r. G e r a l d H y d e . C lerk in the B ritish F oreig n Office, 1 9 0 3 -7 ; A c tin g 3rd Secretary in

V il l ie r s ,
D ip lo m a tic Service. 1 9 0 7-13 ; A ssistant C lerk in F oreig n Office, 1913—2 1 ; C ounsellor in
F o re ig n Office. 1 9 2 1 -9 .
M in u te by. 570 (X’ o. 374), 675 (X’ o. 461).

X*., R ussian X’ aval A tta c h e at L on don , 1914-9.

V o l k o v . C a p t a ix
797 (ed. n ote), 812 (X’ o. 556), 814 (X’ o. 559).
[10900] 3 K
 866

W a n g e n h e im , B aro n v o n , G erm an M in ister a t Athens, 1 90 9-12 ; A m bassador at C onstantinople,

1912 5.
417 (N o. 260).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir L. M allet, 412 (N o. 252;, 413 (N o. 253), 414 (N o. 255).
W atso n , C a p t a i n I I. I). 11., B ritish N a v a l A tta c h é fo r G erm any, D en m ark and H olla n d, at
Berlin, 1910-3.
To S ir E. G oschen, 664-9 (N o. 456), 684-7 (N o. 464, encl.), 711-8 (N o. 483, encl.).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce H en ry o f P russia, 637 (N o. 464, n ote).
C on v ersa tion w ith the E m p eror W illia m I I, 699-701 (N o. 475), 7 05-6 (N o. 480), 707-10
(N o. 482, and encl.).
R e p o r t by, on G erm an N aval A ffairs, 1910-3, 711-8 (N o. 483, encl.).
R e v iew o f the P o licv and P osition o f the G erm an N aval E x p a n sion ist P a r ty , 664-9
(N o. 456). '
P r iv a te L e tte r s —
To S ir E. G oschen, 699-702 (N o. 475), 708-10 (N o. 482, encl.).
W au g h , M r . A lexander T elford, B ritish Consul at C onstantinople, 1903-14 (som etim es A ctin g
Consul-G eneral).
415 (N o. 257).
W eakley, M r . E., B ritish Com m ercial A tta c h é at C onstantinople, 1897-1914.
213 (N o. 139).
P rim e M in ister a n d M in ister fo r F oreig n A ffairs, W ü rttem b erg , 1914.
W e iz s ä c k e r , D r . v o n ,
C on versa tion w ith S ir V . C orbett, 729 (N o. 495).
W e s t a r p , K unoF ., C o u n t v o n , M em ber o f the G erm an B eich sta g , 1913.
S p eech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f the R eich sta g , 682 (N o. 462, encl.).
E., P a r tn e r in S ir W . W h i t t ™ and Sons, C on s ta n tin op le; A d m in istra tor o f
W h it t a l l , M r . th e
N a tion al Bank.
9 (N o. 4).
M em ber o f the G erm an R eich sta g , 1911, 1913.
W ie m e r , D r . O t to ,
S p eech by, in the B u d g et C om m ittee o f th e R eich sta g , 677-8, 631 (N o. 462, encl.).
P rin ce o f W ied , P russian M a jo r ; ca n d id a te fo r the A lba n ian T hrone. 1 9 1 3 -4 : P rin ce
W il h e l m ,
o f A lba n ia, M a rch 1914.
793 (N o. 545).
W i l l i a m , A d viser to T u rk ish D ep a rtm en t
W il l c o c k s , S i r of P u b lic W orks.
2 (N o. 1)
Views of, on B a g d a d R a ilw ay, 7 (N o. 3).
IJ.I.M . W i l l i a m II, G erm an E m p eror, 1888-1918.
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. G oschen, 703 (N o. 476).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd H a rd in g e, 709 (N o. 482, encl.).
C on v ersa tion w ith P rin ce H en ry o f P russia, 6 73-4 (N o. 460).
C on v ersa tion w ith H err von J ag ow , 567 (N o. 371).
C on v ersa tion w ith M ahm ud M u h k ta r Pasha, 700 (N o. 475).
C on v ersa tion w ith C ou n t Osten Sacken, 778 (N o. 536).
C on v ersa tion w ith L o rd Sta m ford ham , 709 (N o. 482, encl.).
C on v ersa tion w ith B a ron von Stum m , 423 (N o. 265).
C on v ersa tion w ith C aptain W a tson , 699-701 (N o. 475), 705-6 (N o. 480), 707-10 (N o. 482,
.and encl.).
R e p o rte d sta tem en t to K in g A lb ert 1 on w ar betw een F ra n ce and G erm any, D ecem ber 1913,
7 23-4 (N o. 490), 727 (N o. 492).
A n d A u g lo-G crm a n n eg otia tion s re P ortu g u ese C olonics, 567 (N o. 371).
A n d L ord Salisbu ry, 661 (N o. 454).
A n d the Z a b ern in cid en t, 723-4 (N o. 490), 725-6 (N o. 491), 727 (N o. 492).
C h a ra cter and person a lity of, 661 -2 (N o. 454), 707 (N o. 482).
P o licy of, 656 (N o. 451), 674 (N o. 460), 727 (N o. 492), 745 (N o. 510).
I n v ita tio n by, to M r. C hurchill and P rin ce L ou is o f B a tten b erg to be presen t at K ie l week,
1914, 744-5 (N o. 509), 749 (N o. 512), 750 (N o. 515).
M e e tin g w ith E m p eror N icholas II a t B a ltic P o rt, J u ly 4 -6 , 1912, 609 (N o. 408), 656
(N o. 451).
T elegram to P resid en t K ru g er, 661 (N o. 454).
V iew s of, on possibility o f a R u s so-F ra n co-G erm an alliance, 770 (N o. 530), 777-8 (N o. 536),
781 (N o. 537).
V isit to C orfu , 760 (N o. 523).
V isit to T an g ier, 707, 708 (N o. 482, and encl.).
V isit to W in d sor, 1907, 128 (N o. 79).
( v . a l s o S u b j e c t I n d e x , sub G e r m a n y , G en eral F o r e ig n P olicy, E m p ero r W illiam 11 and).
 867
H .I .H . W i l l i a m , G erm an C row n P rince.
A n d R e p o r t o f the la n d in g o f the Z ep p elin a irship at L u neville, 1913, 696 (N o. 473).
C h a ra cter and person a lity of, 744 (X o . SOS).

W il s o n , C a p t a in (la ter L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S i r ) A r n o l d T a l b o t , In d ian A r m y ; Officer o f the

P o litic a l D ep a rtm en t, G overnm ent o f In d ia, 1 90 9-13 ; B ritish Consul at M oham m erah,
1 9 0 9 -1 1 ; A ssistant B ritish Com m issioner on the T u rco-P ersian F ron tier Com m ission,
1913—4 ; Com m issioner, 1914.
144 (X o . 92. min.).
N o te by, 1 46-7 (X o . 93).

S i r H e n r y H u g h e s , B ritish D ir e cto r o f M ilitary O perations, 1 9 1 0 -4 ; later

W il s o n , G e n e r a l
F ield -M arslia l an d C h ief o f Im p eria l G eneral Staff.
5S0 (X o . 3S1), 5 31-2 (X o . 332), 535 (X o . 386, n ote).

M . (sin ce 1905. C o u n t ) , R ussian F in a n ce M in ister, 1S92-1903; P len ip oten tia ry fo r the

W it t e ,
P ea ce X e g o tia tio n s at P ortsm ou th , 1905; P rim e M in ister, 1905-6.
770 (X o 530), 777-8 (X o . 536), 781 (X o . 537).

o f B erlin.
W olff, P r o fe sso r ,
S peech by, at m eetin g o f the F lo tte n v e r e in , 1914, 752 (X o . 516, encl. 2).

W o l k o v , C a p t a in M.
( v. sub V o lk o v .)

Z im m e r m a n M H err A lfr e d , C ounsellor in G erm an F oreig n Office, 1 9 0 5-11 ; D ir e cto r of

P o litica l D epa rtm en t, 1 9 1 0 -1 ; U n d er-S ecreta ry o f State, 1911-6.
C on v ersa tion w ith M. J ules Cam bon, 724-5 (X o . 491).
C on v ersa tion w ith S ir E. Goschen, 339 (X o . 209).

3 K 2
[10900]
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SUBJECT
A D A L IA .
Ita lia n desire fo r concession o f a p o r t at
A d alia , N ov. 1918, G reat B rita in w ould
not opp ose if it d id n ot con flict w ith the
S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay , 250 (N o. 157 );
S ir E. G rey oil B ritish position , 261-2
(N o. 1 67 ); T urkish den ia l o f Ita lia n nego­
tia tion s, 263 (N o. 1701; B ritish protest
to T urkey, D ecem ber, 274 (N o. 1 81 );
H a k k i P asha on e x te n t o f the concession
and a suggested solution, M r. A. P a rk er
on, 275- 6 (N o. 1 82 ); T urkish suggestion
o f a lin e A d a lia -B u ld u r fo r a B ritish
C om pany, or to an A n g lo -Ita lia n com b in a ­
tion , 3 23-4 (N o. 199 ); n eg otia tion s betw een
M . N og a ra and S m y rn a -A id in C om pany,
Feb. 191 ), 324 (N o. 199, m in.), 644 (N o.
441) ; B ritish a ttitu d e tow ards Ita lia n
econ om ic a ctiv ity , M arch, 644 (N o. 4 41 );
u n sa tisfa ctory con d ition of A d a lia -
B u ldou r n eg otia tion s, B ritish req u ire­
m ents, A p ril, 3 75 -6 (N o. 2 3 5 ); T u rkey
w ill g iv e a gu a ra n tee to B ritish com p any,
M ay, 386 (N o. 2 4 0 ); A u s tria -H u n g a ry in
com p etition fo r econ om ic concessions,
643 (N o. 4411.
(F o r S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y a greem en t and
n eg otia tion s, v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
T urkey, R ailw ays.)
ADEN.
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on ven tion respectin g
b oundaries, T ex t, M arch 9, 1914, 340-1
(N o. 211).
A D R IA N O P L E .
T u rk ey and (v . sub B u l g a r ia , T u rk ey and).
.E G E A N IS L A N D S .
T u rk ey a n d : T u rk ey w ould g o to w ar again
ra th er than g iv e up islands off A sia
M in or, J u n e 1913, 705 (N o. 479).
A F R IC A .
A frica n questions :
R e p o r t of an In te rn a tion a l C on feren ce
den ied by S ir E. G rey, Feb. 1913, 509
(N o. 3 2 6 ); P ortu g u ese sug g estion fo r a
C on feren ce on la bour re c ru itin g dis­
cou raged , 509 (N o. 3 26 ); P ortu g u ese
en q u iry con cern in g rep orts of a C on­
feren ce, 511 (N o. 329), den ied by S ir E.
G rey, 5 11 -2 (N o. 3 2 9 ); rum ours in
L isb on press, 513 (N o. 3 3 0 ); sta tem ent
by S enhor M a cieira affirm ing the den ial,
513-4 (N o. 330).
A n g ola ( v . sub P o r t u g a l : C o lo n ic s: A fric a n
possessions of).
C on g o Basin :
F ren ch protests a ga in st A nglo-G erm a n
a g r e e m e n t: relation to 1911 n eg otia ­
tion s and the B erlin A c t ( v . sub
F r a n c e , G rea t B r ita in a n d : A n g lo-
G crm an discussion on revision o f secret
T r e a t y ); the 1911 F ran co-G erm an nego­
tia tion s and (n . sub T r e a t i e s : F ra n co ­
G erm an A g reem en t, N ov. 4, 1911).
INDEX.
A F R I C A — (con tin u ed ).
C ongo, B elgia n :
S ir F . B ertie on G erm an designs and effect
on B elgium and F ra n ce if G rea t B rita in
en cou ra ged , Jan. 1911, 426-7 (N o. 2 68 );
p re-em p tiv e claim s o f F ra n ce for, 426
(N o. 2 6 8 ); 442 (N o. 2 7 6 ); B ritish
in terest in, 442 (N o. 2 7 6 ); A n glo-G erm an
discussions, 4 46-7 (N o. 281, m in .);
F ranco-G erm an A g reem en t, N ov. 4,
1911, A rticle 16, 5 6 1 -2 (N o. 365).
G erm an E a s t :
Cession o f R u a n d a by G erm any to G reat
B rita in suggested, 442 (N o. 276).
M ozam bique ( v . sub P o r t u g a l : C o lo n ie s :
I A fric a n possessions of).
N orth A fric a :
A n g lo -Ita lia n discussions for an a rra n g e­
m ent ( v . sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n : Ita ly :
A n g lo-Ita lia n n eg otia tion s, 1912-4).
P ortu g u ese possessions in : (v. sub P o r t u g a l :
Colonies : A frica n possessions of).
Sou th A frica n W a r :
B ritish and P ortu g u ese a rrangem ents
du rin g , 426 (N o. 268), 484 (ed. note).
U n ion o f S outh A f r ic a :
D esire fo r D ela g oa B ay, 1911, 424 (N o. 266),
425 (N o. 2 67 ); fu tu r e of to be assured,
474 (N o. 301), 480 (N o. 309), 545 (N o.
345).
G eneral B otha in form ed of proposed
revision o f A nglo-G erm a n Secret A g ree­
m ent re P o rtu g a l, 474 (N o. 3 0 1 );
reply, proposals fo r revision and
im provem ent, b u t genera l dissent over
surrend er o f Seal and P en gu in Islands
and W alfisch B ay, 4 80-1 (N o. 309).
A L B A N IA .
Essad P asha, a rrest o f : H e r r von J ag ow on,
M a y 1914, 793 (N o. 545).
In su rrection a t D u r a z z o : H e r r von J a g o w ’ s
attitu d e, M a y 1914, 793 (N o. 545 and
n o te (5) ).
P rin ce of W i e d : G erm any and, M a y 1914, 793
(N o. 545).
T iirkhan P asha, position of, M a y 1914, 793
(N o. 545).
A u s tro-H u n g a ria n and Ita lia n relation s and
question of a settlem ent, M a rch 1914, 643
(N o. 441).
G erm a n y a n d : E m p eror W illia m II on
A lba n ian situ ation , nom in ation fo r a
P rin ce, M a y 1913, 699-700 (N o. 4 75 ); H err
von J a g ow on p osition in, his wish to have
as little as possible t o do w ith Albanian
affairs, M a y 19U , 793 (N o. 545).
M o n ten e g r o a n d : S cu ta ri question, H err von
J a g ow on, J a n . 1913, 659 (N o. 454).
B ussia a n d : E m p eror N icholas I I on the
situ ation , A p ril 1914, 780 (N o. 537).
T u rk ey a n d : C ruelties perp etra ted a ga in st
M elissor tribes, A ug. 1911, 5 1 -2 (N o. 37).

ALEXANDRETTA.
P o rt at (r. sub B agdad R a il w a y ,
A lex a n d retta , p o r t "})■
A L S A C E -L O R R A I X E .
F ren ch p u b lic a tten tion draw n to lost
provinces, F eb. 1913, 675 (X'o. 4 61 );
E m p eror W illia m II on, O ctober, 709 (X o.
482, encl.)-, F ren ch relations w ith G er­
m any and, M a rch 1914, 769 X o. 530''.
Z a b ern in cid en t, D ec. 1913, 723-4 (X o. 490),
724-6 (X o . 491), 727 (X o. 492 .
A X A T O L IA .
( i\ sub A s i a M i n o r .)
A X A T O L IA X R A IL W A Y .
A n a tolia n R a ilw a y A greem ent, 1904, 213 (X o.
139), 214 (X o . 140).
A sia tic T u rk ey (fo r concessions and ra ilw ay
projects, v. sub T u r r e t , A s ia tic T urkey).
S m y rn a -A id in ra ilw ay, n a v ig a tion rig h ts on
L ak e B eyshehir, and ju n ctio n lines w ith
A n a tolia n R a ilw ay , 324 (X o . 199, m in.) ;
op p osition to ju n ctio n o f S m y rn a -A id in
and A n a tolia n systems, 333 (X o . 203) ; con­
cession fo r n a v ig a tion discussed, 333 (X o.
203).
(F o r S m y rn a -A id in railw ay a greem ent and
n eg otia tion s, r. sub T urkey, A sia tic
T u rk ey , R a ilw ays.)
ANGOLA.
(v. sub P o r t u g a l : C olon ies: A fric a n posses­
sions of.)
A R A B X A T IO X A L M O Y E M E X T.
O rigins o f, A ra b S ecret S ocieties. A ra b -S y ria n
C ongress in P aris, and F ra n co-S y ria n
C om m ittee in P a ris, 824-6 (.4pp. I l l ) ;
L o rd K itc h e n e r and, 826-32 (.4pp. I l l ) ;
A ziz B ey and, 832-S (.4pp. I I I ).
A R A B IA .
F ren ch C on v en tion respectin g ra ilw ay con ­
cessions in A rab ia , 416 (X o . 259). 418 (X o.
262).
G rand Sheriff and proposals fo r revolt. L ord
K itch en er d iscountenances, 826, 828-9
(.4pp. I I I ) .
G reat B r ita in w ould be con cern ed if any
P ow er tou ch ed A ra b ia , X o v . 1913, 250
(X o . 157 ) ; oil concessions, A n g lo-T u rk ish
C on v en tion , in itia lled , J u n e 10, 1914, 396
(erf. n ote).
P ersian G u lf questions ( r . sub P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
Y em en, rev olt in, M a y 1911, 40 (X o . 28).
ARM AM EXTS, GEXERAL.
N ovoe V rem ya on present arm am en t
E u rop e, M a rch 1914, 769 (X o . 530V
ARM AM EXTS, XAYAL.
G eneral : G en era l n a va l ex pa n sion , T rip le
A llia n ce b ein g ou tb u ilt b v the T riple
E n te n te , Oct. 1913. 721 ‘ (X o . 4S7) ;
the “ n a va l holida y ” proposed by
M r. C h u rch ill a g rea t E u ropea n question,
722 (X o . 488) ; S ir E. G rey ’ s speech, Feb.
1914: difficult to arrest ex p en d itu re on
arm am ents in oth er coun tries, 734 (X o .
497, n o te ( 6) ).
869
A R M A M E X T S . X A Y A L — (con tin u ed ).
A u stria -H u n g a ry a n d : increase contem p la ted,
A u g . 1912, 656-7 (X o . 4 5 1 ); G erm an
in fluen ce on, Jan. 1913, 668 (X o . 4 56 );
suggested A u s tro-H u n g a ria n and G erm an
n aval conversations, A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s
v isit to K on opisch t, M ay 1914, 750 (X o.
514), 753 (X o. 517).
G erm a n y a n d : E m p eror W illia m I I ’ s con v er­
sation w ith L ord H a rd in g e, 1908, 709
(X o . 482, encl.).
S ir F . B ertie on effect o f increase o f G erm an
sh ipb u ildin g program m e, D ec. 1911. 422
(X o . 265), B aron Stum m on, 423 (X o.
2 65 ); effect o f B ritish d isp ositions in
X o r th Sea and M ed iterra n ean on
G erm an con stru ction , J u n e 1912, 596
(X o . 394) ; S ir E. G rey on G erm an naval
stren gth , J u ly . 599 (X'o. 397 >; B a ron von
M arschall. G erm an F leet not in ten ded
fo r aggressive purposes again st E ngland,
A ug. 1912, 655 (X o . 4 51 ); p olicy of
A d m ira l von T irp itz , Jan. 1913, 661-2
(X o . 454), 669-70 (X o . 4 5 7 ); review of
p olicy and position o f G erm an X a v a l
E xpa nsionist P a rty , 664-9 (X'o. 456 );
statem ent b y A d m ira l v on T ir p itz
b efore B u d get C om m ittee on agree­
m ent w ith G reat B rita in , F ebru ary
1913. 669-71 (X'o. 4 5 7 ); rep ort of
speeches b efore B u d get Com m ittee,
675-83 (X o . 4 6 2 ); S ir E. Goschen on
p olicy o f A d m ira l von T ir p itz , 683 (X o .
4 6 3 ); C a p ta in W a tson on reasons un d er­
ly in g A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s rem arks
con cern in g an a greem ent, and the 16 to
10 p rop ortion : p olicy o f X a v a l E x p a n ­
sionist P a rty . 684-7 X'o. 4 6 4 ); a ttitu d e
o f G erm an press tow ards B ritish X a v y
estim ates for M a rch 1913. and sugges­
tion o f a y e a r’ s “ naval h olid a y ,” 690-2
(X'o. 46S ); H err von J a g ow on, 693
(X'o. 4 6 9 ); E m p eror W illia m I I on
G erm an na va l increases an d th e X a v y
L aw . Oct. 1913, 709 (X o . 482, encl.).
R e p o r t b y C a p ta in W a tson on G erm an
naval a ffairs from 1 9 1 0 -3 : X aval
p olicy , A d m ira l v on T irp itz , X'aval
defence, m aterial. Fleet w ork, per­
sonnel, 711-8 (X'o. 483, encl.).
P rin ce H en ry o f P russia on G erm an naval
policy , J a n u a ry 1914, 733 (X'o. 4 9 .,
encl.).
Speeches at annual m eetin g o f F lo tte n -
rerein , M a y 1914, 751-2 (X o. 516,
of en d s.).
(F o r A nglo-G erm a n discussions, 1912-4, r.
infra.
G rea t B rita in and : M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s
Su pp lem en ta ry Estim ates, J u ly 1912,
6 55-6 (X'o. 4 51 ); S ir E. G rey on develop­
m ent o f British navy, relation to size o f
G erm an fleet, B ritish navy the one and
only m eans of defen ce, J an . 1913, 663—4
(X o . 4 5 5 ); B ritish naval program m es and
th eir effect upon the G erm an X a v a l
E x pa n sion ist P a r ty , 664-9 (X'o. 456), 684—6

A R M A M E N T S , N A V A L — (con tin u ed ).
G re a t B r ita in a n d -- (c o n t i n u e d ):
(N o. 464, e n c l.); offers o f ships from M alay
States, Canada and In d ia , 6 66-7 (N o.
45 6 ); C a nadian offer o f ships, 687 (N o.
464, n o te ( 7) ) ; th e question o f 16 to 10
ra tio betw een B ritish and G erm an F leets,
670-1 (N o. 457), 676-8, 680 (N o. 462),
684-6 (N o. 464, e n c l.); M r. W in ston
C h u rch ill’ s N a v y E stim ates, M a rch 1913,
and su ggestion of a y e a r ’ s “ naval
holid a y ,” 690-2, (N o. 4 6 8 ); E m p eror
W illia m II on A nglo-G erm a n naval
m atters, M ay, 699-701 (N o. 4 7 5 ); decision
t o a dvance con stru ction o f 3 ships and
rejection o f the C a nadian N aval A id B ill,
703 (N o. 479 and n o te ( * ) ) ; M r. W in ston
C h u rch ill’ s renew ed proposal fo r
“ h olid a y y ea r,” O ct., 7 18-9 (N o. 485), 720
(N o. 4 8 6 ); M r. W in ston C hurchill on
criticism s o f proposal and a dv an ta g es to
G rea t B r ita in of a “ naval h olid a y ,”
721 (N o. 4 8 7 ); M r. L loy d G eorg e’ s den u n ­
cia tio n o f org a n ized in san ity o f m odern
a rm am en ts and B ritish press con troversy ,
S ir V . C orb ett on th e effect likely to be
p rod u ced in G erm any, Jan . 1914, 729 (N o.
495).
(F o r A n g lo-G erm a n discussions, 1 912-4, v.
in fra.)
A n g lo-G erm a n discussions, 1912-4 :
1912: G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards M r.
W in ston C h u rch ill’ s speech, J u ly 22,
1912, on S u p p lem en ta ry E stim ates,
655-6 (N o. 4 5 1 ); B a ron v on M arschall
on im p ossib ility o f com in g to any a gree­
m en t as to lim ita tion c f arm am ents,
criticism o f M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s
speech, A u g u st, 6 55-6 (N o. 451).
1913: A d m ira l von T ir p it z ’ s sta tem en t
b efore B u d g et C om m ittee and idea o f a
N a val A greem en t, F eb. 1913, 669-70
(N o. 4 5 7 ); discussion o f q uestion o f
lim ita tion o f arm am en ts ceased, 671
(N o. 457, m in .); G erm an statem ents
w ill fa v ou ra bly affect B ritish statem ents
on N a val E stim ates, idea o f a naval
agreem ent, 673 (N o. 459), S ir E.
G oschen on, 683 (N o. 4 6 3 ); G erm an
p op u la r b e lie f in an a greem ent, 677
(N o. 4 6 2 ); A d m ira l v on T ir p itz denies
any naval n eg otia tion s w ith E n g lan d ,
6 77-8 (N o. 462, encl.), G erm any w ould
be w illin g to en ter in to n e g otia tion s if
E n g lan d w ou ld b egin , 679 (N o. 462,
en c l.); S ir E. G oschen w ould h op e to
a void any conversation s, 633 (N o. 4 6 3 );
S ir E. G rey has no in ten tion o f p ro ­
p osin g a naval agreem ent, P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y ’ s h op e th a t naval e x p e n d i­
tu re w ould n ot be raised, no B ritish
desire fo r a discussion on th e 16 to
10 r a t i o ; S ir E. G oschen n ot to speak
unless a pproach ed, M a rch , 6 87-8 (N o.
465).
870
A R M A M E N T S , N A V A L — (con tin u ed ).
A nglo-G erm a n discussions, 1913-4— ( con­
tin u ed ) :
“ N a val holida y a ttitu d e o f G erm an press
tow ards M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s
suggestion , 690-2 (N o. 4 6 8 ); H err von
B ethm a nn H ollw eg p ertu rb ed at B ritish
decision to a dvance con stru ction o f
3 ships, 705 (N o. 4 7 9 ); E m p eror
W illia m I I ’ s h op e th a t referen ce to
“ naval con s tru ction h olida y ” m ay be
avoided , J u ly , 7 05 -6 (N o. 480), K in g
G eorge V on, 706 (N o. 480, m in .); M r.
W in ston C h u rch ill’ s view s as to Germ an
form er request fo r d efinite proposals, 706
(N o. 4 8 1 ); critica l a ttitu d e o f G erm an
press to renew ed proposal fo r a
a “ naval h olid a y ,” O ct. 1913, 7 18-9 (N o.
4 8 5 ); S ir E. G oschen on rev iva l o f
“ naval holida y ” idea, E m p eror
W illia m I I ’ s wish to a void, 720 (N o.
4 8 6 ); S ir E. G rey on necessity fo r a
pu blic statem ent, 720 (N o. 486, m in .);
M r. W in ston C h u rch ill on G erm an a tti­
tude, 721 (N o. 4 8 7 ); S ir E. G rey on
necessity fo r a statem ent, 722 (N o. 4 8 8 );
G erm any suspiciou s o f the proposal,
N ovem ber 1913, 723 (N o. 489).
1 9 1 4 : P rin ce H en ry o f P ru ssia on the
B ritish ten d en cy to com pare B ritish
and G erm an fleets, and effect upon
re la t io n s : G erm an resentm ent due to
con sta n t com parison and the consequen t
im p lica tion th a t G erm any is th e e n e m y ;
C a pta in H en d erson on, Jan. 1914, 732-3
(N o. 497, e n c l.); S ir E y re C row e on, 734
(N o. 497, m in .); A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s
sta tem en t th a t p ositive proposals had
not y e t reached G erm any and, if they
did, th ey w ould b e exam in ed w ith
good w i l l : S ir E. G re y ’ s desire to know
w hat A d m iral von T ir p itz m eant and
w hether proposals w ould be resented,
F eb., 734-5 (N o. 4 9 8 ); H e r r von J ag ow
on A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s speech, a
p a rlia m en ta ry u ttera n ce and in no w ay
im p lied th a t proposal w ould be
accep ted , 735 (N o. 4 9 9 ); S ir E. Goschen
on G erm an dislike o f the id ea o f a
“ naval h olid a y ,” 736 (N o. 5 0 0 ); H err
von J a g o w ’ s reply : no official proposals
on 10 to 16 ra tio had been received, nor
on a “ naval h olid a y ,” “ naval holida y ”
im possible to G erm any, if proposals
on basis o f 5 squadrons to 8 w ere
received G erm any w ou ld ex am ine them ,
736-7 (N o. 501), 7 37-8 (N o. 502, encl. 1),
A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s speech b efore
B u d g et C om m ittee on, 738-9 (N o. 502,
encl. 2 ) ; A d m iral von T ir p itz on B ritish
naval estim ates, M a rch 1914, 740 (N o.
503, encl.).
In v ita tio n from E m p eror W illia m I I fo r
F ir st L ord o f A d m ira lty and F irst
Sea L o rd to be presen t a t K iel w eek,
M a y 1914, 744 (N o. 5 0 9 ); S ir E. G rey
opp osed to, 745 (N o. 509, m in .); M r.
W in ston C hurchill on : value o f a non-

A R M A M E N T S , N A V A L — (continued).
A n g lo-G crm a n discussions, 1914— (con­
tin u ed ) :
com m itta l conversation , poin ts w hich
m ig h t he discussed, 746-8 (N o. 5 1 1 );
S ir E. G rey considers th a t a v isit to
G erm any to discuss poin ts w ith Adm iral
von T ir p it z m ig h t be fu tile and also
cause resentm ent, suggests a pre­
lim in a ry discussion th rou g h a tta ch és,
and a m essage sta tin g th a t M r.
C h u rch ill and P rin ce L ou is o f B a tten ­
b erg had not in ten ded to visit, and
w ere unable to do so, 748-9 (N o. 512) ;
M r. C h u rch ill considers th a t only
person a l discussion betw een him self and
A d m ira l von T ir p it z w ou ld be useful,
749 (N o. 513) ; the m a tter ex p lain ed to
th e E m p eror W illia m H , J u n e, 750
(N o. 515).
I ta ly a n d : Increase con tem p la ted , A ug. 1912,
656-7 (N o. 451) ; G orm an in fluen ce on,
J an . 1913, 668 (No. 456).
R ussia a n d : R ev iv a l of R ussian fleet, 1913,
721 (N o. 487) ; C a pta in G ren fell on
position o f R ussian navy, sm all chance o f
its com p letion hv 1917, 771-2 (N o. 5 3 1 );
R ussian wish to buy tw o D rea d n ou g h ts
b ein g b u ilt in E n g lan d fo r Chile, A p ril
1914, 785 ( N o . 538); B ritish G overnm ent
has no legal m eans o f in terv en in g , con ­
tra cts had been sign ed w ith T urkey, 801
(ed. n ote).
A R M E N IA .
Russia and : A n n ex a tion of tw o eastern
provinces, su g g estion of, D ec. 1913, 275 !
(N o. 182) ; M . S azonov on R ussian
frien d ly pou rp a rlers w ith T u rkey on
A rm en ia n question, M ay 1914, 796 (N o.
546, encl.).
A S I A M IN O R .
F ren ch desire fo r ra ilw ay concessions in N orth
o f Asia M in or, 37 (N o. 24) ; reform s in
A n a tolia prom ised by T urkey, M a y 1913,
122 (N o. 72).
F ren ch , G erm an, Italia n and R ussian econ om ic
expa n sion in Asia M in or, 249-50 (N o.
i5 7 ).
G erm an com m ercia l u n d erta k in g s in, I lc r r
von J a g ow on G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards
any ex clu sion o f G erm any by the T rip le
E n t e n te , J a n . 1913, 660 (N o. 4 5 4 ); S ir E.
G rey ’ s view th a t if there is to be a p a r­
titio n G erm any m ust be in it, 663 (No.
455) ; G erm an ir rig a tio n works, 371-2
(N o. 232).
G rea t B rita in has no p olitica l designs in, 663
(N o. 455).
Ita lia n desire for concessions in, and B ritish
su p port, 644 (N o. 441) (v. also sub
A da lia ).
R a ilw ay s in Asia M in or ( v. also sub T u r k e y :
A s ia tic T urkey).
A S IA T IC T U R K E Y .
(v . sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic T u rk ey .)
871
, A U S T R A L IA .
* T im o r : question o f p u blica tion o f A nglo-
G crinan secret a greem ent re P ortu g u ese
Colonies, and effect upon A u stra lia , 1912,
I 431-34 (N o. 270 and m in.), 453 (N o. 285,
nu n.), 455 (N o. 2 87 ); revised d r a ft of
A nglo-G crm a n C onvention, D ec. 1912, 496
l (N o. 320, encl. 2 ); M arch 1913, 521 (N o.
I 331, m in .); B ritish wish in interests of
Australia to elim inate G erm an claim to
reversion of T im or, 548 (N o. 350).
I
] A U S T R IA -llU N G A R Y .
i F u tu re o f : H e r r von Jag ow on p ossibility of
I a b reak-up of E m pire, J a n u a ry 1913, 659­
] 60 (N o. 4 54 ); effect o f death o f the
Em p eror o f A ustria upon, 769 (N o. 5 30 );
probable G erm an and R ussian acquisi­
tions, 770 (N o. 5 3 0 ); a new g ro u p in g o f
Pow ers based on im p ending b reak-up
discussed, M arch 1914, 770-1 (N o. 530 );
' ll e r r von J a g o w ’ s fea r th a t E m p ire w ould
go to pieces, w ant o f cohesion in
| M onarchy, g row in g in depen dence of
i na tiona lities, 772-3 (N o. 5 3 2 ); S ir E.
G oschen on possible influence o f these con ­
dition s upon G erm an policy, 773 (N o. 532 );
, view s of E m p eror N icholas 11 on
disin tegra tion o f the E m p ire, 7 78-9 (N o.
536).
M ilita ry expansion, M arch 1914, 755 (N o. 518,
| min ). 757 (N o. 519).
. N a v y : B ritish evacu ation o f M ed iterra n ean
! and effect upon A u stro-H u n g a ria n con-
■ stru ction , J u n e 1912, 597 (N o. 394) (v .
; also sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l , A u stria ­
H u n g a ry and).
1 T rip le A llia n c e : restriction o f scope of
A lliance to d efence, 5S6 (N o. 3 8 6 ); em pha­
sis on com m on p olicy o f d efence, M arch
1914, 757 (N o. 5 19 ); A u s tro -H u n g a ria n
position in T rip le A lliance, M a rch 1914,
770 (N o. 530) (v . also sub T r e a t i e s ,
A lliance, T riple).
G erm a n y a n d : G erm an su p p ort to A ustria -
H u n g a ry , D ec. 1912, 658 (N o. 452), 658
(N o. 4 5 3 ); H err von Jag ow on, Jan. 1913,
659 (N o. 4 5 4 ); G erm an o p in ion on, M ay,
702 (N o. 4 7 5 ); possibility o f a b reak-up
of A u s tria -H u n g a ry and influence on
Germ an policy, M arch 191). 773 (N o. 532).
G rea t B rita in a n d : S h a tt-cl-A rab C onvention
com m unicated to A u stria -H u n ga ry , A p ril
1914, 381 (N o. 236, min. and n ote ( 10) ) ;
C ount B e rch told ’ s com m endation of
B ritish policy, M ay 1914, 742 (N o. 506).
Ita ly and (v. sub I t a l y , A u s tria -U u n g a r y
and).
Rum ania a n d : R u m a n ia ’ s cha n ged a ttitu d e,
M a rch 1914, 770 (N o. 530).
R ussia a n d : A u stro-H u n ga ria n ncrvousneps
as to l ’ ussian in ten tions, M a rch 1914, 754
(N o. 5 1 8 ); hostile designs a ttrib u ted to
proposed m ob iliza tion e x ercises : uneasi­
ness w ith regard to possible Russian
schemes o f aggression : fron tier and
other in cidents, 756 (N o. 5 1 9 ); S ir M . de
B unsen on A u s tro -llu n g a ria n and
 872
A U S T R IA -H U N G A R Y — (con tin u ed ).
R ussia an d — (c o n t in u e d ):
Russian relations, no new fa ct to ex p lain
present b itte r press con troversy , 764 (N o.
5 2 6 ); M . Sazonov on en tirely frien d ly
n a tu re o f present relations, M a y , 795 (N o.
546, encl.).
AZO RE S.
(v. sub P o r t u g a l : Colonies, Azores.)
BAGDAD.
T u rk ish p olicy and in cid en ts in B a g d a d (v .
sub M e s o p o t a m i a ) .
B A G D A D R A IL W A Y .
I m p o rta n ce o f question in relation s betw een
G rea t B rita in , T u rkey and G erm any, D ec.
1910, 13 (N o. 6, encl.).
A n a to lia n R a ilw a y ( v. sub A n a t o l i a n R a i l ­
w ay ).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p a n y :
G e n e r a l: T u rk ey urges C om p any to sta rt
w ork in several places, Jan . 1911, 21
(N o. 11, n o te ( 2) ) ; n e g otia tion s w ith
com p an y on revenues, m onopolies, an
ou tlet a t A lex a n d retta and th a t Com ­
pany should abandon its rig h t to b u ild
B a g d a d -G u lf section , F eb., 22 (N o. 1 2 );
no agreem ent yet, M a rch 1911, 29 (N o.
17, m in .); C on v en tion s sign ed betw een
T u rk ey and C om p any re the H e l if -
B a g d a d sections, A lex a n d retta -O s m a n ie
branch, A lexa n d retta p ort, and decla ra ­
tion by C om p an y ren ou n cin g its rig h t
to B a g d a d -G u lf section , 34-35 (N o. 2 3 );
T urkish rep ly to G reat B r ita in , A p ril
1912, oil in d em n ity for ren u n cia tion o f
rig h t, 60 (N o. 47), B ritish com m ent on,
69 (N o. 5 0 ); share in B a g d a d -G u lf sec­
tion , 74 (N o. 5 2 ); suggestion o f a B ritish
D ir e cto r fo r the B oa rd , J u ly , 76 (N o.
55), C om pany w ould p refer to b u ild
and m anage the B a g d a d -B a sra section
ra th er than abandon it to a n oth er
Com pany, M ay 1913, 97 (N o. 6 6 ); the
situ ation und er 1911 arra n g em en t, 97
(N o. 6 6 ); com p ensa tion w ould be
req u ired from T u rk ey if C om p any
a greed to postpon em en t o f th e B a s r a -
G u lf section , 127 (N o. 7 8 ); C om p any
desire to secure alloca tion o f revenues,
127 (N o. 7 8 ); H e r r G w inner on a p p o in t­
m ent o f D irectors, J u n e 1913, 142 (N o.
9 1 ); A nglo-G erm a n a greem ent, in clu sion
o f B ritish d irectors on B oa rd o f B a g d a d
R a ilw a y C om pany, 234-41 (N o. 154),
243, 247 (N o. 156), 300 (N o. 189), 304
(N o. 190), 342 -4 (N o. 213), 359 (N o. 225,
encl.), 398, 403 (N o. 249, encl.).
A g reem en t w ith L o rd In ch ca p e (v. sub
M e s o p o t a m i a , N a v ig a tion ).
A g reem en t betw een B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om ­
pa ny and O ttom an G overnm ent : A g re e ­
m ent referred to in A nglo-G erm a n
C on v en tion , A r ticle 2, 238 (N o. 154,
en cl. ) ; B ritish d r a ft o f proposed a gree­
m ent, T ex t, su b m itted to G erm any,
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
B a g d a d R a ilw ay C om p an y — ( con tin u ed ) :
G eneral— (con tin u ed ) :
N ov. 1913, 251-2 (N o. 1 60 ); d r a ft as
suggested by M r. P ark er, T ex t, 252-4
(N o. 161, N o. 1 ); T urkish d r a ft, T e x tf
254-5 (N o. 161, N o. 2 ) ; G erm an d raft,
T ex t, 2 56 -8 (N o. 161, N o. 3 ) ; Official
B ritish d ra ft, T e x t, 267-9 (N o. 174,
en c l.); R ev ised official B ritish draft,'
T ex t, 308-10 (N o. 1 91 ); B a g d a d R a il­
way C om pany and T urkey, n eg otia tion s
proceed in g slowly, J u ly 191k, 418
(N o. 261).
A n glo-G erm an n eg otia tion s re : A g ree­
m ent betw een C om p any and T u rkey
should p reced e con clu sion o f A n g lo-
G erm an C onven tion , A ug. 1913, 221
(N o. 1 4 6 ); A g reem en t referred to in
A n glo-G erm an C on v en tion , Septem ber,
238 (N o. 154, e n c l.); B ritish d r a ft sub­
m itted to G erm any, T ext, 251-2 (N o.
1 60 ); G erm an d r a ft, T ex t, 2 56-8 (N o.
161, N o. 3 ) ; Official B ritish cou n ter­
d r a ft, T ex t, com m u n ica ted to G erm any,
266-9 (N o. 1 7 4 ); G erm an ob servations
on a rticle 8, 310-1 (N o. 192), B ritish
rep ly to, 3 12-3 (N o. 193).
A n glo-G erm an C on v en tion re : G erm an p ro ­
posals, M a y 7, 1913, 97-9 (N o. 6 6 ); dis­
sussion of, betw een H e r r von K iihlm ann
and M r. P a rk er, M a y 21, 126-7 (N o. 7 8 );
betw een S ir E. G rey and H e r r von
K iih lm a n n , M ay 23, 128-9 (N o. 79), 131
(N o. 8 2 ); fu rth er discussion, J u n e, 133-4
(N o. 8 6 ); con su lta tion o f In d ia Office
and B oa rd o f T ra de, 136-7 (N o. 8 9 );
B ritish d r a ft o f prop osed A n glo-G erm an
D ecla ra tion , J u n e, T e x t, 138-40 (N o. 89,
en cls. ) ; discussion of, betw een H e r r von
K iihlm a nn and M r. P a rk er, J u ly , 162-3
(N o. 1 0 7 ); discussion o f G erm an C ou n ter­
d r a ft, J u ly , 172-3 (N o. 1 1 7 ); G erm an
C o u n te r-d ra ft of D ecla ra tion , P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y ’ s ex p la n a tion o f a lteration s,
1 74-6 (N o. 1 18 ); T ex t, 177-9 (N o. 118,
I encl. 3 ) ; p r a ctica l effect o f present nego­
j tia tion s w ill so fa r b e p r in cip a lly nega ­
tiv e, 208 (N o. 1 3 5 ); M r. P a rk er thin ks
th e agreem en t m ay be sign ed by end o f
Sept., 210 (N o. 137), F ren ch pressure to
delay sign atu re of, 210 (N o. 1 3 7 ); F ra n co ­
G erm an a greem ent reached and effect on
A n glo-G erm an n eg otia tion s, 219 (N o. 144 );
co u n te r -d ra ft o f C on v en tion discussed by
H e r r von K iihlm ann and M r. A. P ark er,
221-3 (N o. 146), 225 -6 (N o. 1 4 8 ); G reat
B rita in w ill not p r e cip ita te conclusion o f
agreem ent w ith G erm any, Sept. 1913, 230
(N o. 152).
B ritish revised C ou n ter-d ra ft, &e., T ext,
Sept. 1913, 234-41 (N o. 1 54 ); Germ an
am endm ents and B ritish com m ents,
N ov., 243-7 (N o. 1 5 6 ); G erm an C ou n ter­
d ra ft, T ex t, N ov. 3, 1913, 247-9 (N o. 156,
e n c l.); G erm an sta tem en t th a t n eg otia ­
tion s betw een G erm any, G rea t B rita in

