EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3731 April 20, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. DOMINGO DEGUIA, FLORENTINO DEGUIA, and
FRANCISCO DEGUIA, Defendants-Appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Felix V.

Makasiar for appellee.
Marino T. Regalado for appellants.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the story of two jack fruits, the dispute over whose
ownership ended in tragic death of Jesus Ogalisco on the morning of
June 4, 1949, in sitio Binog, barrio of Makiwalo, municipality of
Mondragon, province of Samar. According to the medical certificate,
Exhs. "G" and "2", the deceased sustained 20 wounds in all, 4 on
the head, 3 on both sides of the neck, and 1 on the back, all of
which were mortal, the other wounds being found on the chest,
shoulders and the right arm. For the killing, Domingo Deguia, and
his two sons, Florentino and Francisco, were charged with murder in
the Court of First Instance of Samar, were found guilty of the crime
and crime and sentenced each to life imprisonment with the
accessories of the law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P2,000 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case is here on
appeal by the three defendants. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan ro bles virtual law lib rary

Domingo Deguia readily admitted responsibility for the killing, but

he claims that he alone killed Jesus Ogalisco, and in self-defense.
According to the version given by Domingo and his witnesses, at
about two o'clock in the afternoon of the day in question, he was
riding on his carabao drawing a sled loaded with two jack fruits, a
sack of casava and bunches of bananas. On passing near the house
of Jesus in the sitio of Binog, the latter stopped him, claiming, the
two jack fruits as his and accusing Domingo of having stolen and
taken them from his tree. Domingo denied the accusation and was
in the act of continuing on his way when Jesus without warning,
boloed him on the right side of his face, inflicting an ugly wound
that is described in the Certificate (Exh. "1") as a wound "five inches
long and inch deep." In retaliation Domingo unsheated his own bolo
and struck Jesus on the head. But his assailant countered with
another blow on the head. Domingo, however, in the course of the
fight, succeeded in inflicting several wounds on different parts of the
body of Jesus who thereafter fell down and succumbed to his
injuries.
chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

After considering the testimonies of the defense witnesses given

during the trial, the lower court rejected the story told by them as
improbable, and the version given by the witnesses for the
prosecution, particularly by Petra Liwanag, the widow of Jesus and
Juanito Barcelon, as the more credible and acceptable. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan robles v irt ual law li bra ry

After carefully going over the record of the case, we find no reason
for disturbing the action of the trial court in giving more credit to
the witnesses for the prosecution and in rejecting the story of the
defense. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

On the basis of the evidence, oral and documentary, we find the

following facts to have been duly established. On June 4, 1949,
Jesus Ogalisco was living in his small house in the sitio of Binog,
barrio of Makiwalo, Mondragon, Samar, with his wife Petra Liwanag
and his minor children. At about ten o'clock in the morning,
Francisco Deguia, riding on his carabao drawing a sled containing
two jack fruits, passed near the house. Jesus, suspecting that the
said fruits had been surreptitiously taken from his tree, accused
Francisco of having stolen the same, and summarily got the two
fruits from the sled and took them into his house. Francisco,
apparently resenting the charge of theft, hurried to his home about
a kilometer away and told his father Domingo, his mother Gregoria
Toltol, and his brother Florentino Deguia, of what had happened.
About two hours thereafter, Domingo accompanied by his two sons,
Florentino and Francisco, each armed with a bolo and a bamboo
spear, arrived in front of the house of Jesus, Domingo asking in a
loud voice why Francisco had been unjustly accused of stealing the
two jack fruits, at the same time demanding that Jesus come down.
Jesus, sensing danger and considering the prospects of an unequal
combat and heeding the dictates of caution, kept quiet and made no
move to comply with the demand. Then, Domingo in the same tone
warned Jesus that if he did not come down, he (Domingo) would kill
every member of Jesus' family in the house, and immediatetly the
three men deployed around the house, and thrust the points of their
spears through the sidings of the low dwelling. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Fearing that his family, specially his children might be hurt, Jesus
decided to face the situation and went down his house by the back
door, with his bolo hanging from his waist. Father and sons
immediately closed upon and surrounded him, Domingo from in
front, boloing him on the head, Francisco spearing him in the right
arm and Florentino from behind, stabbing him with his bolo on the
back. It was then that Jesus unsheated his own bolo to defend
himself, and in the course of which, he inflicted the wound on the
right side of the face of Domingo. But being outnumbered and
surrounded, the outcome of the encounter was not hard to see.
Jesus, overcome by the numerous blows inflicted on him from all
sides, tried to run away from his assailants and finally fell down face
downward at a spot about seventeen meters away from his house.
His wife Petra, seeing the predicament of her husband, jumped
down from the house to aid him. Florentino met her and threatened
to kill her but she begged him to spare her and her children. At that
moment, Gregoria Toltol, wife of Domingo and mother of Florentino
and Francisco, appeared at the scene and urged her husband and
sons to kill the entire family, but fortunately, her wishes were not
carried out. While the two sons retired with their mother, Domingo
approached Jesus and asked him if he wanted some more, meaning,
if he had not had enough, but the question remained unanswered
for Jesus was already dead. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

