[2019] 1 LNS 423 Legal Network Series

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR

(BAHAGIAN RAYUAN DAN KUASA-KUASA KHAS)

[PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO: WA-25-186-

07/2018]

Dalam Perkara Seksyen 108, 110,

112, 114 dan 116 Akta Perlindungan
Pengguna 1999 dan Peraturan 23(5)
Peraturan-Peraturan Perlindungan
Pengguna (Tribunal Tuntutan
Pengguna) 1999

Dan

Dalam Perkara Award Tribunal

Tuntutan Pengguna di Kuala
Lumpur dan Tuntutan No. TTPM-
WP-(P)-319-2018 bertarikh
12.07.2018

Dan

Dalam Perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-

Kaedah Mahkamah 2012

Dan

Dalam Perkara Aturan 92, Kaedah 4,

Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012

ANTARA

FAIRVIEW SCHOOLS BERHAD … PEMOHON

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DAN

1. JASVINDAR KAUR KARTAR SINGH

2. DALJIT SINGH KARPAL SINGH
3. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA MALAYSIA
… RESPONDEN-
RESPONDEN

JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1] This is the applicant’s judicial review application against the

award of the Consumer Claims Tribunal, the 3 rd respondent
dated 12.7.2018 which is in favour of the 1 st and 2 nd respondent.

[2] The applicant is a company that runs educational institutions

known as Fairview International School (FIS) located at several
states in Malaysia including at Wangsa Maju, Kuala Lumpur.
FIS provides the British curriculum education using the
International Baccalaureate Methodology.

[3] The 1 st and 2 nd respondents are parents of 3 students who studied

at FIS campus in Kuala Lumpur. They are Samerjit Singh,
Amrita Kaur and Sahiljit Singh.

Salient Facts

[4] The material facts in this application are the following :

(i) In the year 2010, the 1 st and 2 nd respondents registered

their children, Samerjit Singh and Amrita Kaur with FIS,
Kuala Lumpur. In this regard, both respondents has filled

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up and signed the student application form for the said

registration.

(ii) Amongst the terms and conditions stipulates in the

application forms are with regard to the tuition and fees
which are as follows :

“SECTION A: TUITION AND OTHER FEES

1. All fees must be paid within 10 days of

commencemet of each term, without exception;

2. A late-payment charge of RM200 per bill will

be imposed if there is delay in payment of fees
after the 10 th day of commencement of each
term;

3. If there is delay in payment of fees after

commencement of each term the School may
suspend the student concerned on the 20 th day
onwards until fill payment is made and penalty
charge of RM500 will be imposed on that
student;

4. If there is delay in payment of fees the School

may terminate the enrolment of the student
concerned on the 30 th day of commencement of
each term if full payment is not made and
forfeit the security deposit.

5. The School may at its sole discretion issue

reminders and warning letters on the non -
payment of fees but the requirement to make
payment of fees within the time stipulated

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remains whether or not there is a reminder

notice sent by the school.

6. School fees paid are neither refundable nor

transferable.”

(iii) In both the application forms, the 1 st and 2 nd respondents

affirmed that they have read, understood the terms and
conditions contained in the application forms and agree to
be bound by those terms and conditions.

(iv) Initially, the respondents’ children were under the

Cambridge IGSE O-levels programme but later in 2012, it
was converted to the International Baccalaureate
Programme.

(v) Next, on 29.11.2017, the applicant has issued its invoice

for student fees to the 1 st respondent for the second
semester of the 2017/2018 academic year for both Samerjit
Singh and Amrita Kaur. The amount of RM43,000.00 was
then paid to the applicant by cheque.

(vi) However, the applicant later discovered that there was a

shortfall of RM4,000.00 in the fees of Samerjit Singh. The
applicant then issued a notice by letter dated 25.1.2018 to
the 1 st respondent asking for the outstanding fees of
RM4,000.00 and penalty of late payment in the sum of
RM200.00. In the same letter the applicant reminded 1 st
respondent that Samerjit Singh may be suspended if
payment of the said outstanding fees and penalty was not
made.