B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion r e — ( co n tin u ed ) :
B ritish revised C o u n te r-d ra ft— ( c on tin u ed ) :
and T u rk ey are to form one whole, 262
(N o. 1 6 9 ); situ a tion as t o sign atu re of
other agreem ents, 263 (N o. 169); B ritish
criticism s and am endm ents to G erm an
C ou n ter-D ra ft, 298-303 (N o. 1 89 );
A nglo-G erm a n C on ven tion , B ritish
C ou n ter-d ra ft, T ex t, D ec. 15, 1913,
3 04-7 (N o. 1 90 ); A nglo-G erm a n d r a ft
a greem ent settled in substance,
J a n u a ry 191't, 314 (N o. 1 9 6 ); fu rth er
G erm an d r a ft, G erm an com m ents and
ex p la n a tion s, 315-20 (N o. 198, encl. 1),
T ex t, 3 20-3 (N o. 198, encl. 2 );
A rticle 6 (6) B ritish cou n ter-d ra ft,
F eb., T e x t, 325 (N o. 2 0 0 ); G erm an
cou n ter-p rop osa l for A rticle 6 ( b),
T ex t, 3 3 4 -5 (N o. 204, en c l.); B ritish
hope th a t n eg otia tion s m ay soon be
con clu d ed , M arch, 336-7 (N o. 2 06 );
B ritish m odifica tion of A rticle 3 (c),
3 37 -8 (N o. 207), 344, (N o. 213, A n n e x ) ;
A rticle 6 (6) B ritish am endm ents com ­
m u n ica ted , M a rch , T ex t, 338 (N o. 208 );
effect o f suspension o f G erm an-T urk ish
n e g otia tion s and hope th a t they will be
con clu d ed b efore M a rch 31, 340 (N o.
2 1 0 ); A r ticle 1 and A rticle 6 (b) dis­
cussed, 3 42 -4 (N o. 2 1 3 ); B ritish d r a ft
o f A rticles 5 (a) and 6 com m unica ted,
T ex t, 349-50 (N o. 2 1 7 ); M r. P a rk er on
B ritish ob jection s to an a d d ition a l
A rticle on the S h a tt-el-A ra b, and conse­
q u en t am endm ents, 3 55-8 (N o. 2 2 4 );
B ritish revised d r a ft of C onvention,
M a rch 31, 1914, T ex t, 3 59-63 (N o. 225,
en cl. ) ; G erm an su ggestion of d rop p in g
A rticle 7, 364 (N o. 2 2 6 ); G erm an com ­
m ents on revised B ritish d ra ft, A p ril,
368-9 (N o. 230) and B ritish rep ly, 381-2
(N o. 2 3 7 ); revised d r a ft o f the C onven­
tion , a d op ted A p ril 21, 370-1 (ed . n o t e ) ;
T ex t o f A rticle 3, clause (c), and
section I I I o f ex p la n a to ry note, railw ay
u n d erta k in g s in com p etition w ith
B agdad R a ilw a y , 372-3 (N o. 2 33 );
G erm a ny agrees in prin cip le to
a rticle 9, b u t suggests m odifica tion of
w ord in g , 374 (N o. 234), 382 (N o. 2 3 8 );
D r a ft C on v en tion , M ay 29, and T ex t of
E x p la n a to ry N otes t o be exch a n ged,
3 92-4 (ed. n o te, Nos. 1 -4 ); revised
B ritish d rafts, J u n e 2 and 5, 395
(ed. n o te ) ; A nglo-G erm a n C onven tion ,
in itia lled J u n e 15, T ex t, 397-408 (N o.
249, en c l. ) ; suggested om m ission of
w ords ‘ ‘ pecu n ia ry claim s ” in the
e x p la n a tory note, 415 (ed. n ote).
C on v en tion of 1 9 0 3 : 7 (N o. 2, m in .); 139-40
(N o. 89, encl. 3 ) ; oil concessions, 152 (N o.
95), 154 (N o. 97), 214 (N o. 1 40 ); p ort at
B asra, 155 (N o. 98), 209 (N o. 135 ); A n g lo-
G erm an A g reem en t and C on v en tion of
1903, 238-41 (N o. 154, encl.), 248 (N o. 156,
encl. 2), 304 (N o. 190), 320 (N o. 198,
encl. 2), 359 (N o. 225, encl.), 398 (N o. 249,
373
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
C onvention of 1903— (con tin u ed ) :
en cl. ) ; B agdad R a ilw ay C om pany and
p roposed A greem en t w ith T u rk ey , 252-7
(N os. 160-1), 267-8 (N o. 174, encl.), 308-10
(N o. 191 ); and C oncession for N a v ig a tion
o f T ig ris and E uphrates, 291 (N o. 188).
Custom s d u tie s : increase of T urkish (v. sub
T u r k e y , Custom s duties).
D ifferen tial trea tm en t, an u n d erta k in g for
the exclu sion of, 136 (N o. 89), 138 (N o.
89, encl. 2 ) ; D r a ft A nglo-G erm a n D eclara ­
tion , T ext, 139 (N o. 89, encl. 3 ) ; dis­
crim in a tion o f rates, &c., 238 (N o. 154,
e n c l.); no d iscrim in a tion a ga in st B ritish
tra de, one of p rin cip a l desid erata o f G reat
B rita in , 299 (N o. 1 89 ); C onvention,
in itia lled J u n e 15, 191k, T ex t, 399 (N o.
249, encl.).
(v. also sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g d a d R a il­
w ay C om p an y ’ s A g reem en t w ith T urkey.)
F in a n c e : B a g da d R a ilw ay B o n d s : fa ilu re of
last issue of, F eb. 1911, 21 (N o. 11, m in .);
B agdad R a ilw ay Com pany, finance and
a lloca tion o f revenues, 34, 35 (N o. 2 3 );
F ren ch refusal of a q u otation for a loan
fo r con stru ction o f B a g d a d R a ilw ay , 44
! (N o. 3 3 ); a greem ent betw een O ttom an
B ank and D eutsch e B ank t o g ive one
a nother options, 44 (N o. 3 3 ); assistance of
F ren ch m oney in the con stru ction of R a il­
w ay, 44 (N o. 3 3 ); n eg otia tion s o f H err
H elfferich and M . L am orn aix , 169-71
(N o. 116).
B a g d a d -G u lf section, q uestion of a llotm en t
of ca p ita l to differen t P ow ers (v. sub
B agdad R a il w a y , B a g d a d -G u lf S ec­
tion).
G uaran tees fo r B a g d a d R a ilw ay an d F in a n ­
cial Com m ission at P aris (v. sub
T urkey : F in a n ce, F in a n cia l Com m is­
sion at P aris).
In dem n ity to be allowed the C om pany for
m ore difficult pa rts o f line, J u n e 1912, 75
(N o. 53).
K ilom etric g u a r a n te e s : G erm an and B ritish
view s on, M a y 1913, 98 (N o. 66, m in .);
C om pany n e g o tia tin g fo r m odifica tion of,
J u n e 1913, 153 (N o. 95).
P orts: a t Basra and B a g d a d (v. sub B a g d a d
: B a g d a d -G u lf section, B a g d a d -
R a il w a y
Basra section).
R ailw ays in A sia tic T urkey, concessions and
p rojects (v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic T urkey).
R a ilw ays in com p etition w ith B a g d a d R a il­
w ay (v. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic T urkey).
T e r m in i: w estern a t K on ia , eastern a t Basra,
338 (N o. 207).
(F or discussion of Basra as term inus
v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g d a d -G u lf
section , B a gd a d -B a sra.)
A lex a n d retta , p o r t o f : T urkish n eg otia tion s
w ith B a g d a d R a ilw ay C om pany and, Feb.
1911, 22 (N o. 1 2 ); plans to be ready w ithin
15 m onths and w orks com p leted w ithin
fo u r years, M a rch 1911, 34 (N o. 23).
 874
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
A lex a n d rctta —Osm anie s e c t i o n : T o be con ­
stru cted w ith ou t k iloin ctric g u aran tees
and w ithin tw o years, M a rch 1911, 34 (N o.
2 3 ); G erm any and, J u n e 1912, 75 (N o.
53), M a y 1913, 97 (N o. 65).
B a g d a d -G u lf s e c t i o n : D ecla ra tion b y the
C om p any ren ou n cin g its rig h t con ­
d ition a lly to the section, M a rch 1911, 34
(N o. 23).*
K o w e it as a term in u s: T u rk ey w ould prefer
K ow eit, p o r t should be b u ilt b y an
in tern a tion a l synd ica te, F eb ru a ry 1911,
22 (N o. 1 2 ); B ritish view s on, 23 (N o.
12, m in. ) ; T urkish proposals, 24 (N o.
14), 26 (N o. 15, en c l.); necessity fo r a
sa tisfa ctory prelim in a ry arra n gem en t,
27 (N o. 15, m in . ) ; con d ition s for
esta blish in g K o w e it as a term in u s to be
settled betw een G rea t B r ita in and
T u rk ey alone, 46 (N o. 3 4 ); Assim B ey
and S ir G. L ow th er on qu estion of
K o w e it as a term inus, 53 (N o. 3 8 );
B ritish view s on T urkish reply, A p ril
1912. 6 9-70 (N o. 50).
(F o r settlem ent o f the K o w e it qu estion with
th a t of the B a g d a d R a ilw ay , v. sub
P e r s i a n G u l f , K ow eit.)
R a tes, d ifferen tia l r a ilw a y : C on v en tion
p r o v id in g fo r ex clu sion of, on all ra il­
w ays in A s ia tic T u rkey ( d . sub T u r k e y ,
A s ia tic T urkey).
G erm a n y a n d : G erm an rights, 11 (N o. 6 );
T u rkey p rep a red to b rin g pressure up on
G erm any to find som e arra n g em en t
w hich w ould sa tisfy E ngland , 14 (N o. 6,
en cl. ) ; p o r t and term in u s on P ersian
G u lf had been le ft open in co n tr a c t
w ith G erm ans, 20 (N o. 9 ); q u estion of
G erm an a p p rov al to T urkish proposals,
27 (N o. 15, m in . ) ; B ritish en q u iry to
T urkey, 2S (N o. 1 6 ); T urkish rep ly th a t
G erm any is gen era lly cog n isa n t o f the
proposals and cou ld not agree to any
foreig n g ro u p h a vin g a la rg er share
than the G erm ans in the section , 28
(N o. 1 7 ); G erm an a ttitu d e not one of
u n m itig ated sa tisfa ction , 29 (N o. 17,
m in . ) ; fa v ou ra ble im pression m ade by
S ir E. G rey 's statem ent, M a rch 8, 1911,
31 (N o. 2 0 ); share o f the G erm an Com ­
pany in new O ttom an C om p any, 35
(N o. 2 3 ); in d ica tion s th a t G erm any
m ay cease to be co n te n t w ith recen t
a rra n g em en t w ith T urkey, D ec., 54 (N o.
3 9 ); T urkish desire th a t G erm any
should not in terven e in A n g lo-T u rk ish
discussions, Feb. 1912, 56 (N o. 42),
G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards R ussian
p a rticip a tio n , 57 (N o. 44, m in.), 58 (N o.
4 5 ); M r. P a rk er on G erm an ex clu sion
from B a g d a d -G u lf section, M ay, 74 (N o.
5 2 ); G erm an position discussed by S ir
K. G rey and Baron von M arschall, J une,
7 5-6 (N o. 53), J u ly , 76 (N o. 54), and
w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, M ay 1913: the
D eutsch e B ank w ished to have b u ild in g
o f line b eyond B a g da d, and w ould agree
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
B a g d a d -G u lf se ctio n — (c o n t in u e d ):
G erm a n y a n d — (c o n t in u e d ):
to have tw o B ritish D irectors fo r this
pa rt, 96 (N o. 6 5 ); proposals o f H err
G w innor and H err H elfferich, 99
(N o. 6 7 ); G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards
co n tin u a tion to P ersian G ulf, 126 (No.
77), 128 (N o. 7 9 ); a greem ent with
T u rk ey fo r T u rk ish con tin u a tion of
ra ilw ay to G ulf, 128 (N o. 7 9 ); British
revised co u n te r-d ra ft, ex p lan a tion s and
T ex t, S eptem ber, 234-41 (N o. 154);
C on vention in itia lled , Ju n e 15, 1914,
T e x t, 3 98-9 (N o. 249, encl.).
G reat B r ita in and : M r. M a rlin g on Turkish
suggestion th a t section should be built
by T urkey, B ritish rep resen ta tion on
A d m in istra tiv e B oa rd , and financial
con sid era tion s, D oc. 1910, 8 (N o. 4 );
M r. M a rlin g scep tica l as to sin cerity of
T urkish overtu res, 9 (N o. 4 ) ; Mr.
M a rlin g on B ritish position w ith regard
to term in u s o f ra ilw ay at K ow eit, possi­
b ility o f using T urkish a n xiety over
K o w e it to ob tain som e concession from
G erm any, J an . 1911, 12 (N o. 6), 15 (No.
6, m in.), M r. P a r k e r and S ir E. Grey
on, 15-16 (N o. 6, m in .); In d ia Office
consulted , 16-17 (N o. 7 ); B ritish main
in terest in G u lf section , Feb. 1911, 21
(N o. 11, m in .); B ritish view s on the
proposal th a t P ow ers should be joint
shareholders, necessity fo r cancellation
o f 1903 A g reem en t and su b stitu tion of
a n oth er arra n g em en t, K o w eit as an
in tern a tion a l port, 2 2-3 (N o. 12, min.).
T urkish p r o p o s a ls : B ritish com m ents on,
2 7-28 (N o. 15, m in . ) ; S ir E. G rey on
p roposed ex ten sion , 31 (N o. 20,
n o te ( 2) ) ; qu estion of B ritish share in
new B a g d a d -G u lf C om pany, 35 (No.
2 3 ); B ritish position ex p lain ed to
F ran ce: sa tisfa ctory arrangem ent
required a b ou t B a g d a d -G u lf section,
str a te g ic position in P ersian G ulf not
to be a ltered to B ritish disadvantage,
a rra n g em en t w ould n ot be concluded
w ith T u rkey unless F ra n ce also was
satisfied, 37 (N o. 2 4 ); coun ter-proposal
to be m ade to T u rk ey , B ritish require­
m ents to be com m u n ica ted t o Germany,
37 (N o. 2 4 ); L ord H a rd in g e on British
position , 38 (N o. 2 5 ); G rea t Britain
ca n n o t a ccep t T urkish proposals, some
o th er solu tion w ill be suggested, May
1911, 3 8-39 (N o. 26). 42 (N o. 30);
q uestion o f differen tia l trea tm en t of
B ritish tra d e and G erm an attitude,
42 (N o. 3 0 ); R e p ly to T urkish pro­
posals, unable to a cce p t proposed divi­
sion o f ca p ita l in new com p any, Russia
to be a dm itted a n d 20"', to be allotted
t o each cou n try , a C on v en tion to be
con clu d ed by P ow ers on differential
ra ilw ay rates and other m atters, 45-6
(N o. 34), B ritish view on allotm en t of
ca p ital, M a rch 1912, 57 (N o. 44, min..),
 875
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (c o n tin u ed ).
B a g d a d -G u lf section , 1912— (c o n tin u e d ):
G reat B r ita in an d— (c o n t in u e d ):
and R u ssia n p a rticip a tio n , 57-8 (X o . 44,
m in.), 53 (X o . 45), 59 (X o . 4 6 ); rep ly to
T urkish m em o., A p ril 1912, div ision o f
sh a re-ca pital in B a g d a d -B a sra section
and R u ssia n p a rticip a tio n , 67-3 (X o .
50), d ifferen tia l rates, con stru ction south
o f B a g d a d , pecu n ia ry in dem n ity , port
o f B asra. 6 3-7 0 (X o . 5 0 ); M r. P a rk er on
exclu sion o f G erm any from B a g d a d -
G u lf section , 74 (X o . 52» ; n eg otia tion s
w ith T u rk ey alone. J u n e 1912, 75 (X o .
53), but if p a rticip a tio n was a rranged,
discussion w ith G erm any w ould be
necessary, 75 (X o . 53), 76 'X o . 54'» ;
G erm an p osition discussed by S ir E
G rey and B a ron v on M arschall, 75-6
(X o . 53), 76 (X o . 54 ; and w ith P rin ce
L iehnow sk y, M a y 1913. 9 6 -7 'X o . 65).
B ritish rep ly to T urkish m em o., T exts,
J u ly IS 12. 76-86 (X o . 55V
Custom s du ties, in crease of (v. sub
T u r k e y ).
B u ssia and : R ussia d isin terested in
southern sections of the railw ay,
J a n u a ry 1911, 12 (X o . 6 ); B ritish
suggestion th a t R u ssia should receive
2 0% a llotm en t o f ca p ita l in new
com p an y , 46 (X o . 3 4 ); G ra n d V iz ie r
sees no necessity fo r R ussia h a v in g a
share, A u g ., 50 (X o . 36) ; A ssim B ey on :
T u rk ey op p osed to p a rticip a tio n o f
R ussia, th a t R u ssia n share be div id ed
u p b etw een the oth er fo u r p a rticip a n ts:
rates, 52 (X o . 3 3 ); T urkish view a ga in st
a ssignm ent o f a share to R u ssia n
ca p ita l : S ir H . B a b in g ton S m ith on a
suggested d iv ision o f ca p ita l e x clu d in g
R ussia, D ec., 53 (X o . 39) ; n ot fo r G rea t
B rita in to suggest le a v in g R ussia out,
54 (X o . 39, m in .); en q u iry as to R ussian
a ttitu d e. M a rch 1912, 56 (X o . 4 3 );
M. Sa zon ov thin ks it prefera b le that
R ussia should p a rticip a te, 57 (X o . 4 4 );
R u ssia n a ttitu d e, M a rch , 56 (X o . 43).
J une, 74 (ed. note).
T u rk ey and : T urkish su ggestion to G reat
B r ita in th a t section should be b u ilt b y
an O ttom an C om p any or by th e O tto-
m au G overnm ent, D ec. 1910. 8 (X o . 4),
14 (X o . 6, encl.), G reat B rita in to be
g u a ra n teed a fa ir share in the orders
fo r m a tériel, <£c ., S, (X o . 4) ; T u rk ey to
req u ire C om p an y to abandon its rig h t
to b u ild B a g d a d -G n lf section , F eb.
1911, 22 (X o . 12), and propose th a t sec­
tion , w hile b ein g an O ttom an railw ay,
be in tern a tion a lised , w ith K o w e it as an
o u tlet, 22 (X o . 12).
P rop osals to G rea t B rita in on an u n d er­
sta n d in g fo r con stru ction o f B a g d a d -
G u lf section , M a rch 1911, sum m ary, 24
(X o . 14), T e x t, 2 5-26 (X o . 15, encl.) ;
G rand V iz ie r suggests p ossib ility o f
rea d ju stin g prop ortion s to be allotted
to P ow ers, A u g ., 50 (X o . 3 6 ); Assim
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
B a gd a d —G ulf section , 1912— (cou tiu u ed ) :
T u rk ey and— (c o n tin u e d ):
B ey on B ritish cou n ter-p roposals,
R ussian share to be d iv id ed up betw een
oth er fo u r p a rticip a u ts, 52 (X o . 33), 57
(X o . 44) ; least th a t T u rk ey could
a ccep t w ould be 20% and P resid en cy,
54 (X o . 3 9 ); T urkish rep ly n ot
rea dy, J an . 1912. 55 (X o . 40), F eb., 55
(X o . 41) ; a ttitu d e tow ards R ussian
p a rticip a tio n , M a rch 1912, 56 (X o . 43,
n ote (D ), 57 (X o . 44 ; J une, 75 (X o . 53).
T urkish rep ly to G reat B rita in , A p ril 15,
1912, T e x t, 59-65 (X o . 47), T u rk ish
desire that G reat B r ita in should lim it
n eg otia tion s to T u rk ey alone, 75 (X o .
53) ; S ir E. G rey on question o f an
in dem n ity to G erm any, 97 (X o . 65).
B a g d a d -G u lf section : B a gd a d -B a sra se ctio n :
a dv oca ted by S ir W . W illcock s, X o v . 1910,
7 (X o . 3) ; B a g d a d R a ilw a y com p an y
renou n ce its rig h t to p ort at B asra,
M a rch 1911, 34 (X o . 2 3 ) ; C om p an y w ould
p r e fe r to bu ild and m a n age B a g d a d -
Basra section ra th er than aba n don it to
a n other C om pany : the 1911 a rrangem ent,
M a y 1913, 97 (X o . 66) ; q uestion o f com ­
pen sation for the ren u n cia tion o f rights,
97 (X o . 6 6 ); lines o f an a greem ent, 97
(X o . 66).
P o rts, con stru ction o f, at B a g d a d and
Basra, J u n e 1913. 133 (X o . 8 6 ); allot­
m ent o f share to B ritish firms, 137 (X o .
89 ; con d ition s fo r con trol o f p o r t a t
B asra, 137 (X o . 89), 13S (X o . 89,
encl. 2 ) ; B ritish rep resen ta tion and
allotm en t o f ca p ita l, 137 (X o . 89,
encl. 1 ); G erm an in terests, 137 (X o . 89^
encl. 1) ; D r a ft A n g lo-G erm a n D ecla ra ­
tio n , T ex t. 139 (X o . 39, encl. 3 ) ; A n n ex
to, establishm ent o f p o r t at Basra
form a tion o f sp ecial O ttom an C om pany,
and con d ition s fo r port, 155 (X o!
93 ; G erm an co u n te r-d ra ft D ecla ra tion ,
T ex t. J u ly 1913. 17S (X o . 113, encl. 3);’
B ritish C ou n ter-d ra ft. T ext, D ec. 15,
1913, 305 (X o . 190) ; A n g lo-G erm a n
C on v en tion in itia lled , T ext, J u n e 15
1914, 39S-9 (X o . 249, encl.).
F ra n ce a n d : desirable fo r F ra n ce to
p a rticip a te , S ept. 1912, 83 (X o . 57).
G erm a n y u n d : G erm any on Basra as te r­
m inus, M ay 1913. 98 (X o . 66) ; H e r r v on
K u h lm a n n on G erm an view s as to con ­
stru ction o f B a g d a d -B a sra section , 118
(X o . 69). position o f S a id R u e te and
M r. L yn ch , 113 (X o . 69) ; G erm any
w ould p refer to bu ild the p ort o f Basra
alone : con d ition s fo r co n tr o llin g the
p ort, 127 (X o . iS ); G erm an desire fo r
an assurance fo r th e m ain line to Basra,
127 (X o . 7 3 ); D ra ft A nglo-G erm a n
D ecla ra tion . T ext. 139-40 (X o . 89,
encl. 3) ; d r a ft o f A n n ex . T ext, 155 (X o !
93) ; G erm an C ou n ter-D ra ft D ecla ra ­
tion , T ext, 177-9 (X o . 11«, encl. 3 );
B ritish revised cou n ter-d ra ft, ex p la n a -
 876
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
B a gda d^ G ulf s e c tio n : B a g d a d -B a sra se ctio n —
(con tin u ed ) :
G erm a n y and— (c o n t in u e d ):
tion s and T ex t, 234-41 (N o. 154, and
e n c l.); G erm an am endm ents and B ritish
com m ents on, 242-7 (N o. 156, and
notes), G erm an C ou n ter-D ra ft, T ex t,
N ov. 3, 1913, 2 47-8 (N o. 156, encl. 2 );
B ritish C ou n ter-d ra ft, T e x t, D ec. 15,
1913, 304-7 (N o. 1 9 0 ); fu rth er
G erm an d r a ft, T ex t, 3 20 -3 (N o. 198,
encl. 2 ) ; basis o f T rea ty th a t G rea t
B r ita in u nd ertakes not to opp ose
G erm a n y's g oin g as fa r as B asra, and
G erm any agrees not to g o b eyon d B asra,
356 (N o. 2 2 4 ); revised B ritish d r a ft,
M a rch 31, 1914, 359 -63 (N o. 225, en cl. ) ;
C onven tion , in itia lled . J u n e 15, 1914,
T ex t, 398-402 (N o. 249, encl.).
G rea t B rita in and : M r. M a rlin g on : finan­
cial aspects of, p ossibility o f a G erm an-
T urkish arra n gem en t to ta ke ov er the
W illcock s railw ay and in corp ora te in
G erm an line. N ovem ber 1910, 7 -8 (N o.
3 ) ; B ritish view s as t o establishm ent of
term in u s at Basra, J u ly 1911, 46 (N o.
34), S ir G. L ow th er on, 53 (N o. 3 8 );
C om m ents on T urkish reply, A p ril 1912,
70 (N o. 5 0 ); if G rea t B r ita in w ou ld
acquiesce t o Basra as term in u s an
a greem ent cou ld be reached w ith
G erm any, J u ly , 76 (N o. 5 4 ); p rep a red
t o w ith d ra w request fo r p a rticip a tio n
if a sa tisfa ctory a greem ent can be
arriv ed at on oth er points, 78 (N o. 55,
encl.), 87 (N o. 5 6 ); tw o B ritish rep re­
sen ta tives on B oa rd o f C om p any fo r
B a g d a d -B a sr a section, term in u s t o be
at Basra, no co n tin u a tion b eyond B asra
w ith ou t B ritish consent, 78 (N o. 5 5 );
F ra n ce in form ed o f B ritish a ttitu d e, 87
(N o. 5 7 ); B ritish com m ents on G erm an
a ttitu d e, 98-9 (N o. 66, m in .); n oth in g
cou ld prev en t the line g o in g to B asra,
M a y 1913, 125 (N o. 7 7 ); if A n g lo-
T urkish a greem ent w ere confirm ed,
G rea t B rita in w ould have no in terest in
op p osin g B a g d a d -B a sra section , 128
(N o. 7 9 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s sta tem en t and
G erm an com m ent on, 132 (N o. 8 4 );
D r a ft A nglo-G erm a n D ecla ra tion , T ex t,
J une, 139 (N o. 89, encl. 3 ); G reat
B rita in requires th a t A n g lo-T u rk ish
agreem ents shall p r o v id e fo r term in u s
t o be a t Basra, 149 (N o. 9 4 ); d r a ft of
A nnex, T ext, 155 (N o. 981; G reat
B rita in t o abandon all claim t o B ritish
con trol o f B a g d a d -B a sr a section , 299
(N o. 1891.
T u rk ey and : R ep ly to G reat B rita in , A p ril
1912, 60 (N o. 4 7 ); Basra as term inus,
J u n e, 75 (N o. 5 3 ); T u rk ey m ig h t g ive
concession fo r m a kin g railw ay to a
B ritish C om pany, J u ly , 87 (N o. 5 6 );
su g g estion th a t H e r r G w inner should
discuss final section o f R a ilw a y w ith
H a k k i P asha, A ug. 1913, 206 (N o. 134).
I B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — {con tin u ed ).
| B a g d a d -G u lf section : B a sra -G u lj section :
P rolon g a tion of line from B asra to
P ersian G ulf, B ritish view s on Basra and
on p rolon g a tion to G ulf, A p ril 1912,
69-70 (N o. 50) ; term s to be settled by an
A n g lo-T u rk ish a greem ent : m ethods of
keep in g G erm any out, M ay, 74 (N o. 5 2 );
no con tin u a tion b eyon d B asra w ith ou t
B ritish consent, 78 (N o. 55) ; G erm any
w ould be w illing t o g iv e up idea o f con ­
stru ction b eyon d Basra, b u t w ould w ant
some in dem n ity, M ay 1913, 96 (N o. 65) ;
G erm an press com m ents on A n g lo-T u rk ish
n eg otia tion s, M a y 1913, 122 (N o. 72) ;
question of G erm an consent fo r con tin u ­
ance o f line to G ulf, 126 (N o. 77) ; G rea t
B rita in has not secured rig h t to b u ild the
section, 126 (N o. 77), 128 (N o. 79) ; B a g da d
Com pany w ould req uire com pensation
from T u rkey if it agreed to in definite
postpon em en t of B a sr a -G u lf section, 127
(N o. 78) ; G erm an d r a ft of ex p la n a tory
note, J u ly, 176 (N o. 118, encl. 1 ); T ext of
G erm an co u n te r-d ra ft d ecla ra tion , 177-8
(N o. 118, encl. 3) ; B ritish revised cou n ter­
d r a ft, ex plan a tion s and T ex t, Septem ber,
234-41 (N o. 1 54 ); B a g d a d R a ilw a y Com ­
p a n y ’ s proposed a greem ent w ith T urkey,
B ritish d ra ft, T ex t, 252 (N o. 1 60 ); A n g lo-
T urkish d ra ft, T ex t, 252-3 (N o. 161,
No. 1 ); T urkish d r a ft, T ex t, 2 54-5 (N o.
161, N o. 2) ; G erm an d r a ft, T ex t, 256-8
(N o. 161, No. 3) ; B ritish cou n ter-d ra ft,
T ex t, 267 9 (N o. 174, en c l.); revised
official B ritish d r a ft, T ex t, 308-10 (N o.
191) ; A nglo-G erm a n A g reem en t : B ritish
criticism s o f G erm an d ra ft, 301 (N o. 189) ;
B ritish C ou n ter-d ra ft, T ext, D ecem ber 15,
1913, 3 04-5 (N o. 190) ; B ritish com m ents
on G erm an A r ticle su g g estin g possible
ex ten sion b eyond B asra, 356-7 (N o. 224) ;
revised B ritish d r a ft, M a rch 31, 1914,
T ex t, 359 (N o. 225, encl.) ; G erm an p a rt­
icip a tion in railw ay south o f Basra, 371
(N o. 2 3 2 ); C on v en tion in itia lled , J u n e 15,
1914, T ex t, 398-402 (N o. 249, encl.).
H a id a r P a s h a -K o n ia -E r c g li s e c tio n : R evenues
of, re-allocation , M a rch 1911, 35
(N o. 23).
H e lif-B a g d a d se ctio n : B a g d a d R a ilw ay Com ­
pa n y u nd ertakes to com p lete w ithin five
years, M arch 1911, 34 (N o. 23).
K h a n ik in branch : G erm an C om pany will
n eg otia te for con stru ction of, 35 (N o. 23) ;
Russian p a rticip a tio n in, 68 (N o. 50) ;
B a g d a d -K h a n ik in line, B ritish and
G erm an in terests in con stru ction of,
Sept. 1912, 87 (ed. n o te ) ; G erm an and
B ritish view s, M ay 1913, 9 8-9 (N o. 66,
m in.) ; S ir E. G rey discou ra ges suggestion
of B a g d a d -K h a n ik in section b ein g
b rou g h t in to discussion, 126 (N o. 77), 129
(N o. 7 9 ); date o f com p letion of K h a n ik in
bra nch in relation to R ussian obligations,
127 (N o. 78).

B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
M osu l-B a g d a d section : p repa ra tion s fo r con ­
stru ction o f line from B a g d a d northw ards,
D ec. 1911, 54 (N o. 3 9 ); S ir G. L ow th er’ s
p rotest a ga in st in ten tion to a lter d ire c­
tion o f lin e so as to a pproach K h an ik in ,
54 (ed. n o t e ) ; m a tter m en tion ed to H err
von K iih lm a n n , M a y 1913, 118 (N o. 6 9 );
no in ten tion o f deflectin g m ain line at
M osul, 126 (N o. 78).
T igris l l a il w a y : T urkish refusal o f B ritish
a p p lic a tio n for, 13 (N o. 6, encl., n o te ( 10) ).
T rip o li-Ilo m s -B a g d a d -P e r s ia n G u l f : adverse
a ttitu d e o f F ra n ce tow ards, 218 (N o. 143).
F ra n ce a n d : T u rkey w illin g to g iv e con stru c­
tion o f railw ays to F ra n ce, in region o f
B lack Sea and in A lbania, desirab ility of
a F ren ch fa v ou ra ble rep ly and o f u n d er­
sta n d in g w ith R ussia, 20 (N o. 1 0 ); F ren ch
con d ition s fo r an a greem ent abou t
B a g d a d R a ilw ay , 37 (N o. 2 4 ); F ren ch
hope th a t G rea t B rita in w ill not be com ­
m itted w ith T u rkey w ith ou t co n s u ltin g ;
a nxious to co-op era te in jo in t defen ce o f
B ritish and French interests, M a y 1911,
39 (N o. 2 7 ); M . P a u l Cam bon in form ed
o f A nglo-G erm a n conversations. M a y 1913,
130 (N o. 81), 131 (N o. 8 2 ); F ren ch and
B ritish agreem en t in p rin cip le to trea t
B a g da d R a ilw ay question togeth er, A ug.
1913, 207 (N o. 135).
G erm an con v ersation s w ith F ra n ce begun,
M a y 1913, 130 (N o. 8 1 ); F ra n ce ready
to com e to an a greem ent w ith G erm any,
Ju n e, 133 (N o. 8 5 ); n eg otia tion s o f
H e r r H elfferich and M . L a m orn aix ,
T u rk ish finances and B a g d a d R a ilw ay ,
169-72 (N o. 1 1 6 ); F ren ch finan cial
m ission to B erlin, A ugust, 209 (N o. 136),
210 (N o. 137), 219 (N o. 1 44 ); suggested
a rra n g em en t betw een F ren ch G rou p of
O ttom an B ank and D eutsch e Bank,
2 11 -2 (N o. 138), 218 (N o. 1 4 3 ); term in a ­
tion o f F ra n co-G erm an n eg otia tion s :
b road lines o f the n e g o t ia t io n s ; review
o f a ttitu d e o f F ia n ce , 2 17-8 (N o. 143);
result o f n e g otia tion s com m u n ica ted by
F ra n ce to G reat B rita in , 219-21 (N o.
1 4 5 ); a greem ents n ot to be reg a rd ed as
d efin itiv e yet, S ept. 1913, 229 (N o. 150),
230 (N o. 152).
F ra n ce a n d R u s s ia : S ir E. G rey on an
a rra n g em en t betw een, M a y 1913, 131
(N o. 82).
G erm a n y a n d : G erm an w arn in g to T u rk ey
re F ra nce and E n glan d , Oct. 1910, 7
(N o. 2 ); financial a rrangem ents for
sections as fa r as B a gda d, 11 (N o. 6 );
question o f T urkish arra n gem en t w ith
G erm any a u th orisin g n eg otia tion s, 24
(N o. 1 3 ); G rand V iz ie r resents its b ein g
taken fo r g ra n ted th a t T u rk ey w ill follow
G erm an d icta tio n , A u g., 50 (N o. 3 6 ) ;
T urkish h op e th a t G rea t B rita in w ill not
discuss B a g d a d R a ilw a y w ith G erm any,
no desire fo r G erm an in terv en tion in
A n g lo-T u rk ish discussions, Feb. 1912, 56
(N o. 4 2 ); G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards, M ay
877
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
G erm a ny and, 1913— (c o n t in u e d ):
1913, 9s (N o. 6 6 ): proposals o f H err
G w inner and H e r r H elfferich, 99 (N o. 6 7 );
G erm an press com m ents on A n glo-T urkish
n egotiations, 122 (N o. 7 2 ); discussions
betw een H a k k i Pasha, H err G w inner and
H err H elfferich, 213 (N o. 139).
C onversations w ith F ra n ce begun, M a y
1913, 130 (N o. 81), 134 (N o. 8 6 ); nego­
tia tion s o f H e r r H elfferich and M .
L am orn aix , Turkish finances and the
B a g da d R a ilw ay, 169-72 (N o. 116);
F ra nco-G erm an neg otia tion s, review of
F ren ch a ttitu d e, 218 (N o. 143).
A n glo-G erm an n e g o tia tio n s : G rea t B rita in
desirous o f an u n d ersta n din g w ith
G erm any, su b ject to a sa tisfa ctory
a greem ent w ith T urkey, 36 (N o. 23,
w in .); no n eg otia tion s w ith G erm any
a t present, M ay 1911, 39 (N o. 27,
w in.), 41 (N o. 2 9 ); question o f differen­
tia l railw ay rates, 42 (N o. 3 0 ); n eg otia ­
tions, M a y 1913, 97 (N o. 6 6 ); Germ an
lines o f a greem ent, 9 7-8 (N o. 6 6 ); con­
versations betw een H e r r von K iihlm ann
and M r. A. P ark er, 126-7 (N o. 7 8 );
alloca tion o f revenues for railw ay not to
en ter as a con d ition in to a greem ent,
127 (N o. 7 8 ); B ritish position ex plain ed
by S ir E. G rey to H e r r von K iihlm ann,
128-9 (N o. 7 9 ); question o f a form ula
and finan cial arrangem ents b y Com m is­
sion at P aris, 129 (N o. 7 9 ); position
ex p la in ed to S ir E. G oschen, 131 (No.
8 2 ); B ritish suggestion th a t G erm any
should talk to PYance abou t R ailw ay,
J une, 133 (N o. 85), hope fo r an agree­
m ent w ith G erm any as to finance, 133
(N o. 8 5 ); G erm an clauses fo r end o f
proposed agreem ent, 134 (N o. 8 6 );
d etails as to G erm an and B ritish D irec­
tors and con stru ction o f ports to be dis­
cussed, 133 (N o. 86)1, 137^8 (N o. 89, and
encl. 1).
D r a ft A nglo-G erm a n D ecla ra tion , T ex t,
J u n e 4, 1913, 139-40 (N o 89, encl. 3 );
H e r r G w in n er’ s com m ents on, 142 (N o.
1 9 1 ); B ritish d ra ft o f A n n ex com m uni­
ca ted to P rin ce L ichnow sky, 155 (N o.
9 8 ); G reat B rita in p repa red to g iv e an
^
u n d erta k in g sim ilar to a rticle 3 o f
!
P otsda m A greem ent, 138-9 (N o. 89,
encl. 2), 161 (N o. 105 ); n eg otia tion s still
; proceed in g , J u ly, 161 (N o. 106), points
a risin g from A n g lo-T u rk ish d r a ft con­
v en tion discussed, 162 (N o. 1 0 7 ); G reat
B rita in a nxious to con clu d e agreem ent
w ith G erm any, 167 (N o. 113 ); H err von
K iih lm a n n ’ s ex plan a tion s o f G erm an
cou n ter-d ra ft, 172-3 (N o. 1 1 7 ); P rin ce
L ich n ow sk y ’ s ex plan a tion s o f the pro­
posed a lteration s, 174-5 (N o. 118);
G erm an C ou n ter-d ra ft D eclaration ,
T ex t, 177-9 (N o. 118, encl. 3 ) ; S ta te­
m ent o f provisions o f A n glo-G erm an
n eg otia tion s com m unica ted t o F rance,
A ugust, 207 (N o. 1 35 ); details o f

B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
G erm a n y a n d — (con tin u ed ) :
A n g lo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s, 1913— (con ­
tin u ed ) :
co u n te r -d ra ft discussed b y H err von
K u ffln a n n and M r. P a rk er, 2 21-2 (N o.
146), 2 25-6 (N o. 148).
B ritish revised cou n ter-d ra ft, &c., T ext,
Sept. 1913, 234-41 (N o. 1 54 ); G erm an
am endm ents and B ritish com m ents on,
242-7 (N o. 156), G erm an C ou n ter-d ra ft,
T ext, N ov. 3, 247-9 (N o. 156, encl. 2 );
G erm an sta tem en t th a t n e g otia tion s
betw een G erm any, G reat B rita in and
T u rk ey should form one w hole, 262 (N o.
1 69 ); B ritish criticism s and a m end­
m ents to G erm an C ou n ter-d ra ft, D ec.
1913, 298-303 (N o. 189).
A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion , B ritish
C ou n ter-d ra ft, T ex t, D ec. 15, 1913, 3 04-7
(N o. 1 90 ); fu r th e r G erm an d r a ft, com ­
m ents and ex p lan a tion s, 315-20 (N o.
193, encl. 1 ); T ex t, Jan. 191k, 3 20-3
(N o. 198, encl. 2) ; B ritish desire for
c o n clu s ior o f agreem ents, M a rch , 3 36-7
(N o. 2 0 6 ); B ritish m odifica tion of
a rticle 3 (c), railw avs in co m p e titio n to
B a g d a d R a ilw a y , 3 37-8 (N o. 207), 344
(N o. 213, A n n ex)-, S ir E. G rey on
e x te n t o f concession, and co u n te r­
concessions desired, 3 46-8 (N o. 2 1 5 );
p rosp ect o f agreem en t b ein g w recked
ov er G erm an refusal o f concessions,
3 54 -5 (N o. 223).
B ritish revised d r a ft o f C onven tion , T ex t,
M arch 31, 1914, 359-63 (N o. 225, e n c l. ) ;
D r a ft C on v en tion , M ay 29, and T e x t o f
E x p la n a to ry N otes to be ex ch a n g ed ,
3 92-4 (fid. n ote, Nos. 1 -4 ); A n g lo-
G crm an C on v en tion in itia lled , T ex t,
J u n e 15, 1914, 398-408 (N o. 249, encl.).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany a greem en t w ith
T u rk ey (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g ­
dad R a ilw ay C om pany: A g reem en t
w ith T u r k e y : A n glo-G erm an n e g o tia ­
tions.)
B a g d a d -G u lf section (v. sub B a g d a d
R a il w a y : B a g d a d -G u lf s e c tio n : G er­
m an y and).
R usso-G erm an (P otsd am ) A g reem en t,
A u g u st 19, 1911, A rticle I I I , 138-9 (N o.
89, encl. 2), 161 (N o. 105), 174 (N o. 118).
G rea t B r ita in a n d : S itu a tion as discussed
w ith E m p eror W illia m I I in 1907, 128
(N o. 7 9 ); B ritish com m ercia l in terests and
G erm an con trol, 8 (N o. 4 ) ; S ir G. L ow th er
on need to avoid a su rprise like P otsda m
A g reem en t, 21 (N o. 1 1 ); G rea t B r ita in
has no legal rig h t to in terv en e or
protest, 2 1 -2 (N o. 11, m in .); S peech
by S ir E. G rey, B ritish a ttitu d e on
suggested ex ten sion of the R a ilw ay ,
M a rch 1911, 31 (N o. 20 and n o te ( 2) ) ;
t h rea t to B ritish in terests o f G erm an
m on op olistic railw ay schem e the reason
fo r d eclin in g to assist T u rkey or G erm an
finan ciers in ca rryin g ou t scheme, 36 (N o.
23, min.).
878
I B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
I G rea t B r ita in and— (c o n t in u e d ):
A nglo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s (v. sub B a g ­
dad R a i l w a y : G erm a n y a n d : A n g lo-
G erm an n eg otia tion s).
Bagdad R a ilw a y C om pany a greem ent
w ith T u rk ey (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y :
B a g d a d R a ilw ay C o m p a n y : A greem en t
w ith T u r k e y : A n g lo-G crm a n n eg otia ­
; tions).
i B a g d a d -B a sr a section : B ritish a ttitu d e to
(v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g d a d -G u lf
1 section ).
1 B a g d a d -G u lf section (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l ­
w a y : B a g d a d -G u lf section ).
T urkish proposals to G rea t B rita in : E x p e c­
ta tio n th a t they w ill be una ccepta ble,
J an. 1911, 19 (N o. 8, m in .); G reat
1 B rita in ready to ex am ine any p roject,
i b u t no proposals m ade vet, 19-20 (N o.
9), 20 (N o. 10), 24 (N o “ 1 3 ); T ex t of
proposals, M a rch , 2 5 -6 (N o. 15, e n c l.);
a d v isab ility o f c o n tin u in g n eg otia tion s
w ith T urkey, 36 (N o. 23, m in .); T ex t
o f B ritish reply, J u ly , 4 5-8 (N o. 3 4 );
B ritish rep ly to T urkish M em o, of
A p ril 15. 1912, T ex t, J u ly 18, 76-86 (N o.
55), 87 (N o. 5 6 ); B ritish a ttitu d e, M ay
1913, on B a g d a d R a ilw ay question to be
com m u n ica ted to F ra n ce and R ussia,
116 (ed. n o t e ) ; S ir E. G rey on ex ten t
o f B ritish p a rticip a tio n in railw ay, 128
(N o. 79), 207 (N o. 135), 300-1 (N o. 189).
Ita ly a n d : E n q u iry as t o term s o f B ritish
con sen t to in crease o f Turkish Customs
i D ues, A u g . 1911, 4 9-50 (N o. 35).
I P ow ers a n d : S u ggestion o f n eg otia tion s a
j qu a tre and con clu sion o f separate a gree­
m ents, 1907, 128 (N o. 7 9 ); B ritish view
th a t n eith er F ra n ce, G rea t B rita in nor
R u ssia should p a rticip a te in B a g da d
R a ilw a y w ith ou t p relim in a ry a greem ent
am ongst them selves, A u g . 1913, 207 (N o.
135).
Russia a n d : F ren ch and B ritish desire to
com e to an u n d ersta n d in g w ith R ussia
over B a g d a d R a ilw ay , F eb. 1911, 20 (N o.
10 ); C ou n t B en ck en d orff on possible
T urkish a rra n g em en t w ith G erm any, 24
(N o. 1 3 ); R ussian a ttitu d e tow ards p a r­
I tic ip a tio n J u n e, 74 (ed. n o t e ) ; A n g lo-
f R ussian conversations, M a v 1913, 131-2
(N o. 83).
j F ra n ce and R u s s ia : S ir E. G rey on an
arra n gem en t betw een, M a y 1913, 131
(N o. 82).
R usso-G erm an (P otsd am ) A greem en t,
A u g u st 19, 1911, A r ticle I I I , 138 (N o.
89, encl. 2), 161 (N o. 105), 174 (N o. 118).
B a g d a d -G u lf section (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l ­
w ay : B a g d a d -G u lf s e c t io n : R ussia
and).
T u rk ey and : T urkish desire to see th e ra il­
w ay b u ilt, J an . 1911, finan cial a rra n g e­
m ents m ade fo r con stru ction as fa r as
E l H e r if and fo r section as fa r as B a gda d,
11 (N o. 6 ); R ifa a t P ash a in form s S ir G.
L ow th er th a t the tim e has com e fo r con -
 879
B A G D A D R A I L W A Y — (con tin u ed ).
T u rk ey and, 1911— (c o n t in u e d ):
elusion o f some arra n gem en t, 18 (X o . 8 );
hopes th a t G reat B rita in w ould not dis­
cuss m a tters w ith G erm any w ith ou t know ­
led ge o f T urkey, 13 (X o . 8 ) ; p u blica tion
o f P otsd a m n eg otia tion s in duces T u rkey
to n eg otia te d ire c tly w ith G reat B rita in ,
19 (X o . 8 ) ; en q u iry as to w hether in stru c­
tion s to n eg otia te had been sent to S ir G.
L ow ther, 19-20 (X o . 9 ); T urkish n eg otia ­
tion s w ith B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany,
J an ., F eb. 1911, 21 (X o. 11, n o te (2) ), 22
(X o . 12) ( v. also sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ,
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany).
P rop osals to G reat B rita in on con stru ction
o f B a g d a d -G u lf section and u tility o f
an u n d ersta n d in g on P ersia n G ulf,
M a rch 1, 1911, sum m ary, 24 (X o . 14),
T ext, 2 5-26 (X o . 15, e n c l.); T urkish
hope th a t conclusion o f con ven tion s
w ith the B a g d a d R a ilw ay C om pany will
lea d to settlem ent w ith G reat B rita in ,
«14—35 (X o . 23), no B ritish rep ly yet
M a y 1911, 42 (X o . 30).
B ritish rep ly , J u ly 29, 1911, 4 5-3 (X o . 34).
(F o r B a g d a d —G u lf section, v. sub
B a g d a d R a i l w a y , B a g d a d -G u lf section .)
G rand V iz ie r ’ s ob serva tions on B ritish
rep ly, 50 (X o . 36), and Assim Bey on,
52-3 (X o . 38).
T u rk ish rep ly, A p ril 15. 1912, 5 9-65 (X o . 47).
A g reem en t w ith B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany
(v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g d a d R a il­
w ay C om pany).
B a g d a d -G u lf section (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l ­
w a y , B a g d a d -G u lf section).
Custom s du ties, increase o f ( v . sub T u r k e y ) .
b a h r e ix .
B ritish and T urkish in terests in the P ersian
Gulf, and B a hrein (v. sub P ersian G ulf ).
BALAX CE OF POW ER.
B ritish p olicy to m a in ta in , and effect o f
G erm an arm am en ts, D ec. 1911, 423 (X o.
2 6 5 ); p olitica l situ ation in E u rop e and
g ro u p in g o f the P ow ers in T rip le and
D ual Alliances, 1912, 586 (X o . 3 8 6 );
T rip olita n w ar and balance o f pow er,
586—7 (X o . 386), 616 (X o . 4 1 8 ); in d eter­
m ina te p osition o f Ita ly a fea tu re o f
b alance o f pow er, 586 (X o . 3 8 6 ); G erm an
a ccep tan ce o f present g ro u p in g o f P ow ers
Aug. 1912, 656 (X o . 4 5 1 ); E m p eror
W illia m I I on S ir E. G rey ’ s a ttitu d e
tow ards balan ce o f pow er, and effect on
a ttitu d e o f G erm any, M a y 1913, 701 (X o.
4 7 5 ); B ritish tra d itio n a l p olicy of
op p osin g dom in a tion o f one P ow er over
rest o f E u rop e, M a rch 1914, 764 (N o.
5 2 6 ); M. S azonov on su p p ort g iv e n by
the T rip le E n te n te to th e balance of
pow er, M ay, 795 (X o . 546, encl.).
G rou p in g o f the P ow ers in E u r o p e : an
alliance b etw een R ussia, F ra n ce, G erm any
and E n g lan d , discussed in the N o v o e
V rem ya , M a rch 191 4; E m p eror W illia m I I
and an allia n ce b etw een R ussia, G erm any
and F ra n ce, 769-71 (N o. 530).
BALKAN S.
Anglo-G erm an co-opera tion in, 1913, 699, 701
(X o. 475), 708 (X o. 482, encl.).
A n n e x a tio n s: H e r r von J ag ow rea dy to com ­
plete recogn ition of, M ay 1914, 792-3
(X o . 545).
Balkan L e a g u e : Russian a ctiv ity tow ards a
new B alkan L eague, M arch 1914, 756-7
(X o . 519), 764 (X o . 526).
P rosp ect o f disturbances in, M ay 1911, 40
X o. 23).
Russian influence in Balkans, H e r r von Jagow
on, M ay 1914, 792 (XY>. 5 45 ); M . Sazonov
on, R ussian a ttitu d e, 794, 796 (N o. 546,
encl.).
BASRA.
B a g da d R a ilw ay and p ort at Basra (a. sub
B agdad R a i l w a y , B a g d a d -G u lf section ,
B a gd a d -B a sra section ).
B E C H U A X A L A X TD.
E xtension o f w estern bou n da ry suggested
M a rch 1912, 441 (N o. 276).
B E L G IA N CONGO.
(v . sub A f r i c a : B elgian Congo.)
B E L G IU M .
B elgian a n xiety con cern in g A nglo-G erm a n
^ A greem ent, Oct. 1913, 544 (N o. 345).
N e u tr a lit y : S ir E. G rey ’ s assurance to
B elgium th a t G reat B rita in w ould never
be the first to v iolate n eu tra lity o f
A p ril 1913, 695 (X o. 472).
G rea t B rita in a n d : S ir F. B ertie on G erm any
and B elgian C ongo and effect o f B ritish
policy in B elgian relations, Jan. 1912, 426
(N o. 263).
B E Y 3 I I E I I I R , Lake.
N a v ig a tion rights on, and S m y rn a -A id in
R a ilw a y , Feb. 1914, 324 (N o. 199, m in.)
333-4 (N o. 203), 337 (N o. 207), 347 (N o.
215), 348 (N o. 216), 351 (X o . 218), 351
(X o . 219), 3 52-3 (X o . 221), 353 (X o. 222),
354-5 (X'o. 223), 383 (X’ o. 238, encl.), 404
(X o . 249, encl.).
B U L G A R IA .
M eetin g between E m p eror N icholas II,
E m p eror W illiam II and K in g G eorge V ;
agreem ent that K in g F erd in a n d must be
called to ord er, M a y 1913, 703 (X o. 476).
T u rk ey a n d : R ussia and A d rian op le, A ug.
1913, 209 (NTo. 136 ); question as to
w hether R ussia w ould eject the Turks
from , 210 (X o. 137); T urkish arm y cross
the M a ritza , 210 (X o . 137, m in. ) ; G reek
orders only to hand over D edea g atch to
T urkish troop s, 212 (X o. 1 39 ); T urkey
had reoccu p ied A d rian op le an d w ould
rem ain there unless ejected by f o r c e :
term s upon w hich T u rkey w ould g iv e
B u lg a ria a line to in clu de K ir k K ilisse
and access to the .¿E gean: T u rk ey m ust
have the M a ritza line and A d rian op le,
212 (N o. 1 39 ); fresh Turkish loan in P aris
dep endent on settlem ent o f A d rian op le
question, 217 (X o . 143).
 880
C A B IN D A , d istrict. EGYPT.
(v. s u b P o r t u g a l : Colonies : A frica n posses­ C a pitu la tion s, a bolition o f, F ra n ce, Ita ly and
sions : A ngola.) G rea t B r ita in , M ay 1914, 650 (N o. 446),
650 (N o. 447).
CANADA. F in a n c e : b orrow in g pow ers of E gypt,
O ffer o f ships to B ritish N avy, 666-7 (N o. 456), rem oval o f restriction s on and question of
687 (N o. 464, n ote ( 7) ). B ritish consent to T urkish custom s
in crease, M a rch 1911, 27 (N o. 15, min.),
C A P E TO C A IR O R A I L W A Y .
29 (N o. 18), 30 (N o. 19), con d ition about
L ord R os eb ery ’ s fa ilu re in 1894 to ob tain
E g y p tia n b orrow in g pow ers not a new one,
fa cilitie s : G erm any n ot u n w illin g to g ive
30-431 (N o. 19, m in.), 32 (N o. 2 1 ); T urkey
a “ w ay -lea ve,” M a rch 1912, 442 (N o. 276).
rem inded o f this con d ition , 33 (N o. 22,
C A P E V E R D E IS L A N D S . en cl. ) ; rem oval o f e x istin g v eto one of
(v sub P o r t u g a l : Colonies.) c on d ition s o f B ritish assent to increase
o f custom s du ties, J u ly 1911, 48 (N o. 34),
C A P IT U L A T IO N S . J u ly 1912, 80 (N o. 5 5 ); difficulty of
( v . sub E g y p t ; T u r k e y .) o b ta in in g consent o f T urkish Cabinet,
N ov. 1911, 53 (N o. 3 S ); suggested A nglo-
C A P R I V I S T R IP . T urkish a greem ent p r o v id in g fo r rem oval
Cession o f in ex ch a n g e fo r P en g u in an d Sea o f veto, M ay 1913, 116 (ed. n ote), 149 (No.
Islands (v. sub P e n g u in and S eal 9 4 ); D r a ft decla ra tion , form u la as pro­
I s l a n d s ). posed b y L o rd K itch en er, 121-2 (N o. 7 1);
discussed by M r. P a r k e r and H akki
C H IN A . P asha, 121 (N o. 7 1 ); T urkey accepts
B ritish ov ertu res to R ussia in reg a rd to C on­
form u la , but requires an o p tion on
v en tion w ith China and T hibet, M a y 1914, m ethod o f m a k in g change, 1 51-2 (N o. 95);
745 (N o. 510). E g y p tia n g overn m en t con sid er that
a ltera tion should be m ade by firm an, 154
C O M M IS S IO N , F IN A N C I A L .
(N o. 9 7 ); A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem ent
F in a n cia l C om m ission at P a ris (v. sub
sign ed J u ly 29, 1913, arrangem ents
T u r k e y ).
d ep en d en t upon issue o f firm an respect­
in g b orrow in g pow ers o f E g y p t, 198
CONFERENCE OF AM BASSADORS,
LONDON. (N o. 124).
N eu tra lity and status o f E g y p t (v. sub
N o t to be reassem bled, Oct. 1913, 718 (N o. 484).
M e d it e r r a n e a n : I ta ly and: A nglo-
CO N G O . Ita lia n n eg otia tion s, 1912-4).
(v. sub A f r ic a : C ongo.) R a ilw ays, G reat B rita in opp osed to any con­
n ection w ith E g y p t and B a g d a d Railw ay
D A N U B E -A D R IA T IC R A IL W A Y . system , 373 (N o. 233), 385 (N o. 239).
F re n ch in terest in p roject, M a rch 1911, 37 S ta tu s quo in E g y p t : B ritish a ttitu d e to, 651
(N o. 24). (N o. 448), 652 (N o. 449).
G erm a n y a n d : S ir II. R o d d on German
D ELAG OA BAY. a m bitions, 1912, 621 (N o. 419).
U n ion o f Sou th A frica , desire for, D ec. 1911,
G rea t B r ita in a n d : B ritish position in E g y pt
424 (N o. 266), 425 (N o. 2 6 7 ); A n g lo-
a nd question o f her sea-pow er, possible
G erm an S ecret A g reem en t and, 427 (ed.
effect o f ev acu ation o f M ed iterra n ean by
n o te ), 474 (N o. 301), 480 (N o. 309), 545
B ritish naval forces, 1912, 5 88-9 (No.
(N o. 345).
3 8 6 ); L o rd K itch en er con su lted as to pro­
DENM ARK. tection o f E g y p t, 590 (N o. 3 8 7 ); his views
G rea t B r ita in a n d : S ir E. G rey ’ s assurance a ga in st proposed changes and dangers to
th a t G rea t B rita in w ould n ever be first E g y p t in volved , m ilita ry defen ce o f E g y pt
to v iolate n eu tra lity : B ritish desire to and relia nce upon In d ia , 592 (N o. 390);
see D anish n eu tra lity m a in ta in ed , M ay S ir R . R o d d ’ s su g g estion o f an Anglo-
1914, 743 (N o. 507). I ta lia n a greem ent re E g y p t, 1912, 621
(N o. 4 1 9 ); S ir R . R o d d on Ita lia n rights
D O M IN IO N S . as regards ca p itu la tion s, 634 (N o. 430).
A n g lo-G erm a n S ecret A g reem en t : p u blica tion A n g lo -lta lia n n eg otia tion s to m aintain
o f ; com m u n ica tion o f to S elf-G ov ern in g sta tu s quo in N o rth A frica , 1912-4 (v.
D om in ion s, 434 (N o. 270, m in .); G eneral sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n : Ita ly and : Anglo-
B oth a on p rin cip le o f con su ltin g , in lta lia n n eg otia tion s).
reg a rd to n e g o tia tin g trea ties, 480 (N o.
309).
I EUPH RATES.
E G H E R D I R , Lake. R iv e r n a v ig a tion (v. sub M e s o p o t a m i a ).
N a v ig a tio n o f L ak e E g h erd ir and S m y rn a -
A id in railw ay, 347 (N o. 215, n o te (3) ), FARSAN .
348 (N o. 216), 383 (N o. 238, encl.), 404 G rea t B r ita in and petroleu m concession in,
(N o. 249, encl.). A u g . 1913, 213 (N o. 139).
 881
F IN A N C I A L C O M M IS S IO N A T P A R I S .
( v . sub T u r k e y .)
FRANCE.
A r m y : m easures fo r stren gth en in g , F eb. 1913,
674 (N o. 4 6 1 ); G erm an and A u stro-
H u n g a ria n view s on, M ay, 7 01-2 (N o.
4 7 5 ); E m p eror W illia m II on, Oct., 709
(N o. 482. encl.)\ reversion to th ree y ea rs’
service, 76* -N o. 529).
In tern a l situ a tion : recru d escen ce o f sp irit o f
e n e rg e tic p a triotism , F eb. 1913, 674-5
(N o. 461).
G en eral F o r e ig n P o lic y : P o lic y d u rin g year
1912, S ir F . B ertie on, 616-9 (N o. 418).
A lsa ce-L orra in e ( v . sub A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e ) .
A sia M in or (e . sub A s i a M i n o r ) .
B a g d a d R a ilw a y ( v . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ) .
C on g o qu estion s (v. sub A f r i c a : C ongo).
M ed iterra n ea n , N a v al con v ersation s (v . sub
M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
M esopota m ia ( r . sub M e s o p o t a m i a ) .
M o rocco ( v . sub M o r o c c o ) .
Persian Gulf ( v . sub P e r s i a n G ulf ).
San T hom e and P rin cip e islands (v. sub
P ortugal: C olon ies: A n g lo-G erm a n
discussions).
Syria (i>. sub S yria ).
G erm a n y a n d : F ra n ce and A nglo-G erm a n
discussions on Secret A g reem en t re
P ortu g u ese Colonies, 1912-4 (v . sub
P o r t u c a l : C olon ies: A n g lo-G erm a n dis­
cussions).
G en era l r e la tio n s, 1912, S ir F . B e rtie on, 616­
8 (N o. 4 1 8 ); relation s im p rov ed by
M orocco A g reem en t, b u t p o litica l a gree­
m ent w ith G erm a ny im possible, A u g., 657
■ (N o. 451).
F ra n co-R u ssia n N a v al C on v en tion , 1912,
a ttitu d e o f G erm an press to, 608-9
(N o. 408).
G en eral rela tion s, 1913, F ra n co-G erm an dis­
cussions ov er A s ia tic T u rk ey , 1913 (v.
sub T u r k e y : A s ia tic T urkey).
P o sitio n b etw een F ra n ce and G erm any a
m uch w id er one th a n m ere settlem ent
o f B a g d a d R a ilw a y question , A u g . 1913,
208 (N o. 1 3 5 ); B ritish desire th a t con ­
clusion o f F ra n co-G erm an agreem en t
should he hastened, 209 (N o. 1 35 );
F rench finan cial m ission sent t o B erlin ,
209 (N o. 136), 210 (N o. 1 3 7 ); term in a ­
t io n o f n eg otia tion s, 217 (N o. 143), 219
(N o. 1 44 ); sta tem en t o f results, 220-1
(N o. 145, encl.), 229 (N o. 1 50 ); a gree­
m ents not to be reg a rd ed y et as defini­
tiv e, 229 (N o. 150), 230 (N o.“ 152 ); A g re e ­
m ent b etw een the F ren ch and G erm an
G roup s fo r railw ays, and concessions,
F eb. 1914, 3 25 -9 (N o. 201).
I G en eral rela tion s, 1913: F ren ch na tion a list
rev iva l d irected aga in st G erm any F eb.
1913, 675 (N o. 461).
L u n ev ille a ffa ir, v isit o f G erm an Z ep p elin
a irs h ip : H e r r v on J a g o w ’ s g ra v e view
o f F ren ch a ttitu d e, th rea t to recall
H err v on S choen from P a ris, M . J u les
C am bon on, A p ril 1913, 6 96-7 (N o. 473).
[10900]
F R A N C E — ( c on tin u ed ).
G en eral relation s, G erm a n y and, 1913— (con ­
tin u ed) :
Z a bern in c id e n t : F ren ch apprehension at
G erm an a ttitu d e, alleged statem ent
by E m p eror W illia m II th a t F ra n co ­
G erm an w ar was in evitable, D ec. 1913,
7 23-4 (N o. 490), 727 (N o. 492), S ir E.
G oschen on F ren ch a ttitu d e, 724-6
(N o. 491).
G en eral relations, 1914- G eneral B ern h ardi
on F ren ch secret plans to surprise and
ca p tu re M etz, M a rch 1914, 761 (N o. 5 2 3 );
H e r r v on T scliirschky on reason for
F ren ch quarrel w ith G erm any, 764 (N o.
5 2 6 ); idea o f an a llia nce b etw een F ra n ce
and G erm any, a lliance betw een Russia,
F ra n ce, G erm any and E n g lan d discussed
in th e X o v o e V r e m y a : E m p eror W illia m I I
and C ount W it te on an a llia n ce betw een
R ussia, F ra n ce and G erm any, 769-71 (N o.
5 3 0 ); C ou n t W it t e ’ s idea o f a F ra n co ­
G erm an ra p p roch em en t, 771 (N o. 5 3 0 );
H e r r von J a g ow on unstable ch a ra cter of
F rench foreig n policy , J u n e, *03 (N o. 550).
G re a t B r ita in and :
G en eral relation s, 1912: F u tu re p olicy and
q uestion o f m utual assistance, 583 (N o.
383), 584 (N o. 3 8 4 ); B ritish p olicy of
e v a cu a tin g M ed iterra n ea n and a conse­
quen t u n d ersta n d in g w ith F ra n ce, 584
(N o. 384), 585 (N o. 3 8 5 ); no ex istin g
alliance w ith F ra n ce by w hich F ra n ce
w ould necessarily b e in volved in any w ar
in w hich G reat B r ita in w as in volved ,
M ay 1914, 590 (N o. 3S 7t; Sir F. B e r tie on
F ren ch a dvances fo r a clearer u n d er­
sta n din g , 590-1 (N o. 3 8 8 ); sta tu s of
n aval discussions, no form al en te n te
b etw een the tw o G overnm ents, J u ly , 601
(N o. 4 0 0 ); S ir E. G rey w ould not aba n don
sp irit o f the E n te n te : M . P o in c a r e ’ s view
th a t if E n te n te does not m ean B ritish aid
t o F ra n ce in ev en t o f an a tta ck , its value
is not g rea t, 607 (N o. 4 0 5 ); E n te n te a
m a tter o f na tion a l p olicy and m eans for
p reserv a tion o f peace, 616 (N o. 4 18 );
F ren ch desire for som ething m ore definite
than th e 1904 A g reem en t, 617 (N o. 4 18 );
F ren ch press and su ggestion o f an A n g lo-
F ren ch A llian ce, 618 (N o. 418).
B ritish assistance to F ra n ce and R ussia in
ev en t o f an a tta ck by G erm any and
A u s t r ia : K in g G eorge V on, D ec. 8,
1912, 653 (N o. 152), 673 (N o. 4 6 0 ); Sir
E. G rey on, 658 (N o. 453).
F ra n co-R u ssia n N a val C on v en tion sug­
gested, 1912: G rea t B r ita in to be
in vited to join , 583 (N o. 383), 584 (N o.
384).
F ra n ce and the A n g lo-G erm a n discussions
on Secret A g reem ent re P ortu g u ese
Colonies, 1912-4 ( v . sub P o r t u c a l :
C o lo n ie s : A n g lo-G erm a n discussions).
N a v a l con v ersation s w ith reg a rd to M ed ite r­
ranean (v. sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ) .
3 L
 882
F R A N C E — (co ntinued).
G rea t B rita in an d— (c o n t in u e d ):
G en eral rela tion s, 1913: H err von J a g ow
a dm its th a t G erm an a ction ov er M orocco
h a d been responsible fo r b rin g in g F ra n ce
an d G rea t B rita in in to closer relations,
J a n . 1913, 660 (N o. 4 5 4 ); B ritish assist­
a nce to F ra n ce, 673-4 (N o. 4 6 0 ); M r.
A s q u ith ’ s sta tem ent th a t G reat B rita in
was un d er no o b lig a tion t o send a m ili­
ta ry force to the C o n t in e n t : referen ce to
A nglo-G erm a n co-op era tion in N ear
E a stern A ffa ir s : M. Paul C a m bon ’ s
rem onstra nce, M a rch , 68S—9 (N o. 4 6 6 );
questions in P a rlia m en t as to ob liga tion s
t o send an arm ed force, and ex te n t of
trea ty o b lig a tio n s : M r. A squ ith ’ s sta te­
m en t o f p osition , 689 (N o. 4 6 7 ): V is it of
K in g G eorge V to B erlin, M a y 1913,
n oth in g said w hich cou ld in any w ay
a ffect E ntente, w ith F ra n ce, 703 (N o. 4 7 7 );
E m p eror W illia m I I on A n g lo-F ren ch
relation s, O ctober, 709 (N o. 48*2, encl.).
F ra n co-G erm an i.grecm ent, G rea t B rita in
will su p port, su b ject to ex a m in a tion of
details, J u ly 1913, 167 (N o. 1 13 ); h op e
th a t com p lete agreem en t w ill be rea ch ed
by d irect n eg otia tion b etw een F ra n ce
and G erm any and use o f g ood offices to
p rom ote, A ug., 208 (N o. 1 3 5 ); F ra n co ­
G erm an n eg otia tion s b ein g ca rried on
in accord w ith R ussia and E n g lan d , 217
(N o. 1 4 3 ); results o f F ra n co-G erm an
n eg otia tion s com m u n ica ted to G rea t
B rita in , 219-21 (N o. 145).
G en eral rela tion s, 1914: V isit of K in g
G eorg e V to P aris, A p ril 1914: com m u n i­
ca tion to press, S ir E. G rey on a v oid in g
im pression th a t a new A g reem en t in
n a tu re of an A llian ce had been con clu d ed,
741 (N o. 5 0 4 ); cordial recep tion o f the
K in g and Queen at P aris, 786 (N o. 5 4 0 );
S ir E. G rey on F ren ch p ea cefu l and
unaggressive m ood, 742 (N o. 5 0 5 ); F ra n ce
p reoccu p ied w ith possib ility o f m ain­
ta in in g the A n g lo-R u ssia n u n d ersta n d in g ,
784 (N o. 538), q uestion o f en la r g in g by
tra n sform in g in to a defen sive a lliance or
b y a naval con v en tion , 785 (N o. 5 3 9 ); Sir
A. N icolson on, 786 (N o. 5 4 0 ); M.
D ou m erg u e on necessity fo r m a kin g
A n g lo-R u ssia n relation s m ore s e c u r e : S ir
E. G rey on B ritish assistance to F ra n ce in
ev en t o f a w ar, q uestion o f B ritish p u blic
op in ion , M ay, 7 87-8 (N o. 5 4 1 ); a closer
ra p p ro ch em en t to F ra n ce, 788 (ed. n o te ) ;
F ra n ce and G rea t B r ita in n ot b ou n d by
an alliance, 788 (ed. n o te ), 790 (N o. 543).
A n g lo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s re B a g d a d R a il­
w ay, M ay 191,3-April 191$: F ra n ce to be
in form ed , 132 (N o. 83, m in . ) ; F ren ch
h op e th a t G rea t B rita in w ill n ot con clu d e
w ith G erm any before F ra n ce was ready
to do likew ise, 163 (N o. 107, m in.), 164-5
(N o. 1 1 0 ); B ritish reply, 167 (N o. 1 13 );
t h a t the A nglo-G erm a n and F ra n co ­
G erm an a greem ents be con clu d ed on the
sam e date, 220 (N o. 1 4 5 ); F ren ch desire
F R A N C E — (con tin u ed ).
G rea t B rita in and— (c o n t in u e d ):
A n g lo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s, & c.— (c o n tin u e d ):
th a t agreem ents w ith G erm any and
T u rkev should be sign ed sim ultaneously,
J an. 1914, 313 (N o. 195), 314 (N o. 196),
B ritish su ggestion th a t F eb. 14 be the
d ate a p p oin ted fo r sign atu re, 314 (No.
1 96 ); S h a tt-el-A ra b C onven tion . F rance
t o be in vited to ex ch a n g e notes w ith G reat
B rita in , A p ril, 381, (N o. 236, w i/i.).
C onversations, m ilita ry and naval, 1 912-4:
early h istory in 1900, 583 (N o. 3831, ques­
t ion o f C a bin et san ction for, 583 (N o. 383,
and m in.), and fu r th e r conversations,
1912, 583 (N o. 383, min.)-, S ir F. B ertie
on F ren ch desire fo r know ledge con­
c ern in g situ a tion in case of w ar, British
m ilita ry and naval assistance, 590-1 (No.
3 8 8 ); question o f F ren ch su p p ort in
C hannel and ren ew in g conversations, 591
(N o. 389), 5 91-2 (ed. note)-, in form al dis­
cussions have ta ken place, J u n e, 597 (N o
3 9 5 ); con tin u ed , J u ly, 599 (ed. n ote), basis
o f discussions h y p oth etica l, 600 (N o. 399);
i M ed iterra n ean arra n gem en ts and naval
stren gth in B ritish hom e w aters, F rench
sta n d a rd and naval disp ositions, discussed,
, 600-1 (N o. 3 9 9 ); sta tu s o f discussions,
' freedom of decision as to m utual assist­
ance in tim e of war, 601 (N o. 4 0 0 ); d r a ft
o f agreem en t rela tin g to the con tin g en cy
in w hich F ra n ce and G rea t B rita in would
be allies in a w ar, T e x t, 602 (ed. n o t e ) ;
M. P a u l C a m bon ’ s ob jection s th a t a gree­
m ent le ft E n g lan d free to aid F ra n ce or
n ot, d esirab ility o f an assurance of
B ritish naval aid in the C hannel and
A tla n tic coasts, 603 (N o. 401), 604 (N o.
402), ex ten t of 1905 assurances,
suggested ex ch a n g e o f priv a te n o te s: S ir
E. G rey ’ s ob jection to secret notes, consul­
t a tio n o f tw o G overnm ents in ev en t of
m enace, 604-5 (N o. 4 0 2 ); M r. W inston
C h urchill considers n on -com m itta l proviso
o f the a greem ent p erfectly fa ir, 605 (No.
4 0 3 ); S ir F. B ertie com m u n ica tes S ir E.
G rey ’ s view s as to m utual assistance in
tim e o f w a r : M. P o in c a r e ’ s views, trans­
fer o f F ren ch fleet to M ed iterra n ean
dep en d en t upon B ritish assistance, ob jec­
tion to articles of d r a ft a greem ent, and
desire fo r a form o f decla ra tion , 606 (No.
4 0 4 ); B ritish C a bin et n ot disposed to
m ake such a decla ra tion , 606-7 (N o. 405);
M r. W in ston C hurchill m akes a suggestion
fo r re d ra ftin g the proviso ob jected to,
A u g u st, 607 (N o. 4 0 6 ); S ir F. B ertie on,
F ren ch view th a t any reservations should
be by an ex ch a n g e o f notes or declara­
tion s and not by arra n gem en ts between
the n a va l ex perts, suggested acceptable
form ula , 609-10 (N o. 409), F ra n ce could
n ot den ude th eir A tla n tic and Channel
coasts unless they had reason to suppose
th a t G rea t B rita in w ould in tervene, 610
(N o. 4 0 9 ); M r. W in ston C hurchill on diffi­
cu lties o f proposed a rrangem ent, 611 (ed.
 F R A N C E — ( co n tin u e d ).
G reat B rita in a n d — (c o n tin u e d ):
C onversations, & c., 101 2-4 — ( con tin u ed ) :
n o te ); M. P a u l Cam bon on p ossib ilities o f
an u n d ersta n d in g , su ggestion o f a form ula ,
611 (N o. 4 1 0 ); F ren ch d isp ositions
tem p ora ry only u n til position was know n
as between F ra n ce and G reat B rita in ,
Sept. 1912, 6 11 -2 (N os. 4 1 1 -2 ); M r.
A squith does not see any harm in the pro­
posed form u la , Oct., 612 (N o. 4 1 2 ); S ir E.
G rey offers M . P a u l Cam bon a d r a ft letter
e m b od y in g p oin ts of situ ation , 612-3 (N o.
4 1 3 ); M. P o in c a r e ’ s am endm ent, 613 (N o.
4 1 4 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s fu r th e r am endm ent,
N ov. 1912, 614 (N o. 4 1 5 ); T ex t o f letters
ex ch a n g ed betw een S ir E. G rey and
M . P a u l C am bon, N ov. 22-3, 6 14-5 (N os.
4 1 6 -7 ); a ttitu d e o f F ren ch press tow ards
n a va l co-op era tion , 1912, 619 (N o. 418).
1913: M em o. on com bined a ction in
M ed iterra n ea n , Feb. 1913, 671-3 (N o.
4 5 3 ); discussions con tin u ed , a rra n g e­
m ents fo r S tra its o f D over, & c., 694,
(ed. n o te ); p rov ision al in stru ction s.
A p ril 1913, 695 (N os. 471—2 ) ; q uestion
of d ire c t com m u n ica tion betw een
E n g lan d , F ra n ce and R ussia, 697-8 (N o.
474 and encls.).
1914: In terch a n g e o f view s betw een n a va l
staffs, qu estion o f in fo rm in g Russia,
7^3 (N o. 537, m in.), 785 (N o. 5 3 9 );
Russia in form ed , 7s9 (N o. 542), 790
(N o. 543).
N a val con v ersation s rela tin g to M e d ite r­
ranean ( v. sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n : F ra n ce
and : A n g lo-F ren ch conversations).
T rip le E n te n te , G rea t B r ita in , F ra n ce and
Russia He. also sub T r e a t i e s , E n ten te ,
T riple).
T u rk ey: suggested u n d ersta n din g w ith
F ra n ce fo r jo in t action in Turkish
affairs, M a y 1911 ( p . sub T u r k e y , F ra n ce
and).
F ren ch con d ition s fo r finan cia l and fiscal
assistance t o T urkey, T ex t com m u n i­
ca ted to G rea t B rita in , J u n e 1913, 134-5
(N o. 87), 135-6 (N o. 8 8 ) ; B ritish com ­
m ents on, 135 (N o. 87, m in.), 135-6 (N o.
8 3 , rep ly prom ised, 157 (N o. 1 02 );
F ra n ce in vited to agree to certain
poin ts in w hich B ritish in terests are
con cern ed , A u g ., 208-9 (N o. 135),
F ren ch g en era l a ccep tan ce of the
su ggestion , 210 (N o. 137). 228 (N o. 150),
3S9 (N o. 243).
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, M ay 1913,
F ren ch press com m ents on, 123 (N o. 7 3 );
F ra n ce to be in form ed o f B ritish
dem ands on T u rk ey , J u n e, 135 (N o. 87,
m in .); C on v en tion s and decla ra tion s
com m u n ica ted to F ra n ce, 157 (N o. 102 );
fu rth e r F ren ch su p p ort in vited in
n eg otia tion s w ith T urkey, 390 (N o. 2 4 3 );
cop ies o f S h a tt-el-A ra b and A n g lo-
G erm an C on v en tion com m u n ica ted, M a y
1914, a form a l exch a n g e of notes w ith
F ra n ce in v ited , 390 (N o. 243).
[10900]
F R A N C E — (con tin u ed ).
I ta ly a n d : Ita lia n a ttitu d e tow ards F ra n ce
lik ely to be affected by ev acu ation o f
M ed iterra n ean by B ritish naval forces,
M ay 1912, 587, 589 (N o. 3 8 6 ); no im p rov e­
m ent o f relations betw een F ra n ce and
Ita ly, J u n e, 598 (N o. 3 9 6 ); S ir R . R o d d on
loss of position by F ra n ce, 620 (N o. 4 1 9 );
F rench en q u iry as to w hether renew al o f
T rip le A lliance w ould affect con d ition s o f
the 1902 agreem ent, N ov., 623-4 (N o. 4 2 4 );
term s o f 1902 secret a greem ent, 616 (N o.
4 18 >, 620 (N o. 419), 624 (N o. 424, m in .);
Ita lia n den ia l o f m odifica tion o f, M a rch
1914, 644 (N o. 4 4 1 ); u n com forta ble rela ­
tion s betw een F ra n ce and Ita ly , A p ril,
644 (N o. 442), difficulty over sta tu s o f
T rip o lita n subjects in T unis and ca p itu la ­
tion s in M orocco, 6 45-6 (N o. 443), 646-8
(N o. 4 4 4 ); F ren ch th rea t to term in ate
F ra n co -Ita lia n A greem en t re T u n is o f
1896, renew ed den ial o f any new M ed ite r­
ranean A greem en t, 649 (N o. 4 4 6 ); con clu ­
sion of an a greem ent w ith F ra n ce
desirable and w ou ld have a g o o d effect
p olitica lly , 6 51 -2 (N o. 448).
M ed iterra n ea n conversations, 1912-4 ( v. sub
M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
B u ssia and ( v . sub R u s s i a , F ra n ce and).
T rip le E n te n te : G rea t B rita in , F ra n ce and
R u ssia (p . sub T r e a t ie s , E n te n te ,
T riple).
S p a in and ( v . sub S p a i n , F ra n ce and).
M ed iterra n ea n discussions (v. sub M e d i t e r ­
r a n e a n : S pa in and).
T u rk ey and ( p . sub T u r k e y , F ra n ce and).
A s ia tic T u rk ey (v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
T u rkey ).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y (p. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ) .
Custom s dues, in crease o f (p. sub T u r k e y ,
Custom s duties).
GERM ANY.
A r m y : Z a bern in cid en t a stru gg le betw een
civ ilia n and m ilita ry parties, D ec. 1913,
724 (N o. 4 9 1 ); arm y and m a in ten a n ce of
p rin cip le o f a u th ority , 729 (N o. 4 9 4 );
S ir G. B uchanan on G erm an and R u ssia n
m ilita ry positions, M a rch 1914, 767 (N o
^ 523), 768 (N o. 529).
F in a n cia l and econ om ic preparedness for
war, G eneral von B ern h ardi on, D ec. 1913,
728 (N o. 493, encl.).
M ob iliz a tion im possible unless v ita l in terests
^ w ere in danger, 1912, 656 (N o. 451).
N a tion a l expa n sion , H e r r v on J a g o w on
G erm an desire for, Jan. 1913, 660 (N o
454). '
N a v y ( p . sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l : G erm a n y
and).
P an-G erm ans, S ir E. G rey on p olicy of. M a rch
1913, 637-S (N o. 465).
T rip le A llian ce : G erm an p olicy and position
in, 1912, 586 (N o. 3 8 6 ); prepared ness fo r
w ar. G eneral von B ern h ardi on, D ec. 1913
1 28 (N o. 493, encl.) (p. also sub T r e a t i e s ,
A llian ce, T riple).
H e r r von T schirschky on G erm an position in
E urope, M a rch 1914, 764 (N o. 526).
3 L 2
 884
G E R M A N Y — (con tin u ed ).
Z a b ern in cid en t, 1913: proceed in gs in G erm an
R eich sta g , 724-6 (N o. 491), 727 (N o. 4 9 2 );
steps ta k en by E m p eror W illia m I I and
H e r r von Bethm ann H ollw eg, 7 24-6 (N o.
491), 727 (N o. 4 9 2 ); H e r r v on T schirschky
on, 723 (N o. 494) ( v . also sub F r a n c e :
G erm a n y and).
G eneral F o re ig n P o licy :
A lsa ce-L orra in e ( v . sub A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e ,
and also F r a n c e , G erm a n y and).
Asia M in or (v . sub A s i a M i n o r ).
A s ia tic T u rkey ( v . sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
T u rkey).
B a g d a d R a ilw a }7 ( v . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ) .
C olonies, S ir F. B ertie on G erm an situ ation
as regard s colonies, D ec. 1911. '423 (N o.
2 6 5 ); B a ron Stumrn on, 423 (N o. 2 65 );
B a ron von M arscliall on G erm an
a lleged desire fo r territoria l ex pa n sion ,
J u ly 1912, 599 (N o. 3 9 7 ); a ttem p ted
settlem ent o f A n g lo-G erm a n differences,
F in p eror W illia m II on, O ct. 1913, 708
(N o. 4S2, encl.).
C on g o (i\ sub A f r i c a , C ongo).
E g y p t : S ir R . R o d d on G erm an a m bitions,
1912, 621 (N o. 419).
M ed iterra n ea n (v. sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
M esop ota m ia (v. sub M e s o p o t a m i a ).
M o r o cc o (v . sub M o r o c c o ).
N aval arm am ents (v. sub A rm am en ts,
N a v a l , A nglo-G erm a n discussions).
P ersia n G u l f (v . sub P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
P o ts d a m M e e tin g (v. sub P otsdam
M e e t i n g ).
S y r i a ( v . sub S y r i a ) .
E m p e r o r W illiam 11 and : V isit t o W in d sor,
1907, 123 (N o. 7 9 ); B a ron Stum m
on the pa cific view s o f the E m p eror,
1911, 423 (N o. 2 6 5 ); B a ron von
M a rscha ll on pa cific p olicy of, A u g .
1912, 656 (N o. 4 5 1 ); H e r r von J a g ow
on E m p e ro r’ s a ttitu d e tow ards E n g lan d ,
relation s w ith L o rd Salisbu ry, K r u g e r
telegram , J an . 1913, 661 (N o. 4 5 4 );
relation s w ith H e r r v on J a g ow , 662
(N o. 4 5 4 ); E m p eror on question of
B ritish assistance t o F ra n ce, F eb., 674
(N o. 4 6 0 ); rem arks of E m p eror to
C a p ta in W a tson : B ritish N a v y , gen era l
A nglo-G erm a n relations, P rin ce of
A lba n ia, b lock ad e o f M on ten eg ro, w ar
w ith E n g lan d , value o f B ritish T e rri­
torials, b alance o f pow er, B a lk an w ar,
M r. W in ston C h urchill and G erm an
m anoeuvres, L o rd H a ld a n e ’ s v isit, M ay
1913, 699-701 (N o. 475), 708-10 (N o. 482),
T a n g ier in cid en t, A n g lo-F ren ch rela­
tions, F ra n ce and A lsa ce-L orrain e,
N a val p olicy o f R ussia and F ra n ce,
B ritish na va l disp osition s in N orth Sea,
L o rd H a rd in g e, O ct. 1913, 708 -1 0 (N o.
4^2'); a ttitu d e tow ards “ n a va l h olid a y ,”
J u ly , 705-6 (N o. 4 8 0 ); qu estion o f an
alliance b etw een R ussia, G erm a ny and
F ra n ce, 770 (N o. 5 3 0 ); and a R u ssia n -
G erm an alliance, 7 77-8 (N o. 5 3 6 ); view s
on valu e o f T rip le A lliance, 778 (N o. 536).
G E R M A N Y — (con tin u ed ).
G eneral F oreig n P o licy — ( con tin u ed ) :
11.1.11. C row n P rin c e W illiam a n d : A nd
re p o rt on L u n ev ille affair, A p ril 1913,
696 (N o. 4 7 3 ); H e r r L im a n ’ s hook on
th e C row n P r i n c e : S ir E. G oschen on
p erson a lity of, M a y 1914, 743-4 (No.
5 0 8 ); S ir A. N icolson on, 745 (N o. 510).
H e r r v on J ag ow , a p p oin tm en t o f as M inister
fo r F oreign A ffairs, 1913, 659 (N o. 454),
662 (N o. 454, n o te (4) ).
A lba nia and (v . sub A l b a n i a , G erm a n y and).
A u stria -H u n g a ry and (v. sub A u s t r ia -
H u n g a r y , G erm a n y and).
F ra n ce and (v. sub F r a n c e , G erm a n y and).
G rea t B r ita in and :
G eneral relation s, 1907: E m p eror W illia m I I ’ s
visit to W in d sor, 128 (N o. 79).
G en eral relation s, 1911: Im prov em en t of
relations, M arch 1911, 31 (N o. 2 0 ); L ord
H a rd in g e on valu e o f any agreem ent
w ith G e rm a n y ; G erm an dom ination of
E u rop e, 38 (N o. 2 5 ); B a ron Stum m on
un iversa l fe e lin g aga in st E ngland , neces­
sity fo r im p rov in g relations, Dec., 422
(N o. 2 6 5 ); discussion of gen era l relations
betw een B a ron Stum m and S ir F. Bertie,
421-4 (N o. 265).
A n g lo-G crm a n a r ra n g e m e n t: Baron
S tu m m ’ s su ggestion of, D ec. 1911,
422-3 (N o. 265).
S ir E. G rey on the possib ility o f a bargain
about naval ex p en d itu re, 424 (N o. 266);
not possible t o discuss a t present,
J a n u a ry 1912, 425 (N o. 267).
G eneral relation s, 1912:
A nglo-G erm a n discussions on naval arma­
m ents, 1912-4 (v. sub A rm am en ts,
N a v a l : A n g lo-G erm a n discussions).
A nglo-G erm a n discussions on Portuguese
Colonies (v. sub P o r t u g a l : C olonies:
A n g lo-G crm a n discussions).
A n g lo-G erm a n discussions on B a g d a d R a il­
w ay (r. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : Anglo-
G erm an C on ven tion re).
F ren ch a ttitu d e tow ards Anglo-G erm an
relations, S ir F. B e r tie on, 617-8 (No.
418).
L ord H a ld a n e’ s m ission, 1912: Turkish hope
th a t G rea t B r ita in was not g oin g to dis­
cuss B a g d a d R a ilw a y w ith Germany,
F eb. 1912, 56 (N o. 4 2 ); alleged offer of
T im or in ex ch a n g e fo r A ng ola, 441 (No.
2 7 6 ); E m p eror W illia m I I ’ s description
o f th e visit as a fiasco, 701 (N o. 475), 710
(N o. 432, encl.).
N a val d isp ositions in M e d ite r ra n e a n : Sir
A. N icolson on the question, and conse­
quences, of an a lliance w ith Germany,
M a y 1912, 585 (N o. 3 8 5 ); S ir Eyre
Crow e on G erm an position in Triple
A llian ce and a ttitu d e tow ards Great
B rita in , 586 (N o. 3 S 6 ); B aron von
M arschall on relation s o f Pow ers in
term s of naval s tr e n g th ; against
G erm an 3’ ’ s ow n in terests to attack
G reat B rita in , no desire fo r territorial
ex pa n sion , J u ly , 599 (N o. 397).

G E R M A N Y — (co n tin u e d ).
G rea t B rita in an d— (c o n tin u e d ):
G eneral r e la tio n s , 1912— ( c o n t i n u e d ) :
T e rrito ria l rectifica tion s and exchanges dis­
cussed, M a rch 1912, 440-3 (N o. 276),
4 46-7 (N o 281, m in . ) ; M r. H a r c o u r t’ s
n eg otia tion s, A p ril, 453 (N o. 285, min.)-,
G erm an desire to p roceed w ith n eg otia ­
tion s fo r C olonia l and t e rr ito ria l
exchanges, possib ility of in clu d in g
P ortu g u ese colonies, B a g da d R a ilw a y
an d southern P ersia, 455 (N o. 2 8 7 );
revision o f the S ecret A g reem en t to
g o on an d discussion o f te rr ito ria l
q uestions p ostp on ed , J u n e, 4 76-7 (N o.
3 0 5 ); S ir E y re C row e on the necessity
for a sta tem en t o f discussions betw een
M r. L. H a rc o u rt and H err v on K iih l-
m ann, 478 (N o. 306, m in . ) ; H e r r von
K iih lm a n u ’ s qu estion con cern in g A n g lo-
P ortu g u ese a lliance, J u ly 1912, 433 (ed.
n ote).
B a ron v on M a rsch a ll on p olicy o f crea tin g
a g ood atm osphere, no h ostile in ten tion s
betw een tw o cou n tries, m isch ief done
by press, A ug. 1912, 6 55-7 (N o. 451).
V isit o f P rin ce H en ry o f P ru ssia to K in g
G eorge V : con v ersation on B ritish
su p p ort to F ra n ce an d R ussia in the
event o f G erm any and A u s tria -H u n g a ry
g o in g to w ar w ith them , D ec. 1912, 658
(N o. 452), 673 (N o. 4 6 0 ); S ir E. G rey
considers th a t it w ou ld be dangerous
and m islea din g to let G erm any th in k
that un d er no circu m stan ces w ould
E n g lan d com e to assistance o f F ra n ce
and R ussia, D ec. 1912, 658 (N o. 4 53 );
S ir E. G rey on P rin ce H e n r y ’ s a ttem p t
to g et an assurance o f n eu tra litv , A p ril
1913, 694 (N o. 470).
(F o r n eg o tia tio n s con cern in g th e B agdad
B a ilw ay, v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ; a n d
M e s o p o t a m i a .)
G en eral rela tion s. 1913: A nglo-G erm a n dis­
cussions on P ortu g u ese Colonies (v. sub
P o r t u g a l : C o lo n ie s : A n g lo-G erm a n dis­
cussions).
A p p oin tm en t of H err v on Jag ow
M in ister fo r F o re ig n A ffairs, his view s
on A n g lo-G erm a n in terests and m utual
relations, 659-62 (N o. 4 5 4 ); m essage
o f w elcom e from S ir E. G rev, J an . 6.
1913. 662 (N o. 454, n o te (*))■, S ir R.
R o d d on the necessity fo r kn ow in g
m ore o f G erm an aim s and id e a ls :
H e r r von J agoiv on A n glo-G erm an
m isu n derstan din g g o in g b ack t o 1839..
661 (N o. 4 5 4 ); S ir R . R o d d on H e r r
v on J a g o w ’ s p redilection s, 661 (N o.
4 5 4 ); S ir E. G rey on G erm an poli-.-y
tow ards G rea t B r it a in : B erlin P ress
B ureau an obstacle to g o o d re la t io n s :
a p p r e cia tio n o f H e r r von J ag ow , 663
(N o. 4 5 5 ); G erm an N a v al E x pa n sion ist
P a r ty and its effect u p on A nglo-G erm a n
relations, 6 67-9 (N o. 4 5 6 ); H err v on
J a g o w on co r d ia lity o f present relations,
885
G E R M A N Y — (con tin u ed ).
G rea t B rita in and— (c o n tin u e d ):
G en eral relations. 1913— (c o n t in u e d !:
F eb., 670 (N o. 457), 679 (N o. 462, en cl. ) ;
E m p eror W illia m II on respon sib ility of
B ritish decision to help F ra n ce, 673-4
(N o. 4 6 0 ); view s on A nglo-G erm a n
relation s as expressed in B u d g et Com ­
m ittee debate, 677-83 (N o. 462, encl.)-,
S ir E. G rey on B ritish pro-G erm a n s:
im p rovem en t o f A n g lo-G erm a n rela­
tions, M a rch 1913, 687-8 (N o. 4 65 );
a ttitu d e of G erm an press tow ards
B ritish N avy Estim ates, M a rch , and
su ggestion of a y e a r’ s “ naval
h olid a y ,” 690-2 (N o.' 4 6 8 ); A n g lo-
G erm an co-op era tion over A lba n ian
q uestion, and a ttitu d e tow ards sugges­
tion o f a y e a r ’ s “ naval h olid a y ,” 692-3
(N o. 4 69 ); E m p eror W illia m I I on
A n g lo-G erm a n relations, co-op era tion
in Balkans, naval co-op era tion in
M ed iterra n ean , w ill not g o to w ar w ith
E n g lan d , p olicy w ith reg a rd to balance
o f pow er, L o rd H a ld a n e’ s visit, 669-701
(N o. 4 7 5 ); B ritish naval p olicy w ould
in te rfe re w ith progress tow ards b e tte r
relations, J une, 705 (N o. 4 7 9 ); E m p eror
W illia m I I on A nglo-G erm a n relations,
ta lk o f in vasion o f E n g lan d by G erm any,
B a lk an W a r, A nglo-G erm a n naval
p olicy , L o rd H a ld a n e ’ s visit, O ct., 708­
10 (N o. 482, en cl. ) ; H err von B ethm ann
H o llw e g ’ s hope th a t fran k com m u n ica ­
tion s betw een G erm any and G reat
B r ita in w ould be m a in ta in ed , 718
(N o. 484).
N eg otia tion s on B a g d a d R a ilw ay , T urkish
finance and riv er n a vig a tion in M eso­
p ota m ia , M a y 1913, 97 (N o. 6 6 ); G erm an
lines o f a greem ent, 9 7-8 (N o. 6 6 );
G erm an press com m ents on A n g lo-
T urkish n eg otia tion s, 122 (N o. 7 2 );
F ra n ce and R ussia in form ed by S ir E.
G rey of G erm an conversation s, 125-6
(N o. 77), 131 (N o. 8 3 ); fu rth er con­
v ersations b etw een H err v on K iih lm a n n
and M r. A . P a rk er, 126-7 (N o. 7 8 ); and
as w ith S ir E. G rey, sum m ary o f B ritish
a ttitu d e, 123-9 (N o. 7 9 ); F ra n ce
in form ed of, 130 (N o. 8 1 ); sta tem ent
b y H e r r von J a g ow as to term s o f the
A n g lo-T u rk ish a g r e e m e n t: A nglo-
G erm an exch a n g e o f view s b egun, 132
(N o. 8 4 ); A n g lo-T u rk ish con v en tion s
and decla ra tion s com m u n ica ted to
G erm any, 157 (N o. 1 02 ); sign atu re o f
these cou ld n ot be dela yed u n til
G erm any was ready, 164 (N o. 108).
P ersian G u lf q uestions (v. sub P e r s i a n
G u l f ).
V is it o f P rin ce H en ry of P russia, A p ril
1913, 694 (N o. 470).
V is it o f K in g G eorge V to B erlin, M a y 1913,
699 (N o. 4 7 5 ); S ir E. G osch en’ s rep ort
o f the success o f the visit. 702-3 (N o.
476), 703-4 (N o. 4 7 7 ); S ir A. N icolson
on, 704 (N o. 478).
 88G
G E R M A N Y — (con tin u ed ). G R E A T B R IT A IN .
G rea t B rita in and— (c o n t in u e d ): A fric a (v. sub A f r i c a , A fric a n questions).
G en era l rela tion s, 1914: A rab N a tion al M ovem en t (p. sub A r a b
A n g lo-G erm a n discussions on P ortu g u ese N a tio n a l M o v e m e n t ).
Colonies ( p . sub P o r t u g a l : C o lo n ie s : A rabia (v. sub A r a b i a ) .
A n g lo-G erm a n discussions). A rm y : E m p eror W illia m I I on the value
o f th e T erritorials, M a y 1913, 700-1 (No.
The discussions a frien d ly tra n sa ction
betw een G erm any and E n glan d , u n d er­ 475).
A s ia tic T u rk ey (v. sub T u r k e y , A siatic
sta n d in g th a t th e w hole m a tter o f the
T urkey).
A n g lo-G erm a n A greem en t res p ectin g
B a g d a d R a ilw a y ( v . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
the P ortu g u ese Colonies should b e left
C on g o ( v. sub A f r i c a , C ongo).
alone, M a rch 1914, 563 (N o. 366), 568
E g y p t (v. sub E g y p t ) .
(N o. 372), 563 (N o. 3 7 3 ); A p ril, 569­
Irish qu estion : S ir A. N icolson on, 746 (No.
70 (N o. 374).
510), 774 (N o. 533) ; M . Sazonov on
A n g lo-G erm a n a lliance or en te n te : G erm an R ussian a n xiety con cern in g , 779 (No.
view s on, M a y 1914, 792 (N o. 545). 5 3 6 ); E m p eror N ich ola s I I on, 780
A n g lo-R u ssia n N a v al u n d ersta n d in g re­ (N o. 537).
ported in B e rlin er T a g eb la tt, effect o f K o w eit ( v . s u b P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
on A nglo-G erm a n relations, M a y 1914, M ed iterra n ea n ( v. sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ) .
791 (N o. 544), 793 (N o. 5 4 5 ); H e r r von M esopota m ia ( p . sub M e s o p o t a m i a ) .
J a g o w ’ s sa tisfa ction at S ir E. G rey ’ s M oham m erah (u. sub M o h a m m e r a h ) .
sta tem en t con cern in g rum ours o f an N a v al arm am ents ( p . sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l ,
A n g lo-R u ssia n N a v al u n d ersta n d in g , G reat B r ita in a n d : A n g lo-G erm a n dis­
bad effect o f such an u n d ersta n d in g , i cussions).
Juno, 802 (N o. 550), 804 (N o. 5 5 1 ); the ' N aval d isp osition s: B a ltic Sea, conversations
B e r lin e r T a g eb la tt reaffirm s the rum our, re A n glo-R u ssia n naval co-op era tion {v.
gap s in S ir E. G rey ’ s sta tem en t, 804 sub R u s s i a , G reat B r ita in and).
(N o. 5 5 1 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s assurances to N a v al d isp o sitio n s: Channel, N orth S ea:
P rin ce L ichnow sky, 809 ( ed. n o te ), 809 F rench desire th a t B ritish navy should
(N o. 554). look a fte r Channel an d n orthern coast of
F ra n ce, M ay 1912, 582 (N o. 3 8 3 ); Sir A.
A g reem en t betw een the S m v rn a -A id in Com ­ N icolson on p olicy o f co n cen tra tin g in
pa ny and th e A n a tolian and B a g d a d Channel and N orth Sea, 584 (N o. 384);
R a ilw a y C om panies (v . sub T u r k e y : w hole q uestion o f fleet distrib u tion being
A s ia tic T u r k e y : R a ilw ays). I consid ered by G reat B rita in , 591 {ed.
in v it a t io n from E m p eror W illia m I I fo r n o te ) ; B ritish freed om to con cen tra te in
F irst L o rd o f the A d m ira lty and F irst N orth Sea, 671 (N o. 4 5 8 ); Em peror
Soa L o rd to be present at K ie l week W illia m II on B ritish N aval dispositions,
(v. sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l : A n g lo- 707, 709 (N o. 482) ; C a pta in W a tson on
Germ an discussions). effect o f w ithdraw al t o the N orth Sea, 711
(N o. 483, encl.) ; S ir E. G rey on the policy
View s o f P rin ce H en ry o f P ru ssia on A n g lo- o f co n c e n tra tin g in N orth Sea, Oct. 1913,
G erm an relations, effect o f A n g lo - 722 (N o. 488).
G erm an naval com p arisons u p on bad N a v al d isp osition s: M ed iterra n ea n conversa­
relations, J an . 1914, 7 32-4 (N o. 497, tion s relatin g to (p . sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
encl.)\ v isit o f P rin ce H e n ry, J u ly 1914, N a vy : E ffect o f G erm an progra m m e on
658 {ed. n o t e ) ; Crow n P rin ce on an B ritish con stru ction , D ec. 1911, 422 (No.
A n g lo-G erm a n a llia nce, M ay 1914, 744 265).
(N o. 5 0 3 ); S ir A. N icolson on, 745 P ersian G u l f ( p . sub P e r s i a n G u l f ).
(N o. 510).
S y r ia (p . sub S y r i a ).
V is it o f B ritish squadron to K ie l, 745-6 G eneral F o r e ig n P o l i c y :
(N o. 5 1 0 ); M r. C h u rch ill on, 7 47-8 (N o. 1911: M r. L loy d G e org e’ s speech, J u lv 21, 422
5 1 1 ); S ir E. G rey on, 749 (N o. 5 1 2 ); (N o. 265).
sober a ttitu d e of G erm an press over
1914: S ir E. G rey ’ s statem ent, J u n e 1914, no
v isit, M ay, 791-2 (N o. 544), 793 (N o.
unpublished agreem ents w hich would
5 4 5 ); J une, 753 (N o. 517).
restrict or ham per freedom o f decision as
I ta l y a n d : Ita lia n relation s w ith G erm any to w hether G reat B r ita in should pa rtici­
an d T rip le A llian ce, 1912, 586 (N o. 386). p a te in a w ar, 801 (N o. 548).
Japan a n d : A ssistance to G reat B r ita in A u stria -H u n g a ry and (u . sub A u s t r ia -
H u n g a r y , G reat B r ita in and).
aga in st G erm any, A ug. 1914, 823 { A p p .l l ) .
B elg iu m and (u . sub B e l g iu m , G reat Britain
P o rtu g a l and : A nglo-G erm a n discussions on and).
P ortu g u ese Colonies (v. sub P o r t u g a l :
D en m a rk and (p . sub D enm ark, G reat B ritain
C olon ies: A n g lo-G erm a n discussions).
and).
Iiussia and (v . sub R u s s ia , G erm a n y and). F ra n ce and (u . sub F rance, G reat B ritain
Turkey and (v. sub T urkey, Germany and). and).
 887
G R E A T B R I T A I N — (con tin u ed ).
G erm a n y and (v. sub G e r m a n y , G rea t B r ita in
and).
I ta ly and ( v . sub I t a l y , G rea t B r ita in and).
J a pan and ( v . sub J a p a n , G rea t B r ita in and).
P ers ia and (v. sub P e r s i a , G rea t B r ita in and).
P o rtu g a l and ( v . sub P o r t u g a l , G rea t B rita in
a n d ; P o r t u g a l : Colonies).
B u ssia and ( v . sub R u s s i a , G rea t B r ita in and).
S pa in and : M ed iterra n ea n discussions (v . sub
M e d i t e r r a n e a n : S pain and).
T rip le E n ten te ( p . sub T r e a t i e s , E n ten te ,
T riple).
T u rk ey and ( p . sub T u r k e y , G rea t B rita in
and).
M esopota m ia (v . sub M e s o p o t a m i a ) .
P ersian G u lf q uestions (v . sub P e r s i a n
G u i .k ).
GREECE.
N a v al position o f, 1913, 641 (N o. 439, encl. 2).
H E L IG O L A N D .
C ession to G erm any, 1890, 423 (N o. 265), 442
(N o. 276), 472 (N o. 299, m in.).
H OLLAND.
T im or ( p . sub P ortugal: C olon ies: T im or).
IN D IA .
E g v p t : In d ia an d m ilita ry defence of, 592
‘ (N o. 390).
IR A K .
ir .sub M e s o p o t a m i a .)
ITA LY .
N avy: effect of B ritish e v a cu a tion of
M ed iterra n ea n u p on Ita lia n naval con ­
stru ction , J u n e 1912, 597 (N o. 3 9 4 ); naval
p osition at en d o f 1913, C a p ta in B oyle on,
6 40-2 (N o. 439, encl. 2 ); in crease of navy
con tem p la ted , A u g . 1912, 656-7 (N o. 4 5 1 );
G erm an in fluen ce on, J a n . 1913, 668 (N o.
456).
G en eral F o r e ig n P o l i c y : P osition o f Ita ly in
T rip le A llian ce, 1912, 586 (N o. 3 8 6 );
Ita lia n a ttitu d e tow ards T rip le A llian ce
and effect o f eva cu a tion o f M ed iterra n ea n
b y B ritish n a va l forces on, 586-9 (N o. 386),
598 (N o. 3 9 6 ); S ir R . R o d d on Ita lia n
p osition in T rip le A lliance, and a ttitu d e
tow ards F ra n ce, R ussia and G rea t
B rita in , A p ril 1912, 620-1 (N o. 4 1 9 );
I ta lia n ob liga tion s u n d er T rip le A lliance
p u rely defensive, 627 (N o. 4 2 7 ); a ttitu d e
tow ards renew al o f A llian ce, Jan. 1913,
634 (N o. 4 3 0 ); Ita ly m ay be im pelled to
jo in T rip le E n te n te , 642 (N o. 439, m in .);
M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o rep u diates idea
th a t there ha d been any m odifica tion of
t e x t o f T rip le A llian ce or a n y subsequent
a d d ition u p on its renew al, J an . 1914, 643
(N o. 4 4 0 ); I ta lia n press on, M arch, 644
(N o. 4 4 1 ); S ir E y re Crowe on Ita lia n
desire to rem a in in T rip le A llian ce and
y e t n ot g o t o w ar w ith F ra n ce, M ay, 653
(N o. 449) (v. also sub T r e a t i e s , A lliance,
T riple).
I T A L Y — ( c o n tin u ed ).
A d a lia and Asia M inor, Ita lia n designs on
( p . sub. A d a l i a ; A s i a M i n o r ) .
B a g d a d R a ilw a y (p . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
M ed iterra n ean , I t a ly ’ s naval p osition in
( p . sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
T rip o li ( p. sub T r ip o li).
A u s tria -U u n g a r y a n d : S ir R . R o d d on Ita lia n
relation s to A u s tria -H u n g a ry , 1912, 620
(N o. 4 1 9 ); C a p ta in B oyle on A u stro-
H u n g a ria n naval position and Ita ly, 1913,
640-1 (N o. 439, encl. 2 ); p roposed visit
of M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o to C ount
B erch told , state of I ta lo -A u s tro -
H u n g a ria n relations, M a rch 1914, 643-4
(N o. 4 4 1 ); frien d ly a ttitu d e o f Ita ly , 757
(N o. 5 1 9 ); Ita lia n a ttitu d e tow ards
A llian ce and in clin a tion tow ards F ra n ce
and R ussia, 770 (N o. 530).
F ra n ce and (p . sub F rance: I ta ly and).
G erm a n y and: Ita lia n relation s w ith
G erm any and T rip le A llian ce, 1912, 586
(N o. 386).
G rea t B r ita in and : Ita lia n desire fo r a con ­
cession at A d alia and B ritish a ttitu d e to
( p . sub A d a l i a ).
S h a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion com m u n ica ted to
Italy, M a y 1914, 381 (N o. 236, m in.
and n ote (8) ).
Ita lia n p o lic y tow a rd G rea t B r ita in lik ely
to be affected b y e v a cu a tion of M e d ite r­
ranean by B ritish naval forces, 1912,
587, 589 (N o. 3 8 6 ); S ir A. R o d d on
B ritish in fluen ce and effect u p on Italy,
J u n e, 598 (N o. 386).
N eg otia tion s fo r an A n g lo -Ita lia n pact,
1912-4 ( p . sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n : I ta ly
a n d : A n g lo -Ita lia n n eg otia tion s).
Bussia a n d : R u ssia n g ood relations, A p ril
1912, 620 (N o. 4 1 9 ); Ita lia n in clin a tion
tow ards F ra n ce and R ussia, M a rch 1914,
770 (N o. 530).
T u rk ey a n d : Ita lia n desire t o see in te g r ity
o f A s ia tic T u rk ey preserved, desire fo r
concession o f p ort a t A d alia, N ov. 1913,
2 49-50 (N o. 1 5 7 ); Ita lia n n eg otia tion s,
262 (N o. 1 67 ); T urkish den ial of, 263 (N o.
1 7 0 ); e x ten t o f n eg otia tion s, no concession
g iv en , m erely a perm ission to in vestig ate
a line and p o r t at A d a l ia : H a k k i Pasha
a nd M r. A. P a r k e r o n : suggested solu tion
proposed bv H a k k i Pasha, D ec., 275-6
(N o. 182).
T rip olita n w ar, S ir E yre Crowe on possible
p olitica l consequences of, 1912, 586, 589
(N o. 3 8 6 ); S ir R . R o d d on, 620 (N o.
419).
JAPAN.
G en eral F o r e ig n P o lic y : P rin ce H e n r y o f
P russia on J ap anese diplom acy, J a n . 1914,
732 (N o. 497, encl.).
G erm a n y a n d : Jap anese assistance to G reat
B r ita in an a ct o f w ar a ga in st G erm any,
A ug. 1914, 823 (A p p . II).
 888

J A P A N — (co n tin u e d ). M E D I T E R R A N E A N — (continued).

G reat B rita in and : S u g gested trip a r t it e F ra n ce and, 1912— (c o n tin u e d ):
a greem ent, J a p a n , R ussia and G rea t N orth Sea, 591 (N o. 3 8 9 ); F ra n ce uneasy,
B rita in , J u ly 1914, 821 (A p p . I) ; J ap anese an en gagem en t betw een F ra n ce, Italy and
assistance in vited a ga in st G erm an arm ed G rea t B rita in suggested, 593 (N o. 3 91 );
cruisers, A u g u st 6, 1914, 823 (A p p . 7 7 ); agreem ent w ith F ra n ce essential, June
J ap anese rep ly to, 823 (A p p . 77). 1912, 594 (N o. 392, end.)-, M. Paul
O pen in g o f TT'ar in 1914: C a m bon’ s view th a t it w ou ld be a mistake
D ocu m en ts on, A ug. 6 -7 , 823 (A p p . II). fo r G rea t B r ita in to red u ce her forces in
R u ssia and : S uggested trip a r t it e a greem ent, M ed iterra n ean , q uestion o f in v itin g Spain
J a p a n , R ussia and G rea t B rita in , J u ly t o join the discussions, 597 (N o. 395);
1914, 821 (A p p . 1). d r a ft of agreem en t on naval dispositions
and ob jectiv es, J u ly , 602 (eel. n ote), 603
JEW S. (N o. 4 0 1 ); present a rrangem ents are best
J ew ish in fluen ce in Y o u n g T u rk m ovem ent, th a t eith er P ow er ca n m ake inde­
A u g . 1910, 2 (N o. 1) ; Jew ish d etestation pen den tly, 605 (N o. 4 0 3 ); m otive for
o f R ussia, 6 (N o. 1). F ren ch and B ritish d isp ositions in
M esop ota m ia suited to Jew ish colon iz a tion M ed iterra n ean , 606 (N o. 404), and ques­
an d ultim a te Jew ish autonom ous S tate, tio n of m utual assistance, 610 (N o. 409);
A u g . 1910, 2 (N o. 1). F ren ch rem oval of ships to M editerranean
a tem p orary step, S ept., 611 (N o. 410),
K A B IN D A . 611-2 (N o. 411), no decision as to A tlantic
(v sub P o r t u g a l : C olon ies: A fric a n posses­
squadron un til they knew the exact
sions of, A n g ola.)
position as b etw een F ra n ce and Great
K A T R , EL. B rita in , 612 (N o. 411).
(v. sub P e r s i a n G u l f .) (F o r genera l A n g lo-F ren ch discussions and
q uestion o f m utual assistance, v. sub
K IA O -C H A IT . F r a n c e : G reat B r ita in a n d : Conversa­
G erm an a n n exa tion of, 478 (N o. 306, m in.). tions, m ilita ry and naval.)
A n g lo -F re n ch conversations, 1912: M em oran­
K O W E ÏT . dum on com bined a ction in M editer­
(F o r discussions on the status, &c., o f K ow eit, ranean, F eb. 1913, 6 71-3 (N o. 458).
v. sub P e r s i a n G u l f : K o w e it ; fo r the A n g lo-F ren ch -Ita lia n conversations, 1912-4:
q u estion o f K o w eit as a term in u s fo r the F ren ch con cu rren ce w ith idea o f an
B a g d a d R a ilw ay, v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : A greem en t w ith Ita ly re N orth A fric a :
B a g d a d -G u lj section .) B ritish view o f an a greem en t to respect
the sta tu s quo in N orth A frica , Oct. 1912,
M A D E IR A . 6 22-3 (N o. 4 2 2 ); S ir F y r e Crowe on desira­
(v. sub P o r t u g a l : Colonies.) b ility o f F ren ch adherence to proposed
MECCA. A n g lo -Ita lia n D ecla ra tion , 630 (N o. 437,
P o sitio n of the G ra n d Sheriff o f M ecca , 1914. m in . ) ; Ita lia n su ggestion of an A nglo-
8 25 -9 (A p p . I I I ). Italia n A g reem en t in to w hich France
w ould com e, M ay 191 j, 652 -3 (N o. 449).
M E D IT E R R A N E A N . G erm a n y and : M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o on
N a val position o f Ita ly and P ow ers a t en d of proba b le G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards agree­
1913, C a pta in B oyle on, 6 40-2 (N o. 439, m ents betw een Ttaly and G reat Britain,
en d . 2). and Italy and F ra n ce, A p ril 1914, 647
T rip le A llia n ce and : S ir R . I lo d d on p olicy (N o. 4 4 4 ); M a rq u is Im p eria li on question
of, 1912, 620-1 (N o. 4 1 9 ); q u estion o f o f in form in g G erm any, M ay, 649 (No.
renew al o f A llian ce and engagem ents 445), 651 (N o. 4 4 8 ); G erm an a ttitu de to
a ffectin g M ed iterra n ean , Jan. 1914, 642 a greem ents, 651 (N o. 4 4 8 ); Italia n desire
(N o. 440) ; Ita lia n den ial o f a m odifica ­ fo r a form ula sa tisfa ctory to Germany,
tion , A pril. 644 (N o. 442), 646 (N o. 444), S ir E y re C row e on difficulty of, 652-3 (No.
649 (N o. 446), 6-51 (N o. 4 4 8 ); M . P a u l 4 4 9 ); A d m ira l von T ir p it z ’ s conversa­
C am bon rea dy to a ccep t Ita lia n tion s : naval arra n gem en ts concerning
assurances, 652 (N o. 449). M ed iterra n ean n ot m ed itated , 750 (No.
F ra n ce and : 514).
A n g lo-F ren ch conversation s, 1912: F ren ch G rea t B r ita in a n d : N a v al disp ositions, British
na va l a u th orities desirous o f ren ew in g p olicy o f ev a cu a tin g th e M e d iterra n ea n :
conversation s, F rench ‘ ca re of the e n q u ir 3T in to stra teg ica l situ ation created,
M ed iterra n ea n ,’ M ay, 582 (N o. 3 8 3 ); S ir m eetin g o f C om m ittee o f Im p eria l Defence
E y re C row e on q uestion o f B ritish assist­ proposed, A p ril 1912, 580-1 (N o. 381);
ance to F ra n ce, 587 (N o. 386) ; F ren ch sta tem ent on foreig n p o lic y necessary for
p r o te ctio n of B ritish M ed iterra n ea n d efen ce ca lcu la tion s, 580 (N o. 331), 581-2
possessions, 590 (N o. 3 8 7 ); S ir F . B ertie (N o. 3 8 2 ); S ir A. N icolson on policy of
on F ren ch desire fo r a clearer u n d er­ e v a c u a tin g : consequences, eith er an
sta n din g, 590-1 (N o. 3 8 8 ); F ra n ce to look in crease o f b u d g et fo r a M editerranean
a fte r M ed iterra n ean , G rea t B rita in the fleet, or an u n d ersta n d in g w ith France,

M E D IT E R R A N E A N "!— (con tin u ed )
G reat B rita in and, 1912— (con tin u ed ) :
M ay, 584 (N o. 384), 585 (N o. 385), or an
a lliance w ith G erm any, 585 (N o. 3 8 5 ); Sir
E y re C row e on effect on relation s o f G reat
B rita in w ith M ed iterra n ean P ow ers, 58-5-9
(N o. 3 8 6 ); effect o f the ev acu ation upon
E g y p t, L ord K itch en er consulted , 590 (N o.
387), his view s upon defen ce of E g y p t,
592 (N o. 3 9 0 ); deta ils o f p roposed naval
a rra n gem en ts in M ed iterra n ean : im p ort­
ance o f an en te n te w ith T u rkey and a
definite a greem en t w ith F ra n ce, J u n e, 594
(N o. 392, and encl.)-, S ir M . de Bunsen
on, and a ttitu d e o f S pain, 5 95-6 (N o.
3 9 3 ); effect o f d im in u tion o f B ritish
naval stren gth upon G erm an, Ita lia n and
A u stria n con stru ction , 596-7 (N o. 3 9 4 );
S ir R . R o d d on B ritish in fluen ce in
M ed iterra n ea n and in fluen ce on Ita ly, 598
(N o. 3 9 6 ); B ritish reten tion of a squad­
ron at M a lta and sufficient stren gth w ith
F ra n ce to h a ve a su p erior fo r ce to I ta ly
and A u stria com bined, 600 (N o. 3 9 8 );
deta ils of M ed iterra n ea n a rrangem ents
c om m u n ica ted to F ra n ce, 600 (N o. 3 9 9 );
A n g lo-F ren ch d r a ft o f agreem en t on naval
d isp osition s an d ob jectives, T ex t, 602 {ed.
n o te ), 603 (N o. 4 0 1 ); M r. W in ston
C h urchill on, 605 (N o. 4 0 3 ); d iv erg en t
view s as to fu tu r e naval a rrangem ents in
M ed iterra n ea n and a b in d in g a rra n g e­
m ent w ith F ra n ce, Aug., 608 (N o. 4 0 7 );
B ritish w ith d ra w a l and b elief in F ren ch
assistance, and F ren ch relia nce upon
B ritish assistance in the Channel and
A tla n tic coasts, 610 (N o. 409).
1 (F o r gen era l A n g lo-F ren ch discussions and
q uestion o f m utual assistance, v. sub
F r a n c e : G rea t B r ita in and : C onversa­
tions, m ilita ry and naval.)
j I ta l y and :
A n g lo-Ita lia n n eg otia tion s, 1 91 2-4:
1912: S ir R . R o d d ’ s suggestion th a t con ­
sid eration he g iv en to an A n g lo -Ita lia n
u n d erta k in g , A p ril 1912, 620-1 (N o.
4 1 9 ); Ita ly w ould he g la d to consid er
any p r o p o s a l: m utual in terests in
N orth A fric a , O ct., 622 (N o. 4 2 0 );
fa v ou ra bly disposed tow ards an
a rra n g em en t w ith G rea t B r ita in and
F ra n ce, 622 (N o. 4 2 1 ); Ita lia n view of
an agreem en t to m a in ta in sta tu s quo
in N orth A fric a , G reat B r ita in w ould
n ot d istu rb T rip oli, Ita ly w ould not dis­
tu rb E g y p t, 623 (N o. 4 2 3 ); S ir R . R o d d
considers m om ent fa v ou ra ble fo r dis­
cussions, N ov ., 625 (N o. 4 2 6 ); S ir R .
R o d d ’ s suggestion s to M a rq u is di San
G iu lia n o fo r som e form of m utual
a ssurance th a t E g y p t and T rip o li should
be e x clu d ed from sphere o f oth er o b liga ­
tion s : q u estion o f exclu sion o f certa in
regions from sphere o f w arlike op era ­
tion s : M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o’ s diffi­
cu lty ov er in fo rm in g I t a ly ’ s allies of
proposed agreem ent, secret or p u b lic
889
M E D I T E R R A N E A N — (con tin u ed ).
I ta l y and— (c o n t in u e d ):
a greem ent, request fo r definite form ula,
626-8 (N o. 4 2 7 ); B ritish view s on S ir R .
R o d d ’ s suggestion s, n eu tra lity o f E g y p t
and T rip o li b eyon d con tem p la ted
a rrangem ent, d r a ft o f a proposed a gree­
m ent to be prepa red , 628-30 (N o. 427,
m in . ) ; possib ility of in clu d in g F ra n ce
in, 630 (N o. 427, m in .); S ir R . R o d d ’ s
fu rth e r conversation w ith M a rq u is di
San G iulia no, Ita lia n view th a t sugges­
tion s w ere too vague, difficulties in idea
of ex clu d in g regions d u rin g a sta ge o f
1 w ar, desire fo r some con crete proposal,
D ec., 630-1 (N o. 4 2 8 ); fu rth e r conversa ­
tion s to be a void ed p en d in g in stru c­
tions, 632 (N o. 428, m in .); S ir E . G rey
on the c o n v e r sa tio n s: effect of th e
A g reem en t on Ita lia n relation s w ith
G erm any, n eu tra lisa tion o f E g y p t and
T rip o li b eyon d idea o f the A greem en t,
d r a ft D ecla ra tion forw a rd ed, 6 32-3 (N o.
( 429), T ex t o f D ra ft D ecla ra tion , 633-4
(N o. 429, encl.).
1913: S ir R . R o d d ’ s p roposed am endm ent
to, J an . 1913, 634 (N o. 4 3 0 ); S ir E y re
C row e’ s fu rth er am endm ent. 635 (N o.
430, m in .); com m u n ica ted by S ir E.
G rey, 635 (N o. 4 3 1 ); S ir R . R o d d ’ s
en q u iry as to w hether fu rth e r com ­
m u n ica tion s w ere to be m ade t o Ita ly,
635 (N o. 4 3 2 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s rep ly,
prefera b le to w ait, 636 (N o. 432, m in.),
636 (N o. 4 3 3 ); en q u iry as to state o f
F ra n co -Ita lia n n eg otia tion s, 636 (N o.
432, m in.), 636 (N o. 4 3 3 ); D r a ft
D ecla ra tion m ay be p u t forw a rd in
ev en t o f M a rq u is di San G iu lia n o
re v e rtin g to th e subject, F eb., 637 (N o.
4 3 5 ); S ir R . R o d d suggests th a t som e
ex p la n a tion m ig h t be g iv en t o Ita ly,
638 (N o. 4 3 6 ); S ir E. G rey consid ers it
prefera b le not to ta ke any in itia tiv e ,
638-9 (N o. 437), Ita ly m ig h t w ish to
m ix the q uestion o f the iE g e a n Islands
and coast o f A sia M in or, 639 (N o. 438).
1914: Italia n p olicy in M ed iterra n ean ,
M a rch 1914, 644 (N o. 4 4 1 ); M a rq u is di
San G iu lia n o on advan ta ges of
resum ing th e neg otia tion s, proba b le
a ttitu d e o f G erm any, A p ril, 6 46-7 (N o.
44 4 ); Ita ly rea dy to p roceed w ith the
arra n gem en t, and w ith F ra n ce : S ir E.
G rey can n ot take it u p a ga in unless it
was w ith F ra n ce as well, M ay, 6 48-9 (N o.
4 4 5 ); G reat B rita in w ill aw ait definite
proposals, 651 (N o. 4 4 7 ); Ita ly rea d y to
con clu d e an agreem ent, w ould like to
have some form u la b efore con su ltin g
G erm any, G rea t B rita in m ig h t discuss
form u la w ith F ra n ce, but n ot t o m en­
tion the Ita lia n approaches, 651 (N o.
4 4 8 ); q uestion o f an agreem en t b etw een
Ita ly and G reat B rita in , in to w hich
F ra n ce w ould com e, request fo r a
form u la : S ir E yre C row e on difficulty
o f fin din g a form u la , 1912 form u la
 890
M E D I T E R R A N E A N — (con tin u ed ).
I ta l y an d— (c o n tin u e d ):
valueless, 6 52-3 (N o. 4 4 9 ); Italia n
request for a form ula w hich m ig h t be
p u t forw a rd to G erm any : Sir E. G rey
cou ld n ot suggest w ith ou t con su ltin g
F ra n ce, Ita ly should suggest n e g o tia ­
tion s to G erm any, J u n e, 653-4 (N o. 450).
F ra n co -Ita lia n n eg otia tion s, 1 012- : F rench
suggestion of a m u tu a l en g ag em en t
betw een F ra n ce, Ita ly and G rea t B r ita in ,
1912, 593 (N o. 3 9 1 ); S ir R . R o d d ’ s sug-
gestion o f a F ra n co-Ita lia n a greem en t re
T rip oli and T unis, 621 (N o. 4 1 9 ); Ita ly
fa v ou ra b ly disposed tow ards an a rra n g e­
m ent w ith G rea t B rita in and F ra n ce re
N orth A frica , O ct., 622 (N o. 4 2 1 ); F ra n ce
to discuss an ex tension o f ex istin g a gree­
m ent o f 1902 ten d in g to gu a ra n tee sta tu s
quo in N orth A f r i c a : S ig n or G io litti
ready to a pprov e a recip roca l guaran tee,
6 24-5 (N o. 4 2 5 ); question discussed, 625
(N o. 4 2 6 ); suggestion to ex ten d 1902
A g reem en t to T rip oli, 628 (N o. 427, m in.),
632 (N o. 4 2 9 ); M. B a rrere on ex ten d in g
F ra n co-Ita lia n agreem ents, Jan. 1912, 634
(N o. 4 30 ); M. B a rrere has no in stru ction s,
Feb., 636 (N o. 434), and su g g estion th a t
com m u n ica tion m ig h t be m ade t o effect
th a t m a tter had n o t been d rop p ed , 638
(N o. 4 3 6 ); M . P a u l G am bon’ s en q u iry as
to ta k in g in itia tiv e, M arch, 639 (N o. 4 3 8 );
the M arquis di San G iu lia n o on resum p­
tion o f n eg otia tion s if difficulties in
present relation s could be elim inated,
A p ril 1014, C 16 (N o. 4 4 4 ); M arquis
Im p eria li on. M ay. 648-9 (N o. 445),
F ra n ce n ot to be in form ed of Italia n
approach es to G rea t B rita in , 651 (N o.
44*o ; th e conclusion o f an a greem en t w ith
F ra n ce desirable and w ould have a g ood
effect p olitica lly , 6 51-2 (N o. 4 4 8 ); S ir
E yre Crowe on F ren ch desire for
guaran tee as to Ita lia n a ttitu d e in ev en t
o f w ar, M ay. 653 (N o. 449).
Itussia and : B lack Sea fleet likely to becom e
a M ed iterra n ean fa ctor, 1912. 595 (No.
3 9 3 ); R ussia as yet can play little part,
598 (N o. 3 9 6 ); question o f op en in g of
D ardanelles, 6 08-9 (N o. 4 08 ); B lack Sea
fleet and T urkey, 641 (N o. 439, encl. 2).
S pa in and :
A n g lo-S p a n ish relation s and d iscu ssion s:
Spanish a ttitu d e to T rip le A llian ce and
effect o f eva cu a tion o f the M ed iterra n ean
by B ritish naval forces, 1012. 5 86-9 (N o.
386), 595 (N o. 3 9 3 ); F ren ch su ggestion of
in v itin g S pain to discuss and perhaps
en large the 1907 a rrangem ents, J u n e, 597
(N o. 395).
F rcn ch -S p a n ish relations and d iscu ssion s:
E v a cu a tion o f M ed iterra n ean by B ritish
naval forces and effect on S panish a t ti­
tu d e to F ra n ce, 1912, 5 86-9 (N o. 386), 595
(N o. 3 9 3 ); M ed iterra n ean d iscu ssion s:
F ren ch suggestion th a t S p a in should
M E D I T E R R A N E A N — (con tin u ed ).
Spain and— (con tin u ed ) :
en ter in to, and perhaps enlarge 1907
a rrangem ents, J u n e 1912, 597 (N o. 3 95 );
F ra n co-S p an ish rapp roch em en t, 1913, 642
(N o. 439, encl. 2).
M E S O P O T A M IA .
Bagdad: Turkish policy, Aug. 1910:
d em olition o f Messrs. L y n c h ’ s prem ises,
encroachm ent on R esid en cy , use o f B ritish
( flag on Lynch steam ers, 2 -4 (N o. 1 ); tre a t­
m ent of B ritish subjects a t B a g da d, Jan.
1011, R ifa a t P ash a ’ s criticism o f G eneral
N azim , 18 (N o 8 ) ; com p en sa tion for,
and g u aran tee a ga in st con tin u a n ce o f
| a rb itra ry acts requested in B ritish reply
to T urkish proposals, J u ly 1911, 48 (No.
34).
I r r ig a t io n : B ritish su ggestion th a t T urkey
w ould g ra n t concessions and con tra cts for
irrig a tion works, J u n e 1012, 153-4 (N o.
96), 154 (N o. 9 7 ); Germ an ob jection to
B ritish claim s for ir rig a tio n w orks, open
com p etition should apply, A p ril 1014, 371
(N o. 2 32 ); open com p etition n ot to apply
t o w orks ten dered fo r by B ritish firms in
1012, 372 (N o. 2 32 ); British rem onstrance
w ith T u rkey over delay in agreein g to
and altera tion s in the a rticles on irrig a ­
tion works, A p ril 101',, 374-5 (N o. 2 35 );
G erm an desire to record ir rig a tio n a gree­
m ent by exch a n g e o f notes, open com p e­
tition ex ten d ed to cover w hole o f A sia tic
T u rk ey , M ay, T ex t o f notes, 388 (N o. 242),
B ritish agreem ent, 392 (N o. 2 4 4 ): A n g lo-
T urkish C onven tion , in itia lled J une 10,
1914, 396 (erf. n ote).
L ynch, Messrs., Bagdad: dem olition of
prem ises by T urkish authorities, 1010, 2, 3
(N o. 1 ); use o f B ritish flag by L ynch
steam ers and Turkish resentm ent of, 2 -4
(N o. 1 ); C oncession Law , the outcom e
of “ affaire L y n ch ,” 35 (N o. 2 3 ); L ord
In ch cap e and L yn ch n a vig ation , M ay
1012, 121 (N o. 7 1 ); a greem ent with
B a g d a d R a ilw ay C om pany for con veya nce
o f b u ild in g m a teria l, 143 (N o. 9 1 );
M essrs. Lynch and the C oncession for the
N a v ig a tio n o f the T ig ris and E uphrates,
T ext, 283-98 (N o. 1 88 ); A greem ent
betw een B a g da d R a ilw a y C om pany and
L ord Inchcape, F eb. 101 329-33 (N o.
202 ).
N a v ig a t io n : O ttom an N a v ig a tion C om pany,
proposed, a dm in istration of, 136 (N o. 8 9 );
p ort required for, 133 (N o. 8 6 ); E uphrates
and T ig ris Steam ship C om p a n y ; R iv e r
N a v ig a tion C om pany, 138 (N o. 89, encl. 1 );
question of allow ing G erm ans to take up
10",. o f Turkish share, 154 (N o. 97).
A n glo-G erm an neg otia tion s, v. sub M eso­
p o t a m i a , G erm a ny and.
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s and D eclara ­
tion , v. sub M e s o p o t a m i a , T u rk ey and.
 891
M E S O P O T A M I A — (con tin u ed ).
N a v ig a tio n — ( con tin u ed 'I:
B a g da d R a ilw a y C o m p a n y : a greem ent w ith
L ord In ch cap e, T ex t, F eb. 1914, 329—33
(X o . 202).
B a g da d R a ilw a y C om pany : a greem ent w ith
T urkey, v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g ­
da d R a ilw a y C om p any : A greem en t w ith
Turkey.
O il-con cess ion s: B ritish represen ta tions on
oil-coneessions fo r B a g d a d and Basra.
M ay 1913. 125 (N o. 7 6 ); clause inserted
in d raft re p ly to H a k k i P asha, 125 (N o.
76. m in .); H a k k i P asha on tw o g rou p s,
N a tion a l B a n k and D ’ A rcy concession,
variou s in terests in volved , 152 N o. 95).
154 (N o. 9 7 1 : H err von K iih lm a n n on
G erm an a n x ie ty t o reach a settlem ent,
163 (N o. 1 07 ); v ariou s g rou p s and the
proposed a m alga m ation, 163 'N o . 107 );
p osition o f v ariou s g ro tps and com panies,
a nd H e r r G w inner and Sir E . Cassel.
172-3 (N o. 117 , and question of an
a dvance to T urkey, ISO (N o. 1 19 ); G reat
B r ita in atta ch es im p orta n ce to a sa tisfa c­
t o ry a rra n g em en t re oil concessions, 19S
(N o. 1 2 4 ); H a k k i P asha and M r. P a rk er
on G erm an claim s an d position o f other
g rou p s an d com panies, 213 (N o. 1 3 9 );
H e r r von K iih lm a n n and M r. P a rk er on
oil co n c e ssio n s: position o f Shell Com ­
pany, N a tion a l B ank o f T urkey, title and
rig h ts o f N ew C om pany, position of
A n g lo-P ersian C om pany, ob jects of
B ritish G overnm ent, A u g . 2 14 -5 (N o. 140).
T u rk ish P etroleu m C o n cession s: a rra n g e­
m ents fo r fusion o f interests. D ’ A rcy
g rou p , D eutsch e Bank, A n g lo-S a x on
P etroleu m C om pany. M a rch 191 4. 345-6
(N o. 214).
T urkish delavs. M av 1914, 394 (N o. 245),
•Tune. 396 <N o.' 247). 411 (N o. 252
T urkey agrees to g iv e T urkish P e tro ­
leum C om p any lease o f concession. 412
(N o. 253), 413 (N o. 255).
R a ilw a y s: ra ilw ay lines in com p etition w ith
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om pany ( r. sub T u k k e y ,
A s ia tic T u rk ey .
F ra n ce a n d : F ra n ce in vited b y G reat B rita in
to su p p ort T urkish d ecla ra tion con sen tin g
to form a tion o f an O ttom an C om p any,
un d er B ritish con trol, fo r n a v ig a tion of
T ig ris an d E up h ra tes. A u g . 191-i, 205-9
(N o. 1 35 ); M . de F leu ria u th in ks there
w ould be no difficulty. 210 'N o . 137 :
F rench su p p ort. 22S (N o. 150'.
G erm a n y a n d : A nglo-G erm a n neg otia tion s,
191-3-4: C on d ition s un d er w hich G erm any
w ould a gree th a t G erm an subjects should
m ake no claim to p a rticip a te in n a v ig a ­
tion o f T ig ris and E u p h ra tes, M a y 1913,
95 'N o . 6 6 ); H err von K iih lm a n n in form ed
o f B ritish statem ent to H a k k i Pasha
abou t n a v ig a tion o f T ig ris and E uphrates,
115 (N o. 6 9 ); G erm any w ould not
en cou ra ge or su p p ort G erm an subjects
front ta k in g p a rt in n a vig a tion , 127 (N o.
M E S O P O T A M IA — (con tin u ed ).
G erm a ny and, 1913— (c o n t 'n u e d ):
7* agreem ent desired as to no dis­
crim in ation in riv er traffic rates, 127 (N o.
75 ); prep a ra tion o f d ra ft agreem ent
suggested, 127 (N o. 7 5 ); G erm an
represen ta tive w anted on B oa rd of
E up hrates and T ig ris Steam ship Com ­
pany. 135 (N o. 59. encl. 1). 140 (N o.
59, encl. 3 ) ; w ill not support claim s to
p a rticip a te in n a vig ation o f T ig ris and
E uphrates, 139 (N o. 59. encl. 3 ) ; G erm an
suggestion that the H a m bu rg -A m erica
L in e should have a share on n a vig ation
com p any, 143 (N o. 91). 154 (N o. 9 7 );
den ial th a t G erm any has renou nced claim s
to p a rticip a te in T ig ris n a vig a tion , J u ly
161 (N o. 106) ; H err von K ü h lm a n n ’ s
ex p lan a tion of, 163 (N o. 1 0 7 ); enquiry
as to B ritish special rights, 163 (N o. 1 07 );
G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards a m on opoly on
T ig ris, 167 (N o. 114) ; P rin ce L ich n ow sk y ’ s
ex p la n a tion s o f G erm an cou n ter-d ra ft
D ecla ra tion , proposed concession for river
n a vig ation , share o f B agdad R a ilw a y in
new sh ipp in g com pany, 174-5 (N o. 115 );
T ex t o f G erm an co u n te r -d ra ft D eclara­
tion . 175 (N o. 115, encl. 3 ); G erm an desire
th a t B a g d a d R a ilw ay should have rig h t o f
usin g launches. 222 (N o. 1 46 ); G erm any
to press fo r increased share in riv er n avi­
g a tion com p any, S ept.. 225 (N o. 14S) ;
B ritish revised cou n ter-d ra ft, ex plan a ­
tion s and T ext, 234-^1 (N o. 154) ; G erm an
am endm ents and com m ents. 2 42-6 (N o.
156 and n o te s ); G erm an C ou n ter-d raft,
T ex t. N ov. 3, 1913, 247-9 (N o. 156, encl. 2 );
G erm an request fo r p a rticip a tio n in the
n a v ig a tion com pany, B ritish view s on,
255—9 (N o. 162), 261 (N o. 166) ; com ­
m u n ica ted to T urkey, 261 (N o. 1 65 );
G rand V iz ie r opposed to adm ittin g
G erm an p a rticip a tio n , 262 (N o. 16S) ;
B ritish view as to ex ten t o f p a rticip a ­
t io n : T urkish views. 264 (N o. 171 ); Sir
E. G rey on, 2 65-6 (N o. 173).; G reat
B r ita in to a gree not to opp ose a cquisition
by G erm an in terests o f 40% o f share
ca p ital, and to acquiesce in certain
fa cilitie s b ein g gra n ted to B a g d a d R a il­
w ay C om pany, 299 (No. 1Sλ, B ritish
rem arks on, 302 (N o. 159), B ritish
C ou n ter-D ra ft. T ext, D ec. 15. 1913, 305-7
(N o. 190) ; fu rth er G erm an d r a ft, com ­
m ents and explan a tion s. F eb. 1914. 318-9
(N o. 19*. encl. 1). T ext. 321-3 (N o. 19S,
encl. 2) ; revised B ritish d r a ft. T ex t,
M a rch 31. 1914, 361 i No. 225. encl.) ;
C on v en tion in itia lled . J u n e 15, 1914, T ext
400 (N o. 249, encl. .
G reat B r ita in a n d : T urkish a ttitu d e again st
B ritish com m ercial or p olitica l pre­
dom inance. August 1919, 3 -4 (N o. 1) ;
B ritish in terests in M esopotam ia and the
B a g da d R a ilw ay (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l ­
w ay); B ritish object to sa feg u a rd in ter­
ests, 36 (N o. 23, m m .); M r. M a llet on
T urkish a ttitu d e tow ards B ritish sub-

M E S O P O T A M I A — {con tin u ed ).
G rea t B rita in an d — (c o n t in u e d ):
jects and interests, A u g . 1911, 51 (N o. 3 7 );
S ir G. L ow th er on d esirab ility o f m a in ­
ta in in g and in crea sin g B ritish establish­
m ents in M esopota m ia , J u n e 1913, 160-1
(N o. 1 04 ); B ritish in terests in M eso­
pota m ia and A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t,
A ug. 1913, 202 (N o. 131).
N a v ig a tio n o f T ig ris and E u p h ra te s: sum ­
m ary o f historica l and legal g rou n d s fo r
B ritish claim to rig h ts o f n a vig a tion ,
Feb. 1913, 90-1 (N o. GO, encl.), 277 (N o.
183 ); A g reem en t o f 18^6, T ex t o f d ocu ­
m ents con s titu tin g , 92-3 (ed. n o te ) ;
perm ission fo r a d d ition a l B ritish
steam ers to n a v ig a te betw een B a g d a d
and Basra, 78 (N o. 55, encl.)-, B ritish
com m ent on G erm an a ttitu d e, 98 (N o.
GG, m in.).
Anglo-German negotiations (v. sub M eso­
p o ta m ia : G erm a n y and).
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, 1913 (v.
M e s o p o t a m ia ,T u rk ey and).
T u rk ey a n d : Jew ish p olicy in, and position
and in fluen ce in Y ou n g T u rk circles, A ug.
1910, 2 (N o. 1 ); Y ou n g T urk p olicy to
create a stron g m ilita ry fo r ce and assert
m astery aga in st all com ers, 3 (N o. 1 ) ;
a ttitu d e a gain st p red om in an t position of
foreig n ers, 3 (N o. 1 ); Ism ail H a k k i’ s
rep orts on con d ition o f a ffairs in M eso­
pota m ia n vilayets, a n ti-E n glish ton e of,
D ec. 1910, 10 (N o. 5), 11 (N o. 6), 51-2
(N o. 37).
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, 1913: N a v ig a ­
tion o f T ig ris and E u p h ra te s: N e g o tia ­
tion s w ith H a k k i P asha, M ay, 117 (ed.
n o t e ) ; B ritish sta tem ent abou t n a v ig a ­
tion com m u n ica ted to H a k k i P asha,
118-9 (N o. 6 9 ); T urkish co u n te r-d ra ft,
116 (ed. n o t e ); G rea t B rita in p repa red
to a ccep t proposed d ecla ra tion , 149 (N o.
9 4 ); D r a ft D ecla ra tion , T ex t, 158-9
(N o. 102, encl.) ; n a v ig a tion concession
discussed, 179-80 (N o. 1 19 ); A n g lo-
T urkish A greem ent, D ecla ra tion ,
J u ly 29, 1913, T ex t, 189-90 (N o. 124 );
D r a ft concession fo r n a v ig a tion
T ig ris and E up h ra tes, in itia lled ,
A u g . 12, 1913, by H a k k i P asha and
L ord In ch ca p e, 206 (ed. n o t e ) ; B ritish
rig h ts o f n a v ig a tion and im p orta n ce
a tta ch ed t o d ecla ra tion o f T u rk ey con ­
sen tin g to form a tion o f an O ttom an
C om p any u n d er B ritish con trol, 2 08-9
(N o. 1 3 5 ); fu r th e r D ecla ra tion a bout
n a vig ation in itia lled , T ex t, 213 -4 (N o.
139, A n n e x ); fo u r p r in c ip a l p oin ts in
d is p u te : assurance aga in st ir rig a tio n
w orks ren d erin g n a vig a tion im possible,
no custom s ex em p tion fo r fu el d u rin g
period o f concession, question o f con trol,
con v ey a n ce o f m a ils; n e g otia tion s w ith
H a k k i P asha and Sassoon E ffen di and
com prom ise suggested, D ec., 2 7 6 -9 (N o.
892
M E S O P O T A M IA — (con tin ued).
T u rk ey and— (c o n t in u e d ):
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, 1913— (con­
tin u ed ) :
1 8 3 ): D eclaration s signed. T exts, D ec.
10, 1913, 231-2 (N o. 1301; C oncession fo r
the N a v ig a tion o f the T ig ris and
E u p h ra tes signed b y H a k k i P asha and
L ord In ch cap e, T ex t, D ec. 12, 1913, 283­
98 (N o. 188).
MOHAMMERAH.
F ro n tie r question betw een T urkey and P ersia,
B ritish a pprehension on possible Turkish
claim s, M a y 1912, 7 3-4 (N o. 5 1 ); pro­
vision fo r the rep resen ta tion o f P ersia on
th e proposed R iv e r a in Com m ission, J u ly,
77 (N o. 5 5 ); sta tem ent o f B ritish view s to
T urkey, 8 4 -6 (N o. 55).
D ecla ra tion reg a rd in g the fr o n tie r of
M oham m erah : H a k k i P ash a ’ s suggestions
for, M a y 1913, 95 (N o. 63).
Sheikh of, to en tru st his in terests to
the B ritish C om m issioner, M a y 1913, 114
sub
(ed. n o t e ) ; fr o n tie r adjustm ents, B ritish
com m ents, 115 (ed. n o te ) ; Sheikh of
M oham m erah and A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia ­
tions, 157 (N o. 101), 202 (N o. 131).
i A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u ly 29, 1913,
D ecla ra tion , T ex t, 188 (N o. 1 24 ); R ussian
criticism o f the a greem ent and d eclara­
tion , A ugust, 216 (N o. 141), S ir E. G rey ’ s
ex p la n a tion s of, 217 (N o. 142).
M O N G O L IA .
A n g lo-R u ssia n discussions (v . sub R u s s i a :
G rea t B rita in and : A nglo-R u ssia n neg o­
tia tion s, 1914).
M ON TENEGRO.
B lo ck a d e : E m p eror W illia m I P s a ttitu d e
tow ards a naval block ad e, M a y 1913, 700
(N o. 475).
A lbania a n d : S cu ta ri question, H e r r von
J a g ow on, Jan . 1913, 659 (N o. 454).
S erv ia a n d : In d ep en d en ce o f M on ten egro,
H e r r v on J a g ow on, Jan. 1913, 659 (N o.
454).
M O RO CC O .
F rench fresh proposal to S pain re territoria l
arrangem ents, M a y 1912, 584 (N o. 3 84 );
Spanish policy , and proposal, J u n e, 596
of
(N o. 393).
F ren ch and Ita lia n difficulties over ca p itu la ­
tions, A p ril 1914, 645 (N o. 443), 647-8 (N o.
4 4 4 ); B ritish view on question o f ca p itu ­
la tion s in M orocco and E g v p t, 650 (No.
446), 650 (N o. 447).
F ra n co-G erm an A greem en ts re M orocco and
C ongo, N ov. 4, 1911, 657 (N o. 451).
G erm any d efeated over M orocco, H err von
J a g ow on, Jan. 1913, 660 (N o. 454).
E m p eror W illia m I P s v isit to T an g ier, A p ril
1905, 708 (N o. 482, encl.).
M O SU L.
B ritish u n d erta k in g not to establish railw ay
un d erta k in g s in com p etition to B agdad
R a ilw a y C om p any ( v . sub B a g d a d R a i l ­
w a y , A nglo-G erm a n A greem ent).

