CASE NO.
100 Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance
No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. The Pilipino
Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc., and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation, filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance. On September 27, 2007, after trial, the
RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
unconstitutional. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly
exercised police power under General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code; that the ordinance being based on a valid classification,
was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was
distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the
residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the
ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be
invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as
void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; The CA
did not see any established relation between the purpose of protection the
public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying and
the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances,
on the other.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 0309-07 enacted by Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City has disregard the health of the plantation workers.
RULING: No. With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and
safety of plantation workers are secured by existing state policies, rules and
regulations implemented by the FPA, among others, which the respondents
are lawfully bound to comply with. The respondents even manifested their
strict compliance with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines
on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001). We
should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the pesticide applicators
to observe the standards provided therein to ensure the health and safety of
plantation workers. As such, there cannot be any imbalance between the
right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers even if a ban will be
imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent adoption of other
modes of pesticide treatment.
MAIN POINT: The constitutional right to health and maintaining
environmental integrity are privileges that do not only advance the interests
of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health and the
environment transcend geographical locations and even generations.
CASE NO. 101
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
VICTORIA SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, GR No.
211010, Mar 07, 2017
FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which
created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on
February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through EO 774, which
designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as
members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by
the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Later that same year,
Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change
testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently
lead policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to
coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the
government relating to climate change. Herein petitioners wrote respondents
regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle,
demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole
country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter-foremost,
through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government
fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%). Claiming to have not received a
response, they filed this petition. Petitioners are Carless People of the
Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in tum represent
"Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if
good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and
reliable".
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition.
RULING: No. Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed
to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being
representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a
concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as
citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been
relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event,
legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in
its discretion.
CASE NO. 102
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16
FACTS: First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) operates two pipelines
since 1969, (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System and (b) the Black Oil.
In May 2010, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower). On July 10, 2010
within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the
wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, WestTower’s
management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City,
which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection. On November 15,
2010, West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in
representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati
City. On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents
FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their
respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease
and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the
structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while
implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident
that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon
within 60 days from receipt thereof.
ISSUE: Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be
issued to direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts
in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment.
RULING: No. To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of
the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection
Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular
address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL. The CA, however,
observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance.
Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to
ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial
operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a
certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This
certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of
the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor
sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes
with existing patches and sleeves. Sans t e required certification, use of the
WOPL shall remain abated.
CASE NO. 103
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
PILAR CAÑEDA BRAGA v. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA GR No. 223076,
Sep 13, 2016
FACTS: The Port of Davao is a seaport located in Mindanao. It is compose
of several ports, all within the gulf of Davao, but its base port is the Sasa
Wharf located at Barangay Sasa, Davao City. In 2011, the Sasa Wharf was
pegged for privatization under the PPP scheme. The DOTC study served as
one of the primary considerations for current Sasa Wharf expansion period.
On December 21, 2014, the Regional Development Council for Region XI
endorsed the project through Resolution No. 118 subject to conditions. On
April 15, 2015, the DOTC published an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for
the Project. On March 15, 2016, the petitioners – all stakeholders from
Davao City and Samal, Davao del Norte – filed this Urgent Petition for a Writ
of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan. The Petitioner seeks to
restrain the implementation of the Project – including its bidding and award –
until the respondents secure an ECC and comply with the LGC. The
respondents, through the (Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argue that
the allegations do not warrant the issuance of a writ of kalikasan because
the petitioners failed to prove the threat of environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition warrant a Writ of Kalikasan.
RULING: No. The court cannot issue a writ of kalikasan based on the
petition. The writ is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an
lawful act or omission. However, the violation must involve environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the issuance
of the writ. The petitioners allege that the respondents have begun the
process of transgressing their right to health and a balanced ecology through
the bidiing process. They cite The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities:
Synthesis Report to identify the four major negative impacts related to port
operations; 1) environmental impacts, 2) land use impacts, 3) traffic impacts,
and 4) other impacts. The synthesis report claims that most of these impacts
affect the surrounding localities.

CASE NO. 104
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Republic v. Court of Appeals and RRZC, November 25, 1998
FACTS: RA No. 1899 which was approved on June 22, 1957 authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities.
Invoking RA 1899, the Pasay City passed Ordinance No. 121 for the
reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands along the seaside in Pasay
City. The Ordinance was amended authorizing Republic Real Estate
Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands in Pasay City under certain
terms and conditions. Republic of the Philippines (RP) filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages questioning subject Agreement
between Pasay City and RREC on the grounds that the subject matter of
such Agreement was executed without any public bidding. It alleged that
what Pasay City has are submerged of offshore areas outside the commerce
of man which could not be proper subject matter of Agreement between
Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National
Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation
No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it
(Republic) has been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since time
immemorial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is Valid.
RULING: No. Foreshore land does not include submerged areas. Foreshore
lands refer to the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The duty
of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention
of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion
of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands”. The subject matter of
Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and
scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
CASE NO. 105
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio 131 SCRA 532 (1984)
FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the
shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After
the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio.
The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from
Santos Del Rioto construct duck houses on said land. The private
oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead constructed
residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the
private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile,
private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications
with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for
registration. The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration.
Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their
respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The
Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with
water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna
de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title
to the land.
RULING: The court says that inundation of a portion of the land is not due to
"flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is
not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition
of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses
over the land. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him has been in
open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the
disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax
declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal
requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of
said land.
CASE NO. 106
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
FACTS: On 13 June 2012, the Government of the Philippines, acting
through the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration
Co. Ltd. (JAPEX). The studies included surface geology, sample analysis,
and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite
surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tanon Strait was conducted. On
12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX coverted GSEC-102 to Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. Offshore
the Tanon Strait. On 17 December 2007, two separate original petiotioners
were filed commonly seeking that the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined
for violation of 10987 Constitution. The petitioners are the “Resident Marine
Mammals” which inhibit the waters in and around the Tanon Strait., joined by
“Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Osorio as their legal
guardians and friends seeking their protection. The respondents in both
petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, SOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza,
DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Tanon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply
Oilfield Service, Inc. as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have a legal standing.
RULING: Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has
been given a more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen
to file an action before our courts for violation of our environmental law on
the principle that human are stewards of nature: “Section 5. - Citizen Suit. -
A n y F i l i pi n o ci t i z e n i n r e pr e se n ta ti o n of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. U p on t h e filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue
an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
relief sprayed for, requiring all i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s t o m a n i f e s t
t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e c a s e within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the o r d e r o n c e i n a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
o r furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
CASE NO. 107
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies Section 16. Right
to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
FACTS: On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067, otherwise
known as the “Tubbahata Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”. to
ensure protection and conservation of the Tubbahata Reefs into perpetuity
for the enjoyment of present and future generations. Under the “no take”
policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited, penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and distributing the resources within TRNP. In December 2012,
the Us Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
USS Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberly.” On 17 January 2013, while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of Tubbahata Reefs, No one was injured in the incident and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On 30 March 2013, the US Navy-
led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef. O n 1 7 A p ri l 2 0 13 , pe t i t i o n e rs A ri g o' et . al . o n
t h ei r b e ha l f an d i n r e pr e s en t at i o n o f t he i r r e s p ec t i v e
s e c t or / or g ani z a t i o n and o t h er s , i nc l u di n g m i n o rs or
ge n er a t i on s ye t u n bo r n f i l e d a p et i t i o n f or t h e i s s u a nc e of a
W ri t of K al i k as an wi t h p r a ye r f o r t h e i s s ua nc e o f a T em po r ar y
E nv i r o nm e nt a l P ro t ec t i o n O r de r (T E P O ) u nd e r t he R ul es of
P r oc ed u re f o r Environmental Cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has become moot.
RULING: Yes. The salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restricted had
already been accomplished. However, insofar as the directives to Philippine
respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine
habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned,
petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the
removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. The court is mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of components for the settlement of
environmental cases is not prescribed by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
CASE NO. 108
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies S e ct i o n 17 .