(vii) As the 1 st or 2 nd respondent has not made the payment as

demanded, the applicant issued another notice by letter

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dated 26.2.2018 to the 1 st respondent. This notice among

others demanded the outstanding fees of RM4,500.00
inclusive of the RM500.00 for late payment. On 28.3.2018,
the 1 st respondent only paid the sum of RM4,000.00 to the
applicant and an official receipt was issued by the
applicant.

(viii) On 30.4.2018, the 1 st and 2 nd respondents filed a complaint

with the 3 rd respondent seeking for the refund of the said
sum of RM4,000.00 from the applicant. The ground for the
refund is that the said amount was for expedition fees and
the 1 st and 2 nd respondents did not want to send their
children for the said expedition.

(ix) After having heard evidence from both parties, on

12.7.2018 the President of the 3 rd respondent ordered the
amount of RM4,000.00 to be refunded to the 1 st and 2 nd
respondents and amongst the reasons given by the
President are the following :

(a) the expedition has no benefit to the students

and did not agree with such requirement for a
student to participate in the expedition.

(b) the expedition fee does not form part of the

terms and conditions of enrolment with FIS.

(c) the applicant failed to show that sufficient steps

had been taken for the safety of the students
participating in the expedition.

(x) Dissatisfied with the award by the President of the 3 rd

respondent, the applicant file this judicial review
application.

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The Grounds For The Judicial Review

[5] The appellant’s grounds for this judicial review application are
the following :

(i) the 3 rd respondent has no jurisdiction to hear the

respondents’ claim as the Consumer Protection Act 1999
(CPA 1999) is not applicable to dispute involving private
education institutions which come under the jurisdiction of
the Education Act 1966.

(ii) the 3 rd respondent committed an error of law and facts :

(a) in accepting the hearsay and unsubstantiated

evidence of the respondents.

(b) in rejecting the evidence produced by the applicant

during the hearing and failed to take into account the
same.

(c) in deciding that the burden of proof is on the

applicant to prove its Standard Operating Procedure
in previous expeditions.

(iii) the 3 rd respondent has acted in contravention of the CPA

1999.

(iv) the 3 rd respondent has deprived the applicant’s right to be

heard and acted against the principles of natural justice.

(v) the 3 rd respondent has failed to take into account relevant

considerations which among others are as follows :

(a) Samerjit Singh and Amrita Kaur had previously

participated in the FIS expeditions without any
complaint.

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(b) All students from grade 6 onwards are required to

participate in expeditions as it is a compulsory
component of the curriculum and for end year
assessments.

(c) All fees are to be paid without exception as stipulates

in the terms and conditions of the students enrolment
application.

Findings Of This Court

[6] The principle of law with regard to judicial review is well

settled that the court may grant an application for judicial
review if the decision made is tainted with illegality,
irrationality or procedure impropriety.

[7] There are plethora of cases on this and one of which is the
Federal Court case of Akira Sales & Service (M) Sdn Bhd v.
Nadiah Lee bt. Abdullah and another appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 537,
which adopted the principles of judicial review application in R.
Ramachandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor
[1997] 1 MLJ 145 which states the following:

“[45] In the same appeal, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ (Eusoff

Chin in agreement) said that an award could be reviewed
for substance as well as for process:

‘It is often said that judicial review is concerned not

with the decision but the decision making process .
(See e.g. Chief Constable of North Wales Police v.
Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155). This proposition, at full
face value, may well convey the impression that the
jurisdiction of the courts in Judicial Review
proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved

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party has not received fair treatment by the authority

to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in
the words of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service
Unions & Ors v. Minister for the Civil Service
[1985] AC 374, where the impugned decision is
flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety.

But Lord Diplock’s other grounds for impugning a

decision susceptible to Judicial Review make it
abundantly clear that such a decision is also open a
challenge on grounds of ‘illegality’ and
‘irrationality’ and, in practice, this permits the
courts to scrutinise such decisions not only for
process, but also for substance.

In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock

(at pp 410-411) defined the three grounds of review,
to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, a nd (iii)
procedural impropriety. This is how he put it :

By ‘illegality’ as a ground for Judicial Review,

I mean that the decision maker must understand
correctly the law that regulates his decision
making power and must give effect to it.
Whether he has or not is par excellence a
justiciable question to be decided, in the event
of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by
whom the judicial power of the state is
exercisable.

By ‘irrationality’, I mean what can by now be

succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury
unreasonableness’ (see Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp.

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[1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision

which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible
person who had applied his mind to the
question to be decided could have arrived at it.
Whether a decision falls within this category is
a question that judges by their training and
experience should be well equipped to answer,
or else there would be something badly wrong
with our judicial system. To justify the courts’
exercise of this role, resort I think is today no
longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious
explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC
14, or irrationality as a ground for a court’s
reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an
inferred though undefinable mistake of law by
the decision maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can
stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on
which a decision may be attacked by Judicial
Review.

I have described the third head as ‘ procedural

impropriety’ rather than failure to observe
basic rules of natural justice or failure to act
with procedural fairness towards the person
who will be affected by the decisions. This is
because susceptibility to judicial review under
this head covers also failure by an
administrative tribunal to observe procedural
rules that the expressly laid down in the
legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction

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is conferred, even where such failure does not

involve any denial of natural justice.

Lord Diplock also mentioned ‘proportionality’ as a

possible fourth ground of review which called for
development.”

[8] Further, a decision which involves an error of law is subject to

judicial review as explained by the Federal Court in Majlis
Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama
Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor [1993] 3 MLJ 1, where it states :

“In our view, therefore, unless there are special

circumstances governing a particular case,
notwithstanding a privative clause, of the ‘not to be
challenged, etc’ kind, judicial review will lie to impeach
all errors of law made by an administrative body or
tribunal and, we would add, inferior courts. In the words
of Lord Denning in Pearlman v. Harrow School (ibid) at p
70, ‘...no court or tribunal has any jurisdiction to make
an error of law on which the decision in the case
depends. If it makes such an error, it goes outside its
jurisdiction and certiorari will lie to correct it .”

[9] The meaning or error of law has also been explained in the case
of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan v. Transport Workers
Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317 in the following words:

“It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an

exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law ,
for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it
may be said that an error of law would be disclosed if the
decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or takes
into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take

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into account relevant considerations (what may be

conveniently termed an Anisminic error) or if he
misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or
misapplies or misstates a principle of the general law .”

[10] Next, in a judicial review, the test applicable is the objective

test as was held by the Federal Court in the case of Titular
Ruman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v. Menteri Dalam
Negeri & Ors [2014] 4 MLJ 765 as follows :

“(1) (per Arifin Zakaria Chief Justice) It is trite that the

test applicable in judicial review now is the
objective test. In considering whether the Court of
Appeal had applied the correct test, it is pertinent to
consider the whole body of the judgments of the
judges of the Court of Appeal and not by merely
looking at the terms used in the judgments The courts
will give great weight to the views of the Executi ve
on matters of national security. The Court of Appeal
had applied the objective test in arriving at its
decision. Had it applied the subjective rest, it would
not be necessary for it to consider the substance of
the first respondent’s decision.”

[11] Before I deal with the merits of this judicial review application,
it is important to deal with the preliminary issue raised by the
applicant in relation to the jurisdiction of the 3 rd respondent to
hear the respondents’ claim.

[12] The applicant contends that the provisions of CPA 1999 is not
applicable in the respondents’ claim by virtue of subsection
2(2)(e) of CPA 1999 which states :

“(2) This Act shall not apply –

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(a) to securities as defined in the *Securities

Industry Act 1983 [Act 280];

(b) to futures contracts as defined in the *Futures

Industry Act 1993 [Act 499];

(c) to contracts made before the date on which this

Act comes into operation;

(d) in relation to land or interests in land except as

may be expressly provided in this Act;

(e) to services provided by professionals who are

regulated by any written law; and

(f) to healthcare services provided or to be

provided by healthcare professionals or
healthcare facilitie.”

[13] In relation to this, the applicant submitted that since the

applicant is an international school which is governed by the
Education Act 1966, subsection 2(2)(e) is applicable. As such,
the 3 rd respondent has no jurisdiction to hear the respondents’
claim against the applicant.

[14] The applicant cited the High Court case of Tenby World Sdn Bhd
v. Soh Chong Wan & Anor [2013] 10 CLJ 822 to support its
contention.

[15] The main issue here is whether the aplicant’s services is services
provided by professionals who are regulated by any written law
as envisaged by subsection 2(2)(e) of CPA 1999.

[16] On this issue, I am of the view that the applicant and it staffs
which includes the teachers are not professionals who are
regulated by written law unlike lawyers, doctors and engineers.

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Education Act 1966 does not regulate teachers in comparison

with for example Legal Professional Act 1976 which governs
and regulate lawyers.

[17] On the same issue, I am in agreement with the reasoning by the

judge in Fairview International School Subang Sdn Bhd v.
Tribunal Pengguna Malaysia & Anor [2015] 1 CLJ 224, which
states that the CPA 1999 contemplated the professionals must
directly engaged in a contract for service with the consumer and
not those hired under contract of service with the employer and
in turn contracted with the consumer.

[18] As in the present case, the teachers are employees of the

applicant by a contract of service and there is no contract for
service with the 1 st and 2 nd respondents.

[19] Hence, subsection 2(2)(e) of CPA 1999 is not applicable in the

present case and therefore the 3 rd respondent has the jurisdiction
to hear the 1 st and 2 nd respondents’ claim.

[20] Moving on to the merits of the judicial review application,

firstly, it is undisputed facts that the 1 st and 2 nd respondents has
signed the application forms enrolling their two children with
FIS, Kuala Lumpur. In the said forms, both 1 st and 2 nd
respondents affirmed that they have read and understood the
terms and conditions therein and agree to be bound by the terms
and conditions.

[21] Clearly, there is a binding agreement between 1 st and 2 nd

respondents with the applicant and as alluded to earlier, the term
among others is for 1 st and 2 nd respondents to pay all their
children fees without delay. Paragraph 1 of Section A states that
all fees must be paid without exception. The terms also allow

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the applicant to impose a late payment charge of RM200.00 or a

penalty charge of RM500.00 for the late payment.

[22] In the circumstances, it is the duty of this court to give effect to

the terms agreed by parties in this case.

[23] In this regard, it is also instructive to make reference to the

recent Federal Court case of CIMB Bank Bhd v. Anthony
Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2019] 2 CLJ 1, which states the
following :

“[26] We agree with the defendant that parties are bound

by the terms of the contract which they entered into and
that it is the court’s duty to give effect to the clear and
plain meaning of the words in the said clause . That is
quite trite.

[27] The law recognises the principle of freedom of

contract. Parties to a contract are free to determine for
themselves what their obligations are. As Sir George
Jassel MR said in Printing and Numerical Registering
Company v. Sampson [1875] LR 19 Eq 462 at 465:

‘....men of full age and competent understanding

shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that
their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be
enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore you have
this paramount public policy to consider – that you
are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of
contract’.

[28] It is also trite that an agreement must be construed

by the words used in the agreement and the court is not

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empowered to improve upon the instrument which it is

called upon to construct. This we have stated in Berjaya
Times Square Sdn Bhd v. M Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ
269; [2010] 1 MLJ 597 where it was reiterated :

‘The court has no power to improve upon the

instrument which it is called upon to construct,
whether it be a contract, a statute or article of
association. It cannot introduce terms to make it
fairer or more reasonable. However, that meaning is
not necessarily or always what the authors or parties
to the document would have intended. It is the
meaning to a reasonable person having all the
background knowledge which would reasonable be
available to the audience to whom the instrument is
addressed; See Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd
v. West Bromwich Building Society. It is this
objective meaning which is conventionally called the
intention of the parties, or the intention of
Parliament or the intention of whatever person or
body was or is deemed to have been the author of the
instrument’.

[29] The House of Lords in Investors Compensation

Scheme Limited v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998]
1 WLR 896 had observed:

‘The ‘rule’ that words should be given their ‘natural

and ordinary meaning’ reflects the common sense
proposition that we do not easily accept that people
have made linguistic mistikes, particularly in formal
documents. On the other hand, if one were to
nevertheless conclude from the background that

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something must have gone wrong with the language,

the law does not require judges to attribute to the
prties an intention, which they plainly not have
had’.”

[24] In the circumstances, I find, the President of the 3 rd respondent

has failed to take into consideration this issue of binding
agreement by parties in arriving to her decision.

[25] Further, the President’s decision in ordering the applicant to

refund the RM4,000.00 ia also against the term of the agreement
which provides :

“6. School fees paid are neither refundable nor

transferable.”

[26] The contention that the 1 st and 2 nd respondent were forced to pay
the expedition’s fee as their children will be suspended is
without merit as payment of fees as mentioned earlier, is the
terms in the enrolment application agreed by parties. The terms
also allows student to be suspended if the fees is not paid.

[27] Aside from this, the expeditions are an integral and compulsory
part of International Baccalaureate Methodology as explained by
the applicant’s Academic Director in his evidence before the 3 rd
respondent and all students are required to participate in their
expeditions for end year assessments.

[28] Furthermore, FIS has carried out successfully this expeditions

programme for the past 11 years and more that 600 students had
participated in the expeditions including Samerjit Singh who has
attended 2 previous expeditions and Amrita Kaur who has
participated in 3 expeditions. More importantly, there was no

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complaint made by the 1 st or 2 nd respondent with regard the

previous expeditions programme in particular on safety issue.

[29] In an email from the 2 nd respondent to the applicant dated

24.1.2018, 2 nd respondent informed the applicant that his
children will not be joining the expedition only because every
time they come back from expedition programme, they will get
very sick. However this reason was never brought to the
applicant before although Samerjit Singh and Amrita Kaur have
attended the expeditions several time.

[30] The 1 st and 2 nd respondents has also raised an issue that they
were not given the choice but to accept the conversion of their
children’s programme from IGSE O-Level to International
Baccalaureate Methodology which includes the expedition
programme. This contention is untenable as the documentary
evidence, which is the replyslip dated 23.4.2012 signed by both
1 st and 2 nd respondents, has shown that they have agreed to the
International Baccalaureate programme for their children.

[31] The President of 3 rd respondent also has taken into account the
alleged complaints to the 1 st and 2 nd respondents by their
children regarding the previous expeditions such as the
following :

(i) students were not fully supervised by the applicant.

(ii) students were allowed to associates with different genders

without reasonable monitoring.

(iii) Samerjit Singh was traumatized during his expedition to

Bangkok as his room mate has done the following acts :

(a) has started to jump on his bed;

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(b) waked up Samerjit Singh during the middle of night

as he claims that he could see some imaginary
objects;

(c) laughed out loud during middle of the night; and

(d) switched off the lights while Samerjit Singh was

taking his shower in the morning.

[32] The evidence mentioned above is clearly hearsay evidence as

Samerjit Singh himself did not testify relating to these incidents
which were said to happened in Bangkok, Thailand. As such,
this evidence should have been rejected.

[33] On this hearsay issue, the Federal Court in Leong Hong Khie v.
PP and Tan Gong Wai v. PP [1986] 2 MLJ 206 explained as
follows :

“This statement has been accepted by the Privy Council in

Mawaz Khan v. The Queen and Ratten v. The Queen. In
Ratten case Lord Wilberforce said at page 387:

‘A question of hearsay only arises when the words

spoken are relied on testimonially, i.e. as
establishing some facts narrated by the words’.

The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor appeared to have

conceded that all the statements allegedly made by the
informers to P.W.1 (which we have underlined) were to be
regarded as hearsay but he argued before the lea rned
judge and repeated the same argument before us that he
sought to have these statements admitted although both
these informers were not called as prosecution witnesses,
not to prove the truth of their contents but the fact that
they were made. The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor

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purported to rely on the Subramaniam case (supra). In our

opinion, the general proposition laid down by the Privy
Council in that case must be read subject to this
condition, viz, that the statement must be directly relevant
in considering the state of mind of the witness to whom it
had been made. In other words, the proposition could
only apply when the mental state of the witness evidenced
by the statement was itself directly in issue at the trial .
What a witness said or heard said might well be the best
and most direct evidence of that witness’s state of mind.
Support for this very restricted construction may be found
in the Subramaniam case (supra) where the Privy Council
said at page 222 :

‘The fact that the statement was made, quite apart

from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering
the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness
or of some other person in whose presence the
statement was made. In the case before their
Lordships statements could have been made to the
appellant by the terrorists, which, whether true or
not, if they had been believed by the appellant, might
reasonably have induced in him an apprehension of
instant death if he failed to conform to their wishes’.

Now, what was the purpose of introducing these statements

allegedly made by the informers to P.W.1 on April 15,
1981, April 16, 1981 and April 18, 1981?The learned
Deputy Public Prosecutor had given his reasons for doing
so and we need not repeat them. Suffice for us to say that
in out opinion, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor had
failed to satisfy this strict test laid down in Subramanian
case (supra). Since the mental state of both the appellants

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was not in issue at the trial, this condition had not b een
satisfied. Having failed to comply with this requirement,
in our judgment, all the statements allegedly made by the
informers to P.W.1 (which we have conveniently
emphasised) are to be treated as hearsay evidence and
therefore inadmissible in law. They ought to have been
rejected by the learned judge.”

[34] In addition, all parents have been informed by the applicant the
details of the expedition and were invited for a briefing with
regard to the expedition. This is supported by the documents
which the applicant intended to tender as exhibits. However the
3 rd respondent refused to admit these documents which would be
able to prove among others, that parents were invited for the
said briefing. This again is an error of law as the documents
which are relevant to the case before the 3 rd respondent should
have been admitted as evidence.

[35] It is also not the burden of the applicant to prove that a Standard
Operating Procedure has been put in place as there was no
complaint on safety issue raised by any party with regard to the
expeditions carried out by the applicants. The applicant has also
appointed teachers to supervise students in the expedition
programme.

[36] Further, the President of the 3 rd respondent’s findings that the

expedition programme by the applicant is not beneficial to the
students is against the weight of evidence and unsubstantiated in
light of the evidence given by the applicant’s Academic Director
and other documentary evidence before the 3 rd respondent.

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Conclusion

[37] Based on the aforesaid reasons, I find, the decision of President

of the 3 rd respondent is tainted with errors of law, serious
irregularities, and unreasonableness that warrants the curial
intervention of this court.

[38] As such, the applicant’s application for judicial review is

allowed and the 3 rd respondent’s decision is set aside.

[39] The 1 st and 2 nd respondents are to pay a total costs of

RM5,000.00 to the applicant and costs is subject to payment of
allocator fee.

Dated: 14 JANUARY 2019

(NORDIN HASSAN)
Judge
High Court Special And Appellate Powers
Kuala Lumpur High Court

COUNSEL:

For the applicant - Jessica Binwani & Ramitra R; M/s Kanesh

Sundrum & Co
Advocates & Solicitors
Unit 13A-3A, Menara Sentral Vista
No. 150, Jalan Sultan Abdul Samad
Brickfields
50470 Kuala Lumpur.

For the respondents - AMBBI Balakrishnan; M/s Shukor Baljit &

Partners

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Advocates & Solicitors

No. 14-2, Wisma Shukor Baljit
Jalan 13/48A, Sentul Raya Boulevard
Off Jalan Sentul
51000 Kuala Lumpur.

Case(s) referred to:

Akira Sales & Service (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Lee bt. Abdullah and
another appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 537

R. Ramachandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997]

1 MLJ 145

Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama -sama

Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor [1993] 3 MLJ 1

Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan v. Transport Workers Union

[1995] 2 MLJ 317

Titular Ruman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v. Menteri

Dalam Negeri & Ors [2014] 4 MLJ 765

Tenby World Sdn Bhd v. Soh Chong Wan & Anor [2013] 10 CLJ 822

Fairview International School Subang Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Pengguna

Malaysia & Anor [2015] 1 CLJ 224

CIMB Bank Bhd v. Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2019] 2 CLJ 1

Leong Hong Khie v. PP and Tan Gong Wai v. PP [1986] 2 MLJ 206

Legislation referred to:

Legal Professional Act 1976

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