Documente Academic
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Documente Cultură
Daniel A. Smith
This edition published 2011 by Routledge:
Routledge Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group Taylor & Francis Group
711 Third Avenue 2 Park Square, Milton Park
NewYork,NY 10017 Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Published in 1998 by
Routledge
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001
Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE
Smith, Daniel A.
Tax crusaders and the politics of direct democracy / Daniel A.
Smith
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-415-91991-6
1. Tax and expenditure limitations-United States-States
2. Referendum-United States-States 1. Title.
HJ4182.S65 1998
336.2'05'0973-dc21 97-51490
CIP
In loving memory of Catherine "Kit" Graf Fernald,
an inspiring grassroots activist
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CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IX
PREFACE xi
Direct Democracy and Conventional Wisdom
1 THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1
4 PROPPING UP PROPOSITION 13 52
Howard Jarvis, the United Organizations
of Taxpayers, and the Los Angeles Apartment
Owners Association
vii
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ix
x ""'" Acknowledgments
Denver, CO D.A.S.
1998
PREFACE
Xl
xii ~ Preface
sentation of all citizens, not just the special interests. For example, political
journalist James Ring Adams writes, "In voting directly on initiative pro-
posals, the citizen body can directly express its consent to taxation or with-
draw it from a level it deems excessive. Unresponsive legislatures have
aroused a reaction threatening to repudiate representation ahogether."s
Concurring, political scientist Jack Citrin writes how "direct democracy;'
in contrast to representative democracy which is bogged down by
entrenched professional politicians and special interests, "expresses a posi-
tive yearning for voice - for the chance to be heard and to participate."6
The second basic assumption, that sweeping electoral support for a mea-
sure on election day signifies a broad base of grassroots support for the
measure, is equally prevalent. When a measure receives across-the-board
support from voters, those writing on the topic frequently assume that the
measure was the result of a grassroots endeavor. Eschewing the investiga-
tion of organization and financial data of a given tax limitation campaign,
some journalists have a tendency to focus exclusively on the personalities of
the tax limitation measures. For example, in Florida, Biddulph's Tax Cap
Committee was bankrolled by the sugar industry in its successful campaign
to pass Amendment 1, its 1996 anti-tax ballot measure. Over a three year
period, the Tax Cap Committee raised more than $4.7 million; $3.5 million
of the total, roughly seventy-five percent, was contributed by the sugar
industry. In 1996 alone, the Tax Cap Committee reported contributions of
$549,795. While only thirty-nine out of the 2,842 (1.3%) contributions that
year were for amounts greater than $1,000, they accounted for eighty-five
percent ($469,033) of the total amount raised by the group. Two compa-
nies, U.S. Sugar and Flo-Sun Sugar, along with the Sugar Cane Growers
Association, contributed $339,947, or sixty-two percent of the totaJ.7 Bid-
dulph, blithely acknowledging the beneficence of the sugar industry, stated
to one reporter that, "[tlhe sugar support has been gratefully received." But
the journalist then went on to report, without checking it against the state's
campaign finance records, Biddulph's populist-sounding claim that "the
average contribution" made to his group was "about $18:'8
No one questions the fact that an overwhelming majority of voting citi-
zens in Florida supported Amendment 1 at the polls. But success on elec-
tion day should not keep those interested in the political process of direct
democracy from asking the following questions: Is the measure the prod-
uct of the people? Are ordinary citizens, and not vested special interests,
driving the process of direct democracy? Is the initiative process any less
corrupted by special interests than the legislative process? Should the pas-
xiv ~ Preface
THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
1
2 ~ Tax Crusaders
In 1898 the citizens of South Dakota became the first to amend their state
constitution and adopt the process of direct democracy. The clamor for the
citizen initiative across the Great Plains states arose out of the doctrines of
the People's (or Populist) Party and other insurgent political organizations
during the early 1890s. Rev. Robert W. Haire, a Catholic clergyman and an
activist in the Knights of Labor, is generally given credit for devising South
Dakota's scheme, whereby citizens would "expressly reserve to themselves
the right to propose measures, which measures the legislature shall enact
and submit to a vote of the electors of the State."8 The initiative was prized
by progressive reformers as a democratic device that would help clean up
the spoils of highly partisan state governments. The reformers believed
that state legislators were being unduly swayed by big business monopo-
lies, most notably the railroads.
During the ensuing Progressive Era, eighteen other states (nearly all of
them west of the Mississippi River) sanctioned the use of the initiative
between 1898 and 1918. The use of the initiative soared during the Pro-
gressive Era, as government reformers used the citizen initiative to enact
measures dealing with labor law, welfare, business regulation and taxation,
and prohibition. The adoption of direct democracy, which included not
only the initiative, but also the referendum and the recall of public offi-
cials, was seen by progressives as an "instrument of democracy" that could
help return government back to the people. 9
The use of the initiative, while still robust during the depression and
New Deal era, slowly began to taper off in the 1940s. In 1954, for example,
citizens managed to place only eighteen statewide measures on the ballots
of the states permitting the initiative; in 1968, there were only ten ballot
measures nationwide, down from the one-year high of ninety in 1914. 10 In
terms of the geographic expansion of the initiative, only one state, Alaska,
added the initiative to its state constitution between 1919 and 1967. Not
until the early 1970s, with the blossoming of democratic participation
spurred on by the civil rights and the women's movements, did citizens
once again turn to the initiative as a policy-making tool in the states. I I
Over the past century, direct democracy and the use of the citizen initia-
tive has become permanently established in almost half of the states in the
union. Citizens in twenty-four states (plus the District of Columbia) are
allowed to propose either ordinary statutes or amendments to their state
constitutions, which are then submitted to the voters for ratification. 12
The Politics of Direct Democmcy __
.~
5
G
6 ~ Tax Crusaders
Figure 1.2 Mike Keefe (Denver Post) editorial cartoon of Citizens as Policy Makers-
"Who Do You Favor in the Legislature?"
The citizen initiative is a readily accepted practice in the states that have
adopted it. According to public opinion polls, direct democracy is seen by a
majority of people as a legitimate tool to propose and enact legislation as
well as amendments to their state constitutions. 13 Once thought of as a sup-
plement to representative democracy, the initiative process now plays a
major role in the shaping and making of public policy in these two-dozen
states. 14 Citizens, businesses, and interest groups in these states regularly use
the ballot initiative as a way to circumvent their intransigent state legisla-
tures. Furthermore, voters are often as interested or even more interested in
ballot measures as they are in races for political office, although scholarly
research generally finds that initiatives do not measurably increase voter
turnout. IS What is certain, though, is that the initiative process prompts cit-
izens' rather than state legislators, to become policy-makers for a day.
The catalyst for the nationwide surge of citizen initiatives was unquestion-
ably California's 1978 property tax cutting measure, Proposition 13.
According to political scientist Jack Citrin, "Proposition l3 ushered in an
The Politics of Direct Democracy ~ 7
welfare reform, and tort reform. In addition, voters have considered several
bizarre issues, such as banning the use of animal traps, outlawing the hunt-
ing of lactating mother bears, prohibiting triple trailers, requiring warning
labels on hazardous materials, and even the deregulation of the denture
industry. The subject matter of a citizen initiative is limited only by the
ability of petitioners to collect the required number of valid signatures to
place the measure on the ballot.
While over half of all citizen initiatives are defeated at the polls, tax limi-
tation ballot measures continue to achieve a high degree of success on elec-
tion day. In 1996, voters in California, Florida, Nevada, and Oregon passed
anti-tax citizen initiatives. That year, anti-tax measures were defeated in
only two states, Idaho and Nebraska. Leaders of successful anti-tax mea-
sures-for example Barbara Anderson in Massachusetts, David Biddulph
in Florida, Douglas Bruce in Colorado, Joel Fox in California, and Bill Size-
more in Oregon - have become major political players in their respective
states. Deft in their ability to spin populist-sounding sound bites in their
appeal for public support, these charismatic individuals command the
attention of not only the media, but also the public officials of their states.
As we shall see, tax crusaders are major power brokers in the political arenas
of the American states.
Why has there been such an explosion in the use of the citizen initiative
in the twenty years since Proposition 13? According to numerous schol-
ars, journalists, and practitioners of the initiative, the proliferation of
ballot initiatives in the American states signifies a growing popular dis-
satisfaction with the institution of representative government. Citizen
and special interest groups are turning to the ballot initiative in order to
circumvent their state legislatures which are either hopelessly unrespon-
sive or gridlocked by partisan politics. The citizen initiative, according to
these observers, functions as a barometer of the popular discontent of
"politics as usual." Advocates like to note that the initiative process-
unlike the institution of representative government-gives citizens a
genuine voice by bringing democracy down to its grassroots. It enables
and even encourages people to become directly involved in the political
process. By circumventing state legislatures, the citizen initiative allows
for popular sentiments to be heard and acted upon directly by the peo-
The Politics of Direct Democracy ~ 9
pIe. It reduces the influence of the "special interests" who have gained-
in many people's eyes-undue leverage over our elected officials. "The
initiative process is the guarantee that the people will always have the last
say in important matters in state policy;' reasons Jim Shultz, the executive
director of the Democracy Center, a voter advocacy group based in San
Francisco. 24 By way of these ballot initiatives, proponents claim, the
states have experienced a resurgence of activist, populist politics. The
people are reclaiming what is rightfully theirs-government of and by
the people.
Or so the story generally goes. While the rhetoric giving sustenance to
direct democracy tends to consist of a patriotic blend of populist and
democratic pronouncements, precious little is known about the actual
mechanics of the initiative process. Compared with other sub-fields of
political science, relatively few scholars have probed the inner workings of
the initiative process. As a result, a host of questions, empirical and norma-
tive alike, have gone largely unanswered by students of direct democracy.
How, for example, are citizen initiative campaigns run and what types of
individuals, groups, and businesses contribute money and provide in-kind
resources to initiative campaigns? What is the role of the author of the
measure? Why are some ballot initiatives ultimately successful at the polls,
and others not? And perhaps most important of all, if ballot measures, as
proponents of the process like to extol, ostensibly empower "the people" to
govern themselves directly, how participatory, grassroots, and democratic
is the initiative process?
her tax limitation measure. Following intense campaigns, the three ballot
measures resonated with a majority of voters on election day.
Conventional wisdom suggests that these and other citizen initiatives
bent on reducing taxes are typically populist endeavors, stemming from
ordinary people. Journalists and scholars who track and study tax limita-
tion initiatives regularly suggest that the measures pit average taxpayers
against the entrenched interests of government officials and public ser-
vants. As historian Michael Kazin writes, the tax limitation "movement as a
populist insurgency rapidly passed into conventional wisdom-along
with the language its organizers had used to describe themselves."25 Tax
limitation initiatives continue to be generally accepted as authentic forms
of mass protest. Indeed, the three tax limitation initiatives I consider in
depth won high levels of support at the polls. In each case considered
here-Proposition 13 in California (1978), Proposition 21/2 in Massachu-
setts (1980), and Amendment 1 in Colorado (1992)-citizens favored by
considerable margins to lower or limit their taxes. According to most
observers, the passage of these initiatives reflects the spontaneous, populist
spirit of direct democracy as envisioned by those who championed the
radical process a century ago.
The core of my argument challenges this conventional view of tax limita-
tion ballot measures. Through the three historical case studies, I attempt to
uncover what is beneath such boilerplate. I argue that the process of direct
democracy in the case of these three tax limitation measures was far less
populist, grassroots-driven, and democratic than is generally assumed.
While appearing on the surface to be populist endeavors, they lack many of
the qualities of traditional populist movements. In all three states, a tax cru-
sader, acting as a populist entrepreneur, maneuvered a tax limitation ballot
initiative through the direct democracy process. Sensing the public mood,
each collected signatures for a ballot initiative and offered it to the voters as
the solution to the perceived problem of excessive taxation. Save for coming
out to vote, citizens were not mobilized into direct political action in sup-
port of the measure once it had qualified for the ballot. While the tax cru-
saders swaddled their measures with populist rhetoric, their initiative
campaigns were not grassroots or populist. Rather, I suggest they were more
akin to "faux populist moments"- fleeting expressions of popular support
for tax limitation initiatives crafted by entrepreneurial tax crusaders. These
ballot measures, while buoyed by the populist-sounding rhetoric of a tax
crusader, lacked the active participation and mobilization of "the people:'
The Politics of Direct Democracy '"""" 11
Although not the primary focus of the book, the three case studies provide
some insight as to why some ballot initiatives are successful at the polls,
and others not. Neither liberals nor conservatives have emerged to domi-
nate the initiative process since the passage of Proposition 13, but the
process has become more open to individuals, businesses, and interest
groups equipped with considerable financial resources at their disposal.
Money, though, by no means guarantees an electoral victory. As Cronin
laments, "[elxplaining outcomes over a broad range of issues and in
diverse states is a challenge that defies tidy causal analysis."26
Relatively few scholars have tried to systematically probe the underlying
causes for successful initiatives. 27 The principal reason for this gap in the
scholarly literature is fairly obvious. The tremendous variation among the
twenty-four states that permit the initiative-from the size and demo-
graphics of the state, to the state's petition requirements, to whether an ini-
tiative is statutory or constitutional, to the subject matter of the initiative,
to the professionalization of the campaigns, to the media play, to dispari-
ties in aggregate campaign spending, to the number and levels of individ-
ual contributions made to campaign committees-inhibits data collection
and quantitative analysis. In addition, the great variance among these inde-
pendent variables makes it extremely difficult to generalize about their
potential influence on the initiative process.
Instead, scholars have tended to focus their attention on the aggregate
spending of initiative campaigns to determine whether or not measures are
successful. All of the states require groups promoting or opposing ballot
measures to report their campaign contributions and expenditures in a
timely fashion. As such, scholars have found it convenient to analyze the
amount of money collected and spent by groups rather than some of these
more intangible variables that undoubtedly influence initiative campaigns.
With respect to campaign spending, money seems to matter more dur-
ing initiative campaigns when it is spent by groups opposing ballot mea-
sures. 28 In one of the earliest quantitative studies on the topic, political
scientist John Shockley discovered that by outspending the backers of the
measures, nine out of twelve opposition groups were able to defeat pro-
environment ballot measures, even though the measures were originally
favored in the polls.29 Examining more than two-dozen California initia-
tives from the late 1960s and 1970s, law professor Daniel Lowenstein found
that one-sided spending by opponents of an initiative-even if the mea-