M O Z A M B IQ U E .
(t>. sub P o r t u g a l : C olon ies: A fric a n posses­
sions of.)
M U SCAT.
B ritish and T urkish in terests in P ersian G ulf
and M u sca t ( r . sub P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
N A VAL ARM AM EN TS.
( r . sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l .)
N A V A L C O N V E R S A T IO N S .
(F o r con v ersation s relatin g to naval dis­
position s in M ed iterra n ean , v.
M e d it e r r a n e a n ; fo r A n g lo-B ritish
genera l discussions, v. sub F r a n c e : G reat
B rita in and : C onversations, m ilita ry and
naval.)
N E U T R A L IT Y .
Belgium a n d : S ir E . G rey 's assurance to, that
G reat B r ita in w ould never he first to
viola te n eu tra lity , A p ril 1013. 695 'N o .
472>.
D en m a rk a n d : S ir E. G rey ’ s assurance to,
th a t G reat B rita in w ou ld n ever be first to
v io la te n eu tra lity , M av 1914, 743 (N o.
507).
G reat B rita in a n d : K in g G eorge V and P rin ce
H en ry o f P russia on B ritish neu tra lity .
1912-1. 658 (N o 452 and ed. n ote). 673-4:
(N o. 460), 694 (N o. 470).
N orw a y a n d : Q uestion o f G erm any and, A p ril
1913, 695 (N o. 472).
S w eden and : Sw edish in ten tion not to
abandon p o lic y o f n eu tra lity : m a jority o f
peop le op p osed to any a lliance : C ount
E hrensw ard opp osed to an a lliance w ith
G erm any. J a n . 1914, 731 (N o. 496).
NORW AY.
N e u tr a lit y : qu estion o f seizing a N orw egian
h a rb ou r as a base o f op eration s aga in st
G erm any, A p ril 1913, 695 (N o. 472'.
P A N IS L A M IS M .
Y ou n g T u rk p a rty and, A ug. 1910, 2 -3 (N o. 1).
PEM BA.
(F o r q uestion o f P em ba an d Z a n zib a r,
Z a n z ib a r and P e m b a .)
P E N G U IN A N D S E A L IS L A N D S .
G erm an request fo r : M r. L. H a rc o u rt on
necessity for com p en sa tion to U n ion o f
South A fr ic a , M a rch 1912, 441 (N o. 2 7 6 );
G erm any w illin g to cede C a p riy i strip in
exch a n g e fo r Seal and P e n g u in islands,
M ay, 474 (N o. 3 0 1 ); G eneral B otha con ­
sulted, 474 (N o. 301) ; rep ly, im possible to
assent, 4S0 (N o. 309).
P E R S IA .
G endarm erie, R ussia and Swedish
gen da rm erie, M a rch 1914, 763 (N o. 529).
R a ilw ay s : M oh a m m era h -K h orem a b a d line :
G erm any w ould he g la d if G reat B rita in
a bandoned , M a y 1913, 93 (N o. 66, m in.) ;
S ir A. N icolson on, 99 (N o. 66, min.).
T ra n s-P ersia n : G erm any and, M a rch 1912.
57-S (N o. 44, and m in.)
893
P E R S I A — (con tin u ed ).
S itu a tion in P ersia, 1914 : A n glo-R ussian dis­
cussions ( r . sub R u s s i a : G reat B rita in
a n d : A n glo-R u ssia n n egotia tion s. A p r il-
J u ly 1914).
T elegraph lin e : G erm an suggestion o f la n d­
line across P ersia, 166 111), 166 (N o.
112), necessity fo r con su lta tion o f G reat
B rita in and R ussia, 166 (N o. 112).
G rea t B rita in and :
A n g lo-P ersia n Oil C om pany : pu rchase o f
shares by B ritish G overnm ent. J u n e 1914,
sub 811 (N o. 555, and note <2> ). ^13-4 (N os.
555—8'.
G reat B rita in not h a pp y as to ou tlook in
P ersia : R ussian ra ilw ay con stru ction and
G erm an com p etition , M ay 1914, 746 (N o.
510).
M oham m erah and T u rkish -P ersia n fr o n tie r
question (r. sub M o h a m m e r a h ) .
B ussia and : R ussian com m ents on A n g lo-
T urkish d r a ft decla ra tion , suggestin g
fr o n tie r line a lon g Sh a tt-el-A ra b, J une
1913. 155-6 ‘ N o. 99). 156 (N o. 1 0 0 ); R ussia
a grees to conclusion o f a rrangem ent on
lines of decla ra tion , J u ly , ISO (N o. 120)
(r. also sub R u s s i a , G reat B rita in a n d :
A n glo-R u ssia n negotia tion s, A p r il-J u lv
1914).
T u rk ey a n d : T urkey as p rotector o f P ersia,
1910, 3 (N o. 1). '
F ro n tie r q u estion s: T urkish F ro n tie r Com ­
m ission, M ay 1912. 74 (N o. 5 1 );
M oham m erah and proposed R iv era in
Com m ission, J u ly , 77 (N o. 55).
A n g lo-T u rk ish D ra ft D eclaration on T u rco-
P ersian fron tier. M ay 1913, T ex t. 100-1
(N o. 63) ; G reat B rita in to com m uni­
cate d r a ft to R ussia, 116 (ed. n o te) ;
H a k k i P asha on the B ritish and
R ussian jo in t note, 121 (N o. 71) ;
G erm an press com m ents on A n g lo-
T urkish n eg otia tion s, 122 (N o. 72) ;
G rea t B rita in p rep a red to join in pro­
posed d ecla ra tion , 149 (N o. 9 4 ); diffi­
cu lties ca u sin g delay, 151 (N o. 95), hope
that R ussia w ill not raise difficulties
see ov er Sh a tt-el-A ra b, 156-7 (N o. 100),
1 59-60 (N o. 103 ); T u rk ey rep orted as
h a vin g a ccep ted the A ng lo-R u ssia n pro­
posals. 180 (N o. 119).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem ent, D eclaration ,
J u ly 29, 1913, T ex t, 1SS-9 (N o. 124).
P E R S IA N GULF.
A rm s sm u g g lin g : T urkish and B ritish desire
to suppress, D ec. 1910, 10 (N o. 5), K ow eit
and M u sca t centres o f con trab a n d traffic,
13 (N o. 6, encl. and n ote ( 12) ), 51 (N o. 36).
B ahrein : D ra ft A nglo-T u rkish C onvention,
in itia lled , M a y 1913. T ext, 106 (N o. 68,
encl. 3) : B ritish com m ents on, 114-5 (ed.
note)', A ng lo-T u rkish A greem en t, J u ly 29,
1913, T ext, 193 (N o. 124).
E l-K a t r : D ra ft A ng lo-T u rkish C onvention,
in itia lled , M a y 1913, T ex t, 105-6 (N o. 68,
encl. 3 ); B ritish com m ents on, 114—5 (ed.
note)-, A n glo-T urkish A greem ent, J u ly 29,
1913, T ex t, 193 (N o. 124).
 894
P E R S I A N G U L F — (con tin u ed ).
(F o r n eg otia tion s, v. sub P e r s i a n G ulf:
G rea t B r ita in and : T u rk ey and.)
K o w e i t : S ta tu s o f the Sheikh o f K o w e it, 3
(N o. 1 ); and T urkish con ten tion that
K o w e it was a p a rt o f O ttom an E m p ire,
4 (N o. 1 ); B ritish view s on, 1911, 47-8
(N o. 34).
G rea t B r ita in and :
A g reem en t o f J an . 23, 1899, betw een G rea t
B r ita in and th e Sheikh o f K ow eit, T ex t,
107 (N o. 681 194-5 (N o. 124).
A g reem en t, im p o rta tio n and e x p o r ta tio n o f
a nus, M ay 21, 1900, T ext, 108 (N o. 68),
195 (N o. 124).
P osta l A greem ent, F eb. 23, 190i, T ex t, 108
(N o. 63), 195 (N o. 124).
B ritish a ttitu d e to status o f Sheikh of
K ow eit, 4 (N o. 1 ); M r. M a rlin g on
ex p ed ien cy o f e n te rin g in to pou rp a rlers
w ith T u rk ey an d a d v isab ility of p os t­
p o n in g n eg otia tion s, 11 (N o. 6 ) ; possi­
b ility o f using T urkish a n xiety to settle
K o w e it to B ritish a d v an ta g e in B a g d a d
R a ilw a y n eg otia tion s, 12 (N o. 6 ) ; diffi­
cu lty o f fin d in g basis of n e g otia tion s on
K o w e it question, im possible to abandon
Shiekh of K o w e it to T urkey, 12 (N o. 6 );
B ritish relation s w ith Sheikh, 12 (N o.
6), 15 (N o. 6, m in . ) ; disa strous to
aba n don Sheikh to T u rkey, 15-16 (N o.
6, m in.), 17 (N o. 7 ); q uestion o f in clu d ­
in g K o w e it in B a g d a d R a ilw a y n e g o tia ­
tions, and possible concessions resp ect-
in g K ow eit, 16 (N o. 6, m in.), 17 (N o. 7 );
K o w e it as an in tern a tion a l free port,
con stru ction and con trol should be in
B ritish hands, 23 (N o. 12, m in .); G rea t
B rita in not an xiou s to a lter sta tu s quo
in G ulf, tre a ty ob liga tion s w ith Sheikh
w ou ld have to be m a in ta in ed , 31 (N o
20., n o te ( 2) ) ; L o rd H a rd in g e on B ritish
p olicy w ith reg a rd to K o w e it ; Sheikh
t o b e p r o te cte d a t any cost, 38 (N o. 25).
R e p ly to T urkish p r o p o s a ls : B ritish view s
as to status o f K o w eit, m odus v iv en d i
o f 1901, 47 (N o. 34), T ex t, 49 (ed. note)-,
G rea t B r ita in cou ld n ot consent to any
in frin g em en t o f a u ton om y o f Sheikh,
p rep a red to recogn ise T urkish
su zerain ty, p r o v id e d sta tu s quo is
g u a ra n teed and other a greem ents
r e c o g n is e d : K o w e it to en joy self­
g overn m en t un d er T urkish su zerain ty ,
4 7-8 (N o. 34).
T u rk ish rep ly to G rea t B rita in , M r. P a r k e r
on, A p ril 1912, 66 (N o. 4 8 ); B ritish
view s on T urkish reply, 7 1 -2 (N o.
5 0 ); and suggested basis o f settlem ent,
M ay, 73 (N o. 5 1 ); desire for sta tu s quo
w hich w ou ld n ot be disturbed , 75 (N o.
5 3 ); rep ly to T urkish m em o, o f A p ril
1912, 79, 83-4 (N o. 55), 87 (N o. 56).
D r a ft A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion , in itia lled ,
M ay 19IS, T ext, 104-5 (N o. 68, encl. 3 );
B ritish com m ents on, 114-5 (ed n o te ) ;
T urkish su g g estion fo r a d d ition o f a
clause fo r e x tra d itio n o f crim inals from
I P E R S I A N G U L F — (con tin u ed ).
K ow eit, 1913— (c o n tin u e d ):
G rea t B r ita in and— (c o n tin u e d ):
K ow eit, J u n e ; B ritish view s on, 140-2
(N o. 90, and m in. ) ; T e x t of, and British
com m ents on, 144-6 (N o. 92, and m in .);
n ote by C a pta in W ilson on, 146-7 (N o.
9 3 ); Sheikh o f K o w e it in form ed of
d r a ft a greem ent, 157 (N o. 101).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u ly 29, 1913,
T ex t, 191-3 (N o. 1 2 4 ); S ecret D eclara­
tion , T ex t, 196 (N o. 1 2 4 ); C on d ition s of
B ritish u n d erta k in g to su p p ort Sheikh
o f K o w eit, 196 (N o. 124).
T u rk ey a n d : T urkish view th a t B ritish
in terferen ce was du e to riv a lry with
G erm any, ex p e c ta tio n o f g e ttin g ques­
tion fa v ou ra b ly settled when final
a rra n gem en ts are m ade fo r B agdad
R a ilw ay , 4 (N o. 1 ); H a k k i P a sh a ’ s idea
'
o f an in terd ep en d en t solution o f the
K o w e it and B a g d a d R a ilw ay questions,
Jan. 1911, 11 (N o. 6 ) ; T urkish desire to
com e to agreem en t in ev en t o f questions
b ein g trea ted tog e th er, 12 (N o. 6 );
H a k k i P a sh a ’ s view that K o w e it ques­
tio n was at root o f T urkish feelin g
a bou t B ritish a ction : con trab a n d arms
traffic a t K o w e it : n ot T u rk e y ’ s interest
to p erm it any oth er P ow er to establish
itself there, 13-14 (N o. 6, e n c l.);
im possible to preserve statu s quo, 22
(N o. 12).
T urkish proposals to G rea t B rita in , rela­
,
tion s o f K o w eit to O ttom an Em pire
m ust be regu larized , 24 (N o. 14), 26 (No.
14, encl.), 47 (N o. 34).
B ritish r e p ly : G ra n d V iz ie r ’ s observations
on, en largem en t o f the dom inions of
Sheikh w ould n ot be view ed favourably,
prov ision m ust be m ade th a t K ow eit
should n ot b ecom e a “ fo y e r de
s e d itio n ,” A ug. 1911, 51 (N o. 36).
T urkish rep ly to G reat B rita in , A p ril 1912,
6 4-5 (N o. 47).
D r a ft A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion , in itialled,
M ay 1913, 104—5 (N o. 68. encl. 3 ); sug­
g ested clause fo r e x tra d itio n of
crim inals from K o w eit, 140-2 (N o. 90),
144-6 (N o. 92), 152 (N o. 9 5 ); Turkish
co u n te r-d ra ft, 164 (N o. 109).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem ent, J u ly 29, 1913,
T ex t, 191-3 (N o. 1 2 4 ); Secret D eclara­
tion , T ex t, 196 (N o. 124).
S h a t t -e l-A r a b : B u oy a ge o f : difficulties over,
proposed A n g lo-T u rk ish riv era in com m is­
sion, J u ly 1911, 48 (N o. 3 4 ); B ritish pro­
posals and e x istin g arrangem ents, 55
(N o. 41).
R iv e r d u e s :n ot to be im posed w ithout
assent of G rea t B rita in , J u ly 1911, 46
(N o. 3 4 ); T urkish rep ly, A p ril 1912, 60
(N o. 47), to be discussed in relation to
the R iv era in C om m ission, 69 (N o. 50).
R iv era in Com m ission : T urkish rep ly, A p ril
1912. 6 1-2 (N o. 4 7 ); B ritish view s on
72 (N o. 50).
 S95
P E R S IA N ' G U L F — ( co n tin u e d ).
S h a tt-el-A ra b — (c o n tin u e d :
A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention fo r establishm ent
o f a X a v ig a tio n Com m ission. B ritish
D ra tt T ex t. J u ly 1012. 75. 5 1-3 (X o .
55) ; T urkish am endm ent to P ream ble,
M ay 191a. 9-5 (X o . 63 : D ra ft T ext.
in itia lled , M ay 1913, 109-11 (X o . 65.
en d . 4 : B ritish com m ents 011. 115 1ed.
n ote ; S h a tt-el-A ra b to be m ade and
m a in ta in ed na vigab le from Basra to th e
P ersian G u lf, 132 (X o . - ^ ) : pow ers o f
C on servan cy C om m ission, ! 17 1X 0 . 89 ;
Germ an in terests and proposed advisory
com m ission. 137 (X o . 59), 135 (X o . S9.
en cl. 1 ); provisions o f A nglo-T u rkish
con v en tion . 135 (X o . S9. en d . 2).
D ra ft A n g lo-G erm a n D ecla ra tion . 140 (X o .
89. en d . 3 : G erm an request fo r rep re­
sen ta tion 011 C onservancy Com m ission,
143 'X o . 91 ; B ritish con d ition s for
assent to. 149 (X o . 9 4 ); m odifications
a greed and in itia lled . 152 (X o . 9 5 );
a rra n g em en t about sh ip p in g dues, <tc.,
hop ed fo r , 162 (X o . 1 07 ); A n g le-
G erm an arra n gem en t proposed, 164 (X o
105 .
B ritish e x p la n a tion th a t Com m ission is to
be O ttom an and not in tern a tion a l, hope
that R u ssia w ill not press fo r adm ission
o f R ussian subjects, 151 'X o . 121', 201
X o . 129).
C on v en tion s g n ed fo r establishm ent o f a
Com m ission for N a v ig a tio n o f S h a tt-el-
A rab . J u ly 29. 1913. T ex t. l ? 3 - 7 X o .
124).
P ow ers, consent o f, necessary. S ir E. G rey ’ s
hope to ov ercom e R ussian objection s.
A u g . 1913. 199 X o. 125 ; question o f
ca p itu la to ry rights and the C onven­
tion . 200 (X o . 127 201 X o 12 », and
note (4)> ; S ir E. G rey ca n n ot a ccep t
M . M in o rs k i's view s : im p ra ctica b le to
ob tain the adm ission o f R ussian sub­
jects to Com m ission. 2 Y2- ] X o 131).
F orm ula fo r a note betw een G rea t B rita in
an d T u rk ey w ith reg a rd to Com m ission.
>ept. 1913. 229 (X o . 151 ); signed, Oct..
242 (ed. n o te '.
B agdad R a ilw a y C o.'s a greem ent w ith
T u rk e y : 1 r. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y :
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C o m p a n y : A greem ent
w ith T u rk ey .
A u s tria -H u n g a ry a n d : S h a tt-el-A ra b C on­
ven tion com m u n ica ted to A u stria -
H u n g a ry , M a y 1914. 381 .'X o. 236. iin.,
and n ote ( 10) ).
F rçn ce a n d : F ra n ce to be in v ited to
ex ch a n g e notes w ith G reat B rita in in
term s o f A n g lo-G erm a n an d Turkish
C on v en tion . 351 (X o . 236. m in.), 390
X o . 243).
G erm a n y a n d : G erm an con d ition s fo r con ­
serva n cy o f. M a y 1913. 95 (N o. 6 6 );
A n g lo-G erm a n decla ra tion , G erm an
co u n te r -d ra ft : e x p la n a tion s of, 175-6
(N o. 1 1 5 ); T e x t o f D ecla ra tion , 179 (X o .
P E R S I A N GL L F — >ntinuedi
S h a tt-el-A ra b — (con tin ued ) :
G erm a ny a e d . 1913— (con tin u ed
11?, e n d . 3 ): 110 G erm an o b jection
e x p e c te d to A nglo-T u rkish C on v en tion ,
A ug., 199 X o. 1 25 ); cou n ter-d ra ft dis­
cussed by H err von K lihlm anu an d M r.
P ark er, 222 (X o . 1-16): H err von
lviih lm an u ’ s view s on A r ticle 4 ; Basra
must be m ade a g ood p o r t ; an in form a l
m eetin g o f B ritish and G erm an ex p erts
suggested to consider financial costs of
con s erv a n cy ; statem ent by H a m b u rg ­
A m erica L in e as to size o f vessels and
necessary con d ition o f the channel.
2 23-4 (N o. 147 ; m eetin g o f ex perts,
date, 225 (N o. 1 45 ); B ritish co u n te r­
d ra ft. A rticle 6. Com m ission fo r Sh a tt-
el-A ra b . T ex t. 226 (X o . 148 ); m eetin g
o f ex perts, suggested. 229 (X o . 151,
note (-1) ) ; held, 229 (ed. n o te ); recom ­
m endation s, 2 53-4 (X o . 161, .In n . 1).
R ev ised B ritish cou n ter-d ra ft, e x p la n a ti ms
and T ex t, g. >7-41 (X o . 154 : G erm an
am endm ents and com m ents. 246 (X o.
156 and notes .
G erm an C o u ir r-d ra ft. T ext, X o v . 3. 1913,
249 X o . 156. e n d .) ; revised d r a ft by
M r. H u rst o f A rticle 6. S h a tt-el-A ra b
Com m ission. 259-60 'X o . 1 63 ); S h a tt-el-
A rab Com m ission to con trol p o r t o f
B asra. A nglo-G erm a n A greem ent, 305
(X o . 190). A rticle 6. SL att-el-A rab , T ex t
307 (X o . 190).
F u rth e r G erm an d ra ft, com m ents. 319 'X o .
1 9 * en d . 1). T ext. J an . 1914. 323 1X 0 .
195. en d . 2 ); A rticle 6 (b) Com m ission
and p roced u re fo r dea lin g w ith com ­
plaints. B ritish co u n te r -d ra ft, T 1 it ,
F eb., 325 (X o . 2 00 ); G erm an co u n te r­
proposal fo r A rticle 6 (b), T ex t. 3 34-5
X o. 204. e n d .) ; B ritish am endm ents to,
T ext. 335 (X o . 208). 343 (X o . 213 ;
B ritish d r a ft o f A rticles 5 (a) and 6
com m u n ica ted, T ex t. 349-50 (X'o. 2 1 7 ';
B ritish com m ents on G erm an A rticle
su g g estin g ex ten sion o f line if S h a tt-el-
A rab n a vig a tion is not m a in ta in ed ,
356 -7 X o . 224).
R ev ised B ritish d ra ft, T e x t, M a rch 31, 1914,
360 -2 (X o . 225, en c l.); G erm an sugges­
tion fo r d r o p p in g A rticle 7, A p ril, 364
(X o . 226). 372 (X o . 232. m in.), 392 (X o.
24 4 ); D ra ft A nglo-G erm a n C onven tion ,
T ex t. A rticles 6 and 7 and e x p la n a tory
note, sections I V , V , com m u n ica ted to
F ra n ce, 390-1 (X o . 243. encl.).
C on v en tion in itia lled , J u n e 15, 1914, T ex t
401, 403 (X o . 249. encl.).
I ta ly and : S h a tt-el-A ra b C on v en tion com ­
m u n ica ted to Ita ly . M ay 1914, 3S1 (X o .
236, n in. and n ote ( s ) ).
R ussia a n d : In tern a tion a l Com m ission o f
n a vig ation . 156 (X o . 99). 156 'X o . 100);
Russia a p p rov es con stitu tion o f m ix ed
com m ission fo r n a vig ation , am endm ents
suggested to d r a ft schem e, 1S0-1 (X o .
 890
PERSIANS' G U L F — (con tin u ed ).
S b a tt-e l-A r a b — ( con tin u ed ) :
R u ssia and, 1913— (con tin u ed ) :
120) ; B ritish ex p la n a tion th a t C om m is­
sion m ust be O ttom an and n ot in te r­
na tion a l, 181 (N o. 121) ; S ir E. G rey
hopes to overcom e R ussian ob jection s
to A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion , 199 (N o.
125), 199-200 (N o. 1 2 6 ); M. S a zo n o v ’ s
a ttitu d e, 200 (N o. 128) ; and view s o f
M . M in orsk i, d esira b ility o f h a vin g
R u ssia n su b ject a p p oin ted to C om m is­
sion, 201 (N o. 129) ; R ussia w ill raise
no o b jection to rep resen ta tion o f G rea t
B rita in on C om m ission, and w ould only
like to h a ve rig h t to recom m end R ussian
subjects fo r som e o f a dm in istra tive
posts : ex p la n a tion o f im p osition o f
dues, 202 (N o. 130), 203 (N o. 132) ; c r it i­
cism o f S h a tt-el-A ra b C on ven tion and
D ecla ra tion , 216 (N o. 141).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion and ju rid ic a l
p osition as regard s R ussian tre a ty
rig h ts, 260 (N o. 164), 269-70 (N o. 1 75 );
S ir E. G rey on R u ssia n view s, hope th a t
o b jection w ill b e w ithd raw n , 270 (N o.
1 76 ); com p rom ise proposed by M.
Sa zon ov, 271 (N o. 177), 2 71-2 (N o. 178 );
R ussian rep ly con cern in g a d d ition a l
d ecla ra tion on S h a tt-el-A ra b , 2 72-3
(N o. 179, encl.) ; R u ssia n stip u la tion s
a ccep ted b y S ir E. G rey, 2 73-4 (N o.
180), 280-1 (N o. 185) ; N otes t o be
ex ch a n g ed b etw een G rea t B r ita in and
Russia, T ex t 279-80 (N o. 184) ; N otes
ex ch a n g ed , M a rch 1914, T ex t, 3 35 -6
(N o. 205).
A n g lo-G erm a n agreem ents, R ussia in vited
to con clu d e sim ilar agreem ents w ith
G rea t B rita in , A p ril 1914, 366 (N o.
228) ; a d d ition a l e x p la n a tory n ote to
A rticles 6 and 7, 3 66-7 (N o. 229) ; R ussia
p rep a red to adhere, proposed ex ch a n g e
o f notes h a vin g b in d in g force, 370 (N o.
231), T ex t o f N otes exch a n g ed, 377-81
(N o. 236, and en d s.).
T u rk ey and : Irrig a tio n works, open com p e-
tion for, and q uestion o f ir rig a tio n and
con servan cy, 394 (N o. 245), 395 (N o.
2 4 6 ); T urkish u n fa v ou ra ble rep ly, 395
(N o. 2 4 7 ); T urkish refusal o f B ritish
p rop osal resp ectin g Com m ission, J u n e,
413 (N o. 253).
T eleg ra p h lin e : G erm an su ggestion o f la n d in g
a lin e a t some p o in t in P ersia n G u lf (v .
sub P e r s i a n G u l f : G erm a n y and).
Z a k h n u n iv eh : D r a ft A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en ­
tio n , M a y 1913, B ritish com m ents on, 115
(ed. n o te ) ; A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t,
J u ly 29, 1913, T ex t, 196 (N o. 124).
G erm a n y and : G erm any w ill n ot establish
p o r t or railw ay term inus w ith ou t B ritish
assent, J u n e 1913, 139 (N o. 89, encl. 3) (v.
G erm any, G reat B rita in a n d : A n g lo -
G erm an C onven tion ).
T e le g ra p h ic cable, q uestion o f la n d in g on
T urkish or P ersian te rr ito ry , B ritish
op in ion in vited , 165-6 (N o. I ll) ;
P E R S I A N G U L F — (c o n tin u e d ).
G erm a n y and, 1913— (c o n tin u e d ):
necessity fo r P ersia to con su lt G reat
B r ita in and R ussia, 166 (N o. 1 12 );
G rea t B rita in u n able to agree to
G erm an suggestion , 365 (N o. 2 2 7 ); H err
von K iihlm a nn on, 371 (N o. 232).
G erm an a ctiv ity in pu sh in g tra d e in
P ersian G ulf, B ritish p ertu rb ation , M ay
1914, 746 (N o. 510).
S h a tt-el-A ra b questions (v . supra P e r s i a n
G u l f : S h a tt-e l-A ra b : G erm a n y and).
G rea t B r ita in a n d : B ritish in terests: R e p re ­
senta tions to T u rk ey on occu p a tion of
Z akh n u n iyeh and e x te n t o f Turkish
ju risd iction , 1909-10, 1 -2 (N o. 1 ) ; Turkish
a ttitu d e aga in st B ritish com m ercial or
p olitica l predom in an ce, A ug. 1910, 3 (No.
1 ); S ir G. L ow th er on T urkish te rr i­
to ria l a cq uisitions, a p p lica tion o f m ethods
o f coercion and possible rea ction of Y ou n g
T u rk pa rty , 4 -5 (N o. 1 ); T rea ty w ith
Sheikh Ahm ed suggested, 1904, question
o f ex p ed ien cy o f a T rea ty, 1910, 5 (N o. 1 );
e x te n t o f T ru cia l Coast, 5 (N o. 1 ); B ritish
sh ip p in g and com m erce regard ed as
, m a tters o f offence, 14 (N o. 6, encl.).
T urkish proposals fo r a g eneral settlem ent,
M a rch 1911, 27 (N o. 15, m in .); settle­
m ent of B a hrein and El Iva tr questions
in relation to assent to custom s
increase, the sa feg u a rd in g o f B ritish
in terests, 36 (N o. 23, m in .); stra teg ic
position in P ersian G u lf not to be
a ltered to B ritish d isa dv a n tag e, 37 (No.
2 4 ); L ord H a rd in g e on B ritish position
and policy, 38 (N o. 2 5 ); B ritish objects
stated to C ou n t M ettern ich , M ay, 42
I (N o. 3 0 ); B ritish p osition w ith relation
to B ahrein, T ru cia l Chiefs and M uscat,
J u ly 1911, 46-7 (N o. 34).
R e p ly to T urkish proposals, 46-7 (N o. 3 4 );
r e c og n ition o f B ritish rights, 48 (N o.
3 4 ); G rea t B r ita in has no te rritoria l
am bitions, b u t m eans to m a in ta in her
position in G u lf, A u g . 1911, 52 (N o. 3 7 );
B ritish view s on T urkish reply, A p ril
1912, 70-2 (N o. 5 0 ); T urkish and
P ersian fr o n tie r nea r M oham m erah,
7 3-4 (N o. 5 1 ) ; B ritish desire fo r a
sta tu s quo w hich w ou ld not be dis­
turb ed, 75 (N o. 53).
B ritish view s in rep ly t o T urkish M em o, o f
A p ril, J u ly 1912, 7 8-86 (N o. 55).
D r a ft A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion respectin g
P ersian G ulf, T ext, M a y 1913, 104-9
(N o. 68, encl. 3), S ecret D eclaration ,
in itia lled M a y 1913, T ex t, 109 (N o. 68,
encl. 3 ) ; B ritish com m ents on, 114^5
{ed. n o t e ) ; S ir E. G rey ’ s ex p la n a tion
to M . Sa zon ov o f B ritish position , 124
(N o. 75), and to M . P a u l Cam bon and
1 C ou n t B e n c k e n d o r f: sta tu s quo in
P ersian G u lf n ot to be disturbed, 125-6
(N o. 7 7 ); T u rk ey rea dy to sign P ersian
G u lf C on v en tion su b ject to a d d ition of
a clause con cern in g e x tra d itio n from
K ow eit, J u n e, 140 (N o. 90).

P E R S I A N G U L F — icontin iicd).
G reat B rita in and, 1013— (c o n tin u e d ):
T ext of. and B ritish com m ents on, 144-6
(N o. 92, and m in. ) ; G rea t B rita in pre­
pared to adhere to. 149 (X o . 94).
A greem ents b etw een G reat B rita in and the
T rn cia l C hiefs o f Oman and the
Sheikhs o f B ahrein and K ow eit, 47 (X o .
34), 10S (X o . 65*; B ritish observations
on. O ct. 1911, 108-9 (X o . 6 8 ); Copies
o f agreem ents com m u n ica ted to T urkev,
J u ly 1913. 195-6 (X o . 124).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u ly 29. 1913,
T ex t, 1 94-6 (X o . 124 ); da te o f ra tifica ­
tion ex ten d ed , 241-2 (X o. 155).
B ritish rig h ts rest not m erely on the a gree­
m ents, b u t on custom , consent and
lon g-established relations, 196 X o. 124V
S u pp lem en ta ry C on ven tion , e x ten d in g date
o f ra tification , T ext, Oct. 1913, 2 '2
(X o . 137).
S ta tu s quo : B ritish in terest in m a in ta in in g ,
Dec. 1913, 299 X o. 159).
G erm any disposed to recogn ize B ritish
in terests in the P ersian G ulf, Jan. 1913,
661 (X o . 454',- B ritish desires can be
recon ciled w ith dev elopm en t o f G erm an
in terests, 663 (X o . 455 .
K ow eit questions < r. supra P e r s ia n G ulf
K ow eit).
S h a tt-el-A ra b q uestions (v. sup ra P e r s ia n
G c l f : S h a tt-el-A ra b).
J tussi; a n d : R u ssia n view o f A n g lo-T u rk ish
n eg otia tion s, M ay 1913, 123 (X o. 74).
T u r le y a n d : T urkish d eterm in a tion to assert
sov ereig n ty in the neigh b ou rh ood of
E! K a tr. j H p . 1 (X o . 1 ': Y ou n g T urk
p a rty ’ s forw a rd policy in regions o f gu lf,
1, 2 (X o . 1 ); a ttitu d e against predom inant
position o f foreig n ers in P ersian G ulf, 3
(X o . 1 ); te rr ito ria l acq u isition s at
Z nkn u n iyeh and El K a tr , 4 (X o . 1 );
T urkish a ctiv e and forw a rd p olicy in G ulf,
6 (X o. 1 ': R ifa a t P asha on settlem ent o f
P ersian G u lf questions a fter conclusion
o f a B a g d a d R a ilw ay arra n gem en t, Jan.
1911. 1" (X o . S>; u tility o f a rriv in g a t an
u n d ersta n d in g w ith G reat B rita in as to
respective rig h ts in P ersian G ulf. M arch.
24 (X o. 14), 26 (X o . 15. e n c l.); hope for
a settlem ent, 35 (X o . 23; ; L o rd H a rd in g e
on T urkish p olicy in G u lf regions, 3S
(X o . 2 5 ); G rand V iz ie r does not
a n ticip a te any difficulty ex cep t over
q uestion o f K ow eit, A u g., 50-1 (X o . 36).
T urkey w ould never alien ate any place on
P ersian G u lf to any oth er P ow er, they
d id not desire to see any other P ow er but
E n g lan d in those w aters, 51 (X o. 36).
T urkish rep ly to G reat B rita in , A p ril 1912.
B ahrein, Z a k n u n iyeh , E l-K a tr , K ow eit.
6 1-5 (X o . 47).
[10903]
897
P E R S I A * G U L F — (c o n tinned).
T u rk ey a n d — (c o n tin u e d ):
D ra ft A n glo-T urkish C onvention, T ex t, M ay
1913. 104-9 (X o. 6< encl. 3). Secret
D eclaration , in itia lled , T ext, 109 (X o.
63. encl. 3 ) ; sign atu re of con v en tion
authorised, subject to a d d ition o f a
clause fo r ex tra d ition i f crim inals from
K ow eit, J u n e, 140 (X o. 90).
A nglo-T u rkish A greem ent, J u ly 29, 1913,
T ext 190-6 (X o . 124).
K o w e it questions (v. supra P e r s i a n G tji.f :
K ow eit).
Sh tt-el-A ra b questions (v. supra P e r s i a n
G u l f : S hatt-el-A ra bi.
PORT A RTH U R.
B ritish a ttitu d e tow ards Russia over, 425 (X o.
265..
PORTU GAL.
C olonies :
1. G eneral.
2. A frican possessions of.
3. O th er Colonics.
A n g lo-G erm a n discussions :
4. G eneral.
5. S ecr et A g r eem e n t o f 1598 and its revision.
6. P u b lica tion of S ecr et A g reem et t.
7. F ra n ce and G reat B rita in.
3. P o r t u g a l and St 'ret A g reen <>nt.
9. A n g lo -P o rtu g u cs e A lliance.
10. F in a n ce.
: 11. G overn m en t.
12. G eneral F oreig n P olicy.
C o lo n ies : 1. G en e ra l: S ir E. G rey on P o rtu ­
guese m anagem ent o f her Colonies, Dec.
’. H I . 424 N 266*. 425 (N o. 2 67 );
M arquis de Soveral on necessity o f m ain­
tena nce by P ortu g a l o f possession o f her
colonies. Jan. 1911. 427 ted. n o te ): question
o f P o rtu g a l's free w ill as to disposal o f
P o rtu g a l’ s free w ill as to disposal of
co lo n ie s ; P o rtu g a l will never alienate
any p ortion to a foreig n > tate. Feb. 1912,
436 (X o . 272’i ; S ir E. G rey on ex istin g
con d ition s in. J u ly, 455 X o . 315,
n o te (* ));. B ritish B lu e-B ook on con tra ct-
labour in P ortu g u ese colonies. F eb. 1913,
511 X o. 329*. w ill con ta in no reference
to the 1593 A greem ent, 512 iX o. 3 2 9 ); S ir
Eyre Crowe on British and G orm an policy
w ith reg a rd to shivery, 532 (X o . 334,
min.)-, M. P a u l Cam bon and S ir E. G rey
on the prosp ect o f P ortu g .'I selling her
colonies, Oct. 1913. 544-5 (X o. 345).
2 A frica n p o s s e s s io n s o f : Baroi S tu m m ’ s
suggestion that t h H w ere o f no advan ta ge
to P o r t u g a l: S ir F. B ertie on B ritish
attitu d e. Dee. 1911 . 423 (N o. 265'.
A frica n questions (r. sub A f r i c a *.
A n g o l a : E arm arked for E n g 'a n d ill secret
A g reem en t o f 159i, 426 (X o. 2 68 ); P o rtu ­
guese and G erm an in cid ent, and fron tier
questions. Jan. 1912. 423 (X o . 269,
and m in .1: G erm an desire for th a t part
of A ngola w hich under trea ty was secured
to E ngland , alleged offer by Lord
H a ld an e, M r. H a rcou rt on possibilities of
3 M
P O R T U G A L — (c o n tin u e d *
2 A fric a n possessions o f— (c o n tin u e d ):
A n g o la — (con tin u ed ) :
an ex ch a n g e, 440-1 (N o. 2 7 6 ); C ount
M ettern ich on, 435 (N o. 2 8 7 ); M r. F rew en
proposes an A n g lo-G erm a n developm ent,
A p ril 1912, 456 -7 (N o. 2 8 8 ); C h a rter
to be g iv en in retu rn fo r a loan to
P o r t u g a l: C om pany w ould ev en tu ally
becom e m ainly G erm an, 458 (N o. 290), 460
(N o. 2 91 ); B ritish views as to A n g lo-
G erm an p a rticip a tio n , 459 (N o. 290, m in .);
and sa feg u a rd fo r B ritish reversion a ry
rights, 461 (N o. 291, m in . ) ; q uestion o f
A nglo-G erm a n su p p ort fo r a h a rb ou r in
A ng ola, 462 (N o. 2 9 3 ); B ritish a ttitu d e
tow ards M r. F rew en ’ s project, 462 (N o.
293), 4 62-3 (N o. 294), and request fo r
G erm an view s, 463 (N o. 2 9 4 ); A n gola con ­
cession one o f con d ition s o f the proposed
loan to P o rtu g a l : equal p a rticip a tio n
b etw een B ritish, G erm an and F ren ch
c a p it a lis t s : q uestion o f u ltim a te G erm an
c o n t r o l: no in ten tion o f m islea ding the
P ortu g u ese G ov ern m en t: G reat B rita in
could only a ct in a greem en t w ith
G e rm a n y : M r. T ia rk s’ s pledg e to a ct only
w ith the a p p rov a l o f G rea t B r ita in :
q uestion o f a B ritish firm ex e rtin g itself
t o prom ote G erm an interests, 463 -6 (N o.
2 9 5 ); e x p la n a tion o f o rig in o f plan and
e x te n t o f G erm an e n co u ra g e m e n t: M r.
T ia rk s’ s offer to p lace option a t disposal
o f G reat B rita in , 466-7 (N o. 2 9 6 ); S ir E.
G rey ’ s view s on, 468 (N o. 296, m in . ) ; Mr.
H a r c o u r t ’ s ob jection s, 468 (N o. 2 9 7 ); M r.
H a rc o u rt's view s requested, 468-9 (N o.
2 9 8 ); stated, A n g ola and revision of
secret A greem en t, 475-6 (N o. 303).
A n g lo-G erm a n S ecret A greem en t, d r a ft
altera tion s, M a y 1912: custom s revenues
a secu rity fo r loan, 469-70 (N o. 299,
en c l.); S ir E yre C row e on : a ltera tion o f
te rr ito ry proposed as a ga in st p rev iou s
T rea ty, q uestion o f a div ision in to
spheres, stra teg ic consid era tion s, rela­
tio n of T rea ty to Mr. T ia rk s’ s schem e,
4 71 -2 (N o. 299, m in .); proposed a ltera ­
tions com m u n ica ted to G eneral B otha,
474 (N o. 3 0 1 ); discussed w ith C ount
M ettern ich , 4 76-7 (N o. 305), 479 (N o.
30 8 ); G eneral B o th a ’ s reply, 480 (N o.
3 0 9 ); A n g lo-G erm a n discussions as to
adv an ta g es and disa dva n tages o f A n g ola
strip , 4 84-5 (N o. 3 1 4 ); B ritish
A d m ira lty ’ s view s on aba n don m en t of
p ort of S. P a u l de L oan d a, 486 7 (N o.
316, encl.).
R ev ised te x t o f A greem ent, D ec. 1912, 489- 90
(N o. 3 1 9 ); difficulty o f custom s revenue
o f A ng ola, 491 (N o. 319, m in .); S ir E yre
C row e’ s notes on revised A greem en t
493-6 (N o. 320, e n d s .); loan on A n gola
should be cou n ter-b alan ced by a sim ilar
loan on M ozam bique, 499 (N o. 322).
R ev ised d r a ft a greem ent, Jan. 1913, 503-6
(N o. 324 and en d . 1), 5 08-9 (N o. 3 25 );
am ended G erm an d ra ft, M arch 1913,
P O R T U G A L — (con tin u ed ).
2. A fric a n possessions o f— (c o n tin u e d ):
A n g o la — (c o n t in u e d ):
515, 517-20 (N o. 331, and encl. 1);
B ritish com m ents on, 521-3 (N o. 331,
m in.), C abinda as p a rt o f A ngola, 525
(N o. 332), 526 (N o. 333), 528 (No. 333,
en d .).
B ritish revised dra ft, T ext, M ay 1913,
528-30 (N o. 333, e n d .) ; J u ly , 538-40
(N o. 341, e n c l ) ; G erm an T ext, 541-3
(N o. 3 4 3 ); the B cn giiella R ailw ay, 563
(N o. 3 6 6 ); G erm an dem ands for con­
cessions in A n g ola, P ortu g u ese anxiety
and en q u iry as to w hat a ttitu d e Great
B rita in w ished them to a dopt, June,
572-3 (N o. 3 7 6 ); B ritish view s on, atti­
tu de to concessions, question o f acting
un d er the 1898 or 1913 A greem en t, 573­
6 (N o. 376, m in .); P ortu g u ese further
en q u iry, J u ly , 5 76 -7 (N o. 3 7 7 ); British
Colonial Office op in ion on, 577-8 (No.
378), 5 78-9 (N o. 3 7 9 ); B ritish reply to
P o rtu g a l, 579 (N o. 380).
A nglo-G erm an A g r e e m e n t : In clusion of the
district o f C abinda in, 515 (N o. 331),
520 (N o. 331, encl. 1), 521, min. and
n o te ("), 522, 523 (N o. 331, min.), 525
(N o. 332), 539 (N o. 341, encl.), 542 (No.
34 3 ); M. P a u l C am bon states that it
w ould be v ery a n n oyin g fo r F ra n ce if
G erm any obtain ed C abinda and nor­
thern p a rt of A n g ola, Nov. 1913, 548
(N o. 3 5 0 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s explanations,
548 (N o. 3 5 0 ); M . P au l Cam bon’s
renew ed rep resen ta tion s re Cabinda;
Sir E. G rey reaffirm s th a t situation is
th a t o f 1898 A greem ent, Jan. 1914, 553
(N o. 357), 5 54-5 (N o. 3 5 9 ); M. Poincare
on, F eb., 556 (N o. 3 6 1 ); S ir F. Bertie
on, 5 57-8 (N o. 3 6 1 ); F ren ch renewed
protest and S ir E. G rev ’ s explanations,
560-1 (N o. 364).
M ozam b iq ue : B ritish rep resen tations to
P o rtu g a l on state of, F eb. 1912, 435-6
(N o. 2 7 2 ); ex ten sion o f the Shire High­
lands R a ilw ay , 435-6 (N o. 2 7 2 ); exten­
sion o f fu tu re B ritish sphere suggested as
a quid pro quo fo r G erm any securing
A n g ola, 441 (N o. 2 7 6 ); C ou n t M etternich
on, 455 (N o. 2 87 ); G erm any ou g h t not to
be asked to g iv e up Q uilim ane piece, 479
(N o. 308), B ritish view's on, 479 (N o. 308);
possibility o f a rev olu tion in Lourenzo
M arques, J u ly , 483 (N o. 312).
A nglo-G erm a n secret T rea ty, d r a ft altera­
tions, M ay 1912: Custom s revenues a
security fo r any loan, 469-70 (N o. 299,
e n c l.); S ir E yre C row e on, 471-2 (No.
299, m in .); proposed a ltera tion s com­
m unica ted to G eneral B otha, 474 (No.
3 0 1 ); reply, 480 (N o. 3 0 9 ); British
stra teg ic con sid era tion s, 481-2 (No.
311), 483 (N o. 3 1 3 ); G erm an resignation
of Q uilim ane, 484 (N o. 3 1 4 ); revised
te x t of A greem ent, D ec., 489-90
(N o. 3 1 9 ); N otes b y S ir E yre Crowe,
4 93 -6 (N o. 320, e n d s .); revised draft
 899
F O R T U G A L — ( co n tin u e d ).
2. A fric a n possessions o f— (c o n tin u e d ):
M oza m b iq u e— (c o n t in u e d ):
agreem ent, Jan . 1913, 5 03-6 (N o. 324,
and encl. 1), 505 (X o . 3 2 5 ); am ended
G erm an d r a ft, M arch, 517-20 (X o . 331,
encl. 1 ); B ritish revised d r a ft, T ext,
M a y , 5 23 -3 0 (X o . 333. encl.), J u ly , 5 3 3 -
JO (X o . 341, en c l.); G erm an T ext, Sept.,
541 -3 (X o . 343, encl.).
M. P a u l Cam bon on F ren ch in terest in
M oza m b iq u e, 54S (X o . 350).
3 O th er C o lo n ies : A zores: C ape V erd e
Isla n d s: M a d e ir a : X o t iu clu ded in S ecret
A g reem en t o f 1893, 443 (X o . 276), 455
(X o . 237), 545 (X o . 3451.
San T hom é and P rin c ip é Isla n d s: G erm an
in terest in, M a rch 1912, 442 (X o . 2 76 );
not in clu d ed in S ecret A g reem en t o f 1898,
su g g estiou o f in clu d in g in a new T reaty,
442 (X o . 2 7 6 ); con sid ered as outside
presen t A g reem en t, A p ril, 455 (X o . 2 8 7 );
M r. F rew en ’ s proposals fo r a S j'n d ica te
fo r Cocoa p la n tation s, 456 (X o . 2 8 8 );
success o f schem e rep orted . 460-1 (X o.
2 91 ); the S y n d ica te to in clu de Messrs.
Sch roder and F ren ch and G erm an
ca pitalists, 463 (X o . 2 9 5 ); M r. Frew en
the o rig in a to r o f the San T hom é plan, 467
(N o. 2 96 ); S ir A. H a rd in g e not to g iv e
fu rth e r su p p ort as reg a rd s B ritish C on­
cessions at present, J u n e, 479 (X o . 3 0 7 );
G erm any and San T hom é an d P rin cip é ,
479 (N o. 3 0 3 ); S ir E. G rey on necessity
o f com m u n ica tin g w ith F ra n ce, 479-80
(X o . 3 0 8 ); question o f o b ta in in g consent
o f F ra n ce, 499 (X o . 322).
A n g lo-G erm a n secret T rea ty, d r a ft a ltera ­
tions, M a y 1 9 1 2 : custom s revenues as
secu rity fo r a loan, 469-70 (X o . 299,
en c l.); S ir E y re C row e on, rela tion o f
T re a ty to present n eg otia tion s, 470 (X o .
299, m in .); F ra n ce to be in form ed , 470
(X o . 299, m in.), 477 (X o . 3 0 5 ); the islands
t o he in clu d ed in the T rea ty and T im or
to he om itted , 477 (X o . 305), 479 (X o
3 0 7 ); in clu sion o f islands discussed.
434 -5 (X o . 314), 438 (X o . 3 1 7 ); om itted
from revised d r a ft, 491 (X o . 391, m in .);
revised d r a ft b y S ir E y re Crowe, B ritish
ren u n cia tion o f any claim to, 494, 496
(X o . 320, encls.), 497 (X o. 320, m in .);
H err von K ü h lin a n n ’ s surprise at
special p rov ision reg a rd in g islands, 499
(X o . 3 2 2 ); revised d r a ft agreem ent,
Jan. 1913, 5 04 -6 (X o . 324, and e n d . '1),
50S-9 (X o . 3 2 5 ); am ended G erm an d raft,
M a rch , 519 (X o . 331. e n c l.); in clu sion
in A g reem en t, 526 (X o . 3 3 3 ); B ritish
revised d r a ft, T ex t, M ay, 529 (X o . 333,
e n c l.); J u ly , 53S-40 (X o . 341, e n c l.);
G erm an T e x t Se pt. 1913, 5 41-3 (X o . 343,
encl.).
M . P a u l C a m bon ’ s en q u iry as to how San
T hom é and P rin cip é cam e in to A g ree-
r O R T U G A L — ( con tin u ed ).
3 O th er C olonies— (c o n tin u e d ):
San Thom é and P rin c ip é Islands— (c o n tin u e d ):
m ent, Oct. 1913, 545 (X o . 345) ; th a t it
w ould be a n n oyin g to F ra n ce if San
T hom é w ent to G erm any, and t o Spain
i f P rin cip é w ent to G erm any, N ov., 54S
(X o . 3 5 0 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s ex p lan a tion s,
548 (X o . 350) ; M . P o in c a r é ’ s rep resen­
ta tion s. F eb. 1914. 556-7 (X o . 3 61 );
S ir F . B ertie on, 5 57 -8 (X o . 3 6 1 ); Sir
E y re C row e and S ir E. G rey on, 558-9
(X o . 361, min.).
T im o r:
G erm a n y a n d : G erm an designs on. Jan.
1912, 429 (X o . 270), 455 (X o . 287), 457
(X o . 239) ; question o f G erm any g iv in g
u p T im or and concessions in p la ce of,
Ju n e, 479 (X o . 308) ; J u ly, 484 (N o. 314).
G rea t B rita in and : T im or and th e A n g lo-
G erm an Secret A greem en t, 189* :
M em o, by S ir E y re Crow e on, 429-34
(X o . 2 7 0 ); C olonel F reire d ’ A n d ra d e ’ s
su ggestion of form a tion o f a com p an y
fo r a d m in istration and d ev elopm en t of,
M r. G ilm ou r's su ggestion o f a B ritish
C om pany w ith a ch a rter : B ritish a t ti­
tu de to, and M r. G ilm ou r’ s a ba n d on ­
m ent o f the plan, Jan . 1912. 429-34 (X o .
270 and m in .); a lleged offer b y L o rd
H a ld an e of T im or in ex ch a n g e for
A n g ola, 441 (X o . 2 76 ); A nglo-G erm a n
discussions, M arch, 446 (X o . 231, m in.) ;
B ritish a greem ent to let G erm any take
T im or, 453 (X o . 285, m in.) ; S ir E. G rey
on D u tch rig h t o f p re-em ption , 455 (X o.
2 3 7 ); and on q uestion o f d r o p p in g
T im or out o f T rea ty, 479 (X o . 30S) ;
D ra ft a ltera tion s to T rea ty, T im or
om itted from , 469 (X o . 299), 471 (X o .
299, m in.), 477 (X o . 305), discussed, 479
(X o . 303) ; possib ility o f a self-d en y in g
ord in a n ce, 435 (X o. 314), 488 (X o . 317) ;
revised d r a ft by S ir E y re C row e, 494,
496 (X o . 320, encls.), 497 (X o . 320, min.) ;
H err v on K ü h lm a n n ’ s surprise at
a rra n gem en t w hereby G rea t B rita in
and G erm any disin terest them selves,
499 (X o . 322) ; T im or now dea lt w ith
in A g reem en t and in a N ote to be sent
to N eth erla n ds G overnm ent, J a n . 1913,
5 02 -3 (X o . 324), T ex t o f N ote, 506-7
(X o . 321, encl. 2), 50S-9 (X o . 3 25 );
a m ended G erm an d r a ft of A g reem en t,
M arch, 515, 519 (X o . 331 and encl. 1 );
B ritish com m ents on, 5 21 -3 (X o . 331,
m in.), 525 (X o . 3 3 2 ); essential to reta in
in the A greem en t, 526 (X o . 3 3 3 ); B ritish
revised d r a ft, T ex t, M av, 529 (X o . 333,
encl.) ; J u ly , 533-40 (X o . 341, encl.) ;
G erm an T ex t, 5 41-3 (X o. 3 4 3 ); Sir E.
G rey ’ s e x p la n a tion of B ritish position
to M . P a u l Cam bon, N ov., 543 (N o.
350) ; S ir F . B ertie on the stip u lation s
o f the A nglo-G erm a n 1898 A g reem en t
a nd D u tch p re-em p tiv e rights, Feb.
1914, 558 (N o. 361).
 900
P O R T U G A L — ( con tin u ed ).
3. O th er C olon ics— (c o n tin u e d ):
T im or— (c o n t in u e d ):
H olla n d and: P ortu g u ese and D u tch
T rea ty, 1904, recip roca l rig h t o f pre­
em ption over T im or, 429 (N o. 2 7 0 );
A n glo-G erm an S ecret A greem en t and
D u tch rig h t, 430 (N o. 2 7 0 ); D u tch
rig h t of p re-em p tion , 455 (N o. 2 8 7 );
bou n d a ry a r b it r a t io n : H olla n d pre­
pa red t o pu rchase P ortu g u ese t e r r i­
tory , 457 (N o. 2 8 9 ); D utch rig h t o f
pre-em p tion and possib ility e f an A n g lo-
G erm an self-d en y in g ord in a n ce, J u ly
1912. l - o (.No. 3 1 4 ); rec o g n itio n of
D u tch rig h t, 496 (N o. 320, encl. 2 );
D r a ft T e x t o f N ote t o be sen t to
N eth erla n ds G overnm ent, 502-3, 5 06-7
(N o. 324, and encl. 2).
4. A n g lo-G erm a n d iscu ssion s: G en e ra l: B a ron
S tu in m ’ s su ggestion th a t A fric a n posses­
sions w ere o f no a d v an ta g e to P o r t u g a l:
S ir F . B ertie on B ritish ob liga tion s
reg a rd in g , D ec. 1911, 423 (N o. 2 6 5 );
G erm any w ould like div ision of P o r t u ­
g uese colonies as soon as p o s s ib le : S ir E.
G rey on B ritish position , im possible to
p u t pressure on P o rtu g a l, 424 (N o. 266),
4 2 4 -5 (N o. 2 6 7 ); S ir F . B ertie does n ot
b elieve th a t G rea t B rita in should con ­
cilia te G erm any by fa cilita tin g her
a cq u isition of te rrito rie s n ot B ritish
p ro p e r ty , 427 (N o. 2 6 8 ); A nglo-G erm a n
discussions, M arch 1912, 440 -3 (N o. 2 7 6 );
A p ril, 4 55-6 (N o. 2 8 7 ); B ritish and
G erm an p olicy w ith reg a rd to the
C olonies. 535 (N o. 337).
5. A n g lo-G erm a n d is cu s sio n s: A n g lo-G erm a n
S e c r e t A g r eem e n t o f 1898, 423 (N o. 3 6 5 );
S ir F . B e r tie on a ttitu d e o f L o rd
Sa lisbu ry and M r. A. J. B a lfou r to A g re e ­
m ent, and on in ten tion s o f B ritish and
G erm an n eg otia tion s, Jan . 1912, 425 -6
(N o. 2 6 8 ); M a rq u is de S ov era l on the
A g reem en t and L ord S a lisb u ry ’ s a ttitu d e
to, 427 (ed. n o t e ) ; P ortu g u ese islands
n o t in clu ded in A g reem en t o f 1898, 442-3
(N o. 2 7 6 ); relation of A g reem en t to loans
fr o m P ow ers, 446 (N o. 281, m in.), 453 (N o.
2 8 4 ); possible revision o f A greem en t, 453
(N o. 285), m odifications b ein g discussed,
A p r il 1912, 454 (N o. 285, m in.), 455 (N o.
287).
G erm an d r a ft o f a ltera tion s proposed for
Secret A greem en t, M a y 26, 1912, T ex t,
4 69-70 (N o. 299, encl.)-, S ir E y re C row e
o n : a ssignm ent o f custom s revenues,
d iv ision o f A n g ola and M oza m b iq u e
in to spheres, elim in a tion o f T im or and
p a rt o f A ng ola, stra te g ic con sid era ­
tions, M r. T ia rk s’ s schem e fo r
A n g ola, M ay 1912, 470-2 (N o. 299,
min.)-, B ritish view s con cern in g A n g ola ,
T im or and San T hom e and P rin cip e
com m u n ica ted to C ount M e t t e r n ic h ;
F ra n ce and San T hom e and P rin cip e ,
J u n e, 4 76-7 (N o. 3 0 5 ); and to S ir E.
G oschen, 479-80 (N o. 3 0 8 ); G erm an
P O R T U G A L — ( con tin u ed ).
5. A n g lo-G erm a n discussions, 1912— (con ­
tin u ed ) :
G erm an d raft, A c .— ( con tin u ed ) :
F oreign Office and C olon ia l Office now
discussing revision, 479-80 (N o. 308);
B ritish A d m ira lty to consid er strateg ic
points in volved , 481 (N o. 310), and W ar
Office sim ilar points, 4 81 -2 (N o. 311) ;
W a r Office opposed t o the m odification
o f A greem en t, J u ly , 483 (N o. 313);
A d m ira lty ’ s view th a t only effect upon
naval p olicy w ould be an a u gm entation
o f certa in naval forces and fortifica ­
tions, n ot o f serious im p ort, 4S6-7 (No.
316, encl.)-, B a ron v on M arschall con­
siders it a g ood th in g to g o on with
rea rran g em en t o f A greem en t, sugges­
tion o f a jo in t gu a ra n tee o f P ortu gu ese
sov ereig n ty and of com m u n ica tin g
A greem en ts to P o rtu g a l, 482-3 (No.
312) ; discussions b etw een M r. H a rcou rt,
Sir E. G rey and B a ron von M arschall
con tin u ed , 4 84-5 (N o. 314), 485-6 (No.
315) ; B ritish A llia n ce w ith P ortu g al
m akes proposed A nglo-G erm a n A gree­
m en t one-sided, 48-5-6 (N o. 315), 488
(N o. 3 1 7 ); P rin ce L ichnow sky in favour
of B ritish d r a ft, q uestion o f pu blica­
tion , N ov. 1912, 4 88 -9 (N o. 319).
R evised t e x t o f A nglo-G erm a n Convention,
D ec. 9, 1912, w ith S ecret C onvention,
and S ecret N ote, 489-91 (N o. 3 1 9 ); Sir
E y re C row e on : deta ils o f differences
from p rev iou s d r a ft, 4 91-2 (N o. 319,
m in.) ; no p rov ision fo r the abroga­
tion o f 1898 A g reem en t, 491 (N o. 319,
m in.) ; notes b y S ir E y re C row e on
revised C onvention, and t e x t o f D ra ft
C onven tion , 4 92-6 (N o. 320 and en d s .);
suggested m odifica tion on contin g en cy
o f P o rtu g a l ren ou n cin g her sovereign
rights, 4 98-9 (N o. 3 2 2 ); G erm an con­
dition s fo r consent to p u b lica tio n :
qu estion o f G rea t B rita in in voking
A lliance in case o f in terv en tion , 500
(N o. 323) ; S ir E y re C row e on, 501-2
(N o. 323, m in.). '
R evised d ra ft, com m u n ica ted to P rince
L ichnow sky, w ith ex p la n a tion s showing
differences from 1898 Agreem ent,
J an . 11, 1913, T ex t, 5 02 -6 (N o. 324 and
encl. 1), D r a ft N o te fo r com m unication
t o D u tch G overnm ent, T ex t, 5 06-7 (No.
324, encl. 2) ; D r a ft m em orandum by
S ir E y re C row e on A greem en t, for
p u b lica tion , 5 08-9 (N o. 3 2 5 ); Germ any
in form ed of P ortu g u ese enq uiry re
n eg otia tion s, 510-1 (N o. 328).
A m ended G erm an d r a ft w ith fu rth er pro­
posals, ex p la n a tion s and T ex t, M arch 18,
1913, 514-21 (N o. 331, and en cl.);
B ritish com m ents, A c., 5 21-5 (No.
331, m in.) ; prop osed altera tion s dis­
cussed w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, 525-6
(N o. 332) ; proposed a ltera tion s com­
m u n ica ted to P rin ce L ichnow sky, and
revised T e x t o f D r a ft C on ven tion , May,
 901
P O R T U G A L — ^ continued).
5. A nglo-G erm a n discussions, 1013— (con ­
tin u ed ) :
A m end ed G erm an d r a ft, Arc.— ( con tin u ed ) :
526-30 (X o . 333, and encl.)-, G erm an
proposed altera tion s to pream ble, and
A rticles 5 and 9, J u n e, 530-1 (X o . 3 3 4 );
S ir E y re C row e o n : ca n n ot om it phrase
rela tin g to preserv a tion of in teg rity
and in d epen den ce o f P o rtu g a l, and
in tr o d u c tio n o f referen ce to a n ti-sla very
con feren ce ob jection a ble, 5 31 -2 (X o . 334,
m in .); B ritish o b jection to a ltera tion
o f pream ble, and oth er altera tion s, dis­
cussed w ith P rin ce L ichnow sky, 533-4
(X o . 336). G erm an suggestion th a t p ro ­
posed w ords be added to pream ble, 535
(X o . 333' ; S ir E y re C row e o n : phrase
rela tin g to m a in ten a n ce o f in te g rity
and in depen den ce o f P o rtu g a l to be
added, 536 (X o . 33S. min. S ir E.
G oschen in form ed , 5 36-7 (X o . 339).
D ra ft C on v en tion tra n sm itted to P rin ce
L ichnow sky, w ith verb al altera tion s,
5 37-3 (X o s. 340 -1 ). T ex t of D ra ft C on­
ven tion , 533 -4 0 (X o . 341, en c l.): E nglish
te x t in itia lled , A u g 13, 540-1 (X o . 3 4 2 );
G erm an T ex t. Sept.. 5 41-4 (X o . 343 ;
in itia lled , O ct. 20, 1913, 544 (ed. n ote).
G erm an a n x ie ty o v e r re p o rt th a t G reat
B r ita in in ten d ed to publish d ecla ra tion
g u a ra n te e in g in te g r ity o f P ortuguese
C olonies a t sam e tim e as A n glo-G erm an
A g re e m e n t; S .r E . G rey ’ s ex p la n a tion
w ith reg a rd to A n g lo-P ortu g u ese
D ecla ra tion , D ec. 1913. 549 (X o . 352 :
if G erm any knew ex a ct B ritish o b liga ­
tion s u n d er P ortu g u ese A llia n ce it
m ig h t g et o v er difficulty a bout pu blish­
in g the A nglo-G erm a n A greem en t, Jan.
1011,, 554 (X o . 353»; G erm an Am bassador
in form ed o f pu rp ort o f 1399 D ecla ra tion
w ith P ortvigal in confirm n g p rev iou s
T re a tie s : su ggestion th a t 1?99 D eclara ­
tion and A n g lo-G erm a n 1393 Agreem ent
be pu blished b efore present revised
A greem ent. 5 55-6 (.Xo. 360 , 560 (X o
363).
D ro p p in g of A g reem en t su g g ested :
Q uestion o f a tim e lim it fo r sig­
na ture, F eb. 1011,, 553-9 (X o . 361.
m in .); G erm any a fra id o f effect of
p u b lica tion o f B ritish A lliance, s :g g e s -
t ion th a t A nglo-G erm a n A greem en t
r es p ectin g P ortu g u ese C olonies should
be le ft a lo n e : S ir E. G rey on m otiv e o f
A g reem en t to im p rov e A nglo-G erm a n
relation s and readiness to lea ve w hole
th in g a lone fo r the present, 562—3 X o.
366), 564 (X o . 3 6 3 1 ; G erm any con ten t
w ith A greem en t as it stands, but
p u b lica tion of th e con firm ation of
A llian ce w ith P o r tu g a l w ould m ore
than cou n ter-b a la n ce any g ood effect
from prop osed A g reem en t. 565 (X o .
3 6 9 ); H e r r von J a g o w ’ s desire th a t
m a tter b e le ft alone fo r the m om ent,
567 (X o . 371).
P O R T U G A L — continued).
5. A n g lo-tterm an discussions— (c o n tin u e d ):
P rin ce L ich n ow sky’ s suggestion re sign in g
A g reem en t and not pu blish in g u n til
la t e r : S ir E. G rey cou ld n ot publish
A g reem en t w ithout pu blish in g the
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese A lliance, an d A g ree­
m ent cou ld not be signed w ith ou t bein g
published, G reat B rita in w ou ld not
m ake any A greem ent w ith P ortu g a l
w ithout in fo rm in g G erm any. A p ril
1914. 567-^ (X o . 372), 5 63-9 (X o . 373),
at present only course is t o leave
th in gs as they are, 569 (X o . 373' :
com m u n ica ted by S ir E. Goschen
to H e r r v on J ag ow , 569-70 (X o . 374b
571 (X o . 3 7 5 ); H err v on J a g ow 's
h op e th a t in fu tu re G erm any w ould be
in a position to raise no fu r th e r ob jec­
tion s to b oth T reaties, th a t th ey w ould
con sid er them selves m orally b ou n d by
th e in itia lled agreem ent, 570 (X o . 374 ;
B ritish views on, 570-1 (X o . 374, m in.).
G erm an concessions in A n g ola, q uestion o f
B ritish a ttitu d e to, w hether b ou n d by
th e 1393 or 1913 A g reem en t. 5 7 3 -6 (X o .
376, m in.). 577-3 (X o . 373 • B ritish
C olon ia l Office considers th a t w hole
q uestion o f th e a greem ent should be
con sid ered and decid ed, J u ly 1914,
5 73-9 (X o . 379).
6. P u blica tion o f S ecr et A g r e e m e n t: S ir E y re
Crow e on the q uestion o f secrecy and
pu b lic a tten tion draw n to the question,
Jan . 1012: su ggestion of ob ta in in g
G erm an consent to p u blica tion discussed,
430-34 (X o . 270), S ir A. X ico lso n and S ir
E. G rey in fa v o u r o f p u b lica tion , 434
(X o . 270. m in. : P ortu g u ese k n ow ledg e
o f A g reem en t, effect o f p u b lica tion upon
G erm any, H olla n d and A u stra lia . 4 33 4
(X o . 2 7 0 ); suggestion o f com m u n ica tin g
p u b lica tion to P rim e M inisters o f selr-
G overu in g D om inions, and ob ta in in g
consent o f P o rtu g a l to reaffirm ation o f the
A lliance. 434 (N o. 270. m in .); B ritish
view s in reg a rd to pu b lica tion , M arch
1012, 440 (X o . 2 7 6 ); G erm an consent
to a P ortu g u ese announcem ent, 444 (X o.
277), 4 44 -5 (X o . 279, and e n c l.); P o rtu g a l
in form ed , 444 (X o . 273 >, 445 (X o . 2 ^ ) ;
P ortu g u ese con tem p la ted loan as a
reason fo r u rg in g G erm any t o consent
to pu b lica tion , 446-7 (X o . 231. m in.), 453
(X o . 2 3 4 ); B ritish C olonia l Office asked
to agree, 4 52 -3 (X o . 2 3 4 ); request that
p u b lica tion be delayed, possib ility of
A g reem ents b ein g revised, 453 (X o . 2 35 );
G erm an o p in ion again st p u b lica tion o f
A greem ent, 456 (X o . 237 ); B aron
v on M arschall and 3 ir E. G rey on
q u estion of com m u n ica tin g A greem ents
to P ortu g a l, 4 32-3 (X o . 3 1 2 ); R evised
T e x t o f C onven tion , question o f p u b lica ­
tion , X o v ., 439 (X o . 3 13 ' ; D ec. 1912, 492
(X o . 319, m in.), 497 (X o . 320, m in.).
 902
P O R T U G A L — (con tin u ed ).
6. P u b lica tio n o f S ecr et A g r eem e n t— (c o n ­
tin u ed ) :
B ritish view s on question o f p u blishing 1898
A g reem en t and effect o f : B ritish p olicy
in 1898 in m a kin g A g r e e m e n t : question
o f pu blish in g th e present A g reem en t,
1912, 497 -8 (N o. 321, min.)-, in evitab le
fr ic tio n betw een G rea t B rita in and
P o rtu g a l when results o f the tre a ty are
know n, 499 (N o. 3 2 2 ); S ir E. G rey on
p u b lica tion o f 1898 A greem en t, certain
phrases n ot suitab le fo r p u b lica tion ,
suggested ex p la n a tory M em o, to a ccom ­
pa ny new A g reem en t, J an . 1913, 500
(N o. 323).
G erm an con d ition s fo r consent to p u b lica ­
tion , 500 (N o. 3 2 3 ); S ir Eyre C row e on,
5 01 -2 (N o. 323, min.)-, S ir E. G rey on
disa d v a n tag es o f keep in g the 1898
A g reem en t secret, Feb. 1913, 509 (N o.
326), in fa v ou r o f p u blica tion o f all
a greem ents, 511 (N o. 328), 512 (N o. 3 2 9 );
G erm an press rep orts o f B ritish in ten ­
tion to publish, 511 (N o. 3 2 9 ); S ir E.
G re y ’ s view th a t 1898 A g reem en t should
n ot be pu blished w ith ou t A n g lo -P o rtu -
g uese D ecla ra tion o f 1899, 513 (N o. 3 2 9 );
G erm an view s on b ad effect o f p u blish­
in g A g reem en t, suggested su p p lem en t­
a ry a rrangem ents, 5 15-6 (N o. 3 3 1 );
B ritish com m ents on, 521 (N o. 331,
m in.), 527 (N o. 333).
B ritish in ten tion of p u blishing sim ul­
ta n eou sly w ith D ecla ra tion o f 1899,
D ec. 1913, 549 (N o. 3 5 2 ); p u blica tion
m ay be delayed ow in g to G erm an
a n x iety a bou t term s o f B ritish A llian ce
w ith P o rtu g a l, J an . 191.',. 555 (N o. 3 5 9 );
the 1898 A g reem en t to be pu blished by
itself and new arra n g em en t later, F eb.,
560 (N o. 3 6 3 ); F ren ch a n x iety at
p roposed p u b lica tion o f A g reem en ts :
S ir E. G re y ’ s v ie w s : G erm an hesita ­
tio n con cern in g p u b lica tion , 560-1
(N o. 364).
H e r r von J ag ow on disastrous effect o f
p u blish in g D ecla ra tion o f 1899 and
A n g lo-G erm a n A g reem en t, and effect
u p on position o f H e r r von Bethm ann
H ollw eg , 5 65 -6 (N o. 370), 566-7 (N o.
3 7 1 ); G rea t B rita in cou ld not publish
w ith ou t also p u blish in g the A llian ce,
568 (N o. 372), 568 (N o. 373), 570 (N o.
374).
7 F ra n ce and G rea t B r ita in : A n g lo-G erm a n
discussions, 1912, on revision o f S ecret
T r e a t y : q uestion o f islands o f San T hom e
a nd P rin cip e : F ra n ce to be in form ed , 470
(N o. 299, m in.), 477 (N o. 3 0 5 ); M . P o in c a r e
in form ed o f discussions con cern in g te r r i­
t o ria l arra n gem en ts and ex ch a n g es o f
te r r ito r y in S. A fric a , 478 (N o. 3 0 6 );
S ir Joh n A n d e rso n ’s q uestion as to how
F ra n ce will rega rd th e T rea ty, 497 (N o.
3 2 1 ); S ir E yre Crowe, S ir A. N icolson
a nd S ir E. G rey on, 498 (N o. 321, min.)-,
q uestion o f ob ta in in g consent o f F ra n ce
P O R T U G A L — ( continued).
7. F ra n ce and G rea t B r ita in , 1912— (con ­
tin u ed ) :
to the proposed su b stitu tion o f San
Thorne and P rin cip e fo r T im or, 499-500
(N o. 3 2 2 ); M . P au l C a m bon ’ s enquiry
c on cern in g A n g lo-G erm a n negotia tions,
q uestion o f p u blishing, and o f publish­
in g the 1898 A g reem en t, Feb. 1913, 509
(N o. 326) ; en q u iry con cern in g Za n zib a r,
San T hom é and P rin cip e , prosp ect
of P ortu g u ese sale of her colonies,
O ct., 5 44-5 (N o. 3 4 5 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s
ex plan a tion s, 5 44-5 (N o. 3 4 5 ); M. P ich on
a n xiou s a bou t the A g reem en t : S ir E.
G re y ’ s e x p la n a tion s to M. P a u l Cam bon,
provisions o f the A g reem en t : M. Cam ­
b o n ’ s criticism s and proba b le F rench
an n oya n ce over C abinda, 5 47-8 (N o. 3 50 );
M . C a m bon ’ s renew ed rep resen ta tion s on,
J an . 191 i, 553 (N o. 357), bad effect on
F ren ch p u blic o p in ion and on th e E n ten te ,
55 4 -5 (N o. 3 5 9 ); rep resen ta tion s by M M .
P o in c a r e and D ou m erg u e, agreem ent
d etrim en ta l to F ren ch in terests and con­
clu ded w ith ou t con su lta tion , con tra ry to
stip u la tion s o f F ra n co-G erm an A g reem ent
o f 1911, S ir F . B ertie on ju stice o f F rench
case, F eb., 5 56 -8 (N o. 361), 559 (N o. 362) ;
B ritish com m ents on F ren ch represen ta ­
tions, 558-9 (N o. 361, min.)-, new arra n ge­
m ent does n oth in g to w hich F ra n ce can
ta k e ex ce p tio n or w hich in ju res her in any
w ay, 560 (N o. 3 6 3 ); F ren ch a n xiety as to
pu b lica tion of, protest a ga in st division
o f P ortu g u ese colonies, especially its
effects in C on go B asin, S ir E. G rey ’ s
ex p lan a tion s, 560-1 (N o. 364), F ra nce
in form ed o f G erm an desire n ot to proceed
and u n d ersta n d in g to let m a tters rem ain
fo r the present, 564 (N o. 368).
8. P o rtu g a l and the S ecr et A g r eem e n t :
P ortu g u ese k now ledge of, J an . 1912, 430
(N o. 2 6 9 ); M . de V illa u r u t t ia ’ s question
as to th e A greem en t, P ortu g u ese know ­
ledge of, 435 (N o. 271), 437 (N o. 272,
min.)-, P o rtu g a l in form ed in 1898 o f ou t­
line and p u rp o r t o f th e A greem en t, 437-8
(N o. 273) ; Senhor V a scon cellos suggests
a p u blic sta tem en t in P a rlia m en t con ­
cern in g , M a rch 1912, 438 (N o. 274), 439
(N o. 275), B ritish view s on, question o f
G erm an consent, 439 (N o. 274, m in.), 440
(N o. 275) ; ou tlin e an d p u rp o r t of
A g reem en t com m u n ica ted to Senhor
V asconcellos, 439 (N o. 275) ; statem ent
m ade by Senhor V a scon cellos in P a rlia ­
m ent, 445 (N o. 280), 450-1 (N o. 282, encl.) ;
revised A greem en t, Jan . 1913, to be
com m u n ica ted, 507 (cd. note)-, press
rep orts up on revision o f 1898 A greem ents,
F eb., 510 (N o. 327) ; Senhor G om es’s
en q u iry as to A n g lo-G erm a n neg otia tion s
and p u b lica tion o f 1898 A greem ent, 510
(N o. 328), 511 (N o. 3 2 9 ); B ritish assurance
th a t p r in cip le o f A g reem en t was not
a ffected or position o f P o rtu g a l changed,
th a t d ecla ra tion m ade in M a rch 1912
 903
P O R T U G A L — (con tin u ed ).
8. P o rtu g a l and th e S ecr et A g r eem e n t, 1013—
(con tin u ed ) :
cou ld be rep eated , 510-1 (X o . 3 2 8 ); desire
fo r a u th ority for a sta tem ent to be m ade
in L isbon P a rlia m en t, o i l (X o . 329) ;
B ritish ex p la n a tion o f n eg otia tion s, and
a u th ority to rep eat th e M a rch statem ent.
5 11 -2 (X o . 329) ; sta tem en t by Senhor
M a cie ira in P ortu g u ese P arliam en t, 513—4
(X o . 3 3 0 ); M a rq u is de S overal on orig in
o f 1S98 A g re e m e n t; a n xiety th a t P o r t u ­
guese colon ies should not be lost, renew al
o f the A llian ce in 1899 n eg a tiv ed the 1898
A greem en t w ith G erm any : S ir E. G rey on
d ev elopm en t o f colonies by en cou ra gem en t
o f B ritish and G erm an ca p ital, com m u n i­
ca tion of A n glo-G erm an A g reem en t
prom ised. J u n e 1013, 533 (X o . 335), 5 34-5
(X o . 337), con v ersation com m u n ica ted to
G erm any, 534—5 (X o . 3 3 7 ); Senhor
M a cie ira pertu rb ed ov er A nglo-G erm a n
n eg otia tion s in view o f his den ia l o f a new
A greem en t, D ec., 5 48-9 (X o . 351) ; B ritish
a ssurance th a t n eg otia tion s w ith G erm any
have rem ained strictly w ithin scope o f
1898 A g reem en t, which there is no in ten ­
tion to ex ten d , 550 (X o . 353), 550 (X o.
3 5 4 ); D r. R o s e n ’ s b elief th a t w hole o f
1898 A g reem en t was know n to P ortu g a l,
551 (X o . 354, and m in.) ; S enhor T eix e ir a -
Gom es urges th a t A greem en t be published,
551 (X o . 355) ; proposed sta tem ent in
P ortu g u ese P arliam en t re fe rrin g to
A g reem en t an d T rea ty o f A lliance. Jan.
101M 552 (X o . 3 5 0 ); press rep orts and
q uestions in P a rlia m en t con cern in g
A nglo-G erm a n A g re e m e n t: Senhor
M a ch a d o’ s statem ent, M a rch 1914, 5 63-4
(X o . 367).
9. A n q lo -P o r tu g u es e A llia n ce : A llian ce to
p r o te ct and preserve P ortu g u ese Colonies,
424 (X o . 266), secretly renew ed, 424 (X o .
266), 425 (X o . 2 6 7 ); S ir F . B ertie on
a n cien t B ritish and P ortu g u ese o b liga ­
tion s and con d u ct d u rin g B oer W a r, Jan.
1012, 426 (X o . 26S); a lliance the basis o f
P ortu g u ese foreig n policy . 429 (X o. 269,
encl.)-, S enhor V a scon cellos’ s su ggestion
o f pu blish in g the 1899 reaffirm ation o f the
A llian ce, F eb. 1912, 436 (X o . 272) ; S ir A.
H a rd in g e in fa v ou r o f p u b lica tion , 436
(N o. 2 7 2 ); G rea t B rita in will consid er
q u estion o f p u blica tion , 437 (N o. 272,
m in.), 438 (X o . 2 7 3 ); referen ce to A llian ce
a nd v ariou s T rea ties m ade by Senhor
V ascon cellos in P a rlia m en t, 445 (N o. 280),
448-51 (X o . 282, encl.)-, q uestion o f
a lliance b ein g affected b y a change in
form of G overnm ent of co n tr a c tin g
parties, S ir A. H a rd in g e on, M ar. ig i 2
4 4 /-S (N o. 2 82 ); S ir E y re C row e on,
p r in cip le of in tern a tion a l law th a t
trea ties arc b in d in g even if form of
g overn m en t changes, d ep recates ra isin g
by S ir A. H a rd in g e o f th e question,
451 (X o . 282, m in .); sum m ary of
T rea ties as g iv e n by Senhor V asconcellos,
P O R T U G A L — (con tin u ed ).
9. A n g lo -P o rtu g u es e A llia nce. 1012— (con ­
tin u ed) :
449-50 (XTo. 232. en c l.); T rea ties had been
reaffirm ed from tim e to tim e w ith ou t
en largin g , 452 (X o . 2 8 3 ); Sir E. G rey con ­
siders the trea ties b in d in g and w ould
d ep recate any dou bt b ein g throw n on
th eir v a lid ity , A p ril, 454 (X o . 2 ^ 6 ); ques­
tion as to in form in g H e r r von K iihlm a nn
con cern in g A n g lo-P ortu g u ese T reaties,
J u ly . 483-4 (ed. note)-, question o f pu blish­
in g the 1<99 D eclaration , Dec.. 484 (ed.
n ote), 492 (X o . 319, min ).
B ritish view s on question of p u blishing the
1893 A g reem ent and the effect of, 497—3
(N o. 321, m in .); and on pu blish in g the
A lliance T reaties, 493 (N o. 321. m in .);
S ir E. G rey declines to publish unless at
the same tim e the A nglo-G erm an A g re e ­
m ent is published, Jan. 1013, 500-1 (N o.
32 3 ); request to P o rtu g a l to con cu r in
pu blish in g D eclaration o f 1899, 507
led. n o te ); Senhor Costa desirous o f
p u blishing th e 1899 D eclaration and
th a t it be ratified in P ortu g u ese P a r lia ­
m ent, F eb. 1913, 510 (N o. 3 2 7 ); Senhor
G om es’ s hope th a t if A nglo-G erm a n 1898
A g reem en t w ere pu blished A n g lo-
P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion o f 1899 m ight
be published sim ultaneously, 512 (No.
3 2 9 ); P ortu g u ese requests for p u b lica ­
tion : B ritish in ten tion o f pu blish in g
w ith the A n glo-G erm an A greem ents,
D ec., 549 (N o. 3 5 2 ); S ir E. G rey 's
in clin a tion to publish the 1898 A g re e ­
m ent and the 1899 D eclaration b y them ­
selves, Jan. 1011,. 555 (X o . 359), 556 (X o.
3 6 0 ); Feb., 560 (X o . 363). 561 (X’ o. 364).
A llia n ce and A nglo-G erm a n A greem ent,
J u ly 1012, 4 85-6 (X o . 315), 488 (X o .
317). 500-1 (X o . 3 2 3 ); and b ad con ­
dition s in P ortu g u ese colonies. 485
(N o 315, n ote ( * ) ) ; A lliance and A n g lo-
G erm an A greem en t, question o f in te r­
v en tion , J an . 1013, 500 (N o. 3 23 );
S ir E yre Crowe on G erm an suggestion
to rem ove P ortu g u ese C olonies from
the scope o f A lliance, 5 01-2 (N o. 323.
m in .); G erm an d r a ft A greem en t w ith
a rticles upon in v ok in g the A llian ce.
5 15 -6 (X'o. 3 3 1 ); B ritish com m ents
on, 521-4 (N o. 331, m in.). 525 (X o.
3 3 2 ); G erm an suggestion th a t an
e x ch a n g e o f notes m ight be effected,
B ritish ob jection to secrecy, 525
(X'o. 3 3 2 ); B ritish re-w ord in g of the
A rticles, 527 (X ’o. 3 3 3 ); B ritish revised
d ra ft, T ext, M ay, 529-30 (N o. 333, encl.) ;
G erm an suggestion o f the om ission of
the phrase relatin g to p reserv a tion o f
in teg rity and in d ep en d en ce: S ir E yre
Crowe on rep eated assurances g iv en to
P o rtu g a l sa feg u a rd in g h er sovereign
righ ts. J u n e. 5 31 -2 (N o. 334, m iiu );
G erm any very m uch a fra id o f effect o f
p u blica tion o f D ecla ra tion o f 1899,
M arch 1014, 5 62-3 (N o. 3 6 6 ); H e r r von

P O R T U G A L — (LOntin ued).
9. A n g lo-P ortu g u ese A llia n ce, 1913— (con -
t in u e d ): _ _
J a g o w ’ s rep resen ta tion s a ga in st p u b li­
ca tion , 565-6 (N o. 370), 566 7 (N o. 3 7 1 );
P rin ce L ichnow sky on : S ir E. G rey on
B ritish a ttitu d e tm vards p u blica tion ,
567 ^ (N o. 372). 5<'8 (N o. 373), view s
com m u n ica ted to G erm an}', 569 (N o.
374).
10. F in a n ce : loan : term s of A nglo-G erm a n
S ecret T rea ty, d r a ft altera tion s, M a y ,
1912, 469-70 (N o. 269, en r l).
N eg otia tion s fo r a foreig n loan, M arch 1912,
416 (N o. 2 S 1 ); relation of A n glo-G erm an
1898 A greem ent to loans from P ow ers,
446-7 (N o. 281, and w in .), 456 (N o. 2 8 7 );
Dir. Frew en and proposed loan to
P ortu g a l, w ith p a rticip a tion of Messrs.
S ch röder, A p ril, 453 (N o. 2 9 0 ); con ­
cession fo r a C hartered C om p any in
A ngola to be g ra n ted as a con d ition :
s ecu rity for, and p a rticip a tio n
P ow ers in. M ay, 460 (N o. 2 9 1 ); S ir E.
G rey ’ s view that G reat B rita in ca n n ot
or need not ob ject to, 461 (N o. 2 92 );
B ritish a ttitu d e ex p la in ed to G erm any,
462 (N o. 2 9 3 ); Messrs. S ch röd er hope to
com p lete a rrangem ents fo r loan by
J u n e, B ritish request fo r G erm an views,
462-3 (N o. 2 9 4 ); a rrangem ents fo r
Messrs. S ch rod er’ s loan discussed by
M r T n|§<s and S ir F yre C row e: P o r t u ­
guese desire to trea t loan and A n gola
C om pany as separate m atters, B ritish
a ttitu d e tow ard loan, question
G erm an con trol in A ngola, pledge n ot
to act con trary to B ritish interests,
463-6 (N o. 2 95 ); use o f pa rt of loan
fo r arm am ents, ex p lan a tion o f share of
M r. F rew en and Messrs. S ch röd er in
loan and position o f M r. T iarks, 4 66-7
(N o. 296 ); G erm any regards loan pro­
posals with fa v ou r b u t delays decision,
request for G reat B ritain to abstain
until G erm an decision is m ade, 473 (N o.
3 00 ) ; G erm an view s in rega rd to pro­
posed loan, 475 (N o. 302, cncl.)-, b rea k ­
dow n on n eg otia tion s, 475 (N o. 302.
m in.), 476 (N o. 3 0 4 ); S ir A. H a rd in g e
not to g iv e su p port to any p r o je c t for
a loan a t present, June, 479 (N o. 3 0 7 );
R evised A n glo-G erm an C onvention and
q uestion o f a loan, 489 (N o. 319).
( v . also sub P o h t u c u , : C olon ies: A n g lo-
Germ an discussions : Secret A greem ent.)
11. G overnm ent, state of, 1911, 427 ( ed . n ote)-,
S enhor Costa and a possible cha nge o f
cab in et, M arch 1912, 4 45-6 (N o. 280).
12. G en eral F o reig n P o l i c y : S ta tem en t by
Setihor Vasconcellos, Jan. 1912, 428 (N o.
269, e n d )-, M arch, 44«-5 1 (N o. 282, e n d ) .
G erm a n y and : ^ isit o f “ P a n th er ” to L is b o n ,
P ortu g u ese dem on stra tion s o f sym pathy,
J an . 1912. 427 (N o. 2 6 9 ); im p rov em en t in
relations o f tw o coun tries, 428 (N o. 269
and encl.).
904
P O R T U G A L — (con tin u ed ).
G reat B rita in and : Q uestion o f British inter­
v en tion over proposed foreig n loan, March
1912, 446-7 (N o. 281, min.)-, British
B lu e-B ook on con tra ct-la b ou r in P ortu­
guese colonies, Feb. 1913, 51 j (N o. 329);
n eg otia tion s for T reaty o f Com m erce and
N a v ig a tion , 513 (N o. 330).
Im p orta n ce atta ch ed to visit from one or
m ore B ritish ships, D ec. 1913; perturba­
tion over new A nglo-G erm an Agree­
m ent, 548-9 (N o. 351), 551-2 (No. 355).
P O T S D A M M E E T IN G , N ov. 4 -5 , 1910.
G erm a ny a n d : B aron von M arschall denies
tru th of published version, Jan. 1911, 19
(N o. 8) ; arra n gem en t between Germany
and Russia and B ag da d-Iv h an ikin branch,
M ay 1913, 129 (N o. 79).
Russia and : A ttitu d e to B a g d a d R ailw ay, May
1913, 131 (N o. 82).
T u rk ey and : P u b lica tion o f negotiations
in duces T u rkey to n eg otia te directly with
of
G reat B rita in , Jan. 1911, 19 (No. 8 );
T urkish a ttitu d e to P otsd a m interview,
35 (No. 23).
PRESS.
A u stria n :
G en era l: P ress a tta ck on R ussia, M arch 1914,
763-4 (N o. 526).
In d ivid u a l p a p ers:
F rem d en b la tt : V isit o f B ritish fleet, May
1914, 742 (N o. 5 06 1.
N eu e F reie P r e s s e : A rticle a gain st activi­
ties o f m ilita ry a tta ch és, M arch 1914,
of
756 (N o. 519).
B ritish :
G eneral : C ontroversy over M r. L loyd G eorge’s
d en u n ciation o f ex p en d itu re on arma­
m ents, Jan. 1914, 729-30 (N o. 495);
A d m ira l von T ir p itz on G overnm ent hints
t o B ritish press, relation s would be
im p roved if press let G erm any alone for
a tim e, Feb. 1914, 740-1 (N o. 503, encl.).
In d ivid u a l p a p ers:
D a ily C hronicle : M r. L loy d G eorg e’ s state­
m ent on arm am ents ex pen d itu re, Jan.
1914, 729 (N o. 495, n o te (2) ).
D a ily M a il: A n glo-G erm an Secret Agree­
m ent re P ortu g u ese Colonies, Jan. 1912,
43!) (N o. 270, n ote (3) ).
D a ily N e u -s : A nglo-G erm a n Secret Agree­
m ent re P ortu g u ese Colonies, 430 (No.
270, n ote (3) ) ; N aval arm am ents, ships
offered by Colonies and 16 to 10 ratio,
Feb. 1913. 671 (N o. 457, and n ote (s)J j
on M r. C h u rch ill’ s speech announcing
decision to a dvance the construction of
3 ships, J une, 705 (N o. 479, and
n o te (5) ).
E v en in g T im es: P u b lic a tio n of Potsdam
n eg otia tion s, Jan. 1911, 19 (N o. 8,
n ote (3) ).
M a n ch e ste r G u a rd ia n : S ir E. G rey ’ s state­
m ent con cern in g rum oured Anglo-
R ussian N aval L’ n d erstanding, June
1914, 804 (N o. 551).
 905
P R E S S — (con tin u ed ).
liritish — (c o n t in u e d ):
I n d ivid u a l p a pers— (c on tin u ed ) :
M orn in g P o s t : S u ggestion o f an A n g lo-
F ren ch A llian ce, 1912, 61S (X o . 418V
O b s e r v e r : A nglo-G erm a n S ecret A g reem ent
re P ortu g u ese Colonies, 430 (X o . 270,
n o te (3) ) .
P all M all G a z e t t e : A nglo-G erm a n S ecret
A greem en t re P ortu g u ese Colonies, Jan .
1912, 430 (X o . 270, n o te ( 3) ).
S a tu rd ay l l e v i e w : A n glo-G erm an secret
A g reem en t re P ortu g u rs e Colonies, 430
(X o . 270, n ote (3) ).
T im e s : G erm an a ttitu d e to T urkish pro­
posals on B a g da d R a ilw ay , M a rch 1911.
29 (X o . 17, m in .); M r. C h irol’ s letters
on P ersia n G ulf, J u n e -A u g u s t, 45 (X o .
34, n o te (s) ) ; letter on k ilom etric
guarantees, M a rch 1911, 93 (X o . 66.
m in.)-, H e r r v on J a g ow on B a g da d
R a ilw a y neg otia tion s, J u ly 1913, 161
(X o . 106), 163 (X o . 1 0 7 ); A nglo-G erm a n
S ecret A g reem en t re P ortu g u ese Colo­
nies. Jan . 1912. 430 (X o . 270, n ote (3) ) ;
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese T reaties, M a rch 1912.
452 (X o . 283, and n ote (2) ) ; B a ron von
M a rsch a ll’ s com p la in ts as to jin goism ,
A u g . 1912, 657 (X o . 4 51 ); M r. W in ston
C h u rch ill’ s speech, renew ed proposal for
a “ naval h olid a y .” O ctober 1913, 71S
(X o . 485, n ote 2) ), 720 (N o. 486,
n ote (3) ), 722 (X o . 483, n ote ( * ) ) ;
G erm an and B ritish criticism s of
proposal, 721 (X o . 4 8 7 ); Zabern
in cid en t, D ec. 1913, 723 (X o . 490,
n ote (3) ) ; M r. L loy d G e org e’ s sta te­
m ent on arm am en ts ex p en d itu re, J an .
1914, 729 (X o . 495, n o te (2) ) ; S ir E.
G rey ’ s speech at M anch ester, F eb. 1914,
734 (X o . 497, n o te ( « ) ) , 734 (X o . 493,
n o te (2) ) ; A d m ira l v on T ir p itz on idea
o f a “ n a va l h olid a y ,” 734 (X o . 4 9 3 );
telegram s a bout P ersia, S ir E. G rey
denies a press ca m pa ig n , Ju n e, 797
(X o . 547).
U n ited S erv ice M a g a z in e : A r ticle by
A d m ira l F rem a n tle, P ortu g u ese C olo­
nies. J an . 1912, 423 (X o . 269, encl.).
E g y p t ia n :
in d iv id u a l p a p e r s :
E s-S haa b: Case of A ziz A li, 191$, 838
(A p p . I I P .
F ren ch :
G e n e r a l: proposed In te rn a tion a l C on feren ce
on A frica n affairs, F eb. 1913, 511 (X o .
3 2 9 ); su ggestion o f A n g lo -F re n ch A llian ce,
1912, 618 (X o . 4 1 8 ); q uestion o f naval
co-op era tion w ith G rea t B r ita in , 619 (X o .
4 1 8 ); u n frien d ly a ttitu d e tow ards Ita lv,
A p ril 1914, 645 (N o. 443), 646 (X o . 4 4 4 );
M . Jules Cam bon on p u b lica tion o f confi­
den tia l m a tters in F ren ch press, A p ril
1913, 697 (X o . 473).
In d ivid u a l p a p e r s :
E cho de P a r is : A n g lo -F re n ch naval
co-op era tion , 1912, 619 (X o . 418).
[109001
P R E S S — ( c on tin u ed ).
F ren ch — (con tin u ed :
In d iv id u a l papers— 'o n t in u e d ):
F ig a r o : M . R ecou ly on A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg o­
tia tion s, F ren ch policv and Sy ria, M ay,
1913, 123 (X o . 73 . '
G a u lo is: C onversation betw een M . Jules
Cam bon and H err von J ag ow rep orted
in, A p ril 1913, 697 (X o . 473).
M a t i n : F ren ch naval dispositions, 1912, 619
(X o . 413).
T em p s : F ra nco-G erm an n eg otia tion s on
A n a tolian R a ilw ay and T urkish L oan,
A ug. 1913. 217 (X o . 1 43 ); review o f
F ra nco-G erm an n eg otia tion s over B a g ­
dad R a ilw ay , 218 (X o . 1 4 3 ); F ra n co-
T urkish agreem ents in itia lled , A p ril
1914, 367-S ed. n ote ; a n nouncem ent
o f F ra n co-R u ssian X a v a l C onven tion ,
J u ly 1 12. 603 (X o . 408. n o te ( * ) ) , and
naval disp ositions, 619 (X o . 4 1 8 ); A n g lo-
F ren ch frien d sh ip affirm ed, 619 (X o .
41S>; renew al o f T rip le A llian ce and
Ita lia n relations, M a rch 1914, 644 (X o .
4 4 1 '; case fo r in creased arm am ents,
Feb. 1913, 674 (X o . 4611.
Germ an :
G e n e r a l: Com m ents on B ritish and T urkish
n eg otia tion s on K ow eit and B a g d a d R a il­
w ay questions, M a y 1913, 122 (N o. 7 2 );
ca m pa ig n a bou t P ortu g u ese colonies, F eb.
1912, 436 (X o . 2 7 2 ); rep orts o f I n te r­
na tion a l C on feren ce on A frica n affairs and
the pu b lica tion o f 1893 A g reem en t, 511
(X o . 3 2 9 ); A n g lo-F ren ch a llia nce and
naval d isp ositions in M ed iterra n ean and
N orth Sea, J u n e 1912, 596-7 (N o. 3 94 );
a ttitu d e tow ards F ra n co-R u ssian X a v a l
C on ven tion , A u g., 6 08-9 (X o . 4 0 8 ); A t t i­
tu d e tow ards M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s
speech on S u pp lem en ta ry estim ates, J u ly
1912. 655 (X o . 4 5 1 ); B erlin P ress B u reau
an obstacle to g ood relation s betw een
G erm any and G rea t B rita in , J a n . 1913,
663 (X o . 4 5 5 ); X a v a l con stru ction and
a n ti-E n glish tone o f press, 665 (X o . 4-56),
685 (X o . 464, e n c l.); A d m ira l v on T ir p it z ’ s
sta tem ent b efore B u d g et C om m ittee and
id ea o f a naval agreem ent, 669-70 (X o .
4 5 7 ); a ttitu d e tow ards B ritish N a v y
estim ates, M a rch 1913, and su ggestion o f
a y e a r 's “ n a va l h olid a y ,’ ’ 6 90 -2 (X o .
4 6 5 ); a ttitu d e tow ards S ir E . G rey 's
speech, M a rch 1913, 692-3 (X o . 4 69 );
c r itica l a ttitu d e tow ards renew ed pro­
posal fo r a “ naval h olid a y ,” O ct., 718-9
(X o . 4 8 5 ); a ttitu d e o f press tow ards
R ussian arm am ent p olicy and d a n g er of
w ar, M a rch 1914, 754—5 (X o . 5 1 8 ); P rin ce
L ichnow sky unable to un d ersta n d orig in
o f the a g ita tion , 758 (X o . 5 2 1 ); S ir E.
G rey on, 7 58-9 (N os. 521-2), C ount
B en ck en d orff on, 759 (X o . 5 2 2 ); con tin u ed
in terest in press on R usso-G erm an rela­
tions, 759-61 (X o . 523), 761-2 (X o . 5 2 4 );
R ussian replies to G erm an press, ord ers to
close a n ti-R u ssian ca m p a ig n , 765 (X o .
5 2 7 ); S ir G. B u chanan on, 765 (X o . 529).
3 X
 D06
P R E S S — ( con tin u ed ).
H erm an — (c o n t in u e d ):
In d iv id u a l p a p e r s:
B e rlin er T a g e b la tt: F ra n co-R u ssian N a v al
C on v en tion , A u g . 1912, 609 (N o. 4 08 );
rep orts of p roceed in g s in B u d g et C om ­
m ittee published by, F eb. 1913, 676 (N o.
462), 677-83 (N o. 462, e n c l.): a ttitu d e
tow ards M r. C h u rch ill’ s speech and su g ­
g estion o f a y e a r’ s cessation from sh ip­
b u ild in g, M a rch 1913, 690 (N o. 4 68 );
a rticle by C a pta in P ersiu s on B ritish
decision to a dvance con s tru ction of
3 ships, J une, 705 (N o. 479), and on
renew ed proposal fo r a “ holida y y e a r ,”
O ct., 719 (N o. 4 8 5 ); Z a b ern in cid en t,
D ec., 725 (N o. 491) ; R usso-G erm an rela ­
tions, no reason fo r uneasiness at
present, M a rch 1914, 755 (N o. 5 1 8 );
R u s sia ’ s preten sion s m u st be stop ped,
760 (N o. 5 2 3 ); A n g lo-R u ssia n N a v al
und ersta n din g , and effect upon A n g lo-
G erm an relations, M a y 1914, 791 (N o.
544), 793 (N o. 545), J u n e, 753 (N o. 517),
802 (N o. 5 4 9 ); reaffirm s tru th o f the
rum our, gap s in S ir E. G rey ’ s sta te­
m ent, J u n e, 803 (N o. 550).
B erlin er Z eitu n g am M i tta g : On question
o f n a v ig a tion on T ig ris, J u ly 1913, 163
(N o. 107).
D eu tsch e T a g e s z e itu n g : A ttitu d e tow ards
M r. W in ston C h u rch ill’ s proposal fo r a
y e a r’ s “ naval h olid a y ,” Oct. 1913, 719
(N o. 485).
F r a n k fu r te r Z e it u n g : F ra noo-G erinan n eg o­
tia tio n s on A n a tolia n R a ilw a y and
T urkish loan, A u g . 1913, 217 (N o. 1 43 );
a ttitu d e tow ards M r. C h u rch ill’ s speech
and su ggestion o f a y e a r’ s “ naval
h olid a y ,” M a rch 1913, 690 (N o. 468),
O ctober, 719 (N o. 4 8 5 ); criticism o f a
b ook by H e r r L im a n on th e Crow n
P rin ce, M a y 1914, 7 43-4 (N o. 5 0 8 );
reassurance in reg a rd to R usso-G erm an
relations, M a rch 1914, 761 (N o. 524).
G erm a n ia : R usso-G erm an relations, M a rch
1914, 755 (N o. 518).
D er G r e if: G eneral von B ern h a rd i on
G erm a n y ’ s finan cial and econ om ic pre­
paredness fo r w ar, D ec. 1913, 728 (N o.
493, encl.).
K öln isch e Z eitu n g : On A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg o­
tia tion s a bou t B a g d a d R a ilw a y , M ay
1913, 122 (N o. 7 2 ); a ttitu d e tow ards
proposal fo r a y e a r’ s “ naval h olid a y ,”
Oct., 719 (N o. 4 8 5 ); ala rm ist a rticle on
Russian m ilita ry p rep a ra tion s, no
a pprehensions o f any im m ed iate d a n g er,
M a rch 1914, 754 (N o. 5 1 8 ); R ussian
w arlike prep a ra tion s du e to F ra n ce, 756
(N o. 5 1 9 ); M. S a zon ov annoyed at, 757
(N o. 520, n o te (2) ) ; den ia l o f official
in sp ira tion o f article, 759 (N o. 5 2 3 );
H e r r von J ag ow th in ks th a t stir caused
by a rticle has g one on too lon g, 763
(N o. 525).
P R E S S — (con tin u ed ).
G erm a n — (continued,) :
I nd iv id u al p a p e r s- -(c o n ti n u e d ):
K r e u z - Z e itu n g : a ttitu d e tow ards Mr.
C h u rch ill’ s speech an d suggestion o f a
y e a r’ s “ naval h olid a y ,” M a rch 1913,
690-2 (N o. 4 68 ); R usso-G erm an rela­
tion s and P rofessor Schiem ann, M a rch
1914, 762 (N o. 524).
L o k a l-A n z e ig e r : a ttitu d e tow ards Mr.
C h u rch ill’ s speech and suggestion o f a
“ naval h olid a y ,” M a rch 1913, 690-2
(N o. 4 6 8 ); R usso-G erm an relations,
M arch 1914, 755 (N o. 5 1 8 ); criticism
o f R ussian pu blic op in ion , 760 (N o.
5 23 ); cha nge o f tone, G erm any and
R ussia still w ork in g tog eth er in
harm ony, 760 (N o. 5 2 3 ); R ussian and
F ren ch prepared ness fo r w ar, J u n e 1914,
803 (N o. 550).
X o r d d eu tsch e A llg en iein e Z e it u n g : On
fa v ou ra b le im pression o f S ir E. G rey ’ s
speech on B a g d a d R a ilw a y , M a rch 1911,
31 (N o. 2 0 ); on pa cific decla ra tion s of
M . Sazonov, 7 62-3 (N o. 525).
F a s t: A t t itu d e o f to P o rtu g a l, Jan. 1912,
428 (N o. 269, e n c l .) ; a ttitu d e tow ards
M r. C h u rch ill’ s speech and suggestion of
a y e a r 's “ naval h olid a y ,” M a rch 1913,
690-1 (N o. 4 6 8 ); Z a b ern in cid en t, Dec.,
725 (N o. 491).
Fossisehe Z e it u n g : On A n g lo-T u rk ish neg o­
tia tion s con cern in g K o w e it and B agdad
R a ilw ay , M ay 1913, 122 (N o. 7 2 ); R usso-
G erm an relations, discounts alarm ist
ta lk, M a rch 1914, 755 (N o. 518).
I ta l ia n :
G e n e r a l: A n g lo -Ita lia n relations, M a rch 1914,
644 (N o. 441).
In d iv id u a l p a p e r s :
T rib u n a : Ita lia n relation s w ith F ra n ce and
G rea t B r ita in , M a rch 1914, 644 (No.
441).
P o r tu g u e s e :
G e n e r a l: R u m ou rs o f in ten tion to hold an
In tern a tion a l C on feren ce, F eb. 1913, 513
(N o. 330).
In d ivid u a l p a p e r s;
D in : N eg otia tion s fo r a foreig n loan, M arch
1912, 446 (N o. 281).
Tlussian :
G e n e r a l: P rofessor S chiem an n on anim osity
o f R u ssia n press, M a rch 1914, 762 (N o.
5 2 4 ); H e r r von J a g o w on, 763 (N o. 5 2 5 );
co n tr a d ic to ry a rticles by th e B ourse
G a ze tte and B ossia, 765 (N o. 527), 766
(N o. 5 2 8 ); on B ritish pu rchase o f A nglo-
P ersian Oil C o.’ s shares, June, 813 (Nos.
557-8).
I n d iv id u a l p a p e r s:
B irsh ev ia W e e d o m o s ti: R ussian and F rench
preparedness fo r w ar, J u n e 1914, 803
(N o. 550).
B ou rse G a z e tte : C h a u v in istic article, R ussia
p repa red fo r w ar, M a rch 1914, 765 (No.
527), 766 (N o. 528).
 907
P R E S S — ( co n tin u e d ). R A I L W A Y S — ( con tin u ed ).
R ussia n— (c o n t in u e d ): J a ffa -J eru sa lem (u . sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
In d iv id u a l pa pers— (c o n tin u e d ) : T urkey).
S o v o e V r e m y a : an ti-G erm a n article, M arch K a r a k o u v o u -S a n d u k ly ( v . sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
1914, 766 (N o. 5 2 7 ); on G erm an press T urkey).
ca m p a ig n , q uestion o f arm am ents and K h a r p u t-D ia r b e k r (v. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
g ro u p in g o f P ow ers in E u rope, 769­ T urkey).
71 (N o. 530), 777 (N o. 5 3 6 ); E m p eror K h a r p u t -E r g a n a -M a d e n -B it lis -V a n (« . sub
N icholas I I on C ou n t W it t e ’ s sugges­ T u r k e y , A s ia tic T urkey).
tions, A p ril, 781 (N o. 5 3 7 ); P ersian oil M ed iterra n ea n -P ersia n G u lf (v. sub T u r k e y ,
concession, J u n e, S05 (N o. 5 5 2 ); v isit A s ia tic T urkey).
o f B ritish F leet to Russia. 811 (N o. 555). M e n d a li-K u t-e l-A m a r ( v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
P e te r s b u r 'is li C o u r ier : E m p eror W illia m II T u rkey ).
and T rip le A lliance, 778 (N o. 536). M es k en e-A lep p o (v. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
R ossia : pa cific d ecla ra tion s o f M . Sazonov, T urkey).
M a rch 1914, 762-3 (N o. 5 2 5 ); R usso- R a y a k -A le p p o (v. sub T urkey, A s ia tic
G erm an relations, co n c ilia to ry article, T urkey).
765 (N o. 527), 766 (N o. 528). R a y a k - L yd da - El A rish (r. sub T u r k e y ,
T urkish : A s ia tic T urkey).
In d iv id u a l p a p e r s : R a y a k -R a m le h (v. sub T urkey, A s ia tic
J eu n e J u r e : J ew ish d irection o f : criticism Turkey).
of B ritish p olicy and A ng lo-R u ssia n S a m su n -S iva s (v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic T urkey).
E n ten te . 1910, 6 (N o. 1 ); Ism ail H a k k i’ s S a n d u k ly -A fion K arah issar (v. sub T u r k e y ,
rep orts on con d ition o f a ffairs in M eso­ A sia tic T urkey).
pota m ia n V ila y ets, D ec., 10 (N o. 5). S m y rn a -A id in (v. sub T urkey, A sia tic
Jih a n -i-J slam : Case of A ziz A li, 1914, 83S T urkey).
( Ap P. lit). S o u lo u -S e r a i-Y o z g a t ( v. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
T anine : P o licy o f Y ou n g T u rk pa rty , T urkey).
a rticles by H ussein Jah id B ey, 1910, 6 S y r i a , r a i l w a y c o n c e s s i o n s i n (u . sub S y r i a ).
(N o. 1 ); Ism ail H a k k i B ey B a ba n za d e’ s T c h a lts -E rz in g h ia n -P e k irid j-E r z e ro u m (v.
rep orts on con d ition o f affairs in M eso­ sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic T urkey).
p ota m ia n V ila y ets, D ec. 1910, 10 (N o. T ch ou m ra -B ey sh eh ir (v. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
5), and K o w e it, and B ritish relation s T urkey).
w ith the Sheikh o f M oham m erah, 11 T ig ris R a ilw ay (u. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
(N o. 6 ); M r. M a llet on, A u g . 1911, 51 T o u rk h a l-Y o s g a t (v. sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
(N o. 3 7 ); con clu sion o f con ventions T urkey).
betw een T urkish G overnm ent and I'r e b izo n d -E rze r o u m (r. sub T u r k e y , A sia tic
B a g da d R a ilw a y C om p anv, M a rch 1911, T urkey).
34-35 (N o. 23). ‘ T r e b iz o n d -P e k irid j (i\ sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic
T urkey).
P R IN C IP E , IS L A N D . T r ip o li-H o in s -B a g d a d -P e r s ia n G u lf ( v . sub
B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
(v. sub P o r t u g a l : Colonies.)
Z ih le -Y o s g a t (v. sub T urkey, A s ia tic T urkey).

R A IL W A Y S . R E D SE A .
A d a -B a z a r -B o lo u (v . sub T urkey, A s ia tic A rm s s m u g g lin g : T urkish su ggestion of
T urkey). a rra n g em en t betw een Ita ly, T urkey,
A fou leh -J eru sa lem ( v . sub Turkey, A s ia tic F ra n ce and G reat B rita in to check, D ec.
T urkey). | 1910, 9 (N o. 5 ); Brussels C onferen ce,
A n a tolia n R a ilw a y (v. sub A n a t o l ia n R a il ­ b reak-dow n o f neg otia tion s, 9 (N o. 5).
w ay ). C oa lin g s t a t io n : T u rk ey had n ot allow ed
A r g h a n a -B it lis -V a n ( v . sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic G erm any to a cq uire, 14 (N o. 6, encl.).
Turkey).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y ( v. sub B a c d a d R a i l w a y ) . R H O D E S , Island of.
D a m a sc u s-B e y r o u th -M z e r ib (v. sub T u r k e y , 1Ita lia n concession, in clu d in g railw ays and
A sia tic T u rkey ). telegraphs, suggested, D ec. 1913, 275 (N o.
D a m a scu s-H a m a h (t\ sub T u r k e y , A s ia tic 182).
T urkey).
D a n u b e -A d r ia tic (r . sub D a n u b e - A d r i a t i c RUANDA.
R a i l w a y ). Cession of b y G erm any to G reat B rita in sug­
E g h ird ir, L ake - L ak e B eyshehir (r. sub gested. M arch 1912, 442 (N o. 276).
T u r k e y , A s ia tic T urkey).
E r z e ro u m -E rz in g h ia n -S iv a s (v. sub T u r k e y , R U M A N IA .
A sia tic T urkey). A u stria -H u n g a ry a n d : R u m a n ia ’ s changed
H a id a r P a s h a -K o n ia -E r e g li (r. sub B a g d a d a ttitu d e, M arch 1914, 770 (N o. 530).
R a i l w a y ). Russia a n d : V isit o f C row n P rin ce to St.
H a w za -C a sta m ou n i (v . sub T urkey, A s ia tic P etersb u rg h , fr ie n d ly relations of two
T urkey). coun tries, M a y 1914, 796 (N o. 546, encl.).
[1 09 00 1 3 0

R U S S IA .
A r m y : G erm an press on R ussian m ilita ry
prep a ra tion s, M a rch 1914, 754—5 (N o.
5 1 8 ); H err von T sch irsch ky on, 764 (N o.
5 2 6 ); S ir G. B uch an a n on R u ssia n m ili­
t a ry position , increases o f arm y up to
1917, 767-8 (N o. 528), 768 (N o. 5 29 );
M ilita r y prep a ra tion s a p prov ed, 1914, 779
( ed . n ote).
In tern a l situ ation , H e r r von T schirschky on,
M a rch 1914, 764 (N o. 526).
N a v al arm am ents (v . sub A r m a m e n t s , N a v a l ) .
G en eral F o r e ig n P o l i c y : S peech b y M.
S a zon ov rev iew in g in tern a tion a l situ a ­
tio n , M a y 1914, 794-7 (N o. 546, encl.).
A rm en ia ( v . sub A r m e n i a ).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y (v . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
M ed iterra n ea n (v. sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n ).
P ersia n G u lf questions ( v . sub P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
A u s tria -H u n g a ry and {v . sub A u s t r ia - I
H u n g a r y , {Russia and).
F ra n ce a n d : M ilita r y C on ven tion betw een,
583 (N o. 383), 584 (N o. 3 8 4 ); N a val C on- |
ve n tio n suggested, and th a t G rea t B r ita in !
should join , M ay 1912, 583 (N o. 383), 584
(N o. 3 8 4 ); F ra n co-R u ssia n naval con v en ­
tio n con clu d ed, A u g ., 607 (N o. 407), 617
(N o. 4 1 8 ); S ir A . N icolson on effect o f
G rea t B r it a in ’ s jo in in g R u ssia
F ra n ce, 608 (N o. 4 0 7 ); effect on G erm an
press, 608-9 (N o. 408).
F ra n co-R u ssia n general relations, 1912, S ir
F . B ertie on, 617 (N o. 4 1 8 ); V is it of
E m p eror N icholas I I to B erlin and
con v ersation w ith M . Jules Cam bon,
M a y 1913, 704 (N o. 477).
F ren ch finan cial assistance tow ards m ilita ry
purposes, M a rch 1914, 756 (N o. 519), 764
(N o. 5 2 6 ); F ren ch and R u ssia n a ttitu d e
b elieved to be m en a cin g to G erm any,
764 (N o. 526).
F ra n co-R u ssia n alliance, M . S a zon ov on,
_ M a y 1914, 794 (N o. 546, encl.).
T rip le E n te n te (v. sub T r e a t i e s , E n te n te ,
T riple).
G erm a n y a n d : F ra n co-R u ssia n N a val C on- j
v en tion , A u g . 1912, a ttitu d e o f G erm an '
press to, 608-9 (N o. 408).
M e e tin g a t B a ltic P o rt, J u ly 1912: G erm an
press com m ent on F ra n co-R u ssia n N a val
C on v en tion in relation to, 609 (N o. 4 0 8 );
m eetin g o f tw o E m p erors, 656 (N o. 451).
R u ssia on frien d ly term s w ith G erm any,
A u g . 1912, 656-7 (N o. 451).
L im a n von Sanders M ission, 1 9 1 3 -4 • N eg o­
tia tion s w ith G erm any, F ren ch and
B ritish su p p ort and m easures o f coer­
cion a ga in st T u rk ey , 779 {ed. n o te).
V is it o f E m p eror N ich ola s I I to B erlin ,
1913, 703 (N o. 476), 704 (N o. 477).
R usso-G erm an tension, M a rc h -J u n e 1914:
A r ticle in K öln isch e Z e it u n g , M a rch 13,
Russian m ilita ry p rep a ra tion s,
a pprehensions as to any im m ed ia te
d a n g er from R ussia, 754 (N o. 5 1 8 );
B e rlin er T a g eb la tt, no reason fo r any
uneasiness a t the p resen t m om ent, 755
908
R U S S I A — ( c o n t i n u e d ).
G erm a n y and, 1914— (c o n t in u e d ):
R usso-G erm an tension, & c.— {c o n tin u e d ):
(N o. 5 1 8 ); V ossische Z eitu n g , dis­
cou n ts the a larm ist ta lk, 755 (N o. 518);
L ok a l-A n zeig er, sim ilar sense, 755 (No.
5 1 8 ); G erm an Am bassador at St.
P etersb u rg h den ies a uthorship of
a rticle in K öln isch e Z e it u n g : M.
S azonov on, p rojected arm am ents for
pu rely d efensive pu rposes, 758 (N o. 520);
G erm an P ress-B u reau w ork in g up a
w ar-scare, 758 (N o. 520, m in . ) ; S ir E.
G rey and P rin ce L ichnow sky unable to
und ersta n d o rig in o f press a gitation ,
increase of R ussian arm y n ot directed
aga in st G erm any, 758-9 (N o. 5 21 ); Sir
E. G rey and C ou n t B en ck en d orf on,
759 (N o. 5 2 2 ); G eneral B ern h ardi on
necessity fo r b ein g prepared , even for
a w ar in im m ed ia te fu tu re, 761 (No.
52 3 ); F r a n k fu r te r Z e it u n g ’s reassurance
in reg a rd to R usso-G erm an r e la t io n s :
P rofessor S chiem an n on a nim osity of
R u ssia n press, G erm an prepa ra tion s
d efensive only, 761-2 (N o. 5 2 4 ); pacific
decla ra tion s o f M . Sazonov, Germ an
com m ent d iscou n tin g the press a gita ­
t io n : H e r r v on J a g ow on, 762-3 (No.
and 5 2 5 ); H e r r v on T schirschky on Russian
a ttitu d e tow ards G erm any, a ttitu d e of
F ra n ce and R u ssia m ena cin g, no im m e­
d ia te con fla g ra tion apprehended , 764-5
(N o. 5 2 6 ); in spired a rticle in B ourse
G a ze tte , R ussia prep a red fo r w ar, a tti­
tu d e tow ards G erm an press attack s, 765
(N o. 527), 766 (N o. 528), con tra d ictory
policies o f R ussian M in ister of F oreign
A ffairs and o f W a r, 765 (N o. 527), 766-7
(N o. 5 2 8 ); S ir G. B uch an a n on R usso-
G erm an relations, m otives fo r press
' a tta ck , relativ e m ilita ry positions, 767-8
(N o. 528), 768 (N o. 5 2 9 ); S ir A. N icolson
believes th a t G erm any w ill do her
utm ost to w in ov er R ussia, 768 (No.
528, m in. ) ; the press ca m p a ig n has
shown th a t n eith er R u ssia nor Germ any
desires w a r : allia n ce betw een Russia,
F ra n ce, G erm any an d E n glan d , dis­
cussed in the N o v o e V rem ya , M arch
1914; E m p eror W illia m I I and C ount
W itte on alliance betw een R ussia,
G erm any and F ra n ce : R ussian attitu de
tow ards G erm any in relation to T riple
A llia n ce and T rip le E n te n te , 769-71
(N o. 5 3 0 ); S ir A. N ico lso n ’ s belief in
an im p en din g ch a n g e in Russo-G erm an
relations, R u ssia m ay g ra v ita te tow ards
G erm any, 773-4 (N o. 5 3 3 ); relax a tion
of tension, B erlin C a bin et noit bellicose,
774 {ed. note) : E m p eror W illia m I I and
an a lliance w ith R ussia , 7 77-8 (N o. 536);
C ou n t W it t e ’ s view th a t R ussia should
no establish closest possible relation s with
G erm any, S ir G. B u ch an a n on, 778 (No.
5 3 6 ); E m p eror N ich ola s I I on ques­
tion s w hich keep G erm any and Russia
a p a rt, A p ril 1914, 781 (N o. 5 3 7 ); H err

R U S S IA — ( co n tin u e d ).
G erm a n y and, 1 9 1 — (c o n tin u e d ):
R usso-G erm an tension, &c.— (con tin u ed ) :
von J a g o w ’ s a tta ck on R ussian p ress:
R ussia b ecom in g uneasy a t G erm a n y ’ s
a ttitu d e , b elie f th a t w ar is alm ost
in e v it a b le : S ir A. N icolson ’ s con tra ry
b elief, M a y 1914, 745 (N o. 5 1 0 ); F ren ch
assum p tion th a t G erm any w ould m ake
efforts to d etach R ussia from F ren ch
A llian ce, 787 (N o. 5 4 1 ); H e r r von J a g ow
v ery a n ti-R u ssian , 792 (N o. 5 4 5 ); M.
S azonov on gen era l relations; M ay 1914,
h op e th a t press polem ics w ill cease, the
con clu sion o f a new T rea ty o f C om ­
m erce, 795 (N o. 546, e n cl.); H e r r von
J ag ow on R ussian p u b lic o p in ion , a w ar
a ga in st G erm a ny w ould be pop u la r,
J u n e, 8 02 -3 (N o. 550).
G rea t B r ita in a n d :
G en eral rela tion s, 1912: F u tu re p olicy and
q uestion o f m utual assistance, M a v 1912,
583 (N o. 383), 584 (N o. 384).
B ritish assistance to F ra n ce and R ussia in
e v en t o f an a tta ck b y G erm any and
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y : K in g G eorg e V on,
D ec. 1912, 658 (N o. 452), 673 (N o. 4 6 0 );
S ir E . G rey on, 658 (N o. 453).
N a val C on v en tion , F ra n co-R u ssia n , sug­
gested, M a y 1 9 1 2 : G rea t B r ita in to be
in vited to jo in , 583 (N o. 383), 584 (N o.
3 8 4 ); F ra n co-R u ssia n N aval C onven­
tion con clu d ed , A u g ., 607 (N o. 4 0 7 ); S ir
A. N icolson on effect o f G rea t B r it a in ’ s
jo in in g R u ssia and F ra n ce, 608 (N o.
4 0 7 ); S ir E. G rey ’ s den ial o f an A n g lo-
R ussian naval a greem ent, J u n e 1914,
753 (N o. 517), 801 (N o. 548).
G en eral rela tion s, 1913 : M oham m erah : A n g lo-
T urkish d r a ft agreem en t to he com m u n i­
ca ted to R ussia, M a y 1913, 116 (ed. n ote).
1 A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s re B a g d a d R a il­
w ay, &c., M a y 1913, M . S a zon ov ’ s a t ti­
tu d e tow ards, 123-4 (N o. 74), S ir E.
G re y ’ s ex p la n a tion to, 124 (N o. 7 5 );
R ussian a ttitu d e, 131 (N o. 8 3 ); A n g lo-
T urkish con v en tion s and d ecla ra tion s
com m u n ica ted to R ussia, 157 (N o. 102).
A nglo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s re B a g d a d R a il­
way, &c., M a y 1913: R ussia t o be
in form ed , 132 (N o. 83, m in . ) ; A n g lo-
G erm an agreem ents com m u n ica ted to
R ussia, R u ssia in vited to con clu d e sim i­
la r agreem ents w ith G rea t B rita in ,
A p ril 1914, 366 (N o. 2 2 8 ); R ussia pre­
pa red to adhere, proposal to ex ch a n g e
notes h a v in g b in d in g force, 370 (N o.
2 3 1 ); T ex t o f N otes ex ch a n g ed , 377-81
(N o. 236, and encls.).
A nglo-G erm a n n eg otia tion s re P ortu g u ese
C o lo n ie s : R ussia w ou ld reg a rd an
A n g lo-G erm a n A g reem en t w ith some
a n xiety , N ov. 1913, 545 (N o. 3 4 6 ); no
new a greem en t und er discussion b u t a
m odifica tion o f 1898 A g reem en t, 545-6
(N o. 346, m in . ) ; M . S a zon ov ’ s a n x iety as
t o scope o f n eg otia tion s, 546 (N o. 3 4 7 );
in form a tion con cern in g 1898 A g reem en t
[10900]
909
R U S S IA — (con tin u ed ).
G rea t B rita in an d— (c o n t in u e d ):
G en eral relation s, 1913— (c o n t in u e d ):
. and present revision to be com m u n i­
cated, 5 46-7 (N o. 3 4 8 ); no new a gree­
m ent un d er discussion, present revised
a greem en t to be published shortly, 547
(N o. 349).
N a val d isp o sitio n s: E m p eror W illia m II on
a lleged B ritish efforts to in du ce R ussia
to send a squadron to S cotlan d w hilst
B ritish ships w ere in M ed iterra n ean ,
1913, 707, 709 (N o. 482).
G en eral rela tion s, 1914:
A ng lo-R u ssia n C on v en tion , 1907: S ir G.
B uchanan on fra g ile fou n d a tion of, 775
(N o. 5 3 4 ); vague ch a ra cter o f th e un d er­
s ta n d in g : M . S a zon ov ’ s suggestion of
co n v e rtin g u n d ersta n din g in to a d e­
fensive a llia n ce : R ussia dou bts B ritish
su p p ort in a war, M arch 1914, 778-9
(N o 5 3 6 ): the E m p eror N ich ola s w ould
like an alliance o f a defensive nature,
su ggestion o f conversations fo r co-op era ­
t ion o f B ritish and R ussian fle e t s : Sir
G. B uchanan on, 780-1 (N o. 5 3 7 ); M.
S azonov on stren gth en in g th e un d er­
sta n din g as a w arn in g to G erm any, 782
(N o. 5 3 7 ); Russia w ould like an a gree­
m ent th a t E n glan d w ould g iv e her
arm ed s u p p o r t : S ir G. B uchanan on,
and possib ility o f e x te n d in g th e A g ree­
m en t o f 1907 by an ex ch a n g e o f notes,
784 (N o. 5 3 8 ); F ren ch wish to see the
A n g lo-R u ssia n u n d ersta n d in g ta ke a
m ore precise form , 784 (N o. 538), 785
(N o. 5 3 9 ); S ir A . N icolson on necessity
fo r tig h te n in g ties w ith R ussia and
p olicy o f definite alliances, 786 (N o.
5 4 0 ); an a llia nce im possible, 786 (N o.
540), 787 (N o. 5 4 1 ); K in g G eorg e V ’ s
letter to E m p eror N icholas I I re
A n g lo-R u ssia n relations, J u n e 16, 1914,
801 (N o. 5 4 9 ); q uestion o f com m u n i­
ca tin g to R ussia A n g lo-F ren ch position ,
m ilita ry assistance a m a tter o f B ritish
p u b lic op in ion , M ay, 787-9 (N o. 541),
788 (ed. n o te) ; cop y o f S ir E. G rey ’ s
letter o f N ov. 22, 1912, to M . P au l
Cam hon to he com m u n ica ted to R ussia,
789 (N o. 542), com m unica ted, 790 (N o.
5 4 3 ); a m ilita ry arra n gem en t im possi­
ble, 789 (N o. 5 4 2 ); H e r r von J a g ow on
valu e o f B ritish u n d ersta n d in g w ith
R ussia, 792 (N o. 5 4 5 ); S ir E. G rey
assures P rin ce L ichnow sky th a t no
a lliance or C on v en tion exists betw een
E n g la n d and F ra n ce, an d E n g la n d and
R ussia, 809 (ed. n ote).
N a v a l c o -o p e r a t io n : E m p eror N icholas II
suggests conversations, A p ril 1914, 780-1
(N o. 5 3 7 ); B ritish view s on an in ter­
cha nge o f views betw een naval staffs,
783 (N o. 537, m in . ) ; S ir G. B uchanan
on p ossib ility o f an in terch a n g e o f
I view s, 784 (N o. 5 3 8 ); S ir A. N icolson on
an u n d ersta n din g betw een naval
1 a u th orities as to action in certain
3 0 2

R U S S IA — ( con tin u ed ).
G rea t B rita in a n d — (c o n t in u e d ):
G en eral re la tio n s, 1914— (c o n t in u e d ):
even tu alities, 786 (N o. 5 4 0 ); S ir E. G rey
on e x ten t o f n a va l con v ersation s and
use o f B ritish fleet, M a y , 7 87-8 (N o.
5 4 1 ); n eg otia tion s fo r co-op era tion of
navies, 788 {ed. n o t e ) ; R u ssia in form ed
of F ren ch and B ritish na va l and m ili­
ta ry conversations, 789 (N o. 542), 790
(N o. 5 4 3 ); conversations to ta ke place
at L on don , 790 (N o. 5 4 3 ); re p o rt of
naval u n d ersta n d in g in B e rlin er T a g e­
blatt, 791 (N o. 544), 793 (N o. 545),
Ju n e, 753 (N o. 517), 800 {ed. n o te ), 802
(N o. 5 5 0 ); naval con su lta tion s held, 797
{ed. n o t e ) ; G rea t B r ita in in no haste
abou t a naval con v en tion , 797 {ed.
n o t e ) ; S ir E. G rey criticises the in dis­
cretion s o f G erm an and oth er new s­
papers, 800 {ed. n o t e ) ; questions asked
in H ou se o f Com m ons as to ex isten ce o f
any naval agreem en t or n e g o t ia t io n s :
S ir E. G rey 's reply, J une,
(N o. 5 4 8 ); B e rlin er T a g eb la tt
M a n ch e ste r G uardian on S ir E. G re y ’ s
statem ent, 804 (N o. 5 5 1 ); S ir E. G rey
on harm b ein g don e b y persisten t
rep orts o f an agreem ent, 809 {ed. n o te ),
808 (N o. 5 5 4 ); M . S azonov a n xiou s
th a t naval con versation s should n ot be
deferred , 812 (N o. 5 5 6 ); E m p eror
N icholas I I on, 812 (N o. 5 5 6 ); S ir E.
G rey ’ s in ten tion to delay m atters, C ou n t
B en ck en d orff on, 812 {ed. n o t e ) ; S ir G.
B u ch a n a n ’ s den ial o f any p a rt in n eg o­
tia tion s, 813 {ed. n o t e ); con v ersation s
held, R ussian N a val A tta c h e u n able to
discuss m atters, J u ly , 814 (N o. 559).
B ritish su p p ort fo r R ussia, S ir G. B u chanan
on, M arch 1914, 768 (N o. 528), 768-9
(N o. 5 2 9 ); S ir A . N icolson on, 774 (N o.
533).
V is it o f B ritish F ir st B a ttle Cruiser S q u ad­
ron to R u s s ia : very cord ial recep tion
of, J u n e 1914, 810-1 (N o. 555), 810
(N o. 556), 813 {ed. n ote).
A n glo-R u ssia n re la t io n s : S ir A . N icolson on
necessity o f determ in in g w hether they
shall be really in tim a te o r else div erg e
in to a nother path, J u ly 1914, 821
_ {A p p . I).
T r ip a r tite a greem ent, J a p a n , R ussia and
G rea t B rita in , su ggestion of, J u ly 1914,
821 {A p p . I ). ' E n te n te discussions, 776 (N o. 5 34 );
A n g lo-R u ssia n n eg otia tion s, A p r il-J u ly 1914:
A fg h a n ista n : R ussian and B ritish position ,
776-7 (N o. 535).
M o n g o li a : Q uestion o f open d oor and
differen tia l trea tm en t, 775 (N o. 534) ;
R ussian and B ritish interests, 776 (N o.
535).
P e r s ia : T rans-P ersian R a ilw ay , N eu tral
Z on e, 775 (N o. 5 3 4 ); S ir E. G rey on
Russian policy, q uestion o f n eutral
sphere, and P ersia as a neu tra l buffer
S ta te, M a rch 1914, 776-7 (N o. 5 3 5 );
qu estion o f T ra n s-P ersia n R a ilw ay , 777
910
R U S S IA — {con tin u ed ).
G rea t B r ita in and, 1914— (c o n t in u e d ):
A n g lo-R u ssia n n eg otia tion s, & c.— (con tin u ed ) :
(N o. 5 3 5 ); the E m p eror N icholas I I sug­
gests th a t th e u n d ersta n d in g ou g h t t o be
ex ten ded , 781 (N o. 5 3 7 ); tra ns-P ersia n
R a ilw a y schem e, em ploym en t o f R ussian
troop s and th e Sw edish G endarm erie,
782 (N o. 5 3 7 ); ex ch a n g e o f view s sug­
gested, 783 (N o. 537, m in .); H e r r von
J a g ow oil the disa dva n tages to G reat
B rita in o f the u n d ersta n d in g , M ay, 792
(N o. 5 4 5 ); S ir E . G rey ’ s decision t o
discuss P ersian m atters, den ial o f a
press ca m pa ign a ga in st R ussia, state­
m ent o f B ritish p osition and view s on
P ersian m a tters com m u n ica ted, Ju n e,
798-800 (N o. 547, e n c l.); K in g
G eorge V ’s le tte r to E m p eror
N icholas I I re, 801 (N o. 5 4 9 ); discussed
by M . Sa zon ov and S ir G. B uchanan,
8 04-5 (N o. 5 5 2 ); and b y E m p eror
N ich ola s I I and S ir G. B uchanan, 805-^6
801 (N o. 553), 811 (N o. 556), and by M.
and Sazonov and S ir G. B uchanan, 8 0 7 -8
(N o. 5 5 3 ); M . S a zon ov ’ s a ttitu d e m ay
be in fluen ced by B ritish a ttitu d e
tow ards naval q uestion, 812 (N o. 5 56 );
S ir E. G rey ’ s ex p la n a tion o f position
con cern in g pu rchase o f shares o f the
A n g lo-P ersia n Oil C om p any, J u ly 813
(N os. 5 5 7 -8 ); R ussian rep ly to B ritish
m em orandum on situ a tion in P ersia ,
815-20 (N o. 561, en c l.); B ritish view s on
u n sa tisfa ctory n a tu re o f rep ly, 820 (N o.
561, m in.).
T h i b e t : O vertures to R u ssia w ith reg a rd
to C on v en tion w ith China and T h ib et
n ot fa v ou ra b ly received by M . Sazonov,
M a y 1914, 745 (N o. 5 1 0 ); B ritish con ­
cessions and R ussian in terests, 775 (N o.
5 3 4 ); G rea t B r ita in w ill w ant v ery
little as regard s T h ib et, 776-7 (N o. 5 35 );
T hibetan question m ay be in fluen ced b y
the na va l question, J u n e 1914, 812 (N o.
556).
T rip le E n t e n t e : R u ssia n su ggestion that.
E n te n te P ow ers should th rou g h th eir
represen ta tives in L on d on establish
com m u n ity o f th eir view s, F eb. 1914,
774-5 {ed. n o t e ) ; S ir G. B uchanan on
p olicy o f sim ultaneous discussion o f
questions w ith R ussia, 775 (N o. 5 34 );
M. S a zon ov ’ s m ention of T rip le
ex te n t o f discussions in L on don , M arch,
776 (N o. 5 3 4 ); S ir E. G rey agrees w ith
idea o f a gen era l discussion w ith R u ssia ,
b u t hesitates to propose it a t presen t,
776-7 (N o. 5 3 5 ); M . Sazonov on an
u n d ersta n d in g w hich w ould con fron t
G erm any w ith the u n ited forces o f the
th ree P ow ers, A p ril, 782 (N o. 5 3 7 ); M .
Sa zon ov on the tra n sform a tion o f the
T rip le E n te n te in a new T rip le A llia n c e ,
783 {ed. n o te), 7 94-5 (N o. 546, encl.).
{v. also sub T r e a t i e s : E n t e n te , T riple).
Ita ly and (v. sub I t a l y : R u ssia and).
 911
R U S S IA — (c on tin u ed ). SLAVERY.
J a pan a n d : T rip a rtite a greem ent, J ap an , Suggested referen ce to a n ti-slavery conferen ce
R ussia and G reat B r ita in , suggested, at Brussels, 1890, in A n glo-G erm an A gree­
J u ly 1914, 821 (A p p . 1). m ent, June 1913, 531 (X o. 334, en cl. ) ; Sir
P ersia and ( v. sub P e r s i a : R ussia a n d ; and E y re C row e’ s ob jection s to, B ritish and
also sub R u s s i a : G rea t B r ita in a n d : G erm an policy to slavery and P ortu g u ese
A n g lo-R u ssia n neg otia tion s, A p r il-J u ly colonies, 532 (X o . 334, m in. ) ; ob jection to
1914). in clu sion in A greem en t com m unicated to
R um ania a n d : V isit o f Crow n P rin ce to St. P rin ce L ichnow sky, J une 1913, 534 (X o .
P etersb u rg h , frien d ly relation s o f th e tw o 336).
cou n tries, M a y 1914, 796 (N o. 546, encl.).
S P A IX .
T u rk ey and (v. sub T u r k e y : B ussia and).
T rip le A llia n c e : Spanish a ttitu d e tow ards,
B a g d a d R a i l w a y ( v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ) .
1912, 587-8 (X o . 386).
F ra n ce a n d : F ren ch fresh proposals re te rri­
S A X P A U L D E L O A X D A , p ort. to ria l arrangem ents in M orocco, M a y
B ritish A d m ira lty view s on abandonm ent o f 1912, 584 (X o . 3 8 4 ); Spanish proposal,
t o G erm any, J u ly 1912, 486-7 (X o . 316, J u n e, 596 (X o . 393).
e n c l.); >1. P o in ca re on, 556 (X o . 3 6 1 ); M ed iterra n ean discussions and relations (».
A n g lo-G erm a n A g reem en t and, 560 (X o . sub M e d it e r r a n e a n : S pa in and:
364). F rench-S panish discussions).
G reat B rita in a n d : M ed iterra n ean discussions
and relations (i\ sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n :
S A X T H O M E IS L A X D . S pain and : A nglo-S pa n ish relation s and
(» . sub P o r t u g a l : Colonies.) discussions).
S T R A IT S — BO SPH O R U S AXD DAR­
SE A L IS L A X D . D AXELLES.
P e n g u in and Seal Islands (r . sub P e n g u in a n d F ra n co-R u ssian Xaval C onvention, 1912,
S e a l I s l a n d s ).
b elieved to con ta in a prom ise by F ra n ce
t o assist R ussia in op en in g D ardanelles,
SECRET AG REEM EXTS. 608 (X o . 4 0 S ); R ussian plans to seize
A n g lo -F re n ch n a va l conversations, 1912: S ir S tra its in event o f E u rop ea n com p lica ­
E. G rey ’ s o b jection to e x ch a n g in g secret tions, 1914, 779 (ed. n o t e ) ; E m peror
X o to s , 604 (X o . 402). X ich olas II on G erm an policy, A p ril 191S,
B ritish p o lic y tow ards, and S ir E. G rey ’ s view s 781 (X o . 5 3 7 ); M . S azonov on, 782 (X o.
u p on (v. sub P o r t u g a l : C olon ies: A n g lo- 5 3 7 ); S ir E. G rey denies rep orts o f an
G erm an d iscu ssion s: A nglo-G erm a n secret A n g lo-R u ssia n b arga in a bout th e open in g
A greem en t, p u b lica tion of. A lso sub o f the Straits, J une. 809 (ed. n o te), 809-10
P o r t u g a l : G reat B r ita in a n d : A lliance). (X o . 5-54).
B ritish statem ents re: by M r. A squith, SW EDEN.
X o v . 27, 1911, 436 (X o . 2 7 2 ); M a rch 10, N e u tr a lit y : in ten tion not to abandon a policy
1913, 688 (X o . 466, n o te ) ; M a rch 24, 1913, of, Jan . 1914, 731 (X o . 496).
6S9 (X o . 4 6 7 ); by S ir E. G rev, J u n e 11, M. de Seavenius on h er fear o f R ussia, M ay
1914, SOI (X o . 548). 1914, 743 (X o . 507).
M arquis d i San G iu lia n o on a d v isab ility of
in form in g I t a ly ’s allies o f F ra n co -Ita lia n S Y R IA .
secret A g reem en t : q uestion o f an a gree­ F ren ch desire to com plete system o f Syrian
m ent w ith G rea t B r ita in and p u b licity of, railw ays, M a rch 1911, 37 (N o. 2 4' ; F ren ch
1912, 627 (X o . 427). p olicv d irected tow ards S vria, M a y 1913,
123 (X o . 73).
(F o r F ran co-G erm an n eg otia tion s about
S E R Y IA . railw ays in A sia tic T urkey, v. sub
R a ilw a y : D a n u b e -A d r ia tic p r o je c t : F ren ch T u r k e y : A sia tic T urkey.)
in terest in, M a rch 1911, 37 (X o . 24). F ren ch claim s for a sphere o f in terest in,
A u s tria -H u n g a ry a n d : S itu a tion , D ec. 1912, H err von J ag ow on, Jan. 1913, 660 (N o.
6 58-9 (N o. 4 5 3 ); O riental R a ilw ay s ques­ 454).
tion , M a rch 1914, 756 (X o . 519V * F ra n co-S y ria u C om m ittee in P aris, 1913
M o n ten e g r o a n d : In dep en den ce o f M on ten e­ ( i\ su b A rab N a t io n a l M o v e m e n t ).
g ro, H e r r von J a g ow on, J an . 1913, 659 G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards any exclu sion o f
(X o . 454). G erm any from Asia M in or or S yria by
T rip le E n te n te , Jan . 1913, 660 (X o . 454).
G rea t B rita in w ill proba b ly ask for oil con­
S H A T T -E L -A R A B .
( v. sub P e r s i a n G u l f .) cessions in S yria, A u g . 1913, 213 (X o .
1 39 ); A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention
in itia lled , J u n e 1914, 396 (ed. n o te );
S H E R IF F , G R A X D . T urkish request fo r su p p ort in resisting
Of M ecca , proposed rev olt and L ord dem ands b v F ra n ce and R ussia, 411
K itc h e n e r ( r . sub A r a b iaand M e c c a ) . (X o . 252). '

T H IB E T .
( v. sub R u s s i a , G rea t B r ita in and : A n g lo-
R ussian n eg otia tion s, A p r il-J u ly 1914.)
T IM O R .
A u stra lia and (v . sub A u s t r a l i a ) .
G erm a n y and (v . sub P o r t u g a l : C olonies).
G rea t B r ita in and (v. sub P ortugal :
Colonies).
H olla n d and (v. sub P o r t u g a l : C olonies).
T R E A T I E S , A G R E E M E N T S , A L L IA N C E S ,
C O N V E N T IO N S , &c. ( v. also sub S e c r e t
A g r e e m e n t s ).
A llia n ce, T rip le (M ay 20, 1882, and la ter).
P o lit ic a l situ ation in E u rop e dom in a ted
by g ro u p in g o f P ow ers in T rip le and D u al
A lliances, M ay 1912, 586 (N o. 386) ; ev acu a ­
tion o f M ed iterra n ean b y B ritish nava.
forces and its effect up on th e P ow ers and
m em bers o f the T rip le A llian ce, 5 86 -9
(N o. 3 8 6 ); M ed iterra n ean questions not
cov ered b y the A llian ce, 586 (N o. 386),
593 (N o. 391) ; effect o f T rip le A llia n ce
P ow ers g a in in g a fo o tin g on coa st of
N orth A fric a , 620-1 (N o. 4 1 9 ); B ritish
in form a tion reg a rd in g n a tu re o f the
A llian ce, N ov., 627 (N o. 427, and n o te ( 3) ) ;
rela tiv e naval pow er o f A llia n ce and
T rip le E n te n te , 191-3, 641 (N o. 439,
encl. 2) ; A u s tro-H u n g a ria n and Ita lia n
position , M arch 1915, 770 (N o. 5 3 0 );
E m p eror W illia m I I on valu e o f the
A llian ce, 778 (N o. 536).
I ta ly and : Ita lia n position in the A llian ce,
J u n e 1912, 598 (N o. 396) ; S ir R . R o d d
on; 620 (N o. 419) ; Ita lia n o b lig a tion s
pu rely defen sive, 627 (N o. 427) ; S ir
E y re C row e on u n d esira b ility of
cr e a tin g th e im pression th a t G rea t
B rita in was schem ing to deta ch I ta ly
from th e A llian ce, 630 (N o. 427, m in.) ;
S ir E. G rey on, 633 (N o. 429) ; Ita ly m ay
be im pelled to join th e T rip le E n te n te
ra th er than the T rip le A llian ce, 1913,
642 (N o. 439, m in.) ; Ita lia n position ,
ISla rch 1914, 770 (N o. 530), G erm any
and Ita lia n position in th e A llia n ce
M ay, 787 (N o. 541).
R en ew a l o f : in clu sion o f M ed iterra n ean
questions, M ay 1912, 593 (N o. 391) ; and
th e F ra n co -Ita lia n secret agreem ent,
1902, 623-4 (N o. 424) ; Ita lia n a ttitu d e
to renew al of, J an . 1913, 634 (N o. 430) ;
no m odification o f t e x t or any subse­
q uen t a d d ition , 643 (N o. 4 4 0 ); F ren ch
and Ita lia n press on renew al of, M a rch
1914, 644 (N o. 4 4 1 ); F ren ch belief in a
m odifica tion o f the A llian ce, Ita lia n
den ial, A p ril, 6 44-5 (N o. 442), 646-7 (N o.
4 4 4 ); M ay, 649 (N o. 446), 651 (N o.
448) ; M. P a u l Cam bon ready to a cce p t
Italia n assurances, 652 (N o. 449).
T u rk ey and : Press articles show ing in clin a ­
tion tow ards T rip le A llian ce, 1910, 6
(N o. 1).
( v . also sub A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ; G e r m a n y ;
I t a l y .)
912
T R E A T I E S , A G R E E M E N T S , A L L IA N C E S ,
C O N V E N T IO N S , & c.— {con tin u ed ).
E n te n te , T r ip le : G rea t B r ita in , F ra n ce and
R ussia : T u rk ey : P ress articles in veigh in g
a ga in st T rip le E n te n te , 1910, 6 (N o. 1),
G erm an a ttitu d e tow ards any exclu sion of
G erm a ny from A sia M in o r and Sy ria by
T rip le E n te n te , Jan . 1913, 660 (N o. 454);
S ir E. G rey ’ s view th a t th ree P ow ers can­
n ot tre a t A sia M in or as M orocco, if there
is to be a p a rtitio n G erm any m ust be in
it, 663 (N o. 4 5 5 ); E m p eror W illia m I I on
E nglish allia n ce w ith tw o n a tion s h a ving
offensive a greem ents a ga in st G erm any,
701 (N o. 4 7 5 ); C ou n t W it te on, R ussian
position in T rip le E n t e n te and relation
t o T rip le A llian ce P ow ers, 771 (N o. 530),
777 (N o. 5 3 6 ); R ussian su ggestion th a t the
th ree P ow ers should th rou g h th eir repre­
i sentatives a t L on d on establish the com ­
| m u n ity o f th eir view s, 774-5 (ed. note)-,
lack o f solid arity in E n te n te as against
the T rip le A llian ce, 778 (N o. 5 36 ); M.
Sa zon ov on an u n d ersta n d in g which
w ould con fro n t G erm any w ith united
forces o f three P ow ers, A p ril 1914, 782
(N o. 5 3 7 ); M. S a zon ov on transform a­
tion of the E n te n te in to a new T riple
A llian ce, 783 (ed. n o te ), and solidarity
o f the E n te n te , 784 (N o. 5 3 8 ); S ir A.
N icolson on, 786 (N o. 5 4 0 ); detachm ent
o f R u ssia from , 787 (N o. 5 4 1 ); B erlin er
T a q eb latt on a ttem p t t o tra n sform the
E n te n te in to an a lliance, M ay 1914, 791
(N o. 5 4 4 ); M. S a zon ov on Russian
position in th e E n t e n te and the sugges­
tion of co n v e r tin g it in to a T riple
A llian ce, 794-5 (N o. 546, e n c l.); S ir E.
G re y ’ s assurance to P rin ce Lichnow sky
th a t there was no allia n ce between
E n g lan d and F ra n ce, and E n g lan d and
Russia, J u n e, 809 (ed. n o te ), a grow th of
in tim a cy betw een ju st as though they
w ere allies, 809 (ed. n o te ).
A n a tolia n R a ilw a y A g reem en t, 1904, 213 (No.
139), 214 (N o. 140).
A n g lo-F ren ch A g reem en t, A p ril 8, 1904, 616
(N o. 418).
A n g lo-F ren ch D ecla ra tion re E g y p t and
M orocco, A p ril 8, 1904, 650 (N o. 447).
A n g lo-F ra n co-S p a n ish M ed iterra n ean A gree­
m ent, M a y 16, 1907, 500 (N o. 322), 597
(N o. 395), 616 (N o. 418).
A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion re B a g d a d Railw ay,
in itia lled J u n e 15, 1914, 398-408 (N o. 249).
A n g lo-G erm a n S ecret A g reem en t, A ug. 30,
1 8 9 8 : A nglo-G erm a n discussions (v. sub
P o r t u g a l : C o lo n ie s : A nglo-G erm a n dis­
cussions).
A n g lo -K o w e it A g reem en t, J a n . 23, 1899, T ext,
107 (N o. 68).
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese D ecla ra tion o f O ctober 14,
1899, 424 (N o. 266), 425 (N o. 267), 436 (N o.
272), 437 (N o. 272, m in.), 438 (N o. 273),
4S4 (ed. n o te), 507 (ed. n o te ) (v.
also sub P o r t u g a l : A n g lo-P ortu g u ese
A llian ce).
 913
T R E A T I E S , A G R E E M E N T S , A L L IA N C E S ,
C O N V E N T IO N S , A c.— ( co n tin u ed ).
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese D eclaration , A c .— {con ­
tin u ed ) :
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese A llia n ce : sum m ary of
v ariou s T rea ties, as g iven by S enb or
V nsconcellos in P ortu g u ese P arliam en t,
M arch 1912, 449-50 (N o. 282, encl.)
{v. also sub P o r t u g a l : A n g lo -P o rtu ­
guese A lliance).
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese, 1661, confirm ed 1899, 484
(ed. note).
A n g lo-P ortu g u ese A r b itra tio n T rea tv, N ov. 16,
1904, 455 (N o. 287), 4S3-4 {e d .'n o t e ).
A n g lo-R u ssia n C onvention, A ug. 31, 1907 :
T urkish a n ti-B ritish feelin g ow in g to
the e n te n te reg a rd in g P ersia and
A fgh a n ista n , 1910, 3, 6 (N o. 1 ) ; C ount
W i t t e ’ s a ttitu d e to the A g reem en t, 771
(N o. 530) (F o r proposals to ex ten d, v.
sub R u s s i a , G reat B r ita in and, G eneral
R elation s).
A n g lo-R u ssia n -J ap an ese gu a ra n tee c f A sia tic
possessions, discussed, 1914, S21-3 (.1pp. I).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re bou n da ries o f
A den, sign ed M a rch 9, 1914, 340-1
(N o. 211,.
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re m on opolies and
S in y r u a -A id in R a ilw ay , in itia lled J u n e 10,
1914, 396 {ed. note).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re n a v ig a tion o f
S h a tt-el-A ra b, in itia lled M a v 6, 1913,
109-14 (N o. 68. encl. 4), sign ed J u ly 29,
1913, 1S3-7 (N o. 1 2 4 ,: sup plem en tary
d ecla ra tion , sign ed O ctober 21, 1913, 242
{ed. note).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re P ersia n G ulf,
in itia lled Alay 6, 1913, 104-9 (N o. 68,
cncl. 3), sign ed J u ly 29, 1913, 190-6 (N o.
1241 : su p plem en tary conventions, sign ed
O ctober 21, 1913. 2 41-2 (N o. 155), sign ed
D ecem ber 10, 1913, 282 <N o. 187 ,.
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on v en tion re railw ays in Asia
M in or, in itia lled M ay 6, 1913, ioi— 3 (N o.
68. cncl. 2), in itia lled A u g u st 12, 1913,
203-6 (N o. 1331.
A n g lo-T u rk ish D ecla ra tion re n a v ig a tion of
T ig ris and E up h ra tes, in itia lled M a y 20,
1913, 158-9 (N o. 102, encl.), sign ed J u lv 29,
1913, 189-90 (N o. 1241; fu rth er d ecla ra ­
tions, in itia lled A u g u st 19, 1913, 213—4
(N o. 139), sign ed D ecem b er 10, 1913, 2 81-2
(N o. 186).
A n g lo-T u rk ish D ecla ra tion re T u rco-P ersia n
fron tier, in itia lled Alay 6, 1913, 100-1
(N o. 68, encl. 1), sign ed J u ly 29, 1913,
188-9 (N o. 124).
A n g lo-T u rk ish D ecla ra tion re T urkish
C ustom du ties, sign ed J u lv 29, 1913,
196-7 (N o. 124).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y , C on v en tion o f 1903 {v. sub
B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
' B a g d a d R a ilw a y A greem en ts (v. sub B agdad
R a i l w a y ).
B erlin , A c t of, F eb. 26, 1885, A nglo-G erm an
S ecret A g reem en t and C ongo B asin, dis­
cussions in 1914, 426 (N o. 268), 557 (N o.
361), 560 (N o. 364), 561-2 (N o. 365).
T R E A T I E S . A G R E E M E N T S , A L L IA N C E S ,
C O N V E N T IO N S , A c .— (con tin u ed ).
B lack Sea Basin A greem en t, 135 (N o. 87,
min.).
D u tch -P ortu g u ese C onvention, 1893, and
T im or, 507 (N o. 324, encl. 2), 509 (N o. 325).
D u tch -P ortu gu ese, 1904, p re-em p tion rig h ts
in T im or, 429 (N o. 270), 457 (N o. 2S9).
E rzeroum , T rea tv of, 1347, 77 (N o. 55), 156
(N o. 100), 159 (N o. 103).
F ra nco-G erm an C onven tion s re A lorocco and
C ongo, N ov. 4, 1911, 426 (N o. 268), 616
(N o. 413), 657 (N o. 4 5 0 ); and A n g lo-
G erm an n eg otia tion s re P ortu g u ese
Colonies, 553 (N o. 357), 557 (N o. 361), 559
(N o. 361, min.), 560 (N o. 364), 561 (N o.
3 6 5 ); G erm any and A rticle 16, 557 (N o.
361), 559 (N o. 361, min.), 5 61-2 (N o. 365).
F ra n co -Ita lia n A greem en t, re T unis, 1 8 9 6 :
term s of, F ren ch th rea t to term in a te, A lav
1914, 649 (N o. 446).
F ranco-T ta lian A greem en t, D ec. 14-16, 1900,
respectin g T rip o li and A lorocco, 616 (N o.
4*8 .
F ra n co -Ita lia n S ecret A greem ent, N ov. 1-2,
1902: term s of, 616 (N o. 4 1 8 1, 620 (N o.
419), 624 (N o. 424, m in .); not to be
a ffected by renew al o f the T rip le A lliance,
1912, 623-4 (N o. 4 2 4 ); m odifica tion o f th e
A greem en t denied, Alarch 19-14, 644 (N o.
441), 653 (N o. 449).
F ra n co -M o ro c ca n T rea ty, 1912, 616 (N o. 418).
F ra neo-R ussian A llian ce (D ec. 27. 1893-Jan. 4,
1894, and la ter), 616-7 (N o. 418).
F ra n co-R u ssian A lilita ry C on v en tion (A u g. 17,
1892, and la ter), 583 (N o. 3S3), 617 (N o.
413).
F ra n co-R u ssian N a val C onvention, J u ly 16,
1912, 583 (N o. 3^3), 607 (N o. 407), 608
(N o. 408), 617, 619 (N o. 418».
F ra n co-S p an ish A greem ents, Oct. 3, 1904,
Sept. 1, 1905, re A lorocco, 616 (N o. 418).
F ra n co-S p an ish C onvention, N ov. 27, 1912, re
M orocco, 616 (N o. 418 >.
F ra n co-T u rk ish A greem en t re ra ilw ays in
A sia A linor, in itia lled Sept. 11, 1913,
2 31-3 (N o. 153).
Ita lo-T u rk ish T rea tv o f P eace, L au san n e
T rea tv, Oct. i s / l 9 1 2 . 416 (N o. 258), 616
(N o. 418).
L on d on , T rea ty of, Alay 30, 1913, Turkish
a ction in u p settin g bou n da ry fixed by,
1913. 183 (N o. 123).
N o rth Sea D ecla ra tion , A p ril 23, 1908: as a
pa ttern fo r proposed A lediterranean
A greem en t, 1914, 651 (N o. 448), 652
(N o. 449).
P a cific S ettlem ent o f In tern a tion a l D isputes,
J u n e 29, 1908, 226 (N o. 148), 241 (N o. 154,
encl.), 260 (N o. 163).
R usso-G erm an A greem en t (P otsd a m A g ree­
m ent, A ug. 19, 1911, A r ticle I I I , 138-9
(N o. 89, encl. 2), 161 (N o. 105), 174 (N o.
118).
S erb o-G reek -R u m a n ia n u n d ersta n d in g , sus­
p ected, A larch 1914, 756 (N o. 519).
 914

T R IP O L I. | T U R K E Y — (co n tin u e d ).
T rip o lita n w ar, S ir E y re Crowe on possible A sia tic T urkey, 1913— (c o n t in u e d ):
p o litica l consequen ces of, 1912, 586, 589 135), 210 (N o. 1 3 7 ); F ra n ce sending a
(N o. 3 8 6 ); a n n exa tion o f T rip oli b y Ita ly , finan cial m ission to B erlin to try t o com e
re c o g n itio n of, 593 (N o. 391), 621 (N o. to term s abou t respectiv e interests of
4 1 9 ); Ita lia n ex h au stion and relation s to F ra n ce and G erm any, 209 (N o. 136), 210
A u s tria -H u n g a ry , 620 (N o. 419). (N o. 1 37 ); suggested financial a rra n g e­
A n g lo -Ita lia n n eg otia tion s for A g reem en t to m en t and concessions for railw ays on
m a in ta in sta tu s quo in N o rth A fric a , B lack Sea Coast and Syria, 211-2 (No.
1912-4 ( v . sub M e d i t e r r a n e a n : I ta ly 138), 218 (N o. 143).
an d ,: A n g lo -Ita lia n n eg otia tion s). F ra n co-G erm an A g reem en t reached, Aug.
F ren ch and Ita lia n difficulties over ju risd ic­ 1913, 219 (N o. 1 4 4 ); M esk en e-A lep p o
tion in T rip o li and T unis, A p ril 1914, p roject, 219 (N o. 144), 222 (N o. 146 );
646-7 (N o. 444). F ra n ce com m u n ica tes result of
n eg otia tion s to G rea t B rita in , 220-1
T R U C IA L C O A ST . (N o. 145, en cl. ) ; G erm an stron g feelin g
( v . sub P e r s i a n G u l f .) abou t the M es k en e-A lep p o line, 225
(N o. 1 4 8 ); F ren ch view s on the
T U N IS . M e s k en e-A lep p o lin e, 228 (N o. 150 );
F ra n co -Ita lia n difficulties over status of B ritish su ggestion o f a F ran co-G erm an
T rip o lita n subjects in T unis, A p ril 1914, discussion on the M es k en e-A lep p o pro­
645 -6 (N o. 443), 646-7 (N o. 4 4 4 );. F ren ch je ct, 230 (N o. 1 5 2 ); G erm an hope th a t
th re a t to term in ate the F ra n co -Ita lia n the question can be dealt w ith d u rin g
A g reem en t o f 1896, 649 (N o. 446). n eg otia tion s a bou t railw ays in Asia
M in or, 245 (N o. 1 5 6 ); T urkish a ttitu d e
TURKEY. to question, 302 (N o. 1 89 ); F ra n co­
¿E gea n I sla n d s: T u rk ey w ould ra th er g o to G erm an discussions, only one poin t
w ar a ga in than g iv e u p islands off Asia unsettled, 313 (N o. 1 95 ); A g reem ent
M in o r, J u n e 1913, 705 (N o. 479). betw een the F ren ch and Germ an
A rab N a tion a l M ov em en t (v . sub A rab grou p s, T ex t, F eb. 1914, 3 25-9 (N o. 201).
N a t io n a l M o v e m e n t ). R ussian d r a ft agreem ent w ith T urkey
A r m y : increase of, 1910, 6 (N o. 1). resp ectin g ra ilw ay s and certain
L im a n v o n S anders M ission, 1 9 1 3 -4 : M . I econ om ic questions, J a n . 1914, 313 (No.
P a leolog u e less h op efu l o f a solu tion , 194).
D ec. 1913, 723 (N o. 4 9 0 ); a p p oin tm en t of In te g r ity o f A s ia tic T u r k e y : Ita lia n desire to
G eneral v on Sanders, 726 (N o. 4 9 1 ); Sir see preserved, N ov. 1913, desire for con­
A. N ico lso n ’ s hope th a t R u ssia and cession o f a p ort at A d alia , 249-50 (No.
G erm a ny w ill be able to a rra n g e 157), 2 61-2 (N o. 167 ); no B ritish politica l
m a tters, 727 (N o. 492). aim s in the d istrict, 262 (N o. 167).
A s ia tic T u r k e y : Irrig a tio n w orks, A nglo-G erm a n agreem ent
F in a n cia l, econ om ic and ra ilw ay d e v e lo p m e n t : fo r open com p etition in, A p ril 1914, 372
F ra n co-G erm an discussions on respectiv e (N o. 232, A n n ex ), to be record ed by an
in terests, J u ly 1913, 163 (N o. 107, m in.), exch a n g e o f notes, T e x t o f notes, M av,
164U5 (N o. 110), 167 (N o. 1 13 ); F ren ch 388 (N o. 242), 392 (N o. 244), T ex t ¿ f
sta tem en t as t o B ritish su p p ort, the N otes, M ay 29, 3 93-4 (ed. n o te, nos. 3, 4 );
n eg otia tion s o f H err H elfferich and M . T urkish a ttitu d e, 394 (N o. 2 4 5 ); A n g lo-
L a m orn a ix , T urkish finances and the G erm an C on v en tion in itia lled , J u n e 15,
B a g d a d R a ilw ay , F ren ch a ttitu d e , con ­ 1914, N otes ex ch a n g ed , 4 07-8 (N o. 249,
s tru ction o f railw ays in A s ia tic T u rk ey , encl., N o te s nos. 4, 5).
F re n ch and G erm an program m es, 169-72 R a ilw a y s : G e n e r a l: F ren ch con d ition s for
(N o. 1 16 ); B r itish m ed iation n o t desired finan cial assistance, & c., t o T u r k e y : rail­
a t p r e s e n t : sta tem en t o f F ren ch aim s in w ay concessions desired, J u n e 1913, 134-5
E a stern A n a tolia and S y ria, and the (N o. 87), 135-6 (N o. 8 8 ); B ritish com ­
H e d ja s r a ilw a y ; these aim s collid e w ith m ents, 135 (N o. 87, m in . ) ; progress being
G erm an rig h ts and in terests, 182-3 (N o. m ade in F ra n co-T u rk ish neg otia tion s
1 2 2 ); T urkish su g g estion th a t F re n ch and a bou t railw ays, A ug., 209 (N o. 1 36 ); G reat
G erm an claim s should be discussed B rita in w ould p roba b ly ask for an exten­
betw een H akki P asha and H err sion o f S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y concession,
G w inner, A u g u st, 206 (N o. 1 34 ); B ritish 213 (N o. 1 39 ); F ra n co-T u rk ish agreem ent
desire th a t F ra n ce and G erm any should on railw ays and p u b lic w orks in A siatic
com e to a d ire c t u n d ersta n d in g , 207 (N o. T u rk ey , T ex t, S ept. 18, 1913, 231-3 (No.
1 3 4 ); suggestion th a t G rea t B r ita in should 1 5 3 ); A nglo-G erm a n a greem ent, revised
in d ica te to G erm any the u n d ersta n d in g B ritish co u n te r-d ra ft, ex p lan a tion s and
betw een F ra n ce and G rea t B rita in T ex t, 236-41 (N o. 154), B ritish interests in
re g a rd in g th eir in terests in A sia tic S m y rn a -A id in line, 236 (N o. 1 54 ); Italian
T u rk ey , 207 (N o. 135 ); B ritish su ggestion concession o f a p o r t a t A d alia and the
th a t a com p rom ise should not be S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y , 250 (N o. 157),
ex clu d ed from con sid era tion , 209 (N o. 2 61-2 (N o. 1 6 7 ); B ritish desire for
 915
T U R K E Y — ( con tin u ed ).
A sia tic T urkey. 1913— (c o n t in u e d ):
R a ilw ay s— (c o n tin u e d ):
G erm an co-op era tion w ith reg a rd to
Sm yrna—A id iii line, 2 64-5 (X o . 172 , 303
(X o . 159 ; B ritish protest to T urkey
again st any in frin g em en t o f rights o f
S m y rn a -A id in com p an y , D ec.. 274 ^Xo.
1 3 1 ); H a k k i P asha and M r. A. P a rk er
on suggested Ita lia n concession, 275—6
(X o . 132»; n eg otia tion s betw een M.
X o g a r a and S m y rn a -A id in C om pany, F eb.
1914, 324 (X o . i9 9 , m in .); S m y rn a -A id in
ra ilw ay and ju n ctio n w ith A n a tolian
system . 324 X o. 199), 3 36 -4 (X o . 203 :
B ritish h op e th a t G erm an op p osition will
be w ith d ra w n . 337 (X o . 2 0 7 ); agreem ent
in itia lled by S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw a y Com ­
p a n y and M . X o g a ra , M a rch , 343 (X o.
213, e n c l.); p roposed a greem ent w ith the
Ita lia n S y n d ica te, p oin ts fo r discussion,
3 48 -9 X o. 216 ; F ra n co-T u rk ish a gree­
m ents in itia lled , A p ril, 3 67 -3 ed. note .
A n g lo-T u rk ish n e g o tia tio n s : A nglo-T u rkish
C on v en tion . R a ilw ay s in Asia M in or,
D ra ft, T ex t. M a y 1913, 101-3 (X'o. 65.
encl. 2 ) ; B ritish com m ents on, 115-6
(ed. n ote ; G reat B r ita in satisfied w ith
this con v en tion p rov id ed “ T u rq u ie
d ’ Asie ” is su b stitu ted fo r “ Asie
M in en re,” 149 (X o . 9 4 ); com p letion
delayed ow in g tc n eg otia tion s betw een
T u rkey and the B a g d a d R a ilw ay Com ­
pany, J u ly , 193 (X o . 124 ); A n g lo-
T urkish C on v en tion , R a ilw ay s in T u rk ey
in Asia. T ex t, in itia lled A u g . 12, 1913,
2 03 -6 (X o . 1 3 3 ); B ritish view that it is
desirable th a t a ll railw ay questions
should be decid ed in p rin cip le now . 208
(X'o. 135 ; F ra n ce in vited by G reat
B rita in t o a gree to the proposed C on­
v en tion , 205 (X'o. 135 : A n g lo-T u rk ish
C on v en tion w ill not be sign ed yet,
X'ovem ber, 263 (X'o. 169).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p an y ’ s agreem ent
w ith T u rk ey and A n g lo-T u rk ish a gree­
m ent r. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y : B a g d a d
R a ilw a y C o m p a n y : A g reem en t w ith
T u rk ey .
S m y rn a -A id in ra ilw ay, im p orta n ce
a tta ch ed b y G reat B rita in to n eg otia ­
tions, T u rk ish a ttitu d e to claim s con ­
cern in g term in a l land at Sm yrna, and
necessity fo r an a rticle in C on v en tion
in d e m n ify in g the co m p a n y ; u n sa tisfa c­
tory n e g otia tion s resp ectin g A d a lia -
B u ld ou r line, needs o f G reat B rita in
st'¡ted , A p ril 1914, 3 7 4 -6 (X'o. 2 35 );
T urkish offers, 356 (X'o. 2 4 0 ); A g ree­
m ent in itia lled b y H a k k i P asha and
L o rd R a th m ore, 357 (X'o. 241), F ren ch
prom ise to su p p ort A n g lo-T u rk ish
A greem en ts, 359 (X'o. 2 4 3 ); q uestion of
loca l lines t o serve as feeders fo r riv er
n a v ig a tion . 394 X o . 245), 395 (X'o.
246), T urkish u n fa v ou ra ble rep ly, 395
(X o . 2 4 6 ); S m y rn a -A id in railw ay con ­
cession, A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention
T U R K E Y — on tm u ed ).
A n g lo-T u rkish n eg otiation s, 1914— (c o n tin u e d ):
R a ilw a y s — (con t nued :
S m y rn a -A id in railw ay— ( c o n tin u e d ):
in itia lled . J u n e 10, 1914, 396 ed. n o te );
no T urkish reply yet as to loca l feed er
lines and A rab ia n lines, 397 (X'o. 245 );
A nglo-G erm a n C onvention in itia lled ,
June 15, 1914, T ex t, A nnex. O ttom an
R a i’ way from Sm yrna to A id in , 401,
404 -6 X'o. 249, encl. . railw ays in com ­
p etition w ith the B a g da d R a ilw ay , 400-3
(X o . 249. en c l.); T ig ris-M e n d e li line,
406-7 (X'o. 249, encl., X o t e , nos. 2, 3 ) ;
T u rk ey w ill not g iv e w ay over O ttom an
dire c to r on S m y rn a -A id in railw ay, 411
X'o. 252), 413 (X'o. 2 5 3 ); T urkish a t t i­
tu de to in vestm ent o f B ritish ca p ita l in
railw ays, 412 (X o . 252 ; B ritish request
fo r an assurance a gain st deb a rrin g
B ritish in terests from a cq u irin g a con ­
cession in fu tu re fo r a th rou g h line
from the M ed iterra n ean to P ersian
G ulf, J u ly. 416 (X o . 259), noth in g in
F ra n co-T u rk ish A greem en t to p reclude
B ritish a p p lica tion , 418 (X o . 262).
R ailw ay R a tes, d iffe re n tia l: Q uestion o f
differen tia l trea tm en t of B ritish tra de
and G erm an a ttitu d e, M a y 1911, 42
(X'o. 3 0 ); B ritish su ggestion of a
C on v en tion p r o v id in g fo r exclu sion
o f d ifferen tia l rates. 46 (X 'o. 3 4 );
G rand Y iz ie r can n ot und ersta nd
B ritish a n xiety on the question,
50 IX'o. 3 6 ); Assim B ey on. 52—3 (X o.
35), suggested prelim in a ry C onven tion ,
M a rch 1912. 57 (X'o. 44. m in.), T urkish
rep ly to G reat B rita in , A p ril 15, 1912,
59-6 0 (X'o. 47), B ritish rem arks on, 68-9
(X o . 5 0 ) ; S ir E. G rey on possib ility of
d ifferen tia l rates, 75 (X o . 53).
D ra ft C on v en tion as p roposed b y G reat
B r ita in . T e x t, 50-1 (X o . 5 5 ); A r ticle I,
d r a ft com m u n ica ted by H a k k i P asha,
A p r il 1913, 9 4-5 X'o. 62). and P rea m ble,
and com m ents on A rticles, M a y . 95,
(X o . 6 3 ); B ritish com m ents on d raft
con v en tion . 115-6 led. n o te ); B ritish
D irectors on B oa rd o f B a g d a d R a ilw a y
as a g u aran tee aga in st differen tia tion
of rates, 12- (X'o. 7 9 ': H err
G w inner on a p poin tm en t o f D irectors,
142 (X'o. 9 1 ) ; G reat B r ita in asks
F ra n ce to agree that there should be no
d ifferen tia l trea tm en t o f B ritish goods
on ra ilw ays un d er F ren ch m anagem ent
and th a t F ra n ce w ould assent t o d r a ft
agreem ent w ith T u rk ey , 205 (X o . 135 );
F ren ch gen era l a greem ent, 210 (X'o.
137), 22S (X'o. 150), 230 (X o . 152' 3S9
(X o . 243 ; B ritish desire fo r an
assurance by G erm any as to p u blica tion
o f all rates and con d ition s o f B agdad
R a ilw ay . 223 (X'o. 146. A n n ex ).
R evised B ritish cou n ter-d ra ft, ex p la n a ­
tion s and T ex t, S ept. 1913, 234-41 (X'o
154 : G erm an am endm ents and B ritish
com m ents, 245 (X'o. 156 and notes).

T U R K E Y — (con tin u ed ).
R a ilw a y s : G eneral— (con tin u ed ) :
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s— ( co n tin u e d ) :
G erm an C ou n ter-d ra ft, T ex t, N ov. 3, 1913,
248 (N o. 156, encl. 2) ; B ritish com m ents
on, 302 (N o. 189).
B ritish C ou n ter-d ra ft, T ex t, D ec. 15, 1913,
305 (N o. 190).
F u rth e r G erm an d ra ft, com m ents and
T ex t, J an . 1914, 318 (N o. 198, encl. 1),
321 (N o. 198, encl. 2 ); B ritish m odifica ­
tion to A r ticle 3 (c), no lines in A s ia tic
T u rk ey in com p etition w ith B a g d a d
R a ilw ay , 3 37 -8 (N o. 207), 344 (N o. 213,
A n n e x ) ; S ir E. G rey on e x te n t of
B ritish concession and cou n ter-con ces­
sions req u ired : a line from M en d eli to
K u t-el-A m a ra , and L ak e B eyshehir to
be reg a rd ed as w ith in the area o f
S m y rn a -A id in ra ilw ay, 3 46-8 (N o. 215) ;
G erm any agrees to M en d eli concession,
D eutsch e B a n k to be con su lted over
S m y rn a -A id in concession, 351 (N o.
218), 351 (N o. 219), 352 (N o. 220),
B ritish agreem en t w ith G erm an
con d ition s fo r con stru ction o f railw ay,
352 (N o. 220, n o te (2) ) ; G erm an refusal
o f S m y rn a -A id in concession, 3 52-3 (N o.
221), 354 (N o. 223), B ritish re g re t at
and offer o f com prom ise, 353 (N o. 222) ;
im p orta n ce a tta ch ed to the concession,
d a n g er of a greem en t b ein g w recked on
this p oin t, B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p any
unable t o g iv e w ay, 354—5 (N o. 223).
R ev is ed B ritish d r a ft on u n d erta k in g by
G rea t B rita in as to con stru ction o f
railw ays, T ex t, M a rch 31, 1914, 360-1
(N o. 225, encl.) ; A r ticle 3, clause (c),
and sectioD I I I o f e x p la n a tory note,
railw ay lines in com p etition w ith
B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om p a n y ’ s lines, T ex t,
A p ril 22, 3 72-3 (N o. 233), suggested com ­
m u n ica tion of to T u rkey, 373 (N o. 233),
com m u n ica ted, M ay, 385 (N o. 239).
A g reem en t : B ritish d r a ft A g reem en t
betw een the S m y rn a -A id in , E nglish
C om p any and the A n a tolian R a ilw a y
C om p any and B a g d a d R a ilw a y C om ­
pany, the G erm an C om panies, 370-1
(ed. n o te ), T ex t, M a y 1914, 3 82 -5 (N o.
238, encl.).
B a g d a d R a ilw a y ( n . sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
C a p itu la tion s : T urkish su g g estion th a t con ­
sid era tion be g iv en to q uestion o f sup­
pression, M a y 1918, 96 (N o. 64) ; G reat
B r ita in p repa red to stud y the question,
116 (ed. n o te ) ; form of rep ly suggested
b y H a k k i P asha, 130 (N o. 80), 148 (N o.
94) ; B ritish com m ents on, 151 (N o. 94),
form u la m odified, 153 (N o. 95) ; A n g lo-
T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u ly 29, 1913, T ex t,
197 (N o. 124) ; S h a tt-el-A ra b C onvention
a n d q uestion o f ca p itu la to ry rights, A u g .,
200 (N o. 127), 201 (N o. 129, and n o te (4) ) ;
M r. M a rlin g ’ s sum m ary o f in form a tion
as to presen t exercise o f ju risd ictio n over
foreig n ers, Sept., 226-7 (N o. 149) ; G erm an
916
T U R K E Y — (con tin u ed ).
C a pitu la tion s, 1913— ( con tin u ed ) :
C ou n ter-d ra ft, rights acq u ired b y the
ca p itu la tion s n ot to be im p aired , Nov.,
246 (N o. 156, and n o t e s ) ; T ex t, 249 (No.
156, encl. 2 ) ; R ussian ob jection to S h att-
el-A ra b C on ven tion and ca p itu la tory
righ ts, 260 (N o. 164), 269-70 (N o. 175),
270 (N o. 176), 271 (N o. 177). 271-2 (No.
178), 272 (N o. 179, encl.), 279-80 (No.
184), 280-1 (N o. 185), 335-6 (N o. 205).
C om m ercial A g reem en t on basis o f in ter­
n a tion a l law, proposed, J u n e 1914, 414
(N o. 255), 414 (N o. 256), 415 (N o. 257),
4 15-6 (N o. 2 5 8 ); T u rk ey w ants freedom
to n eg otia te u ntram m elled by C a pitu la ­
tions, 416 (N o. 2 5 8 ); rea dy to forgo
clause in M on op olies A g reem en t but
a ttach es im p orta n ce to a ccep tan ce o f pro­
!
posal in prin cip le, R u ssia ’ s consent
assured, desire to secure econ om ic inde­
pen dence o f T u rk ey , 417 -8 (N o. 2 6 1 ); com ­
plete in depen den ce in econ om ic m atters
and rig h t to fix custom s du ties and nego­
tia te com m ercia l trea ties desired, 419
(N o. 263).
(F o r A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, v. also sub
T u r k e y , G reat B r ita in and.)
C oncession L aw , 35 (N o. 23).
Custom s du ties : increase o f :
F ra n ce a n d : F ren ch con d ition s fo r assent,
37 (N o. 2 4 ); F ren ch hope th a t G reat
B r ita in w ill not consent w ith ou t con­
su ltin g F ra n ce, a n x iety fo r co-opera tion
ov er F ren ch and B ritish interests, 39
(N o. 27), 40 (N o. 28).
G erm a n y and : q uestion of p rov id in g means
fo r B a g d a d R a ilw a y not b ound up w ith
any in crease in the custom s, J u n e 1913,
134 (N o. 86, en cl. ) ; G erm an proposals
and n eg otia tion s in suspense, M arch
1914, 339 (N o. 2 0 9 ); Anglo-G erm an
C on ven tion , in itia lled J u n e 15, 1914,
referen ce to in crease o f custom s dues,
402 (N o. 249, en cl. ) ; G erm an consent to
con tin u a tion o f th e su rtax, 409 (No.
251).
G rea t B rita in and : T urkish efforts to obtain
B ritish consent to, D ec. 1910, 9 (No.
4 ); B ritish con sen t the m ain lever
tow ards settlem ent o f K o w e it and
B a g d a d R a ilw a y questions, 16 (N o. 6,
m in.), 17 (N o. 7 ) ; T urkish m is-state­
m ent as to B ritish con d ition s o f assent
to an increase o f 4 % , 25 (N o. 15, encl.),
B ritish view s on, 26-27 (N o. 15, m in .);
B ritish rem onstrance and statem ent
o f con d ition s, 29 (N o. 1 8 ); S ir G.
L ow th er on form o f com m u n ica tion , an
official note, or “ n o tic e ,” 30 (N o. 19);
com m u n ica tion to be in w ritin g and in
a w ay w hich w ill p u t it on record at
P orte, 30-31 (N o. 19, m in.), 32 (N o. 21);
S ir E. G rey n ot p rep a red to agree to
proposed increase if this a dditional
revenue was to be d ev oted to building
o f a ra ilw ay o f d o u b tfu l advan ta ge to
, G rea t B rita in , 31 (N o. 20, n ote (2) ) ;
 917
T l'H K E Y — -if. ued .
Custom s d u tie s : increase o f— ( con tin u ed ) :
G reat B rita in a m i, 1911— (c o n tin u e d ):
X o t e con n » uni f a t a l to T u rkey sta tin g
B ritish ai/Litude w ith reg a rd to the
increase, 3 2-33 (X o. 22. e n c l.); B ritish
share in B a g d a d -G u lf section in rela­
tion to consent to increase, 35 (X o . 23),
and settlem ent o f questions in P ersian
G u lf and M esopotam ia, 36 (X o. 23,
m in .); G rea t B rita in w ould not g iv e
assent u n til F ra n ce was also satisfied,
37 (X o. 2 4 ); B ritish assurance to
F ra n ce. 39 (X o. 27, hi in.). 41 (X o . 29 :
if G reat B r ita in con ceded an increase
to T u rk ey m ust g et som e position fo r
a g u a ran tee a gain st d itferen tia tion o f
railw ay rates, 42 iX o . 30).
R e-statem en t o f B ritish con d ition s in
replv to Turkish proposals, J u ly 1911,
43 (X o. 3 4 ); den ial th a t p la cin g o f
ord ers fo r ships in E n g lan d was a con ­
d ition . 50 (X o. 3 5 i : S ir E. G rey on
B r i t i s h con d ition s. J u n e 191?. 75 X o.
5 3 ); a sa tisfa ctory settlem ent of
B a g da d R a ilw ay q uestion a necvssary
con d ition . J u ly . 7> ■X o. 55, e n c l.);
B ritish reply to T urkish m em o, sta tin g
con d ition s o f absent. ^0 (X o . 55, encl.).
T urkish m em o. on. suggested form u la fo r
assent. M ay l'Jh>. 96 tX o. 6 4 ); in crease
of 4 to l>e ter an in definite period ,
not m erely fo r seven years, 116 (ed.
note)-, A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s and
B ritish assent to the increase. 124 'X o .
7 5 ); fu r th e r form u la fo r B ritish assent :
increase t o 15 per cent, ad valorem ,
and ev en tu al su b stitu tion of a specific
ta riff. 148 (X o. 9 4 ); B ritish com m ent
on. 150 (X o . 94' ; form u la m odified, 152
(X o . 95).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, J u lv 29. 1913.
T ex t. 197 (X o . 124).
A n g lo-G erm a n A g reem en t and qu estion of
consent. X o v . 1913. 243 (X o . 156'. 299
(X o. l's p ); G rea t B rita in rea dy to assent
when T u rk ey signs a greem ent on ra il­
ways in A s ia tic T urkey, Jan. 1914, 315
(X o . 197 : delay in con clu d in g a gree­
m ents betw een B a g d a d R a ilw a y Com ­
pany and T urkey, and T u rk ey and
G erm any, and effect up on B ritish assent
t o increase. M arch 1914. 336-7 (X o . 2 0 6 );
delay in con sen tin g to M esopota m ia n
Oil concession and B ritish consent, M ay.
394 (X o . 2 45 ); T urkish dem ur and
alleged B ritish new con d ition s. 395 (X o .
246). 396 (X o . 24 7).
A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion , in itia lled .
J u n e 15. 1914. referen ce to in crease of
custom s dues, 402 (X o . 249. encl.).
B ritish consent fo r p rolon g a tion o f surtax
beyond J u ly 1 d ep en d en t on the settle­
m ent o f th e questions now und er dis­
cussion, J u n e 1914, 409-11 (X o . 251
and e n d s .); T urkish a ttitu d e to the
threa t, 412 (X o . 252), 413 (X o . 2 5 4 );
G rea t B rita in p rep a red to a gree to
T F R K E Y — {con tin u ed .
Custom s d u tie s: increase o f— ( con tin u ed ) :
G reat B rita in and. 1914— (c o n tin u e d ):
con tin u a n ce o f 3 % levy if all other
P ow ers do so, 414 (X o. 2 5 6 ); T urkish
overtu res offerin g ra tification of certain
agreem ents and assurances con cern in g
the others in return fo r B ritish consent
to custom s increase, A u g . 1914, 420
(cd. note).
C otton g o o d s : B ritish request fo r sp ecial
rates on increase of Custom s dues,
J u ly 1 9 i l . (X o . 55), >7 ’ X o . 56 ;
Turkish difficulty in a cced in g to, Sir
E. G rey w ill hold ov er th e m a tter, possi­
b ility of even tu ally g iv in g w ay on it,
9 3-4 (X o . 61 .
E g y p t: rem oval of restriction s on
borrow in g pow ers in reg a rd to B ritish
consent to increase of custom s duties
(r. sub E g y p t ).
I ta ly and : Italia n en q u iry as to con d ition s
of B ritish consent, A u g . 1911, 4 9-50
(X o. 3 5 ’ .
P o w ers a n d : A greem en t by F ra n ce, Russia
and G reat B rita in fo r com m on a ction
rc. 19 ?. 123 (N o. 7 9): B ritish view that
none o f the three P ow ers should assent
w ith ou t m a k in g en forcem en t o f th a t
increase con d ition a l upon assent of the
other P ow ers, A ug. 191S. 2 07-3 (X o.
1 3 5 ): consent of P ow ers, oth er than
G reat B rita in given for con tin u a tion of
su rtax . 410 (X o . 251).
P u ssia a n d : R ussian enq uiry of G reat
B r ita in as to 4 % increase, 313 (X o.
19 4 ); R ussian con sen t to levy o f 3 %
g iv en . J u n e 1914. 409 (X o . 251).
D is in te g ra tio n of O ttom an E m p ire : H> rr
von J a g ow dou bts w heth er the O ttom an
E m p ire will lon g be able to m a in ta in
itself even in Asia. A nglo-G erm a n
in terests lay in s u p p ortin g the rem ains
o f the E m p ire in A sia. Jan. 1913, 660 (X o .
454), likelih ood o f a p a rtition , in terests of
variou s P ow ers, 660 (X o. 4 5 4 ); S ir G.
L ow th er on possible u ltim a te d issolution
o f T urkey, J u n e 1913. 160-1 (X o . 104 );
M r. A. P a rk er on T urkish policy , D ec.
1913, 275 (X o. 1S2); H err von J ag ow
does n ot g iv e T u rkey m ore than tw en ty
years, im p orta n ce of B ritish and G erm an
co-op era tion to a to rt. M arch 1914, 355
(X o . 223), 772 (X o. 532).
F in a n c e : A n g lo-F ren ch co-op era tion a t C on­
sta n tin op le in financial m atters, 1911 ( v.
sub T u r k e y . F ra n ce and).
B ritish ca p ita l, position o f in T u rkey,
D ec. lO ln . 15 (X o . 6, c ic l.).
D eutsch e B a n k : a greem ent w ith O ttom an
Bank as to option s, J u ly 1911, 44
(X o . 3 3 ); and M esopota m ia n oil con­
cessions, 173 (X o . 1 1 7 ); u n d erta k in g to
vote fo r D irectors, 177 (X o . 113, encl. 2 );
financial arra n gem en ts w ith O ttom an
B ank ov er F ren ch p a rticip a tio n in
B; g d a d R a ilw av . A ug. 1913, 211 (X o.
133), 218 (X o . 143), 219 (X o. 144).
 918
T U R K E Y — vco n tin u e d ).
F in a n ce — ( con tin u ed ) :
F in a n cia l situ a tion , M a rch 1914, in u rg en t
need of m oney, 337 (N o. 206), 339 (N o.
209), 340 (N o. 210).
F in a n cia l Com m ission at P aris, 1 9 1 3 -4 :
D eutsch e B a n k hope fo r B ritish su p p ort
as to rep la cem en t of secu rities lost
d u rin g the w ar, M a y 1913, 97 (N o. 6 5 );
G erm an desire fo r co-op era tion of ,
B ritish delegates, 98 (N o. 66), 121 (N o.
70, m in.) ; G erm an desire fo r finan cial
g u aran tees for B a g d a d R a ilw a y , 126
(N o. 7 7 ); a lloca tion o f revenues and,
127 (N o. 7 8 ); B ritish su p p o rt and
q uestion o f secu rin g necessary g u a ra n - ,
tees fo r the R a ilw ay , 128-9 (N o. 7 9 ); '
G erm an o p in ion th a t it w ould be a
p ity if all agreem ent should be post­
pon ed till financial question h a d been
settled at P aris, 129 (N o. 7 9 ); sugges­
tion fo r a form ula , th a t agreem en t
a bou t the R a ilw a y should n ot com e in to
fo r ce unless results o f the finan cial
a rra n g em en ts at P a r is w ere sa tisfa c­
tory , 129 (N o. 7 9 ); und esirab le th a t
G rea t B r ita in should m ake prom ises to
G erm any w ith w hich F ra n ce cou ld not
be associated, J u n e, 133 (N o. 8 5 );
F ren ch , B ritish an d G erm an a greem en t
as to finan cial a rra n g em en t in su p p ort
o f the R a ilw a y , 133 (N o. 85), 133-^4 (N o.
8 6 ); F ra n co-G erm an con v ersation s on
in terests in A s ia tic T urkey, J u ly , 164
(N o. 1 1 0 ); n eg otia tion s of H err
H elfferich and M . L am orn aix , 169-72
(N o. 1 1 6 ); B ritish view th a t necessary
finan cial settlem ents should be d ecid ed
in p rin cip le now, Aug. 1913, 208
(N o. 1 3 5 ); agreem ents betw een F ra n ce,
G rea t B r ita in an d G erm any and j
p ossib ility of g e ttin g a deq u ate 1
guaran tees fo r B a g d a d R a ilw a y , 219
(N o. 1 44 ); schem e fo r a lloca tion
o f revenues, 393 (ed. n o te, no. 1 );
A n g lo-G erm a n C on v en tion : g u aran tees
a n d a lloca tion o f revenues, 406 (N o. 249,
encl., X o t e no. 1).
I n d e m n it y : Q uestion o f an in d em n ity and
finance fo r B a g d a d R a ilw ay , M a y 1913,
129 (N o. 7 9 ); 134 (N o. 8 6 ); T urkish
h op e th a t G rea t B rita in w ould opp ose |
an in d em n ity , J u n e 1913, 151 (N o. 95).
L o a n s : H o p e fo r a fu tu re loan in L on d on ,
D ec. 1910, 9 (N o. 4 ) ; F ren ch refusa l to
allow loan to be q u oted in P a ris, 11
(N o. 6 ) ; B a g d a d M u n icip a l loan, 15
(N o. 6, en c l. ) ; p olicy o f O ttom an B ank
w ith reg a rd to T urkish loan, 44 (N o.
3 3 ); loan ob ta in ed in G erm any, 44 (N o.
3 3 ); F ren ch p olicy tow ards loa n , 44
(N o. 3 3 ); M . S azonov on press rep orts
o f a B ritish loan, M a y 1913, 124 (N o.
7 4 ); no q uestion o f a B ritish adv an ce
u nd er con sid era tion , 124 (N o. 75).
T UR K E Y — (to n tinned).
F in a n ce, 1913— (c o n t in u e d ):
J o in t a dvance b ein g m ade by F ra n ce and
G erm any, T urkish reg ret at absten tion
o f S ir E. Cassel from , J u n e 1913, 151
(N o. 9 5 ); F ren ch and R ussian a ttitu d e
tow ards loans, A u g ., 210 (N o. 137) fresh
T u rk ish loan in P a r is dep en den t on
settlem ent of qu estion o f A d rian op le,
A ug. 1913, 217 (N o. 143 ); F ren ch loan
and in vestm ent o f ca p ita l in railw ays,
J u n e 1914, 412 (N o. 252).
T h ree-P ow er u n d ersta n d in g th a t no
m oney should be g iv en to T u rk ey u ntil
the conclusion of peace, M a y 1913, 131
(N o. 83).
French conditions for financial and fiscal
assistance to Turkey (v. sub T itrkey,
F ra n ce and).
N a tion a l B ank: S ir H en ry B a b in g ton
S m ith ’ s en q u iry as t o w hat prospects
T urkish G overnm ent cou ld hold out of
p u ttin g business in w ay o f the B ank,
and H a k k i P a sh a ’ s reply, D ec. 1910,
1 3-5 (N o. 6, en c l.); F ren ch concessions
and N a tion a l B ank, J u n e 1913, 135 (N o.
87, and m in.), 136 (N o. 8 8 ); N a tion al
Bank and con stru ction o f p ort at Basra,
137 (N o. 8 9 ); M esopota m ia n oil conces­
sions and N a tion al B ank, 152 (N o. 95),
163 (N o. 107), 173 (N o. 117 ); question
o f an a dvance to T u rkey and oil con­
cessions, 180 (N o. 1 1 9 ); N a tion a l B ank
and oil concessions in M esopota m ia , 213
(N o 139).
O ttom an B ank: p olicy a gain st A n g lo-
F ren ch finan cial co-op era tion and other
interests, M a y 1911, 40 (N o. 28), 41 (N o.
28, m in.), 43 (N o. 3 3 ); a greem ent w ith
the D eutsch e B ank to g iv e one another
op tion s, 44 (N o. 3 3 ); finan cial a rra n g e­
m ents w ith D eutsch e B a n k over F rench
p a rticip a tio n in B a g d a d R a ilw ay , Aug.
1913, 211 (N o. 138), 218 (N o. 143), 219
(N o. 144).
O ttom an P u b lic D e b t : R ussian a ction in
reg a rd to adm ission o f a R ussian dele­
ga te t o ; F ren ch w arn in g to R u s sia ;
action o f oth er P ow ers in a p p ly in g for a
delegate, M a rch 1914, 342 (N o. 212).
P ecu n ia ry claim s, R ussian and B r itish :
T u rk ey ca n n ot pla ce dep osit in bank or
giv e debt guarantees, M a v 1914, 386
(N o. 240).
T em ettu ta x, im p osition o f : suggested
on B ritish subjects on con d ition of
im p osition on all foreig n ers, M a y 1913,
96 (N o. 64), 116 (ed. n o te ), B ritish com ­
m ent on, 150 (N o. 9 4 ); 154 (N o. 9 7);
A n g lo-T u rk ish A greem en t, J u ly 29,
1913, T ex t, 197 (N o. 124).
G o v e r n m e n t: Y ou n g T u rk p a r t y : Com m ittee
a Judseo-Turkish alliance, A ug. 1910,
2 (N o. 1 ); Jew ish d etestation of Russia,
6 (N o. 1 ); p olicy o f, to assert sovereign
rights, A ug. 1910, 1 -2 (N o. 1 ); d octrine
o f reu l-p olitik , 2 (N o. 1 ); S ir G. L ow ther
on present form o f C on stitu tion a lism , 2-3
 919
T U R K E Y — (con tin u ed ).
G overnm ent, 1910— (c o n tin u e d ) :
(N o. 1 ) ; C om m ittee d eterm in ed to level
all priv ileg es, 3 (N o. 1 ) ; a ttitu d e tow ards
F ra n ce and E n g lan d , D ec., 9 (N o. 4 );
a ggressive a ttitu d e o f C om m ittee, position
now less secure, Jail. 1911, 11 (N o. 6 );
H akki P a s h a ’ s ‘view th a t it was
undesirable to g iv e any P ow er an
ex clu siv e or prep on d era n t in fluen ce, 14
(N o. 6, e n c l.); rem oval o f m ain causes
o f riv a lry an d fr ic tio n betw een G erm any,
E n g la n d an d F ra n ce w ould be a g rea t
benefit, 35 (N o. 2 3 ); g overn m en t o f
E m p ire by the Y ou n g T u rk P a r ty a
fa ilu re, M a y , 40 (N o. 28).
K o w e it (t>. sub P e r s i a n ’ G u l f : K ow eit).
M esopota m ia (a. sub M e s o p o t a m i a ).
M o n o p o lie s : suggested m on opoly fo r m atches,
cig a r e tte papers, &c., 152 (N o. 9 5 ); A n g lo-
T urkish C on v en tion , m onopolies a gree­
m ent, in itia lled , J u n e 10, 1914, 396 (ed.
note)-, p roposed a d d ition a l article, 409
(N o. 2 5 0 ); T e x t o f article, J u ly , 415 (N o.
257).
(F o r proposed C om m ercia l A greem en t, v. sub
T u r k e y , C om m ercial A greem en t.)
N a v y : in crease of, 1910, 6 (N o. 1 ); p la cin g o f
ord ers fo r ships n ot a con d ition fo r
B ritish con sen t to in crease of Custom s
D ues. A u g . 1911, 50 (N o. 3 5 ); con tra cts
sign ed fo r pu rcha se o f tw o D rea dn ou g h ts
orig in a lly b u ilt fo r Chile, J u n e 1914, 801
(ed. note).
P an islam ism ( a . sub P a n i s l a m i s m ).
P ersian G u l f (v. sub P e r s i a n G u l f ) .
P ost offices, a b olition o f fo r e ig n in T u r k e y :
T u rk ey suggests, .May 1913, 96 (N o. 64),
B ritish com m ents on, 116 (ed. n ote),
T urkish form u la , 130 (N o. 80). 148 (N o.
94), B ritish com m ents on. 150-1 (N o. 9 4 );
form u la m odified, 153 (N o. 9 5 ); sugges­
tion th a t post-offices a t B a g d a d and Basra
be reta in ed , 160-1 (N o. 1 04 ); A n g lo-
T urkish A g reem en t, J u ly 29, 1913, T ex t,
197 (N o. 124).
P otsd a m M e e tin g (v. sub P o t s d a m M e e t i n g ).
R a ilw ay s in A sia M in or and A s ia tic T u rk ey
(v. supra T u r k e y , A s ia tic T u rkey ).
B a g da d R a ilw a y (v. sub B a g d a d R a i l w a y ).
T eleg ra ph lin e : G erm an su g g estion o f a la n d­
line across T u rk ey , J u ly 1913, 165-6 (N o.
I l l ) , 166 (N o. 112).
G en eral F o r e ig n P o l i c y : T rip le A llian ce,
possib ility o f T urkish associa tion w ith,
M a y 1912, 593 (N o. 391).
A lba n ia and (v. sub A l b a n i a , T u rk ey and).
B u lga ria and (v. sub B u l g a r i a , T u rk ey and).
E g y p t an d (v. sub E g y p t ).
F ra n ce and : Y’ ou n g T u rk p a r t y : p olicy o f :
resentm ent o f F ren ch position in T unis,
A lgiers and M orocco, A u g . 1910, 3 (N o. 1 );
F ren ch p ertu rb a tion a t sta te o f a ffairs in
T u rk ey , M a y 1911, 40 (N o. 28), necessity
fo r F ren ch and B ritish jo in t a ction
a ga in st G erm an op p osition , 40 (N o. 28),
42 (N o. 31), B ritish view s on, 41 (N o. 28,
m in .); M . C ru p p i to form u la te the lines
T U R K E Y r— (con tin u ed ).
F ra n ce and, 1912— (c o n t in u e d ):
o f a financial and general u n d erstanding,
43 (N o. 3 1 ); F ren ch sa tisfa ction a t B ritish
m essage and desire to arrive at an un d er­
sta n din g , 43 (N o. 3 2 ); M . de Selves
concurs, 43-4 (N o. 3 3 ); F rench a ttitu d e
tow ards T urkish loan, 44 (N o. 3 3 );
P ress criticism of F ren ch p olicy in
N ea r East, M ay 1913, 123 (N o. 7 3 );
F ren ch con d ition s fo r finan cial an d fiscal
assistance to T urkey, T ext, com m uni­
ca ted to G reat B rita in , J u n e 134-5
(N o. 87), 135-6 (N o. 8S>; B ritish r e p ly :
hop e th a t railw ay to E l A rish w ould
n ot be pressed for, e x p la n a tion
of position of N a tion a l B a n k w ith
reg a rd to con stru ction of p orts of
T reb izon d and Sam sun, J u ly , 1 68-9 (N o.
1 15 ); B ritish view th a t no settlem ent
reg a rd in g econ om ic dev elopm en t of
T u rk ey cou ld be com p lete if it lack ed
F ren ch su p port, 207 (N o. 1 3 5 ); F ra n ce
in vited b y G rea t B r ita in to assent to
A n g lo-T u rk ish agreem ents, 208 (N o. 135 );
progress b ein g m ade in F ra n co-T u rk ish
n eg otia tion s, 209 (N o. 1 36 ); F ra n co-
Turkish a greem ent on railw ays and pu blic
w orks in A sia tic T urkey, T ex t, S ept. 18,
1913, 2 31-3 (N o. 1 53 ); F ra n co-T u rk ish
C onven tion , increase o f custom s, the
ta riff, new taxes, m onopolies, &c., signed,
Sept., 233 (N o. 153 ); F ren ch desire th a t
all agreem ents w ith T u rkey should be
sign ed sim ultaneously, J an . 1914, 313
(N o. 1 95 ); A greem en ts in itia lled , A p ril,
367-8 (ed. n o te ); F ren ch financial
assistance and interests, 412 (N o. 2 52 );
F ren ch a ttitu d e to proposed Com m ercial
T rea ty, J u n e 1914, 414 (N o. 255).
G erm a n y a n d : in crea sin g G erm an in fluen ce
in T urkey. M ay 1911, 39 (N o. 27). 40 (N o.
2S), 42 (N o. 3 1 ); loan to T u rk ey , J u ly ,
44 (N o. 3 3 ); A g reem en t betw een G erm any
and T urkey, delay in con clu d in g , M a rch
1 9 1 J, 337 (N o. 2 0 6 ); n eg otia tion s stated
to be in con n ection w ith in crease o f
custom s dues, G erm an n eg otia tion s w ith
T u rkey now suspended, M arch, 339 (N o.
2 0 9 ); B ritish hope th a t T u rco-G erm an
n eg otia tion m ay be conclud ed before
M a rch 31, 340 (N o. 2 1 0 ); n eg otia tion s not
y et finished, J u n e 1914, 413 (N o. 2 53 );
G erm an statem ent th a t delay was caused
by ob stin a cy o f D jev a d Bey, G erm an
in terests in con clu d in g as soon as possible.
J u ly 1913, 417 (N o. 2 6 0 ); E m p eror
N icholas I I on G erm an p olicy in T urkey,
A p ril 1914. 781 (N o. 5 3 7 ); M . S a zon ov on,
782 (N o. 5 3 7 ); Com m ercial T rea ty pro­
posed. J u n e 1914, G erm an a ttitu d e to
414 (N o. 255).
G rea t B rita in a n d :
G eneral re la t io n s : Y ou n g T u rk p a rty , p olicy
o f : B ritish a ttitu d e to, S ir G. L ow ther
on, A ug. 1910, 1 -6 (N o. 1 ); ch a n g e in
T urkish a ttitu d e, 1909, 1910, 2 (N o. 1 );
a n ti-B ritish cu rren t ow ing to B ritish
 920
T U R K E Y — (c o n ti nued).
G rea t B r ita in and— (c o n t in u e d ):
G eneral relations, 1910— (c o n tin u e d ):
position in In d ia , A den, E g y p t and
P ersian G ulf, 3 (N o. 1 ) ; S ir G. L ow th er
on A n g lo-T u rk ish relation s and likelih ood
o f a co n flict o f in terests in M esopota m ia
and the P ersian G ulf, 1910, 6 (N o. 1).
B ritish silen t d isa p p rob a tion o f T urkish
gen era l policy , D ec. 1910, 9 (N o. 4 );
genera l relation s discussed b y R ifa a t
P asha and S ir G. L ow th er, J an . 1911,
18-19 (N o. 8).
A n g lo -F re n ch jo in t a ction a ga in st G erm an
g row in g in flu e n c e ; suggested u n d er­
sta n din g , M a y 1911 (n. sub T u r k e y ,
F ra n ce and).
Ism ail H a k k i B ey on B ritish cha nge of
fe e lin g tow ards T u rkey, T urkish
fr ie n d ly sentim ents tow ards G reat
B r it a in : M r. M a llet on B ritish dis­
a p p oin tm en t at T urkish w an t o f confi­
den ce and a ttitu d e tow ards B ritish
in terests in M esopota m ia , A u g . 1911,
51 (N o. 3 7 ); T urkish desire to settle
ou tsta n d in g questions and p la ce rela ­
tion s w ith G rea t B rita in on a m ore
sa tisfa ctory fo o tin g , D ec. 1911, 53 (N o.
3 9 ); effect o f B ritish sea -p ow er in
M ed iterra n ean , and consequen ces o f
w ith d ra w a l from , 1912, 588 -9 (N o. 3 8 6 );
im p orta n ce of an en te n te w ith T u rk ey ,
594 (N o. 392).
A n g lo-T u rk ish n eg otia tion s, 1 9 1 1 -4 : T urkish
proposals to G rea t B rita in , in clu d in g
B a g d a d R a ilw a y and P ersian G u lf ques­
tions, M arch 1911: G en e ra l: Sum m ary
of, 24 (N o. 14), T ex t, 2 5 -6 (N o. 15, encl.).
B ritish reply, J u ly 1911, 4 5-8 (N o. 3 4 );
G ra n d V iz ie r on, A u g ., 50-1 (N o.
3 6 ); A ssim B ey on, 5 2-3 (N o. 3 8 );
decision o f T urkish C a bin et in fa v o u r
o f a settlem ent o f questions u n d er dis­
cussion, D ec., 53 (N o. 3 9 ); T urkish
rep ly not readv, Jan. 1912, 55 (N o. 4 0 );
F eb., 55 (N o. 41).
T u rk ish reply, A p ril 15, 1912, T ex t, 59-65
(N o. 4 7 ) ; B ritish com m ents on, 65 (N o.
47, m in . ) ; M r. P a r k e r on, a m arked
d iv erg en ce on all the p rin cip a l points,
66 (N o. 4 8 ); D jev a d B e y ’ s rep ly to,
6 6-7 (N o. 4 9 ); T urkish rep ly a ck n ow ­
led g ed and con tin u a n ce o f n eg otia tion s
prom ised, M ay, 73 (N o. 51).
B ritish rep ly to T urkish m em o., J u ly 18,
1912, T ex t, 7 6-86 (N o. 55 and encl.),
87 (N o. 5 6 ); en q u iry as to da te o f a
T urkish rep ly, D ec. 23, 89 (N o. 58).
N eg otia tion s w ith H akki P asha, Feb.
to J u ly 29, 1913: H a k k i P asha b ein g
sen t to L on don , F eb., 90 (N o. 5 9 ) ;
C om m unica tions from H a k k i P asha, 94
(N o. 62), 95 (N o. 63), 96 (N o. 6 4 ) ; sug­
gested form u la fo r B ritish con sen t to
ra isin g o f Custom s D ues, and oth er
concessions, 96 (N o. 6 4 ); n eg otia tion s,
com m ents by S ir L. M a llet and S ir A .
H irtzel on, 114 (ed n otei
T U R K E Y — ( con tin u ed ).
G reat B rita in and— (c o n tin u e d ):
A n g lo-T u rk ish neg otia tion s, 1913— ( con-
tin ued) :
D ra ft con v en tion s and d eclarations
in itia lled , M ay 1913, T exts, 100-14 (No.
68 and encls.)-, D esidera ta , fu rth er list,
o f T urkish G overnm ent, 116 (ed. note)-,
A g reem en t not dep en d en t upon consent
o f F ra n ce and R ussia, 128 (N o. 79).
T urkish d r a ft fo r a B ritish N ote in place
o f B ritish D ra ft : cov erin g list of
desid era ta and conven tion s, &c.,
betw een T u rkey and G reat B rita in ,
J u n e 1913, 148-51 (N o. 94) ; C on­
versa tion s b etw een H a k k i P asha and
M r. A. P a r k e r con tin u ed , 151-3 (N o.
95) ; T urkish d r a ft fo r a B ritish note
m odified, 152-3 (N o. 9 5 ); sign atu re o f
C onventions could n ot be delayed until
G erm any was rea dy, but they w ould not
be published, 164 (N o. 108), 198 (No.
124).
A n g lo-T u rk ish A g reem en t, C ollection of
D ocum ents sign ed, J u ly 29, 1913, T ext,
183-98 (N o. 1 2 4 ); Sir* E. G rey ’ s hope
th a t these w ould b e the b eg in n in g o f a
p olicy by w hich G rea t B rita in could
su p p ort T urkey, b u t T urkish a ction
m igh t upset this p olicy , 183 (N o. 123);
p ra ctica l effect o f the present n eg otia ­
tion s w ill so fa r be p rin cip a lly negative,
208 (N o. 135) ; d elay in pu blica tion o f
agreem ents a t G erm an request, 263 (No.
169).
D eclaration s and sup plem en tary conven tion
sign ed, T ex t, D ec. 1913, 2 81-2 (N os.
1S6-7) ; C oncession fo r T ig ris and
E up hrates, signed, T ex t, 233-98 (N o.
1831.
D elay caused by suspension o f G erm an-
T urkish n eg otia tion s, M a rch 1914,
339-40 (N o. 2 1 0 ); A rticle 3, clause (c),
and Section I I I of th e e x p la n a tory notes
o f A n glo-G erm an A g reem en t com m uni­
ca ted to T u rkey, M ay, 385 (N o. 239) ;
a tten tion draw n t o ou tsta n d in g points
o f A nglo-T u rkish n eg otia tion s, M ay, 394
(N o. 245), 395 (N o. 2 4 6 ); T urkish
un fa v ou ra ble replies to B ritish points,
requests reg a rd ed as new cond itions,
395-6 (N o. 2 4 7 ); suggested Anglo-
G erm an u ltim atu m , J u n e 1914, 397 (No.
24S, n ote (2) ), suggested w ithd raw al of
H a k k i P asha and effect o f ; B ritish
request fo r sign a tu re o f all ou tsta n din g
docum ents b efore J u ly 1, 397 (N o. 248 );
B ritish consent fo r prolon g a tion o f sur­
ta x b eyon d J u ly dep en d en t upon settle­
m ent o f variou s questions now und er
discussion, 409-11 (N o. 251 and encls.) ;
T u rk ey w ill a ccep t P ecu n ia ry Claims
C onven tion , b u t w ill not g iv e way about
S m y rn a -A id in R a ilw ay , possible solu­
tion fo r Oil question : A nglo-T u rkish
relation s discussed, 411-2 (N o. 252),
4 12-3 (N o. 253) ; pressure ex erted upon
T u rk ey to con clu d e neg otia tion s, refusal
 921
TUI? K E V — \co lit in ued).
G reat B rita in an d— (con tin u ed ) :
A nglo-T u rkish negotia tion s, 1914— (con-
tin n ed ) :
still m a in ta in ed respectin g S h a tt-el-
A ra b C om m ission, 413 (N o. 2 5 3 ); G rand
V iz ie r ’ s rem onstrance a ga in st threat,
413 (N o. 254) ; delay caused by
M on op olies a greem ent and Com m ercial
T rea ty, 4 15 -6 (N o. 2 58 ); T u rk ey to be
urged to con clu d e the n eg otia tion s
forth w ith , 417 (N o. 260).
(F o r delay in the negotia tion s, v. also
in fra. A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention, the
m on opolies agreem ent.)
H a k k i T a sh a ’ s suggestion th a t certain o f
a greem ents should be ratified, and that
T u rk ey should g ive assurances and
u n d erta k in g s con cern in g others, Aug.
1914, 420 (ed . n ote) ; S ir E y re Crowe on
con d ition s o f n eu tra lity o f T urkey
which w ould in fluen ce G reat B rita in to
consent, 420 (ed. n ote).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C onvention, the m onopolies
a greem ent, in itia lled , J u n e 10, 1914,
sum m ary of, 396 (ed. n o t e ); A greem en t
ca n n ot be sign ed u n til M esopotam ian
Oil q uestion is settled, 397 (N o. 248) ;
proposed a d d ition a l article, 409 (No.
250) ; request fo r n eg otia tion s for a
com m ercia l trea ty , T ex t o f in F rench
agreem ent, 414 (N o. 255), B ritish a t ti­
tu de to, 414 (N o. 2 56 ); T ex t o f a rticle
fo r B ritish a greem ent : B ritish view
th a t it was unreasonable to p u t forw a rd
this new stip u lation , J u ly , 415 (N o.
257) ; d elay likely to be caused by,
B ritish difficulty in con sen tin g to, 415—6
(N o. 258) ; T u rk ey ready to fo r g o clause
re com m ercial a greem ent, b u t attaches
im p orta n ce to a ccep tan ce o f proposal
in p rin cip le, desire to secure econ om ic
in d ep en d en ce o f T urkey, 4 17-8 (N o.
261), and rig h t to fix custom s du ties and
neg otia te trea ties, 419 (N o. 263 );
B ritish request fo r a sta tem ent o f w hat
is w anted , J u ly 27, 1914, 419 (N o 264).
A n g lo-T u rk ish C on vention respectin g
bou n da ries o f A d en , T ex t, M a rch 1914
340-1 (N o. 211).
I ta ly and (v. sub I t a l y , T u rk ey and).
T ersia and (v. sub P e r s i a , T u rk ey and).
B ussia a n d : Y ou n g T u rk p a r t y : p olicy o f :
stron g anti-R u ssian cu rren t, A u g . 1910,
2 -3 (N o. 1) ; H a kki P a sh a ’s distru st of
R ussian p olicy tow ards T u rk ey in Asia
1913, 183 (N o. 123).
W t. 2748/S99 1500 5/38 10900 G p . 340
| T U R K E Y — (continued).
Iiussia and— (con tin u ed ) :
R usso-T urk ish conversations to settle finan­
cial and econom ic interests, A ug. 1913,
209 (N o. 136 ); Russian represen ta tion
at P aris th a t no m ore m oney should be
giv en to T urkey, 210 (N o. 1 37 ); D ra ft
a greem ent w ith T u rkey respectin g ra il­
ways and econom ic questions, Jan. 1914,
313 (N o. 194).
L im an von Sanders M ission, question o f
com pulsion aga in st T u r k e y : Russian
and Turkish relations th orou gh ly
ex p lored , 1913-4, 779 (ed. n ote).
S t r a it s : R ussian plans to seize, in ev en t o f
E uropean com p lica tions, 779 (ed. n o te ) ;
Em p eror N icholas and M. S azonov on
R ussian a ttitu d e tow ards Germ an
policy, A p ril 1914, 781-2 (N o. 537).
G eneral relations w ith Russia, M. Sazonov
on, M a y 1914, 796-7 (N o. 546, encl.).
Q uestion o f A d ria n op le (v. sub B u l g a r i a ,
T u rk ey and).
U N IT E D S T A T E S O F A M E R IC A .
G erm a n y a n d : E m p eror W illiam I I and the
danger o f A m erica, 770 (N o. 530).
W A L F 1SC H BAY.
G erm a ny and, M a y 1912, 441-2 (N o. 2 76 );
exchanges in G erm an S outh W est A fric a
fo r W alfisch B ay, 474 (N o. 3 01 ); G eneral
B otha opposed to, 480 (N o. 309).
YEMEN.
(v. sub A r a b i a .)
Z A B E II N IN C ID E N T .
(u . sub F r a n c e , G erm a ny and.)
Z A K N U N IY E H , Island.
(u .sub P e r s i a n G u l f .)
Z A N Z IB A R .
G erm an un d erta kin g s in regard to, D ec. 1911,
423 (N o. 265).
ZA N Z IB A R AN D PEM BA.
B ritish and G erm an discussions over, M arch
1912, 442-3 (N o. 276), 455 (N o. 287);
possible F ren ch ob jection s to cession to
G erm any, 478 (N o. 3 0 6 ); S ir E y re Crowe
on necessity for a statem ent o f discussions,
I 478 (N o. 306, m in .); S ir E. G rey denies
th a t G erm any had asked G rea t B rita in to
g iv e up Za n zib a r, 544-5 (N o. 3 4 5 ); F rance
and question o f cession of Z a n zib a r, 558
(N o. 361).
S.O . C ode N o. 59 - 2 - 10-2