It so happened that same morning, two boys named Juanito

Barcelon and Agapito Taroma, both nephews of Jesus, had come
from their homes in the neighboring barrio of Cawayan, to
get Palawan, and about the same time that the three defendants
Domingo and his two sons arrived at the scene, they (the boys)
were resting under a cabac tree, near the house of Jesus, slicing
some vines. Naturally they witnessed all that transpired near and
around the house. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
After finding that Jesus was already dead, Domingo discovered the
presence of the two boys, Juanito and Agapito, near the premises
and he chased them away. While Agapito remained and hid in the
bushes, Juanito ran toward his home and notified his grandmother
and other relatives of his uncle's death. The grandmother hurried to
the poblacion of Catarman, being the town nearest to the scene,
and notified the police authorities, and policeman Porfirio Marquez
hurried to the sitio of Binog where he found the body of Jesus in the
same place where he fell. In the meantime, for fear that Domingo
and his sons might return, Jesus' widow, Petra Liwanag, was still
hiding in the bushes and policeman Porfirio Marquez had to blow his
whistle three times before she ventured out from her hiding place.
Policeman Marquez found three bamboo spears near the body of
Jesus, and in the house he found the two jack fruits already
mentioned. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

That same afternoon, Domingo, rather weak from loss of blood due
to his wound, accompanied and supported by his sons, Florentino
and Francisco, repaired to the house of Sinforiano Coche, lieutenant
of the barrio of Makiwalo, and informed the said official that he had
killed Jesus. Domingo was later sent to the poblacion of Mondragon
where he was treated and then placed under arrest. chanrobles virtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The two brothers, Florentino and Francisco, interposed the defense

of alibi, claiming that it was their father who drove the sled where
the two jack fruits were loaded; stripping abaca, and that it was
only later in the afternoon that they were informed by one Felix de
la Cruz that their father had met with an accident; that they
(Florentino and Francisco) with their mother went to the house of
Jesus and there saw his body; and that at some distance along the
trail, they found their own father lying on the ground nursing his
wounds. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

There are several reasons why this story of the defense can not be
accepted. As pointed out by the trial court, Felix de la Cruz was not
presented as a witness in order to support the theory of alibi.
Moreover, the participation of the two brothers, Florentino and
Francisco, in the attack was witnessed by Petra Liwanag and Juanito
Barcelon, whose testimonies were accepted by the trial court. These
same testimonies as transcribed, we have read, and they appeared
to be straightforward and sincere. Besides, as observed by the trial
court and the Solicitor General, it is incredible that Domingo who
was far inferior to Jesus in build, stature, and strength could, alone,
have overcome him and inflicted so many wounds on different parts
of the body, in front and from behind, especially if we bear in mind
the claim of Domingo that it was Jesus who initiated the fight and
therefore had a distinct advantage and opportunity in killing his foe
instead of himself of being overcome and killed. Furthermore, the
version given by the prosecution that the three appellants, father
and sons, were armed not only with bolos but also with bamboo
spears, is confirmed by the finding near the body of Jesus of said
three spears by policeman Porfirio Marquez who was the first agent
of persons in authority to arrive at the scene. The story of the
defense that Jesus had taken the two jack fruits from the sled to his
house was also confirmed by the finding of the two fruits by Porfirio
in the house of Jesus. There are other details pointed out by the
Solicitor General in his brief against the acceptance of the theory of
said defense which we consider unnecessary to mention and
discuss.chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

We agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court should have
considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of Domingo his
having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. We, however,
disagree with the Solicitor General in his contention that the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place be considered as
having attended the commission of the crime. It is true that the
house nearest to the dwelling of Jesus was about a kilometer away
but it should be remembered that the appellants did not select the
place either to better attain their object without interference, or to
secure themselves against detection and punishment. We are,
moreover, inclined to find as we do find in favor of the three
defendants the existence of the mitigating circumstance of
provocation. In our opinion the act of Jesus in accusing Francisco
Deguia of stolen the two jack fruits and in summarily taking the
same from the sled into his house was an insult and provocation not
only to Francisco but also to his family, particularly his father who
must have resented the accusation. We do not, for certain, know
who really owned the fruits. Petra Liwanag, widow of Jesus, admits
that neither she nor Jesus saw the taking away of the fruits from
their tree. On the other hand, Domingo claims that he did not have
to steal jack fruits because he had plenty of them at home, giving
us to understand that the two jack fruits in question, belonged to
him.chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In conclusion, we agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General
that the appellants are guilty of murder, the killing being raised to
that category because of the qualifying circumstance of superior
strength. In relation with Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code and
because of the existence of a mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the two brothers,
Florentino Deguia and Francisco Deguia, deserve the imposition of
the penalty for the crime of murder in the minimum degree. As to
Domingo, with the existence of two mitigating circumstances,
namely, voluntary surrender and provocation, with no aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law should be imposed. We also agree with the
Solicitor General that the indemnity which the appellants are
sentenced to pay should be increased to P6,000.00. chanroblesvi rtua l awlibra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Florentino Deguia and Francisco Deguia is hereby sentenced each to

not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not
more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Domingo Deguia
is hereby sentenced to not less than ten (10) years of prision
mayor and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal. The three should be credited with any
preventive imprisonment they may have already suffered. The
indemnity to be paid by them is increased from P2,000 to P6,000.
With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrobles vi rtual law lib rary

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48224 September 23, 1942

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff.

NATIVIDAD FLORENDO, complaint-appellant, vs. GENEROSO
MACEDA and CORAZON MACEDA, Defendants-Appellees.

Constancio E. Castañeda for appellant.

Estanislao A. Fernandez for appellees.

MORAN, J.:

This is a criminal action for slight slander instituted in the justice of

the peace court of Pasig, Rizal, against defendants Generoso
Maceda and Corazon Maceda and which was dismissed on the
ground that the offense had already prescribed. The offense was
allegedly committed on July 21, 1940, and the action was filed on
October 22, 1940, that is three months and one day after the
supposed commission thereof. The appeal of the private prosecutor
to the Court of First Instance having been dismissed on the same
ground on motion of the fiscal, the complainant appealed to this
Court.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The first question here raised is: May the offended party appeal
from the order of dismissal rendered upon petition of the fiscal to
that effect? This question inevitably leads to the inquiry as to
whether the offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a
criminal action and, in the affirmative case, the instances where
intervention is proper. This is so because, obviously where there is
no right to intervene, there is no right to appeal. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual l aw libra ry

Rule 106, section 15, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly
reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal
case, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the
offense.
This provision was taken from section 107 of General Orders, No.
58, which recites:

The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be

injured by commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution
of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by
reason of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provision
of this order; but such person may appear and shall be heard either
individually or by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court
upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for
the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be
the duty of the promoter fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to
the right of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the
court denying him a legal right.

The late Chief Justice Arellano, one of the members of the

commission which drafted General Orders, No. 58, commenting on
the right of the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the
criminal action as provided for in section 107 aforequoted, said:

... La accion penal privada del ofendido mismo era necessario

mantener como consecuencia de la vigencia del Codigo Penal por
dos razones; primera porque, en principio, con el pronunciamiento
principal acerca de la responsabilidad criminal suele ir el relativo a
la responsabilidad civil; y segunda, porque hay delitos que no
pueden perseguirse de otro modo que por medio de instancia formal
de la persona ofendida. Por estas razones, bajo el epigrafe
"derechos de la persona agraviada por el delito"; se dicto la section
107, segun la cual, "los derechos hasta ahora asegurados por la Ley
a la persona que alega haber sido agraviada por la comision de un
delito, para tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir la
responsabilidad civil nacida del delito, no quedan restringidos por
las disposiciones de esta orden. (Estados Unidos contra Malabon, 1
Jur. Fil., 760, 762.)

In a resolution, upon a motion for reconsideration in the case

of People vs. Orais (38 Off. Gaz., 2434), this Court had occasion to
explain the specific import of the above-quoted observations of the
late Chief Justice, thus:
... No pudo haber sido la intencion del legislador el permitir al
particular lesionado por la comision de un delito tomar parte en sun
persecucion haya o no sufrido daños y perjuicios en su persona o en
sus intereses. La frase "tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir la
responsabilidad civil nacida del delito limita esta intervencion a los
casos en que el ofendido particular haya surfrido daños y perjuicios
provenientes del hecho delictivo.

And in Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan (63 Phil.,

846, 857), this Court reaffirmed these observations as follows:

Some of the rights secured by the Spanish law to the person

claiming to be injured by the commission of the offense and
conserved by section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, are to take
part in the prosecution of the offense, to recover damages for the
injury sustained by reason of the same and to appeal only in
matters affecting restitutions, reparations and indemnities claimed
by them, but not with regard to the criminal action. (Emphasis
ours.)

It is thus evident, in the light of the history of the enactment of

section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, as reflected in the
observations of one of its framers and the explanatory decisions of
this Court, that the offended party may, as of right, intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal action, but then only when, from the
nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action
therefor has not by him been waived or expressly reserved. This is
the rule we have now embodied in section 15 of Rule 106 of the
new Rules of Court, elsewhere quoted. But, as expressly provided in
this same section, this right of intervention in appropriate cases is
subject to the provision of section 4 of the same Rule which reads
as follows:

All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information

shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

As a necessary corollary to this provision, we laid down the principle

that even if the offense is one where civil indemnity might rightly be
claimed, if the criminal action is dismissed by the court, on motion
of the fiscal, on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the
offended party cannot appeal from the order of dismissal because
otherwise the prosecution of the offense would, in the last analysis,
be thrown beyond the direction and control of the fiscal.
(Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, supra;
People vs. Orais, supra; People vs. Moll, 40 Off,. Gaz., 2d Sup., p.
231; People vs. Lipana, 40 Off. Gaz., 3456.) In the case cited,
statements were, however, made by this Court importing a grant
right to the offended party to appeal upon a question of law. We
reaffirm these statements as a correct qualification of the rule, it
being understood, however, that such right to appeal upon a
question of law presupposes the existence of a rightful claim to civil
indemnity and the offended party has neither waived nor reserved
expressly his action therefor.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

It is argued that in People vs. Baes (38 Off. Gaz., 2319), wherein
the crime charged is that of offending religious feelings which
obviously precludes any idea of civil indemnity, we ruled that the
offended party may appeal upon a question of law from the
dismissal of the case ordered by the Court of First Instance. The
contention rests on an erroneous predicate regarding the true
offense alleged to have been committed. In our resolution rendered
upon a motion for a reconsideration in People vs. Orais (38 Gac.
Off., pag. 2434), we explained our ruling thus:

... Existe, pues, una distincion fundamental entre la cuestion

envuelta en la causa de Baes y la envuelta en la de Gonzales. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Aunque en la primera causa los hechos denunciados constituyen

mas bien delito de allanamiento de una propieda, previsto y penado
por el articulo 281 del Codigo Penal Revisado, que lleva consigo
responsabilidad civil, no habiendose alegado en la denuncia que el
denunciante particular hubiese sufrido algun daño, hubiera sido mas
propio el que hubiesemos considerado la solicitud
de mandamus como si se hubiese presentado para obligar al
Juzgado inferior a admitir no la apelacion, sino la denuncia en la que
los hechos denunciados constituian el delito de allanamiento de una
propiedad, y no el de "ofensa a los sentimientos religiosos", ya que
la calificacion que el Ministerio Fiscal da en una querella a un delito
no es la que determina su naturaleza, sino los hechos delictivos
alegados en la denuncia y probados en el juicio; puesto que, no
teniendo el particular agraviado por la comision de un delito derecho
de tomar parte en su presecucion y de apelar, a menos que
reclamase daños y perjuicious o el delito enjuiciado fuese de los que
necesariamente producen responsabilidad civil, al unico remedio
que le queda es el de mandamus para obligar al Ministerio Fiscal a
presentar la querella correspondiente con vista de la denuncia que
alega hechos constitutivos de delito, probados en la investigacion
preliminar, y al Juez que sobreseyo la denuncia a mocion del
Ministerio Fiscal a reponer la causa, si se ve que uno y otro
cometieron abuso de discrecion.

In the instant case, the civil action for damages arising from the
oral defamation charged does not appear to have been waived or
expressly reserved by the supposed offended party. And since,
according to Rule 107, section 1, paragraph ( a) "when a criminal
action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action," we believe, and so hold, that the offended party may rightly
intervene by interposing an appeal from the order dismissing the
action upon a question of law. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

An admission is imputed to the attorney for the offended party to

the effect that no damages had been sustained by the latter arising
from the offense charged, but this supposed admission is denied.
Besides, no attorney can waive his client's cause of action unless
with the consent of the client (7 C. J. S., 922), and, in the instance
case, the admission attributed to the private prosecuting attorney is
not alleged to have been made with the offended party's
consent. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The next question is: Has the offense of slight slander charged in
the complaint prescribed? chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion

temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Crimes punishable by other afflicted penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor,
which shall prescribe in five years. chanroble svi rtuala wlibra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The crime of libel or other similar offense shall prescribe in two

years.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe

in six months. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtu al law lib rary

Light offenses prescribe in two months. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest

penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.

This provision fixes the different prescriptive periods for grave

felonies. Thus, a grave felony prescribes in 20 years if it is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetual or reclusion temporal, or in
15 years if it is punishable by other afflictive penalty. Less grave
felonies prescribe in 10 years if they are punishable by correctional
penalty, or 15 years if punishable by arresto mayor, except the
offense of libel or other similar offenses which shall prescribe in 2
years, or the offense of oral defamation and slander by deed which
shall prescribe in 6 months. All light offense prescribe in 2 months.
As the offense charged in the instant case is a light offense, the
prescriptive period of 2 months applies thereto. The case, therefore,
was rightly dismissed. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

It is contended by complainant-appellant that all offenses of oral

defamation, whether light or serious, prescribe in six months
because the second to the last paragraph of article 90 above quoted
apparently so implies. We cannot uphold such interpretation. The
very fact that the prescriptive period for serious oral defamation
was expressly excepted from the general rule by lowering it from
ten years to six months argues against the supposition that the
lawmaker intended to raise the prescriptive period for light oral
defamation from two months (as that of all other light offenses) to
six months, i. e, on the same level with serious oral defamation.
The obvious reason for shortening the period of limitation for the
prosecution of serious oral defamation - namely, that a verbal insult
is forgotten as soon as the heat of passion subsides - applies with
equal, if not greater, force to light oral defamation. Hence, there is
no reason to suppose that the lawmaker intended to raise the
prescriptive period for light oral defamation above that of other light
offenses. Indeed, that was the same law under the old Penal Code,
and there has been no reason or occasion for any change. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

The order of dismissal is affirmed with costs against appellant. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary