III.
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW
A. Choice of Forum
1. Sweet Lines Inc. vs. Teves, et.al., G.R. No. L-37750 (May 19,
1978)
FACTS:
 Private Respondents, ATTY. LEOVIGILDO TANDOG AND
ROGELIO TIRO
- Contractor by profession
- Dec. 31, 1971: bought tickets for Voyage 90 at the branch office
of Sweet Lines
 Sweet Lines
- a shipping company transporting inter-island
passengers and cargoes at Cagayan De Oro City
- were to board M/S “Sweet Hope” bound for Tagbilaran via the
port of Cebu
 Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many
passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice,
went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced
to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers
of the Philippine Coastguard."
 Private Respondents’ Allegations:
1. during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and
the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits,"
2. the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran
were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other
tickets
 Complaint for Damages and Breach of Contract of Carriage in
the sum of PhP 10k at CFI Misamis Oriental
 Sweet Lines: moved to dismissed on the ground of improper venue,
alleging that based on Condition No. 14 of the ticket, actions arising
out of the conditions in the ticket shall be brought in the courts of
Cebu
 Trial Court: MTD was denied
 MR: denied
 Hence, this Petition for Prohibition for Preliminary Injunction
 1973 Resolution: restrained the judge from proceeding the case
 1974: gave due course to the Petition
ISSUES:
1. W/N the stipulations thru condition printed at the back of
passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out
of the ocntract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of
all others?
HELD:
There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered
into by petitioner and private respondents and that the passage tickets,
upon which the latter based their complaint, are the best evidence thereof.
All the essential elements of a valid contract, i.e., consent, cause or
consideration and object, are present.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen
(14) conditions — one of which is "Condition No. 14" which is in issue in
this case — printed at the back of the passage tickets, these are commonly
known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability of
which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining
in each case and the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be
enforced. For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations in a contract come about
after deliberate drafting by the parties thereto, ... there are certain contracts
almost all the provisions of which have been drafted only by one party,
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usually a corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because
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the only participation of the party is the signing of his signature or his
'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of lading, contracts of make of
lots on the installment plan fall into this category" 16
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are
entered into — namely, that it is drafted only by one party, usually the
corporation, and is sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party,
in this instance the passengers, private respondents, who cannot change the
same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on the "take it or leave it"
basis — certain guidelines in the determination of their validity and/or
enforceability have been formulated in order to that justice and fan play
characterize the relationship of the contracting parties.
We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the
passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the
following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-
island ship. ping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to
the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets,
on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second,
Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of
proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and
interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who,
under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only
in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial
notice, that there is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels
plying between the country's several islands, and the facilities they offer
leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the
piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be
transported. The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy
seasons, when Passengers literally scramble to whatever accommodations
may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their
safety — their immediate concern, for the moment, being to be able to
board vessels with the hope of reaching their destinations. The schedules
are — as often as not if not more so — delayed or altered. This was
precisely the experience of private respondents when they were relocated
to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the
scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn
grits, " because even the latter was filed to capacity.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the
passengers to examine their tickets received from crowded/congested
counters, more often than not during rush hours, for conditions that may
be printed much charge them with having consented to the conditions, so
printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions m fine print, as
in this case. 20
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at
the ms of the petitioner, respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither
did the latter have the opportunity to take the into account prior to the
purpose chase of their tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions of
contracts — the common example of contracts of adherence — which are
entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the
insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of inter-island v
do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only
from the fact that they purpose chased the tickets.
It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders
of certificates of public convenience and therefore, posses a virtual
monopoly over the business of transporting passengers between the ports
covered by their franchise. This being so, shipping companies, like
petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the
business of transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of
passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail
of their vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that the bulk of those who board these inter-island vested come from the
low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice
but to avail of petitioner's vessels.
2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue
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of actions. For, although venue may be changed or transferred from one
province to another by agreement of the parties in writing t to Rule 4,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid
where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private
respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer
of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the expense
and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to
prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not
to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance,
the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices
in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any
of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental,
as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less
prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject
or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good ... 22 Under this principle" ... freedom of
contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the
public. 23 Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the
public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions
of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner company
at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate
claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and
unenforceable, as contrary to public policy — to make the courts accessible
to all who may have need of their services.
2. HSBC vs. Jack Robert Sherman, et.al., G.R. No. 72494 (August
11, 1989)
3. Unimasters Conglomeration Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. 119657
(February 7, 1997)
FACTS: On October 8, 1988, KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS entered into
a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of KUBOTA’s products in
Samar and Leyte. The contract contained: 1. a stipulation reading: “All suits
arising out of this Agreement shall be filed in the proper Courts of Quezon
City;” 2. a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain a credit line with
METROBANK in the amount of 2M pesos to answer for its obligations to
KUBOTA.
Five years later, UNIMASTERS filed an action in RTC- Tacloban City
against KUBOTA, a certain Reynaldo Go, and METROBANK for
damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On the same day, RTC issued a restraining order
enjoining METROBANK from authorizing or effecting payment of any
alleged obligation of UNIMASTERS to KUBOTA arising out of or in
connection with purchases made by Go against the credit line of 2M pesos.
On January 4, 1994, KUBOTA filed two motions, one of which was a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Thereafter,
the RTC denied the said motion. The trial court said that UNIMASTERS
was holding its principal place of business in Tacloban City, while
KUBOTA was holding its principal place of business in Quezon City. The
proper venue therefore, pursuant to the Rules of Court (ROC), was either
Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Quezon City,
as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership Agreement, was an
additional place stated in the ROC. The filing, therefore, of the complaint
in Tacloban City was proper.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed RTC’s decision. The CA agreed with
KUBOTA that the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership
Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits
arising thereunder only and exclusively to the proper courts in Quezon City.
It further held that the participation of KUBOTA’s counsel at the hearing
on the injunction incident did not operate as a waiver or abandonment of
its objection to venue.
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ISSUE: W/N the stipulation in the Dealership Agreement had the effect
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of effectively eliminating Tacloban City as an optional venue and limiting
litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to
Quezon City.
HELD: No. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between
them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City
— or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and
intention — the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits
between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing
suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff,
which is UNIMASTERS in this case.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing
the venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons who
neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements
on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of
an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Parties may by
stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being
merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or
prejudicial to third persons. It is a general principle that a person may
renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be
against public policy.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the
parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept
the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most
serves the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating
venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions
arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply
adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this
general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical
as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix
places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. This is easier
said than done, however, as an examination of precedents involving venue
covenants will immediately disclose.
In at least 13 cases, the SC construed the venue stipulations involved as
merely permissive. One of these cases includes: Polytrade Corporation
v. Blanco, decided in 1969. In this case, the venue stipulation was as follows:
The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila. This Court
ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning is that the
parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive
words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are
totally absent therefrom. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed
to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did
not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned
in Section 2(b) of Rule 4."
On the other hand, there were some cases where stipulations on venue were
held to be restrictive, or mandatory. An example of this is Bautista vs. De
Borja, decided in 1966. In this case, the contract provided that in case of any
litigation arising therefrom or in connection therewith, the venue of the
action shall be in the City of Manila. This Court held that without either
party reserving the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by law, it
can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the
venue of the action, in connection with the contract sued upon in the
proper courts of the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither party
is a resident of Manila.
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Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their
agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That
ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the
foundation of venue regulations, and that construction should be
adopted which most conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction
placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely
complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical
and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between
them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the
prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as
mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said
rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of
the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions
different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more,
suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must
be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their
purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at
the place named by them, regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4;
and any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved
against giving their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other
rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without
stable standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless
inconsistency.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, the Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Tacloban City, Branch 6, dated February 3, 1994, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED, and said Court is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with
Civil Case No. 93-12-241 in due course. SO ORDERED.
4. NM Rotschild & Sons vs. Lepanto, G.R. No. 175799 (November
28, 2011)
FACTS:
On August 30, 2005, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint against NM
Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring
the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being
contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for
damages.
Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s
counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect
service of summons on petitioner.
On October 20, 2005, petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion
to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that
the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due
to the defective and improper service of summons; the Complaint failed
to state a cause of action; respondent does not have any against petitioner;
and other grounds.
On December 9, 2005, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion
to Dismiss providing that there was a proper service of summons through
the Department of Foreign Affairs on account of the fact that the
defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines,
nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Written Power of
Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal
processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to
Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be
ventilated during the trial.
On April 3, 2006, petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss.
On September 8, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
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Hence, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss on account of its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.
HELD:
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person
on account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on
petitioner through the DFA, with respondent’s counsel personally bringing
the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney, Australia.
Respondent argues that extraterritorial service of summons upon foreign
private juridical entities is not proscribed under the Rules of Court.
Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with
the service of summons on a defendant which does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines,
in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3)
when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been
attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons
may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the
action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. . On the
other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court
It is likewise settled that an action in personam is lodged against a person
based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to
a corresponding lien or obligation.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and
Hedging Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It
is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the
defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to
the plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in
personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property within the
Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be
converted to onequasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the
defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless
it voluntarily appears in court
In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held
to have voluntarily appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and
was actually afforded, specific reliefs from the trial court.
The Court therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from
the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
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obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
Page
 Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial
of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
Petition is DENIED
B. Choice of Law
5. Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
6. Tayag Renato vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. 23145
(November 29, 1968)
7. Pakistan International Airlines vs. Ople, 190 SCRA 1990, G.R.
No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990)
Facts: Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila
2 separate contracts of employment with private respondents Ethelynne B.
Farrales and Ma. M.C. Mamasig. The contracts provided that (1) the
agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the
mutual consent of the parties; (2) PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by
paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary; and (3)
that the agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws
of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the
jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their
training period, they began discharging their job functions as flight
attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different
parts of the Middle East and Europe. One (1) year and four (4) months
prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate
letters to private respondents advising both that their services as flight
stewardesses would be terminated. Private respondents jointly instituted a
complaint, for illegal dismissal against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE). PIA claimed that both private respondents
were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from
abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects". PIA further claimed that
the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.
Regional Director of MOLE ordered the reinstatement of private
respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them
of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed
three-year period of their employment contracts. The Order stated that
private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they
had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation
limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null
and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and
that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance
from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to
reinstatement with full backwages.
Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions
of the Regional Director.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contracts of employment shall be governed
by the laws of Pakistan instead of the Labor Code, and only Pakistan shall
have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the
agreement. (No)
HELD: A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected
since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party
autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in
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Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus,
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the
equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the
contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may
not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The
law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are
not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact
of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
The net effect of the agreement here involved is to render the
employment of private respondents basically employment at the pleasure
of petitioner PIA. The Court considers that those provisions were intended
to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private
respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, and thus to escape
completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code (on
security of tenure).
PIA cannot take refuge in its employment agreement which specifies,
firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The
first clause cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine
labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the
employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private
respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much
affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing
upon some other law to govern their relationship.
Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause, specifying the
Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute;
between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant
circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the
relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only
executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and
actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private
respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights
to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the
Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the
resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, provisions of the employment
agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies
and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and
prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same
as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were
illegally dismissed and that public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had
not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act without or in
excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages.
8. Zalamea vs. CA and Transworld Airlines Inc., G.R. No. 104235
(November 18, 1993)
FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los
Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three
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tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said
flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight
at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually
allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The
two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able
to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority
among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-
fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife
and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus,
they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets
from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action
for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of
Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay
the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral
damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages
are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it
is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud
nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding
that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?
HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA
when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight
for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied
solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that
the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in
fact.
"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when
it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of
confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
9
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fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn
Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition
9. United Airlines Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. 124110 (April 20, 2001)
Facts:
The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes
up the bone of contention of this controversy.
--
Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the
Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets for himself, his wife
and his minor son with the following routes:
(a) San Francisco to Washington (15 April 1989);
(b) Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);
(c) Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);
(d) Los Angeles to San Francisco (1 and 5 May 1989)
The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned. To extend the trip, Aniceto bought
additional coupons: San Francisco to Washington. After paying the penalty for rewriting
their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with
the words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED,” for a United Airlines flight. However, at the junction of
their trip of LA-San Francisco, the Fontanillas were not able to board said flight because
allegedly, they did not have assigned seat numbers.
Fontanilla's account: Upon arrival at the airport in LA, they went to the counter where they
were attended by a woman with nameplate "LINDA". The attendant examined their tickets,
punched something in the computer and told them the flight is in 15 mins. When the flight
was called, they were refused to board the plane because they had no seating assignment,
and are asked to go back to the check-in counter where Linda informed them that the flight
is overbooked. When they tried to explain their situation, they claimed that they were
subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of United Airlines where Linda
was alleged to have told them: "Who do you think you are? You lousy Flips are good for
nothing beggars. You always ask for American aid..." "Dont worry about your
baggage. Anyway there is nothing in there. What are you doing here anyway? I will report
you to immigration. You Filipinos should go home."
United Airlines account: The Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get
their seat assignments for UA Flight 1108. They instead proceeded to join the queue
boarding the aircraft without first securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket
and boarding passes. Having no seat assignments, the stewardess at the door of the plane
instructed them to go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded to the
check-in counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at the counter
informed them that the flight was overbooked. She booked them on the next available flight
and offered them denied boarding compensation. Allen vehemently denies uttering the
derogatory and racist words attributed to her by the Fontanillas.
RTC - Sided with United Airlines. Respondents failed to prove their allegations.
CA - Reversed RTC. The appellate court said the Fontanillas did comply with the check in
requirement and gave credence to the claim that they were subjected to harsh treatment.
Awarded moral and exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the Fontanillas were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations
of breach of contract in bad faith. (No.)
Held:
Firstly, the Fontanillas failed to prove that they complied with the check-in requirements
where they are suppose to obtain their seating assignments. Whether or not the Fontanillas
complied is well within the knowledge of the petitioner Airline. The RTC ruling as to the
demeanor of the parties during the trial should not be disturbed. The determination of the
other issues raised is dependent on whether or not there was a breach of contract in bad
faith on the part of the petitioner in not allowing the Fontanillas to board United Airlines
Flight 1108.
10
Secondly, Existing jurisprudence (Alitalia Airways vs. CA) explicitly states that overbooking
Page
amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. But
it is necessary first to determine which law applies, Philippine Law or US Law. The SC held
that Philippine law should apply because of the doctrine of lex loci contractus - as a general
rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to
its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. Hence, the court should apply the law
of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline (citing
Zalamea vs. CA).
With that in mind, the applicable law is Economic Regulations No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics
Board which provides that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the
aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful act of non-accommodation - and
hence, will not amount to fraud or bad faith, entitling respondents for damages.
The CA is faulted for applying US Law: Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales -
where private respondents' failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat
his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Although, the contract of
carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through
petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were rewritten in Washington,
D.C. However, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage
entered into by the parties in Manila.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37044 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-4268 dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.
10. Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 774-775 (1994)
11. Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. CA, G.R. No. 110263 (July 20, 2001)
FACTS:
 Petitioner: Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia
 Respondent: Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
 Sometime in 1983, Asiavest initiated a suit for collection against
PNCC, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines(CDCP), before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.
(to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor
of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project
and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn.
Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project)
 High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment
in favor of Asiavest.
 Following unsuccessful attempts[6] to secure payment from private
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September 5, 1988
the complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to
enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.[7]
 PNCC sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should
be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion
and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
 RTC dismissed Asiavest’s complaint.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment rendered by High Court of Malaya
with respect to Asiavest and PNCC is enforceable in the Philippines
HELD: YES
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was
decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment,
against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
11
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is
proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden
Page
of overcoming its presumptive validity. In this case, Asiavest sufficiently
proved the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment and PNCC
failed to overcome the presumption of validity of the foreign judgment.
There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not
enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon
which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. lex fori or the
internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court
of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the
judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the
same must be accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
12. Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322 (October 2, 2001)
13. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186751 (August 11, 2010)
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines around April 2005 only to find his wife having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce. His petition was granted on December 8, 2005
and took effect on January 8, 2006.
2 years later, Gerbert found another Filipina to woman and was
desirous to marry her. He then went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC.
RTC RULING: Such, however, was denied. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or
her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Gerbert elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review on certiorari. He asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims
that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office.
ISSUE: WON the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
HELD:
12
Page
1. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him
or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in
a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established
by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Guys, the issues discussed after the line are beyond the main issue
tackled in the case. Isinama ko na rin kasi baka itanong ni Atty. Nash
dahil may involvement of conflicts of Philippine and Canadian laws.

2. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition
in this jurisdiction
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
13
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
Page
Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
3. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
We note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to
what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
14
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
Page
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
14. Raytheon International vs. Rouzie, G.R. No. 162894 (February
26, 2008)
FACTS: Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union. Named as
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI
and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the previous labor case,
wherein SC favored the dismissal of the case before NLRC due to lack of
jurisdiction . The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor
case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured
on behalf of BMSI.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and
BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence
to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local
courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements
of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss
CA:affirmed the decision
Issues:WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
Held: The instant petition lacks merit.
The Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution
of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where
the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be
proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make
an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine
Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by
the Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the Commented [DG1]:
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The is an action for
damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the
nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
15
Page
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party
defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are
two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits
of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that
is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements
in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction
over Civil Case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of
forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more
properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals
respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers
to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are
binding on this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
C. Minimum Contact
15. HSBC vs. Sherman, G.R. No. 72494 (August 11, 1989)
 See 2nd case above
16. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA, G.R. No. 122191 (October 8, 1998)
17. Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177 (November 23, 2007)
 See previous cases under Part I
D. Jurisdiction over the Person
18. International Shoe Co vs. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
19. Perkins vs. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
FACTS: From that summary, the following facts are substantially
beyond controversy: the company's mining properties were in the
Philippine Islands. Its operations there were completely halted
during the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese. During that
interim, the president, who was also the general manager and
principal stockholder of the company, returned to his home in
Clermont County, Ohio. There, he maintained an office which he
conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the
company. He kept there office files of the company. He carried on
there correspondence relating to the business of the company and to
its employees. He drew and distributed there salary checks on behalf
of the company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of
two company secretaries who worked there with him. He used and
maintained in Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts
16
carrying substantial balances of company funds. A bank in Hamilton
County, Ohio, acted as transfer agent for the stock of the company.
Page
Several directors' meetings were held at his office or home in
Clermont County. From that office, he supervised policies dealing
with the rehabilitation of the corporation's properties in the
Philippines, and he dispatched funds to cover purchases of
machinery for such rehabilitation.
Petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, a nonresident of Ohio, filed two
actions in personam in the Court of Common Pleas of Clermont,
County, Ohio, against the several respondents. Among those sued is
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, here called the mining
company. It is styled a "sociedad anonima" under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, where it owns and has operated profitable gold
and silver mines. In one action, petitioner seeks approximately
$68,400 in dividends claimed to be due her as a stockholder. In the
other, she claims $2,500,000 damages, largely because of the
company's failure to issue to her certificates for 120,000 shares of its
stock.
In each case, the trial court sustained a motion to quash the service
of summons on the mining company. The Court of Appeals of Ohio
affirmed that decision, as did the Supreme Court of Ohio. The cases
were consolidated, and we granted certiorari in order to pass upon
the conclusion voiced within the court below that federal due
process required the result there reached.
ISSUE: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes Ohio
from subjecting a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts
in this action in personam.
RULING: No. The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional
level, is a like one of general fairness to the corporation. Appropriate
tests for that are discussed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
supra, at 326 U. S. 317-320. The amount and kind of activities which
must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the
forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation
to the jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each case. The
corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state
statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a
statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful,
but not a conclusive, test. For example, the state of the forum may
by statute require a foreign mining corporation to secure a license in
order lawfully to carry on there such functional intrastate operations
as those of mining or refining ore. On the other hand, if the same
corporation carries on, in that state, other continuous and systematic
corporate activities as it did here -- consisting of directors' meetings,
business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of
salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc. -- those activities are enough
to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to
proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the
proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to
those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within
the state.
Respondent carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company. He there discharged his duties as president and general
manager, both during the occupation of the company's properties by
the Japanese and immediately thereafter. While no mining properties
in Ohio were owned or operated by the company, many of its
wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the
personal attention of its president in that State at the time he was
served with summons. Consideration of the circumstances which,
under the law of Ohio, ultimately will determine whether the courts
of that State will choose to take jurisdiction over the corporation is
reserved for the courts of that State. Without reaching that issue of
state policy, we conclude that, under the circumstances above
recited, it would not violate federal due process for Ohio either to
take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
vacated, and the cause is remanded to that court for further
proceedings in the light of this opinion.
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. vs. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
17
FACTS: A products liability action was instituted in an Oklahoma state
court by respondents husband and wife to recover for personal injuries
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sustained in Oklahoma in an accident involving an automobile that had
been purchased by them in New York while they were New York
residents and that was being driven through Oklahoma at the time of the
accident. The defendants included the automobile retailer and its
wholesaler (petitioners), New York corporations that did no business in
Oklahoma. Petitioners entered special appearances, claiming that
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would offend limitations
on the State's jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court rejected petitioners' claims, and
they then sought, but were denied, a writ of prohibition in the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to restrain respondent trial judge from exercising in
personam jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE: WON Oklahoma may exercise in personam jurisdiction.
HELD: Consistently with the Due Process Clause, the Oklahoma trial
court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over petitioners. Pp. 444
U. S. 291-299.
(a) A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the
defendant and the forum State. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U. S. 310. The defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such
that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, id. at 326 U. S. 316, and the relationship
between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable .
. . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there," id. at 326 U. S. 317. The Due Process Clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts,
ties, or relations."
(b) Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating
circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state court
jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they
close no sales and perform no services there, avail themselves of none of
the benefits of Oklahoma law, and solicit no business there either through
salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach that
State nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma
residents, or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the
Oklahoma market. Although it is foreseeable that automobiles sold by
petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the automobile here might
cause injury in Oklahoma, "foreseeability" alone is not a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. The
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State, but rather
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Nor can
jurisdiction be supported on the theory that petitioners earn substantial
revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.
21. Calder vs. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)
FACTS:
Respondent Shirley Jones brought suit in California Superior Court
claiming that she had been libeled in an article written and edited by
petitioners in Florida. The article was published in a national magazine with
a large circulation in California.
Respondent lives and works in California. She and her husband brought
this suit against the National Enquirer, Inc., its local distributing company,
and petitioners for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional harm.
The Enquirer is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in
Florida. It publishes a national weekly newspaper with a total circulation of
over 5 million. About 600,000 of those copies, almost twice the level of the
next highest State, are sold in California.
Petitioner South is a reporter employed by the Enquirer. He is a resident of
Florida, though he frequently travels to California on business. South wrote
18
the first draft of the challenged article, and his byline appeared on it. Aside
from his frequent trips and phone calls, South has no other relevant
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contacts with California.
Petitioner Calder is also a Florida resident. He has been to California only
twice — once, on a pleasure trip, prior to the publication of the article and
once after to testify in an unrelated trial.
Calder is president and editor of the Enquirer. He "oversee[s] just about
every function of the Enquirer. He reviewed and approved the initial
evaluation of the subject of the article and edited it in its final form. He also
declined to print a retraction requested by respondent. Calder has no other
relevant contacts with California.
In considering petitioners' motion to quash service of process, the Superior
Court surmised that the actions of petitioners in Florida, causing injury to
respondent in California, would ordinarily be sufficient to support an
assertion of jurisdiction over them in California. But the court felt that
special solicitude was necessary because of the potential "chilling effect" on
reporters and editors which would result from requiring them to appear in
remote jurisdictions to answer for the content of articles upon which they
worked. The Superior Court, therefore, granted the motion.
California Court of Appeal reversed. The court agreed that neither
petitioner's contacts with California would be sufficient for an assertion of
jurisdiction on a cause of action unrelated to those contacts. "). But the
court concluded that a valid basis for jurisdiction existed on the theory that
petitioners intended to, and did, cause tortious injury to respondent in
California. The fact that the actions causing the effects in California were
performed outside the State did not prevent the State from asserting
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects. The court
rejected the Superior Court's conclusion that First Amendment
considerations must be weighed in the scale against jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, California has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in any State with which the defendant has "certain minimum contacts . . .
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. In judging minimum contacts, a court
properly focuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation. The plaintiff's lack of "contacts" will not defeat otherwise
proper jurisdiction but they may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction
when it would not exist in their absence.
The article was drawn from California sources, 789*789and the brunt of
the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury
to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California
is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction
over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of
their Florida conduct in California.
Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew
would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they
knew that the brunt of 790*790 that injury would be felt by respondent in
the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer
has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners must
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there" to answer for the truth
of the statements made in their article.
An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress
from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury
in California.
In this case, petitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing
intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is
proper on that basis.
19
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 We also reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the
jurisdictional analysis. The infusion of such considerations would needlessly
complicate an already imprecise inquiry.
We hold that jurisdiction over petitioners in California is proper
because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause
injury to respondent in California. The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal is Affirmed.
22. Philsec Investment et.al., CA, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997
Facts: Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from
petitioners AYALA and PHILSEC in the sum of US$2,500,000.00, secured
by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc.,
through its president, private respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducats
obligation under an Agreement whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty
Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner ATHONA a parcel of
land in Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA
extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000.00 as initial
payment of the purchase price.
The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note
executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their
receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA
released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the
entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly
private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and
ATHONA in Texas in the United States for payment of the balance of
US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud
allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of
the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
ATHONA filed an answer with counterclaim, impleading private
respondents herein as counterdefendants, for allegedly conspiring in selling
the property at a price over its market value. ATHONA sought the recovery
of damages and excess payment allegedly made to 1488, Inc. and, in the
alternative, the rescission of sale of the property.
Thereafter, while Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States,
petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.
The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective
counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District
Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling
the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value. Petitioners
claimed that, as a result of private respondents fraudulent misrepresentations,
ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were induced to enter into the
Agreement and to purchase the Houston property. The trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment against the real and personal properties of
private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case contending that the
action being in personam, extraterritorial service of summons by publication
was ineffectual and did not vest the court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc.,
which is a non-resident foreign corporation, and Daic, who is a non-resident
alien.
TC - Granted MTD.
CA - Affirmed TC’s ruling.
While the present case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered judgment in
the case before it. The judgment, which was in favor of private respondents,
was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
20
Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res
Page
judicata, a judgment admitting the foreign decision is not necessary. On the
other hand, petitioners argue that the foreign judgment cannot be given the
effect of res judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it.
Issue: 1) WON US judgment can be regarded as res judicata.
2) WON TC has jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic’s person.
Ruling: CA’s ruling reversed. 1) No.
Petitioners contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the effect of
res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on
grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate
a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment.
What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
xxx
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring
it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The
proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the
appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court
or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court
were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might
be rendered would constitute res judicata.
2) Yes. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to
hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because
this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial
service.
Rule 14, 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a
non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of
Court where, among others, the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines. It is not disputed that the properties, real and
personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of
summons under the Order of the trial court.
23. Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil 761 (1959)
Facts:
Vicente Pantaleon instituted an action to recover the sum of P 2,000.00
with interest and attorney’s fees against Asuncion. A summons was issued
with the statement that Asuncion was residing in B-24 Tala Estate,
Caloocan, Rizal. When provincial sheriff of Rizal served the summons
upon the person of Asuncion, he learned that Asuncion had left the Tala
Estate and that diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avail. Thus, the
summons was returned by the sheriff unserved.
Upon motion of Pantaleon, the court ordered that defendant be
summoned by publication on a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva
Ecija. Having failed to appear or answer the complaint within the
prescribed period, Asuncion was declared in default. Subsequently, after
hearing in the absence of Asuncion and without notice to him, the court
rendered judgment for Pantaleon and against Asuncion.
21
About forty-six days later, Asuncion filed a petition for relief from said
decision on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. Asuncion
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stated that he was resided at 34 Pitimine Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. He received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office in
San Jose, Nueva Ecija. The letter contained the order and judgment by the
court. He contends that he had not been summoned nor notified of the
hearing regarding of his case and that had copy of the summons and of
the order for its publication been sent to him by mail, as provided in Rule
7, Section 21, of ROC said summons and order would have received him,
and that his failure to appear before the court is excusable by reason of
mistake of the authorities concerned in not complying with the said rules.
In other words, the copy of the summons and of the order for publication
were not deposited in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by ordinary mail to his last known address.
Issue:
WON, by summons by publication, the court has acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Asuncion.
Held:
No.
The Rules of Court prescribes the proof of service by publication,
regardless whether defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not. We
conceive of no reason that plaintiff has suggested none, why copy of the
summons and of the order for its publication should be mailed to non-
resident defendants, but not to resident defendants. We can not even say
that defendant herein, who, according to the return of the Sheriff of
Nueva Ecija, was reportedly residing in Rizal — where he, in fact he is in
San Francisco del Monte and Quezon City used to be part of Rizal - could
reasonably be expected to read and summons published in an newspaper
said to be a general circulation.
Apart from the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle of Constitutional
Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal
service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by
publication cannot — consistently with the due process clause in the Bill
of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal
judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal
service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional
requirement of due process. . . .
Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on
its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in action in
personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants, who are personally
within the state and can be found therein is not "due process of law", and a
statute allowing it is unconstitutional.
24. Santos vs. PNOC. G.R. No. 170943 (September 23, 2008)
FACTS:
 Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a
sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 representing petitioners unpaid
balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was
still a member of its board of directors.
 Since personal service of summons cannot be served to Santos due to
his absence and his last known address cannot be located, respondent
seek for Court’s approval to summons by publication.
 Upon court’s approval, respondent submitted the affidavit of
publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of
service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of
the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
22
 When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period,
respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer
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of its evidence. Then, it was submitted for decision.
  Before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He sought
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the
affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with
Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he
was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that
respondents evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his
answer be admitted.
o The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not
require the affidavit of complementary service by registered
mail to be executed by the clerk of court. Hence, the case was
elevated to CA.
 During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial
court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered
petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.
Meanwhile, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision in sustaining
the dismissal of the petition.
ISSUE: WON there is lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of its
orders and processes
HELD: The petition lacks merit, the Court affirmed the decision of CA that
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Santos.
 Under Section 14, Rule 14 of ROC, “In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,
be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order”.
 Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite
diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was
granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
properly served with summons by publication.
 Further, the in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old
rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was
applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of
the old rule to in rem actions only.
 Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, Section 19, Rule 14 of
ROC states that “an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
 Said rule does not require that the affidavit of complementary service
be executed by the clerk of court. Service of summons by publication
is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk,
or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper
which published the summons. The service of summons
by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered
mail to the defendants last known address. This complementary
service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of
the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known
address.
 Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was
defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against
him.
23
ENTITLEMENT TO NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS
 The Court ruled that if the defendant fails to file his answer on time,
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he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice
 to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall
proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take
part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings.
 In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to
file his answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. But
respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not
for the declaration of petitioner in default.

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