E d u ca ti o n , S ci e n ce an d Te c h n ol o g y, Ar ts , C ul t ur e a n d
S p or ts
Guingona v. Carague G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners are Senators of the Republic of the Philippines who brought
this case to raise the question of constitutionality of the said automatic appropriation for debt service
which is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty(4860), as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No.
1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening
the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For
The Purpose. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
with P86.8 Billion for debt service Petitioners argue that the said automatic
appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President
Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986.And upon
the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative
power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was
ratified by the people. Therefore, a new legislation by the Congress providing
for automatic appropriation should lie, but Congress up to the present, has
not approved any such law and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the
1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot
been forced. Whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law
must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Petitioners state
said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as ––
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasuryexcept in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Automatic Appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget violates Sec. 29 (1) Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Because there is no provision in our Constitution that provides
or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that
be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under
the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may
be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. 1177 and P.D. No.1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely
complying with the duty to implement the same.
CASE NO. 109
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies S e ct i o n 17 .
E d u ca ti o n , S ci e n ce an d Te c h n ol o g y, Ar ts , C ul t ur e a n d
S p or ts
Philconsa v. Enriquez: S5, Art14 which provides for the highest
budgetary priority to education is merely director
FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994
(GABof 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. It imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President.
It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in
the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions
of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal
standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them
in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the
latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury
which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of a
claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no
legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of
Congress.
CASE NO. 110
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 18. Labor
Protection
PNB v. Dan Padao
FACTS:
Dan Padao was a credit and loan officer in PNB Dipolog who was allegedly
involved in the granting of behest loans, where the collateral was over
appraised, and the credit standings of the loan applicants were fabricated
allowing them to obtain larger loans from PNB causing PNB to suffer millions
in losses. After due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and
habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao
appealed to the bank’s Board of Directors, but after almost 3 years of
inaction Padao instituted a complaint against PNB with the NLRC. The
Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) found the dismissal to be VALID, but the
NLRC REVERSED the decision and ordered Padao to be reinstated.
ISSUE:
Whether Padao was illegally dismissed by PNB.
RULING:
No. The PNB acted in accordance of the law by dismissing Padao, which it
deemed appropriate under Article 282, b. Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties and by the given circumstance that Padao failed to
do what he was employed to do but also repetitively and habitually causing
millions of pesos damage to PNB.
CASE NO. 111
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 18. Labor
Protection
JMM Promotion v. CA
FACTS:
T h e d e p l o y m e n t o f f e m a l e e n t e r t a i n e r s t o J a p a n , through
Department Order No. 3, were required an Artist Record Book as a
prec on di t i on t o t he pr oc es s i ng b y t h e P O E A of an y c o nt rac t f or
ov ers eas em pl o ym en t . The petitioners filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of Department Order No. 3 of Respondent requiring an
Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the
POEA of any contractor overseas employment. Petitioners contends
that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of
the Constitution and avers that the alleged deprivation thereof through
the onerous requirement of an ARB violates due process and constitutes
an invalid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether Department Order no. 3 is constitutional and the said requirement
is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes. The Department Order is constitutional, and the ARB requirement were
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to valid exercise of Police power.
One cannot be deprived of the right to work and right to make a living
because these r i g h t s a r e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , t h e a r b i t r a r y a n d
u n w a r r a n t e d d e p r i v a t i o n o f w h i c h n o r m a l l y constitutes an
actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper
regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power
by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of
legitimate governmental f u n c t i o n s , t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e
S t a t e , t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d w e l f a r e a n d p u b l i c m o r a l s . In
this case, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and
artistic skills from them and limits deployment to onl y those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of
employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at
least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and
agencies.
CASE NO.112
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 18. Labor
Protection
PASEI v. Drilon
FACTS:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female,
for overseas placement. It challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
ISSUE:
Whether Department order No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an
exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes, the SC said that it is admitted that the assailed order is in the nature of
a police measure and police power is in the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated as in
this case, the Department of Labor and Employment is vested with such
authority by the Labor Code. Police power has been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. As a general rule, official
acts enjoy a presumed validity and in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The SC also said
that it being the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation and in fulfilling that duty it must sustain the
Government’s efforts. Discrimination in this case is justified. Lastly, the Court
understands the impact this order would have on the business of recruitment
but the concern of the Government is not to maintain profits of business
firms which suffer because of governmental regulation, but rather to provide
a decent living to its citizens. Petition is dismissed.
CASE NO. 113
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 19. Self-
Reliant and Independent National Economy
Garcia v. BOI
FACTS:
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation formed by Taiwanese investors, applied
for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally
specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but
later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas.
Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a
copy of BPC’s original and amended application documents. The BOI denied
the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their
consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the
Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents
absent consent to disclose. The BOI subsequently approved the amended
application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the
amended application.
ISSUE:
Whether BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
application of the investors without considering national interest.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ordered the original application of BPC to have its
main plant in Bataan and products maintained. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it
will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” (p. 4).
The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second
application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to
be held (p.3). The Court went on to note that despite the right to access
information, “the Constitution does not open every door to any and all
information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny”.
CASE NO. 114
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 19. Self-
Reliant and Independent National Economy
Tanada v. Angara
FACTS:
The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with
the goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The
Philippines agreed to submit the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization that require the Philippines, among others, “to place nationals
and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products”. To that effect, the President ratified and submitted the same to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section21, Article VII of the
Constitution. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO
agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a
self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution ratifying the WTO agreement is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the resolution is not unconstitutional. While
the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a
“self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. On the other hand,
there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries will all
be wiped out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in
fact, WTO recognizes need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.
CASE NO.115
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 19. Self-
Reliant and Independent National Economy
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. PCA
FACTS:
The PCA is in charge of issuing license to would- be coconut plant operator,
however, the PCA issued a Board Resolution which no longer require those
wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition
for engaging in such business. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of
licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order.
ISSUE:
Whether the PCA is in conflict against its very nature of creation.
RULING:
Yes. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are
hereby been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut
Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of
then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The
President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN
plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. The PCA resolution
is rendered Null and Void. In the first place, it could not have intended to
amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory
system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that
had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that,
when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she
was no longer vested with legislative authority.
CASE NO. 116
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 19. Self-
Reliant and Independent National Economy
Pharmaceuticals v. Duque
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which RIRR imposes a ban
on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. The petitioners filed against
respondents whether respondents’ officers of the DOH acted in violation of
the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
ISSUE:
Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code).
RULING:
No. Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of
the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.
However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code
which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the
land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are
not deemed part of the law of the land.
CASE NO.117
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 20. Role
of Private Sector
Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines v. Reyes
FACTS:
The petitioners are self-described "Filipino entrepreneurs deeply
involved in the business of marine radio communications in the country" and
also operators of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine coastal
radio stations, 2 and are holders of certificates of public convenience duly
issued by the National Telecommunications Commission. Among other
things, they handle correspondence between vessel passengers or crew and
the public. The Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled
anP880-million project, designed to "ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS)
through the establishment of efficient communication facilities between coast
stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in navigational
routes at sea. It was set out to provide, among other things, ship-to- shore
and shore-to-ship public corresponding, free of charge. The he petitioners
brought the instant suit, alleging, in essence, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes
had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion and cited the provisions of
Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution, which states that the “State
recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment.”
ISSUE:
Whether DOTC acted in violation of Art. II Sec 20 of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. There is no merit in this petition. The duty of the State is pre-eminently
"to serve . . . the people, 9 and so also, to "promote a just and dynamic
social order . . . through policies that provide adequate social services. . . .
and an improved quality of life for all. There can hardly be any valid
argument against providing for public corresponding, free of charge. It is
compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution, and
certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less. The petitioners
can not legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the
Constitution, to defeat the act complained of. The mandate "recognizing the
indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an acknowledgment
of the importance of private initiative in building the nation.
CASE NO. 118
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 20. Role
of Private Sector
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan
FACTS:
Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic
corporation. Its primary purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and
environment-conscious development of Boracay Island, thereby preserving
and maintaining its culture, natural beauty... and ecological balance, marking
the island as the crown jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist
destination in Asia and the whole world." The Panlalawigan of Aklan
Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file an
application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to
reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the
Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed
reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize
the utilization of its resources. In June 2006, the President of the Philippines
issued Executive Order No. 543, delegating the power "to approve
reclamation projects to PRA through its governing Board, subject to
compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition
that reclamation contracts to be executed with any person or entity (must) go
through... public bidding." Boracay Foundation, Inc. filed a petition for an
issuance of a writ of mandamus suspending the implementation of a land
reclamation project on the ground that the classification of the project was
incorrect leading to the failure to perform a full EIA as required by law and
that there was a failure for proper, timely and sufficient public consultation.
ISSUE:
Whether there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project.
RULING:
No. The law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to
reclaim land in this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval.
However, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC
had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements
under the LGC. Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and
approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation
project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang
Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and
insistence of the Province. The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes
the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological
balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval
of local government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the
Court emphasized that, under the Local Government Code, two requisites
must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such
mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation as illegal.
The Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities.
CASE NO. 119
Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 21.
Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves
FACTS:
In 1928, PLDT is granted a franchise to engage in telecommunications.
Telecom companies must have 60% of Filipino ownership pursuant to
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Gamboa questioned the indirect
sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus,
First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent
to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%.Petitioner argued that the term “capital"
should only refer to common shares as only they are able to exercise voting
rights.
ISSUE:
Whether the term “capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
to the total common shares only.
RULING:
Yes. The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total
common shares in PLDT. Considering that common shares have voting
rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term
“capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate
in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the
right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote
in the election of directors.
Case 130
Topic: Article VI: Non-Delegation of Legislative Power
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. NHA 153 SCRA 399
Facts: Jose Hernando aquired prospective and beneficial ownership over
Lot no. 15 block IV of Ponderosa heights subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal. With
the consent of Antipolo Realty, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot
15 to Virgilio Yuzon. Mr. Yuzon assumed the obligation under original
contract including payments of predecessor’s installment. Antipolo Realty
failed to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking
under clause 17 of the contract to sell (subdivision beautification). Thus, the
failure shall permit the buyer to suspend his monthly installment. Antipolo
realty rescind the contract to sell claiming the forfeiture of all installment
made by Mr. Yuzon. Mr. Yuzon brought this matter then to the NHA through
a letter of complaint. Antipolo Realty filed motion to dismiss on case no.
2123. NHA denied Antipolo Realty’s motion to dismiss. NHA ordered the
reinstatement of account for the monthly amortization. wherein Mr. Yuzon
has 60 days to pay as shown in the statement of accounts.
Issue: Whether hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the partis NHA assumed the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicail functions which is was not
authorized to perform.
Ruling: The Court held that under the law creating NHA, it is empowered to
regulate the real estate trade and business involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by the buyer. The “sense-making
and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.”
Main Point: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act
of such agency. The extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-
judicial authority is determined by referring to the terms of Presidential
Decree No. 957. Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: “National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate
trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree.”
CASE NO. 131
Non-Delegation of Legislative Power (Exceptions)
PITC v. Angeles G.R. No. 108461
Facts: PITC is a GOCC created during Marcos regime to undertake trades b
etween Philippines and SOCPEC. During Aquino’s presidency she made PIT
C one of DTI’s line agencies. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lo
st the authority to issue AOs. PITC issued SOCPEC 89-08-01 where importa
tion from China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Pro
gram of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or t
hrough a tie-up with a legitimate importer with 1-1 ratio. Domestic corporatio
ns, Remington and Firestone applied and were granted to import. Both failed
to comply with export credits with 1-1 ratio and their imports were withheld. B
oth assailed the constitutionality of the AO. RTC decided in favour of Reming
ton and Firestone for AO was not published contrary to Article 2 of NCC. He
nce the petition for review on certiorari. The respondents likewise argue that
PITC is not empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no grant
of such power was made under the Trade Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991.
Issue:
Whether the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders.
Ruling: Yes. The Trade Protocols aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the
products and goods which signatory countries have agreed to trade. They do
not bestow any regulatory power, for executive power is vested in the Execut
ive Department, and it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of such power
among its designated agencies. In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to
issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legisl
ation. This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a
valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Or
der issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their appli
cations for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a news
paper of general circulation.
Mainpont: The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is n
ot unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bo
dies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the partic
ular field assigned to them, they can deal within the problems thereof with m
ore expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the c
ourts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislati
ve and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourt
h department of the government.
Case no. 132
ART VI. The Legislative Department
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Atitiw vs. Zamora 471 SCRA 329
FACTS: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating
the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the
Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino
she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A
6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous region, a
plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared
that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or
amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the
General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed
special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of
the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O
328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the
special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for
the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all the affected members and employee.
Issue: Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can
unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220.
Ruling: NO. On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend CASE NO.134 In a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner union submits
or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. Article VI: The Legislative Department: Valid Delagation: that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 delegating to the Minister of Labor the power
And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealing the Requisite of a Valid Delegation and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
Agustin vs Edu, G.R. No. L-49112
E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law. The last issue, the arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law
FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 229 was issued by President Ferdinand
court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers
Marcos. The LOI requires all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure
respect. and is contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-
early warning devices (EWD) to be installed a distance away from such
organization and collective bargaining.
vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his
Main point: The implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while
capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing
the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence ISSUE: Whether or not BP 130 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
rules and regulations of the said instruction. Petitioner Agustin is an owner of
of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either power.
a Volkswagen Beetle Car stated that cars are already equipped with blinking
the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.
lights upon production which could very well serve as an early warning
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the unconstitutionality of the act has
device. Agustin argued that the LOI is violative of the constitutional
CASE 133 not been demonstrated and that any ruling on the question of
guarantee of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of
SEC v Interport 567 SCRA 354 unconstitutional application would be premature in the absence of factual
non-delegation of legislative power.
determination by the Ministry of Labor and the NLRC.

ISSUES: Whether the LOI is violative of the principle of non-delegation of

FACTS: Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement
with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). In compliance with the SEC Chairman's
directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching
thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. SEC Chairman issued an
Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in
connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely
disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that
some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving
IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the
Revised Securities Act.
ISSUE: Whether the Securities Regulations Code repeal Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act.
RULING: No. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act since said provisions were re-enacted
in the new law. While the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives a court
of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old
law prior to its appeal, an exception to this rule comes about when the
repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. There
are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause
in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on
pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the
former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law.
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the
respondents despite the repeal, since Sections 8, 12, 26, 27 and 23of the
Securities Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act. Clearly, the
legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their authority to punish
a person charged with violation of the old law that was repealed; in this case,
the Revised Securities Act.
legislative power.
RULING: No, the LOI is not violative of the principle of of non-delegation of
legislative power. In the cited case of Edu v. Ericta it was mentioned that to
avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be affected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative once
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
present case, Marcos passed the LOI intended for transit safety upon the
road which was the standard set in relation to its issuance. Therefore, the
LOI, having met the requisite of providing a standard upon its issuance, does
not violate the principle of non-delegation of power.
MAIN POINT: For a valid delegation of legislative power, the act passed
subject to the delegation must fulfill the requisite of standard which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy.
Case No. 135
ARTICLE VI, Sec. 1: REQUISITES OF VALID DELEGATION
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment
[G.R. No. L-58184, October 30, 1981]
MAIN POINT: It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making
of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required
is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
136
G.R. No. 94571
ARTICLE VI: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, SECTION 1:
LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON DELEGATION: VALID DELEGATION
GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation. P86.8
Billion of which is for debt services. The said automatic appropriation for debt
services if authorized by PD No. 81, as amended by PD 1177 and PD 1967.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question
which is the repeal or amendment of said laws addressed to the legislative
body and not this Court.
Issue: Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling: No. Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for
the delegate to do but to enforce it. In the case at bar, the questioned laws
are complete in their essential terms and conditions. The purpose of this law
is to enable the government to make promt payment and/or advances for all
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

Main point: PD 81, PD 1177, and PD 1967 are all complete in all its
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of strike for unfair
essential terms and conditions. Therefore, there’s a valid delegation on the
labor practices allegedly committed by private respondent company in said P86.8 Billion to be spent on debt services.
violation of their existing collective bargaining agreement to the detriment
and interest of its members. Several conciliation meetings called by the
Ministry followed. Thereafter, the Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified
the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and the holding of
any strike at private respondent establishment was enjoined
 CASE No. 137
ARTICLE VI Sec. 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER; NON-DELEGATION
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN [G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.]
Complete in Itself/ Completeness Test
FACTS: Act No. 4003 or “Fisheries Act” authorized the Sec. of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to impose restrictions “on the use of any fishing net,
or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or fish eggs.” Pursuant to this a
regulation is passed prohibiting the use of trawls.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid and there is no undue delegation.
RULING: Yes. It is valid and without undue delegation. The regulation
merely supplies the details for implementing the law which is already clear
and complete in itself and contains a standard to guide the administrative
officer.
MAIN POINT: Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to
prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could
endanger and deplete the supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations
such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic
resources of the land.
In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries
Act is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the
legislative intent. The exercise of such authority did not, therefore, constitute
an undue delegation of the powers of Congress.
CASE NO. 138
ART. VI, SEC. 1: The Legislative Department
Valid Delegation; Completeness Test
Marcos v. CA 287 SCRA 696
FACTS:
Petitioner Marcos II had filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the
actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on Real
Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and
properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate
of the will of the late president. The CA ruled that the deficiency
assessments for estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the
estate of the deceased President Marcos have already become final and
unappealable, and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying
upon the properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Petitioner now assails the validity of the
appellate court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the BIR erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was
required to seek first the probate court's sanction.
RULING:
No. The enforcement and collection of estate tax, is executive in character,
as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue Code attests that: The
powers and duties of the BIR shall comprehend the assessment and
collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith,
including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall
Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give be conducted. In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
this Code or other laws. the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation,
The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over has become imperative, as here.
the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate
taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the BIR erred in proceeding with the MAIN POINT: There is a valid delegation of legislative power when the law is
levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on complete in itself. The law is compete when all its essential terms and
the ground that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction. condition is provided so there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to
There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that enforce it.
implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of
the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and
CASE NO.140
collected. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the
Topic: Completed in itself/Completeness Test – PD No.984
prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax
Title: Pacific Steam v. Laguna Lake Development Authority 608 SCRA
Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final,
442
executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through the
summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to the Tax Code.
FACTS:
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services.
On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
MAIN POINT:
Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to levy and sell the
the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located
properties allegedly owned by the late President Marcos without the need to
at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On June 22, 2001, LLDA conducted an
approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the
investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry
deceased is drawn from the declared policy of the Tax Code. Such law is
washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte
complete in itself, as it sets forth therein the policy to be carried out or
River.
implemented by the BIR.
The Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without
LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the
Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling
CASE NO. 139
of petitioner’s effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with
COMPLETE IN ITSELF/COMPLETENESS TEST
effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD),
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD, 570 SCRA
Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of
757
Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed
LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance
followed and it has been found that the water treatment equipment and facility of Pacific steam was
FACTS: Petitioners questions the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic
still under repair.
Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
requested another test. This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities. For one,
imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September
the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
2001. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner
of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary
of drug testing.
wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to
impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions.
ISSUES: Whether aforementioned provision constitute undue delegation of
legislative power. ISSUE:
Whether Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines and penalties.
RULING: NO. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of
secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private RULING:
offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo Yes, The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation
drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with referred to in PD No. 984. CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines. LLDA is granted
the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such
the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be responsibilities." This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments
picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater.
against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established. The provision is complete in itself as to the manner of drug
testing.
The testing is subject to the implementing rules and regulations. It is
incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to
 CASE NO. 141
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – Blue Sky Law
Title: People v. Rosenthal 68 Phil 628
FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of
the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company
are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil
products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases
of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding
written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581,
commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially
depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil
business, rather than on actual tangible assets. On appeal, Rosenthal &
Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Treasurer.
RULING:
No, the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or
permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that
the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has
complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in
relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit
shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581
have been complied with.
The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all
modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the
authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the
safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in
mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
CASE NO.142
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test –POEA Memo Circular
No.2
Title: Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern
Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued
by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the
family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity
of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction
and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers
RULING:
No, Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers. In
questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines
contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation,
and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. With
this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
one such administrative regulation.
CASE NO.143
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – RA No.2382 NMAT
Title: Tablarin v. Gutierez 152 SCRA 730
FACTS:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required
by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition
for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend
against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education
RULING:
No, standard is established. In this case, the necessary standards are set
forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and
regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act,
the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rulemaking
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education
are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either
expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met, the standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
CASE NO.144
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – POEA Governing
Board
Title: Conference v. POEA 243 SCRA 666
FACTS:
Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is
an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and
its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and
recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-
owner-principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power and authority
to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of
Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to
amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under
Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
ISSUE: Whether the POEA can create rules by virtue of delegation
of legislative power.
RULING:
Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA
based on impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as
correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively
to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations
that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely
further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform
to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment
practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
CASE NO.145
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – Oil Price
Stabilization Fund
Title: Osmeña v. Orbos 220 SCRA 703
FACTS:
Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD
1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts
on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that
the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid
delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that
since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power
of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is
limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus
appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on
the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended,
partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation.
RULING:
No. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes,
they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. The OPSF
as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to
the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to
impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient
standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose
additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
CASE NO.146
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – Liga ng mga
Barangay
Title: Viola v. Alunan 277 SCRA 409
FACTS:
Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the
validity of the Art III, Sec.1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers
insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its
chapters. He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those
provided in the LGC Sec.493 which mentions as elective positions only
those of the president, vice president, and five members of the board of
directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan
political subdivision, and national levels and thus the implementing rules
expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the principle that
implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions
of the law LGC,. Sec. 493. Organization – The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect
a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of
directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create
such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of
the national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on
the national level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of
the liga they are designed to implement.
ISSUE:
Whether the positions in question are created without the authority of law
RULING:
Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the
LGC which in fact requires – and not merely authorizes – the board of
directors to “create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of these positions
was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga
barangay which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC
decisions have upheld the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices in the
executive management.
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions
to provide for the needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National
Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional positions not
only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal,
city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the
National Liga would be no different from the local chapters. The fact is that
Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the
local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.
CASE NO.147
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – R.A. 9337 -NIRC
Title: Abakada v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et
al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties,
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
These questioned provisions contain uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the
VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied: (1) Value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (2) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent
(1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes
under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contends that
delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to
republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and
transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not
pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the
law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, which includes
the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the
Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power
in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. In this case it is valid because it fixes a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to take effect. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
CASE NO.148
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – RA No.7719 –Blood
Bank Act
Title: Beltran v. Secretary of Health 476 SCRA 168
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was
enacted into law on April 2, 1994. This act seeks to provide an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by
regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the
Official Gazette on August 18, 1994.The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by
respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of
Fatima Blood Bank, et al., seeking the annulment of the following: (1)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; for a mandatory injunction ordering and
commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’
license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
ISSUE:
Whether Section 7 of R.A. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of Legislative
Power
RULING:
No, the fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of the
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise
legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
delegate of Legislature.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated
several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of
commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a
definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out
its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.
The Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which
unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its
policy, a classification was made between non-profit blood banks/canters
and commercial bloods.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the
State’s police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances,
adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for
common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues
raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property,
and violation of the non-impairment clause to be unmeritorious. In sum, the
Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
CASE NO.149
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test – BATAS PAMBANSA
880
Title: Bayan v. Ermita 488 SCRA 226
FACTS: The first petitioners, BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato
Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated
in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. Respondents are Eduardo Ermita, as
Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region Police
Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police
District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong. Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 is an
act ensuring the free exercise by the people of their right peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government [and] for other purposes. This Act
shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985. Petitioners Bayan and
company, contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law.
Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly’s time, place and
manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of
commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the
denial of a permit on the basis of a rally’s program content or the statements
of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear
and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral
regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec.7
ISSUE:
Whether Batas Pambansa No.880 is unconstitutional.
RULING: No, Batas Pambansa No. 880 is constitutional. The Bayan… claim
that it is unconstitutional because of the “No Permit, No Rally” policy that is
implemented and that the Mayor has the power to turn down the eligibility of
the gathering thus creating a great, if not complete, hindrance to the cause
of the gathering. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent.
"Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test. It is
very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies.
Case no. 150
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient
Standard Test
Abakada vs. Purisima
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition that seeks to prevent
respondents from implementing and enforcing R.A. 9335, which optimizes
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Reward and Incentive Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of R.A.
9335, claiming that it violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
and petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9335 unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President
Ruling: No. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide
the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. Two tests determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. For it to be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented. For this case, the determination of revenue targets does
not rely solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Moreover, the Court
recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest”, “justice and
equity”, “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.” R.A. 9335 lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal of officers
and employees with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection.
Main Point: The completeness test and the sufficient standard test determine
the validity of delegation of legislative power. Not only there are sufficient
standards to delegate the power to the President to fix revenue targets, the
Court also finds that the determination of revenue targets does not solely
rely on the President, but also on the scrutiny of the DBCC.
Case No. 151
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas
Facts: Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA) while petitioner de Lima was serving
as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations (OPR) at the Central
Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City. While serving,
Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by respondents was issued. Petitioners
questioned the validity of Resolution 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same. In the
resolution, the office of the petitioners, OPIA and OPR, together with the
Office of Career Systems and Standards (OCSS), are merged to form the
Research and Development Office (RDO) thus assigning the petitioners to
regional offices. Moreover, the resolution shows that the Commission re-
arranged some of the administrative units, renamed some of the Offices of
the Commission, and re-allocated certain functions moving some functions
from one Office to another.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the legal authority to
issue Resolution No. 94-3710
Ruling: Yes. The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting
Resolution No. 94-3710 were described as “effecting changes in the
organization to streamline the operations and improve delivery of service”.
The order assigning petitioners to regional offices was mainly because the
incumbent Regional Director of Office No. 3 of Pampanga is set for
retirement and the incumbent Direction in Region V was under investigation
and needed to be transferred immediately to the Central Office. The court
was convinced that the Commission’s order is valid as it promotes
administrative efficiency and convenience. Additionally, the changes
introduced – re-naming, re-allocation, and re-arrangement- are precisely the
kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code.
Main Point: The Resolution issued by the Civil Service Commission
promotes administrative efficiency and convenience and the changes made
were necessary in the provincial offices of the Commission, thus making it
valid.
Case No. 152
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
Facts: Petitioners, at the time of the filling of their petition, members of
Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotabato,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. They
challenged the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. 6734) authorizing the President of the
Philippines to “merge” by administrative determination the regions remaining
after the establishment of the Autonomous Region. Petitioners contend that
there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and
cities within the existing regions and restructure them to new administrative
regions. Petitioners also contend that while the authority necessarily includes
the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority
to reorganize. Thus, the President’s authority under R.A. 6734 to “merge
existing regions” cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize
them.
Issue: Whether or not Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional
Ruling: No. R.A. No. 5435, authorizing the President of the Philippines, with
the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to organize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of
the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations
owned or controlled by it, was already passed at the time of filing and the
purpose was to promote “simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government”. Moreover, the law provided that any reorganization plan
submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. Thus
the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have
been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The
Congress merely followed the pattern set in the previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. It was also
stated in the case of Abbas vs. COMELEC that while the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. No
abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President
the power to merge administrative regions because the regions themselves
are not territorial and political divisions but are “mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes”. The regrouping made by
the law involves no more than a redefinition of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services.
Main point: The power to merge administrative regions is a power that has
traditionally been lodged with President to facilitate the exercise of the power
of general supervision over local governments. R.A. 6734 cannot be held
unconstitutional as it “merge existing regions” for administrative purposes
Case No. 153
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Rodrigo vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioners move for a reconsideration of the decision that Petitioner
Mayor’s position has been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A.
No. 6758 and having been charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) prepared the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades where the
position of Municipal Mayor was assigned Salary Grade 27. Petitioners
contend that the authority of the DBM was limited to the “preparation” of the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades.
Moreover, petitioners also alleged that the authority conferred upon the DBM
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers resulting in the
executive branch, through the DBM, determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 6758 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power
Ruling: No. Congress delegated the administration of the System to the DBM
because it relieves itself of this task, leaving to the DBM the preparation of
the Index to “fill in the details”. It is said that this is the very rationale for the
delegation of powers by the legislature to administrative agencies. With their
specialized knowledge, administrative agencies are more up to tasks
involving their expertise. It was also clarified that the Congress delegated to
the DBM is the administration of the Compensation and Position
Classification System, and not the determination of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. When the DBM assigns a position a certain Salary Grade, it
does so pursuant to its authority under R.A. No. 6758.
Main Point: There are exceptions to the rule on the principle of separation of
powers. Congress can delegate their power to local administrative agencies
to “fill in the details” in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law
since all administrative agencies have their own specialized knowledge, thus
they can deal with the tasks involving their expertise more efficiently
Case No. 154
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Tondo Medical vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for Review on Certiorari on the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals denying a petition for the nullification of
the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the
Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health”. E.O. No. 102
provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational
processes of the DOH. Under this Order, the DOH refocused its mandate
from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific
health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of
basic services to local government units. Petitioners argue that the said
Order should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
function, and that the Order is void, having been issued in excess of the
President’s authority.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 102 was issued by the President
in excess of his authority
Ruling: No. The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct
the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. It
is already stated under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that
“the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices” and in the Administrative Code of 1987 that the “President, in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.”
Moreover, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments mainly tasked
with the functional distribution of the work of the President. To sum, the
President, under the Administrative Code, has the authority to reorganize the
Office of the President and this includes the DOH.
Main Point: The President has the discretion to control the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency. E.O. No. 12 was issued for the changes in the roles,
functions, and organizational processes of the DOH and the President has
the authority to reorganize this Office under the Administrative Code.
Case No. 155
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
Facts: Petitioner seeks to declare Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), entitled,
“Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring its
Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President” as
unconstitutional. Before the said Order, Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
has been issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or head administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption against presidential appointees. On November 15, 2019,
President Benigno Aquino III issued E.O. 13 abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division- Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-
ODESLA).
Issue: Whether or not E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of
the legislature to create a public office
Ruling: No. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It was highlighted in the case of Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora that “the President, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.” It was further highlighted in the case of Domingo v. Zamora “To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies”. Therefore, the abolition of the PAGC
and the transfer of its functions to IAD-ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative
authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to the Administrative Code of
1987.
Main Point: E.O. 13 did not totally abolish PAGC and did not create a new
public office. The Order was only issued for the purpose of Abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to IAD-ODESLA. It was already
mentioned in numerous cases that the President, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, has the authority to reorganize the offices under him in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Case No. 156
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Filling in the Details
Arroyo vs. Department of Justice
Facts: A massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 National elections occurred. On August 2, 2011, the
Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. On August 15, 2011, the
Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team. This was composed
of officials from DOJ and the Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 is unconstitutional as it
violates the principle of separation of powers
Ruling: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Comelec has the power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses. This power is reflected in the
Omnibus Election Code wherein “Comelec has the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same. In the same provision, Comelec is
given the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government, such as the DOJ. The Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team by the Comelec and DOJ was made for the purpose of conducting a
thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the
manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections. In
addition, it was ruled that the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team are
not new public offices, but merely collaborations between two existing
government agencies sharing concurrent jurisdiction. DOJ is tasked to
administer the criminal justice system specifically to “investigate the
commissions of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation
and correction system”. Together with the Comelec, it is undoubtedly that it
is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the Joint Order
which gives the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary
investigation.
Main Point: Joint Order No. 001-2011 did not make a new public office. It’s
simply a collaboration between Comelec and DOJ for the purpose of
conducting a thorough investigation on the electoral fraud that occurred in
the 2004 and 2007 elections. Moreover, the two existing government
agencies share the share concurrent jurisdiction as one has the power to
prosecute election offense and the other is taked to administer the whole
criminal justice system.
Case No. 157
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Undue Delegation of Legislative
Power
People of the Philippines vs. Vera
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng has been convicted under the criminal case
entitled “The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al”.
The information in this criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila on October 15, 1931. The same court convicted the
defendant and sentenced him. The Defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration and four more motions for new trial but were denied.
Thereafter, the defendant sought to have his case elevated on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States but the same was denied. Then
again, the defendant filed a second alternative motion for reconsideration or
new trial and remanded the case to the court of origin. The Defendant
applied for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No.
4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature and claimed that he is innocent.
The CFI of Manila referred his probation application to the Insular Probation
Office which denied the same. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh
branch, presided by Judge Jose Vera, finally set the petition for hearing.
However, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to the respondent. In its supplementary opposition, the private
prosecution elaborated on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221, as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces.
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power
Ruling: Yes. All three branches of the government have their own powers
and responsibilities and each may not escape its duties by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void. However, there are exceptions such as the
Congress has the authority to delegate legislative power to local authorities.
Courts can also delegate legislative power to the people at large and also,
legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. However, this
case does not fall under any of the exceptions. As a rule, an act of the
legislature is incomplete, thus invalid, if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Act No. 4221 does
not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a “roving
commission” as used by Justice Cardozo, which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. To sum, the applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards.
Main Point: Act No. 4221 was declared unconstitutional mainly because the
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely place in the
hands of the provincial boards. The Act itself is incomplete and invalid as it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it
Case No. 158
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Undue Delegation of Legislative
Power
The United States vs. Ancieto Barrias
Facts: Defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of
Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Barrias was navigating the Pasig River by
bamboo poles without steam, sail of any other external power and was liable
under Paragraph 83 where he was liable to a fine of not more than P500, in
the discretion of the court. In Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397, it is clearly
stated that “no heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be
permitted to move in the Pasig River without being tower by steam or moved
by other adequate power.
However, it is stated under Act No. 1136 that the Collector has the authority
to make and publish rules and regulations to carry this law and violators shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment
for not more than six months or by a fine of not more than $100.
The Defendant challenged the validity of Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397
on the grounds that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the
interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are
void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not the authority given to the Collector to carry out the
Circular constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power
Ruling: Yes. The collector cannot impose penalties higher than the penalties
stated under Act No. 1136 and the collector doesn’t have the authority to
charged Barrias of a fine more than 500 pesos under the Circular because
only a fine of not more than $100 dollars is stated under the Act. One of the
settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody
or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
Main Point: Act No. 1136 was already enacted to fine the violator of not more
than $100 and Circular cannot impose penalties higher than the penalties
mentioned in the Act as the legislative power of the Congress cannot be
delegated to anybody. In this case, the Collector has no authority to collect
the penalty higher than the Act as this is an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Case No. 159
Article VI: The Legislative Department: Undue Delegation of Legislative
Power
The United States vs. Adriano Panlilio
Facts: Panlilio was convicted for violating the law relating to the quarantining
of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases
and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40. On February 22, 1913, an
authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture notified the defendant in
writing that all of his carabaos had been exposed to the dangerous and
contagious disease known as rinderpest and that said carabaos should be
duly quarantined in a corral in a barrio in the Province of Pampanga and
were ordered to be kept in the corral and were to remain there until released
by further order of the Director of Agriculture. However, the accused illegally
took the carabaos from the corral while the quarantine was still in force and
together with this servants and agents, took the said carabaos and drove
them from one place to another for the purpose of working them. The
accused raised the defense that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Panlilio is liable for the violation of the order of the
Director of Agriculture
Ruling: No. The defendant did not violate any order of the Bureau of
Agriculture. The only sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibits acts and
pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5 and this case does not fall within
any of them. There is also no section under the Act punishing the violators of
the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture. The Act itself does not prohibit any
act, does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal
penalty. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be
said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statues.
Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way
therein. However, the accused constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph
2, of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violate the regulations,
ordinances, or proclamations issues with reference to any epidemic disease
among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague.
Main Point: The defendant did not violate the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture but he was still sentenced to pay a fine of P14 for the violation of
the Penal Code which punishes any person who violate the regulations with
reference to any epidemic disease among animals. Act No. 1760 does not
prohibit any act nor punish the violator but a law under the Penal Code
punishes the violators, thus the defendant is still liable.
CASE NO. 160
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
People of the Philippines vs. Maceren, M., et. al, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977
FACTS: In 1969, Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were accused of violating Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1 which prohibits any person to engage in
electro fishing in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines. The Fisheries Law
does not expressly punish electro fishing. It only prohibits the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. For this reason, the lower
court dismissed the complaint. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters which was later on amended to
restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries, by promulgating Administrative Order No. 84 and
84-1constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Commissioner of Fisheries constituted an undue delegation of legislative
power as they exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1. Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statue. Promulgating an administrative order penalizing electro fishing is
not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation
was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
MAIN POINT: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries neither can assert issuance of regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of the law nor can state what act constitute
an offense. The former is permitted to carry out issuances provided it
encompasses the law itself. To declare what shall constitute a crime and
how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and
it may not be delegated to any other body or agency.
CASE NO. 161
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
People vs. Dacuycuy, A., et.al., G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989
FACTS: Celestino Matondo, Segundino Caval and Cirilo Zanoria, public
school officials of Leyte, were charged for the violation of Republic Act No.
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. At
the arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the charge and immediately
moved to quash the complaint but the municipal court denied the motion to
quash for lack of merit. The respondents again filed a motion of
reconsideration but with the further allegation that the offense under Section
32 of the the said Act is null and void for being unconstitutional, but then
again this was denied. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and alleged
the additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
since Section 32 of said law is unconstitutional because it imposes a cruel
punishment where the term of imprisonment is unfixed and it also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of the
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.
ISSUE: Whether Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional thus
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the term of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court
RULING: No. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is declared
unconstitutional. Section 32 of the said act also constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power because the term of imprisonment was solely
left to the discretion of the court as if the judicial department is a legislative
department. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the legislature.
MAIN POINT: The discretion of imprisonment delegated by the legislative
body to the court is an undue delegation of power as it defies the rules of the
separation of powers. The legislative body should state a point of reference
on imprisonment.
CASE NO. 162
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Drilon, F., et.al., G.R. No.
82849,
August 2, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu
Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA)
entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering the years 1986 to
1988. The company agrees to grant to all regular covered employees salary
increases. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed
increasing the minimum wage. Additionally, the Secretary of Labor issued
the pertinent rules implementing the provisions of the said Act. Section 8 of
the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary
wage increases negotiated under a CBA against such wage increases
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.
ISSUE: Whether the implementing rules issued constituted an undue
delegation of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. The rules issued by the Secretary of Labor implementing the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6640 constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power. This is in line with the fundamental rule that implementing
rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to
implement and the rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not
contemplated by the law. Moreover, Republic Act No. 6640 or any other law
cannot be expanded by such regulations because an administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.
MAIN POINT: Executive body cannot issue an implementing rule that does
not encompass with the law itself. Administrative Orders should be
consistent with the provisions of the law and not unduly expand it as it is the
sole power of the legislative body to amend a law.
CASE NO. 163
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March
20, 1987
FACTS: Executive Order No. 626 is already an existing law which prohibits
the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos.
The said Executive Order was amended such that it also prohibits the
transportation of carabeef from one province to another. On January 13,
1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo and the said carabaos were confiscated by the police station
commander of Iloilo for violation of Execution Order 626-A. The Petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of the executive order as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. He claimed that it is unconstitutional because the
owner has the right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. More so, he contested that there is an improper
exercise of legislative power from the then President Ferdinand Marcos
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether E.O. No. 626-A, as amended by the former President Ferdinand
Marcos, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Whether the act of the police station commander of Iloilo in confiscating
the carabaos constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
1. Yes. The president can exercise his legislative authority provided that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could in order to meet the exigency, issue decreed, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. In this case, there is
no showing of any exigency to justify the exercises of that power by the
president and the petitioner has the reason to question the validity of the
executive order. This executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment which was carried out
immediately thus denying the petitioner the right to be heard. There are
exceptional cases where the summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only, however, cases are excepted if there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In
this case, no urgency was found.
2. Yes. The act of the police station commander of Iloilo in confiscating the
carabaos constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power. The court
ruled that E.O. No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation should have been
pronounced not by the police but by a court of justice, which alone would
have the authority to impose prescribed penalty, and only after the trial and
conviction of the accused.
MAIN POINT:
1. Instead of merely implementing an existing law, the promulgation of the
amended E.O. No. 626-A by the former president constitute an undue
delegation of power as there is no indication of exigency to justify and
exercise such power.
2. The court and not the police has the sole authority to pronounce and
impose prescribed penalty on the accused for violating E.O. No. 626-A.
 CASE NO. 164
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Pharmaceutical vs. DOH (2007)
FACTS: E.O No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued in 1986 under the freedom
constitution. The order states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112
of the International Code for Marketing of Breastmilk Substitute (ICMBS), a
code adopted by World Health Association (WHA) in 1981. The latter
adopted resolutions in view of the importance of breastfeeding, however
pronounced that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitute. The Philippine consented with the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 duly stated the state parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant mortality, and ensure that all
segments of the society, especially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. Thereafter, in 2006, the Secretary of DOH,
et.al. issued a Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations which was
contested by the petitioner, Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines, representing member of breastmilk substitute manufacturers,
stating that the regulation exceeds the provisions of the Milk Code.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of DOH, et.al., by issuing RIRR constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. The Court partially granted the petition and specified Sections
4(f), 11 and 46 null and void for being ultra vires. It ruled that the
respondents are incapable from implementing such provisions as it amends
and expands the provisions of Milk Code, therefore constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. The Milk Code per se is a verbatim
reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products.
MAIN POINT: Since the provisions of Milk Code does not prohibit the
advertising or promotion to the public of products, therefore, the
respondent’s amendment and expansion of such provisions is an undue
delegation of legislative power.
CASE NO. 165
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Abakada vs. Purisima
FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status. Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents
from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 also invoking their
right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. In addition, petitioners assert that the law
unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks
a sufficient standard on that matter.
ISSUE: Whether there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue
targets to the President.
RULING: No. The determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC. To determine
the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
MAIN POINT: Under jurisprudence, RA 9335 adequately states the policy
and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Therefore,
there is no unduly delegation of power to fix revenue target to the President
as the provisions of RA 9335 expressly stated the guidelines and limitations
of his authority.
CASE NO. 166
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Philippine Coconut vs. Republic, G.R. 178193, January 24, 2012
FACTS: COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be known as the
“Coconut Industry Trust Fund (CITF) for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers,”
with respondent Republic, acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA), as trustee. As proposed, the constitution of the CITF shall be subject
to terms and conditions which, for the most part, reiterate the features of
SMC’s conversion offer, albeit specific reference is made to the shares of the
14 CIIF companies. For consideration is the Urgent Motion to Approve the
Conversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares dated July 24, 2009 (Motion) interposed by petitioners Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc., et al. (collectively, COCOFED).
COCOFED seeks the Court’s approval of the conversion of 753,848,312
Class “A” and Class “B” common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
registered in the names of Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the so-
called “14 Holding Companies” (collectively known as “CIIF companies”) into
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter, the Conversion).
Republic filed its Comment questioning COCOFED’s personality to seek the
Court’s approval of the desired conversion. Respondent Republic also
disputes COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe terms and conditions on
the proposed conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares are
sequestered assets and are in custodia legis under Presidential Commission
on Good Government’s (PCGG’s) administration.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan, with grave abuse of discretion, issued
its Order dated February 20, 2001 enjoining PCGG from voting the
sequestered shares of stock in UCPB.
RULING: No. "Petitioner has failed to make out a case of grave abuse or
excess of jurisdiction in respondents' calling and holding of a stockholders'
meeting for the election of directors as authorized by the Memorandum of
the President * * (to the PCGG) dated June 26, 1986, particularly, where as
in this case, the government can, through its designated directors, properly
exercise control and management over what appear to be properties and
assets owned and belonging to the government itself and over which the
persons who appear in this case on behalf of BASECO have failed to show
any right or even any shareholding in said corporation." This Court holds that
the government should be allowed to continue voting those shares inasmuch
as they were purchased with coconut levy funds – that are prima facie public
in character or, at the very least, are "clearly affected with public interest."
The Court granted PCGG the right to vote the sequestered shares because
they appeared to be "assets belonging to the government itself."
MAIN POINT: Since the sequestered shares appeared to be assets
belonging to the government, therefore, under jurisprudence, PCGG has the
authority of right to vote.
CASE NO. 167
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Executive Misapplication
Tatad v. Secretary DOE, 281 SCRA 330 (1997) and MR 282 SCRA 337
(1997)
FACTS: On December 1992, the Congress created R.A. No. 7638 or the
Department of Energy, to be able to take charge of energy related
government projects. On March 1996, the Congress created the R.A. No.
8180 or Downstream Oil Industry Act of 1996 as a means of deregulating the
downstream oil industry in terms of crude oil and petroleum. Francisco
Tatad, petitions for the annulment of R.A. No. 8180 after the undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
by not providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry. The respondents responded that the said
petitioners have no locus standi, as they did not sustain nor will they sustain
direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180. However, the
Court issued a cease and desist order towards the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
on undue delegation of power.
RULING: No. There were no violations present when considering the
prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power. According to the Court,
determining the validity of the delegation of legislative power would rely on;
first, the completeness and sufficiency test. The purpose of both tests is to
prevent interference with the legislative authority to the delegate and Sec 15
of R.A. 8180 passes both tests by having the proper documents and by
leaving it in the President’s choice as how to deal with it.
MAIN POINT: The Court ruled that there cannot be undue delegation of
power without passing the two tests of validity: completeness and
sufficiency.
 CASE NO. 168
ART. VI, SEC. 1: Legislative Power
Mere Directive
Dagan, W., et.al vs. Philippine Racing Commission, et. al., G.R. 175220,
February 12, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners, William Dagan, et.al. refused to comply with the
directives of Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom) which directed
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to
formulate club house rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) on race
horses. MJCI and PRCI instructed horse owners to submit their race horses
for blood sample and Coggins Test. Copies of guidelines to monitor and
eradicate EIA were issued by Philracom. Petitioners were non-compliant
which made their horses banned from races, non-renewal of their license,
and eviction from stables. They filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) contesting on the implementation of guidelines. The court ruled the
case moot and academic because all horse owners except from Dagan
subjected their horses to the guidelines. Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) yet the decision still affirmed RTC in toto. They filed the case
with the Supreme Court (SC) and contested that Philracom has
unconstitutionally delegated its rule making power to other respondents
MJCI and PRC, however, the court dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether Philracom’s directive is a delegation of its rule making
power to MJCI and PRCI.
RULING: No. Philracom did not delegate rule making power to MJCI and
PRCI in addressing EIA. The directive made was simply to instruct MJCI and
PRCI to manage EIA. The directive given by Philracom is part of the
mandate of MJCI and PRCI under Sections 11 of RA 7953 and Sections 1
and 2 of RA 8407.
MAIN POINT: Since the Philracom’s directive is part of the mandate of MJCI
and PRCI issued by Congress, the directive given by Philracom is merely to
instruct MJCI and PRCI in eradicating EIA. The directive’s validity and
effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental guidelines. Philracom has
every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct
of horse racing, with or without implementing guidelines.
CASE NO. 169
ART. VI, SEC. 3: Qualifications of Senator
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC and Elamparo, G.R. No. 221697, March
8, 2016
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez, G.R. No.
221698-700, March 8, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-LLamanzares ran for
the senatorial election and presidential election in 2012 and in 2016,
respectively. She is the legally adopted daughter of the late presidential
candidate Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and tv personality Susan Sonora Poe.
Prior to the adoption, the petitioner was under the foster care of Edgardo
Militar, her foundling parent. The petitioner is a naturalized American citizen
and is married to Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a Filipino-American
citizen, where she has three children in which two were born in the
Philippines. After her adoptive father died in 2004, she and her husband
decided to permanently reside in the Philippines thereby transferred her
children in Philippine schools, filed an ITR, acquired a home in San Juan
City, and took an oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 9225.
The petitioner was appointed as the Chairman of the MTRCB in 2010.
Before assuming the office, she renunciated her allegiance and citizenship to
United States of America which effected in the same year. In 2013, she filed
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator and in 2016, she also filed
her COC for President. In 2016 election, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition
questioning her citizenship and residency. Likewise, Francisco V. Tatad,
Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez also filed a petition to disqualify
her on the grounds of citizenship, residency, and material misrepresentation.
COMELEC issued a resolution to cancel her COC. Out of the unfavorable
ruling, she filed a petition in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, is
qualified to run for president?
RULING: Yes. The Court reiterated that under the international law,
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth (Article
14, 1930 Hague Convention) and is presumed born of citizens of the country
where the child is found (Article 2, 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness). Foundlings in the Philippines are regarded to have
citizenship. Hence, if the foundling is presumed natural-born Filipino citizen
and wants to repatriate in the Philippines, he may reacquire his natural-born
status under R.A. 9225.
MAIN POINT: Under jurisprudence, foundlings have the right for citizenship
on the country of birth or of which she is found, thus qualifies the Poe-
Llamanzares as a candidate for presidential election.
CASE NO.170
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC GR 147589
FACTS: On March 26, 2001, the COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 approving the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
petition before the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
RULING:
1. Yes. Under the RA 7941, Section 3, "party" is defined as "either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution also provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations." Therefore private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties.
2. No. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party—or any organization or group for that
matter—may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system as laid down
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Party-List System Act (RA
7941).
MAIN POINT: The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit
those who have less in life and is not exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations. Political parties may participate
in the party-list elections but must still be consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system.
CASE NO.171
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system.
Petitioners filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." They
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, thus additional representatives shall be
proclaimed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the constitutional provision under Section 5 (2),
Article VI which provides twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives is mandatory.
RULING: No. The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
MAIN POINT: The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives.
CASE NO.172
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
AKLAT v. COMELEC
FACTS: On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-
qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004
elections. The COMELEC dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be
considered as an organization representing the marginalized and
underrepresented groups.
According to the COMELEC, Aklat’s statement that it has re-organized itself
does not cure this defect as "there is nothing in the petition which will help us
identify what particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is
now representing."
ISSUES: Whether AKLAT’S candidacy is consistent with the purpose of a
party-list system for it to be qualified in the election.
RULING: No. In Bagong Bayani case, the court set guidelines for screening
party-list participants, i.e., that "the political party, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of R.A. The court held that an organization, for it to
qualify as a representative of marginalized and underrepresented group
must show—through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record—that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
The general averments contained Aklat’s articles of incorporation in that it
supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the youth, indigenous
communities, urban poor and farmers/fisher folk but these do not measure
up to the purpose of the party-list system.
MAIN POINT: The purpose of party-list system is to represent and seek to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
CASE NO.173
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC
FACTS: Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent
COMELEC regarding the formula to be adopted in computing the additional
seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioners
assert that they are entitled to additional on seat each in the House of
Representatives.
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the way the
Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in
Ang Bagong Bayani.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting the simplified formula of
"one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes."
The resolution reads: Considering that the simplified formula has long been
the one adopted by the Commission and is now the formula of choice of the
Supreme Court in its latest resolution on the matter, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one
additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the
proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming May 10, 2004 National
and Local Elections.
ISSUES: Whether petitioners are entitled to one additional seat each.
RULING: No. The ruling in the above-mentioned case expressly qualified as
pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It
was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November
20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been
abandoned.
Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass
Report, the COMELEC do not find petitioners entitled to any additional seat.
MAIN POINT: A party-list only entitled to one additional seat each only if
shall reach the required two percent mark of the total votes provided that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
CASE NO.174
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Citizens v. COMELEC
FACTS: After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS
ranked second among all the party-list candidates and were allocated two
seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee,
Rep. Kho. Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative
which was followed by a board resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such
resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement made between
the nominees of the party-list. However COMELEC refused to recognize the
term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho.
The term of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of
private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared,
apportioned or be made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC
resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-list. On
December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior
Citizens and directed COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in
the printing of official ballots for the May 2013 elections. The party-list won
one seat in the HOR. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was
in order. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner’s term-sharing is valid.
RULING: No. COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-
sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The
COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication
that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court,
the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-
implementation of the agreement. Having established that the COMELEC En
Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled
to be proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently
concluded May 13, 2013 elections.
MAIN POINT: There can be no term-sharing in holding a seat in the party-list
system. There can only be two representatives when the party-list wins
additional seat.
CASE NO.175
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Bantay v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners Bantay and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms seek to
cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to some party-list
groups set to run on the forthcoming May 2007 elections on the ground that
these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
They assailed that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it granted the assailed accreditations even without simultaneously
determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are
qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in
Congress prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani
case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees."
ISSUES: Whether it is necessary that not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees.
RULING: No. Petitioners’ posture that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without
basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification
of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation
of an organization.
MAIN POINT: It is not necessary that the nominees of a party-list must
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
CASE NO.176
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Phil. Guardians v. COMELEC
FACTS: The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition
for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar
as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These
resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List
System Act, COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party, may
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to
participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered PGBI; it
was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections.
ISSUES: Whether PGBI can still participate in the elections.
RULING: Yes. In an exercise as important as an election, the COMELEC
cannot make a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect
everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced
declaration

An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of
free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them; the party-list
system, in the words of Ang Bagong Bayani–OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC,24 affords them this choice, as it gives the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in governance.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the COMELEC took this freedom of choice away and
effectively disenfranchised the members of the sector that PGBI sought to
represent when it did not include PGBI in the list of qualified parties vying for
a seat under the party-list system of representation.
MAIN POINT: The purpose of party-list system is to represent and seek to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors and the courts protect this
purpose.
CASE NO.178
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Abayon v. COMELEC
FACTS: Respondents Lucaban, Jr., Dela Cruz, Doroga, all registered voters,
filed a petition for quo warranto with against Aangat Tayo and its nominee,
petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a
party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. They also pointed out she did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the
wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. Petitioner Abayon
countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list
organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and
elderly and that she belonged to the women sector.
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1)
members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
MAIN POINT: Sectoral parties or organizations may participate in the party-
list elections but not the religious sector.

CASE NO.177
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
BANAT v. COMELEC
FACTS: In the May 2007 elections, the COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as
quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans
case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contends that Article VI Section 5
(2) should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for
certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Article VI Section 5 (2) of the Constitution mandatory.
RULING: No. The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated
in Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third,
the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
MAIN POINT:
Four parameters of the Philippine party-list system:
1. the twenty percent (20%) allocation
2. the two percent (2%) threshold
3. the three-seat limit
4. proportional representation
Petitioner Palparan, Jr. on the other hand is the first nominee of the Bantay
party-list group. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible
to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented or sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
ISSUES: Whether Abayon and Palparan are qualified to represent a party-
list group
RULING: Yes. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a
"bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests
that they presumably embody.
MAIN POINT: There is no qualification as to the nominees of the party-list
but only the as to the party-list that it represents.
CASE NO.179
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives;
Apportionment; Party List, Par. 2
Layug v. COMELEC
FACTS: Rolando D. Layug, in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned
citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating
in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He
argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere "extension of the El Shaddai," which
is a religious sect. In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike
claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party
possessing all the qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for
the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the
professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented elderly group.
ISSUES: Whether Buhay Party-List belongs to a religious sector.

RULING: No. Article VI. Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts